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Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mdthode. by errata led to ent jne pelure, apon d 1 2 3 32X 1 2 3 4 5 6 -i -^- J, A TREATISE ox Till-; LAW OF EVIDENCE Ay ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND ; WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM SCOTCH, INDIAN, AMERICAN, AND OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS. BY HIS HONOUR THE LATE JUDGE PHT TAYLOR. Ilinth (Ebition (in I'ART BK-WBITTK.n) By G. PITT-LEWIS, Q.C. Mitlj ilotfs as to Amrrican ICalrr By CHARLES F. CHAMBERLAYNE. in two \()lu.mks. Vol. 1. LONDON : SWEET AND MAXWELL, Ln.., :{, CHANCERY LANE. P.OSTON, MASS. : THE BOSTON BOOK COMl'ANY. TORONTO : THE CARSWELL Co. Ltd., LAW ITTHLISIIERS, Etc IH97. TAVLO^^K-, N( Copyriijht, 1897, By The Boston Book Company. Entered according to Act of the Parliament of Cabida, in the year one ttiousand eight hundred and ninety-seven, by Swzet & Max- well, Ltd., in the Office of the Minister of Agr.'ulture. wark (€'iiniuliiin KtlitloiO by tli«^ <'iirHW<*ll «'«>. Mil., .lit A<li-lnl<l«' Hi. r.. PREFACE. The text of the last Edition of Taylor on Evidence consisted of 1,600 pages; the present Edition has been ::»riiirtr»rl l-v»-» i?._. Note to Canadian Edition . Owing to some omissions of the London Edition, from the Boston Edition, the paghiation in this Edition is, in some cases, duplicated, as follows : — Mr. G. Pitt-Lewis' Preface and Contents to London Edition, pages i-xiv. Table of Statutes Cited, Rules and Forms of Supreme Court, 1883, Cited, Addenda and Errata, pages ccxviiccxliii. The above are inserted at the beginning of First Volume, Appendix pages i-xi in Second Volume before the Index. The CARSWELL CO., Ltd., Printers. \^»-t'i»J ** AiiV^lJ. f '^X have elapsed since the last Edition have, it is hoped, all been noted up in their respective places. Moreover, it is believed that no legal proposition, which is still accu- rate, haa been excised. In consequence of the great use which is made of tlie Work in the United States and in Canada, and of the growing importance of the decisions in the Courts of those countries which are required for citation in the Courts there, but are not expected to be cited in England TAYLOR Entered according to Act of the Parliament of Canada, in Uie year one tliousand eigbt liundred end ninety-seven, by Sw2et & Max- well, Ltd., in tliG Oillcnof the Minister of Agriuiture, PrrHMvorkMnniuliaii Kdilioiit b> the « nrHwt'lTT <t. l.l.lT^so AdHI^- hi. f PEEFACE. The text of the last Edition of Taylor on Evidence consisted of 1,600 pages; the present Edition has been reduced by nearly one fourth of this bulk, and only contains 1,234 pages of Text. The general arrange- ment of the Work and Index has not been altered. The Editor has, however, in one solitary instance, ventured to throw two chapters into one (the chapters contained in former Editions on the Best Evidence and on Secondary Evidence now forming only one chapter, treating of the general rule that the best evidence of which a case is capable must always be produced) ; and he has also amplified the "Summary" into an Analysis which clearly brings out the completeness with which the Author mapped out in this Work the whole of the Law of Evidence. The decisions and enactments of the ten years which have elapsed since the last Edition have, it is hoped, all been noted up in their respective places. Moreover, it is believed that no legal proposition, which is still accu- rate, has been excised. In consequence of the great use which is made of the Work in the United States and in Canada, and of the growing importance of the decisions in the Courts of those countries which are required for citation in the Courts there, but are not expected to be cited in England IV PREFACE. (seo per C. A., 33 S. J. at p. 419), it is proposed to pub- lish an American Edition of the Work corresponding to the present (9th) Edition, and containing, in addition, notes by an American Editor. American decisions have accordingly been more sparingly cited in the present Edition of the Work than they would otherwise have been, and, in fact, few now American cases have been cited at all, except when they oitlicr are rulings of the Sm)reme Court of New York, or are of value to com- parative jurisprudence by containing the present view in America on points which have been (and therefore may be again) on subjects on which English decisions have not always been the same, or relate to matters of import- ance which appear to be likely to arise in actual practice, but are not yet covered by any English authority. The principal Irish decisions have, it is believed, been referred to. At the same time, in citing in England the decisions of Irish Courts, it must be kept in mind that these, though entitled to the highest respect, are not binding on English Judges, as was pointed out by Kay, J., in Re Parsons, 45 Ch. D, at p. 62. The necessity for the amendment of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases, by permitting accused persons and their wives and husbands to give evidence, has, for some time past, been a matter upon which the great body of English lawyers have been h& much agreed as it was, subsequently to the writings of Bentham, with regard to the propriety of that corresponding amendment in the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, which has long ago been made, and has of late years been so greatly developed. In the event of an identical, or similar, and much-needed reformation of the Law of Evidence f PREFACE. V in Criminal Cases hcln^ effected by any Act of Parlia- ment dealing exclusively with the su))ject, and passed before the present Edition of tliis Work becomes sub- stantially exhausted, a Supplement to this Edition will be published containing such Act, with appropriate explana- tions and notes, and so written that it can be interleaved in copies of this Edition in its proper place (between pages 894 and 895) without in any way making the present text either inconsistent or incoherent. It has been thought well to make the Work one only dealing with the substantive Law of Evidence, and to eliminate so much of it as related to mere details of practice. The long intervals which, of necessity, elapse between the various Editions of such a Work, alone appear to call for, and to justify, this course. y te In the Table of Cases referenros have, at a great expenditure of labour, been, for the tirst time, furnished to evert/ Report of each case which c; j ascertained to exist, including the first 20 vols, of evised Reports; to give all these references in the fooiuote, each time a case is cited, makes a very serious demand upon space, the extent of which will be realised by supposing the not improbable case of a modern decision of import- ance being reported in six different Reports, and being cited six times. For these reasons, in the citation of cases in the footnotes no references have been given to those Reports in which they are to be found. An addi- tional reason for this course is, that a footnote, in which Reports are referred to, is, if it omits a reference to the particular Reports which the reader chances to possess (an omission especially likely to occur in the case of a ▼1 PREFACE, country practitioner), of little use. To enable a reader, however, to weif^li tlie value of each decision at a j^lance, he has been supplied in the footnotes with its date — (a very important factor in determining- its value, since few decisions of a date prior to the Revolution of 1G68 are of any value, while the Law of Evidence is chiefly founded upon decislcms given within the last 150 years), — with its nationality, and (where tlie case is English) also with the name of the Court, or of the particular Judge, responsible for the decision or dictum. As the plan thus adopted is a new one, it may perhaps be usefully mentioned that a complete Table of all Cases refeired to throughout the Work is j)refixed to each Volume, so that, if it be required to examine in an original Report the cases cited in any passage, the reader may o\)cn the one volume at the required passage and obtain the references from the Table of Cases prefixed to the other Volume, and in this way be saved having to lose his place while turning over pages. It has also been endeavoured to obtain some saving of space, as well as additional clearness of style, by the removal of some matters (especially in the Second Volume, which followed Professor Greenleafs work less closely than Volume I.) that were formerly mentioned in the Text as examples of principles there stated, but which were necessarily inserted there at some length, from the Text (which they tended to somewhat obscure to an ordinary reader) to footnotes, where they have been condensed as far as possible, and in general re- arranged in alphabetical order. Specimens of this may be found throughout the work; but, taking some examples at random, they will be found in the notes to § 1107, to § 1108, to § 1592, and to § IGll. (( .-1^ 'kfr PREFACE. Vll it(» In addition to the large saving of space effected by the several means which have been mentioned, a fui-ther largo saving in this direction has been made by remorse- lessly pruning all exuberance of expression, even some- times, it may be, at a sacrifice of style and rhetorical effect. Some Editors, indeed, consider the text of their Author to be so absolutely sacred that not a word of it ought to be touched. The present Editor, however, tl links that the true duty of the Editor of a Law Book is to strive his best to render the Work which he is editing one that the Author would have produced if writing at the present day ; and that, in carrying out this task, the Editor of such a Book must be bold, and must not shrink from responsibility. Moreover, the tendency of every legal Author naturally 18 to "note up" new decisions, but to omit to excise cases which have, by the lapse of time, become of comparatively little importance, or which have even been actually overruled. A work of long standing has a tendency, in short, to grow into stating the history of the law in more detail than is at all necessary. The warmest acknowledgments are due to Mr. Arthur May, of the Inner Temple, for having, with much accuracy and diligence, verified every reference, and supplied the date to it ; to Mr. J. J. Button, of the Inner Temple, for most carefully revising the proofs, and for assisting in the irksome task of prepai*rng the Index, Table of Statutes, and Table of Rules, &c., referred to ; to Mr. J. A. Hawke, of the Middle Temple, for kind assistance in preparing the Index ; to Mr. R. Riches, the excellent Librarian of the " Bar Library " at the Royal Courts of Justice, for • •• VIH PREFACE. preparing the exhaustive references contained in the Table of Cases; and to friends, too numerous to mention, both at the Bar, and occupying official positions, for most kind assistance in editing portions of the Work dealing with subjects of which they, respectively, are acknowledged masters. In a word, it has been endeavoured to bring this standard English text book of the Law of Evidence into an "up-to-date" shape, of which its Author, if yet living, would not be ashamed. Whether this has been done with any succesb, or not, will be determined by a profession which has, on previous occasions, extended great indulgence to the Editor for the many errors and omissions which, in spife of every care, will inevitably creep into a work of magnitude. Plowever inadequately the task of the present Editor may have been performed, the great Work of the Author will, in future Editions, and in spite of any defects in the present one, secure for him the realisation of his hope that, to use the words in which he concluded his Preface to the last Edition published under his own supervision — " Unthought of by man in rewards or in praises- May I be remembered hj wbat I have done." G. PITT-LEWIS. 4, Paper Btjilutnos, Tehplb, Itt August, 1895. PREFACE. The American editor is completely excused from the necessity of saying anything concerning the merits of Judge Taylor's original work. A treatise which in Eng- land and America has so long and so admirably stood tlie tests of time and daily use among an exacting profession, critical as to correctness of statement and fullness of research, speaks for itself with sufficient distinctness. The ninth English edition embodies many extensive and painstaking improvements by G. Pitt Lewis, Esq., Q. C. Among others, mention may be made of the facts that the original work, while benefited by many additional cases, has been condensed, without sacrifice of essential value; and that the range of citation for English and Irish cases and for English legislation has been carried down to a late day. The condensation referred to has added clearness to the text. Many illustrations of prin- ciple, which, though valuable in themselves, in earlier editions somewhat impeded the flow of thought, have been judiciously reduced to a proper position as foot-notes, in condensed form and, so far as possible, in alphabetical order. The English editor, thinking, to use his own lan- guage, " that the true work of the editor of a law book is to strive his best to render the work which he is editing one that the author would have produced if writing at the U IV PUErACE. present day," has industriously and successfully labored to that end. The American editor, while not, it is hoped, neglecling the valuable consideration suggested by his learned coad- jutor, has proposed, as his primary object, a somewhat different result : — namely, to give to the profession, so far as conveniently possible within the limitations imposed by the form of notes, such a statement of the modern law of evidence as might be practically useful to the active practitioner, and yet possess value to those who were desirous of acquainting themselves with the fundamental principles of the subject. It has seemed necessary, in pursuing this object, that many inviting by-paths of antiquarian research should consciously be neglected, and the desire to follow the cur- rent of authority up among the headsprings of our juris- prudence should be repressed. The historical development of the present rules of evidence has been noted only so far as seemed fairly needed for a clear conception of the rules themselves. The feeling has been strong that the clianged conditions of modern life have not failed to affect also the development of this branch of the law, and that it there- fore yearly grows more essential that, as the intricacy and magnitude of matters submitted to judicial investigation continues to increase, the rules of evidence under which they must be determined should be simplified, both in number and through being formulated with precision. In many ways, statutory and judicial, it is fairly to be said that the law of evidence is tending in this direction. Tlie present work is intended as a contribution to the same end. The range of citation has necessaril}' embraced the entire United States and the Province of Canada. So far as PREFACE. possible, leading cases have been cited in each jurisdiction. But to many a practitioner without ready access to a large law library such bountiful citations merely furnish a "feast of Tantalus." To remedy this ditiiculty, so far as possible, the point of the case cited has been given in the exact language of the court. This not only furnishes a quotable statement, but possesses the additional advantage that the reader is not forced to rely wholly upon the ability of an editor to catch and paraphrase the precise shade of mean- ing intended by the court. The plan of putting the entire collection of American law relating to a particidar topic at the end of the Englisli chapters on the same subject has been found acceptable in practical use, and is continued in the present international work. To afford still further opportunity for ready ref- erence to American and Canadian law, a separate index to subjects treated in the American notes and a separate tabulation of cases therein cited have been prepared. AVhile it has not proved possible to embrace within the present compass certain topics covered by well accepted separate treatises, or by the statutes of the several juris- dictions, it is hoped that the present work will prove of material assistance to our busy profession in the prepara- tion and trial of causes, and also be of value to those who arc interested in a consideration of the underlying prin- ciples which affect the larger aspects of the subject. CllARLE^i F CIIAMBEllLAYNE. Boston, January 19, 1897. Ire (13 analvJ^tji* PART I. Nature and Principles of Evidence. CHAPTER I. Preliminary Observations American Note : Defiiiitions. Evidence — Pact — Proof — Testimony — Cumula- tive Evidence — Competent Evidence — Rele- vancy-^ Legal Relevancy FAOK 1-2 2i_2» CHAPTER II. Matters Judicially noticed without Proof . . . . American Note : Judicial Notice. Required Cognizance — Instances — Optional Cog- nizance — Instances CHAPTER III. How Questions of Fact Tried — Functions of Judge in Jury Trials American Note : Law and Pact. , Function of the Court — Construction of Writ- ings — Negligence — Due Diligence — Probable Cause— Preliminary Facts — Foreign Laws . 3-21 21i_21« 22-52 52'-52" i'i ('■■ ANALYSIS. VU CHAPTER IV. PAGE The Grounds of Belief 63-68 CHAPTER V. Presumptive Evidence 69-183 American Note: Presumptions. Conclusive Presumptions — Instances .... 183^-183'' Presumptions Proper — Instances .183^^-183'' PART II. Rules Governing the Production of Testimony. CHAPTER I. Production of Evidence governed by Four Great Rules. Rule I. — Evidence must correspond with Issues ; Vari- ances ; Amendments 184-218 American Xote : Relation of Pleading to Evidence. Evidence de Bene — Relevancy — Auxiliary Facts 218^-218* CHAPTER II. Rule II. — Evidence must be confined to Points in Issue 219-257 American Note : Res inter Alios Actse. Instances 257^-257* Relaxation of Rule — Mental State — Tracing a Constant Cause — Instances — Railroad Cases . 25 7^^-25 7^ Character Evidence. Civil and Criminal Cases — Exceptions — Charac- ter of Witness — Proof 257''«-257" iii Viii ANALYSIS. CHAPTER III. PAGE RcLE III. — Burthen of Proof lies on Party who sub- stantially ASSEKTS THE AkFIKMATIVE : — RiGHT TO Begix asd to Reply 258-276 American Note -■ Burden of Proof. Double Meaning — Instances 276^-276" CHAPTER IV. RcTLE IV. — The Best Evidence must always be pro- duced; Secondary Evidence (1) As to Documents, Notices to Produce, &c. ; (2) As to Oral Evidence, Depositions, «&c 277-3.58 American Note: Best Evidence. Early Rale — Modern Statement — Application to Written Instmments 358'-358" PART III. Certain Particular Descriptions of Evidence. CHAPTER I. Evidence Addressed to the Sknses 359-36o American Note : Real Evidence. Mixed Real Evidence — Instances — Personal In- juries — Compulsory Exhibition — Experiments in and out of Court 365^-305*' CHAFFER II. Hearsay is, as a General Rule, rejected 366-391 ANALYSIS. IX American Note : Bes Gostse, Declarations Constituting — Declarations, Facts in the Res Gestae — Declarations, Part of a Res GestsB Fact — Instances — Spontaneity as a Test — Narrative — Differences in American Decisions — Privity 391^-391-» Hearsay. Objections — Reported Statements zs Facts — Instances Sn^^-SdV^ CHAPTER III. First Exception to General Rule rejecting Hearsay- Evidence AS to Matters of Public and General Interest 392-412 American Note: Matters of Public and General Interest. Boundaries, Public and Private — Reputation . . 412^-412''^ CHAPTER IV. Second Exception to General Rule rejecting Hear- say-Evidence AS TO Matters ok Pedigree .... 413-427 American Note : Hearsay concerning Pedigree . 427^-427" CHAFPER V. Third Exception to General Rule rejecting Hear- say-Evidence AS to Ancient Possession 428-433 American Note : Hearsay concerning Ancient Pos- session. Corroboration 433M33* CHAPTER VI. Fourth Exception to General Rule rejecting Hearsay- JiVIDENCE afforded HY DECLARATIONS BY DECEASED PeRS )NS AGAINST THEIR PECUNIARY OR PROPRIETARY Interests 434-452 American Note : Declarations against Interest. Not Admissions 452>-4.02"' ||! .» ,^l! ANALYSIS. CHAPTER VII. PAOB Fifth ExcEirriON to Glnerali Rule hejectino Heab- SAy-£viDENCE AKFOHDED BY DECLARATIONS IN THE CouusE ov Office ok Business 453-463 American Note; Shop Books 4631-463* Books of Account 463»-463''< Entries in Course of Business. An Extended Development 463^-463" CHAPTER VIII. Sixth Exception to Genekal Rule rejecting Hear- say-Evidence afforded by Dying Declarations . . 464-470 American Note: Dying Declarations. Modem Restrictions 470M70'*' f CHAPTER IX. Admissions 471-554 American Note: Admissions. Silence — Compromise 554^-554^' CHAPTER X. Confessions 555-588 American Note: Confessions. Corroboration — Undue Influence — Instances . . 588^-588" Pi Cei G ANALYSIS. Zl PART IV. M Special Rules of .Law as to the Evidence in Certain Particular Cases. CHAPTER I. FA OB Public Policy requires the Exclusion of Evidence on Certain Matters, viz. : (1) Communications during Marriage between Husband and Wife: (2) Communications witli Professional Adv isers : (3) Evidence of Judicial Personages and of Counsel : (4) Mat- ters which are State Secrets : (5) Indecent Matters 589-622 American Note: Privileged Matters. Marital Confidence — Communications between Attorney and Client — Secrets of State — Pub- lic Justice — Grand and Petty Jurors — Sources of Information — Matters against Decency . . 622^22" CHAFFER II. Certain Matters which are not Provable by a Sin- gle Witness, viz. : (1) Treason: (2) Perjury: (3) Affiliation: (4) Breach of Promise to Marry : (5) The Evi- dence of Accomplices in Crime 623-635 American Note : Corroboration. Treason — Perjury — Accomplices — Bastardy and Seduction 635^-635* ■Ai xii ANALYSIS. CHAPTER III. PAOK Certmn Matters wiiicii are required to be Evidenced BY Writing, viz.: 637-738 (1) At Coinmon Law : ' (2) By Certain Statutes. » American Note : Statutory Writings 738^ CHAPTER IV. The AoMissiBiLiTr ov Parol Evidence to affect Written Instrument.s 739-808 American Note : Parol Evidence Rule. Limitations applied — Receipts — Bills of Lading — Bills of Parcels — Collateral Agreements — Scope misunderstood — Mortgages and Trusts — Duress — Illegality — Incapacity — Fraud — Consideration — Mistake — Incomplete Deliv- ery — Discharge, Waiver, Modification, etc. . 808M08" ^ By Common Law, " writing " wa.s, iii general, etiuivalont to a deed. The prin- cipal matters required l)y the Common Law to he " in writing " (tliat is hy deed) are : — (a) Grants or Demises of Incorporeal Rights: (1)) (iifts of Personalty unaccom- panied by delivery, whether inter vicos or mortis causa: (c) Appointments of Agents to execute Deeds : (d) Contracts with Corporations : and (e) I'uwcrs of Attorney for the Execution of Deeds. 2 The principal matters required by Statute to be evidenced by writing are aa follows: — (a) Sales of Ships or Shares in Ships: (b) Certain dealings with Real Property (including Leases for more than Three Years) : (c) Or niattei's falling within the Statute of Frauds, such as Assignments or Surrenders of Realty, Special Promises by Executors or Administrators, Guarantees, Agreements in consideration of Marriage, Contracts for Interests in Lands, Agreements not to be performed within a Year, and Sales of Goods for CIO, or upwards : (d) AVills and Codicils and Revo- cations or Revivals thereof : (e) Acknowledgments (other than hy part payment) of Debts or Incorporeal Rights which have become Statute-barred: (f) Acceptances: (g) Contracts under the Truck Act: (h) Or under the Merchant Shipping Act: (i) Documents governed by various other Acts : Or (j) Documents requiring Inrol- ment or Registration, such as Warrants of Attorney or Cognovits, Bills of Sale, Grants of Annuities, &c. ANALYSIS. XUl PART V. Instruments of Evidence. •!> ,• ■ J I CIIAFrER I. PAOK Witnesses, and the Means of Procuring their At- tendance 809-873 CHAFrp:R II. The Competency of Witnesses . 874-910 American Note : Competency of Witnesses. Mental Derangement — Youth — Tntoxication — Atheism — Policy of Law — Judges — Attor- ney taking the Stand — Husband and Wife — Infamous Crime — Testamentary Witnesses — Functions of Court and Jury 910^-910^ CHAFfER III. The Examination of Witnesses — inoluding the tak- ing OK Affidavits — befoke an Examiner, or on Commission 911-978 American Note : Memoranda refreshing Memory. Primary Recollection — Secondary Recollection . 978'-978''' Separation of Witnesses. Consequences of Disobedience 978^-978" Examination of Witnesses. Direct Examination — Scope 978^^^-978'^ Cross Examination — Scope — Impeachment — Contradictory Statements 978'M78'''' Subsequent Fxaminations 978'^^-978''''"' f" XIV ANALYSIS. CHAPTER IV. Matters EviDENCEn by Public Documents , American Note : Public Documents. Proof — Relevancy PAQB 979-1179 1179>-1179» CHAFfER V. Matters Evidenced by Private Writings 1180-1229 American Note: Private Writings. Frodaction — Proof of Execution — Attested Writings — Exceptions — Unavailable Wit- ness — " Own Claim " — Ancient Documents — Proof of Contents 1229M220^« Proof of Handwriting. Witnesses — Correspondence, etc. — " Com- parison of Hands" — Conflict of Authority — Ancient Documents — Documents in the Case — Province of Court and Jury — Let- ters in Reply 1229'"-1229'" PART VI. Some General Rules as to the Admission or Rejection of Evidence at the Trial, and as to the Admissibility of Further Evidence on Appeal 1230-1234 CONTENTS. Preface ---------- Pagea iii — viii Analysis of Work -------- x— xiy List of Abbreviations refeurinq to American, Irish, or Scotch Authorities -------- xv — xix Table of Cases cited -------- xx— ccxvi Table of Statutes cited ------ ccxvii— ccxxxiv Tables of Rules and Forms of Supreme Court cited ccxxxv— ccxxxvi Table of Rules and Forms of County Courts cited - - ccxxxvi Addenda and Errata ------- ccxxxvii — ccxlii TEXT 1—1234 Appendix ---------- App, i— xi .f INDEX (Ee/erencea are to the Paragraphs (§§), and not to the Pagea). jl < I ANALYSIS OF WORK. w ■t:i* ■' ^ttalfisfljBf of movk. PART I. Nature and Principles of Evidence. CHAPTER I. Peeliminabt Observations FAOB 1—2 CHAPTER II. Matters Judicially noticed without Proof 8—21 CHAPTER in. How Questions of Fact Tried-Functions of Judge in Jury Trials - - _ . 22—62 CHAPTER IV. The Grounds of Belief fi3— 68 CHAPTER V. Pbbsumpiive Evidence J-183 ANALYSIS OF WOBE. Zl PART n. Rules Governing the Production of Testimony. CHAPTER I. Production of Evidence governed by Fonr Great Rules. PAQB Rule I.— Evidence must correspond with Issues; Vari- ances; Amendments --.---_ 184 — 218 CHAPTER n. Rui-E n.— Evidence must be confined to Points in Issue - 219—257 CHAPTER III. Rule III. — Burthen of Proof lies on Party who substan- tially ASSERTS THE AFFIRMATIVE :— RiGHT TO BeQIN AND TO Reply ---------- 258—276 CHAPTER IV. Rule IV.— The Best Evidence must always be produced ; Secondary Evidence (1) As to Documents, Notices to Produce, &c.; (2) As to Oral Evidence, Depositions, &o. 277 — 368 I' xu ANALYSIS OF 'VOR^. PART III. Certain Particular Descriptions of Evidence. ♦ CHAPTEE I. PAGE Evidence Addressed to the Senses . - _ - - 359 — 365 CHAPTEE II. HeauSay is, as a General Eule, rejected - - [] - 366 — 391 CHAPTEE III. FiusT Exception to General Eule rejecting Hearsay — Evidence as to Matters of Public and General Interest ..-- 392—412 • CHAPTEE IV. Second Exception to General Eule rejecting Hearsay — Evidence as to Matters of Pedigree - - - - 413—427 CHAPTEE V. Third Exception to General Eule rejecting Hearsay — Evidence as to Ancient Possession - - . - 428—433 CHAPTEE VI. Fourth Exception to General Eule rejecting Hearsay — Evidence afforded by Declarations by Deceased Persons against their Pecuniary or Proprietary Interests -.-----_. 434—452 CHAPTEE VII. Fifth Exception to General Eule rejecting Hearsay — Evidence afforded by Declarations in the course of Office or Business -------- 453- 4C3 CHAPTEE VIII. Sixth Excbption to General Eule rejecting Hearsay- Evidence AFFORDED BY DYING DECLARATIONS - - - 464—470 CHAraEE IX. Admissions ----- .-.-- 471—554 CHAPTEE X. Confessions ---------- 555—588 ANALYSIS OF WORK. xui. PART IV. Special Rules of Law as to the Evidence in certain Particular Cases. CHAPTER I. Public Policy kequires the Exclusion of Evidence on OEKTAIN MaTTEBS, VIZ. : (1) Comiimnications during Marriage between Husband and Wife : (2) Communications with Professional Advisers : (:3) Evidence of Judicial Personages and of Counsel : (4) Matters which are State Secrets : (6) Indecent Matters - - . . - - FAOB 589—622 CHAPTER II. Certain Matters which are not Provable by a Single Witness, viz. : (1) Treason : (2) Perjury : (3) Affiliation : (4) Breach of Promise to Marry : (5) The Evidence of Accomplices in Crime 623—635 CHAPTER III. Certain Matters which are required to be Evidenced by Writing, viz. : .-_.-*■- (1) At Common Law : ' (2) By certain Statutes.* 637—738 CHAPTER rV. The Admissibility of Parol Evidence to affect Written Instruments __. 739—808 ' By Common Law, "writing" was, in general, equivalent to a deed. The principal matters required by the Common Law to be "in writing" (that is by deed) are; — (a) Grants or Demises of Incoqioreal Rights: (b) Gifts of Personalty un- accompanied by delivery, whether inter vivos or mortis causa : (c) Appointments of Agents to execute Deeds : (d) Contracts with Corporations : and (e) Powers of Attorney for the Execution of Deeds. * The principal matters requh-ed by Statrtte to be evidenced by writing are as follow ; — (a) Sales of Ships or Shares in Ships : (b) Certain dealings with Real Property (including Leases for more than Three Years) : (c) Or matters falling within the Statute of Frauds, such as Assignments or Surrenders of Realty, Special Promises by Executors or Administrators, Guarantees, Agreements in consiilcration of Marriage, Contracts for Interests in Lands, Agreements not to be performed within a Year, and .Sales of Goods for £10, or upwards: (d) Wills and Codicils and Revocations or Revivals thereof : (e) Acknowledgments (other than by ^art payment) of Debts or Incorporeal Rights which have iKX'omo Statute-barred : (f) Acceptances : (g) Contracts under the Tru(^k Art : (h) Or under the Merchant Shipping Act : (i) Documents governed by various other Acts: Or (j) Documents retiuiring rnrolnient or Registration, such as Warrants of Attorney or Cognovits, Bills of Sale, Grants of Aimuities, &o. !i i'r 3UV ANALYSIS OF WOBK. PART V. Instruments of Evidence. CHAPTER I. Witnesses, asv the Means of Pbocuring theib Attend- ance --_.-----» PAOB 809—873 CHAPTER n. The Competency of Witnesses - CHAPTER ni. - 874—910 The Examination of Witnesses — including the taking of Affidavits— befobe an Examiner, or on Commission - 911 — 978 ■ CHAPTER rV. Matters Evidenced by Public Documents - CHAPTER V. Matters Evidenced by Private Writings - 979—1179 1180—1229 PART VI. Some General Rules as to the Admission or Rejection of Evidence at the Trial, and as to the Admissibility of Further Evi- dence on Appeal ...... 1230—1234 ( XV , BY WHICH VARIOUS IRISH, SCOTCH, AND AMERICAN AUTHORITIES ARE CITED IN THIS TRI^ATISE.' y I •V \^ .Mil Note. — Most of the American Reports are to he found in the respective Libraries of the Inner and Middle. Temples. But some few of them are only to be obtained at the British Museum. The letters A., B., C, D., np/iended to the American Reports, denote the relative estimation in which those Reports are held by the prtfeaaion in general, out of the particular State where the decixiona were pronounced : A. marking the highest degree of excellence. A very eminent American jurist kindly furnished the Author with this guide. ABBBGYIATIONS. KAlfE OF WORK, BTO. Addis Addison's Reports, Pennsylvania, 179' — 1799. 1 vol. (0.) Aik Aiken's Reports, Vermont, 1826— 1827. 2 vols. (B.) A. K. Mamh A. K. Marshall's Rep., Keumoky, 1817—1821. 3 vols. (D.) Ale. & Nap Aloock & Napier's Reports, icing's Bench, Ireland. 1 voL Alisou, Cr. L Alison's Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland. Alison, Pra';t. of 1 Alison's Practice of the Criminal Law of Scotland. Cr. L ) Am. Dec American Deoisious (Select Cases from various American State Courts), San Francisco, 1700—1344. 40 vols. Am. Ed American edition. Am. Jur American Jurist. Boston. Am. Rep American Reports (Selected from the Decisions of the Courts of lust resort in the several States of America), Albany, 1869—1887. 60 vols. Am. St. Rep American State Reports (a rontinuation of Anierican Reports), 188V— 1896. 42 vols. (Series still current.) Anthon Anthon's Nisi Pr. Rep., New York, 1808—1818. 1 vol. (D.) Applet Appleton's Reports, Miiine, from 1841. 1 vol. (C.) Arm. M. & Armstrong', Macartney & Ogle's Rep., Nisi Pr., Irel. 1 vol. Arm. & T Armstrong & Trevor's Rep. of R. v. O'Connell, Dub., 1844. Bail Bailey's Reports, South Carolina, 1828—1832. 2 vols. (B.) Ball & B ; . Ball & Beatty's Reports, Chancery, Ireland. 2 vols. Batty Batty's Reports, King's Bench, Ireland. 1vol. Bay Bay's Reports, South Carolina, 1783— 1804. 2 vols. (B.C.) Bell, Dig Bell's Digest of the Laws of Scotland. Bibb Bibb's Reports, Kentucky, 1808-1817. 4 vols. (D.) Binn Biimey's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1799 — 1814. 6 vols. (A.) Bland, Ch Bland's Chancery Rep., Maryland, 1811— 1830. 2 vols. (0.) Blackf Blackford's Reports, Indiana, 1817—1838. 4 vols. (CD.) Bi"owne Browne's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1806 — 1814. 2 vols. (G.) Burnet, Cr. L. . . Burnet on Criminal Law of Scotland. ' A list of the ordinary abbreviations u.sed in En<rlish law is cominoiJy known, and can, at any rate, be found in the catalogues of many law publishors. ii^ id t I' I XVI ABBREVIATIONS, ETC. NAUE OF WORE, ETO. CaineB Gaines's Reports, New York, 1803—1805. 3 vols. (A.) dtj Hall Bee . . New York Recorder, contaiDing Reports of Cases in City Gaorts from IS16 to 1821. 6 vols. Com. Commonwealth. Conklin'e Pi. .... Conklin's Practice of Cts. of United States, New York, 1842. Conn. Connecticut Reports, by T. Day, 1814— 1848. 15 vols. (B.) Const. R. Constitutional Rep., 8. Carolina, 1812—1816. 2 vols. (B.C.) Const.U.S. Amend. Amended Constitution of the United States. Cooke & Ale .... Cooke and Alcock's Rep., King's Bench, Ireland. 1vol. Cocke Cooke's Reports, Tennessee, 1811— 1814. 1 vol. (D.) Cowen Cowen's Reports, New York, 1823—1828. 9 vols. (A.) Coxe Coxe's Reports, New Jersey, 1790—1795. 1 vol. (0.) Cnmch Cranch's Rep., Sup. Ct. of U.S., 1800—1815. 9 vols. (A.) Crawf.&D.,Abr.C. Crawford and Dix's Abridged Cades in Ireland. 1 vol. Crawf . & D., C C. Crawford and Dix, Irish Circuit Reports. 3 vols. Cush. ...,,,,,„. Cnshing's Rep. Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 9 vols. DalL ..., Dallas's Reports. Supreme Courts of United States, and Pennsylvania, 1790—1806. 4 vols. (A.) Dane, Abr Dane's Abridgment, United States. Day Day's Reports, Connecticut, 1802—1810. 5 vols. (B.) Deane, Vom. B. . . Deane's Reports, Supreme Court of Vermont. 3 vols. Dev Devereux's Rep., North Carolina, 1826—1834. 4 vols. (B.) Dev. &B Devereux and Battle's Rep., North Carolina, 1834—1840. 4 vols. (B.) Dicbon, Ev Dickson on Evidence in Scotland. 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1855. Drury. Ch-K Drury's Irish Chancery Rep., temp. Sugden, Ch. 1vol. Dm. k War. .... Drury and Warren's Reports, Chancery, Ireland, 4 vols. Ersk. Inst. ...... Erskine's Institutes of the Law of Scotland. Fairf Fairfield's Reports, Maine, 1833— 1835. 3 vols. (B.) Fox & Sm. ...... Fox and Smith's Reports, King's Bench, Ireland. 2 vols. Gall Gallison's Reports, United States, Ist Circuit Court, 1812 — 1815. 2 vols. (A.). Judge Story's Decisions. Gill, ft J Gill and Johnson's Rep., Maryland, 1829—1840. 10 vols. (B.) Glassf . Ev Glaasford ou Evidence, Edinburgh, 1820. Gr. Ef Grecnleaf on Evidence. Gray Gray's Reports, Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 2 vols. GreenL Greenleaf's Reports, Maine, 1820—1832. 9 vols, (B.) Hal»t Ralstead's Reports, New Jersey, 1821— 1831. 7 vols. (0.) Har. & G Harris and Gill's Rep., Maryland, 1826—1829. 2 vols. (B.) Har. ic M'Hen. .. Harris and MHenry's Rep., Maryland, 1790-1799. 4 vols. (D.) Hardin Hardin's Reports, Kentucky, 1805-1808. 1 vol. (D.) Harr. ft J Harris and Johnson's Reports, Maryland, 1800 — 1826. 7 vols. (B.) Hawks Hawks' Reports, North Carolina, 1820— 1 820. 4 vols. (0.^ HHyes Hayes' Reports, Exchequer, Ireland. 1 vol. Hayes 6l Jon Hayes and Jones' Reports, Exchequer, Ireland. 1 voL . ABBREVIATIONS, ETC. ifVU :it| |12— 1(B.) ItoIs. ABBREVIATIONS. NAME OF WOKE, ETC. Hayw Haywood's Reports, North Carolina, 1789—1806. (C.) Hen. & Munf Henning and Munford's Rep., Virginia, 1806—1809. 4 vols. (C.) Heisk Heiskell, Tennessee, 1870 - 1874. 12 vols. Hill, S. Car. R. . . Hill's Reports, South Carolina, 1833-1835. 2 vols. (B.C.) nm, N. Y. R. . . Hill's Reports, Now York, 1841—1842. 3 vols. (B.) Howard, S. Ct. R. Howard's Rep., United States, Sup. Ct., from 1843. (A.) Hume, Com Hume's Commentaries on Criminal Law of Scotland. Humph Humphrey's Reports, Tennessee, 1839 — 1841. 2 vols. (D.) Iredell Iredell's Reports, North Carolina, 1840—1841. 1 vol. (C.) Ii. C. L. R Irish Common Law Reports, 1849 — 1866. 17 vols. Formerly cited by Author as " Jr. Law R. N. S." Ir. Ch Irish Chancery Reports, 1850 — 1866. 17 vols. Formerly cited by Author as " Ir. Eq. R. N. S." Ir. Cir. R Irish Circuit Reports. 1 vol. Ir. Eq. I*ep Irish Equity Reports. 1838—1850. 13 vols. Ir. L. T. Rep. . . Irish Law Times Reports. Ir. L. R Irish Law Reports (i. e., Reports at Common Law), 1838 — 1850. 13 vols. I. R. C. L Irish Reports, Common Law, 1807 — 1877. I. R. Eq Irish Reports, Equity, 1867—1877. J. J. Marsh J. J. Marshall's Rep., Kentucky, 1829—1832. 7 vols. (D.) Jebb, C. C Jebb's Crown Cases Reserved, Ireland. 1 vol. Jebb & B Jebb and Bourke's Rep., Queen's Bench, Ireland. 1 vol. Jebb & Sy Jebb and Symes' Rep., Queen's Bench, Ireland. 2 vols. Johns Johnson's Reports, New York, 1806—1823. 20 vols. (A.) Johns. Ch. R Johnson's Chan. Rep., New York, 1814—1823. 7 vols. (A.) Jones Jones' Exchequer Reports, Ireland. 2 vols. Jones & Lat Jones and Latouche's Rep., Chancery, Ireland. 3 vols. Joy on Conf Joy on Confession in Criminal Cases, Dublin, 1842. Kent, Com Kent's Commentaries, Boston, 1840. Kirby Kirby's Reports, Connecticut, 1786— 1788. 1 vol. (D.) L. R. (Ir.) Law Reports for Ireland, 1878—1894. 33 vols. (vol. 33 cnrrent to end of 1894). Formerly cited by Author as "Ir. Law R." LL., U. S Laws of the United States. Lans. (N. Y.) .... Lansing, Reports of Decisions in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. New York and Albany, 1869—1873. 7 vols. Law Rec. Ist Ser. \ ^^^ Recorder, Ist and 2nd Series. Irish. 10 vols. or 2nd feer ) Leigh, R Leigh's Reports, Virginia, 1829—1839. 9 vols. (B.) Lloyd & G Lloyd and Gookl's Ir. Chan. Rep., temp. Sugden, Ch. 1 vol. Long. & T Longfifc.d and Townsend's Rep. Exchequer, Ireland. 1 vol. Louis Reports of Louisiana, 1830 — 1840. 16 vols. (B.) McC MoCord . Rep., South Carolina, 1820—1828. 4 vols. (B.C.) MoC, Ch. R McCord's Chancery Reports, South Carolina, 1825—1827. 2 vols. (B.C.) McDouall, Inst. . . McDouall's (Ld. Bankton) Institutes of Law of Scotland. McNuUy, Ev McNally on Evidence, Ireland. A. K. Marsh A. K. Marshall's Rep., Kentucky, 1817—1821. 3 vols. (D.) J. J. Marsh J. J. Marshall's Rep., Kentucky, 1829— 1832. 7 vols. (D.) i ill xyiu ABBREVIATIONS, ETC. ABBBEVUTIOm. HAXB OF WOBX, ETC. Mart Martin's Reports, Louisiana, 1809—1823. 12 vols. (B.) Mart., N. S Martin's Reports, New Series, Loniiiiana, 1823 — 1830. 8 yola. (B.) Mart., N. Car. R.. Martin's North Carolina Reports, 1778—1797. 1 vol. (D.) Mart. & Y Martin and Yerger's Rep., Tennessoe, 182i— 1828. I vol. (D.) Mason Masou's RoportH, United Stittes, l8t Cirouit <§ourt, 1816 — 18;iO. 5 vols. (A.) Judge Story's Decisions. Mass RejKirts of Mussaohimetts, 1804 — 1822. (A.) Meto Metualf 8 Reports. MiiHsiohusetta, 1840 -18 IP. (A.) Milw. £o. Ir. R. . . Mil ward's E ules. Iii^h Rep., temp. Dr. Radoliffe. Mo Missouri, 1821— 1881, 74 vols. Moll Mulluy's Reports, Chancery, Ireland. 3 vols. Monroe Monroe's Reports, Kentucky, 1824 — 1828. 7 vols. (D.) Morison Morison's Scotch Reports. Munf Munford's R^-ports, Virginia, 1810-1820. 6 vols. (C.) Murph Murphey's Reports, North Caroliua, 1804—1819. (0.) N. York Civ. Code The Code of Civil Procedure of New York, 1850. N. York Cr. Code The Code of Criminal Procedure of New York, 1850. New Hiiinp Reports of New Himpnhire, 18IC -1843. (B.) Nott&M'C NottandM'Cord'sRep., S.Carolina, 1817— 1820. 2 vols. (B.) Ohio R Hammond's Ohio Reports, Ohio, 1821—1839. 9 vols. (D.) Fa. St Pennsylvania State Reports, New York and Albany, 1815— i 1S95. 16 j vols. (."Series still curreut.) Paige PaiLfe'.s Chan. Rep.. New York, 1828— 1814. 10 vols. (B.) Paine Paine's Rep . United States, 2nd Circuit Court, 1810 — 1826. 1 vol. (B.) Paine & D. Pr. . , P.iine an 1 Ducr's Practice of the Courts of the United States, Ntw Yoik, 1830. Peck Peck's Report.^, Tennessee, 1822—1824. 1 vol. (D.) Penning Penniiijrtou's Rep., New Jersey, 1800 — 1813. 2 vols. (0.) Pennsylv Report't of Pennsylvania, 1829— 1.'<32. 3 vols. (B.) Pet Peters' Rep., Supreme Courts of United States, 1827—1843. (A.) Pet. C. C. R Peters' Circmit Courts Reports, United States, 3rd Circuit Court, I80.S-1S18. 1 vol. (B.) Pick Pickering's liep., Massachusetts, 1 823— 1 S40. 24 vols. (A.) Porter Porter's Rejorts, Alabama, 1«34— 18*9. 9 vols. (D.) Poth. Ohl Pothier on Obligations, by Evans, Philadelphia ed., 1826. R The Reports. R. R Revised Reports. Rimd Randolph's Reports, Virginia, 1821—1828. 6 vols. (B.) Rawle Rawle's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1S28 — 18;J5. 6 vols. (A.) Rev. St Revised Statutes of different Stiites in Americ*. Ri'lg. L. & 8 Ridi^way, Lapp and Sohoalos' Rep., King's Bench, Irel. 1 vol, Riilg. P. C Riclgway's Parliamentary Cases, Irish Parliament. Riley Riley's Law Cases, South Caroliua, 1836—1837. 1 vol. (B.) Sob. & Lpf Schoales and Lefroy's Reports, Chancery, Ireland. 2 vols. Serg. & R Sergeant and Rawle's Rep., Peunsylv., 1818— 29. 17 vols. (A.) ABBREVIATIONS, ETC. XIX ABBBBTUTIONS. NAXE OF VOBK, BTO. Shepl Shepley's Reportg, Maine, 1836—1841. 6 vols. (0.) South Southard's Reports, New Jersey, 1816—1820. 2 vols. (0.) Stiiir Inst Stair's Institutes of the Law of Scotland. Story, B Story's Reports, United States, Ist Circuit, 1839—1846. t vols (A.) Judge Story's Decisions. Sumn Sumner's Ri^ports, Ist Circuit Court of United States. Judge IStory's Decisions. 1830—1839. 3 vols. (A.) Swift, Dig Swift's American Digest. Swift, £v Swift's American Law of Evidence. Hartfcid. Tuit, Ev Tait on Evidence. Edinburgh, 1834. U. S United States. Verm Vermont's Reports, Vermont, 1826—1837. 9 vols. (B.) Virg. Cas Virginia Cases, Virginia, 1789—1826. 2 vols. (D.) Wall Wallis's Irish Chancery Reports, 1766—1791, 1 vol.; or in refHreuces to American Reports, either Wallace's United Stiites Supreme Court Reports, Washingtfni, 1803—1874. 23 vols. ; or else Wallace's Circuit Court Reports, Phila- delphia, 1801. 1 vol. Wall, Jr Philadelphia. 1842—1862. 3 vols. Wash Washington's Reports, Virginia, 1790—1790. 2 vols. (C.) Wash. C. C. B. . . Washiiipton's Ciniuit Court Reports, United States, 3rd Circuit Court, 1803—1827. 4 vols. (B.) Watts Watts' Reports, Peunsylvania, 1832—1840. 10 vols. (A.) Wtttts&S Wutts and Sergeant's Rep., Pennsylv., 1811—1842. 3vol8.(A.) Wend Wendall's Reports, New York, 1828— 181 1. (A.) Whart Wharton's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1835—1840. 6 vols. (A.) Wheat Wheaton's Rep., Superior Ct. of Un. States, 1816—1827. (A.) Wheel. C. C Wheeler's Criminal Cases, New York. 3 vols. (D.) Woodb. & M Woodbury and Minot's Reports, United States, Ist Circuit, 1845-1847. 2 vols. (A.) Wright, R V/right's Reports, Ohio, 1831—1834, 1 vol. (D.) Teates Teates' Reports, Pennsylvania, 1791 — 1808. 4 vols (B.) Yerg. Yerger'ii Reports, Tennessee, 1832—1837. 10 vols. (D.) '■ i ■ J, i!li ( ^^i ) htl '1 TABLE OF CASES CITED. FAoa Aaronv. Aaron(1849). 3DeG. &Sm. 47S; 14 Jur. 126 7C1 Abbey V. Lill (1829), 2 M. & P. 534; 5 Bing. 299 932 Abbeyleix Gardens v. Sutcliffe (1890), 26 L. R. Ir. 332 608 Abbot V. Hermon (1830), 7 Groenl. 118 624 Abbot V. Plumbe (1779), 1 Doug. 216 1208 Abbot V. WolKoy (1895), 14 R. (July) 211 ; (1895), 2 Q. B. 97 ; 72 L. T. 681 ; 43W. R. 513 yWrf. [689, 690] Abbott V. Abbott and Godoy (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 57 ; 4 S. & T. 254 . . 1048, 1054 Abbott V. Bates (1876), 45 L. J. C. P. 117 ; 33 L. T. 491 ; 24 "W. R. 101 . .748, 766 Abbott V. Hendricks (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 791 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 183 ; 1 Drink. 31; 4 Jur. 1113 758 Abbott v. Mnssie (1796). 3 Ves. 148 ; 3 R. R. 79 796 Abbott V. Middleton (1868), 7 H. L. Gas. 68 ; 28 L. J. Oh. 110 ; 33 L. T. 60; 21 Beav. 143; 6 Jur. N. S. 717 741 Abbotun v. Dunsford (1699), 2 Bott, 80 465 Abeel v. Radoliff (1816), 13 Johns. 297 673 Abel v. Potts (1800), 3 Esp. 242; 6 R. R. 826 1048 Abignyer. Clifton (1612), Hob. 213 901 Abley v. Dale (1860), 10 C. B. 62 ; 1 L. M. & P. 626 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 33 ; U Jur. 1069 1148 Abouloff t'. Oppenheimer (1882), 62 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 10 Q. B. D. 296; 47 L. T. 325 ; 31 W. R. 57 1142 Abrath v. North East. Ry. Co. (1886), 11 App. Cas. 247 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 457; 65L. T. 63; 16 Cox, C. C. 364 30, 31, 110, 643 Abrey v. Crux (1869), L. R. 5 C. P. 37 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 9 ; 21 L. T. 327 . . 767 Accero v. Petroni (1815), 1 Stark. 100 922 Accidental and Mar. Ins. Co., Re (1867), 37 L. J. Ch. 66 ; L. R. 5 Eq. 22: 17 L. T. 308 846 Acebal V. Levy (1834), 10 Bing. 384; 4 M. & Sc. 217 689, 691 Ackary, Re, Ex parte BoUand (1876), 45 L. J. Bank. 133 ; 3 Ch. D. 126 ; 34 L. T. 666 ; 24 W. R. 932 861 Ackland v. Pearce (181i), 2 Camp. 601 317 Ackworth, Ex parte (1843), 3 Q. B. 397 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 718 ; 1 New SesB. Cas. 64 ; 13 L. J. M. C. 38 ; 18 Jur. 291 1139 A'Court V. Cross (1825), 3 Bing. 329 ; 1 1 Moore, C. P. 198 712 Acramanf. Hemiman(1851),16Q.B. 998; 20L. J. Q. B. 355; 15Jur.l008 736 Acraman v. Morrice (1849), 8 C. B. 449 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 67 ; 14 Jur. 69 . . 690 Adam v. Kerr (1798), 1 Bos. & P. 360 1213, 1216 Adams v. Angell (1876), 6 Ch. D. 634 ; 36 L. T. 334 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 352 . . 163 Adams v. Balch (1827), 5 Greenl. 188 1098 Adams V. Barnes (1821), 17 Mass. 365 , 1114 Adams V. Barry (1843), 2 Y. & C. (Ch.) 167 601 Adams v. Dansey (1830), 6 Bing. 506 ; 4 M. & P. 245 678 Adams v. Frye (1841), 3 Mete. 103 1201 Adamaw. Gibney (1830), 6 Bing. 666; 4 M. & P. 491 773 Adams v. Jones (1852), 21 L. J. Ch. 352 797 Adams v. Lloyd (1858), 3 H. & N. 351 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 499 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 590 964 Adams v. Sanders (1829), M. & M. 373 ; 4 C. & P. 25 652 Adams v. Wordley (1836), 1 M. & W. 374 ; 2 Gale, 29 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 158 ; IT. &G. 620 743,757 Adamson, Re (1876), L. R. 3 P. & D. 263 146 Vol. I. end* with page 635. xxu TABLE OF CASES CITKD. Adiimthwaite r. Synpfo (1816), 1 Stark. 183 AddiiiKton f. Clofle (1774-5), '2 Win. Bl. 1030 ArtdinKtonr. Ma^an (1851), IOC. B 576; 20 L. J. C. P. 82 Adelaide, Tho (179 t). 2 Ri)bertHon. Oil Admiral Austen, Ro (18VJ), 2 C. Rob. 112, n Admiral Bojtor, Tho (1857), Swab. 193 Aflnlo V. rourdrinif'r(18>9), M. & M. 334, n AKnew v. Jobson (1878), 47 L. J. M. C. 67 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 625 Agra Bk. v. Barry (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 155 ; Ir. R. 8 Eq. 325 AKTioultural Cattle Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald (1851), 14 Q. B. 432 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 244 ; lo Jur. 489 294, Aheam v. Bellman (1879), L. S. 4 Ex. D. 201 ; 40 L. T. 771 ; 27 W. R. 928 1018 904 192 1095 192 178 314 226 737 1197 523 Ahearnev. M'Guire (1840), 2 Ir. Eq. R. 437 867 AinHworth, Re (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 151 699 Airth Peer. (1839). Part. Min. 105 423 Aitken, Ex parte (1820), 4 B. & Aid. 49 594 Alban v. Pritohett (1796), 6 T. R. 680 604 Albert v. The Grosvenor Invest. Co. (1867), L. R. 3 Q. B. 123 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 24 ; 8 B. & S. 604 761 Alohini;. Hopkins (1834), 1 Binpr. N. C. 99 ; 4 M. & So. 615 682 Alcookr. Cook (1829), 1 Ph. Evid. 251, n. 1 404, 1040 Alcock V. The Roy. Exch. Ins. Co. (1849), 13 Q. B. 292; 18 L. J. Q. B. 121 ; 13 Jur. 446 924, 926, 949 Alcook V. Whatmore (1840), 8 Dowl. 615 15 Alcorn v. Larkin (1842), Arm. M. & O. 367 1023 Alder V. Savill (1814), 5 Taun. 464; 15 R. R. 651 1160 Alderson v. Clay (1816), 1 Stark. R. 405 169, 288, 526 Alderson v. Langdale (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 660 1194 Alderson v. Mnddison (1877), 8 App. Cas. 467 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 737 ; 49 L. T. 303 ; 31 W. R. 820 ; 47 J. P. 821 639, 688 Aldous V. CornweU (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 673 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 201 ; 9 B. & 8. 607 1 195, 1201 Aldridge v. Gt. W. Ry. Co. (1864), 15 C. B. N. S. 682; 33 L. J. C. P. 161 729 Aldridge v. Haines (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 395 1099 Aldridge v. Johnson (1857), 7 E. & B. 885; 26 L. J. Q. B. 296; 3 Jur. N. S. 913 690 Alexander ». Burchfield (1842), 7 M. & Gr. 1066; 3 Scott, N. R. 656; Car. & M. 75 ; 1 1 L, J. C. P. 253 32, 33 Alexander v. Calder (1885), 64 L. J. Ch. 487 ; 28 Ch. D. 457 ; 33 W. R. 579 912 Alexander v. Crosbie (1835), Lloyd & G. (temp. Sugden) 145 749 Alexander v. Dixon (1823), 1 Bing. 366 ; 8 Moore, 387 816 Alexander v. Strong (1842), 9 M. & W. 733 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 316 ; 2 Dowl. P. C. 256 307 Alexander v. Vanderzee (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 530 ; 20 W. R. 871 42 Alexandria, Mechanics' Bk. of, t'. Bk. of Columbia (1820), 6 Wheat. 336. . 388 Alfonso t). U. 8. (1843), 2 Story R. 421 ... 278 Alford V. Clay (1875), Ir. R. 9 Eq. 216 462 Alivon V. Fumival (1834), I C. M. & R. 277, 296 ; 3 L. J. Ex, 241 ; 4 Tyr. 751 278. 306, 309, 1024 Allan's Patent, Re (1867), L. R. 1 P. C. 507 ; 36 L. J. P. C. 76 129 Allen, Re '1839). 2 Curt. 331 694 Allen i>. Bennet (1810), 3 Taun. 169; 12 R. R. 633 ,.672, 675 Allen ». Cameron (1833), 3 Tyr. 907 : 1 C. & M. 832 223 Allen V. Denstone (1839), 8 C. & P. 760 388 Alien*. Duncan (1831), 11 Pick. 309 376 Allen ». Dundas (1789), 3 T. R. 126; 1 R. R. 666 1045,1103, 1133, 1161 Allen ». D. of Hamilton (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 630 ; 16 W. R. 866 829 Allen V. Maddoek (18 18), 11 Moo. P. C. 0. 427 70', 785 Allen ','. M'Keen (1833), 1 Sumn. 314 623 Allen V. Pink (1818), 4 M. & W. 140 ; 6 Dowl. 668 ; 1 H. & H. 207 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 206 746 TA« references are to pages, not to paragrapht. TABLE OF CASES CITED. xxin PAOB All-nP Snywnnl (1S28), 5 Oreenl. 227 90 Allonr YcfxalKlHU), 1 C. & Kir. aifi 819 AlliHTio'' Hunk of Simla v. Carey (1870), 6 0. P. D. 249 ; 49 L. J. C. P. -Hi ■ "!) W. R. 306 76 AllM.t't, IJc (l«(i»). 33 L. J. r. & M. H6 701 \ll, ,„f r. Mi'fk (1830), 4 U. & P. 207 1224 Aliiin-i.iiKi. Ke (I860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 46 ; 39 L. T. 19 ; 8 W. R. 29; 6 Jur. N. S. 302 701 , 785 AliKT i: (J.orge (1808), 1 Camp. 392 662, 744 ANti.n. In tlio OoodH of (1892), P. 142 ; 61 L. J. P. 92 ; 66 L. T. 691 ... . 174 \lv„ra / . B«ker (1832). 9 Wend. 323 154 Amiilia, The (1804), Brown & L. Adm. 311 185 Aitibroso Rookwood'H Cano (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 139 236 Aiiieii.aii l'"iir Co. v. U. S. (1829), 2 PeU'rs, 358 382 Aimy '■■ I-niig (1808). 9 East, 473; 6 Esp. 110 ; 1 Camp. 14 ; 9 R. R. 580 814 AniturHt. Ld v. Ld. SoinerH (1788), 2 T. R. 372 ; 1 R. R. 497 1101 AmiKH, Kc (1849), 2 RobertH. 116 700 AmoH r. IIiiKhcs (1835), 1 M. & Rob. 464 258, 259 Amos t: Smith (1867, should be 1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 423 ; 1 H. & C. 238. . 715 Anchor Milling Co. v. Wulsh (1^91), 32 Am. St. R. 600 ^M. [460] Anderson v. Anderson (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 247 ; L. R. 13 Eq. 381 ; 26 L. T. 12; 20W R. 31H 701 Anderson v. Gill (1858), 3 Miicq. 180 ; 1 PMterson. 738 170 262 Anderson v. Gorrie, 14 R. (Feb.) 283 ; 71 L. T. 382 1099 Anilerson v. Hamilton (1816), 8 Price, 244 ; 4 Moore, C. P. 693, n. ; 2 Bio. & B. 156, n 618 Anderson V. Hayman (1789), 1 H. Bl. 120 ; 2 R. R. 734 678 Anderson v. Long (1823). 10 Serg. & R. 55 252 Anderson r. Pitcher (ISOO), 2 Bob. & P. 164 ; 3 Esp. 134 ; 1 Stark. 202 ; 6 R. R. 665 783 Anderson v. Sanderson (1817), 2 Stark. R. 204 ; Holt, 691 ; 17 R. R. 681 . 603 Anderson v. Scot (1806), 1 Camp. 235, n C90 Anderson ». Thornton (1853), 8 Ex. 425 201. 542 Anderson t>. Weston (1840). 6 Biug. N. C. 296 146, 451 Anderson v. Whalley (1852), 3 C. & K. 64 926 Anderstonr Magawlev (17^6). 2 Bro. P. C. 688 , 1040 Andrew v. Motley (1862), 12 C. B. N. S. 626 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 128. .278, 431, 1215 Andrews r. Andrews (1881-6), 15 L. R. Ir. 199, 211 793, 797 Andrews v. Andrews {nee Re D'Angibau). Andrews v. Askey (1837), 8 C. & P. 7 253, 254. 257. 951, 954 Andrews v. Elliot (1856), 6 E. & B. 602; 6 E. & B. 338; 25 L. J. Q. B. 330 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 663 643 Andrews v. Hailes (1853), 2 E. & B. 349 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 409 ; 17 Jur. 761 116 Andrews v. Martin (1862), 12 C. B. N. S. 371 ; 6 L. T. 433 869, 871 Andrews V. Pabner (1812). 1 Ves. & B. 22 329 Andrews v. Solomon (1816), 1 Peters C. C. Rep. 356 598 Andrews v. Turner (1842), 3 Q. B. 177 708, 709 Andrews v. Vandiizer (1814), 1 1 Johns. 38 266 Angell V. Duke (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 174 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 78 ; 32 L. T. 26 ; 23 W. R. 307 683, 764 Angell V. Worsley (1849). 2 Ex. 196. n 146 Anglesey (M. of) v. Ld. Hatherton (1842), 10 M. & W. 218 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 67 231. 232, 402, 403 Anglo-French Co-operative Soc, Re (1380), 14 Ch. D. 633 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 388 ; 28 W. R. 580 36 Angus t'. Dalton (1881), 3 Q. B. D. 85 ; 6 App. Cas. 740 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 689; 44 L. T. 844; 30 W. R. 196 115 Angus «. Smith (1829), M. & M. 473 954 Ann, The (1860), Lush. Adm. R. 55 186 Annapolis, The (I860), Lush. Adm. R. 295 ; 30 L. J. Adm. 201 ; 4 L. T. 417 178, 976, 977 Annesley v. Ld. Anglesea (1743), 17 How. St. Tr. 1430 . .65, 81, 108, 368, 592, 606, 610, 892, 976, 977 Vol. I. mdt uith page 636. i XXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. FAOB Annett r. Osborne (1840), 2 Jebb & Sy, 376 31 Anon, (undated), cited 3 Esp. 115 645 Auon. (undated), Ry. & M. 143 1227 Anon, (undated), 1 Ph. Ev. 406 5ij9 Anon, (undated), cited 2 Ph. Ev. 523 976 Anon, (undated), cited 6 East, 195 ; 8 R. R. 455 464 Anon. (1623), 2 Rolle R. 255 1 14 Anon. (1670), 11 Mod. 79 9 Anon. (1693), Skin. 404 592, 596 Anon. (1698), 1 Ld. Raym. 731 108 Anon. (1748), 3 Atk. 644 612 Anon. (1753J, 1 Lew. 101 923 Anon. (1764), cited 5 B. & Aid. 939, 940, n 629 Anon. (1799), 12 Mod. 345 9 Anon. (1807, Burr's Trial), Evid. for Deft., 2 616 Anon. (1808), cited 2 Ph. Ev. 29 1117 Anon (1810), cited 2 Camp. 390 n 1161 Anon. (1811), 8 Mass. 370 604 Anon. (1827), 1 Moo. C. C. 101 924 Anon. (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 382 1100 Anon. (Ia32), 1 Dowl. 157 870, 872 Anon. (1833), 1 Lew. C. C. 128, 133, 134 824, 825 Anon. (1833), 1 Hill, S. C. 251 972, 973 Anon. (1841), Ir. C. R. 165, 167, n. (a) 238 Anon. (1841), 3 Ir. L. R. 301 871 Anon. (1841), Ir. C. R. 374 165 Anon. (1846), cited Bull. N. P. 236 b 1228 Anon. (1878), cited Campbell v. 'i' wemlow, 1 Price, 88 890 Anon. V. Anon. (1856), 22 Beav. 481 ; 23 Beav. 273 021 An8teer.Nelmes(1853), 1H.&N.225; 26L.J.Ex.6; 27L.T.190; 4W.R.612 787 Anstey v. Dowsing (1745-6), 2 Str. 1253 ; Bull. N. P. 264 279 Antram v. Chace (1812), 15 East, 209 ; 1 Rose, 344 1038 Apoth. Co. V. Bentley (1824), Ry. & M. 159 ; 1 C. & P. 538 267 Appleton V. Ld. Braybrook (1817), 6 M. & S. 34 ; 2 Stark. R. 6 ; 18 R. R. 294 52 Appotens v. Dunswell (1699), 2 Bott, 80 466 Aranguerin v. Scholfield (1856), 1 H. & N. 494 ; 28 L. T. O. S. 105 308 Arbon v. Fussell (1862), 1 N. R. 31 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 753 ; 11 W. R. 26 ; 7 L. T. 718 133 Archangelo v. Thomson (181 1), 2 Camp. 620 ; 12 R. R. 758 154 Archer, Re (1871), L. R. 2 P. & D. 252 ; 40 L. J. P. & M. 80 ; 19 "W. R. 785 699 Archer v. Baynes (1850), 5 Ex. 626 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 54 670, 172 Archer V. Leonard (1863), 15 Ir. Ch. R. 267 710, 711 Arden v. Sullivan (1850), 14 Q. B. 832 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 268 ; 14 Jur. 712. . 654 Ardingv. Flower (1800), 8 T. R. 536; 3 Esp. 117 866, 869 ArgoU, Ly. f. Cheney (1624), Pabner, 402 1200 Arklow, The {see Emery v. Cichero). Arlctt V. Ellis (or Sheftord) (1827), 7 B. & C. 346 ; 9 D. & R. 897 ; 9 B. & C. 671 116 Arniistead v. Wilde (1851), 17 Q. B. 261 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 524 ; 16 Jur. 1010 162 Armory f). Delamirie (1721), 1 Str. 605; 1 Sm. L. C. 385 108, 117, 361 Armstrong, Re, Ex parte Lindsay, (1892) 1 Q. B. 327 ; 65 L. T. 464 ; 40 W. R. 159; 17Cox, C. C. 349; 8M. B. R. 271 36 Armstrong V. Hewett (1817), 4 Price, 216; 18 R. R. 707 430, 1050 Armstrong V. Norton (1839), 2 Ir. L. R. 96 1113 Armstrong f. Stockham (1835), 24 L. J. Ch. 176 ; 3 Eq. Rep. 130 1030 Aniit's Trusts, Re (1868), Ir. Rep. 5 Eq. 352 100 Arnold V. Bp. of Bath & W. (1829), 5 Bing. 316 ; 2 M. & P. 650 1050 Arnold v. Blaker (1871), 40 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; L. R. 6Q. B. 433 ; 19 W. R. 1090 124 Arnold v. Hamel (1854), I) Ex. 404 ; 2 C. L. R. 499 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 137 . .40, 226, 227 / ajlJ V. Holbrook (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 96 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 80 ; 28 L. T. io • 21 W. R. 330 124 The re/eiencet are to pages, not to paragrapht. 'm TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXV PAOB Arnold V. May. oi Poole (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 860 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 97 ; 7 Jur. 653 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 741 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 574 639, 640, 644, 645 Arnott V. Hayes (1887), 36 Oh. D. 731; 66 L. J. Ch. 844; 57 L.T. 299; 36 W. R. 246 1062 Arnott V. Redfem (1826), 3 Bing. 353 ; 2 C. & P. 88; 11 Moore, C. P. 209 1 163, 1 154 Amsby v. Woodward (1827), 6 B. & C. 519 : 9 Dowl. & R. 536 622 Aronegary v. Lambonade (1881), 50 L. J. P. C. 28 ; 6 App. Cas". 3G4 ; 44 L. T. 895 149 Arundell v. Ld. Falmouth (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 440 ; 15 R. R. 305 404 Arundell v. White (1811), 14 East, 218 1033 Ash, Re (1856), Deane's Ecc. R. 181 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 526 701 Ashby V. Bates (1846), 15 M. & W. 589 ; 4 Dowl. & L. 33 259 Ashbyr. James (1843), 11 M. &W. 542; 12 L. J. Ex. 295 716 Ashcroft V. Morrin (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 450 ; 6 Jur. 783 671, 075 Asher v. Whitelock (1865), 35 L. J. Q. B. 17 ; L. R. 1 Q. B. 1 ; 13 L. T. 254; 11 Jur. N. S. 925 118 Ashforth v. Redford (1873), L. R. 9 C. P. 20 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 57 42 Ashhurst f. Mill (1848), 7 Hare, 502 ; 12 Jur. 693, 1035 749 Ashlin V. Lee (1875). 44 L. J. Ch. 376 ; 32 L. T. 348 ; 23 W. R. 458 .... 721 Ashling V. Boon, (1891), 1 Ch. 568 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 306 ; 64 L. T. 193 ; 39 W. R. 298 281 Ashmore, Re (1843), 3 Curt. 758 696 A.shmore v. Hardy (1836), 7 C. & P. 601 617 Ashpitel V. Bryan (1864), 32 L. J. Q. B. 91 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 328 ; 3 B. & S. 474 ; 5 B. & S. 723 ; 3 F. & F. 183 ; 11 L. T. 221 ; 12 W. R. 1082. . 548 Ashpitel V. Sercoi.ibe (1850), 5 Ex. 147 ; 6 Rjiil. C. 224 : 19 L.J. Ex. 82. .44, 526 Ashrufood Dowlah Ahmed v. Hyder Hosseiu Khan (1885), 11 Moore, lud. App. C. 94 101 Ashton, In goods of, (1892) P. 83 ; 61 L. J. P. 85 ; 67 L. T. 325 739, 740 Ashton V. Ld. Langdale (1851), 4 De Gex & Sm. 402, n 684 Ashton's case (1845), 7 Q. B. 169 811 Ashwell V. Lomi (1850), L. R. 2 P. & D. 477 136 Ashworth v. Munn (1878). 15 Ch. D. 363 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 747 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 107 ; 43 L. T. 653 ; 28 W. R. 965 683 Ashworth v. Outram (1877), 5 Ch. D. 923 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 687 ; 25 W. R. 896 ; 37 L. T. 85 ; 36 L. T. 400 663 Aslin f. Parkin (1758), 2 Burr. 065 1113 Aspden v. Scddon (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 359 ; L. R. 10 Ch. App. 391 ; 31 L. T. 626 ; 32 L. T. 415; 20 W. R. 580 114 Astbury v. Belbin (1850), 3 K. & C. 20 871 Aste v. Stumcre (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 82 ; 13 Q. B. D. 326 ; 49 L. T. 742 ; .32 W. R. 219 ; 6 Asp. M. C. 175 769 Aston, Ex parte (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 631 ; 4 De Gex & J. 220; 27 Beav. 474 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 779 !»65 Astor V. Union Ins. Co. (1827), 7 Cowen, 202 763 Atalanta, The (1808), 6 Co. Rob. Adm. 440, 454 102 Atchinson t\ Baker (1797), Peake, Add. Cas. 103 153 Atchley r. Spngg (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 345 ; 10 L. T. 16 ; 12 W. R 364 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 144 101, 422, 621 .A -henrv Peer. (1836), Pari. Miu. 45 426 Atherfold v. Beard (1788), 2 T. R. 610 ; 1 R. R. 556 996 Athcrley t'. Hurvey (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 518 ; 2 Q. B. D. 524 ; 36 L. T. 551 ; 25 W. R. 727 , 961, 1182 AthlonePccr (1841), 8 CI. & Fin. 262 1048 Atkins t'. Cir. wood (1837), 7 C 4: P. 757 166 Atkins f. Hiitton (1794), 2 Anst. 386 ; 3 Gwill. 1406 ; 4 Wood's Decrees, 410 ; 2 Eag. & Y. 403 ; 3 R. R. 689 430, 1050 Atkins V. M.Tedith (1836), 4 Dowl. P. C. 658 314 Atkins f. P'llnicr (1821), 4 B. & Ad. 377 347, 348 Atkins V. Trci'^-old (1823), 2 B. & C. 23 ; 3 D. & R. 200 492, 493 Atkins t\ Ld. Willoughbyde Broke (1794), 4 Wood's Decrees, 424 ; 2 Anst. 397; 3R. R. 691 " 430 Vol. I. endt with page 036. .|| I XXVI TABLE or GASES CITED. I : i Atkinson v. Littlowoi)d (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. S95 ; 31 L. T. 225 806 Atlniitio Milt. Ins. Co. v. Hiith (1880), 10 Ch. D. 474; 44 L. T. 67; 29 VV. U. ;'H7 179 Attrr V. AtkiiiHoii (18(9), L. R. IP. & D. Clio; 20 L. T. 404 141 An.-Gen. r. Asho (18.M)), 10 Ir. Cli. R. 309 320 Att.-Gen. v. Bond (183i»), 9 C. & P. 1H9 956 Att.-Gen. v. Boston (1K47), 1 Do G. & Sm. 619 791 Ait.-Gen. f. B»>wmau (1791), 2 B. & P. 632, n. (a) ' 252 Att.-Gen. t'. BnwllniKh (1885), 14 Q. B, D. 667; 64 L. J. Q. B. 205 ; 62 L. T. 689 ; 33 "W '^,. 673 ; 49 J. P. 500 899, 901, 903 Att.-Gon. V. Bmzouoso Coll. (1834), 2 CI. & Fin. 295 ; 8 Bligh, N. S. 377 ; 1 L. J. Ch. 6(! 791 Att.-Gen. f. Briunt (1846). 15 M. & W. 169; 15 L. J. Ex. 265 613, 614 Att.-Gen. v. May. of Bristol (1820). 2 Jac. & W. 294 790 Att.-Gen. f . Bulpit (ISil), 9 Price. 4 918 Att.-Gen. f.Bunce (1868). L.R. 6 Eq. 563; 37 L. J. Ch. 697; 18L.T. 742 77 Att.-Gon. v. Calvert (1857), 23 Beav. 248; 26L. J.Ch. 682; 3 Jur. N. S.600 138 Att.-(Jen. r. Cast Plate Glass Co. (1792), 1 Austr. 39 ; 3 Rev. R. 51S 766 Att.-Geu. V. thamhers (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 662; 4 Do G. M. & G. 206 ; 2 Eq. Rep. 1195; 2 W. R. 036 112 Att.-Gen. v. Clapham (1854), 4 Do G. M. & G. 691 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 177; 1 Jur. N. S. 505 791 Att.-Gen. r. Clero (1844). 12 M. & W. 640 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 82 201 Att.-Gen. f. Dakin (1869), 36 L. J. Ex. 167 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 160 ; 39 L. J. Ex. 113 ; L. R. 4 E. & I. App. 338 4 Att.-Gcn. f. Davison (1825). MClel. & Y. 160 325 Att.-Gen. f. Donaldson (I8li), HI M. & W. 117; 11 L. J. Ex. 338 4 Att.-(}eu. V. Drumniond (1842, should bo 1849). 2 H. of L. Cas. 862 . .784, 791 At^-(}en. V. DiMinimond (1842), 1 Dr. & War. 3.^3 786 Att.-Gen. v. Einerson (18s2), 62 L. J. Q. B. 07; 10 Q. B. D. 191; 48 L. T. 18; 31 W. R. 191 1183 Alt -Gen. r. Ewehne Hospital (1853), 17 Beav. 366 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 846 . . 123 Att.-Gen. f. Fadden (1815), 1 Price, 403 837 Att.-Gon. f. Gaskill (1882), 20 Ch. D. 519 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 870; 46 L. T. 180 ; 30 W. R. 658 660 Att.-Gen. f. Grote (1827), 2 Russ. & My. 699 785 Att.-Gcn. r. Il.iwkes (l«:iO). 1 Tyr. 3; 1 Cr. & J. 121 216 Att.-Gen. v. Hitchei ok (1847), lEx. 93 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 259 ; 11 Jur. 478.. 949, 950, 952, 953 Att.-O-'n. f. Kohler(1861), 9H. of L. Cas. 660; 8 Jur. N. S. 467 416 Af.-Gon. V. Lambe (1838), 3 Y. & C. (Ex.) 162 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 323 ; 2 Jur. 6'j8 1183 Ati.-Geu. r. Le Menhant (1772), 2 T. R. 201, n 310 Att.-Gen. V. Corp. of London (1850), 2 Hall & T. 1 : 2 Mao. & G. 247 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 314 ; 14 Jur. 205 1183 Att.-Gen. r. Metrop. Dist. Ry. Co. (1883), L. R. 6 Ex. D. 218 ; 42 L. T. 342; 28W.R.376 911 Att.-Gen. r. Murdoeh (1852). 1 De O. M. & G. 86 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 694 .... 791 Att.-(Jen. f. Nayior (1864), 33 L. J.Ch. 151 ; 1 H. & M. 809 538 Att.-Gen. v. North Metropolitan Tram. Co. (189,5), 72 L. T. 340 ..Add. [1182] Att.-Gen. v. Parker (1747), 3 Atk. 577 791 Att.-(Jen. r. Panitber (1 ;921, 3 Brown, C. C. 413 170 Att.-Gen t'. Earl of Powis (1853), Kay, 186 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 218 784 Att.-Gen. v. Radloff (1854), 10 Ex. 84; 23 L. J. Ex. 240; 10 Jur. 656; 2 0. L. R. 1110 262, 884,970 Att.-Gen. v. Ray (1843), 2 Haio, 518 353 Att.-Gen. v. Riddle (1832), 2 C. * J. 493 : 2 Tyr. 523 107 Alt -Gen. r. St. Cross. Hosp. (1853). 17 Beiiv. 435 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 793 . . . . 791 Att.-( Jen. I'. Sidney Sussex Coll. (18(i9). 38 L. J. Ch. 657 790 Att.-Geu. r. Sitwe'll (183,5), '. Y. Hl C. Ex. 559 ; 5 L. J. Ex. Eq. 80 780 Att.-{Jeu. r. Skinners' Co (1837;. Cooper C. P. 1 870, 871 Att -Gen. v. Stephens (1855), 6 De O. M. & G. 141 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 888 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 51 99, 442, 443, 637 The re/eretieea art to paget, i»»< to paragraphi. TABLE OF CASiiJS CITED. KXVU PAOB Att. -Gen. «. Sullivan (1842), 1 Arm. M. & O. t!94 919 Alt -Gen. f. Theakstone (1820), 8 Prico, 89 18, 1093 Att.-Gen. v. Thompson (1849), 8 Hare, 106 1 183 Att.-Gen v. Tomlhie (1877), 6 Ch. D. 750; 46 L. J. Ch. 654; 36 L. T. 684 : 25 W. R. 802 ; 15 Ch. D. 150 ; 43 L. T. 486 116 Att.-Gen. f.Whitwood Local Bd. (1S70), 40 L. J.Ch. 692; 19W.R. 1107.. 1189 Att.-Gen. v. Wilson (1839), 9 Sim. 526; S L. J. Ch. 119 813 Att.-Gen. of Prince of Wales v. Cio8«man (1866), 4 H. & C. 568 ; L. R. 1 Ex. 381 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 215; 14 L. T. 856 ; 14 W. R. i)96 ; 12 Jur. N. S 712 276 Attn-e V. Hawe (1878), 9 Ch. D. 337 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 863 ; 26 \V. R. 871 ; 38 L. T. 733 684 Attridgo, Re (1848). 6 Notes of Cases (Ecc. & Mar.), 597 698 Aitwood V. Small (1838), 6 CI. & Fin. 234 486 Attwood V. Taylor (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 289 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 01 1 10;S5 Attwood V. Welton (1828), 7 Conn. 66 950 Aiibfrt V. Walsh (1812). 4 Taun. 293 164 Auckland, The Earl of (1861), 30 L. J. P. M. & A. 121 ; Lush. Adm. 164 ; {nom. Maloomson v. Baldock) 16 Moo. P. C. C. 304 ; 5 L. T. 558 ; 10 W. R. 124 178 Auckland, Maid of, Re (1848), 6 Notes of Cases (Ecc. & M.) 240 1122 Audley, Ld., case of (1631), 3 How. St. Tr. 402 893 Au(^u.sta, Bk. of v. Earlo (1839), 13 Pet. 590 16 Auj,'ustien f. Challis (1847), 1 Ex. 280; 17 L. J. Ex. 73 285, 288 Austee (should be Anstce) v. Nelma (1853), 1 H. & N. 225 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 6 ; 27 L. T. 190 ; 4 W. R. 612 787 Austen, Admiral, Re ( 1 8.)2), 3 Kobcrts. 611 702 Austin, Ex parte (1870), 4 Ch. D. 13 ; 46 L. J. Bky. 1 ; 35 L. T. 629 ; 25 W. R. 61 849 Austin V. Buuyard (1865), 4 F. & F. 253 ; 6 B. & S. 687; 34 L. J. Q. B. 217 646 Au.stin «. Chambers (1837-8), 6 CI. & Fin. 1 486 Au.stinr. Evans (1841). 2 M. & Gr. 430 814 Austin V. Guard, of Bethnal Green (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 91 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 100 ; 29 L. T. HO? ; 22 W. R. 406 642 Austin V. Mead (1880), 16 Ch. D. 651 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 30; 43 L. T. 117 ; 28 W. R. 891 638 Austin r. Olsen (1868), 37 L. J. M. C. 34 ; L. R. 3 Q. B. 208 ; 9 B. & S. 461 ; 16 W. R. 426 77 Austin V. Rumsey (IS 19), 2 C. & Kir. 736 329, 1216 Australasia, Bk. of, • . Breillat (1847), 6 Moore, P. C. R. 152 ; 12 Jur. 189 160 Auutralasia, Bk. of, v. Harding (1850), 19 L. J. C. P. 315 ; 9 C. B. 661 .. 1165 Australasia. Uk. of, v. Nias (1851), 16 Q. B. 717 : 20 L. J. Q. B. 281 .... 1154 Australian Roy. Mail St. Nav. Co. v. Marzetti (1855), 11 Ex. 228 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 273 642, 645 Aveline v. AVlii.sson (1842), 4 M. & Gr, 801 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 168 664 Avory v. Pixloy (1808), 4 Mass 462 706 Avoson f. Ld. Kinnaird (1806), East, 188; 2 Smith, 286; 8 R. R. 455. .374, 464, 691 Awdloy V. Awdley (1690), 2 Vcm. 194 482 Avkroyd. Re (1847). 1 Ex 479; 17 L. J. Ex. 157 ; 5 Dowl. & L. 701.. .. 1126 Aylosford. Ld., v. Morris (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. App. 4'JO , 42 L. J. Ch. 540 ; 28L. T. 5U; 21 W. R. 424 137 Aylosford Peer. (1885), 11 App. Cas. 1 415, 621 Aylitfe V. Tracy (1722), 2 P. Wms. 66 680 Aynsloy v. Glover (1876), 44 L. J. Ch. 623 ; L. R. 10 Ch. App. 283 ; 32 L. T. 345 ; 23 W. R. 457 76 Ayrey v. Davenport (1807), 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 474 1031 Ayroyr. Hill(1824), 2 Add. 209 170 Ayrton v. Abbott (1849), 14 Q. B. 1 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 314 ; 14 Jur. 314 . . 1099, 1136 Ay ton V. Bolt (1827), 4 Bing, 106 713 Vol. I. ends with page 636. '■rf < : I XXVlll TABI<E OF CASES CITED. PAQK B., falsely called B. ». B. (1875), Ir. R. 9 Eq. 551 167 Babbr. ClemBon (1825), 12 Serg. & R. 328 514. Babbape v. Babbage (1870). L. R. 2 P. & D. 222 881 Babington v. Mahony f 1837), 5 Law Kec. 2nd Ser. 232, n 870 Backhouse, Inre(1841), 3 Ir. L. R. 301 871 BackhouHC v. Alcock (1885), 28 Cli. D. 669 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 842 ; 52 L. T. 342 ; 33 W. R. 407 913 Backhouse v. Bonomi (1861), 28 L. J. Q. B. 3/8 ; 1 E. B. & E. 622, 654; 6 Jur. N. S. 1345 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1 182 ; 32 L. T. 156 ; 9 H. of L. C. 503 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 181; 9 W. R. 769 114 Backhouse f. Jones (1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 65; 8 Scott, 148 230, 369 Bacon v. Bacon (1876), 34 L. T. 349 602 Bacon v. Chesney (1816). 1 Stark. N. P. Rep. 192 608, 552 Baddeley v. Mortlock (1816), Holt, N. P. Rep. 151 ; 17 R. R. 626 266 Bagot V. Bagot (1878), 1 L. R. Ir. 308 240, 349 Bagot V. Easton (1877), 47 L. J. Ch. 225 ; 7 Ch. D. 1 ; 37 L. T. 369 ; 26 W. R. 66 187 Bagot, Ld., V. Williams (1824), 3 B. & C. 235 ; 6 D. & Ry. 87 1123, 1124 Bagueley v. Hawley (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 625 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 328 ; 17 L. T. 116 776 Bahia, The (1865), L. R. 1 Adm. cfe Ecc. 15; 11 Jur. N. S. 1008; 14 W. R. 411 818 Bahia & Francisco Ry. Co., Re r. Tritten (1368), 37 L. J. Q. B. 176; L. R. 3 Q. B. 584 ; 9 B. & S. 844 ; 18 L. T. 467 ; 16 W. R. 802 641 Baildon v. Walton (1847), 1 Ex. 617 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 357 480, 717 Bailey, Ex parte, and Ex parte Collier (1854), 23 L. J. M. C. 161 ; 3 E. & B. 607 132, 1 136 Bailey, Ex parte. In re Barrell (1852), 22 L. J. Bank. 45 ; 1 W. R. 343. . 83 Bailey, Re (li>3S), 1 Curteis, 914 700 Bailey v. Applevard (1838), 8 A. & E. 161 ; 3 N. & P. 257 ; 1 W. W. & H. 208 ; 2 Jur. 872 207 Bailey V. Bellamy (1841), 9 Dowl. 507; 10 L. J. Q. B. 41 733 Bailey I'. Bidwell (1844), 13 M. & W. 73 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 264 262, 1210 Bailey v. Bodenham (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 288 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 252; 10 Jur. N. S. 821 ; 10 L. T. 422 ; 12 W. R. 865 32 Bailey f. Edwards (1865), 34 L. J. Q. B. 41 ; 4 B. & S. 761 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 134 758 Bailey V. Harris (1849), 12 Q. B. 905 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 115 1104 Bailey v. Hyde (1820), 3 Conn. 463 255 Bailey v. Macaulay (1849), 13Q. B. 816; 19 L. J.Q. B. 73; 14 Jur. 80.... 541, 617 Bailey v. Sweeting (1861), 30 L. J. C. P. 150 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 843 ; 9 W. R. 273 673 Baillie i'. Jackson (18")3), 3 De G. M. & G. 38 ; 10 Hare (Appendix) xlvi ; 22 L.J. Ch. 753; 1 W. R. 196; 19 Jur. 170 13 Baillie v. Kell (1858), 4 Bing. N. C. 638 ; 6 Scott, 379 ; 1 Am. 246 223 Baillie v. Ld. Inchiquin (1796), 1 Esp. 435 712 Baillie's case (1778), 21 How. ^t, Tr. 358 603, 612 Bain V. Case (1829), 3 C. & P. 196; M. & M. 262 1048 Bain f. Fothergill (1874), L. R. 6 Ex. 69 ; L. R. 7 H. L. 158 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 34 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 243 ; 23 L. T. 670 ; 31 L. T. 387 ; 19 W. R. 134. . 773 Bainr. Mason (1824), 1 C. & P. 202, 203, n 1172,1173 Bain 1'. Whitehaven andFurness Junc.Rail.Co. (1850),3 H. L.Cas. 19. .61,1176, 1231 Bainbridge v. Wade (1860), 16 Q. B. 89 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 7 ; 16 Jur. 672. . 786 Baiubrigge v. Baddeley (1847), 2 Phillips, 705 1117 Bainbrigge v. Browne (1881), L. R. 18 Ch. D. 188 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 522 ; 44 L. T. 706 ; 29 W. R. 782 136 Baines t. Swainson (1863), 4 B. & S. 270 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 8 L. T. 536 ; 11 W. R. 945 116 Baird v. Cochran (1818), 4 Serg. & R. 397 969 Baker, Re, Collins c. Rhodes (1882), 20 Ch. D. 230; 61 L. J. Ch. 316; 45 L. T. 658 ; 30 W. R. 858 76 The n/ertncM are to pages, not to paragraph*. ^i TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXIX FAQB Baker v. Baker (1863), 32 L. J. Pr. & Mat. 145 ; 3 Swab. & Triat. 213 ; 11 W. R. 602 947, 949 Baker v. Bradley (1856), 2.5 L. J. Ch. 7 : 4 Do G. M. & G. 697 1.36 Brtker v. Cave (1857), 1 H. & N. 674 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 190 107« Baker v. Dening (1838), 8 A. & E. 94 ; 3 N. & P. 228 700 Baker r. Dewey (1823), 1 B. & C. 704 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 99 92 Baker v. Keen (1819), 2 Starkie, N. P. .501 168 Baker v. Lond. and S. W. Ry. Co. (1867), 37 L. J. Q. B. 53 ; L. R. 3 Q B. 91; 8B. &S. 645; 16 L. T. 126 1186 Baker v. Monk (1864), 33 Boav. 419 ; 4 De G. J. & S. 388 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 624,691; 10 L. T. N. S. 86, 630 ; 12 W. R. 521, 779 136 Baker r. Ray (1826), 2 Ru-^s. 73 108 Baker v. Sampson (1863). 14 C. B. N. S. 383 166 Bakewell's Patent, Re (1802). 15 Moo. P. C. 385 129 Balcetti v. Seraui (1792), Peake, N. P. 142 231 Baldey v. Parker (1823), 2 B. & C. 37 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 220 689, 690 Baldney v. Ritohie (1824), 1 Starkie, N. P. 338 311 Balkis Co. Re (1888), 58 L. T. 300 ; 36 W. R. 392 134 Ball, Re (1890), 25 Ir. L. R. 556 790 Ballard v. Way (18361. 1 M. & W. 52G : 2 Gale, 61 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 207 .... 1092 Balls and Met. Bd. Works. Re (1866), 7 B. & 8. 177 ; L. R. 1 Q. B. 337 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 101 ; 13 L. T. 702 ; 14 W. R. 370 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 183 . . 728 Balme v. Hutton (undated), 2 Lew. C. C. 162 (dted) ; 3 Moo. & Sc. 1 . . . . 926 Baltazzi v. Ryder (1808), 12 Moo. P. C. C. 168 ; 31 L. T. O. S. 373 102 Bamfield v. Massey (1808), 1 Camp. 460 256 Bamfield v. Tapper (1851), 7 Ex. 27 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 6 716 Bamford, Ex parte (1809), 15 Ves. 449 379 Banbury Peer. (1809), Le Marchant's Gardner's Peerage; Selwyn's Nisi Prius, 748-750 101,416, 422, 423, 424 Banbury's Trusts, Re (1876), I. R. 10 Eq. 408 144 Bancroft v. Bancroft and Rumney (186.5), 34 L. J. Pr. & Mat. 14 ; 13 W. R. 506 1110 Bandy v. Cartwright (1819), 8 Ex. 913 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 285 773, 774 Bank Prosecutions (1819), R. & R. 378 278 Bank of Augusta V. Earle (1839), 13 Pet. 619, 689 16, 181 Bank of Columbia v. Patterson (1813), 7 Cranch, 299 640 Rank -f Monroe v. Field (18421. 2 Hill R. 445 388 Bank of New South Wales v. Owston (1879), L. R. 4 App. Cas. 270 ; 14 Cox C. C. 267 ; 48 L. J. Pr. C. 25 ; 40 L. T. 500 343 Banks v. Crossland (1874), 44 L. J. M. C. 8 ; L. R. 10 Q. B. 97 ; 32 L. T. 226 ; 23 W. R. 414 681 Banly, R« (1849), 1 Roberts. 710 698 Biinnatyue v. Bannatyne (1852), 2 Roberts. 475 ; 16 Jur. 864 1102 Banner v. Jackson (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 472 609 Bar V. Gratz (1819). 4 Wheat. 213 429, 433 Barbat v. Allen (1852), 7 Ex. 609 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 156 879, 887, 891, 910 Barber, Re (1806), 36 L. J. P. D. & Mat. 19 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 267 ; 15 L. T. 192 ; 15 W. R. 231 307 Barber v. Holmes (1800), 3 Esp. 190 1049, 1172, 1173 Barber v. Houston (1885), 18 L. R. Ir. 475 71 Barber v. Liimb (1860), 29 L. J. C. P. 234 ; 8 C. B. N. S. 95 ; 8 W. R. 461 ; 6 .lur. N. S. 981 1153 Barber r. Wood (1877), 4 Ch. D. 885; 46 L. J. Ch. 728 ; 36 L. T. N. S. 373 801 Barber v. Wood (1838), 2 M. & Rob. 172 814, 815, 816 Barclay v. Bailey (1810), 2 Camp. 527 ; 11 R. R. 787 33 Barclay v. Maskelyne (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 115; 1 Johns. 124; 4 Jur. N. S. 1293 704 Barclay f. Parrott (1856), 1 C. B. N. S. 49 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 77; 3 Jur.N.S. 072 726 Barden r. Keverberg (1837), 2 M. & W. 61 ; 2 Gale, 201 231 Bartraddie Coal Co. v. Wark (1859), 3 Macq. H. of L. Cas. (Sc.) 468 ; 1 Paterson, 814 592, 761 Vo\. /. ends with page 635. 'ii' ■. i ( . ^ xyx TABLE OF CASES CITED. Baring r. Clagett (1802), 3 B. 4 P. 215 ; 6 R. R. 759 Bariujr v. CUrk (1837). 12 Pi..k. 220 Barker r. Buttnax (18l5j, 7 Beav. 134 ; 13 L. J. Ch Barker v. Davia (ISM). 34 L. J. M. C. 140 ; 11 Jur. Barker r. Dixie (17:*6), Cisew temp Hardw. 264 PAOS 1146,1149 388 VsTsJur! 89 !!!!'.! 74 N. S. 651 638 891 Barker r. Rav (1826), 2 Rniw. 7H 433 Barker r. Richardison (1827), 1 Y. & J. 362 487 Barker r. Stead (1817), :» C. B. 946 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 160 1219 Barker's Estatr, Be '187!»), 10 Ch. D. 162 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 171 ; 27 W. R. 393 534 Barkw-orth r. Y.iung (185:), 26 L. J. Ch. 153 ; 4 Drew. 1 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 34 680 Barnard, Re (186.'). 31 L. J. Pr. & Mat. S:> ; 2 Swab. & Trist. 4S9 1031 Bumed's Baukinir Co.. Re (PeelV Ca.sf) (1867). 36 L. J. Ch. 757 ; L. R. 2 Ch. 674 ; 15 W. R. 110«; 16 L. T. N. 8. 780 1076 Barnes, Ex parte (1812), 2 Dowl. N. S. 20 ; 7 Jur. 217 994 Barnes v. KetUe (1766) 2 Wils. 314 932 Barnes r. Lu(a« (182>). Ry. A- M. 264 1213 Barnes r. Mawsoo !1813), 1 M. & Sel. 81 397, 403 Barnes r. Pendrey (183 'I. 7 Dowl. 747 733 Barnes r. To?e (1884f. 13 Q. B. D. 410 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 567 ; 61 L. T. 292 ; 33 \V. R. io ; 4« J. P «)64 48 Barnes t. Trompowrskr (1797), 7 T. R. 265 12l3 Barnes r. Vincent 'lM6i. 5 Moo. P. C. C. 201 1045, 1 132 Bamett r. Rrand»o a843). 6 M. & Gr. 6:<0 6 Burnett i. Cox (1847;, 9 Q B. 617; 4 New Sess. Cas. 487 ; 16 L. J. M. C. 27 ; II Jur. 118 228 Bamett r. Gloaop a8;<5j. 1 Bing;. N. C. 636 ; 3 Dowl. 625 220 Baruttt f. Lucas il«7i). L R. 6 C. L 24, 1 120 Bam.tt r. Tugwell as6-'), 31 Beav. 23> ; 31 L. J. Ch. 6''.9; 8 Jur. N. S. 787: 10 W. R. 679; 7 L.T.N. S. 121 174 Barnstal.le r. Lathev .1789). 3 T. R. :<0.t !'95 BaruNiaple Second Annuity Society (1884), 50 L. T. 424 74S Barough r. White (182-1 . 4 B. 4 C. 328 487, 512 B<trr .•: Gratz (1819;, 4 Wheat. 213 429, 433, 1U98 Barracloujrh r. Grernhoujrh (1867), 36 L. J. Q. B. 26, 251 ; 7 B. & 8. 17u ; 8 B. \- 8 623 ; L R. 2 Q. B. 1 1 163 Barraclough r. Johnson (.838), 8 A. & E. 99 ; 3 N. & P. 233 ; 1 W. W. & H. 162 : 2 Jur. 8 >9 402 BaiTell, Re [nee Bailer. Ex parte). Barrel! f. TrusseU (1811;. 4Ttunt. 121 653 Barrett v. Buxton {1826). i Aik. (Vermont) 167 747 Barrett v. Uyndmau 1840;, 3 Ir. L H. 109 676 Barrett v. L<.ii}r {l.s56j. 8 Ir. L. B. 331 ; 3 H. L. Cas. 395 46, 24 { Barrett t'. Rolfe (1845). 14 M. & W. 348 : 14 L. J. Ex. 308 656 Barrett v. WiWn (1834), 1 C. M. & R 586 ; 3 Dowl. P. C. 220 ; 5 Tyr. 218 IKiO Barron r. Daniel ^1838,. Crawf. & Dix. Abrid. C. 283 1015 Barronet's Caae (ISo-t,, 1 EI. & Bl. 1 ; Dears. (Peaice's Report) ol : 22 L. J. M. C. 25 ; 17 Jur. 1H4 79 Barrow f. Dvster '1884;. H Q. B. D. 635 ; 51 L. T. 673 ; 33 W. R. 199. . 769 Barrow t'. Huinphn-vs J82(i). 3 B. & A. 598 831, 832 Barrs r. Fewkes (iS65/. M L. J. Ch. 522 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 669 ; 13 W. R. 987 ; 12 L. T. N. 8. 727 808 Barr«f.Ja>k--*on(l8l5 , 1 Piiillip.s. .582; 14L.J.Ch.43:i: 9Jur. 609.. 1105, 1 106. li:V2 Barry v. Bebbiugt'.n (I7»2). 4 T. R. 514 ; 2 R. R 450 27?, 437 Barry f. Butliu (18 (8 . 1 Curt. 638 ; 2 Moo. P. C. K. 482 142 Barrymore. Ld., r. Tavlor (1795), 1 Esp. 326 484 Barstow's case (1831;. 'l LewinC C. 110 662 Birtheiemy r. The People, k, . (1842), 2 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 248 378 Bartholomew r. St.-phen-« (1.S30), 8 C. & P. 728 308, 30n, 319 Baitlett V. Delprat (18i»S), 4 Matw. 702 371, 514 Bartlett v. Downes (182aj, :< B. & C. 616 ; 6 Dowl. & R. 526 ; 1 C. & P. 622 12G The Tt/eriHct* urt to pages, not to paruyrapht. TABLE OF CASIW IUKD. XXM PAttK I3arH.-tt». Oillanl (1826), 3 Rush. 156; 6 L. J. Ch. 19 4S:{, NO>i KHrtlett. f. Pentlaiid (1830), 10 B. 4: C. 7ii'> l.iS Birtlettv. riiker-.>fill (175!).G0), 4 I'^.sr, 577. n. ; I V>,x, 5; 1 U. li. 1 ., i.U7 Biiitlett I.'. Smith (1843), U M. vV VV. 18 ; I'i L. J. Ex. -.'87 ; 7 Jur. 4l8. .25, 26 Banlett i: Wells (1861), 31 L. J. Q. B. 17 ; 1 B. & S. 8 6 ; 5 L. T. 007 ; 111 \V. R '229 541 Barton v. Bank of New South Wales (1^9.l), 15 A p. Cas. 37i* So. 748 Barton v. Diwes (1850). 10 C. B. 261 ; 19 L. J. C. l\ 302 758. 304 Barton (»hould be Harlow) i>. Dupuy (1S23), 1 Mart. N. S. 442 1034 Barton (should be Barstow) v. Palm-s (17o4), Preu. in Ch. 233 327 Barton V. Robins (1769), 3 Pliillim. 445. u. (A.) 140 Barwell e. Adkiiis (1810), 1 M. & Gr. "07 : 2 Scott, N. R. 1 1 1^43 Barwiok v. Enirlish Joint Stock Bin.. (1867), L. U. 2 Ex. 259 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 147; 16L. T. 461; l.S W. li. 877 686 Baseley c. Fordor {nee Bazelev v. Fordor). Bass i>. Clive (I8I0), 4 M. & Sel. 13 ; 4 Camp. 78 647 Bastard v. Smith (18 i9), 10 A. & E. 213 ; 2 P. & D 453 476, i'.56, 1014 B.istar I V. Trutch (1836), 3 A. & E. 451 ; 6 N. & M. 1()9 ; 4 Dowl. 6 ; 1 H. & W. 32 1 130 Basten v. Carew (1825), 3 B. & C. 652 ; 6 D. & R. 558 10i>8, 1 1' Bastint). Carew (1824). Ry. & M. 127 917 Batchelor v. Ho .ey wood (1799), 2 Esp. 714 r222 Biter. Hill (1823). 1 C. & P. 100 257 Batew. Kiuspy (1835), 1 C. M. & R. 41; 4 Tyr. 662 109, 319, 6'i3 Bateraan f. Bailey (1794), 5 T. R. 512 377, 38i). 381. 514 Bateman v. Phillips (1812), 15 East, 272 ; 4 Taun. 157 G70, 759 Bateman i-. Binder (1842), 3 Q. B. 574 ; 2 G. & D. 790; 11 L. J. Q. B. 281 714 Bateman w. Ld. Roden (1844), 1 Jones & Lat. 356 739 Bates I'. Barber (1849), 4 Cush. (Mass), lii7 974 Bates i: Dun Pablo Sora (1856), 10 Moo. P. C. R. 467 178 Biites V. Townlev (I8I8), 2 Ex. 156 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 399 517, 1161 B.itesoii V. Hart>irik (1801), 4 Esp. 43 598 Bath, Ld. v. Bathersea (1695), 6 Mod. 10 480 Bathui>t r. Erinifton (1877), L. R. 2 App. Cas. 698 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 748 , 37 L. T. :i38 ; 25 W. R. 908 741 Batley v Kynock (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 632 ; 44 L.J. Ch. 565 ; 33 L. T. 45. . 818 Batten. Re (1849), 7 Notes of Cu.ses (Eccil. & M ) 2h8 6M Battbews v. Galindo (1828), 4 Bing. 613 ; 1 M. & P. 665 ; 3 C. & P 238 539, 890 Batthyany f. Bouch (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 421 ; 44 L. T. 177 ; 29 W. R. 665 651 Battursp. Sellers (1820), 6 Har. & J. 117 628 Baugh V. Cradouke (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 182 602 Bauiuann r. James (1868), L. R. 3 Ch. 508 ; 18 L. T. 421 ; 16 W. R. 877. 672 Baxendale v. Bennett (1878), 3 Q B. D. 525 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 624 ; 26 W. R 899 ... . 647 Baxendale v. De Valmer (1887), 57 L. T. 556 697 Baxter v. Brown (1845), 7 M. & Gr. 215 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 1019 . . . J3G6, 683, 084 Baxter f. Nurse (1844), 6 M. & Ur. 935 ; 10; 13 L. J. C. P. 82; 8 Jur. '^73 .. Bayard c. Malcolm (I8116), 1 Johns. 467 , B.iyli-y V. Ashton (I81O), 12 A. A: K. 493 7 Scott, N. R. 8ul ; 1 C. A: K. 153 713 4 P. & D. 204 717 16 L.J. C. P. 206 93. 98 Biiylcy V. Bradley (1848). 6 Com. B. 396 Bajley ». Buckland (1847), 1 Ex. 1 ; 16 L. J. Ex.204 Ill I Bavley v. M. of Conyngham (1n63), 15 Ir. C. L. Hop. 406 654 Bayleyr. Overseers of Nantwich (If 16), 2 C. B. 118; 1 Lutw. Reg. C. 363 156 Bayley v. Wilkins (1849), 7 C. B. 886 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 273 ; 13 Jur. 883 . . 158 Bayley f. Wylie(l807), 6 Esp. 85 ...U).i7. lOlO Baylitfo V. Biitterworth (18l7), 1 Ex. 429 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 18 ; 11 Jur. lilO ; 6 Railw. Cas. 2'>3 157. 168 Bay lis v. Lawrence (1840), 11 A. & E. 926 ; 3 P. & D. o26 ; 4 Jur. 652 .46, 46, 82 f I t-.il Val. J, ends withpaye 636. xxxu TABLE OF CASES CITED. FAOB Baynton's case (1702), 14 How. St. Tr. 630 359 Bazeley v. Forder (186S), L. R. 3 Q. B. 662 ; 9 B. & S. 602 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 240 ; 18 L. T. 756 166, 168 Beadle, Ro (1849), 1 Roberts. 749 ; 7 Notes of Caees (Euol. & M.) 43 698 Bcadon V. King (1849), 17 Sim. 34 601 Beal V. 8. Dev. Ry. Co. (1864), 6 H. & N. 875 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 441 723 Beale v. Suiulers (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 8 oO ; 6 Scott, 58 654 Beall V. Beuk (1 794), 3 Hard. & McHen. 242 508 Bealy «. Greenslade (1831), 2 C. & J. 61 716 Beamish ». Beamish (1876), I. R. 10 Eq. 413 1071 Beamon v. EUioe (1831), 4 C. & P. 585 918 Bean v. Quimby (1829), 6 New Hamps. 94 600 Beardroan v. Wilson (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 57 ; sub nom. Beardmore v. "Wilson, 38 L. J. 0. P. 91 ; 19 L. T. 282 ; 17 W. R. 54 656 Beardslee v. Richardson (1833), 11 "Wend. 25 378 Beasley v. Magrath (1804), 2 Sch. & Lef. 34 496 Beasnej's Trusts, Re (186i/), 38 L. J. Ch. 169 ; L. R. 7 Eq. 498 173 Beatson v. Skene (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 430 ; 5 H. & N. 838 618, 619 Beattie v. Ld. Ebury (1872) L. R. 7 Ch. App. 777, 800—803 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 804 7»0, 781 Beauchamp v. Cash (1822), Dowl. & Ry. N. P. 3 1223 Beauchamp ". Parry (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 89 611, 612 Beaufort, D. of v. Ashburnham (1863), 32 L. J. C. P. 97 ; 13 C. B. N. S. 698 818 Beaufort, D. of r. Crawshay (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 699; 35 L. J. C. P. 342; 1 H. &R. 638 25, 349 Beaufort, I>. of v. Neald ^1844), 12 CI. & Fin. 249 638 Beaufort, D. of v. Smith (1849, 4 Ex. 450 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 97 124, 396, 397, 403, 404, 1040, 1092 Beaufort, D. of v. May. of Swansea (1849), 3 Ex. 413 124, 791, 792 Beaumont v. Breugeri (1847), 6 C. B. 301 690 Beaumont v. Fell (1723), 2 P. "Wms. 141 795 Beaumont v. Field (1818), 2 Chittv R. 275 789 Beaumont V. Mountain (1834) lOBing. 404 1006 Beaumont v. Perkins (1809), 1 Phillim. 78 1223 Beiura.^ ". Sir "W. Scott (not dated). Lord Eldon's Life by Twiss, Vol. II. pp. 233—236 616 Beavan«. M'Dounell(1854), 23L. J. Ex. 326; 10 Ex. 184 243 Beck and Jackson, Re (1857), 1 C. B. N. S. 695 1039 Beckett v. Howe (1869), 39 L. J. P. & M. 1 ; L. R. 2 P. & D. 1 697 Beckett v. Corp. of Leeds. (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. App. 421 ; 26 L. T. 375 ; 20 "W. R. 454 112 666 664 Beckford v. Beckford (1774), Lofft, 490 Beckham v. Drake (1847-9), 2 H. L. C. 579 , Beckham t». Osborne (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 771 486 Beckton v. Barton (1859). 27 Beav. 99 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 673 806 Beckwith V. Benner (1834), 6C. &P. 681 610 Beckwith v. Sydebotham (1807), 1 Camp. 117 ; 10 R. R. 652 934, 935 Becquetv. MiicCarthy (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 95'. 1146, 1147, 1154 Bedford, E. of r. Exeter, Bp. of (1616-17), Hob. 137 1115 Bedford, D. of r. Lopes (1838), cited Doe v. Pulman, 3 Q. B. 623 .. ..301, 433 Bedfordshire cane (1785), 2 Luders, 411 497 Beech V. Jones (1848), 5 C. B. 696 924,927 Beecher t: Major ( 1 865), 2 Dr. & Sm. 431 667 Beechingv. Gowor (1816), Holt, N. P. Rep. 314; 17 R. R. 644 909 Beemant'. Duck (1843), 11 M. & "W. 251 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 198 547, 548 Beer v. "Walker (1877), 46 L. J. C. P. 677 ; 25 W. R. 880 776 Beer v. "Ward (1821), cited 2 Ph. Ev. 258 1227 Bees V. "Williams (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 581 ; 1 T. & G. 23 660 BecHton v. Collyer (1827), 4 Bing. 313 • 12 Moore, 552 ; 2 C. & P. 607. . . . 163 Belbin v. Skeats (1857), 27 L. J. P. & M. 56 ; 1 Sw. & Tr. 148 278, 1215 Belcher v. M'Intosh (1839), 8 C. & P. 721 258, 269 The references are to pages, not to paragraphs. TABLE OF CASES CITED XXXlll FAOK BoWon f. Campbell (1851), 6 Ex. 886 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 32'- 179 Bulfn>t Dock A.!t, Ro (1860-7), Ir. Rep. 1 Eq. I'i8, 14". 234 Belf.Ht, The (1884), 9 P. D. 215 ; 63 L. J. P. 88 ; 51 L. T. 271 ; 33 W. R. 171; 6 Asp. M. 0. 291 282 Bell r. AtiHley (1812), 16 East, 143 ; 14 R. R. 322 490 Brll r. HruHi (1840), 17 Peters, 161 755 ];ill r. Cliiivtc,r(1843\ 1 C. & Kir. 162 12H Bell r. I'otherg-ill (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 148 ; 23 L. T. 323 ; 18 W. R. 1040 H3 Bell V. Fraiikis (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 446 ; 11 L. J. C. P. 300 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 460 520, 521 Bill i: Hottiml (1741), 9 Mod. 305 752 Brll i: Kennwlv (1868). L. R. 1 H. L. (So. & D.) 307 17S Bell r. Love (18«4), 10 Q. B. D. 547 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 290 ; 48 L. T. 592 ; 17 J. P. 41.8 115 ]^11 /■. Mor.i>oii (1828), 1 Peters, 371 386 Bill r. I'arke (1860), 11 Ir. C. L. Rep. 413 255, 256 B.il r. Simpsuii (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 363; 2 H. & N. 410 83 ]<, 11 r. Stewart (1842), Arm. M. .t 0. 401 977 Bill r. Wardcll (1740), Willes, 202 39 Hi II r. AVil.sdii (INi.O), 2 Dr. & Sm. 395 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 337 50 Bi U's case (1800), eited in Joy ou Couf. 71 ; (iiid in 1 McNally, Ev. 43 . , 560 Brllaiiiv r. lAbcnham (1891), 45 Ch. D. 481 ; 00 L. J. Ch. 166; 64 L. T. ■178 ;' 39 AV. H. 257 672 Bcllaiiiv V. Junes (1802), 8 Vos. 31 ; 6 R. R. 20.) 342 BiUerophon, H.M.S. (1874), 44 L. J. Adm. 5 ; 31 L. T. 756 ; 23 AV. R. •J4S 618 Brlliiifrer r. The People (1832), 8 Weud. 595 962 Bellinger's ease (1832), 8 Wend. 595, 599 674 Belt r. Lawes (IS83), "Time,«," 1SK3 932 B.inpde r. Johnstone (1790), 3 Ves. 198 179 Beud r. Georgia Ins. Co. (1842), Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1842, cited in Gr. Ev. s. 292 706 Benesh v. Booth (1864), 18 C. B. N. S. HI ; 34 L. J. C. P. 99; 11 L. T. 479; 13W. R. 271 726 Bengal, The a.s59). Swab. Adm. 408 1120 Benham's Trust.^ Re (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 205 ; 16 W. R. 180; reversing 36 L. J. Ch. 502 ; L. R. 4 Eq. 416 173 Benhain r. Newell (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 424 ; S. C, sub nom. Palmer v. Xewall, 20 Beav. 32 807 Benmore, The (1873), L. R. 4 Adm. i Ecc. 132 ; 43 L. J. Adm. 5 260 Beniiet ••. Bennet (1879), 10 Ch. D. 474 ; 40 L. T. 378 ; 27 W. R. 573. . . . 666 Benuet v. Hartford (1650), Sty. 333 899 Bennet v. Watson (1814), 3 M. & Sel. 1 ; 15 R. R. 373 811 Bennett r. Blain (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 518 ; 1 H. A: P. 36 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 6:i ; 10 Jur. N. S. 130 ; 9 L. T. 506 ; 12 AV. R. 175 684 Bennett v. Brmntitt (1867). L. R. 3 C. P. 28 : 37 L. J. C. P. 35 ; 17 L. T. 213 ; 16 AV. R. l;jl ; 1 II. & P. 407 700 Bennett v. Ganigee (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 33, 204 ; 35 L. T. 764 ; 36 L. T. 48 : 23 AV. 11. SI, 293 92 Bennett A: Ghive, Re (1877), 46 L. J. Bunk. 81 ; L. R. 5 Ch. D. 145 ; 25 AV. R. 504 847 Bennett r. Crittiths (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 98 ; 3 L. T. 735 ; 9 AV. R. 332 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 284 364 Bennett r. Houldsworth (1877 , 40 L. J. Ch. 646; L. R. 6 Ch. D. 671; 3'i L. T. 648 806 Bennett v. Hyde (1825), 6 Conn. 24 265 Bennett r. Jfarshall (1856), 2 K. & J. 740 793 Biiinett r. Sharpo (1892), eited Greeuleaf ou Evid., 15th ed. 309 698 Bennett v. The State of Teunes.see (1826), Mart. & Y. 133 18 Bennion i>. Davison (1838), 3 M. & AV. 179 ; 1 H. & H. 46 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 1'*^ 533 m Vol. 1. ends uith page 635. XXXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOE Benson v. Benson (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 172 ; 40 L. J. P. & D. 1 ; 23 L. T. 709 ; 19 W . R. 190 705 BeuHon V. Chapman (1848), 2 H. L. Cds. 696, 722 ; 8 C. B. 950 ; 13 Jur. 969 207 Benson v. Marshal (undated), cited Shaw Broom, 4 Dowl. & \y. 731 .. 511 Benson r. Olive (1781, should be 1732), 2 Su-. 919 171, 328 Benson v. Post (1718), 1 Wils. 240 996 Bentall V Buru (1824), 5 D. & R. 284 ; 3 B. & C. 423 ; R. & M. 107 .... 091 Bentall f. Sidney (1H39). 10 A. & E. 164 1014 Benthani v. Wilson {see Re Parker). Bentley 4'. Cooke (1784). 3 Doutf. 424 892 Bentley, Dr., case of (173i)-6), Fortesc. 202; 1 Str. 557; Andr. 176; 2 Ld. Raym. 1334 1148 Bentley V. Maci.'iy (1802). 31 Bi-av. 155; 31 L. J. Ch. 697 539, 749 Benton v. Snttou (17!»7), 1 Bos. & P. 24 37 Beuyon v. Crosswell (1818). 12 Q. B. 899; 18 L. .T. Q. B. 1 : 12 Jur. 1036 652 Beuyon v. Nettlefold (1850), 3 Mac. & G. 94 ; 20 L. .7. Ch. 186 91 Beniau v. Greenwood (1878). 20 Ch. D. 767, n. ; 46 L. T. 524, n 536 Bere v. Ward (1821), 2 Ph. Ev. 246 87 BerKheim v. Gt. East. Ry. Co. (1878), 3 C. P. D. 221 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 318 ; 38 L. T. 160 ; 26 W. R. 301 161 Berkeley, Peerage (1811), 4 Camp. 415; 14 R. R. 782, vi. ..307, 393, 408, 416, 418, 419, 422, 435, 976 Berkeley, Peerage (1853-61), 8 H. L. 0. 21 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 21 ; 4 L. T. 686. .309, 411, 412, 423 Berkeley v. Hardy (1826), 5 B. & C. 355 ; 8 D. & R. 102 645 B -rmon v. Woodbridge (1781), 2 Doug. 788 479, 480 Bemardi r. Motteu.x (1781), 2 Doug. 575 1149 Bernasconi v. Atkiiisou (1853), 10 Hare, 345 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 184 ; 1 W R. 152; 17 Jur. 12S 798, 799 Bernasconi r. Farel)rother (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 372 498 Bei-ne, City of v. Bk. of England (1804), 9 Ves. 347 ; 7 R. R. 218 S Bemett v. Taylor (1801), 9 Ves. 381 1213 Berney v. Bp. of Norwich (1860), 36 L. J. Ecc. 10 032, 884 Berneyt'. Read (1845), 7 Q. B. 79- 14 L. J. Q. B. 247 1038 Berrev v. Liudley (1841), 3 M. & G. 512 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 01 ; 5 Jur. 1001 ; 11 ii. J. C. P. 27 654, 655 Berridge r. Ward (18G1), 30 L. J. C. P. 218 ; 10 C. B. N. S. 400; 7 Jur. N. S. 876; 2 F. & F. 208 112 Berry, E.\ parte (1872. should be 1812), 19 Ves. 218 824 Berry v. Alderman (18.-)3), 14 C. B. 95 : 2 C. L. R. 691 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 34 202 Berry v. Banner (1792), Ptake, 157 ; 3 R. R. 674 397, 1 109 Berry v. Pratt (1823), 1 B. \- C. 276 ; 2 Dowl. & R. 424 818 Berryman v. Wise (1792), 4 T. R. 366; 2 R. R. 413 148, 150, 519 Bertbim r. Loughman (1817). 2 Stark. 258 934 Bertie r. Beaumont (1816), 2 Price, 308 87, 431 Berwick i: Horsfall (1858), 27 L. J. C. P. 193 : 4 C. B. N. S. 450; 4 Jur. N. S. 615 44, 45 Berwick- upon-'iVccd, May. & Corp. of v. Murray (1850), 10 L. J. Ch. 281, 286 945 Berwick, May. of, v. Oswald (18.j3), 1 E. & B. 295 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 129 ; 17 Jur. 1148 750 Berwick's case (1716), Fost. C. L. 10 ; 18 How. St. Tr. 370 658 Besaut v. Cross (1851), 10 C. B. 895 ; 2 L. M. & P. 351 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 173 ; 15 Jur. 828 756 Besley, Ex parte (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 176 ; 2 H. & Tw. 375 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 382 ; 14 Jur. 704 64X Bessela v. Stem (1877), 2 C. P. D. 266 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 467 ; 37 L. T. 88 ; 25 W. R. 661 631, 881 Bessey v. Windham (1844), 6 Q. B. 172 ; 14 L.J. Q. B. 7 ; 8 Jur. 824. .481, 1133 Bethara v. Benson (1818), Gow, R. 45 388 The rtferencea are to payet, not to paragraphs. TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXXV PAUU Bethell f. Bkncowe (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 119 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 668 ; 10 L. J. C.P. 243 288,291 Betttley f. McL.vd (1837),. 3 Bing. N. C. 405; 6 L. J. 0. P. Ill ; 4 So. IJl; 5Dowl. 481 819 Betuloy 1. Koid (1843), 4 Q. B. 511 ; 3 G. & D. 561 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 172 ; 7 Jur. 507 6^i> Belts V. UiiKley (1832), 12 Pick. 572, 582 1098 Beits V. De Vitre (1868), L. R. 3 Ch. 429 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 325; 18 L.T. 165; 16 AV. R. 529 107 Betts f. Menzies (1859), 1 E. & E. 990, 1020 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 301 ; 5 Jur. N. 8. 1164; lOH. L. Gas. 117; 31 L. J Q. B. 233; 7 L. T. 110; 11 W. R. 1 : 9 Jur. N. S. 29 43, 599 Betty r. Niiil ^1856), 6 Ir. C. L. R. 17 417 Beviin V. Bevan (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 45 1138 Beviiu V. Gething (1842), 3 Q. B. 740 ; 3 G. & D. 59 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 37 ; Jur. 971 717 Buvau v. Hill (1810), 2 Camp. 381 ; 11 R. R. 741 307 Bevan r. McMalion (185U), 2 S. & T. 55 ; 28 L. J. P. & M. 40 977 Bevuii V. Waters (18L'8). M. & M. 235 ; 3 0. & P. iVJO 609 Bevan v. WilliainH (1775-1776), 3 T. R. 635, n. («) 15U, 518 Beveri(lf,'o i . Miutur (1824), 1 C. & P. 364 691 Bevi y r. Beverley (1690), 2 Vern. 131 171 ]?everlev, JLiy. of t'. Craven (1838), 2 M. & Rnli. 140 1040 BeverleV v. Liucoln Gas Liglit and Coko Co. (1837), 2 N. & P. 283 ; 6 A. i: E. 829 640, 641, 644 Beverley's ease (1603-4), 4 Co. Rep. 123, 124 5u9 Bewlev V. Atkinson (1880), 13 Ch. D. 283 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 6 ; 41 L. T. 603; 2SW. R. 638 76, 437 Bu.vley f. Power (1833), Hayes & J. 368 711, 713 Bevnon v. Cook (1«7.)), L. R. 10 Ch. 389 ; 23 W. R. 531 ; 3;) L. T. 353. . 137, 138 Bevuon r. Garrat (1824), 1 C. & P. 154 649 Bhearf. Harradine (1852), 7 E. . 269; 21 L. J. Ex. 127 1160 Bibb V. Thomas (1770-7), 2 W. Bl. 1043 705, 706 Bieeard i: She])herd (1«61), 14 Moore, P. C. C. 471 ; o L. T. N. S. 504 ; 10 W. R. 136 770, 771 Bickett V. Monis (1806), L. R. 1 H. L. 47 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 803 ; 14 L. T. 835 1 1 1 , 523 Bidder v. Bridges (1884), 37 Ch. D. 406 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 300 ; 68 L. T. 666. . 342, 343, 349, 430, 914, 1168 Biddle v. Bond (I860). 6 B. & S. 225 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 12 L. T. 178 ; 13 W. R. 501 ; 11 Jur. N. 8. 426 645 Bie), Do r. Thomson (1844), 3 Beav. 475, 476 680 Biffin c. Bignell (1S62), 7 H. & N. 877 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 189 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 647 ; 6 L. T. 248 ; 10 W. R. 322 167 Bigg V. Strong (1857), 3 Sm. & G. 592 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 108, 983 ; 6 W. R. 173 -iiif, 523 Bigg r. Whisking (1853), 14 C. B. 195 689 Bigge V. Parkinson (1862), 7 H. & N. 955 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 301 ; 8 Jur. N. 8. 1014 ; 7 L. T 92 ; 10 W. R. 349 776, 777 Biggs V. Lawrence (1789), 3 T. R. 454 ; 1 R. R. 740 747 Bignell V. Clarke (1860), 5 H. & N. 485; 29 L. J. Ex. 257 ; 2 L. T. 189. . 201 Bigsby V. Dickinson (1877), 46 L.J. Ch. 280 ; 4 Ch. D. 24 ; 35 L. T. 679; 2i W. R. 89 1233, 1234 Bilbie V. Lumley (1802), 2 East. 469, 472 : 6 R. R. 479 79 Bill f. Banient (1841), 9 M. & W. 36; 10 L. J. Ex. 302 674, 690 Billage v. Southee (1852), 9 Hare, 634 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 472 137 Billing v. Welch (1871), Ir. R. 6 C. L. 88 86 Billiugshurst r. Vickers (1810), 1 Phillim. 191 140 Bills V. Smith (1863), 6 B. & 8. 214 ; 04 L. J. Q. B. 68 ; 12 L. T. 22 ; 13 W R. 407; 11 Jur. N. S. \H 83 Bingham r. Stanley (1841), 2 Q. B. 117 ; 1 G. & D. 237 ; 6 Jur. 389 ; 9C. ^^' ^^^ 262, 533 Vol. I. ends with page 636. 'I!ll ft r i ■ ■'i' Hi" ifsji XXX VI TABLE OF CASKS CITED. PAOR Binrti, Ro (t8')3), 17 Beav. ;W,H 129 Birch V. Bircli (IHIS), (! Notrs of Ca^. (Kcc. * M-ir ) 142 Biichr. DciM'VMtiT (ISUi), 1 Sliirk. 210; I Cariii). liSo 733 Birch V. Edwi'mlM (18»7), 6C. B. 45; 2 Lutw. (Reg. Can.) S7; 17 L.J. 0. P. 32 ; 12 Jur. IH 726 Birch V. lA. Livoriiool (1S2'J), 9 B. & C. 392, 395 ; 4 M. & R. 380 (iHl Birch V. RiJ^wav (1858), 1 F. A: F. 270 1224 Birch V. Hoim-rvillc (1852), 2 Ir. C. L. R. 243 900, 90G, 910 Bird L\ Adcock (1878), 47 L. J. M. C. 123 ; 26 W. R. 034 132 Bird r. Boulter (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 443 730 Birdf. Uaiiimon (1837), 0Sc()tt,213; 3 Bing. N. C. 883; 3 Uodjres, 224. .077, 711 Bird V. HiKffiusou (1834), 2 A. & E. 090 ; 4 N. & M. 505 ; 1 II. & W. 01 . . 272, 637. 038 Bird r. Randall (1762), 3 Burr. 1345 ; 1 W. Bl. 373, 387 1115 Birkenhead, Laiio. & Cheshire June. Rail. Co. r. Brownrigg (1849), CRailw. Cas. 47 ; 4 Ex. 420 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 27 ; 13 Jur. 943 1176 Birkenhead. Lane, ii Clieshiro June. Rail. Co. v. rileher (1850), 5 Ex. 121 ; 6 Raihv. Cas. 604 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 207 ; 14 Jur. 297 100 Birkinyr r. Darnell (1704). Salk. 27 ; 1 Smith L. C. 3.59, 302 076 Birks r. Birks (1805), 34 L. J. P. & M. 90 ; 4 S. & T. 23 ; 13 L. T. 193; 13 W. R. 038 704 Birnig., May of, v. .Vlleu (1877), 40 L. J. Ch. 073 ; Ch. D. 284 ; 37 L. T. 207 ; 25 W. R. 810 114 Binng., Brist. & Thames Juno. Ry. Co. v. White (1841). 1 Q. B. 282 ; 4 P. & D. 049 ; 2 Railw Cas. 803 ; 5 Jur. 800 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 121 995, 998 Birrell r. Drvcr (1881), 9 App. Cus. 345 ; 51 L. T. 130 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 207 17 Birt, R(! (187 1), L. R. 2 P. & D. 214 ; 40 L. J. P. & M. 26 ; 24 L. T. 142 ; 19 W H. 51 1 699 Birt V. Barlow (1779). 1 Dcmg. 171. 174 150, 295, 373, 1172 Birt V. Rothwell (1097), 1 Ld. Raym. 210, 343 18 Bishopc. Chanit)ro(1827), 3C. &P. 65; M. &M. 116 1193 BLshopf. Hclps(1845),2C. B. 45; 15L. J. C.P. 43; 1 Lutw. (Reg. Cas.) 353 156 Bisliop r. Howard (1823), 2 B. & C. 100 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 293 152 Bishop r. Countess of Jersey (1854), 2 Drew. 143 ; 2 Eq. R. 545 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 483 ; 18 Jur. 705 101 Bittle.stou V. Cooper (1845), 14 M. & AV. 399 474 Bittlestone r. Cooke (1850), E. & B. 296 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 7')8 83 Black V. Lonl Bravbrook (1810). 2 Stark. 7 ; 6 M. & Sel. 39 62 Black V. Holmes (1822), 1 Fox & Sm. 28 618 Black V. Jobling (1809). L. R. 1 P. & D. 085 ; 38 L. J. P. ic M. 74 ; 21 L. T. 298; 17 W. R. 1108 143 Elackbmn v. Hargroave (1828), 2 Lew. C. C. 259 816 Blackburn v. Mackoy (1823), 1 C. & P. 1 108 Blackburn Guard, r. Brooks (1877). 25 "W. R. 57 912 Blackett v. Lowes (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 494 ; 15 R. R. 324 398 Blaokett V. Roy. Ex. Ass. Co. (1832). 2 C. & J. 244 ; 2 Tyr. 206 765, 766 Blackball r. Gibson (1878), 2 Ir. L. R. 49 94 Blackham's case (1708), 1 Salk. 290, 291 1132 Blackie v. Bidding (1848), 6 C. B. 196 , 307 Blacquiere v. Hawkins (1780), 1 Doug. 380 7 BlagTttve V. Blagrave (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 262 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 346 ; H Jur. 744 327 Blague V. Gold (1635), Cro. Car. 4*7 802 Blair, Re (1848), Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & M.) 528 701 Blair v. Ormond (1851), 17 Q. B. 423 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 444 716 Blake v. Albion Life Ass. Co. (1878), 45 L. J. C. P. 663 ; 36 L. T. 269 ; 24 W. R. 677 243 Blake v. Blake (1882), 61 L. J. P. D. & A. 36 ; 7 P. Div. 102 ; 46 L. T. 641 ; 30 W. R. 505 695, 697 Blake v. Concannon (1870), 4 Ir. R. C. L. 323 100 The references are to pages, not to paragraph*. &I TABLK OF CASES CITKD. XXXVll 243 b, 697 100 VXdK Bliiker. .Tfimini?H(lsni), I'J Ir. C. L. R. 45S lior. Bliikr r. Jnlinson (1H19), Milw. KU 1.0 nii.ke r. K.iiKlit (ISt.'t), :< ('"rt. Mii O!"'-, t'!)? Uliik.. r. l'ilf..i<l (l.s;i2), 1 M. .S: Rob. 198 (il8, OlIO Bliiktiiidrc r. lUaiiiortraunliiri; Cau. Co. (KSSo), 2 C. M. & R. I.'i.'i; 1 (Julc, 7S- 5Tvr <ii':' ""- ""'■'• l"''"' 1^^^ El'ih.'l i\ Hhi'iid (lH(i(i), b6 L. J. P. & M. 1U4 ; L. R. 1 1'. & D. '237 ; 16 W. 11. !) Bl.niil r. Swiittonl (1791), IVake, CO 831 Uliiiidy r Dc Kiirtfli (1K48). (i C. B. 023; D. & L. 412; 6 Railw. Cas. ;i(il ; IH L. J. U. P. 2 ; 12 Jur. lOOo l(i» Blaiiklcvr. WiiiHtiuilcy (17S9), 3T. R. 2.9; 1 R. R. 704 791 BImvii.'j-'h Tni>ts, Ro (187.')), Ir. R. 9Eq. 413 7'.'H Bl.'iikl.'y V. J^inith ; 1840), 1 1 Sim. 1.50 070, (,7 ' Blciikiim r. Lonjfstart'o (188.^)), 51 L. J. Ch. 510 ; .52 L. T. 081 91 Bliiikinsop r. Blcnkiiisop (1848), 17 L. J. Cli. 343 ; 2 Pliill. 007 Bi.'wett V. Tiegonning (1835), .5 N. & M. 308 ; 3 A. & E. 654 ; 1 H. & W H 4 15 003 432 BlcNvitt, In re (1880), 49 L. J. P. D. & A. 31; 5P. D. 116; 42L.T.329; 2S W. 11. 520 700 Bl.'witt c. HolitTts (1841), Cr. k Ph. 274 ; 10 L. J. Ch. 342 ; 5 Jur. 979. . 144 Bl..« itt r. Trittou, (1892) 2 Q. B. 327 ; 01 L. J. Q. B. 773 ; 67 L. T. 72 ; •11 W. II. 30 282 Blijfh r. Umit (1836-7), 2 Y. & 0. Ex. 968 ; 6 L. J. Ex. Eq. .58 683 Bliu'li c. Hiewpr (18;i4), 3 D. P. C. 206 ; 1 C. M. & R. 051 ; 6 Tyr. 222 . . 732 Blisrh r. WcUcnIcv (1826), 2 C. & P. 400 305 Bliffht r. Fixli.T ("1809). 1 Pet. C. C. R. 41 873 Bloinintftoii r. Lckk (1894), 42 Am. St. R. 210 AM. [220] BlcmuT r. Si)ittie (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 427 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 309; 26 L. T. 272 : 20 W. H. 435 749 Bloomfitld r. \Vhiitt.)n(1867), Ir. R. 8 C. L. 08 Ill BlosMum V. Cuniioii (1817), 14 Mass. 177 122 Blount r. Hnrrow (1792), 5 Brown. C. C. 75 480, 482 Blount r. HiiriiH (18;9\ 47 L. .1. Q. B. 596 ; 4S L. J. Q. B. 159 ; 39 L. T. 405 ; 27 W. R. 202 736 Blount r. Kinq)ton, (1S92) 31 Am. St. R. 554 692 Blow.r'.s TiustM (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. 97 ; Ch. 351 ; 23 L. T. 548; 26 L. T. 181; 19 W. R. 121. 066 740 Blow.r r. G. W. Kv. Co. (1872\ 41 L. J. C. P. 268 ; L. R. 7 C. P. 655 ; 27 L. T. 883 ; 20 W. R. 770 771 Blowerr. Hollis [IXXi], 3 Tyr. 356; 1 C. & J. 393 1035, 1036 Bloxam r. Klsce (1825), 1 C. &P. 558; Rv. & M. 187 291 Bloxiim r. Favre (1.S84), 8 P. D. 101 ; 62 "L. J. P. 42; 31 W. R. 610; 47 J. P 377 703 Bluuk f. Gonipertz (1852), 7 Ex. 67 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 25 1195 Bluok r. RHckuian i 1846), 6 Moo. P. C. R. 308 16, 267 Bhuidollf). Catterall(182l), 5 B. & A. 293, 298 112 Bhuidell r. Gladstone (1841), U Sim. 486; 1 Phillips, 279, 283, 289; 12 L. J. Ch. 225 739, 784 Blunt f. Lack (1857), 26 L. J. Ch. 148; 3 Jjir. N. S. 195 7 Elyth V. Archhold (1 835), Pears. Chit. PI. 330, n. (A) 147 Blyth r. Dennett (18.53), 13 C. B. 178; 22 L. J. C. P. 79 623 Boardmau v. Jackson (1813), 2 Ball & B. 382 527 Buardman v. Reed and Ford's Lessees (1832), 6 Pet. 328, 345 801 Boast V. Firth (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 1 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 19 L. T. N. S. 204 ; 17 W. R. 29 780 Boddington v. Schlencker (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 572 ; 1 N. & M. 641 ; 2 L. J. K. B. 138 32 Boddy T. Boddy (I860), 30 L. J. P. & M. 23 243 Boddv V. Wall (1877), 7 Ch. Div. 104 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 112 ; 26 W. R. 343.. 187 Bndarer v. Arch (1854), 10 Ex. 333 ; 2 C. L. R. 1491 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 19. .714, 716 Bodmin United Mines Co., Re (1856), 23 Beav. 370 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 670 ; 3Jur. N. S. 360 7 Vol. I. ends with page 635. i'li m i'-iir f xxxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED. FAOB Bodv, Re(n6»), 34 L. J. T. & M. 5a ; 4 S. & T. 9 307 B.>ehtlinck r. Schneider (1799). 3 Fsp. .VS ; 3 East, 381 ; 7 R. R. 490 . . . , 936 Bogert K. OHuman (181)7-51), Anthon R. 70 743 Bohuu V. Delesxert (1813). 2 Coop. 21 129, 424 Boiloauv. Rutlm(1848), 2 Ex, C78 50(1, 531, f52, 1158 Bolokow V. Seymour (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 107 44 Bold r. Hutchinson (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 285 ; 20 Beav. 250 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 365 ; 3 Eq. Rep. 743 539, 679, 749 Bold V. Ravner (1836), 1 M. & \V. 343 ; 2 Gale, 44 : 5 L. J. Ex. 172 . .299, 763 Bolding t'. Lane (1863), 1 De G. J. & 8. 122 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 219 ; 11 W. R. 386 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 506 720 BoMron v. Wid.lows (1824). 1 C. & P. 65 219, 230 Bolinfrbroke, I,d. v. Local Board of Swindon (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 287 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 575 ; 30 L. T. 72;. 587 Bolingbroke. Ld. v. Towimend (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 045 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 255 ; 29 L. T. 430 191 BoUand, Ex parte. Re Ackary (1876), 45 L. J. Bank. 133 ; 3 Ch. D. 125 ; 34 L. T. 666 ; 24 W. R 932 851 Bolland, Ex parte. Bo Holdcu (1874), L. R. 19 Eq. 131 ; 44 L. J. Bk. 9; 31 L. T. 445 ; 24 W. R. 24 849 Bolton V. Bolton (1876), 2 Ch. D. 217 ; 34 L. T. 123 ; 24 \V. R. 426 1036 Bolton V. Bp. of Carlisle (1793), 2 H. Bl. 263 659, 1 198 Bolton r. Gladstone (1804), 5 EnA !65 ; 1 Smith, 372; 2 Taun. 85 ; 7 R. R. 674 1149 Bolton c. Corp. of Liverpool (18^.:;, 1 Myl. & K. 94 ; Cooper, 19 ; 1 i-i. J. Ch. 166 ..593, 601, 606, 1183 Bolton r. Corp. of Liveriio. ' (1831), 1 Myl. & K. 88 ; 3 Sim. 467 995 Bolton f. Lanjbert (1889;, 41 Ch. D. 295; 68 L.J. Ch. 425 ; 60 L. T. 687; 37 W. R. 434 672 Bolton V. London School Board (1878), 7 Ch. D. 76G ; 47 L. J. Ch. 461 ; 38 L. T. 277; 26 W. R. 549 123 Bolton f. O'Brien (1885), 16 L. R. Ir. 97 46, 243 Bolton r. Sherman 1837), 2 M. & W. 403 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 147 507 Bolton, Ld. r. Tcmiiin (1836), 1 N. & P. 247 ; 6 A. & E. 856 ; 1 C. & J. 391 926 Bond f. Douglas (1836), 7 C. & P. 626 245 Bond V. Evans (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 249; £', h. J. M. C. 105; 69 L. T. 411; 36 W. R. 767; 52 J. P. f' . 107 Bond V. Rosling (1861), 1 B. .«: S. 371 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 227 ; 4 L. T. 442 ; 9W.R. 740 049 Bonelli, Re (1875), L. R. 1 P. Div. 69 ; 45 I ■. J. P. D. & A. 42 ; 34 L. T. 32 ; 24 W. R. 255 938 Bonfield v. Smith (1844). 2 M. & Roll 519 270, 929 Bonner, Re, Tucker v. Good (1881), 1;! Ch. D. 201 ; U L. J. Ch. 83 ; 45 L. T. 470 ; 30 W. R. 58 145 Bonnewell v. Jenkins (1878), 8 Ch. D. 70 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 758 ; 38 L. T. 81 ; 26 "W. R. 294 673 Bonzi V. Stewart (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 295 ; 5 Scott, N. R. 1 634 Booker «>. Allen (1831), 2 Ru.ss. & M. 270; 9 L. J. Ch. 130 807 Boorman v. Johnston (1834). 12 Wend. 573 741 Boom's Case (1S19), »ite<l Greenleif cm Evid. 290 656 Boosey V. Davidson (1S19), 13 (J. B. 257 ; IS L. J. Q. B. 174 ; 13 Jur. 678 290 Booth V. Briscoe (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 496 ; 25 W. R. 83S 187 Booth V. Clivo (1851), 10 C. B. 827 ; 2 L. M. & P. 283; 20 L. J. C. P. 151 ; 15 Jur. 563 227 Booth r. Keunard (1858). 2 H. & N. 84 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 305 43 Boothf.Millns(1816),4 Dowl.i: L.52; 15M.&W.669; 15 L.J. Ex. 3f4. .271, 272 Booth V. Turle (1S73), L. R. 16 Eq. 182 ; 21 W. R. 721 665 Bootle I'. Blundell (1815). 19 V'es. 494 ; 13 R. R. 254 1215 Porthwiok P. cr, (1812), Pari. Min. 62 423 Bogimquet, Ro (1852), 2 Rolicrts. 577 696 B iHBnipiet I'. Anderson (IHDi)). 6 E-ip. 44 647 Bosville r. Aff..niev(ieneral (1««7), 12 P. D. 177; 66 L. J. P. 97; 57 L. T. 88 : 36 \V. R. 79 101 The ri'fi ii'iiirf hit Io piije; not to pariigriiphi. TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXXIX PAOB Boswell f. Smith (1833), 6 C. & P. 60 154 Bosworth V. Crotchett (18'J4), 1 Ph. Ev. 300 447, 4ol Botham r. Swingler (1794). 1 E»p. 104 ; 1 Pea. 285 910 Bothe'8 case (1G02), Moo. (F.) 000 DS5 Bothnia, The (1800), Lu»h. 5J ; "JO L. J. P. M. & A. 05 ; 30 L. T. O. S. 100 1 "8 Bottinir V. Martin (1808), 1 Camp. 317 656 Bottomley v. Forbes (1838), Scott, 816 ; 6 Bin^. N. C. 121 ; i Arn. 481 ; 2 Jur. 1010 782 Boucher r. Lawson (undated), Cas. temp. Hard. 9 1 160 Bdmher r. Murray (1844), Q. B. 362 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 278 192 Bouchierf. T.ylor (1770), 4 Bro. P. C. 708 1103, 1105 Bouillon r. Lupton (1803), 15 C. B. N. S. 113 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 37 ; 10 Jur. N S 422 : 8 L. T. N. S. 575 ; 1 1 W. R. 900 770 Bouiter v. Peplow (1850), 9 C. B. 493 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 191 ; 14 Jur. 248..291, 292, 298 Boulton's case (1835), Milw. 30 502 Bourd r. Lawrence. (1892) 1 Q. B. 226 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 21 ; 65 L. T. 844; 40 AV. R. 1 ; 50 J. P. 118 779 Bourdin f. Greenwood (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 281 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 73 ; 25 L. T. 782 ; 20 W. R. 100 713 Bourke v. Davis (1890), 44 Ch. D. 110 ; 62 L. T. 34 ; 38 W. R. 167 915 Bourne v. Coulter (1884), 53 L. J. Ch. 699 ; 50 L. T. 321 186 Bourne «•. F<isbrooke (1805), 18 C. B. N. S. 515 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 164 039 Bourne f. Gatlifte (1811), 3 M. & Gr. 613, 689, 690; 3 Scott, N. R. 1 ..43, 782 Bours V. Tuckennau (1811). 7 Johns. 538 870 Boustieldr. Mould (1S47), 1 DeG. &Sm. 347; 11 Jur. 902 910 Bovillc. Pimm (1850), 11 Ex. 718 ; 26 L. T. O. S. 312 43 Bowdcu 1'. Henderson (18.i4). 2 Sm. & G. 360 172 Bowdcnr. Home (1831), 7 Binj?. 716 1124 Bowcn V. Owen (1847), 11 Q. B. 130; 17 L. J. Q. B. 5 ; 11 Jur. 972 .... 48 Bowerbank c. Monteiro (1813), 4 Tauu. 844 ; 14 R. R. 679 755 Bowers I'. Bowers (IS.iO), 1 Abb. (N. Y.) App. Dec. 214 76') Bowers r. Nizon (1847), 2 C. & Kir. 372 189, 192 Bowes t'. Foster (18.58), 2 H. & N. 779; 26 L. J. Ex. 262 91, 481, 562 Bowes ■ . P<mtifex (1803), 3 F. & F. 739 6t.2 Bowes r. Shand (1877), 2 App. Cas. 465 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 561 ; 36 L. T. 857; 25 W. R. 730 42 Bowey V. Bell (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 95 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 101 ; 39 L. T. 607 ; 27 W. R. 247 41 Bowker r. Burdekin (1843), 1 1 M. & W. 128 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 329 1204 Bowlby !•. Hell (1840), 3 C. B. 284 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 18 685 Bowles V. Jackson (1854), 1 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. i: M.) 294 702 Bowles f. Jolins.m (1748), 1 W. Bl. 36 815, 819 Bowles f. Lan>rworthy (1793), 5 T. R. 300 ; 1 Doug. 216, n. (/) 1208 Bowman, Ke (1834), 5 B. ic Ad. 1 1 13 988 Bowman v. Bowman (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 501 921, 1209, 1215 Bowman f. Hodgson (1807), L. R. 1 P. 302; 36 L. J. P. 124; 16 L. T. 392 278 Bowman r. Horsey (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 8') 704 Bowman r. Manz.'lnmn (1809), 2 Camp. 315; 11 R. R. 716 319 Bowman r. Nichol (1794), 5 T. R. 537: 1 Esp. 81 1194 Bowman «•. Norton (1831), 5 C. & P. 177 699, 003 Bowman v. Rostnm (1835), 2 A. & rl. 295 ; 4 N. & M. 452 89. 552 Bowman r. Tavlor (IS.'i,-)), 4 N. & M. 2(i4 ; 2 A. & E. 278, 279 88, 93 Bowring i: bhJ'pherd (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B. 309 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 129 ; 24 L. T. 721 ; 19 W. R. 852 158 Bowshcr V. Calley (1808), 1 Camp. 391, n. ; 10 R. R. 71 1, n 3S5 Boycc*. Douglas (1807), 1 Camp. 00 1115 Bovcc f. arceu (1820), Batty. 0u8 071, 084 Bovd f, Ifolton (\HU), 8 Ir. Eq. K. 113 623, 627, 528 Bovd ,. M'Lean (181.i), 1 Johns. Ch. (Am.) 582 007 Boyd I. lVtrie(l«08), 19 W. R. 221 1189 Boyd I'. The State (undated , 2 Humph. 37 671 Vet. I. tnth with puj/t 036. I t:i m d TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOB Boydell «. Drummond 0809). 11 East, 142; 10 R. R. 450 G73, 681 Boydell's chso (18:iO), Macq. 11. of L. Practice, 6.51 502 BoycH V. Bedale (186.5), 1 H. & M. 708 ; 10 L. T. 131 ; 12 W. R. 232 ; 33 t,. J. Ch. 233 145 Boyle v. MiiUioUand (1860), 10 Ir. C. L. R. ISO 803 Bi)ylet'. AViHomim (18.').-)), 11 Ex. 360; 24 L. J. Ex. 281 26, 300, !tfi4 Boyntoii f. Kello^r>r (181)7), 3 Mass. 189 255, 973 BcyH •. Willianm flM3i;. 2 Rush. & My. 689 78.". Boyso r. Cololoujfh (1,S.>1), 1 K. & J. 124 ; 2 W. R. 354 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 7. . 1145 Bracei-'irdlo v. llcald (1818), 1 H. k Aid. 722 681 Briw.rirdle v. ilinks (1854), 9 Ex. 361 ; 2 C. L. R. 991 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 128; 18 Jur. 70 222 Bradford v. Romney MS02), 30 Beav. 431, 438 ; .11 L. .T. Ch. 497 749 Bradford v. Youii-,' (1884), 29 Ch. D. 617 ; 53 L. T. 407 ; 33 W. R. 860 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 96 1105 Bradliiujrh r. GosM<.tt fl8«4), 12 Q. B. D. 271; 53 L. J. Q. B. 209; 53 L. T. 620 ; :i2 W. R. .^)')2 4 Bnullaujrh r. R. (WH,. 3 Q. B. D. 607 ; 38 L. T. 118 : 26 W. R. 410 .. 85 Bradley f. Arthur (1825), 6 Howl. & R. 4 13 ; 4 B. & C. 292 932 liradlfy v. B.ckctt (1844), 7 M. & (Jr. 99 1 89 Bradley r. Bradloy (18;i4), 2 Fairf. 367 1117 Biadl.yr.HoIdswortli(I«3H),lH.A:lI.15G; 3M.\\V.422; 7L. J.Ex. 153. . 6S3 Bradley v. Jiiiiips (l«5;i), 13 C. B. 822 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 193 412, 448 Bradloy v. Pilots of Newcastle (1853), 2 E. & B. 427 : 23 L. J. Q. B. 35. . 792 Bradshaw v. Bennett (1831), 5 C. & P. 48 ; 1 M. ic liob. 143 1211 Bradshaw r. Murphv (ISIUI), 7 C. & P. 612 969, 997 Bradstreet ;■. Nept. Ins. Co. (183S!, 3 Humn. 600 1142, 1147, 1150 Br;idy v. Cubitt (1778), 1 Doujf. 31, 39 667 Brady f. (Jurran flHii«), 2 Ir. R. C. L. 314; 16 W. R. 514.. 508 Brady v. Oa.Mtler (1864), 3 II. & C. 112 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 300; 11 Jur. N. S. 22 ; 1 1 L. T. N. fS. 6,S1 745 Brady v. Tod (;n61 ), 30 L. J. C. P. 224 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 592 ; 4 L. T. 212 ; 9 W. R. 483 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 827 388 Brain r. Preece (1843), 1 1 M. & W. 773 4.55 Braitli>vaiter. Gardiner (1845), 8Q. B.473; 15L. .T.Q. B. 187; 10 Jur. 591 546 Brake. Re (1881), 50 L. J. P. D. & A. 43; 6 P. Div. 217; 45 L. T. 191 ; 29 VV. R. 744 798 Bramble, Ex partr'. In re Toleman, &c. (1880), 13 Ch. D. 885; 42 L. T. 413; 28 W. R. 676 321 Braniwell v. Lucas (1824). 4 Dowl. & R. 367 ; 2 B. & C. 745 608 Branilao v. Burnett (1816), 6 M. & (ir. 630 5 Brandford i'. Freeman (1850), 2 Ex. 734 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 36 272 Branford r. Branford (1879), 4 P. D. 72 ; 48 L. J. Mat. 40 ; 40 L. T. 059 ; 27 \V. R. 6<J1 604 Brantr.n r. Grittits (1877). 2 C. P. D. 212 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 408 ; 36 L. T. 4 ; 29 \V. II. 313 736 Bianwell v. Pennectk (1827), 7 B. & C 530 1 136 Bru.shi.r v. Jackson (1840), 6 M. & W. 649; 8 D. P. C. "84 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 313 192, 193, 194 Brassin^toii v. Brassinirton 0823). 1 S. i St. 455 321 Bray r. Hadwen (1816). 5 M. \- Sel. 68 32 Brave Peer. (18;t6-39). 6 CI. Ac Fin. 7')7 403 Bra/ier r. Jones (1828 , 8 B. & C. 124 1038 BreiMlalbane Can.. (1866). L. R. I H. L. (Sc.) 182 106, 149 Breadalbane. M. of. r. M. of Chandos (1837), 2 My. & Cr. 732 ; 4 CI. & F. 43; 7 L. J. Cli. 28 1124 Breadalbane i'ei'r. (1872), L. R. 2 II. L. (Sc.) 269 181 Brcckon r. Smith (18:i4), 1 A. & E. 488 517 Breech LoadR. Arm. Co., R.' (1867). L. R. 4 Eq. 463 ; 15 W. R. 1007 .. 845 Bree/er. Hawker (1844), 14 Sim. 350 1054 Bremhridjre t. G.slMprne (I816j, I Hiark. R. 374; 18 R. R. 784 154 Bremer v. BVeeman (18,'i7j, 1 Deane, Eec. R. 192 9.36, 937 Brunan's case (1847), 10 Q. B 498; 16 L. J. Q. B. 289 ; 11 Jur. 775 7,83 Th0 r^erentet art to pag**, not to pttiaympht. TABLE OF CASES CITED. xli PA(1R Brenchley r. Still (18.i0), 2 Roberts. 162 697 Brcnnan i'. Dillane (1843), Ir. Cir. 0. 853 1035 Brennan v. Howard (1856), 1 H. & N. 138 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 289 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 546 192, 194 Brcnnan (Hhould be Breenan) v. Moran (1857), 6 Ir. Ch. R. 126 80.5 Brrat V Lever (1841), 7 M. & W. 593 ; 9 D. P. C. 246 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 337.. 1 18 Breton's Estate, In ro (1881), 17 Ch. D. 416 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 369; 44 L. T. 3:i7 ; 29 W. R. 777 630 Breton v. Cope 0791), Fcako, 31 154, 1054, 1092, 1173, liOS Br<tt V Beales ( j29), 10 B. & C. 508 ; M. & M. 416 397, 403, 433, 10(16 Brettel v. Williams (1849), 4 Ex. 623 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 123 161 ]!rettonr. I'rettiman (100.;),T. Ray. 153 498 Brew f. Hiiren (1877), 11 Ir. R. C. L. 29 1116, 1161 Biewerf. Kuapp (18J31, 1 Tick. 337 154 Brewer r. Palmer (ISOO), 3 Eap. 213 285 BrewiuK Co. r. Beaner (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 686 AM. [220] BnwiN, Ro (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 124 ; 3 S. & T. 473 701 Brewster, Rt* (1800), 3 S. & T. 473 ; 33 L. J. P. 124 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 593. . 706 Brewster v. Sewell (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 296 277, 302, ."03, 3(15, 323 Briee f. Bannister (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 569 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 722 ; 38 L. T. 7:ti) ; 2G W. R. 670 513, 651 Bri.kell V. Hiilso (1837), 7 A. & E. 456 ; 2 N. & P. 426 500 Uii.lgo r. E-rjrleston (1817), 14 Mass. 245 514 Bri.l^'e V. Gray (1833). M Piek. 55 1 123 Bri.ljfe r. Sumner (1823), 1 Piek. 371 1139 Bri.l!.'es r. N. Lond. Ry. (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 213 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 151 ; 30 L. T. 844 ; 23 W. R. (i2 38 Brid^'es r. Potts (18(11), 17 C. B. N. S. 314 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 338 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1049; 11 L. T. 373 35 BiiilKet Feltham, Ro (1855), 1 K. & J. 528 798 ]!iiili;ewuter, Ld., ease of (undat(>d), cited Skin. 15 1 1 79 Briil^cnian c. .lenninfrs (1699), 1 Ld. Ruym. 731 ; B. N. P. 2S;!a 510 Brid^rwater Trust r. Bontlc-cum-Linaere (1860), L. R. 2 Q. B. 4 ; 36 L. .1. ii. B. 41 : 7 B. & S. 348 HI, 112 Bridscin v. Smith (1H76), 24 W. R. 392 53 1 Brien v. Swainson (1877), 1 L. R. Ir. 135 (i73 Brifrtfs, Ex parte (1859), 28 L. .1. Q. B. 272 ; 1 E. & E. 881 903 Bri^:^'8 v. Avnsworth (1838). 2 M. A: Rob. 168 274 Biitf^'H V. lirijf^s (1880), 5 P. D. 163 ; 19 L. J. P. 38 ; 28 W. R. 702 1 143 W\i!t:H V. Wilson (1853), 5 De G. M & G. 12 ; 17 Bcav. 330 448, 451, 712 Bii^diiim I-. Rip^rers (1822), 17 Mass. 571 757 Biisfht r. lluttou (1851-2), 2 H. L. Cas. 341 ; i8 Jur. 695 510, 541 Biicht r. Legerton (1860-1), 30 L. J. Ch. 338 ; 2 Do G. & J. 421 ; 8 W. R. 678 455 Britflitr. Walker (183 1 ' 0. M. &R. 222; 3L. J. Ex. 250; 4 Tyr. 502. . 110, 125 BrigHtoeko i: Smith (18o , 1 C. M. & R. 483; 3Tyr.445; 2 L. J. Ex. 187. .710, 712 Brine r. Bazal^rette (1849). 3 Ex. 692 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 348 252, 253 Briiigloo V. Goodson (1839), 8 Seott, 71 ; 5 Bing. N. C. 738 ; 1 Am. 322. . 1208, 1213 Brinsmoad v. Harrison (1871), L. R. 7 C. P. 517 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 190; 27 L. T. 99; 20 W. R. 781 UU Bri.sco r. Lomax (1838). 3 N. & P. 308 ; 8 A. & E. 198 ; 2 Jur. 682 . .233, 396, 398,404, 405, 1109 Briscoo V. Stephens (1824), 9 Moore (C. P.) 413 ; 2 Bin^. 213 1133 Bristol Aerated Bread Co. r. Magjfs (1890), 44 Ch. D. 616; 59 L. J. Ch. 472; tVi L. T. 11(1; 38 W. R. 303 672 Bristol, Citv of, r. Wait (1834). 3 N. & M. 359 ; 1 A. & E. 204 303 Bristol, May. "f. >'. Cox (1884), 26 Ch. D. 678; 53 L. J. Ch. 1144; 50 L. T. 719; 33 W. R. 255 1182, 1183 Bristow V. Brown (18(i'.'), 13 Ir. C. L. R. 201 77.3 Brist.iw r. Corniieiin (187H). 3 App. Cas. 641, 667 Ill, SOI, 432 Bristiiwr. Miller (1818), 11 Ir. L, R. 461 387, 716 m Vol, I. ttuh uilh paye 635. xlii TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOB Bri«tow V. Sequeville (1850), 6 Ex. 276 ; 3 C. & K. 64 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 289; 14 Jur. 674 61, 938 Pristowr. Wri>rht (1781), 2Doup, 6fi6; IT R. 225, n 187 Britain v. Rossiter (1879), 11 Q. B. D. 123 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 362 ; 40 L. T. 240 ; 27 W. R. 482 681 British Empire Ass. Co. v. Browne (1852), 12 C. B. 723 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 49; 16 Jur. 1157 676 British Farmers' Pure Lins. Cake Co., Re (1878), 7 Ch. D. 633; 47 L. J. Ch. 415 ; 38 L. T. 45 : 26 W. R. 334 1076 British Linen Co. v. Drumraond (1835). 10 B. & C. 903 62 British Prov. Life and Fire Aas. Co., Re {see Grrdy's Case). Biittain v. Kiuuaird (1849), 4 Moore, C. P. 50; 1 B. & B. 432; Gow, 164. .1098, 1099, 1108, 1136 Britten, Ex parte (1840), 3 Deac. & Chit. 35 865 Brittlebauk v. Smith (1884), 50 L. T. 491 1031 Broad v. Ham (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 722 ; 8 Soott, 40 ; 8 L. J. C. P. 357 . . 30 Broad v. Pitt (1828). 3 C. & P. 618 693, 694, 596 Brooas v. Lloyd (1857) 23 Beav. 129; 26 L. J. Ch. 758; 4 W. R. 540; 2 Jur. N. S. 555 819, 832 Bro.;k V. Kent (1807), 1 Camp. 306. n. ; 10 R. R. 706. n 498 Brockbank v. Anderson (1844), 7 M. & G. 295 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 102 910 Brodio r. Brodio (1861), 2 S. Ac T. 259 ; 30 L. J. Mat. 185 ; 4 L. T. 307 ; 9 W. R. 815 377 Brodie r. Howard (1856), 17 C. B. 109; 25 L. J. C. P. 57 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 1209 179, 492 Brogan's case (undated). 2 Russ. Cr. & M. 874 (4th ed.) 585 Bromagof. Prosser (1825), 4 B. & C. 247 ; 6 D. ot'R. 296; 1 C. & P. 475 110 Bromley v. Smith (1859), 26 Beav. 644, 665; 29 L. J. Ch. 18; 5 Jur. N. S. 833 137 Bromley f. Wallace (1803), 4 Esp. 237 254 Bromwich's case (1060), 1 Lev. 180 340 BrookandDelcomyu, Re(1864), 16C. B. N. S. 403; 33 L.J. C. P. 246 .. 1147 Brook r. Hook (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 89 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 50 ; 24 L. T. 34 ; 19 W. R. 508 44 Brook r. Jonuey (1841), 2 Q^B. 273; 1 G. & D. 667 ; 11 L. J. M. C. 10 , . 132 Brooke, Re, (sen Brooke v. Kent). Brooke v. Brooke (1881), 17 Ch. D. 833 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 628; 44 L T. 612 ; 30 AV. R. 45 Brooke r. Havmes (1808), L. R. 6 Eq. 25 Brooke r. Kent (1840), 3 Moo. P. C. C. 334 ; 2 Curt. 343 Brooker r. Hcott (1843), 1 1 M. & W. 67 Brooks V. Mitchell (1841), 9 M. & W. 15; 11 L. J. Ex.61 Broom r. Biitchelor (1856), 1 H. & N. 255; 25 L. J. Ex. 299 Broome r. Wootton (1606), Yolv. 67 ; Cro. Jac. 73 ; Moo. (F.) 762 Broomfiold r. Smith (1836), 2 Gale, 114 ; 1 M. & W. 642 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 155. . Brough ('. Parkings (1703), 2 Ld. Ravm. 994 Brouukcr, Ld. r. Atkvns (16S2), Skiii. 14 Brown, Ex parte (18.V1), 19 Beav. 97 Brown, Re (1849), 1 Rob. 710 Brown, Re (18.')8^ 27 L. J. P. & M. 20 ; 1 Sw. & Tr. 32 ; 30 L. T. 353 : 2 Jur. N. S. 244 143, 356, 705 Brown, Re (1881)^. 61 L. T. 463 Brown and Cr(i\d. Ciin. Co., Ro (1839), 9 A. & E. 526 Brown V. Aokroyd (1856), 5 E. & B. 819 ; 2J L. J. Q. B. 193 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 283 7 Ir. C. L. R. 130 . Batchelor (1856), 1 H. &N. 258; 25 L.J. Ex. Brown t'. Annstrong (1873) Brown (should bo Broom) ) 299 Brown V. iirown (183()) 1 Keen, 275 Brown V. Brown (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 173 ; 8 E. & B. 876 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 163 ; 1 a. & T. 32 ; 27 li. J. P. 20 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 244 143, 356, 705 Brown f. Brown (1869), 38 L. J. P. & M. 78 ; L. R. 1 P. cfe D. 720 13 93 708 49 512 787 1115 222 16 1179 626 698 , 708 793 1160 166 296 787 114 , 709 360 The r^erencet art to pag**, not to paragraph*. TABLE OF CASES CITED. xl 111 PAOB 881 768 S06 82 755 Brown v. Brown and Paget (1874). 33 L. J. P. 198 ; 43 L. J. Mat. 33 ; 30 L. T. N. S. 7(i7 : 22 W. R. 759 .... Brown r. Bvnie (1854), 3 El. & B. 703 ; 2 C L. R. 1599 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 313 , '.8 iar. 700 Brown V. Dawson (1705), Free, in Cli. 240 Brown r. Ettstem Counties Ry. Co. (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 391 ; 58 L. J. Q B. 212 231, AM. [220] Brown V Edgiugton (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 279 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 496 ; 1 Drink. 100 ; iO L. J. C. P. 60 777 Brown v. Foster (1857), 1 H. & N. 736 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 249 ; 3 Jur. N. S. .)45 005, 609, 611 Brown's." Get'cheil (1814), 11 Mass. 11 871 Brown V. Goodwin (1841), )r. Oir. Rep. 61 257 Urown V. Kompton (1850), 19 L J. C. P. 169 «•> Brown V. Liingley (1842;, 5 Scott, N. R. 249 ; 4 M. & Gr. 400 ; 12 L. J C. P. 02 Brownr. Loeson (1792). 2H. Bl. 4.5; 3R. R. 341 621 Brown v. M'Dermott (1840), 2 Ir. Eq. R. 438 809 Brown V. I'ayson (1833), 6 New Hamp. 443 609, Oil Brown V. I'eHrson (1882), 21 Ch. D. 716 ; 46 L. T. 411 ; 30 W. R. 436 .-. . 5:-t Brown ('. Perkins (1843), 2 Hare, 540 ; 1 1 L. J. Ch. 307 005 Uiottu V. Philpot (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 285 201 Bro»n V. Pinkham (1836), 18 Pick. 172 1196 Brown r. Robins (1859), 4 H. & N. 186 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 250 114 lirown r. Symons aSOO), 29 L. J. C. P. 251 ; 8 C. B. N. 8. 208 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1079 ; 8 W. R. 460 152 Brown f. Thornton (1837), 1 N. & P. 339 ; 6 A. & E. 185 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 82 52 Brown r. Wood (1820), 17 Mass. 68 122 Brown f. Woodman (1834), C. & P. 206 300, 356 Brown r. Wren, 15 R. (Feb.)281 ; (1895) 1 Q. B. 390; 43 W. R. 351 ..Adl. [169] Brown's case (1673), 1 Vent. 243; I Russ. C. &M. 709; 2 Russ. C. & M. 984 893 Browne r Gumming (1829), 10 B. & C. 70 ; 5 M. & R. 1 18 986 Browne f. Gisbonie (1843), 2 Dowl. N. S. 903 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 2il7 ; 7 Jur. 328 836 Browne i. Murray (1825), Ry. & M. 254 272 Brownell r. Bonney (1841), 4 P. & D. 623 ; 1 Q. B. 39 ; 6 Jur. 6 621 Browning v. Budd (1848), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 430 140 Browning r. Paris (1839), 6 M. & W. 117 ; 7 Dowl. 398 ; 2 H. & H. e.-^ ; 8 L. J. Ex. 222 714 Browning v. Sabiu (1877), 5 Ch. D. 511 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 728 ; 25 W. R. 602 834 Brownsword v. Edwards (1751), 2 Ves. sen. 245 960, 961, 1110, 1132 Bruce r. Bruce ^1790), 2 Bos. & P. 230, u 179 Bruce f. Nicolopulo (1855), 11 Ex. 129 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 321 129, 309 Bruce v. Wait (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 39 : 1 Scott, N. R. 81 ; 9li. J. C. P. 237 7 Brum f. Knott (1842), 12 Sim. 452-456 ; 6 Jur. 885 7 Biuner. Thompson (1842), 2 Q. B. 789: 2 G. & D. 110; Car. & M. 34; 11 L.J. Q. B. 131 17, 443, 792 Bninner. In re (1887), 10 Q. B. D. 572 ; .56 L. J. Q. B. 606 ; 57 L. T. 418; 3.5 W. R. 719; 4 Morr. B. R. 255 340 Bruiisd.ii r. Humphrey (1884), 11 Q. B. D. 712 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 766 .... 1120 Bnniswi.k, D. of, v. Harmer (1850), 3 C. & K. 10 929 Brun>«\vi.k Gas Co. v. United Gas Co. (1893], 35 Am. St. R. 385 Adj. [169] Brutt r. I'irard (1824), R. & M. 37 1196 Bivan t . Child (18.50), 6 Ex. 368 ; 1 L. M. & P. 429 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 264 ; i I Jur. 510 735 Brvan r. Wagstuff (1825), 8 Dowl. & R. 208 ; f B. & C. 314 ; B,. & M. 329 ; 2 C. & P. 126 315 Bryan v. WHiite (1850), 2 Roberts. 31 "i ,, 700 Bryan v. Wiiiwootl (1808), 1 Taun. 208 ; R. R. 751 1 10, 233 B.yan Reynolds, Ro(1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 20; L. R. 3 P. & D. 35; 28 L. T. 144 ; 21 W. R. 512 709 Bryant r. Foot (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 497 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 217 ; 9 B. & 8. 411; 18L. T. 687; 16 W. R. 808 10, 12? Vol. I. ends with page 635, xliv TABLE OP CASES CITED. FAOB Bnant, c. Herbert (187?;. 3 C. P. D. 189, 389 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 670 ; 39 L. T. 17 ; 26 W. K. 898 40 Brvant v. Lefever '1879 , 4 C. P. D. 172; 48 L. J. C. P. 380 ; 40 L. T. 57!» : 27 W. R. 592 76, 125 Prvce, Re (183'J;. 2 Curt. 3-'.i 700 Brydpes v. BnmfiU flS41 . 12 Sim. 334 ; 11 L. J. Ch. 12 348 Bryd^es i-. Walford 1817 . •! M. & Hel. 42 ; 1 Stark. 389 ; 18 R. R. 787, n. 549 Bucclemh. D. of, r. Met. Bd. of Works (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 418; 41 L. J. Ex. 137: 27L T. 1 612 Buchanan t. Rutker ISOSi. 1 Camp. 63 ; 9 East, 192 ; 9 R. R. 531 . .1147, 1 l'i4 Budier r. Jan-dt! '180.',. 3 Bos. & P. 143 289, 290, 318 Buck r. RoljNon 1878;, 3 Q. B. D. 686 ; 39 L. T. 325 ; 26 W. R. 804 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 250 651 Buekell v. Blenkhom '1846 . 5 Hare. 131 693 Bucket r. Church (1840;. 9 C. i P. 209 44, 710 Buckhonse v. Crossbv 1737i, 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 32, pi. 44 752 Buckin^'ham, D. of,"r. Com. of Inl. Rev. (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 311 ; 6 Ex. 404 : JO L. J. Ex. 2'59 277 Bmkhiud r. Johnson 1854], 15 C. B. 145 ; 2 C. L. R. 784 ; 23 L. J. C. P. •J(U; IS.Iur. 775 191, 1115, 1118, 1120 Buckle r. Kn.Kip 1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 33? ; 36 L. J. Ex. 49, 223 ; 16 L. T. 571: 15 W. K.999 157, 781 Buckler f. Jlillt rtl : 1689). 2 Ventr. 107 746 Buckley f. Bcardi<lce fl819;. 2 South. 570 669 Buckley f. C«K)ke ,1854,, 1 K. & J. 29 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 24 ; 3 Eq. Rep. 138 ; 3 W. R. 33 940 Buckley r. Littlcburr 1711 . 3 Bro. P. C. 43 805 Buckley r. U. 8. '1S46 . 4 How. Snp. Ct. Rep. 258 1050 Euckmaster r. Meikk-john (1851), 8 Ex. 634 : 22 L. J. Ex. 242 531 Buckniastcr (. Ru.**U '1>61). 10 C. B. N. S. 745 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 155 712 Bu<kma.ster8 t . Cox 18.39^ 2 Ir. L. R. 101 870 Buckminster r. Perry 1S0^\ 4 Ma-ss. 593 931 Buckton r. Hipjn. (1879 . 4 Ex, D. 174 ; 40 L. T. 755 ; 27 W. R. 803 536 Bull r. Loveland (1830,. 10 Pick. 9, 14 593, 969 Bullf. 0"Sulliyanfl871;.L. R. 6Q. B.209; 40L. .T. Q. B. 141; 24L. T. 130 546 Bull V. Pc^rker (1843). 2 Dowl. N. S. 345 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 93 ; 7 Jur. 282. . 48 Bullen r. Michel (1816), 4 Dowl. 297; 2 Price, 399; 16 R. R. 77.. 430, 431, 441 Bullev V. BuUey (1875), L. R. 9 Ch. 739 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 79 ; 30 L. T. 848 ; 22 \V. R. 779 93 Bullock r. Corrie 'or Corrv) (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 356; 47 L. J. Q. B. 352; 38 L. T. 102 ; 26 W. R." 330 599, 602 Bulmer v. Norris f|860t, K. & G. 321 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 19 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 25 ; 7 Jur N. S. 342 : 3 L. T. 470 : 9 W. R. 122 683 Buubury r. Bunbury (1833*, 2 Beav. 173 ; 8 L. J. Ch. 297 • 3 Jur. 644 .. 599 Bunbury r. Matthews 1814), 1 C. & K. 382 147 Bunn r. Bunn (1864), 4 De G. J. & S. 316 ; 10 L. T. 211 : 3 N. R. 679 ; 12 W. R 561 965 Bunn V. Markham (1841), 2 Marsh. 532 ; 7 Taunt. 224 ; Holt, 3.' ; 17 R. R. 497 638 Bunsby r. Bailly {ft Bnmaby r. Riillie). Buntinie's ca«* ('lo85\ 4 Co. Rep. 29 1103 Burchar.1 i . Macfarlane, (1891; 1 Q. B. 408 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 587 ; 65 L. T. 282 ; 39 W. R. 094 856, 857 Burchell r. Clark (1876), 2 C. P. D. 88 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 115 ; 36 L. T. 690 ; 25 W. R, 334 300 Bunhfield r. Moore (1854), 3 E. 4 B. 683 ; 2 C. L. R. 1308 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 261: 18Jur.727 1194 Burderf. O'Neill (1863), 9 Jur. N. S. 1109; 9 L. T. 232 632, 884 Burdickr. Hunt (1873). 43 Ind. 38 616 Burgess c. Burtress (1817). 2 Hagfc. Con. 227 503 Burpeiwc. ClemenU(1815),4M. &S. 306; Holt, 211, n.; 1 Stark. 261, n.; 16 R. R. 473 162 TJtt rtftftMt* are to page*, not to pmayraphl. TABLE OF CASES CITED. xlv FAOB 494 Riirn-css «'. Laue (1824), 3 Greeul. 105 Bm-ess r. Langley (181X), 5 M. & G. 722 ; 1 D. & L. 21 ; 6 Scott, N. R. ofs: 12L. J. C. r. 2.i7 nun'i'xs r. Wickliam {18f)4). 3 B. & S. 669 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 17 Bur-hart t . An-erstein (18;i4), 6 C. & P. 690 5CG, Bi.i^'liart r. Hall (1839), 4 M. & W. 727 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 235 Buirfoyue r. ShowliT (1844), 1 Roberts. 6 B.irke r. Mooro (1875), 9 Ir. R. Eq. 609 Biiilriirh c. Stil.bs (1793), 5 T. R. 465 JluiliiiLr i: Tatorson, 1792 (.should be 1840), 9 C. & P. 570 134 Bi.rlinson r. Hall (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 347; 53 L. J. Q. B. 222 ; 50 L. T. 7j:i ; ;i2 W. R. 492 ; 48 J. P. 210 Burls r. Burls (180S), L. R. 1 P. & D. 472 ; 36 L. J. P. & M. 125 ; 16 L. T. 677 ; 1.) \V. K. 1090 Burmah Trading Corp. Lim. v. Mirza Mahomed Ally, iio. (1878), L. R. T Iiid. App. 130 586 Bunni'stcT'-. N.rri8(1851), 6 Ex. 796; 21 L. J. Ex. 43 160 Burn r. Boulton (1846), 2 0. B. 476; 15 L. J. C. P. 97 714, 717 Buruiil>v r. Biillie (18>S9), 42 Ch. D. 282 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 842 ; 61 L. T. 631 : :iH W. H. 125 309, 621, 1054 Burnby ). R(illitt(1847), 16M. &W. 644; 17 L. J. Ex. 190 ; 11 Jur. 827.. 776 Buruluiui r. Binm-tt (1817), 1 Dt' G. i: Sm 513 ; 2 Colly. 260 134 Buruliain c. WVbstt-r (lf<40), 1 Woodb. A: M. 170 1145, 1148, 1150, 1155 Burnsidf r. Dayrell (1849), 3 Ex. 224 ; Kailw. Cas. 67 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 46.. 541 Burr" I- la-c (l.Su7), Eviileiice for Defi'udant, p. 2 616, 619 Burr r.JIarpor(l.SlO), Holt, 420; 17 R. R. 656 1220,1221 BurruU r. Nichols.m (1832), 1 I^Iyl. .V: Iv. 6S0 906 617 770 1170 48 697 697 300 651 307 306 ; 6 C. & P. 202 . . 996, 1183 Burrell i: Nimolson (1833), 1 M. & R Burroui.'li . . Ifartiu (1809), 2 Camp . 12 ; 1 1 R. R. 679 923, 925 Burrows - . liakor (1S69), I. R. 3 Eq. 596 711 Bursill . . Tanner (1885), 16 Q. B. 1). 1 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 53 ; 63 L. T. 445 ; ;,4 W. R. 35 321, 592, 598, 609, 610 Burstall I. Bovfu.s (1S84), 26 Ch. D. 35 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 566 ; 50 L. T. 542 ; 32 AV. R. 418 535 Burt. Kx parte (1842), 2 Mont. D. & De G. 666 .' 869, 870 Burt r. Hurt (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 133 ; 2 S. & T. 88 ; 2 L. T. 439 ; 8 W. K. .^52 149 Bua r. Palmer (1803), 5 Esp. 145 ; 10 R. R. 707, n. ... 498 Burtr. AValktr (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 697 328, 329, 1214, 1216 Burteiishaw v. Gilbert (1774\ 1 Cowp. 52 708 Burton and Saddlers' Co., Ro (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; 10 W. R. 87 . . . . 994 Burtcu V. hil. Darulev (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 576, n 510 Burton c. Griffiths (1843). 11 M. Ac W. 817 38 Burton t: ': -sitt (1821), 5 B. A: Aid. 267 386 Burton r. Uowbery (1875), 1 Ch. D. 234 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 202 ; 34 L. T. 15 ; 2 » W. K. 388 701 Burton r. Payne (1827), 2 C. & P. 520 311 Burtc n r. Plunimer (1834), 4 N. & M. 315 ; 2 A. & E. 3 U 924, 926, 927 Buia.n r. Reevell (1«47), 16 M. A: W. ;i07 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 85 ; llJur. 71 . . 048 Bury c. Bloirg M81S1, 12 Q. B. 877, 882; 18 L. J. Q. B. 85 15, 192 Burv r. Oppenheini (18.')9), 26 Beav. 594 136 2') L. J. Ex. 251 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1029 4 Biiig. N. C. 41 ; 3 Hodges, 265 ; 43 33L. J.Ex. 17; lOJur. N. S. 347; 227 713 Bush r. Pox (185(!\ 5 H. L. Cas. 7iJ7 Bush r. Green (1837), 1 Seott, 289 ; 1 Jur. 814; 7 L.J. C. P. 38 Bush r. Martin (1863), 2 H. & C. 311 9L. T. N. S. 510; 12 W. R. 204 . Bushel r. Wheeler (1844), 15 Q. B. 543, n. ; 8 Jur. 532 689, 092 Bushell's ease (1670), 6 How. St. Tr. 9!i9, 1008, 1013, 1014 25 liussard r. Levering (1821), Wheat. 102 165 Bussey c. Barnett (1842), 9 M. & W. 312 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 646 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 211 222 Bustros r. White (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 423 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 642 ; 3! L. T. SOJ; 24 W. R. 721 4, 698, 1182, 1187 VcL I. ends with page 635. !<tl ! I' t . ■ i 1- t ! ! '■ it xlvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. Butcher ». Jarratt (1802), 3 Bos. & P. 146 289, 290, 318 Butcher t>. Nash (1889), 61 L. T. 72 671 Butcher v. Steuart (1843), 11 M. & W. 857 ; 1 D. & L. 503 ; 12 L. J. £x. 391 ; 7 Jur. 774 677 Butcher's case (1601), Cro. Eliz. 821 1019 Butchers' Co. v. Jones (1794), 1 Esp. 160 910 Bute V. James (1886), 33 Ch. D. 157 , 65 L. J. Ch. 658 ; 56 L. T. 133 ; 34 W. R. 754 363 Butler*. Allnutt(1816), 1 Stark. 222 167 Butler V. Carver (1818). 2 Stark. 433 910 Butler V. Ford (1833), 1 C. & M. 662 ; 3 Tyr. 677; 2 L. J. Ex. 286 ; M. 0. 109 148 Butler V. Gale (1855), 27 Vem. 739 741 Butler V. Moore (1802), MacNally, 253 696 Butler V. Mountgarret (1859). 7 H. L. Cas. 646, 647 .... 146, 154. 409, 417, 423 Butler V. Wrijrht (1829). 2 Wend. 369 454 Butteraeret'. Hayos(1839), 6M. &W. 466; 7Dowl. 489; 9L. J.Ex.44 .. 682 Buttcrworth, Re {see Ex parte Russell). Butts t'. Swartwood (1823), 2 Cowen, 431 903 Buxton V. Cornish (1844), 1 Dowl. & L. 586 ; 12 M. & W. 426 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 91 286 Buxton V. North East. Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 3 Q. B. 549 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 258 ; 18 L. T. 795 ; 16 W. R 1124 ; 9 B. & 8. 824 772 Buxton V. Ruht (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 279 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 173 ; 27 L, T. 210 ; 20 W. R. 1014 673 Byam v. Booth (1814), 2 Price, 234, n 1040 Byne, Ex parte (1813), 1 V. & B. 320 866 Byrd, Re (1842). 3 Curt. 117 697 Byrd V. Nunn (1877), 5 Ch. D. 781 ; 7 Ch. D. 284 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 1 ; 37 L. T. 585 ; 2G W. R 101 224 Byrne v. Boadle (1863), 2 H. & C. 722 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 13 163 Bvme V. Frere (18 J8), 2 Moll. 157 327 Byrne v. Harvey (1838), 2 M. & Rob. 89 314 Byrom V. Thompson (1839). 3 P. A: D. 71 ; 11 A. & E. 31 ; 3 Jur. 1121. .1193, 11!)6 Bywater v. Richardson (1834), 3 N. & M. 748 ; 1 A. & E. 508 769 Caballkbo v. Slater (1854), 14 C. B. 300 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 67 669 Caddiokr. Skidmore (1858). 3 Jur. N. S. 1185 673, 682 Cadpe, Re (1808), 37 L. J. P. & M. 16; L. R. 1 P. & D. 643; 17 L. T. 484 ; 16 W. R. 406 142 Cadogun. Re, Cadogan r. Palagi (1883), 26 Ch. D. 154; 63 L.J. Ch. 207; 49L. T. 606; a2 W. R. 57 146 Cahu Re (1877), 3 Redf. (N. Y.) 81 766 Caldbeck f. Boon (1872), 7 Ir. R. C. L. 32 611 Caldcr f. Dobell (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 486 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 224 ; 25 L. T. \2\): I'J AV. R. 409, 978 768 Caldcr r. Halket (1839), 3 Moo. P. C. C. 28 1099 Caldwell f. Hunter (1848), 10 Q. B. 85, 86 19 Caldwell f. Parker (180!»), Ir. R. 3 Eq. 619 1 194 Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Sprot (1856), 2 Macq. 449 ; 1 Paterson, 663 1 14 Call c. Dunning (180:i), 4 East, 53; 5 Esp. 16 1208 Callaghan v. Pepper (1840), 2 Ir. Eq. R. 399 645 Calliin, Re (1874), Ir. R. 9 Eq. 484 307 Callans v. Sherry (1832), Ale. & Nap. 126 870 Calley v. Richard,'. (1854), 19 Bcav. 401 600, 602, 607 Callow 1'. Howie (1847). 1 DeG. & Sin. 531 ; 17L. J. Ch. 71 ; 11 Jur. 984.. 495 Calinady t'. Rowe (1848), 6 C. B. 801, 878, 879 112, 124 Calvert f. Bovill (1798), 7 T. R. 523; 4 R. R. 517 1147, 1149 Calvert v. Flower (1 836), 7 C & P. 386 956, 1191 Calvert t\ Seinde Ry. Co. (1865), 18 C. B. N. S. 306 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 245 ; 13 W. R. 430 C19 TABLE OF CASES CITED. xlvii PAOB Calye'8 case (15fi3), 8 Rep. 32a ; 1 Smith, L. C. 132 162 Calypso, The (185G), Swabey, 28 1122 Cambrian Miniug Co., Re (1881), 20 Ch. D. 37b ; 61 L. J. Ch. 221 ; 30 W. R. 2N3 ■ 8(8 Camen)u'8 Coalbrnok Ry. Co., Re (1858), 25 Beav. 1 320, 321 CameTOD v. Li^liifoot (1777), 2 W. Bl. 1190 Sil, 872, 873 Camfteld v. Bird (1852), 3 C. & K. 66 244 CainmeU f. Sewell (1860), 3 H. & N. 646 ; 5 H. & N. 728 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 350 1101, 1103, 1149 Camoys,* Lord i'. Blundell (1848), 1 H. L. Cas. 786 79t, 797, 798 Cumors Peerage (1839), 6 C. & F. 789 424, 425, 426 CaDipbell, Ex parts, Cathcart, In re (1870), L. R. 6 Ch. 703; 18 \V. R. 1056 692, 610 Campbell v. Mt.-Gen. (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. 671 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 600 ; 15 W. R. 915 858 Campbell v. Campbell (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 241 ; L. R. 1 Eq. 383 ; 13 L. T. 667; 14 W. R. 327; 12 Jur. 118 806 Campbellr. Christie (1817), 2 Stark. 64 1193 Campbell r. Dalhousie, Earl of (1869), L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 462 ; 22 L. T. 879 352 Campbell f. Hodgson (1819), Gow, 74 757 Campbell v. MoConaghey (1870), L. R. 6 Eq. 20 144 Campbell r. Kickards (1833), 6 B. & Ad. 840 ; 2 N. & M. 642 933, 934 (Dumpbell r. Twemlow (1814), 1 Price, 88 890 Campbell v. Webster (1845), 2 C. B. 258 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 4 ; 9 Jur. 992 . . 521 Campion's case (1578), cited 7 Howell, St. Tr. 1205 (R. v. Cellier) 573 Canada's Appeal (1880), 47 Conn. 450 696 Canada, AVcst of, OU Co., Re (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 683 ; 6 Ch. Div. 103 ; 25 W. R. 787 345, 917 Canal Bk. r. Bk. of Albany (1841J, 1 Hill, N. Y. R. 287 641 Caunr. Clipperton(l839), 10 A. &E. 582; 2 P. & D. 560 226 Cannam v. Farmer (1849), 2 C. & K. 746 ; 3 Ex. 698 271 Cannan v. Hartley (1850), 9 C. B. 634 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 323 ; 14 Jur. 577. . 660 Canning's, Kliz., case (1754), 19 How. St. Tr. 632 877 Cannon v. People (1893), 36 Am. St. R. 295 Add. [635] Cape Copper Co. v. Cuinptoir d'Escompte (1890), 38 W. R. 763 243 Capital Fire Ins. Assoc, Re (1883), 24 Ch. 1). 408 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 71 ; 32 W. R. 260 321 Caprou V. Capron (1874), L. R. 17 Eq. 288 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 677 ; 22 W. R. 347; 29 L. T. 826 139 Cardwell f. Martin (1808), 9 East, 190 ; 1 Camp. 79, 180 1 194, 1203 Carcw f. White (1842), 6 Beav. 172 1184 Carey v. Adkins (1814), 4 Camp. 92 603 Carey v. Pitt (1797), Pea. Add. Cas. 130 1221, 1222 Cargill V. Bower (1878), 10 Ch. D. 502 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 649 : 38 L. T. 779 ; 20 W. R. 716 192 Cariss t. Tattersall (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 890 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 257 1193 Carlisle, Mayor of v. Blamire (1807), 8 East, 487 ; 9 R. R. 4C1 300, 552 Cariisler. Eady (1824). 1 C. & P. 234 910 Cariisle t'. Whaley (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 391 ; 13 W. R. 229 738 Carlos V. Brook (1804), 10 Vea. 49 974 Carmalt f. Post (1837), 8 Watts, 411 930 Cannarthen, Mayor of v. Lewis (1834), 6 C. & P. 608 190, 643 Caniarvon, Lord v. Villebois (1844), 13 M. & W. 313 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 233. . 397, 405, 406 Came V. Nicholl (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 430; 1 Scott, 466 443, 444 Caruev. Stf ?r (18G0), 5 H. & N. 628; 29 L. J. Ex. 281 526 Carpenter v. BuUer (1841), 8 M. & W. 212 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 393 89, 93, 94 Carpenter V. Provid. Wash. Ins. Co. (1846), 4 How. Sup. Ct. R. 222 .... 750 Carpenter v. Wall (1840), 3 P. & D. 4.)7 ; 11 A. & E. 803 254, 969, 973 Carpenters' Co. v. Hayward (1780), 1 Dougl. 374 2 Carpniail v. Powis (1845-6), 1 Ph. 687 : 16 L. J. Ch. 275 692, 693, 699 Carrv.Burdiss (1835), 1 C. M. &R. 782; 6Tyr. 309; 4 L. J. Ex. 60. .1211, 1213 m Vol. I. «nd» with page 636. 1 1 xlvlil TABLE OF CASES CITED. \\\ FADE Carr v. Oriffith {tee Ro Griffith). Carr r. JiickMon {185-'), 'Jl L. J. Ex. 137; 7 Ex. 3S2 7o'J Ciirr t. Lond. k N. W. Kv. Co. (lS7o), L. 11. 10 C. P. 307 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 109; 31 L. T. 7S5; 2J W. R. 747 648 Carrr. Moafl (18.^8), 12 Gniv, 106 610 Carr r. MoiitcHoro (1804), f> B & S. 408 : 33 L. J. Q. H. 2o(i 741 Cai/ I'. Mostyn (18.V)), h Ex. 09 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 249 397, 510, 1109 CaiiierDovf, Tlie (18(i3), n. Ac L. 113; 2 Moure, P. C. C. (N. 8.) 201.... 178 CarriKV i: Brock (1871), 5 Ir. R. C. L. ."jOI 730 Carviiilrton r. Comoc'k ( 1 829). 2 Sim. 567 327 Carrinjfton r. Jones (1824), 2 Sim. & St. 135, 140 417 Carriiij,'ton r. Roots (1837), 2 M. & W. 248 ; L. J. Ex. 95 GH7 Carroll r. Cow.-li (1838), 1 Jebb & Sy. 43 070 Carroll r. Tliu State (1893'i, 40 Am. St. R. 786 Adil. [908] Carrutli.T.H r. Graham (184 1). 9 Dowl. 94'/ ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 304 328,' 319 Car.skiidduii r. roormnii (1840), 10 Watts, 82 422 Carstuir.s r. Stewart (1734), Morison's Pre.-iiimptions, XVI 170 Carter v. Uochm (1700), 1 W. Bl. 593 ; 3 Burr. 190.^ 931, 93:!, 934 Carter r. Carter (1858), 27 L. J. Ch. 74, 84, 85; 3 K. ife J. 018; 4 Jur. N. S. 03 94 Carter v. Leeds Daily News (1370\ W. N. 1870, at j). 11 9o3 Carter v. Ld. Coleniiiie (1740), cited 2 Ball & B. 38 4 ; Barnard, Ch. R. 12i).. 482 Carter f. Downish (1058), Ciirth. 83 5 Carter v. James (1844), 13 M. k W. 137 ; 2 Dowl. ic L. 230 ; 13 L. .L Ex. 373; 8 Jur. 912 532, 534, 1132 Carter v. .Tones (1833), 1 M. A: Rob. 281 271 Carter v. llurcot ( 1 7(:8) 4 Burr. 2 1 03 1 1 1 Carter v. Prvke (1791), Peake, 95 230 Carter v. Toussiiint (1S22), 1 Dowl. & R. 515 ; 5 B. & A. 855 089, 090 Carter r. White (1882), 20 Ch. D. 225; 51 L. J. Ch. 4G5 ; 46 L. T. 236; 30 vV. R. 400 1205 Ca* ter and Crost's case (l5S.'i). Godb. 33 1151 Cartwri^Jit r. Cartwriulit (1878), 20 Vr R 084 938 Cartwrifrlit r. (inrn (1803), 2 Leach, C. C. 9.32 ; 8 Ves. 405 ; 7 R. R. 99. .<592, 900 Carver, Re (181J), 3 Curt. 29 098 Carver r. Jack-on (1830), 4 Pet. 83 88, 509 Cary v. Gcrrish (1801), 4 Esp. 9 154 Caser. Reeve (1817), 14 Johns. 81 1112 Casement v. Fulton (1845), 5 .Moore, P. C. C. 140 ; 3 Moore, In, App. 395 . . 093, 094 Cashill r. Wrisrlit, (1850), 6 E. A: B 891 ; 2 Jur. In. S. 1072 102 Casmore, Re ("l809), L. R. 1 P. 053 ; 38 L. J. P. 54 ; 2 J L. T. N. S. 497; 17 W. R. 027 699 Cas.sidy t: Finnan (1867), Ir. R. 1 C. L. 8 712 Cassidy v. SU'iuirt (1841), 2 Scott, N. R. 432 ; 2 M. & Gr. 437 ; 9 DowL P. C. 300 ; 5 Jur. 25 4 Casson V. Chutrhley (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 335 ; 50 L. T. 508 731 Ca.sson v. O'Brien (1842), Arm. M, & O. 263 977 Cast t!. Povser (1850), 2 Sin. A: G. 309 ; 3 Jur. N. 8. 38 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 93, 353 831 Castle r. Downton (1879), 5 C. P. D. 56 ; 49 L. J. C. P. 6 ; 41 L. T. 528 ; 28 AV. R. 257 736 Castle r. Fox (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. .542 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 302 ; 24 L. T. 536 ; 19 W. R. 840 784, 786 Castle f. Sworder (1801). H. & N. 828 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 310 ; 8 Jiir. N. S. 233 ; 4 L. T. 805 : 9 W. R. 097 690 Castlebar Guard, v. Ld. Luc., a (1849), 13 Ir. I,. R. 44 1173 Castleden r. Castleden (1801), 9 H. L. C. 180 ; 4 Macq. 159 ; 31 L. J. Mat. 103 : 5 L. T. 104 129 Castrique v. Imrie{1800), 8 C. B N. S. 405; 30 L.J. Q. B. 163; 30 L. J. C. P. 177: 4L. T. 143; 9 W. R. !55 1103 Castrique r. Imrie (1809), 39 L. J. C. P. 350 ; L. R. 4 H. of L. 414 ; 23 L. T. 48; 19 W. R. 1 1103, 1147 Cates V. Hardacre (18U). 3 Taun. 424 ; 12 R. R. 078 962 Gates f. Winter (1789), 3 T. R. 300 310, 312 The references are to pagei, not to paragrapht. ri if TABLE OF CASES CITED, xllx FAOB Catherina Miiris, The (1866), L. R. 1 Adm. 83 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 380 1049 Cutlu'iwood f. Caslon (1844), 13 M. & "W. 261, 265 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 433 ; H.Iur. 1076 149 Catliiiif r. SkoiiIdiiiK (1795). 6 T. R. 189 715 Ciitlinir r. Kiug (1877), S Ch. D. 660 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 384 ; 36 L. T. 526 ; 25 W. R. 5:.() 671 Caton ('. Catnii (1849), 7 Notes of Cuh. (Ecc. & Mar.) 28 185, 503 Catou f. Catoii (1867), L. R. 2 II. L. 1J7; 3(1 L. J. Ch. «HG ; 16 W. R. 1 . .674, 679, 080 Caton r. Hamilton (1889), 53 J. P. 504 1108 Ciildu r. U'uox (1827), 5 Rimd. 31, 36 3,54 Catt r. Howard (1820), 3 Sturk. 3 483, 494, 926 CattcU r. lre^ou (1858), E. B. & E. 91 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 107 ; 1 Jur. N. S. m) 884 Citton V. Siiti|i8oii (1855), 8 A. & E. 136 ; 3 N. & P. 248 1194 Cattrall, Ro (lS(i3), 3 S. & T. 419 ; 33 L. J. P. 100 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 136 . . 141 Caunce t'. Spautou (1844), 7 M. & (ir. 903 152 Cavanr. Stewart (1816), 1 Stark. 5>5 1147 Cavev. Hastiii!,"- (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 125; 50 L. J. Q. B. 575; 45 L. T. 318 ; 40 .J. P. 50 072, 673 Cave V. Mackenzie (1877), 40 L. J. Ch. 504 ; 37 L. T. 218 729 Cave V. Mills (1S02), 7 H. & N. 913 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 265 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 363 ; L. T. ti.iO 642 Caver. Mountain (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 200; 1 Scott, N. R. 132; 9 L.J. M. C. 91) 36, 1 100 Cawley i: iMirnell (1852), 12 C. B. 291 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 197 ; 15 Jur. 908. . 712 Cawthorne '•. Cordrev (1803), 13 C. B. N. S. 400 ; 32 L. J. 0. P. 152 081 C:izenove r. Vuuifhan (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 4 ; 14 R. R. 377 325 Central News Co. r. Eu.st. New» Tel. Co. (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 230; 50 L. T. 235 ; 32 W. R. 493 346, 855 Clinbbock'.s case (1804), 1 Mass. 144 602 Chad r. Til,-ed (1821), 2 B. & B. 403 ; 5 Moore (C. P.), 185 791 Ctiadwick r. Chadwick (1853), L. R. 8 Ch. 926 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 805 ; 29 L. T. 284 901, 970 Cliadwick r. City of Hub. St. Pack. Co. (1850), 6 El. & Bl. 771 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 207 6 Cliadwick v. Turner (1800), 34 Beav. 034 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 356 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 349 ; 1 1 Jur. N. S. 333 738 Chalmers r. Shackell (1834), 6 C. & P. 475 105 Chambcrhiin r. King {or Kinjr r. Chamherh in) (1871). L. R. C. P. 474 ; 40 L. J. C. P. -273 ; 24 L. T. N. S. 730 ; .'9 W. R. 9.11 22S Chamberlain v. Stimeham (18)-9), 61 L. T. 5f;>'^ : 38 W. R. 107 817 Cliamber» v. Benia.seoni (1831), 1 C. M. 4: R. 347 ; 4 Tyr. 531 ; 3 L. J. K.x. 373 444, 4.58 Chamlicrs r. Kelly (1873), 7 Ir. C. L. B. 231 Chambers i . Ma^o« (1858), 5 C. B. N. S. 59 ; 28 L. J. C. P. 10 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1 037 784 507 Cliambcrs r. Wood (1848), 2 Notes of Cases (lieo. & Mar.), 485 UO Chamley r. Lord Dunsauy (i8ii7j. 2 Sch. & Lef. 718 1123 Chamney, Re (1849), 7 Notes of Cases (Ecc. & Mar.), 70 099 Chanii)ian c. Atkin.sou (l'i"2), 3 Keb. 9(i 232 Cbiimiiiou V. Plummet (ISO-i), 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 252 ; 5 Ksp. 240; 8 liev. R. 7!)5 071 Chfimiiion r. Terry (1 822), 3 B. & B. 295 ; 7 Moore, C. P. 130 ;j07 Cliamimeys r. Peek (1810), 1 Stark. 404 157, 454 Chandler r. Grieves (1812). 2 11. Bl. 000, n. ; 6 T. R. 325, n. ; 3 R. R. 525. . 4,21 Chandler t'. Home (1812), 2 M. Ac Rob. 423 918 Cliandler v. Howell (1877 , 4 Ch. D. 651 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 25 ; 35 L. T. 692 ; 25 W. R. 55 684 Chmdus, Marquis of, v. Corns, of Inl. Rev. (1851), 6 Ex. 464 ; 20 L. J. Kx. 209 ; 2 L. M. & P. 311 277 Cliandos Peerage (1791), Pari. Min. 27 423, 424, 425, 420, 427 Chant r. Brown (1851-2), 9 Hare, 790 692, 699, 608 Vol, .!.'. end* with page 635. m 'i^ii \\ .1 h ill ' 1 -' I , 1 ■ .1 1 \' ', rjiil ! 1 III Il ) 1 TABLE OF CASES CITED. rAOB Chanter r. Hopking (18381, 4 M. & W. 399 ; 1 H. & H. 377 ; 3 Jnr. 58 . . 777 Chapel V. HickH (1833), 2 C. & M. 214 ; 4 Tyr. 43 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 38 223 Chaplin v. Levy (1854), 2 C. L. R. 666 ; 9 Ex. 631 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 117. .318, 47r. Chaplin v. Rogers (1800), 1 Eant, 192 ; 6 R. R. 249 (191 Chapman, Re-, Ex parte Johiison (I884\ 26 Ch. D. 338 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 703 ; 50 L. T. 214 ; 32 W. R. 693 129 Chapman v. Beard (1797), 2 Anst. 942 ; 4 R. R. 875 621 Chapman r. CalliH (18(il), 9 C. B. N. S. 709 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 211 ; 3 L. T. 890 ; a W. R. 375 ; 7 Jnr. N. 8. 995 631 Chapman v. Chapman (1817), 2 Conn. 347 413 Chapman t'. Coffin (1800), 14 Gray, 454 954 Chapman v. Cowlan (1810), 13 Ea.st, 10 ; 12 R. R. 294 395 Chapman v. Bavin (1841), 1 Dowl. N. S. 239 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 319 ; 3 M. & Or. 009 817, 832 Chapman «». Emden (1841), 9C. &P. 717 272 Cha])man v. Keano (183.-)), 3 A. & E. 193 : 4 N. & M. 007 32 Chapman v. Monm. Ry. & Can. Co. (1857), 2 H. & N. 207 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 97 1 1 02 Chapman t'. Rawson (1815), 8 Q. B. 073; 16 L. J. Q. B. 225 271 Chapman v. Seark- (1825), 3 Pick. 38. 44 544 Chapman r. Spuller (1850), 14 Q. B. 621 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 239 ; 14 Jur. 052. 775 Chapman v. Walton (1833), 10 Bing. 57 ; 3 M. & Scott, 389 934 Chappell V. Piirday (1845), 14 M. & W. 30.) ; 14 L. J. Ex. 258 1030 Chappie V. Cooper (1811), 13 M. & W. 252 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 280 49 Charkieh, Tho(1878),42L. J. Adm. 17: L. R. 4 A. & E. 69; 28L.T. 513.. 21 Charlotta, The (1814), 1 Dods. Adm. 392 79 Charlter v. Barret (1790), Peake, 32 244 Charlton t'. CoombeH (1803), 32 L. J. Ch. 284 ; 4 Giff. 372; 8 L. T. 81 ; 11 "W. R. 504 ; 1 New R. 547 ; 9 Jur. N. 8. 534 592, 003, 605 Charlton r. Hiiidmarsh (ISGl), 1 S. & T. 619; 8 W. R. 259 ; 8 H. L. Ca». 100 695, 700 Charlton v. "VVatton (1S34), 6 C. & P. 385 246 Cb-imley r. Grundy (1854), 14 C. B. 008 ; 2 C. L. R. 822 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 1 18 Jur. 053 307 Char, .ek r. Uewinjrs (185.3), 3 C. & K. 378 918 Charter v. Charter (1874), L. R. 2 P. 315; 41 L. J, P. 10 ; 20 W. R. 212. .792, 798 Chart. Mer. Bauk of India r. Diek-:<m (1871), L. R. 3 P. C. 574 38 Cha.se V. Lincoln (1807), 3 Ma.ss. 237 931 Chaseraore v. Richards (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 349 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 81 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 873 ; 7 W. R. 085 125 Chasemore v. Tumor (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 500 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 06; 33 L T. 3J3: 24 W. R. 70 711 Chatelain »'. Pnntigny (1859). 1 S. & T. 411 1 132 Chater r. B-ckett (1797), 7 T. R. 201 ; 4 R. R. 418 678 Chatfield v. Fryer (1815), 1 Price, 253 401 Chatland v. Thonilev (1810), 12 East, 644 19 Chaurand r. A.iifr(.r»tein (1 79 1 ), Pea. 43 764 Cheese v. Lovejoy, Re Harris (1877), L. R. 2 P. D. 10 1 ; 25 W. li. 453 . . 7o5, 700, 1231 Cheescbrough, Re (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 358 ; 40 L. J. Bank. 79 ; 25 L. T. 70 ; 19 W. R. 973 82 Cheesman r. Exall (1851), 6 Ex. 341 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 209 645 Cheltenham aud Gt. West Union Ry. Co. v. Daniel (1841), 2 Q. B. 281, 292 ; 2 Kaihv. Cas. 728 641 Chemical Electric Light, &c. Co. v. Howard (1890), 150 Mass. 496 741 Cheney v. Courtois (I8B3), 13 C. B. N. S. 634 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 116 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1057 ; 7 L. T. 080 129, 915 Cheunell, In re, Jones v. Chenuell (1877), 8 Ch. D. 492 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 80 ; 38 L. T. 494 ; 26 W. R. 595 1233 Chfirry v. Colonial Bk. of Australasia (1869), 38 L. J. P. C. 49 ; 21 L. T. 356; 17 W. R. 1031 781 Cherry V. Homing (1819), 4 Ex. 19; 19 L. J. Ex. 63 135, 654, 667, 680 Cheslyn V. Dalby (1H46), 4 Y. & C. Ex. R. 238 713 The references an to paget, not to paragraphs. TAULE OF CASKS CITED. li PAOK Chwter r. WortW (1850), 18 0. B. 239 «60 ChTZrUm V. vM (1838), 7 A. & E. 713 ; 3 N. & P. 16 ; 1 W. W. & II. 10 ; •.' .Iiir. ;il)4 I'^a Cli. twvn.l r. Lindon (1752), 2 Vph. non. 450 «0O n,i.lM"-UT r. M. of Donegul (1870), 39 L. J. Oh. 0U4 ; 5 L. It. Ch. 497 ; 22 J, T. laS ; 18 W. R. 631 321, 697 Cliirli.Htpr, L(l. Jn., f. Coventry (ise"), 36 L. J. Ch. 673 ; L. R. 2 H. L. 71 • 1,-) W. R. 849 800 Cliitlrri.l ' . AVatson (1889), 58 L. J. Ch. 137 ; 68 L. T. 877 ; 30 W. R. 806. 912 ChiM r. (iriKC (1825), 2 C. & P. 193 527, 528 Cliilili rstoii r. JJurrett (1809). 1 1 East, 439 806 ChiiiH .^t. Ship Co. f. Com. Ahs. Co. (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 142 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. ];)'• 15 L. T. 041 ; 30 W. R. 224 1180 Chiiiii<M k f. Ly. Ely (1805), 2 H. & M. 220 ; 4 Do G. J. A: 8. 038 ; 34 L. J. Di ii'.i',) ". 673 Cliipnr Harris (1839), 5 M. & W. 430 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 64 734 Clii . HTfiild '•. Carter (1895), 72 L. T. 487 A,M. [073] Chirac r. Ueiiiioker (1826), 11 Wheat. 280, 295 610 Chismim v. fount (1H41), 2 M. & G. 317 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 669 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 124 6'-2i Chitty V. Deiidy (1835), 3 A. & E. 324 ; 4 N. & M. 842 ; 1 H. & W. 169. . 20 Choilwiek v. riilmir (1851), unreported 094 Ch..hmmdclry, Ld. v. Ld. Clinton (1815), 19 Ves. 208; 2 Voh. & B. 113; &. Coop. SO ; 13 R. R. 183 ; 14 R. R. 219 003 Chrintiun, Re (1849), 2 Rob. Eco. Rep. 110; 7 Notes of Caa. (Eco. & Mar.) 265 700 Christian r. (Jooinbe (1790), 2 Esp. 489 SVi Christie r. Richard.son (1842), 10 M. & W. 688 ; 2 D. N. 8. 503 ; 12 L, J. Ex. 8G; (i.Iur. 1009 1073 Christie r. Unwiu (1840), 3 P. & D. 204 ; 1 1 A. & E. 373 ; 4 Jur. 303. . 131, 132, 1 137 CiiristmiiH r. Whinyates (1863), 32 L.,J. P. & M. 73 ; 3 S. & T. 81 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 283 ; 8 L. T. 801 ; 11 W. R. 371 142 Chul)l> r. Solomons (1852), 3 C. & K. 76 617 Clnirth r. Imp. Gun Light and Coke Co. (1838), C A. & E. 846 ; 3 N. & P. 35; 1 W. W. &H. 137 639, 640, 641, 642, 614 Churrhward r. Palmer (1856), 10 Moo. P. C. C. 472 6 Churtun i: Frewen (1805), 2 Dr. & Sm. 390 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 660 ; 12 L. T. 105; 13 W. R. 490 599 Churton r. Frowen (1877, should bo 1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 060 ; 15 W. R. 659; 16L.T. 171 818 Chute r. Bustecd (1802-3), 15 Ir. Law R. N. S. 115 054 Ciocci f. Ciom (1800), 29 L. J. P. & M. 60 1119 Citv of H(-rne r. Bk. of England (^1804), 9 Ves. 347; 7 R. R. 218 3 City of Hristol r. Wait (1834), 6 C. & P. 591 303 City of Cambridge, Re, Wood v. Smith (1874), 43 L. J. Adm. 11 ; 6 L. R. P, C. 451; 30L. T. 439; 22 W. R. 678 178 City of London v. Clerke (1690), Cartli. 181 397 City of London r. Perkins (1734), 3 Bro. P. C. 602 327 Citv of London Gaa Light and Coke Co. v. Niobolk (1820), 2 C. & P. 365.. 611 Citv of Mecca (1880), 5 P. D. 28; 49L.J.P. 17; 41L.T.444; 28W.R.200 1103 Clagctt V. Phillips (1842), 2 Y. & C. Ch. 82 601 Clan Gordon, The (1882), 7 P. Div. 190; 4 Asp. M. C. 613 ; 46 L. T. 490; 30 W. R. 691 178 Clanmorris, Ld. v. Mullen (1837), C. & D. Abr. Ca.s. 8 1214 Clapham v. Cologan (1813), 3 Camp. 382 1 195 Clapham r. Langton (1865), 34 L. J. Q. B. 46 ; 6 B. & S. 729 ; 10 L. T. H75; IJ W. R. 1011 770 Clarapedor. Commercial Union Assoc, (1893) 32 W. R. 262 188 Clargfts I'. Sherwin (1698-9), 12 Mod. 343 1097 Claridgo V. Hoare (1807), 14 Ves. 59 961 Clarid^'.' r. Mackenzie (1842), 4 M. & Or. 143 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 726 98, 99 Claridge r. South Staffordshire Ry. Co., (1892) 1 Q. B. 422 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 603 ; 66 L. T. 055 ; 66 J. P. 408 117 ;,1 ! I ■i: : V Vol. I. tnds with page 635. :!i t; Ill TABLE OF CASES CITED. J PAOB Clark's Ex. r. Van Reimsdyk (ISir)), 9 Crunch, l/JS 495, 627 Clark, Ro (lai'J). -2 Q. 11. U;t() ; 'J G. & I). Tlil) ; 1 1 L. J. Q. D 75 132 Clark i: A<lio (1877), 2 App. Cas. 423; 46 L. J. Ch. 5i)S : A' L. T. 1 ; '26 W. R. 4 ') 544 Clark r. Alexander (1844), 8 Seott, N. R. Kil ; 13 L. J. C. P. 133 ; 8 Jur. 498 Ki'J, 387, 716 Clark .'. Riu'flow (1839). 4 Slicpl. '24(5 930 Clark c. ( 'lark /18;i0), 1 M. A: Hob. 3 i-.!)3 Clark v. Uitford (1833), It; Wend. 310 748 Clark c. Iloopur (1834), 10 Bing. 481 ; 3 L. J. C. P. 159; 4 M. & So. 353 713 Clark V. HouKliani (1823), 2 B. & C. Mi) , 3 Dowl. A: R. 322 '219 Clark V. L.-ach (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 290 ; I DeU. J. & 8. 409 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 610 ; 32 Bcav. 14 169 Clark r. Molyncux (1«76), 14 Cox, C. C. 10 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230 ; 3 Q. B. 1). 237 : 37 L. T. 694 ; 26 \V. R. 104 Ill Clark v. MuUick (1840), 3 Mim. T. C. C. 279 51, 62 Clark r. Vorce (18:i6), 15 W.iid. 193 927 Clark r. Waito (181.".), 12 M . «. 439 614 Clark r. Wilmnt (1S41), 1 Y. \- C. C. C. :>:i 437 Clark i: Wrav (1885), 31 Ch. D. 68; 65 L. J. Ch. 119; 53 L. T. 485; 34 W. U. H!i.." 192 Clark I'. Wright (I860), 11 Ir. C. L. R. 402 48 Clark r. York (18S2), 47 L. T. 3S1 , 31 W. R. 62 192 Clarkf, Ex parte (1832). 2 l>ea. & C. 99 866, 869, 870 Clarke, Ko (1812), 2 (i. B. 6)0 ; 1 1 L. J. Q. B. 75; 2 G. & D. 7H0. . 132, 1100, 11 ;iO Clarke, He ( 1 831)), 2 Curt. 329 701 Clarke, He 1S58.. 1 S. A: T. 22 ; 27 L. J. P. & M. 18 700 Clarke r. Bradlauifh (18,S1), 8 Q. B. J). 63; 51 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 16 L. T. 411 ; 31) W. R. 53 . 4(i J. P. 278, affrf. 7 Q. B. D. 151 84 Clarke r. Cullow 1S76), 46 L. J. Q. 15. 53 224 Clarke r. Clarke >lSlt6), 6 Esp. 61 512 Clarke r. Clarke (1868) 1. U. 2 C. L. 395 700 Clarke v. Clarke (1879), 3 L. R. Ir. 306 700 Clarke c. Courtney (1831), 5 Pet. 319, 344 429 Clarke r. Cuekfiold i:ui..n (1S51-2), 1 Bail Ct. C. 81 (Lowndes, M. & P.) ; 21 L. J. (i. B. 349; 16 Jur. 686 641, 644 Clarke r Dickson (1858), C. B. N. S. 463; 28 L. J. C. P. 225; 6 Jur. N. S. 1027 746 darker. Fuller (186»), 16 C. B. N. S. 21 ; 12 W. R. 671 073 darker. Hall (18,S,s). 2« L. R. Ir. 316 93 Clarko r. Itoehe (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 372 ; 25 W. R. 309 281 darker. Kovstone ,1815), 13 M. & W. 752; 14 L. J. Ex. 143 781 darker. Satierv (1824), liv. i M. 126 921 Clarke r. Scripps (1852), 2 RoK ts. 568 706 Clarkson r. Clarkson (1.S62), 2 S. & T. 497 ; 31 L. J. P. 143 ; 6 L. T. 506 ; 10 \V. R. 78 1 703 Clarkw.ii r. Woodhouse (1782), 5 T. R. 412, n. ; 3 Doug. 189 301, 433 Clary r. Clarv (U IP, 2 Iredell. 78 931 Clay's rase (l""' l)i - ^''-'^U P. C. 580 148 Clay r. ( 'n.we (1853), 8 Ex. 295 ; 9 Ex. 604 308 day f. St.'pheiison 1837), 3 A. & E. 807 ; 5 N. \- M. 318 347 Clay c. Thiiekrah (IHll'.l;, '.» C. & P. .'i3 ; 2 M. 4c Rob. 214 475 Clay r. Yates (18.'.6), 25 1.. J. Ex. 237 ; 1 11. A: N. 73 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 908.. 6S8 Clayton r. Hlakey (1798). 8 T. R. 3 ; 4 Rev. R. 575 654 Clavfon t'. (irejfson (18:!6), 5 A. i E. 302 ; 6 N. Ac M. 694 763 Clayton v. Ld. Nugent (1844), 13 M. i^ \V. 205 744, 784, 796, 790 Cloare v. Clearo (1869), I. R. 1 P. & D. 655; 38 L. J. P. & M. 31 : 01 Clonienshaw r. Corp. of D-iblin (1875), 10 Ir. R. 0. L. 1 ••••^••••••••» 646 Th* r^erencu or* to pagei, not to parugrapht. m^t 19'2 48 192 ), «70 ,IVM> 701 700 84 2-24 642 700 700 429 746 073 di 281 781 021 "Oli 703 , ni <,tni 148 308 3»7 475 (iS8 054 7(i:{ |fi, 7U6 HO |0. 717 !i:»t 046 4 TABLE OF CASES CITED. ini PAOK Clement's case ( 1 808), 37 L.J. Ch. 296; L. B. 13 Eq. 179; 18L.T. 690.. 84 J Clcn.'iit, Ex parte (18i2). 11 Price, 08 9^0 Clfiii.'iiti V. Goldinff (1809), 2 Camp. 20 ; 11 Eiwt, 244 16, 20 'JU'iulou r. Diuiiffonl (1831). 6 C. iV P. 18 ; 3 Stark. Ev. 1 IGO 13, 152 f'U-Tnv Sdcictv, Re (IH.^6). 2 K. & J. 615 TOO Clerk'r. Mdi/i.ux (HOI). T Rav. 100 ; 1 Lev. 160 ; 1 Sid. 2t.8; 1 Keb. 84.') 871 Clever. Pi.wel (18.(2), 1 M. A: Rob. 228 CO.', 1119 Clev.liiiid, IJuoh. Dow. of, v. Meyriek (18C8), 37 L. J. Ch. 126 ; 17 L. T. 2:m 50 Cli«nr<l f. Hiirtou (1823), 1 Hiiijf. 199; 8 MiM)re. C. P. IC 390, 604 i;i:ft..nl !. Hunter (1827), 3 C. & P. 10 ; M. & M. 103 48, 942 Clittord r. Parker (1811), 2 M. & Gr. 909 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 233; 10 L. J. C. P. 227 1 102, 1193 Clitlord f. Turrell (1841), 1 Y. & C. C. C. 138; 9 Jur. 633; 14 L. J. Ch. 390 748 Clifton f.U. S. (1846), 4 How. S. Ct. R. 242 109, 277, 520 Cliiian f. C(H)ko 11802), 1 Seh. & Lef. 41 ; 9 U. R. 3 679, G88, 750 Ciine's eane (1«70), L. R. 18 E.|. 213 ; 22 W. R. 512 ; 30 L. T. 249 139 diver. Carew(1859), 1 J. k U. 199, 207; 28 L. J. CIi. OH.'.; 5 Jur. N. S.487. . 495 ClojfMowii c. Walcot (1847), 5 Notes of CawH (Kec. \- Miir.), 523 143 Clou, urry, Ld., ease of (1811), Macci. H. of L. Pnietiee, 606 602 Clo>e, i;.\ parte (Ex parte Kirk. Re Beiinett) (1877), 40 L. J. Bk. 1 ; 36 L. T. 42:i ; 25 W. R. 504 ; 6 Ch ]). 145 847 Closmiulem! r. Carrol (1856), 18 C. B. 36 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 216 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 474 133 Clothierr. Clmimian (1H0.5), 14 EaHt, 331; 12 R. R. 543 398 Clowes r. lliK'^riiihon (1813), 1 Ves. A: B. 375 ; 12 R. R. 284 750 Clowes I . lliUianl (1876), 4 Ch. D. 413; 40 L. J. Ch. 271 ; 25 W. R. 224. . 187, 192 CliinueH r. l'r//.'v 1 1807), 1 Camp. 8 108 Cly.le Nav. Co. r. Biirclay (1876). 1 Apj). Cas. 790 ; 36 L. T. 379 178 Coal CoiisuiMiii)jr Gas Co., Re, Ex i>arte Gover (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 96; 1 Ch. I). lo2.- 33 h. T. 619; 24 W. R. !25 1233 CoHtes r. HaiuliriilKe (1828 . 5 Binjf. 58 ; 2 M. & P. 142 388 Coates r. liirih (1841), 2 U. B. 252 ; 1 G. Ac I). 647 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 640 ; 6 Jur. 540 609 Couts r. fliaplin (1842), 3 Q. B. 486 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 315 ; 2 G. & D. 6.52 ; 6 .Fur. 1123 670, 692 CoMiett, Kx parte (1.S5H), 4 Jur. N. H. 146 837, 869, 870 Cohliett r. (Jrey (1H|9), 4 Ex. 729 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 137 ; 1 L. M. & P. 383. . 479 Cobbett (. lIuasoii(18.VJ), 22 L. J. Q. B. 11; 1 E. & B. 11; 17 Jur. 4H8 , 909, 918 Cobliett f. Kihiiiuhter (186.i), 4 F. A: F. 490 1224, 1226 Col.lM.ld I. Castoii (1824), 1 BinK. 399 ; I C. & P. 51 ; 8 Mooro (C. P.) 466.. 688 Colslen I-. Keudric k (1791). 4 T. R. 431 ; 2 R. R. 424 607, 610 Cot'hrau i. RetU'rjf (1800), 3 E.Mp. 121 768 CiKhrane <. Moore y\H\M), 26 y. B. 1). 67; 59 L. J. Q. B. 377 ; 63 L. T. 153 ; 38 W. R. 5H8 ; 64 J. P. 804 639 Gnk c. Gent (1813), 12 M. At W. 231; 13 L. J. Ex. 24; 1 D. 4 L. 413 227, 228 705, 708 682 490 697 936 Cmkayue, Ro (185i>i, Deaiie, Ew. R. 177 ^MikiiiK r. Ward ^1M45), 1 C. B. 858 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 246 CoekriU V. Sparkes ^1862), 32 L. J. Ex. 118 ; 1 H. A: C. 699; 9 Jur. N. S. 307 ; 7 L. T. 752 Corks r. Nash (lH33i, 6 C. & P. 154 CiH'ks I . Purday ^1816;, 1 C. At K. 2(>9 Cm- c ("lay (1829), 5 Bin^. 440 ; 3 M. Ac P. 57 773 VKtuiH I . Bernard ^1704). 2 Ld. Ravm. 9IH ; 1 Smith, L. C. 201 161, 102 Cohen r. Davidson (1877), 46 L. J.'y. B. 305 ; 2 Q B. D. 466; 36 L. T. 244 ; 25 W. R, 369 771 Cohen V. Hinkley (1809), 2 Camp. 61 ; 1 Taun. 249 ; 11 R. U. 680 Cohen r. Templar (1817), 2 SUirk. 260 Cohn r. Davidson («r ("ohen r. DttvidiMm). Coil V. Tracy (1830), 8 Conn. 268 175 698 88« ;i y«l, I. end* with pag* 636. II ir TABLE OF CA81-:S CITED. PAOH O.IIktii'h catio (lS-'3), 1 Whnel. C. C. 479 8'Jl Colb<.urn v. Diiwsou (I8.M;, 10 C. B. 70'> ; '20 L. J. C. P. 154; 15 Jur. 6«0 "86 ColuloiiKli t •«"'>'>' {1 **•*•')• 15 Ir. Ch. R. 347; 10 L. T. Uls 7'JS Cole V. Iladk-y (IHUt), 1 1 A. & E. 807 ; 4 Jur. 183 ; 3 1'. i D. 458 6u0 Colo f. Uiiwkiim (I73H), Amir. 275 ; 2 Str. 1091 873 Cole V. MiinniiiK (1877), 40 L. J. M. C. 175; 2 Q. D. D. Bll ; 35 L. T. UU C31 Cole r. Slurard (185.)), 11 Ex. 482; 25 L. J. Kx. 59 9 Colemun'n ciihi- (1718), ••itiHl in Joy on Conf('.'*»ioii 655 Colemmi v. (Jibsou (1N32), 1 M. & Rob. 108 092 Coleman v. Southwirk (1812), 9 Johns. 45 372 Coles V. m. of EntflanJ (1839), 10 A. & E. 437 : 2 P. & 1). 521 542 Coles t'. BriHtowe (1808), L. R. 4 Ch. App. 3 ; 38 L. J Ch. 81 : 19 L. T. 403; 17 W. R. 105 158 Coles V. Coles and Brown (I8GG), 35 L. J. P. & M. 40 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 70 939 Collard v. Sainpson (1853). 10 Bwiv. 543; 4 Do G. M. & G. 224 ; 17 Jur. 041 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 729 ; 1 Eq. Rep. 202 093 Colledge V. Horn (1825), 3 Bing 1 1'J ; I'l Moore (J B.) 431 507. 711 Colleu V. Wright (1857), 20 L. J. Q. B. 147 ; 7 E. c& B. 301 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 215; 8 E. Jt; B. 047; 3 Jur. N. .S. 3C3 780 Collett V. Collett (183H). 1 Curt. 087 931, 934 Collett p. Hubbard (ISK!). 2 Coop. 94, 99 544 Collett ». Ul. Keith (1803;, 4 Esp. 212 517, 1144 CoUette V. (J.KHle (1877j, 7 Ch. D. 842; 47 L. J. Ch. 370 ; 38 L. T. 504 . . 224 Collier, Ex parte {.ire Ex parte Bailey). Collier f. Nok.'s(I8l<t), 2 C. & Kir. 1012 15,900 Collier t). Simj)»on (1831), 5 0. i P. M 935, 930 Colling V. Trewwk (1827\ 6 B. & C. 398 300, 310, 317 Collins f. B irrow (1831). 1 M. i Rob. 112 774 Collins f. Bavntun (1841), 1 Q. B. 1 17 ; 4 P. & D. 6-U ; 5 Jur. 530 1211 Collins c. Bishop (1879), 48 L J. Ch. 31 149, 373 Collins r. Blantern (1707), 2 Wils. 341 ; 1 Sin. L. C. 310 91, 740, 747 Collins v. (;aniegi<^ (1834), I A. & E. 095, 703; 3 N. & M. 703 151, 519 Colliiw*. (JaHhon (iMiO), 2 F. 4 F. 47 1192 Collins «'. (Jodefroy (1831), 1 B. & Ad. 950; 1 D. P. C. 320 819, 820 Collins V. Jaoksou (1802), 31 Beav. 646 , 100 Collins V. Martin (1797;, 1 B. & P. 051 ; 2 E»p. 250 ; 4 R. R. 752 133 Collins f. Maide(1838), 8 C. & P. 502 297, 1054 CoUiuBf. PnwwT (1823), 1 B & C. 082 ; 3D. &R. 112 1194 Collins V. Rliodes {nrr |{c Biker). Collins c. Wel.ih (1879), 5 C. P. D. 27 ; 49 L. J. 0. P. 200 ; 41 L. T. 786 ; 28 W. R. 208 41, 4a Collinson i. Margesson (1858). 27 L. J. Ex. 305 712 Collisr. Em.tt (1790), I H. Bl. 313 1205 CoUisf. Stark (1857;, 1 H. A: N. 005; 20 L. J. Ex. 138 711 Collyer v. Will.Hrk (lMJ7i, 12 M.H.re (C. P.), 567; 4 Ling. 313 716 Coliuan f. Auderwm ( 1.S13), 10 Maws. 105 122 Colt V. Nelt.rvill (172..), 2 P. Wnis. 308 085 Coltn.an p. (ingory (1871). 40 L. J. Ch. 362; 19 W. R. 571 80U Coltman v. Marsh "(1811), 3 Taun. 380 712 Colvin t. PrcHi. (Jen. (1827), 1 llagg. Ecc. R. 02 174 Com. V. Boviiton (1871), IIO Mush. 313 035 Com. V. Bulhird (1812 , 9 Muhn. 27o 740 Com. I'. VhU'V (1823). 2 I'l.k. 47 1221, 1228 Com. «'. Dana (1841;. 2 .Mitc 329, 337 000 Com. V. Downing ( 1855,, I ( iray. 29 035 Com V. Drake (181H), 15 Mass, 101 607, 590 Com. V. Ebi'ile (1817). 3 .STg. & R. 9 382 Com. •'. Ki.ly (I7M9.1820:, 2 Vjrg. ('as. 1 873 Com. V. (itc'ii (|N22), 17 Mass. 538 910 Com. V. Uriftlii (1872), 110 Mass. 181 6U0 Th* rrj'inncet art /« puyn, nut to parai/rap/ti. TABLE OF CASES CITED. I- ! FAoa Com. f. ITill(1817), 14 Mass. 207 897 Com r. Kuapp (1H30). 9 Pick. o07 651,568,585,632 Com.i'. Kiittaaiid (1838), 20 Pick. 229 16 Cora r. LviiPH (ISHfi), 142 Mass. 577 898 Cora. V. NorcTOBH (1813), 9 Mass. l92 295 roin. ('. r.ilhird (1847), 12 Mete. 225 630 Com. V. RirharJs (1836), 18 Pick. 434 354 Cora. V. Sapt) (1 890), 29 Amer. St. R. 405 590, 691 Com. e.Slupherd (1814). 6 Binn. 283 621 Com. V. Smith (1812), 9 Miuw. 107 615 ( om. f. Tilik-n (iiiulated), cited 2 Stark. Ev. 232, n. 1 615 Com. «. VaHH (1831), 3 Leigh, R. 786 4C9 torn. r. Woelpcr (1817), 3 Serg. & R. 29 1175 Com. V. Wood (18.5s), 11 Gray, 85 635 Combe r. Corp. of Lomlon (1842), 2 Y. & C. C. C. 631 601, 1183 Combo V. Pitt (1704), 3 Burr. 1586 ; 1 Wm. Bl. 524 550 Coram, of Li'ith Har. A: 1). r. Iiispe<!. of Poor (1860), L. R. 1 H. L. (Sc.) 17 1139 Comm. f. White (1888), 147 Mass. 76 617 Commeniul Bk. of Scotl v. Rhind (1860), 3 Macq. 643 ; 1 Paterson, 903 . . 652 ComminjTH .-. Heanl (1809), 10 B. & S. 606 ; L. R. 4 Q. B. 669 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 9 ; 20 L. T. 975 ; 18 W. R. 16 1160 Commins v. Scott (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 11 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 503; 32 L. T. 420 ; 23 W. R. 498 671 Compton f. Chandless (1801), 4 Esp. 19 1081, 1165 Concha r. Concha (1886), 11 App. Cas. 541 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 257 ; 55 L. T. 622 ; 35 W. R. 477 012 Concha r. Miirrietta (1889). 40 Ch. D. 543 ; 60 L. T. 798 937 Concordia, The (1860), L. U. 1 Adm. 93 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 771 ; 14 L. T. 896. . 6 Conflann «iu!irry Co. i. Parker (1867), L. K. 3 C. P. 1 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 51 ; 17 L. T. 283 ; 16 W. R. 127 308 Coulon.. M(K)re (1875), 9 I. R. C. L. 190 1114 Connelly i'. Connelly (1850), 2 Robert*. 202 1144, 1 145 Omnor, In the goods of, (1892) .£9 L. R. Ir. 201 172, Add. [181] Conmr v. (1842), tr. Cir. R. 610 832 Connor c. Cronin (1858), 17 Ir. L. R. 480 133 Connybeare v. Farries (1869), L. R. 5 Eq. 16; 39 L. J. Ex. 26; 21 L. T. 497 313 Conradi v. Conradi (1868), L. R. 1 P. A: D. 614 ; 18 L. T. 659 ; 16 W. R. 1023 353, 1103 Conronr. Conron (1858), 7 H. L. C. 168 144 CoHHorv. of Uiv. Thames v. Hall (1868), 37 L. J. C. P. 163 ; L. R. 3 C. P. 416; 18 L. T. 361 ; 16 W. R. 971 178 Conhtable f. Constable (1879), 11 Ch. D. 681 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 621 ; 40 L. T. 616 140 Contrail Corp., Ho (1871), 40 L. J. Ch. 351 ; L. R. 6 Ch. App. 146 846 Conway r. Biazley (1831), 3 Ilagg. Ecc. R, 639 1144 Cooch V. O.K>dman (1842), 2 Q. B. 580 ; 2 O. * D. 159 ; 6 Jur. 779 .. . .653, 654 Co<Kle «'. CoiMle (1838), 1 Curt. 755 1048 C<H.k, He (1846), 7 Q. B. 653; 14 L. J. Q. B. 188; 9 Jur. 869 837 Cook I'. Hearu (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 20 319 Cook .•. LamlHTt (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 93 ; 3 S. & T. 46 ; 9 L. T. 211 ; 1 1 W. H. 401 ; Jur. N. 8. 258 699 C«Mik I . Lnmanl (1827), 6 B. & C 351 ; 9 Dowl. & R. 339 226 CiMik I . Nuth'Tcote (18;),')), C. & P. 743 918 Cook 1'. North Metroinditan Tramways Co. (1887), 18 ti. B. D. 683; 56 L. J. Q. B. 3U9; 66 L. T. 448; 57 L. T. 746; 35 W. R. 677 ; 61 J. P. 6.10 779 Cook I . Stearns (1814), 1 1 Mass. 533 683 Cook I'. Tlie State (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 756 Add. [568] C.Hik I. Tondinwm (1876), 24 W. R. 851 912 Cnker. Hanks(l8'.!6),2 C. & P. 478 401. 1174 C.K.ku V. Butler (1872). 2 Hop. & Colt. 22 ; 21 W. R. 73 ; 27 L. T. 648 ; 42 L. J.C. P. 26; L. R. 9C. P. 2.56 1173 I t'i Vol. I, tndt with payt 03j. lyi TABLE OF CASES CITED. J>AOK Cooke f. Orenn (1823), 11 Priro, 736 112 Owkof. LaiiKift" (1 «.')!), lo Hi uv. 234; 21 L. J. Cli. 371 136 Cooko V. Lloyd (1803), I'cako, Evid. Ajipcndix xxviii 414 f ;o..ko V. Loxlev (1 7i)2). T) T. H 4 ; 2 R. It. .521 96 C(i.)k.( r. Maxwell (1817). 2 Stark. N. P. 183 ; 19 R. R. 700 018, 620, 1031 CcM)k(M'. Shoil n7!l3), oT. R. 25.') U03, 1141 C.H.kcr. TaiiHw.'ll(lsi8), 2 MoDfo (0. P.), .')13; 8Tauii.l31 1210 CokfT. Wilby (1881), 25 Ch. D. 7GU ; 53 L. J. fli. 592; 50 L. T. 152; 32 W. K. 379 13, 1030 Cooko V. Wildi-.s (1856). 5 E. A: B. 328 ; 3 C. L. R. 1090 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. ;i(i7; 1 Jur. N. S. 610 47, 111 C(M.kPH v. C(H>kfH (I86;«), 3 N. R. 97 ; 11 W. R. 871 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 813 .... 462 Cook.'H r. Masortll {Um), 2 Vorn. 200 639 Cool.' r. Braliam (1848), a Ex. 186; 18 L. J. Ex. 105 498,609,612 Coombs, llr (1806), 36 L. J. P. & M. 25 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. :t02 698 CoomliH r. BrisU)! and Exoter Rv. Co. (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 401 ; 3 H. & N. 510 ' 692 CoonibH !•. (Jocthrr (1829), M. & M. 398 1050 CooinbH V. WilkH, (1891) 3 Ch. 77 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 42 ; 65 L. T. 66 ; 40 W. R. 77 071 C(M>p.> r. CroHswcll (1806), L. R. 2 Ch. 112 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 114 ; 16 L. T. 42 ; 15 W. R. 2 12 449 Coopor, In re. Cooper v. Vesoy (1882), 20 Ch. D. 611, «'.;9 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 862 ; 47 L. T. 89 : 30 W. R. 018 135 Cooper r. Rlardv (1839), 1 HinK- N. C. 45 99 CfM.jM-ri'. Boik.it (18(i3, r(hould be 1844), 4 Moo. P. C. C. 419; 4 Not in of CaweH (Ere. & Mar.), 685 ; 10 Jur. 931 142, 097, 707 CooiMT r. Uibl«)iin (1813), 3 Camp. 363 109 Cooper r. Grant (18,V2), 12 C. B. 154 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 197 732 CooiK-r f. Ilardin^r (1845), 7 Q. B. 928; 9 Jur. 777 818 Cooi)erf. Lloyd (1859), C. B. N. 8. 519 622 Cooper <•. MaiMlonald (1807), 30 I.. J. E(i. 304 1030 Coiiper r. Macdonald (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 533, 638 ; L. R. 16 E.i- 258 ; 28 L. T. 693 806 Cooper I'. Marxdeu (1 i . 3), 1 Esp. 1 457 CooiM-r r. Metrop. Board of Works (1883), 26 Ch. D. 472 ; 50 L. T. 602 . . /)97 CoojM-r f. Mever (1831)), 10 B. & C. 468 .547, 548 Cooper c. Robinson (1842), 10 M. & W. 09 J ; 12 L. J. Ex. 48 750 Cooper t. Shepherd (1840), 3 C. P. 272 ; 4 U. & L. 218; i5 L. J. C. P. 237; 10 Jur. 7.58 1115 Cooper t: Slado (1858), 6 E. & B. 447 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 324 ; 2 Jur. N. 8. 1016 104, 106,686 Cooi>er r. Smith (1812), 16 East, l(t3; 13 R. R. 397 672 Cooper f. Taylor il844), M. & Or. 989 ; 7 Scott, M. R. 950; 13 L. J. C. P. 92 ; 8 Jur. 150 632 Cooper r. Wands. Board of Works (1863)^ 32 L. J. C. P. 185; 14 C. B. N. S. 180; 9 Jur. N. S. 1155; 1 1 W. R. 046 1118 Coo|Mr r. Woolfitt (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 310 ; 2 H. & N. 122 ; 3 Jur. N. 8. 870 146 CoorK, Rajah of r. East India Co. (18.56), 25 L. J. Ch. 346 6 IK Cooto r. Boyd ( 1 789), 2 Bro. C. C. 521 807, 808 Coote e. Leitrhworth (1590), Mooro (F.), 467 543 Cope, Re (1850), 2 R.(bprts. 335 701 CoiM. I'. (;oiH' (1H33), 5 C. & P. 604 ; 1 M. & R«ib. 209, 27 . .101, 621, 622, 1170 Copo V. Mooney (1802), 14 Ir. C. li. R. 250 ; 10 L. T. 8.54 1163 Copo V. Rowlands (1830). 2 M. & W. 160 ; 2 dale, 231 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 63. . 1.50 CoiM! I'. Thames Haven Dock Vo. (1848), 2 C. & Kir. 757 929, 900 CojMj V. Thames Haven Dock & Rail. Co. (1849), 3 Ex. 841 ; Railw. Ciw. 83 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 345 642 CoiHhindc. Watts (1815), 1 .Stark. 95 698 Copin V. Adamsoii (1875), L. R. 9 Ex. 346; 43 L. J. Ex. 161 ; 31 L. T. 242; 22 W. R. 058 1147 Copland v. Toulmin (1840), 7 CI. & Fin. 360 486 /%(• ye/erencu »r* to page$, not to para/raph§. TAHLE OF CASES CITED. Ivii rxait Copley r. Burton (1870), L. B. 6 C. P. 489; 39 L. J. M. C. 141; 22 f.. T. has 213 Copp V. rplmm (1825), 3 New Hamp. 169 9Q9 Copper Miutre" Co. v. Fox (1851), 16 Q. B. 229 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 174 ; Ifi .fur. 703 531, 042 CorU'tt V. Corbctt (1813), 1 Ves. & B. 335 329 Corl.ishU'v'B Trusts, Re (1880), 14 Ch. Div. 840; 49 L J. Ch. 200; 28 W. li. 530 172 Cordi'r, Uv II8I8). Notos of Ciis. {Eiw. & Mar), 550 098 C.nl.TV r. Colvillo (or Colvin) (1803), 14 C. B. N. S. 374 ; 32 L. J. C. P. •Jll);" 'J Jur. N. S. 1?00; 8 L. T. 245 521 ('..rdwriit r. Ilunt(l»;i8), S Tuun. 5!I0 750 Cork, Hp. of, V. Poru'r(1877). Ir. U C. L. 94 901 Cork uml Uiindoii Ky. Co. v. Ca/.eiiovo (1847), 10 Q. B. 935 ; 1 1 Jur. 802.. lUO Cork ami Haiulou Uy. Co. v. OikkIo (1853), 13 C. B. 826; 22 L. J. C. P. HIS ; 17 .Tur. 555 76 Corn.litis Rctraii, U<' (1838), 1 Curt. 908 096 Cormll I. Hak.r (1885), 29 Ch. I). 711 : 54 L. J. Ch. 814; 52 L. T. 421.. 913 Conirll r. Gr.'«!ii (1823). 10 Scrir. & H. 14, 10 3.54 (•,.riif.«)t I. Fowkf (ISIO), M. & W. 377 ; 4 Jur. 919 ; 9 L. J. Kx. 297. . 200 Cornforth r. Smithard (I8')U), 5 II. & N. 13 ; 29 L. J. Kx. 228 • W. R. 8 711 C.niish r. AMii^'toii (1S5!>), 4 II. & N. 519 ; 2S L. J. Kx. 202 538 CoriiiHh r. Clark (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 1S4 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 14 ; 26 L. T. 494 ; •JO \V. U. 897 135 Coniish r. llotkin (1853), 1 E. & B. 002; 22 L. J. Q. B. 142; 17 Jur. 1049 186 Cornwall r. Hirhanlson (182.5^, Ky. A: M. 305 219, 252, 255, 2.'ia G)rs.'ii I. Dubois (ISIO), Holt, N. V. U. 239 698 Cort r. Aiuli.ixalc, iir. Uy. Co. (1851;, 17 Q. B. 127 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 460 ; !•') Jur. S77 751 C.rtis c. Ktiit Watt'rworkH Co. (1827), 7 B. it C. 314 151 C.irv I'. Brittou ^1S30), 4 C. Ac P. 40J 514 Coryr. Davis (1SG3 , 14 C. B. N. S. 370 '2H2 CoHMioiMilitaii, Itc ( S48), Notes of Can. (Kcc. & Mar.), Supji. xxviii 177 Cwiialian r. Criou i V.'), 15 M«h). P. C. C. 215 (VM ( (issciiB, Kx partf, >V^arrall, Ho (1820), Buck, 531, 5li 970 ("osscns 1'. Cossi'MH (1737), WillcH, 25 92 ( oHMsy ) . Loud. & HriKht. Ry. Co. (1870), L. R. 5 C. I'. 140 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 174 ; 22 L. T. 19 ; 18 W. K. 493 599, 1 186 Costa Rioa, Hep. of v. Erlanger (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 281 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 33 321 Coster*, lletheritifrton (1859), 8 Cox, 0. C. 175 ; 1 E. & E. 8u2; 28 L. J. M. C. I'.i.! 1073 ( Mtchinif I. I5a»st.t (IS02), 32 L. J. Ch. 286 ; 32 Bcav. 101 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 5!iO ; 1 1 \V. K. 197 •. 623 Cotes r. Davis (1S08), 1 (?rtiiip. 4S5 504 (ot.sworth r. Sp<,kes (IC il i. 30 L. J. C. P. 220; IOC. B.N. 8 103; 7 Jur. N. S. Sii;{ ft23 C..tt«m r. Parlridjfe (1842), 4 M. & Ur. 271 ; 4 Seott, N R. 819; 11 L. J. <'. 1'. Mil 715 ( oil, rill V. Ifnl.l.y (1S25), 4 B. & C 405 ; I). & R. .561 286 CottiuK"!", Kx jiarte ( I07S), 2 Swans. 320 1 150 tMiil,., Kx parte ^1S50), 2 Mae. & (J. 1S5 ; 2 H. & T. 382 ; 19 L. J. Ch. ■"i» 640 <'"tton, Re(lR4S), 6 Not«'H of Can. (Kco. & Mar.) ;»(I7 098 f.ittrell r. Hughes (IS.Vi), 16 C. B. /..32; 3 C. L. R. 490; 24 L. J. C. P. 107; 1 Jur. N. S. 44S 120, 127 Cnttrill r. Myri.k (1s:(5). 3 Fairf. 222 03i • uuih V. Meeker (1S17), 2 Conn. 302 765 Cnulinjf t. Coxe (184S), 6 C. B. 703 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 399 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 100 ; 1 ' •''"■ 101 836 (•■Mt.lnve ({,. (1S73), L. R. 8Q. B. 410; 42 L. J. Q. B. 217 ; 38L.T. 701 ; 2\ W.U. 8N3 1028 rW. I, tndi with pagt 035. ivm TABLE OF CASES CITED. TAOI Courti'cn r. Touse (1807), 1 Camp. 43; 10 R. R. 6'J7 'Jtl CoiisiuHc. Paddon (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 547; 5 L. J. Ex. 49; 6 Tyr. n'A^ 222 CoutU r." Acworth (1869 , -iS^L. J. Ch. 694 ; L. R. 8 Eq. 668 ; 21 L. T. J24 ; 17 W. R. 1 121 . ; 136 Couturier r. Hiu«tie IS.J2). 8 Es. 40 : 22 L. J. Ex. 97 677 Coventry v. tireat Ea.-»ttni Ky. Co. (1883), 11 Q. B. 1). 776 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 694; 49 L. T. 641 648 Cowi-n t . AbrahaniH M793). 1 Esp. .50 289, 318 Cowan «•. Braidwood (1840,, 1 M. i Gr. 882 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 138; 9 D. P. C. 27 1142, 1143, 1146, 1147, 1154 Cowbum, Re [tre Ex parte Firth). Cowell r. Chambers ;i»o6), 21 Beav. 619 1092 Cowie V. HaUall (1821;, 4 B. 4 Ad. 197 ; 3 Stark. N. P. 36 1194 Cowie V. Remfry (1846), 5 Moo. P. C. C. 232 ; 3 Moo. Ind. App. 448 ; 10 Jur. 789 298 Cowley f. Knapp(1886), 42 N. J. L. 297 693 Cowling f. Ely (1818), 2 Stark. R. 366 ; 20 R. R. 694 488 Cowper r. Lord 0.w|>er ;17:»4), 2 P. Wms. 720, 748. 749, 750. 751, 752 .. 108 Cox's Trusts, Re il878), 47 L. J. Ch. 735 ; 9 Ch. D. 159 ; 27 ^V. R. 53 . . 139 Cox V. Allinufham (1822), Jac. 514 1045 Cox r. Cannon (1838;, 4 Bing. N. C. 453;. 6 Dowl. 625 732 Cox f. Hill, (18H2; 36Sol. J. 446 193 Cox I. Knight (18-36;. 18 C. B. X. S. 645 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 314 99 Cox r. Middleton (1855), 2 Drew. 209 ; 2 Eq. Rep. 631 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 61S 673 Cox r. Midi. Ry. Co. (1849), 3 Ex. 268 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 65 ; 14 Jur. 65 ; 6 Railw. Can. 583 641 Cox r. Newman (1813). 2 Ve«. & B. 168 1037 Coxf. Reid (1849), 13 Q. B. 858; 18 L. J. Q. B. 216; 13 Jur. 563 ....39, 227 Cox V. Walter i»hould bo Walker) (undated), cited 9 C. & P. 339 259 Cox V. Willoughby il8»0], 13 Ch. D. 863 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 237 ; 42 L. T. 125 ; 28 W. R. 503 169 Coxhcad r. Mullia (1878), 3 C. P. D. 439 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 701 ; 39 L. T. 349; 27 W. R. 136 718 Coxhcad t. Richards (1846), 2 C. B. 584 ; In L. J. C. P. 278 ; 10 Jur. 984. . 39, 47, 111 Coyle V. Great North of IreUnd Ry. Co. (1887), 20 L. R. Ir. 409 163 Cruigf. Fenn (1841;, C. A Man«h. 43 259 Crane v. London Dm\ Co. (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 224 ; 6 B. & 8. 313 ; L. T. 372: 12W. R. 745; 10 Jur. N. S. 984 10 Crane i . Man«hall (1839). 4 Shepl. 27 443 Crane t . Powell ;1h68/, 38 L. J. C. P. 43 ; L. R. 4 0. P. 123 ; 20 L. T. 703; 17 W R. 161 672 Craven, Ex parte (1870). 39 L. J. Bank. 33 ; L. R. 10 Eq. 648 ; 23 L. T. 663 ; 18 W. R. 1022 : atfd. 8ub nom. Craven, Ex parte, TempcHt, In re, L. R. 6 Ch. 70 ; 40 L. J. Bank. 22 ; 23 L. T. 650 ; 19 W. R. 137 .... 82 Craven r. llalliley (1838,. cited Thomas v. Connell, 4 M. & W. 270 379 Crawcour f. Salter (1881,, 18 Ch. D. 30 ; 45 L. T. 62 6, 61 1 Cruwfonl f. Crawford (1867), Ir. R. 2 Eq. 166 710, 711 Crawford and Lindsay Peer. (1848), 2 U. L. G. 634, 650 ; 2 Marq. 479 . . 134, 423, 1018, 1227 Crawford i . Spencer (1851), 62 Mass. 418 757 Cray t: HallK liS25;, cited Smith r. Blandy, Ry. & M. 259 479 Crcagh r. BliHid (1845/, 3 J ' La T. 133. 161 660 Creude v. Barrett (1835), It M. i R. 919 ; 5 Tyr. 458 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 297. . 393,' 395, 396, 397, 401, 404, 413, 435. 444, 445, 510 Credland v. Potter (1874), 10 L. R. Ch. 8 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 169 ; 31 L. T. 522 : 23 W. R. 36 738 Creen r. Wright (1877), 2 C. P. D. 354 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 427 ; 36 L. T. 356 ; 25 W. R. 502 42 Crcevy i. Carr(1835\ 7 C. 4 P. 64 245, 942 Cruppsf. Durden (1776-7), 2 Cowp. 140; 1 Sm. L. C. 092 1130 Th4 Ttfertnttt art to pages, not to paragraph*. TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixit I 82 379 311 ni m 42 FAaa Creror r. S()do (1827), M. & M. 8.5 ; 3 C. & P. 10 j;* Cn-HHwell r. Jiickhon (I860), 2 F. & r. 24 V2U CiTWf. Sai.iKltTH (1734-5), 2Str. 1008 993, 996, 997 CriDiwr. Diivw (1843), 12 M. & W. 159; 13 L. J. Ex. 217 713, 714 Cri ) )N r. nnrliioll (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 381 ; 10 .Tur. N. 8. 300; 8 L. T. 7ii,^ ; 1 1 W. R. 953 678 Crippsr. HillH(1844), 5 Q. B. 606; 1 Uav, Jc M. 644; 8 Jur. 466; 13 L. J. Q H. 130 49 Criuiw V. WoUh (1S43), C. & Mar. 489 271 CriwlcM'. Bolton (1827), 3 C. & P. 240 44 CrHii r Aiidernou (1816), 1 Stark. R. 35 ; 18 K. II. 744 lOi), 133 Cii-pin r. Doglioni (1862), 32 L. J. P. & M. 109; 3 S. v% T. 44 ; 8 L. T. 91 ; II W. R. 600 309, 414 Croft r. Croft (1863), 4 S. & T. 10 ; 31 L. J. P. & M. 44 , 11 Jur. N. S. 183; llL.T.781; 13 W. R. 526 967 Croft V. Grnham (186.1), 2 De G. J. & Sm. 155 ; 9 L. T. 589 137 Croft ». Lmiiley (1867-8), 5 E. & B. 648 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 223 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. H21 ; 6 H. L. Cas. 672 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 903 522 Cr)ft I'. Ri(to\answorth Highway BoHrd(1888), 67 L. J. Ch. 589 121 Cn.ftonf. Poole (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 608 519 Crofts V. Marshall (1836), 7 C. & P. 507 765 CroktT V. M. of Hertford (1844), 4 Moo. P. C. C. 339 702, 703 CroniHck V. Hoathcote (1820), 4 Moore (C. P.) 357 ; 2 B. & B. 4 591, .')92 Croiiii)tou r. Butler (1790), 1 HagK- Coiih. 460 632 Croiik •-•. Frith (1839), 9 C. & P. 197 ; 2 M. & Rob. 262 1209 CnH.kf. DowliiiK (1782), 3 Doug. 77 1013, 1014 Cr(K)k V. Hill (1876), 3 Ch. D. 773 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 119 ; 24 W. R. 786 ... . 145 Cr.K)k <■. Seaford (Corpn. of) (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 651 ; 25 L. T. 1 ; 19 W. R. 9:!8 645 Crookt-nden v. Fuller (1859), 29 L. J. P. & M. 1 ; 1 S. & T. 441 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1222; 1 L. T. 70 179, 180 Crook.wit I . Fletcher (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 153 ; 1 H. & N. 893 1198 CropiHT r. Smith (1884), 26 Ch. D. 710 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 891 ; 61 L. T. 733 ; 33 W. R. 60 187 Crodhief. Thompson (1847), 11 Ir. Eq. R. 404 487 Crosby r. Iletherington (1842), 4 M. & Or. »33 ; Scott, N. R. 637 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 261 6, 7 Crosby v. Percy (1808), 1 Taun. 364 372, 1214 CroHby V. Wadsworth (1805), 6 East, 602 ; 2 Smith, 559 ; 8 R. R. 566 687 Ci-oNH f. Kuyc (1796), 6 T. R. 663 518 Crosse r. Pediugfield (1821), 12 Sim. 36 488 CrosHley, Ex parte, Re Taylor (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 409 ; 41 L. J. Bank. 35 848 Crosslty V. Dixon (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 617 ; 10 H. L. Cas. 293 ; 9 Jur. K. 8. 607; 8L. T. 260; 11 W. R. 716 644 Crosslcy r. Elworthv (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 158 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 480 ; 24 L. T. 607 ; 19 W, R. 842 135 Cros.'^lev r Lightowler (1867), L. R. 3 Eq. 279 ; 2 Ch. App. 478 ; 36 L. J. Cli. 5S4; 15 W. R. 801 HI Cro^sliy r. Maycock (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 180; 43 L. J. Ch. 379; 22 AV. R. 387 673 Crottv V. HodgcH (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 561 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 221 1194 Cniurh r. Cred. Fon. of England (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 374 ; 42 L. J. y. ». 1S3; 29L. T. 259; 21 W. R. 946 960 Crouch I'. H<iopor (1852), 16 Bcav. i82 421 Cniudson v. Leonard (1808), 4 Crauch, 434 1 150 Ciou)fhton r. Blake (1843), 12 M. & W. 206 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 78 ; 8 Jur. 275 1050, 1 109, 1 169 Cn)wder v. Hopkins (1843), 10 Paige, 190 433, 514 Crowe f. Clay (1854), 9 Ex. 604 • 23 L. J. Ex. 160 ; 18 Jur. 654 307 Crowley v. Page (1837), 7 C. & P. 789 954 Crowley «•. Vitty (1852), 7 Ex. 319 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 135 667 Cniwiiiushield'B case (1830), 10 Pick. 497 382 Vol. I. tnd* with paye 635. i^iil ■iiii u TABLE OF CASKS CirKD. J ; PAOK CrowtiinHhiold v. CrowninshioM (18r)4), 2 Gray, 624 170, 262 CrowthLT r. Appleby (1873), L. li. C. P. 23 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 7 ; 29 L. T. •iSO ; 22 W. K. 2().'. 814 Ciowther v. SolomoiiH (1848), 6 C. R. 758 ; 18 L. .T. C. P. 92 \M <ti.xt..ii I'. May (187G), 'J L'li. D. 3hH ; 39 L. T. 401 ; 27 W. K. 327 101 CniiNO f. Clunoy {\HU\ (i Ir. Eq. 11. -iW 30), 1223 Ctil.itt V. Port.r (1^28). 8 U. & V. 257 ; 2 M. & U. 207 1 13 Cuff V. I'.iin (IHKt), 1 M. A- Hul. 21 ; 14 R. It. 384 762 CmnbiTlaiid c. Ccim land (1801), 1 II. Si C. 194 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 3.')3 ; 9 Jiir. N. H. 2.13 ; 7 L. 'i'. 334 730 Cimiinff c. FrciiiJi (180!)), 2 Camp. 100, n filo fninmin r. Siiiifli (1810), 2 Mit)? A: |{. 440 620 fuinmiiiKf. lt<)et'u.^k (1810), Holt, N. 1". K. 172 297 CuiidcU r. I'ratt (1827), M. A: M. 108 907, 908 Timliffe r. Seftoii (1802), 2 Ka^-t, is;{ 328, 1214, 1210 ('iiiiiiiii>?luiiii, Ke(1800), 29L. J. I Ac M. 71 ; » S. li T. 194 704 (' iiiiiiif^liani r. Ciniiiiii^'haiii (1814 . Div, 48 i 149 ( .rl.!wi« f. Corfii'ld (1811), 1 (J. & '' ; ! Q. B. 811; Jur. 269 ..620, 521 ('iirliii;jr«'. IVrriiiK (183.')), 2Myl. i . ;5 ; ' J. Cli. 80 OOI Currciif. Crawford (181S), 4 StTjr. A. ' .,6 468 Ciirrio r. A:id.-rw.ii (18,V.)), 2 E. Ac E. 6. ; 29 L. ,< (' B. 87 ; Jur. N. S. 442 ; 8 \V. H. 274 089, 092 Ciirrio v. Cliild and Brown (1812), 3 (Tamp. 283 1207, 1213 Curry r. Wallir (1790), 1 E.sp. 450; 5 K. R. 743; 1 Bos. & P. 626; 4 H. It. 717 012 Curtiii V. Kvans (1872), Jr. R. 9 Eq. 653 800 CiirtiH r. Hunt (1821), 1 C. & P. 180 663 CurtiH c. Jlarkt-nzi.' (1877). W. N. No. 45 of 1N77, Ch. D. 213 800 Curtid r. Mandi (1868), 3 II. & N. 80G ; 28 L. J. E.x. 30; 4 Jur. N. S. 1112 16 Curti.t f. M'Sweoncy (1841), Ir. C;r. K 343 1211 Curtis f. Pn^li (1847), 10 Q. B. HI ; U' L. J. Q. B. 199 090 Curtis V. Ri(!kard8 (1840), 1 M. i: Gr. 47 ; 1 Scott, N. It. 166 ; 4 Jur. 608 118 Curzon t'. Loinux (1803), 6 East, 00 397, 403 Cuwick r. Farrrll (18,S7), 18 L. V.. Ir. 494 ; 20 L. It Ir 60 162 Cunackf. Itobinwrn (1«01), 1 B. .V S. 299; 30 L. J. Q. B. 201 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 642 ; 4 L. T. 600 ; 9 W. R. 736 089, 690 Cutbimh v. GiUuTt (18Jh;, 4 Scr-.f. & R. .655 279 Cufhliert r. Cuinmiug (1855), U Ex. 405 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 310 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 080 7"8 CutliTt'. Ni'wlin (1819), Mann. Dig. N. P. 137 608 Cutler I'. PoiH.' (1830), 1 Shcpl. 337 080 CutUi r. Gilbert (18,64), 9 M)o. P. C. C. 143 143, 706 Cutis V. rickering (1072). 1 Ventr. 197 000 Cuttsr. U. 8. (1812), 1 Gall. 09 1199 CuttH V. Ward (1807), L. R. 2 Q. B. 367 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 101 ; 8 B. & S. 277; 16L. T. 614; 16 W. R. 446 723 15. falsely nailed F. v. F. n804), 34 L. J. P. & M. 60 167 Dabbsf. Itunipliries (18.14), 10 Bing. HO; 4 M. & Se. 286 711 Da CostJi t . Edmunds (1816). 4 Camp. 143 ; 2 Chitty, 227 ; 10 It. It. 703.. 765 Da (^ostJt r. Jones ( 1 "H), 2 Cowp. 729 620 DaCoHtae. Pym (1797), Peake, Add. Can. 144 1221 DaCostuP. Villa Real (1734), 2 Str. 901 1103, 1107 Dagleish v. Dwld (1832), 6 C. & P. 238 484 Daines r. Hartley (1818), 3 Ex. 200; 18 L. J. Ex. 81 929 Daines v. Heatli (1847), 3 C. B. 938 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 117; 11 Jur. 185 1200 Daintry »'. Broekleliurst (1818), 3 Ex. 207; 18 L. J. Ex. 67 117 Daioz, Tliu (1878), 47 L. J. Adm. 1; 37 L. T. 137 178 Dalby V. Hirst (1819), 1 B. & B. 224 ; 3 Mooro (C. P.), 636 732 The rtferenen ar* to pagti, not to parayrnpht. \% TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixi PAOB Dale's .use (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 474 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 234 ; 43 L. T. 785 : 4") I P ''HI '" I),l'..V' IlaM.ilton flSIO), 5 Ilaro, 369 ; 2 PhillipH, 208 ; 1(5 L. J. Oh. V>C>, ■M- ; 1 1 .I.ir. l(l:i. ^^74 V,' '.• ' "^ •-•; ' ' V ^'^^ Daler. Hu.nfiev (IS'-S). 20 L. J. Q. B. 137; 7 E. & B. 2«(i ; 2. L. J. (J H :tiii) : K. H. A: K. UMU ; fl Jur. N. S. 101 7fi9 DiilkHeisl. r. ll.KlifHon (ISHl). 7 Bill^. IK.'); fl M. & P. 407 1 UO Daliwm IV Stiiik(l«"3). 4 Esp. I(i3 2h'.t Ji.ll,.vv.Ue(lHliil), 3,-. L. J. I'. \ M. HI; L. R. 1 T. & D. 189 701 Dalivnu.le t: Diilryinple (IHl I), 2 Hit).'?.'. Cons. i>l 7. 9.10 l>,.lrvin pie r. Hull (ISM). Hi Ch. D. 71o ; oO L. J. Oh. 302 ; 29 W. U. 421 HO Diilstou c. Oiutsworth (1721), 1 P. \Viii«. 731 ; 3 Bn.wu, P. (;. .JJlt 108 Iialic.ii c. Anjriis (IHSl), App. Cum. 1740; 50 L. J. Q. B. 089 ; II L. T. fi4J; ;!li \V. K. 191 : 40 J. p. 13.> 115 DalvV Scttl.iiieiiis, Ro (18.^)fS), 20 ISmv. 4.00 ; 27 L. J. Ch. ? ol ; 31 L. T. •i;,S C, W. H. •');<3 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 52') 1 144 Daly r. Att.-Oeli. (IH70). I. H. H I'^l- MS 130 i)aly r. Wilwrn (ISfJ). Milw. (u'tX. 43;'), 1 10 Dal/.U r. Mair 1 1808), 1 Camp. ;">;i2 o42 Daiiitivll I. l'n.theroe(1847), 10 Q. B. 20; 16 L. J. Q. B. 170; 11 Jur. ;(31 397, 404 Dun V. lirtiwii (182.')). 4 Cowoii. 483, 492 493, 705 j)am'e r. Uolwi.n (1829), M. .V- M. 29.-) 20, 1045 Dannrr. (Vabb (1873), 42 L. .J. P. & M. M ; L. 11. 3 P. A: D. 98; 28 L T. 91 1 703 Dati.lvi.l;.'.' c. Cor(len(1827). 3 C. & P. U 960 Dan- '. KiikwHll (ISIiH), 8 C. & P. 0S3 1102 Dunfotil r. Ml Amiltv (IHSIl), 8 App. Cus. 456; 62 L. J. (i. B. 652; 49 L. T. ■-'iiT ; :U W.'B. 817 221 !>• \ii.'iliau. Ill re. Aii.lrewH c. An.lrews (18.10), 15 Ch. D. 228 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 7.iti ; r.i I-. T. 13.-) ; 28 W. H. 9.!0 100 Dai.iil r. Hun.l (IS61), 9C. B. N. S. 716: 3 L. T. 700; 9 W. R. 313 .... 1186 Daiii.l i: Luker (1571), 3 Dver. 30i)A, pi. 68 1151 Daniel r. North (1809). 11 East, 375 446 Duiiiel r. Pitt (180S), IVake, Add. Ciw. 238; 6 Esp. 74; 1 Camp. 366, n. ; 10 K. H. 706, n 498 Duiiiel r. Tlinmpsoii (1812). 15 Fjist, 78 837 Dunielf. AVilkiii (1852), 7 Ex. 429; 21 L. J. Ex. 230 .■?96. 404 Duiiiell r.llaiiiel! (1NI0\4 DeO. J.4:Sm.337; 18 L. J. Ch. 157; 13 Jur. 164 803 Daniels r. ('..iirud (18.i;<), 4 Lei^fh R. 401, 405 954 Daniels r. Harris (1874), 4 1 L. J. C. P. 1 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 1 ; 31 L. T. 408 ; ■j:( \V. R. 86 770 Daniels r. .''utter (1830). M. & M. f-01 385, 386, 493 Dansrv r. hl-liardsou (1S.)4), 3 E. & B. 144 ; 2 C. L. R. 1442; 23 L. J. <i. 11. 217; i.Mur. 721 102 Darby r. Ousoley (1856), 1 IL. & N. 1 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 227 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 497.. 46, 213, 291, 483, 93 i Dareys, Re (1800). 1 1 Ir. C. L. R. 2-:)R 021 Darlev r. Martin (1853), 13 Q. B. 684 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 249 ; 17 Jur. 1125.. 740 Darliiijrton. \cv Bank. Co., Ex jiarte ^1864).4 1). J.vVS. 5H1 ; 34l<.J.Bk.lO 160 Darnll v. Kvans (lS62'i. 30 L. J. Ex. 251; 6 11. A N. 660; 1 II. & C. 174; 31 I,. J. Mx. 337; 9 Jur. N. S. 104; 7 L. T. 97; 10 \V. R. 665 730 Dartnioutli. I.V., «'. Roberts (1812), 16 East, 334 610, 1013 Darvill r. Hojirr (1855), 3 Drew. 294 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 779 50 Da^liwood r. Jennvn (1879), 12 Ch. 1). 776; 27 W. R. 868 680 Davinport i: The Uueen (1877), 3 App. Ciis. 115 ; 47 L. J. P. C. 8 ; 37 I.. T. 727 622 Duvev r. Sliannou (1879), 4 Ex. D. 81 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 459 ; 40 L. T. 628 ; 27 \V. R. 599 682 David r. Privro (18J3), 5 (J. B. 440 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 88 192 D.ivul.snn i: Coop.-r (1813^. 11 M. & W. 784 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 467 ; 13 M. & \V. 313 : 13 L. J. Ex. 276 134, 1193, 1194, 1195, 119H. 1200, IJOl, 1202 Davidson r. Kiniptoii (ISSl), 18 Ch. D. 213 ; 45 L. 1. 132 ; 29 W. R. 912.. 101 t'ot. I. etitU with page 635, . 1 1 '• ' : i Ixii TABT E OF CASES CTTED. 110 Co. (1883), 12 Q. B. 279 86 ; 46 L. T. 632 ; D. 30 163 645 Davidson v. Smyth (1887), 20 L. R. Ir. 326 ... Diividnon r. Wood {see Wood's EHtate). Davie (should be Uavey) v. London & S. W. Ry. 70 . 63 L. J. Q. B. 68 : 49 L. T. 739 ; 48 J. P. Davies, Ex pirte, Ro Sadler (1881), 19 Ch. D. W. R. 237 Davipfl, Rp(1849), 2 Roberts. 377 fidO Davies f. Brown (1N24), 9 Moore (C. P.), 778 998 Davi.s f. Campbell (1841), 1 Iredell. 482 443 Davies v. Davies (1840), 9 C. & P. 262 956, 957, 1013 Davies V. Davies (1863), 2 New R 384 ; 4 Giff. 417 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1002 ; 11 W. R. 1040; 9L. T. 161 136 Davies f. Dodd (1817). Wils. Ex. 110 308 Davies v. Edwards (1851), 7 Ex. 22 ; 21 L. J. Ex 4 ; 15 Jur. 1014 716 Davies f. Fitton (1842), 2 Dr. & War. 232 749, 760 Davies v. Humphreys (1840), 6 M. & W. 153, 166 : 9 L J. Ex. 263 .... 410 Davies v. Lowndes (1843), 7 Scott, N. R. 214 ; 6 M. & Or. 527 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 506 146, 408, 409, 414, 416, 424, 426 Davies f D. of Marlborough (1818), 2 Swans. 108 137 Davies t'. Marnhall (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 697 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 61 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 1247 ; 4 L. T. 681 ; 9 W. R. 806 623 Davies v. Morgan (1831), 1 C. & J. 5S7 ; 1 Tyr. 457 396, 410. 416, 442 Davies v. Nicholas (1836), 7 C. & P. 339 162 Davies v. Otty (1865), 35 Bcav. 208 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 252 ; 13 W. R. 484 ; 12 L. T. 789; 6N. R. 391 971 Davies w. Pierre (1787), 2 T. R. 63; 1 R. R. 419 444, 446, 610 Davies 0. Ridgn (1802). 3 Esp. 101 ; 6 R. R 817 493 Davies v. Stuinbank (1865), 6 De G. M. & G 679 768 Davies v. Waters (1842), 9 M. & W. 608; 1 Dowl. N. S. 651 ; 11 L.J. Ex. 214 697, 607 Davies V. White (1884). 63 L. J. Q. B. 276 ; 60 L. T. 327 ; 32 W. R. 620.. 1002 Davis's Trusts, I5(? ( 18G9), L. R. 8 Eq. 98 ; 21 L. T. 137 9 Davis f. Blaek (1811), 1 Q. B. 911, 912 ; 1 G. & D. 432 ; 6 Jur. 65 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 338 86 Davis V. Capper (1829), 4 C. & P. 134a, 138; 10 B. & C. 33 ; 5 M. & Ry. 63. .36, 37 Davis V. Curling (ISt.'i), 8 Q. B. 2H" ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 56 ; 10 Jur. 69 227 Davis V. Dale (1830). M. & M. 614 ; 4 C. & P. 335 942 Davis V.Davis (1880), 13 Ch. Div. 861 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 241 ; 41 L. T. 790; 28 W. R. 345 508 Davis >: Dodd (1812), 4 Taun. 602 307 Davis f. Hedges (1871), L. R. G Q. B. 687; 40 L. J. Q. B. 276 ; 25 L. T. 165; 20 W. R. 60 1122 Davis V. Jmes {I860), 17 C. B. 026 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 91 746 Davis V. Lloyd (1844). 1 C. & K. 276 436, 456. 1048 Davis V. Lovell (183!)). 7 Dowl. 178 ; 4 M. & W. (i79 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 152. .816, 835 Davis V. Lowndes (1835), 6 Scott, 738 ; 1 Am. 379 ; 7 Dowl. P. C. 101 ; 2 Jur. 946 1098, 1227 Davis f. Macon (182f>). 4 Piek. 166 931 Davis V. liuinsford (1821). 17 Mass. 210 802 Davis V. Ueid (1832). 6 Sim. 443 965 Davis r. Scraco {or St^rase) (1869), 4 L. R. C. P. 172 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 79; 19L. T. 7«9; 17W. R. 411 263 Davis V. Spiirling ( KSJ!)), 1 Russ. & M. 68 482 Davis r. Treharne (ISHl), 60 L. J. Ch. 666 ; 6 App. Cns. 460 ; 29 W. R. 869. 1 14 Davis V. Trevanion (1846). 2 D. & L. 743 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 138; 9 Jur. 492. . 734 Davis V. VasH (1812), 16 East. 97 1039 Davis V. Wuddington (1814), 7 M. & Gr. 44 : 8 Suott, N. R. 807 ; 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 169 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 45 ; 8 Jur. 1 142 791 Davis ». Williams (1811). 13East,232; 1 Smith, 5 1045,1046,1064 Davis V. Wocjd (1816), 1 Wheat. 6 368 Davison c. Cent (1866), 26L. J. Ex. 122; 1H.&N.744; 3 Jur. N. S. 342.660, 061 Davison f. Stanley a768). 4 Burr. 2213 6.58 Davliu V, Hill (1834). 2 Fairf. 434 766 The rej'ereftcet are to page; not to paragraph*. TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixiii FAOI Davy f. Garrett (1877), 7 Ch. D. 473 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 218 ; 38 L. T. 77 ; 26 W. R. 225 187 Diiwrg V. Peck (1799), 8 T. R. 330 ; 3 EHp. 12 ; 4 R. R. C75 691 Dttwkins ». Antrobus (1879), 17 Ch. D. 616 ; 44 L. T. 5S7 : 29 W. R. 51 1 . . 1147 Dawking v. Puulet (1809), L. R. 6 Q. B. 94 ; 9 B. & 8. 7«8 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 53: 21 L. T. 584; 18 W. R. 336 46 DttwkinH f. Rokeby. Ld. (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 266 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. G3 ; 28 L T. 134; 21 W. R. 644 618, 619, 865 DiiwB V. Shed (1818), 16 Mans. 6 608 DaWHon v. Clmmnoy (1843), 5 Q. B. 164 ; D. & M. 348; 13 L. J. Q. B. 33 ; 7 Jur. 1037 162 DawHon V. Dawson (18(57), L. R. 4 Eq. 604 806 DawKou V. GreK'Ty (1845), 7 Q. B. 766; 14 L. J. Q. B. 286 ; 9 Jur. 688. . 1033 DawHour. Jay (1854), 2 Hm. & O. 199; 22 L. T. 345; 23 L. T. 36; 2 W. R. 311 1160 DawHonr. Macdonald (1836), 2 M. & W. 26 ; 2 Gale, 216; 6 L. J. Ex. 10 225 Dawson t\ Remnant (1806), 6 Eap. 24 662 Day ('. Bather (180.3), 2 H. & C. 14 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 171 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 440 ; 8 L. T. 205 ; 1 1 W. R. 675 162 Day V. KinK(1830), 6 A. & E. 359; 6 N. & M. 816; 2 H. & W. 178.. 132. 1137 Dayt). Spread (1842), Jebb & B. 163 1103, 1141 Day r.Tri>r (1715). 1 P. Wins. 286 801 Day r.W'illimns (1832), 2 C. & J. 461 ; 1 L. J. E». 168 125 Deaclo r. Hancock (1824). McCleland, 85 ; 13 Price, 220 401, 410 Deacon's case (1740), 18 How. St. Tr. 365 236 Deady t'. Harrison (1815). 1 Stark. 60 614 Dean ». Green (1882). 8 P. D. 79 ; 40 J. P. 742 846 Deune V. PackwcMid (1846). 4 D. & L. 395, n. (A) 9ii9 Dear v. Knight (1869). 1 F. & F. 433 938 Debenham r. Mellon (1880). 6 App. Gas. 24 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 155 ; 43 L. T. 673 ; 29 W. R. 141 ; 45 J. P. 252 166 DeBiclr. Thomson (1844), 3 Beav. 475 080 De Bode, Baron, Ciwe of (1845). 8 Q. B. 245 444, 936 De Caen, General, The (1855), Swa. 9 178 Decamp v. Arohibald (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 622 246 De Cosse Brissao v. Rathbono (1863), 6 H. & N. 301 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 238 . . 1154 Dceblo p. Linehara (1860). 12 Ir. C. L. R. 1 126 Defreeze v. Trumwr (1806), 1 Johns. 274 776 Dcfriesf. Davis (1835). 7 C. & P. 112 246 Do Gaminde r. Pigou (1812), 4 Taunt. 246 642 De Grave v. May. of Monmouth (1830), 4 C. & P. Ill 640, 644 Delamere, LJ. f. The Queen (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 419; 36 L. J. Q. B. 313 : 17 L. T. 1 85 Delamotte v. Lane (1840), 9 C. & P. 261 231 Delaueyi. Fox (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 708; 26 L. J. C. P. 248 97 Delarue». Church (1833), 2L. J. Ch. 113 123 Do la Rue v. Dickenson (1«57). 7 E. & B, 738 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 841 47 De la S.ussaye, Re (1873), L. R. 3 P. & D. 42 ; 42 L. J. P. & M. 47 ; 28 L. T. 308 ; 21 AV. R. 549 705 Dcl.galiv Highlej (1837), 8 C. & P. 444; 6 Scott, 154; 3 Bing. N. C. 95U ; 3 flodges, 158 244 Dcli'!*line v. (Jrecnlaud (1 705), 1 Bay, 458 499 DtlliMNse, Ex parte, He Megevand (1807), 7 Ch D. 611 ; 47 L. J. Bk. 06 ; 3.S L. T. 100 ; 20 W. R. 338 159 De L'IhIo, I'eer. (1820), House of Lords Minutes of Evidence, 12 1167 D.lmcgor. Miillins(lS75), 9 Ir. R. 0. L 209 98 Del.iu'ny r. Rcntoul (1812). 2 Mart. 175 615 De Medina e. Norman (1842), 9 M. & W. 827 ; 2 D. N. S. 239; 11 L. J. l'.\. 320 774 De M.dina r. Owen (1H.',0), 3 C. & K. 77 484 Df .M„ni V. Concha (1H85), 29 Ch. D. 281 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 632 ; 62 L. T. 282; 33 W. R. 840 , 1118 Vol. I. mdt with page 635. m Il ' N Ixiv TAni-K OP CA«ES CITKD. PAoa Domiwoy V. LiiWN.m (1877), L. R. 2 P. D. 98; 40 L. J. F. 23 ; 30 L. T. .IIS ; 2r» W. n. (iJ!) 704 l>.Mi f. Cluik (ISiM), .1 lIulHt. '.'17 1102 JJiii I. Fulfi.rd (I7(il). 2 Hurr. 117!) 1015 luuih V. Doiifh (1(17H), 4ti L. J. P. ]). & A. 13; 2 P. Div. 60; *.>■') W. II. 114 112, 747 Dnidy v. Nirhol! (IHoS), 4 C. U. N. S. ;<70 ; 27 L. J. O. P. 220 C>i2 J)fii.ly »•. SiinpMMi (IS,V,j, IHC H. H:il ; 2 Jiir. N. S. or^ 2:W J><'iiiH<>n I'. I>ililiir (ls.'i7), I)t'iiiii' iSc Swiilx'y, Ki c. II. .'llil 77 Ilciiii V. S|,MV (17H0) 1 T. II. 4110 ;!".>.) Dwmr. Wliii.. (17'J7i. 7 '1'. II. 112 , Ihnn r. Wilfc.nl (1820). 1 C. \- I'. 2S 1 ; Ry. & ,M. 88 Dfiinctt r. ( •ro.kcr (ls:i.';, 8 (ir.'ciil. L'TO ])(nt r. H.iiiicU (18,Vi). 4 .Mvl. Ac Cr. 20!l. 787 288 i;io 1),- pDiitcH (. Kitidiill (|H(;jj, ;il L. J.Ch. I8.j, 8 Jur. N..S. 323; 10 W. 11. (i'.t ; ft L. T. i')!;') ; :iO llciiv. 572 702 Dc I'riiHliii, i)w., ciisi! (if, liiiw llcviow. Art. 7 (No. xiii.) ;')74 Derby, Ld., ciihc .if (\r>'rl). Littlitmi. II. .'i70 170 Dcriii/y v. Turnrr (18.-il), 1 Ir. (Jh. R. ;141 OOS Dtrixlry r. Ciistiiiicc M7'."0), 4 T. U. Tf> 0(i:; l)v Unr, ,: KoNt.r (I8(i'.'j, , 2 (.'. H. N. .S. 272 .')tl ]).. Jl<ioM I'rir. (ISDI-.'i), V C.ioii.T, '>4i 422. I'.'.'t, 421. 427, 1100 l)f Kcisjiz KniiiniiH, III ir(MKidH.,f (1877), 40 L. .1. p. & M. 0; 2 P. I>. lit; ; ;iO L. T. 203 ; 2:') \V . II. 3iV.i 798 !)<• Kiitzen, Huron, r. F.fr (18:{.-)), 4 A. & K. .'J3 ; 5 N. & M. 017 ; 1 II. & \V. 7;i.'> 442 I)..hIhipiiik1i v. UiiwliiiH (1838), 3 Myl. & Cr. mn ; 7 L. J. Ch. 171 ; 2 .Iiir. rj;') .')93, 000, 008 DcHbrow V. Wi'tlii-rlcv (1834), 1 M. .V Roll, 4:18 ; C. & P. 7f)8 1 l'J4 l)(.H]iiiu V. .Swiiidiir ('\Hi-)), ;) Mint N. H. 70.» 'JO DcNWiu r. Jicwin (1S87), iVi L. T. 00!) 912 J).' Thorcii r. Alt.-<i.ii. (187.')), 1 A\>\>. Cus. 080 M'J Di'viiiu IVov. (!.iM Mill. (;.i., R<- (l.'-8:t,, 'J'J Ch. Div, £93; ,V2 L. .1. Ch. •«:M ; 48 li. T. 2.011 ; 31 W. R. 42i'i 388 Di. Vimx V. .SleiiikclkT (183!)), IJiiiK. N. C. 81 ; 8 Seott, 202 ; 8 D. P, C. :);i ; 3 .lur. Ut.y.i 719 !)«• Visiii.', Inre(1804), 2 DoO. J. .Sl- S. 17; 33 L. J. Ch. 332 000 ])uvoii PiMT. (1832). Kc](oit, liy NifoliiH, App. 41, 40 423 Dov.iii Wi».rlics (1082), 8 Ilovv. St. Tr. 1017, 1037 5.')7 l.».voiiHhiris Diikc of, v. Noill (1877). 2 Ir. L. R. 132, 110; 8 Ajip. Cih. 147 42, 2i)0, ;)!)«, 403, 40.^, 407. 411, 42.'), 791, 1007 Devoy f. I)(!V<iv (18.'i8,, 2 Sm. & (J. 403; 3 Jur. N. .S. 79 ; 20 L. .1. Ch. 290 000 IJow.lni.y f. PahiiiT (is:{!)), 4 M. \- W. 004 ; 7 Dowl. 177; 8L. J. Kx. 148.. 909 Do Wh.lpdul.' I. Miibiirii (1818), C} Priro, 48;') .OlO, 6i')l DcwN r. Ryl.y (18.)l), 2 L. M. A: P. 544 ; 11 C. B. 434 ; 20 L. J. C. P. '204 ; IT) .lur. 1 159 1023 Doxtcr r. lliiyiH («'c IIiiycH r. Di-xter). Dfyl)urs<us("(lHJl). 4 H. k Aid. 243 17 J)iuim, Tlir 'I ho:!;, 5 C. Koli. (Adiii.) GO 179 Dianu, The fI840), 1 VV. Hob. 1. 1 ; 4 Afoo. P. 0. 1 1 178 Dions t'. LiiwHoii (18:f5), 1 C. M. & R. 934 ; 3 Dowl. 427 ; 5 Tyr. 235 ; ■< ].. ,1. Kx. 80 832 DickoiiHoii V. DickciiHoii (1814), '2 Phillini. Ivo. II. 173 083 DiokoiiHoii »•. 'IViiHdalo fl8fi2), 1 Do (i. J. i .S. 52 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 37 ; 9 Jur. N. S. '.'37 ; 7 L. T. 055 449 Diokiim, Ko (1842j, 3 Curt,. 00 701 Di.kiiiHoii r. Cowiird (1818,, 1 n. & Aid. 077 518, 519 Di<:kiiisoii «'. I'lotohcr (1874), 43 h. J. M. C. 25 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 1 ; '29 L. T. 540 107 DiokitiKon v. llaMi.ld (I8;il). 5 C. i: P. 40; 1 M. & Rob. 141 713 DiokiiiKou r. Shrc (ISOI), 4 Ksp. 07 945 DiokiiiHoti V. iStidolph (1801), 11 C. H. N. 8. 341, 357 143, 701, 705 Dickinsou v. Swiitmau (ISOl), 4 8. & T. '206 ; 30 L. J. P. & M. 84 703 3'he references are to pages, not to paragraph*. li' TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixv Dirkiiidon r. Vulpy (1829), 10 B. & 0. 128 ; fl Af . & R. 126 Di.kHc. Hro..kHtl»SO), 15 Ch. D. 22; 49 L. J. (Jh. 812 ; 4! W. 11. 87 DirkHoiir. Kviiim flTOn, OT. R. 80: 3R. R. 119 Di.kMon r. K. -.f Wilton' (l«.')i)), 1 F. & F. 42.') Dit'liv r. AtkiiiHon (181;')), 4 Ciimi). 27o ; Hi R. R. 702 TAOU .ir.O, 640 D 1 J)i.xoii r. «ini-lnir (l!<;ij), 4 Venn. ,Ul li;i» Dix.iii I'. Viilc (IS-.'I). 1 C. & r. 278 970 Dixdii f. Wliilc (IHSi), 8 App. CiiH. 8;i;{ 114 i)nl)cll r. llut<liius(.u (183.')), 3 A. & E. 371 ; 1 H. & \V. 391 ; 5 N. & M. •J.'il G71, 672 Piilxll v. StcphiMiK (1825), 3 B. & C. 623 ; 6 D. & R. 490 747 l»(il)ir.M'. Kiistwnoil (1827). 3 C. & r. 2.')0 32, 48, 1.').5 DmIiwpii r. H.Il (ICiTC.^, 2 Li'V. 17() 19 DoLson r. ('(.IliH ,\HM), I H. & N. 81 ; 2.') L. J. Ex. 2(57 681 J)(«lil I. Arklnm 08i:i), <■' M. & Or. 072 ; 7 SiH)tt. N. K. 41.5; 7 Jur. 1017; 13 L. .r. (\ r. n ecio, 002 T)o(l.l ,: Nciriis ;\HU\. 3 Cainp. ,VJ() ; M R. R. 832 253, 2.';6, 9.il, !lti7 Doiliiii^'foii'N (MM,. (l.VJl). 2 Co. Rop. 33 92 D.iilds r. Kivkf friikf) (1884), 25 <'h. 1). 017 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 598 ; 5 1 L. T. 3J((; 32 \V. H. 124 473 r)i>'ip' r. M Ii ^18jsn 1 Uaffn. Eoc. 1)20 140 Dcdsl.y r. Viirl.'V (181(1^, 12 A. & E. 632 ; 4 I*. \- D. 148 ; 5 '.ir. 316 690 11.h1si.ii r. Markry (1831), 8 A. & E. 225 11. ; 4 N. A: M. 327 711 DcM' r. Alliii il7'.i',(), 8 T. K. 147, 407 747 Dor r. All.'ii (IMd), 3 Tauii. 78 2 R. R. 597 522, 52.1, 524 Duo V. Alli'ii 1 18 1(0, 12 A. & E. H ' ; 4 r. & I"). 220 793, 794 DcKT. Ancln'WN (1778), 2 Oowp. S4- ; cited 1 Myl. & K. 108 ....610, 611, 815 l>(H'f. Aiiilii'WN (1S51(), 15 Q. H. 75ti 171, 1049 ]»..,. c. Aikwiiffht (1833), 5C. vt P. 57.'. 377, 445, 1173 Dcei, Ahblry 1,1847), 10 (J. B. (')«3 ; li. L. J. Q. B. 356 803, 1050 !).«. r. Askrw (1809), 10 East, 620 ; 10 R. R. 366 1060 'I i 'i- 1 ii ihi Vol. 1. etidi with page 635. " il Ixvi TABLE OP CASES CITED. Doe f. AuHiin (IR3 Doi) V. niinmnl (IH 1)(X) V. BuriioH (IK.'t Doo I'. HimioH (!H4 IJCHJ 1. Uiirt4.li (18'. Drx? r. Hiirt<iii ( 1 SI Dm. v. HiiUcn (177 1> ..t V. Kitvtiip HH !)(..• f. h,;\iAt(lH 1)(M! 1 . \M\ (I "!».() !)(«! C. Hciijiiiiiiii ( D<K' r. KcllHOIl ( 1 H Doc r. HcviMN MK4 ])»•' r. Itcyiioii flH Doc I'. l«iK'!^x(lKO' D<M> f. l<iii)fl:iiiii ( Don r. Itin.h (Ih;<( Doe r. liirchiriorc Do(! C. Hir.1 l\HV,) J)oc r. Hoia (1H17 D.H- 1. Itowcr (IH:t Dim. I'. ll..rtcr (IH,- D.M! . hniwti fis: Dot! r. Mriiv (IN'JK D.M. •. Hriiyiic (\H ])iM> r Hri.lKcH(l^ D(M'r hiottti MK D<M- 1 lliinl.tt (It Dot- 1' Hurl. (17H7 D<M- 1' Ulli-toll (is Dim) r Culvert. (M D<M' V (''t)«T»OII ( Dim V l'i4r|M "cr DiK! •' Ciirtwri^lil Dm! V Ciirtwrij^lil DiMl t' ('iktoinoro ( D<m' r CliiilIiH (!H i>.M- )' (IIiiiimIm'Tn D<IU<1 . «'liiM r. It D«Mi r ,,i oft 'lev Door Clillonl (II' Doo r ('...•loll 'IH DtM) V CoIiiiiIiIk ■ Doo V Cole (IHItl DfMi r . ('.MlkcflSJ D<Hi r . Cooke {is: 1 )(M( t' . Corlu'ti (1» Doo 1' , ('oiilthriil Doo i> . (Niiirlciiiiv Dooi' . Vox (\lWf\ D"ii V . ('thu« (1«I ; o r . CniiiHtoiiii DlMI I' . Dlltc (IHI. ]>oo )' . DiivicN (17 Doo 1 . DiivicM (IS Doo < . D»vioM(tH ] )oo 1' . Dciikiii fU Doo 1 . D.rl.y, v.. Doo • . 1 ((Vine r. Doc 1 . Diiriifxiil Doo 1 . jivcliitll ri D<M! r I'^liii.iii.l'* ( 9BinK. 41 ; 2 Moo. & Sc. 107. • •t**C ••••#•• FAOa .443, AlO 849), 13 Q. B. 04.'> 118 (4), 1 W. ic Kol.. 380 104!), 10.54, 1I7<» 118, '.'09 (1), 8 il H. 1037 17), '/ M. & Uol>. '28 .ili .!»«. ifS, !•» ...til, .V22 U7 721 VIM III), 11 A. & K. :)ll ; 3 P. & D. lOJ ; 4 .Fur. 4.12 '.). I Cowp. 243 ; KiiMt., 314, n.; i) II. K. .'>70. .i.^ 2 N. & M. M.t7 ; 3 A. tc K. 1M8; 1 H. A: W. 270 t3), 4 Q H. C.Ol ; 12 L. J. Q. n. 230 fiT. R. 471 ; 2 K. U. 042 is;t((), !i A. & K. 044 21), 4 H. & Al.l. .'.H8 706 411), 18 I,. .1. C. I'. 128; 7 C. H. 4.'.0 ., 40), 12 \. kV.. 431 ; 4 V. & D. I'.i:i •;, 1 r, 317; 2TU11I1. 107; 11 U. K. :>33 .441, 4r.7, 791, 1231 .87, 788 r>24 IS2I1, 1 It. ic AM. 072 1202 Cii 97 /)l)6 04 ;i 804 273 14H 104!. 1), 1 M. & W. 402; 1 T. & Gr. 709; 6 li. .1. Kx. 18.1 (|8:t!i), 1 I*. Ac 1). 448 ; 9 A. & K. 002 ), 7 C. 4: 1'. ). 11 (i. H. 12; t.'), 3 H. A: Ad ■.1), 11; (i. H, 8 •J I). .". n. fc A. .M. \ M. 101 IS ('. II. s.ti). I H. iV A r A A: 1;. 8.(0), 4 A. A- I' I, I T. R. 701 III., !l C. A: r. 2.'il 7 ; 12 Jnts 'AM . 4.VJ ...8i);i. (1.) 243 0; 3 M. A: R. 428; ■;:,■ 17 L. .I.e. I'. .1. 817 8 n. A:C. 813 .. 127 ..270, . . . 2ti9, 417 . 19; N. * .U 2. , 1 R. R. 307 . . . i9 ....80, . . . 780, 99 13t 787 4 18 .022, .'121, 1101 III). 2 CHmp. .38S; 11 R. R. 7l.''> is:i!ii, 9 C. A: I'. 110 IM, 1213 800 28H (is.io.. 10 i). M. I'll ; 20 L. .1. Q. H 70 I (isjii), ;j H. .V Aid. 320 t (1821;, R. A- M. ii2; I (!. k V. 2IS, 18.'.h, IK Q. It. 746; 20 L. J. H. U. 728 , Ki.Vi, 1173 .14.' 1192 17 it H. 100 1113 .h::,). 4 a. A: K. 410; N. k M. r.;t9 1214 ;H,V.'), I K. .V M 279; 22 I.. .1. W It. 102; 17 .Iiir. 130 M)7 clutid (182!l . !l M. .*!: C. 804 8t7l, 2 C. .V .11., C. A: IKII), <;. A: Kir 118 .... 1'. /.27 290 321 . .Miindi l.'),') ;i.''o ;ioi' lull MO; r> M. Ac 1' IHI |. llllH . iV K. 23.-. .... .111 j, c. .1: r. i!i), Itiiitr. il), 7 Itiii^-. S|;fl, ;t Cnni (18.17). 7 A, (IsiN), 11 Q. II, 702; 17 L.J. Q. B. l.'il \ 0(!. & I'. 713, II. |8|, 01;. |« !I0; 17 L. .1. 'J. r. 20.1 (isiii), 7 M. * W. 1 119, 1211 I. Ml 1191 411 t, .510 12,5 118 20J 0, 444 0.5H U18 I. 52 8111 i), 3 ^^ It, 009 ;tJ2, 000, 909, 970, 979. 987 ■95), I i:-\, 401 ; ft R. R. 71.5 110 137), 2 .M . A- \V. .503 ; li. .1. Kx. 170 1 19 147), 10 (J. It, III . 10 I.. J. il U. 218 ..20, 27, 171, 409, 411, 097, 1227 402 ; 8 n. ft C. 2i 1 70, 1 72 828h 3 a. k of 1 811), 1 A. A- K !m , W 1111111 1 s,-,, 10 .M. I'. C. H. fl27 320, 327, 1112, 1114 123, 1221 (|SH). 2 M, A- S..1, lij 1207 8.",l , :i C .V 1' 1110; M. ft M. 340 118 ISIOj, 1; M .t \V. 30;. 44, 721 The ri/er*Heet »t* to pugti, not to pitiUj/iaji/u, >i:i I17:» W'.'i 1113 .Ml" r.Mi ;t,!l 111 •jii-j TABLE OP CASES CUED. Ixvii PA OK Pnr r. E.l«iir<l« {>«3<). 1 M- & Ko»>. 321 1«.J I)„..|. F-!w;inl.i (IR.r)), 1 r. « I). 40H: 9 A. & E. 654 8,0 D.H. r. U. Kifnin.iiit(l841), -2 M. & Iti.b. m\ OCO, 070 I).... r F.rriii,ft.m (1H:I4). 1 A. & K. T.'X) ; 3 S. & M. ftIO ; I M. & Rob. 344 ii. 1U4 I),,.. I KiriiiKt"" (1N40). G Biiig. N. ('. 7'J ; « H<:<»lt, '.ilO ; a Jur. n.!0..«.'V, lion I>.N. . . Kviii.H (1S-J7), :t (J. &. P. 219 ».'0 ]»..,.,. KvanH(IH;i.'). !<;. A: M. 42: 3Tyr. .'i(i 7ni !).«■ r. E\T«' (IH.'il). 17 (i. B. ;t(i(i ; JO L. J. U. B. 431 ; 1.') Jur. 1031 .... 7fi 1),H. .. ri.miiip (IHi7), 4 BiiiK- -'<''<1 '^^i 373 I)<«. r. Fonl (1H3A). 3 A. 4: K. 040 ; 4 L. J. {N. S.) K. H. ■.MiS : ft N. & M. •m "0, 01 , 747 Do.' r. F-mifor (ISl 1). 13 Ea«f. 40.'i ; \2 U. U. 383 6'.'4 ]),,.. I. Foiw<K.<l (IHI'2), 3 (.1. M. f.J7; 11 Ii. .1. Q- B. 321 t.')S Dm... F.mt.r (1834), I A. At E. 7UI. n. (A) 3.'tt Dmr. F<.wl.r(18.'i0). lUL. .f. (i. B. 1.1; 14 Q. B. 700 430 I ).H. . . FntiiriH v!H37), 2 M. * I^.^. h: ilO D,... r. FniiikiH (1840), II A. iV E. 7lt.') ; 3 V. & D. -IC..'. .'•-•0. .''20 D.«.r. (Jallc.wiiy {1H33), h I!. .^ A<1. 43; 2 N. & M. 240 HOO, Hdl DcH. f. (!iinliii..r(lS.V.>), 12C. B. 31'.l; 21 L. J. C 1*. •J22 11» 1).H. ... (Jiilii.r.' (1S3H), H (!. \- I'. .'>78 1017 Do.) r. (ilii.lwiii (IHir>). 'i «^ B. 0''3; 14 L. J. v^. B. Ihl) ^22, 544, 7.'«0 I r. (il.Miii (IK3(), I A. \- K. 4ii ; 3 N. * M. N37 l»2 D.M. .■. <!<ir.' II.S37I. 2 M. \ W . 321 103!» D.«.i. lionhv (lK3<t). 2 M. .V \M>. 213; d C. .^: I'. 4(1 274 l).iii i. (ir..ii (lK2ih, (i..w, K. 227 4l.\ D.M. r. (iiiV IMii), I Stiirk. Wi 3H> Dm... (irilliii >1SI2). I.-. Fii-t. 203 ; 13 |{. |{. 474 171, 41.^ D..«.f. (in.v.H IM47), 10 ii. II. 4H(! ; II .Fur. .V.K ; l(i I,. ,1. (^ B. •.".i;,... .112 licH. I. (iiiiiniiijf (1N37), 3.N. .V 1'. 2(1(1; 7 A. \- E. 240, \V. \V. .V D. Kio.. U)Ui D.M. r. <i«illiiii 'IS33;, .'. II. .V A.l. 1211 78S D<M. I'. Mull (1S12), 1(1 F.ii»t, 20K 11(10 D.-«M'. lliimpH.iinlH(7 , I f B. 2(17; 17 L. J. C. 1'. 22.1 Ii2 D<H. r. Hinlv (IS((l\ I M >v Uoh. .12.1 747 DiH. ... Hiin..i(IH33i, 1 B. \- A.l. 110; I N. & M. 237 01 1).K» r. IIi.rriH (lK33j, .1 ('. A: IV .102 Ml D.H. f. llarriH (IS37 , (1 A. .V E. 211; I N. 4 1'. 40.» (LVI D(H. r. lliiiTi»(ls3s , H A. \- E 12 70(l D.m i: ll.iv.v (IH2.1;, Kv. .V M. 207 ^Ift !)<)<• r. Miirv.V (1S32',. K llin^. 230 ; 1 M.i,.. \ H,'. 374 2M.1, 288 ])....(' Ilii»kiim (1X41 , 2U- B. 212; Hl.\. I), /i.il : (l.lur 2!.'>; 10 L. J. W. B. 2H,-. 3H7, 442 Dn. .1, H.iirl.. .. IliikM (1H3I-2), « I).iwl. A U 1.1 704 l»... .. Il.iniiiiinf ;lM2(i , !i Dowl. * U. l.'i 1211 I I. M uf llMtfonI IH.Vl , 111 I,. ,1. il 11. ,12(1 003, liOa Dmi I. Ilirki. iiii.l.ititl , .IIimI DiMt .. Wiilkcr, 4 i;"]!. AO ; Bull. N. 1'. 2ml imm. (iiMiiliiiflit I'. Hi. km 2A2, 2ftS D.M. .. Ilil.l.r ISI',1), J II ,V ,\l.l. 700, 7U3 fl, 120 D.M. r. Uimi \\h-:\], 3 .Siark.dO UOH l)m> r. Ilim.H'kN (I.S30), 6 M. ii W. 3(10; L. .1. Ex. 27 . . . .744, 784, 703, 704. 70.1, 7117, 7UN, 7i»0. H02, 804, «Oft D.... .• llmltfM,,, (1810), 12 A. & E. V\f> ; 2 M. * H<.b. 283 ; 4 I'. * D. 142 ; 4 Jur 12(12 IIOJ D.«. .-. Ilnltom {\h:\>), 4 A. .V- E. 7« '. 7fiO Dm., l|..ri...(I.Hi:i , 3ii. B. 7.i:, 70(1. 707; 3 U. ic D. 230; 12 L. J. W. B 721 ; 7 Jur. 38 01 D Ilciw.nil84ii , 12 A. I'c E. (10(1 734 Dm. I. II.. Mill. (In;i2), 2 B .V A.l. 747 91 I ' llul.l.iii,MH.-.(H, 1.-, (^ B. 227 ; 20 I. ,1 ii B. (II 7no, 794, 800 l)i. . Iliicl.lm. (lH;t.1), 2 0. M. & Ii. 31(1; ft Tyr. H4U ; I (Uli>, 2(10; . ' ""»' '^'7 1.9. 1113 !)'■>■ I. llii(liwiii(.. (18201, 2 M .V B.il.. 18 7tm !)...' . .hiiiio IHiVj, 2 .M .V ll.ll>. 4 7 321, 322, flOl D... . Ju..iii..j 0817), 8 c;. .V I*, lol AD9 HI i Ixvui TAULK OF CASKS CITED. rknn Doo r. J A. Jonwy (18:25). 1 B. & AM. 580 7«tj I)<M' r. .fcsMon (1 SO.'i), C, Kiisf , 85 172 ])...• r. .jMhiiHiiii (IHl't), <J"w. N. I'. 17» 117 ])(M. r. JoliiiHoii (IHU). 7 M. H (Jr. 1017; K H<m.u, N. R. 7<il : H L. J. C. r. 17 269 Door. .I.ihiixtr . MSJ.'i). M.CI. * Y. Ill fi«i Dop r. .Ic.iiosiiHdS), I (fillip. :t(i7 Hi, ur>, fllO DiM) r. .Fiiii.H {IHTJ), !» M. \ VV. :t7'.' ; 1 1)..»1. N. S. .ViJ (i04 1)(H- r. .r.iii.s iHlii), 1.1 .M. .V: \V. 580; 1(1 [>. .1. IW. .Vs IKl 1).M» •■. Jc.ii.K (isiii), i:j (J. n. 771 : 18 I,. .1. «i. H. v!tio IJ7 1)(M) c. Jiin.H (IS.'.il;, 5 K-c. lim; l'.» K. ,F. Kx i»:> 622 Uiio ('. Ki-oling (1848), 11 Q. U. H8<J ; 17 L. J. Q. X. ID!) ; 12 Jur. 433 . . 2(i, HOi'i, 4:t2 n.ii' r. Komp (1831), 7 Hiinr. .1.30 26, n2, 233, 234 ]).«• ( K.'iiip (IN3.". , J liiuit. N. C. 102; 2 Scott, 9 112 I)...' . . Kiliiir IN'.'(i), 2 C. .V P. 28!) 297, 1054 Dim. r. Kiinr-t.m (1841). I I)..wl. N. H. 2ii3 734 J).M. r. KniKl.t fI8'.'(>). 8 I). A: R. 348; 5 U. Ac <'. 471 1204 !).)f r. I.tikiii (183ti), 7 ('. >Vi 1'. 4S1 lli;8 l)(Ki r. LiimiiiK (IHM). 4 Ciiiiip 7(1; 15 R R 728 1(12 Doo V. l^»iiK<l<>ii (IHIH;, 12 ii. R. 711 ; 18 I.. J Q. H. 17 ; 13 Jur. '.HI, .08. 1'.'7, 3'.M. 322, 508 I)..<> r. LiiiiKft'l'l lis 17', 10 M. & W. 497 ... 294, 443, 414, 454 DiM' r. Lni (lH(l!t . II Kii-I. n\> 7'>« Dim' r. l,.wli (1811), ;j M. \ (ir. 230; lO L. ,1. C. 1'. 289 192 !)iH» r. I.cwi« ;i8;i0i, 7 <". .^ I'. 574 134 Door. Irf'wiH (I8»:i , 1 <;. \ K. 122 20!) Door. liilliiTlim.l (|h:;(.), (i N. Ac M. 313; 4 A. & K. 7H4 511 Dmi i'. IJnvd (iM.li), i'lii. Kv. A|>p. 41 12(i Dmi r. l<lov«l (183i"„ 5 IliiiK. N C. 741 ; 8 S. )tt. 93 ■ 3 Jur. 751 89, 1214 Dim. c. l.l.ivfl (1840), 1 M. * Or. 085 ; 1 SiM.tf, N. M. 505 ; 10 L. .1. C. 1'. 128.. ..." 21, 1081, 1083 Dim- c. I^mIc (18:t.-.), 4 N. & M. 807; 2 A. A: K. 705 03H n.M. c. Lnii,^ (1811 , iMV & 1', 777 19:i D.M- r. I-viii- (1822), lii.-.! 2 I'h. Kv. 258, n. 1 1227 Do., r. Nlunifol.l 1811;, 1 M. \- .S,.l. 291 Ill Dim' I'. Miirtin (18:12), I M. .\: Rot). 212 31J Dim. r. Miirtin (18:i,l), i H. Ac Ail. 771, 785; I N. At M. 512 7«4, 7U(;, 7«H Dim' r. .\[ii«m (1793), I KMp. 53 « Dim* r. Mii»«7 ils5l . 17 «i. ». 373 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 4:'» ; 16 Jur. 1031.. ".>, IIH Dm«c. MiH' (18:i3,. 4 M. & Ail. (117 Il(i! DiHi r. Miw (is:i7). 7 A. tc K 24(t lOi^ Do«f. MiiliiK'l >l8.il), 17 y. H. 270 171, 4!;i DiMM'. Millitt (isi.s , 11 {). \\. 1036, 17 I- J <i H 2(2 125, 4il Dmi r, MilU (18.15 . 2 A. >v. *J. 17 ; I M. .V Ri-I.. 3S-) Dim. r. Milwunl (183^), 3 .M .k W. 328 ; I H. \ M. 79; 7 L. J. V,x. 6 Doo r. MoI.In. (1811), Cur. Ai M. I Dim. i: Molfutt ,lN.-,(r, |.'. H. H. 257 ; 19 L. J. U. B. 438 ; 14 Jur. 935. , Dim) r. M..i»f«li ln:i2 . I C. It M. 235 Dim. r. .MoiriH (1835), 3 A. \ K. 4'i ; 4 N. At .M. 59,1 Di>« !'. MorriM (I8|0), 12 VM-t, 237 . 2 Tiiuii. 52 Dim. v. .Mii-tvii (185.' , 12 ('. H. 208 ; 21 l...}.V..V. I'H DiM>r MouImIiiIi. (1SI7 , k; .M. & \V. 08H; 10 L. J. Kx. 109 Dim. r. MiilliiitT (1795 , I Kmp 400 ; 5 R. U. 74£ Dim. r. Murl.'(w(l8l7), M. \ Sil. 110 I Dim) r. .Murri'll (I8;i7), 8 <". \ I'. |;it Doo r. N.iiU (183(1), 2 M. A: W. I. :» ; 6 L. J. Kx. 69 DiM'r. N.|M.iui (1833), 5 II, A; Ail. 80 Dim. r. Olli'v il8|0), 12 A. At K. 481 ; 4 P. ft D. 276, 4 Jur. 1084 !)...• r. Owiii (I8;i7), Hi', k V no Dim. r. I'lilimr Is.'.l), 10 (^ H. 717: 20 I,. J. (J. B. 307; 15 Jur. 836. Dim. I. t'liNniiitfliiiiii (1820 , 2 (!. \. V. 444 D(K) V. I'liul (isj'.t;, :u!. ft P. iii:t , Til* rr/errHc»t iir* to pngtt, ntt to paraj/mjihi. r, J9 HOO 442 056 793 319 39 110 100 110 V93 174 109 320 747 (33 31« TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixix Door. Ppan-o (1S30), 2 M. & I).. c I-. I'fiirscy i IS'J li. ic Dorr. \wk {mo). I n. & A<1 l).,tr. IVw ('"«'). I T. R. 7 I r. l'..ml.r..kc (ISO!)). 11 Ki I).«T. r.'iif..l<i (IN.IH;. NC. \- |)n.. ). IVrkoH ;iHiOj. 3 n. ic <1 !),...(. IVikinH(17i)l»), 3 T. U. I).«. r. IVrnitt (1S43), 6 M. & ])...•(■. rrttrft (IHJl), 5 n. \- ; !).«• r. PliillipH (lH4o). H Q. I«, 1)(H. r. I'lowiimn IHlil), 2 H. t ])„,•,: l'(K.|f(l«l«), 11 Q- "• ' |).H. r. P.,w.ll (1H34), 1 A. & 1 ]».«• r. IV.wvll (1N3()), 7 ('. i 1 i»c«. ., r.)«tii (iH.vj), 3 <;. &• y J).Mr. IVir.. (1847,, 16 M. A: V 1).M. r. Pulniiiii (l«4'i). 3 Ki. H. Dm. I. Pyu (i:i»'>). 1 Kep. 36ii Dnrn. Hiimlnll (1H28), 2 M. & Dc». I. H.rN(lH34), I. <". i^ P. Dwi. H.vh(IH38;, 4 Hill..'. N D.Mr.Kl.iHl.«(18^3:, II M.\- Ri.lmnl, (IHl.')). -2 ( *. \ Dc. D,... f. Ki.ki.rl.v (IH((3). .'> Kh| Docf. Ridtfwav (IH.'O , 4 B. >^ Dui-r. Hif« ,\M-2), H Hiiiir. 17 ]).«.!■. U..t).Tt-»(IHl'.t). 3 H. & Dooc. R..l»rt.-.;IS44), l.< Ji. i' D(M( r. 'H<ilHTtH (l,st7). HI M. i DiM' r. HiiliMili IKl'J), 1/5 Kii.it DiH' r. K.ifCK'.'iV,. A Ddwl. 4: D.K ,: HnJi.iiijfN 1847), 4 ('. 1«. IS8 ; 17 L. J. V. P. -'CH C 301 9 D. & U 'J08 . ' 1 428 7(io iiNt .')(I4 • 1 1 K U. 2(10 . 1'. '.37 V 48U 116, 749 U2; (ir. 343 A 'i2;"i .441 1, 44^ . I'.l; If. L. J. Q V All .'.77 n. 201) 713: 17 L. J. a I K .'iSl : 3 N. lie M. ^ !43; (jltl . 12 Jur. ■^0 .... \ (ii7 nn K. 323 V. (i03; IS 1.. J. y . 622; b Jur. 1122 ix. i.'.!) ; U L. ;"ll'jur J. U. H. 131' 3111 '."36 P. 20 4li (ill) (". 384 ; () Si'iitt, Ifil ; 1 Am. 15U (.382; 1 Diiwl.^ W.liOO; ViL. J.Ej >: Kir 2 1 C . ..... L.2 93.. 1. 4 V Alil ft3 .43f ".90. 1, 40 8 ; 1 M.K). & So. 1 ^'■■\. 3ii7 .'!9 ... 3(17 .V W. .'.20, f.33 . . . i^ W. 778 1U40 31) , 32; 13 11. U. 3(il !0 PAOR 431 112 522 96 424 1208 706 ), 924 741 I, filO 429 6 6.')8 98 1216 326 127 I, 433 623 6, 41« 116 622 36 606 444 , 466 318 1133 10.04 I, 488 43« 644 606 DiH Do Dii Ki. (IMC . 7 M & W. 102 ; 10 L. J. Kx. 201 ..300, 320, 321, 366, 367 HiihKtr .isii'.i), 3 K'iMt, 1.'). 1848), 6 (;. n. 422 : 17 L. J. C. P. 108 IK.O 707 l!c.wi. (M2i'>i. 2C. ic P. 246; K, & M. 343 644 D.I.' r. H..»lnii<U , I8I(»). 9 C. & P. 73S 248, 269, 273 ])..«• .. Saiiiplir ^\8:il<), 8 A. 4: K. l-'-l ; 1 W. W. & II. 228 ; 2 Jur. 841 ; ,t N. .^ P. 2.')» 87. 429, 431 D.KM'. S.ii.)iimi,r.' (170.i), 2 JA. Uiivm. 1026 Dot Snil.i ISM). 2 A. At Iv iTS Do.. I. Siai.,n (183.^), 2 C. M. A: K. 732 ; 1 Tyr. i (Jr. 1!) : 1 (Jiilr, 303 6 1060 89, !I0. '.18, ,'.10, (102, 1113, 1173 D.H. f. Ki*«m (1810). 12 KhmI, 62 231, 396 D.H- r Skiii'i.r (18»8), 3 K- . 84 ; 18 L. J. Kx. 107 .....403, 466, 457 807 163 268 Dot- r. SIfiiimii (1816), H. B. 298 ; l.'i L. J. (^ IV 338 ; 10 Jur. ,V<H . Dm- 1. Hiniiri.lKc (1H4."'), 7 <J H. 9.'.7 : 14 L .1. t^ II. 327 ; 9 Jur. 781 . DiH' r. Sii.irt [VMi,), 1 M. Ac Itiil.. 476 .Sinilli ^1838;, H A. & K. 266; ,1 N. & P. 336; 2 M. & Kob. 7 »•••••••• I W. W. At II. 429; 2 Jur. 864 474,476 1166 30 97 36 I1.H. V. H..iii..rt<.ii 1I.S461, 7 W. H. :>i*; 14 L. J. y. H 210 ; II Jur. 776 .... 817 D.H. V. S] .ii.T ( IHO.')). (1 KhM, 123 ; 2 Hmitli, 266 ; 8 K. K. 422 36 DiH. I. 8|.itlv(l832), 3 11. .V All. 182 316, 319 1). D.K' 1. Smith il817), 2 Hliirk. 109; Ml It. R. 7.)'i Dur il Smith r. Jorwv (1819), 1 U. At M. 07, 160; 2 B. k P. .692 D-K- I. Liuly Siiiylhr "1816. , 4 M. i S.-!. 348; 16 R. R. 480 .. . I1..C I. .Sii.,wih.n"(l7(i!»i, 2 W. !«l. 1224. Slar.'y (1833). n C. » P. i;i9 44'J I)i«.. StHiiioii(l836),l M.* W.(1«S; 6 L.J Kx.263; 1 F.*0. 1066. .668, 6.'i0, 773 DcM' I. Stiipli. (178HI, 2T. R. (184 ; 1 R. R. 1.96 127 D.HM. Sl.,1 (1811). 3('Hni|.. 116; 13 R. R. 708 Due I'. »l> {.hvDiioii (18U1), 3 Enp. 284 ; 4 Enp. 60 661 976 t ii;'ii ■ Mlt! r»/. /. mJi ttili p»ge 635. l!< I ! h XX TABLE OF CASES CITED. Doo r vuilwoU fl'- i.i), 8 A & J., 'il'; 3 N. & P. 701 ; 1 W. W. ft H. I)3'i; -Uvf. ''Jl TkOM 146 Dot' V. iiuc'korinorf (iN.iiij, •) A. ic r.. iu,i; -i n. x r. in; >v. »> . « u. iu,i . ij.'u, 1221, 1222, 122:1, 12i0, 1228 I loo V. .'ut»<>'- (1841). \> C. & P. 7<»fi M4 ]).«. V. Sylxiimi ' IT'.lfi), ■ T. U. 2 ; 2 Ek|). 499 ; 4 II. U. .mi . . Vlft. 12(1. Hr,-!. 1 158 J»uo f. f.iiii<'r«- flSIH), 12 ii. R. 99M ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; 13 Jur. 119 . .1V2, (145 Doo .'. Tiirv.T (IHit), \iv. A: M. 141 410, 1227 Do.. (1. Tiithiim r. Wiight (IHUTi, 2 Uiihm. & Mvl. 1 ; 1 A. 4: E. ;t ; H N. & M. 260; 7 A.iE.313; 6N.&iI. 1.12; 4 Bin(f.'N. U. 489: .'jL. J Q. B, 124. .309, 370, 371. 410 Doo V. Tnvlor (1K19), 1 Allmi. 144 (N. BrmiH.) 766 Doo V. TliomiiH (IHl 1). 11 EuHt. ;123 ; 2 Smith, L. C. 432 :i!t8 Doo f. TlioiiiiiM (1S29 , 9 B. \- C. 299 12H, ,V,)8, (l.-i9 Doe r. ThnniHoii (IK II). 9 Dowl, 948 816 Doei'. Thviiiit' (1808;. 1(1 EiiHt. 20(i ; 10 U. It. 280 443 Doo r. Tidlmry (18.VI). 14 C. B. 304 ; 2 C. L. U. 347 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 67 ; 18 Jiir. 4(iS 116 Dood. Tiii<!al r. U(»- fl8:«i), f> Dowl. 420 475 Doo V. Tn.k.T (l«;i(),. .M. & M. .'>:ifl 269 Doo r Tiirfonl 1h:12). :t 11. & A<1. 890. 89,') l.')7, 43.), 437. 4ft4, 4.')7, 4/i9 Door. Tvl«T{18:i(i . (I Minif. .'Xll ; 4 M. & P. 377 1113 Doo I'. VowloM (18,).t), 1 M. ic Kol). 201 438 Doo r. WHiiiwri>flif (lH:i(i\ :) A. A: E. .V20 1211 Door. W.iiiiwrifflil (1838,. 8 A. & E. "00 444, 407 Door. Wiilk.r (isoi), 4 Enp. oO ; Hull N. P. 29(1 2o2, 2a3 Doe V Wiinl ;I8.VJ , 18 U. B. 197 ; 21 E. J. il. B. 1 1') ; Id .lur. 709 .... 704 Doe r. Wiitkiim (180(i), 7 EiimI. .l-ll ; 3 Smitli. .117 ; H U. K. (170 3« Doo c. WiitkiiiH (18:t7i, 3 Biii^f. N. ('. 421 ; 4 Scott. 15.) OO'J Doe f. Wii'Hoii (1H17U 2 Sturk. 2.10 08 Doe V. W.blxT (18;i4), 3 N. A: M. 58(1; 1 A. & E. 733 513, 514, 1114 Door. Wi>hM«r (IHMI), 12 A. & E. 442; 4 P. At I). 270 759 D«:o V. WclJH (18:i9 . 10 A. A: E. 435, 437 6.58 Doe V. \VVll«miiii (IH48). 2 Ex. 3(18 ; (i I). & L. 170 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 277. .. . 1113 Doo r. Wliit.-fcM.t (1838). 8 V. ic P. 270 :tO« Doe V. Whit.'h. iicl (1838), 8 A. & E. 671 ; 1 W. W. & H. .')2I ; 2 Jur. 403. .260, 267, 306 Doo r. WhitriK. (18221. I). & R. N. P. C. 1 08 Doo f. WiKKii'H f 18|;t). 4 Q. B. 3(17, 375 ; 3 (J. & D. 604 ; 7 Jur. 529 .... 96 Doer. Wilforil (i8.'4), 1 (". .t P. 284; U. & M. 88 7«7 WilliHiii»(ls:t(l). 7 ('. & P. 332 lift, lift WiUon (1809V 1 1 Eu»t. 5(1 39 WitUMiml) (1851), 1 H. I,, fas. 425; Ex. 601 3(i ' " 467, 460 Wciltrv il8J9). 8 B iV ('. 22 ; 2 M. & . . (05 . 3 C. 4 P ( ' ..80, 170 Woinr.w..ll (IMII). 2 Ciiin|). 5.*)9 CrH W.Miil iilMiut 182H , 5 Hiiiif. 439 977 WckI 1845). 14 M. & W. (1S2; 15 E. J. Ex. 41 ; 9 Jur. 10(10 .... 060 W.M..n>riilt^i. ,lH.'9i. M. A; U. :(02 ; 9 II \- ('. :i7(l ftij WriKlit (I8:t9 . 10 A. & E. 703. 2 P. .V I>. (172 80, 1140 Vountf (1845;. 8 (j. B. 03; 15 L. J. (^ It. 9 ; 9 Jur. 911 148 .iii r. CriKiiiii (IHOO), 35 h. J. P. & M. 12U ; Ij It. 1 11. L. 301 ; Ift .'.44 1 106, 1 145 ty .'. Dv.r (1890). 25 L. It Ir. 297 Hi f. IIiikLt (1821). Ity. At M. 198 691 r. Il.-M (IHIO), II A. Ac E. 335 ; 4 Jur 432 07, 09 • r. Bk. of EiiKliiiiil ( 180.5), 10 V(«H. 285, 352 3 ■V. L<l. IIuiiliiiuHi'ia (1805), n ViiN. 202; 8 It. R. 160 18 H r. Evniin(1807), 30 L. J. Ch. 474 673 ill r AvKviinl (|,<(l|l. 15 Ir. Ch. R. 5s;i 1117,1123 ; r. It..l.inHilH5:i). 7 11. li <'iiH. 390; 3 Miicij. 603; 20 I,. 3. P. II , r. N. B. 1271 ; 7 W. R. 074 180, 1144 Tk* r-/i , fHctt art to page*, not to parafrupkt. D iK' XABLE OF CA8E8 CITED. 1 XXI :'AiiR flMii r T,ii.i.miM)n(1837). 6C1. *Fin. 1. U 17 6 , IM? IHO, 11.15 l).,i..i(rh I . I»<rt,iu (ISI'J). Ai-m. M. & O. .I.ir 1023 Dmml.l r. SuckliiiK ,iH(iii), ;J6 L. J. Q. R 'JMi ; 7 B. 4 8. 783; J li. 1 (J H. isft ; li Jur. N, H. 7U6 ; H L. T. 772 ; !•'> W. R. K* 781 Doiml.lM.ii r. Tlioiiiiw.n (1H()8\ I {'iiini). •»'.•(•; 10 K. H. 717 IHM. I U9 Dot. ii-t.r, Miiv. c.f. I. Diiv I^IO). u'lWi. •J(1J: 12 K. U. O.'.O WU, :».>:« l).>i,.>f.ill r. Trini.l«>ni(.ro (IH.IH). » Ir. 'J. L. H. ;t7» '^M. 7!ll DoiK'llaii (. Dciiulluii (17^), 2 HiiKtr. K<«'. Ill t'.ii l)..i..llHn I. H.'ii.l (1K;)21. 3 M. & Ad. '.106 li.'iU, <i80 J)..i.i'lw.ii r. Taylor (lH2!t), 8 rick, .imi 009 I»onKrrtii.iH<o,Tlii';l8(12M IiUrtJi.»G8; 31 L. J. A(lin.20,'i; 6 L.T. 133. . 1 182, 1189 I)..iiiiiHoii r. KUlrv (1821), 3 KukI"' ^» Y. liCXl. ii 3'.m IKm.I.v r. Million ■;1877;. Ir. 11. 11 K^i. 29!) 7im J).«.nr"mii r. J.nkiiiH (1831), 2 A. Hi K. 260, 2(10 ; 4 N. & M. 170 38. 39 Doriiii'K ciiHi. 1838), 2 Moo. ('.('. 37 1>07 l)..r.'(i.ill«ry. In re. (18!I0), r.2 I-. T. 7''>8 ; 38 \V. R. 4!)1 {tl3 Dorin r. ItoVi-i (I87'<), L. U. 7 H. L. 6ti8 ; 4« L. J. Cli. ".Vi ll.i, 7'.'3 Dorr f. MiniMcll M81)i), 13 John». 431 74« Dorr.tt .. M.ux ,18/il), 23 L.J. C. P. 221 ; ISC. B. 142 104.-|, 10.-.4 Dorw V r. DorMcy (1838). 7 Wiittn, 3.')0 1 14t DoHi Aly Kliiin. In tfoiMln of (1880). (J P. D. ; 4U L. J. P. 78 ; 2U W. U. 8it 1)37 Dour.., ]{,' (1S(12), 2 8 & T. fi03; 31 L. J. P. 172; 8 Jur. N. 8. 723; (1 L. T. 78l» 700 Dnmot I. (i..o(flir>f'»" (1H78), 9 Cli. I>. 441 ; 2«i W. K. 82ft 378 Doi.kIiih, U.. ;1812,, 3 Q. U. 837 i 12 L. J. Q. II. 4U; 3 O. 4 D. 509 ; 7 .lur. 31t 808, 870 DoiiKliiHr. CorlK'tt (185(1), K. 4 H. 514; 2 Jur. N. 8. 1247 30 Do.i^liiH r Di.iiKliiH (1871), L. K. 12 l-:*!. 017 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 74 ; 25 L. T. .13(1 ; 2(1 \v. ]<.:>:> 180 Doii)^l.i» r. Kwinir (18.'i7), Ir. C. ].. R. MOft 39 DoiijfiiiMi. IMl.iw»(1853), I Kiiy, 114; 2 W. R.ii54 ; 23 L.J. Ch. 107. .792,798, 7l»9 DoMirliiMi. Forn-Ht (1828), 4 Uiutt. 080; 1 M. ic V. 0'13 114(1 Doiiffliwr. Ilohni. (1840), 12 A. A: K. 041 ; 4 P. Jt I). 085 117 DoiikIiiht. SiiunilrrHon (1701), 2 Dnil. 110 42^ D<ntKl»ti''. Touwv (182!)), 2 Wfuil. ;t.)2 2.V), 117 1 Dour r. Child (1870), 1 E«. Div. 172 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 402 ; 34 L. T. .'37 ; 24 W. R. 537 1 159 Dover t . Miu'HtuiT ( 1804), 5 K»\y. 00 . 4 KitM, 43.1 ; 1 .Smith, 123 273 Dowdril r. Auhtriiliiin Roynl Muil Co. (1854), 3 K. & H. '.M)2 ; 2 C. L. U. Ili5«; 23 l<. .1. (^ U. 309; 18 .lur 579 819 Dow.l.ii V. Fowl.' (1814), 4 Cimiii. 38 498 D..wlin)f t. Dowlintr (1800), 10 Ir. ('. L. R. 244 229 Dowlinif t . Finijfim (1824), 1 C. * P. 587 273 Dor I, ( . KlliH isii5). ;15 Btiiv. 578 031 Downi... t. (iiirhuti (l8|3).2Dowl.N.8. 045; 14 L. J. Q. W. 210; 9 Jur. 090 734 Downt-M t. Ri<')iiirdi«<n (1822), 5 H. 4 A. 075; 1 D. 4 Ii, 332 1203 Downing r. Hiit.hi-r (1811), 2 M. & R<di. 374 25a Dowuiiitf .. CitiMl (1807), 36 L. J. M. C. 07 ; L. R. 2 0. P. 401 ; ifl I,. T. 323 ; 1,1 W. K. 745 22C, 499 DownHr.Coo|«.r(|841 ,2Q.B. 250; 10.4D.673; 11 L.J.Q.B.2; OJur.022 98 Dowt4in r. (VwK (1794). 1 KnJ). 108 , 498 Ii.ivly'HiiiH.. ilN30!, .Miici. Pi4f. H. L. 054 50'i Dnil.l.lr I. Donncr '1M2I . Re. .V M. 47 ; 1 ('. \- P. 188 31A Diiik.r. Dr.ikrtlMtiir, Hll.i;, CiiH. 172; 29 L J.("h. 8,Mi. 3 L T. 193, ,707, 708,790 l.'iiki. I. MiirrvHt (1823), I H. A; C, 473. 2 D. 4 R. 000 1178 ihiikr . Syk.H il7'.)7/, 7 T, ii. 113 490 Drati.(uit r. i'rudhonimc (1831), 3 I<(iuii«. H3, 8ft 218 Drunl I, llrown (1825', 5 I). 4 R, 582; 3 B, 4 C. 005... 288 Driiytim r. DiiIj. (1823), 3 D. 4 R. 534 ; 2 H. .V C. 293 117, 546 DpHMiri. SlunH«..ld (i845). 14 M 4 \V. 828 ; 15 L. .'. Kk. "74 1030 Dr.w I Nuun (1870), 4 y. B. D. 001 ; 48 L. J. il B. .101 ; 40 L. T 071 ; JT \V. R. 810 107 Diiw I. Trior (1843), 6 M. A « Jr. 2(54 1222 Voi, /. tHilt U■tt^ /Mj/t 03d. 1 1 ffij ^^P! 'i Ixxii TAHLE OF CASES CITED. VAOII J)rinkwater r. Vnrtrr (IMH), 7 C A P. 181 397, 399, 402 Droitwjih raw ' 1 H.J.V . Kimpji i O. r.4 497 Dr.Aii r. Smith 1H2'>), 3 Now Hump 299 r,U l>riiift'H >«•■<• 1N7J>. L. K II l-J|. t) «45 Diuinmon i, K.- IK«0. nhouia U- ISO"), 2 S. & T. 8 ; 8 W. K. 470 701 Drimimi.iKl r. Att.-Oen. IS49 . I Dr. & War. 353 703, 784, 791 DrummoiKl r I'Hri.h 1843 . 3 CJnrt. Mi, ftVl 702 JJniry'" <"»•*«' »"■ MhIium' r. O'Cuniiori, Drtirv (tomp. N.ipifr), 644 79 Druryr. M.i<t.«mani Is.Vi .5E. A. B.(il2; 2/)!,. J.Q B.fy. 1 Jur. N. S. 1163 773 Drydeii r. Allix (IK»i;i,. I M.)o. 1'. C. N. 8. .')28 e Duanc, U«- (1862), 31 L. J. P. 4 M. 173 ; 2 S. & T. 590 ; 8 Jur. N. 8. T.VJ ; 6 L. T. 788 140 Dii Barri- r. Livottp '17911. P.-n. K. 77 : 3 R. Tl. GSo S9.5, f)98 Duhliii, Al.p. off. I>ml Trimli*t<.ii (I84!i), 12 Ir. Eq. R. 2i'>l ..1133, 1167, 1168 Dublin, C.rp. i.f r. Juil^e ;I8I7 , 1 1 Fr. L. R. 8 729 Dublin, W .V W. Rv Co. r. Slatt.rv 1878). 3 App. Cum. 1155; 39 L. T. 30o : 27 \V. R. \'J\ : 10 Ir. C. L.'Rip. 2ri(i 28 Du n.wt 1 . 15. r.ff.inl I8H» , 2 Camp. aI2 : 1 1 K. R. 782 371, 374 Duckftt r. (iov.r ,is:7 . >; Ch. D. 82 ; 40 L. J. C\\. 1(17 ; 25 W. R. 6)4 .. 187 Diick.lt r. William* IH.-.P. 1 1'. 4 J. 510; 1 Dowl. 291 347 I>ml)^.Mm f . l'.iiil.r.k.- '1877;. L. R. 2 App. Cnx. 284 ; 1 (^ B. D. 96 ; 46 L. .1. H. B. 40!» ; 30 I,. T. 382 ; 2.') W. R. 499 771 Dudlry I . Sumner ■ i 809'. 5 Miuw. 444 372 Dudlcv t. V'.M«- (1873, 114 Mii.Hr'. 31 7fi3 Dufau'r r. Cri.ft ISIU). 3 M.*.. P. C. R. 1 17 140 DuH.rin'H, Ul.. chm- {I8S7,. 4 CI. & I'in. .')(i8 1093 Dutfirin P.HT. 1H48 . 2 H. of L ("m.. 47 1018 Duttin ( . ;smitli 1792 . P«a. R. 1(18 (.00 Duflv Itf (1871). .'i Ir. R. F:<iuitv, 500 142, 747 DujfdMlr .. R„l».rt!wn (18:17 . .{ K kj. C!»5 , 3 Jur. N. 8. 0S7 114 DujfjriiH. Rf ;lN7ii,. 39 L. J. P. 21 ; 22 L. T. 182 701 Duk. r. Anhiiy M862), 7 U. 4 N. tJOO . 31 L. J. Ex. 168; « Jur. N. 8 •>M, : low. R 273 97 Duki'H (. OoHtlinK (183.5 . I a,.:-^. N. C. 588 ; 1 Srott. 570 ; 1 H.)dKo», 120; 4 L. J. C. P. 21 1 202 Dumfri.i*. VmtI of. The (1885). 10 P. D. 31 , 64 L. J. P. 7 ; 61 L. T. 906 ; :U \V. R. 568; 5 A»p. M. C. 3«2 388 Dumper r. D'lmpir dv/J,. A 'iitf. 583 606 Dunh.viic, ]a\. r. BranUer ■ :;«.'<4). 18 B.av. 313 144 Dunoaiir. B.i.rd (1820). 2 Nott ft .*!C. 4iii) 429 Duncan r. Bntdr a86f)'. 12 Ir. C. /.. R. 171 1085 Duiuan r. Hill '1871), 40 L. J. Ex. 137 ; L. P 6 Ex 265 ; 26 L. T. 59 ; lU W. R. su» 158 Dun.an r. H.mIitpii (1827). 4 Mc-0. 239 1200 Duncan i. I^.uch VHh,, « Q. H. 901; 14 L J. Q. P. 135; » Jur.346.... 207 Duncan I. I>i»ndi-H (1813 . 3 Camp. 478; 14 R R. 815 IttI Dunran i. S<!..ll il8(»; , I Camp. I(!0 1013, 1044 Duncan v. Tiiidal :x:,.i . 1.1 (.'. ». 257 , 21 L J. C V. 137 ; 17 Jur 347. . Oil Dun-ombc r Danicll (Ih:{7;, 1 W. W k II. 101 ; 2 Jur. .'f.' ; 8 V. ic V. 222 007 Duncuft ('. Albwbt :l84tj. 12.Hi,;. 1H9 fi85 Dundan'M riwM' (1814 , M.i«| H. L. Pmc. 610 , 602 Dund.iKv. DuK-UH (179't,. 1 V.-« jun 199; 2Coji,240; 1 R. R. 112 679 Dunfor.1 r. Tmttka ,1844), 2 II. * SV .>29 ; 1 D. & L. 581 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 124; 8 Jur. 180 533 DunSop r. Hijfifin. 1848\ I H. o* L. C. 381 ; 12 Jur 295 166 ■)umi V. Devon, kr. Newupa, or C" . (1H9J) 10 R. 107; (1896) 1 Q. B. 211, ti. ; 03 L. J. ti. B. .H^ , 70 L. " 593 6.36 Dunn V. Murray 1829). ♦ M * R. .iST . . (' iJ. 4 C. 780 1 124 Dunn r. 81ee 1810,. 1 Mt^^-e. C. '.' ; H.,h, V. P. 401 ; 17 R. R. 061 608 Dunn .. Snowden (1863,, S; f-.J-Cb. 10* ; .' Dr. &8ra.201 ; 7 L. T. 668; UW.R 160 173 DunnBc. EntjUiih (1874). L. R. 18 E.;, '24; H L. T. 75., 324, 971 Dunnu e. Fertruaon > 1832). Ksyeti, :«•»;; ,, 686, 686 Tkt rtftrtntn art U jxi^ts, tnt t» p^> vfrapKt, TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxiii ri.am DunniiKr ». Robertu (1862), 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 463 i.,4 iMiinivrii, Ld. V. LleweUyn (1850), 15 Q. B. 791 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 3S8 .3!)*. 30C, 397 398 402 I)ut.8ford r. Ciirlowis (1859), 1 F. & F. 702 !... ' 26 Diiiiston V. PaUTson (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 495 ; 26 L. J. 0. P. 287 643 DupavHt'. ShephtTd(16!»8), 12 Mix! . 216 4 Diipiiyr. Trumau(1843), 2 Y. & C. 341 927 Dtiriinoc, It^s (1872), L. R. 2 P. & D. 406 ; 41 L. J. P. & M. 60 ; 26 L. T. <m : JO V,'. R. 759 703 Durham. Lady, Re (1842), 3 Curt. 67 701 Durlmm Bp. of, v. Beaumont {1808), 1 Camp. 207 4(i4, 976, 977 Kurhai.i .11.(1 Suiulerl. Rv. Co. v. W.ilkiT (1842), 2 O. & D. 320; 2 (i. B. 940 638 D.irlinif v. Luveland (1839), 2 Curt. 220, 227 140 D.irrHi.t i'.Frioud(1857),5Do(J.&Sm.ai3; 21 L. J. Ch. 353; 16Jur.709 174 Durnll r. Btilerloy (1810), Holt, 283 ; 17 R. U. (i39 934 Diirnll 'kI.ouUI 1«' Darrell) r. Evans (1861), I II. \- C. 174 ; 31 L. J. Ex. ;t:i7 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 104 ; 7 L. T. 97 : 10 W. R. 6(15 297, 674 Dutton, Re 18(12), 32 L. J. 1'. & M. 137 ; 3 S. A: T. (if. 143 Di.ttdnr. SdomoiiHon (1803). 3 Bos. & P. 582; 7 R. R. 883 691 |).ilton r. Wocdman (1852), 9 Cush. 255 491. .526 l)» vcr I. Cu\\\ux (IH.VJ). 7 Ex. 639 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 225 ; 16 Jur. ,569. .318, 3I'J. 609 Dwverr. Rich (1871), 6 I. R. (J. L. 144 Ill l)v.'e.S,,ml.r.'f. Troup ( 18.>6). Deune, Eoc.R. 38; 26L.T.(0.8.)288. . 169, 170,262 Dye r. Dye (1884), 47 J. P. 520 666 Dvir. H." (182HI, ! lluftn. Eee. It. 219 693 DVer I , HeMt (1866), L. R. 1 E.x. 152 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 105 ; 4 H. & C. 189. . 76 Dv.ri. Dyer 1788 .lWhite\T.L. C. 236; Wiitk.C.pyh. 214-228 (3rd ed.).. 665, 666 Dv.Ti. (irecii i,18l7). 10 L. J. Ex. 239; 1 E.\. 71 1206 Dyer r. Mimiiay 189.5). 14 R (^fiiy) 266; (1895) 1 Q. B. 742; 64 L. J.Q. B. 418; 7 J L T. IIS; 43 VV. R. 440 Adil. [1073] Dvko r. AMrM^'o ( 1 798). eitwl 7 T. R. 665 ; 1 1 Eiiit. 5«< | 49b Dvke r. WillmiiiH (1861 1. 2 8. & T. 491 ; 31 L. J. I*. \- M. 157 414, 416 DviiicKh .. W.iikiiiM (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 431 ; 31 W. It 331 ; 48 L. T. 393 944 Dyne r. Niillry (1853), M C. B. 122 801 DvH.irt IV.r. IHM), 6 App. Can. 48',l 149, 367 Dj*.u I'. Wo<xl (1824), iti. k C. 449 1033 Vkvon V. .TeffeiKk (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 379 ; 42 L. J. Ex. 36; 28 L. T. 273; •2(1 W. H. 1033 KilIh r. WillianiN (1854), 24 L. J. Ch. 531 ; 4 I)e (J. M. A: (}. 674 Kat.'l.-t..ii r. (iiitteri<lKo (1843), 11 M. Ac W. 460; 12 L. J. Ex. 3.59; 2 Do«l. N S. 1053 2i7, 1I9(!. Eaifleton I . KinK'-ton (1803), 8 VoH. 438 , 1220, Kair.iT ''. Merle i^lSOJ-!)), i',ite«l 2 ("amp. 253 Kiirl'» Trust. Ru ^1H.',8,. 4 K. At J. 300 9, Eurl (if Auekland, The (1861 1, 30 L. .7. P. M. .V A. 121 ; LunH. Adm. 164; 15 MiMv i'. ('. C. 304 ; 5 L. T. .V)8 ; 10 \V. R. 124 Earl of DuuifrieH, The (18851. |0 P. D. 31 ; 54 L. J. P. 7 ; 51 L. T. 906 ; 31 W. H. ..(iS ; 5 Af.p. M. C. 342 Karl I. UwiH (1801), 4 Vm>. 1 4.32, Karh. r. Tick^n (1833), 5 (i. A; P. 542 291, 292, Karp r. H.-nderwrn (1876), 3 Ch. 1). 254 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 738 ; 34 L. T. 844.. Eaq. r. Lloyd (1857 i. 3 Kav (S: .f. 549 Ea.-! t (niajmian ^^1827), 2 C. & P. 570 ; M Ac M. 46 245, Eaxt bind Waterw. IVi. v. Bailey (1827), 4 Bin^. 283 ; 12Mim). (C. P.)5:e2 EaM. C(m. Ky. Co. t: Broom (1851), 6 Ex. 614 ; L. J. Ex. 196; 6 Rail*-. Cai.. 578 F*»t. Union Ry. Co. r. Ea«t.Ct». Ry. Co. (185.3), 2 R.& B.640; 22L,.r.'i.B.371 Kant. I'nion Ily. Co. r. Hymonda (18.iO), 5 Ex. 237 ; 6 R^ilw. tJiw. 678. .454, EMtlmd I'. Bunhell (1870), 3 Q. B. D. 432 ; 47 L. .7. Q. B. 600; 38 L. T. 56H ; 27 W. K. 200 , 114 1039 1206 1223 256 1030 178 388 1168 555 221 PH3 970 642 648 1160 468 167 4 '■'^m Vol, I, mdi *oitk p»ii$ 636, V ' I'i Ixxiv TABLE OF CA.SES CITED. PAOI EiiMtniiin r. Tattle (1823), 1 Coweii. 248 644 EiiMliiiuio r. LiiWM (lH.t!i), fl lUiiK. N. C. 444 ; 7 Scott, 4(51 ; 7 Dowl. 431 ; •2 Am. 54 ; .J Jur. lnn 1121 EiiKtoii c. CarU'T (IH!H)].:> Kx. S; lU L. J. Ex. i::i 1133 EuNtw<x)d f. Kciiyou (1840), U L. J. Q. U. 4(IU; 4 J«r. 1081 ; 3 P. iD.270; 11 A. & E. 4.18 079 EiiHtw(KHl V. Siivillw (1812). 11 L. J. Ex. 383 : M. & W. (il.") 717 E»t<m r. HiiKkcr (ISSl). tl Q. B. 1). 201 ; 7 Q. »(. D. o2'J ; M L. J. Q. B. 444; 44 L. T. 70;i; •-",) W. It. f)'J7; 45 J. r (ilti 050 Err\ea r. lliirrimm (!HI«), ti Nott-n of Cas. (Kvr. \- Mar.) 204 488 EimIoh. ConiiniHM. v. iMi-rrul (186U), L. K. 4 Kx. 102; 3H L. J. Ex. 93; 17 W. H.67C 07. 152, 644 EcIuM. ConimiKM. i. Uo»o (1S80), 6 Api). Cm. 730; 4!1 L. J. Q. B. 771 ; 43 L. T. 353 ; 2'J U'. !^. 159 ; 46 J. V. 30 74 EecleHtou V. Siiikr (KiH!)), tJirth. 79 : 3 M<k1. •■!58; (%.iiil>. 150 488, 496 Eik.rt.l«y i». I'iiitt (IHOii), L. R. 1 P. & H. 2S1 ; 30 L. J. P. 7 ; 14 L. T. 800 ; 16 E. T. 327 ; 15 W. R. 232 143, 703 E< k.Htoiii •'. Hrynol.lH (1837). 7 A. & E, 80 ; 2 N. \- P. 25(1 48 Ediin V. Di'«itt.ia (1841), 1 Q. B. 302, 307 ; 4 P. i D. 050 ; 5 Jur. 317. .48, 091, 717 E«liir)wo« f. ArjiOHtino Land Co (18!)0), 69 L. J. Ch. 392 ; 02 L. T. 514 ; 38 W. K. 029 915 E<l<'ii I. Hlak<^ (1845), 13 M. .V W. 014; 14 L. J. Ex. 104; Jur. 213. . . . 745 Edjfi) r. Hilliiry (1862). 3 C & K. 43 271 ¥.<\t(o V. Sulihlmrv {\U\)), Ami.. 70 7S9 Kiljfcr. Siriittoia (18:il). 1 Tvr. 2'.3; I C. vt J. .391 082 EdKfWortli V. .lohnMton (l^*";. I. U. 11 E«i, 320 800 Eilie V. EiiMt IikHh Co. (I70n, 2 Burr. 1220 : 1 W. HI. 295 6 Etlio V. KiiiKHford (1854), 14 C. B. 7.)9 ; 2 C. L. K. 832 ; 23 L. .1. C. P. 123 280 Edim-. Ex imrto (1822), 9 Serjr. \- R. 147 H09 EiIiiu.ikIhi. CliiilliH(1849),7C. B. 413; (i Dowl. & I,. 58 1: is L. .I.e. P. Idi.. U9l E<ltiioiidH 1'. FoMtor (1870), 45 L. J. C. P. 41; 33 L. T. OUO ; 24 W. R. ■MH 109, 620 E.<liiiomlH »•• Uoat«>r (1852), 15 Boav. 415 ; 21 L. .1. Ch. 290 711 E.lmoiHlNf. lIiirriM (1834), 2 A. A: E. 414; 4 N. & M. 18i 222 E.IiiioikIh r. WiiIUT (1820), 3 SUrk. 8 922 EdmondMon r. .SU-vciiMon (1705). Bull. N. P. 8 110 Edniuiidfi. l)owncN(1834),2C.A: M.45U; 4 Tvr. 173: 3 L. J. Ex. 98. .073,712,713 Ea.nuinlHi'. I-<.w (1857), 3 K. A: J. 318; 20 1,. J. Cli. 432 800 EdmuiidN I . Nfwmun (1823). R. & M. 5 .'.OO EdwiirilH, Re (1848), 6 Not«» of Ciw. (Ecc, & Mar.) 300 70l EdwardH i. liattn (1844K " M. & U. OOO 754 EdwardHi'. Burlmnan (18;, ' 3 B. & Ad. 788 1019, 1174 EdwardH r. Cr<Kk (1801). 4 hM), .19 370 EdwardH I . EilwanU (l«3(i), 2 Y. »^l- C. Ex. 123 fl(!7 EdwariJH r. Etlirriii>ftou (I825i. Kv. \ M. 2(>8 "74 E<lwardH r. Hall (1M5.-.). Do (J. M, A: (J. 71 ; 25 L. .1. Ch. 82 083 Ed«ardH r. Ilavtil (1853), 14 C. B. 107 ; 2 C. L. R. 1313 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 7; 17 Jur. 1103 179 EdwaitU r. IIodjeiH (1855), 15 C. B. 477 ; 3 C. L. R. 472; 24 L. J, M. C. 81; 1 Jur. N. S. 91 101 EdwanUi'. Juikm (185.V,. 1 Kuv & J. 534 717 E<lwardHf, J.'voiiH (1849), 8 C! B. 430; 19 L. J. C. P. 60 780 l-Mwiirdsr. Johoh (1837). 7 C. .V P. (133 208 Edwards «. MatthuwH (1817). 10 L. J. Ex. 291 ; 4 D. & L. 721 ; 11 Jur. 398 272 EdwardH r. Midi. Ry. Co. (1880). 9 Q. B. D. 287 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 43 L. T. 004: 20 W. R. OOU ; 45 J. P. 374 043 JMwardBi'. H. (1854), 9 Ex. 028 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 166 84 K«ran ('. Cowan (1858), 30 L. T. 223 1224 E^aii r. Earkiii (1842), 1 Arm. M. & (). 403 20, 330. 1214 EgiTtoii V. MatlmwH (1805), 2 Smith, 389 ; Eant, 307 ; 8 R. R. 489 . .008, 074 I'Ji* n/ereiieri ait to piiytt, nvl to jtiirnyrapht. TAHI.K OF CASES CITED. 1 XXV PAOB Ekk v. Barnett (1800), 3 Enn. 196 154 K»f«'nioiit Hiiriiil n<mrd r. KK«"»'niinit Iron Ore Co. (1880), 14 Ch. D. 158 ; 49 L. .1. Ch. 62:\ ; »2 L T. 17i» ; .'S W. it. 594 321 EhrviiMiMTiien r. Aml.TH<m (1842), 3 Ex. 148 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 132 315 Ei.lmlz .. Hiii.niHN'r (18(i4). 17 C. B. N. S. 708; 34 L. J. C. P. 105; 11 •li.r. N. S, 15; 12 L. T. 70; 13 W. R. 96 775 Ei.kor. NokoH (I8.'l)). M. & M. 30:j 009, 713 Klcl.ii V. KiMM (1807), 9 11. K. 404 ; 8 Eant, 187 1040 Elilor V. Ciiitrr (18!)0). 25 Q. H. I). 194 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 02 L. T. 510 ; .SH W. K. 012 ; 64 J. P. 092 343 i:Mri.l>f.> r. Khott (1774). 1 Cowp. 214 119, 123, 125 Kliit. Teh'K. Co., Uo, Ex purfti Hiiiin (1857), 24 Bcuv. 137 ; 26 L. J. Ch. tiI4 844 KI.'V «'. PoNitivo Oovt. &o. Co. (1875), 46 L. J. Ex. 68 ; 1 Ex. D. 20 ; 33 li. T. 143 ; 24 W. R. 252 048, 081 Klfi.nl r. Tvoi\ (1813), 1 M. & H«>1. 28 33 KliiiM ,. ftriftith (1877), 40 L. J. Ch. 800 ; 8Ch. 1). 521 ; 38 L. T, 871 ; 26 W K. S(,9 971 Kliut.'. Albn (1845), 1 C. n. 18; 14 L. J. C. P. 1.30 227 Klkiii V. Jaiiwm (1846), 13 M. & W. 085 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 201 ; 9 Jur. 35.). . .201, 202, 200, 207 Klkin>rt<)n r. nollimd (1845), 9 M. & W. 059 ; I Dowl. N. 8. 013 733 i:ilrnlH.r.mtfh'H. 1a\., vumi (1830), Miic<|. II. L. Pnirt. 055 502 EllcTHhiiw I . liobiiiBou (1810-28), Stjirk. Ev. 04 1 . (142 255 Klh.f. It.' (1804), 33 L. J. P. A: M. 27 ; 12 W. U 353 143 Klli... . . Koupi-U (1803), 2 Now R. 3 ; 11 W. R. 579 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 503 ; 9 .Jur. N. S. 533 353 Elliott r. I>miii (1884), C. & E. 283 673 Ellii.tt. I. i:iliott(1841), 9M. ^ W. 27; 111*. J. Ex.3 '7 Ellinit.'. K.iiip (^1840). 7 M. & W. 300; 10 L. .1. Ex. 321 116, 117 Ellidtl r. North Eiitit. Rv. Co. (1803), :)2 L. J. Ch. 402; 10 II. L. C. 333; s L. T. 3:i7 : 114 Elliott r. South Devon Ry. Co. (1848), 2 Ex. 725 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 202 ....60, 763 Elliott r.ThomaM(I8;i8), 3 M. & W. 170; 7 L. J. Ex. 129 089 Elliott r. TutiiiM Union (1893). 57 J. P. 151 ; 9 T. L. R, 35 373 Ellin r.('..wmi (1849), 2 0. & K. 719 480 KlliH I. 1). Mlvii (1881), Q. B. D. 621 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 328; 4 I L. T. 209; 2'J \V. K. 493 42 i:iii«f. ElliM (1814), 11 MiiKH. 92 295 Ellin f. HouHtoun (1878), 10 Ch. D. 230; 27 W. R. 501 146, 706 Ellin r. Siiltuu (1808), 4 C. 4 P. 327, n. («) 6H Ellin r. Thonipnon (1838), 3 M. * W. 450 ; 1 H. & H. 131 164 Ellin ... Wiitnon (1818), 2 Sliirk. R. 453 ; 20 U. R. 725 49.5, 551 Elli«.in V. Kllihoii (1802), 6 Vch. 050 ; R. R. 19 ; 1 WhiUi & T. L. C. 291. 005 Klliimk.r .•. Bii.kloy (1827), 10 ik-rtt. & U. 77 945 Elni..r.' . . KiiiKm.t.! (1820). 8 Dowl. i R. 343 ; 5 B. & C. 683 071 Eliiion I , St.Mio (1809;, 1 Tiiun. 458 ; 10 R. R. 678 090 Elniiiii c. Kiiucott (1797), 2 EHp. 503 253, 254 ENtoii ,, WihhI (183,1), 2 My. & K. 078 496 Elton I. Liirkinn (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 190; 6 C. & P. 385 605, 954 Elw.'Hf. E1w..h(18«1), 2 011!. 545 749 Elw.nxl .•. Bnllock (1844). Q. B. 384 ; 13 L. J. (J. B. 330 1091 Elworthv I. Siin.lfonl (18<i»). '^* ^'- J- '-«■ *'- '• 3 U. ii C. 330 304 Einami.l r. Rolmrtn (1808), 6 B. & H. 687 ; 34 L. .1. Q. B. 217 646 Kn.M.-t.m i: Bwwn (1800), 3 E. & K. 234 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 1 ; Jur. N. 8. '■»'« 112 Em.mou r. lUim ■..•u (1791), 1 E»p. 142 ; 5 R. K 725 603 EiM.ry I. Ilarm.tt (1858), 27 L. J. C. P. 216 ; 4 '). B. N. 8. 423; 4 Jur. N. s. «;u OS El... TV .. Chi.iluTo (Tho Arklow) ^1883), 63 L. J. P. C. 9; Apu. Cm. 136 ; •.M.. T. ;t05; 6Ahp. 219 177 iM..<ry .. (Jroiink (1821), 6 Madd. 64 126 Eiu«rjr 1. TwomUy (1840), 5 MhopL 05 ,.,.,..,.. 121S Vol. J. eiidt with pay* 636. ■I li! i 1 ilii 1 XXVI TABLE OP CASES CITED. 9kan Eramonioiiti. HocH« (1809). 2 Tauii. 38; 11 R. R. MO 6Sfl, 7aO Kmmirton v. MiUUicwh (IHftJ), Ml L. J. Ex. 13U; 7 H. & N. 6H6 ; 8 Jur. N. S. «1 ; S I.. T. tiHl ; 10 W. R. ii-ld 776 Emiiift r. I).whir«t (1852), 21 L. J. Ch. 497 ; 3 Mao. & O. 687 ; 16 Jur. 111,'. 762 Einiii-.tt r. Vsimlmiit, IlBlkctt, Cliiiiiit. (1878), 3 Q. H. D. 666; 3H L. T. .'.(IS ; 17 L. .1. U. M. i:iU ; Jti W. U. (!32 1088 EiiiHl.'y. Miirv, It.- (18021, 2 S. \ T. 4iil 414, 416 EiiKfll I'. Fitlli I IK6U), 10 H. & M. 738 ; 17 W. H. 894 ; L. R. 4 Q. U. (iM ; 37 L. J. (J. M 146 773 EiikIiukI <•. Dowim (1810), 2 Bfuv. 623 ; 6 Bcuv. 2(19 786 Eiik'""'! • • i^'ii'l" (I7'.<2). 4 T. K. (iH2 ; 2 R. K. 4!m 12(1 EnjfliHh Jt. St.prk Hk., Ui. (lS(ifl>. L. li. 3 E(|. 203 816 EiitfliHli I'. Tcitli.. (1H7.')), 1 U. U. i). 141; 46 L. J. Q. M. 13H; 33 L. T. 724; 21 W. |{, .i'.M 1187 KiijfliHhiimii, Tlu- (1877), 3 P. I). 18; 47 L. J. Adra. 9; 37 L. T. 412.... 177 I'.niiiM'M ciiBf (lH;t.'>). Kimpp A: (). 436 497 Kiinhin V. Wvlir (ISti-'i, 10 H. of L. C)in. 1 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 402 ; (i li. T. N. 8. «o;j; 10 W. U. 407 1161 Emm c. Tiittlo (1H20), 3 Conn. 2,"i0 .'IHO Eiii-'irii r. Wi'I.Mt(T (I7!'0). 1 ,T'>liiiH. ll,'> .'i,'i2 Eiiti. .,,1111. r, Wire (INii.'.l, 4 S. & T. 13(1 ; l.'iL. T. 211; 34 T<. .1. P. 110. . 978 EntwiHtlf r. DaviH (1S07), L. K. 4 K<|. 272 ; 30 L. J. Ch. H2,'( 6S4 KntwiHtlo r. D.iit (1840), 11 <^ h. 1002 1037 Env-.n, llo (lt*7.l), 42 L. J. P. & M. .V2 ; L. K. 3 P. & D. 92 ; 21 W. R. H.JO 096 Erinkiiii' r. Miirniy (1728), 2 I A. HiiMii. 1A42 6 Erm«t I . Niihdlls ( 1H67), II. of L.'Ciih. 401 042 Erhkiiu' r. A<lfam' (1873), 42 L. .1. Ch .Ht.') ; 3 Jur. N. 8. 919 774 Erwiii r. S.iumliTN (1823), 1 (N.w.'ii. 2I!» 7.'>7 EHchi'miiiiii, In re, (IS93) 9 TimcH L. U. 420 179 E»cott r. MiiHtin (1HI2), 4 M.m.. P. C. l:tO 101!) EH|)cy I . Liiko (1862). 10 Hiirc, 20o ; 10 Jor. 1 107 ; 22 L J. Ch. 330 .... I;i7 Ehscx, CountpsH (if, ciiw (10i;t), 2 How. St. Tr. 802 3,'.9 E..H.X WitchcM (104,'.), 4 Ili.w. St. Tr. 817 fi,')7 KiiKton, L(l., t . 1,(1. lly. SiTniour (1802), nUd 2 Curt. 3311 702 EvHiiH 1'. An^i'll ( 18;'iH), 20 \U'iiv. 202 H04 Evimn r. P.attiu (1H03), 6 E«p. 20 '(.8 Evium r. Dallow (1802), 31 L. J. P. 128 700, 707 Evans r. DavipH (IHUO), 2 H. & W. 16 ; » N. \' P. 404 ; 4 A. & E. 840 .. 717 Evans . EvanH und Hol.inm.n (1H68), 27 L. J. P ,'.7 1119 EvuiiH .. Ervcr (18:t9 , lOA. AtE. 016; 2 P. & 1). 601 187,190 Evans r. (Ji'ttinK (18:M;, C. & P. AHO H73 Evans r. loarc, (IS92) 1 Q. R. d!i3 ; Ul L. J. Q. B. 470 ; 6U L. T. 346 ; 40 W. 1.. 442 ; 60 J. P. 004 074 Evans V. MnrMTHU (1832), 2 C. & J. 46;{ 296, 373 EvimM «•. Niohol (1841), 3 M. & (Jr. 014; 4 Scott, N. R. 43; 6 Jur. 1110 646 Evans r. PhillipN (1703), 2 .Sclw. N. P. 1072 9H7 Evans c. PowiH(lH47), 1 Ex. 001 ; 11 Jur. 1013 1!»2 Eviins .. R<-c>8 (18,19), 2 P. k D. 627 ; 10 A. & E. 161 ..39«, 4(I4, 40.\ 400, 432, 811, 1109, 1101, 1207 Evans I . Rolxrts (IH20), 8 D. & It. 01 1 ; 6 H. & C. 832 086, 086 Evans c. Roc (1H72), I.. U. 7 C P. \M ; 20 L. T. 70 763 Evans I . Simon (1H,'..1), 9 Ex. 2H2 ; 2 C. L. R. 416 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 10 .... 711 Evans.. SwiM-t (1K24), Ry. A: M. 83; IC 4 P. 277 311,312 EvmiH V. Taylor (1h:ih), 7 A. & E. 017 ; 3 N. cic P. 174 396, 404. lo;J8, 1040 Evans f. Wntson (1840), 3 C. H. 327 ; 4 D. & L. 193 ; 16 L. J. C. P, 260 ; 10 Jur. 81H ;{06, 818 Evans r. Williamson (i8Kl), 60 L. J. Ch. 197; 17 Ch. I). 090; 43 L. T. 719; 29 W. R. 2,30 UA Evflyu «'. HaynoN (1782), uitvd Uutraiu c. Morewood, 3 Eutit, 306 ; 7 R. R. 473 1120 jf'A* re/rfHief «r* to pagM, not to yaragnij>k$. TABLE OP CASra CITED. Ixxvi 11 rAnR 710 1 1 mi Everaid r. Topi loton (t8i;<), A Q. B. 181 ; Duv. & M. :I22 : 13 L. J. Q, R. 1 : 7 Jur. !'!)! 73:J, 734 EviiMt .. Kurett (1877), 7 ('h. D. •I'28 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 307 ; 3« L. T, 013 ; ■IS W. K. "(•)•. 8(18 KviTifit V. I^.w.llmiii (IHIIl). fiC. & P. Ul UI8 Evirctt f. KoUrUon (IH.Mt). 28 L. J. Q. B. 23; 1 E. & E. Iti ; I Jur. N. S. lOHl Kvmtt r. YniulU ^IH:12), U H. & Ad. ;U1) r,v.riti(rhiim r. iOmmlcll (IHtH), 2 M. & Hoi). MM; 2 I,fwiii. C. C. liT.M.tl, H.W K«iiii .. .Icm-H (lH^.5), llM. AliW. 771: 2 Dnvvl. .V I,. J.V-' 872 Kwiirtr. WilliiiniHilSftA), .1 Drew. 21 ; 7 I)'<i. M. Ac (J. (iS 402 Kw.r .. Amliniwi (182i), 4 H. \- C 21 ; (i DmwI. 4 K. 127 086, 1013 Kwinjf (■ (MiiililiHtoii (ls;U), (i Sim. (108 1)7(> i;<iill r. I'lrlii.ltfc 'uii.lutwl,, cIUhI 1 Stiirkin, 284 .119 Ex.ttT, Miiv. of, V. Wiimii (1844), 6 U. B. 801 ; 1). Jc M. .VJ4 ; H Jur. Ill ' 123. IK), 442, 443 Kvnon, In c I H7;i), 42 L. .1. I", k M. ,')2 ; L. R. .t I' & I). 02 ; 2 1 W. K. Hod. (i'.<.5 Evrc, ll«! [\s:i:>), 72 L. T. 68S ; 1.1 NV. K. .')38 •/</</. [(170] Ejrrer. Smith 1877), 2C. P. D. 436; 37L.T.417; 25\V.K.871 1132 •I'll .1 F., fal-cly ihII.mI I)., r D. (ISO.'i), 4 S. * T. 81 ; 34 L. J. P. & M. 60; 11 .Fur N. S. (07; 12 li. T. 81 : 13 \V. K. ..tu 107 FulihKu-. I. MiHivii [ni(>), 211 |[ow. St. I'r. Hi ; 2 W. Bl. 020 ftOO hVi'V r. Ilm.loiii (1S24), 3 H. \- 0. 213 37 Kairlir ,■. CliriMi.' (1817), 7 Ticiii. IK! ; Holt, 3)1 ; 1 M.m.po, C. P. 114 .. 1103 Fairli.r. Il.tiluii (1828), 3 C &. P. 1(13 f>->r, Fiiiilii- r. lla-liii;fH (18114). 10 Vch. 123 388, 380 Fiiiriimii r. o.ikford (IH'W, fi H. & N. f)3.) ; 20 L. J. Ex. 4.')9 l.'>3 Fwirtitl.' c. (iillnrt (1787', 2 T. K. UiO ; 1 11. |{. 4.).') 01 Fiiilh I. Mliiiviv,lS3.-i), 7('. * P. 44 271, 274 FiilroiMT. MiiiiHon (IMOH), 1 Cimip. 171; 10 H. It. 003 328,485 Fallot, r. Ii..l)iiis(l8(l.')), 10 Ir. Ch. H. 422 749 Kalii'.oiitli, K. of, r Mos« (IH22), II Pric!.', 455 .505 FHlitioiitli, K of, r. Kol«Tti»(18l2), M. & W. lUO; 11 L. .1. Ex. 180; 1 Dowl. N. S. i;;i3 328, 1102. 1107, 1214, 1218 Faliii.aitli. !•;. of, V. ThmiiUM ilH32), 1 C. k M. 80; 2 L..I. Ex. 67; 3Tyr. 28 687 Fatmy Carvill, 'I'liii {art Tin- Ma^iittt). Fatinliawc I'. loiiil. and Pruv. l)iiiry ('o. («r TiiiiHoii v. Wilwiii). Fiiritm f. Ilottii' M810), 10 M. & W. 119; 10 L. .f. Ex. 73 091 Far.;iilmr r. Soiilhry (182(1). 1 M. .& M. 14 1100, 1201 Fatiiiiliarxoii r. S'toii (1828), ft Uuhh. 45 1123 Far,|iiliar»oti Tw.'..,hil.., In ro (1875), 44 L. J. P. i M. 35 ; 1„ U. 3 P. & I). ■-MM ; 31 I,. T. 70!( 142, 702 F.irrah r. K. it ( 1h38), Dowl. 470 833 1 1'. * I). 437 2 W. \V. At ...487, .'i.VJ, Kattur r. H.'..wi.'k (1830). 1 M A: Hol>. ,')27. Famir r. lliitchiliHon (18;10), A. & E. 041 II. 1(10 Furtar i. .Stufk|iolo (1820). (In-ciii. 154. . . Faii-rr, .St. Citli.rino'H Coll.^fr (1873). L. H. 10 F-<|. 21 ; 42 L. .F. Ml!) ; -iH L. T. ."^OO ; 21 W. K. 013 , Farriii^doii v. r|,.rk (1782). 3 Donj?. 121 ; 2 (^hitty. 120 Fairiti({t4iti I. DoiiohiMt (18(i0\ Ir. R. 1 C. L. 07.'>'; 14 W. R. 022.. . Fi.in.w r. MavcM (IH.V2). 18 (J. B. 510 : 17 .Fur. 132 I'.M ..'V , \V,'l»,„- (|S(191. Ah ],. .1. (;. P. 320; I,. R. 4 ('. P. 74 1 W U, 41 318 lOU 744 ... 789 Ch. .707, 700 ... .'>I5 , . . . 082 ... 735 18 780 1115 131 1102 Fill w. II r. Ililliiirtl (18.'.) , :i Ni-w Hiiiii|). R. Fii"ii c. Hmwii (lnoi), Pi'ikc, R 23 l'',iuiaer .'. Silk ^ISU), :t Canm. 120 ; 13 It. R, 771 Fit.ililM r. .iHikNoii (1845), 6 Ni.t.'M .,f Can. [Vaw. & Miir.1, Sujn). i 004, OOfl FiiiilktiiT r, Itiiiii' (185H), 1 F. A: F. 254 0.39 Fauwitt r. FaiiHW'tt (1840), 7 NotoH of Cmm. (hxjo. jc Miir.), 93 380, .50« Vol, J. md* wilkpayt 035. ' . i IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT.3) k // / V.A ic -% 1.0 I.I 11.25 m -IM |2.5 " ^ 112 i^ 14 Li 2.0 J4- IIIII16 V] v^ 'J; ^S/ t * Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. 14580 (716) 873-4503 C/a fA >S ^v Vi Ixxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED, rAQB Faviell v. East. Count. Ey. Co. (1848), 2 Ex. 344 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 54; 17 L. J. Ex. 223, 297 543 Fawcettv. Cash (1834), 6 B. & Ad. 904 ; 3 N. & M. 177 36, 153 Fawcett V. Jones (1810), 3 Phillim. 476 140 Fawcus, In the goods of (1884), 9 P. D. 241 ; 54 L. J. P. 47 ; 33 W. R. 323 ; 48 J. P. 743 1031 Fawcus V. Sarsfield (186G), 25 L. J. Q. B. 249 ; 6 E. & B. 192 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 666 771 Fawkesr. Lamb (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 98; 8 Jur. N. S. 385 756,782 Fazakerley v. Wiltshire (1720), 1 Str. 1720 17 Fearn v. Lewis (1830), 6 Bing. 349 ; 1 M. & P 1 712 Fearnside v. Flint (1882), 22 Ch. D. 579 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 479 : 48 L. T. 154 ; 31 W. R. 318 721 Feaubert v. Turst (1702), Preo. Ch. 207 938 Fellowes v. Clay (1842), 4 Q. B. 313 ; 3 G. & D. 407 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 202. . 76 Fellowes v. "Williamson (1829), M. & M. 306 378 Feltham's Trusts, Re (1855), 1 K. & J. 528 798 Fenn v. Griffith (1830), 6 Bing. 533 ; 4 M. & P. 299 285 Fennell v. Tait (1834), I C. M. & R. 584 ; 5 Tyr. 218 837 Fenner v. Lend. & S. E. Ry. Co. (1872). 41 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; L. R. 7 Q. B. 767 ; 26 L. T. 971 ; 20 W. R. 830 1186 Fenton v. Emblers (1762), 3 Burr. 1278 ; 1 W. Bl. 353 682 Fenwick, Re (1 867), L. R. 1 P. & D. 319 ; 36 L. J. P. 54 ; 16 L. T. 124 . . 704 Fenwick v. Bell (1844), 1 C. & K. 312 934, 935 Fenwick v. Laycock (1841), 2 Q. B. 108 ; 1 G. & D. 532 ; 6 Jur. 341 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 146 650 Fenwick v. Reed (1816), 1 Meriv. 114 600 Fenwick v. Thornton (1827), M. & M. 51 495 Ferguson t). Mahon (1839), 11 A.&E. 179; 3P.&D. 143..8, 1142, 1147, 1148, 1154 Fernandey v. Glynn (1807), 1 Camp. 426 1200 Fernandez, Ex parte (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 3; 30 L. J. C. P. 321 920,962, 964 Femley v. Worthington (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 491; 1 Scott, N. R. 432; 4 Jur. 918 304, 1101 Ferrand v. Milligan (1845), 7 Q. B. 730 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 103 ; 10 Jur. 6 . . 1231 Ferrer V. Oven (1827), 7 B. & C. 427; 1 M. & R. 222 1038 Ferrers V. Arden (1599), 6 Co. Rep. 7; Cro. Eliz. 668 1110 Ferrers, Ld., v. Shirley (1730), Fitz-G. 195; Bull. N. P. 236 1221 Ferris*. Goodbum (1858), 27 L. J. Ch. 574: 6 W. R. 485 763,807 Fesenmayer v. Adcock (1847), 16 M. & AV. 449 117 Fevershani, Ld., v. Emerson (1856), 11 Ex. 385 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 254 ; 26 L. T. (O. S.) 28 ; 3 C. L. R. 1379 89 Fewr. Guppy (1830), lOBeav. 281, n. (i); 13 Beav. 457 597 Ffinoh V. Combe, (1894) 6 R. 545; (1894) P. 191 ; 63 L. J. P. 113; 70 L. T. 160 ; 42 W. R. 377 142, 708 Fielder, Re, Jones v. Frost 872), L. R. 7 Ch. 773 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 47 ; 27 L. T. 465 ; 20 W. R. 1025 93 Field V. Flemming (1836), 7 C. & P. 619; 6 Dowl. 460 ; 1 M. & H. 21 ; 1 Jur. 24 474 Field V. Gt. North. Ry. Co. (1878), 3 Ex. D. 261 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 662 ; 39 L.T.80; 26W.R.817 42 Field V. Hemming {ace Field v. Flemming). Field V. Holland (1810), 6 Cranch, 8, 24 495 Field V. Lelean (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 170; 6 H. & N. 627; 7 Jur. N. S. 918; 4L T. 121; 9W. R. 387 756, 769 Field f. Woods (1837), 7 A. & E. 114 ; 2 N. & P. 117 226, 646 FiggP. Wedderbume (1842), 6 Jur. 218 419 Filipowskir. Merry weather (1860), 2 F. & F. 286 162 Filmerv. Gott(1774), 4 Brown. P. C. 230 746, 748 Financial Ins. Co., Re (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 687 845 Finch V. Finch (1752), 2 Ves. sen. 493 960 Finch V. Finch (1807), 36 L. J. P. & M. 78 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 371 ; 16 L. T. 268; 15 W. R. 797 143, 307 The r^erences art to pages, not to paragraph*. I TABLE OP CASES CITED. Ixxix PAOB Fmch V. Finch (1882), 23 Ch. D. 267 ; 48 L. T. 129 ; 31 "W. R. 526 631 Finlay v. Bristol & Ex. Ry. Co. (1852), 7 Ex. 409 ; 7 Railw. Cas. 449 ; 21 L.J. Ex. 117 643 Finlay f. Finlay (1862), 31 L. J. P. & M. 149 62 Finn's case (1827), 5 Rand. 701 328 Finnerty v. Tipper (1809), 2 Camp. 72 245, 246 Finney v. Finney (1868), L. R. 1 P. & D. 483 ; 37 L. J. P. & M. 43 ; 18 L. T. 489 1106 Finney v. Grice (1878), 10 Ch. D. 13 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 247 ; 27 W. R. 147 . . 146 Firkin v. Edwards (1840), 9 C. & P. 478 314 Firth, Ex parte. Re Cowburn (1882), 19 Ch. D. 419 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 473 ; 45 L. T. 120 ; 30 W. R. 529 136 Firth, In re. Ex part* Schofield (1877), 12 Ch. D. 337; 48 L. J. Bank. 122 ; 40 L. T. 823 ; 27 W. R. 925 966 Fischer v. Popham (1875), L. R. 3 P. & D. 246 ; 44 L. J. P. 47 ; 33 L. T. 231 ; 23 W. R. 683 697 Fischer p. Szataray (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 239; E. B. & E. 321 ; 4 Jur. N. 8. 632 347 Fish, Re, Ingham v. Rayner, (1894) 7 R. 434 ; (1894) 2 Ch. 83 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 437 ; 70 L. T. 826 ; 24 W. R. 620 793 Fisher v. Clement (1830), 10 E. & 0. 475 82 Fisherv. Duddiug(1841), 9DowI. 872; 3M. &Gr. 238; 3 Scott, N. R. 516.. 1031 Fisher v. Heming (1809), cited 1 Ph. Evid. 170 600 Fisher v. Joyce (1839), cited 9 C. & P. 338 259 Fisher t). Keane (1880), 11 Ch. D. 353; 49 L. J. Ch. 11 ; 41 L. T. 335 .. 1147 Fisher v. IGtchingman (1742), Willes, 3f)7 1031 Fisher v. Lane (1771), 2 W. Bl. 834 ; 3 Wils. 297 1033, 1034 Fisher v. Magnay (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 787 ; 1 D. & L. 40 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 588 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 276 643 Fisher v. Ogle (1808), 1 Camp. 419 1149 Fisher v. Owen (1878), 8 Ch. D. 645 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 681 ; 38 L. T. 577 ; 26 W. R. 581 961, 964 Fisher V. Ronalds fl852). II C. B. 762; 22 L. J. C. P. 62; 17 Jur. 393; 20L. T. O. S. 1!0: 1 W. R. 54 964, 970 Fisher v. Samuda (1808), 1 Camp. 193 357 Fisher f. Thames June. Ry. Co. (1837), 5 Dowl. 773 .227, 357 Fishmongers' Co. v. Dimsdale (1852), 6 C. B. 896 ; 12 C. B. 557 ; 22 L. J. 0. P. 44 ; 16 Jur. 799 1213 Fishmongers' Co. v. Robertson (1845), 5 M. & Gr. 194; 12 L. J. C. P. 185 ; 6 Scott. N. R. 56 97, 531, 552 Fishmongers' Co. v. Robertson (1845), 1 C. B. 67 1213 Fitch V. Jones (1865), 6 E. & B. 238 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 293 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 854 201, 262 Fitch V. Smallbrook (1661), T. Raym. 32 l(J3i Fitz r. Rabbits (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 60 306 Fitzgerald t'. Dressier (1859), 29 L. J. C. P. 113; 7 C. B. N. S. 374; 6 Jur. N. S. 593 676 Fitzgerald r. Elsee (1811), 2 Camp. 635 1209 Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (1849), 8 Com. B. 492 1069 Fitzgeraldw.Fitzgerald(18G3),3S.&T. 397; 33L. J.P.&M. 39; llW.R.85 325 Fitzgerald v. O'Flaherty (1827), 2 Moll. 394, n 487 Fitz- James v. Moys (1003), 1 Sid. 133 ; Audr. 321 899 Fitzmaurice, Re (1864), 15 Ir. Ec]. R. 445 720 Fitzmaurice v. Bayley (1857), 8 E. & B. 064 ; 9 H. L. Cas. 78 673, 729 Fitzpatriok v. Dunphy (1851), 1 Ir. C. L. R. 306 117 Fitzroy, Sir C, Re (1858), 1 S. & T. 133 702 Fitzwalter Peer. (1842). Pari. Min. 34, 91 425, 426, 1226, 1227, 1228 Fladoyen, The (1799), 8 T. R. 270, n 1143 Flaggr. Mann (1837), 2 Sumn. 487 909 Flannery's case (1832), I Lew. C. C. 133 824 Flannerv v. Wuterford & C. Rv. Co. (1877), I. R. 1 1 C. L. 30 103 Fleet t). 'Murtou (1871), 41 L. J. Q. B. 49; L. R. 7 Q. B. 126; 26L. T. 181 ; 20 W. R. 97 232, 764, 769 m Vol, I. tnd* teithpagt 636, Ixxx TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOB Fleet V. Perrius (1868), 37 L. J. Q. B. 233 ; L. R. 3 Q. B. 536 ; 9 B. & S. 675 ; 19 L. T. 147 103G, 1037 Flemings. Flemiug (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 419; 1 H. & C. 242 793 Fleming v. Newton (1848), 1 H. of L. Cas. 363 1005 Fletcher v. Braddyll (1821), 3 Stark. R. 64 154, 932 Fletcher v. Calthrop (1840), 6 Q. B. 880, 891 ; 1 Now Sosb. Cas. 529 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; 9 Jur. 205 131 Fletcher v. Fro-gatt (1827), 2 C. & P. 569 479 Fletcher v. Gillespie (1826), 3 Binjr. 035 ; 11 Moore, C. P 5 17 754 Fletcher v. Gt. West. Rv. Co. (1859), 4 H. & N. 242 ; 29 L. J. E.x. 253 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 961 ; 8 W. R. 501 114 Fletcher v. L. & N. W. R. Co. (1892), 1 Q. B. 122 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 324 ; 65 L. T. 606; 40 W. R. 182 1138 Flinn v. Calow (1840\ 1 M. & Gr. 589 758 Flitters V. Allfrey (1874), 44 L. J. C. P. 73 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 29 ; 31 L. T. 881 1117, 1119 Flood V. Russell, (1892) 29 L. R. Ir. 91 436 Flory V. Denny (1852), 7 Ex. 581 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 223 639 Flower v. Herbert (1851), 2 Ves. son. 326 542 Flovd V. Barker (1607), 12 Co. Rep. 25 1099 Flureau v. Thombill (1775-6), 2 \V. Rl. 1078 773 Fogarty r. Smith (1836), 4 Dowl. o'JS, n 15 Foggassa's ca.se (1349), Y. B. 24 Edw. 3, 23, cited in Olive r. Guin, 2 Sid. 146 8 Foley t'. Tabor (1861), 2 F. & F. 663 270 Folkes V. Cbadd (1782), 3 Doug. 157 240, 930, 932 FoUettt'. Jefferyes(isr;0), 1 Sim. N. S. 17; 20L. J. Ch. 65; 15 Jur. 118. ..592,605 Fonsick v. Agar (1807), 6 E.sp. 92 328 Foot V. Clarke (1826), 1 Ruj^s. 604 423 Foot V. Stanton (1856), Dwino, Ecc. R. 19 697 Foot V. Tracy (1806), 1 Johns. 45 255 Foote V. Hayne (1824), 1 C. & P. 545 : Ry. & M. 165 699 Foquet v. Moor (1852), 7 Ex. 870 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 35 657 Forbes' case (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 467 ; 20 W. R. 585 ; 26 L. T. 680 845 Forbesf.Forbes(1854),Kay,364; 2Eq. R. 178; 23L. J.Ch. 724; 18Jur.642. 179 Ford V. Ager (1863), 2 H. & C. 279 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 138 ; 7 L. T. 795 ; 11 W. R. 429 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 416 75 Ford V. Batley (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 225 ; 17 Beav. 303 800 Ford V. Coteswoilh (1870), 9 B. & S. 559 ; 10 B. & S. 991 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 544; 39L. J. Q. B. 188; 23L. T. 165; 18 W. R. 1169 154 Ford V. Elliott (1849), 4 Ex. 78 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 447 382 Ford V. Ford (1848), 6 Hare. 490 741 Ford V. Tennant (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 466 ; 32 Beav. 162 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 292 ; 7 L. T. 732 ; 1 1 W. R. 324 608 Ford i\ Yates (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 549 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 645 757 Fordham v. Wallis (1852-3), 10 Hare, 217 ; 17 Jur. 228 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 548 493 Forman v. Free Fishers of Whitstable (1869), L. R. 4 11. L. 266 ; 21 L. T. 804 123 Forinanf. Wright (1851), 11 C. B. 481 ; 20 L.J. C. P. 145; 15 Jur. 706.. 201 Forrest v. Fon-est (1865), 34 L. J. Ch. 428 666 Forshaw v. Chabert (1821), 3 B. & B. 158; 6 Moore (C. P.), 369 1193 Forshawt). Lewis (1855), 10 Ex. 716; 1 Jiir. N. S. 263 1184 Forster v. Clements (1809), 2 Camp. 17 : 1 1 R. R. 650 647 Forster v. Farquhar, (1893) 1 Q. B. 564 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 296 ; 68 L. T. 308; 41 W. R. 425 42 Forster v. Forster (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 1 1:< 1215 Forster v. Hale (179H), 3 Ves. 696 ; 6 Ves. 308 ; 4 R. R. 128 665 Forster v. Mackreth (1867), 22 L. J. Ch. 926 160 Forster v. Rowland (1H61), 30 L. J. Ex. 396 ; 7 H. & N. 103 676 Forsyth v. Bristowe (1853), 8 Ex. 716 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 255 ; 17 Jur. 675 . . 722 Forsythe v. Norcross (1836), 6 Watts, 432 458 Forth V. Stanton (1668), 1 Wms. Saunders, 21 la, 21 le 676 Foster v. Allansou (1788), 2 T. R. 479 754 Foster V. Bank of England (1846), 8 Q. B. 689 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 212 ; 10 Jur. 372 997 TAt referencM art to paget, not io paragraph*. TABLE OF CASES CITED. 1 XXXI FADE Foster v. Blakelock (1826), 6 B. & C. 328 ; 8 D. & R. 48 653 Foster V. Charles (1S30), 6 Bing. 396 ; 7 Bing. 105 ; 4 M. & P. 61, 741 .. 82 Foster v. Comptoii (1818), 2 Stark. 364 1032 FoNter V. Hall (1831), 12 Pick. 89 599, 600 Foster V. Jolly (1835), 1 C. M. k R. 707 ; 5 Tyr. i;39 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 65. .748, 757 Foster v. Mentor Life Ass. Co. (1854), 3 E. & B. 48 ; 2 0. L. R. 1404 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 145 ; 18 Jur. 828 44, 538, 548, 7'''9 Foster V. M'Mahon (1847), 11 Ir. Eq. R. 287 437, 5j3 Fosters. Pointer (1840), 9 C. & P. 718 189, 315, 319 Foster V. Shaw (1821), 7 Serg. & R. 163 353, 354, 1097 Foster V. Steele (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 892 ; 5 Scott, 25 ; 3 Hedges, 231 . . 176 Foulkes V. Sellway (IHOO). 3 Esp. 236 255, 373 Fountain f. Boodle (1842), 3 Q. B. 5 ; 2 G. & D. 455 Ill, 253 Fountain v. Young (1807), 6 Esp. 113 GOO Fowell V. Forreist (1609-70), 2 Wms. Saund. 47 ft, 47 gg 750 Fowkes V. Pascoe (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 307 ; L. R. 10 Ch. 343 ; 32 L. T. 545 ; 23 W. R. 538 667, 806 Fowler f. Coster (1828), M. & M. 241 ; 3 C. & P. 463 270 Fowler V. Fowler (1735), 3 P. Wms. 353 806 Fowler V. Fowler (1859), 4 De G. & J. 2.i0 749 Fowler r. Fowler (1881), 50 L. J. Ch. 680 ; 44 L. T. 799 ; 29 W. R. 800. . 321 Fowler V. Sa\ ,ige (1819), 3 Conn. 90 1098 Fowlis r. Davidson (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 473 263 Fox V. Clifton (1830). 6 Bing. 792 3S6, 640 Foxf. Fox (lS6:i), 15 Ir. Eq. N. S. 89 '66 Fox V. Jones (182S), 7 B. & C. 732 ; 1 M. •& R. 670 998 Fox V. Waters (1840), 12 A. & E. 43 291 , 492 Fox's case (1863), 3 Dc G. J. & S. 405 1176 Foxcroft V. Nevens (1826), 4 Greenl. 72 508 France v. Lucy (1826), Ry. & M. 341 313 Frauchot v. Leach (1H26), 5 Cowen, 508 746 Francis v. Cockrell (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 184 ; o9 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 5M1 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 291 : 10 B. & S. 950 772 Francis t>. Dichfield (1742), 2 Cc.op. 631 760, 805 Francis v. Hawkesley (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 370 ; 1 E. & E. 1052 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1391 710 Francisco r. Gilmore (1797), 1 Bos. & P. 177 341 Francklin's case (1731), 17 How. St. Tr. 025 25 Frank v. Frank (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 315 1102 Franklin v. Baker (1893, should be "1891"), 29 Am. St. Rep. 547; 48 Ohio, 296 1192 Frankum v. Ld. Falmo th (1835), 6 C. & P. 529 ; 2 A. & E. 452 192 Fraser. Re (1869), 39 L. J. P. & M. 20 ; L. R. 2 P. & D. 40 703 Eraser t'. Burrows (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 601 ; 2 Q. B. D. 624 11«6 Eraser v. Hill (1853), 1 Macq. 398 ; 1 Paterson, 232 30 Fraser v. Pondlebury (1862), 31 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 10 W. R. 104 94 Fray v. Blackburn (1863), 3 B. & S. 576 1099 Frayes v. Worms (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 149 1152 Frederick v. Att.-Gen. (1874), 44 L. J. P. & M. 11 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 270 ; 32 L. T. 39 409 Free v. Hawkins (1817), Holt, N. P. R. 650 648, 767 Free Fishers of Wliitstiiblc ». Foreman (1869), L. R. 2 C. P. 688 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 305 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 346 ; L. R. 4 H. 266 ; 21 L. T. 804 123 Free Fishers of Whitstablc v. Gann (1863), 11 C. B. N. S. 387 ; 13 C. B. N. S. 859 123 Freeman v. Arkell (1824), 2 B. & C. 494 ; 3 D. & R. 669; 1 C. & P. 135, 3'J6 303, 616 Freeman v. Baker (1833), 6 C. & P. 482 ; 6 B. & Ad. 797 ; 2 N. & M. 446 1047 Freeman v. Cooke (1848), 2 Ex. 662 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 189 ; 18 L, J. Ex. 1 14. .89, 90, 538, 543, 660 Freema-.i v. Cox (1878), 8 Ch. D. 148 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 660 ; 26 W. R. 689 . . 624 Freeman v. Freeman (1864), 23 L. J. Ch. 838; 6 De G. M. & G. 704; Kay, 479 704 m m ,1" I-;;! Vol, I. end* with page 636. Ixxxii TABLE OP CASKS CITKD. PAOH Prooman v. OalnHford (1805), 3t L. J. 0. P. 95; 18 0. B. N. 8. 185; 1 H. & P. 255 ; 1 1 Jiir. N. H. 1 Hi ; 11 L. T. 075 ; Hi W. R. lUH 684 Frociimii V. I'liillipim (IHKi). \ M. & HA. 48(1; 1(1 U. II. 524.,;i'J5, ■»()4, HO, 411 FriM'iiiiiii r. l'<>i)i) (1S7(I), Fi. K. i) Kt{. 20(1 ; L. 11. 5 Oh. 5;{8 ; 39 L. J. Cli. 14«, (iS9; 21 L. T. 81(1 ; IH W. li. !)()(! 136 Frooiimn v. R.'iid (IHOli), 3> I,. J. M. V,. 220; 4 U.&H. 174; 10 Jiir. N. 8. 1 19 : 8 L. T. 458 ; 11 VV. R. 802 ; 95 :i9(i, 1010 Fri'omiui V. Htx'jfKiil (1849), 14 (i. H. 202; 19 L.J. Q B. 18; 13jur. ../tn.. 474, 1192, 1212 Fmrnian v. Tiitlmm (IHKi), 5 Hans 329 ; 15 L. J. Oli. ;i23 ; 10 Jiir. 08,i. , 482 Frcmrmn r. Wiilkcr (1829), (I (Jrcciil. (18 551 Frcciiioiiit r. l)(!(liro (1718), 1 I' Wiiih. 431 930 FrccHtotio /'. But(!lii!r (1840), 9 (!. & I'. (i47 100 Frctich r. Vrrurh fl7')5), 1 Diitk. 208 1 104 Fpjstoti, In r.i (1883).52L..1.(M1. 515; II (J. B. 1). 545: 31 W. R. 804 . . 808 Fri<'k.T's .•iiHc, R«( Blink of lliiidustan (1871), L. R. 13 Kq. 178; 41 L. J. <!li. 278 815 Friend v. I><.nd. <!lmt,. & I). Ry. (1877), I.. H,2 Kx.437; 40 Fi..!. Kx. 090. .597, 1 180 FrniHc]) (hIiouM lie rrinHcp) anil 10. India Oo. v. Dycc Honibru (1832 Hlmnld he 1850), I.) Mod. I". (!.(!. 28'> 140 Frith, Re (1858), 27 L. J. I'. A: M. ; I 8. & T. 8 ; 4 Jar. N. S. 288 700 Frith i;. Uiirker (1807), 2 .lohnH. 335 705 Frost f. Holloway (1818), cited 1 Stark. Kvid. 212 ; 2 I'h. Kvid. 500 .... 907 Front V. Oliver (1853), 2 E. & B. 301 ; 1 C. L. R. 1003 ; 22 I,. .1. il. U. 3.)3 ; 18 Jiir. 100 17s Fronde r. Ilohim (1859), 1 Kont. & Fin. 012 20 Fry I'. (;hai>niaii (1830), 5 Dowl. T. C. 2(i5 2S7 Fry r. Hill (1817), 7 Taiin. 397; 18 R. R. 512 37 Fry V. Wood (17.il), 1 Atk. II') 328, 329 Fryer v. WiHcniiin (1870), 15 L, J. ('At. 199 ; 24 W. R.. 205 ; 33 L. T. 779. . 910 FuentcM f>. Montis (18(;8), L. R. 4 ('. 1'. 93 ; 38 L. .). (;. I'. 95 ; 19 li. T. 304 ; 17 \V. R. 208 110 Fuller V. ( Vitti iiden (1832), 9 Conn. 401 552. 744 Fuller «. F.iiwiek (lH|i.), 3 C. B. 705; 10 L. J. (.'. 1". 79; lO.liir. 1().)7 .. 1100 Fuller I). Kotch (1095). ('arth. 311) 1050, 1051, 1059, 1103 Fuller t). Hamilton (1824), 5 Conn. 110 515 Fulhirr. I'attri.k (1849), 18 I,. ,1. Q. B, 230 1211 FuUer r. IVentire (1788), I ||. B|. 49; 2 R. R. 715 819 Fuller '•. Rc^dnian (1859), 20 Beuv. 014 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 321 ; 5 ,Ti,r. N. H. 1045 713 FuliiierNlon /'. Steward (1551), I'lowden, 107a Fulton r. Andrew (1875), I/. R. 7 11. L. 401 ; 44 li. J. I'. & M. 23; 32 L. T. 209 : 23 W. R. 500 Fulwood'H, Latly, rase (1037), Cm. Car. 483; 1 Chit. (V. L. 40J Furl.y r. Wooil (1791), 1 Ksp 198 Furlong t;. Howard (1801), 2 Sirh. i^; I,..f. 115 Fiirly »'. Newnliiim (I7H0I, 2 Hoii)<. 4 19 Furni'aux v. llutehiriH (1778), 2 ( lowp. 8;)7 Fnrnell v. Stm l<|)oole (182!)), Millwurd, 485 9, Furne.HMf). Meek (18.-)7), 27 1-. .1. K\ :il 44, 17, FurHilon V. CIokr (1842), 10 M. Ac VV. 572 Fut(dier )'. l<'ut<!her (1881), 50 L. J. Ch. 735; 45 L. T. 300; 29 W. R. 884 Fyler V. (liveuM (183.5), Riley, \.. V>ih. 50 FyHon r. ChaniherH (1842). 9 M. >t W. 400; 11 L. .1. Kx. 190 Fyson 1'. Kemp (1833), C. &, 1'. 71 058 140 980 700 321 837 231 1024 1204 437 224 009 117 1018 Pi OAiiAYr. Lloyd (1825), 3 B. * (!. 703 IfiR tJalibett r. Claney (1814-5), 8 Ir. L. R. 299 1040 Oadil I'. Honj^htr)!! (1877). 40 I,. .1. Kx. 71 ; 1 Kx. I). 357 758 OaiuNford i>. (Irainniar (1809), 2 Cam]). 9; II R. R. 018 500, 007 The rf/creticci t:re to payei, not to pmuytaplu. TABLE OF CASKS CrPED. hx MU PAOK Giilliriiith r. Ncvillo (ITTfl-fi), 1 Douj?. 0, n 1164, ii.-.» (Jnl(. c. I.iiido (1SH7, Nlitmld h<^ 10H7), 1 V.-rii. 175 5»'» GuIm I'. Willimiiwm (1841), K M. & W. 4(IS ; 10 L. J. Ex. 44(i 748, 7Al (iiilMWOrthy r. Nornmii (IHAI), 21 h. ,h il H. 70 llBr) {iiiimiKXiiic, Tim (18()'2), Lusli. 448 1P8 (iimcrr. I.iiiii'HlKiniiiKli (IT'.)"). ' l'<'iiki'. 18; H R. U. (il7 938 (iaiiii r. En-o l-mhfiM of VVliitHtiiM.. (18(1'2), 20 O. H. N. S. 1 ; lift L. J. C. 1'. 2i) : r2 L. T. \M) ; i;t W. K. M\) ; II ILL. Cum. llfJ 123 Oimn ('. OiTjrnrv {\XM), '22 L. .1. Cli. lO.V.); 3 1). M. & (1. 777 ; 18 Jur. l(Mi;t; 2 Ki{. \l. 484 ; 2 W. H. 484 142 Ouiiii r. .ToliiiNoii (18(i;i), 11 (!. H. N. S. ;iH7; 13(!. H. N. S. 8.V.) 123 (iiii-liuH r. Siii.i)'..iii (18t);i), ;i2 L. J. M. U. I8(i ; 2 Ni'w U. 27(1 ; 8 L. T. 42.t ; 1 1 W. R. 7r>l 951 (liiiviiiN r. Ri' iirdi. (1844), 14 Him. 2(i5 ; 12 (U. & Eiii. ;t(i8 1 142 (iiinlni r. Cir.xHWi'll (1837), 2 M.«t W. 31U; 6 DdwI. 4til ; M. & H. 44 . . 810, 832 (JiinlciuT r. I'liiiKir (18(l(i), 3,') Rciiv. 54!) 130 (iiiidiicr, R.^ (18.'.8), 27 L. J. 1'. & M. S,-) ; 1 8. & T. 109 356 (Jiinlii.rlVcr. (1727), Lc MaroIiiiiit'H R.'i).389, 4 32; SrUv. N. P. (i72— 074 . . 101 (iiirdmirf. ('nmHdiil.i (17(10), 2 Hurr. 904 207 (iardiuir r. Onuit (1857), 2 C. H. N. S. 340 (190 Uaidnur r. M.Miilioii (1812), 3 Q. H. 501; 2 O. & I). 593; Jur. 712; 11 li. J. U. M. 297 710, 711 (iiirdiMT r. Moult, (1839), 10 A. »^i K. 4(14 ; 2 P. & I). 403 500 Gnrdiiurr. WmImIi (1855), i) K. & U. H". ; 24 L. .1. Q. V 28r) ; 1 .lur. N. S. 828 1194 Oimloin, Kx piirt.o (1808), 15 Vch. 28(i Kil Garoy v. NIcIioInoii (1810), 24 Wriid. 350 222, 479 Garcy r. I'vkc (I8:tii), 10 A. \- K. 512 ; 2 P. \- I). 127 222 (iarlaiul. Re, (iarland v. Itcvciloy (1878), 47 L. J. Oil. 71 1 ; 9 Cli. I). 213 ; 3S I,. T. 91 1 ; 20 W. R. 718 798 Garland v. ("o|>o (1848), II Ir. L. R. 514 444 Giiilaiid r. J»(M>iid) (1873), L. R 8 Kx. 21(1; 28 L. T. 877 ; 21 VV. U. 8(18 547 Garland r. HcoonoM (l7!'8), 2 Ksi). 048 1032 (Jarlorh r. (Jcortiirr (181(1), 7 Wfiid. 198 l.')4 (ianicr r. (iarniT (18(10), 29 Hcav. 11(1; 7 L. T. 182 708 Gariiot, r. Hall (1822), 3 Stark. R. 1(10 49<» (ianictt, IiL re, (landv I'. Macaulay (1885), ;tl Cli. I). 1 (i;U (iariH'tt. f. Konaiid (1827). H. \-"(". Oil ; 8 I). \ R.. (157 1099 Gani.'lt c. \V Icofk (1817), (1 M. & S. 44 ; 1 Stark. R. 475 113 (iariii.T, Ro (1872), L. R. 13 I'^i. 532 ; 41 T,. .1. Cli. 419 ; 20 W. R. 288 . . 1150 GariioriH r. Maniard (1791). 1 An«t,r. 298; 3 Kajrli- \- V. 3S0 401 Garrurd r. Lcwin (1882), 10 Q. R. I). 30; 47 L. T. 408 120.5 (iarrard i: Tuck (1840), 8 (!. H. 231 ; 18 li. .1. (;. P. 338 ; 13 .lur. 871 127 (ianvllH V. Alcxaii.lcr (1801), 4 Ksp. 37 1220, 1223 (iarrct.t. r. llandl.'V (1825), 4 11. \- (!. (1(11 ; 7 D. .V R. 144 : I C. & I'. 483. 759 (iartli r. Howard '(18;!2), 8 Ring. 451 ; 5 0. it P. 31(1; 1 Moo. & Sc. 028.. 888. ;I90 GartNido r. Outram (185vl), 20 L. J. Cli. llfl ; 3 .Tur. N. S. 39 592 (iarLsidiM'. Sdk.'^tou.., \-.r. (^). (1882), 21 Cli. I). 702; 51 L. .F.Ch. 828; 47 L. 'V. 70; 31 \V. R. 3(1 133 (iarviii r. Carroll fl847), U) Ir. L. R. 330 957, 1013 (ias l.iKlit and Coko Co. r. Turner (18,10-40), 5 HiuK. N. C. 000 ; Ring. N. C. 324 ; 7 Scc.ii, 779 ; 8 Scott,. 009 01 Gaskill r. Skcrnc (1857). 19 L. ,1. U. R. 275 ; 1 1 (i. R. (i04 ; 14 Jur. 507.. 525 GaHMC. Stiiimm (1837). 2 Suniii. (110 972 GatluTtiolo I'. Miull (184(1), 15 M. .V W. 319; 15 L. J. Ex. 179; 10 Jur. 337 303 Gatty V. Erv (1877), L. K. 2 Ex. Div. 205; 4(1 J^. J. Ex. 005 ; 30 L. T. 182 ; 25 \V. R. 305 540 Gaunt r. Jolnwon (1848), Rcuv. 551 819 Gaunt f. VVainnian (183(1), 3 IliiiK. N. (!. 09; 3 Scott, 413; 2 HodKOH. 180 95, 1 109 Vol. I. ciuh with poji* 036. Ixxxiy TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOI Gitusdmi, Ro (1862), 2 S. & T. 362 ; 31 L. J. P. 53 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 180 ; 6 L. T. 767 699 Grty V. Hill (1819). 18 L. J. Q. B. 12; 5 Dowl. & L. 122 734 Gazo V. Giizo (ISi;!), 3 Curt. 4.')1 696 G*ach V. Ingall (1845), 14 M. & W. 96 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 37; 9 Jur. 691. .258, 259, 273 Geary v. Hopkins (1702), 2 Lfl. Riivm. 8,-)l 997 Goaves r. Price (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 113 : 3 S. & T. 71 "04 Gee v. Wurd (1857), 7 E, & B. 509; 3 Jur. N. S. 692 404, 411 Geill V. .Toremy (1827), M. & M. 61 32 Geils r. Geils ■^852), 1 Miicq. 36, 255 ; 1 Paterson, 1 1 144 General De Caen, the (1855), Swa. 9 178 Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Brit, and Col. St. Nav. Co. (1869), L. R. 3 E.x. 330; L. R. 4 Ex. 238 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 194 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 97 ; 20 L. T. 581 ; 17 W. R. 741 178 Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Guillou (1843), 11 M. & W. 877 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 168 1143, 1146, 1152 Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Hedlcy (1869), L. R. 3 P. 0. 44 ; 39 L. J. Adm. 2U ; 21 L. r. 086 ; 18 W. R. 264 ; 6 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 263 6 Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Lond. and Ed. Ship. Co. (1877), 2 Ex. D. 467 ; 47 L. J. Ex. 77 ; 36 L. T. 743 ; 25 W. R. 694 41 Gen. Stcum Nav. Co. v. Mann (1855), 14 C. B. 127 ; 22 L. T. (0. 8.) 223 ; 2 W. R. 154 6 Gen. Stciim Nav. Co. v. Morrison (1856), 13 C. B. 581 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 179. . 6 Genese, In re, Ex parte Gilbert (1885). 3 Morrell, B. R. 223 964, 966 Goniug V. The State (1822), 1 McC. 573 267 George's Estate, Re, King v. George (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 670 ; 36 L. T. 759 ; 25 W. R. 038 ; 808 George v. Pritchard (1826). Ry. & M. 417 773 George v. Surrey (1830), 1 M. & M. 516 1220 George v. Tliompson (1836). 4 Dowl. 656 314 Geralopulo v. Wieler (1851), 10 C. B. 712; 20 L. J. C. P. 105 ; 15 Jur. N. S. 316 290, 299 Gerish v. Chartier (1845), 1 C. B. 13 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 84 ; 9 Jur. 69 242 German Mining Co., Re (1853), 22 L. J. Ch. 926 ; 4 De G. M. & G. 19 . . 160 Germania, The (1868), 37 L. J. Adm. 59 ; 19 L. T. 20 ; 21 L. T. 44 .... 364 Gervis v. Grand West. Canal Co. (1816), 5 M. & Sel. 76 1165 Ger- V. Redman (1875), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 161 ; 45 l,. J. Q. B. 267 ; 24 \V. R. 270 112,444 Geyer v. Aquilar (1798), 7 T. R. 636 ; 4 R. R. 543 1103 Geyi^r v. Irwin (1790), 4 Dall. 107 871 Gib'jlehouse v. Strong (1832), 3 Rawle, 437 443, 5 U Gibbon r. Budd (186.3), 32 L. J. Ex. 182 ; 2 H. & C. 92 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 525 ; 8 L. T. 321 620 Gibbon v. Featherst(jnhaugh (1816), 1 Stark. R. 225 154 Gibbon «;. Young (1818), 2 Moore (C. P.), 224 763 Gibbon's case (1734), 17 How. St. Tr. 810 1176 Gibbons v. PoweU (1840), 9 C. & P. 634 314 Gibbons v. Wilcox (1817), 2 Stark. R. 43 494 Gibbs V. Cruikshank (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 451 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 273 ; 28 L. T. 735 ; 21 W. R. 734 1118 Gibbs V. Fremont (1853), 9 Ex. 25 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 302 ; 17 Jur. 820 48 Gibbs V. Guild (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 69 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; 46 L. T. 248 ; 30 W. R. 591 71 Gibbs V. Phillipson (1829), 1 Russ. & My. 19 867 Gibbs V. Pike (1842), 9 M. & W. 351, 360, 361 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 409; 12 L. J. Ex. 257; 6 Jur. 465 85, 111, 1231 Gibbs V. Ralph (1845), 14 M. & W. 804; 15 L. J. Ex. 7 1139 Gibson v. Doeg (otherwise Doey) (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 37 ; 2 H. & N. 615. . 128 Gibson v. Fast India Co. (1839), 6 .'^ing. N. 0. 269 ; 1 Am. 493 ; V Scott, 74; 3 Jur. 66 640,642, 644 Gibson v. Holland (1865), 35 L. J. C. P. 6 ; 1 H. & R. 1 ; L. R. 1 0. P. 1; 11 Jur. N. S. 1022 ; 13L.T.293; 14 W. R. 86 672,673 The references are to paget, not to paragraph$. r^ i;. -1 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxxv 763 175 iU 194 [IS 48 71 !67 l23 I44 I73 PAOB Gibson t> Huntor (1794), 2 H. Bl. 288 ; G Bro. P. C. 235, 255 242 Gibson V. M'Cnrty (173G), Gas. temp. Hardwicke, 311 1116 Gibson V. Small (1863), 4 H. L. Gas. 39G ; 1 C. L. R. 363; 17 Jur. 1131 770, 771 Gilbert 0. Endean (1878), 9 Ch. D. 259 ; 39 L. T. 404 ; 27 W. R. 252. . . . 914 Gilbert f. Smith (1876), 2 Ch. D. 686 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 514 ; 35 L. T. 43 ; 24 W. R. 568 634 Gilbert v. Svkes (1812), 16 East, 151 ; 14 R. R. 327 682 Gilchrist r. "Bale (1839), 8 Wutts, 355 374, 375 GiUlea v. Brieu (1821), 10 Ir. C. L. R. 230 865 Giles V. Dyson (1815), 1 Stark. R. 32 ; 18 R. R. 743 553 Giles r. Sinev (1864), 3 New R. 78 ; 11 L. T. 310 ; 13 W. R. 92 1032 Giles V. Warren (1872), L. R. 2 P. & D. 401 ; 41 L. J. P. 69; 26 L. T. 780 ; 21) W. R. 827 703, 705 Gillaiiders r. Ld. Rossmore (1835), Joues, 504 683 Gillardt!. Bates (1840), 6 M. & \V. 547 ; 8 Dowl. 774; 9 L. J. Ex. 171 .. 611 Gillespie v. Gumming' (1841), Long. & T. 181 1031 Gillespie v. Moon (1817), 2 Johng. Ch. (Am.), 585 749 Gillespie v. Riissel (1859), 3 Maccj. 757 ; 1 Paterson, 877 1139 Gillett V. Abbott (1862), 3 N. & P. 24 ; 7 A. & E. 783 ; 2 Jur. 300 ; 1 \V. W. &H. 89 95 Gillett V. Gane (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 29 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 818 ; 18 \V. R. 423 ; 2 ! L. T. 5S 798 Gihiatr. Gilliat (1860), 28 Beav. 481 804 Gillies r. Smither (1819), 2 Stiirk. R. 528 1208 Gillis V. Gillis (1874). I. R. 8 Eq. 597 179 Gillman v. Connor (1840), 2 Jebb & Sy. 210 36 Gilpin V. Fowler (1854), 9 Ex. 615 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 152 ; 18 Jur. 292 Ill Giraud v. Richmond (1846), 2 C. B. 835 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 180 681, 753 Gisbome v. Hart (1839), 5 M. & W. 50 ; 7 Dowl. 402 ; 3 Jur. 536; 8 L. J. Ex. 197 1038 Giveus V. Bradley (1813), 3 Bibb, 192 252 GladwelU'. Turner (1869), 39 L. J. Ex. 31; 5 L. R. Ex. 59; 21 L. T. 674 ; IS W. R. 317 32 Glannibanta, The (1876). 1 P. Div. 283 ; 34 L. T. 934 ; 24 W. R. 1033 . . 1234 Glass V. Beach (1833), 5 Verm. 172 324 Glave r. Wentworth (1844), 6 Q. B. 173, n 481 Gleadow v. Atkin (1833), 1 C. & M. 424 ; 3 Tyr. 289 ; 2 L. J. Ex. 153 . , 435, 445, 451, 452 Glencaim Peer. (1796). 1 Macq. 444 180 Glengall, E. of, t'. Barnard (1836), i Keen, 769 ; 6 L. J. Ch. 25 806 Glenister r. Harding, In re Turner (1885), 29 Ch. D. 985 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 1089; 53 L. T. 628 420, 1170 Glenorchy i\ Bosville (1733), Cas. temp. Talbot, 3 ; 1 Wliite & T. L. C. 1 665 Glerawley's, Ld., case (1821), Macq. Prao. H. L. 629 603 Glossop V. Heston and Isleworth Local Board (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 536 ; 26 W. R. 433 911 Glossop V. Jacob (1816), 1 Stark. N. P. R. 69 ; 4 Camp. 227 16 Glossop f. Pole (1814), 3 M. & Sel. 175 1102 Glover v. Hall (1848), 2 Phillips, 484 1183 Glubb V. Edwards (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 300 1213 Glyn V. Caulfield (1851), 3 Mac. & G. 463 ; 15 Jur. 807 699 Glyn V. Houston (1836), 1 Keen, 329 ; 6 L. J. Ch. 129 997 Glynn f. Bk. of England (1 750), 2 Vea. sen. 38 435, 448 Goate V. Goate (1866), 1 H. & N. 29 710 Goblet V. Beechey (1829), 3 Sim. 24 ; Wigr. "Wills, 187 762, 785, 786 Godard •. Gray (1870), 40 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; L. R. 6 Q. B. 139 ; 24 L. T. 89 ; 19 W. R. 348 1147 Goddaxd's case (1584), 4 Co. Rep. 44 95 Gcddardv. Parr (1856), 24 L. J. Ch. 783 948, 949 Godefroy v. DaUon (1330), 6 Bing. 460 39 Godefroy v. Jay (1827), 3 C. & P. 192 ....,.;...... 1031 Godfrey v. Macaulay (1796), Pea. R. 166, li. ; 3 R. R. 672, n. ; 1096 m Vol. I. end* with page 633. Ixxxvi TAMLK OF CAHK8 CITKI). VAoa (i(.<lfr<7 r. Tiirnlmll (171l.'>). ' I'^hji. :i7l lOBft OoiIhom r. Hmilli flHlH), 'I Mcinri', C. P. 1J7 ; IK If. U. rM\ 1115 (JihIIk v. Uowi finr.f)). 17 <!. II. ■i'.^K; 'i:< I/. .1. <;. I", tn ; l .lur. N. S. 117:1. 7(ll) (iiHlwin V. Oiilli.y {\M'.\), I II. .V N. :i7:i 711, TIU (lo(Uiii r. FruiiriM (1H7U), 111) li. J. C I'. \l\ ; I-. 11. /if'. I'. I'^l ; 22 I,. 'I'. ;);iH (171, 77H (Jcir I'. (It, NorUi. Hy. «!<>. (IHfili), .'Id L. .1. (J. II. IIH; ;( K & K. (17'i ; 7 Jiir. N. H. 'JHd ; .'I I,. 'I'. H/iO (Ii;i (Ji.ir V. MillH(lHilj, 2 Dc.wl. & I-. 'i:\\ i;i I,. .1. (i. II. '^-'7; H .hir. 7'>H .. Hill, H.'l2, H3U OoHin r. Dniii'lly (IHHI), C, (^ It l>. ;i()7 ; 1(1 I,. ,1. (i. II. :t()',l ; 11 L. 'I'. I'll ; '.» VV. It 11(1; UtA. V. III!) Sd.'i, H(19 (l.iid Co., !(.'•, 'I'liii (1HV!»), \2i'\\. I). 77; IH li. .1. Oil. (iftO; 40 L. T. H(i.-| ; 21 W. R. 7'.7 Hl/i Uiiiil I'. IJiiiilmiii (|(l7H-tl), I'ili'il ill iiiil.!^ 1^) Ki'iitiiiily V. (!ti~NilliN, 2 Hwiiiih. •.vi:> I Ifil OoMcii r. (iilliini (IHH'2), /il I,. .1. Cli. I .VI ; Hi I,. T. 'JJi ; 'Jd Cji. I). IIMII ; ftl li. .1. cii. m:\ i;i'> (idldirilU V. TowiiwikI (IHUM), 'IH IIpiiv, 1 ITi (1711 (tiijijidf. H»iiiUl(>wc.rt.li flHOT), iCiiiiiii. 70 ■17.') (JnliliiiK r. Wliitil.nii Hull. VV.iiku (1870;, 1 (^ II. 1). :t74 I M I-. T. 171 ; 2\ \{..\i:\ n);i w. 7H(I 1(1 M 1IH3 adl.lHli.MJi, ,.. Hwiiii (IH17), I Kx. l/)4 ; 1(1 I,. .1. V.%. 2M (I(.l(l«l,.iiii r. I''.MM (IH'J7j. (i II. .V O. Kil ; I M. iV I'. W2 ; 2 Y. *. J. 11(1 ; I) k \i. 107 ; I ItiiiK- l»<0 ; 2 (^ \. I'. 2.V2 aoMflioriiK r. Miinliiiiiii (IHIA), l.'l M. iV VV. .177; 2 Dnwl, k L. 112; 11 li. .1 V.%. 01 (Ji.iiim I'. I'limiU, {lK.'i7), 20 L. J. ('. I'. 270; :i (J. II. N. H. 47; ;t Jiir. N. H. II .'.0 <J..ui|i.Tt/ .'. Hiiit,l..a {\M:\), 2 K. >V It. HIO; 2 <!. L. II. iior) ; 2:i li. .1. (i. II. 05; IM .lur. 2'10 222, 770 (J.Hi.iiill (>. Ijt.tin (IH''il), 20 I,. .(. Cli. i;i2; I Him. N. H. I,'..') r.ilO, 001 , 000 U..o.|nr. .I.il. MH.'.M), 2H L.J. (i. II. I; 1 K. & K. 0; o .Jur. N. H. li:., .721, 1)0(1 (iooili'ivil V. AriiH>iir(iHI2), It <|. II. '.)M\; It (1. & I). 200; 12 L. .1. (^ II. 50 IIIH (loiMlinr V. Liil<.. (17.'I7), I Al.k. 110 IIOO (;<iiMliii >■. Hiiiit.li (IHIfl), Milw. 2i:i IIO.'I (loodiii^f.^ V. (J.hmIImk" (I71U;, I V.'M. HCli. 2.'ll 7K1) (l(m<iiiiiiirH'rni»U(IHH()), 11 Cli. I). OIU ; 11) li. J. (Jh. HO.'i ; 111 L.'l'. 11; 2H VV. It. 002 lift O.xhIiuhii f. CImmi (IHIH), I II. .V Al.l. 207; 10 It. II. 1122 077 OiHMlmiiii r. (Jri.Mliimii (IHftOJ, 2H \,. .1. Cli. 71.'i ; .'i .lur. N. H. 002 ....Ml), II7U (Joo'lmiiii V. (JrifllMiM (1H,'.7), I II. * N. 571 ; 20 L. .1. Kx. 415 071, 072 • JiMKlrrimi v. Iliirvcy MS01), 11 New |{,, 512 llHft OikmIiiiiiii V Hiiltiml'i, Miiyorof f 1HH2), 7 <i. M. D. lOO; 50 \,. .1. Q. II. 508; 4a I,. T 120; 20 VV. (t. 0)0; L'l .1. I'. K11 12:1 <lo.«lric,li K. Ht..-v..iiH (1H7I), 5 [,t.iiH. fN. Y.) 2110 7011 OiKxlriKlit ". (loriiwi'iit, (17115;, (1 T. If.. 211); It It. It. 101 522 (JiMMlrijflit, (. Diivi.iH (I77H), 2 (li.wp. HOIt 522 (JiMvlriKlit. " lliirwoii.1 (1771-5), 2 VV. III. 0117; II VVilM, 407 704 (>(io(lri(^lit r. IlidkM (IHOl), lluliiir N. 1'. 20(1; (mim. Dcmic. VViilkiT, 4 Km|». N. 1'. 50) 252 Ooddritclil. V. Ilod)^.. (17711), VViit.kliiM on (;ci|.yli..ldH, 227 ; 2 Kiim),, 5111, n.. 007 (loodriKlit'". M<.MM (.777), 2 (.'owp. 501 10H, Hit, 411, 11H, 424, 021 (irmdriKlit. ". Hiiiil (1701), 1 T. It, 1150; 2 II. R. 100 122 (JooilriKlit. I'. Htriiiiliiiii (1774), I (lowp. 201, 201 ; Hhcp. Tnui^Ji. 5S 120(1 (ioodUtl.) «. Ifiildwiii (IHOO), II KiiHt,, 4HH; 11 II. It. 210; IV.ifiKin, v, yl,. 12;t, 2(il) (Jood(,il,l(i V. RriiliiiiM (1702), 1 T. It. 4I)H 031, 122H (J(.(idt,it,l<) V. Dnw (IH02), I'.'ii. Add. (!iih. 204 .'107 (loo<lt,it.lo »'. .lomm (1700), 7 T. It. 47 127 (IfiodLillii t;. Mill.uni (IH:i"), 2 M. k W. H5;i; M. k II. 207; fl li. .1. Kx. 200 14(1 (io.xltit,l<i V. H(.ut,lM.rri (IHII), I M. k Hrl. 201) «0l The rijcnnctit am lu yityc; nut to }>tt>Uj/iuji/u, TAHI.K OI' CASKS (;iTKI). Ixxxvii OimhIwIii c. lliil.lmnl (IHIH), K) Muhm. ■i\H. ii CiMiilwiii r. liciclciii (IKM;.), 1 A. & !•;. :i"H: ;; Howl. r. a. ft()4 ; 3 N. St M, 607 870 (liimlwin V. UolmrtH (1H7I1), I A|)|>. Cum. 17(1; l.'t Ij. J. Kx. 7IH; .'iri Fi. T. 1711 ; 'it NV. I{. '.IS7 fl, .'>i:« <|.«iUviii I'. VVrHt, (I(i;i7), »'ro. Ciir. T.'i'^ Nl!», H'2(l H71.' U Iwyii r. Clirvrlry (IMM)), 4 II. .V N. (llll ; W I,. .1. Kx. WH; :i;i I,. T. iXi W. K,. (i;il ; 1 V.Hi I- llnulil r. VVliiti- ('«'>•). Kiiy, im <l II r, Allulo (IH'JC), (i H. .V- ( (Idnli.ii'HCMw (IHll), '^ M. \ Hf (iiimIiiii'h, liiiril Ociir^i', Iriiil (1 (iiiriloii I'. Ooi'iloii (IN7I), I.. I{. 1. union I'. Liii'il Kniy (IN:I.!), (lol'tll H. ni'liiii :iKM7), H K ;i ; 2 I'll . U. 1 1(1(1 I) 1). .V K. • 1 t ' 117 ; I'lN •1. /iHi 7«l). '21 /j II. 1 Niiii. '27 How. . -2^1 . 1 St.. Tr. r,v> in) /its •. I'. «'. ('. IHO Oc.n-, Ho (IMi:i), :i <'iiW. 7."pH . doroi'. Ki'ilii'l (iH.'iH). I'J Mniin (Inm V. lldWHT (IN.M), :> \U' (i. iV Shi. ;I(» ; S.('., mili iikiii. (imc r. MiirfiM, •21 I.. .1. ell. 1(1; \(> .liir. IKiH (inrxf. (liiliiiKiiii (IHl'.l), Milw. '2'.>( (Jipinr. lliirriH (.«'(' (Iiini ('. IIiiwm<i (l..r.« I'. HftUHry (1H(1'2), ;i V. Si V. doitx'. NViiKlit{lH;tK), H A. & K. (iorliiiiii )'. CmiiIoii (IH'.'H), r> (iii'i'ii CniiiHHri) c. I'nriii (lHr.7), '27 I/. .». (• 1'. '^!i ; '2 (". H. N. S. (;«l ; ;i .Inr. 1 )• M)\) IIH; ;i N. 1. '2(1(1 .... vt r. ;m:i 117 IHO '2117 H.'lll :i77 711 7(11 r2ii (nm 177 (KIH MO f)2(l (1(11 :i77 N . S. .S(i7 7(i;« 1(11(1 7'21> Oortnii V. Dyw.ii (IHlli), I M. & II. '2111; ;i M.H.ro ((!. V.], /■>.■.« (ioHlM'll r. A'itIht (1 «;».'-.). '2 A. \ K. :.(i(l (iipHfdnl, l.il., •'. K-.lil. (IHI/.), H Ir. Ii. K. '217 'i'.*'^, (M(l (ioHJiii r. (N.i-ry (IHIl). 7 M. * dr. :i42 ; H Hrott, N. U. '21 r2:il lliniir(IH:tl), 7 l»iii>f. nid; T) M. \- P. KiO !>\e> Uim\ luH V. \A. NiiKi'iil. (IH;t:i), f> H. & Ad. (II ; '2 N. & M. '2H; WiK"'. 'WillH, fi ; '2 I'll. Kv. :t:tii 7 i;i, 7r)l. 7W, 7^3 UoNiir. (Clinton (IHI'2), ;i M. iSc Or. H'2.''i ; 4 Snoll, N. h. 171; l'2 li. .1. c. I*. 17:1. OoHHf. WulliiiKloii (IN'2I). :t n. * M. i:i'2; (I M.iorr, (!. V. ;i.'..'> (JoHNi't, I'. Iliiwiml (IN'I7). 1(1 Q. n. 'K>:i; l(i I.. .1. (^ II. ■.U(y ; II .Iiir. ■IHl ■1:17, ft(18 7/)0. (UM V. (liiii.ly (IHr.:", '2 K. & H. HU) ; '2 (I. I,. K. :ill'2 ; '2:1 L. .1. (^ II. I .h;i, i;i2, 811 IH ,liir. :iio Omul 1)11 iiilh IHr 1 Kx. ■i;iO; C l>. & li. '2(111; 17 l<. .1. Kx. 7(1. Oiiiilil r. ('otiiiilm (Ih Oniilil r. 0<iiilil (in:: Oimld «'. Liild'H (IHh OiiiiM V. Sliii'li'y (IH II. rii;i; II li. ,1. (!. I*. 176 ; 11 .liir. 101. 11(1. '2(i;i 1(10 774 :t(t 1104 .1. V. Si M. .Ml; i:. It. (1 r. DIv. I, 700 \- r. r.Hl 71'2 OiiiiM (nIioiiIiI lin Ooolil) ,. \\liit4t (lHri4), Kiiy, (IHII ; '2 I'lij. Kt'p. 11(10..., IHO OiiiiIiIIk v. OiiiiHtoii (IHHl). I (!miii), IIHI ft4'2 OniiiiiHwortii r. KiiiKlitH (iHiit), II M. .t \v. ;i;i7 : r2l,. .1. Kx.'2h;i uh Oiiiilliwiiid', Kn |iiirlt' [nrf lt<< Niirtli of l'',iijfliiiHl .loiiil Slnck < 'o.). 0..vrr, Kx imrlr (IH7(1), 4.'. I,. J. Cli. O.'i ; I (;ii. I). IH'2 ; ;i;i I.. T. (110 ; '24 W, u. i'2A r2;i;« Oovi'iiior r. Iloll (IHIO), :i Miiiiili. ;i;il I17H Oovcnior ('. .IcII'ifyM (IH'.'O), 1 lliiwkM. '207 1178 Oowiili V. K.mtrr (■ih:I'2), It II. \ A<l. f)(17 717 Omily'H niNii, Ho IIiiIIhIi I'luvidilit l.il'o Ahh. Sooy. (1H(1;I), :I2 I.. J. (Ii. :i2(i; I DoO. .1. * S. 4HH i;i4 704 Oriilmm, Ho (IHd.'l), .'fj I,. .1. P. & M. Il.'l; M S. * T. (10. Oriiliiim I'. Iliiki'iilinid Ity. Co. (IH.'iO), '2 Miin. & O. 14(1; l'2 lloiiv. 4110; ■2 II. & T. 4, Ml. a:i8 Ondmiii c. Cox (IH4H). '2 C. * K. 7(1'2 I.'.4 OmImiii V. DvHlor (IHKl), '2 Mtiirk. I{. '2:1 Oftd, IHM Oiiiliiim ('. Olovor (IHM), '2.') I,. .1. Q. II. 10; [, K. \ II. ,M1I ; '2 .liir. N. S. 1(10 H,18 r<'/. /. etiili with pagf (l.'J5, iifui Ixxxviii TAHLK OK v\H\:n < irKI). PAOH Onilmmr. Hoim (I7!»:>), Pen. R. 1M ; U R. U. 071 Kl'Jft Uriitmm r. OIiIIh (IH,')H), 1 K. * I'". 'Jdi :U2 (Jriiliiim V. Wliiiihclo (1H:I2), 1 C. & M. IHH; 11 Tyr. 201 ; 2 L. J. Kx. 70 (1(^0 (Iriitminn r. (iriiliiiinn (ISS7), 1!) I,. R. Ir. '210 73!), 7114 (iiiiiid .hint!. Can. Co. r. Dinii'H (|H.'>0), 1'^ IImiiv. (Ill ; 2 \l.& T. 92 ; 2 Miiu. * U. 'JH.-i; 10 L. J. Cli. ;tir) 1117 (Jriuitr. Miij^K"' (lH"'-!\ •'! I'liiHt, 128; (i R. R. .Mil IH (iniMt, r. KIctflHir (IH20), ■) IJ. & (! i;)!! ; S I). .V R. .'lO 207 (Iriiiit, r. OniiM (1702). 2 H. HI. 100; ;t R R. :)l2 1103 (Iriirit. V. (iriint. (I«;t0), 2 (!urt.. 10 603 (Iriiiit, r. Umnt, 'JHd,'.), 31 Ui^iiv. 023; 31 L. J. C'h. (Ill ; 12 I,. T. 721 ; 13 VV. R. 1 o:.7 031 Orimt r. Onml, (1H(I!I), L. R. 2 1'. & I). H ; 30 li. .f. T. At M. 17 ; 21 li. 'I'. r)'J7 ; IH W. R. 230 739, 710 (Jraiit V. (Sniiit, (1H70), li. R. r, (,'. I'. 727; 39 L. .f. O, 1'. 272; 22 L. T. K21 ; IH VV. R. 0.^1 784 (;niiit. r. .Iii.kHMii (1703). 1'"" •<■. 201 103, 404, /)17, fi'il Oriiiit I'. M'Liichliii (I800J, 4 .loliiis. :il llrto Onint c. Maiidox (1810), 1;'. M. k W. "37 ; Hi li. .1. Kx. 227 7«3 (Irimt, r. Mow, r (1813), f. M. * (Jr. 120; (! H<v>tt., N. R. 1(1 ; 2 Di.wl. N.H. 023; 12 li. .1. (J. V. 11(1; 7 .Iiir. 8.VI 17 (Jraiit I'. '^l(.Ill|>^uIl (1822), 4 (!i)im. 203 031 (Iravciior r. VVikhHhhihi, (1821), 1 ItiiiK. .'W ; 7 Mcmro, 289 90 ( Jrav<'H c. Ivi-y (I«:i2), 2 H. \. A<1. 313 552 (Jrav(,H V. li.'KK (1857), II Kx. 042; 2 l[. & N. 210 ; 2(1 I,, .1. Kx. lilC. ; 3 Jur. N. S. 510 157 <lniv(wi). lVr'(^iriliv (18:i8), Crawf. He I). Alir. ('. 127 HdS, 8(i9 (ImvoH V. VVrld (1833), 5 H. iVc Ail. 105 ; 2 N. H M. 725 (;8(i, (187 Gray r. HaiMiolomcw, (1801) 11 R. [Voh.) 251; (1^95) 1 Q. 11.209; 71 li. T. 8(17 ; 13 W. R. 177 ; (H L. J. <f. H. 125 530 Oray f. Ilimwiill (1802), 13 Ir. Ch. R. 77 719 Gray v. Coi.kMon (1812), 1(1 KaHt, 13 1100 (Jray v. Diniii'ii (1810), 2 Joldi & Hy. 205 39 (Jray v. (ianhu,!- (1807), 3 MawN. 390 122 (Jray v. Wiiig (1855), 20 IWv. 219 108 (Jray v. ]Iar|Kr (1811), 1 Htory, R. 574 783 (Jray r. I'altinTH (1791), 1 Km|.. 135 194 (Jray v. Pcarwrn (1851), H. L. Cm. 100 741 (Jray v. iV'nUaiid (1815), 2 Hcrj?. & R. 23 010 (Jray r. Smith (1800), 43 Ch. I). 208 ; 50 L. .T. Ch. 115 ; 02 L. T. 335 ; 38 W. R. 310 072, 082 Oray v. Warner (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 550; L. R. 10 Kq. 577 ; 28 L. T. 835 ; 2 1 VV. R. 808 1.3G Oray r. Yoinij? (1823), 1 M'C. 31 374 OrayHon »-. AfkinHon (1752). 2 Voh. hcu. 459 ; Dirk. 158 700, 1215 (ircMit KaHt.'rii, Th(, (18(18). ],. R. 2 Adm. 88 ; 17 L. T. 007 179 (JrfNit North. Ry. Co. v. Hh(ij)i)ard (1852), 8 Ex. 30 ; 7 Railw. CaH. 310; 21 L. .1. Kx. 280 102 (Jn.at, VV(!Mt,. Ry. Co. v. H.-iuictl, (1807), 36 L. J. (i. U. 133 ; L. R. 2 H. L. 27 ; 10 L. T. 180; 15 W. R. 017 114 Onat, WoHt. Ry. Co. v. WilliH (1805), 34 L. J. C. V. 195 ; 18 0. B. N. H. 748 388 Or<!HV(>Hi\ AMhlin (1813), 3(^aini). 420; 11 R. R. 771 767 (IrcavoH .'. Morning (1879), 48 L. J. il B. 335 ; 4 Q. B. D. 220; 27 W. R. 458 636 Oniav(« t>. Greenwood (1877), 40 L. J. Ex. 262; 2 Ex. D. 289; 30 L. T. 1 ; 25 W. R. 039 171 (JroavoH t'. Hunter (1820), 2 0. & P. 477 1222 GriMivoH V. Lngt^ (1857), 11 Ex. 042 ; 2 II. & N. 210; 20 L. J. Ex. 310; 3 .Jur. N. 8. 519 167 GrmivcH r. Tofield (1880), 14 (^h. I). 603 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 118 ; 43 L. T. 100; 28 W. R. 840 131 The references are to paget, not to paragraphi. TAHI.i: OF CASKS t'lTKI). 1x XXIX rAOR nrrolvr. Binitli (IHJfi), 1 W.mmU.. & M. 181 , O'.t, 1 1 :»H (Jrrfi! I'. Uniwii (1711), 2H(.r. ll(ll» I7.> «lr.i'ii v. CriHHW.'ll (IH;ii)), 10 A. & K. (fill ; 2 1". & F). ■430 fJH dr.-*-!!!'. (Jiitt'wiik {\(\TXi, Hull. N. I'. '21;! ;mi( • JriTin'. Uir.m (IH7H). ri I.. .1. IV * M (i ; I,. It. H T. & I). 121 lll!» (ir.'.ii I'. Howiiril {I77'J), 1 Fir... (!.('. Ill 7H!» <)r<-«'ii r. FFuiiiplircyH (1H8I), fiU L. J. Ch. 02ri ; 20 CFi. F). 474: '>! L. T. 42 711 Orc'ii V. Jiirkwrn (IS(l.-i), IN-ii. \l. 'iM I.'.O Uni.ti V. K.ii.ki- (IH/i(i), IH (!. M. r.l!t; ir) I,. J. < !. p. •.'!»7 Hll (Jr.'.-ii •'. F^.mli.n (J.ii. Oinii. (!o. (l«.V.i), J't !.. J ( '. 1'. 13; 7 C. F». N. H. 21)11 ; « .Fiir. N. S. T>» ; 2 F,. T. !>.. ; H W. I{. KH 043 (JrtH'ii r. \A. I'cii/'inir (ISHI), (i Apn. Cum. (i.'>7 ; .'>1 I,. J. U. FJ. 2.'> ; ».'» Fi. T. 3r.:i; ;io \V, It. 21H; Id. I. I'. Il''> HJO Cnrii r. Nnw FHv.t ( !... ( 1 7!l'.') I 'I'. 11. .VIO Fl)U6 (Irrni V Tiil... (1N7H), i) (Jli. I). 2:11 ; 17 I-. .F. Ch. 7H3 ; 3M F.. T. '.Hi ; 27 VV. Fl. :iH 701 Cncii r. Waiirr ll7«3). 2 \A. lUym. Hil.l K I in. 11 r. W.'iivcr (1827), 1 Him lill .'.II (;r.'.'iii.wiiy. V.x imrld (1802), (i Vch. 812 308 (ir.-.'iiiNli r. Wliito (18(JI), ;tl Fi. .F. C. F'. '.);i ; II <!. H. N. H. 2n<.t ; 8 .Fur. N. H. fMi /»»» <!r.-«-nlliw f. FCiiiK (1838), 3 Fl.-iiv. 4\) fiOl (!r.'.'ii<.iiKl' '. V,rr\m (18f.!»), f. (!. Fl. N. .S. 78(1; 28 I,. .T. U. F'. 100; ft Jur. N . H. 7<;r. !)38 (irf('ii..ii>?li I'. (liiHkcU (lh;t3), 1 My. iV Iv. 10(1; C....i>.'r (toriij.. llr.>ii);liHiii), <l(i .' .'"iKI. '■.'.13, .'.'.M, Cilll!, (i(l8, 010 (}rc«'n..uK»i V. M-(n<'lluii(l (18(il), 3(1 I,. .F. <i. B. If); 2 K. >V !•;. 424; 2 Fi. T. r>l\ ; 8 \V. Fl. (112; (t.lur. N. H. 772 7.»8 (Jrc.iiMFiicl.l II. FVitdliiinl (1811), 8 M. .V \V. 148; 10 I,. .1. K\. 2!t,'i 872 (Jriii'MHliifl.lH r. Criiwf..ril (1812), 1 l)..\vl. N. ,S. I.'t'.t ; !) M. Ar W. 311 : fi .Fur. 3113 121C.. I2F!» (Jninwi.ili F$il. <.f W.nkH f. Muu.IhIiiv (1870), F.. II. r, (^ l». 307 ; 3'J Fi. .F. (i. n. 20::; 23 li. T. 121 ; 18 W. II !M8 124 (In'tfK't'''""' (1708), 14 IF..W. Ht. Ti'. 1370 .V.8 *'>rvKf( r. W.'IIh (18;|0), 10 A. \- K. 08 ; 2 P. *, It. 20(i .''.37, r,ti (in'K'Ty'M .Sfttliu.. U.1 (I8(i.'^i). 3( lli-av. (iOO ; 13 VV. U 828 7!iH iir<'K..iy f. l).)i.lKn (1827), 3 HiiiK.I7l; U Mi.i.rc (C. F'.), 3<)4 '.lit ^iTl^^tl,^y V. FF.iwiir.1 (1800), 3 I';m|i. 113 .'ilO (Inxory f. Miirycliur.!!! (18,'iO), 12 Hciiv. 3!)8 ; ID L. J. Ch. 280; 13 Jur. 1010 . 920 <Jr«>«..ry r. F'urknr (1808), I Ctiiiii.. 301 ; 10 U. Fl. 712 fi04 «!ri'Ki>ry r. Qucim'n FV.M'tur (181(1), 4 Ncit^'H .if Ciiwm (F'ah;. & Mar.), 020 . . 141 ( JrcK.)ry v. Tiivcnior (18.33), C. «c P. 281 027, '.l-'B Cnt^i.ry r. ThonuiN (181 1), 2 Hil.li, 280 2.V2 (Jn^ory r. WoHt Mid. Kv C... (1801), 33 L. J. Kx. 15.1; 2 FF. & C. 914 ; 10 .Fur. N. H. 243 ; 12 'VV. Fl. .V28 722 (Jnxw.n r. Fliirk (1843), 4 U. H. 737 208 (Jri'llior I'. Nciiln (1700), 1 Peak.-, 108; 3 II. Fl. 0(10 134 (Jri'Uiairor. liO oWk Hf.iH Val.iii (1800), 2 Chiii|). 144 I.'.O (Imifcll r. Oir(lloHt(.iuW1837), 2 Y. Ac C. lOx. (170 71.3 (InHhiiui IF<.t«aC<>. r. Mimninjr (1807), Fr. Fl. 1 C. Fi. 12.'> 3(1!) (Jrcshy r. M.iUHloy (1801), 3 D.M). F'\ & .1. 433 ; 31 Fi. ,F. Cii. .137 »2 (IrcMlj.y r. M.umloy (1869), 28 Fi. J. Ch. 020 ; 1 tJitt'. 4.''.0 ; 4 Do O. & .1. 78 13« (in-voH, Ke (18.V.)), 28 L. .F. P. k M. 28 ; \ H. it V. 2.10 ; 7 VV. R. 80 .... 701 (Srcvilb V. Chaimmu M814). f) d. H. 731 ; F). He M. .'ii">3 034 ♦ Jroviilo I'. Hfulz (1847), 11 Q. F«. 1004 ; 17 Fi. J. Q. B. F4; F2,Fur. 40 .347, 1037 (Jrfvillo V. Tylfo (18,11). 7 M..<.. P. (7. <3. 320 140, 142, 707 (Jrcw V. Hill (1840), 3 Kx. 801 ; F)..wl. * Fi. 004 ; 18 L. J. Kx. 317 />.3.3 (Irpy (HhnuUF bo(}ray) r. YoiitiK (182.3), 4 M'C. 31 374 Grioo V. KidhanlHon (1877), 47 L. .1. P. C. 48 ; 3 App. Chm. 319 ; 37 Iv. T. 677 ; 20 W. K. 358 689 y«t. I. ttidt with page 635. m liiii ! , 1. xc TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAaa Griffin i: Brinvn (1821), 2 Tiik. 'MH 10»7 Griffith, In re, Ciirr f. Griffith (1879), 12 Ch. D. Cii); 41 L. T. fltO 1H9 Griffith V. DavioM (1«:{;{), 5 B. & Ad. 502 602, 007 Griffith r. liicketts (1H49), 7 Hare, ;«)3 ; 19 L. J. Ch. .'599 ; 14 Jur. 325. .o2I, 942 GriftithH, Kx part.) (IS22), 6 B. & AM. 730 837 GriffithH r. OriffithH (1871), L. R. 2 1'. & D. 300; 41 L.J. P. 14 ; 25 L. T. 574 ; 20 V/. K. 192 700 Griffiths v. Jenkins (1864), 3 Now R. 489 683 GriffithH V. Lond. & St. Kath. Dncks Co. (1884), i:i Q. B. D. 259; 53 \..J. ii. B. 604; 51 L. T. 533; 33 W. R. 36; 49 J. P. 100 778 Griffiths v. Rijrhy (1856), 1 IL & N. 237 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 284 43 Grttithsr. Williams (1787), 1 T. R. 710 600 Griffits v. Ivory (1840), 11 A. & E. 322; 3 P. & 1). 179 1226 tJrittitsv. Paynt)(1839), 11 A. & E. 131 ; 3 P. & I). 1079 231 Grieg's casu (1672), T. Raym. 1 ; 1 Hale, 693; 3 Riiss. C. & M. 315, 621 888, 889, 8t 3 Grill V. (Jen. Iron Screw Collier Co. (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 600 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 321 : 1 II. & R. 054 ; 14 L. T. 711 ; 14 W. R. 893 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 727 347 Grinmni v. IViiper (1848), 6 Notes of Cases (Kcc. & M.) 421, 441 170, 263 (irimiiian v. Le^jre (1828), 8 B. & C. 324 ; 2 M. & R. 438 660 Grimwood v. Hartels (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 788 ; 25 W. R. 143 1150 Grim wood r. Cozens (I860), 2 S. & T. 364 : 6 Jur. N. S. 497 143 Grimwood v. Mo's (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 3(i0 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 239 ; 27 L. T. 268 ; 20 W. R. 972 622 Grindell r. Godmond (1836), 6 A. & E. 756 ; 1 N. & P. 168 ; 2 II. & W. 339 166 GrinnoU v. Wells (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 1033 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 741 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 610; 40 L. J. C. P. 19; 8 Jur. 1101 253 Grippor I). Bristow (1840), 6 M. & W. 807; 8 Dowl. 797; 9 L. J. Ex. 324 733 Grissell v. Bristow.! (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 36 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 10 ; 19 L. T. N. S. 390; 17 W. R. 123 168 Groenvelt i: Burrell (1696-7), 1 Ld. Raym. 253 ; Cartli. 421 987 Grose f. West (1816), 7 Taun. 39; 17 R. R. 437 112 arosvouor v. Sherratt (1860). 28 Beav. 659 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1228 137 Grounsell r. Lamf) (1836), 1 M. & W. 362 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 154 222 (Jrovo V. Ware (1817), 2 Stark. R. 174 317 Groves v. Groves (1829), 3 Y. & J. 170 606 Gucnllumse r. Blackburn (1866), L. R. 1 P. & I). 109 ; 36 L. J. P. & M. 116; 12 Jur. N. S. 278; 14 L. T. 69 ; 14 W. R. 463 140,141 Gudgen V. Bessot (1850), 26 L. J. Q. B. 36 ; E. & B. 986 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 212 746, 1204 Guest r. Elwes (1836), 6 A. & E. 120 104 Gu<!st I'. Warren (1854), 23 L. J. Ex. 121 ; 9 Ex. 379; 2 C. L. R. 979 ; 18 Jur. 133 1120 Guidon V. Bobson (18()'.)), 2 Camp. 302 ; 11 R. R. 713 640 (Juier V. (*'l)aniel (180(1), 1 Binn. 349, n 179 (iuihl's use (1828), 5 Halst. 168 660, 503, 604. 666, 671 Guilt'. Lindsay (1849), 4 Ex. 46; 18 L. J. Ex. 356 192, 677 (Jully «'. Bp. of Exet^T (1828), 4 Bing. 298 ; 12 Mooro, C. P. 491 302, 614 Gumm I'. 'I'yrie (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 108; 4 B. & S. 680 741 Gun IK Mc(;arthy (1884), 13 L, U. Ir. 304 746, 760 Gunn f. Koherts (1S74), L. R. 9 C. P. 331 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 233 ; 30 L. T. 424 ; 22 \V. R. 652 178 Gurford r. Bi.yh'y (1842), 3 M. k Gr. 781 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 398 ; 1 Dowl. N. H. 519; 11 L. J. (^ P. 105 190, 192 Ou» ney <•. Lanjflands (1822), 5 B. & A. 330 1228 Gurr .'. RuUon (1816), Holt, N. P. R. 327 373 Gutsole r. Mathers (1836), 1 M. & W. 602; 2 Gale, 64 ; 5 Dowl. P. C. 69; 1 T. & G. 694 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 274 , 220 Guy V. Sharp(( (1833), 1 Myl. & K. 602 784 Quyv. West (18i,8), 2 S(a. N. P. 1244 113 2'he refti-enc*i are to pagei, not to paragraph*. TABLK OF CASES CITED. XCl FAOB Guy ManncrinMT, Tho (1882), 7 P. D. 132 ; 61 L. J. Adm. 57 ; 46 L. T. 906 ; 30 W. R. 8;)6 ; i A^p. M. C. !}fy,i 178 Gwillim V. Gwillim flSGO). 29 L. J. P. & M. 31 ; 3 S. & T. 200 6!r8 ( Jwy iiuo r. Davy (1840). 1 M. & Gr. 867 751 Gyles f. Hill (1809), 1 Camp. 471, n 1018 H, fulsfily callcdC. f. C. (18G2), 31 L. J. P. & M. 103 128 II ijrluim V. Vinrciit (1793), 2 Vcs. 201 ; 5 T. R. 92 701 I.,, kwood f. Lyall (1855), 17 C. JJ. 124; 25 L J. C. P. 44, n. ; 2 Jur. N. S. 44, 11 179 Huddrick v. Hoslop (1848), 12 Q. B. 274—277 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; 12 Jur. GOO : aft'. Hiib nom. Hoslop v. Chapman, 2 C. L. R. 139 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; 18 Jiir. 348 30 Iladley v. Carter (1835). 8 Now Hamp. 40 375 Il.idley V. Gmm (1S32), 2 Tyr. 390 ; 1 J. J. Ex. 137 ; 2 C. & J. 374 1123 Ha^'edorn «'. Rcid (1813), 3 Camp. 305 ; 1 M. & Sol. 567 454 JlHKgitt V. Iiiftf (1854), 24 L. J. Ch. 120 ; 5 Do G. M. & G. 910 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 49; 3 W. R. 141; 3 Eq. 144 1030 Hiiif?i'. Ni'wtcm (1817). 1 Mill, R. 423 927 1 Inigli V. Belchei- (1830), 7 C & P. 389 946 llaiKli «. Kayo (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 567 ; L. R. 7 Ch. 469 ; 26 L. T. 675 ; 20 W. R. 597 688 Hui^h )'. Nortli Biorlcy Union (1858), E. B. & E. 873 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 62 . . 641 HaiKh v. West, (1S93) 2 Q. B. 19; 62 L. J. Q. B. 532 ; 68 L. T. 531 ; 09 L. T. 165 ; 57 J. P. 358, 630 125 iriiilfH V. Marks (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 389 ; 7 H. & N. 66 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 851 30, 189 Haiuo f. Davey (1836). 4 A. & E. 892 ; 6 N. & M. 356 ; 2 II. & W. 30 . . 227 HaiiicH t'. East India Co. (1866), (i M(H)rc, Ind. App. 467 543 Haines r. Giithrio (1884), 13 Q. B. 1). 818 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 621 ; 51 L. T. (i45 ; 33 W. R. 99 ; 48 J. P. 756 419, 645 Hiiines f. RolxTts (1857), 25 L. J. Q. B. 353 ; 7 El. & BI. 625 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 49 ; 3 Jur. N. S 886 114 Hairor. Wilson (1820). 9 B. & C. 643; 4 M. & Ry. 606 82 lliildano V. P^i^kford (1869), L. R. 8 Eii. 631 378 Hale r. Russ (1821), 1 Greenl. 335 1190 Halkett v. Eminott (1878), 47 L. J. Q. B. 436 ; 3 Q. B. D. 555 ; 38 L. T. 508 ; 26 W. R. 632 1088 Hall's Estate, Re (1852), 22 L. J. Ch. 177 ; 2 Do G. M. & G. 748 ; 9 Hare, App. xvi 1054 Hall, Ex parte. Re WhittiuK (1878), 10 Ch. D. 615; 48 L.J. Bank. 79 ; 40 L. T. 179 ; 27 \V. R. 385 651, 682 Hall, Re (1871), L. R. 2 P. & T). 256; 40 I,. J. P. & M. 37 671 HalU. Bainl)ridKe(1848), 12 Q B. 699; 17 L. J. Q. B. 317 134 HalU. Ball (1841), 3 M. & Cr. 242; 10 L. J. C. P. 285 300, 305, 350 Hall c, Betty (1842), 4 M. & Gr. UO; 6 S.'ott, N. R. 508; 11 L. J. C. P. 256. 773 HhU v. Brand (18H3), 12 Q. B. D. 39; 53 L. J. Q. B, 19; 49 L. T. 492; 32 W. R. 133 829, 830 Hall v. Burgess ():;26), 6 B. & C. 332 ; 8 I). & R. 67 660 Hall V. Butler (1839), 10 A. & E. 206 ; 2 P. & 1). 374 99 Hall V. Byron (1876), 4 Ch. 1). 667, 680 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 297 ; 30 L. T. 367 ; 25 W. R. 317 115 Hall V. Cazenovo (1801), 4 East, 477 ; 1 Smith, 272 ; 7 U. R. 61 1 750 Hall r. City of London Brewery Co. (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 257 ; 2 B. & S. 737 ; 9 .lur. N. S. 18 773 Hall t'. Condor (1867), 2 C. B. N. S. 40 ; 26 L. ,1. C. P. 251 776, 777, 778 Hall V. Eve (1876), 4 Ch. D. 341 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 140 ; 35 L. T. 920 ; 25 \V. R. 177 221, 224 Hall c. Eeatherntone (1868), 3 H. & N. 284 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 308 262 Hall r. Fisher (1844), 1 Coll. 47 ; 8 Jur. 119 804 \lail i: Hall (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 444 ; L. R. » Ch. 430 ; 28 L. T. 283 ; 21 W, R. 373 189 Vol. I. tndi with pagt 036. - i ^! -il Hi8f X(.'ll TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. PAUR lull V. Hill (rr);), '2Str. 109J 604 lull r. Hill (IHIl), 1 Dr. ft. War. 116 ROr). HOfi, 807, 808 lull V. JiiiiHoii (IS.'j.'i), 4 E. & H. 600 ; 3 0. L. R. 7»7 ; 24 h.J.ii. B. 97 ; I .lur. N. H. 671 760 lull r. Lew (1876), 44 L. J. V. V. 8'J ; L. li. 10 C. V. 164 ; HI L. T. 727 ; ■r.i \V. H.'vxi 1120 lull r. Lund (lH(i;i), 32 L. J. Kx. li;i; 1 H. & O. 070; 9 Jur. N. 8. 206; II W. U. 271 116 hill .■. Miiulo (18;i8), 7 A. & E. 721 ; H N. vt P. 46'J ; 1 W. W. & IL U!)!) ; ■.' .lur. 8K7 132 lull /. Mayor of HwaiiMca (1811), 6 il U 620; 1 I), k M. 476; 13 L. J. (^ M. 107 ... 043 lull r. OdI.cr (IHOO). 11 KaMt, 118; 10 K. K. 113 1162, 1165 tail V. Warr.li (1801), i» Vch. twr, : 7 K. H. 300 170 lalhurk fi. U. of Cainbri.lKc (1841), I il U. 6!)3 ; 1 (1. & J). 100; I). T. C. 683 ; (i .lur. 10 132 liill.i. r. Uunchir (1834), 1 C. M. & li. 20(1; 3 'J'yr. i)6i) ; 3 L. J. Kx. iilO (j83 lallcr r. Woniiiiii (1800). 2 K. & I''. 106 607 lallct. f. McarH (1810), 13 KaNt, 16; I2U.U.200 820 liilNit r. (loUHciiH (1830), 2 M. &. Huh. 238 022 lall.y. The (I8(i8), L. U. 2 A.l. * Kvv.. 3 ; 37 L. J. A.ltii. I ; L. R. 2 1'. (.!. 103; 37 L. .1. A.liii. 33; 18 L. T. 870; 10 W. R. Oim 178 lalliday v. Iloljfal.^ (1801), L. If.. 3 Kx. 200; 37 L. .1. Kx. 174 78 1 lalliday r. MartiiifU (I8'J'J), 20 .IoIiiih. (Am.) 108 464 lallifax r. Lyl(. (1840), 3 Kx. 44(i ; Dowl. i*i L. 421 00, 647 iallinark'M <W) (1878), 47 li. J. Ch. 808 ; Ch. 1). 320 ; 38 L. T. 000 ; 2<i W. R. 8'.JI 620 laly V. Lane (1741), 2 Atk. 182 640 laiiilxT »•. KolirrtH (1840). 7 (!. B. 801 ; 18 L. J. ("!. 1*. 260 1219 Ininla-ook r. Siriltli (1862), 17 Sim. 200 001 laimliiii. Hruck (1817), (i. B. 300 ; 16L. .I.(i. B. 343 ; 10 .lur. 1004 . . 1100 lam.rton v. llam.Tl.oii (I8'28), 2 lla^f^'. K.'.'. It. 8 603 liiiii(Tt,(m r. Hlciid (1824), 6 Dowl. tV R. 200; 2 H. iV <!. 478 067, 068, 000 lamiltcm v. VAmUw (1881), 60 L. J. Q. B. 460 ; 7 ^. B. D. 1, 319; 29 VV. R. 070; 44 L. '1'. 704 130 lamiltoii r. Nott. (1873), 42 L. .1. <;ii. 612; L. K. 10 K<|. I 12 609 lamilt,)u f. Terry (1862), IIC. B. 064 ; 21 l/..l.«:. I'. 132 712 lainlyu r. BrUelcy (1880), 6 C. 1'. D. 327; 49 L. .». (!. 1'. 406 ; 42 L. T. 373; 28 W. R. 060; 44 J. 1'. 411 130 lamiiiiTHlcy r. do Bid, Biirou (IS46), 12 01. .V Kin. 46 .WO, 074, 070, <i80 lammick v. BroiiKon (\H12), 6 Day, 200, 203 373 lammond'M caM' (1822), 2 (ircrn'. 33 1223, 1228 lamniond, He (1803), 3 S. >V T. 90 ; 32 L. .F. I'. 201 ; 8 I,. T. 610; 9. lur. N. .S. 6,S1 , il W. R. 030 090 lanimoiid r. BradHtrect (1864). 23 L. .1. Kx. 332 ; 10 Kx. 300 403 lammonil r. Uiikivh (I860), 7 Moo. I'. C. C. 100 178 lammond r. Hinitli (1801), 33 Bcav. 462 712 lammoad c. Stewart, (1734-6), 1 Sir. 610 816 IiiiMpdeu V. WalliM (1884), 27 Ch. D. 261 ; 64 L. J. Cli. 1176 ; 61 L. T. 3'-.7 ; 32 W. R. 077 624 lam|>deii c. WalHli (1870), 1 il B. D. 189 ; 43 L. .1. <l B. 238 ; 33 L. T. 862 ; 24 W. It. 007 : 020 lampHliirn «'. J'eircie (1760), 2 Vch. Hen. 210 7o7 laMi|.loii v. Silencer (1003), 2 Vern. 288 482 liint.iiry „. lolla (1834), 1 A. & K. 01 ; 3 N. & M. 438 190 liineoek v. SomeH (I860), 8 (Jox, (J. C. 172 ; 1 K. it K. 706 ; 28 L. .1. M. <;. 108; 6. lur. N, S. 086 1073 fiiMcoek v. WcIhIi (1810), 1 Stark. 347 1113, 1110 liind V. Hall (1877), 2 Kx. I). 366; 40 li. J. Kx. 003 040 landley r. .loiieN (18.30), eiled Moiyan v. BoyH, 7 A. & E. 337 371 landley v. Ward (1818), riled 1 SInrk, Kv. 188, n.(»() 021, J44 uniiiurv. Clmiiee (1806), 4 l)e(l..l.\S 020,031; .34 L. .F. <;h. 413. . I lU, 722 'J'/ie mjeinnceii are to jiiit/ei, not to jiuiuj/i njj/u. TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. XCIU Himnii, Till) (lS{i(i), 30 L. J. Adin. I ; L. R. 1 A. & K. iS:} ; lo L. T. li.il ; 16 W. It. ,;<>;{ 17S ]Iiiiiiiiifor<l r. lliiim (IS.T)), 2 0. & 1'. \hr, 1101, 11():{ Haiiimfonl r. Whilcway {\HM>). 1 (!. H. N. H. fl.'t ; li] h. J. V. V. T". ; :t Jur. N. H. T);) l.^ii Hiimiiiy r. Stewart. {1S;(7), (i WatfH, IH" .'ISS HaiiHanl v. KobiiiHim (ISiT), 7 It. \- (Vi/O ; i) 1). & U. KiiO ; U. & M. KU, ii. :t07 HaiiHoin f. Arinit.a>r<^ (l«'i'^), C) H. iV A. f}M ; 1 I). \ H. TiS tisri II iiLsouV case (ISil), I'alry <m Coiiv. '282, '^S,'! ; 1 H. k Aid. tyU Ml llaiiNiiii r. I'arkcr {nv.i), l" \Vil«. 'Ifu I'.lii IlaiiMonr. ShiirUcltoii (1H;<.'>), t l).)wl. 'IH ; 1 II. & \V. ;ir2 IC IlaiLsoii r. Sti'tsoti (1H27), .') I'ick. 6()(> TAH Ihinli'ti c. (ic.nloii (lS2;i), 2 Mhmdii, T)!!, .Illl .'^i.V2 llanliiiif r. (iri'i'riiii^r (IM7), H 'rami. -12 107 JIariliiiK '■. I'cini's (IH.t.')), Tyr. iV (Jr. l:(i") :>IC> llanliiitf «. Kiiijir (IHMI), (I ('. i: V. 127 107U llartliiijr r. WiiliaiiLs (ISSO), 11 Cli. I). 1!)7 ; •!!• L. J. Ch. CCl ; -12 L. T. MH : 2H \V. H. (llfi lOfri Ilanlmim r. Willcock (lH:t2), !) liiiijr. ;iS2, ii .11.') llardwiikr, ^^^(ISHlt), <» I'. I). ;i2; .Mt L. J. I'. I). \ A. 2:i -i;:!, .^i^ llanlwick r. Ilardwick (lS7;i), I-. U- Hi K(|. IC.S; ri L. ,1. Cli. o:i(i ; 21 W. It. 7I!» HOI llarilv'H <•.!».• fl7ft4), 21 Hdw. St.. 'IV. lol l.l.'! lilU Hardy, Km (IMII), HO I,. .1. I'. .V M. 1 12 112, 717 Hardy r. Ali'Xaiidi'r (1S;!7), 2 Sunk. I'lv. (ill, 012, n. (/•) 2.").i llaru'r. Ilciitv (IHOl), KM'. Ii N. S. (;,) ; M) L. ■!.<!. I'. :i02 ; 7 .hir. N. S. .')2;t ; I ].. '\\ .iO.'t ; !1 \V. It. TM 32 Harof. Ilvd'' (IMAl). \*iii. H. itHI : 20 I,. J. Q. IJ. 185; 16 Jur. 3lo . . . . 870 Harffcst. c." I'"ollH'rKill (1832), 5 C. \- I'. 303 314 HarKniviw. Ilarirravc (18181, >.» Kcav. .'■).V2 ; 1!) Ii. J.Cii.'iOl ; 14. Fur. 2 12. .101,422 llHrKravnr. HiirKravr (18.)0), 12 Ilrav. 108 .•)«)0, ilo.'i llur>{riMivi> c. Kvoiard (18.)0), i; Ir. <'li. It. 278 137 Harjfroavo c. Si.ink, (1802) 1 (^ H. 2.); 01 Ji. J. Q. H. 318; Oft L. 'l'. CM; 40 VV. It. 2.VI 7 Ilar^frcavrM v. I'arHonH (1814), 13 M. & W. fiOl ; 14 L. J. Ex. 'iitO 07U Harlaiid v. Morlcy {sir Morli'V c Moricy). Harlddk v. Anlilirrry (1882), MM 'li. I). fi30 ; 51 L. J. Cii. 304; 40 L. T. ■M)(S ; 30 W. It. 327 Vft Hariiiaii v. AndtTHoii (1800), 2 ("ami>. 243; 11 It. It. 70(1 oiri Hariiiaii v. (iiirnnr (18(10), .Ift Hcav. 748 702 Hariiian r. It.rv.. (IH.IO), 2') I,. J. (!. I'. 2r)7 ; 18 C. M. .''.87 088 Haniiarr. Davin (1817), 7 'ra-iii. .'")77 ; 1 Moon', 0. 1'. 300 518, ;V»2 Harm.T v. Kcaii ( : 8,5.3), 3 ( '. \ K. 307 2y i Hanii.T r. M.'ll (1851), 7 Mn,). I'. (;. C. 207 1103, 1120 HariiiiT f. Cnni.liuM (18.".8j, 28 I,. J. C. V. 88 ; 5 C. M. N. S. 240; 4 .lur. N. H. 1110 780 HariiK.nv, Tim (1800), 2 I!. Itoh. Adm. 322 179 Uarii.'Iti liiro, I-cal.y c. O'drady (188(;), 17 I.. It. Ir. 5|3 031 Hariiftt. r. VIh.- (1880), 5 Kx. I). '307 ; 43 L. T. 045 ; 20 W. It. 7 41 Hanior r. (Jr<iv.'H(lK55), 15 C. 11.007; 3 (\ I,. It. 400 757 HariHT, lt«' (1810), 7 NotcMof Can. {Km. \- Mar.) 44 700 Harrall, r. Wmo (18.30), H. \ V,. 712 ; 4 M. \- It. 521 3a, 1095 Harriiijrtciii r. Fry (1824), Ity. iV M. 00 ; M.H.rc, 344 ; I C. & l\ 289; 2 IJiiiT. 17it 1218, 1221 HarriM, U.I (1800), 2!) I,. J. I'. >% M. 7!»; I H. & T. 530 70H HarriM, It., ^"'i!'^ 33 I,. .1. I'. \ M. 181 ; 3 S. \- T. 485 TOO, 707 HarriH, He, CIucho v. J.ovij.iy (1877), 40 L. .1. 1'. I). \ A. 00 ; L. It. 2 1'. Div. 251 ; 37 1,. T. 204 ; 25 \V. It. 85,1 70(5 HarriH fi. It.Trall (1858), 1 S. & T. 153 705 HarriH v. Oiintar (1825), 1 0. & I'. 037 102 HarriH v. OainM.^ (1878), 7 ('li. I). 877 ; 47 L. J. ('li. 344 ; 38 L. T. 253. . 221 HarriH «•. Ooodwyn (1H41), 2 M. & Or. 405; 2 Soott, N. 11. 459; 9 l)owl. 4(tO H5, 750 > I Vol, I. tiidi with pagt 035. X<;lV TABLE OF CASKS CITED. PAOB HarriH V. IIiiniH (1H2I)). 2 \ln)t\^. V.va'.. U. 400 ftArt lliimHi'. Hill (IH'iJ), .iSliirlc. IK); I). & U. N. 1'. K. 17 '-m IliiriiH f. Miiiitl.'dTHll), It 'I'. R. ;107 TU) llim-iHU. ()'l,..Klil<'n (IH7I), T) Ir. U. K(|. />14, WO 17 JlarriNi'. I'.|.|«rfll (lH(i7). I,, li. .'. K.|. I ; 1(1 VV. It. OS, 17 I,. .1. <!li. liM 7l!l lIiiiriMC. I'.llK.rirU (IH7i)), 1 Q. H. I>. (Ill ; 4S Ji. J. (i. II. Wn ; 41 h. T. 14(1 4'i lIurriHi'. kirkcl.t. (IH.'iit), 4 II. & N. (1; 'iK I,. J. Kx. 47 62!) IliimHi'. Kydiiij^ {IH;»!)), T) M. & VV. (10 114 lliirriMi'. Hiiim.lriM (IH-'ft), 4 H. & (!. 411 ; (I I). & U. 471 1142, IIM IlurriH V. 'r.M|.iiiiv (IHH;{), 1 C. & K. (ir. 1 ll)(i, Vm\ llaiTiMD. 'riiom|)H(.n (IHft;)), l.'t (J. I». :);i;t HI lliiiriHi'. TipiM'tt. (IHll), '2 (!aiii|). (I.IK ; 11 11. It. 707 1)47, !)/»(>, i)«7 lliirrlHt'. WilMi.ii (IH;11), 7 VVcli.l. :.7 4!)4 llanim.ii, Kx pailii (lMf)'2), Id Jiir. 72(1; !'.» L. T. IM 1100 llaiiiHcii r. Itaildii (IH(ll), .'10 I/. J. Cli. 2lf. ; 7 .lur. N. H. 11»; it W. U. 177 I ai), 7H7 IlairiNon »'. HIadoM (IHl.'l), 'A (.'amp. 4r)H WiX), 120!) Ilarrlwiii r. Corp. of H(>iiUiainj>l.<>ii (IHr);i), 22 L. .). V,\\. 722; 4 l>«<). M. & (1. I, ■17 MO, 2!i.'>, I lo:i, II. '12 JlHiriHOTi V. (JrcHwic.k {\M\\), Kl (J. H. It!)!), 410; 21 I/. .1. (). I'. Il.t; !0 .1 iir. :t 1 .1 K5 JlaiTiHciii r. Klviii {1H42), ;tQ. II. 117; ^w. HID; 2 (i. k I). 7(1!); 11 I,. ,1. (^ II. I!I7 700 IlaniHon v. Kaiio (IH40), 1 M. * dr. UM) 48, 41) llaniMi.ii V. (Jiiidoii (I HUH), 2 l,i>w. <;.<,'. 1,111 WA llaifiMi.ii V. Ilcallioin (lH4;t), (1 M. * (ir. HI ; Sim.II, N. It. 7:i.'i ; 12 I/. .1. (!. r. 20:t M» IlarriMoii r. Ilyiln {l«''!'). -^ "• ''' N. HO.'. ; 'i'i. \,. .) . V.n. I|<) HOI llairiH.iii w. .I.ickw.ti (IH77), 7 <:ii. I>. ;i:i!l; 47 I-. .1. (!li. 142 7.'>:i llarriHoii r. Luk.i (IK4.'i), 14 M..V VV. I.ll); 14 I,. .1. I'',x. 24H 222 llaniMim v. Iti.waii (IH2(I), 11 VVaHli. .'.HO i)4.''i llarriH.iii )). Unwlry (l7!iH), 4 V..h. 1'I2; 4 It. It. 1!!!) 144 llaniHiin c. Siiiil.li(':i.ti. (I7.'>l). 1 Alk, fi2H !)(;2 llarriMoii v. Taylor (IH(IO), T.) L. .1. Kx. It ; 4 II. .t N. HI.'. ; ,'. .I.ir. N. H. 1211) 47 llarriHi.ii r. TiinKT (1H47), 10 (^ It. 4H2 ; 1(1 h. .1. () \\. 2!».'i ; II .liir. H17 4H0 llarriHi.ii f. Vallniirfi (ih22), 1 IliiiH-. 4.'. ; 7 Mcnir, (1. I'.. '(01 41)(i, f.ll JIaniHc.ii (.. VVilliaiiiM (IH'J4), 11 It. .V ( !. Ki'i 1))),'. JliirrlMon v. VVri>(lit (IH I.'.;, l.'t M. .V VV. H20 ; 2 I). & L. (iO.'i ; 14 I,. .1. Kx. 100 lt\M, fi44 Ilain.<l !■. Ilarrcl (lHr.4), 1 K. * .1. 4 ; IH .lur. H.'i.'l 140, H(»7 Harry i'. Itn.ail (1704), 2 S.ilk. 02(1 10 llarl V. Alrxaiiilcr (Ih:I7), 7 »'. ft I'. 740 ; 2 M. & VV. 4H1 ; M. & II. (i;i ..lOOo, 1000 Hart. c. IIiihIi (IH.'.H), '^7 I.. .1. <i. It. 271 ; K. II. \ K. 4 04 (i!)2 Hart, II. |)..aiiirr (IK.'tl;, Wrml. 407 1102 lliirl.r. Krondti'i, \i'., (iolil Min. Co. (IH70), I.. It .'. Kx. Ill; Itl I,. .1. Kx. Oil ; 22 lj. T. :io r.4 1 llart.fi. llarl. (IH42), I liar.', I ; fi .Jiir. 1007 ; 11 I.. .1. Cli. ....i;(l, ;I02, ;t(),'. ]|art. V. Iliirii (IHOll), 2 Camp. 1)2 40(1 Hurl, r. NaMh (ih:!..), 2 1). M, .Sc It. ;i:t7 : 1 <ial.s 171 ; '> Tyr. ii.'..'. 715 llarl, ('. Niiwmaii (IHI I), :t Cami.. l.'t ' [,'IK) Jlarii). l'Mii..l..rKaHt, flHl.'.), 14 M. .V VV. 74 1 ; If) K. .1. Kx. 22;t ..710, 711, 712 llarl, t). Hal.lloy (IHI 4), :i Camp. .'.2H (till llarl, r. Tiilk (IH,'.2), 22 I,. .1. «:li. (1111; 2 l»o (1. M. & (1. .'lOO . H02 llarl, w. WilliamM {IH2I(), 2 W.'riil. .'ii;i 4f)l llarl. r. Wiii.lMcr flHl.'l), V>. M. .V VV. OH; Kt I,. .1. Kx. 120; H .lur. IW).. 774 llarl. .rr. I larl.T (1H72), 42 \,. J. I'. .V M. I ; I-. It. .'I I'. Ik. U. li; 21 I ,. T. Hi-.H , J\ VV . It. ;i4 I 141 llarlf.iril c, ralriwr flHIO), IH .InliriN. fAm.) I4.'t H'lO llHrll'iiril V. I'owiT (IHdO), I. It. ;t Ki|. (102 (lltl liurtliiy ti. Cook (IH,l2j, 6 (J. ,Sc l>. 4 1 1 1171 Till' rr/'irrtiirii iiif to pagm, tint to piiriii/riijih^. TAHLK 01'' CASKS CI IKI). XCV m 'i rm vknn ITarlloT V. IlindmarHJi (lH(i(i), L. U. 1 O. P. ChVi ; 35 L. J. C. V. 'l.Vt ; 14 W. k.Mi W'Vi iriirUoy V. Wharton (IHIO). 1 1 A. & K. it.H ; :i P. & P. M!); 1 Jiir. f>7«..07:<, 7i:« llartli'V »'. WilkiiiMoii (1HI.'>), I Cam|>. 127 ; J M. * S. -2^ 7.'>.'> iriirtiMi. Tilt' (IHHI), it P. I). 4« ; M L. J. P. I). & A. JA ; M L. T. UTO; ■Vi W. K. ;)!»7 ; f) Ah|). M. C. 'illl 177 llartopji f. Ilart(.iip (IHr).'.), '21 Moav. "iftO ; '2 Jiir. N. H. 71>« ; 2r> \,. .1. (Mi. ■J71 i;i« lliirtMhonid f. Watwm (IHHO), 5 Hiiijf. N. C. 477 ; 7 Him)U, HU ; '2 Am 70 imi> lliirty c. DaviN (IS.'iO), 111 Ir. L. K. •r.\ 7'2(> llamw'M raw (ISOO), '2 KaHt., P. (/'. (\!>H fiH". llarvi/y c (laytoii (KwA), '2 Hwhiih. ^^I, ii. ; 11) H. H. (Ki fill-2 llarvry r. Ccii"'''""!. ("<'•'-) •'<> •'• H. Ir. iVl .'iri llarvoy c. Croydoii Hiiiitn, Aid. (IHHI), ('diirt i)f Alijii'al, "TiiiioH," It Kdh., ov.TniiiiiK M Ii. J. (;ii. ;t;ir> r.07 Harvey «'. DivurM (m>!>), IC. C. H. Ii)7 HISI llarv.'y v. Kiirnid (1HH((), f. P. Div. I.'.H ; lU L. J. P. I). & A. Xi IM.t Harvey r. I'Mniie (lHh'2), H App. Cum. 1:1 IMt Harvey »'. (Iraliliaiii (lH;i(i), ft A. & K. (U ; (I N. * IVT. Ifll "M Harvey r. Iliirvev ('.«HI), 2(i Cli. I), till ; [<\ Ii. T. M)H ; ;{;t W. II. 7(1. .. . Hl\H Harvey f. MilrlKill (IHll), 2 M. & Kob. ;i(i(l 2(i, 271), ;ilO Harvey v. MorRaii (ISIO), 2 Hl.ark. 17 ;U;i Harvey e. M.m. Perm. Invest. Iliiilil. Hoe. (IHMl), 2(! Cli. O. 2711 ; tfl Ii. J. Ch. '.'Mil ; .'i.'t Ii. .1. di. 1 12(i ; ftl I,. T. Ids ; ;)•.; \V. K. r>,%l (iou Harvey v. TowerM (IHAl). (i Kx. K. (i.'.(i ; 20 L. J. Kx. ;UH ; U. .Iiir. .'ilJ . . 2(12 Hiirw.xMl r. (i(H«lriKlit. (1T7I), 1 Cowp. 91. il2 ; liotl't, CM); ;t Wiln. Iil7 ; 2 W. HI. !t:t- 2i) Harw I V. Keys (lH.r2), 1 M. .t Hcilt. 201 4!l(!, ."ill Hiirwood ('. HiiuH (IHlO), WiRlilw. 112 101, 410 IhiHeldine »'. drove (1KV2), 3 (1. & I). 210; 3 H. M. !lil7 ; 12 I,. .1. M. (;. 10 ; 7 .Tur. :t(! 39 IhiHleliainr. YounK(IHIl).''Q- It. H;t:i; 13 Ii. .1. (i. M. 20.'".; 1 I). \- M. 70(1 1(11 llMsloek V. KerKUHNon (1H:17), 7 A. \- K. HO ; 2 N. \- P. 209 ; 1 .liir (iS9 . . 719 HaHliiek r. Pe(ilev(lH7.i). II I'-.I-<'1>- li;i: I-. It. 19 Kti. 271 ; 23 \V. It. I.^.") I.i!» llasNaril r. Sini'li (IH72), I. It. (i Ki|. 129 170, 2(i3, 1102 llaHtie r. IhiNtie {1S7(>), I Cli. I>. f)(i2; I.'. I,, .T. Cli. 2.SH 1234 HaH(,il<.w r. Stoltie (IKO.'.), '.\r> }.. .1. P. .V: M. IH ; Ii. It. 1 P. & I). (14 ; 14 \V. It. 211; 13li. T. 173; 1 1 .Tiir. N. .S. 10.19 140 IhiMtinKH P •• (IHIO), Pari. M. 200 423, 42.'5, 42(1 IJHHwell, 'I'lie (IH(il), llrown. \' I,uh1i. 247 IS."! Hatch r. MeiiniN (lH:t3), I Pairf. 211 ,'.ll llateli c. Ilatrh (1812), 9 Mann. 311 1201 Hateh r. .MearleH (IH.'') I). 2 Sni. \(1. 117; 23 L. J. Ch. 4(17 ; 24 l,..I. ("!h. 22. . r2(l.-> Hat.luiwav i: Harrow {1H07). 1 <'ain|), l.M 1102, 1109, 111(1 llaUiaway v. HaHkell (1H2!0. 9 Pick. 42 493 Hatliorn v. I\in>f (IHll), M MaMH. 371 931 llatton r. Ituyle (IH,')H), 27 Ii. .1. I'lx. IH(1 ; 3 1[. *. N. <^00 101 llavelock r. IJockwooil il799), S T. It. 2(iH 1M3 Hawanlen r. Dunlop (IHC.l), 2 H. \. T. 310; 31 \j. J. P. 17; t> Ii. T. 7(i.') 104ft llawcH V. AriMNtronnr {IH3.'>), I IHnur. N. O. 7(1') (109 llawcM r. IhneKer (1HH3), 23 Ch. I). 173; 52 li. J. Ch. 449; 48 Ii. T. 51H; 31 VV. It. 570 t< HitweHC. PorHter (1H3I), 1 M. .V Wol>. ;!(iS 297, I'ilH llaweN r. WiilNon (l,S2l), 2 It. .V C .'.10; 4 I). * It. 22 545 Hawk V. I'Vi'iincI (IHVI), I K. \ V. 291 474 HawkeM c. linker (IH'.lin, (Ireenl. 72 90(1 llawkcM e. .Suiter (IH30), 4 ItinK- 71.'> ; 1 M..VP.750 32 HuwkeHley r. llnMlNliaw (I.SMll), 49 L. .1. (^ II. 3.13 ; ft il. It. I). 302 ; 42 li. T. 2H5 ; 2H \V. It. 557 535, 53(1 llawkimworth c. Hhowler (IH43). 12 M. & W. 49 ; 13 Ii. .1. Kx. H(t H89 HawkiiiMf. (iathercole (IH.'iO-l), I Him. N. S. 150; 20 I,. .1. (!li. 303 (101 llawkinMi'. Ilowar.l (IH2I), Ity. \ M (14 ; I C. \ P. 222 fil»8 yi)!. I. m>d* With jtmit t)30. ; ■*.% .. ^: XCVl TAI'MC OK CA8KH v.'! Kl), ilnwkliiH V. TiiiHCdinlin (1R18), 2 Swiiim. ;i'.)2 . nan H..(Ik.,h I'. Tiij^K (l«7'^), I' K. 7 Kx. v'H;i ; 't I I,. .1. Kx, Kilt ; '^(1 VV. K. »V\ W.i ](<ulli'yt;. lliiiMl>ii<l)f<'flHr/),;i(/. Il.;ili); II L.J.W. II. 'Jd.'l ; '.Mi. ,V I). 4H;| HXI llncimii f>. (Mi.iiir'iilH (IH,')(l), I Ir. <:. Ii. II,. 11 fil'2 M.lll..l(l (.. McmrloWM (IHliDj, I,. It. I ( !. I'. .Mill; '.id I,. T. 7U\ VHll JlriiiiM'HriiHi', |{<. M<.l.r<>|i<iliiiiii lliuik (JKHII), li'iOli. I). I lltl ; '!<,> I,. .1. Oil. fif.i ; 111 I,. T. y:»i) Hia ^^l^\>y v. MuUh.wh, (ih'/i) 2 g. n. wi; (la 1,. .l.(^ ii./i77; 70 1,. r. h.iv; ri W. U,. f.l4; f.H.;. r. 7Hr.. 11 I,. : II K. (Auk) I ; 'M I.. ./. (/. It. 4(1/) ; •»;( W. U. ftdl Iilil. ( lun ll.'llliiKH, II... (I8l!»), I KolpitrU. 70;t m»M ll.l|iH.;. Oliivl"" MHill), 17 <!. M. N. H. fiM; :t4 I,. .1. (!. I'. I; II 1,. T. 47'!; 1.1 VV. II. nil 49 IIkIhIiiiiii f>. lllurkMooil (IH/)|), II r. II. Ill ; W \,. J. C. I>. IH7 IIIO llnlycur I). Iliiwkn (|H{(;|;, (, Km|i. Ti IIHH JlftiliriillKf. HI'li'l""' (l«7;ii, 4'^ Ii. .1. <!. I'. I'lM; '.^1 W.ll,. (i;t(l lt> lli'inriiliiK r. MiMlilii'k (IK7'/), 41 I.. .1. Cli. titl ; I.. 11. 7 <''li. -W^' ; W l<. 'I'. r,iu> , vu VV . II,. 4a;t 1K.4 llniiimiiig V. I'liriy (IH:t4), (1(3. & l'.,ftHO lUO 'J'ht mftittwri an Id pni/m, mil to )iuriiijrii/i/ii. TAHLE OF CASKS CITKn. XCVU H(«nimin>rH r. Omhhoii (18.18), K. T\. & l). ;il(! ; i!7 T-. J. (^ H. -'.IJ ; t .Im-. II Jj. s. h;ii pAoa 2U I'lniiiiiiu'H I' •IS I,. T. ;i!ij Willi II (lH8;t), 10 Q. It. I). •J.V.I; fi'i I,. J. a. It. '-'T:!; :ti W. U. ;i:i(; 1177 Hniil.liill r. M'K.'iiim (IM !,'>), H Ir. I,. H. I.'l IIO'.I II.'iii|ihIi.ii c. Iliiiii|ilin>.i ilSl'.T), li-. |{,. 1 (". I,. '.'71 .Sll'i llcMili'iMiii I'. AiiNlniliiiii Koval Mail .Stciiiii Niivij^. (.'<>. (1H;").')1, .'1 M. & It. •Illil ; 'Jl I.. .1. <^ It. '.i-l-i ; '1 .liir. N. H. n:10 OIJ, (M.'i lli'iuliTHoii r. Iliinu'Wi'll (1H!7), 1 V. .V .1. ;tS7 -".17 liciiil.'rHoii r Itnmmlii'ail (IH.V.l), \ II. & N. .1(1:1; 'JS I,. .1. I''.x. iiCid ; .'i.liir. N. S. 117.' ;;;i I,. T. o. s. ;io2 HM lltiiil.THon c. ll.'inliTHim (IKI.!). .'I llaro, ll.'i I I'J:), 11.1.1, 11.11 II.Miilciw.ii r. Il.'-i.lcrwpii (ISI.S). (i l^ It. JSS I I I'i, 11 17 ll.n.l.TM.ii r. S,|uin< (IN(l'.i), I.. U. I Q. It. 17(1; 'Mi \,. .1. l^. H. 7:i; 1(» It. .V .S. l.SH; 111 I,. T. 1.01 ; 17 \V. II. i.ll) 774 ll.'ii.lorwiii r. William.M, (l.S'.l.l) 1 i). It. ,1.;i ; 111 I,. .1. {.). It. lidS ; 7- l<. '!'. 1)8; 4;i W. II. '^71 If/./. |,>I1| llriifnio «'. Itriiinii'v (I.SdS), 11 j'lisl, liOlt ; •_• Sniilli, KMl; S U. U. I'.M l'.!()(l il.iirroy «'. Ilfiiriv'y (ISli), I Muc. I'. (\ (V '.I!! : 'J ('ml. KIS 701 liciikin V. (I.T.SH (181(1), 'J (',iiii|i. lOS ; I'J I'la.sl., '.' 17 ; 11 U.K. 7.11 (I'.'l lliiilcy r. So|«T (iHv'Hl, 8 It. .V ( '. Hi ; -J l\l. \- It. l.i:t ll.i;i ll.iiinim f. Iiicl(iiis.,ii (i.sj.s), .1 Itinir. 1^:1; 'J M..V r. ".isj w;. iiiij lic'iiiiiaii r. I,..,^lrr (I.Sil'J), :tl I,. .!.('. I'. :!7(» ; liC. It. N.S. 7SI; ll.lur N. S. (101 '•■>:<, '.ill8 llriiia'NNjr.\VriKlil(188H), ;iii\V. |{.. 870 ; .17 l,..1.Q.n. AO I ; 10 I,. T. 701.. (11 ;t, (.18 ll.iirv c. (i..l.lii(.v (181(1), 1.1 IM. \- W. 101 ; 1 |)..wl. \ L. (1; M I,. .1. l\\. '.'118 ; 10 .liir. r:iO 1111 lli'iiry «'. I"'!' (^181 l\ ',! ('Iiit. I!. I.'l 0'.'(1 II. iiry f. I.<'ijfli (ISI.!), .1 ('Mni|). 100 lilO, 1017 lliiiiy '•. lii^'ti (.1 ."8^<K 1 l>all. '.'■>'•■'< 7(1.1 lli'iiiy '■. Mill]. 1)1' W.-tiiirnlli il8i:!), If. Cir. U 800 •J8i1 ll.iir'v (1p.\im, 'rii(Ml8;8), 17 I.. .1. Adiii. s:t , :i 1', Div. 1.1(1 ; lis I,. T. 810. . Ill, lis, 1171 IIiiinIiuxv v. IMia.saiici' (1777), 'J \V. It!. 1171 ll(i:i 18 ll.iiwoiiii c. Olivrr (ISI I), 1 {). It. 100 ; 1 11. \ l>. 'Jl Il.i.worlli I'. Il.'i.woilli (1870), I,. K. II \''.i\. 10; 10 li. .1. Ch. Ill ; 'J.i I.. 'l\ .188 ; 10 W. |{. Id (1(1(1 Ilrrlirrt, f. ANliliiiiiit'r (17.10), 1 \VII«. •J07 III rlicrt, »■. II. 'iIkmI (181.1), Dran.., \'W. I llnlii'tt. c. Hji.. (ISIi'J), 1:1 Ir. Ki|. It. 'Jl lliilint. r. .Say..|- (1811), ft il. Jt. 0(1.1; 2 :'(.»; 8 .lur. 81'. Ili'vhirl. V. 'I'diKnl (l(lli:i), 'I'. Itiiym. 81 It. 1(1 TC III Dowl. * 1,. 1 ; III 1,. .1. (^ It, 111' 117. •1'.' ill llcivtl It 1'. ('. N. .S. lis,'. lnllii|l III, I' r (18,111), l{llll|.«lH. 1'! H. .101 ; I M<M>r< llrniiami r. SnirNilial (IS(l'J), If,! \.. ,1. (!. I'. 411; 111 ('. II. N. 8. Ml (I I.. T. (11(1; II \V. It. \Hi. J'.'d, ISO lIcnni'H r. ('liii'aK') Hay Cn (IS'.U), '.'7 Am. .S|. It. (10 lli.llirM rrcniK-i' (18 18), ;i Mari|. .18.1; '< I,. It. II. I,. (So ) .MS lli'iTiiiK »'. ItiiNlon Inm ('11. (IS.in, I (liay (Miin.h.), i;il 78lt lli'ifiiiK I'. rliili..ry (18 I'J), 1 I'liill >,l| .. .'. .101, .ion, (iOO llriv.-v «'. lli'rv.iv"{lV7llV 'i \V, 111. 877 11711, IVd lli'Ht.ltinn I'. HiffgiTH (1818), I Kx. 81(1 ; 18 I,. .1. Kx. 1(1(1 ( S,1 IIi'nIii|i I'. Cliapiiiaii {.in- llail.liii'K r. llt'Nln|0. Ili.hloii r. HI. Iliiil.i (1 8111), •.'■' I,. .1. M. ('. (11; 1 K. ,V II. .1811 nil llfllicriii^flim 1'. llillii'iiiiKlim (IS87), I'J I'. D. I I'J ; M I,. .1. I'. 7S ; Kl'J 1.18 /i7 li. T. ft.'ill; lid W. It. I'J; Al .1. no lli'tlii'i'iiiKliiii «'. Ki'iiip (ISIfi), I ('aiii|i. 1011 ; Id It. It. 7711 llrllii'iiiiKloii <'. liOiiKTiRK (1870), 18 li. J. I'll. 171 ; 10 Cli. D. Id' 'J7 W. k, IIO.'I rax lli'dtfli I', (laiwll, (187.1). -ll li. .1. I'll. liO.I; ;t'J li. 'r. 11 IISII 1 1. 'Will, c. l'iK>f..U (18111), ft ('.\ P, 7.1 IS., .'.Jd Jli.wlolt, r. (!...<k (I8;il), 7 Woii.l, ;t71 4'JO, laii yol, 1, 0HiU U'ilh /Kiyc (Klft. i!^ ^ xcvm TABLE OF CASES CITED. H 4S7 , 8S1 663 rxoR Hewlins v. Shippsm (1826), 5 B. & C. 229 ; 7 Dowl. & R. 783 637 HewHOii r. Brown (1700), 2 Burr. 1034 1014 Iloxt, 1'. Gill (1872), L. K. 7 Cli. 099 ; 41 L. J. Oh. 761 ; 27 L. T. 291 ; •20 W. It. 957 114 Hoy V. Moorhouse (1HH9), 6 Biiijr. N. O. 62 ; 8 S<!ott, 160 2.^8 HcyoN V. Ilindlo (1803), in Q. B. M. T. 1803, MS 010 Iloynmn «'. Fluwkor (1863). 13 C. H. N. S. 619 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 132 ; 9 Jar. N. 8. 896 110 Hoyman v. Noalo (1809), 2 Uamp. 337 297 Hcviminn v. R. (1873), L. R. 8 <i. B. 102 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 383 ; 28 L. T. 102 ; 21 W. R. 367 84 HcyHliam v. FoMter (1829). 6 M. & R. 277 1039 Hcywood f. Piekoiinf? (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 428 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 145 ... , 33 Hcyworth i>. KiiiKlit (1804^, 17 C. B. N. 8. 298 : 10 Jiir. N. 8. 806 298 JUbbiTil V. Knight (lHi8), 2 Ex. 1 1 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 119 ; 12 Jur. 102 . .321, 698 Hibbcrt V. Barton (1842), 10 M. & W. 0S3 ; 2 Dowl. N. 8. 434 ; 12 L.J. Ex, 70 733 Hibbliiwhito v. M'Morino (1840), 6 M. & W. 214 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 217 . >83, 084, 120;, 1204, 1206 HibbH V. Ro88 (1800), L. R. 1 Q. B. 631 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 193; 12 Jur. N. 8. 812; 16 L. T. 07; 14 W. R. 914 178, 1176 Ilickcy, In ro (1876), Ir. R. 10 Ecj. 117 166 lliokcy r. Birt (1810), 7Tami. 48; 17 R. It. 440 , Ilickcy V. Campion (1872). Ir. R. C. L. 6i7 631 Hic'.ccv r. llavter (1796), 1 Esp. 313 ; T. R. 384 ; 3 R. R. 213 Hicknum v. Ilayiics (1876), L. R. 10 C. P. 698; 44 L J. C. P. 368; 32 L. T. 873 ; 23 \V. R. 872 762 liii'.kinan v. Maobin (1869), 4 II. & N. 710; 28 L. J. Ex. 310; 6 Jur. N. 8. 670 98 Hickman v. Upsall (1877), 4 Ch. D. 144 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 245 ; 35 L. T. 919 ; 26 VV. R. 176 172 Hick«, Ro (1809), 38 L. J. P. & M. 65; L. R. 1 P. & D. 683; 21 L. T. 300 702 Hi(;ks r. Duko of Beaufort (1838), 4 Bing. N. C. 229; 6 Scott, 698; 1 Arn. 66 ; 2 Jur. 266 621 Hickw r. Faulkner (18S1), 8 Q. B. D. 167 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 208; 30 W. R. 646 ; affiit. 40 I.. T. 127 ; 40 J. P. 420 29 Hicks r. Sallitt (18,64), 23 L. J. Ch. 671 ; 3 Do C. M. & 0. 782 741, 789 Hickton r. AntrobuH (1840), 2 C. B. 82; I Lutw . Rog. Ca.-. 303 166 Hide, Ro (1871). L. R. 7 Ch. 28; 41 L. J. Banl:. 6 002 Hide i>. TiioniborouKh (1840), 2 C. & Kir. 260 114 Hi^ririuH' Trusts, Ro (1801), '.> i'.in. 662 ; 30 L. J Ch. 405 632 Hi>rifinH V. Hopkins (1818). 3Ex. 163; Railw. Caa. 75; 18L. J. Ex. 113 611 HiKlfins V. Scott (1832), 2 B. & Ad. 413 79 Hifr^nns i'. Senior (1841). 8 M. & W. 814 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 199 768, 769 Hi!,'Ki"w>" '•• Clowes (1808), 16 Ves. 610 ; 10 R. R. 112 760 Hitf^iiiHo" "• Siinpaon (1877\ 40 L. J. C. P. 192; 2 C. P. D. 76; 36 1,. T. 17; 26 W. U. 303 620 HiffRHV. Dixon (1817), 2 Stark. 180 1207 Hiwst'. Maynard (1866), 1 II. & R. 681; 12 Jur. N. 8. 706; 14 L. T. 332 ; 14 W. R. 610 163 Hiyham v. Ridgway (1808), 10 East, 109 ; 2 Smith, L. C. 270 ; 10 R. R. 236 ; Preface, v 434, 436, 437. 438. 439, 441 HiKhlield r. Peako (1827), M. & M. 109 960, 1013, 1030 Hi^rhland Turnp. Co. v. M(d(<'an (1813), 10 Johns. 164 1176 Hiliard v. Phaley (1723), 8 M.)d. 180 496 Hill, Ro (1849), 1 Roberts. 270 698, 702 Hill t'. Camj)bell (1872), 44 L. J. C. P. 97 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 222 ; 32 L. T. 69 ; 23 W. R. 330 1 182 Hill c. C.>onibo(1818), cUM 1 Stark. Ev. 188, u. (ii) 921, 944 Hill V. Crook (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 702 ; L. R. II. L. 206 ; 22 W. B.. 137 ; 24 L. T. 488 739 Hill f. Dolt (1867), 7 Do O. M. & (4. 397 812 Hill r. Hart-Davis (1881), 20 (!h. D. 470 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 1012 ; 61 L.T. ->79 914 Hill V. Ilennigan (1877), I. R. 1 1 C. L. 622 130 The referenccn are to pages, nnt lit paragrapht. TABLE OF CASES CITED. XCIX I'AdK Hill V. Maiichcstor Waterw. Co. (18:!1), 2 B. & Ad. flfl'i, 55a ; '2 N. & M. 573 91, i>'i, M Hill r. Piickiml (1830), 5 Wond. 387 1018 }lillr. rtiilp (18.-)2). 7 Ex. 'J3'2: '21 L. J. Ex. 8'2 ; Ul.Tur. 'JO 1187 Hill f. Rutloy (180'2), 31 L. J. Cli. 380 ; 2 J. & U. (531 \H Hill V. Salt (1831), 2 O. & M. 120 ; 4 Tyr. 271 ; 3 L. .1 Ex. 84 103 Hill r. TboiinwDu (1817). 3 Mor. (i3() ; 2 Mdoro, 424 ; 8 Taiin. 375 : Holt, (i;t(! 43 Hillary v. Waller (1805). 12 Von. 230, 252 126 Hills V. EvaiiH (18(i2), 31 L. J. Ch. 401, 402 ; 4 DoO. F. & J. 28S ; L. T. 90 : 8 Jur. N. S. 525 43 Hills V. I;aiiiinff (1854), 9 Ex. 250 ; 23 L. J. Ex. (iO 93 Hills r. Loiulim Oas Co. (1858), 27 L. .T. Ex. 60 ; (1860), 5 H. & N. 312 ; 20 L. .1. Ex. 409 43 Hillvard v. Grauthiiin (1750), cited 2 Vcs. son. 240 1116 Hilton V. i'ainaouKh (1811), 2 Camp. 633 : 12 K. H. 76(i 32 Hilton V. (lii'aud (1847), 1 DoG. & Sin. 187 ; 16 L. ,1 . Ch. 285 ; 11 Jur. 838 693 ] I iiuli-koptT V. Cotton (1834), 3 Watts, 56 616 Hindlfy*'- Ilaslam (1878), 3 Q. B. n. 481; 27 W. R. 61 1119 llindmiirsh, Ud (1860), 1 Drew. & 8m. 129 713 Hindmiir.sh r. Charlton (1861), 8 H. L. Cas. 160 095. 700 Jlindos. China and .Tajmn, Bk. of, v. Smith (1867). 36 L. J. C. 1'. 241 1198 J'.ind.s(m v. Korsoy (1765), 4 Burn, Ecu. L. 118 1215- llindustan, Bk. of, Ro, Frickor's ca.so (1871), L. R. 13 E(i. 178 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 278 845 Hiiiton r. Heather (1845), 14 M. & W. 134 ; 15 L. .T. Ex, 39 ;U) HipKravo v. Case (188.5), 28 Ch. I). 356; 54 L. .1. (^h. 399 ; 52 L. T. 242 192 Hirs(^litield r. Smith (1841), 1 H. & R. 284, 288; L. R. 1 C. V. 310; 35 L.J. C r. 177; 12 Jur. N. S. 5-'3 31 Hirst, V. Hannah (1851), 17 Q. B. 383 732 Jlileh r. Wells (1816), 10 Beav. 84 607 Hitcliinv. Campbell (1771-2), 2 W. Bl. 827; 3 VVils. 304 ....1118, 1120, 1122. 1 1 39 Hitehin v. Groom (1848), 2 M. & W. 816 801 Hitchings v. Thompson (18,^0), 5 Ex. 60 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 146 99 Hitehins v. Eardley (1871). L. R. 2 P. & H, 248 ; 40 L. J. P. & M. 70. .20, 414 Hitchins v. Hivehins (1866), L. R. 1 P. & I). 15,5 ; 35 L. J. P. & M. 62 .... 347 Hoad V. Grace (1H62), 31 L. J. Ex. 98 ; 7 H & N. 494 786 Hoaro V. Corvtou (1812), 4 Taun. 560 147, 408 J loaro V. Graham (181 1), 3 Camp. 57 : 13 R. R. 75 J 756 Hoare v. Johnstone (1838), 2 Keen, 55;i ; 7 L. J. Ch. 207 495 Holihsr. Henning (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 791; 34 L. J. C. P. 117 1149 Hobbs t'. Knight (1838), 1 Curt. 768 706, 707, 708 ][obhou80 I'. Hamiltcm (1803), 1 Seh. & Lef. 207 ; 2 Si'h. &- Lef. 28 1009 Holwon f. Parker (1 753-4), Banies, 237; cited in 3 T. R. 142 ; 1 R. R. 673.. 994 Holwrn r. Thellusson (1867), 36 L. J. Q. B. 302 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 642 .... 639 If.obv V. Roebuck (1816), 7 Taun. 157 (iH2 Ho<kin V. Cooke (1791), 4 T. R. 314 16, 765 Ho.leni)yl r. Vingerhoed (1818), Chitty on Bills, 627, n. (y) 386 Hodgens V. Graham (1831), Ale. & Nap. 49 712 ] lodges V. Anenim (1855), 1 1 Ex. 214 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 257 944 Hodges f. Bennett (I860), 5 H. & N. 625 ; 29 I,. J. M. C. 224 630 Hodges »'. Cobb (1867), 36 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 652 ; 8 B. & S. 583 ; 16 L. T. 792 ; 15 W. R. 1038 .347 ITodges ('. Holder (1813), 3 Camp. 366 270 Hodgkinson v. Fletcher (1781), 3 Doug. 31 118 Hodgkinson v. Kelly (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 837 ; L. R. 6 E<i. 496 ; Ki W. R. 1078 158 Hodgson's case (1830), 1 Lew. C. C. 102-104 246 Hodgson, In re, Beckett v. Ramsdalo (1885), 31 Ch. D. 177; 55 L. J. Ch. 24 1 ; 54 L. T. 222 ; 34 W. R. 127 631 Hodgson e. Clarke (1860), 1 Do G. F. & J. 394 ; 1 Giff. 139 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 1024 798 Vol. J. inda with pag» 636. n n r ' I . : ;i I i i i j 1 ' " if «f i TA15LE OF CASES CITED. VAca Hods^sdu f. DaviiiM (IHIO), 2 Ciiinp. 832 ; IIR. R. 789 d.' jriMljfMon )'. ])f ncaiich.'SMc (IHaS), 12 Afoo. P. C. C. 2S,'), 317 I7!>, 378 HoiIk-mihi v. lliitclifiison (1712), '') Vin. Abr. iVii '>'M, OHO Hfidj^Non )'. JoliiiHon (18:)!)), 28 L. J. Q. U. 88; K. B. & E. 08:); 6 Jur. N. H. 2',)() 082 IFodKN'm V. Ln Brot. (1S(I8), 1 Ciiinp. 223 (iiiO 1Iim1),'s()Ii v. Mor.'Nt, (1821), '.) rn(M', .')(i3 VM H.)(lK*m f. H(^iirl(^U (1S13), 1 B. >'i AI<1. 232, 245, 21(; Ill lliiiltu^tt I). Fonnim (181')), I Stark. !i() 1213 Hndsim »'. M='i •"• '»^ Ry. (!o. (1H77), r. K. II 0. L. 101) 1232 Hoc r. Niitli Ihorpc) (1(;()7), 3 Hiilk. IT)! ; I LA. Ray. ITil ..101(1, 10.')2 llollinim r. J io3), I (jaiiics, l.')7 rm Iloviirth r. Lutlmin flH78), 3 Q. B. I). 013 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 330 ; 39 L. T. ICy ; 2(i W. R. 3S8 120.') Ilojrv: '•• <iarroU (181!)), 12 Ir. Eij. R. T).-)!) 38i) llcijj^r V. Hk(!cn (18(1.')), 31 L. J. ('.. V. 1.53 ; 18 C. B. N. H. Vin-, II Jur. N. S. 2M ; 12 L. T. 709 ; 13 W. R. 383 202 IIoKliton V. Hoghton (1872), IT) Beiiv. 27« ; 21 L. J. Ch. 482; 17 Jur. 99. .137, .OOO, 5U ir<.ll)ii-.(l V. StcplioiiH (1811), r, .Tur. 71 280 lIollM'ck r.I[.)liiock (1819), 7 NotcHof OaN. 291 (Ecu. & Mar.); 2 RoIktIh. 120 (198 n(illir<r)k V. Tirroll (1829i, 9 I'idk. 109 0;')9 Ilolcoinhu f. HcwHoii (1810). 2 (Janip. 291 ; UR. R. 710 230 IIol<Tc>tt'.s aiso (l,')77-8), 4 Co. Rop. 40 b 1129 IloWoft V. Harbor (1813), 1 C. & K. 4 1 -13 llolcroft, Liulv, V. Smith (1702), 2 Frocm. 2.')9 1214 Iloldcii, Re, Ex parte Holland (1871), L. R. 19 Eq. 131 ; 43 L. J. Bk. 9 ; 3 1 L. T. 44."> ; 23 W. R. 24 849 Holdim V. Ballantyiio (1800), 29 L. J. Q. B. 148 : Jur. N. S. 451 194 IT.ddnn r. lloldcn (Hill r. Dolt.) (1857), 7 Do O. M. & (1. 397 812 Holdon I. Kin« (1870), 40 L. J. Ex. 75 ; 35 L. T. 497 ; 25 W. R. 02 .... 1073 H(ddor V. Coatns (1827), M. & M. 112 114 Holder v. S.mlby (1800), 29 L. J. C. P. 246 ; 8 C. B. N. S. 254 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1031 ; 8 W. R. 438 102 HoldtuHt V. DowsinjT (1740), 2 Str. 1254 ; Bull. N. P. 204 1215 Holdiuf,' V. Elliott (18.')0), 39 L. J. Ex. 134 ; 5 H. & N. 117 520, 7o8 IIoldiiiK ''. Pi^ott (1831), 7 Binj,'. 405 ; 5 M. & P. 427 781 Holdsworth V. Davenport (1870), 40 L. J. Ch. 20 ; 3 Ch. D. 185 ; 35 L. T. 319 ; 25 W. R. 20 084 Holford V. Bailoy (1850), 13 Q. B. 427 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 109 ; 13 Jur. 278.. HI Holnato, Re (18.')9), 1 S. & T. 201 ; 29 L. J. P. 101 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 251 ; 17 W. R. 19 097 HolKiite V. Slight (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 602 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 74 732 Holiday v. l»itt (1814), 2 Str. 986 ; Gilb. R. 308 807 Ho!l V. Griffin (1833), 10 Binjr. 240 ; 3 M. & 8c. 732 515 IfoUand V. Roovcs (1835), 7 C. & P. 705 485, 929 HoUiday v. Atkinson (1820), 5 B. & C. 501 ; 8 D. & R. 103 133 HolUngham v. Head (18.58), 27 L. J. C. P. 241 ; 4 C. B. N. 8. 388 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 379 230, 241 IIollinB V. Vorney (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 301 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 430 ; 51 L. T. 753 ; 33 W. R. 5 ; 48 J. P. 580 76 TIolliH V. Goldfineh (1823), 2 D. & R. 316 ; 1 B. & C. 205 235 Holloway V. Rakos (1772), cited Davies r. Piorco, 2 T. R. 55; 1 R. R. 419 445 Holman v. Burrow (1702), 2 Ld. Raym. 795 16, 18 Holman v. Pullin (1884), C. & E. 254 780 Holmo V. BrunHkill (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 495 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 610 ; 38 L. T. Q'jQ 523 H .lines V. Badd'oloy (I'sVtV Y iphiil.476 V UL. J. Ch." iii? ;' 9 Jur." ij'sb" ." .' 601 Holmas r. BoUingham (1859), 7 C. B. N. S. 329 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 132 ; 6 Jur. N. 8. 534 112 Holmes V. Clifton (1839), 10 A. & E. 673 649 Holmes V. Ho.Hkius (1854), 9 Ex. 753 689, 690 Holmes «. MackrcU (1858), 3 C. B. N. 8. 789; 30 L. T. (O. 8.) 243.... 674, 713 The references are to pages, not to paragraphs. I TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. d r*OK Holmes V. Milwaid (1878), 47 L. J. Cli. 522 ; US L. T. .181 ; 20 W. R. MH.. i;j;{ IIi.lm.-H r. Milchfll (186!)), 48 L. J. C. P. liOl ; 7 C. H. N. H. -.m ; (i Jiir. N. H. 7;J (i7(t, ()76 HdIui.h r. Stiiim h (IsriO), U C. .V Kir. It) fi2l licit -•. Cnllvcr (IHHl), l(i till. D. 718 ; flO L. J. Ch. .VA : 41 L. T. 214 ; •J!) W. It. ViD'J 7 1 1 Holt V. JcHMi) (lH7(i), 3 Ch. I). 177 : 40 L. J. Cli. 2.')l ; 24 W. 11. 87!) .'•)(>8 Ilolt V. MioFH (18;(<)), !) (J. A: P. 11),-) ;u I, 1();12 lloltt'. rio(1888). 120 Ph. St. 4;)!) 741 Holt r. Squini (182i')), Ky- & M. 2H2 rtOfl Hoiiiiin r. ThoiniiMon (IMIil), (iC. \- P. 717 271 llcmiof. n.'iitiiK^k (1820), 2 H. & IV 102 014, 018 lloiiuT V. lloimr (1878), 47 L. J. Cli. OliS ; 8 Ch. 1). 7.)8 ; 3!) L. T. 3, 27 8(13 JlointTf. Wallis (1814). 11 Mums. 3((',» 1223 llotiKTHlmiii »'. Wolvurhainpton WiitcrworkH Co. (IS.'il), C Ex. 137 ; K.iilw. C. 7!I0 042, 045 Iloiiiball I'. Uloonicr (1854), 10 Ex. 538 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 11 ; 1 Jur. N. 8. 188 1008 Hooilc. L(l. HiimiiKtoi) (1808), L. K. Eq. 218 071. 1045 Iliio.lt'. Lady Hc'iiiirhum|> (1830), U\iUh. Ev. of Slice. 408 420, 423 Hood V. Kccvc (1828), 3 C. & P. 532 4i)8 ]lo(.p(T r. (iiiiiiiii (1802), 2 J. & H. 002 ; 10 W. R. 014 : L. T. HUl 5!)!) Hooper V. StoplioiiH (1835), 4 A. \- E. 71 : 7 C, k P. 2(iO 715 ]i(.p.:iuft i\ KcyH (1833), i) Biiitf. 013 ; 2 M. * Scott, 700 im ]Iopc r. Pciidoi'i (1851), 2 L. M. A: P. 5i»3 ; 17 Q. B. 50!) ; 21 L. .1. Q. h. 25 ; 10 .Jur. 80 315 ] lope V. 1 lopo, ( 1 H'.)3) W.N. 1 8i)3. at p. 20 453, 4 55 Hopor. Liddcll (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 01)4; 7 Do (J. M. & G. 338 321 Hoiicwellr. Dc Pinna (180!)), 2 Ciinip. 113 172 Hoi)kiiiHr. Crowo (IK30), 4 A. iV: E. 774; 2 H. .V W 21 227 Hopkins r. Gni/cbrook (1820), H. & C. 31 ; !) Dowl. & B. 22 773 Hoi>kinsr. Logim (1839), 5 M. & W. 248; 7 Howl. 360; 8 L. J. Ex. 2 IS 3S7, 710 Hopkins V. "Waro (ISO;)), li. K. 4 Ex. 20S : 3S I>. .T. Ex. 147 ; 20 L. T. 147 32 Hopper V. Warburton (1803), 32 L. J. Q. B. 104 ; 7 L. T. 722; 11 \V. K. 3vl 191, 196 Hopwood r. Hopwood (1800), 20 I,. J. Ch. 292 ; 22 Boav. 4»8 ; 29 L. .T. Ch. 717 ; 7 H. L. Cas. 728 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 897 800 Honlcrn r. Coniinorcial Union (1887), 50 L. J. P. C. 78 ; 50 L. T 210 48 Horn V. Thoniborough (1849), 3 Ex. 840 ; Howl. & L. 061 ; 18 L.J. Ex. 349 39, 227 H.rnor. Mackenzie (1839), 6 CI. & Fin. 028 924 Honii^ V. Smith (1815), 6 Taun. 9; 1 Marsh. 410 ; 3 East, 10, n. (a) ; 10 K. R. 658 819, 832 Iforno v. Swinford (1822), 1 D. & R. Mag. Cas. 301 8(i8 Horner v. Horner (1877), 40 L. J. Ch. 017: 47 L. J. Ch. 036; 8 Ch. D. 75S.. 803 Hornsby v. Kobsou (should bo Bolton) (1850), 1 C. B. N. S. 03 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 55 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 074 156 Horrouks v. Metrop. Ry. Co. (1803), 4 B. & S. 315 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 307 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 204; 8 L. T. 003: 11 W. R. 910 1102 Horsefall r. Ilodtfos (1824). 2 Coop. 116 673 Horsey v. Graham (1809), L. R. 6 C. P. 9 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 68 ; 21 L. T. 5,39 ; 18 W. R. 141 682 Horsfall V. Hey (1818), 2 Ex. 778 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 200 088 Horsford, Re (1874), 44 L. J. P. & M. 9 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 211 ; 31 L. T. 553 ; 23 W. R. 211 707 Hort(m V. M'Murtry (1800), 29 L. J. Ex. 265 ; 6 II. & N. 007 ; 8 W. R. 285 202 Horton r. Westminster Improvement Comrs. (1852), 7 Ex. 780; 21 L. J. Ex. 297 91, 93 Horwood, In ro (1880), 55 L. T. 373 914 Horwood V. Griffith (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 466 ; 4 He G. M & G. 700 . .785, 789 Hospital for Incurables, In re (1884), 13 L. R. Ir. 301 1012 Hotson V. Browne (1860), 30 L. J. C. P. 100 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 442 747 Voi. I. tudi with page 636. ;!■ si t: ill oil TAHr.K OF CAKKH Ciri',!). !i PAIIN IImij^Ii r. MiiTiziiliim riHTOj, IH I,, J. I'W. ;illM ; I l\%. I). Kll 7M ll..iiKli(.,n, Kx imrhi flHIO), 17 V.'«. '.','.1 ; II If. It. "M <1'1*1 lli.iitfliloli f. K.riiix (|H.')(1|, IH«: II. •.'.'l.'i; LT. I.. .1. ( !. I'. '.^IM 'MW lloiiMi'M <'. Hinitli (IH.'iOj, II <^ II. Mil : I!) I,. J. {). M. 170; II Jul'. .'>'IH.. KIW'.I lioiilditrh V. M. of l)i)iii'Kiil (IH.'II;, H llliKli, N. It. ;t;t7 ; 2 «'l. \ I'in. ■17'l III.!, IIK;, 1117, ll.'.M, IKi.'i IldiiliNtoii V. Hiiiyt.li (1820), 'Ji (',. A I'.'^l ; U IliiiK. r^7 ; H> Mooic, ( 1. I'. {Hi 1 17, ;i7.'i, loii'i Iliiiim')i.,lit Kiiv, cVr. liiH. Co. r. Onint. (IH7!);, IH I,. J. Kx. f.77 ; 1 Kx. I). 2111 ; 11 I,. T. V!»H; 27 W. It. Hr.H l.'./i llMiiw'tiiiiii (. lti.lMr(.H (IH:t2), :> (!. A I". .■I!tl .'112 lloimliiii I. Hli(/.., M(ii(|iiiM.if (IHH.'.j, 'ilirii. I). IIH; f,2\,.'\'.m I I Id, 1117 II. .w (. Hull MHlli, II I'liiMi.. 271 ; 12 If. It >>\:> 2H!i. ;iiH, :iiu ilouiinl / . Il.iil (IHH'.lj, 2;t <i. II. I). I ; 'iH I,. .1. II II. ;iHI ; (10 I,. 'I'. (l.'JV ; .'17 VV. It. r.;,.-, 10(12 H.iwiii.l r. (;iiii(Im|(| nH.'Kl;, r, howl. 117 l»27 llowiii<l r. hu.iilii) flK2;i|, I 'I'lini. * It H(l; iL.J.CIi O. H. H.') 6 ll..wur.l V. lliiilwMi (IHf).'!;, 2 K. .V II. I ; 22 li. .1. ^^ II. .'11 1 ; 17 .liw. «').'».. MH, r)IH II. .ward ('. M.iillaml (IHH.I), II ). II. I). mr,\ M ].. J. (i. II. 12 77:1 ll..w.ir.l i: .Mll.'li.'ll nHI7^ H Mii^h 211 HI) ll.iwiir.l i'. N.-wl.iii MHi;i , 2 M .V It.ili. fiWt '.'.'17 ll.iwar.l V. r.'.'tn (IHI7,, 2 dliiCy, It .'IKi 20| ILiwanU. Hli.wanl MMOOj, ;i(l l',. .1. 0. I', n ; I,. It. 2«:. I". IIH; IT. I,.'!'. ih;i ; U) w. It. iri 2;io, ;ihh II. .war.) f. Hiiiill) MHII;, ;i M. * (Jr. 2/11; ;i Hc.i.t.t,, N. It. .')7l 21t| l|..wiir.lr. VVilliaiiiM 'IH12;, !t M. A W. 72.'i; I D.iwl. N. H. H77 ; « .Inr. .'<HC> :tll J|..wur.l .. VVii)^lil, MK2:t), 2<!.h.|i. Ill 7'>0 JI..WCIIII, r. |t..iiM<T flMlll). ;) \;%. l!)l ; IH r*. .1. Kx. 202 7^1, I'i'^i Il.,w<! r. Mall 'IH70j, I. It. 4 K.]. 212 OHH M..WH r. I'alrii.r nH20), ;t It. \ ALL .'121 0H1» Mow.! 0. H..air..t,l. MH.'.!);, I II.A(N.72;i; 2H I,. .J. Kx . ;i2.'i im 11. iw.. I. Walk.T llHMj, 70 MiiHM. (1 (Jray; .IIH 7.''7 Il.>w..||. It.' (\H\Hj, I) N..I..K .if C.iiH. (Ki:r.'. H. Mar.) 20, lOli OlIH J|..wi.|| c. I^i.;l< MHO!);, 2 i',ilu\). M 0011 II..W.-M ii. llarlxT (\Hr,ij, IH ().. II. MH ; 21 I,. .1. I). H. 2/')l ; III .liir. (111. . H|',» J|..wl..U V. 'J'ario flH(il), 10 (/'. II. N. H. Hl.'l ; ;il I,. .1. (!. I'. 11(1 ; ID W. It. H(,H I 120 M..yl.', It.', Iloyi.iw. Il.iyl.i. riH!)2) II W. It. HI : ri.v.'rHiii(^ (17 Ii. 'J'. 2.')l.. (i7;i ll.iyl.. V. Li,ii\ (:oriiwalliM M720j, I Htr. .■)H7 HI lliil.liiir.l V. AI.'xaii.ii.r(IH70/,.'l(;ii. I). 7;iH ; If. L. J. Cli. 710; ;tf) l,.'V. [,2; 21 VV. It. lO.'.H mt, iliililiar.l I'. .(..liiiMloii.. MHIOi, .'I Taiiii. 20!) 29 IliiMiar.l > l,.^.'H MH'ld;. :t.'> I,. J. Kx. KIO ; I, It. I Kx. 'IM ; 4 il.Ar. C. IIH; 12 .liir. N. H. l:!.'. ; I :i I,. T. .".(17 ; 11 W. It. (101 12:t, (lO.'l Iliit.l.art, .'. I'(.illi|.« flHI,'>;, I.I M. Ac W. 70.) ; 2 Dowl, Sc \.. 707 ; 11 I.. .1. Kx . I (CI 1112 Jliil..r V. Hl.in.'r MH.'lOj, 2 Hi...l,(,, :i()1 ; 2 IliiiK. N. C 202; 2 l)..wl. I'. (). 7HI ; I II.,.Ik'm, 200 fi2 Jliil...rl,». M..r.'aii flH2(l;. 2«;. * I'. tiW ; 12 M.iori' (<!. I'.). 210 (\7t, JliiU'rl. I', 'ri.'h.in.o nH12), .'I M. Hi. (h. IV.i ; 1 H.i.il.1,, N. It. 1H(l; tiar. & ,M. .'l.'il ; II I, .1. »;. I'. 7H 071 j|ijl,..r(,'M CaM.' MddO/, How. H(.. 'IV. HO? ; VVIIIn, »!lr. Kv. 70 hf,! Ilii.ld.iaii .'. Kiriil.! flH.'IH;, .'I M. Si. W. M'l ; I II. .V II. Ill); 2 Jiir. Ill ; 7 I- .1. Kx. I'i:t 272 H.i.Jival.!, It.. MH(17^ ;i(l I,. .;. I'. At M. HI ; I,. It. I !'. \. D.Mr,; Id I,. T. i;il ; Id W. It. 01 dllH IIii.|h..ii /'. (Jii.'Mlii.r MHIH^, 1 daii.Ji, 21)11 I I .'.0 J|ii.|«..ii );. I'ark.-r HHII), I lf..l,.rf,«. 21 OD.O, (llHl, (107 J|ii(|m..ii .'. lt..v..U, IIHV.U), r, lUiitr. .'IdH ; 2 M. * I*, dd.'l 1201 1Iii.Im..ii r. 't'.iiinr 'lHV7j, 2 <^ li. l>. 'Am, Id I.. J. Q H- 10:1; .'Id I-. 'I'. 11)2 ; 2.'/ W. It. 710 :i'.'7 ilii'lw.i. V. 'r..<.l,li (\HT7i, 2 r. I). 12.'. ; Hr. I,, T. H20 Mil) 'J'ht rtj'iireiivin urn In imi/ift, tint In /mrui/riijihii. TAIIM', OF CAHKH CITI'.I). oitt Itiift r. I^. M.'hiirii.r (l"Hn), 1 ('..x, Cli. l'7A lluOVII I'. AriiiilM.Mil (IMll.'i), 7 <'. A I', f.tl KMH •Mi \[„n^rmH I. WumI (Ih7:i), h l^ li l». .'.'.'l ; w \,. 'V. ;i:i; ii W. It. itll./2<i<;, !:iim IIiikIk'n' riiMt. (INO-'j, .! KhmI , I'. ( !, KKI'J •J7H (!. J(»; I App. CiiN. 171 ; l'? W. K. \i9 dill IIiikIikh' I'lil.'iit, U<. (IH71IJ, IH I,. .1. I'. <;. J(i; I App. CiiN. 171 ; •-•7 \V. K. nil ii^Id'm r. Iliililiilpli (IH'J7), I UiiNN, Hill IIiikIh'n c. Illiiko (IHIK). I MiiNoii, l,\:, II III iiiikIm'n I. iiiK'iiiiiiiii (iHiiij, [r, M. ,v w. Miii; ;i howl, .v I,. "02, m, \. J. K TM. Ill .liir. KM I ;ii. ;iii. j'27 IIiiviImn r. Itiiilil (IHKI), H Di.wl. .'ICi; I .liir. I.M) .ill', :il I IIiikIk'n r. Mi.tii.p. My. Co (IH77), 1.' [,. .1 •'. I'. fi7H ; -10 I...F.('. I*. fiKM . ■i App. < 'iiH. I.'lll ; .'111 li. T. li;i'J ; 'Jfi W. H. (iHO /iU litiKlK'h I. MoiiiH (IN.'i.!), 21 I,. J. Ch. 7111 ; '/ l>i' O. M. & O.llili; lU Jnr iiii.'i I'h'il lliiiflK'H r. I'nriiiniirii (IHri.'i), '^1 I,. ,1. (Ui. IIHI ; 7 l><'li M ^ <l '.!'J»; I N. .s. mil 710, 7lft liiit^lii'N r. Uonrrn (IHII). H M. \ W. I'J.'i; III I,. ,1. Kx. '.^;iN III II kIi.'m r. Viir^riiH (IHli;i), (I K,. ISIII ; II T. I,. It. \v> IIXUCMIII v. IIUH.I...V (1HII7), 1 1 V.'N. •.!7:i ; 1» llllllx'll I. Hllllirl'l. (I Hill I, Jll AllliT. St.. K. I Mil {. U. IIH, 27(1; H'i rrrfiico vi .. i: .'ii . . Ii: )•> •.'■J, \1 .. II).' tiis, i;mi III II) Hull I'. Illiiko (IHliM. i;i MiiHH. l,').'! Hull. Mii>'»r<>f, I'. Iloi'MiT (I77II), I I'owp. 10 lliiMihlor. Iliiiil. (IHI7), Moll, N. I'. K. mil . Iliiiiil>l«r. Iliiiiti'r (IHIH), 12 (|. II. lllll ; 17 I., .1. W- K. ^I-' *• i I'-' -'"r IV I Ililiiihlit r. Milrhi'll (IH.'ltl), II A. A( K. Wr, ; '2 Uiillw. ('llH. 70 <'>^':i, l)!<t lliiiiif c. lliiiliMi (I;h;.), I Ifi.lK I'. <'. (Ir ) .'Ol IIIIJ lliiiiii' r. Hc.ilt (IHJI), .1 A. K. MiiihIi. Vlil !I73 lliiinpliri'y '■. HI.. L.K't (1H4I), Ir. I'ir. U. 711 it 14 r.i» iiiiiiiplin.VH r. Iliiilil (IMII), U lliiwl. Illlll); (> ,1ur. OIIO . lliiiiiplirryH r. (Iririi (INH'.>), III i). II. I>. IIH; A'i L. .1. U. l\. Ill); IH I,. T. 11(1- '•' • " "" lliiiiipliri'y II iiiii| iliiii'i .liir. I.!t : 17. 1. I' N 1'. Jlllll'H •Jll (IHI,'.), 1 IM * '\ w. i ; II V,.' y.'i ''.X V!t 1 • • ... r. lli'tiKi vu (IHIH), 1'.; w. II. 7;ti) 7 in; ■JO I, J. a i«. 10. 1' . II lliiiiKUl" >'■ OiiHniyiix (IHIH). J I'liill. IT); 'J Coiip Il4 lliiMKi'rfiiril r. Itcrlirr (IK/ill), ,'i Ir. <1i. Ui<p. 117. 17 liSH 712 I, lift r.'V. IJ.I. i;'l iia lliii'l. I'. AiliiiiiM (IHiili), fi MiiHM. IliiO C.im, m, 7.'>7, 7/>H lliliil. r. AiliiMiN (IHII), 7 MiiHM. .'ilH 7.')H, I Mill lliiiil. (. Aii.l.rwiii (IHiiH), I,. K. I l>. A 1>. 1711; ;i7 I.. .1. I'. A M. 27 .... I IHII II mil r. (iooilliikn (IH7:i). M li. .1. (I. I', fi I ; '.Ml I,. T. I7'2 Ill llillil. r. Ilrrlil (IH;i:t), H Ki. HI I ; Ti I.. .1. I'U. '.'Dll Illl'i Until I'. Ili'will. (IH.'i.!), 7 Kx. '2i:i; 21 l<. .1. Kx. 210; Kl.liir. .MM ..IIHI, IIN.'V Until, r. II. .rl. (1701), :i IIki. V. ( !. Ill I Until, r. Iliiiil. (IHIlll). I,. II. I I'. H I). lliMll r. I.iv.'Mtliif.. (IH27). A I'irk. nM lliilil. I'. MiiHHi'y (IHill). 2 It. \' All. M\ lliiiil. I'. I'i'iiki<'(l).li()), .loliiiN. 7lir> ; 2ti lliiiil ('. KouHMiiitiirr (IH'Jin. H Whi'iil. Iliiiil. (nIii.iiM Im> Hull) I'. 'I'lilk (IH,'>2). 2 l>i<(l. M. .V (l.:illl); 22 I.. J.CIi. 201) ; M.'i 1.. J. r. a M . \M> •■ ;i N..V . I'll. M. 100 1HI> ; (1 1. .1 211 .liir. N. H. 107 .. 1)1!) Ilniil I'. Wliiililnloli I Ill lliiiml (1H7H), :i ( !, I>. |>. 2IIH ; 17 I.. .1. ('. I' Ml) 7i>i) liUII 7f>.l III) lift 7lrl H()2 i;,M) i;ii llniil I'. VVJHti (IHfill), I \<\ Xt \'\ II.') Ilillilif, 'I'll.' (IHri), I DihIn. A.lm. IHII, iml, IH? III.'. MIS ItiitiM't' c. AlkiiiH (1h:i2). :t My! \ K. li:i 1:17 lliiiiliT r. <!alilw..|l (1HI7). Ml^^ II. (ill . 12 .lur. 2H.'i ; Mil, .l.t II. 271.. .Ill lliiiiirri'. Kitiiiiiitiiii'l (inrii), \r,i'. Ii. .mh); 21 I,. .I.e. I', id m)0 MiiiiUt r. I,i'iillil..y (IH.KI), Ml II. .V ( !. H.'iH :;2l lliliilcr I'. Nri'k (IHII), :i M. Hi Dr. 1H| ; :i Hnitl, N. It. IIH; III |.. .1. (!. r. 21)7 lU I'ul, I. riidx int/i iiiife 0115. W' CIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOB Hnnterr. Parker (1840), 7 M. & W. 343; 10 L. J. Ex. 281 ....645, 646, 6ft 1, 652, 7:iO Hunter V. Stewart (1861), 31 L. J. Ch.346; 4 De G. F. & J. 168. . . .1117, 1123 Hunter v. "Walters (1870), L. R. 11 Eq. 292 ; 24 L. T. 276 642 Huntingdon Peerage (1818), Report by Bell, 3J7 ; Att.-Gen.'s Report, 357 423, 426 Huntingford v. Ma.saev (1859). 1 F. & F. 690 243 Huutley r. Donovan (1850), 15 Q. B. 96 1047 Huntley Peerage (1818), Pari. Miu. 15 423 Hurd V. Moring (ltt24), 1 C. & P. 872 609 Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dval (1870), L. R. 3 Ind. App. 259, 286 899 Hurat'f casw (1804), 4 ball. 387 866 Hurst V. Beach (1821), 5 Madd. 351 805, 808 Hussey v. Crickott (1811), 3 Camp. 168 621 Hussoyr. Horne-Payne (1878), 4 App. Cas. 311; 48 L. J. Ch. 816; 47 L. J. Ch. 751 ; 8 Ch. D. 670 672 Hutcheon t'. Mauuington (1802). 6 Ves. 823 9 Hutchins v. Denziloe (1792). 1 Hagg. Cons. R. 181 632 Hutchinsv. Soott (1837),2 M.& W.816; M.&H. 194; 6L.J.Ex. 186. .801, 1197, 1199 Hutchinson v. Bernard (1836), 2 M. & Rob. 1 355 Hutchinson v. Glover (1876), 46 L. J. Q. B. 120; 1 Q. B. D. 138; 33 L. T. OO.-i ; 24 W. R. 185 1187 Hutchinson v. Tatham (1873), 42 L. J. C. P. 260 ; L. R. 8 C. P. 482 . .764, 769 Hutchison v. Bowker (1839), 5 M. & W. 535 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 24 43 Huthwaite v. Phaire (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 159 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 43 ; 8 Dowl. 641 1133 Hutt, Ex parte (1839), 7 Dowl. 690; 3 Jur. 1105 994, 99S Hutt V. Mon-ell (1849), 3 Ex. 241 532 Hutton, Re (1837), 1 Curt. 595 173 Hutton t'. Bright (1851-7), 3 H. L. Cas. 341 ; 16 Jur. 695 540, .541 Hutton 1'. Ro.«siter (1854-5), 7 De G. M. & G. 9; 24 L. J. Ch. 106 . . . .539, 553 Hutton V. Upfill (1850), 2 H. L. Cas. 674 ; 14 Jur. 843 540 Hutton V. Ward (1850), 15 Q. B. 26 : 19 L. J. Q. B. 293 ; 14 Jur. 372. . . . 318 Hutton V. Warren (1836), 1 M. & W. 466 ; 2 Gale, 71 ; IT. & G. 646 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 234 169, 768, 770, 781, 783 Hux, Re (1877), 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 39 ; 35 L. T. 909 ; 25 W. R. 273 . . 1214 Huxley v. East Loudon Ry. Co. (1889), 14 App. Cas. 26; 5f L. J. Q. B. o'05 ; 60 L. T. 642 ; 37 W. R. 625 41 Hycknian v. Shotbolt (1567), 3 Dyer, 279 b 643 Hyde v. Hyde (1889), 59 L. T. 623 914 Hyde v. Palmer (1862), 3 B. & S. 667 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 126 ; 11 W. R. 433 380 Hyde v'. WaV(s'(i8i3)," I2M.& W. 254";"l Dowl.' '&' L.'479 '; 13 L.'j." Ex.'ii 522 Hvman v. Nye (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 685 ; 44 L. T. 919 : 45 J. P. 654 772 Hynde's case (1592-3), 4 Rep. 71 b: cited in Doer. Wright, 10 A. \- E. 775 1140 hi' InnoTT V. Boll (1865), 34 Beav. 395 708 Illingworth v. Leigh (1800), 4 Gwillim, 1615 ; 3 Eag. & Y. 1385 611 Ilott V. Gcnge (1846), 3 Curt. 174 696, 697 Imperial Bank v. Lond. & St. Catherine Dock Co, (1876), 46 L.J. Ch. 337; 5 Ch. D. 195; 36L. T. 233 6, 769 Imperial Gas Co. v. Clarke (1830), 7 Bing. 95 ; 4 M. & P. 727 995 Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, (1892) 1 Q. B. 699 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 449 ; 66 L. T. 5.i6 ; 56 J. P. 436 242 Imrie v. Castrique (1S60), 8 C. B. N. S. 405 1103 Inca, The (1858), 12 Moore, P. C. C. 189 ; Swab. 370 177 Incledon v. Berry (1805), 1 Camp. 203, n. («) 1096 Indian Zoedone Co., Re {\HSi), 53 L. J. Ch. 468 ; 26 Ch. D. 70 1022 Ingallsv. Bills (1845), 9 Mete. 1 772 Ingilby v. Shafto (1803), 32 L. J. Ch. 807 ; 33 Beav. 31 1183 T/ie re/crcneet are to pages, not to paragraphs. TABLE OF CASES CITED. CV PA03 Inglesant v. Inglesant (1874), L. R. 3 P. & D. 172 ; 43 L. J. P. & M. 43 . . ti9t^ Inglis V. Buttery (1878), 3 App. Cas. 652 74:J Inglis V. GreatNorth. Ry. Co. (1852), 1 Macq. 112; 1 Paterson, 78. .294, 1176, 1177 Inglis V. Inglis and Allen (1867), 16 L. T. 775 ; 15 "W. R. 1093 621 Inglis f. Spence (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 436; 4 L. J. Ex. 11 ; 3 Tyr. 8 518, 519 Ingraham v. Bockius (1823), 9 Serg. & R. 285 45S Ingram v. Lea (1810), 2 Camp. 521 '^89 Ingram v. Wyatt (1828), 1 Hagg. Eco. 384 140 Inman v. Foster (1832), 8 Wend. 602 255 Inman v. Stamp (1815), 1 Stark. 12 ; 18 R. R. 740 082 Innell v. Newman (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 419 487 Innis V. Campbell (1829), 1 Riiwle, 373 172 Interleaf Publishing Co. v. Phillips (1885), C. & E. 315 281 International Ry. Co. v. Anderson (1891). 27 Amer. St. R. 907 377 lona. The (1867\ L. R. 1 P. C. 426 ; 4 Moo. P. C. C. N. 8. 336 ; 16 L. T. 158 178 Ipswich case (1835), Knapp & Ombler, 387 497 Ipswich Dock Commiss. v. St. Peter, Ipswich (1867), 7 B. & S. 310 112 Ireland f. Powell (1802), cited Pea. Ev. 16 396, 400 Irish Society v. Bp. of Derry (1846), 12 CI. & Fin. 666 1 102, 1230 Irons V. Smallpiece (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 551 639 Irving V. Greenwood (1824), 1 C. * P. 350 255 Irving V. Veitch (1837), 3 M. & W. 90 ; Mur. & H. 313 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 25. . 717 Irwin v. Callwell (1800). 12 Ir. C. L. R. 144 1163 Isaaci;.Farrer(1836),lM.&W.70; 4Dowl.755; 5L. J.E.x.04; 1T.&G.2S1 220 Isaac V. Gompertz (1837). cited Hubback on Ev. of Succ. 650 418 Isaacs v. Hardy (1884), C. & E. 287 Add. [688] Isabella, The (1799), 2 C. Rob. Adm. 241 757 Isquierdo r. Forbes (1760-51), cited 1 Douff. 6 1 155 Israel v. Argent (1834), Pears. Chit. PI. 330, n. (i) 147 Israel v. Clark (103, should be 1803), 4 Ksp. 259 550 Issard v. Lambert, In re Davies (18'J0), 44 Ch. D. 253 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 516 ; 02L. T. 715; 38 W. R. 634 013 Ivat V. Finch (1808), 1 Taun. 141 ; 9 R. R. 716 612 Ivey f. Young (1836), 1 M. & Rob. 545 192 Ivy, Lady, and Neal's case (1684), cited Skin. 623; ISalk. 281; 12 Mod. 86 1179 Jackd. Kiernan (1840), 2 Jebb & Sy. 231 1015, 1017, lOU Jackson, Re, Ex parte Bk. of Manchester (1871), 40 L. J. Bk. 57 ; L. R. 12 Eq. 354 ; 19 W. R. 872 ; 24 L. T. 951 685 Jackson, Re. In re "Walker (1885), 53 L. T. 660 ; 34 W. R. 95 621 Jackson v. Adams (1835), 2 Scott, 599 ; 2 Bing. N. C. 402 ; 1 Hodges, 339 244 Jackson v. Allaway (1844), 6 M. & Gr. 942 ; 7 Scott, N. R. 875 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 84 ; 8 Jur 63 201 Jackson v. Allen (1822), 3 Stark. R. 74 1191 Jackson v. Bailey (1806), 2 Johns. 17 354 Jackson f. Bard (1809), 4 Johns. 230 443, 510 Jackson v. Blanshan (1808), 3 Johns. 292 86, 433 Jackson v. Browner (1820), 18 Johns. 37 413 Jackson v. Bumham (1852), 8 E.'c. 173 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 13 604 Jackson v. Christman (1830). 4 Wend. 277 927 Jackson v. Cooley (1811), 8 Johns. 128 422 Jackson v. French (1829), 3 Wend. 337 598, 599 Jackson v. Frier (1819), 16 Johns. 196 306 Jackson v. Gridley (1820), 18 Johns. 98 898 Jackson v. Hesketh (1819), 2 Stark. R. 518 270 Jackson v. Hill (18,i9), 10 A. & E. 477 ; 2 P. cfe T). 455 ; 3 Jur. 970 6»9 Jackson v. Irviu (1809), 2 Camp. 60 ; 1 1 R. R. 658 169 Jackson v. Jackson (1825), 5 Cowen, 173 909 Jackson v. Jackson (1842), Ir. Cir. R. 409 1102 Jackson v. Knitten (1806), 2 Johns. 31 466, 470 Jackson t>. Lamb (1827), 7 Cowen, 431 433 Vol, I. ends with page 636, CVl TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAoa Jackson v. Lowe (IS?""), 1 Bin«. 9; 7 Mooro, 219 672 JatO son V. Luquere (l.S'2o). o Cowen, 221 433 Jaikson v. M'Call (18i:<), 10 Johns. 377 124, 433 Jackson «. Malin (1818), 15 Johns. 297 1199 Jackson v. Marsh (1826), 6 Coweu, 281 802 Jackson v. Miitsdoi-f (1814), 11 Johns. 97 90 Jackson v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1877), 3 App. Cas. 193; 47 L. J. C. P. 303 : 37 L. T. 679 ; 26 W. R. 175 23, 28, 38 Jackson v. Miller (1827), 6 Cowen, 751 11/8 Jackson v. Oglander (1865), 2 H. & M. 465 : 13 L. T. 16 ; 13 W. R. 936. . 672 Jackson V. Pesked (1813), 1 M. &Sel. 237; 14 R. R. 417 86 Jackson v. Seagar (1844), 2 Dowl. & L. 13 815, 832 Jackson v. Thomason (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 11 ; 1 B. & S. 745 ; 8 Jtir. N. S. 134 ; 6 L. T. 104 ; 10 W. R. 42 939 Jackson t). Waldron (1834), 12 Wend. 178-197 1219 Jackson v. Williamson (1788), 2 T. R. 281 816 Jackson f. Winchester (1800), 4 Dall. 206 327 Jackson t-. Woorl (1829), 3 Wend. 27 1098 Jackson v. Woolley (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; 8 E. & B. 778 ; 4 Jur. N. 8. 656 490 Jackson v. Wrij^ht (1817), 11 Johns. 193 90 Jacob V. Hunjyate (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 445 261, 816, 832 Jacob t>. Loo (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 33 313 Jacob V. Lindsjiy (IHOl), 1 East, 4(10 293, 485, 926 Jacobs, Ro (18:!5), 1 Har. & W. 123 833 Jacobs f. Hart (1817), 6 M. & Sel. 142; 2 Stark. R. 45 1195, 1196 Jacobs V. Humphrey (1834), 2 C. & M. 413 ; 4 Tyr. 272; 3 L. J. Ex. 82. . 496 Jacobs V. Jacobs (1834), 3 Dowl. 677 870 Jacobs V. Layborn (1843), 11 M.&W. 685; 1 Dowl. & L. 352 ; 12 L.J. Ex. 427; 7 Jur. 562 909, 910 Jacobs V. Seward (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 464 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 221 ; 27 L.T. 185 192 Jacobs V. Tarleton (1848), 11 Q. B. 421 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 194 ; 12 Jur. 617 272 Jacomb v. Turner, (1892) 1 Q. B. 47 1040 Jagrgers v. Binnings (1815), 1 Stark. R. 64 ; 19 R. R. 746 492 Jakeman v. Cook (1879), 48 L. J. Ex. 165 ; 4 Ex. D. 26 ; 27 W. R. 171 . . 1157 James v. Biou (1826), 2 Sim. & St. 606 620, 521 James v. Cohen (1844), 3 Curt. 782 709 James f. Hatfield (1734), I Str. 548 488 James v. Salter (1837), 3 Binj?- N. C. 544 74 James v. Smith (1890), 63 L. T. 524 665 James c. Williams (1H34), 5 B. & Ad. 1109 ; 3 N. & M. 196 ; 2 Dowl. 481 669 Jameson v. Drinkald (1826), 12 Moore (C. P.), U8 935 Jameson*). Leitch (1842), Milw. 688 1031, 1116 Jamewm v. Stein (1855). 21 Brav. 5 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 41 679 Jamewm v. Swinton (1810), 2 Taun. 224 ; 2 Ciimp. 373 33 Janaway, Re (1S75), 44 L. J. P. & M. 6 ; 31 L. T. SOO ; 23 W. R. 385 . . 697 J' Atis<m V. Stuart (1796), 1 T. R. 754 ; 1 R. R. 392 249 Janliiie v. Sheridan (1846), 2 C. & K. 24 606, 514 Jarmain .•. Hooper (1843), C M. & Or. 827 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 769; 13 L. J. C P. 63; 8 Jur. 127 168 Jarrett v. Leonard (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 265 498 Javiie r. Vtuo (1814), 5 Taun. 326 ; 1 Marsh. 68 ; 15 R. R. 518 110 Jeiikes f. White (1851), 6 Ex. 873 ; 'M L. J. Ex. 265 682 J.'itns r. Cooke (1857), 24 Beav. 513 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 67 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 202. . 066 Jeans <•. Wheedon (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 480 294, 356 Jeffcott f. North Brit. Oil Co. (1873), I. R. 8 C. L. 17 671 JeHerson Ins. Co. c. Cofh<'al (1831), 7 Wend. 72 934 J<.tferv V. Walton (1816), 1 Stark. R. 267 745 JetF.Tvs f BooHov {l»<yi), 4 H. L. Cas. 815 ; 3 C. L. R. 625 ; 24 L. J. Ex. HI ;' 1 Jur. N. S, 615 731 Jeffries r. Great Western Ry. Co. (1856), 6 El. & Bl. 802 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 107 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 230 117 tm Tht rtfereneei are to pagen, not to paragrapht. I'i : tjm TABLE OF CASES CITED. CVU PAOB Jeffries v. Williams (1850), 5 Ex. 792; 20 L. J. Ex. 14 114, 115 Jenkius r. Bt-thttm (1854), 16 C. B. 188 ; 3 0. L. R. 373 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 94 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 237 "80 Jenkins V. Blizard (1816), 1 Stark. R. 419; 19 R. R. 792 1096 Jeiikiiis V. BuHhby (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 400, 820 ; L. R. 2 Eq. 647 ; 14 W. R. 031 ; 34 L. T. 431 692, 59!), 1183 Jenkins r. Bushby, (1891) 1 Ch. 484 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 264 ; 64 L. T. 213 ; 39 W. R. 321 23 Jenkins f. Davies (1876), 1 Ch. D. 696 ; 24 W. R. 690 534 Jenkins v. (Jai-sford (1863), 37 L. J. V. & M. 122 ; 3 S. & T. 93 700 Jenkins r. Harvey (1835), 1 C. M. & R. 877 ; 2 C. M. & R. 393 ; 1 Gale, 23 ; 5 Tvr. 326 792 Jenkins r.'Heycock (1853), 8 Moo. P. C. C. 361 ; 1 C. L. R. 406; 6 Moo. Ind. App. 3G1 771 Jenkins v. Morris (1847), 16 M. & W. 877, 880 160 Jenkins v. PhiUips (1841), 9 C. & P. 766 ; 6 J;ir. 252 189, 194 Jenkins t>. Reynolds (1821), 3 B. & B. 21 ; 6 Mooro (C. P.), 86 668 Jeuner v. Ffinch (1879), 49 L. J. P. & M. 26 ; 5 P. Div. 106 ; 42 L. T. 327 ; 28 W. R. 520 704 Jenner v. Joliffe (1810), 6 Johns. 9 293 Jenncrv. Morris (1861), 30 L.J. Ch. 361; 2DoG. F. & J. 45 ; 7Jur.N. S. 375; 3L. T. 871 ; 9 W. R. 391 167 JcnniugH, Re (1851), 1 Ir. Ch. R. 236 '. 1177 Jenninr - v. Johnson (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 425 724 Jennings v. Whittaker (1826), 4 T. B. Monroe, 60 529 Jeshcl i: Bath (1867), 36 L. J. Ex. 149; L. R. 2 Ex. 267 ; 15 W. R. 1041 ..85, 741 Jesus Coll. V. Gibbs (1834), 1 Y. & C. Ex. 156 ; 4 L. J. Ex. Eq. 42 320 Jetley v. Hill (1884), C. & E. 239 166 Jewell V. Christie (1867), 36 L. J. C. P. 168 ; L. R. 2 C. P. 296 ; 15 L. T. 580 85 Jewell r. Jewell (1843), 1 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 231 413 Jewettw. Torry (1814), 11 Mass. 219 644 Jewis t'. Lawrence (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 345 144 Jewison v. Dyson (1842), 9 M. & W. 640 ; 2 M. & R. 377 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 401 232 Jewitt, Re (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 730 ; 33 Beav. 559 869 Jewittf. Eckhardt (1878), 8 Ch. D. 404 ; 26 W. R. 416 651 Jewsbury v. Newbold (1867), 26 L. J. Ex. 247 166 Jeycs V. Booth (1797), 1 Bos. & P. 97 ; 4 R. R. 771 732 Jinks r. Edwards (1856). 11 Ex. 775 773 Joel V. Dicker (1847), 5 Dowl. & L. 1 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 369 732, 733 Jolin and Mary, The (1859), Swab. Adm. R. 471 1 120 John V. Bacon (1870), L. R. 6 C. P. 437 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 3!)5 772 Johnson, Ex parte, Ro Chapman (1884), 26 Ch. D. 338 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 763 ; 32 W. R. 693 915 Johnson c. Appleby (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 146 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 158 743 Johnson v. Baker (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 440 1203 lohnson V. Ball (1851), 5 De G. & Sm. 85 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 210 701 Johnson v. Barnes (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 627 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 259 ; 29 L. T. 65 122 Johnson f. Blane (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 457, 461 170 Johnson v. Caulkins (1799), 1 Johns. 116 266 Johnson v. Credit Lyonnais Co. (1877), 3 C. P. D. 32 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 241 ; 37 L. T. 657 ; 26 W. R. 195 116 Johnson v. Davenio (1821), 19 Johns. 134 609, 1221 Jolinson c. Dodgson (1837), 2 M. & W. 659 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 185 674 Johnson r. Duke of Marlborough (1818), 2 Stark. R. 378 1193 Johnson v. Durant (1831), 4 C. & P. 327 ; 2 B. Ac Ad. 925 012, 1160 Johnson v. Hooker (1789), 1 Dall. 406 1 178 Johnnou t'. Holdsworth (1836). 4 Dowl. 63 487 Johnson v. Jolinson (1832), 2 L. J. Ex. 73 ; 1 C. & M. 140 ; 3 Tyr. 73 696 Vol. I. end* with page 636. CVIU TABLE OF CASKS CITKI-). PAdB Joliiiwiii V. KcrHhaw (18.J7), 1 V'' • O. & Sni. 2fi0 ; 11 .Tur. ftfi^, TOri a2.J Jnliiiwm V. LawHOii (IH'21), 2 IMun. H(i ; 9 Mimiic, IH;t 4i;{, •lift JolitiHoii V. Liii()Mny (IHHU), r.i Q. H. I). /JOH ; M h. .1. (i. H. f.Sl ; ;« w. u. 11!) m JohiiHoii V. Lyfoid (i808), 37 L. J. 1'. & M. Oft; L. 11. 1 V. & IJ. /iiC,. . li;i, :i,'.il, 717 JoliiiHoii V. MiiiininK (IHdO), 12 Ir. (J. L. U. 148 1(17 Johimoii V. MiiNoii (17!M). 1 Khii. S!) 1208 .I..li!iM<iii «. Kavlldii (IHSI), 111. n. I). IMS; /iO I,. .1. (i. H. 7.');t 777 Joliiiwin V. K<'i<l (IHKI), M. & W. 124 ; i) li. J. M. (). 2.') i;i2 JoliiiHiin »'. Ht. I'.^tcr, Il.acford (IMC), 4 A. & K. 620; 4 N. vt M. 18(1; 1 II. & W. 720 1(1!) .TiiliiiHon V. SIcar (18(1.1), lA (!. H. N. H. .'iiid 781 JciliiiMiiii V. W'linl (is(i(l), (1 V.H\). 17 f)()(), IO.jO JiilinHon V. VVarwiik {I8.'i(l), 2;'. I,. .J. (J. I'. 102; 17 (!. H. :)1(1 (*2 .iDlinHton r. <Miiil(,ti ns41), Ann. M. <t-. (). I2;t 1)77 .l(ilinHl.«iii V. Majipin, (IHi)l) (10 I,. .1. Ch. 241 ; (11 I,. T. 48 (171) JnlitiMloii r. JSumimr (18r)H), :t H. & N. 201 ; 27 I. J. Kx. ;fll ; 4 Jiir. N.H.4(12 KUl, 1(17 .T.pliiist,(.ii V. llHliiirtK' (1810), 11 A. ti !•;. .'^14!); .') I'. Ki 1). 2;t(l 704, 78;l .IdliliHtDiK! T'. lliKllrstciiic (182.1), 4 II. \' (',. !i.'12 ; 7 l>. .V 11 411 1(1, (KiO .Iciliimtonc .'. Hutt.m n;8(l), [T.H.fyiC; I U. H. 2.)7, 2(i'.» 110 .Jd'iit, V. Mnriyri ( lH'.i:t), '2 |>ox .t Hiii. 4 (Id!) Jo !(!V '■. Tayiiir (I807j, I (laiiip. Mli 289, ;tlH Jolly r. Ui'fH (18(14), li.'t L. .1. (). I'. 177 ; K) (;. I). N. H. (128 1(1(( Joll'y ('. Yomi),' (If'O"), 1 \''.n]i. 18(1 7(i:l Joly r. Hwift, (1817), 11 Ir. K(|. It. 410 1110, 11:18 JoiiiM, Iti r<' (IH.'j.'i), Dcaiic, I'lcrt. It. .') (;'.)(! Joni'H, In re n8(;4,, 4(1 I;. J. T. I). \' A. 80 (H)!) JoncM, |{<-, Kx |.ait,(! .JonitM (1881;, 18 Cli. I). 10!) ; 2'.) W. It. 717; M ],. J. (;ii.07;i 100 J'lni'H anil lioavor'H caHo (\i>(\C>), KcIvuh'c, .02 1 12') Jon.-M V. H..laini n840), 2 Jf^lil) * Hy. 2.S1) 47 Joni'M f. It<)y<:<' (181(1;, 1 .Stark. 4!):t Kl.'l Joniw V. Urcwcr (1811), 4 Tauii. 47 .'(29, 1209 JonrH V. CarriiiKt'in (1824), 1 C. & I'. .'129 f.|| Joni^HV. Cc.wliy (182.'>), 4 H. (fe C. 4 1.') 18.'i JoMi'M.;. OurlihR (1881), 111 Q. 11. I). 2(12; .'i.'l K. J. (i. H. ;i7.'t ; l>n K. T. .'ilO; ;)2 VV. It. (1.11 41 JoiicH »'. «;winorllMn Hlal.ii Co. (187!*), f, Kx. Div. 9.'1 ; 49 K. .1. Kx. 110; 4 I L. T. .17.1 ; 28 W. k. 2.'I7 ; 44 .1. I'. 1(18 M -Toni« V. KdwanlM (182.1), M'(;l. .V V. i:i'.l a I. J JoiicHti. Kiilit (lH:i9j, 10 A. it K. 768; 9 I,. J. (l II. 2.12; 2 1*. .V I). Mli (18,'), (18(1 JorifHW. T-'ort, (1828), M. * M 19(1 '.^(1 JoniM r. Koxall (1861!;, 16 llrav. .'188; 21 K. J. (!li. 726 [,[{ Jon<« D. KroMt, In ro V'uMij (187'i), K. K. 7 <'li. A|i|p. 77;i ; 42 K. J. <;ii. 47 ; 27 K. T. 4(16 ; 20 W. It. 1026 (i.l Joni'H i>. ,'lalti'H KnorH. (18 1 7), 4 Mart,. (l.'!6 \i JoiicM »i. (Jalway Town (/'oniniiMMicincrH (1847), Ir. K. H. 4;t.1 i:u JoiHw f). (Jooilay (1H42), !t M. Si. VV. 7i:f I 1 Dowl. N. H. 911 22(i, 227 JoncM 1). (looilriili (181 I;, 6 Moo. I'. (,'. (J. Kl 010, 1(»I6 .fi,wnv. llarriM (1H71), 41 I.. .1. (|. H. «; K. It. 7 </. It. 1.17 7:i(l JoncHi'. Ilocy (IHHO;, 1 JH MaMM. 681 7H2 JoncH »). Ilowill (18:tr,). 4 Dowl. 17(1 280 Joii'.- «. lliil<;liinHon (1861), lOO. 11.616; 20ri.J. C.I'. 114 1 9:t J>)MCM r. .loni'H (1786), I Cox, ( ill. 184 ;)K9 JoiiiH I'. .lon.'H fl8llj, 9 M *VV. 76; 1 1 K J. Kx. 2(16 |tl(l JoiiOH t>. JiiMt, (IHdH;, :i7 I,. J. (^. It 8!); I,. It. .') (^ If. 197; 9ll. .V.S. 141 7?7 Joiicn .1. I.itl.liilali' M8:i7), (1 A. \- v.. 48(1; I N. iV I'. 077 7*8 Joni.Hr. Mill« (18(11;, IOC. II. N. H. 788; .'li I,. J. C. I'. 0(1: 8 .liir. N. H. ;(^ oil JuuuH ».' Morriili (4 844), I C'. A K . Wli '. '. '. .' .' .' ." .' .'.'.'...!!.*.!.!.*.'.'!!!!!!!! W8 2'h4 rej'trninrii urr to juti/ff, nut tti puKiyriiphi. TAnLE OF CASKS OITKI). (MX I'AOK .loiii-H r. N.wmiin (1760-1). 1 W. HI. Oil ;i»a .loiiiw c. OrI'i (1«7;J), 41 li. J. (111. <i:i.t: 1' I. J. CU. XU ■ \,. U. 11 V.<[. ;1»; I;. II. soil. H)2; '20 VV. R. 7'.»l: 21 \V U. TM) : 27 \,. T. iiiiT ; •2H I,. T. 'JIT) 1 :i!) JoticH I'. PrpiMTcoriKi (IHf)!)), US li. J. Ch. i:.S; JoliiiH. JHO ; fi .lur. N. .S. 1 10 5 ,I(MH'H V. I'.Tiv ( 1 7!t«), -2 Khj>. 4^2 .Ic.ii.'MC. rii^ii (1SI2), I I'hill. i»l •lunc'sr. Itaiidiill (1771), 1 <''>w|) 17; I-o(l(, .tSIt, i'.'H I(i;f2, lOlto. 1 KyiU'f (IS.tH), 1 M. \- \V. ;f2 ; 1 II. & II. L'M ;iN7, ,S|',.v.'iiM (1H22), 1 1 I'ri.ic, Tit) •>!,■>, Sinm.l (ISJ.'))! 2 C. \ V. \M !I2:!, 'I'lirlclcm {1NI2), ".) M. \- \V. Hli> ; 1 Dowl. N. S. (i2.". ; C. Jiir. ;)7:i 71(1 .llllll'N I' .loiicM r ■llllll'N r JiinrH f :(»s :iii<) .Ii.iii'M (I. TiirliiTvilld {17'.>2), '2 V(iM. jiiii. 11 nCi .rnlll'SC. 'I'iininm-(l.s,t(i), I (1. >t I'. '201 /).|7 .liiMi'H r. 'riirpiii (lH7n, t\ IIi'IhU. Cl'iMiii.) ISl (il(i .IniH'M r. Vii'l...ri« (IniviiiK HorkCo. (1S77), IC li. .1. Q. IV 21il ; 2 Q. It. 1). :il I ; :iii ly. T. Ill ; 2.-. W. R. IMS 072, (17J .Iniii'M r. WiilliT (17.^:1). •■( <!williiii, HI7 171, l.'U .li.iii'H r. VViilliTM (lH:t.')). I I,. J. Kx. 10!); 1 (). M. & R. 7l:t, f) Tvr. ;ii;i i2o:t, i 204 1102, uk; ■>:\A .... fi7;i .Iniii'sc. \Vlii(.i< (1717). 1 Htr. (!H ; Hull. N. I'. 2:t:t .IiiMi'H r. \VimiiiiiH(l.s;)7), 2 M. X- W. :i27 .Iniiiiiiix. M.iiliinn", i'iimi" nf, " 'I'Iiih'm." K .liiii., 4 l''ol). IH',1.') .lupp ,■. Wii.hI (1S().')), 4 l>« (.'. .1 .V S. (iPi; ;t4 li. ,1. Ch, 211 ; U .lur. N. S. 212; 12 li. T. 41 ; l.'l \V. R, ISI .li.rilMiiH- r. li;iNlil.riiiik«. (170S), 7'!'. R. <i01 .Ii.riliin i\ Li'wIh (17:10), 14 KiihI, .'to,'), ii. ; 12 R. R. fi20, n (100, ,Ii.nli.|i /■. Mimry (IHf>4), '', II. I,. (!iis. LS.'); 2:1 I,.. I. ('\\. .Sll.") ....'"i:)!t, ,I.M-v c. Oiv.liimi (1770), 2 Hum. ^V: I'. :tO; fi R. R. .V(7 .InsiiiiKt-. KiiiKNl'oi'il (IHO;t), :t2 li. .1. (!. P. !»4 ; i;! (). H. N. ' 447; 11 W. R. .177 ,Iiiiiriiu f. Ilimrilii'ii (17S7), I'lirU im IiiHiiriiiKic, 2ir) .Iiiilil r. (Iririi (1H7C>), 4:i ).. ,1. Cli. lOH ; ;t;) L. T. Ml .Iiiiltfn r. Ili'rk.'i.'y (lH2rO, rili'il 7 (!. \' P. :i71, ii. («) .lii^Lriiiiiiiliiiii OliiiM' r. Miiiiii'lo'liiiiKl (ISTiO), 7 Moo. Iiiil. A|)|i. (^iiH. '2(l.'l .. ,lu«li«^«ir. KIhI,oIi (IH.'iH), 1 I'. \ I''. 2/".(i 200, ;U2, I .liiMtirn r. (iimliiiK (IN )2), 12(1. |l. ;tO ; 21 L. ,1. C. P. 01 ; U! .Fur. 420 . . 1 .IuhUi!!! r. Mrrufy SlrrUJo. (lH7i''>), 24 W. R. 100 1 170 N77 0H7 027 :U7 77(1 7(i:t /.t7 24(1 :,S2 o.'iri 11(1 2;t4 Kai.ihii f. (Iiinlrii City. .Vo.. (1S04) 4'2 Am. 8t. R. 2.'.(1 tdil. !(!(4| Kiilil f. .liuiHi'ii (1H12)', 4 'I'liiin. /■•(!■'• .■IHH, IH(I Kiiiii f. I Mil (1S2I). 2 11, .V (!. 0;t4 747 Kiiini-H r. Kiiijflitlv (l(iH2t, Hl<iii. /i4 7^(1 Knrlii, 'l'li.'(lS(il),' II. .V liiisli. A.lm. ;t(l7; lit W. R. 20.'> HIH KhviiiiiikIi r. < Jiilhlinrl. (lH74-r.), I. R. (1. Ii. l.'Kl 770 Kiiy r. Ilronldiiiin (1H2S), :t ( '. .Sr P. 656 .'riS. 12 IC. Kii'v <'. <'r<">li (1H''7), .'I .Sni. \ <1. 407 070 Kay r. DiicIii'nhi. do Piniii.. (IHIl), H (!iiiii|>. 12:t ;t7;» K.iil.lor. Piiyiin (1H;W), H A. .t K. 600; 7 li. .1. Q. U.21H, a N. & 1'. 6;tl.. 1 102. 111(1 Ki'iily .'. 'I'i'iiiiiil. (IH(ll), la Ir. I,. R. aO| (iOO Ki'iiiiK V. Siimlllioii,. (IH,'..'.), 17 r.. n. 170; 26 li. .1. C. P. 7'2 1106 Kf'iirin'y V. (Irniil, Hoiittii'iii luiil VVi'Nl.ini Ry. ('o. (IHS(i). 18 I,. R. Ir. ao;i. . Kia Kfiinii.y V. KiuK (IHIO). 2 H. \- AM. aoi 1(1, IH K.'imiry .'. lioiiil. Miiil HriKli Hv. Co. (1H71), 1j. R. 6Q. 11. 411 ; ao 1,. .r. (^ II. 200; 2'2 Ii. T. MHO; IH W. R 1000; Ii. R. 'IQ. H. 760 ; 40 li. J. W. H. 2Hrt; 24 Ii. T. 01, t ; 20 \V. R. 24 loa KiMil.iiiK I'. lloiilloM (lHa7), 22 li. R. Ir. 14a 6'24 KuM'h V. HHiKlford (1770), 1 WhiUi & T., Ii. U, 6a ; Udlwl Oiim. in Oluiii. Ill 6(10 Vol. I. frnl-i u.'itft pitfo (136. Mil .li ox TABLE Oi" CASES CITED. FAOR Keeling f. Ball (1796), Toako, Add. Cus. 88 1214 Keen v. Batshoro (17U4), 1 EHp. 11)4 1 Kil Ko<'n V. Keen (1«7;«), 4'2 L. J. P. & M. 61 ; L. R. 3 V. & 1). 105 143 Ki>on f. PrieHt (IHoH), 1 F. & F. 314 526 Keene r. BIhooo (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 644 ; 8 Ch. D. 201 ; 3S L. T. 286 ; 26 W. U. 552 522 Kehoo, Re (1884), 13 L. R. Ir. 13 701 Keiffwiii V. Keigwin (1843), 3 Curt. 607 6!)(i Keonnn v. Boylaii (1803), 1 Sell. & L('f. 232 1014 KeiHHeH)ra(!k v. Livingxtono (1810), 4 JohnH. (Am.) 114 75(t Koith V. BurroWH (1876), 1 ('.. V. 1). 722 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 876 6U Kell V. Channer (1H56), 23 lirav. 105 761, 786, 706 Kell V. Nainby (1820), 10 B. & C. 20 540 Keller, In goodM of (1801), 61 L. J. P. 30 ; 65 L. T. 763 702 Keller v. Blood (1K61), 13 Ir. C. L. R. 10 'Zu'Z Kellington, Vioar of. v. Trin. Coll. (1747), 1 WUh. 170 1010 Kelly r. Bamewall (1834), Cooke & Ale. 94 870 Kelly V. JavkHon (1849), 13 Ir. V.q. R. 129 502, 605 Kelly r. Keatirige (1S71), I. R. 5 Kii. 174 607 Kelly V. Lawrenee (1804), 33 L. J. Kx. 197; 3 H. & C. 1 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 637 ; 12 W. R. 4 13 543 Kelly r. Mid. (1. W. Ry. Co. (1872), I. R. 7 C L. 8 613 Kelly V. Powlet. (1763), Amb. 605 ; J)iek. 550 780 Kelly V. Small (1700), 2 Khj). 716 504 Kelly r. Hmitli (1841), Ami. M. & (). 130 077 Kelly r. Webster (1852), 12 C. B. 283 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 1(!3 ; 16 Jur. 838 . . 682 KelHall V. MarHliall (1856), 10 C. B. N. H. 266 ; 26 Ij. .). C. P. 10 ; 2 Jur. N. 8. 1142 341, 1155 Kelsev v. Bush (1842), 2 Hill. S. Car. R. 440 470 Kel.soii V. Kelmin (18-)3), 10 Hare, 385 ; 17 Jur. 129 ; 22 L. J. Cli. 745 . . 748 Keinble v. Farren ( 1 820), 3 C. & P. 623 488 Kemp I'. Herrett (1814), 3 (?amp. 510 ; 14 R. It. 820 , 35 Kempr. King (1842), 2 M. & Rob. 437 321 Kempland v. Maeaulev (1701). Peake, R. ()6 ; 4 T. R. 436 514 Kempson v. Boyle (186.-)), 34 L. J. Kx. 191 ; 3 II. & C. 763 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 832 209 Kempston v. Butler (1861), 12 Ir. C. L. R. 516 115 Kemptxm v. Cross (1735), Cas. temp. Ilardw. 108 8, 1015, 1046 Kendall r. Hamilt<m (1870), 4 App. Cas. 504 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 705 ; 41 L. T. 418; 28 W. R. 97 1115 Kmdall r. Lond. & S. W. Ry. Co. (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 373 ; 41 L. J. Kx. 184 ; 26 L. T. 735 ; 20 W. R. 886 771 Keim's case f 1607), 7 Co. liep. 42 1 103 Keiinaw. Nugent (1873), I. R. 7 C. L. 464 1119 KtnniMly r. Karl of Essex, (1801) 28 L. R. Ir. 586 544 Ken ly r. Hilliard (1850), 10 Ir. L. H. N. S. 106 865 Kenneriy r. Nasb (1816), 1 Htark. R. 452 1203 Kennette. Milbank(l83l), 8 Bing. 38; 1 Moo. & He. 102 713 Kensington, Ld., v. Bimverie (1850), 7 Jl. L. C. 557; 6 Jur. N. 8. 106; 20 L. J. Cli. 537 138 Kensington v. Inglis (1807), 8 East, 273 ; 9 R. R. 438 .303, 027 Kent V. Courage (.\: Co., (1801) 55 J. P. 264 ; 7 T. L. K. 50 643 Kent f. Jackson (1851), 14 Beav. 384 ; 2 I)e O. M. & U. 49 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 438 638 K<>nt ». Rih^y (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 190 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 569 ; 27 L. T. 263 ; 20 W. K. 852 135 Kenworthy v. Hcliofield (1824), 2 B. & C. 947; 4 Dowl. & R. 556 6()8, 730 Keogh V. keogh (1874), I. R. 8 V.q. 170, 449 801 Keogh V. Lwmaril (1877), I. R. 11 Kcj. 365 012 Kepp V. Wiggett (1K51), 10 C. B. 53; 20 L. J. C. P. 49: 14 Jur. 1137 ..88, 04 Kerin v. Dav.iri.'ii (1861), 12 Tr. Ch. R. 352 455 Keniot V. PittiH (18.^3), 2 K. & B. 425 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 33 ; 17 Jur. 932 . . 887 Kerrti. Shedden (1831), 4 C. & P. 531, n. («) 1048 The re/creiieei are to payet, not to purayrapht. TABLE OP CASKS CITED. CXI I PAOK Ki'whaw V. Cox (1800), 3 Ewp. 240 IVM Ktmhiiw «'. KorHhiiw (187.5), 1 li) Miihh. 110 744 KtTHhiiw r. O^rdim (IHC).")), 34 L. J. Ex. 159; 3 H. & C. 717; 11 Jur. N. H. r. 12 ; 12 L. T. fi;:! : 1 3 W. B. 7.')') ((«i), 01)0 K.'strel, Tho ll»«l). P- " IM'^ ; * Anp. M. C. 433; 45 L. T. Ill; 30 W. H. 182 936 KBttlcwdl r. RarHtow (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 718; L. R. 7 Ch. 080; 27 L. T. 258 ; 20 W. It. 917 1184 Kovati I'. Cmwford (187()). 45 L. J. Ch. 658 1031 Ktivil r. Lynch (1873), I. R. 8 Eq. 244 G'>» Key V. Cotiwworth (1852), 7 Ex. 595 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 4 42 K.'y r. Slmw (1832), 8 Hingr. 320 ; 1 Moo. & Sr. 4(i2 372, 524 KcynoH (sliould bo RyvcH) v. I), of "WolliiiKtou (184('>), 9 Hcav. 579; 16 L. J. Oil. nn 1045 KcyHor. TowoU (1853), 2 E. & B. 132; 22 L. .J. Q. H. 305; 17 Jur. 1052.. 118 Kibblo, Ex imite, Ro OiihIow (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 373; 44 L. J. Hunk. {i3 ; 32 L. T. 138 ; 23 W. R. 433 718 Ki.hk'nninstcr. Mayor of, v. Hanlwitiko (1873), 43 L. J. Ex. 9 ; L. R. 9 Ex. 13 ; 29 L. T. 612 ; 22 W. R. ItiO 531 Kidgill r. Moor (1850), 9 C. B. 304; 19 L. J. C. P. 177; 14 .Jur. 790; 1 L. M. & 1'. 131 85 Ki.lnor v. Krith (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 35 l?().t Kiilnoy »'. Cm'.kburn (1831), 2 Rush. & Myl. 168 417, 423 IvidHton t'. Euip. Mar. InH. Co. (1866), 35 L. .1. C. V. 250; li. R. 1 C. V. 535 ; 1 H. & R. 433 ; 12 Jur. N. H. 665 ; 15 L. T. 12 ; 15 W. R. 63 . . 764 Kioran v. HandarH (1837), 6 A. & E. 515 ; 1 N. & P. 625 546 Kilbfo V. Sncyd (3 828), 2 M.dl. 193 527 KilKourv. Aloxiiudor (1860), 14 Moo. P. C. 0. 173; 4 L. T. 487 185 KilKour r. Einlyson (1789), I H. »1. 155 ;iS6 Killby V. RoiOuLsNon (1865), 18 C. B. N. S. 357 521 Killick, R«> (1865), 3 8. & T. 578 ; 34 L. J. P. 2 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1083 .... 695 Kilpin r. Ratluy, (1892) 1 Q. B. 682 ; 66 L. T. 797 ; 40 W. R. 479; 56 J. P. 5(55 039 Kilvirt'H TruHtH, Ro (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 170 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 361 ; L. R. 12 E(l. 183 ; 26 L. T. 221 ; 20 W. R. 226 798 Kind)all v. Morroll (1826), 4 (Jrocnl. 368 306 ICininiol v. Kinmu'l (1817J, 3 ScrK- & R- 330 972, 973 Kinipton, Ro (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 153 ; 3 S. & T. 427 699 Kii>ii)ton V. Loud. & N. WoHt. Ry. Co. (1864), 9 Ex. 766 ; 2 C. L. R. 1026 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 232 868, 870 Kindurshiy r. ChaHO (undated), 2 Park, Lm. 743 1149 Kino V. Balfo (1813), 2 Hall & B. 347 679 Kine v. Beaumont (1822), 3 B. \- B. 291 ; 7 Moore, C. P. 112 310, 317 Kine V. EverHhed (1847), 10 Q. B. 1 13 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 271 ; 11 Jur. 673. . 220 KinK'H Coll. lfotti)ital v. Wlieildon (1854), 18 Hoav. 30 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 5:i7. , 784 King'n ('oiinty (Hliould be Knox County) v. Neath National Bank (nhould be Ninth National Bank) (1893), 147 U. S. 91 133 King, Ex parte (1802), 7 VeH. 312 869 King, In ru, Unity Joint Stock, iVrc. Amhii., Ex parte ^1858), 3 Do G. & J. 63; 27 L. J. Bunk. 33; 4 Jur. N. H. 1257 641 Kingc. Andermin (1874), 8 [. U E.i. 147 136, 137 Kingf. BoiU)rd (1863), 1 II. & M. 343 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 040 ; 8 L. T. 033 ; 11 W. R. 900 ; 2 N. R. 442 100 King V. Chamberlain (1871), L. R. C. P. 474 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 273 226 King r. Clerk (1695), 1 Hulk. 349 7 King V. Colo (1848), 2 Ex, 632 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 283 291 King r. Eoxwell (1876), 3 CA\. I). 618 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 093 ; 24 \V. R. 629. . 179 King V. FranciH (1800), 3 Ksp. 116 250 King c. Ceorge, (leorgeV KHtate, Bo (1877), 46 L. J. CJh. 670 ; 36 L. T. 759 ; 5 Ch. I). 627 ; 25 W. R. 638 808 King V. Il.iwkesworth (1879), 4 Q. B. I). 371 ; 48 L.J. Q. B. 484 ; 41 L. T. 411 ; 27 W. II. 660 41 King V. Hoaro (1844), 13 M. & W. 494 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 382 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 29 1116 Vol. I. endi with page 036. : 1 1 ■ ■ i ' r cxu TAULK OF CAKIiS CMFJ), ■| PAoa IfiiiK*'. KiM)f (IHflO), '2 Koh.TtM. I.IM Oftl, 11(12 Kint^r. Nonimri (IHIV), I (I. It. SHI ; 17 L. J. 0. I'. '2;i ; I! Jiir. H2\.J)m, 1()!>7 KitiK •'. I'liclilo.ik (IH-'(i), IH .IntiriM. Ill 172 KiiiK •'. Wulk.T (iH(i;i), 2 11. \ ('.. :wi ; ;t;) ij. j. Kx. 1117 '-!(>7 \ih\n r. WiinuK {IHdlt), r, Km|., \\ 2M KiiiK-c. /imiiH'imiiii (IH7I), ID I,. J. C. I'. '27H ; !<. It. (1 <!. I'. KIC ; '21 L. T. il^;i; l!» W. It. lOii!) ;t0H KiiiKof 'I'wi) Hinili.iH r. VVIII.cx (IH:)!), 1 Him. N S. .((il l)(|(i, (t70 KitiK«ii>ill >'. Milliir.1 (IK.'),-.), llKx. ;tl:t; :t<;. I,. It I()"J III! KiiiKHton'M {Duc.Ih'mh of) CiiMct (17711), '20 llnw. Hi. 'I'r, ,')!((; 2 Hni. 1,. (!. <H'2 fi'.d, i)'2 1, 'ri:>, 1107, 1 I li», II II Kin^Htoii V. (Jiiin (l(!7<i), lii')!. fi'iiip. I''iii<!li, '2.V.) (lll'i KiiiKHtoin'. Kiiililm (IH(I!(), I Cniiip. ftOS, n. ; 10 it. It. 7I2, 11 Turi KiiiKHtoll f. l,cMl"y (IML'I), III HiTK. .t U. .'m;! lOI.S KiiiMiTHlcy r. ()r|Mi (177;)), I Dim^. fiH jOHl, |(H:t, lll'2, II.VI KiriHiiiiiiii'. ItmiH.) (IHMl), 17 (Jh. I). 101 ; 50 Ti. J. Cli. ■IKd ; •! I ],.T MH ; '20 VV. R. (127 7.') Kiiil.n^ii V. I'liiHloii (IH'id), I II. & N. •■ir,7- 'lU \,. ,1. Kx. 2H7 77:1 Kip r. Ilrijfliimi (IHIO), d .l..liim. I.IK; 7 JoliriM. HIH 1(107 Ki|)pi'ii f). Diirlfy (IH/')M), ;i M.ii(|. 2o;t; I I'lttcrMoii, 702 Hor. Kirliy V. IlickHoii (!«•'>"), 1 I.. M. 'V I'. 'MM 17 Kirl.y f>. Hiiiipm.ii (IHril), 2;t I,. J. M. C Kir); 10 V.\. WhH; '>. (!. I,. It. i'2Hn ; IH .liir. im;t 10, '.".'d, 22H Kir.rlmiT r. VonuM (IHftO), 12 Muoic, I'. V.. C. lidl ; 7 W. It. I.'..'.; (i.liir. N. H. 7;!2 16K Kirk, Kx |>iirt.«, Iti'iiiirllitiKl (iliivc, Itc (IK77), ') < li. D.NIIO; 411 L .1. Itiiiik. 101 ; :)d li. T. 'lid ; 2.'. W. It. .V.lH H03 Kirk V. Kililowi'H (IHIl), I) Ifan', r.l7; l.'t I- .1. (Hi. •102; H.lur. 1021 . .7.'<;i, WHl, S07, HOH Kirkliimi V. M.irl.r (IHIO), 2 II. A A. di;i; ICIiiMy, It. :|H'2 077, d7H Kirkliiiid f). NiMlii't, (IH.'.O), ;t Miicij. 7dd, 1 I'litcrHoii, H7d .i;) Kirkitian v. Oxlc>y (IHIl -Id), cited 2 Hi.iirk. Kv. ;;0d, 11. (/) 2'>.'i Kiikpat.ri.k r. (Jinvun (IK7.0), Ir. It. !» ( :. I,, f.'l 770 KiikMUll Hniwi'iy Co. r. I'uiIM'Mm Ity. < '... (IH7 I), I,. It. (^ ll.IdH; •i;ir,.,r. (i M. H2; .'toL. T. 7H:t; '22 VV. It. H7d .'IHH Kirkw(>(«rHriiMi. (IHltd), I l,.,w. (). <!, 102 21'! Kirwun'M TriiHlM, Itii (IHH.')), 2/)(;ii. I). :t7;i ; W I.. .1. Cli. !).'V2 ; 10 I,.'!'. 292 ; ;t2 VV. II. fiHl 702, 7(';i Kirwim v. (Jor.kl.urii (IKOf,), 5 Knp. 2;t;i ; H !l. II. HID 100:1 Kirwitii V. (lonimii (IHld), If. K.|. It. Kil 1)2 Kiln mill LiiiKi'MeiiHr (IH'22), 1 II. .V (1. Mil 11:17 KlitiK'Uiiiii, <i(MHlH.,f, It.. (IHd2j, :i H. ,^i T. IH; Wl \,. .1. I'. M. & A. Id .. II7H Kiiiipp V. Miiiihy (IH.t.'ij, i;{ VV.'ii.l. r)S7 Iiod KimppV ciiMi! ( 1 h:tO i, I \'uV . IHO .')d2, fid I Ktml<:lil.iill r. I''..wl«i (IH7d), I oil. I). diH ; 21 VV. It. d'JO Oil KiiiKlit «'. Iliirlier (I Kid), Id M. & VV. «d ; 2 C. .V K, :i:i:i ; Id I,. .1. Kx. IH ; 10 .(iir. OJO dH4, dHO KriiKht v. (/'iiiiiplMill (IHIS), ((iiiil.lf.,nl Hiiimiiiit AMMi/,..H MH.) :ilO Kiiixlit t). <;i»'Mimit^ (iK.'iHj, H A. * K. 2l/i; ;i N. \- I'. :i7.'. llo;i KniKlit ». <!ox (1H,V1), IH V,. II. Mt> ; 2o I;. .1. (!. \' . :'.ll 00 l<iii«»il, f). Oorkford (I70I), I Knp. 100; .O It. It 7'20 (171 Ki.i(<lit,, 10', Kiiij^lif, r. (iiinlfi.T (IHH;)), 'i.h (;h. I). 207 ; M li. .1. V,\\. Ih:1 ; 4!» lj. T. f.tr. ; ;i2 VV. It. ido oi:t KiiiRlit, I'. Mimty (lHi:i), 12 I-. .1, (|. H. '.'o:) 7:11 KniKlifc*'. KihkM. (IHdl), :iO li. ,1. (;li. dll ; 2 Oill'. (11(1 7H0 Knight V. Miirliii (IHIO), (low, 2d ;ilO, 1212 Kiiixli*. «'. M. of VViit.irfonl (lH;id), 2 V. & 0. Kx. :iH dill KniKlif. V. M. of Wiitrcfoid (IHIO), 1 V. & 0. '201 ; 10 li. S. Kx. Kq. f)7 ; ,') .liir. HIH; II CI. Hi K. d.);t IIO, 'HI KiiitfhtN r. Wiir.^ii (IS70), li. It. ft (i. H. (1(10; 10 I.. .1. </. H. M | 2:) I,. T. dlO; 10 W. II. '2'l'l fdfi Ktiill V. llo.ip<ir(IH,'.7), 2 II. A N. 277 ; 20 li. .1. Kx. ;t(7 770 Kiiill V. WilliiirnN(IHOO), 10 KiiM, 4.11 ; 10 It. It. :HU llUi 'I'h* r^tretuxi art to pagei, twl to parai/riij)/i». TABLK OF CASKS CITICP. (!Xm I'AIIK Kiinlirll «'. Fiillrr (171)7), r«'ii. A.M. CiiH. I.f!) : i U. U. H'.m •.','>.'> KnowlrH, III IT (IMHO), I!) I,. J. CU. (>'2.'> ■ i;i L.T. I If-'; 'JH \V. It. '.>7.'> ll,'. KiK.wliiiiiii r. niii.U (lH7lt), 4;» li. J. Kx. 'JD; li. U. It Kx. 1 ; '.".• I,. T. •JO'i ; '.i'J \V. U. 77 MM, (iKO. (182 Knox i: HiinIi.H (I.s:i7. nIm.uM Ii« 1H.'.7), Hd. H. N. H. Illll I(i7 Kui.x V. I..1. Mmvo (IS,-iS), 7 Ir. (^li. H. .'>(i:i IKIH Knox r. Wiililc.lM.nmKJi ( 1H'.!7). .'' ( iiiriil. IH.'i ll.'tH Knox (ioiiiilv f. Nintli Niitioiml Hunk (IHWl), 117 U. M. !i| I.^S Koi'lirl r. SMiiii.lrrM (IHill), ;i;i I,. .1, (I. 1'. IIKI ; 1 7 < '. I». N . S. 7 1 ; 10 .liir. N. S. :y>n -. l'.' VV. It. I Kic 771 Kopiicir (. Wilw.n (iH7i;), ir. l,. .1. ^^ 11. i;i(i; 1,. it. 1 (^ n. D. ;i77; ;u I,, 'r. (.77; 'J I W. It. 7(1(1 771 K.iHtcr c. IniHN (IH'J.'i), Ity. .V M. .'I.l.'t 17f> KnHt.T /■. Krnl (IH'J(l), (1 It. \- C. 11); !l D.iwl. * It. 2 17'') Knifl, r. Wii'k.'v (IH:fJ), I Hill. * .1. Ilt'i l\M) Jvi'i.xliiiii lli'liiin Itoy ('. lliciJi'Hwiiiii ( 'iiowilijinci' (IS76), I.. It. 'J Imliiin A|i)., 'JMI .' Illh Kionlii'iiii c .loliMHiii (1S77), 7 <'li. I), (ill; 17 I-. .1. VU. i;tJ; ;i7 I-. 'r. 7fil ; 2(i W. It. 1 1'2 (!(ir. Kiifh <•. W.'hioii (I7!)!l), :i I'lHp. ,'il 1,'.,'> Kiiriz r. H\H-uii' (IS.SH), f>7 I.. .1. <'li. 'JMM ; .'.s I,. T. lil.S fiOC. KvIk »'. .li'MicvH (lH:t!i), ;i Mii(<|. ;tl7 ; 1 rnti'iMni, H.'io 7.'i() KyniiHlon /•. Mu.'liiinl.T ( 1.S7II), 17 L. .1. il H. 7('> ; H7 1.. T. :i'.)il 41 Imckinoton v. AlliiTloii (1811), 7 M. .t (ir. liCO ; 8 Him.M, N. It. ;is ; M .liir. 1(1(1; i:i I,. .I.e. I'. 1 10 nio l.lirloiijfli r, 'I'owli' (IKdO), ;i K.xii, 111 t>\!\ J.iicM.n r. IliwKii'N (l«'.!-'), •■! >^Ui\-\i. 178 ; Dowl. \- It. N. I'. «'. :t8 '.III? ],Mlnii.> r. FiilkliiiKl IsIiiihIh Co. (M>1), 27 I-. .1. Cli. '.!,'> ; 4 K. .V .1. I! I ; (1 W. It. •! M»!» JmMH V. Iliurliiy (1821), .t Stark. 42; 2 Dowl. \ It. I'l.iO ; 1 It. \- C. ;iim f)!l8, !1(1H }.n^w^fv. Kiiim- (18()((), 2 Mom. ,V I'. 8,^^ 1212 JmiiiNoii c. 'I'lviiHTo (1k;II). I A. \ K. 71)2; It N. * M. (lOU 88, !)« l,Minl r. lliiirKM (IM«I). H* <"'■ !>• -~- •'■'' ''• '''• '■-''<•'< H''^ l.iiko »'. Diikoof Aiyyil (IMII), (1 i). II. 177; II I.. .1. <|. It. 7:1 fill ].iiK(i c Ilill.CM (1(1118), I I,<1. Itiiyni. 7:i:t 481 Jiiiktu'. KiiiK (Hi'i"), 1 WiiiH. Siiiinilt'iN, lllla; 2 Ki'lili>, ;i(il, 4(i2, 4!M1, (I.)!), 801, 8:t2 ; 1 Li'V. 210 ; I Si.l. 414 4 Liikniiiiii r. MoiiiitNli'plii'ii (1874), 111) I;. .1. (^ It. 27'> ; l<. •.. (> Q- K. mil ; 4 1 li. .1. (^ It. (17 ; I.. It. 7 (|. It l!i(i; I,. II. 7 II. li. 17; 22 \V. It. (ii7 ; 4;i I,. .1. Q. It. 188 ; ;io l,. 'I'. 4;t7 (177 Liikof r. Iloi'ili't'ii (187(1), 1 Cii. I). (144; 24 W. It. (tV.i ; 4.'i li. ,1. CU. Illft ; ;i4 L. 'I'. 88 14f. I,iilor V. I.iiloi- (18711), 4 li. It. Ir. (17H ,')i;t Liiml. r. Orion (18(1(1), 2!) li. .1. Cli. 28(1 ; (! Jur. (II ; 1 I.. T. 21)0 17'.i liiiiiibf. MiiimliT (1882), r}2 I.. .1. (^ H. 4(1; 10 (^ II. I). 110; 47 I.. T. 412; .'tl W. It. 117 Dill, »II4 IjiiiiIh.'h.wiw (17111). 2 Lea. .'.,'.4 ; 1 MrNully, I'lv. 42 f>;.8 ],iiinlM«i(.'M KHtuto, III r« 088(.), Ill I,. It. Ir. 2114 424, f)42, 7:11) J.iiinl>ort., Iti< (180(1), ;IA li. .1. I'. \ M. (14 ; li. It. I I', ^f l>. 1:18; 14 I,. T. 227; 14 \V. It. (117 lo;ii LimilHTl. f. NorriH (I8;i7), 2 M. \ W. .•i;t.'i ; (1 I,. .1. Kx. 101) (l.M) I.Miiioiiil «'. Daviill (1847), 1) (^ It. lO.'lO; Id I.. .1. i). It. l.'KI ; II .liir. 200. 222 J.:iinonl. c. (^rook (18l(>), (I M. .V W, 02/); 8 Dowl. 7:i7 ; 4 .liir. 481) H;I1, H;t4 J,iiin|iliiKli I'. Luiii|iIuk1i (1701)). 1 I'. Wiim. 112 (I(l(i ].iiiii|>oii <'. <'orkn (18114, nIkiiiIiI Iio 1822), h It. i<i(; Alil. (10(1; I Dowl. .Mc It. 2 1 1 1):t, Mi Iminpivll V. Itilloi'iimy Union (1840), It Kx. 2811; 18 ]i. .1. Kx. 282 . .Oil!), (142, (I4A J,iiiian/,n|.. I'alliirr (1827), M. .V M. Ill ;il<t l.iiiM'aHl.(ii- Cunal Cii.'m kiihk (18112), Mini. & II. 114 ; I Dnio. iV (^li. 411 ; 1 Moul. IIU 603 t'vl, I, tttdt wUh ftuyt OJO, W'\ CXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOB LiiiKlfTH and Bngley'H Contradt, (1802) 3 Cli. 41 ; 01 L. J. Oh. 707 ; 07 li. T. r.2l (170 Liuhi'h (iiiHo (l/)H7), '2 <>'i>. Il<-I>- '"'• K, 10, '20 Liirin'H riwo (IH(i;»), 1 Do (». J. & H. 50J ; 'M L. J. Ch. H4 ; 10 Jiir. N. H. 2.') M4 Liiiii., Ill n. MHHO), It Oh. J). H.IO; 40 h. J. Ch. 70H ; lU L. T. H7 ; '2H W. K. 7(11 110 Liimi ('. Miirnhiirt (IHII), 1 (i. H. O.'IH ; 1 (J. & I). ;U2; Jur. 16,'i 077, 07H IiUii.li'. (Jmy (lH7;i), li. It. 10 E(i. ■'i.'i2; 4;Ui. .1. (!h. 1H7 11H2 liiUK. II. llarriMoii (1H2()), C. Muiif. .')7;i li;W Liiiio I'. IroiiiiK.nt^rr {1HI4), lit M. & \V. aOH ; 1 i L. J. Kx. K.l 100 Liiiii. r. Nixon (lS(i(i), li. K. 1 (!. I'. 412; iiCt I,. J. (,'. I'. 24.H; 12 Jur. N. S. ;i!)2; 14 VV. It. Oil 771 Liiiifriiiiiilii V. Afiuk.'ii/io {\Hr,^), HO I,. J. Ch. f)18 ; L. It. 4 Kii. 421 ; 16 VV.It.(il4; KlIi.T.llI 70 liiiiiK I'. Hulo (IHIH). I M. & H. Ill 710 Jiiiiij^ V. Hiiiilh (1S;)H, nIioiiIiI ho IH;(I), 7 Hin^. 2H4 ; C) M. &. I'. "H 42 LiiiiKiliilo r. 'rriiiiiiur (IKl'i), IT) KiimI,, 2iM ;J2 Lim>f.liilo .-. WhIUiolil (IH.-)H), ;{ K. & J. 420, 4;t2 ; 4 .lur. N. H. 700; 27 li. J. Oil. 7!t.') ; W. It. H(12 140 liiiiij^ilon .'. IIiiIIh (IKOI), 4 (i. U. I). a:t7 ; 4H li. J. M. 0. li;i; 40 li. T. HHO; 27 W. It. 0,'i7 ;il7 liiiiiK-foril »'. HoiiiHm (IH'i7), .'i IC. & J. 220 ; '.] Jur. N. H. HM ilH liiiiiKfonl <•. W.mkIh (1H) I). H HooU, N. It. :((;!) ; 7 M. tt (ir. 02.') 227 liiiiiKhoni r. .\llnuU (IH12). 4 'riiiiii Oil; lit It. It. OOlt IISS Jiim^rloy »'. K of Oxfonl (ISHO), I M. & \V. flOK ; 2 Oiiio, (i;» ; 1 T. it (1. KOH ; ri li. .1. Kx. 100 rtO,-) LiiiiKtiioimI r. Munlo I'lKO.')), IH 0. H. N. S. 2.').') ; 12 L. T. Ml) ; lit W. It. 4(1!»; llJiir. N. H. 177 1117, IIHH I,iiii>^ii(lKo V. Ciiiiipholl (IS7;), 2 Ex. I). 281 ; 40 L. J. Kx. 277 ; liO I,. T. 04 ; 2.') VV. It. H.ll ,^.;i(i TiiiiiKHtcii ''. rioUoii (17!(:i), I'oiikc, Add. Cum. 21 .S:i7 iMMKUm V. Ciirh^toii (l«7;t), Ij. It. !) Kx. .07 ; 4;t L. .1. Kx. .'>4 ; 21) K. T. O.OO 1 .V2 liiiiiKloJi V. Ili^'KiiiH (IH.'i!)), 4 II. *. N. 402 ; 2H li. .1. Kx. 2.''i2 '1!I0 liiiiivoii t). Miirlin (1HS4), l.'J K. It. Ir. 207 OMH liii /'lata (IH.O,')), 1 Hwal). Adiii. It. 2!IH (1 liUlmlov V. (iriiTHon (1K4H), 1 II, K. Cim. 4i)S 100, 111) LiiNoolfoM r. li.l. OiimIow (IH77), 2 (i H. I). 4;!:), 4.00 ; 40 ].. .1. ^l. H. lillj ; DO li. T. 4.V.) ; 20 VV. It. 4W0 110 TiiiHMcii.io r. Tioriicy (IHID), 1 Mao. & U "01 ; 2 II. & 'I'. 1 10 ; II .lur. 1H2 o;i» JiUNwiir V. 'ryr<:otiiii'l (IHIO), 10 lloav. 2H 1101 liiiKdi V. VVoillak.' (IHIOj, ;t I'. & I). 4!)i) ; 1 1 A. & K. 00!) :iS() ],alkow r. Kaiiior (1700), 2 II. HI. 4;t7 1102 I.a Tourho ».. lluUoii (IK70), Ir. It. Kc]. 100 440 Jiittlcr r. (Jooliloii, (IHDI) 10 Nov. (iiol, roiioHcd) fljH, Oli), 020 l,au.lordalo, \',;'riiK<- (ISSO). 10 \\>\k Cas. iil)2 1 I 77 KavcT r. Kirldrr (lHii2), II VV. It. 240; 7 Ii. T. 002; O.liir. N S. 1110 .. 0;tO Jjavoiry <•. I'lirHoll (1HH«), HO (Jli. I). OOM ; 07 K. .1. (Jh. 070; OS K. T. 8411; ;t7 VV. It. 10:t 0H7 liiivioi). I'liillipM (170.'.), :i Hiirr. 1770; I VV. HI. 700 7 LavioM, In r..', Kx i.ait,.' Hl.oplioiiH (1H77), 7 <!li. D. 127 ; 47 Ii. .1. Uk. 22 ; ;i7 li. T. 01 li ; 20 VV. It. |:tO 002 Law r. Wilkin (1M:<7), A. & K. 7IH ; 1 N. «t I*. 007 ; W, VV. .fe I). 2:10. . KlH Lawdon r. KaWilon (IHHO), Ir. It. 27 022 Tiawo«, In ro (1HH2), 20(:ii. D.HI; 40L. T. 4H0; ;J0 VV. It. ICt HOO TiawoM V. Rood (ISIIO), 2 Lowin, (J. (J. 102 020 Lawl.;r»». liindon (1870), Ir. It. 10 (!. L. 188 ;i(i LawloHMi'. (^loalo (1840), H Ir. I,. It. .■182 202 Lawlry'H, Ka.ly, cam! (undated) Hull. N. V. 287 HOI? Lawronco v. Hakor ( 18;il)), VVond. HOO 040 JiUWifiKio.;. Oainpl.oll (1800), 4 Drew. 480; 28 L. J. ('At. 780; 7 W. It. aaO; Jur. N. H. 1071 600 Tito refereneei art to pa(je», not to parayrapht. TABLK OF CASr.S CITHD. Cxv I'AdlC I,awronoo r. Cliirk (IHI,-)), U l)<.wl. & I.. 87 ; 14 M. & W. '2fiO ; 1ft L. J. Kx. 10 :<l 1, 31H I,,iw ivi.r.- r. llitrli (IHC.H), li. R. » W. «. ft'21 ; 37 L. J. (i. H. '201); 1) B. & S. 1(17; IH I', 'r. IHI ; Kl W. H. Hl.i LiiwifiMii r. Ilniif,'ht(iii (IHOil), Ti .loliiiH. r2t» Ijiiwiiiicc r. LuwK'iKO (IHHI), '20 (!h. I). 'M ; 63 L. J. (Jh. im'2 ; fto L. T. 71.'>; 32 \V. K. 7l»l I,iiwri'ii(«» r. Miiiil«< (IH.Ilt), •! Divw. 472; 7 W. K. 311 Liiwiciini r. Wiilii.Hlry (1H112), 31 L. J. C. I'. 113; 12 V. H. N. 8. 7!l» ; f) I,. T. 71IS ; 10 VV. H. 311 LiiwmiMoii r. nmliT (1H(I2), 1 Sell. & Li-f. 13 LuwM f. lUii.l (inr);), '27 L. J. (!. r. 70 ; 3 (J. U. N. 8. 112 ; 4 Jur. N. H. ■•1 1'23 !()(> 140 326 7.'.S (176 32 6 Lawwiii f. Ciirr (IH.'X'.), 10 Mno. P. 0. 0. 102 J,a\vw.ii r. Ht.xl.lait (IH,'-)3), 3 Now U. 241 ; 1» L. T. filili ; 12 W. It. 2H0 ; 1(1 .liir. N. S. 33 844 I.iivlHmni.M'. CriHj. (1838), 4 M. & W. 320; 8 C. & J'. 3!»7 ; 1 11. * H. ■.m 3',I7, 405, 4(iO, 103^1, 1030 1-avrr'M niNo (1722), 10 How. Ht. Tr. 03 2;iil, :U8, 026 l-HJI'iii'l «». Htrwurt (1870), 40 L. J. VA\. 103; 4 CM. I). 410; 26 W. H. •226 061 I>ii,Vt.lioari) r. Hrjant. (1830), 3 Hn.tt, 238; 2 HiiiK. N ('. 736; 2 ILkI^th, ■1^, ■ 070, 676 l.a/.niil.y r. IfawNon (1864), 4 Do ii. M. & (J. 660; 24 li .1. {'h. 4Hi; 1 .lur. N . H. 2.S0 663 Lea ('. WliraMcy (1078), oili'd in 20 Mow. Hi. Tr. 674 0(13 lifiicli, III k"'"1m cf (1«'»0), 1 li. T. 101 706 lii'adi, \<v (1818), N..ICM c.f ra.s. (Ki'n. & M.) O-,! 007 ],.'arl. ,. Iliiirljanaii (18(i;t), 4 Msp. 228 640 li^aiili r. SiiiiiiKi.ii (ls;i!l), 6 M. .V \V. :100 ; Duvl. I'. (!. 13 , 3 Jur. 0.'>4.. 283 JiiMulir, lii'NNci) of .'. Dii^rRini (1841), Ir. Oir. H. 124 314 ],ra.li'i-r. Itiiny (1706), 1 Ksp. 3,-.3 373, 1018 L.'iif r. Iliilt (1812), <!. i^ Mmi-mIi. 461 311 ],i>ako r. M. of WiHtiiicalli (1H41), 2 M. \- Kol). .^Ol 1036 lifaiiior. limy (1814), 3 KiimI,603; 6 Km|>. 18; 7 H. H. IVrfaci- vii liiariiioiitli, K.\ iHiilr (1H21), Madd. 113 363 Lcaroytl, Kx paito, l<<i I''oiiI<1h (1878), 10 Cli. I>. 3; 48 L. .1. Ilmik. 17; 27 \V. U. 277 ; 30 li, T. 626 1 167 Li'Mi-v r. liloy.l (1800), 3 K. & i<). 178; 2i» L. .1. M. V. 104 ; .lur. N. 8. I'.'io 1 176 licallirr f^lolli Co. r. IlirroiiiiiniH (1876), li. U. 10 (j. H. 140; .( I h. ,1. U It. 64 ; 32 li. T. 307 ; 23 W. K. 603 073, 762 liC Cuiix V. I'Mcii (1781), 2 DuMH. 604 1103 L.rlitiirr« I'. I''l.'(.(^lii-r (18;t3), 1 C. \- M. 023; 3 'I'yr- 460 711, 713, 1116 Ji.dl)..U<.r r. 8all (1828), l ItihK. 023; 1M.&1'."607 618 ],(<iKar«l f. 'riioiii]iNoii (1843), II M. & W. 40 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 700; 12 li. ,1. K.\. 220 ; 7 .lur. 2 :<0 734 liCC I'cfiiiKo (wliould lin LriKli), (undated). Mill. Kv. 1.66, I'l.. 2 117S> liC.) V. AiiRaH (1800). 36 I,. .1. (Jli. 373 ; 14 L. T. 324 ; 14 \V. |{. 007 .... «13 lici V. Jlinvll (18i;i), 3 (;aiii|i. 337 ; 1 M. & 8ul. 482 606, 017 licn r. Dick (1830), 10 I'rt. 182 766 ],.'.« V. I'lvcri'Nt ( 1 867), 2 1 1 . \ N . 286 ; 20 I .. .1 . K\. .,:: ! 820 ].(•(! r. (iiiiiNol (1774), 1 Cowp. I ; l.oll't,, 374 1031 Lvov. (!aHk;'ll (1870), 1 (i. 11. I). "00; 46 L. .F. (j. H. 640; 34 li. T. 760; 24 V/. H. 824 083 Low. Crilllii (IHOI), 1 II. \ 8. 272; 30 L. .1. U. H- 2 J2 ; 7 .lur. N. 8. 1302; 4 I,. T. 640; \V. U. 702 088 licur. lliiHoii (1701), I'cakc, KiO 244 lico •'. .lohiiHtouii (18(i0), li. li. I II. li. (,S(i.) |J(i I'Ji) Leo V. liaiKi. A Yorkn. Hail. Co. (1871), Ji. It. Cli. 627 ; 26 li. T. 77 ; 10 W. It. 720 662, 744 liCc r. Miccui^k (1806), 6 Kmii. 177 1031 Luo V. Mvnmi (18701. 30 L. .1. Ki^i. 03 ; 22 L. T. 420 322 ^ i :l 'ipi !p In,.'? yul. 1. mida with pui/e 036. I cxvi TAMLK OF CASKS CITKD. TAOB Li-o P. Pain (1814), 4 TTiiro, W\ ; 14 L. J. Cli. 310 ; 9 Jiir. 127 ..740, 70',, ,s(),t, I,.'n r. Mmitli flH'.l), I-. H. () K«. 002 ; 2M L. J. Kx. lim ] VViliiint, {]HtW]. ],. II. I Kx. H(it ; MA I,. ,r. Kn. ITo ; 14 L. T. 027 II VV. It. iiD.t; I II \ (^ Ki!); 12 , fur. N. H. 702 HOH OiU 711 Lrfcvri- r. Mc.y.l (IKH), 5'l'.iiin. 740; I MiirHli. ;ilH ; 15 U. R. 044 7.'>S l,rfroy .•. \Val«li (IS;".!), I Ir. (J. T,. 11. ;tl 1 128 LcKiyt, V. O'HriMii (1h:1I), Milw. ;i;t4 170 LcKk'att, r. TolliTVov (ISll). 14 KiiMt, UOl ; 12 H. U. .OIH 000, !)7',), OS", KMIO L.'KK'' '•■ KiIiik.imIm (lS;-,(!), 2') L. .1. Ch. Vir, ■ 4 W. \l. 71 ....101, 4'.»."), 021, 022 l;iVK"tt '•. <irciit, Nortli. Kv. <-<>. (1H70), 1 Q. H. I). 509; 4.5 L. J. (i. H. .1:57 ; :tr. li. T. ;t:tl ; 24 W. 11. 7H4 02 Li^jfli v. Hewitt (lKo;i), 4 KiiHt, l.'i4; 7 11. U. .'il.') 7H2 li.-Kli ('. L.-i^h (l,S20), 1 lloH. & 1'. 447 4S7 T,«.i.!(.Mt..T, Karl of, v. WiiltiT (IHOO), 2 Camp. 251 ; 3 Camp. 211, n 255 Ldid.'inanii c. Hcliultz (lH5;i), 14 C. 11. 38 ; 2 0. L. 11. 87 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 1 7 ; 1 8 .Fur. 42 703 Lcif(^liil.rH ciiHo (1805), L. U. 1 E<i. 231 ; 13 L. T. 267 ; 14 W. R. 22 ; 1 1 .Tiir. Oil 748 LcIkIi'm KHtato, III re, Kowdiffu v. Imgh (1877), Ch. Div. 250 ; 37 L. T. 557 ; 25 W. R. 783 1 189 Jioiffh riiiniHIo (1828-9), Turl. Min. .307; Purl. Min. (Vt. 2), 145.. 410, 422, 423, 1107 LeiKh r. Hakcr (1857), 2 C. B. N. 8. 307 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 220 ; 3 Jur. N. H. 008 186 L.i^rh r. .Tank (1879), 49 L. J. Ex. 220; 6 Kx. I). 201; 42 L. T. 403; 28 VV. R. 452 ; 44 J. P. 488 112 LoiKh V. IJ^iyd (1865), 35 Boav. 455 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 040 ; 2 Do O. J. & S. 330 1208 I,oiKlit<m V. Loitrhtou (1720), 1 Htr. 308 ; Ifiibb. Ev. of Hucio. 590 1040 LciKhtoiiD. Leiffhton (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 594; L. R. 18 Eq. 458; 22 W. R. 727 806 Lolaml V. Murphy (1805), 10 Ir. Ch. R. 500 710 LcmaKu V. (Joodhaii (1805), 35 L. J. P. & M. 28 ; L. R. 1 P. & 1). 57. .704, 711 Lmnaitro v. Davis (1881). 19 Ch. D. 281 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 173 ; 46 L. T. 407 ; 30 W. R. 300 . 40 .1. P. 324 114 Lo Marc.hant'H Gai 's Pecraffo caHO (naiibiiry Poc^rago, 1727), Solw. N. P. 072-071 101 Le Marchaiit v. Lv Marcihaiit and RadolilF (1870), 45 L. J. P. D. & A. 43 ; ,34 L. T. 307; 24 W. R. 374 502 L('mayiio r. Htaiiky (1081), 3 Lov. 1 074 Limu^re i'. Elliott (1801), 30 L. J. Ex. 350 ; H. & N. 050 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 1200 ; 4 L. T. .304 117 Lomon v. Diwii (1810), 2 Camp. 030, n 1209 Lomprioro v. Lango (1879), 12 Ch. D. 075; 41 L. T. 378; 27 W. R. 870 100 Lonc.h V. liOiioh (1805), 10 Vim. 511 564, 656, 607 Lo Nouvillo r. Nourw) (1813K 3 Camp. 351 776 L(x)iiard V. SimpHon (1835), '^ HiiiK. N- C. 170 ; 2 S(H)tt, 336 ; 1 Hodgos, 261 632 Leonard v. Taylor (1874), L R. 8 0. L. 300 774 Th« re/«rmM$ an to pagw, not to paragraph*. ..m- TAHLK OF CASKS CUKI). CXVIl PAoa I^piotf. Brnwno (170,1), 1 Sulk 7 ••■■'t LinniiiK f. Kr.lRi'will (1G7.'.). 1 Moil. '.M)? li;tJ L.1.IIIX r. Hrown (1«.V2), VI V,. H. HOI ; 'i'i L. J. (!. I*. 1 : \(i .liir. IOJl../»2, (iHI L.Mli.. r. ]).• Ill Torrr il7!i.')), nli'il \2 MiiHt, .Wa ; U It. U. fi7H 'fill I-i«liiT. I,<Hlic(is7J), I. R. r. K.|. ;t;t2 "oj IrfHHii.of l,.ii.l.i- c. l)ii>rKiii" (imij. Ir. Cir. It. I'.'t 314 I..M^r.. c.f I'liuyitic. I'aliy (IS.f.!), Iliiy. .V .Ion. IJ8 47 Lr StruiiKt' '■• Itowo (l«ii:)), I K. & l'\ lOIH 124 LcSiicur r. LoHii.ur (l,s7(l), 1 1'. 1). i;t!»; 4,') L. J. 1'. 1). At A. T.i ; iil L. T. :)11 ; i!l VV. It. (ill! 1144 I^alMili.T'MciiH.'(lll'.»'.;), -Z Sulk. 44H _. 704 Lo 'rriiiiilail v. Ilr^wiic (1HH7), 'M't \V. 11. lUH; rcixirti'd <m uiiiithtT imiiit, ;t7 Oil. l>iv. 1 ; 67 L. J. (.'li. 87 VVi Lcttc. Kiiiiiliill (IHCO). '2 Hill. iV (litr. SM; '2 !)i, (1. V. Ac J. ;WS ; (i Jur. N. s. lariii; !t W. 11. DO; ;j L. T. ir.,-) ; ;io L. j. ch. no 144 I,iviTi'. (J.MMlwiii (1HH7), ;t(i(Jli. I). I; ill \.. T. /■)«;(; HO \V It. 177 .... l/:ii> Jji'viy anil UkIimoii, Ud, Kx partu T(i|i]iiiig' (ISti/)), 3t L.J. Hank. 41; 1*2 I,. T. 7N7: 1:1 W. U, I02r) 71') I,.vin f. Li'vin (IHN!)), (iO f,. T. ai7 ; 37 W. It. 3l)(i 1M4 l,.nMH<.n r. Sv<r(lN.>2),'2l L. J. il ». 10; '2 L. M. & l'.Cy.>7: lAJur. 10.. 1173.1 J,rvilt c. Levitt (IKIi.'t), 2 II. A M. (i2(i 1030 J-.VV r. llul.' (IHI'J), 2<J L. J. C. r. 127 ; Jur. N. S. 702 ; 1 L. T. 132 ; H\V. K. 12;) .110 Levy r. Miriill (IHili), 4 Ori'inl. 180 IM'.t I,.'vv r. r<>|>«> {182")), M. & M. 4 10 t;o'J Lcwcm' TriiNtM, Hi) (1871). L. It. 11 V.i\. 23(1; h. U. Cli. Apj). 3.10; 40 L. J. «!li. (102 ; 24 L. T. i)33 ; 1!) W. It. lit."), (il7 172 L<'wiN, It.'. Kx part.' Miinin (1870), 1 Q. h. D. 724 ; 4,') L. J. U. H. 810 ; 3.0 L. T. 8.17 ; 24 W. It. 1017 724 IjI'wIh, He («r L('wi» r, Lowis). LcwiM, fiiU'ly .allcil H., r. JIavwi.nl (18(i.1), 3.') li. J. P. & M. 10.) 107 Lewis r. HraN.s (1878), 3 Q. H. I). 0(17 ; 37 L. T. 738 ; 2(1 \V. It. 1.12 .... 073 I^ttiH 1-. KvHiiH (1874), 44 L. J. (J. r. 41 ; L. Jt. 10 C. 1*. 207 ; 31 L. T. 487 ; 23 W. It. 24 I ; 2 I lopw. Ai O. 271) IflO LewiH !■. (it. Went Ity. Co. (18(iO), Jl. iV N. H(i7 ; 20 L. J. Kx. 42i) .... 723 LfwiM r. (Jt. Went. Itv. Co. (1877), 3 <4. U. 1). 106 ; 47 L. J. (i. B. 131 ; 37 L. T. 774; 20 W. It. 2.14 723 liOwiK r. Ilanloy (183.1), 7 C. & J'. 40,1 ll'JZ LewiM 1: Jaini'M (1880), 64 L. T. 2(.0 ViZ LewiHf. Ia\. Kcnhingtou (1810), 2 C. B. 403; 3 Dowl. & L. 037 ; 16 L.J. C I'. 100 734 Lewis r. Lewis (1802), 2 S. & T. 1.13; 4 L. T. 68.1; 31 L. J. 1*. 153; 7 .Iiir. N. S. (i88 700 Lewis r. Marsl.all (1814), 7 M. & Ur. 713; 8 Scott, N. K. 720; 13 L. J. C. 1'. 1!I3; « Jur. 818 20, 703, 78'i Lewis r. Parker (1830), 4 A. & K. 838 201 Liwisp. Payn (1827), « Coweii, 71 1108, 11U9 Lewi.s r. Penuingtou (1800), 20 L. J. Ch. 670 ; 8 W. R. 405 ; Jur. N. 8. 478 605 Lewis f. Rok-rtH (1801), 11 C. 11. N. S. 23; K. & C. 402; 31 L. J. C. P. 61 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 485; 6 L. T. 351 ; 10 W. It. 80 726 Lewis r. Sapio (lw27), 1 M. & M. 610 1220 Lewis V. Simpson (1848), 2 Kx. l!Ki, n 140 Lexington v. (Jlaik (1000), 2 Vent. 223 078 Ley V. Ballard (1700), 3 Ksp. 173, n 1200 Lev r. Barlow (1848), 1 Kx. 801 ; 6 Hailw. Cas. 1 ; 5 Dowl. & L. 376 ; 17 L. J. Kx. 10.) 321 Leyfield's, Dr., casts (1010), 10 Co. Itep. 88 1108 Leylaud r. SUswart (1870). 4(> L. J. Cli. 103 ; 4 Ch. D. 419 ; 25 W. R. 226 051 Lidstj-r V. Borrow ( 1 83:i), A. & K. 05 » 227 Liebinant'. Pooley (1810), I Stark. K. 107; 18 It. R. 766 .'.'.278, 358 Lightfoott'. Biekley (1830), 2 Jtawle, 431 " 1161 Lightfootti. Cainerou (1776), 2 W. Bl. 1113 \ ()6» Vol. I. endt tiith page 635. I I i ^h CXVIU TADLK OF CASKS CITED. PiOIl T.iirhtiHir V Wilco (ISl 8), 1 Sarn;. & R. 20;j 'AH Lik.) V. ir<)W(( (1H()()), Km|). '20 642 Lilli-y V. Klwin (1843, Hhould bo 18IH), 11 Q. Ji. 742; 17 L. J. Q. B. 132; 12 .Iiir ()i3 30, 1(»3 Liil/ & Co. V. Smiiies, (1892) 1 Q. H. i.W ; 10 W. U. 544 7G4 Lillywliit.) )'. I).!vor.mx (181(1), 16 M. >V; W. 2!)1 48, 091 Limi^liouso Board <.f VVorkN, Ex piirtc Vullimc.' (18S3), 24 (!li. I). 177; iV2 li. J. Oh. 791 ; 48 L. T. 941 ; 32 \V. R. 287 1151 Liincriok V. Liinoii.k (1803), 32L.J.P. &M.22; 4 S. & T 252; llW.H, 503 1 30, 294 Liiii;(iln'n ciiHo, Kiirl of (l(i20), 1 Rl. Com. 402 ; 3 l?iU!. Abr. 202 900 liiticolii r. Wri^bt, (18.V.»), 28 L. .1. Cb. 70") : 4 Do U. & J. 10 (hS8, ii20 Lindcimii v. Dosboroiijfli (182H), 8 11. it (!. 580 934 LindcnbiTKiT v. Ili'iil (1821), Wbciit. 101 155 LiiidKiMui 1'. liiiidKmi (1810), 9 '.\nv. 358 ; 15 L. ,1 . Cb. 428 ; 10 Jiir. 074 802 I.iiidli-y V. (JirdbT (1843), 1 Dowl. it I,. 099 ; 13 L..T. <i. M 53 ; 8 .liir. 01 734 Liiidb'v V. Liiooy (1804), 17 C U N. S. 578; 34 L. J. (;. I". 7; 10 Jur. N. H. 1103; il L. T. 273; 13 \V. U. 80 745, 740 Lindo V. Rodney (1782), 2 Doiij?. 014 1103 Liiidon V. Hhiirp (1843), (! M. & Gr. 898 ; 7 Scott, N. R. 730 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 07 130 LindHiiy v. Wi(;klow, Karl of (1873), Ir. R. 7 Kq. 192 93 Liiiticli and Walker v. Uunn (1807), L. R. 1 Adni. & Ecn. 303; 30 L. J. ]<:,:<:. 23 1 133 I>inH..ll »'. H(>n«or(1835). 2 HinK- N. C. 241 ; 2 Scroti, 399 ; 1 Hod^^cH, 305. .44, 712 Lion, Tbo, Owners i: York Town Owners (1809), 38 L. J. Adui. 51 ; L. R. 2 1*. C. 525 ; 21 I.. T. 41 ; 17 W. R. 993 ; Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 103 . . 178 Lipseombe v. IIc>1im(w (1810), 2 Camp. 441 620 Lisbon Steam Tramways Co., Ro (1870), 2 Ch. D. 575 ; 34 li. T. 209 ; 25 W. H. 510 845 Lislmnie, Lord r. Davies M800), L. li. 1 C. P. 259; 35 L. .T. (5. P. 193 ; 12 Jnr. N. H. 340; 13 L. T. 795 ; 1 I W. R. 333 ; 1 H. .fe R. 172 110 Lisbman r. Cbristio (1887), 19 Q. II. I). 333; 60 L. J. Q. B. 5;i8 ; 57 L. T. 552 ; 35 W. R. 744 ; Asj). M. <!. 180 700 I/Isb> Peer. (1825), Pari. Min. 110 423 List's case (1811), 2 Ves. & B. 371 809 Lister «'. lieatber (185S), 27 L. J. Q. H. 295; 8 K. & B. 1004; 4 Jur. N. H. 947 47 List<!r V. Perryman (1870), L. R. 4 H. L. 521 ; 39 L. J. Ex. 177 ; 23 L. T. N. n. 209 ; 'l9 W. R. 9 29 Lister V. Priestly (1810), WiKlitw. 07. 405 518 Lister «. Hmitb '(1803), 33 L. .1. P. & M. 29 ; 3 8. & T. 282 740 Litebfield v. Jieiuly (1H50), 5 Kx. 9;i9 ; 20 L. J. Kx. 51 98, 1 113 Littin r. TmrralH'e'(1822), 2 (Jreenl. 37, 41, n 010 Little V. Mbby (1823), 2 (Jreenl. 212 443 Littlo V. WiiiKfield (1859), 1 1 Ir. C. I,. R. 03 123, 124, 125 Litfbxdiild r. Hanks (1845), 7 il H. T^t'-' I H L. J, (J. M. 35(i ; 9 Jur. 1090 222 Littler r. Holland (I7!M)), 3 T. R .590 751, 752 Litton r. Murpby (1878), 1 L, li. Ir. 301 ;)53 Liver Alkali (Jo. f. Jobnson (1871), L. R. 9 Kx. 338; 43 L. J. Kx. 210; 31 L. T. 95 771 Livermorer. Hersebell (1825), 3 Piek. 33 1118 liiverpool Adelj)lii Loan Asso(>. r. Kairburst (1851), 9 Kx. 423; 2 C. L. II. 512 ; 23 L. J. Kx. 103 ; 18 Jur. 191 6(1 Liverpool I!oroii»;b Hank r. Kreles (1859), 4 II. & N. 1;I9 ; 28 L.J. Kx. 122 076 Liverpool lloron^'b Hank r. Turner (18(iO), 1 J. & II. 159; 2 l)e (1. F. & J. 502 ; 30 li. J . (;b. 379 051 Llanover v. Ilomfray (1880), 19 Cb. I). 224 ; 30 \V. U. 557 320 Liowr'llyn V. Jersey, Karl of (1813), 1 1 M. He W 189 ; 12 L. J. Kx. 243. .072, 758 Llewellyn V. Winckworib (1815), 13 M. \- \V. 598 ; 1 1 L. J. Kx. 329 241 Lloyd V. Klimiin^r (1872). W. N. 18-'2, at p. 052 Lloyil V. (JreKoi-y (I03M), Crn. C!ar. 51)1 (i68 LUi'yd V, Harvey (1832), 2 Russ. I't My. 310 807 Thf rrfoviicn <ire la puf/rs, nut lo jmraijraph!*. TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. CXIX FAOH Lloyd V. Minmd (1788), 2 T. R. 700 U I^loyd V. Mostyii (IHI'2), 10 M. & W. 481 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 470; 12 L. J. Ex. 1 000 Lloyd r. I'asHiiiKlmm (180!)), 10 Voh. 01 970 J,l..yd V. KolxTtH (1S,-.H), 12 Moo. P. C. C. 1(58 007 Lloyd r. f^iHiililuiul (181S), (!ow, R. 13, 10 lot LioVd V. Si.ill.'t (1710), 2 Atk. I-'jO 600 Lloyd I'. Watcrford & Lini. Ky. Co. (1802), 16 Ir. C. L. R. 37 72;i Lloyd f. \Villiin(17i)l), 1 Ksp. 178 •10!) I.ol.bf. Stiinlcy (18-14), 6 Q. H. r.74 : Ki L. J. C^ IV 117 07;i. 071, 713 Lock r. Furze (I SCO), L. R. 1 C. T. 441 ; ;i,') L. J. C. T. 141 ; H. iV U. 37!) ; 14 W. It. 403 773 Lock V. Norlxinio (1087), 3 Mod. 141 1113 Lockor. JiiiiicH (1843), 11 M. & W. !10I ; 13 L .T. Ex. 180 708 Loc^kcttc. Cary (18(14). 3Ncw R. 40.'); 10 .Tur. N. S. 144 3'.'1. 1184 Lockcttr. Nirkliii (1848), 2 Kx. 93; 19 L. J. Ex. 403 744, 7.')7 Lockwood r. Smith (1812), fl Day, 309 493 L(MiK'« V. riiiplicr (1824). 1 1 S.tk. & R. ■'■» 1228 liodK^ t'. I'n(!lmid (18r);;), 3 Do G. M. \ O. 900; 1 Hiii. & U. Aj)!!. viii..402, Ci'll LoffiiH I'. Maw (1802), 3 Gifl". .'■)92 ; 32 L. J. Cli. 49 8;i9 LoK'iii »'• ri-iii. "i (^ooiK (18()2), 30 Ui-iiv. (;;(2 8 JiOtidtwborouKli'N, Lord, caso (18.'>3), 4 Do (i. M. & G. 41 1 ; 22 L. .1. Cli. 730 629 LondoHboroiiKli. Lord r. Eo^to^ (1803), 3 11. & S. 805 ; 32 L. J. Q. R. 225 ; 9 .Tur. N. S. 1173 ; 8 L. T. 240 ; 1 1 W. R. 693 629 London f. I-ynn (178!'), 1 H. Bl. 214, n. (.s) 1176 Jiond. & Itirm. By. Co.'h case (1838), 3 M. & W. 422 ; 1 H. & II. I'lO 083 Lond. & BriKh. iW. (-o. •'. FairclouKli (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 706; 2 Railw. CnH. .VI4 ; 3 H(u,U, N. B,. 08 ; 10 L. .1. 0. V. 133 1 192, 1204 Lond. Chart. Bk. of AiiHtralia v. Whito (1878), L. R. 4 App. (^aw. 413 ; 48 L. .T. P. (;. 76 6 Lond., City off. (Ilorko (1090), Carth. 181 397 Jiond., City of r. PorkinH (1734), 3 Bro. P. C. 002 327 I;oiid., City of, GaH Light and (Joko Company r. Nicliols (1820), 2 C. & P. 306 041 Lond. Comni. of Howors r. Gclhitly (1870), 46 L. J. Ch. 7«8 ; 3 Ch. D. 010; 24 W. R. 34(i, lO.V.) 1113 Lond. (^onini. of Hcwors f. GhiHHo (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 346 1183 Lond. (should 1)0 Dublin), Corp. off. .ludiro (1817), 11 Ir. I,. R. 8 729 Lond. Dock Co. v. Sinnott (1867), 8 E. (i B. 347 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 129 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 70 042 Loud. (JaH I.. Co. V. Ch(>lm>a Vch. (1869), 28 L. .T. C. P. 276 ; (i C. B. N. 8. 411 1186 Loud. GaN Meter Co., Re, The (1872), 41 L. .). Ch. 146 ; 20 AV. R. 394 . . 846 Loud., Mayor of v. Lonjf (1807), 1 Camp. 22 ; 10 B. M. 018 791 Lond. H,'hi>i>\ Board f. llarv(>y (1879), 4 U. B. D. 461; 48 L. J. M. C. 130 ; 27 W. B. 780 1033, 1072 Lond. a N. \V. Ry. Co. r. Durham (1860). 18 (;. B. 820; 4 \V. R. 063 .. 723 Lond. & N. W. Ry. Co. t'. M'Michael (I860), 6 Ex. 866; 14 Jur. 987 .... 100, 1170 Lond. & N. W. Ry. Co. r. Wont (1807), L. R. 2 C. P. 663; 30 L. J. C. P. 246 97, 98 Lond. & a. WeHt. Bk. f. VVentwortli (1880), 6 Ex. D. 90; 49 L. J. Ex. 067 ; 42 li. T. 188 ; 28 W. B. 610 647, 1206 Lon.'rKan r. Roy. K\. Anh. (1831), 7 Bing. 726, 729 ; 1 Dowl. P. C. 233 ; 6 M . & P. 806 818 I/ong'H (^iimi (17!)7), 1 Ilayw. 624 (466) 600 Longf. Barrett (1846), 7 Ir. L. R. 439; 8 Ir. L. R. 331 ; 3 II. L. (^ih. ;196 40, 242 Longf. Ghamjiion (1831), 2 B. .V Ad 284 486 Long f. DonoKan (1880), I. R. 7 Ivj. 194 1234 liongf. llilel,<M.ck (1840), 9(!. \- P. 019 964 Longf. Keiglith'V (1877), 11 Ir. B. G. L. 221 263 Longf. Liinikin (l862), \} V\in\\. 301, 306 »74 t i 11 ]'ul, J. eiiih with piij/r 035. I cxx TABLE OF CASES CITED. pi.ai Long V. Millar (1878), 4 C. P. D. 450 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 596 ; 41 L. T. 306 ; 27 W. R. 720 672 Longchamp v. Fish (1807), 2 Bds. & P. N. R. 41.') ; 9 R. R. 670 140 Longeuecker v. Hyde (1813), 6 Binn. 1 608 Longfellow V. Williams (1804), Peake, Add. C. 225 673 Loiigworth r. Yelverton (1867), L. R. 1 H. L. (Sc.) 218; 4 Msicq. 746; 10 Jur. N S. 1209 ; 1 1 L. T. 1 18 ; 13 W. R. 235 876 Loomis V. Green (1831), 7 Greenl. 386 1118 Loomis V. Jackson (1822), 19 Johns. 449 802 Loomis and Jaokson v. Loomis (1854). 3 Deane, Verm. R. 198 386 Lopez V. Andrew (1826), 3 M. & R. 329 a 112, 123 Lord V. Colvin (1854), 2 Drew. 205 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 469 ; 5 De G. M. k G. 27 927 Lord V. Colvin (1855), 3 Drew. 222 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 517 ; 4 W. R. 455 . .943, 946 Lord V. Colvin (1857). 4 Drew. 366 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 361 377 Lord V. Colvin (1859-1860), 28 L. J. Ch. 361; 1 Drew. & Sm. 24 : 29 L. J. Ch. 297 : 8 W. R. 254 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 189 8, 179, 180, 377 Lord V. Commiss. for City of Sydney (1859), 12 Moo. P. C. R. 473 Ill Lord V. Lord (1855), 5 E. & B. 404 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 34 1039 Loring V. Steineman (1840), 1 Mete. 204 172 Lothian v. Henderson (1803), 3 Bos. & P. 499, 517 ; 7 R. R. 829 1149 Lovat's, Ld., ease (1746), 18 How. St. Tr. 590 909, 910 Lovat Peerage (1826-57), Pari. Min. 89 416, 419, 424, 425 Lovat Peerage case (1885), 10 App. Cas. 763 421 Love, In re, Green v. Tribe (1878), 9 Ch. 1^. 231 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 7s3 701 Lovell V. Wallis (1884), 63 L. J. Ch. 495 ; 49 L. T. 593 911 Loveridge v. Bntham (1797), 1 Bos. & P. 49 552 Lovesy V. Smith (1880), 15 Ch. D. 655 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 809 ; 43 L. T. 240 ; 28 W. R. 979 749 Low's case (1827), 4 Greenl. 439 615, 616 Lowe V. Carpenter (1851). 6 Ex. 825 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 374 ; 15 Jur. 883 . .76, 119 Lowe f. Govett (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 862 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 224 112 Lowe V. London & N. \V. Ry. Co. (1S52), 7 Railw. Cas. 524 ; 18 Q. B. 632 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 301 ; 17 Jur. 375 6'.3 Lowe V. Peers (1768), 4 Burr. 2225 S6 Lowick's case (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 267 236 Lowrey v. Barker (1880), 5 Ex. D. 170 ; 49 L. J. Ex. 433 ; 42 L. T. 215 ; 28 \V. R. 559 662 Loyd V. Freshfield (1826). 2 C. & P. 325 695, 927 Lubbock V. Tribe (1838), 3 M. & W. 607 ; 1 H. & H. 160 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 158 Lucas V. Lucus 1". S. 68 Lucas r. Lucas f. Lucas »'. Lucas V. Lucas V. 706 ., Beale (1851), 10 C. B. 739; 20 L. J. C. P. 134 Biistow (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 364 ; E. B. & E. 907 ; 5 Jur. N. 763 Ccoko (1880). 13 Ch. D. 872 ; 42 L. T. 180 ; 28 W. R. 439 . . . . De la Cour (1813), 1 M. & Sel, 249 ; 14 R. R. 426 Groning (1816), 7 Taan. 164 Tarlcton (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 246 ; 3 H. & N. 116 Williams, (1892) 2 Q. B. 113; 61 L. J. Q. B. 695; 66 L. T. Lucey v. Murphy (1873), 7 Ir. R. C. L. 494 Lucker, Ex parte {see lie Wood). Luckie V. Bushby (1853), 13 C. B. 864 ; 1 C. L. R. 686; 22 L. J. C. P. 220 Lucy V. Mouflet(1860), 6 H. & N. 22C ; 29 L. J. Ex. 110 Luders r. Anstey (1799), 4 Ves. 601 ; 6 Ves. 217 ; 4 R. R. 276 Ludford r. Gretton (1676), Plow. 490 Ludlow, May. of, t>. Charlton (1840), 9 C. & P. 242 639, 640, 645, Luff I'. Lord (I86t), 34 Beav. 220 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1248 ; II L. T. 650 . . . . Luke, R« (1805\ 34 L. J. P. & M. 105 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 397 Lumlcy r. Gyeil854), 3 E. & B. 114 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 112 Lund V. Tyngsboro (1851), 9 Cush. 37, 43 377 Lundy V. lieilly (1858), 30 L. T. 223 307 194 , 768 1002 488 763 191 310 733 552 626 639 84 1044 136 701 347 , 379 768 The re/ireiicci are to pagea, not to paragraph). TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXl Lnnnis v. Row (1839), 10 A. & E. fi06 ; 8 L. J. Q. B. 264 ; 2 P. & D. 638 910 Luntly V. (1833), 1 0. & M. 579 867 Luscombe r. Steer (1867). 37 L. J. Oh. 119 ; 17 L. T. 370 118* Lush V. Druse (1830), 4 "Wend. 313 802 Lush V. Russell (1860), 1 L. M. & P. 369 ; 5 Ex. 203 ; 7 Dowl. & L. 228 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 214 ; 14 Jur. 435 202 Lushiugton v. Onslow (1848), 6 Notes of Cases (Eoc. & Mar.) 183, 18S . . 142 Lutscher, In re. Ex parte Waddell (1877), 6 Ch. D. 328 ; 26 W. R. 9 ; 36 L. T. 345 848 Lutterell v. Revnell (1677), 1 Mod. 284 329, 976 Lyde v. Barnard (1830), 1 M. & W. 101 ; Tyr. & Gr. 250; 5 L. J. Ex. 117 718, 729 Lyell V. Kennedy (1884), 27 Ch. D. 1 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 937 ; 60 L. T. 730. . 352, 424, 001, 1170 Lyell V. Kennedy (1889), 27 Ch. D. 1 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 937 ; 60 L. T. 730. . 424, 1049 Lygon V. Strutt (1795), 2 Anst. 601 ; 3 R. R. 631 430 Lylo r. Ellwood (1872), L. R. 15 Eq. 67 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 80 ; 27 L. T. 671 : 21 W. R. 69 1030 Lyle V. Ellwood (1874), 44 L. J. Ch. 104 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 98 ; 23 W. R. 157 149, 373 Lyle V. Richards (1866), 35 L. J. Q. B. 214 ; L. R. 1 H. L. 222 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 947 ; 15 L. T. 1 42, 44 Lyman v. Lymun (1814), U Mass. 317 514 Lyu V. Miller (1855), 24 Pa. St 392 757 Lynch f. Gierke (1696), 3 Salk. 154 4f-0, 1052 Lynch v. Lynch (1843), 6 Jr. L. R. 142 657, 658, 660, 661 Lynde «. Judd (1807), 3 Day, 499 1018 Lyne, Ex parte (1822), 3 Stark. R. N. P. 132 h68 Lynn, Mayor of, v. Denton (1787), 1 T. R. 689 ; 1 R. R. 359 995 Lynn v. Robertson (1823), 2 Coop. 217 : 1 L. J. Ch. 88 330 Lyon's Trusts, In re (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 245 798 Lyon r. Home (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 674 ; L. R. 6 Eq. 655 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 674 ; 18 L. T. 461 ; 16 W. R. 824 136 Lyon t'. Lyman (1831), 9 Conn. 55 1223, I2J8 Lyon V. Molls (1802), 5 East, 428 ; 1 Smith, 478 ; 7 R. R 726 771 Lyon V. Reed (1844), 13 M. & \V. 303 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 377 ; 8 Jur. 762. .637, 656, 657, 661, 662 Lyons v. De Pass (1840), 11 A. & E. 326 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 51 ; 3 P. & D. 177 7 Lyons V. Mulderry (1832), Hayes, R. 530 92 M., falsely called H. v. H. (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 159 ; 3 S. & T. 517, 592 167 Maber v. Maber (1S67), 36 L. J. Ex. 70 ; L. R. 2 Ex. 153 715 Maherley v. Sheppard (1833), 10 Bing'. 101 ; 3 M. & Scott, 436 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 181 689, 090 Maby t'. Shepherd (1023), Cro. Jac. 640 543 Macallumr. Turton (1828). 2 Y. & J. 183 961, 962 Macartney v. Graham ( 1 828), 2 Sim. 285 308 Macbeath v. Haldimand (1786), 1 T. R. 172 ; 1 R. R. 177 44 Mucbride v. Macbrido (1802), 4 Esp. 242 947, 967, 9C8 M'Ardle v. Irish Iodine Co. (1864), 15 Ir. C. L. R. 146 646 M'Cabe, Re (1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 7ii ; L. R. i P. ct D. 94 707, 7(»3 M'Calmont v. Rankin (1852), 2 De G. M. & G. 403 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 554. . . . 651 M'Cance v. Lond. & N. W. Ry. Co. (1864), 34 L. J. Ex. 39 ; 3 H. & C. 343 54i» Macaulay v. Robertson (1886), 18 L. R. Ir. 483 524 Maocann v. Maccann (1862), 3 S. & T. 142 ; 32 L. J. P. & M. 29 601 M'Cannon v. Sinclair (1859), 2 E. & E. 63 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 247 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1302 Ill M'Carthy v. Do Caix (1834), 2 Russ. & My. 614 ; 3 Hagg. Ecc. 642, n. . . 1144 Vol. I. tndt with page 636. M^ \ ■ i Caa.1 TAULi: OF CASKS CITED. PAna In ill! it 'I : MTiirthy ». O'llrirn (is;i!)), 2 Ir. L. U. 67 713 M'<;i<.ry V. WiiKlit. {\HM)), 10 Ir. 0. L. R. T)!! ClU M(^<;.)lliii V. (Jiljiiii (IKHl), (1 {i B. Div. /)l(i ; 44 L. T. 914 : '2!) W. H. 40H 7K4 M-(!<>Mil)i(( fi. Anton (lH4.'t), (i M. & (ir. 27 ; (> SimiU, N. I{. !)2;1 ;i26 ink (lH"(i), I. K. 11 Kc|. i:i(); 1 I, K. Ir. I19..749, 7'")() MiicrC MnrC, M'Cormiiik r. Uiiri!<4.t (1S,')4), r.i L. ,1. (.'h. 717 ; 5 I)., (i. M. & (}. 278 MiC Jorquni Mf Hell (IH-(i), 4.') L. J. C. 1'. ;t29 ; 1 V,. I'. 1). 471 50 .597, 11 HO M'(/iilli)(!li i;. Diiwi'H (lH2(i), 9 Dowl. & H. 40 492 M'Doimldf. Lon>rlH)U(.m (IHliO), 1 K. & K. 977; 28 L. J. Q. U. 29;i ; 29 L. J. (i. IJ. 2.^(> 784 M'Doiiiilil t. Kiiiiior (IKll), 8 JoliiiH. 442 Ii;i9 M<!r)oiiall V. Alciorii, (1894) 1 I. U 274, 278 ■1M. [IIOM] IM'Donnoll v. Coiiry (184;i), Ir. C. Ur]}. 807 (UW Muwlonnoll v. Evhiih (1852), 1 1 C. It. 930 ; 21 L. J. C. 1'. II 1 ; Ul Jiir. lo;j 955, 956, 908 H08 (i()0 ;i57 M'noimoll V. Mumiy (1859), 9 Ir. C. L. R. 495 W'Ddnnoll V. Poih' (M52). 9 irims 705 ; 16 .Jnr. 771 , MiinlouKiil V. Yoiiuf? (1826), Ry. & M. .'{92 ; 1 Voiit. 257 McDouj^iillt'. Finld (1872), I. R. 6 (!. L. 185 757 M'Dowiil! r. Lyntcr (18:t(;), 2 M. & W. 52 ; L. J. Kx. 11 225 M.K'ow. Cadrll (1774), 1 (Jdwj). 2;!;{ 5;)9 Ivl'Klvt: iioy v. (^oimcllitii (1H6I), 17 Ir. C. L. U. 55 618 M'Kwan v. Cfiiiiidwll (1H57), 2 Uiuii. 499 ; 1 I'litrrKon, 676 540 M'Kwim V. Smith (1849), 2 II. L. Vmh. ;i09 ; i;» Jiir. 265 691 M'Ku(l(l«!ii r. Murdofk (1867), I. R. 1 C. h. 211 240, 9;t;j MiKtfarlim v. Huh (1872), L. R. 14 Kcj. 680; 41 L. J. Ch. 619; 27 L. T. ;>05 ; 20 W. R. 915 602 M irfiirlaiKi, Rt( (18H4), 11! L. R. Ir. 264 704 MacfcrHon r. Tlioyt.cH ( 1 790), I'ciikc, 20 547 M'Gahfiy v. AlHton (IHliO), 2 M. & W. 206 ; 2 (Jalc, 2;i8 ; 6 L. .7. Kx. 29.. 148, ;i02, ;t04, 508 M'OimiKiU V. Miirpliy (1869), T. R. 3 Kii. 460 6;iH, 6;{U M'OrcKor v. UninbriKK'' (1848), 7 lla-o, 161 ii. ('() 160 Mllc^K'■<•^r<>^r. Ki'ily (IH49), ;i Kx. 794 ; 18 L. .1. Kx. ;i91 ; 2I).&L. 635.. 158 AI (ircKori). Topliaiii (1H50), 3 II. Ii. (Jaw. 155; I! Iliirc, 48S 1215 M(Jn^K'>r I'aird, Tlui (1867), 36 L. J. Adiii. iO; L. R. I A. & K. 307 ; 15 \V. R. 262 1 189 nawi (IHOl), 2 KaHt, I'. C. 1002 278 MaclKill V. KiliH (1845), 1 (J. & K. 682 507 Miiiiliiu V. (Jriiidoii (1756), 2 Lm-, 335 ; 2 Add. 91 1223 Mac.hu V. lioiid. ti: H. W. Ry. Vai. (1848), 2 Kx. 415 ; 17 L. .1. Kx. 271 549 ]Ma<inl.)Mh r. Iluydon (I826\ Ry. tic M. 362 1 194 M<liityrof. MaiiciiiK (1819), 16 .loliim. 592 961 WflviT f. Walker (1815), 9 Craiicli, 178 802 Mackay v. (Jom. Bank of Kiw UrunHwick (1874), 43 L. J. 1'. C. 31 ; I,. R I'. C. 394 M'Kay V. Riitli.irfoi'd (1848), 6 Moo. I'. «!.(!. 413, 586 (180 WrKcchnic .'. Vautrlian (1873^ L. R. 15 K(|. 289 803 M.KiN! V. KiirnaiM (1811), 2 (jiawf. & 1). (J. C. 209 1035 M'KiHi V. NcIhom (1825), 4 (!owrn, 355 9.30 McKmiini v. FraHcr (1803), 9 Vi'h. 5 4 33 M.K - f.uwiv. KaK<T (1875), 9 I. U. (',. K. 79 128, 1046 MrKcn/io c. Hrilihli Kincii Co. (1881), 6 A pp. Cim. 82 538 Miick<ui/io V. Diiiilop (1856), 3 MaiMj. 26 763 Ma-kcTizio V. I'oi.h'y (1856), 11 Kx. 638; 25 L.J. Kx, 124 179 Mackcn/i.i v. Vim. ('1841), 2 (iurt.. 866 60S M'K-y, R.^ (1H7I1), I. R. 11 K(|. 220 699 " " ■ " ..47, 157 ... 818 ,866, 809 MiickintoMh f. Min>*hiill (1813), 11 M. & W. 126; 12 I,. .1. Kx. 337 Marklcy r Chilliiitfworlli (1877), 46 L. .1. (!. I'. 484 ; 2 C. T. I), 273 M'Koiio, |{.' (I8llj, Ir. Cir. R. 05, M'K'liio r. MiithrrliiiKl (1854), 3 K, Ac Ii. I ; 2 C. K. R. i:i20; 23 L. .1. Q. H. 229; IH.Iiir. 942 160, 161 M.iLaron f. Iloiius or lloriic (1881), 7 Q. H. I). 477; 50 L. ,1. (i.R. 658. . HIS I'he rcfwmcn an to p(iij$; twt to jmrdijrupht. TABLE OF CASES CITED. CX M 1 1 TACIR Miidoiui V. nunn (1828), 4 Biiijf. 72.! ; 1 M. & P. 701 ";;'.» M'Lciiii ('. Jrcrt.zoK (1820), (i Sim-^. »; H. l.Vl 289 M'firllim r. IliiihimlHoii (lS:t(i), 1 Hlic|)l. 82 015, (il(i M.K'l.'od V. Wakloy (1S28), ;M!. & I', .'m 'IVi McMahou » . Hiirtilicll (I8l(i), 2 I'l,. 127 ; 1 Coop. 475 -187 RI-MnhoMW. Elli.s(18r)i)), 10 Ir. I,. It. N. H. 120 'MVi ArMMh.mr. KIHh (18(i:{), 10 Ir. (!. \,. It. I'.tO, .50'.l 148 M Millions. L.liimrd (18,'j8), 11. L. C. 970 148 JP Million V. M-KIroy (lH(i9), I. R. .'. K(|. I 172 Jl .Million V. UawliiiKM (18 IS), 1(1 Sim. 420 11.01 M'.MiinnHi'. LiuiciiM. & Vorks. liy. Co. (IH;')!)), 2 II. & N. (iO:t ; 4 II. A N. ;{27 ; 28 I,. .1. Ex. ;!,');<; ;j;) L.'T. O. S. 2.'')0 ; ;". ,Iiir. N. S. {!.-il 72;(, 771 M'MiVHior and HovIi>'h <'aso (18 Hi), Ir. Cir. II. 7ti8 314 M'Miirdo. Ko (IkV>7), 37 L. J. 1'. & M. 14 ; L. R. I P. & I). CAO; 17 L. T. ■MV.i ; 10 W. li. 28;t 702 MNaghtwi'H cttKO (1843), 10 CI. & F. 200 ; 1 C. & K. ViR ; 8 Scott, N. R. 695 9;)4, 9.15 M'NanKhtcn'H trial, Lrj^al Olw., May 27, I8i;i 104 M'Ni'il r. I'.rc.liurd (1795), 1 Enp. 204 1018 W'N.-il V. I'liilip (1821), 1 mr,. (South Car.), ;192 544 M.l'liorwm V. Watt (1877), :t App. Cas. 251 VMi Ma(^rory r. Scott (1850), 5 Kk. 907 ; 20 L. J. I'ix. 90 072, 077 M'Vicar. Ro (1809), L. R. 1 P. 071; MS L. J. P. «; '>0 L. T. lOlU; 7 \V. H. 8;i2 703 M'VVilliiiniH r. NiMhy (1810), 2 Sor^. & R. 515 90 M.iddison ('. AldorHon (lHS:t), 8 App. Cas. 473 ; 52 L. J. Q. R. ■;)7 ; 49 li. T. :iO:t ; ;H W. K. 820 ; 47 J. P. 821 5;t9, 088 IMaddiHon r. Niittall (1829), RiiiK. 220 ; :( M. it P. 544 510 Maddock, Ro (1874), L. R. ;J P. 109; 4;i L J. I'. 109; HO L. T. 090; 22 VV. R. 74 1 700 Maddox f. FiHlicr (1S51), 14 Moo. P. C. O. lOH 6 Madoii r. (Jatanach ('.802), 7 11. & N. ItOO ; 31 L. .1. lOx. 118 ; 5 h. T. 2«8; 10 VV. 11. 112; 7 .lur. N. S. 1 107 902, 904 Magdalen Colicfri' ''. Alt. -Con. (1857), 20 L. J. Cli. 020 ; H. L. Cas. 189 ; ;t Jur. N. S. 075 74, 125 Ma^dali-n ItoHpital, CovcriiorH of, »>. Knott (1877\ 47 E. J. Cii. 720; 8 (Jli. I). 709 ; 38 L. T. 024 ; 20 VV. R. 040 301 MaK<'0 V. AtkinHon (1837), 2 M. & VV. 440 ; L. J. Ex. 1 15 758 Alajji'O r. Mark (18(i0), 11 Ir. V,. ],. R. 449 105, 0;t4 Miin:rniiiH r. MiU'.C'iillounfli (undulfd), Cill). (Kq. R ) 230 059 MaKliooc. O'Noil (1H41), 7 M. & \V. 531 ; 10 E. . I. Ex. 320 717 MaKniiy «•. Hurt (1843\ I>av. & M. 0,')2 ; 5 Q. H. 381 ; 7 Jur. 1 1 10. . . .800, 872, 873 Mavrnay v. VMxcr (1813), 5 M. & dr. 778 ; Soott, N. R. 588 543 MiiKimv I'. KiiiKht (1840), 2 Scott, N. R. 04 ; 1 M. & Or. 944 ; i Drink. 13 ; I .Iiir. 1088 2B7 MiiKiict. Tim (The Fanny (Jarvill) (1875), 44 L. J. Adni. 34; 32 E. T. 040 ; 24 VV. R. 02 ; 5 ANp. M. (!. 5(;9 177 MiiK lun V. N. En^l. InH. Co. (1810), I Story, R. 157 1142, 1148 Maj^rath i'. Itrowno (1841), Arm. M. & O. 133 954 Miitfratli f. Hardy (I83H), 4 Wuxg. N. C. 782 ; Scott, 027 ; Dowl. P. C. 749 ; 1 Arn. :152 ; 2 .Inr. 591 89, 1101 Miilialcn I'. Dublin Dintillcrv Co. (1877), 11 Ir. R. C. E. 83 672 Mahalm c. MrCuU.iKh. (1891) 27 I-. R. Ir. 431 031 Maliarajali I'crtah Niirain Sin>?li v. Maliarancc Siilihao Koocr (1877), li. R. 4 Ind. App. 228 703 MahoiiV TniMt, Ro (1852), Hare, 459 ; 22 E. J. Ch. 75 1020 Malion »'. Million (1340). 2 Ir. E(|. R,. 440 H07 Malioncy v. Kcknio (1854), 14 C. II. 390; 23 E. J. C. P. 54; 18 .Inr. 313 101 Miihnny r. VVi.loW Eifo Amh. Fund (1.S71), E. R. 0. P. 252; 40 E. ,1. C. p. 203 ; 24 L. T. 548 ; 19 W. R. 722 1 180 Muhood V. Muhood (1874), I. R. 8 K.i. 359 30? Vui. I. ftitli ivith page 0;<6. I I- , l!,lit CXXIT TABLE OF CASES CITED. : f Mn FAOB Miid of Auckland, The (1848), C Notes of Gas. (Eoo. & Mar.), 240 1122 Mainijav v. Gahaii (1793), Ridg. L. & S. 1, 79 ; 1 Ridg. P. 0. 43, 44. n. . 1103 Mair's Estate, Re (1873), 42 L. J. Oh. 882 ; 28 L. T. 760 ; 21 W. R. 749. . 1208 Major r. Williams (1843). 3 Curt. 432 709 Malcolm v. Ray (1819), 3 Moore, C. P. 222 MU Malcolm v. Scott (1843, should bo 18A()), ,5 Ex. 601 487 Malcolmsou v. Morton (1847), 1 1 Ir. L. R. 230 766 Malcomson t'. Baldock {see Auckland, Eiirl of). Malcorasou v. Chiyton (lS6u). 13 Mi>o. P. C. C. 198 186 Malcomson v. O'Doa (1862), 10 H. of L. Cas. 693, 614, 616 ; 9 L. T. 93 ; 12 W. R. 178; 9 Jur. N. S. U3.i 87, 111, 124, 432 Maiden v. Great North. Ry. Co. (1874). L. R. 9 Ex. 300 1186 ]\Iaie V. Roberts (1800), 3 Esp. 1S3 ; 6 R. R. 823 7 Mallalieu v. Hodgson (1852), 16 Q. B. 689 ; 20 L. J. Q B. 339 ; 15 Jur. 817 91 Mallan v. May (1844), 13 M. & W. 517 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 4S 741 Mallau r. Radcliff (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 588 ; 11 L. T. 381 ; 13 W. R. 139; 10 Jur. N. S. 1132 777 Milhtt r. Bateman (1865), L. R. 1 C. P. 163; 35 L. J. C. P. 40; 13 L. T. 410 ; 14 \V. R. 225 ; 1 H. & R. 109 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 122 ; 16 C. B. N. S. 530 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 243 076 Mallison, Re (1832), 1 L.-w. C. C. 132 824 Muloue V. O'Connor (1859), Drury, temp. Napier, 644 79 MaUme v. Spillessy (1847), Ir. Cir. R. 504 946 Malouey v. Bartley (1M12), 3 Camp. 210 900, 961 Miilpas V. Clements (1850), 19 L. J. Q. B. 435 146 Malpas V. London & South West. Ry. Co. (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 336 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 166 ; 13 L. T. 710 ; 14 W. R. 391 ; 1 H. & R. 227 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 271 745 Maltby V. Christie (1795), 1 Esp. 340 618 M.-lton V. Nesbit (1824), 1 C. & P. 70 935 Man V. T ketts (1815), 2 Coop. (C. P.) 21 ; 14 L. J. Ch 255 16, lz9 Manby ''urtis (1816), 1 Price, 225 171, 430, 443 Manby t. S)oott (1660), 2 Smith's L. C. 4G6 ; 1 Lev. 4 166, 107 Manchester, Bank of. Ex parte, Re Jackson (1871), 40 L. J. Bank. 67; L. R. 12 Eq. 354 085 Manchester Bonded Warehouse Co. v. Carr (1880), 5 C. P. D 607; 49 L. J. C. P. 809 ; 43 L. T. 476 ; 29 W. R. 354 ; 45 J. P. 7 774 Manchester, May. of, v. Williams, (1891^ 1 Q. B. 94; 60 L. J. Q. B. 23; 63 L. T. 805; 39 W. R. 302 ; 64 J. P. 712 643 Mandevillt v. Welch (1820), 1 Wheat. 233 488 Mangles v. Dixon (1849), 1 Mac. & G. 446 ; 1 H. & T. 660 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 240 638 Mauley v. Boycot (1853). 2 E. & B. 46 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 205 ; 17 Jur. 1118. 758 Mauley v. Shaw (1840), Car. & M. 361 899 Maun, Rb (1859), 28 L. J. P. & M. 19 69 J Mann v. Lang (1835), 3 A. & E. 702 ; 6 N. & M. 202 ; 1 H. & W. 441 . . 553 Manne. Nunn (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 241 ; 30 L. T. 626 683, 754 Manur. Owen (1829), 9 B. & C. ii5 ; 4 M. & R. 449 1133 Manners!). Postan (1803), 4 Esp. 239; 3 Bos. & P. 343 1209 Manning v. Cox (1823), 7 Moore, C. P. 617 487 Manning V. East. Cos. Ry. Co. (1843), 12 M. & W. 237; 3 Railw. Cas. 637 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 265 1033, 1039 Mansel f. Clauricarde (1885), 54 L. J Ch. 982 ; 63 L. T. 496 913 Mausell V. Clements (1874). L. R. 9 C. P. 139 9(0 Mauser v. Back (1848), 6 Hare, 443 760 Mauser v. Dix (1856), 1 K. ■': 3. 451 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 497 602 Marathon, The (1879), 48 L. J. Adm. 17; 40 L. T. 163 178 Marbury v. Madison (1803), 1 Cranch, 144 618 Marchmont Peer. (1840), Pari. Min. 345, 353 423, 1179 Mare v. Charles (1866), 6 E. & B. 978 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 119 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 234 787 Margareson v. Saxton (1835), 1 Y. & C. Ex. 629 487 T/i» refireueea are tu pages, not to pai nyniphs. TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXY FAOB Maria das Donas, or Dores, The (18G3), 32 L. J. P. & M. 163 ; Brown & L. 27; 7L. T. 838; IIW. R. 500 1172 M-iriiiiiski t. Ciiims (18ol-2), 1 Macq. 212 ; 1 raterNon, 416 480 Murine Investment Co. v. Havisido (1872), L. K. 5 H. L. 621 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 173 133 Markham ';. Gonaston (1688), Cro. Eliz. fi26 1200, 1205 Markiiam v. Statirtford n863), 14 C. B. N. S. 380 ; 8 L. T. 277 649 Marksf. Bevfu«(1890), 25Q. B. D. 494; SDL. J. Q. B. 479; 38W. R. 705.. 613 Murks r. Liihoe (1837), 3 Binjr. N. C. 419 ; 4 S^jott, 137 435, 440 Marmyon Peer. (1818), Pari. Min. Ill 423 Marriage r. Linvreuce (1819), 3 B. & Aid. 412 1050, 1 175 Miirriotf. Marriot( 1725-6), 1 Sir. 671 1105, 1133 Marsden r. Coode (1845), 2 C. & Kir. 133 48 Marsden r. Lane. & York. Ry. Co. (1881), 7 Q. B. D. (Ml ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 318 ; 44 L. T. 239 ; 29 W. R. 580 41 Marsden r. Ovorbury (1856). 18 C. P. 34 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 200 838 Marsli V. CoUnott (1798). 2 Esp. 606 ; 5 R. R. 76.5 86, 105,3, 10.54, 1173 Marsh r. Keith (18h0). 30 L. .1. Ch. 127 ; 1 Dr. & Sin. 342 605 Marsh V. Loader (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 535 ; 2 New R. 280 ; 11 W. R. 784. 99 Marsh 1'. Marsh (1858, should be 1860), 1 S. & T. 628; 30 L. J. P. & M. 77 ; 6 Jiir. N. S. 380 141, 709 Marshal r. Crutwell (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 328 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 504 667 Marshall v. Berridjro (1882), 51 L. J. Cli. 329 ; 19 Ch. D. 2J;i ; 45 L. T. 599 ; 30 W . R. 94 ; 670 Marshall r. Clitt' (1815), 4 Camp. 133 506 Marshall v. G()u<,'ler (1823), 10 Serf,'. & R. 164 1199 Marshall r. (Jreen (1875), 1 C. P. D. 35 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 153. .685. 686, 687, 690 MarshaU v. Lamb (1843), 5 Q. B. 113 ; D. & M. 315 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 75 : 7 Jur. 850 147, 148 Marshall v. Lvun (1840), M. & W. 116 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 126 762 Marshall r. Smith (1865), 34 L. J. Ch. 189 ; 11 L. T. 443 ; 13 W. R. 198 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1 174 74 Marshall v. Taylor. (1895) 1 Ch. 641 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 416 Jdd. [113] Marshall v. The Ulleswater St. Na. Co. (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 139 ; 3 B. &S. 732; 9 Jur. N. S. 988; 8L. T. 416; 11 W. R. 489 Ill Marshall v. The York, Newcastle, k Berwick Ry. Co. (1851), 11 C. B. 398 832 Marston v. Dean (1835). 7 C. & P. T3 2S7 Marston v. Downes (1834), 1 A. & E. 31 ; 4 N. & M. 861 ; 6 C. & P. 381 . . 320, 321, 597, 969 Martin's case (1830), 1 Lew. C. C. 104 246 Martin, Re (188;i), 13 L. R. Ir. 312 321 Martin v. Andrews (1856), 26 L. J. Q. B. 39 ; 7 E. & B. 1 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1121 820 Martin r. Gale (1867), 4 Ch. D. 428 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 84 ; 36 L. T. 357 ; 25 W. R. 406 100 Martin v. Geoghejjran (1850), 13 Ir. I^. R. 403 710 Martin v. Kennedy (180(i), 2 Bos. & P. 71 1 122 Martin v. Nicolls (1830), 3 Sim. 458 1 154 Martin f . Podfrer (1770), 5 Burr. 2631 481 Martin v. Smith (1874), 43 L. J. Ex. 42; L. R. 9 Ex. 50 660, 654 Martin r. Thornton (1796), 4 Esp. 181 612 Martindale v. Booth (1832). 3 B. & Ad. 498 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 15 136 Martindale v. Falkner (1846), 2 C. B. 719, 720; 16 L. J. C. P. 91 ; 3 Dowl. & L. P. C. 600 79 Manyn V.Williams (1857), 26 L.J. Ex. 117; 1 H. & N. 817 .., 192 Marvin v. "Wallace (1856), 25 ''.. J. Q. B. 369 ; 6 E. & B. 726 690 Mary, Tlie (1878), 48 L. J. P. D. & A. 66 ; 6 P. D. 14 ; 41 L. T. 351 ; 28 W. R. 95 178 Mary, The, or Alexandra (1868), 38 L. J. Adm. 29 ; L. R. 2 Adm. & Eco. 319; 18L.T «01 964,1189 Mary, The (1815), 9 Cranch, 126 11.50 Marzetti v. Smith (1883), 49 L. T. 580 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 166 ; 1 C. & E. 6 . . 769 Mash V. Deiisham (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 442 190 Vol. I, mit with page C3fi. I CXXVl TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOK Miwon and Btirry v. Comptoir d'Emiompto (1800), 38 W. R. 6R/5 343 MiiHoii V. Hmdlcy (1HI3), 1 1 M. & W. MH) ; 1 DcwI. & L. MHO ; 12 L. J. Ex. I'if) ; 7 .Tiir. 4!)(i 1194 MiiHon V. l''ariioll (1811), 1'2 M. & W. 074 ; 1 Dowl. & li. /i70 ; V.i L. J. Ex. 142 47 Miimm V. Kiildlo (!H;t!»), /i M. & W. fiKl; 8 Dowl. '207 ; L. J. Ex. 37 .. 732 MiiHim V. MiiHoii (181(1), 1 M(^riv. 308 174 MiiHou V. Hkunny M780), I'lirk, liw. 240 703 MiiHon f.. Wooil (187.'>), 46 L. J. U. 1'. 70; 1 C J'. J). 03 ; 33 L. T. fi71 ; •24 W. K. 40 1088 MiiMpor and Wifn v. Ilrown (1875), 46 L. J. 0. 1'. 203 ; 1 C. 1'. I). 97 ; 34 li. T. 264 ; 24 VV. It. 309 1130 WiiNMiiv V. Allen (1879), 13 Ch. I>. 668 ; 49 L. J. Cli. 70 ; 41 L. T. 788 ; 28 W. K. 212 436, 466, 816 MiiHMoy V. Ji.luiHon (1847), 1 Ex. 266 ; 17 1.. .1. Ex. 182 082 MiMtiir V. Mlllor (1791), 4 T. K. 330 ; 6 T. II. 307 ; 2 11. I'.l. 1 10 ; i AnHtr. 226 ; 2 U. K. 3!)'J I 193, 1 IDI, 1200, 1201 Miiht.IT I'ilotH k Seamen of NowciiHtlo v. llradlry (1861), 2 K. & U. 428, n. ; 23 1. ,J. Q. U. 36 791 MaHtciH r. HarrctH (1849), 2 C. & K. 716 202 MaHtoFM V. AlaHtiTN (1718), 1 r. WniH. 426 702 W..Ht(TH V. I'.illic (1020), 2 Uollc R. 141 114 Wutlicrv. L<ird MaidHlxmo (1860), 20 L. J. (I V. 68; 1 C. II. N. H. 273; 3 Jur. N. H. 1 12 • 2(52 Matlior V. 'IViiiity (Jlmrcli (1877), 3 SiTt^. & H. 6011 123 JIiilhewH f. MiitlKrWH (1807), I,. It 4 K(i. 278; 16 W. It. 701 80» MiiUicwM.'. Ov.^y f|H8t), 13 (i, H. I). 4113; 63 L. .1. (i. M. 439; 60 li. T. 770. . 12;i2 WaMiiaM, lt(!(lH<13;, 32 Ji. J. I*. * M. 116; 3 H. \- T. 100 7ol l^latwm II. linctli (1810), 6 M. .V S.'l. '223 1203 Watwnu). Wlianiiri (1787y, 2T. It. 80; 1 It. It. 429 078 ]VliiH.li.!wt'. ()Hl.c,in(^(18.')6), 130. H. 919; 22 L.. 1.0. I'. 211; 17.liir. 000. .89, 1113 Wal.l.h<;WH v. Mal.llifWH (176.6), 2 Vt;H. wn. 030 KIO AlaUhdWH V. I'orl, (10K7), Oonil). 03 1107 MaUlmwH r. WliiUlo (1880), 13 (Jli. I>. 81 1 ; 49 L. J. (jli. 369 ; 43 L. T. 114; 28 \V. It. 822 636 MaUhcy V. Wiwinan (IHCr,), IH C. W. N. H. 067; 31 L. ,1. (!. ]'. 210; U .liir. N. H. 0(;3; 12 1,. T. h.|0 ; |;) \V. It. 914 1110 MattM r. llawkiiiH (1813), 6 Taiiii. 20; 1 1 It. It. 0!)6 113 Alaul.(mr.|n.l, r. Wyse (|K07), I. It. 1 O. I,. 171 1140, 1148 Miiudd r. Ilaiidon IaxmI Jli.ard (1883), 10 il li. I). 391 ; 48 h. T. 874 ; 47 .1. r. 014 48 MaiiKliain »'• lluldjanl (I8'28), 8 H. .t O. 14 ; 2 M. & It. 6 920, 927 Mamid r. AIoiumouUi Oaii. Oo. (1812), 0. \- MmthIi. 000; 2 Dowl. N. S. 113; 4M.*<i.462; 6 HcoU, N. It. 467 ; 3 Itiiilw Cas. l.V.I; Jur. 932. . . . 227 Maunm'll V. AinHWorlli (1810), N Dowl. 80!) ; 1 11.^, \V. 6 816 WaiinMfill V. llodK<T (1861), 2 Ir. <!. I*. It. 88 712 Miiunw'll «.. Wliit,.i (1864;, 4 II. li. OaH. 103!) 639, 079 Mavor )). I'ayiKi (182.1), 3 HiiiK. 28.-^1; 1 1 Moon^ O. I'. 2 082 Mawliy r. Iliitliir (1820), '2 St,. Kv. Oil, (142 266 MawHoii V. llailHiiik (18fl'2), 4 KHp. 103 ; It. It. 811 1)72, !<74 Maxwrll ... rarncll (1800-7), I. It. 1 <;. L. 234 780 May, It.. (1808;, 37 L. .). I'. & M. (i8; li. It. I I'. iV D. 676 70() May V. Ill-own (1821), 3 l(. & (!. 113; 4 I). &. It. 070 246, 240 May f. E<.ot.nt)r (1866), 6 E. & \i. 606 ; "6 L. J. (i. H. 32 ; 1 Jur. N. H. 1010 188 May V. (Iwyniic (1821), 4 It. A Al.l. 301 900 Alay V. H<.|l')y (I842), 4 M, cV Or, 112; 4 SroU, N. It. 727; 1 D. N. H. 702; (i'Jur. 62 ; 111,. J. O. I'. 223 818 May V. Taylor (1843), M. & Or. 200 ; Hrott, N. It. 974 ; 12 li. J. C. I'. ;il4 ; 7 Jur. 616 490, 407 Mavflf^ld f. Itoliiimon (1846;, 7 Q. U. 480; <) Jur. 820 01(7 Mayli.'ld r. WadHli^y (18'21), 3 H. Ac (',. 300; 6 D. A- It. 224 087 Mayhow v. Ni'Imou (I83;i), O. & T. 68 378 3'he re/er«neei art to ynyei, not to paniyrnphi. TAHLE OF CASKS CI'IKD. CXXVll ■AOH ;iti7 •2\i til 7 If.',') tldO :)<.m (\H2 Mayor r. .Tolinnoii (18i:i), 3 Ciiiiii). :12« Mond V. DiiubiKiiy (17U2), I'.'ii. IJ.'i M.'iide f. Hinitli (1814), 1(1 Conn. IMO Mi-iiK'>" » • Hiiiiii'oi'H (if^'^"). 3 c. & r. Tr) JVIrurHr. lA. Htonrton (1711), 1 I'. WniH. 140 M.-iith, »i>. of V. L.I. Ui'MMA (174H), 7 WUh. 2 IT. ; 2 Stilk. ft 12 Mi'iitli, Up. of V. M. of WinohoHtiT (IHUd), U HinK- N. <;. IHH; ;i H.^ ftfll 2(i, 87, 421), 4:n, ,')l(l, Mrolmiiinr Hk. of Aloxiindria v. Hk. of ColuniMii (1H20), C> Wlicut. .'I.'KI ., Mcdioli-n r. Wiilliuui (18;)7), 7 A. & K. 40; (i li. J. IC. 11. 217 ; 2 N. .& I'. 224 (i"«, Mcrrcdy v. Taylor (187:)), I. It. 7 O. h. 2f)(i Klii Mid.lowrroft c. Ilujrii.nin (1814). 4 AIoo. 1'. (!. C. ;t8(; 1 i;t2 Mi'dlyiMitt. r. AnhIu'Idii nH24), 2 Add. 22!) 14;» Aim ('. Koid (17itl), IN'ii. K. 2;i ; :» K. li. 048 W)r> M<-.'kiiiH (I. Smith (17!)1), 1 H. III. (•.;t7 8(ift, 800 McRfvand, Hf, K\ parto DoHuin-.o (18(17), ;{7 h. T. 440 ; 20 W. It. 20 ; 7 ( :li. I). 611; 47 L. .1. Ch. 06 ; ;t8 L. V. 100 ; 20 VV. It. :i.')8 l.V.) McKKO" »'. Hindi" (1880), 16 Ch. 1). I!)8 ; 4:» L. T. 661 ; 28 W. It. 800 . . 146 Mrli^iv. AIl<l^^•w^4 (1820), M. .V M. MHO 62;l, 62S, 687 M.41iuiHhv. (\.llior(186()), 16 (i. U.878; l!)Tj..T.(i. H.4!i:t; 14 .liir. 021 . .242, !);tS> MrlliNh V. Itawdon (18;i2), i) Hiiijf. 41(i ; 2 M. & H.Mit.t. 670. :t8 Mcilor v. Sidrhott^mi (1877), 40 L. J. Ch. ;ii)8 ; 6 Cli. I). I'.i.; ; ;t7 L. T. '. ; 26 W. It. 4 10 6!) t M.'iiow r. May (1601), Moo. (K.) (i;iO 067 AIclvilln'H, l,d'., raN(i(1800), 2!) Il<.w. Ht. Tr. 707 8, 14, 108, 472, .')87, i)0!» Molviiif. Whit,iiit^(1828),7 I'i.'k. 70 ;127 Mi^rraiit. ("iM'dit, AMHociat., Jtn, Clcniciil's (lai'o (18(;8), 37 Ij. .1. Cli. 206 ; l.'l L. It. Kq. 179, n. 1 846 Mcm-r f. ChcrNo (1842V 4 M. & Gr. 804 ; 6 Hoott, N. It. 004 ; 2 Dow!. N. H. (>1!) ; 12 li. J. C. l*. 60 108 MiMwr V. H]iaikn ( 16H0), Owon, 61 ; Noy, ;t6 110 MciiKT t'. Whall (1846), 6 Q. 11. 402 ; 14 L. J. Q. 1$. 207 ; .Inr. 670. .270, 27;! Mcroor v. WIho (1800), ;i Knj>. 210 642 JW.-rcr V. WooilKat,o (1870), 10 H. & H. 8:!;t ; Ml) h. J. M. C. 21 ; L. It. 6 «i. n. 20 ; 21 L. T. 468 ; IH VV. It. 1 10 124 Merchant IViiK^o, Th.', (1802) T. !l, 170 ; 07 L. T. 261 200 MiTohantH' Co., Ito (1 (07), Ji. It. 4 Kii. 46;t ,S|6 Ali'i-fditli V. KootniT (184;t), 11 Af. it W. 202 ; 12 L. J. Kx. I8;i 6t);i, 606 Alcn-ditli r. Ar.'iRli (186;!), 2 I'!. \- H. a(i4 ; 22 L. J. Q. U. 401 01)2 Alcrlo r. Alor.. (1820), Ity. & AI. 3!)t) 003 Merrick r. Waklcy (18.)8), 8 A. & K 170; 3 N. & 1'. 284 ; 1 VV. W. & II. 208; 2jiir. 838 1()4H Merrill v. Mort..iM (1881), 60 L. J. Ch. 241); 17 Ch. 1). 382 ; 43 L. 'l'. 760 ; 20 VV. It. 3114 741 Alorritl, llo( 1868), 1 S. &T. 112; 4 Jur. N. 8. 1102 706 Alrrry v. Nirkalls (1876), L. 11. 7 Ch. 733; 41 L. J. Ch. 707 ; 20 L. T. 40(1; 20 VV. It. 631 168 MiiMHin V. lid. AlaMMarceno (1701), 4 T. It. 403 1 166 AI.'HHiiia V. IVilroiMicchino (1872), Ji. 11. 4 1'. C. 144 ; 8 Moo. P. C. C. N. H. 376 1147 Motoor, 'I'ho (1876), I. It. i! Kq. 607 178 Mftroiiol. Uv. Co. r. DcfrirH (1877), 2 U. 11. I). 18!), 387 ; 30 L. T. 160, 40 1 ; 26 W*. It. 27 1 , 8 II .',35 ATctropol. Itv. (!o. «•. .lac'kHoi; (1877), 3 Ajip. Chh. 11)3 ; 47 L. J. C. 1*. 303 ; 37 li. T. (i70 ; 20 W. It. 176 23, 2S, 38 MeUtTM r. Hrowii (1802), 32 li. .1. I'lx. I3S; 1 H. \- C. (,80 92, 110, 106 M.nvH V. Cur (1860), 1 II. & N. 481 ; 20 li .1. Kx. 20 730 Mi'xiiiin \- H. Anicricaii Co., Ite, Kx parto AHton (I8,M)), 28 L. J. Ch. 034 ; 4 l)o(). .V[ .T. 220; 27 Heav. 471 1)04 A%.T«'. I>rrHH(,r (1801), l(i C. H. N. H. 040; 33 L. J. C. P. 289 ; 10 li. T. 012 : 12 VV. It. 1)83 8/5 Moyor •». Moutriou (1840), 9 !?,,av. 621 496 t Vol. J. rmh with pa^0 036, CXXVlil TABLE OF CA3i:S CITP^D, i; \l\ Moyer t-. Ralli (187fi), 1 C. P. D. 358 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 741 ; 24 W. R. 963. . Meyer v. Softoii (1817), 2 Stark. R. 274 ; 19 R. R. 720 Meyerhoff r. Froehli<;li (1878). 3 C. P. D. 3;« ; 4 C. P. D. 63 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 43 ; 39 L. T. 620 ; 27 W. R. 258 MeyuoU'a case (1831). 2 Low. C. C. 122 Moyriokf. Janics (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 579 32 Meyrick r. Woods (1812), C. & MiiFMh. 452 Michiiol V. Scookwith (1587), Cro. Kliz. 120 Michiiel t'. Trer -iu (1856), 17 C. B. 551 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 83 Michell t'. RiibbettH (1810), cited 3 Taun. 91 Michell V. "Williams (1843), 11 M. & W. 205 ; 12 L. .T. Ex. 193 Middleditch v. Ellis (1848). 2 Ex. 623 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 365 Middlchurst r. JohnHon (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 14 Middlesex Sheriffs, case of (18 lO), 11 A. & E. 273 Middletoix's case (1603). 5 Co. Rep. 21 Middlotou, Re (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 16 ; 3 S. & T. 583 ; 10 Jur. N. S 1109 vxoa 1147 323 712 500 4, 920 314 1200 771 430 30, ,U 754 140 4 92 '. 708 Middloton r. Barned (1849), 4 Ex. 241 : 18 L. J. Ex. 433 106, 977 Middleton r. Croft (1736), Str. 1056 79 Middloton r. Mass (1819), 2 Nott. & M C. 55 429 Middleton v. Melton (1829), 10 B. & C. 322 ; 5 M. & R. 264. .279, 437.441, 508 Middleton v. Pollock, Ex parte Wethcrall (1876), 4 Ch. D. 49 : 46 L. J. Ch 39 ; 35 L. T. 608 ; 25 W. R. 94 639 Midland Ry. Co. r. Hunchwood Brick and Tile Co. (1882), 20 Ch. D. 662 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 778 ; 46 L. T. 301 ; 30 W. R. 610 60 Midland Rv. Co. v. WithinKton Local Board (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 788; 6" L. J. Q.'B. 689 ; 49 L. T. 489 ; 47 J. P. 789 226 Miwhell V. Sultan of Johore, (1893) 9 R. 447 ; (1894) 1 Q. B. 149 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 593 ; 70 L. T. 64 ; 58 J. P. 244 Mig-otti V. Cclville (1879), 4 C. P. D. 233 ; 48 L. J. C. P. (;95 ; 40 L. T. 747 ; 27 W. R. 744 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 305 Milan, The (1861), Lnsh. 388 ; 31 L. J. Adm. 105 ; 5 L. T. 590 Mildrone's case (1786), 1 Lea. C. C. 412 Miles V. Bough (1842), 3 Q. B. 845; 3 Railw. Cas. 668; 3 G. & D. 119 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 74 294, 1177 Miles f. Dawson (1796), 1 Esp. 4»o ; 2 Pcake, 54 969 Miles V. M'CuUoukIi (1803). 1 Binn. 77 873 Miles v. O'Hrra (1811), 4 Biun. 108 353, 354 Millar v. Heinrick (1815), 4 Camp. 115 936 Millard v. Bailey (1866), L. R. 1 Eq. 378 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 312 ; 13 L. T. 751 ; 14 W. R. 385 Miller's case (1772-3), 3 Wilson, 427 : 2 W. Bl. 886 Miller's ca. , (1817), Macq. Pia(!. H. L. 620 MiUerv. Cook (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 641 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 11 ; 18 W. R. 1061; 22 L. J. Ch. 740 Miller V. Covert (1828), 1 Wend. 487 1124 Miller V. Huddlestone (1851), 3 Mae. & G. 613, 623, 524 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 1 ; 15 Jut. 1043 144 Miller V. Irvine (1834), 1 Dev. & B. 103 669 Miller v. James (1872), L. R. 3 P. & D. 4 ; 42 L. J. P. & M. 21 ; 27 L. T. 862 ; 21 W. R. 272 1151 MiUer V. Lawtou (1861), 2 New R. 430 ; 15 C. B N. S. 834 388 Miller V. Salomons (1852), 7 Ex. 534 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 161 905 Miller v. Stevens (1868). 100 Mass. 518 763 Miller v. Tetherington (1861), 6 H. & N. 278 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 217 ; 7 H. & N. 954: 3 L. T. 893 ; 9 W. R. 437 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 214 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 363; 10 W. R. 356 764, 765 Miller f. Travers (1832), 8 Ring. 250 744, 760, 761, 801,802 Miller v. Wheatley (1890), 28 L. R. Ir. 144 305, 431, 460, 1210 Milligan, Re (184!t), 2 Rol)eit8. 108 702 Millington r. Loring (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 190 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 214 ; 43 L. T. 657 ; 29 W. R. 207 : 45 J. P. 268 220 Millman f. Tucker (1803), Pea. Add. Cas. 222 967, 970 The rcftrencu or* to pages, not to paragrnphe. 14 16 1122 905 789 930 603 137 TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXIX FAOE MiUnerV Estate, Ro (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 246 ; 42 L. J. Cli. 44 ; 26 L. T. 820 ; 20 AV . R. 823 101 MillH r. Biirbor (ISHO), 1 M. & W. 427 ; 5 Dowl. P. C. 77 ; 2 Gale, 6 . .258, 2(il Mills V. DeniiiN (1818), 3 Johus. 3G7 496 MilU v. FowkoH (1839), 5 Bing. N. 0. 455 ; 7 Soott, 444 ; 8 L. J. C. P. 270 715, 716 MillH V. Mayor of ColoheHtcr (18G7), L. R. 2 C. P. 476 ; 36 L. J. 0. P. 216; 16 L. T. fiJC) : 15 W. R. (i.?5 123, 124, 1092 Mill« V. Mills (18(>1), 30 L. J. P. & M. 183 ; 2 S. & T. 310 ; 4 L. T. 479. . 348 Mills V. Mihviinl (1890), 15 P. I). 20 ; 59 L. J. P. 23 ; 61 L. T. 051 703 Mills 1'. (Wilv (183»), 6 C. & P. 72S 271. 3'.>0, -)99 Mills V. Scott (1873), 42 L. J. Q. B. 234 ; L. R. 8 Q. B. 496 ; 29 L. T. 90 ; 21 W. 11. iil5 Ifll, 195 Miliio r. Leislcr (1802), 31 L. .T. Ex. 257 ; 7 11. & N. 786 ; 6 L. T. 802 ; 10 W. R. 2.iO ; 8 .Jur. N. S. 121 378 Milroy v. Lord (1862), 4 De G. F. & J. 264 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 798 639 Milsoij r. I),iy (1829), 3 M. & P. 333 817 Milward r. Forhes (180.S), 4 Esp. 171 517 Milward v. Hibbert (1N42), 3 Q. B. 135 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 2G. & D. 142 765 Alilwavd V. Ti'tnple (1808), 1 Ciiinp. 375 Mima Queen r. Hepbuni (1813), 7 Cranch, 290 368, 506 Minet v. MorKnn (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. App. 361 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 627 ; 28 L. T. N. 8. 673 ; 21 VV. R. 467 321, 601, 602 Miuna, The (1808), L. R. 2 A. & E. 97 178 Minor r. Tillotsou (1833), 7 Pet. 100 277 Minshnll )'. Lloyd (1837). 2 M. & W. 450 ; 6 L. 7 Ex. 1 15 304 Mints V. Bcthill (1601), Cro. Eliz. 749 323 Minty, Re (1S.")0), 7 Notes of Ca.ses (Ecc. iit Mar.) 374 698 Mires r. Solcbay (1()78), 2 Mod. 244, 245 29 Mit(^hell f. Cnissweller (1853), 13 C. B. 237; 22 L. J. C. P. 100; 17 Jur. 716 193 Mitchell t>. Darley Main Coll. Co. (1886), 11 App. Cas. 127 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 529; 54L. T. 882; 51 J. P. 148 114 Mitehell v. Ilomfray (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 460 ; 8 Q. B. D. 587 ; 45 L. T. 694 ; 29 W. R. 5.')8 136 Mitchell t: Jenkins (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 594-596 ; 2 N. & M. 301 . . . .30, 39, 110 Mitchell V. Lapage (1816), Holt, N. P. R. 253 ; 17 R. E, 633 299 Mitchell V. Thomas (1847), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 137 140, 141 Mitcheson r. Oliver (1865), 5 E. & B. 419; 25 L. J. Q. B. 39 ; 1 Jur. N. 8. 900 i7d Mobile, The (1856), Swa. Adm. 69, 127 178 Mody V. Gregson (1868), 38 L. J. Ex. 12 ; L. R. 4 Ex. 49 ; 19 L. T. 458 ; 17 W. R 1 76 776 Moti'att V. Biiteman (1869), L. R. 3 P. C. 115 ; 22 L. T. 140 ; 6 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 369 163 Mohesh Lai v. Mohunt Bawan Das (1883), L. R. 10 Ind. App. 62, 70, 71.. 153 Moises V. Thonitoti (1799), 8 T. R. 307 ; 3 Esp. 4 1214 Mollett V. Brayne (1809), 2 Camp. 103 ; 1 1 R. R. 676 650, 660 Mollettv. Wackerbath(lS47), 5 C. B. 181; 17 L. J. C. P. 47; 11 Jur. 1065 1193, 1195 Mollwo, March & Co. v. Ct. of Wards (1872), L. R. 4 P. C. 419, 435 159 Molton r. Camroux (1849), 2 Ex. 487 ; 4 Ex. 17 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 356; 18 L. J. Ex. 58 ; 12 Jur. 800 542 Molton V. Harris (1797), 2 Esp. 549 296 Monaghan v. Cox (1892), 31 Am. St. R. 555 372 Moncrieff v. Reade (1848), 2 C. & K. 705 192 Mondelt'. Steele (1841), 8 M. & W. 300; 9 Dowl. 812; 6 Jur. 611; 10 L. J. Ex. 314 1122 Mone' V. Jorden (1852), 15 Beav. 372 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 174 5'?9 Monk m*. Att.-Gen. (1831), 2 Russ. & My. 161.. 408, 409, 410, 413, 415, 416, 418, 421, 423, 424 Monroe, Bank of , t». Field (1842), 2 Hill, R. 445 388 Monroe v. Twistleton (1802), Pea. Add. Cas. 221 691 Vol. I. tndt with pagt 636. -*;|i! 1 i'lll cxxx TABLE OF CASES CITED. il PAoa MonUoute v. Maxwell (1720), 1 P. WmH. 619 679, ti80 Monteprue «. Harrison (1867), 3 0. B. N. 8. 292 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 24 ; 4 Jur. N. 8. 29 86<) MontH«ue, Ld., i>. Diidman ('."51), 2 Ves. son. 397 997 Montague t'. Montague (ISSi), 15 Beav. 505 805 Montague v. PerkiuH 0853), 22 L. J. C. P. 187 ; 17 Jur. 577 38, 1205 Mouteflore v. OuedHllii (1800), 29 L. J. Cli. 05 ; i De G. F. & J. 93 .... 806 Monteflori v. Montefiori (1702), 1 \V. 81. 303 639 Montgomery v. Middleton (1802), 13 Ir. C. L. R. 173 43 Montreal, Hank of. r. Munttter Bunk (1876), I. K. 1 1 C. L. 47 44 Montrose, Poor. (1853), 1 Macc|. 401 180, 792 Moodie V. BiiuniBter (1859), 4 Drew. 432 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 881 ; 5 Jur. N. 8. 402 722 Moody V. Rowcll (1835). 17 Pii^k. 490 922, 945, 1220, 1223, 1228 Moody V. SurridgH (1798), Park, InH. 245 703 Moons V. De BernalcH (1856), 1 Russ. 301 1104 Moor p. (1813), 1 M. & Sul. 284 255 Moore V. Booth (1797). 3 Ves. 350 869 Moore V. Campbell (1854), 10 Ex. .323 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 310 298, 752 Moore V. Culverhoiise (1860), 27 Bca>. 639; 29 L. J. Ch. 419; 6 Jur. N. 8. 1 1 5 738 Moore V. Garwood (1849). 4 Ex. 081 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 15 44 Moore v. King (1842), 3 Curt. 243 694 Moore t>. Mot. Ry. Co. (1872), L. R. 8 Q. B. 36 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 23 ; 27 L. T. 679; 21 W. R. 145 586, 643 Moore v. Moore (1755), 2 Ves. sen. 696, 603 180 Moore V. Moore (1871), 6 Ir. R. Eq. 166 142 Moore v. Moore (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 617; L. R. 18 Eq. 474; 30 L. T. 752; 22 W. R. 729 638 Moore V. Mourgue (1770), 2 Cowp. 470 . 39 Mooro V. Oastlor (1830), St. Ev. 041, 642 255 Moore V. Peaohey, (1891) 2 Q. B. 707 ; 39 W. R. 592 1181 Mooro V. Smith (1826), 14 Serg. & R. 393 627 Mooro V. Terrell (1833). 4 B. & Ad. 870 ; 1 N. & M. 559 591 Moore v. Wliitehouso (1804), 34 L. J. P. & M. 31 ; 3 S. & T. 507; 11 L T. 468 307 Moorhouse v. Newton (1849), 3 De G. & Sm. 307 480 More (should be Moor) v. Salter (1015), 3 Buls. 79 1 198 Moreau and Ciirloton's Trial (1820), 200 900 Morewood v. Wilkes (1833), 6 C. & P. 144 135 Morewood v. Wood (1792), 14 East, 327, n. ; 12 R. R. 637. .393, 399, 401, 1220, 1227 Morgan v. Boys (1836), cited 7 A. & E. 337 371 Morgan v. Brydges (1818), 2 Stark. R. 314 945 Morgan v. Chctwynd (1805), 4 F. & F. 451 160 Morgan v. Couchman (1853), 14 C. B. 100; 2 0. L. R. 53; 23 L. J. C. P. 36 629 Morgan v. Davios (1878), 3 C. P. D. 200 ; 39 L. T. tU) ; 2<i W. R. 810 . . 35 Morgan r. Griffith (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 70 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 46 ; 23 L. T. 783 ; 19 W. R. 957 745 Morgan v. Hatchell (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 135 ; 19 Beav. 96 ; 1 Jur. N. 8. 125 731 Morgan v. Hodger (1870). L. R. 5 C. P. 485 ; 40 L. J. M. C. 13 263 Morgan r. Lond. Gon. Omnibus Co. (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 203; 63 L. J. Q. B. 352 : 50 L. T. 687 ; 32 W. R. 416 779 Morgan r. Morgan (1832), 9 Bing. 359; 2 L. J. C. P. 27; 2 Moo. & So. 490 ] 372, 1216 Morgan r. Nicholl (1860), 30 L. J. C. P. 86 ; L. R. 2 C. P. 117 ; 15 L. T. 184 ; 15 V/. R. 110 ; 12 ,Tur. N. 8. 903 327 Morgan v. Pike (I8;)4), It C. B. 473; 2 C. L. R. 096; 23 L. J. C. P. 64.. 676 Morgan v. Ravey (1801), 6 11. & N. 265; 30 L. J. Ex. 131 ; 3 L. T. 784; 9W.R.376; 2 F. & F. 283 182 Hu re/«r*nee$ mrttopagu, not to paragraphs. TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXXl PAOK Morgan r. Rowlands (1872), 41 L. J. Q. B. 187; L. R. 7 Q. B. 493; 20 L. T. SfiS : 20 W. R. 726 715, 1125 Morgan v. Sim (1868), U Moo. P. C. C. 307 6 Moivuii V. Svki'H (1842), cited Coats v. Chiiplin, 3 Q. B. 480 670 MoiKuu r. flir.rne (1841), 7 M. & W. 408; 9 D. P. C. 228 ; 5 Jur. 2'JI ; ", L.J. Ex. 125 488, nil Mori^iinf. Whitmore (1852), 6 Ex. 710; 20 L.J. Ex. 289 146 Morgan's ciiHo (1764), 1 Leo. C. C. 54 9(H Moi^uns V. Bridgei) (1818), 1 B. & Aid. 650 543 Morittrty r. Grey (1860), 12 Ir. C. L. R. 129 302 Moriarty f. Loud. Chat. & D. Ry. Co. (1870), 39 L. J. Q. B. 109; L. R. 5 Q. B. 314 : 22 L. T. 163 ; 18 W. R. 625 620 MorW «'. Attenborous:h (4849), 3 Ex. 500 ; 18 L. J. Ex. HS ; li Jur. 282 775 M..rlcy f. Morley (1855), 5 De G. M. & G. 010; 1 Jur. N. S. 10'J7 ; 25 L. j. Ch. ) 1 38, 720 Miirley's, Ld., case (1666), Kd. (J.) 55; 6 How. St. Tr. 771 ....328, 330, 340 MoriiinKtoa v. Moniington (^1801), 2 J. & H. 097 , 692 MoiroU r. D'Ckey (1814), 1 Johns. (Ch. Am.) 153 1160 Moirell f. Eisher(1849), 4 Ex. 604; 19 L. J. Ex.273 803, 804 Moirell V. Frith (1838), 3 M. & "W. 402 ; 8 C. & P. 240 ; 1 11. & 11. 100 ; 2 Jur. 619; 7 L, J. Ex. 172 44, 710, 712 Morrcll V. Martin (1841). 3 M. & Gr. 693 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 3()0 1101 Morrell v. Morrell (1882), 7 P. Div. 68 ; 61 L. J. P. & M. 49 ; 46 L. T. 485 ; 30 W. R. 491 ; 40 J. P. 328 141 Morris v. Bethell (18()9), L. R. 4 C. P. 7C6 ; L. R. 6 C. P. 47 ; 38 L. J. C. P, 379; 17 W. R. 730 241 Morris V. Burdett (1808), 1 Camp. 218 ; 10 R. R. 067 524 Morris v. Davies (1806, should be 1827), 3 C. & P. 216, 427 ; 5 CI. & Fin. 163; 1 M. iR. 271, n 101, 422 Morris ». Glyun (185'j), 27 Beav. 218; 6 Jur. N. S. 1047 084 Morris t). Hurmcr (1K33), 7 Pet. 564 1179 Morris V. HauKcr (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 392 ; Car. & M. 29 313 Morris v. Miller (1707), 4 Burr. 2067 ; 1 W. BI. 032 U9, 295, 649 Morrison v. Arnold (1817), 19 Ve,s. 670 363 Morrison v. Gen. St. Navig. Co. (1862), 8 Ex. 733 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 233 .. .. 6 Morrison v. Kelly (1762), 1 W. BI. 385 9S7 Morrison v. Leonard (1827), 3 C. & P. 127 897 Morrison v. Martin (1846), 5 Hare, 507 803 Morrison V. Univ. Marine Ins. Co. (1872), 42 L. J. Ex. 17, 115; L. R. 8 Ex. 40, 197 ; 27 L. T. 791 ; 21 W. R. 190 156 Morritt V. DouKlass (1872), 42 L. J. P. cS: M. 10 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 1 ; 27 L. T. 591; 21 \V. R. 102 694 Morrogh v. Power (1842), 5 Ir. L. R. 494 713 Morse V. Royal (1806), 12 Ves. 362 ; 8 R. R. 338 493, 494 Mortimer v. M-Callan (1840), 6 M. & W. 68 ; 4 Jur. 172 . . .308, 309, 388, 1049, 1052, 1054, 1069 Mortimer v. Mortimer (1820), 2 Hagg. Cons. 310 503, 558 Mortimer v. Sbortall (1842). 2 Dru. & War. 371 749 Mortimore D. Wright (1840), 6 M. & W. 482 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 158 168 Morton V. Chandler (1831), 8 Greenl. 9 746 Morton v. Copeland (1856), 16 Com. 517; 24 L. J. C. P. 517; 1 Jur. N. S. 979 207, 729 Morton V. Tibbett (18.J0), 15 Q. B. 434 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 382 ; 14 Jur. 669 689, 692 Morton V. Woods (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 658 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 242 ; L. E. 4Q. B. 293; 38 L. J. Q. B. 81; 17 W. R. 411 ; 9 B. A: S. 669 97 Moseley f. Davies (1822), 11 Price, 102 396, 401, 410 Moseley v. Haiiford (18301, 10 B. & C. 729 ; 5 M. & R. 607 757 Moseley v. M'Mulleu ( 1850), Ir. C. L. R. 09 222 Moss .'. Ang. Egyp. Nav. Co. (1805), L. R. 1 Ch. lOS ; 36 L. J. Ch. 179 ; 14 W. R. 150 1117 Mossr. Russell (1884), 1 Times L. R. 13 162 Mossom ». Ivy (1684), 10 How. St. Tr. 602 362, 1179 Vol. I. end* with pag$ 635. i I i^^ \ CXXXll TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOS MoHsopt). Eiulon (1810), 16 Von. 430 308 Mcmtyn r. Fiil.rijfiiM (1771). 1 ('"wp. 171 ; 1 Sni. L. O. (\>H 7, 51, 62, 938 MoHtyu V. MoHtyii (IH.Vl), 3 Do G. M. ic U. 140 ; 23 L. J. (Jli. ilLT) ; d 11. L. Cas. 1/55 796 MoNlyii V. WfHt MoMtyn Coal & Inm Co. (lH7fl), 31 L. T. 531 602 MotttTiiin r. KiiMt. Cos. Uy. Co. (IS.M)), '29 L. J. M. C. 57; 7 C. B. N. S. 58 : r. Jur. N. S 759 . ." 10.-)1, 1089 Moiifl.-t r. (Join (1872), L. U. 7 Ex. 70 ; I,. U. 8 Ex. 32 ; 41 L. .T. Ex. 28 ; 42 L. J. Ex. 8 : 27 L. T. r.78 : 21 W. 11. 1 75 16 Mould ». WilliiiitiH (IHU), .') (i. n.47i; !).&M.(i31 109:), 1100, IKll Moulet'. Brown (1838), 4 HiiiK'. N. C. 2(i() ; 5 Scott, (i9l ; 1 Am. 79; 2 Jur. 277 32 , 120S 19 Mount f. Boircrt (ISKi), Antlion, 190 515 Mt.unt V. LiirkiiiH (1831), H Binj,'. 108 ; 1 M. &- Scott, 1(15 38, 818 MouHHpy V. Burnliiirri (1811), 1 ITiiro, 15 MouiiHon r. Bourn (KilS), Cro. (^iir. 520 M. luntiif^uc )'. Hi 4 Jur. N. S. 29 (1857), 27 L. J. C. r. 2»; 3 C. B N. H. 292; 809 Mo.ntford V. Hiirpor (1847), Hi M. & VV. 825 ; Hi L. J. Ex. 182 154 444, 415 Mountnoyi'. Colliur(1853), 22L.J.Q. B. 124; 4 E. & B.fi30; 17Jur.503. Mountstophcn v. Brooko (1819), 1 Cliitty, H. 390 487, 713 Mountstcphcn V. Liikimmn (1874), 39 L. J. Q. B. 275 ; L. R. T) Q. B. 013 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 07 ; L. II. 7 <i. B. I'M) ; L. R. 7 H. L. 17 ; 43 L. J. Q B. 188; 30 L. T. 437; 22 W. R. 017 G78 Moylii Nolan (1801), 17 Ir. C. L. R. 427 106 Moyjot'. JcnkiiiH (18.S1). 8 Q. B. 1>. 110; .Tl L. J. (i. B. 112; 40 L. T. 472 ; 30 W. R. 32 1 156 Muilii v. l)'E(|uiiio (1795), 2 H. Bl. 504 , 37 Mulhollaiid r. Ki;.cn (187 I), I. R. 9 ]■)<[. 471 1109 Mullaly r. Walsh (1872), I. R. C. L. 314 , Mullon, R(( (1871), I. R. 5 V.i\. ;i(i9 171 .095, 096 Mulk'tt V. Hunt (1833), Car. & M. 752 831, 835 Mulli 107 Kin 1878), 3 Q. B. i). 484 ; 47 L. J. (J. B. 700 ; ;18 L. T. 20 W R. :t85 5, 781 Muliins V. Collins (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 292 ; 43 L. J. M. C. 07 ; 29 L. T. 838 ; 22 \V. R. 297 107 Muniford r. (;otliiiiK (18:.9), 29 L. J. C. P. 105 ; 7 C. B. N. S. 305 M uncHiv V. Dt'nnis ( 1850), 1 H. & N. 210 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 0(! Munday v. Asprcy (1880), 13 Ch. I). 8.-)5 ; 49 L. J.Ch. Ml Bak.T(1817), 2 Stark. R. 255 ; Holt. N V. OKI 210; 28 \V R 347 . , n. ; 19 R. R. 71P.. . 49 Munii f. (Jodl)old (1825), 3 Binjf. 292 ; 11 Moore, C. I' Munro, Kx j)arto (1870), 1 il B. I). 724 ■ 45 L. J. Q. B. 810; 35 L. T. 784 781 073 1096 300 857 ; 24 \V. R. 1017 724 Munro ('. I).! Chomant (181,-)), 4 (Xinip •»15. Mu Mil 539 (1840), 7 CI. >»;: Fin. 842 179 ■ 176 Munro •'. Vaiidani (1791), <iit<!d I Park, Ins. 409 Miinr o f. Pilkin>?ton (1802), 31 L. J. Q. B. 81 ; 2 B. & S. 11 ; G L. T. N. S. 21 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 557 1140, 1154 MiinHtnrr. F-aint) (1883), 1 1 Q. B. 1). 588; 52 L.J. Q. B 720; 49 L. T. 32 \V. R. 248; 47 J. P. 805 869 Miirclim c. Blank (180.')). 31 L. J. V,. P. 337 ; 19 C. B. N. S. 190; 11 Jur. N. S. 008; 12 L. T. 735; 13 W. R. 890 114, 115 Murjratroyd >\ Mur^^atroyd (1828), oitnd 2 St. Ev. 307, n. (o) 267 Miiri..ta:. \V..lflia>?oii (1819), 2 C. & K. 744 1219 Murly I'. M-|)..riiiott (1838), 8 A. & E. 138 ; 3 N. & P. 250; I W. W. * II. 220 lis Miirpliv ('. Bo.'si! (1875), 44 L. J. Ex. 40; L. R. 10 Ex. 126 ; 32 L. T. 122; 23 W. R. 174 668 Miirpliv »'. Mirndith (1812), 5 Ir. L. R. 120 711 Murpliv r. Ncdan (187t), I. R. 7 K<|. 49S 818 " 682 Miirpliy V. Sullivan (180ii), 11 Ir. Jur. N. S. Ill Murruy, lu tliu goiHU of ( 18;i7),l Curt. 596 174 Tit rrftrntM* art to pag**, ml to paragraph*. Jill iiw TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXXIU r-AOK Mnrray f. Ccmtcr (18'25), 4 Cowcii, 635 f)\:> Muiiiiy 1'. Sheriffs of Dublin (1841). Arm. M. & <). I'M) 'J77 Alumiy c. (iri'Kory (1850), f) Ex. 4(i8 ; I'J L. J. Kx. :i:>r> ; 14 Jur. M'i '.'«:$ Wurmy v. Maci; (1H74), Ir. S C. L. :mi 774 Wuiiiiy !•. Alackiiizi.' (18701. L. K. 10 0. P. CJ.'i ; 44 L. J. C, P. 313; 3'2 L. T. 777 ; '23 W. U. r.<)5 736 Murmy r. Milnur (187'J), 48 L. J. Cli. 775 ; I'i Cli. D. 849 ; 41 L. T. 213; •J7 W. U. 881 415 Mmniy r. I'lirkiT (1K54), 10 Bciiv. 305 749 Miirriiy r. K. of Stiiir (1S23), •> B. k C. 82 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 278 74C>, 1203 MuHuriivo 1'. Kiii.TNoii (1817), 10 Q. JJ. 320 ; 1(1 L. J. Q. M. 174 440 MiiMsiiiiuit Clici'tliu t'. lliiboo Milu'eu Lull (18(17), 11 Moore, Indiiin App. C 3(iit, 3S0 1C)9 Miitiml Life, \e. v. Ilillman, (1892), 145 U. S. 28.') 377, 7'.f4 Mutual Loan Kuiid Ahh. v. 8udlow (18ii8), 28 L. J. C. P. 108 ; 6 C. li. N. S. 449 ; 5 Jur. N. H. 338 758 MvtTH r. DefricH (1879), 4 Ex. D. 170 ; 40 L. T. 795 ; 27 W. R. 791 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 4«0 41, 42 Mvirs »'. Perigal (1851-2), 2 De O. M. & U. .599; 11 C. B. 90; 21 L. J. C. v. 217 ; 10 Jur. 1118 084 Mver« r. Sari (1800), ;U) J.. J. Q. B. 9 ; 3 E. & E. 300 : 7 Jur. N.S. 97.. 704, 700 J>\y-rs r. AVillis (1855), 17 C. B. 77 ; 18 C. B. 880 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 39, 255 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 4 1 1 79, 1 1 75 MyleH V. Burton (1S84), 14 L. B. Ir. 258 539 Myriek r. Dame (1852), 9 (^unIi. 218 758 Mywiri', &e.., Co., Re (1889), 42 Ch. D. .535 ; 68 L. J. Cli. 731 ; 01 L. T. 453 ; 37 W. li. 79 1 ; 1 Meg. 347 346 Nadin r. BuHHett (1883), 25 Cli. D. 21 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 253; 49 L. T. 4fi4 ; 32 W. R. 70 349 Nanle V. Sli.'it (1875), I. R. 9 C. L. ;i89 293, 1213 Nui.sli r. Brown (1840), 2 C. A: K. 219 274 Nuppur f. SanderH (1028). Iluttun, 119 170 JfuMi r. ArniHtronfif (1801), ;t0 L. J. C. P. 280; 10 C. B. N. S. 259; 9 W. R. 782 ; 7 Jur. N. S. KIOO 751 Na.xli c. (iilkehou (1819), 5 Ser>^. A: R. ;152 252 NaHh r. llodKNoi^ (1850), 25 L. J. Cli. 180; De (i. M. \- (i. 471 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 94ti 714, 710 Nash r. Turner (17!'5), 1 Enj). 217 1213 Natehholt. v. Porter (1089), 2 Verii. 112 059 N'ate'H («)• Nute'N) cunh (1800) Peters, Aliridj;. 82 ; 3 Runs. C. A: M. 458 (5t.h ed.) 502 JJavlor f. SeiniiieM (1829), 4 (Jill. \: J. 273 909 Neal r. Jay (1084),eited 12 Mod. 80 ; 1 .Salk. 281 1179 Meal c. WihliiiK (1740), 2 Str. 1151 423 Neulor. Ery (1081), (Mted 1 Salk. 281 ; 12 Mod. 80 1179 Meale r. Parkin (1 795), 1 Ksp. 229 523 Medhy f. N.flby (1852), 21 I,. J. < 'li. 440 ; 5 De U. & Sin. 377 137 Needham r Itreinner (1800), L. R. 1 C. P. 583; 35 L. J. C. P. 313; 1 II. & It. 731 1103 Neeilhani v. I'Vamr (1845), 1 C. B. 815; 3 D. & L. 190; 14 L. J. C. P. 250 ; 9 Jur. 734 835 Keedham r. Smith (1704), 2 Vem. 403 900, 910 Neeley c. Loek (1838), 8 C. & i". 532 106 Neil r. Neil (1829. 18;i9), 1 l.eigh, R. 0, 10, 21 M"- Neiler. Jakl.' (181!)), 2 C. & K. 709 528 Neill r. D. of Devoimhire (1870 82), 2 I,. R. Ir. 154 ; 8 App. ('as. 1 17. .42, 290, 3!iO, 103, 4(t5, 400 Neilwm V. Harford (1841), 8 M. & W. 800,818, 8l'i ; VVelm. PhI. Rep. 295, 328; II I,. J. Kx. 20 43 NeiHon f. Walters (1890), 03 L. T. 328 531 Nulsoii, Re (1872), 1. U. Ecj. 509 708 Fol. I, tndt with pagi iiiii. CXXXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. li!! jfl ■I * 1 1 1 1 • J PAOB Nelson, Ld.v.L(l.Bri(lport(1844, should bo 181C), 8 Boav. 547: 10 Jur. !043.. 51,936 Nelson V. Couoh (IHC3), 15 C. B. N. 8. 99 ; 8 L. T. 577 ; 11 W. R. 9C4 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 366 1120 NolHon V. Stockcr (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 7(iO ; 4 De G. & J. 758 54 1 Nelson V. "Whittall(1817), 1 B. & Aid. 19 1216 Nopcan V. Doo d. Knight (1847), 2 M. & W. 894 ; 2 Sm. L. C. 610, 629, 729. 173 N(!ptunu8, The (1799), 2 C. Rob. 110 1096 Nosham v. Selby (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 191 ; L. R. 7 Ch. 400 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 551 ; 26 L. T. M5, 568 673 NethcrlaudH Steam Boat Co. v. Styles (1854), 9 Moo. P. C. 0. 286 178 Nethorwood f). Wilkinson (1855), 17 C. B. 226 832 Neve V. Tennell (1863), 2 Now R. 508 ; 1 1 W. R. 980 738 Nevil V. Johnson (1703), 2 Vorn. 447 327 Novill V. Snolling (1880), 49 L. J. Ch. 777 ; 15 Ch. D. 679 ; 43 L. T. 244 ; 29 W. R. 375 138 Neville f. Fino ArtsCo., (1805) 2 Q. B. 156; 72 L. T. 725 IM. [47,643] Neville v. Wilkinson (1782), 1 Bro. C. C. 543 539 Novin V. Drysdalo (1867), 30 L. J. Ch. 662 ; 15 W. R. 980 753, 806 Newall »>. Elliott (1803), 1 II. & G. 797 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 120; 7 L. T. 758; 11 W. R. 438; 9 Jur. N. S. 359 1160 Newberry v. Benson (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 1003 462 Newboul'd v. Coltmiin (1851), 6 Ex. 189 ; 20 L. J. M. C. 149 1101 Newbould r. Smith (188U), 14 App. Cas. 423 ; 65 L. J. Ch. 788 ; 55 L. T. 194; 34 W. R. 6i)0 447, 452 Newburph r. Newburgh (1712), 3 Bro. P. C. 553 1038 Newby I'. Reed (1763), cited 1 Park, Ins. 148 175 Newbv r. Sharpo (1877), 8 Ch. D. 39; 47 L. J. Ch. 617 ; 38 L. T. 583; 26 W. R. 685 192 NewoH.sllo, I), of, V. Broxtowo (1832). 4 B. & Ad. 273 394 Now.iastlo, 1). of, V. Clark (1818), 8 Taun. 027, 628 ; 2 Moore (C. P.) 666 ; 20 R. R. 583 113 NewcHNtlo, I), of, V. Kinderley (1803), 8 Vcs. 363, 375 ; 7 R. R. 71 108 Newcastle. Muster Pilots and Seamen of, v. Bradley (1851), 2 E. & B. 42S, u. ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 35 791 Newell r. Radford (1867), 37 L. J. C. P. 1 ; L. R. 3 C. P. 52 ; 17 L. T. 118; 16 W. R. 97 671 Newell I'. Simpkin (1830), 6 Bing. 565 ; 4 M. & P. 395 996 New England Bank v. Lewis (1829), 8 Pirk. 113 1 139 Newenham v. Smith (18591, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 245 788 Newhallf. Holt (1840), 6 M. & W. 662; 4 Jur. 610 291 Nowham c. Raithby (1811), I Phillim. 315 1047 Newington f. Levy (1870), 40 L. J. C. P. 29; L. R. 6 C. P. 180; 23 L. T. 595; 19 W. R. 473 1119 Newman r. Jinkins (1830), 10 Piek. 515 172 Newman v. Piercy (1876), 4 Ch. 1). 41 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 36 ; 35 L. T. 461 ; 25 W. R. 317 803 Newman v. Strot(!h (1829). M. & M. 338 379 Now Romiicv, Alayor, &c.. v. New Romnoy Commissioners of Si'wers, (1892) 1 Q. B. 84"0 ; (11 L. J. Q. B. 55S ; 56 J. P. 756 404 Newrv and Ennisk. Rv. Co. v. Combe (1849), 5 Railw. Cas. 633; 3 Ex. 665"; 18 L. J. Ex. 325 100 Newsam v. Curr (1817), 2 Stark. R. 6<J ; 19 R. R. 675 252, 256 Newsomo ti. Coles (1811), 2 {'amp. 617 ; 12 R. R. 756 1096 Newton c. Askew (1848), 6 Hare, 319 869 N<-wton I'. Boh her (1848), 1 Q. B. 921 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 38 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 53 ; 13 Jur. 253 530 Newton ('. Boresford (1831), Younge, Ex. R. 376 601 Newton V. Blunt (1846), 3 C. B. 676 ; 4 D. & L. 674 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 29 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 121 1116 Newton r. Chaplin (1850), 10 (!. B. 356 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 374 ; 14 Jur. 1121. 320 Newton c. Cliirke (18;i9), 2 Curt. 320 696 Nowton 0. Constable (1841), 2 Q. B. 162; 1 (J. \- 1). 408 ; 9 D. P. C. 933; 6 Jur. 317 869, «70, 871 Th* rej'$r$ncei ar* to paga, not to purayrapht. TABLl OF CASES CITED, cxxxv Newton r. Ellis (1855), 6 E. & B. 115 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 337 ; 1 Jnr. N. S. 860 227 Newton V. Harland (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 956 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 602 ; 9 Dowl. 16 ; 1 W. P. C. 63 ; 4 Jur. 992 819 Newton r. Liddiiird (181S), 12 Q. B. 927; 6 Railw. Cas. 42; 18 L. J. Q. B. 53 530 NowUm V. RickettH (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Krc. & M.) 35 942 Newton V. Rickctts (1861), 8 II. L. C. 260 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 247 131 New WiiidMor caso (1H35), Knapp & O. 173 497 NiHs V. North. & East. Ry. Co. (1838), 3 My. & Cr. 355; 7 L. J. Ch. 142 ; 2 K. 76 601 , 995 Nichol r. Godts (1854), 10 Fix. 191 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 314 776 Nicholas and Freeman v. Binns (1858), 1 S. & T. 243 ; 27 L. J. P. & M. 6 170 Nichollo 1'. Pluino (1824), 1 C. & P. 272 691 Nicholls r. Dowding (1815), 1 Stark. R. 81 ; 18 R. R. 746 . .386, 488, 494, 921 Nicholls •;. Downes (1830), 1 M. & Rob. 13 520 Nicholls V. GoUlsniith (1831), 7 Wend. 160 454 Nicholls V. O.sbom (1727), 2 P. Wms. 419 789 Nicholls V. Parker (1811), 14 East, 331, n. ; 12 R. R. 542 3:'6, 410 Nicholls V. Walker (1634), Cro. Car. ;i94 1101 Nichols, III re (1872), 41 L. J. P. & M. 88 ; L. R. 2 P. ic M. 461 ; 27 L. T. 323; 21 AV. R. 161 173 Nichols V. Johnson (1834), 10 Conn. 192 1 199 Nichols v. Wehb (1823), 8 Wheat. 326 454 Nicholson, Ex part.% Re Willson (1880), 14 Ch. D. 243 ; 49 L. J. Bk. 68 ; 43 L. T. 266 ; 28 W. R. 936 849 Nicholson v. Bower (1858), 1 E. & E. 172 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 97 ; 6 Jur. N. 8. 246 689, 692 Nicholson t>. Brad«eld Union (1866), 35 L. J. Q. B. 176; L. R. 1 Q. B. 620 ; 7 B. & S. 744 641 Nicholson v. Mullijjan (1868), I. R. 3 Eij. 308 806 Nicholson v. Revill (1836), 4 A. & E. 675 ; 6 N. & M. 192 1 194 Nicholson f. Smith (1822), 3 Stark. R. 129 515 Nickalls v. Merry (1876), L. R. 7 H. L. 630 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 575 ; 32 L. T. 623 ; 23 W. R. 063 158 Nickells V. Atherstone (1847), 10 Q. B. 944 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 371 ; 11 Jnr. 778 660, 661 Nickolson r. Knowles (1820), 5 Madd. 47 645 Niooll V. Greaves (1864), 33 L. J. C. P. 259 ; 17 C. B. N. 8. 27 ; 10 L. T. 631 ; 12 W. R. 961 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 919 36 Nifa, The, (1892) 1 R. 540; (1892) P. 411; 62 L. J. P. 12; 69 L. T. 66. .740, 766 Nightinjral f. Devismo (1770), 5 Burr. 2594 1036 Niles f. Brackett (1819), 15 Mass. 378 910 Noblo'8 Trusts, Re (187 1), I. R. 6 Vai. 140 798 Noble V. Chapman (1854), 14 C. B. 400 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 50 ; 18 Jur. 44 . . 190 Nohio t'. Durcll (1789), 3 T. R. 271 766 Noble V. Kennoway (1780), 2 Doug. 513 157, 232, 766, 782 Noble V. Wanl (1867), 36 L. J. Ex. 81 ; L. R. 1 Ex. 117 ; 4 H. & C. 149 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 91 ; L. R. 2 Ex. 135 762 NoUe V. WiUoek and Phelps (1871), 40 L. J. P. & M. 60 ; L. R. 2 P. & D. 276; 25 L. T. 65; 19 W. R. 1115 1132 Nodin V. Murray (1812), 3 Camp. 228 : 13 R. R. 796 , 296 Noding r. Alleston (1892), cited Greenleaf on Ev. 15th edit. 369 698 Noel f. Wells ( 16(i9), 1 Lev. 235 1 103, 1 105 Nolan t'. Copenian (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 84 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 44 ; 27 L. T. 789; 21 W. R. 263 818 Nolan V. Gumley (1863), 14 Ir. C. L. R. 301 732, 734 Norden v. Wiliiamwm (ISi(S), 1 Taun. 377 891 Nordone'.Defries(1882),8(i.B.l).5()8; 5lL.J.(i. B. 415; 30W. R. 612.. 1186 Norman v. Colo (180(1), 3 Esp. 253 747 Normiin r. Morrell (1799), 4 Ves. 769 ; 4 K. R. 317 762 Norman r. Phillips (1S45), 14M.& W.283; 14 L. J. Ex. ;106; 9 Jur. 832. .689, 692 Norruya t'. Franks (1874), I. R. 9 Eq. 18 801 Vol. I. tnd* tvith pagt OSS. iii CXXXVl TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOB Norris v. Beach (1807), 2 Johns. 29 1 866 Norris V. Cooke (18o7), 30 L. T. (Ir.) 22 1 667 Norris v. Cottle (1850), 2 H. L. Cas. 647 ; 14 Jur. 703 640 Norris I'. Miles (I80S), 1 Camp. 389 ; 10 R. R. 710 385, 496 North of EuK- Joint Stock Bk. Co., Re, Ex parte Gauthwaitc (18;)1), 20 L. J. Ch. 182, 192, 193 ; 3 Mac. & G. 187 74 North of EiiK. Joint-Stook Bk. Co.. Re, Ex parte StraflPon's Exors. (1853), 22 L. J. Ch. 194 ; 1 Do tt. M. & G. 576 : 4 DeG. *: Sm. 250 541 North German Lloyd St. Ship. Co. v. Elder (The Schwablc) (IfiGl), 1 Lush. 239 ; 14 M<K). P. C. C. 241 ; 4 L. T. KiO 178 North-West. Ry. Co. t'. MoMichael (1850), 5 Ex. 855 ; 14 Jur. 987 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 6 ; 100 Northam v. Latouche (1829), 4 C. & P. 140 1019 Northcote v. Doughty (1879), 4 C. P. D. 385 ; 24 Sol. J. 77ii 718 Northumberiand, D. of, r. Todd (1878), 7 Ch. D. 777 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 343; 38 L. T. 746 ; 28 W. B. 350 914 Norton V. Bazett (1856), Deane, Ecc. R. 259 695 Norton v. Pettibone (1S29), 7 Conn. 319 610 ^.' Twich & Lowestoft Nav. Co. t Tlicobald (1828), M. & M. 153 109fl JNorwich, Bishop of, r. Pear8c(18r 37 L.J. Ecc. 90; L.R.2 A.&E. 281 . .884,885 Notor r. Brooks (1861). 7 H. & N. -i99 778 Nottidg-o V. Prince (1858), 2 Giff. 246 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 857 136 Nottingham, Guard, of, r. Tomkinson (1879), 4 C. P. D. 343 ; 48 L. J. M. C. 171 ; 28 W. R. 151 621 Novellif. Rossi (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 757; 9 L. J. K. B. O. S. 307 1147, 1200 Nowlan r. Ablett (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 54 ; 1 Gale, 72 ; 5 Tyr. 709 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 155 36 Nowlan f. Gibson (1847), 12 Ir. L. R. 5, 8—12 89, 1110. 11 13, 1140 Nugent r. Smith (1876), 1 0. P. D. 423 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 697 ; 34 L. T. 827 ; 25 W. R. 117 771 N; .:n's Will, Re (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 255 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 331 7!"8 Nunn r. Fabian (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 140 ; L. R. 1 Cli. 35 631, 688 Nye r. Macdoniild (1870), 39 L. J. P. C. 34 ; L. R. 3 P. C. 331 ; 23 L. T. 220; 18 W. R. 1075 9 325 ; 35 : 36 L. J. L. J. Ex. Ch. 87; 919 14 L. T. 20; Oakapple t'. Copous (1791), 4 T. R. 361 , Oakeley r. Ooddeen (1861), 2 F. & F. 651 Oakes r. Hill (1833), 14 Pick. 442 Oakcs r. Turquand (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. Oaklcv «•. Monck (1S05), L. R. 1 Ex. 159 14 W. R. 406 ; \ H. & C. 251 Oastler v. Hcnderwm (18771, 2 Q. B. D. 575 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 007 ; 37 L. T. 22 Obicini r. Bligh (1H32), 8 King. 335 : 1 Moo. & S. 477 1 O'Brien r. Lewis (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 569 ; 4 Giff. 221 ; 8 L. T. 380; 11 W. R. 716; 9 Jur. N. S. 620 O'Brien r. R. (1849). 2 II. F^. Cas. 465 O'Brien r. Slieil (1873), I. R. 7 Eq. 255 Ocean, The (1801). 5 C. Rob. Adm. 90 Ochsenlwin c. Pape'.ier (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. 695 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 861 ; 28 L T. 459 ; 21 W. R. 516 1 132, 1 O'Connell'H case (18 J3-4), Arm. & T. 275 0'C<miiell t. Butler (1819), Milw. (Ir. Ecc.) 102 O'Conuell v. The Queen (1844), 11 CI. & Fin. 373 O'Cmnor «•. Majoribanks (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 435 ; 11 L J. C. P. 267. .590. O'tJonnor r. Hpaight (1804). 1 Sch. & Lef. 300 Odell, Re (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 207 435, O'Donnellt'. O'Donell (1882), 13 L. R. Ir. 226 O'Donnell f. O'DonnoU (I87H), 1 L. R. Ir. 284 O' Flanagan r. Oeoghcgan (1864). 16 C. B. N. 8. 636 Ogden r. Heskcth (1849), 2 C. & K. 772 Ogilvio V. Currie (1868), 27 L. J. Ch. 641 ; 16 W. R. 709 ; 18 L. T. 593 . . Ogilviev. Foljamlw (1817), 3 Mor. 63; 17 R. R. 13 52. 271 rs 076 16T 660 147 136 895 665 J 79 142 383 140 435 591 682 698 765 10 830 481 129 674 The reftvencM are to pagei, not to parngraphi. TABLE OF CASES CITED. cxxxvii IB PAOB Ogle*. Cook (1748), 1 Ves. sen. 177 1215 Ogle V. Norcliffe (1708), 2 Ld. Raym. 869 19 Ogle V. Ld. Vane (1868), L. R. 2 Q. B. 275 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 175 ; 7 B. & S. 855 752 O'Grady v. Corr (1876), I. R. 10 Eq. Ill 462 Ohlsenf. Ter,jro (1874), 44 L. J. Ch. 155; L. R. 10 Ch. 127; 31 L. T. 811 ; 23W. R. 196 922 O'Kane v. O'Kane (1892), 30 L. R. Ir. 489 Adtl. [125] Okcden v. Clifden (1826), 2 Russ. 309 786 Olding, Re (1841), 2 Curt. 8G5 697 O'Leary v. Douglass (1878), 1 Ir. L. R. 45 704 Olive V. Guin (l(i53), 2 Sid. 146 8, 283 Oliver t: Bartlett (1819), 1 B. & B. 209 373 Oliver r. Hunting (1890), 44 Ch. D. 205 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 255 ; 62 L. T. 108 ; 38 W. R. 618 672 Oliver f.Woodroffe (1839), 4 M.&W. 650; 7 Dowl. 166; 1 H. & II. 474. .732, 733 Ollivant V. Bayley (1843), 5 Q. B. 288 ; D. & M. 373 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 34 ; 7 Jur. 1 1 30 777 Olvcr 1'. Johns (1870), 39 L. J. P. & M. 7 't? O'Meagher v. O'Meagher (188,3), 11 L. R. Ir. 117 6i»7 Omi ..mdr. Barker (1744-5), Willes, 550 901,903,905,11(8 Omiimney r. Stilwell (1856), 23 Beav. 328 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1058 173 O'Neill V. Allen (1859). 9 Ir. L. R. N. S. 132, 141 123 O'Neill c. Bell (1866), I. R. 2 C. L. 68 768 O'Neill f. Read (1845), 7 Ir. L. R. 434 487 Onions i'. Tyrer (1716). I T. V.'ms. 43 708 Onslow, Rp. Ex parte Kibble (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 373 ; 44 L. J. Bk. 63 ; 32 L. T. 138 ; 23 W. R. 433 718 Oppenheim v. AVlnte Lion Hotel Co. (1871), 6 L. R. C. P. 515 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 231 : 25 L. T. 93 162 Ord. In re (1878). 9 Ch. D. 667 80S O'R'illv, Re (1874), 43 L. J. P. & M. 5 ; 2!) L. T. 516 ; 22 W. R. 224 . . 793 Orine-od v. Chadwiek (1847), 16 M. & AV. 307 ; 16 L J. M. C. 143 131 Ormrod r. Huth (1815), 14 M. & W. 664 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 366 775 O'Rorke r. Bolingbroke (1877), 2 App. 0<i«. 8M ; 26 W. R. 239 138 O'Rourke v. P ••eval (1811), 2 Ball & B. 58 ; 12 R. R. 68 G76 Orr t'. Diekension (185H). Jolms. 1 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 516 : 5 Jur. N. S. 672 . . 652 Orr V. Morico (1821), 3 B. & B. 139 ; 6 Moore, C. P. 347 1211 Onvll Colliery Co., Re (1879), 12 Ch. D. 681 : 48 L. J. Ch. 655 1138 Orrell v. Coppock (1857), 2() L. J. Ch. 269 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1244 . . 67* Orrett v. Corser (1855), 21 B.'av. 52 436 0.sborn v. Lond. Doek Co. (1855), 10 Ex. 698 ; 3 C. L. R. 313 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 140 ; 1 Jur. N. 8. 93 964 Osbom V. Thompson (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 256 ; 9 C. & P. 337 268, 259, 27* Osgathorpe r. Diseworth (1745-6), 2 Str. 1256 ; Burr. 261 1 139 Osgood r. Manhattan Co. (1824), 3 Cowen. 612 493 O'Sullivau f. Burke (1875), I. R. 9 C. L. 105 444 Oswild, In re (1874^, 43 L. J. P. & M. 24 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 162 141 OHwell c. Shepherd (xfe Re Smith). Ottuway V. Hamilton (1878), 47 L. J. C P 725 ; 3 C. P. D. 393 ; 38 L. T. 925 ; 26 \V. R. 783 16« Otter, The (1874), L. R. 4 Adm. 203 • 30 L. T. 43 ; 22 W. R. 557 260 Oiigier «'. Jeunings (1800), 1 Camp. 5(.i", 506, n. ; 10 R. R. 739, n 766 Outhwaiter. Luntley (1815), 4 Camp. 179; 16 R. R. 771 1191, 1203 Outram v. Morewood (1803), 3 East, 34t. ; 6 T. R. 121 ; 7 R. R. 473. . . .88, 89, 446, 1110, 1112. 1113, 1114, 1120 Overend, Gumey & Co r. Oriental Finiii ce Corp. (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 348 ; 31 L. T. 322 ; 21 W. II. 501 ; 4/ ^ J. Ch. 502 758 Owei; V. Flack (1826), 2 Sim. & St. 600 620 Owen V. Warburton (1805). 1 Boh. & P. N. R. 326 ; 8 R. R. 817 616 Owen r. Wynn (1878). 9 Ch. I). 29 ; 38 L. T. 623 ; 26 W. R. 644.. ..994, 1183 Owing* r. Wvaut (179.5), 1 Har. & M'H. 393 '295 Oxford Circuit case (Spring, 1833), 6 C. & P. 642, n 188 5 i - I Vol. I. end* with pagi 63w. cxxxvin TABLE or CASES CITED. m p ft i ; FAOfl Oxford, Worcester, and Wolverhampton Ry. Co. v. Scudamore (1857), 1 H. &N. 666 474 Paget v. Lond. Tramways Co. (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 440, n., 698 1186 Paoifio St. N.IV. Co. v. Lewis (1847), 16 M. & W. 792 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 212 ; 4 Dowl. & L. 681 187, 190 Packard v. Richardson (1821), 17 Mass. 122 669 Paddock v. Forrester (1842), 2 Scott, N. R. 731 ; 3 M. & Gr. 903 506, 514 Paddon v. Winch (1870), 39 L. J. Ch. 627 ; L. R. 9 Eq. 666 ; 22 L. T. 403 608 Padgett V. Lawrence (1843), 10 Paige, IHO 514 Pager. Carew(1831), 1 C. & J. 514 817 Page V. Faucet (1591), Cro. Eliz. 2i7 16, 20 Page V. Homans (1837), 2 Shepl. 478 1221 Pain i>. Beeston (1830), 1 M. & Rob. 20 954 Paine & Layton, Ex parte, (1809), 4 Ch. App. 215 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 305. .321, 845 Paine v. Hall (1812), 18 Ves. 476 140 Paine v. M'Intier (1804), 1 Mass. 69 ; 10 Maws. 461 759 Paine V. Strand Union (1846), 8 Q.B. .'520; 15L. J. M. C. 89; 10 Jur. 308. .639, 642 Painter ». Abel (1862), 3 F. & F. 518 529 Palermo, The (1883), 9 P. D. 6 ; 63 L. J. P. D. & A. 6 1186 Palethorp v. Furnish (1783), 2 Esi>. 511, n 604 Pallikelagatha Marcar '•. Sigg (1880), L. R. 7 Ind. App. 83, 100 740 Palmer v. Maclear (1858), 1 S. & T. 149 929 Palmerv.Newhall(1855),30Beav.32; 8DeG.M.&G. 74; 24L. J. Ch. 424. .806,807 Palmer f. Palmer (1885), 18 L. R. Ir. 1»2 i, 419, 420 Panton v. Holland (1819), 17 Johns. 92 201 Panton v. Williams (1841), 2 Q. B. 192 ; 1 G. "• D. 504 ; 10 L. J. Ex. Ch. o45 . . 25, 30 Papendick v. Bridgwater (1855), 5 E. & B. 166; 24 L. J. Q. B. 289 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 657 444, ■«46, 511 Pardington v. South Wales Ry. Co. (1856), 1 H. & N. 392 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 105 723 Pardoe v. O'Connor (1848), 12 Ir. L. R. 63 621 Pardoet). Price (1844), 13 M. & W. 267; 14 L. J. Ex. 212 302 Parfltt V. Lawless 0872), 41 L. J. P. & M. 68 ; L. R. 2 P. & D. 462 ; 27 L. T. 215 ; 21 W. R. 200 136 Pargeter v. Harris (1845), 7 Q B. 708 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; 10 Jur. 260.. 93 Parker, In re, Bentham v. Wilson (1881), 15 Ch. D. 628 ; 17 Ch. D. 262 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 639 ; 44 L. T. 885 ; 29 W. R. 855 146 Parker v. Carter (1818), 4 Munf. 273 598 Parker v. Gordon (1808), 7 East, 385 ; 3 Smith, 368 ; 6 Esp. 41 ; 8 R. R. 646 33 Parker v. Hoskins (1810), 2 Taun. 223 328, 1214 Parker v. Ibbetson (1858), 4 C. B. N. 8. 348 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 236 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 6^6 1 53, 768 Parker ». M'Keiina (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 802 ; 30 L. T. 807 324 Parker v. M-WilUam (1830), 6 Bing. 683 ; 4 M. & P. 480 918 Parker v. Morrell (1848), 2 Phill. 453 495 Parker v. Palmer (1821), 4 B. & Aid, 387 37 Parker ». Potts (1815), 3 Dow, 2J; 15 R. R. 1 17a Parker v. Stuniland (1809), 1 1 East, 362 ; 10 R. R. 521 68a Parker v. Taswell (1858), 2 De G. & J. 659 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 812 04!/ Parker ' Wallis (185.')), 5 E. & B. 21 689 Parker V.Wells (1881), 18 Ch. D. 477; 45 L. T. 617 ; 30 W. R. 392 118H Parker v. Yates (1827), 12 Moore, C. P. 520 603 Parkhurst ». L'>wten (1816), 1 Mer. 401 ; 2 Swanst. 194 ; 15 R. R. 140 . . 960, 961, 962, 965, 967, 968, 969 Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt (1814), 1 Johns. 280 673 Parkin e. Moon (1836), 7 0. & P. 409 921, 944 Parkins f. Hawkshaw (1817), 2 Stark. R. 239; 19 R. R. 711 506, 599 Parkinson v. Lee (1802), 2 f:ii«t, 314 ; 6 R. R 429 776 Parkinson i. Townsend (1875), 44 L. J. P. & M. 32 ; 33 L. T. 232 ; 23 W. R. 656 1 132 Parmenter v. Webber (1818), 8 Tauu. 593 656 Parmiter v. Coupland (1840), 6 M. & W. 107, 108 ; 4 Jur. 701 46, 46 The refermcet ar» to paffe$, not to paragraphs. TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXXIX I FAOa Panniter v. Parmiter (1860), IJ. & H. 135 ; 3 De G. F. & J. 461 ; 30 L. J. Ch. 508 : 3 L. T. 799 712 Parnt'll V. "Wood, (1892) P. 137; 66L. T. 670; 40W. R. 664 1062 Parr, Re (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 70 708 Parr lor Bosworth) v. Cotchett (1824), 1 Ph. Ev. 333 ; 3 St. Ev. 824 .... 451 Parrott v. Watts (1877), 47 L. J. C. P. 79 ; 37 L. T. 755 377 Parry «. FairhurBt (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 190 187, 190, 194 Parry r. May (1833), 1 M. & Rob. 279; 5 Tyr. 685 311 Parry v. Nicholson (1845), 13 M. & W. 779 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 119; 2 Dowl. & L. 640 1192 Parsons v. Brown (1852), 3 C. & K. 295 284 Parsons v. Hancock (1829), M. & M. 330 653 Parsons v. Hayward (1862), 31 L. J. Ch. 666 ; 4 De G. F. & J. 474; 8 Jur. N. S. 924 169 Parsons v. Loyd (1772), 3 Wils. 341 83 Parsons i'. PurcoU (1849), 12 Ir. L. R. 90 292 Parsons r. Sexton (1847), 4 C. B. 908 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 181 777 Parteriche r. Powlet (1742), 2 Atk. 383 743 Parton v. Cole (1842), 6 Jur. 370 286, 287 Parton v. Crofts (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 11 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 189 ; 10 L. T. 34 ; 12 W. R. 653 297 Partridge p. Coates (1824), Ry. &M. 156; 1 C. & P. 534 311 Partridge f. Scott (1838), 3 M. & W. 220 ; 1 H. & H. 31 114, 116 Partridge v. Usbome (1828), 5 Russ. 196 1 123 Pasker. Ollat (1815), 2 Phillim. 324 140 Pauley v. Freeman (1789), 3 T. R. 51 ; 2 Sra. L. C. 74 ; 1 R. R. 034 .... 718 Pdter V. Baker (1847), 3 C. B. 831 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 124 ; 11 Jur. 370 .... 189 Patersonv. Ganda8equi(1812), 15East, 62; 2Sra. L. C.378; 13R.R. 368.. 758 Paterson V. Hardacre (1811), 4 Tauu. 114 262 Paton V. Sheppard (1839), 10 Sim. 186 146 Patrick t-. Sheclden (1853), 2 E. & B. 14 1153 Patrickson v. Patrickson (1865), 35 L. J. P. & M. 48 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 86; 12 Jur. N. S. 30 ; 13 L. T. 667 ; 14 W. R. 212 150 Patten v. Poulton (1858), 1 S. & T. 65 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 341 ; 27 L. J. P. 41 . . 143 Patterson v. Becher (1821), 6 Moore, C. P. 319 521 Patterson f. Black (1780), cited 2 Park, Ins. 919, 920 173 Pattinsou v. Luokley (1876), L. R. 10 Ex. 330 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 180; 33 L. T. 360; 24W.R.224 1197 Pattonv. Ash (1821), 7 Serg. &R. 116, 125 1.54 Patton V. Goldsborough (1822), 9 Serg. & R. 47 614 Paul V. Cleaver (1810), 2 Taun. 360; UR. R. 608 732 Paulv. Meek (1828), 2 Y. & J. 116 300 Paul«. Roy (1862), 21 L. J. Ch. 361; 15 Beav. 433 1163 Pauling V. London & North Western Ry. Co. (1853), 8 Ex. 867 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 106 ; 7 Railw. Cas. 816 641, 644, 647 Paull V. Simpson (1846), 9 Q. B. 365 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 382 663 Pawseyt). Armstrong (1881), 18Ch.D.698; 60L. J. Ch. 683; 30W.R.469. 159 Paxton f . Douglas (1809), 16 Ves. 242 970 Paxtonv. Douglas (1812), 19 "Ves. 225; 12 R. R. 176 , 961, 962 Paxton V. Popham(1814), 9 East, 419 91, 746 Payne r. Barker (1659), Bridg. 18, 23, 26 6, 83 Payne v. Ibbotson (1859), 27 L. J. Ex. 341 926, 927 Payne v. Rogers (1785), 1 Doug. 407 487 Payne v. Wilson (1895), 16 R. (April) 275 ; (1895) 1 Q. B. 653 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 328; 72L. T. 110; 43 W. R. 250 Add. [116] Peaceable v. Watson (1811), 4 Taun. 16 ; 13 R. R. 552 444, 445 Peaoham's case (1616), 2 How. St. Tr. 870 573 Peacock's Estate, Re (1872), L. R. 14 ^q. 236 806 Peacock t'. Bell (1667), 1 Wms. Saunders, 75 20, 83 Peacock v. Harper (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 238 ; 7 Ch. D. 048 ; 38 L. T. 143 ; 26 W. R. 109 274 Peacock V. Harris (1808), 10 East, 104 ; 10 R. R. 231 619 Peacock V. Harris (1830), 6 A. & E. 449 619 Vol, 1. ends with page 636. cxl TABLE OF CASES CITED. w n Jjrt; PAGE Peacock V. Monk {174S), 1 Vos. sen. 128 748 iVacock V. Peacock (1809), IG Ves. 49, 56; lOR. R. 138 IGO iVaoock V. Peacock (1859), 1 Sw. & Tr. 183 ; 27 L. J. Mat. 71 48 Pcarcev. Hooper (1810), 3 Taun. 60 1211 Ptarce f. Morrice (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 396 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 21 ; 4 N. & M. 48 30(» Pcarce v. Ornsby (1835), 1 M. & Rob. 455 244 Poardonv. Underhill(1850). 16Q.B. 120; 20L. J.Q. B. 133; 16Jur.465.. 234 Poarn, Re (1875), 45 L. J. P. D. & A. 31 ; 1 P. D. 70 ; 33 L. T. 705; 24 W. R. 143 698 Pearn r. Liiing (1871), 40 L. J. Ch. 225 ; L. R. 12 Eq. 41 ; 24 L. T. 19; 19 W. R. 653 449, 720 Pcarso V. Coaker (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 92 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 82 ; 20 L. T. 82 . . 1119 Pearse v. Grove (1747), 3 Atk. 623 537 Pcarse v. Pear8o(lS46), 1 DeG.&Sin.25; IGL. J. Ch. 153. .592, 693, .594, 601, 602 Pcurnon v. Att.-Gen. {"re Ro Peiton). I'.arson r. Eletclier (1803), 5 Esp. 90 598 Pearson t-. Isles (1781), 2 Doujf. 556 834 Pearson v. Le Muitre (1843), 6 Scott, N. R. 607 ; 5 M. & Gr. 700 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 253; 7 Jur. 748 243, 244,246 Pearson f. Pearson (1872), 40 L. J. P. & M. 53 ; L. R. 2 P. & D. 451 ; 24 L. T. 917; 19 W. R. 1014 698 Pearson c Pearson (1884), 27 Ch. D. 149 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 37 ; ■■<2 W. R. 1006 754 Pearson r. Scott (1878), 47 L. J. Cli. 705; 9 Ch. D. 198 ; 38 L. T. 717 ; 26 ^V. R. 796 167 Pearson v. Shaw (1844), 7 Ir. L. R. 1 16 Pearson r. Spencer (1863), 3 B. i S. 761 ; 8 L. T. 166 ; 11 W. R. 471.. .. 115 Pearsons. Re (1864). 33 L. J. P. & M. 177 697 Pease r. Wells (1840), 8 Dowl. 626 732 Peck, Re (1860), :V L. J. P. & M. 95 : 2 S. & T. 506 173 Peck V. Peck (1870), 21 L. T. 670 ; 18 \V. R. 295 929, 9()0 Peckhamf. Potter (1824), 1 C. & P. 232 511 Pedlar v. Paige (1833), 1 M. & Rob. 258 1209 Pedley v. Dodds (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 819 ; 14 L. T. 823 ; 14 V.'. R. 884 . . 803 Pedley v. Wellesley (1829), 3 C. & P. 558 891 Pet^k V. North Staliord Ry. Co. (1849, should be 1860), 29 L. J. Q. Ji. 97 ; 35 L. T. O. S. 407 ; 8 W. R. 364 675 Peek V. North Stafford Ry. Co. (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 469 ; E. B. & E. 958.. 755 Peek V. North Statl'ord Ry. Co. (1863), 10 H. L. Cus. 473 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 241 ?J3 Peel's case {see Re Barned's Banking Co.). Peel, Re (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 46; 39 L. J. P. & M. 36; 22 L. T. 417.. 789 Peerless, The {see Prowse f. European, &c. Shipping Co.). Pcirce v. Corf (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 210 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 52 ; 29 L. T. 919 ; 22W. R. 299 673, 730 Peisch V. Dixon (1816), 1 Mason, 11 763 Pejepscot Prop's v. Ransom (1817), 14 Mass. 145 122 Pelham v. Pickersgill (1787), 1 T. R. 660 ; 1 R. R. 348 1:;4 Pell f. Daubeny (1850), 3 Ex. 955 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 44 820 Pelletreau v. Jackson (1833), 11 Wend. 117 88 Pembroke, Lady, Re (1856), Deane, Ecc. R. 182 ; 20 Jur. 626 701 Pender f. FoIkss (1838), 1 Dev. & B. 250 767 Pendleton v. Rootli (1859), 1 Giff. 45 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 265 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 840 4C7 Peudrcll v. Pendrell (1731), 2 Sir. 924 417 Penfold V. Abbott (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 67 ; 7 L. T. 384 ; 11 W. R. 169 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 517 773 Penn c.Bibby (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 465 ; L. R. 2 CL. 127 ; 15 L. T. 399; 15 W. R. 208 12.32 Penn v. Jack (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 314 ; 14 W. R. 76C ; 14 L. T. 495 272 Pennefather v. Pennefather (1872), Ir. 6 Eq. 171 172 Pennell v. Meyer (1838), 2 M. & Rob. 98 ; 8 C. & P. 470 481 Penuiman f. Hill (1875), 24 W. R. 245 917 Penny v. Watts (1848-,50), 2 De G. & Sm. 601 971 Penrioev. Williams (1883), 23 Ch. D. 353; 62 L. J. Ch. 693; 48 L. T. 868 ; 31 W. R. 496 1188 The rtjeimoen are to page», not to puruyia^ht. TABLE OF CASES CITED. cxli PAoa Ponniddook «. Hammond (1817), 11 Buav. 59 601 Ppntre^uinea Coal Co., Re (1862), 4 Do G. F. & .T. all ; 31 L. J. Ch. 741 ; 7 L. T. 84 ; 10 W. R. 660 ; 8 .Tur. N. S. 70(> 681 People, The, ». Holbrook (1H16), 13. Tohns. UU 283 People, The, t'. Matlier (1830), 4 "Wend. 22f», 2.'52— 254 . .962, 904, 905, 968, 9;2 People, The, v. Matte.son (1827), 2 Cowen, 433, 573, n 903 People, The, ex. rel. Ordroiiaux v. Choguray (1836), 18 Wend. 642 893 People t'. Bill (lav-i), 10 Johns. 9.i 883 People V. Cannon (1893), 36 Am. St. R. 689 AiM. [70] People V. Carlion (Ki94). 40 Am. St. R. 346 AM. [68] People V. Whipple (1827), 9 Cowen, 707 6:>2 Perchard v. Tindall (1795), 1 Esp. 394 50!) Pereival v. Cauey (1851), 4 De G. & Sm. 623 480 Periival v. Nanson (1851), 7 Ex. 3 ; 21 L. J. Ex 1 4-i5, 440, 458 Perfeft v. Lime (1861), 3 De G. F. & J. 369 ; 31 L. J, Ch. 489 ; 6L. T. 8 ; 10 W. R. 197 , 30 Beav. 187 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 547 137 Peri^al v. Nicholson (1810), Wightw. 63 447 Perkins v. Bradley (1842), 1 Hare, 219 ; 6 Jur. 254 135 Perkin.s v. Vuu^'han (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 988 ; 5 Scott, N, R. 881 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 38 ; 6 Jur. 1114 243, •44 Perriiig v. Hone (1826), 4 Binp. 28 ; 12 Moore, C. P. 135 ; 2 C. & P. 401 . . 1194 Perry v. Davis (185S), 3 C. B. N. S. 769 524 Perry v. Fisher (1846), Spring Assize, Surrey, 1816 194 Perry y. Fitzhowe (1846), 8 Q. B. 757.778: 15 L. J. Q. B.239; 10 Jur. 799.. 038 Perry v. Gibson (1834), 1 A. & E. 48 ; 3 N. & M. 462 942 Perry «. Moalowcroft (1846), 10 Boav. 122 1103, 1104, 11,32 Perry v. Phosphor Bronze Co. (1894). 71 L. T. 854 1062 Perry V. Smith (1842), 9 M. & W. 682; 11 L. J. Ex. 269 602, 603 Perry c. Watts (1842), 3 M & Gr. 775 ; 11 L. J. C. P. 97 , 192 Porsse V. Persse (1856), 5 H. L. Cas. 671 867 Perth Peerajre (1846-8), 2 H. L. Cas. 265 .' 403, 425, 1043 Perton, Re. Pearson r. Att.-Gen. (1885), 53 L. T. 707 413. 415, 421, 436 Peruvian Ry. Co. v. Thames and Mersey Marine Ins. Co. (1867), L. R. 2Ch. 617; 36 L.J. Ch. 864; 15 W. R. 1002 648 Fetch 1). Lyon (1846), 9 Q. B. 147 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 393 506 Petchell. Re (1874), 43 L. J. P. & M. 22 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 153 ; 30 L. T. 74; 22W.R.353 704 Peter v. Compton (1693), Skin. 353 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 359 682 Peters ». Brown (1801), 4 Esp. 46 713 Peters v. Fleming (1840), 6 M. & W. 42 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 81 48, 49 Petersfield case (1833), Cock. & Arm. 34 ; Perry & K. 49 497 Petherbridge v. Ash (1846). 4 C. B. 74 ; 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 507 ; 10 Jur. 950 726 Petheriok v. Turner (1802), cited 1 Taun. 105 ; 9 R. R. 712 386, 495 Peto V. Hague (1804), 5 Esp. 134 ; 1 Smith, 417 388 Petrie v. Nuttall (1855), 1 1 Ex. 569 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 200 95, 406, 1116 Potty V. Anderson (1825), 3 Bing. 170 504 Petty V. Styward (1632), 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 290 ; 1 Ch. Rep. 67 139 Peyton v. M'Dermott (1837), 1 Dr. & Wal. 198 297 Phayre, Lessee of, I'. Fahy (1832), Hayes & Jon. 128 47 Phelan v. Slattery (1887). 19 L R. Ir. 177 793 Plielps V. Foot (1815), 1 Conn. 387 /. 372 Phelps V. Prew (1854), 3 E. & B. 430 ; 2 0. L. R. 1422 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 140 ; 18 Jur. 249 321 Phene's Trusts (1869), L. R. 5 Ch. App. 139 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 316 ; 22 L. T. Ill; 18W. R. 303 172 Phen6 v. Popplewoll (1862), 31 L. J. C. P. 235; 12 0. B. N. S. 334; 6 L. T. 247 ; 10 W. R. 523 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 1104 SCO Phenix v. Ingraham (18091, 5 Johns. 412 5 14 Philadelphia and Trenton Ry. Co. v. Stimpson (1840), 14 Pet. 448 945 Philiraore v. Barry (1808), 1 Camp. 513 ; 10 R. R. 742 672 Philips V. Hunter (1795), 2 H. Bl. 402 ; 4 T. R. 182 : 2 R. R. 353 . .1152, 1155 Philips V. Philips (1878), 48 L. J. Q. B. 135; 4 Q. B. D. 127 ; 39 L. T. 656; 27 W. R. 436 187, 220 Vol. I. mdi with pagt 636. liil 1 I'll cxlii TABLE OF CASES CITED. I Tf! Plan Philipson V. Chase (1809), 2 Camp. HI 316 Philipson v. Earl of Egromont (1844), 6 Q. B. 005 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 26; 8,Tur. 1164 1132 Phillips V. Barker (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 44 ; 1 Sm. & G. 583 788 Phillips r. Berricit (1819), 16 Johns. 136 1123 Phillips f. Bistolli (1824), 2 B. & C. 514 ; 3 Dowl. & U. 822 fi89 Phillips V. Briard (1856), 25 L. J. Kx. 233 ; 1 H. & N. 21 765 Phillips V. Bury (1788), 2 T. R. 346 IIOJ Phillips V. Olagett (184;5), 11 M. & W. 84 ; 2 Dowl. 1004 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 275 492 Phillips V. Cole (1839), 10 A. & E. 106 ; 2 P. & D. 289 ; 4 Jur. 83. .435, 444, 512 Phillips V. Earner (1795), 1 Esp. 357 942 Phillips f\ Evans (1843), 12 M. &A\. 309; 1 I). & L. 463 ; 13 L.J. Ex. 80.. 1160 Phillips V. Gibbs (1846), 4 Dowl. & L. 275 ; 10 M. & W. 208 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 48 733 Phillips r. Hall (1832), 8 "VVeud. 610 644 Phillips V. Hallidav, (1891) A. C. 301 ; 64 L. T. 745 ; 65 J. P. 741 121 PhUlips V. Hen8on'(1877), 3 C. P. D. 26 ; 47 '-.. J. C. P. 273 ; 37 L.T. 432; 26 W. E. 214 723 Phillips V. Iin Thum (1866), 18 C. B. N, S. 400, 691 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 220 ; L. R. 1 C. P. 463 : 1 H. & R. 499 648 PhiUipsr. Irving (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 325; 8 Scott, N. R. 3 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 145 38 Phillips V. Kiugfield (1841), 1 Applet. 375 972 Phillips f. Mullings (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 244 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 211 ; 20 W. R. 29 137, 139 Phillips V. Phillips (1864), 34 Beav. 19 806 Phillips V. Pound (18.i2), 7 Ex. 881 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 277 ; 16 Jur. 645 866 Phillips V. Ward (1863). 16 i B. N. S. 717 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 7 ; 9 L. T 345; 12 W. R. 106; 9 Jur. N. S. "82 1116 Phillips V. Winbum (1830), 4 C. ^.273 679 Phillipson v. Hayter (1870), 40 L. J. C. P. 14 ; L. R. 6 C. P. 38 ; 23 L. T. 556 ; 19 W. R. 130 166 Phillpotts V. Phillpotts (1851), IOC. B. 85 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 11 90 Phipps V. Hale (1874), L. R. 3 P. & D. 160 700 Phipps V. Parker (1808) 1 Camp. 412 1209 Pickardt). Sears (1837), 6 A. ic E. 174 537, 542 Pickering V. Appleby (1720-1), Com. R. 354 685 Pickering v. Dowson (1813), 4 Taun. 779 757 Pickering t-. Noyes (1823), 1 B. & C. 263 ; 2 D. & R. 386 321, 969 Pickett V. Packham (1809), L. R. 4 Ch. App. 190 169 Pickford v. Giiteh (1787), 8 T. R. 305, ti. (a) 161 Pickup V. Thames lus. Co. (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 504 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 749 ; 39 L. T. 341 ; 26 W. R. 689 176 Picton'scase (1806), 30 How. St. Tr. 493 1093, 1179 Piercy'rtoa8e(1682), T. Jones, R. 164 1179 Piei-8». Piers (1849), 2 H. L. C. 331 ; 13 Jur. 509 149 Pierson v. Hutchinson (1809). 2 Camp. 211; 6 Esp. 126 307 Tiggv. Clarke (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 849; 3 Ch. D. 672; 24 W. R. 1014 .. 146 Piggott V. Green (1833), 6 Sim. 72 144 Pigot's case (1611), 11 Co. Rep. 27 1193, 1200, 12U1 Pigot V. Cubley (1864), 16 C. B. N. 8. 701 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 134 ; 9 L. T. 804; 12 W. R. 467; 10 Jur. N. S. 318 781 Pigott V. HoUoway (1808), 1 Binn. 436 927 Pike's case (1829), 3 C. & P. 698 898 Pike V. Ongley (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 708 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 373 ; 35 W. R. 634 769 Pilgrim, Re (1835), 3 A. & E. 485 ; 4 Dowl. 89 ; 4 L. J. M. C. 120. . . .838, 842 Pilt^rim v. Southampton & Dorchester Ry. Co. (1835), 18 L. J. C. P. 330 ; 8 C. B. 25 476 Pllkington v. Riley (1849), 6 Dowl. & L. 628 ; 3 Ex. 739 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 323 228 Pillar V. Llynvi Coal Co. (1809), T.. R. 4 C. P. 752 ; 38 L. J. 0. P. 294 ; 20 L. T. 923 ; 17 W. R. 1123 728 Pilsworth V. Mosse (1802), 14 Ir. Ch. R. 163 704 The referencei are to pages, not to paragraphs. TABLE OP CASES CITED. cxliii FAOB 40J, 4n"), 4()n, iio'j J. Q. B. ;u().. 7:t4 Km 9. CurreU (184(»), 6 M. & "W. 234 393, 397, Pinches V. Harvey (1841), 1 Q. B. 869 ; 1 G. & D. 'J3G; 10 L. Pipiiey V. Jones (1894), 42 Am. St. R. 209 rinney v. Piuney (1828), 8 B. & C. 335 10 Pipe «. Fiilcher (18.W, 28 L. J. Q. B. 12 ; 1 E. & E. Ill 403 Piper V. Chappell (1815). U M. & W. 649 ; 9 Jur. 601 7 Pitcher v. KiuK(1845), 2 Dowl. & L. 755 815, 816 . Add. [376] 046 Pitman v. .Maddox (1098), 2 8»lk. 690 Pitman v. 'V/oodbury (1848), 3 Ex. 4 2 Ld. Raym. 73i 454 675 Pitt V. Chappelow (1841), 8 M. & W. 616 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 487 546 Pitt V. Coomes (1834), 6 B. Ai Ad. 1078 ; 3 N. & M. 212 867 Pitt V. Shew (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 206 37 Pittonv. Walter (1718), 1 Str. 162 1031, 1034, 116? Pitts f. Beckett (1845), 13 M. & W. 746; U L. J. Ex. 358 297 Pizarro, The (1817), 2 Wheat. 227, 241, 242, n. (e) 102, 108 Plaoker v. Gonsaliis (1815), 1 Serf,'. & R. 526 614 Planch6 (Packer) v. Braham (1837), 8 C. & ?. 68 ; 6 Scott, 242 ; 4 Bing. N. C. 17 ; 3 Hodges, 288 ; 1 Jur. 823 50 Plant V. M'Ewen (1823), 4 Conn. 544 495 Plant V. Taylor (1863), 7 H. & N. 211 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 289 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 140 127 416, 418 Piatt V. Att.-Gen. of N. S. Wales (1878), 3 App. Cas. 336 ; 47 L. J. P. C. 26 ; 38 L. T. 74 ; 26 W. R. 516 179 Plaxton V. Dare (1829), 10 B. & C. 17 ; 5 M. & R. 1 305, 396, 403 Playne v. Snriven (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecu. & Mar.) 122 ; 1 Roberts. 772 694 Plenty v. West (1845), 1 Roberts. 264 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 185 704 Plevins v. Downing (1876), 1 C. P. D. 220; 45 L. J. C. P. 695; 35 L. T. 263 752 Plimmer v. Sells (1834), 3 N. & M. 422 604 Plowes V. Bossey (1862), 2 Dr. & Sm. 145 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 681 ; 10 W. R. 332 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 352 101, 621 Plnmerw. Brisco (1847), H Q. B. 46 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 158; 12 Jur. 351. .148, 1213 Plummer v. Woodbume (1825), 4 B. & C. 625 ; 7 Dowl. & R. 25 . . . .1142, 1152 Pluukett'8 Estate, Re (1861), 11 Ir. Ch. R, 361 798 Plunkett V. Cobbett (1804), 6 Esp. 136 243, 617 Pooook V. Billing (1824), 2 Bing. 269 613 Pocock V. Pickering (1852). 18 Q. B. 789 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 365 733 Podmore v. Whatton (1864), 3 S, & T. 449 ; 33 L. J. P. 143 ; 10 L. T. 764 ; 13 W. R. 106 143, 307 Pogson V. Thomas (1840), 6 Bing. N. C. 337 803 Polden f. Bastard (1865), 4 B. & S. 258 ; 8 L. T. 635 ; 11 W. R. 778 ; 7 B.&S.130; 13L.T.441 115 Pole V. Leask (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 155 638 Pole V. Rogers (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 287 259 Polini V. Gray (1881), 12 Ch. D. 411 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 41 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 80 ; 6 App. Cas. 623 ; 43 L. T. 209 ; 29 W. R. 217 ; 44 L. J. 812 458, 1092 Pollack V. Pollaek (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 183 ; 2 S. .& T. 310; 4 L. T. N. S. 479 348 Pollard t>. BeU(1800), 8 T. R. 434; 5 R. R. 404 1147, 1149 Pollard V. Scott (1790), Pea. R. 19 404, 1168 Pollock V. Pollock (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 329 ; 22 W. R. 724 ; 30 L. T. 779 ; 44L. J. Ch. 168 139 Pollock V. Stables (1848), 12 Q. B. 765 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 352 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 352 ; 12 Jur. 1043 157, 158 Pollock V. Stacy (1847), 9 Q. B. 1033 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 133 ; 11 Jur. 267 . . 656 Pollok i>. M'Alpin (1851), 7 Moo. P. C. C. 427 178 Pomeroy t'. Baddeley (1826), Ry. & M. 430 918 Ponsfordv. Swaine (1861), 1 J. & H. 433; 4 L. T. 15 612 Pontefraot, Ex parte (1843), 3 Q. B. 391 ; 7 Jur. 1086 1139 Pontifex v. Bignold (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 63 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 390 ; 9 Dowl. P. C. 860 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 259 82 Pool V. Bridges (1826), 4 Pick. 379 376 Poole V. Dicas (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 663 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 47 ; 1 Sc. 600. .453, 454, 457, 458, 469, 460 Vol. I. ettdt with page 636. 111 \h cxiiv TAni-E OF f;Asi:s crri:D. PAOV. I'oolfl V. Could (Iflftfi), 2S L. J. Ex. 'irOO ; 1 II. & N. 09 873 Pooler. nrittiUi (imd), Ift Ir. C. I^. H. '2:i9 IKiS Pooloi'. Ilol.l)H (IHU'.I), 8 Dowl. 11.) 733 Tool.) ». Ilu«kiiiw)ii (1813), II M. i- W. 827 \H I'ooli) V. I'lilmcr (1812). (Jar. & M. 0!t 171 Poolo f. Ki.liiirdHnii (1807), 3 Miihh. 330 931 Poolo V. Wamm (18;»8), 8 A. it K. MH ; 3 N. & P. (!!)3 1210 Pooliiy V. Driver (187<i), 6 Cli. 1). -J-ia ; 40 L. J. Cli. 4(i(i ; 3(1 L. T. TO ; 25 W. R. 1(12 1ft!) Pooloy V. <»oi>(lwiii (is;).')), 4 A. & K. 94 ; ft N. k iM. 400 133 Poolcy f. Jlanailiiic (18;^7), 7 K. & Jl. 431 ; 26 L. .1 . Q. H. 1,^0 ; h W. H. 40)) ; 3 .liir. N. S. 488 7.')8 Popofi. AndruwH (1810), 9 (I & P. fi«4 fiOfi PopiM'. Askew (1840). 1 Iredell, 10 1221 Poplo, Ko, Kx parte Hiiker (1889), 40 Ch. D. 589; ftS L. J. Cli. 372; GO L. T. 008 ; 37 VV. U. rm 172 Porter'H TniHU, Uo (18.').')), 2.') L. J. Cli. 088 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 349 1054 Porter, Ro, PeurNon r. Att.-Coii. (1885), 53 L. T. 707 421 Porter v. Cooper (1H34), C. & P. 364 1031 Porter v. WeHtoii (18:t9), 5 HiiiK- N. C. 715 ; 8 H.'ott, 25 ; ;» ,7iir. 507 110 Portland, 1). of, v. Hill (I8(;(l), L. 11. 2 K«i. 705 ; 35 L. .1. Ch. 4H9 ; 12 .Jur. N. 8. 280 ; 15 "W. K. 38 40:' Portmore, Ld. r. Taylor (18;il), 4 Him. 182 ; 9 L. J. Ch. 20;) 137 PoHtlethwaite f. Freelaiid (1880), 5 App. Can. 599; 49 L. J. Ex. 030; 42 L. T. 845 ; •;8 W. U. 833 163 Postlethwaito v. Iliekiium (1889), 00 L. T. 514 ; 37 W. R. 200 ; 53 J. P. 357. 121 Potez V. GloNKop (1848), 2 V.x. 191 140, 450 Pothonierr. DawMoii (1810), II(dt, N. P. K. 383; 17 R. K. 047 781 Pott V. Kytoii (1840), ;{ C. B. 32 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 257 159 Pott V. TodhuntcT (1845), 2 Coll. 70 748 Potter V. Baker (1850), 13 Beav. 273 ; 21 L. Ch. 11 ; 15 Beuv. 489 144 Potter V. I)elK)oH (1815), 1 Stark. R. 82 15,3 Potter V. Diiffield (1874), L. R. 18 K<i. 4 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 472 ; 22 \V. R. 585. 071 Potter f. Nicholson (1841), 8 M. A: W. 294 ; 9 Dowl. 808; 10 L. J. Ex. 311 733 Potter V. Rankin (1870), L. R. 6 C. P. 518 ; 18 W. R. 808 818 Potter V. Webb (1829), Creenl. 44 252 PottH V. Diirant (1795), 3 Anstr. 789, 795 ; 2 Eag. & Y. 432 ; 3 (iwill. 1450; 4 R. R. 804 430 PottH V. Nixon (1870), 6 Ir. R. 0. L. 45 89, 92 PottH e. Smith (1809), 38 L. J. Ch. 68 ; L. R. Eq. 311 ; 18 L. T. 029 ; 10 "W. R. 891 78 PottH V. Surr (1806), 34 Bcav. 543 ; 13 W. R. 909 13i» PoulBiim V. Thirst (1807), L. R. 2 C. P. 449 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 225 ; 10 L. T. 324 ; 15 W. R. 700 227 Poultney v. Holmes (1 733-4), 1 Str. 405 050 Poulton V. Lond. & S. West. Ry. Co. (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 634 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 294; 8 B. & S. 016 043 Pound t>. Wilson (1806), 4 F. & F. 301 9 (8 Pounsott V. Fuller (1850), 17 C. B. 000 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 145 773 Pountney v. Clayton (1883). 11 Q. B. D. 820 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 506 ; 49 L. T. 283 ; 31 W. R. 664 : 47 J. P. 788 114 Powell, Re (1864), 34 L. J. P. & M. 107 ; 4 S. & T. 34 099 Powell V. Bradbiny (1849), 7 C. B. 201 ; 18 L. J. C. P. UO ; 13 Jur. 3«9. '.^02 Powell ». Dillon (1814), 2 Bull & B. 420 071 Powell ». Divett (1812), 16 East, 29; 13 R. R. 358 1193, 1195 PoweU p. Edmunds (1810), 12 East, 6 ; 13 R. R. 785 767 Powell V. Ford (1817), 2 Stark. R. 164 . 1220 Powell ». Hellicur (1858), 26 Beav. 201 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 255 ; 6 Jur. N. 8. 232. 038 Powell V. Hodgetts (1820), 2 C. & P. 432 385 Powell V. Jessop (1856), 18 C. B. 330 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 199 083 Powellr. Lavton(l806), 2B<>8. &P. 371; 9 R. R. 660 1097 PoweU ». Miibum (1772), 3 Wils. 365, 366 105 The re/ereneen art to pages, not to paragraphi. TADLE OF CASKS CITED. cxlv PAoa Powell r rowoll (18f.fi), 3,'. L. J. V. & M. 100; L. R. 1 P. & D. 209 ; 14 L. T. 8(10 "03 Powoll V. Smith (1872), 41 L. J. Cli. 734 ; L. H. 14 E<i. 85 ; '10 W. K. (102. 71> Power r. Il.'.vrH(l8«4), 10 If. of L. Vm. (H5 86 Power r. \Vel.l.er (IH70), I. K. 10 Ku. 1^8 830 Powers c. MnihurNt (1880). I!) L. ,1. Oli. ■>'.){ ; 4i L. T. 1'.'3 ; '28 W. It. 31)0. 1J4 Powii* Hiiioiiy (1731), rittKl CriiiHe, 1)1^". >•■ '', f<. (iO 1040 I'owiH V. Smith (18'22), 5 H. A: A. 850 ; 1 1). & U. A'M) 39 PowyHt'. Miiii-field (18MC.-7). 3 My. \ (V. 3,V.) ; 7 li. J. Oh. 9 000 I'riineo »'. Symi'toii (I8.'i4), Kiiy, 078 710, 711 PriiMliri, DiiV lie, rii»e of, 7 Law Hev. Art. vii .174 Piatt, Kx imrte, He Ifiivmim (1882), 21 Ch. J). 403; .'.2 L. Ch. 120; 47 L. T. 308 ; 31 \V. It. 18i) 848 Priittf. lliii.l.iirv (1849), 14 Q. U. 190; 11) I. .1. I). H 17; I3.)iir. 10ii;j.. 1N9 I'riitt f. Prutt (IS82), 61 L. J. Ch. 83S ; 47 L. T. 219 , 30 W. H. 8,i7. .321, } 182, 1184 ProNcottf. Biitfery (18JS), 1 C. B. 41 1174 I'reHi.K-nt, The (1804), Ct C Roh. A.liii. 277 179 ProMtoii f. Ciirr (1820), 1 Y. A J. H.') 001 PreMtoii V. Mereeau (1775), 2 W. HI. 1219 743, 7.'>7 PreHton V. Peeko (18.1S), 27 L. J. Q. H. 124 ; K. B. & K. 330 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 013 84, 1 123 Prentwick v. Poloy (1805), 31 L. J. C. P. 189 ; 18 C. U. N. S. 80C ; 12 L. T. 390 ; 13 \V. R. 753 ; 1 1 Jur. N. S. .183 508 Priec, Rn (1804), 4 Ku«t, 587 ; 1 Smith, 284 ; 7 R. R. 037 8:t8. S42 Price V. Carter (1845), 7 Q. B. 838 732, 734 Prioo f. DewhurHt (1838), 8 Sim. 302 1112, 1 147, 1 151 Prioo r. Dvnr (1810), 17 Ves. 350 ; 1 1 U. R. 102 7.12 Price r. ]rarwo<Kl (1811), 3 Ciimp. 108 ,143 Price f. llewett (1852), 8 Ex. 110; 17 Jur. 4 511 Price v. lIolliK (1813), 1 M. * Sil. 105 499 Price V. Ley (1803), 4 Gift'. 235 ; ,32 L. J. Ch. 530 748 Price V. Littlewood (1812), 3 Camp. 288 1 174 Price V. Manning (1889), 42 Ch. D. 372 ; 68 L. J. Ch. 049 ; 01 I.. T. 5.37 ; 37 W. R. 785 921, 9.39 Price V. Powell (1858), 3 H. & N. 341 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 400 706 Price f. Price (1852), 1 Do <1. M. & (4. 308 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 53 i;»7 Price V. Price (1847), 16 M. & W. 2.30 ; 4 Dowl. & L. 537 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 99. . 108 Price V. RaniHay (1840), 2 Jet.b & Sy. ;!38 526 Price f. RichardKon (1845), 15 M. & W. 540 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 315 (!fi9 Price V. Torrington (1703), 1 Salk. 285 ; 2 Ld. Riiym. S73 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 352.. 451, 458 Price V. Woodhouso (1849), 3 Ex. 010 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 271 407 Price V. Worwood (18.19), 4 II. & N. 512 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 329 522 Price V. Wright (1779), 1 Dougl. 241 096 Prichard v. Powell (1845), 10 Q. B. 589 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 10'^ :i9ii, 3!i8, :}99 Prideaux v. Bunnett (18.>7), 1 C. B. N. S. 613 777 Prideaux v. Criddle (1809), L. R. 4 (J. B. 45.1 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 232 ; 20 L. T. 695 ; 10 B. & S. 615 32 PrieHtley v. Fowler (1837), 3 M. & W. 1 ; M. & II. 306 ; 1 Jur. 987 778 Priextman v. Thomas (1884), 9 P. D. 70 ; 53 L. J. P. 1). & A. 58; 32 W. R. 842 1118 Prince v. Blackburn (1802), 2 East, 250 1213 Prince v. Sumo (1838), 7 A. & E. 030; 7 L.J. Q. B. 123 ; 3 N. & P. 1.39. . 480, 484, 501, 970 Prince Peter Oldenburg, Re (1884), 63 L. J. P. D. & A. 46 ; 9 P. D. 234 ; .32 W. R. 724 ; 49 J. P. 104 1178 Prince of WalcH Life Ash. Co. v. Harding (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 297 ; E. B. & E. 183 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 851 042 PrinccHH Chariotto, The (1803), Brown. & L. 75 1 176 IVimcton, The (1878), 47 L. J. Adm. 33 ; 3 P. D. 90 ; .38 L. T. 200 .... 178 PrinBep & E. India Co. v. Dyce Sombre (1832, bhould be 1866), 10 Moo. P. C. C. 286 140, 170, 203, 1 102 Vol. I. end* with pagt 036. cxlvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. PA08 Pristwici P. Foley (1866), 34 L. J. 0. P. 189 ; 18 0. B. N. S. 806 ; 12 L. T. 300 ; 13 W. R. 753 ; 1 1 Jiir. N. S. 583 608 Pritchard». Rii>,'Hhawo (1851), 11 C. B. 459; 20 L. J. 0. P. 101 500 Pritchurd v. Hrowii (1828), 4 New HiitnpH. 397 607 Pritchard r. Dnipor (1830-31), 1 Ruhh. & Mv. 191 386, 49.5 Pritchard v. roulkcs (1S37), Coop. (C. P.) 14 607 Pritchard v. IliMirock (18J3). 6 M. & Or. 165; 12 L. J. C. P. 322 ..1096, 1097 Pritchard v. Walk.-r (ISi?), 3 C. & P. 212 148, 519 Pritt V. Fairolo.ijrh (1812), 3 Camp. 305 ; 13 Fi. R. 81 1 157, 454 Proc.-Gen. »•. WilliamH (1861), 31 L. .1. P. & M. 157 ; 2 8. & T. 491 ..414, 416 Proctor f. JoiioN (18.'6^ 2 C. & V. 532 690 ProcU)r r. Lainwni (183(1). 7 C & P. 631 329, 498 Prolo f . Wi^'-rins {18:>7), 3 HiiiK. N. C. 235 ; 3 Scott, 607 ; 2 Hodgus, 204 . .90, 91 Prossor r. (iwillim (1S43), 1 C. & K. 95 512 ProHsiT c. \\'.i>ni«'r(1856). 1 C. B. N. S. 289; 26 L. J. C. P. 81 1103 Protector, The (1839), I \V. Roh. Adm. 45 178 Proudfoot r. Montofiore (1867). L. R 2 Q. B. 511 ; 8 B. & 8. 510 ; 16 L. T. 585 ; 15 W. R. 920 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 225 686, 770 Provis I'. R.i'd (1829), 5 Bin^. 435 ; 3 M. & P. 4 977 ProwHo r. The Kuropean iV: Anicricaii Steam Sliippiiig Co. (IS'iO), 13 Moo. P. C. R. 481, Hubiiom. The PccrleHt* ; Lush. Adm. R. 103; 30 L. J. Adm. 89 7, 178 Priidoiitial Ahn. Co. f. Edmonds (1877), 2 Ajip. OaH. 487 172 Prudential Mutual Ass. Co. v. Cur/.on (1852), 8 Kx. 97; 22 L. J. Ex S.').. IHU Prudhamr. Phillips (1737), 2 Amb. 703; 20 How. St. Tr. 479, 48i), u. .. IKHi. 1133 Prudliommo v. Frasur (1834), 1 M. & Roh. 435 192 Prueii r. (N.x (18I.V, 2 C. B. 1 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 17 ; I Rarr. & Ar. 514 726 Pryor v. Prvor ( 1 HiiO). 29 L. J. P. & M. 114 700 Pryor r. Swaiue 1SJ4), 2 Dowl. & L. 37 732 I'u.l.lephatt, Re (1870), L R. 2 P. & 1). 97 ; 39 L. J. P. it M. 8» 699 Pujfh A: Shariimu's cas»' (1872). L. R. 13 E.j. 5611; 41 L. J. Cli. 580; 26 L. T. 27 1 816 Pugh v. R(pl)iiis(m (1786), I T. R. 118 19 Pujoias i: Holland (1811), Ir. Cir. R. 19 -J.V. I'uil.HM.k r. Liiwesfl8:6). I.") [,..F. (i. H. 178 ; 1 Q. B. D. 284; 3| L. T. 95.. (.(,S I'ulh'u r. Sn.'lus (187!)^, 18 I,. .1. C. 1*. :!9I ; 40 L. T. 363 ; 27 \V. R. 534. . 224 J'ullen r White (1828), 3 C. * P. 431 '273 .'•ulley r. Hilton (1823,. 12 IVice. ti25 lO.iO Pulsford r. Rielnrds (18.Vt), 17 B.mv. 87 ; 22 L. J. Ch 559 M't Pureell r Maenamara (1«08), 1 Camp. 200 ; 9 Eii.st, 157, 361 ; 9 R. R. 578. .1013, 1096 Pnrdon r. Ld. Longford (1877,, 11 Tr. R. C. L. 267 48 Punh.n c I'urdon ,1812), 10 M. & W. 562 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 3 716 Putnam r. Lewis (1811), 8 .Johns. 3,S9 552 Pye .-. Iliittiilield (1865). 31 !.. .1. (J. B. 17; 5 B. & S. 829 960 I'Ver i\ < '.liter (IS.Vl), 1 II. \- N. OU; ; 26 L. .T. Ex. 258 11,5 Pyke V. Cronrh (1696). 1 Ld. Raym. 730 321. 328, 1113 Pym r. Campl.rll (l8.-.(i), 25 L. .T. (i. B. 277; 6 E.&U. 370; 27L.T. 122; 4 \V. n. 528 ; 20 .»ur. 611 746 Pym r. Lockver (1840), 5 My. & (>. M ; 10 L. .T. Ch. 153 806 Pyno, Re (1843), 1 Dowl. A: L. 703; 13 L. .1. (J. B. 37 816 QrAiiTr.iiMAN P. Cox (1837), 8 C. & P. 07 910 Quart/ Hill Co.. Ite. Ex parte Young (1882), 21 Ch. D. 642 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 94(t; 31 \V. R. 173 912, 042 QuelMi- Marine Ins. Co. v. ("oinmer. Bk. of Canadu (1870), L. R. 3 P.O. 231 ; 39 L .1.1'. ('.53 770 Mwru, The (18t;9i, L. R. 2 .Vdm. 354 ; 38 L. J. Adm. 39 ; 4 Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 3 16 177 Queen, The, r. Flavell (1881), 14 Q. B. D. 364 ; 52 L. T. 133 ; 33 W. K. 343 ; 49 .1. P. 406 696 I'hii n/cntuMi an to pagei, not to p>ira^iiijjhs. u TABLE OF CASKS CITED. exl VI 1 PAOK Queen's, The, oaao (1820), 2 B. & B. 287 . . . .280, 281, 484, 661, 587, 901, U(H, 90(1, 950, 9,')4, 9oo, 959, 974. 975, 977 Queen's Proctor*. Fry (1879), 4 P. D. 230 ; 48 L. J. P. D. & A. 68..10.')0, 10.54 Qiii-niiell c. TurmT (l»ai), 13 Beuv. 240 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 2;i7 802, 801 Quick I-. Quick (18r.4\ 33 L. J. P. & M. 1J6 ; 2 S. & T. 442 ; 12 W. R. 119; 10 Jur. N. S. «82 1 I'l Qui.k V. Staines (1798), 1 Bos. & P. 20H ; 4 H. K. 801 6.i.t Quilter «'. Jor«. (18,')3, Hhould be 18(13), 14 C. B. N. 8. 747 ; 11 W. R. 888 ; 3 F.& F. 644 309 Qiiincov f Slmrpe (187G), 1 Ex. D. 72 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 347 ; 34 L. T. ii>,. ; 24 W. R. 373 Til Quinuf. Butler (1808), L. R. 6 Eq. 223 7()» R 'h TruHtH. Re (1870), 39 L. J. Ch. 192 021 R. V. (1S2(1), 2C. &P. 4.'j<) 120 R. i>. (1834), 60. & P. 408 21(i. R. ,.. (1S3H), 3 N. & P. 627 ; 8 A. & E. 689 824 R. V. AlMTKUvennv Union (1880), 6 Q. B. I), .il ; .10 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 43 L. T. (102 ; 29 \V. R. 303 631 R. r. AlKTKwilly (1807, Hhould be 1801), 2 Ea«t, 03 3(i8, 420, 4(15 R. r. Abin^rdon (1794), Pea. R. 23(1 274 R. ,•. A.krnyd (1824), 1 Lew. C. O. 49 671 R. r. Aaiinis(l,S28), 3C. & P. 600 120 R r. AdderlMiry East (18431, 6 <i. B. 187, 189, n. (n) ; 13 L. .1. M. C. 9; ]). vV M. 324 ; 7 Jur. 1036 494 R. r. Addis(lH:i4), 6(5. & P. 3H,S (i34 R, r. Ad.v (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 94 'MW) R. V. AiclileH (1781), 1 Lea. 294, 297, t.., 300, u. (-/) ; 2 Lust, P. C. 9(18 .. 2>'.». 318, lO.iO, 1172 R. r. Allen (1826), 1 Den. C. C. 364 ; T. & M. 56 ; 2 C. & K. 86!) ; 3 (.'ox, C. C. 270 ; 18 L. J. M. C. 72 ; Vi Jur. 108 100, 2(13, 278 R. »•• Allen (1872), L. R. 1 C. C. 367 ; 41 L. J. M. C. 97 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 1!)3 149 R. r. Alltfood (17*^8), 7 T. R. 746 ; 4 R. R. 674 99 1 R. f. Allison (18(((11, R. & R. 109 130, 29> R. r. All Saints (1828!, 7 B. & (!. 789 416 R. r All .Siints, Snutbanipton (1828). 7 B. & C. 790 132, 1137 R. r. All 8,iints, Worcester (1817), 6 M. ic Sel. 194 891, 892, 960 R. c. Almon (1770), 6 Burr. 26S6 107 R. r. Amb.TKate. \c. Rv. Co. (18,'>2). 17 Q. B. 957 ; 16 Jur. 777 998 R. f. Aniburv (1862), 6 Cox, C. O. 79 826 R. c. Anderson (KIMO), 7 How. St. Tr. 874 H'A) R. V. Anderson (18(iS), 11 Cox, C. C. 164 1029 R. ('. Andrews (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 37 209 R. ». Antrobus (1836), 2 A. & E. 793; 1 IL & \V. 96 ; 6 C. A: P. 784 ; 4 N. \- M. 666 397 R. r. Ajiplrbv (1821). 3. Stark. R 33 628, 687 R. V. Arclier'( 182(1), 1 M.w>. (\ C. 143 166 R. V. AnnitaKe ( 1 872), L. R. 7 «^ B. 773 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 16 630 R. c. Arnold (1H3.S1. H C. & 1'. 622 570, 676 R. f. Aniiidel (,1721), Hob. Ki'.l KiH R. V. Asbburton (1816). 8 il H. S76 133 R. r. Ashton (18.17), 2 Lew. V. V. 147 470 R. V. Asi.inall (1S27), eidil 3 St. Evid. 962 257 R. V. Aspiiiall (1876), 40 L. J. M. C. 146; 2 Q. B. D. 48; 30 L. T. 297 ; 26 W. H. 283 84 R. r. Aston (ls:m), 2 Runs. C. ti M. 732 246 R. e. Atkins (l(i7!i). 7 How. St. Tr. 728 518 R. e. AtwiKMl (178!i), 1 Lea. C!. C. 464 633 R. f. Austin (18.)tl), Dears. C. O. 612 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 56 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 48 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 95 328 R. f. Avery (18;18), 8 C. & V. 5i)6 692, 602, 604 R. V. A/.ire (1737-1'), 1 Str. 633 893 f'ol, I, mih with page C39. '^ "11 > i cxlviii TAIILK OF CASES CITKD. v\nv. R. 1'. Biibb (1790), 3 T. R. o8l 09 (., 'JO: R. V. BairHliiiw (1797), 7 T. R. 303 1137 R. V. UiiiiifH (17061, 2 LA. Riivm. 1199, r.'O'i 131 R. V. Bukor (1837). 'i M. & Rob. fi3 4(i5 R. r. Bilker (189Ai. 15 R. (May), 380; (1895) 1 Q. B. 797 ; (U L. J. M. C. 177 ; 7J L. T. 631 IM. [17, 948] R. V. Baldry (185.2), 2 Den. C. C. 430 603, 67i R. V. Bull (1807), 1 Ciimp. 321 ; R. & R. 132 ; 10 R. R. f>9.i 24S R. V. Ball (1837), 8 C. & P. 745 921 R. r. Bulls (1871), 40 L. J. M. C. 1 18 ; L. R. 1 f. C. 328 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 90 ; 24 L. T. 760 ; 19 W. U. 876 239 R. f. Banks (1791), 1 Esp. 146; 5 R. R. 720 204 R. r. Biiiiniim (1839), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 117 214 R. e. Barker (1829), 3 C. & P. 589 257 R. V. Barker (1858). 1 F. & F. 326 312 R. 1'. Barnard (1823), 1 C. & P. 88 633. 917 R. f. Barnes (1816), 1 Stark. 243 520, 1040 R. V. Banies (1835). 7 C. & P. 166 826 R. «. Barnes (1860), L. R. 1 C. C. 45 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 204 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 549 : 14 L T. 001 ; 14 W. R. 805 198 R. r. BarMett(1829), 3 C. & P. 000 829 R. f. Bamsley (1813), 1 M. & Sel. .!77 521 R. f. Barrett (1833), C. & P. 121 118, 518 R. V. Barrett (1852), 6 Cox, C. V. 78 826 R. V. Barrow (1800), 10 Cox, C. C. 4o7 275 R. V. Barry (1865), 4 F. & F. 392 238 R. f. Bartiett (1837), 7 C. & P. 832 509, 587 R. V. riarton (1854), Deam. 284 121 R. V. Basin«Htoko (1851). 14 Q. B. 611 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 28 ; 3 Now Sess. Cas. 093 ; 6 1). & L. 303 291 R. V. Bate (18/1). 1 1 Cox, C. C. 086 572 R. I'. Batenian (1800). 4 F. & F. 1068 583 R. V. Bates (1800). 2 F. & F. 317 335 R. V. Bathwiek (1832). 2 B. & Ad. 048 87. 890, 891, 892 R. V. Bayloy (1835), 7 C. & P. 204 217 R. V. Beule (1860), L. R. 1 C. C. 10 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 60 : 12 Jur. N. 8. 12 ; 13L.T.335; 14 W. R. 57 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 157 100 R. V. Beauoy (1820), R. & R. 416 16, 205 R. v. Beard (1837), 8 C. & P. 143. 148, 149 80, 110 R. *. Beardsall (1876), 1 Q. B. I). 452 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 157 1 173 R. V. B.'ckwith (18.58). 7 Cox. C. C. 505 275 R. V. Bwlfonlshiro (18.55), 4 E. & B. 542 39.3, .39U R. V. BedinKtteld (1879), 14 Cox, C. 0. 341 377, 467 R. V. BedinKham (1844), 1 New Sew). Ciw. 144 621 R. V. Becston (1865), 24 L. J. M. C. 6 ; Dears. C. 0. 405 ; 3 C. L. R. 82 ; 18 Jwr. 1058 326, 327, 335, 337 R. I'. Beet^m (1849), 1 Den. 414 239 R. «'. Beezliy (1830), 4 C. & P. 220 943 R. «-. Bell (r831), 5 C. & P. 162 .580 R. t-. Bellamy (18U), Ry. & M. 171 1031 R. V. Benson (1810), 2 Camp 508 129, 278, 10i;i R. V. Bentley (1833), 6 C. & P. 148 580 R. V. BerenKer (1817), 2 Stark. R. 129, n 921 R. V. B.'rijfan(1841). Ir. Cir. R. 177 669, 1130 R. V. Beniadotti (1H69), 1 1 Cox, C. 0. 316 408 R. V. Rerriman (1833), 5 C. & P. 601 216 R. I'. B.rry (1859). Bell, C. C. 46 884 R. V. Berry (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 447 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 123 897 R. I'. BottM(1850). 10 (J. B. 1022; 4 Cox, C. C. 211 ; 19 L. .1. Q. B. 601.. 47 R. !'. Beverley (1839). 8 Dowl. 140 994 R. I'. BiffK(l"717), 3 P. Wms. 423 640 R. r. BiKnold(1824), Dowl. & R. N. P. 59 ; 4 Dowl. 4 R. 70 274 R. v. BinRbam (1829), 3 Y. & J. 109 1013 R. ♦>. BinKley (1833), 6 C. 4 P. 602 211 E. V. Birch (1842), 3 Q. B. 431 1031 I'A* r*/«rtnM* art to pagei, not to paragrapht. fl TABLE OF CASES CITED. cxilx PAOIS R. V. Binl (1851), 2 Den. 94 ; T. \: M. 437; 5 Cox, C. C. 11 ; 20 L. J. M. C. "0; 15 Jur. 11)3 206 R. f. Bii(l«?ye(183(i), 4 C. & P. 380 238 E. f. BiriuinKl""" (uudiited), citt d in Ilubb. on Ev. of Sik^o. 660 417 R. r. HiriiiiiiKlniin (!>*<' 1). ■*• L. J. M. C. 63 ; 1 B. & S. 763 436, 444, 445 R. t'. Hi«< (in.ihj, 8C. & P. 773 216 R. (. Bionmin (1865,, 1 L. & C. 545; 10 Cox, C. C. 74 ; 34 L. J. M. C. 180 ; 12 L. T. 473 ; 13 W. R. 664 ; 1 1 Jur. N. S. 58!) 106, 129, 1175 R. r. Bliukbiirn (1853), 6 Cox, C. C. 339 ; 3 C. & K. 330 273, 569, 672 R. ,: BlnkL" (183J), 4 B. & Ad. 355 : 2 N. \- M. 312 870 R. f. Blake (1844), 6 Q B. 126 ; 13 L. J. M. C;. 131 ; 8 Jur. 666 382,384 R. r. Blukimoro(1852), 2Den. 410; 21 L. J. M. C. 60 ; 16 Jur. 154. .80, 1102, 1110, 1114 R. V. Bland (1832\ 1 Lew. C. C. MO 217 R. r. Bliindy (1752), 18 How. St. Tr. 1187 65, 374, 4(i9 R. i: Bl.'ii»dttl.! (1848), 2 C. & K. 765 236 R. r. BIiKH(l837), 7 A. & £.555; 7 L. J. Q. B. 4. .. .396, 397, 400, 401, 402, 446 R. r. Bodle(18;(3), OC. & P. 186 943 R. r. Bodmin, JJ. of, (1892) 2 Q. B. 21 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 151 ; 66 L. T. 562 : 40 AV. R. 606 ; 56 J. P. 501 998 R. (. Bolton (1841), 1 Q. B. 74 ; 4 P. & 1). 679 ; 5 Jur. 1 154 1 100. 1136 It. f. Bond '185(1), 4 Cox. C.C.23ii; 10 L. J. M.C. 1;«. 1 Den. C.C. ^17. .578.579 R. r. Bonner (1834), 6 C. \: P. 386 467, 468 R. r. Borrett (1833). 6 C. ic P. 124 148, 518 R. «•. BoKwell (1812), C. ii Miirsli. 581 569, 572 R. V. Boucher (18.')y), 1 F. & F. 486 312 R. r B<.u!tA;r (1852), 2 Den. C. C. :W6 ; 3 C. & K. 2;«i; 21 Ji. J. M. C. 57. . 627 R. «'. Bowdeu (IS.VJ), LiverjxM)! Amtizes. Dee. MS. (Mr. V. 11. llopwood). 568 R. r. Bowen (1841), C. & M.irMh. 149 82 R. V. Bowen (1849), 13 (J. B. 790 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 65; 13 Jur. lt,45 ; 3 Cox, C. C. 483 84 R. f. Bowmim (1834), 6 C. & P. ;U2 1133, 1140 R. I . Bojes (1860), 2 F. & F. 158 070 R. «•. BoyeH (1861), 30 L. J. (J. B. ;102 : 1 B. .V S. 3! 1 . . . .633, 960, 061, 965, 966 R. <•. BradlHunh (1883), 47 L. T. 477; 31 W. R. JJli; 15 Cox, C. C. 217 884 R. r. Bruintree (18.)9), 28 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 1 E. \: E, 51 304 R. r. Bniithwaite (1859), 8 Cox, C. C. 254. 4 14 : 1 F. & F. 638 627 R. V. Biaitliwaite(l864). 8 Cox. C. C. 254, 414 627 R. f. Brandey (17!<5), 6 T. R. 330 621, HOC R. V. Brandreth (1817), 32 How. St. Tr. 867 383 R. f. Brunjran (1712), 1 Lea. C. C. 27 987 R. r. BraHier (1779), 1 Lea. 199 : 1 East, P. C. 443 367, 898 R. V. Brayuell (18.)0), 4 Cox, C. C. 404 683 R. V. Breekumik and Aber^. <'"n. Co. (1 8:t5\ 3 A. & E. 222 998 R. r. Breiinun (1813). 3 Craw. A: D. C. C. 109 . 31H R. r. Brettell(l«.t2), 3 B. & Ad. 424; 1 L. J. M. C. 46 60 R. V. Brewer (1834), C. & P. 363 601 R. f. Brewer (1863), 9 Cox. (\ C. 409 968 R. f. Brie* (18191, 2 B. Ac Aid. 606 909 R. I'. Bri^rKM (1830), 2 M. & Kob. 199 241 R. r. BrijfhtHide Bicrlow (1849), 13 Q. B. 933 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 60; 4 New ScHH. (;. 47; 14 Jur. 174 2:i4, 405 R. I-. BiiKby(184y), 1 Den. C. C. 416; 2 Car. & K. 962 ; 18 L J. M. (". 157. . 1160 R. r. Brixtol Aj Exeter By. Co. (1843\4 W B. 162; 12 L. J. W. B. 106,. . . e«j8 R. V. Brittleton and Bntew (1881). 12 Q. B. D. 2( 6 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 83 ; 60 L. T. 276 ; 32 W. R. 463 ; 48 J. P. 295 ; 15 Cox, C. C. 431 . . 165, 894, i"3l R. V. Britton (1833). I M. Ac Rob. 297 683 R. V. BroadhenipHton (1859), 28 L. J. M. C. 18 ; 1 E. & E. 154 ; 6 Jur. N. 8. 267 131 R. I'. BroKHU (1834). 3 Ruhh. C. & M. (4tli ml.) 463; Rowioo, Cr. Ev. 60 . . 677 R. c. Hnininiich (1679), 7 How. St. Tr. 722 618 R. r. Br.H)ke (1810), 2 Stark. R. 472; 20 R. R. 723 94i R. f. BriKikcM (1847), C. i Marxh. 5i:; 205 K. r. BrookB(1847), 2 0. & K. 402; 1 Den. C. C. 217 78 y'et. I, *mU with jiag* 636. tl ! mv cl TABLE OF CASKS CITED. R. r. Br.ic)l<H (1553), Dears. C. C. 184 ; 6 Cox, C. C. 1 18 : 22 L. J. M. C. lil ; 17 Jiir. 4(M» PAOB 16,-. K. V. llrown (18()1 1, i v. & V. ii.v.t -m R. r. Brown ( ISfii), 9 Cox. C. C. 'iSl 6(1 i R. r. Browu (18(i7). ;t(J L. J. M. (;. o9: L. R. 1 C. C. 70 !>7i K. I'. Browiio (18 JO). M. & M. :U!» ; ;i C. * V. .'.Ti 'iSiJ, 10;{3, 10.14 U. r, Browiioll (1S:U i, 1 A. & K. rm ; 3 L. J . M. C. 1 18 833 R. r. Brviin /!8:t4 . .J.l.l., C. C. I.'i7 /iO? K. r. Miif'kiiiKlmm, .1.1. (18J8). 8 B. & C. 37') 900. 907 R. r. Bii<'kiiiKhitiii»liiri> JJ. (1843<, 3 Q. B. 800; 2 U. & D. .OGO ; 12 L. J. M. r. JO 1 100, 1 130 R. r. Bii.kU-y (1873^. 13 Cox. C. C. 293 326, 436, 4.i.i R. I . Biiiia (1805), ;■) Esp. 230 108 R. r. Bull {18.301, 9 C. & P. 22 913 R. r. Bull (1871), 12 Cox, C. C. 31 329 R. V. Bi:lliir(l(1872), 12 Cox, C. C. '.'.M 016 R. r. Bullock (182>), 1 M(KKly, (". C. 324, n. («) 205, 209 R. r. Burbiijro (1703), 3 Burr. 1440 8.37 R. f. Bunltlt (18.'-..')), Donrn. C. C. 431 ; 6 Cox, C. C. lr>» 9»3 R. V. BurjrisN (1830). 7 C & P. 488 . 829 R, V. Burk.. (18.-.0), 8 Cox, C. C. 44, 47 •''8. 953 R. r. Buriev (1818,. 2 Stiirk. Kv. 13, n. («) 608, 600, 032 R. r. Burridjrc (17:t.'>). 3 P. Wihh. 4»7 17 R. c. Burt (1851). 5 Cx. C. C. 284 251 R. r. Burton (1853), D.-iirs. 284 121 R. r. Burv «t. E<lmuml» (1784), Cald. 480 465 R. 1'. Bu4i (I8IH), II. & K. 372 216 R. r. But«lifr(l798\ I Loa. 205. n 58.5 R. r. Butt.rwi.k(1830), 2 M. & Rob. 196 824 R. r. Butt TV 0818 , n. k R. 342 1105, 1107 R. r. Buttlf(r870). 30 L. .1. M. C. 115; 11 Cox, C. C. .'Uifl ; L. R. 1 C. C. 248 : 22 L. T 728 ; 18 W. R. 050 962 R. V. Buttipt'Mi («r K c. Brittk'ton). R. t . C«(loK«". E. of (1822). 5 B. & A. 902 ; 1 Dowl. 4 R. 650 998 R. V. Cain (1839). 1 Cniw. & D. C. C. 37 668, 585 R. V. CiillHKhaii (1793), McNally, Evid. 385 470 R. V. Culver' (1818.. 2 Cox, C. C. 491 336 R. V. (-aniliri.!i<.>. V. of (1730), 2 Ia\. Rayin. 1331 20 R. V. CaniplM'll (1813), 1 C. & K. 82 216 R. !•. Cavit^-rlmry, Al.p. of (1848), 18 Q. B. 581 792 R. ••. CanU-rbu-v, Al.p. of (IS.W), 28 L. J. Q. B. 154 ; 7 W. R. 212 ; 1 E. a. K. 31.. ,...■ 1147 R. V. Canw.'ll (1809), 11 Cox, C. C. 203 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 194 ; 20 L. T.402; 17 W. R. 023 206 R. V. Ciirow (18.-.0), 1 I,. M. & P. 020, n 727 R. r. Cari'v (184.'.), 7 «i B. 120; 1 1 L. J. M. C. ISO 814 R. r. Carlili«(l832) 2 B. A: Ad. 307 -:J69 84 R. V. Cutlilo (1834), (;. & P. 013 274 R. I. ('HriiarvoiiKliiro(l8U).2<i. B.325: llL J. H. G. 3; H». & D. 423.. 521 R. «•. Carr (1000), 1 Sill. 418; Bull. N. P. 237 480 R. V. Carn.l (1800). II Cox, C. «'. 3-.!2 3.30 R. •■. Cart (I8:i8), Mai<iHtoni> Sum. A-w. MS 570 R. r. Cart.T (18I.S), 1 Den. <;. C 05 1019, 1174 R. r. (;art.r fl88t\ 12 i). B. I). 522 ; 53 L. .1. M. C 06 ; 50 L. T. 4o2, .'lOO; 32 W. R. 003; 48 J. P. 45(1; 15 (.'..x, (!. C. 418 247 R. r. Carty (1707). cihid Joy (.u (V.nf , 07 ; MiiNally, Evid. 45 579 R. V. < 'iiHuv (1837), .Fol.h, C. O. 203 034 R. »•. <;.iHs (1784), 1 I^>a. 20:;. n. (rt) 503, 571 R. V. CaMi.iv (18581, I F. * E. 70 043 R. I', rami. 'Morton (|820i, 3 B. * Aid. .V.IO 28J R. I. <;aMliton (170.*.), T. R. 230 303, .100 B. V. CtttfMby (1824), 2 B. ft C. 814 130, 131 The rf/crcneti are to pojfin, not to parnj/raphi. TABLE OF CASES CITED. cli R. V. li. •'. K. 1. It. f. R. V. R .. R. t. R. t: R. f. R. r. R. f. U. V. R. I . R. V. R. «'. R. r. R. t. R. .'. R. I . R. r. R. V. R.V. R. r. R. «. R. . R. r. R. f. R. f. R. f. R. t'. R. r. R.I. i!0 R. . R. f. R. r. R. .. R. V. R. « . R. r. R. I . M. R. f. R. •'. «'. »'. •'. V. r. r. R R R R R R I'J R. I. R. I . R. r. R. .. R. r. 13 R. V. R. •'. 4« R. I . R. V. R. < PAOB Cafor (1802), 4 T.n\i. 1 17, 145 ; 2 E.iHt, 3G1 1228 C.iv™(li»h|18-M). S Ir. R. C. L. 178 106 OlliiT (1680). 7 How. St. Tr. 1205 673 Chml.lirtoii ( 181)1 ), 2 Eiwt, 20 420 Clminpiify (18;tt)), 2 Li-wiii, C. (;. 2.'>!) 626, 627 (^hninimcvH {18;<7). i M. & Rob. 20 1127 ChttjMimn (18;t8), 8 C. & P. ft.VJ 921. iH3 r» ..rlhiiry (1843), 3 Q. H. 378 ; 13 L. J. M. C. 19 ; 3 (J. & D. 177. . 113!) (niurlcNWoitli (1860). 2 F. & F. 32G 062, 066 Chatlmiii (1807), 8 Eiwt, 408 <)21 Chiiwton (1841), Hi. B. 247: 10 L. J. M. C. 5.) 740 Clieudlu (1832). 3 B. & A<1. 838 7A5 Clicm- ^1871). 12 Cox, C. «'. 32 583, 1)66 Clu:.tfr (IHIO), 1 Cliitty, H. 207 002 Cl.CHttr. Pp. of (1747). 1 W. Bl. 25 1133 CliPMtcr, Sli.'riff of (IHIO). 1 CliiUy, R. 477 008 Choverton (1862), 2 F. A: F. 833 ft(i(i, 571 Chidlfv (1860), 8 Vox, C. C. 365 5H0, 583 ChriHtiMii (1842), Car. i M. 38H 196, 1018 ChriHtic (1821), 3 Kuhh. O. it M. 355 468 Cllri^»it! (1858), 1 F. & F. 75 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 506 276 ClirUonher (1849), 2 C. & K. 994 ; 1 Den. 636 ; 4 Cox, C. C. 76. . . . 283, 281,291,335.356, 950 Cliiph..m (1829), 4 C. & 1". 20 1 170 (■Inn!(1803), 28 How. St. Tr. 887, 924 623 '^liirk (1810), R. & U. 181 211 v.'lark (1818), R. At K. 3.58 216 Clarkf (1700), 8 T. K. 220 651 Clarke (18171, 2 Sfark. R. 241 257,375, 976 Clarke (18.59), 2 F. \- F. 2 337 Cleury (1^62), 2 F. Ac F. 850 339, 467 CKinent (1821), 4 D. A: Aid. 218 833 CleimiitM (1851), 2 J)eu. 251 ; 5 Cox, C. C. 191 ; T. & M. 579; L. .1. M. C. 103 ; 15 .Iiir. 407 336 Ck'WOH (1830), 4 C. & 1'. 221 561, 562, 666, 570 Clint (1841), 11 A. & E. 624; 10 L. J. M. C. 151 1139 Clivij^er (1788). 2 T. R. 263 8<ti Cliitleroy 1840), .. C. 4 K 205 821, S24 Clim!(1841), Ir. Cir. R. : 75 257 CcMidy (1882), 15 Cox, C C. S9 46 CoIkU'ii (1862), 3 F. ic F. 833 237 C.Hkbum (1857), Dcani. &. Bell, 203; 7 Cox, C. C. 265; 19 L.J. C. no 320, .3.32 (loekeroft (1870), 11 Cox. C. C. 410 257, 951 CoekiiiK (1836). 2 L.'wiii, C. C. 235 120 Colien (18.^8), 8 Cox. C. C. 41 264 , Coleloujrli (1882), 15Cox, C. C. 92; 10 L. R. Ir. 241 246 Cold (1810), 1 Ph. Ev. .508 235 , Coleiimii 1 1852), 6 Cox, C. <;. 163 1228 . Coleortoii (1830). 1 B. & Afl. 25 521 , Colenie (18.50), 11 Q. B. 900; 3 New Sew. Can. 143; 17 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 12 Jiir. 699 727 . Coll (18H9), 24 L. R. Ir. 622 28.3, 284, 975 . Collev (1827). M. A: M. 320 918 . Collier (1831), fiC. & r. 160 23H . Coltner (1864). 9 iUtx, C. C. 506 683 . Com. of Si'wern for T. Hamlet« (1812), 3 Q. B. 670; 3 (}. & D. 92; L. J. Q. B. 12 ; 6 .Iiir. 1050 997 ComjiUm (1828). 3 C. Ac P. 418 205, 1120 Coney (1882) 8 Q. B. 1). 53 » ; 16 Cox. C. C. 46; 61 L. J. M. C. 06; L. T. 307 ; 30 W. R. 678 ; 46 J. P. 404 633 . Connell (I8.)3), 6 Cox, C. C. 178 1126 . Coiiiiin(< (1868), 11 Cox. C. C. 134 1029 . Com.lly (1829), 2 U-* . (5. C. 229 106 Fol. I, tnd* witk piigt C3A. J .. 11 clii TAHLK OF CASES CITED. PAOR R. V. Cook (If.90), 13 Tfow. Hi. Tr. 318 017, 967 R. V. CM.ko (lH2t), I C. & P. ;iii R. V. C.iokc (is:t(i). 7 C. & P. .vv.) 820 1U6 R. V. C«K.k<T (1H:1S), 8 <;. & P. r.Ki 80, 247, fil5 R. w. Cojior (IHIil), ft (!. & P. M:t .66;;, 086. 607 120 R. I'. CoojMT ( ISfti), 3 C. & K. 318 : 10 .Tnr. 7.V) R r. dmU: (1873). L. R. I I'. C. (ili:. ; 12 L. J. M. C. 45; 29 L. T. Ill 21 \V. H. 5.53: 9 M.io. P. ('. C. 403 , , f)82. 583 R. c. V,i>\w (18:i;-.). 7 '.;. & p. 7'.'0 4.')4, 4.VJ R. V. (^oppiiril (1827/. M. & M 118 1034 R. r. C.)|.|)ull (18(11), 2 K.i«l, 2,') 290 R. r. Cordcn (1709), 4 Uurr. 2281 131 R. V. ConuiliuH (1743-4), 2 Htr. 1210; 1 WiN. 142 R. V. CottiiiKliiim (1834), 2 A. & K. 250 R. V. Cotton (1813), 3 Ciiliiji. 444 997 1139 399, 400, 408, 1101 U. «•. Cotton (1873). 12 C„\, C. C. 400 237 R. r. Court (1830), 7 C. & P. 487 505, 572 _ _ ~ " 47 670 820 U. V. Courtfimy (I85(!), 7 Cox. C. C. HI ; 5 Ir. C. L. R. 431. R. I'. Courtney (1840), 2 Criiwf. & D. C. (J. 03 R. V. CouMcnH (I8.')()), 3 Runs. C. it M. 599 R. t>. Cox and Itiiilton (18S4), 14 (i 11. I). 153; 54 L. .T. M. C. 41 ; 52 L. T. 25 ; 33 \V. P.. 390 ; 4!i .1. P. 374 ; 15 Cox, C. C. Oil . 592, 004, 006 R. r. ("oylf (1855), 7 Cox, C. C. 74 507, 527 R. r. ( 'nKlock (1803). 3 F. & F. 837 129 R. r. (;niMi|) (1880). 5 Q. M. 1). 307 ; 49 I.. .1. M. C. 44 ; 42 L. T. 442 ; 28 W. U. 701 ; 44 .T. P. 4 1 1 ; 14 Cox. C. (\ 390. 401 635 R. «■. Crc<lit.in (1858). 27 L. J. M. C. 205 ; K. H. v% E. 231 1170 R. r. Cn-fvi-y (1813). 1 M. & H. 273 ; 14 II. ]{.. 427 109 R. r. Crcaswell (1870), 45 L. J. M. C. 77 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 120 ; 1 Q. B. D. 440 ; 3;l L. T. 700 ; 24 W. U. 281 130 R. f. (!rink (1832). 6 C. & P. 5((8 209 R. r. (JrockcU (1831), 4 C. & P. 541 408 R. V. Croko (1774), I Cowp. 30 1137 R. V. Cron.liill (1817), 2 Ni«w Schh. Ciih. 667 ; 10 Q. B. 812 5^1 R. V. ("roi (1850), DciirH. \- Boll. 08 906 R. R. CnmNtifU (1 790), 20 How. St. Tr. 109 550, 559 C c'.lltT (1802), 3 F. & V 130 R. ». Crowth.r (1780), 1 T. R. 125; 1 R. R. '02 335 R. V. Ouim- (1842), Ir. Cir. II. 074 986 R. V. CniM.' (1838), 8 C. «.- F. 515 81, 165, 160 R. c. Culkin (1812), 5 (;. At P. 121 213 R. V. Cul|M.i)pcr (1090), Skin. 073 300 R. .'. Curjr.tiwcn (1H(;5), 35 L. .1. M. C. 58 ; L II. I C. C. I ; llJur. N. 8. 984 ; 13 L. T. 383 ; 14 \V. R. 55 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 152 172 R. V. t'urtitt (1818), 2 ('. & K. 703 958 R. V. nunmn (1819), 2 H. * AM. 378 131 U. «'. Dunn (18 '5), 1 Moo. l\ I'. 424 1127 7M U. r. Diivio (1837), A. \: K. 380 . 580, 582 R. I'. I)iivin(l833), OC. & P. 177 R. r. DiiviH (1870). L. !l. 1 ('. C. 272; 39 L. J. M. C. 135; 11 Cox, C. C. 678 251 R. I'. DiiwUt (1821). 3 .Stiiik. R. 34 0:(3 R. I'. MiiWKon (1821). 3.Sli»rk. 02 204 R. I'. Day (1H.V2). 6 Cox. C. C. 55 335, 330 R. V. D.ii.on (1740), Fowt. C. L. 9 625 R. V. D.-an (1852), Cox, C. C. 23; 18 How. St. Tr. 306 R. r. Di-an of St. Aniiph (1783), 21 How. St. Tr. 1033. , R. V. Do B.trii>fi'r (1814). 3 M. & S, 07 ; 15 R. R. 415 R. V. Do la Motti' (1781), 1 Kiwt, P. C. 124 1«. f. Donio (1827). 7 H. & C. 020 ; 1 M. & R. 291 . . . R. r. Dimt (1813). 1 <;. \- K. 97 267 .23,46 ,18. 1092 ,318, 972 . . . 303 . . . 938 . . . 727 R. f. Derby (18,50). 1 I,. M. & P. 000 R. V. Derl.y»liirii (1837), A. \- F. 885 727 R. V. Derrini^ton (1820), 2 C. & P. 418 608 R. e. DoSalvi (1857). C. C. C. Sens. Pup. vol. 46. p. 881 1120 TAi rc/ertncet art to pagtt, not to par<t4/rapht. TABLE or CASES CITED. cllii TAUK R. r. DoHpnnl (1801), 28 How. St. 'V. 489 (l.'Jft B. V. Devlin (1841), 2 Cniwf. & D. O. C. 162 6(19 R. V. DfwhurNt (1825), 1 Low. 0. C. 47 680 R. V. Dillon (1877), 14 Cox, C. C. 4 28;J R. V. Dilnioro (186'J), Cox, C. C. 52 ;i2(j, :{:»7 R. r. DinKliT (1 791), 2 lii-ii. .'iOl 3.'»'1 R. i: Dintfl.'V (1845), 1 C. & K. 637 60(i. .'i(!9, 672 R. .'. Dixon ■( I7(>ri), 3 Burr. 087 G(t4, !i(i9 R. r Dixon (1814), 3 M. & Stl. 15; 4 Camp. 12; 16 R. R. 381 80, 107 R. V. Dohfrty (1810), 13 Kiist, 171 ; 12 R. R. 315 893 R. V. Dohorty (1874), 13 Cox, C. C. 23 6<i6 R. V. Doolin (1832), 1 .Tebb, C. C. 123 971 R. V. Doran (1791), 1 Esp. 127 290 R. V. Do.HKoit (184(i). 2 C. & K. 3()ii 248 R.v. Douglas (1824), 2 Dowl. N. S. 416 341 R. V. Douglas (1816). 1 C. & K. 070 318 R. V. Dougltt.s (1840), 13 Q. B. 42; 16 L. J. Q. B. 417; 11 Jiir. 811. .,341, 348, l(t2<> R. V. Dowlin (1792), P.-a. R. 170 ; 3 R. R. 679 3,>l K. I'. Dowling 1H20), Rv. & M. 433 209 R. f. Down.T (18S0), 14 Cox, C. C. 480 604 K. V. Dowuliani (1868), 1 F. & V- 380 312 II. r. DowiiinK: (1840), Chclni.'*fortl Spring AKni/ift, MS RGl K. r. DowiiNJiiiv, Dow. March, of (1836), 4 A. & E. 232 ; 6 N. & M. COJ ; 6 .M. At \V. 002 209 U. r. Doyle (ISIli), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 390 609 R. r. Draifi" (1876), 14 Cox, C. C. 85 247 K. r. Drew (1S37), 8 (!. Ac 1". 140 603, 672 K. f. Drununond (1781), 1 I''''i. C. C. 338 404, 407 R. «•. Driirv (1819), 3 C. & K. I'i3 1140 K. V. DulHii (1818), R. & R. 306 81 R. r. DukinHfld (1848), 11 Q. B. 078; 17 L. .T. M. C. 113 464 R. r. Diilwiiili Colli'gf (1861), 17 Q. B. 000 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 30 ; 16 Jiir. 064 791 R. I'. Dunboyni', Ld. (1S60), 3 C. & Kir. 1 77 R. V. Dun(!omlH)(1838), 8 C. & T. 309 929 R. V. Diingpy (1804), 4 F. & F. 99 1127 R. t'. Diinnmrry (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 312 210 R. V. Dunn (1820), 1 Moo. C. C. 140 238, 247 R. V. Dunn (1831), 4 C. & I'. 643 504 R. r. Duiini! (1838), Ir. Cir. R. 407 980 R. V. DunHforcl (1836). 2 A. * K. 608 ; 4 N. & M. 349 ; 1 II. * \V. 93 .. .6t> R. t'. DmrnUn (1824), Ry. & M. 109 47 R. V. Durham (1787), 1 Lna. C. C. 478 033 R. t'. Durkin (1837), 2 I.K-W. C. C. 1(W 8.'6 R. r, Durort M7SI), 1 L.a. 361; 1 Eaut. P. C. 46 202 R. V. DwyiTN (1843), 1 Ruhh. C. & M. 797 677 R. V. Eanf. Count. Rv. Co. (1839), 10 A. A: E. 631 99H R. V. EaMt Fiiirl.'v (r8-'6), Dowl. & R. 163 303 R. r. Kant Murk 'I'ything (1848), 1 1 Q. B. 887 ; 3 Cox, C. C. 00 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 877 : 12 Jur. 3.)2 124 R. f. EaHt Winch (18 10), 12 A. & E. 09/ 621 R. .•. Eaton (1861), 2 Den. C. C. 274 ; uoni. R. r. U.-z/oli, 3 C. & IC. 160; T. & M. 698 209 R. r. Edgar (1831). 3 Rush. C. * M. 411 660 R. V. Edmonton (1831), 1 M. At Rob. 32 • li;j R. V. EdmundH (1833). 6 C. & P. IOl 326, 329, 628 R. V. Edmundwrn (1869), 28 L. J. M. C. 213 ; 2 E. & E. 77 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 212; 6.1ur. N. 8. 1361 264 R. V. E<lwurd« (1791), 4 T. R. 440 917, 907 R. V. 10<lwanlH (1837 , 8 C. & P. 20 9.'i9 R. V. EdwanlH a872), 12 Cox. C. C. 230 377 R. V. I'MwinHtowo (1828). 8 B. & C. 071 621 R. V. Egort«m (1819), R. & R. 376 ; oitwl in R. v. Ellin, 6 R. & C. 148. .. . 241 rv. /. end4 with payt 035, l!^ c ;liv TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOK R. V. Elderslmw (1828), 3 C. * P. ;{<.)« 100 R. t . Elili-rtoii (I 70:«), 2 Ld. Uiivm. i)HO 4 R. f. EUiruliTf (IS21), R. & It 4 10 600 R. v. Ellol (IHJ.J), 7 «i. B. .VW; 2 Now Sew*. Ca«. 3U li:i» R. «•. Kllicomlx! (lH;{;t). 5 0. (V P. 522 21)0, 314, a 18 R. V. Elliott (1S3!0. « (". & P. 772 210 R. V. KIliH (1802), Mc^Niilly, Kv. .'if) 8H3 R. «■. ElliH (1824, Nlnmld Im^ 1S20), B. & C. 147 230, 241, 609 R. V. KliiiiKton (1802), 1 B. & S. 088 : 31 L. .1. M. C. 14; 90ox. C. V. 8(i. . 1131 R. r. Klworthy (18(i7), L. R. 1 C. 0. 103 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 3 ; 17 L. T. 2'J3 : low. R. 207; 10 Cox, C. C. r>7'J 318 R. r. Ely, Hi., of (1828), 8 B. & C. 112; 2 M. & R. 127 U97 R. V. EminoiiM (1810), 2 M. & Rob. 279 826 R. f. Eiiorh (IH33). .') C. & P. r,Mi 503, 572 R. V. Eiifrflinmn (1842), C. & MiirHli. 218 105 R. r. Eri.Mwi'll (1790), 3 T. R. 721 325, 329, 333, 340, 308, 398, 420 R. t'. Erith (1807). 8 EiiHt,. 539 420 R. V. Errinjfton (18.(8), 2 Lew. 0. C. 142 333, 408 R. r. EHdiiilo (1858), 1 F. & F. 213 1231 R. V. Esop (183(i), 7 C. & P. 450 80 n. r. EviiUM (1821), 3 Stiirk. 35 204 K. V. Eviiim (1839), 8 C. & P. 7Ci 215 R. V. Evi'iiwood Barony (1843), 3 Q. B. 370 li:)9 R. f. ExhU (1800), 4 F. & F. 922 120 R. V. Exotc;r(18(i9), L. R. 4U. B. 341; 38L. J. M. C. 127 ; lOB. &S. 433., 4.(4, 445 T f. Exeter, TiwiMnrer of (1829). 5 M. & R. 167 ; and see 8 A. & E. 690. . S24 r '. FHKont(1835), 7 C. & P. 23S 408, 409 R. r. Fiiirie (1857), 8 E. & B. 480 247, 1121 R. r. Fiilkiier mid Bond (1822), R. & R. 481 600 R. r. Fanning (1805), 17 Ir. C. L. R. 289 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 411 ; 14 W. R. 701 149 R. V. Farler (1837), 8 C. & P. 100 033, 034 R. I-. Farley (1840), 2 C. & K. 313 .592, 001, 605 R. f. Farrell (1874), 43 L. J. M. C. 94 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 605 ; L. R. 2 C. C. 110: 29 L. T. 404 : 22 W. R. 678 3.V2 R. V. Farrington (1811), R. & R. 207 80 R. I'. FearKiw O'Connor (1843), 5 Q. B. 16 OOO R. V. Fearshiro (1779), 1 Lea. 202 283, 679 R. r. Felton (l(i28), 3 How. St. Tr. 371 673 R. c. Fennell (1881), 7 Q. B. I). 147; .'>0 L. J. M. C. 120; 44 L. T. 087 ; 29 W. R. 742 ; 45 J. P. 000 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 007 671 R. (. FerrerH. E. of (17.58), 1 Burr. 035 893 R. f. Ferry FryHtone ( 1801 ), 2 Eaut, 64 308, 420 R. r. Finiieane (18.13), 5 C. & P. 551 238 R. r. Firth (1.S09), 38 L. J. M. C. 54 ; U Cox, C. C. 234 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 172: 19L. T. 740; 17 W. R. .327 230 R. V. FiHlier (1786). eiUnl 1 Ltu. 310, 311, n 679 R. t'. Filzgerald (1741), 1 Lea. C. C. 20 1049, 1172 R. r. Fit/K<'rald (1811), Ir. Cir. R. 108 409 R. f. Fitzgerald (188»), nnrei»orti-d 877 R. V. FitZHinioiiH (1809), L R. 4 C. L. 1 289 R. V. Flaherty (1817), 2 C. it K. 782 293 R. r. Flannagan (I8H2), 15 Cox, C. C. 403 237, 247 R. V. Flutley (1842), Ir. (Jir. II. 445 912 R. V. Flavell (1884), 14 Q. B. I). 304; 62 L. T. 133 ; 33 \V. R. 343; 49 .1. P. 400 695 R. V. Fleming (1842), 1 Ann. M. & O. .330 603, 671 R. f. Fleniniing ( 1 799), 2 Leu. 854 334, 338 R. I. Fl.'t.Oier il8i>9), I C. \- P. 250 fS2 R. I). Flint-ihire (1K40). 3 Dowl. & L. 53? 768, 788 R. V. FolkeH(1832), 1 MiMt. U. U. 3.i4 238 TTiD n/irencea an to ^xye*, not to puriii/nijjht. TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. clv PAOR R. V. Fontftino Moroau (1848), 11 Q. B. 1028 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 187 ; 12 Jur. 02(i 1 1 10, 1 1 1 7 R. r. ForU'H(18U). H.tlt, N. P. R. f>9!), ii :V.iii R, V. Forl..'H ( ISa,) , 7 C. ^ P. 224 247 R. ». Fonl {\HC)l), 2 Den. C. C. 245 ; 2 C. & K. I Vi ; ft Cox, C. C. 18» . .i)2/>, 'J.)8 R. f. F(.r<liiijfl>ridift) (1858), E. B. & E. 085, G78 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 290 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 051 149, 303 U. r. F..i.'sl.-r (I8(lf;), 4 F. & F. 857 408 It. r. KoiNttT ( 1 855), r "iirM. 450 210 K. r. l''nrsvHi (1814), iv. & R. 271 15, 21 1 R. V. F.mti'r (1827), 1 lK.<wiii, C. C. 40 5;0 R. V. FohUt (I8H4), OC. & P. ;i25 ;J77, 5(i2 K. r. Fox Maulu (1839), 7 Dowl. 00;i 8:t2 R. V. Friim-t. ( 1 839), 2 M. & Rob. 207 330 R. ••. Fruii.iw (1874), 43 L. J. M. C. 97 ; L. R. 2 C. C. 128 ; 12 Co.x, C. C. 612 ; 30 L. T. 503 ; 22 W. R. 003 . . 217 R. V. Frniicklin (1731), 17 How. St. Tr. 038 1093 R. V. FriiMcr (1797), 1 McNiilly, Ev. 50 8,S3 R. V. Fmli-rick (1738), 2 Str. 1095 S88 R. V. Ficfiimn (1S75). I. R. 9 C. L. 527 :< 5 R. V. Frc-iml (10!)0).13 How. St. Tr. 10 837. 900, 901, 907 Ii. V. IVftwoll (1804), 1 L. & C. 443 ; 9 Cox, C. C. 471 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 145 : 6 L. T. 333 : 10 W. R. 545 80 R. V. Frost (1839), 9 C. & P. 131 829. 895, 890, 909 K. V. Frost (1855), Dl-ufh. C. C. 474 ; Cox, C. C. 520 ; 3 C. L. R. 005 ; 24 L.J. M. C. 110; 1 Jur. N. S 400 198, 216 R. V. Fulliirton (1853), Cox. C. 19J 198 R. V. Fullnr(1810), R. & R. C. C ,08 121 R. V. Fullford (1801), 1 L. & Cave, 401 9 Cox, C. C. 453 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 122 : 10 Jur. N. H. 522 ; 10 T T. 34«. ; 12 VV. R 715 47 R. V. Fumival (1821), H. & R. . :5 205 R. V. Fursey (1833). 6 C. & 1*. 81 21 1, 308 R. V. Gadlmry (1838), 8 C. & P. 070 251 R. ». (;ullaKlier (1875), 15 Cox, C .*. 291 883 R. V. (lallaKhi'r(l883). 13 Cox, C. C. 01 033 R. V. Galvin (1805), 16 Ir. ' L. R. 452 335 R. V. OuHZ (1882). 9 Q. B. 93 ; 51 L. J. (J. B. 419 ; 40 L. T. 592 .... 1028 R. V. Uartett (1847), I Den. O. C. 230 ; 2 C. & K. 474 584, 900, 905, 970 R. V. Oardiuer (1839), 8 C. & P. 737 ; 2 Moo. C. C. 95 027 R. V. Ounlner (1810), 2 Camp. 613 ; 11 R. R. 784 518, 1093 R. V. Guriicr (1848), 1 Don. 329 ; 3 Now Sens. Can. 329; 2 C. & K. 920. .503, 571 R. V. Ganior (1804), 3 F. & F. 681 237 R. V. Oanit (1807), 30 L. J. M. C. 89 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 400 ; 8 B. & S. 305. . 1 100 R. r. Gay (18:»5), 7 C & P. 230 470 R. V. Grtvnor (1839), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 142 ; Jobb, C. C. 202 627, 029 R. V. Gazard (1838), 8 C. & P. 595 612, 899 R. V. Gi'Utjh (1840), 9 C. & P. 499 80 R. V. Oo.'riuK (1849). 18 L. J. M. C. 215 237, 247 R. V. OfUKo (1774), 1 Cowp. 10 00 R. V. Gibbons (1823), 1 C. & P. 98. n. (A) 501, 500, 594 R. r. Gibney (1822), Jebb, C. C. 15 507, .50!i, 570 R. «'. Gibnon(1802), R. & R. 343 1105. 1107 R. r. GiliHon (1887), 18 (J. B. D. 537; 56 L. J. M. C. 49; .50 L. T. 307; 35 \V. R. 411; 51 J. P. 742; 10 Cox, C. C. 181 1231 R. V. GiddinH(18»2), C. & Marxh. 034 238 R. V. GilbrnHH (1830), 7 C. & P. 444 820 R. V. Gilham (1795), 1 Esp. 285 ; T. R. 205 905 It. r. Gilham (1828), 1 Moo. C. C. 180; Joy on Con f. 52-.50.... 607, 583, 5ii». 595. 5',I0 R. ('. Gillis (1800), 1 1 Cox, C. C. 09 869, 582, 584 R. I'. Gillow (1825), 1 Moody, C. C. 85 ; 1 Lowin, C. C. 57 82 R. V. Gllmoro (1882), 15 Vaix, C. C. 85 1120 R. V. GilHon (1807), R. & R. 138 290 Vol. I. *Hdt with page 6»6. :« t m w ! clvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAnK R. f.Oi«lwoo<l (1770), 1 Leaoh, C. 0. 142; 2 Eiwt, P. C. 1120 ,. 46 11. «'. (SiHlmrn (IH12), 15 KiiHt, 67 910 K. V. OiMHoii (1847), 2 C. & K. 7H1 U'iO K. f. (J1hhmi<i(1Ho4). 7 Cox, C. O. 1 «88 11. r. (ilc«(il ( I8:f.'), ;j UuHH. C. & M. (523 802 II. V. (Ilymu) (1871), L. K. 7 U. U. 10; 41 L. J. M. C. 58; 20 L. T. 01 ; 20 W K. i»4 1 160 R. f. (J.HMiird (1882), lo (J.ix, C. C. 7 41.8 11. r. (JoMmIkkIo (1811), 1 (!. & K. (i.51 M:i K. «'. Ooldmiiith (IH7:»), 12 Ci.x, C. C. 470 84 li. r. (J.Mxhio (1741). 17 How. St. Tr. 1()1.'» 017 11. r. (}i..)(ltVli«)w (18Vi)), 14 Cox, C. (!. ;i2(i 3;t2 It. r. (SooiUiii (1828), I L<.w. (;. C. 100 148 11. 1'. Oonloii (178'.>), 1 Lfii. r,ir> 148 It. f. (lordoii (1842), (^iir. * M. 410 10;i4 It. V. Cordon (18.'-)5;, 2;') I,. .1. M. ('. 10; DniiH. C. C r>m 1(02, 110:1 11. r. Cordon, 1^1. (J. (1781), 21 How. St. Tr. ■''i.i.). ..-177, '-i'lii, 383, 80.'), 000, 001 It. c. Could (1840), (; \- 1*. 3(11 121, MCi It. c. (Jriidy (1830), 7 <!. & 1'. 0;')0 331 It. V. tJriiliiiin (1701), 2 Liiirli, .')47 217 It. V. (iriiy (1^3'>), 7 ('. A: 1*. 101 238 (Iruy (1811), Ir. Cir. K. 73 405, 400 (Jrity (18(10), 4 V. Hi V. 1102 247 (Iniit Moltoii (181.')}, 7 »i II 387; 14 Ij. .1. M. C. 122 1139 (Irciit CaiiHcld (1810^. K«p. 130 200 (Jrcon (1832), Ct V,. it V. 312 570, 570 (Jrofii (1834), C. & r. 0.'^i5 508 Crccii (1852), 3 C. iV K 200 240 , (Srei'iiuwiiy (1845), 7 H. H. 120 814, 8.33 I?. (Irc'iU! (1837). A. & K. 548 .• 1002 V. (Iri'Kory (1840), 8 Q. B. 508; 2 N«,'w Soh'*. Chh. 220; 15 L. J. M. C. ; 10 .Jur. 387 216 Grittin (1800), It. & It. 151 58,'5 It. V. Criffln (1853), Cox, C C. 210 507, 500 R. f. Griffin (1879), 14 Cox, C. C. :i08 ; 4 L. It. Jr. 407 140 It. f. GriffiHiH(l832), 3 Uiihh. C. & M. 450, 403 571 H. f. Griffiths (1841), C. & 1'. 740 0.-.8 It. I'. Grimwood (1815), 1 IVico, 309 1050 11. V. Groonil.ridKu (1830), T C. & V. Ml 09 11. f. Grov.!(1833), 7 C. & 1'. 0;i.); 1 Moo. C. C. 447 212 R. V. Gnindon (1775), 1 Cown. 322 1103, 11'8 R. V. GuiniMi(18ll), Ir. Cir. H 107 027 R. «•. Gully (1773), I L<>.irh, 08 14 R. r. Guniblf! (1872), 42 L. J. M. C. 7; L. It. 2 C. H 1 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 248 ; 27 L. T. 092 : 21 W. It. 299 198, 212 R. V. Gimn-y (1800). 11 Gox, (J. C. 414 0(9 R. r. Gut<h (1820), M. * M. 433 107, 587 R. f. Giitlirif (1870). H <''X, G.G.522; L. 11. I C.C.241; 39 L. J. M. C. 95; 22L. T. 485; 18 W. It. 702 206 R. V. Guttridjyo (1840), 9 C. Ac P. 473 330, 376 R. r. HiiK»"OH!»"). »C. & r. 107 328 R. f. Hhkiiii(1873), 12 Cox, (! C. 357 248 R. r. HiiMics (18;iO), 2 HiiHH. C. & M. (4tli ihI.) 8,S(1 578 R. V. lliiinB (1005). Gonil). 337 lolO, 1032, 1033, l(t46, 10.V2 R. r. Hule(1778), 2 Cowp. 728 120 R. r. Hall (1700), 1 L.-win, C. ". 110 .-iOO, 579 It. r. Hall (1838), 8 G. & V. MH 388, 5(i2 11. V. Hiilliday (18(10), 29 L. .1. M. C. 148; 8Cox,C. C. 298; IWl, C. C. 257.. 891 R. i.. IIaini)(l8,Vj), Cox, C. C. 107 314 R. V. Iliindroi^k (1811), Ir. Gir. It. 229 901 It. r. HunkinN(l840), 2 V. & K. 823 314, 604 R. r. HanHon (1811). <;.& Mari^li. 3.34 : 2 Mim). C. C. 246 80 H. t>. IlapgiMKl and Wyatt (1870), 11 Cox, C. C. 471 206 R. 1'. It. I'. It. r. It. r. It. V. It. r. It. V. R. V. It. V. R V. iH R. r. The ri/ircticet aro to pagat, not to parayrophi. £> TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. C'lvli TAilR R. f n.v H. K. R R. R. n. R. It. TTiirbome (Ifi.l.')), 2 N. & M. 341 ; 2 A. & K. r,U) ; 1 If. 4 W. M',.. 100, ITU lliiiiliiiK(lH4'J). 1 Ann. M. & (). ;M0 oTi ~ 4110 'Kid 114 Hani wick (IHllD), 11 Kiist. Ilimlwi.k (IHU), 1 O. & r HiirilvdTiH). 24 How. St. lliiin(l«7(l). KlCox, c. c llar»friivf (IHMI), T. C. & P. IliiniiijrworHi (IHIT)), 4 M. r. lliirriH(lOHO), 7 How. St. ' r. HiirriH(ls;f.'), 1 Moo. C. C K. r. HarriH(IH:iO), 7 ('. & V. 4'i U. V. HamM(lH,-.0), 4 0ox, O. C, K. f. U. .'. It. r. R. t. R. r. 11. r. R. V. h. r. U. r. R. r. 19 R. f. R. I' R. r. n. r. R. r. 80; R. V. It. r. R. :•. R. V. R. .'. R. .>. R. V. R. V. R. V. R. .'. R. r. R. r. R. r. R. f. R. f. R. V. R. I . R. f. R. r. R. r. R. V. n. V. II. V. 1 I R. ». R. f. R. f. R. V. R. V. R. f. R. .'. R. .'. R. I . R.I'. Mf, . . . !)H II U) ' * • • ■ < ':m. 38(1* Vo'i, 494, 4 Tr. 704 174 .. 170 .. ..248 ,383 384 386, 013, UI4, 9J7, ! . . . 1 . . . ( & S..I. I'r. i)2C toli . .... .... .... . ., IJ • ;j;is .. '.'SI. : !) .•'10. i 440 33.1 I 2 •- ^t. Ti'. 8 51 . 330, ; (!. 118 920 . . .. < *sH. (*afl. 490 ( n. 7.S0 . .1100. I ) (l«-'7), ;. 441 .. 2B. & f!. 2,'i7 ; 3 D & R. 4(H ^ .. 133 !ll8 llarriH(IS(iO), 8 Cox, C. (J. 1 1 arris (1804), 4 F. & F. 34 HarriNon (101)2), 12 How. t' HanUon (1831). 2 Low. C. llarriNH(1822). 5 H. & AM. llarriMHoii (1S40), 2 Now Sc llartiiiKton (IH.I.-i), 4 K. & 1 Harvey (mIiouIcI Im Hanioy) Harvey ( I S.-iO), 4 (Jox, (;. C llarvov (1871), L. It. 1 C. C. 284; 40 L. J. M. (). 03; 23 L. T. HM; \V. It. '440; 11 Cox. C. C. 002 Ilarv.y (1874), 44 L. J. M. O. 1 ; L. R. 10 i) U 40 1137 " 1039 033 113 130 I ■.'(» -MS tto .'4 S 129 190 131 109 i32 26 1 HasliiiKtii'l'l (1814), 2 M. & Sel. .'i.-)8 ; IT) It. R. 3i>0 IhtMli lllfH (I83.-)), 7 c. & 1*. i.n. llatHoM (1830). 4 A. & K. IM 1 12, 1 13 Haiurlitoii (18r)3), 1 E. & B. 612 ; 6 Cox, C. C. 101 ; 22 L. .1. M. C. 17Jiir. 4.^ 89, 1109, 1141 HawcH(18l7), 1 Di'ii. C. C. 270 1170 HawkiiiH(1808), 10 KiiHt, 211 ; 2 Dow, 124 ; 14 R. R. 129 10.5 Hiiworth (1830), 4 C. & V. 2.54 289, 318, 319, .')83 ' "" 98 Hay (1800), 2 F. & F Hay, Dr., Staiiwix'n HaycM(1838), 2 M. & Ha>nfH( 181.5), 4 M. Havwanl (1833), G (; Hayward(lH4fl), 2C Ha/oll (1810), 13 Ea.. Hazv(182(i),2(;. & I Healoy (1824), 1 Mooi Hearii (1841), C. & M H.-arno (1830), 4 C. * Heath (1744), 18 Hoi Heliden (1738), Aiulr lle<lue.s (1707), 28 H< H.H'Mom (1878). 14 C. Helling (I7I'> 10), 1 eil«o(1767), 1 AV. c Rob. 166 Bl. 040.. 17 27 & S. 214 2(1 . & P. 157 4fi . & Kir. 234 ; 1 I tun. C. C. IGO . . . OC »t, 1 4 1 i; P 4.58 203 27 ..Iv. C. C. 1 larHli. 109 V: P. 215 • • • ■ •>•*•*• 2( .....503, 508, .57 5( w. At. Tr. 123 8i . 389 88, 1 1 1 iw. St. Tr. 13(i7 9'. i.\, C. C. 14, 40 . 237, 3; Str. 8 131, l: u 78 02 14 24 32 12 Henderwm (1841), 2 M<io. C. C. 192 1 120 JIunilon (undated), eittsl arguendo, 9 C. & P. 2.5.5 438 " ~ 230 986 HouwcmmI (1870), 1 1 Cox, C. C. 626 ; 22 L. T. 486 HerefordHliirn, J,J., Ex parte HuniiihreyM (186"), 19 L. J. M. C. 189; ,. M. & P. ,323 Jlerrington (1804), 3 Now R. 4(58 11.59 HerHtinoncouux (1827), 7 C. * B. 6.56 081 H.!WPtt(1842), C. & MarHh. 634 563, 606, 667 Heyd Hi.^kling (1845), 7 Q. B. 880; 16 L. J. M. C. 23 Hioknmn (1784), 2 Eiutt, P. C. 593 (1841), 9 C. & P. 780 196 (1762), 1 W. HI. 361 ..... .^ 997 ,1100, 1103, 1108 202 601 683 IIitfginM(1829). 2 C. & P. 003 Higlifli>ld (1828), nitod 3 Ruhh. 0. & M. 479 HigHon (1849), 2 C. & K. 769 677 Vol. J. md* with pag* «W». mi clviii TABLE OP CASES CITED. \h PAOB B. V. Hill (1838), 8C. 4 r. 276 80 R. (. Hill (18ftl), 2 Den. C. C. 254; 20 L. J, M. C. 222 26. 896 R. I'. HillHiii (1H72), 12 Cox, C. C. 174 683, DOrt R. V. Iliucklcy (IHIO), 12 Kwit, 3«1 130 R. r. liiiioklcy (IH(i3), 32 L. J. M. C. 168; 3 B. & S. HHr) ; 8 L. T. 270; II W. R. 0«3; d.hir. N. S. 10.54 306 R. r. Himl (1H()(I). 29 L. J. M. C. 147; 8 Cox, C. C. 300 4(<6 R. V. lliiiluy (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 524 238 R. f. Ilinxman (1701), citwl 1 Leufih, C. C. 310, 311, n 670 R. I. Hinit (182H), 1 Low. C. C. 40 676, 680 R. r. Hod^^o (1838), 2 Lowiii, C. C. 227 68 R. V. HoiljykiHs (1830), 7 C. & P. 208 260, 042 R r. HodKion (1812), R. & R. 211 257, 951, 907 R. r. HddgHoii (1831), 1 Lcwin. 236 217 R. f. HoKK (1833), OC. & r. 176 329 R. <•. n«w(IH*l). 2 M. & Kob. 380 216 K. V. Holbrook (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 60 ; 4 Q. B. D. 42 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 650 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 1H,5; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; 37 L. T. 530 ; 30 L. T. 530 ; 26 W. U. 144 ; 27 \V. R. 313 107, 687 R. r. Holilen (1838), 8 C. & P. 609 913, 958 R. r. HoU (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 675 ; 80 L. J. Q. B. 763 ; 45 L. T. 69 ; 46 J. P. 53 962 R. i: IIoUinKbcrry (1825), 4 B. & C. S'.'O ; 6 Dowl. & R. 346 203 R. I. Ilollond (17!»4). 6 T. R. 607 ; 2 R. R. 078 208 R c. HoliiieH ( 1S43), 1 C. & Kir. 248 572 R. c. Holmes (IS(il), 2 F. &F. 788 897 R. V. Holmt-H iiud FurncHH (1871), 41 L. J. M. C. 12 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 137 : L. R. IC. C. 334 257, 950, 961, 967 R. c. Holt (1703), 5T. R. 430 15, 20, 1093 R. V. Holt (1830), 7 C. & P. 518 81 R. r. Holt (1800), 30 L. J. M. C. 11 ; B.ll, C. C. 280; 8 Cox, C. C. 411 ; 6 Jur. N. 8. 1121 ; 3 L. T. 310 ; 9 W. K. 74 247 R. r. Holy Trinity, Hull (1827), 7 B. & C. Oil ; 1 M. & R. 444 288 R. r. Hood (1S30), 1 Moo. C. (;. 281 888 R. r. HiK)k {18.')7) Deiiw. & Bull, 600 ; 8 (.'ox. C. C. 6 629 R. V. Hoopor (1812), cited 3 Kiwa. C. ii M. 501) 670 R. r. HopoM (1835), 7 C. & P. 136 : 1 M. & Rob. 396 678 R. I'. Homo (1777), 20 How. St. Tr. 6(il 274, 275, 276 R. r. Home Tooke (1794), 25 How. St. Tr. 120 526, 923, 1220 R. f. HoHtmon of NewciiHtle (1744-5), 2 Str. 1223 1»94, 997 R. f. HouKh (180ii), R. & R. 122 246 R. V. Houlton (1823), 1 Jebb, C. C. 24 8S9, 892 R. V. Howard (1832), I M. & Rob. 187 147 R. r. Howell (ISI.'i), 1 C. & K. 080; 1 Den. C. C. 1 468 R. f. Howes (1834), 6 C. & P. 404 5(i7 R. r. Hubbard (1881), 14 Cox. C. C. 506 408 R. r. Hu(!ks (1810), 1 Stark. N. P. R. 823 25. 5i) R. r. Huot (1798), 2 Lea. 821 579 R. I'. HujrJios (1813), 2 Lew. C. C. 229; 1 Rush. C. & M. 147 165 R. V. Hujfhes(1832), 6 C. & P. 126 213 R. I'. Hujjrhes(18.t9), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 13 1018 It. r. HuKlies(1814), 1 C. & K. 510 015 ]i V. Hughes (1800), 29 L. J. AL C. 71 239 R. r. Huluott (1790), 6T. R. 583 132, 1137 R. r. Hull (1800), 2F. &F. 10 78 R. ( . Hulmo (1870), L. T,. 5 Q. B. 377 ; 39 L. J. Q B. 149 962 R. f. Humphries (1829), cited 3 Rus«. C. & M. 344 318 R. r. Hunt (1811), 2 Camp. 583; 31 How. St. 'IV. 408 203 R. V. Hunt (1820), 3 B. A: Aid. 560 248, 296, 383 R. r. Hunt (1825). 1 Moo. C. C. 93 80 R. V. Hunt (1881), 6 Q. B. D. .".OO ; 60 L. J. M. C. 35 1140 R. r. Hunter (1829), 3 C. & P. 691 698 The references are to paget, not to paragraph*. TABLE OF CASES CITED. clix r.'.oB R. ». Huiitlev (1860), 29 L. J. M. C. 70 ; IM\, C. C. 238 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 260: 1 L. i!. 38J ; 8 W. R. is;»; 6 Jur. N. S. 80 1127 R. f. Hurley (ISD), 2 M. & R<»b. 473 278 R, V. Hut.-hin« (1880), ft Q. n. D. .l.Vt ; 6 Q. B. D. 300 ; 4!) L. J M. C. 64; 42 L. T. 760; 28 W. R. flu:) 8a, I07;(, 1131, 1140 R. r. niiKhiiiHon (1822), 2 B. & C. 008, n 46') R. V. Hy(ln(l8l8), ;iCox, C. C. 00 3;i5 R. V. lughHin (Ih64), fl B. & S. 257 : 3:j L. .1. W- B. 183; Cox, C. C. 608 : 10 Jur. N. S. 908 ; 10 L. T. i.W> ; 12 VV. U. 703 210, 213 R. ». InKrani (170.')), I Siilk. 384 16.') R. r. Iiit^H (18.>0), 33 Uiivf. St. Tr. 7")7 310 R. r. Mo of Ely (18:)0;, 15 Q. B. 827 ; 4 New Sohh. Cm. 222; 19 L. J. M. C. 223 ; U Jur. 056 17 R. r. .THckmrn (1842), oittnl 3 Ruh.h. C. & M. 404 20.5 R. V. .Tu(^km)ii (18.-)ij), 6 Cox, C. C. 625 8S3 R. f. .Ia<!ob* (1781), 1 Lt'ti. 309 283, .')7'J R. V. JiiKK'T (l"i'7), nited 3 Ruhh. C. & M. 625 803 K. V. JaiiifH (1823), cited 1 C. & P. 86 <JJ7 R. r. .Jiirralil (1«6:»), L. & C. 301 ; Cox, C. C. 307 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 258 ; 9 Jur. N. 8. 629; 8 L. T. 515; 11 \V. R. 787 209 R. r. JarviH (1756), 1 EaHt, 644. n 2<>3 R. V. JarviM (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 40 81, (i;{3, 636 K. r. JarviH (1855), 25 L. J. M. C. 30 ; Dears. C. C. 652 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 532 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 1114 121 R. V. JarvJM (18671, L. R. 1 C. C. 06 572 R. V. .I<tfrifH(l722), 1 Str. 446 20, 1(106 R. V. J.'licote (1810), 2 Stark. R. 483 576 R. V. Jflljnmu (18;!8), 8C. & 1'. 001 8!t3 R. r. JeiikiiiH (1822), R. & R. 492 563, 586 B. V. Jenkins (1869), L. R. 1 C. C. 187 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 82 ; 11 Cox, C. C. 250 468 R. r. JonningH (1858), DoarH. & B. C. C. 447 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 397 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 146 205, 1129 R. r. JevcH (1835), 3 A. & E. 416 821, li22, 824 R. f. John (1790), 1 EiiMt, r. C. 357 467 R. ». JohnHon (1805), 7 Eart, 65; 3 Smith, 91; 29 How. St. Tr. 103; 8 R. R. 597, and Profaeo viii 154, 302 R.r.. Johnson (1827), 1 Moo. C. C. 173 824 R. V. John(tou(l820), 2 C. & K. 3.55 57'J R. f. .Iohn»..>n(1840), 2 C. & K. 394 335, 374 R. r. JohnHon (1847), 2 C. & K. 355 336, 578 R. V. JohuHtou (1864), 16 Ir. C. L. R. 60 .WJ R. D. .Tohnntono (1793), 2 Eu»t, P. C. 786 202 R. r. Jolitre(1791), 4 T. R. 290; 2 R. R. 383 321, ;i5.3, 351 R. p. JoneH (1774), 1 L»'a. 174 151, 1209 R. r. Jones (1791), Pea. R. 38 3.54 R. r. Jones (1896), 8 East, 31, 451 ; 9 R. R. 368 342 R. V. Jones (1809), 2 Camp. 131 ; 11 Rev. R. 680 15, 18, 67, 147, 237, .085, 633 R. V. Jones (1809), R. & R 1.52 663, 571 R. V. Jones (1827), 2 C. & P. 629 561 R. V. JoncM (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 61 1 203 R. V. Jones (18;U), 7 C. & P. 167 826, 820 R. r. Jones (1840). 9 C. & P. 260 81, 822 R. V. .'ones (1846), 1 Den. C. C. 166 ; 2 C. & K. 234 , 604 R. t' Jones (1868^ 11 Cox, C. C. 358 106 R. . Jones (1872), 12 Cox, C C. 211 572 r . V. Jones (18S3), 52 L. J. M. C. 96 ; 15 Cox, C. C. 281 106, 172 A. V. Jones (1887), 14 Cox, C. C. 3 247 R. V. .Tordttn (18;>8), 9 C. & P. 118 99, 273, 274 R. V. Kaiu (1883), 15 Cox, C. C. 388 274 B. u. Kea( 1809), 11 East, 132; 10 R. R. 448 . 621 Vol. .1. *nd* with piu/c Oafi. n clx TAHI.K or CASKS CITKD. R. I'. Koul.'y (IS,')1), 2 Di-ii. 08 ; T. & M. 406 ; 5 Cox, C. C. 193 ; 20 L. J. M. C. /)7 ; i:* .lur. no R. t'. K.-lly (lH.!;'i), I M<M). C. C. lia; I Low. C. C. iu:i R. "" R. PAoa 202 213 . K.aH4"y (\h:U), 1 I)..wl. 4H1 824 ilh (I7«H). 2T. U. Mill 1103 ill R. r. K-iiilw..nli (IH4,')), '.' S.^hw. Cum. 72 ; 7 <i. H. tW2 ; 14 L. J. A. C. 100 ; 9 Jiir. Slis R. r. Kenny (1H77). Mi I,. J. M. C. ISO; 13 Co(, C. C. M97 ; 2Q. H. I). 307; 30 li. T. :tti; 'Jfi W. K. (i7!». 304 105 R. V. J.T. of Ki lit (1H73), I.. R. 8 Q. B. 30/) ; 42 L. J. M. C. 112 726 R. r. Ktnif (lfi7!i'. 7 How. St. Tr. 714 f;18 R. r. K.rr (1H37).'8(!. Hi V. 17(i /iiiO R. ». Kicl.lv nH2l), 4 I). * H. 734 33.5 R. .. Killniiim».T(lN3;i). 7 «'. & P. 228 78 R. r. KinilKT (INI'.t), 3 Cox, (!. C. 223 ,'.77 R. r. Kiuit (17HH), 2 T. 11. 23;) <.i'i7, IC'.d, l<iA4 R. r. KiiiKliikf (l«7il\ 11 <'ox. (-. ('. 4^19 !i(l!) R. r. KiiiK-il'Tc (IHI3). 3 Q. M. 388 : 13 L. ,!. M. C 3 c. \ I), i; 1139 R. r. KitiK"!"". Diirli. of (177<i), 20 How. St. 'IV. .'.:iH, n. ; 1 Smitli's I,. C. 812 1103, 1104. Ulli, 1131. Il:i2. 1133 Kiii>fNt<m ( 1K::!(i, 4 < '. * 1'. 387 .'i<i3. .'.(14, R. R. V. KinHTMlon (ISiKi', H KiiHt, 41 ; !t H. I!. 373. |{. r. Kiiilo.li, Sir A. Cor.!..!! (179.). JA II. .w. St. Tr. 937 U. r. Kiiil.Kh (174(1). 18 II. .w. St. IV. 492 il 2:17 923 8!»7 R. I. Kiiiwv (I83.i). 7 r. .V I'. 447 K.'9 R. I'. KitHon"(1832.Mli.ml.lU'18.'>3).22li..J.M.C. 118; I (.iirHCC. 187. .•-'9(1,314,318 R. r. Kiii.|.t..ft ilH.'l). 2 H. * «' 883 1131 R. r. Kliill (I822K .'> ». \- * 1.1. 929, 9.19. 11 (129 R r. KhiillvM (1(191). I l,.l. lluviii. 10, l.'i IH (1837). (1 A. .V K. 198 104ft U. .J). i9 , It. t . Liiiiiiloii (1799), 8 T. K. 379 IM R. V. LiilliiiH-nt (IS.-.;)), (i C.x. C. C. 294 198 f.79 .'.76 R. •>. IminlM'tli (1N4.'.). .'. «^ H. .')13 727 R. «•. Imn.iiHliirc (isct), 3 (^ M. 3(17; 12 I,. .J. M. C. 70; 2 (J. & U. 714.. 11.J9 ]{. «'. Tiiin.liilpli (18.111. 1 M. & K..I.. 393 Ill R. I. I,iiinlH- (17h4^. 2 L. R. V. I,imil.<' (1791). 2 I..'i.. fi.Vi R. r. Liinjfl.ri.lK" ("*''•'). ' "'■"• ^l** 1 -' <'• * K. 97.'. ; T. * M 140 ; 3 Cox, C. <;. 40.-. . 3 N<»w S.'HH. CiiN. M.)-, )8 I,, .r. M. C. 198; 13.riir. .'i4.'».... R. r. Imiijrini'iul (1804), I,. \- C 427 ; 9 ('(.•i, (.'. I'. 4(14 ; 19 I^. T. 3,'»0 .. K. r. Iiiin){ti>ii (1877), 2 (j. K. 1). 2UU ; 40 L. J. M. C. 130; 36 L. T. 627; 3.3,5 120 13 (• ('. ('. 349 1,'>9, 294, 926 R. f. Liirkin (is.-.i), (1 «'.,x. <". i\ 377 ; Doarn. C. (^ 306; 2 C. L. R. 776; !3 I. M. r. ]•. is .Il .39 R. f. LuiikIkt ( 1 8 10), 2 C. .V K . 226 R. r. liiiv.'v (IS.-.(I), 3 C. .V K. 2(1 R. r. Liiviii (1813), Ir. i'W. I{. 813 R. f. LiiViT (1722). !'l How St. Tr. 214 68(1, 020. 907, 971 R. r. IrfMttl.iiii isdl ), 3 K. \ Iv (i'lS it(i2, 90U 108 .603, 672 ... 17 .f(19, 918 R. r. Ii<M|I.Ht.r I8,-.(I), 3 (;. * K. 108 R. ('. I.if (17(1)1). .'IiihI 3 UiiNN. ('. \' M. R. V. !..•<' (»838i, 2 l,<w. C. ('. 164 327 02a 960 R. I'. Ii<i' (18(14), 4 K .V F. 03 320, 330, 337 R. f. Immh1m(1H47 , »<i H 910 1140 R. r I,ei.'.'Mt.T .1,1. (18.',-.), 4 l«. k C. 892 992, 993 R. I'. \a-\u\\ (18»(l). 10 A. * K. 398 ,307, 404, 400, I10» . 728 . 204 R. I'. Iw>..MiinN|<>r 1 1816), 6 (j. II. 040 ; 13 I,. .1. M. ('. 6( R. p. I.i>oniir.l (IsiHi, I H.'ii. 394 ; 3 Vox, C. C. 284; 2 (V & K. A14 R. r. Ii«.vy (1819 , 2 Si.irk. H. 468 210, 237, 238 R. I'. I,nvv (1868;, 8 C.x, C. C. 73 R. V. I/«.wcn (IHtO), 2 I^-w C. a. 101 R. t. I. 1071 824 (18(121, 4 Kh|.. 226; 2 T. R. 017 947, 90? U. r. IiOwiii(183:t), U C. ii P. 101 KI, ,'.H2, 683 Th» rtjeirnefi art to pagt*, not to pai ayrapht. TABLE OP CASES CITED. clxi H. V. H. V. K. r. R. . . R. r. R. r. R. r. R. «•. It. r. R. r. R. . . R. r. II. r. R. r. R. r. 2;« K. .'. R. f . R, I . R. (. R. I . R. r • ••• •••#•) rpwfd (1S40), Arch. Cr. PI. Ml LcwiH (IHiT). Di'iirn. & H. .TJO l.i>rlitf<M.t (IS,-)til, (i E. & H. HJ'J ; 'ifl L. J. M. ('. II.-) . I.illf.sliiill (lKi.->), 7 «i. R. 1''>H; 14 L. J. M. (". !t7 ... MliKiil"' (IKl.'i). 1 I'll- Kv ■♦"* Liltl.' (17')S). 1 HiiiT. (ii:< I,iv.i| 1, Mayor i.f {l7(iS). •» Hiirr. TIH Uiiiifa.ihlv (IH.iU). J E. iV n. iiio l,luiiKiiiiii"r(lH:tlj. •! II. A: Atl. (iiti r.liivd MS;i(i), I ('. A: 1'. •2.i:i EidVa i is.ti). (i V. \- r. :!'.•;( Eurkliiiil (17H.')). 1 l..'a. t". C. -Mi; Enllry INIJ , U. \ li. •.•;)7 ; 1;'> l{. R. 7M7 EoikI. \ Ni ilh-W.M. Uv. i\>. {1«V|), ••! E. \- n. ii;i. I .1. \ SI. Ktiili. Doikt'o. (1H7I), i\ I.. .1. (^ H I ; W. I{. l.iC. Loiiil. A: Sdiitli ('..iiht lly. Co. (IH.'.l), '20 L. ,1. M C ,821 .■)SS ; ;ii L. T. II.'. ; I'. (^ iV. I'AdK •JIti , H'2i SSI ii;h .'id 7 i:il !i:t7 •.iH> 7:1.'. •I Hi) .'i(l8 iiH.'i lit:; 10(11 R R. R. K. R. R. R. R. R. R R. U. H. H. R K. n. n. R. R It. It. R. R R K R. It. R. R R R. R. 708 I'. I'. r. V. r, r. c. r. 101 r. I' \ I . ('. I,onK (l.f:i:n, c. c. & P. 17'.> '.'.•17, fiW) L.PI.K Hiiikl.y (I80.V, 7 EiiM, l.'> ; 3 Smilh, 'J2 ; H R. R. ft'.i.'i i;tl, \M I Ill (1S'J7), 1 Moo. «'. (". HiO L'l 1 Eoiiiflniiii (18;t!i), 1 Cniwr. & I). C. C. 7!t 87:! Low«nl8;<.t), l.j Cox, (.'. (". J8C. ; .')2 L. J. M. V. IJ.'; IS L. T. 1 008 Lowir ll.vford (IS 101, .itinl •> Stiiilh L. C. :w:\ CtH l.illilH'iiliiim (18:i|i. .) II. .V All. IMiH 1170 EilfiiM J.S118). 10 Eioil, L'lf.'i ; 10 It. I{. ■>X.\ llll.'i, OiH l.uikliurj.1 (I8.'..n. 1 DntrM. «'. C. Jl.) ; '.'.1 h. .1. M. <". 18 '.(;;t, ,'.(i^*, o71 Lullc (1807). 8 EiiHt , 'JOJ ; il It. |{. lili; ; I'r.fi vii 1.'., 101, ('.•Jl.O'Ji I.imilrv (IHCii), L. U. 1 C. C. I'.MI; ;i8 I.. .1. M. C. 80; It Cox.C. ('. ; JO li. T. I.'il ; 17 W. It. (.s.-i 10(1, 170 Liimiy (IS.ti), C.ix, «". (' ^77 ;I7.'> I-vc.ii ,1824), Rv. A: M. I'>l Joit M'AiiiiiKv (1811). Ir. Cir It. '.'70 •.'Hi MiHcKhfi..).! (17-'.">). 1(1 How. .S|. Tr. ]i:>>, \M)\ '.100 Mii<il..-.li.l<l (18101, 1:M^ li. S81 II III Mill, iofirld. I..i. (I7.'.'.i, Id lli.w. St. Tr lUd 1010 M'CiittVrty (l.S(id-71. I. It. I ('. I,. ;td3 .w.'. M'lNmkfv (1811). Ir. (ir. R. 77 2i:i M"«'ur liH'M), .l..|)I., r. i\ I'.'O 1117 M'Ciiliiv (I8:i8). '.' McH. (;. C. .11 ; •_> U'\^. ('.(". •J7i '.'I I M'DoMiii.l I'.sil. ,\iiii. M. «r (). ir.' 1018 M'tiovcrii (I8.VJ . .'i ('o\. C. <'. .'lOd .>:<.> MailirM jl8<!ii, H (^ II. 71 ; 18 E. ,1. M. C. 21:1 llio, ll.V.i, II do M'lliijfli (IH.>7). 7 Cox, C (;. 18.1 .'.82 Mil.kav (I81I8). 11 i'ox, r. ('. 118 4118 MiKrnim (1812). Ir. Tir. It. IK! 202, :i82 Ma. pliciwiu n8d!i), HO I,. J. r. C. ,')» ; E. It. .1 V. C. 2dH ; 2:i L. T. ; 18 \y. R, i(i.->:i 'jo;! M'I'Ihtm.ii (18..7). Jd E. .1. M. C. l.'U ; Di-arn. & H. 1'.I7 20« .MaKlll (I 70'.'). filnl MrNallv. Ev. 118 ,'idU Majrill ilsiJ), Ir. Cir. II. lis oaft Miiiii»ariii>{ ^18.■|71, 2(1 E. .1. M. C. 10; 10 Cox, C. C. 102; l>rani. I. 1.12 ; 2 .Iiir. N. S. 12:1(1 120. 2'.»fl, 10.'i:i, lo.'.d Maiiiw.irlii;^ {1S.'.8), E. H. k K. 474 ; 27 E. J. M. C. 27S 78 ^I.ili.ll (18.10), (•iti.<l .) K11.N. C. & M. 402 .'.7(1 Mallorv (18811, i:i li II l> .1.1 ; .'.,( E. .1. M. C. 134 ; 60 L. T. 4'20 ; W. It. 721 ; 48.;. I'. |s7 ; 1.. (\.x. C. (5. 4Ad 41)8 MiiiiiiiiiK (ISIO), 2 t;. \ K. 887, Ol'l Idft MniiNltciil (IH4I), 1 Q. It. 444 ; Mi. & I). 7 I A Jur. .'lO.'i ... 101, KKt, 4'2'2, 621 MuhhHcKI (1881), U Cox, 639 671 ^! ^ "I'n r*/. /. tHiU uitk ptk/gt (J35. IN Clxii TABLE 01? CASES CITED. R. t'. Mariqiiite 4 Now Granada Miniiifr ('o. (18.58), 28 L. J. Q. n. 07 ; 1 KI. iV Kl. W\) ; 6 Jur. N. H. 72? 1001 H. r. Martcy ( 1H4',!), oit,<-<l '> Riikm. C. & M. 289 2;i3 K. «•. Marwk'ii (182!)), M. & M i:i'J 27ft R. V. MarHli (18;»7). « A. & K. TMi ; I N. & P. 187; 2 H. & W. U(18 ...Olfl, (117 R. r. M-.rMlmll (1841), C. & M.irHti. 147 .TiO R. v. M.irliii (I8(ii»). 2 ("uin|>. HHI ; 11 R. R. (174 UiM. 1174 R. c. Miirtin (IH.12), r> C. ti V. 128 2 CI, 257 R. r. Miirliii (I8:M), (1 (; & I' :i(i2 O.IO R. r. Maniii (IHhit). L. li. 1 (!. (.". 214 ; 11 Cnx. C. i'. M4:! 261 R. I'. Martin (1872), L. R. 1 ('. C. ;)78 ; r.'C.x, (;.(;. 204; 41 I,. J. M.C. 1 1 ;t 365 R. f. Miisliit.r (I8:»7), fi A. & K. 15;i; I N. \- I'. .114 763 R. r. Mullirws (17!):t), fi T. U. 1(12 20;j R. (. May (INHO), 4i) L. .1. M. C (17; !> il. H. 1). :m2 lldO R I. Muyh.w (18:14), V>('. .V V. Ml;") (127 R. I. Miiziii/c.nt (l81o), R. it R. 2'.»1 80 R. I . Mfa<l (1 7.')S), 1 Hurr. .'142 8!i:j U r. M.'ikI (1824). 2 H. & C. (.(18; 4 Dowl. iV K. 120 40/) R. I. M.Mllrv (I8;M), (K;. & P. 2!>2 107 R. f. M.^-.nn(lS40). •) C. tc V. 420 :J7/), 4(18 R. (. Mnvrrnii (18ISj,2 Stnrk. U. :i(lii r>8;{ R. I. M.ivli, TiiilorH' Co. (18 Ml, 2 H. At Ail. 128 !t!M, DIM, ilil.i ]{. r. .Mirll.vr'ri.lvil fl8:i0). 1 1«. * A»l. 20 285 R. r. Micl.Il.tiurM '17.'>7), i Fliirr. 4(10 20.1 R. r. Mi.l.li.^rx (is.-.(r, 1 L. M. it I'. (121 727 R. r. Mnl.ll.w.x .1.1. , Uv HowniJiii (IHIII), .-i H. \- Ail. lli;i '.»s8 R. I. Mi.llarii (I7(l.'>), .'I Hurr. 1720 iMt2 R. - , .Millanl (IHl.t). |{. \- It. 24.1 24(1. 247 R. 1. Mill.T (1772), 2 W. HI. 707 14 R. r. .Mill.T (i8,'i0), 4 (;ox,(V ('. 1(1(1 ;m\ R. r. .Mill.r '18TU), 14 Cox, C. C. :t.'>(l 1120 R. r. MilU(18.i:)), (;<;. \ v. nil .'.(i:!, ri7l R. . . MiliK' (uiiclii(<'<l). I'itisl 2 It \: Aid. (lOU, li. (>i) OoO R. r. MiliHH (ISdO), 2 K ..V F. 10 1014 R. I. .Milioii (I84:i), 1 C \ K. M 40.1 R. r. .Minion (178:i), 2 KmhI, P. C. 1021 202, 4(18 R. .. Mi(.h.!l (1818). 2 Siuik. Kv. :io7, n. (c) 148 1{. .. .Mi(.li,.ll (I.S.'iJ), 2 !>.ii. 4(iM ; :iC. .V K. 181 ; 21 \...1 M. C. i;!.'). .20(1, 112!» R. . . .Mii.li.'ll, (1802) 17 Cox, (!. C. Ao.'i (./,/, f.i:!.'.). :i;»9, 4(i.'», 4ii«, r.2:i R. . . Mo.kfor.1 (18)18), 1 1 Cox, C. C. 1(1 ; 17 I-. T. .•.s2 ; Hi \V. It. .•»7.') . . 121 R. r. Miiutt (18.10), 4 <^ .V I'. :i(ll 248 It. r. Moon- (I8:il), ritcl :i Kuxx. C. A: M. .loit .-.TU It. r. Moor.' (18.i2), :M'. .V K I.', t ; 2 D.n. «!. (!. ,V.'2 ; 21 I,. .». M. C. l!l!». . ft03 R. .. Mo.r.-, (1802) (II Fi. .r. M. C. 80; (1(1 I,. T. 12.'); 40 W. R. :I04; M\ .1, P. ;il.'. ; 17 Cox. (;. C. 4.)8 002, U03 R (. Mo.,r.M I8t(,), 7 (V .V P. 270 ti;U It. .. .McMirn (IHOI), (1 Kiist, 421, 11 20.'i R. .. Mortr.iii (18,-.J), (1 Cox, <V C. 107 204 It. I. M.irk'iin (IHT.'i). 14 Cox, C. C. :i:i7 4(17 R. . Morrif. (17(11), 2 Hnrr. MM!) loi;i It. • Morrii. (1702), 4 T. It .'i^2 l.tl R. I. MorriH (H40), 0(! A: 1'. .147 211 Jt. I . Morris (18(17). .'l') li. .1. M. C. 85 ; L. R. I C. (5. OH 1 12(1. I l.U R. r. Morw (lN,t8), 8 C. .V P. (10.') fi78 R. r.' MorlliM'k (1S|.-)), 7 U. M. 4.)0 ; 2 N.-w H.HH.Cai.. 108 ; 14 I.. J. M. C. l,').l : .lur. (121 M' R. <. Morton (IHl.'i), I M. .V' S.'l. 48 110.1 R. r. Morion (I8»;i), 2 M. .V Hot). ftU 6(13, 672 R. .. Mowy ("7Mi. I I.<'a. 2ii.'>, n 68,1 R. .. MoHJ.'y (IS2.)), 1 M.M.. C. (;. 07 21 M, KIT, 4(18 R r. .MotlnT».ll (1707), I .Sir. 0:i I0.)0, 117.5 R. r. Mii.lio (In:II), I M. & lioli. ViH (12*i Tht rrffiturf are lu piiyrn, uol In juinijfriifi/i$. TAHI.K or CASKS CirKD. clx 111 1*4 UH R. I-. MuiihIow (IH!).')), l.'i R. (Mar.) '.Wi ; {180A) 1 Q. B. IM ; 72 L.T. 301 ; 4H W. It. 4!'.') yIM [Hl>] It. I'. MiiiliH (IHi'it). M. & M. .'il.') iHl H. I. .Muri.liv (17.W), ItUow. St. 'IV "'.J I !174 U. «. Miiipli'v (iH:t;), HC. \ 1'. ;tio IIH. :<h;i, 384, 'J17, IC'l, 12-.'(> U. •'. Mnr)>liy (1«11), 1 Arm. M. \- O. Jod 4ti><, !H.'. 11. (. Miirphv (1»''»). '•'» •'• •'• <- !*• •''•* •'-' H. t. Miirphv (IH7.'>), 13 i'«x, (". C. JUS HO II. C. MllKrnt (1713), 10 Mo.1. 1!I4 «'J7 It. r MiiwM.ii (IH.'iN), ii7 li. J. M. C. 100; 8 K. ti H. !I00; 4 Jiir. N. !*. Ill Wi It. r. MmIoii (IS(iO), 2 K. & E. fift"; 29 L. J. M. C. 10!) 3'.tl, 410 It. »• Nai>i»r (1><24), 1 Moo. (!. C. 44 •.'0<» It. >• N.iil (IHiA). 7 ('. .V: 1'. 1<!8 (,;t.-, U. r. N.lli.r llalliim (IH.'>I), C.x. C. C. 435 1141 1{. r. N.tli.rtlioi.jf (IHI3), 2 M. & St-l. 337 87. 432 K. r. N. villi' il7'.M), IVii. It. 01 ftlO, fi.Vi U. r. N.vill.' (IH.Vi), <i Cox, 0. O. CO 1118 U. .. Nrwliniilt (18721, 41 L. J. M. <;. 03; L. It. 1 ('. C 344 ; 2:> h T. NN3; W \V It. 3^3; 12 Cox, (t. C. 148 217 ]{. c. N.wiiiim (|H'.!J, hIioiiIiI Ihi 1853), 1 K. & H. JiiS ; :» C. Jt Kir. 2.')2 ; 22 L. .1. ^^ H. li'xl />87 It. .. N.HiMiiii (18.VJ), J I>..|i. 300; 3 C. & K. 2«0 .•>.!;{, 018, 1034 It. r. N. wt.Hi (181,)), 2 M. A: l{ol>. i'i03 joa It. r. N.wloii {\Hi\\ I C. \ K. ifii) 117 It. I. N. wtoii ^I8.v.t), 1 V. \ F. liu ;i;i.-, It. r Ni.liola-. (I.Slii), 2 C. .V K. 24(1 3t.7, 8!iH It. r. NiilinllH (I8,IN), I F. A: I-'. M 217 It. c. Nic'oliiH (is^rj), Cox, ('. C. \>\ 4(iH It. I'. NiMM'it (IS,">.l), 1) Cox, (' i'. 3J0 :'i(i 11. r. Noiik.'M ( I8;i.!), ;• ( '. \- I'. II.'C. !,;»,'> It. V. Ndilliltiich aiitlWiliii'v |{..ml«TniHt«MH(|H14V 3 A.* K.477; A N. A: M. 314 .' !t!i« U. f. Noitli I'.Unrfon (I82(i), fi II. * C. /)08 ; 8 I). A: H. 32.'i 1170 It. c. Nortli Kcillmrii (1784), Calil. 4')2 ,lo.( n. f. Norton (isj:!), It. \ It. .'iio vio It . . Noiwiili Koiul TriiHtr.'H (l,^3G), 6 A. & K. r.(!3 ; 1 N. & V. ;f2 ; 2 II. Ac \V. :iK.-. 1 1;{7 It. r. NiimKaiii Cniirliicy (1801), 1 Ka»l, 373 . ;t(,S It. r. Nut.' (IS42). 3 ItiiHH. <;. A: M. I.'.H ; (i IM.th, Al>r. 82 ,',07 It. r. O'C.ijfly (I7'.i8), JC. II. iw. St. Tr. I,l.')l IMi? It. r. O'Coiimll (1843-4), Arm. A- T. 103 200. W't, :ih;|. 384, )IU It. ». Oil.lv (I8.'-|1), 2 D.ii. 204 ; T. A:. M. 6'J3 ; /) Cox, C. C. 210, 20 I,.. I. M. (.' liiH; I'l.liir. fil7 247 It. r. (t'Uoiiiii-ll (IH.I,-;), 7 C. * I*. 138 h:\t It. )•. (I'D ii'll il.S,')T), 7 C..X, (!. C. 337 883 |{. c. Olixir (l.'siiO), I l«4'll. 218, H Cnx, C. <'. .181 ; .30 I,. .1. M. C. li ; .lur. N. S. IJ14 , 3 I,. I". 311 ; W. It. (10 20rt U. I. «)lmv. (1813), I M. A S,l. 3S7 7V» It. r Oiiiaiit (I8.ll). Cox, C. C 4110 ;i (2 11. .. (fN.ill (1871), I. U.(\l'. I.. 1 '.'10 It. r. OiiMnw a:i<l Vviiallcv (is7;i). 12 Cox, C. V. 3,'.N H73 It. r. Onlianl ^1838), 8 c'. \ I'. .11..1 'ilM, !i4:» It. .. O'ltrilly (18:12), Ir. Cir. It. T18 ,'.70 It. r. (MM.riii- (1837), 8 C. A I', ll.'l XM\ K. 1. ONlM.riii' (1812), C. A: .Mi.r-li. (l.M ;i;/i It. r. Ommiiii (I8SI), |,j i;,i)i, C. C. I n,n U. r. Otway (1810), 1 Ir. C. I.. It 00 -JOH H. I. (hiltoii (lH:ir.», A II. A A.I. o.>8; ,1 N. A M. OV; ,1 I,. .1. M. C. ;i:i .. |i,H It. r. Omil (17.Vi). 18 ll.iw. St. Tr. 1223. 1227 45 If. I'. Owiii (I8.C.), I M.HI. C. C 118 •.•Oil It r. (Iwiii (IKilo,, 4 (;. A: I'. 230 |r,| It. r. Owni (1840), C. it V. 23H Ami, ,1«i I'ol. 1. '-.uU hi/A yxiyi I!il5, < *t cl XIV TAni.K OV CASKS OJTKD. f» f. '7'- ; A7 L. J. M. C. 40 ; I, .? M. (J. Ift .-.Tit •J«7 •.'h:i lo:it R r. <)w,m (1R8«), iO li. h. I). H'.'it , :i(l W. U. .'■s I,. T, ;h(i; ..'.'.i. 1'. ."isj; i(i Cii., ' (.' •;)); It. .. tt^fnnl IHMii, U. * K. .IHJ , It. r. IJxfiinl (IHlll), !M\ \ I'. /■t2.i U. r. I'a.kiT (IK.'ii). I'it'-a :i KilHH. r .>j M. ftOii .. It. .'. I'lKUtow ilH:f.',, I H. .V A.I. 2<ih; 1 N. <: M. K. r. I'livr.- ( 1 7HS). <; K»|.. hu HI U. f. I'aifi- ( 1 7'.tH), •.' Ki»|.. (Mil, II U. r. I'll!.. (IK-.'ii). 7 I), fc It. f.TH; 'i H. \- ('.•.'.•) I I.ll It. r. I'liiiiK 1 1(1 i.'i), 1 S.ilk. '.'HI ; .') Mo.l. I(l:» .'tXI H. •'. I'liiiif (IHMi), 7 C. \ I'. i;t(i M-'l It. r. I'liiiil.r (INKl), 2 C \ K. ;il!l r.Wi K. r. I'liliiH-r ( IH.-.l!. 5 «'..x, (". ('. r.W ().-)H K. r. I'liiiK-litir ;IH7.M, !•.' C.x. C. C. 177 ..MU, .1,1,1. [.V.MlJ It. r. I'lirkiT (I7H;I), :I Uoutt. iVl !»7(l U. r. I'lifkiT (IH !•.'), C. \- Miirnh. n.»?t (•.•J8, (!:iO It. r. I'lirk.r (IH(ll). I,. \- Ciivf. li: H Ton, C. O. 4(1A :mi It. r. I'iirk<r (IHiiJ), Yi.ik Siiiiiiii.r A«-i/.'«, lH(li aiW It. <•• I'ark.T (IHill), .1:1 I,. .1 M. «'. l.i;. ; I I,. & <". l.'iU : !,('„x. C. V. ilH 7» It. (. rmk.T (l.s7ti). L. It. 1 «'. <". ■-"-'■»; 11 <'<>x, C, C. •J7H; llU L. J. M. C. (i(l ; '.'I I,. T. 7.'l ; IS \V. It. .IVI 3.16 U r. I'.irnilt IHll), 4 V. ii . I'. .'.70 .'.(i:t. A7I It. ! . I'lirry (Ih:17). 1 C ic V H.td TM. iis,'.. 1 1-.'7 U. .'. PiirhoiiH (IHdil), .'lA I,. J, M. C. 1(17 ; I. H. 1 <^ «'. 21 ; Kir.iji, C.C. ■n:i 1071 U, r. I'iutn<lKc (lH:t(li. 7 r. & IV •i.-.I l.'O, .•.71 K r. I'liviH- (IH7J). 41 I.. .1. M. < . (i.'i ; 12 ('..», «'. (! MH ; 1,. U. I C. C. :t4',t . '. KS3 It. I . r.iir.' (iHjo). :i n. it AM. .'.;'.» jm It. . I'.iiriMk flHTo^. I2r..x, r. r. Jl ;i:i| U. .. I'i.(ir.r (I7!ili, IVii. 7.'. 211 Tt I. Pnin .• IHIO). !t C. V V. (KIK H;»3 K. f IVut ( IHimU 2 I^-w. (!.(;. 2MH HIH) n I .r.Miirv (17MI). I i^.M. c. <!. ;»w 11.10 K . . I'..«'l (IHiKi), 2 v. u i' 21 nm, ».•.» It < l'..»fl.r (IKH'l), ft ('. \ p. .VJl 11(10 r.nu^r (1 70:1). N..lai.'i. ll.|., 17(1 1!.10 I'irkiii (IMI(t). 2 M-N. «'. (• I.IO Kl»7 I'.lkiiiM (INKl). lie. & I». ;i1l.'. ; 2 M.M.. V {!. i;i,> 4(18 I'l rruii/Hl.iii.Ht (tKI4), :i W B. 4oo ; :i <}. ft li. .11,'. ; |.l \.. .1 M. C. 7KH, 1 1 .■10 IVrry fumliitnl). «it.Nl Itv. \ M. :t.V2 hnh l'..t.liiTiiii MN.'.d). 7 !•..»,■«•.«•. 711 383 IVipl.. >1H.V.), 24 I,. .1. U U, 1(17 ; » K. ^ H. 737 ; 1 Jar. N. H. Ui IH I'liiliiiN (1H:I7). K«V K I*. 7;i(! 100 l'liilli|M(lH18), It. As H .1(111 202, 283 I'liillli.* (182!t), .il.-.! 3 Itiiw. C. * M. liM .WI» It .. 11 .. It . It .. 17 It. . It. . K .. 11 . It . It . It . It. ( It . it. r u . It . 11 . It . U r (11 n . It r It . It . U ( K. I I iillUiw(l82. , I Lrw. ('.(;. 10.'. 247 n.ill|N.ff • • 2 l)..||. 308 104A I'liilplf I.M.. r. C. 2(13 HO I'irkfor.! ., - ' H;. \ I'. J27 4(1 I'irlnji (IHi M Mow. Ml. Tr. A3fl— .MO, 804 H70 A|, U3B, 1)37 ri.l.lli'liiiiloii 18 12), 3 n. Ac Ad. 4(10 3(i(l I'iki. (1820, 3(!. k V. :>\>H 4(17 l>ikit (1 I'iki-xlcy ; I83!() !M'. & I'. 124 A77, ft80 I'ilkiiiiftoii (1844), A g. I). lillU; I Niiw Hmm Vn». DO; 13 h. J. M. U. . H .Iiir. Wl IAS l'U.h.<r!l817), I (!. * r. 8,'J 1)47 hlt«(l8.1!M, 8(5. A I'. 771 'Hi I'Ihi.i ! 18.1(1), 7('. * V. M,'>\ \ MiM.. 0. 0. »77 ll'iT rium.T 1H14), U. A II 2(14 IA4 riiiiiiiiirr (18141, \r. k K (104 ; 8 Jiir 021 334 I'lyiK.iilli, ko. Ily. I'o. (IN8U), 37 W. It. 334 9IA n« tt/tirntM art ta p«f**, mtt h paru^mfik*. '';%,■■' TAin.K OF CAEEH CITKD. R. R. R. H. it. R. R. R. R. R. R. R. R R. |{ R. R. K. R. K. R R. R. R R. R. R R. R. R R R R R. R R. R R R R R. R R R It R R R R. R R R R R. R. R R R R rollnH (18W. RC. * V. flA3 cIav PAax I (I A iliv (IHin. 'I (^ M. 1 1 . 1 Gulf & I). 71:) )> ''ur (112 !',iH«Y ^l(^J'.l). 7 l". * 5". <;■■•". n. l'..iiiiinrv(IH:ni!. 7 <•. .v r. :to-' . . . JVC . . ...w .All., Mi Pi.viy nW.'i), '.'l' I-. .1. M. «;. lit ; 1).>».-H. O. T. ;»U ; 17 Jiir. 120.. 7. U.>... O"; l'( I'owi IS,'))) K. \ l«. a77 I. .1 Q. It. I'.M) Kinl (H17K-M.'.}, 7 How. St. Tr. I.IHI, ILiH, l.V>2 r. 1'r.Hi.ly ;IH;|:I). :I C \- P. IM;I .. I'n*t.m (IM«H), \> il U. sii;. H'.'.l, HJ(1 (. I'r...t«.ii. I^l. tl7l»l), \1 How. St. Tr tV,H , V>mt. C. L. •-'■.'« V. I'rii'i- (|n;i7). N C. \- I'. I'.» ; 7 <'"X, C. C. HK> 00 '•?»' '.'.ft. U.'"H 7.1 , r. r. f , I'. I', N S. I'liiitfl.' (IMdl, 'J M. .V Roll. '2711 .13, J8 Pritilmnl (l«i)7), :i(t I.. .1. M. ('. Hi!'; L. & C. 34 ; H Cox, C. C. 401 . 4 I, T. ;i|it; !i \V. R. 1171 >!I9 '.'14 ;i4(l 1IH7 Wi 4(.8 I'u.l.lifonl (I «.".»!. I Moo. C. «'. '217 I'lircfov IT'.'I). l'<u. Kvitl. fil II. (."til 111.).. i'lirii.li ,I7IM.1I>, I \V. III. :i7; I WiU. •j.i!) I'ji' ll7!MM, i I'JlHt, I'. «'. 7H.'l •Milliter (l.s.'.l., li Cox, <'.('. :i.i7 , tJuci.ii'i.C«v.J.I..K<'!''>"liiiiiilNSj),|oL. R Ir.'^iil; |.'i('ox,(;.l".Mlt..4s3,KHj Jiiiit'liv i\Xl-i). Ir. I'ir. It, 1177 :i".A «.'»» I. Wiiii. I. Mi:;,. ;i !•'. .V K. MIH Itiidliv (IHIli,. I Dm. l.'iO; 11 Ni-w S.-m. ^',»». ii.'.l ; T. \ M. 144 \K.'.i74: ,1 Cox. r. (". Hill; IH L. .1. M. < '. INI ; Kl.liir. .Ml ,. RuiiiHay ilHs;i.. l.'i Co*. <•.«'. iM ; I C. At K. I'Jii ; 4M I,. V. TM.. 107, .''H7 r KiiiiiRlK.tiom (I7H7). I i^ii. 'J.'i, II MM A Km hI, IH'i7). '2 C. * I'. (iOI IfJ '.Hid I itiii.iific iH.i'ji. I i^'wit , <•. <'. I'jj mi'.' I Hiit<liilV<'nl(v |sn; . J Nfw Ht,.H. <'ii«. :i.V.> .'i7M r Hiwtliii ^ls.'H . H H. .V «'. 711N ; ;» M. ti It. 4J(i (. Itawilili (IMIHi. 2 A. .V K. l.iN I Itiiiil ,1810 , !» A. ti v.. (il!i; I 1'. \- I), 41'l ... I It.iMlir (IH:|i>!, 4 (• .V I'. '.'I.'.; I M. T. (;. •.';i!l I. Kt'iiiliii); i^lil7'>ii II. Ml. Ti '.Hi •J.S4 :iii.'i lillO 1110 UiiA l<i>»<liii)r (17:il', ^\i<»•>^ t> mp. ll.inU. 7'.) 11.21, ni'i lt.iiiliii»f (In;ii1). 7 «'. \ r. till /.;8 . .... ^^^^ JM ,4ti-t. 470, .'.70 It.riii.yil8.'.7i. |)riirH.\ Mil. I,'il; 'ill L. J, M.(V 4:1; 7Co«,C.lJ. 'JoO. Iti'ill<li-ll IKiii,, I I-'. \ it< •h il7:i»). 1 Htr. iW . Hi II. .w. Hi. Tr. 1 V. Re* (i»;i'.'). ;. c. iV I', iiiij Rt-MllNliiii. 7 V. \ I*. Mill. . lfi«i.oii (lh7.M. I'i I'.ix. r. f. 'i'iH l>Vi r. lt<-«-«l (IH.'O,. M \ M. 411:1 -iM, .'.HO I. R<vK {\:h\>, nIioiiM Ih> in:ii), ec. ti V. (ion U8 HH Alia x.( r i.-o , A7'i 7.'U AK.^ lo;i3 \m .... ,10411. 1I7'JI I I1.1.VI. (IH7.'). I.. R I (' {'. M-i ; 41 I,. .1 M C. !•-'• .i I . IC.K'. o^ |I|.<.<In for Miihlli'M't ll8.'iU), iH I. .1. ({ It. r 1. Iti'lil (I8.MI), M. .V M. Iil.l ^m r. Itiiiiy (I84:i), Ir. Cir K 70.'>..|p 1 U.-mimiit (|Nli7), A r. It. H.'.' I. Ith.Mi.H ,174'.'), I I-...!. «'.«'. i4 I. ltii'linr<U (|N.'N\ N II. \ I . Iti.'iKinU (IN:r.'j. I M \ I I ItirlitiniK (INIili , 4 I''. .V V I. Itii'liiinlwiii ^INiiOj, ■> V. In I. KirliHiilMiii (imi:i). ,1 V. \ I. Kii'kiimii ;17rtOt. 'J KuM, r. Itit'.irv (18.':i). R k R .'.I I. IliifK I80II). 4 F. ti V III . Riliv IN.ilj, ;i I' .V K I Itil.V (IHH7), IH W II. 1). INI : fto L, J. M. C. A'J ; Art 1,. T. 371 ' 4'.'0 lOili. 177 8'i 607, .'7 •', Hlill ., ;t; ^ I'' 143 : H Cox, C , 'ji • K 1.0:1 , ill 1'. c. 10:11 1 .■> .... Vi m.'i ;i 1 Hi 3: III 0{) 14 'il 00 III lill :i.'i \V. It. ;iKj U.'io 1, h. 1. Itinir ^IHOii), H T. U, MS i A 11 K. 478 f'W. /. Hidt mlA j><if* 0>6. 4- ^! clxvi TARLK OF CASKS ( imD. R. V u n. u. K. u u. u. u. u. K. U. U. It. U R U R R. It, R R. R. R II. U H R R n R R u R It U K R R R R R R If R k R 11 R R R R R R H P.U.K «. Rixliwonh (1812). 2 (i. H. IS7 ; 1 «. & I). .V.>7 : ML. J. M. C. Ill . . -tU r. Riv.TH (iHil.')). 7 (!. & r. 177 •-'.s:j, .'>Ko !• U.«iai.y (IHHO), lICox, ('.(;. I«;i; 4U L.J. M.C.HH; 42L.T. .'j1.').. 1(0 V. RuIhtIm I IHOH), 1 (;iim|i. :iU'> '2.VI r. R>lM<rU(lSIH), 2 C. & Kir. CK (i:il» r. R..lN.rtM (1871), 14 (.'ox. C C. 101 117, H)J:» r. R..l>fv (IH Clj, r>C fc V. Ml S.'.-i r lluhiliH (IH t.tl, i M. \- R:>1.. fill 2.'i7, '••■l /■. Iliiliiiiwiii ('7'.»(1). 2 li'iiih. (). C 7.')."i, 7<!.'> •lli, -'IK I. It.l.inwm (1H17), Holt, N. V. R. .'•!).') nh r. \Mmm,n (IH.'S), 1 Low. (!. C. IJ!) 82(1 I. RMimiK<m(i«;j!t), I (Viiwf. * I). ('. c;. :ii'.) i(i:ii. lo;i3, kkh r. I^)l)inH.m (181(1). 12 A. A: !•;. (172: I I*. & I). .TM id?:! r. K..l.iiiH.m (18(17). L. R. 1 <;. C. NO; .td L. J. M. (.'. 78 UdO r. II.kIiiM177.i). I L.II. l.H ; B. N. 1'. 21i) ll.V! r. K.mIi.. (1811). (.'. & Miir. :tll .17(1, .'>8.-. r. K.idiltim (1777). 2 Cowp, (172 8:i8 c lt«l.n (1871). 12 (ox. (J. (!, (i:iO 2;i7 r. I^M•lml•lc (I8.V>), D.arH * H. 21 ; 7 Cox, (!. C. 12(1 ; 2') L. .1. M. C. 101 : 2 .Iiir. N. H. ft!i7 247 I'. Honk (17''2), 1 WiIm ;M0 (i'.M t: l{.M.k«<MMl (Kiitilj. 1,1 ir.iw. St. Tr. 211 1»71. !I7.I .. K.H.ii.-v (18:i(l., 7 (!. * 1". .117 211, S2!i r. It'twi fliii. (18711), I. 'I (''IS. «'. C. 20!) .'i(l(I r. UmfWdll (11181), 10 How. St. Tr. 1!)0 il20, Wt) r. K.mi.T (1821). 1 I'll. Kv. no :-|H7 r. UoHwr (18.t(l), 7 ('. At r 018 8!t!t I. II..W (I8'l!(i. It. iV It. l.'i.l i'lOd r. Itowliiliil (182(1), Uv. \- .M. 101 88,1 . Howl4-y (I82.M. 1 Moo. C. (!. Ill ;U)4 r. Itowloii (18(1.)). Ml L. .1. .M. C. r>l : L. & O'V.', WO; 10 C.x, C. C. 2.'i ; 1 1 L. T. 74,5 ; 1,1 W. R. 4.K1 ; 1 1 .Iiir. N H. :I2.') 2 19. 2'.| .". Ru.lil fl77.">), 1 licii. (• C. 127 88!) , i'. Itiiilvo (I80.'i). l'..ii. Add. (;iiH. 2:»2; 4 R. R. 000 !>18 V. HiiilKc (18711, I.K^ox. C. C. 17 112H r ItiiKMril (IN27'. (1 H. \- ('. am 47 I. HiiHwli. 1^1. .1 (I8:!'.i). 7 Dowl. 7i);i 8112 r, ItiiHtoli (178(1), 1 Irf.u. «;. (.'. 408 807 , r. lt\Mii (18,101, ■> M. ti Itol.. 2i;i 81 V. RyliilKl (18(18). 11 (Jox, ('. V,. 101 ; 18 L. T. AllH ; 1(1 W. R. Oil..,. 20(1 V. llVlo (1811 \ M. * \V. 227 ; 1 I). N. S. till ; (l.Fiir. 2:t8 :il!) , r. ll'viiKT (187.). 2 (i. II. I), l.id ; 4d \j. .1. M. C 108 ; ,|.) L. T. 774 ; ■>r, W It. li.'); 1.1 Cox, (!. C. ;i78 1(12 . r. ltviii<H(l8.i:i), :i(". A K. :i2d 108 , r Itvloii (1702), /)T. It. 2.V.I 87, 4112 V. H.iil!.T (18(0). ■!<;.*: r. 218 81Ji , r. Matln.n Hill (;8,V.'). 22 L. .1. .M . C. 22 ; 1 K. Ai l\. Oli ,'102, IIO.I , . M». Aiiilnw. rtrKhorr (I8j8). 8 II. & (!. (17!) IM . . Hi. Ami". W.-Htmii.Hl.T (1817), 2 New Schh. (.'«h. ft2I) ; Q, H. 884 ; 1(5 L. .1. M. I'. :i:i Ii;i8. 1140 . w. St. Awiiih. l).-uii of (178:i). 21 How. St. Tr. lo;n), loio 2:), 45 , I. .St. (l.'.irKi' '18 10), i) (!. 4 I'. 488 074 *. Ht. (l.«r)^.-,'ni.M.iiiMlmrv (l8,-..i), 4 K A: II. .V.'O ; 21 L. .1. M. C. 4!) .. li:i(l . V. Ht. <liltHil8,-i,l), 22 L. .1. M. ('. fil; 1 V. He H. (112 1214, 121!) , r. Mt. (Jiici-iiitli.-Ki.l.lH (1811). .'i t). M. 872; 1). A: M. 110; 1 New Si-mi. CiiM i;i7; i:i L. .1. M. C 8i) , 8 Jur. 407 .'i;!l . .. SI. .rolm il8;i0), (!. \ P. 40 20U .. Ht. Kiitli.Tiiio (I8:U), !> H. & All. 1)70, n 1170 , r. HI, Mitrtiii'H, U-iifHUr (18.11), 2 A, Ac K. 210 ; 4 N. 4 M. 202 . .280, 024, 020. !t27 . r. HI Murv, I.iiiiit">tli (170di, d T. R. dl,'. ; H It It 2:i'l, 210 I 108 , ' St. Miirv. LunilHali (184,'. , 7 11 H. .»87 . 2 Niw >»m». Cuh. M 1 1'lO , r. Ht, Mur>;.'lHini'(l82)), 4 Howl, & H. 47.1 140 TA* riftitHttt art la piifr; »<il I" /"i'i(yi"<(^A». TABLE OF CASKS CITED. cl K. r. St. MuryUlM.iio(183«). r, A. & K. 2(JS K. V. St. Miiry Miwlulen (ISi);)), 2 E. & H. 801) ; 23 L. J. M. 0. 1 ; 17 Jiir. xvn PAOIC 093 131 R. r. St. Miin-, Warwick (isri;!), TI L. J. M. C. 1011 ; 1 El. & HI. 810; I C. L. K. 1!)'2 ; 17 .Iiir. Ml 4.11 R. .. St. MiiiiriM. (1k:.1). Ki Q. H. 1)08 ; 20 L. .1. M. (!. 221 ; 16 Jur. :>.')!>. . 17 R. f. St. Miclm.'rH(18l8), 12 Q. 11. IKi ; :» NfW S.>«h. Cum. 200 fi78 R. .. St. PiiiiniiM (171) I). •''•II- H. 22(1 1109, 11 II R. r. St. I'.iiil. Cov.nt (Jiinli'ii (18 lA), 7 »i. H. 2.J2 lltl K. i: St. WtnimnrM (1831), (H;. A: I'. ,'.82 209 R. <■. SiiliMl.iiiv (1838). 8 A. & E. 710; 3 N. & V. 170; 7 L. J. M. C. 110.. 083 R. r. Suit (1802). 3 V. ii h\ 831 210 R i: Sult.T (1801), 6 Eh|>. llf} 218 R r. SifiiNdiiif (I8i')0), 1 Di'ii. .'iiri 677, 680 R. .. S,iviiK<' (1831), 6 C. A: P. 113 329 R. r. S;lViiK<- (1870). 13(;..x. ('. (.'. 178 293, 037 R. r. S.tailV (1861). 17 U. H. 212 ; 2 Den. 281 ; 6 Cx, C. V. 213 ; 20 L.J. M. ('. 2211 ; 16 .Fur. 007 3J8, ;i30, 332. 109 R. r. .Sciilliiii (18.iK), Cniw. & D. Alir. fax. 310 KiK, 170 R. f. SiumiiKMiilpii (1789), 3 T. R. 17'> ; 1 11. R. 762 718, 766 R. r. .S.Iil.Hiiijft.r (1817), 10 Q. 11. 070; 2 Cox, C. C. 200 ; 17 L. J. M. C. 29 ; 12 Jlir 283 930 R. r. Scott (17!»(»), 3T. R. 001 7'J2 R. c. Scott (18.10), 25 L. J. M. C. 128 ; Dean*. & B. C. 0. il ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1090 683, 968 R. I. S-ott (1877), L. R. 2 Q. B. 1). 116; 10 L. J. M. C. 269; 13 Cox, 694 1041, 1042, 1097 . V. Soarli- (1831), 1 M. iV Uoli. 76 R. V. R. «'. R. r. R. V. R. V. R. V. R. v. R. f. R. V. R. V. R. V. R. V. K. V. R. V. S.Ml>f..|cy IH31), 2 II. \ A<1. 0.').., S«-ll«'rH (179(;), Carr. Cr. L. 233 ., S«'rj"aiit (1820), Rv. & M. 362 .. SiTva (1846), 2 V.'ii K. 60 Stmcll (184,6), 8 (j. K. 101 ; 16 L. 9.34 60 , 109 888, 889, 893 900 .T. Q. B. 49; 10.1ur. 48 1178 Sexton (1822), riU-d in .lov on ( 'oiif. 17 19 608, 670 Sliafti'Hlmry (l(i81), 8 How. St. Tr. 817. !'ti6 Slmw (1823), R. tc H. 620 1032. 1097 Shaw (1831), C. \- I'. 372 608, 6r,9 Shaw (18(i7), L. \- Cave, 679 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 00; 34 ],. J. M. C. 109. . 027 Slii-j-han (1820), .Ichl., <;. C. 64 .633, 034 Hhii'ii (1837). 2 C. ic V. 706 216 Sh.-criiw (I8,l(i). 7 C. i V. 440 821 R. r. »h«-ll»ra (1810), 9i'. .V V. 279 960, 968 R. r. Sli..|l..y (17891. 3 T. R. 142 ; 1 R. R. 07'' 9ii3, 997 R. V. Sli.'i.li.nl (1830), 7 C. & V. 679 ,603, 672 R. r. SIhiiIi.H (1808), 37 \.. J M.C 46- L. R. 1 C. C. 118; 11 Cnx, C. C. 119; 17 L. T. 482; Iti W. R. 373 211 R. V. Sli.pjmnl(180(; , U. & R 109 80 R. I'. Sliinnan (1730). Ciimn icinp. 1 1 aril w. 303 883 R f. Sliij.lcv (1784). 4 Doii^. 7:1, 177 H2 R. c. Sliott (■l8.-.l). 3C. & K. 200 1128 It. V. Stirinii.lon (1861), 2 Din. 319 ; 3 C. & Kir. 373; T. t M. 028; 21 L. J. M. C. 37; 6 Cox. ('.<;. 387 261 R. r. Stiurni.r (188li), 17 (J II. I). 323 ; .66 L. .1. M. C. 163 ; ,66 I.. T. 120; ,14 W. R. i;,'.0 ; .'.0 .1. I', 743 .138 R. •'. Sidney WvHtli-y (IKON , H Cox, C. C. 139 1073 R. r. SininioiiilH (1823), 1 C it P. 84 043 I'. SinionK (|s;i4). C. \' P. 641 183, ft66, 600 R. V. Hiniiwon (1738). 2 I A. Wayni. 1 179 17 R. R. R. R V. BiinpMm (18.11). 1 Moo. i'C 110 V. Siiijwt (1839), Maiiiftoiii' A-hI/ch II. Sirri.ll (18,60). citc.1 2 l>cn. 2C: r. Skcin and IVi- min ( 18.M»). 28 L. .T. M. <•. 91 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 143; Bell, C. C. 97 ; 7 W. R 2.66 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 161 . . . rw. /. tnJ* with payt 636. 603 608 247 903 Clxviii TABLE OF CASKS CITED, R. <•. Skinner (1772), Lofft, flS 8(i9 R. r. Slanoy (183.!) , S C. * 1\ '213 UOO R. ••. Sinter (1881). 8 Q. H. D. 267 ; 61 L. J. Q. H. 210 ; 30 AV. R. 410 ; 4r. J. P. fi»j 003 R. r. Sliiutrlitpr (IS.Jl). » C. ft P. ,54 1, n. (A) 604 U. I. SliiwHtonc a8V.>^. IS Q. n. ;t88; 21 L. J. M. C. 145 ; Iti Jiir. 1000.. 727 K. V. .Sl.t-iiiun (18.i3). Dciirs. & nrll, 249 ftti:t. r^M, .')«7 R. r. Mtt-ii (18(11), L. ic Ciivc, 14 ; 8 C.x, C. 0. 472 : 30 L. J. M. C. 170; 7 Jur. N. S. 97!» : I L. T. r>>ry ■ 9 W. K. 709 204 R. c. Slogget (18)0), DourH. A: Boll, 056 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 93 ; 2 Jur. N. 8. l(i'.;« 583 R. /•. Sl.mmn (1812), 1 Dcwl. 618 832 U. r. Smiillimio (1821 ), 2 (niitty, K. 288 990 R. r. Smart (1811), Ir. Cir. K.'p. 15 240 R. r. Smith (1783), 1 I-oii. 2K8 IIIH R. i: Smith (IHIO), 1 Htiirk. K. 242 580 R. V. Smith (1817). R & H. 339 ; 2 Stiirk. R. 208 ; Holt, N. P. It. C.l 1..320, 339 R. I. Smith (1H.'2), rit.d 1 I'h. Kv. 171 001 U. v. Smith ;18'J0), 1 Moo. ('. C. 289 888 R. I'. Smith (1827), 2 ( '. A: P. 033 246 R. V. Smith ISJS), 8 II. \- C. 311 1031, 1033 R. r. Smith 1833), 1 M<h> C. C 402; 6 C. & P. l.')l 215 R. c. Smith (IHIJi, Ir. C. R. 1,V.) 105 R. r. Smith (18|.')). 2 <!. & K. 207 334 U. r. Smith (\MU), 1 Dvii. 510, 512 ; 2 C. \ Kir. 882, 881 10 R. r. Smith (ISVi), DciirH. 5.-.9 ; 7 Cox, C. <" 5 8i) R. r. Smith (18,-i8). DenrH. \- Holl, 553 ; H Cox. ('.(!. 27 105 R. r. Smith (180,-|), L. k (^uvo, tio7 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 82 ; 34 L. J. M. «!. 163 409 R. r. Smithi.'H (1832). 5 C. & P. 332 .^87 R. V. Soiii.Twt^hina .J.J. (1820. 5 H. k C. 810 1 130 R. I'. Sourtoii 1830). 5 A. A: E. 180 ; N. \- M 575 ; 2 |[. & W. 209 621 R. r. South IIollau<l I)riiin,ige (1841), 8 A. 4: E. 437 ; 1 1*. & I). 79 ; 1 W. W. & H. 047 1137 R. f. Southiim|.toii(18l,')), 5 Q. H. ."ilS 727 R. r. Sow 18I3\ 4 Q H. 93 525, 1131 R. t. SpiiKPr (1824), Rv. A: M. 97 1013, lol4 R. r. SpciHfr (1837), 7 C. & P. 770 .'i64 R. I'. Sjiict-r (18|.Vj, 1 C *K. 699; 1 Don. C. C. ;;2 214 R. II. SpilHhiirv (1835). 7 C. & P. 187 408. 508, 579 R. r, Stattonl (108(1). 7 How. St. Tr. 1378 920 R. i: .StnffordHhir.' J.l. (1837), 6 A. & E. 99 981. 992, 993 R. V. Stiijnforth (1815), 11 Q. H. 60 ; 3 New .Sewt. Ctix. 63; 17 L. J. M. C. 26 ; U .lur. 95 1,30, 131 R. r. StumiMir (1841). 1 Q B. 123: 10 L. J. M. C. 73 93 R f. Stimli-vrum Wn-iithoqM- (1812). 15 Eiixt, 3,50 621 R. c. Stiuitoii M851), 5 Cox. C. C. 324 1131 R. V. St.ipU»Fit/piiiiio(l8l2), 2 Q. B. 494 290 R. r. Stiiplot<m (1828). Ji-hh, C. C. 93 16.'i R. V. Sttfi (1787). 1 I^'ii. 462 897 R. V. »U-]Am\H (1800). L. R. 1 Q. B. 702 ; .35 L. .1. Q. B. 251 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 340 ; 7 H. & S. 710 ; 14 L. T. 693 ; 14 \V. R. 8.59 ; 12 Jur. N. 8. 901 107 R, r. Stq.honmm (1802), 31 L. J. M. C. 147 , L. & Cavo, 165 ; 9 Cox, C. C. 150 .332, 3.38 R. V. St».pt(H- (1830). 4 C. * P. 397 501 R r. Stovc-nmm utid C.nlt.'r (1851). MS., 4th Mitrch, Ir.l.ind 883 R. I'. Stevmiton (1813). 1 (J. Ac K. .55 209 R. (• St4"WHrt (1870), 13 «\>x, 0. C. 296 1030 R. r. Stokf (loUlinir (1817^, 1 B. & A. IT'! 306 R. f. Sloki-uixHi-Trunt (1843), 5 Q, B. 308 ; 1>. k M. 357 ; 13 L J. Q. B. 4 1 ; 8 .lur. 34 766, 768 R. V. StukoM (18,50), 4 Cox, 0. C. 461 ....»«. .^ 9M JA* ruferaiiti art to p«gu, mat to parayr,tphi. TABLE OF CASE8 CITED. clxix r.<nii R. r. Stone (1796), 6 T. R. MR :»H2 K. f. StoiiviT (I8J3), 3 KuMii. C. & M, 371 '.•;»7 K r. Htoirr».riiU«' (l«W). 8 B. & C. 00 ; 2 M & It. 43 304 K. r. Stourton (IH.tO), fi A. & E. 180 415 11. V. Stmlmt. f IM.Vi). 7 Cox, C. C. 8.', 903 R. ,: Strand ILmnl of WorlcH (1801), 4 B. 4 S. MO ; 33 L. J. M. C. 3:i ; \Z \V. K. 8Jli 1 1 1, 112 K r. Stn'fch (IS;!.-)). 4 Howl. 30 ; 3 A. & E. MY.i 8.11, 832 K. r. StrippllH'ili). 7 C'-x, C. C. !)7 ; Dciin'. C. C. fl»8 .'.77, .ITO U. , . .Stn>ii<-r IHI.')), 1 <;. A: IC. Ck.O i»43 R. I. Stn.ml (IHIJ), 1 C. & K. 187; 2 M.m.. f!. C. 270 21.'> R (• Stul.lw (18.">.')), 26 L. J. M. C. 10; Dmrn. C. C. ft.W ; 1 Jiir. N. S. 1 1 l.-i 03.3, 034 R. r. Stiim<! flS.'Jl). 3 E. Ac B. 73J ; 23 L. J. M. C. 172 ; 18 .Iiir. 10.V2 . . 1'I8 R I. Hu.lcliH ISOll, 1 I'jiHt, 300 no:; R. I. SuUivHi. '1H7I\ I. U. HC. L. 401 H84 R. r. SiiUiviiM ; 1S.S7 . 20 L. It. Ir. .').'.0 .'..')1 R. r. SiiIIh (IHOO , 2 Lciirh, 801 217 R. I . Summ.TH ■ 1 70.'>). 2 EiiMt, P. C. 78.') 202 R. .'. Hiirr. V aHll). o «i. B. .'tOO 727 R. c. Sutrlilf.- ( 18.')0), 4 Cox, 0. O. 270 fiOO R. r. Sutton (1817), 4 M. & .S. .^12 3, HO', 1(H»2 R c. Sutton (18i.'.), 3 A. iV E. M>7. 012 : .'> \ .V .M. 3.'j3 ; 1 H, .V W. I2S 101 R. r. .Sutton (18;is , 8 A. * E. .'ilO ; 3 N. i 1'. .'.li!* ;<!»;, 402 R. .. Sw.itkiuH 1M31), 4 C. 4: P. 018 10, f.03, f)70 R. (. Sw.rn.y (1811). Ir C. Hi-p. 300 21.'» U. r SwrMilHcn (1702), 14 IIow St. Tr. 400 2.->0 R. r. Tiiit (18011, 2 !•' \ V. .'..Vi 332 R, r. TiintcH-k 1870 , 1.1 Cox, (". C. 217 IIJ".* R. r. Tiinnrr . KO.'.,, 1 Enp. 300 108 R. f. Turriint ^1833 , < '. \- P. 1H2 .')78, .'iHO R. r. TiivirniT < 180',»), ("arr. Supp. 11).') ; 4 C. A: 1'. 113, n. ,./i 21(1 R. r. Tiivlor il7i>0;, IVit. K. 11 01)4 R. ,: Tiivlor (1823), 1 C. *: P. 81 n 013 R. r. Tiivlor ^1812,, .'. C. \. V. 301 821 }<. r. T.ivlor ;lSfii , 8 C. \- 1'. 731 .^03, .'lO.'i R. V. Tiivlor 180H , L. R. I C. C. 104 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 100; 11 (^.x, (' <". 201 ; i V. ti. V. i'll 1 200 R. r. Trill (1800,, 1 1 l-MHt, 300 ; 13 Eiiitt, 4 ; 10 R. R. ,'.10 877 R. I'. Tfw (18.V.), I)i'iir«. V. C. 120 010 R. r. Tli.imt, Eiirlof (17H0), 27 IIow. St. Tr. 84.') '112. 800 1{. V. Thihll.'WiMMl (1820), 33 How. St T.-. 001 207, 201, 310 R. r. Thoniim (1871), 12 (.'ox, ('. C fil 211 R. r. ThoniiiH (1704), 2 Loii. CC. 037 .'>7fl R. r. ThoHiiiH (1834). 2 liCH. 877 : 2 Eimt, P. C, 034 230, .Vil, .'.Tl H. r. TlioniiiH (1837), 7 (-'. * P. 817 3:^4 R, r. ThoimiH ilH70), 11 ("ox, C. C. 63.') H.'l, lo.'O R r. TlioiniiH (l8T.'t). 13 Cox, C. C. 62 1120 R. . . Thompnon (1783). 1 Lou. C. C. 2'M 603, 471 R. r. 'HioinpHon (1820), 1 M(Mt. (;. C. i;{>j ; 1 I^-w. U. C. 104 213 U. r. ThonipMon (1HI61, Oil B. 721 bl»8 R. r. Tl.onvpHon (1870), 13 (;ox, C t). 181 962 U. I . ThonipKon, fl803) 2 Q. B. 12 ; 02 L J. M. C. 03 ; 00 L. T. 22 : 41 W. R. .V2.') ; 67 .1. P. 312 ; ') R. 302 .'.02, 603, .nl, 673 R. r. TliompH.n hihI otliors (1872), 41 L. J. M. C. 112 ; L. R. 1. ('. C. 377 : 12 Tox, d. (;. 202 888 R. I . Tlionii.«o!i mill SiinpMon (1803), 3 F. & F. 824 880 R. r. Thornton ilM24), 1 M.m.. C, (!. 27 .'.08, .600, 671 R. I. ThrinK (1832), 6 C. .V P. 607 10:U R. V. Thun«<roHM ;183»). 1 A. & E. 120 1109 R. r. Thurii-ll (1822), Aliiw.n, Vme. 6H I ; Joy on ("onf. 8t ,'.8,'. R. f. Tinikl«r(l78l). 1 Eiwl, P. C. 354 . . . ." 407, 408 R. r. Tipi)tt (1823). R. & R. 600 669 Vtl. I. iiuls with pf0 636, itl clxx TABLE OF CASES CITED, PAOII R. V. Tonkliiy (IftflO), 10 Cox. C. C. •100 27S R. c. Ti.Imoii ( IHill). 4 K. & F 73 1071 U i: T.milinw.ii (1H;J4). (). & I' 370 213 U. r. TiH.ko (17iM), •.'.I IIow. St. Tr. 4 •« 1033 It. r. I'cK.I.) (lH.'i7). Diiirn. \: n. 101 ; 7 Uox, C. C. 200: 20 L. J. M. C. 70 ; :iJiir. N. H. 420 216, fi72 R. r TorjK'y (1871), II Cox, C. C. 4/5 105 H. I'. T..tiicBH(18l9). 11 (J. n. 80; 18 L. J. M. (\ 40 132 R. I'. Tower {\H\r>), 4 M. & Sol. 102 ; 10 U. H. 4JH 003, iUH R. r. Towcy (18(1(»), 8 Cox, C. C. 328 027 R. r. TowiiiM'ii.l (1H41), C. & Mttrnh. 178 148 R. f. Tn-l)l«»(1810). 2T«uii. 320 1194 R. r. Trchurno (IHIll), 1 Mno. C. C. 298 210 K. r. Troiiwvtli;i841), Ir. C. R. 172 US R. V. Trovolii (1882), Li Cox, C. C. 2S0 274 R. r. Trowbridjrt' (1827). 7 n. & 0. 2.V2 .'rJl R. r. Trufiimii (18,19), 8 C. * P. 727 2.38 R. V. Tiililiy (IH.I.l), 6 C. & V. MO RH2 R. r TulHjrHold (1804), 34 L. J. M. C. 20; L. & C. 49.1; 10 Cox, C. ('. 1 2.'50 R «'. TiitfH (1848) 1 Don. C. C. 324 004 R. I'. Tumor (1004), How. St. Tr. 013 249, 250. 2V2 R f. TuriiiT (1810), /> M. A: S.^!. 200 200, 207 R. V. Turner (IHDO), 1 I^-w. C. C. 177 213 R V. Turner (1832), 1 M(K). 1». C. 347 ; 1 Luw. C. C. 110 628, .'.80, 1 102, 1110 R r. Tunier (1818), 2 C. & K. 732 1014 R r. Turwewton (I8.'!0. nIiiuiIiI Im> I8.')0), 10 Q. li. 100 ; 4 Cox, C. C. 349 ; 20 L. J. M. C. 40 ; \h .lur. 0,10 203 R V. Tutohin (1701). 14 Mow. Si Tr. 1128 45 R. I'. TwviiiiiK (1810). 2 H. & A. 380 108 R. V. Tyler (182;»), 1 C. & P. 129 fiflfl R. r. Tvlney (1849), 18 L. J. M. C. 37; 1 Don. C. C. 319 004 R. V. TyniHiM (1870), 11 Cox, C. C. 615 108 R. V. VAM (1590), 1 How. St. Tr. 1289 45 R. f. Uezzoll («r R. r. Eiiton). R. V. Vhwr (18.10), 4 Cox, 0. C. 442 3,30 R V. UnkleH(1873). I. R. 8 ,^. L. 60 619 R. r. Uixhunh (1830), 1 Moo. C. C. 40.1 503, .171 R. V. UpiM'r nod(lin>rt<m (182il), 8 D. & R. 720 321, 507, .199 R. V. Upton (iruy (1830), 10 B. &C. 812 127, I.'IO It. V. lJpt<Hi-on-.' -oni (1833), fi C. & P. 133 202, 209 It. V. V»n MuKhoU (lh25, nhould \x> 1820), 3 C. & P. 0:U 407, 108 R. V. Vantleroomb '1706), 2 Kant, P. C. 514 : 2 I<oii. 708 ...20.1, 235, 985, 1120 R. V. Vnne (l(i02), 6 How. St. Tr. 123 ; 1 Eiwt, P. C. 125 026 R. f. Viiilo (1771). 1 Cowp. 248 701 R. r. Viiujrlmn (1090), 13 How. St. Tr. 5.35 024, 625, 017 R. r. VirelHt (181,1), 3Ciimp. 432; 14 R. R. 775 U7 R. r. V.mon (1872), 12 Cox. C. C. 153 503 R .•. Virkery (1S18). 12 Q. B. 478 ; 3 New Sohm. Ciih. 193 ; 17 L. J. M. C. 129; 12Jur .181 833 R. V. Vidil (lrt<il). 9 Cox. C. C. 4 3,32, 333 R .. Vincent (1771-2). 1 Sir. 481 1105, 1107 R. r Vii.eent (1830). 9 C. & P. 01 013 R. r. Vincent (1840). 9 C. & P. 275 373 R. I'. Vincent (18.12). 2 Dtn. C. V 404 ; 5 Cox, C. C. 537 ; 3C. & K. 240; 21 L. J. M. ('. 109: lOJur. 457 108 R. r. Virri.r (1810). 12 A. * E. 324 627 R. f. Voke (1823), R. ft R. 5.U 248 R r. Wu.le (182.1). 1 M.«), C. C. 80 ..807, 898 R. r. W.iinwrij^ht (1870). 13 Cox, C. 0. 171 378 R. r. Wnite, fl892) 2 «. B. 000; 01 L. J. M. C. 187; 67 L. T. 308; 41 \V. R. 80 100 The reftftnett art to pagti, not to paragraph*. 4 I TABLH OF CAsr.S CITKD. clxxi I'AOB R. •>. Wiikrflflfl (IflOi), 5 KiiMt, 3;j.'): 1 Smith, .') 12 :>n R. t. WiiktH.'l.l (1HJ7], 'i Lt'w. C. (;. 27'J 890, HD.J R. c. Wiilktr(IHiiti),<it.'<jOC. & P. lOi M:i n. I. WiiiktT iHii). :n^imi). in* •.'!« U. r. VViilk.T (I8:twj, 1 M. A: Uoli. iVl MS R. r. Wulk.T(lHi;i), 2 M. i Ii<.l>. :i.)7 1100, 11:11 R. r. Wiilk.T (IKoO), 1 F. & F. iV) I ;(,I2 K r. Walkl.-y (1H33), 6 C. 4 1'. 17/5 Mi, MM It. V. Wall (18:«l). 3 Rutw. C. & M. .■)•.'■'), ■'):i I tl-'O. ;i 10 l;. r. WuUiue f IS.VI), H Ir. C. L. R. 38 lOK, 1 1 1 R. f. W.illiiw (ISiifi). 17 Ir. 0. L. R. 200 15 R. r. Walnh (1843), Ir. Cir. R. 800 SOU, .')71 It. V. w.ii»ii (isflo), f, Cox, ecu:) 33-) R. f. Walter (li!3tl), 3 Kmji. 21 ; R. R. 808 ; Prefnuo vi /)78 It. V. Ward (1811), OO. & r. 300 1032 R. r. Wsnl (1830 , 4 A. & E. 38» 47 R. V. Ward (1804), 10 Cox. C. C. 42 238 R. f. Wanll.) (1800), R. & R. il 202 It ", WanlroiHT (1800), 1 JWl, C. C. 249 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 284 ; 2!» L. J. M. 0. 116 105 R. r. Wai iiikHhall 1 783), 1 Lfii. C. (I 203 .')8.i R. V. Warmaii (Is Hi), 1 Don. 183 ; 2 Car. & K. iu:i 213 R. r. Wariior (1832), <'it(<<l 3 Riihm. C. & M. 4.')2, 408 AOH R. V. Warrintfhain (ISftl), 2 Don. C. C. 447 602, .WA R V. WarwiokHliirc (1837), A. & K. 873 ; 2 N. & P. lo3 727 R. r. WiiNlibnM.k (182")), 4 B. & C. 732 1 133 R V. Wali'rH (1832), 7 C & P. 260 ; 1 Moo. C. C. 4r)7 213. 210 R. r. WatiTi»(l8l8). 1 Di>n. Am ; 2 C. & K. 808 ; 18 L. J. M. C. .03 ... .84, 21.i R. f. WatkinH (1831), oit.xi 4 C. & P. 650, n. (A) '.80 R. V. Watkinw.n (1730-40), 2 Str. 1122 010 R. V. Watj«m (1T8S), 2 T. R. 201 ; 1 R, R. 461 310 R. V. VVntKon 1808), 1 Cunip. 216 164 R. V. Watson (1817), 2 Stark. R. 13'.l ; 32 How. St. Tr. 82 121, 248, -JDO, 382, 381, 38.'), 620, 013, 010, 020, H'X), 800, 90'J, 1)21, 017, 018, 970, 072 R. V. WatMon (1834), 6 C. & P. 663 960, 977 R f. WafMon (1861). 3 C. & Kir. Ill 580 R. V. Watt* (1804), . New R. 177 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 63 ; L. & Cuvo, 339 ; 9 Cox, C. C. 396 L. T. 463 ; 12 W. R. 112 33a R. V. Waverton (1861), 17 Q. H. 502 ; 2 Den. C. C. 340; 21 L. J. M. C. 7 ; 10 Jiir. 6 209 R. r. Wavertreo (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 263 399 R. r. Weaver (1873), 43 L J. M. C. 13; L. R. 2 C. C. 85 ; 12 Cox, C. ('. 527 lOS.i. 1060 R. V. Wi'hb(1819), ;i Rniw. C. & M. 622 918 R. V. AVebb (1831 , 4 C. & P. 50 1 682, 889 H. V. Webb (1807). 11 Cox, C. C. 133 877 R. r. WebHti-r (1801). L. &C. 77; 31 L. J. M. O. 17 199 R. V. Wi'd.UTbiini (1740), Font. C. L. 22 ; 18 How. St. Tr. 425 626 R. r. WtfkK (1801), b Cox, C. C. 4.'."> ; L. & C. 18; 30 L. ,1. M. C. 141 ; 7 Jiir. y. 8. 472 ; 4 L. T. 373 ; W. R. 653 240 R. V. Welbom (1792), 1 Eawt, P. <". 358 408 R. r. Welch (1840), 2 C. & K. 200 ; 1 Deii. C. C. 199 291 R. r. Welland (1S.'2). R. & R. 401 216 It. I'. Weller (1810), 2 0. & K. 223 334, 579 R. r. WellitiKH (1S78), 3 Q. H. D. 426 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 100 -. 38 L. T. 652 ; 26 W. R. 592 332 R. r. 'V,.1Ih (1820), M. &M. 320 634 R. I . Weltou (1802), 9 Cox, C. C. 297 198, 210, XHi R. !■. Weiihain (1800), 10 Cox, C. C. 222 1079 R. I . Weht, Dr. (uiidate<l), rited 2 Wiln. 240 ; 6 Mod. ;!95 990 R. f. WeHtbury (1844), 6 Q II. 600; 1 New SeHM. Cu». 33; D. & M. 006 727 Vol. J. *nd$ with pagt 636. * iH IF "^ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 1m^ 2.5 2.2 1.1 l.-^l^ 1.8 1.25 1.4 III A ^ 6" ►• V] <^ /a % ^l ^/^J> ^ ,>^ V V /A Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 '^ f h i\ \ V'"0^ ^ <* i clxxii TABLE OF CASES CITED. R. V. 93 R. i: R. f. R. r. R. V. R. V. R V. R. V. R. r. R. r. R. r. R. V. R. r. li. f. R. V. R. r. C. R. r. R. c. R. r. R. r. R. (. R. r. R. r. ■Jo R. ,: IG R. r. 18 R. r. R. r, R. r. R. r, R. f, R. r, R. t' R, V R. f R. i R. r R. r R. f R. <• R. I R. r R. I R. (• R. r R. V R. r 54 R. r. R. I R. . R. r R. r R. r R. r R. r B I- R. . R. f PAOK Western (1868), 37 L. J. M. C. 81 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 122; 11 (.'ox, C. C. 18 L. T. 299 ; 16 W. R. 730 198 Wt'stley (18.i9),Bell, C. C. 193; 29L. J. M. C. 35 ; ft.Tur. N. S. 1362. . 198 \Mieater (1838), 2 Moo. C. C. 45 ; 2 Lew. C. C. 157 583, 584 Wheatland (1838), 8 C. & P. 238 629 Whceley (1838), 8 C. & T. 250 ;i83, 580 Wheeling (1789), 1 Lea. C. C. 311, n 5G0 Wheelook (1826), 5B. &C. 511 788, 1139 Whelau (1881), 8 L. R. Ir. 314 ; 14 Cox. C. C. 595 954 Winston (1836), 4 A. & E. 607 ; 6 N. & M. 65 131 Whitbread (182;<), 1 C. & P. 8t, n 943 Whitchurch (1827), 7 B. & C. 573 130 White (1786), 3 Bar. Ab. 202, n. ; 1 Lea. C. C. 430, n. («) . .896, 898, 901, 904 White (1823), R. & R. 508 560 White (1843), 4 Q. B. 111. 112 91 White (1865), 4 F. k F. 383 104 AVhitehead (1866). 35 L. J. M. C. 186; L. R. 1 C. C. 33 ; 10 Cox, C. 34; 14L. T. 189; 14AV. R. 677 910 Wliiteliouse (undated), cited 3 Russ. C. & M. 625 893 Whith'v Lower (1813). 1 M. & S. 636 491, 496 Whitworth (1858), 1 F. & F. 382 468, 469 , Wick St. Lawrence (183;j), 5 B. & Ad. 526 .. 788, 1103, 1139, 1140, 1141 , Wickham (18:i5), 3 A. & E. 517 755 Wickham (183!)), 10 A. & E. 34 ; 2 P. & D. 333 204 , Widdop (1872), 42 L. J. M. C. 9 ; L. R. 2 C. C. 3 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 1 ; 27 L. T. 693 ; 21 W. R. 176 583 , Wideconibe in the Moor (1847), 2 New Soss. Cas. 539 ; 9 Q. B. 894 ; L. J. M. C. 44; 11 Jur. 227 1139 , Wigiin (1849), 14 Q. B. 287 ; 3 New Sews. Cas. 670 ; 19 L. J. M. C. ; 13 Jul-. 1052 521 . Wi.rley (1 835), 2 Lew. C. C. 258, 259, n 627 , Wild (1835), 1 Moo. C. C. 452 567, 569 . Wilde (1669), 1 Lev. 396 ; 1 Doug. 97, n. 41 18 . Wilkes (1836), 7 C. & P. 273 633, 634 . Wilkinson (1838). 8 C. & P. 662 281, 579 . AVillans (should be Williams) (1835), 7 C. i- P. 320 898 . Williams (1710), 10 Mod. 63 ; 4 Bl. Com. 29 165 . Williams (1811), 2 Camp. 646; 11 R. R. 781 203 . Williams (1826), 1 Moodv. C. C. 107 204 Williams (1834), 6 C. Ac 1*. 626 239 Williams (1836), 7 C. & P. 298 216 . Williams (1838), 8 C. i; P. 284, 434 889, 932 . Williams (1850), 2 Den. 61 202 . Williams (185;i), 6 Cox, C. C. 343 925 . Williams (1862). 3 New R. 338, per Ir. C. C. ; 9 Cox, C. C. 338. . . . 211 Williams (18(i5;, 4 F. & F. 515 336 Williams (1871). 11 Cox, C. C. 684; 12 Cox, C. C. 101 .... 121,326,337 Williams, (18!/3) 1 Q. B. 320 ; 62 L. J. M C. 69 ; 41 W. R. 332 . . 100 Willis (1710), 15 How. St. Tr. 624 658, 559 . Willis (1845). 1 Den. C. C. 80 ; 1 0. & K. 722 216 . AVillshiie (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 366 ; 50 L. J. M. C. 57 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 1 ; 44 L. T. 222 ; 29 W. R. 473 ; 45 J. P. 375 106 . Wilmett (184S), 3 Cox, C. C. 281 264 . Wilshaw (1841), C. & Marsh. 145 329, 336, 339, 577 . Wilson (1817), Holt, N. P. R 597 569 . Wilson (1861), 8 Cox, C. C. 453 332 . Wilson (1874), 12 Cox, C. C. 622 322, 336 . Wilton (1858), 1 F. A: F. 309 332 . Wilts. & Berks. Can. Co. (183.5), 3 A. & E. 47 992, 998 . Windsor '.864), 4 F. \: F. 366 563 . Wink (.S<34). 6 C. & P. 397 367 . Winkworth (1830). 4 C. A: P. 444 248, 375 . Winslow (I860;. 8 Cox, C. C. 397 237, 247 T/ie rq/Wencea «)•# to pages, ttol to pttrayraphi. TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxx 111 PAOR R V AVithers (1811), cited B. f. Holt, 5 T. R. 446 20, .098 R I' Witney (lH:i<',). 5 A. & E. 191; 6 N. & M. 5o2 131 R. r. Woburii (18IIH), 10 East, 3!)o 494 R. (• AVoiiieislv (1830), 2 Lew. C. C. 1(12 S'.'G R. V. Wood (1S;S2), 1 Oowl. ")09 816 R ,-, Woud (18U), Jebb & B. vii. ; 7 M. & W. ;)73 ; 9Dowl.310; lOL.J. Ex. 168 3 12, 906 R. V. AVond (1842), Ir. Cir. R. 597 .■)72 R. V. A\'o()d (1860), .-) Tur. 22;') 2.)0 R. V. Wood (1877) 14 Cox, C. C. 46 375 R. f. AVoodohcster(1742-3), Burr. S. C. 191 ; 2 Str. 1 172 1 106 R. V. AVoodcoi'k (17S7), 1 Leach, 504 'Ai, 333, 464, 4G7, 468, 470 R. V. AVoodfiill (1770), o Burr. 2661 ; 20 How. St. Tr. 913.918, 920.. 20, 45, 109 R. r. AVoodlmll (1872), 12 Cox. C. C. 240 206 R. V. AVondlioad (1817), 2 C. A: K. .520 942, 943 R. r. AVondky (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 390 322 R. V. AVoods (1840), 1 Crawf. 4: D. C. C. 439 974 R. V. AVoodward (1831), 1 Moody, C. C. 323 16, 209 R. r. AVooldale (1844), 6 Q. B. 549 ; 1 New Ses.s. Cm. ill ; 14 L. J. M. C. 13 ; 9 .Jur. 83 543, 784, 795 R. c. AVoolford (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 384 1127 R. r. Worotster (1838), 5 Q. B. 508, u 727 R. r. AVoicestershire .JJ. (1854), 3 E. & B. 477 ; 2 C. L. R. 1333 ; 23 L. J. M. C. 113; IS .Tur. 424 *. 1137 R. V. AVorfield (1794), 5 T. R. 508 153 R. V. AVorth (1843), 4 Q. B. 132 ; 12 L. J. AI. C. 47 ; 3 G. & D. 376 . .436, 437. 46« R. r. AVniiigle (1835), 2 A. & E. 514 ; 4 N. & M. 375 ; 1 H. & VV. 41 . . . . -if^M R. V. AViiirht (1821), R. & R. 456 931, 934, 935 R. V. AV right (1860), 2 F. & F. ,320 199 R. r. AVycherlev (1838), 8 C. & P. 262 ;i59 11. r. AVye (18.38), 7 A. & E. 770 ; 3 N. & P. 6 1 Hlii R. V. AVylde (1834), 6 C. & P. 380 357, 918 R. V. Wylie (1804), 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 94 ; 2 Lea. C. C. 983 237, 246 R. V. Yiirwell (1829), 9 B. & C. 894 ; 4 M. & Ry. 685 521 R. V. Yates (1841), C. & Mar. 139 624 R. 1'. Yeadoii (1861), L. & Cave, 81 ; 9 Cox. C. C. 91 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 70; 7 Jur. N. 8. 1 128 ; 5 L. T. 329 ; 10 AV. R. 64 206 R. f. Yeoveley (1838), 8 A. & E. 818; 1 P. & D. CO 788, 1032, 1140 R. I'. Yewiu (1811), 2 Camp. 639 947, 950, 951 R. V. Yore (1839), 1 Jebb & Sy. 463 893 R. f. Y^irk, Mayor of (1792), o T. R. 66 1114 R. V. Young (1850), 3 C. A: K. 106 336, 578 R. V. Young (1866), 10 Cox, C. C. 371 633 Rabey v. Gilbert (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 170 ; 6 H. & N. 536 ; 3 L. T. 752 ; 9 AV. R. 386 621 Raekhftin v. Marriott (18-)7), 1 H. & N. 234 ; 2 H. & N. 196 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 315 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 495 712 Rttdoliffe V. Fur.sraan (1730). 2 Bro. P. C. 514 601 Radclitfe v. Un. Ins Co (1810), 7 Johns. 38 1093 Radford r. M'lntoch (1790), 3 T. R. 632 150, 519 Radford v. AVilson (1754), 3 Atk. 815 180 Rae, In Goods of (1892), 27 L. R. Ir. 116 702 Raggett r. Mu.sgravo (1827), 2 C. & P. 556 520 Riiikos V. Todd (1838). S A. & E. 855 ; 1 P. & D. 138 ; 8 L. J. Q. B. 35. . 669 Rainforth, Re (1880), 49 L. J. Ch. 5 716 Ruiusford v. Smith (1563), Dyer, 196a 94 Ra,jah, The (1872), L. R. 3 Ad. & Ecc. 639 ; 41 L. J. Adm. 97 ; 27 L. T. 102 ; 21 W. R. 14 178 Rajah of Coorg r. E. India Co. (1856), 29 Boav. 300 ; 30 L. J. Ch. 226 . . 618 Riimadge v. Ryan (1832), 9 Bing. 333 ; 2 Moo. & Sc. 421 933 Rjimbertr. Cohen (1803), 4 Esp. 213; 6 R. R. 864 293, 926 Rambler v. Tryaou (1821), 7 Serg. & R. 90 931 Vol. I. melt with pag» 636. ii clxxlv TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ramchum Mullick v. Luckmeechund Riidakissen (1851), Moo. P. ( Ramsbotham v. Senior (1869). L. R. 8 Eq. o7o ; 17 W. R 1057 . . Ramsbottom v. Buckhurst (1814), 2 Maule & S. 567 ; 15 R. R. 352 Rsmsbottom v. Mortley (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 445 ; 15 R. R. 304 FAOB 0.40.. 38 610 81 .286, 289 Ramsbottom v. Tunbridge (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 434 ; 15 R. R. 302 .... 286, 289 Ramsden v. Dyson (1865), L. R. 1 H. L. 129; 12 Jur. N. S. 506; 14 W. R. 926 538, 542 Ramuz v. Crowe (1847), 1 Ex. 167 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 280 ; 11 Jur. 715. . . .307, 308 Rancljffe v. Parkyns (1818), 6 Dow. 202 433 Randall v. Gurney (1819), 3 B. & Aid. 252 ; 1 Chitty, 679 868. 869, 870 Randall v. Lithgow (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 525 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 518 ; 50 L. T. 587; 32W.R.79t 1116 Riindallt). Lynch (1810), 2 Camp. 357 ; 11 R. R. 727 1212 Randall v. Morgan (1805), 12 Ves. 67 ; 8 R. R. 289 665, 680 RandaU v. Newson (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 259 ; 2 Q. B. D. 102 ; 36 L. T. 164 ; 25 W. R. 313 777 Randall's case (1820), 5 City Hall Rue. 141 891 Randell v. Trimen (1856), 18 C. B. 786 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 307 780 Randle v. Blackburn (1813), 5 Taun. 2 15 479 Randolph v. Gordon (1815), 6 Price, 312 ; 19 R. R. 633 4;i() Rands v. Thomas (1816), 5 M. & Sel. 244 877 Ranee Khujooroonissa f. Mussainat Roushun Jehan (1876), L. R. 3 Ind. App. 291, r,ll 149 Rangeloy v. Webstw (1840), 1 1 New Hamps. 299 1148 Rmken v. M'Murphy (1889), 24 L. R. Ir. 290 542 Rjinkini'. Hoimr (1812), 16 Ea'^t, 193 518 Rankin r. Tonbrook (1837), Watts, 388 443 Rann v. Hughes (between 1764— 1 797), 7 T. R. 350, n 653 Kansley, Ex parte (1823), 3 D. & R. 572 120 Riper V. Birkbeck (1812), 15 East, 17 ; 13 R. R. 354 1200 33, 617 488 Mat. . 1050, Raphael v. Bk. of England (1855), 17 C. B. 161 ; 25 L. J. C. P. Rapp V. Latham (1819), 2 B. & A. 795 Rashdall v. Ford (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 750 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 769 ; 14 L. T. 790 14 W. R. 950 Ratcliff V. Ratcliff and Anderson (1859), 1 S. & T. 467; 29 L. 171 Ravee r. Fanner (1791), 4 T. R. 146 ; 2 R. R. 347 Raveuga v. Mackintosli (18;>4), 2 B. & C. 693 ; 1 C. & P. 204 ; 4 Dowl. & R. 107 Ravenscroft v. Jones (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 482 ; 32 Beav. 669 Rawley v. Rawley (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 460 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 075 ; 35 L. T. 191 ; 24W. R. 995 718 Rawlins v. D^sborough (1810), 2 M. & Rob. 328 ; 8 C. & P. 321 ..48, 250, 271 Rawlins v. Rickards (1860), 28 Beav. 370 455, 708 Rjiwlins V. Turner (1699), 1 Ld. Raym. 736 Rawlins v. West Dei-by (1816), 2 C. B. 72 ; 1 Lutw. 373 Rawliuson v. Clarke (1845), 14 M. & W. 187 ; 14 L. J, Rawlinson v. Oriel (1688), 1 Show. 75 ; Carth. 96 .... Rawurth v. Marriott (1833), 1 My. & K. 643 Rawson v. Haigh (1824), 2 Bing. 104 370, 377, 381 Rawsont). Walker (1816), 1 Stark. 301 767 Rawstome v. Gandell (1846), 15 M. & W. 304 ; 4 Railw. Cas. 295 ; 3 Dowl. &L. 682; 15 L. J. Ex. 291; 10 Jur. 291 492 Ray V. Jones (1836), 2 Gale, 220 458 Raymond, Ex parte (1874), I. R. 8 Eq. 231 128 Rayner v. AUhusen (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 605 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 68 ; 15 Jur. 1060 1183 ; 15L. J. C.P. 70. Ex. 304 780 1054 1124 372 806 655 726 7J0 1115 140 Read v. Anderson (1884), 10 Q. B. D. 100 ; 62 L. J. 74 ; 31 W. R. 453 Read v. Bishop of Lincoln, (1892) A. C. 644 ; 62 L 128 ; 56 J. P. 725 Read v. Coker (1853), 13 C. B. 850 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 201 Read v. Dunsmore (1840), 9 0. & P. 588 Q. B. 214 J.'p'.c'i 48 L. T. 620 67 L. T. 16, 1179 17 Jur. 990 .... 227 190 The re/ereticei are to pages, nol to purmjvaphs. TABLE OF CASES CITED. ClxXY PAOB Reade. Gamble (1839), 10 A. t E. 597, n 289, 318 Read v. Nash (1751), 1 "Wik. 305 677 Read v. Passer (1794), 1 Esp. 214 373, lu47 Read v. Victoria St. and Pimlico Rv. Co. (1863), 1 H. & C. 82(3 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 127 '. 1 102 Readers case (1604-5), 5 Co. Rep. 33 660 Reader r. Kingham (1862). 13 C. B. X. S. 344 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 108 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 797; 7L. T. 789; 11 W. R. 366 677, 679 Readhead v. Midi. Rv. Co. (1869), 36 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 412 ; 8B. &S. 371: 16L. T. 485; 15 W. R. 831 772 Reardeu r. Minter (1843). 5 M. & Gr. 204 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 139 1211 Reay'8 estate (1855), 1 Jur. X. S. 222 1208 Redding v. Wilks (1845), 3 Bro. C. C. 401 679 Rcdford V. Birlev (1822), 3 Stark. 88 373, 383 Rcdiiigton c. Rediiigton (1734). 3 Ridg. P. C. 106 666 Reece v. Rigby (1821). 4 B. & AH. 202 39 Reecei). Trje (1846), 9 Bear. 316 601 Reed v. Deere (1827), 7 B. & C. 261 ; 2 C. & P. 624 287 Reed V. Devavncs (1791), 2 Cox, 285 ; 3 Br. C. C. 95 ; 2 R. R. 48 144 Reed v. Fenn'(186G), 35 L. J. Ch. 464 721 Reed t'. Jackson (1801), 1 East, 355 ; 6 R. R. 283 84, 397, 398, 405, 1109 Reed v. James (1815), 1 Stark. R. 132 942 Reed r. King (1858), 30 L. T. 290 939 Reed f. Lamb (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 4.32 ; 6H. &N. 75; 6 Jur. N. S. 828. .1050, 1230 Reed v. Passer (1791). Pea. R. 232 ; 3 R. R. 696 29-5 Reed v. Woodward (1877). 11 Phila. (Pa.) 54, 541 693 Rees, Re (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 56 697 Rees V. Bowen (1825), MCI. & T. 383 957 Rees V. Lloyd (1811), Wightw. 1811 119 E«e8 V. Overbaugh (1827), 6 Cowen. 746 1 1'J9 Rees r. Rees (1S73). L. R. 3 P. A: D. 84 : 29 L. T. 375 141 Rees V. Smith (1816) 2 Stark. R. 30 272 Rees V. Walters (183S), 3 M. & W. 527 ; 2 Jur. 378 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 138 431, 1116 Ressi'. Williams (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 314 1209 Reeside, Schooner, The (1837). 2 Sumn. 567 766, 783 Reeve's Trusts, Re (1879), 4 Ch. D. 841 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 412 144 Reeve v. Bird (1831), 1 C. M. Ac R. 31 : 4 Tyr. 612 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 282 .... 660 Reeve v. Hodson (1853), 10 Hare, App. xix 1037, 1053 Reeve v. Whitmore (1865). 2 Dr. k Sm. 446 483 Reeve v. Wood (1865), 34 L. J. M. C. 15 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 58 ; 5 B. & S. 364 894 Reeves v. Hearue (18:J6), 1 M. & iV. 323 ; 2 Gale, 4 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 156 . . 716 Reeves v. Lindsay (18(i9j. I. R. 3 E<i. 509 Reeves v. Slater (1827), 7 B. i C. 486 : 1 M. & R. 265 Reffell V. Retfell (1866), L. R. 1 P. & D. 139 ; 35 L. J. P. & M. 121 697 543 756 899 746 599 Regicides, Trial of the (1660), Kel. J. 12 ; 6 How. St. Tr. 1181 Reidf. Batte(1829), M. & M. 414 281, 286, 287, Reidi). Langlois (1849), 1 Ma^. & G. 627; 19 L. J. Ch. 337 ; 2H. &T. 59.. Reid V. Margisoii (1SU8), 1 Camp. 469 1018 Reid V. Teakle (1853). 13 C. B. 627 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 161 ; 17 Jur. 841 .... Reidpiith's oa.*e (1870), 40 L. J. Ch. 39 ; 11 L. R. Eq. 86 ; 23 L. T. 834 ; 19 W. R. 219 Reidy v. Pierce (1861). 11 Ir. C. L. R. 374 Reilly v. Fitagerald (1843), 6 Ir. E. R. 335 409, Reimers v. Druce (1857), 26 L. J. Ch. 196 ; 23 Beav. 145 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 147.. Remmett r. Lawrence (1850), 15 Q. B. 1004 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 25 ; 14 Jur. 1067 106 155 19 1105 1147 549 Rendles, Re, Rhodes v. Rhodes (see Rhodes, Re, &c.). Reneaux v. Teakle (1853), 8 Ex. 680; 22 L. J. Ex. 241 ; 17 Jur. 351 .... 166 Renner v. Bank of Columbia (1824), 9 ^Vheat. 581 767 Reunie V. Clarke (1850, 5 Ex. 292; 19 L. J. Ex. 278 541 Renuie v. Wynn (1849), 4 Ex. 691 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 2 641 Vol. I. end* with page 635. clxxvi TABLK OF CASES CITED. PAaE UeuniKon v. Walker (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 143 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 43 ; 26 L. T. 1G7; 20 W. R. 471 187 Rosp. V. Fi.l.l.s (182-.'-4), Peck, R. 140 655 Re.sp. V. MoCurty (1781), 2 Dull. 8(i 561, 574 Reu».s V. Pick>lcv (1860), L. R. 1 E.x. 342; 35 L. J. Ex. ■>]»; 4 II. & C. 588 ; 15 L T" 25 ; 14 VV. R. !2» : 12 Jnr. N. S. 628 675 Renter v. Elccitrio Telegr. Co. (1856), 6 E. & B. 346 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 46 ; 2 Jnr. N. S. 1215 642, 645 Rovell, Ex parte, Tollemnche. In re (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 720, 727 ; 64 L. J. Q. B. 80, 92 : 51 L. T. 376, 379 ; 33 W. R. 288, 289 629 Revell r. Blake (1873), 41 L. J. C. P. 129; 42 L. J. C. P. 165; L. R. 8 C. P. 533; 29 L. T. 67 ; 22 W. R. 96 1157 R«vis V. Smith (1856), 18 C. B. 126 ; 29 L. J. C. P. 195; 2 Jur. N. S. 614. . 865 Rew V. Barber (1824), 3 Cowon, 272 775 Rew V. Hutchins (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 829 230 Reynell v. Lewis (1846), 15 M. & W. 517 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 25 540, 541 Reynell v. Sprye (1846), 10 Beav. 51; 16 L. J. Ch. 117 602, 603, 607 Rcyner v. Hall (1813), 4 Tauu.-725 ; 14 R. R. 650 552 Reyner v. Pearson (1812), 4 Taun. 662 ; 13 R. R. 723 388 Royiiold.s, Ex parte ' :83). 52 L. J. Ch. 223 ; 21 Ch. D. 601 ; 47 L. T. 495 ; 31 W. R. 187 . 849 Reynolds, Ex parte, ..teynolds, Re (1882), 20 Ch. D. 294 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 756 ; 46 L. T. 508 ; 30 W. R. 651 ; 46 J. P. 533 964 Reynolds, Re (1873), L. R. 3 P. & D. 35 ; 42 L. J. P. & M. 20 ; 28 L. T. 144; 21 W. R. 512 709 Reynolds v. Feuton (1846), 3 C. B. 194 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 16 ; 10 Jur. 668 . . 8, 1146, 1148 Reynolds t>. Reynolds (1848), 12 Ir. Ch. R. 172, 181 117 Reynolds v. Staines (1849), 2 C. & K. 745 1219 Reynoldson r. Perkins (1 769), Anib. '163 497 Rhodes, Re, Rhodes v. Rhodes (1887), 36 Ch. D. 686; 56 L. J. Ch. 825 ; 57 L. T. 652 172 Rhodes v. Airdale Drain. Com. (1876), 45 L. J. C. P. 337 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 508; 31 L. T. 69 1160 Rhodes f. Rhodes (1889), 7 App. Cas. 112; 46L. T. 463; SOW. R. 709.. 741 Rioardo v. Garcias (1845), 12 CI. & Fin. 368; 9Jur. 1019. .1117, 1142, 1143, 1152 Riccardf. Inclosure Conimiss. (1854), 4 E. & B. 329; 3 C. L. R. 119; 24 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; iJur. N. S. 496 Ii85 Rice, In re (1886), 32 Ch. D. 35 ; 66 L. J. Ch. 709 ; 64 L. T. 689 ; 34 W. R. 747 1208 Rice, Re (1870), Ir. R. 5 Eq. 176 690 Rice V. Howard (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 681 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 311 ; 34 W. R. 532. 939 Rice r. Rice (1853), 2 Drew. 73 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 289 542 Richf). Jackson (1794), 4 Bro. C. C. 619 743, 750, 757 Richards v. Bassett (1830), 10 B. & C. 633 398, 408 Richards v. Bliick (1848), 6 Dowl. & L. 325 ; 6 B. 437 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 17 . 192 Richards v. Easto (1846), 15 M. & W. 244 ; 3 Dowl. & L. 616 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 163 ; 10 J<ir. 696 227 Richards 1'. Gellatly (1872), L. R. 7 C P. 127; 26L.T. 435; 20W. R. 630.. 1186 Richards v. Gofyarty (1870), I. R. 4 C. L. 300 436 Richards r. Hough (1882), 51 L. J. Q. B. 361 ; 30 W. R. 676 900, 906 Richards v. Johnston (1859), 4 H. & N. 660 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 322 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 520 629 Richards t>. Lewis (1852), 11 C. B. 1054; 20 L. J. C. P. 177; 16 Jur. 612.. 303, 305, 1204 Richards v. Lond. & S. Coast Ry. Co. (1849;, 7 C. B. 839 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 49; 18 L. J. C. P. 251 ; 13 Jur. 986 201 Richards f. Porter (1827), 6 B. & C. 437 672 Richards «. Richards (1731), 16 East, 294, n. (rt); 13 R. R. 475, n 171 Richards v. Richards (1844), 2 M. & Rob. 567 246, 255 Richards f. Rose (1852), 9 Ex. 218; 2 C. L. R. 311: 23 L. J. Ex. 3 115 Richardson v. Anderson (1805), 1 Camp. 65, n. (<i) ; 10 R. R. 028, n 1011 Richardson v. Barry (1860), 29 Beav. 22 712 The rcjtrencet an to page», not to paragraph*. TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxvii PAOB EicTiardson v. Dubois (1869), L. R. 5 Q. B. 61 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 69 ; 21 L. T. 6.i5; 18W. R. 62; 10 B. & S. 830 167 Richardson v. Gittord(1834), 1 A. &E.r)0; 8Dowl.&R.643; 2Sm.L. C. 112. 654 Richardson v. Mellinh (18i4), 2 Bin<r. 241 1048, 1049, lO.iO Richardson v. Nowcomb (1838), 21 Pick. 315 1223 Richardson v. Watson (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 737 ; 1 N. & M. 567; 2 L. J. K. B. 134 740, 789 Richardson r. Williamson (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 276 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 145 . 780 Richardson r. Willis (1872), 42 L. R. Ex. 15 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 2fi8 ; 27 L. T. 828; L. R. 8 Ex. 69 190, 1071 Richardson r. Younge (1871), L. R. 10 Eq. 275 ; L. R. 6 Ch. 478 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 475 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 338 ; 25 L. T. 230 ; 19 W. B. 012 491 Riches and Marshall's Trnst Deed, Rp (18()4), 4 De G. J. & S. 581 ; 11 L. T. 651 ; 34 L. J. Bank. 10 ; 13 W. K. 353 160 Richey f. Garvcy (1817), 10 Ir. L. R. 514 298 Ridiniond r. Smith (1830\ 8 B. & C. 9 ; 2 M. & R. 235 102 Rickards r. Murdock (1830). 10 B. & C. 627 934 Ri(^kotts V. Bennett (1847), 4 C. B. 686 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 17 ; 11 Jur. 1002. . 160 Ricketts r. Gumey (181(1), 7 Pri.'e, 699 866, 8(18 Ricketts c. Tnrqiiand (1848), 1 11. L. Cas. 472 784 Rickford v. Ridjre (1810), 2 Camp. 539 32 Rickman r. Carstairs (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 602 789 Rideout's Trusts, Ru (1870), L. R. 10 Eq 41: 39 L. .T. Cli. 102 021 Rider v. Wood (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 737 ; 1 K. & J. 644 6 Ridgeway r. Darwin (1802), 7 Ves. 404 ; 8 Vcs. 65 ; 6 R. R. 227 482 Ridsjway v. Ewbaiik (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 218 258, 259 Ridgway v. Wharton (1856-7), 3 De G. M. & G. 677 ; II. L. Cas. 238 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 46 672, 673 Ridlcr, Re, Ridlor t'. Ridler (1882), 22 Ch. D. 74 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 343 135 Ridley V. Gyde (1832), 9 Bing. 349 ; 2 Moo. & So. 448 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 25 . . 376, 380 RidU>y r. Ridley (1805), 34 L. J. Ch. 462 ; 34 Bcav. 478 ; 12 L. T. 481 ; 13 W. R. 763; 11 Jur. N. S. 475 682 Rigden v. Vallier (1751), 2 Ves. sen. 252 ; 3 Atk. 731 139 Rigg V. Curgenven (1769), 2 Wils. 39!) 519, 550, 554 Rigge V. Burbidge (1816). 15 M. & W. 598 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 309 ; 4 Dowl. & L. 1 532, 1122 Bight, on d. of Flower, r. Darby (1786), 1 T. R. 162 ; 1 R. R. 169 35 Right V. Price (1770), 1 Doug. 241 696 Riley V. GerrLsb (18.)1), 9 Cash. 1 "4 758, 1205 Rilev V. Home (1828), 5 Bing. 217; 2 M. & P. 331 771 Ripley, Re (1858), 1 S. & T. 08 747 Ripley v. Warren (1824), 2 Pick. 592 20 Bipon case (1833), Cock. & R. 301 ; Per. & K. 211 496, 4i)7 Ripon V. Davies (1833), 2 N. & M. 310 607 Rippon V. Prie.'^t (1863), 3 F. & F. 644 1163 Rishton V. Nesbitt (1844), 2 M. & Rob. 554 421 Rishton r. Nisbett (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 347 866, 869 Rishton V. Whatmore (1878), 8 Ch. D. 467 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 629; 26 W. K. 827 073, 730 Rising )'. Dolphin (1840), 8 Dowl. 309 732 Rist f. Faux (1863), 4 B. & S. 409; 32 L. J. Q. B. 386 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 202 ; 8 L. T. 737; 11 W. R. 918 253 Ritchie «'. Van Geldt. (1854), 9 Ex. 762: 18 Jur. 385 193 River Steam Co., Re (Mitchell's Claim) (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 822 ; 25 L. T. 319; :j W. R. 1130 710 Roach V. Garvan (1748), 1 Ves. sen. 159 1150 Robarts v. Tucker (1851), 16 Q. B. 560 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 270 547 Robbr. Connor (1874), Ir. 9 Eq. 373 818 Robb V. Starkey (1845), 2 C. & K. 143 310 Roberts, Ex parte (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 192 ; 2 H. & T. 391 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 368 : 3 De G. & 8m. 205 540 Roberts, ^e. Ex p. Brook (18"9). 10 Ch. D. 100; 48 L. J. Bank. 22; 39 L. ' . 458 ; 27 W. R. 255 662 Vol. J. *nds with page 636. V i il i . clxxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED. pAes Roberts v. AUatt (1828), M. & M. 192 965, 967 Roberts V. Bethell (1852), 12 0. B. 778 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 69 ; 16 Jar. 1087. . 147 Roberts v. Bradshaw (1815), 1 Stark. 28 317 Roberts V. Doxon (1791), Pea. K. 85; 3 R. R. 660 323 Roberta v. Eddington (1801), 4 Esp. 88 1178 Roberts v. Fortune (1742), HarK. Law Tracts, 468, n 1 1U3 Roberts v. Humphreys (188>), L. R. 8 Q. B, 483 ; 42 L. J. M. 0. 147 ; 29 L. T. 387 ; 21 W. R. 8So 266 Roberts i: Justice (1843), 1 C. & K. 93 613 Roberts v. Ogilby (1821), 9 Price, 269 546 Roberts v. Orchard (1833), 2 H. & C. 769 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 65 ; 9 L. T. 727 ; 12 W. R. 253 226 Roberts r. Phillips (1855), 4 E. & B. 450 ; 3 C. L. R. 513 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 171; 1 Jnr. N. S. 444 700 Roberts v. Roberts (1862), 2 8. & T. 337 ; 31 L. J. P. M. & A. 46 ; 5 L. T. 689 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 220 709 Roberts V. Snell (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 577 194 Roberts v. Tucker (1849\ 3 Ex. 632 681 Roberts' case (1827). 1 Dev. 259 566 Robertson t'. French (1803), 4Ea8t,130; 4 Esp. 246 ; 7 R. R. 535. .116, 740, 741 Robertson v. Jackson (1845), 2 C. B. 412 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 28 ; 10 Jur. 98. . 763, 764, 782 Robertson v. Powell (1864), 2 H. & C. 762 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 34 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 442 ; 12 W. R. 623 704 Robertson K. Struth (1813), 5 Q. B. 942; Dav. & M. 773; 8 Jur. 404.. 83, 1143, 1154 Robins v. Bridge (1837), 3 M. & W. 114 ; 6 Dowl. 140 : M. & H. 357. . . . 820 Robins V. Dolphin (1858), 29 L. J. P. & M. 11, 138 ; 7 H. L. Gas. 390; 3 Mauq. 563; 1 S. & T. 518; 8 W. R. 177 1144 Robinson r. Anderson (1855), 20 Beav. 98 : 7 De G. M. & G. 239 160 Robinson t'. Brown (1845), 3 C. B. 754; 10 L. J. C. P. 46 316, 317 Robinson v. Collingwood (1865), 17 C. B N. S. 777 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 18; 10 Jur. N. S. 1080; 11 L. T. 313; 13 W. R. 84 148 il. . inson v. Curry (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 465 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 561 ; 45 L. T. .8 ; 30 W. R. 39 ; 46 J. P. 148 76 i' ibiuson V. Davies (1879), 5 Q. B. D. 26; 49 L. J. Q. B. 218; 28 W. R. 255 . 347 Ivobiuson v. Davison (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 269 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 172 ; 'M L. T. 755 ; 19 W. R. 1036 780 Robinson v. Harman (1818), 1 Ex. 850 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 202 773 Robinson v. Hawksford (1846), 9 Q. B. 52; 15 L. J. Q. B. 377; 10 Jur. 964.. 32 Robinson v. liitchin (1856), 21 Beav. 365 ; 8 De G. M. & G. 88 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 44 1 MI Robinson v. Local Board of Barton (1882), 8 App. Cas. 798 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 226 ; 50 L. T. 57 ; 32 W. R. 249 47, 48 Robinson v. Markis (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 375 329, 349 Robinson «;. MoUett (1875), L. R. 7H. L. 802; 41 L. J. C. P. 302; 33L.T. 544 158 Robinson v. Nahon (1808), 1 Camp. 245 639 Robinson f. Robinson (1 879), L. R. 2 P. Div. 76 ; 46 L. J. P. 47 ; 36 L. T. 414; 25 VV. R. 376 89 Robinson v. Robinson and Lane (1858), 1 S. & T. 362 ; 27 L. J. P. & M. 91 ; 5 Jur. N. 8. 3f 2 502, 562 Robinson v. Sco',ney (1816), 19 Ves. 684 482 Robinson v. Swett (1825),3 Grecnl. 316 377, 1117 Robinson v. Touray (1813), 1 M. & Sol. 217 ; 3 Camp. 158 ; 13 R. R. 781. . 1196 Robinson v. United States (1871), 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 363 782 Robinson v. Vaughton (1838), 8 0. i P. 262 294 Robinson v. Vernon, Ld. (1859), 7 C. B. N. S. 235 ; 29 L. J. C. P. 310. .281, 746 Robinson v. Wakefield, (1892), 30 L. R. Ir. 547 644 Robinson v. Yarrow (1817), 7 Taun. 455 ; 1 Moore, C. P. 150 ; 18 R. R. 637 547, 548 Robinson's case (1603), 5 Rep. 32 b 92 Robson V. Alexander (1828), 1 M. & P. 448 517 The references are to pages, not to paragraph*. TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxix i PA»H Rohson ». Att.-Gen. (:843), 10 CI. & Fin. 500 416, 422 RobHou V. Eaton (1785), 1 T. R. 62 1112 Eobsonv. Kem()(1803), 4 P'lp. 234 498, 611 Ellison V. N. East. Ry. Co. (1876), 46 L. J. Q. B. 60 ; 2 Q. B. D. 85; 35 L. T. o3.i ; Jd W. R. 418 38 Robson V. Rolls (1833), 9 Bing. 648 ; 2 M. & Sc. 786 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 80 . . 379 Ro<:h V. Callen (1847). 6 Hare, 531 ; 17 L. J. Ch. 144 ; 12 Jur. 112 808 Rocliester, Dean and C. of, v. Pierce (1808\ 1 Canxp. 466 97, 643 Rochfort V. Sedley (Irtfil), 12 Ir. C. L. R. App. iv 476 Roddam v. Morley (1857), 25 L. J. Ch. 329 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 438 ; 1 De G. 6 J. 1 ; 3 Jut. N. 8. 449 i:<8, 448, 497, 720 Roden V. Lond. Small Arms Co. (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 213 ; 35 L. T. 505 ; 25 W. R. 269 784 Rodpn V. Rvde (1843), 4 Q. B. 626 ; 3 G. & D. 604 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 276 ; 7 Jur. 213 1218 Rodriques v. Mclhuihh (1854), 10 Ex. 110 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 26 178 Rodriquez f. Tadmire (1799), 2 Eep. 721 252 Rodwell V. Osjrood (1825), 3 Peck. 379 82 Rodwell V. Phillips (1842), 9 M. & W. 505 ; 1 Do^vl. N. S. 885 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 217 685, 686, 687 Rodwell V. Hedge (1824), 1 C. & P. 220 105 Roe f. Birkenhead, Lane, & Ches. Junct. Ry. Co. (1851), 7 Ex. 36; 6 Railw. Caw. 795 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 9 643 Roe V. Davis (1806), 7 East. 303 300 Roe V. Day (1830), 7 C. & P. 705 484 Roe V. Fcrrars (1801), 2 Bos. & P. 548 ' 48'', Roe V. Harrison (1788), 2 T. R. 430 ; 1 R. R. 513 522 Roev. Harvey (1769), 4 Burr. 2084 109 RoBf. Horsey (1771), 3 Wile. 174 84 Roev. Ireland (1809), 11 East, 280; 10 R. R. 504 123 Roe V. Minshal (1759), cited B. N. P. 96 522 Roe V. Nix, (1892), Times Newspaper, 2 December, 1892, and following days. 1102 Roe V. Parker (1792). 5 T. R. 32 402, 403 Roe V. Rawlings (1815), 7 East, 291 ; 3 Smith, 254 ; 8 R. R. 632 87, 417. 436, 437, 1227 Roe V. Reade (1799), 8 T. R. 1 18 127 Roe V. Wilkins (1835), 4 A. & E. 86 ; 5 N. & M. 434 1212 Roev. York, Archb. of (1805), 6 East, 86; 2 Smith, 166; 8R. R.413..128, 658,659 Roffey V. Henderson (1851), 17 Q. B. 674 637 Roffey i> Smith (1834), 6 C. & P. 622 223 Rogei.i V. Allen (1808). 1 Camp. 309 ; 10 R. R. 689 432 Rogers t'. Custance (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 181 313 Rogers v. Goodenough (1862), 2 S. & T. 342 ; 31 L. J. P. & M. 49 709 Rogers 1). Hadley (1863), 32 L. J. Ex. 241 ; 2 H. & C. 227 746 Rogers v. Payne (1768), 2 Wils. 276 750 Rogers «). Pitcher (1818), 6 Taun. 202; 1 Marsh. 541 99 Rogers v. Powell (1869), 38 L. J. Ch. 648 ; 18 W. R. 282 631 Rogers f. Spence(I846), 12 CI. & Fin. 700 (■64 Rogers f. Taylor ( 1858), 2 H. & N. 828; 27 L. J. Ex. 173 114, 115 Rogers v. Wood (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 245 395, 406 Rohan V. Hanson (1853), 11 Cush. (Mass.), 446 745 Rokoby Peerage (IK::), Pari. Miu. 4 424 Roles V. Davis (1859), 4 H. & N. 484 ; 1 F. & F. 563 ; 28 L. .T Ex. 287 ; 33 L. T. 166 186, 191 Rolf V. Dart (1800), 2 Taunt. 51 1018 Rolfe, Ex parte. Re Spindler (1881), 19 Ch. D. 98; 61 L. J. Ch. 88; 45L. T. 482; 30 W. R. 52; 46 J. ":>, 181 136 Rolls V. Pearce (1877), 5 Ch. D. 730 ; 36 L. T. 438 ; 25 W. R. 899 6.^8 RoUason v. Leon (1862), 7 H. & N. (3 : 31 L. J. Ex. 96 649 Roltv. White (1802), 3 De G. J. & S. 360 538 Ronaynet'. Sherr.ard (1877), 11 Ir. R. C. L. 146 682 Ronkendorff v. Taylor (1830), 4 Pet. 349, 360 1173 Rooke V. Ld. Kensington (1856), 2 Kay & J. 753 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 795 749 Vol. I, ends tvith page 636. .1 m, I clxxx TAHI.K OF CASKS CI'IKD. Hooker )'. Tl.H.kcr iiml Nrwfoii ^lH(il), 3:1 L..I. P. & M. 12; 3 S. & T. r>'>r, O.Tur. N. S. lii'Jll; 12 \V. U. 81)7 nil, l/SO Kowot). J'lirkor (IT'.i.!), !> I. H. ;il LM'i ]i()wo r. Rdwo (INIM), 2 I)e (i. it Hin. '-J'.»7; 17 L. J. Cli. 3i)7 «()(; Ilowo r. Tipixr (IH.'),!), i:{ C. U. 211) ; 22 L. J. C. T. 136; 17 Jur. 410. . .. :i2 Jtowliiiid V. AHlihy (1K2.')), Uy. & M. 2:t2 679 llowliimlH w. ])<( V»!(M;hi (1SH2), Cub. & K. 10 l.W, •l.Vl JlowliiiidH r. Siiinud (IH.IO), 11 Q. 15. H, ii. ; 17 L. .1. Q. 15. <!•'> 30 llowloy V. Uortw. (1826), 3 HiiiK. 2 1096 Rowloy V. Loud. & N. \V. Ky. Co. (1H73), 42 L. J. Kx. 163 ; L. II. 8 Kx. 221 m, 035 Kowntroo v. Juoob (1809), 2 Tauti. 141 1)2 lloyiil A(iuariiim r. I'arkiiiwm, (1802) 1 Q. T5. 431 ; 01 L. J. Q. B. 409; U(i L. T. 613 ; 40 W. K. 460 ; 60 .1. V. 404 809 Koyal Hunk, &<•.. v. Tottoiiluim (181)1), R. 601) ; (18!)4) 2 Q. B. 716 ; 04 L. J. Q. 15. 1)1) ; 61 L. T. 622 ; 43 W. R. 22 yIM. [540] RoyalKx. Ahh. Co.f. Mo()re(1803),2Now.Cii.(i3; 8L.T.242; 11W.R.602. 758 Koylo V. llarriM, (181)6) P. 103 ; 04 L. J. P. 06 ; 43 W. R. 362 ; 72 L. T. 474 Adi/. [090] Riidd V. "Wright (1832), 1 Ph. Kv. 240 390, 440 Ruild(K!k V. MiirHh (1867), 1 II. & N, 001 106 Th« refereticet are to paget, not to paragraph4. i m TAHLE OF CAoiiS CITIOD. clxxxi PwIko I'. M'CartJiv (ISll), I Tr. L. Tl. IC.l FAOB '28ft KnsNcll r. Killer ( iM.ll). (>(... iV l'. lUi Mzn, !n>(( KiisMc'll c. Ht. Aul)vn(lS7(i),'J(Ui.I).:i!iH; Id L.,1. Cli.Oil ;;(."> L. T. ;!'jr>.S(i(;, 1!.>3 KiiswU c. Smyth (181'J), i) M. & W. SIO; 1 Dowl. N. S. '.I'J'J ; II I,.. I, Kx. ;ii)H lll'J. 111(1, l'J17 UiiHtr. linker (1H;!7), S Sim. •ll;l 172 Itii.stell r. Miie(|iiiNter (LSOil), 1 Cimi]). I'.), ii 214 Jlutlierl'circl, We (IHSO), 11 Cli. 1). ()«7 ; 111 1-. .1. Cli. d.VI ; II! I,. '1'. Kiri ; ■IH W. R. 802 7 1« KiitliitMrM, CouiitcsM (if, eiiHd (KiO;')), (! (!i). Kej). filii S3, 7111 Kiitlerr. (!lmi>miiii (1811), 8'M. & W. liSH ; 1 Dowl. N. 8. '8; i") .lur. (ilO; 11 L. .r. Kx. 178 476 Butler I'. Treureiit (187!>), '18 L. J. Cli. 7'.ll ; 12 <'li. I). 7.'>8 : II L. 'I'. l(i : 27 \V. li. i)()2 221 PyilU f. lliiiiniim (1817), 1(1 lleiiv. .■);!(; ; 1(> I,. .1 . Cli. CM ; ll.lur. 7(il .. 7!I8 Ityan v. D.ilmi (1S72), I. I{. 7 Iv]. '.12 818 liyiiii V. Nolini (iK(;i-,')), I. |{. ;t ('. L. ;!H) l(>(> Kyim r. UiiiK (18i)()), ^Ci I.. U. Ir. ISl 1170 Ifyiiii r. Kyuii (I8l(i), 2 I'liill. Kee. L. ;i;i2 11 14 llviiii r. Uyiiii (l8Si)), 2i") Ii. U. Ir 18;") 4i")i'), 4o7 Kvmi r. HimiH (1818), 12 Q. H. ICO ; 17 L. J. <i I!. 271 : 12 .Tiir. 74.') Hi!) ]<yl)eix '•• Wvlier^ (I8(i;i), ;!2 L. J. P. & M. Hi ; 1 1 W. K. .')()2 !»;ti) liVder f. IMii'lhonie (18;n). eitod 2 Rush. \- Mv. IC'.I 418 Ityder c. Woinluvell (18(18), 118 L. J. Kx. 8 ; L. 11. 4 Kx. :)2 ; 10 L. T. 491; 17 VV. 11. 107 28,48, 49 SAPi.KKf. RdbiiiH (1808), 1 Camp. U'> 1142, lir):t, lir.4 Hadlier r. IIIkrh (18.'-):!), 4 H. L. Cut*. 4;i5 ; 10 Ir. V.t[. R. fy>2 2!)7, 7!»2 Sa^re r. Wileox (1820), (i Conn. 81 (>(!!) SiiiiiHluiry r. AlaUliowH (18;)8), 4 M. & W. ;il7 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 7 Dnwl. 2;i. . 1K7, nil, (;8() St. Oatlierino'H Hospital nnw (1(172), 1 Vent. Iftl 1 17<.» St.. Devereux r. Much Dew <;hur<'li (17(11-2). 1 W. HI. 11(17 2!i.'> St. OeorKo v. St. Maixaret (17()<>), I Salk. 12;i 102 St. I,OHky I'. Green (18(10), <J V,. U. N. S. ;!70 ; 2 K. \- I"'. 100 ; aoL. .1. O. J". 101 ; 7 .Tiir. N. S. ;104 ; 3 L. T. 207 ; W. R. 110 188, 194 Sainter v. i'VrKUson (1840), 7 C. 11. 727 ; 18 L. J. C. 1'. 217 44 Saint-liill v. Hoiiml (1802), 4 K^p. 74 9.)7 Halo V. Laml)ert (1874), L. R. 18 K<|. 1 ; 4;i L. J. Ch. 470 ; 22 W. R. 478. . 071 SuliMlmry v. Marwliull (1820), 4 (\ & T. Ofi 774 Salislmry, M. of v. Ut. North. Ky. Co. (18f)8), (i C. U. N. 8. 174 ; 28 L. J. C. 1'. 40 ; T) Jiir. N. S. 70 112 Salkeldr. .loluiHon (1841), 1 llaro, 180 ; 11 L. J. Cli. 201 7> Salkeld I). JohiiMon (1810), 2 C. H. 740 7i) Salkeld V. JohuHon (1840, Hhould bo 1848), 2 Kx. 250 ; 18 L. J. Kx 80 . . 76 I'ol. I, etuis with page 035, !i clxxxii TAliLK OF CASKS CITKI). F40S Hiilmkvrl.urj^ v. r«)mmiHky (1HS4), V> Q. B. D. 'ilH ; .i;) L. J. Q. B. IJH ; ;J2 W. U. 7M 834 Salmon r. VV.a.l) (IH'>2), 3 II. li. C.iH. /-.lO ; i;Ui. II. HS(J If,! S:tloui'L'i V. WcHxlimisH (uiidiitrd), 2 Turk. liiN. 721 1 1 l!> .SiilU) r. ThomiiH (ISOJ), 3 15. & P. IHH JCWd, 1051, 1 172 SttltmarNli v. lliinly (lH7;i\ 42 Ti. J. Ch. 42'i VXi SiiinmoriHi'. niiil<'y(lH'J(t),2»(i. H 1). 727; MJj.JM. l!.:tli; ;m W. ll.lior).. i)(il Saiiipwrn f. Yurillcy (l()(i7), 2 Kol). '223, jd. 71, I!) Car. 2 3(17 HanlM.ni v. Noilwiii (IH2H), •» New. llaiii|iH. i')()l 515 Saiidertt v. Mac l.iiii (18M3), 11 (i. B. D. ,327 ; f)2 L. J. Q. B. IHl ; I'J L. T. 4t)2 ; 31 W. U. (I'JH 6 Sttiident f. MtTtdith (1H2H), 3 M. \: Uy. 110 461 HaiidfT!. r. St. Neot'a Union (IHIli), 8 Q. B. 810; l.'i L. J. M. (,*. 101 ; 10 Jur. .'.t;ti (! 1 1 , 044 Sandcrx .. SaudiTH (1882), I'J C'h. 1). 380; Til L. J. C.'li. 271) ; 4.'> L. T. 037; 30 W. K. 281 721 Saudcrwm r. Odlnian (1813), 4 M. & Or. 209 ; 1 Snott, N. H. 038; 11 L. J. C. P. 270 •. !)0, 547 Sanderson v. (iravtH (1875), L. R. 10 Kx. 234 ; 44 L. .1. Kx. 210; 3;( L. T. 209 ; 1 1 L. J. P. 270 ; 33 W. U. 7i»7 752 Sanderson v. Ni'slor (182(1), Ky. iV M. 402 1 139 Sandcrwin r. Svmondu (1819), I B. & H. 430 ; 4 Mooro (C. P.)42..119t, 1195, liOl Saudcrw.n r. WfHtlry (1810), M. & VV. 98; 8 Dowl. 412; 9 L. J. Kx. 204 732 Sandford r. RcniinKtou (179;t), 2 Vns. 189 ; 2 K. 11. 19.) Oil SandilandN, R.' (1871), L. R. C. P. 411 ; 24 L. T. 273; 19 W. R. 041 .. 134 Sandiiands r. MarHh (1819), 2 B. & Aid. (173 101, 380 Sandys r. IIod^fHon (i839), 10 A. & E. 472 ; 2 P. &D. 435 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 31 . .5J2, 549 Sanford r. Cliasi; (1824), 3 Cowcn, 381 809 Sanford v. RaiktH (1810), 1 Mer. 053 781 SanKMttT r. Mazarreilo (1810), 1 Stark. 101 495 Saph r. Atkin.'wm (18J2), 1 Add. 215 1223 Sarell r. Wine (1803), 3 Kawt, 409 714 Sar^cwju r. Sealy (1742), 2 Atk. 412 1102 Sari r. Bourdillon (18.50), 20 L. J. C. P. 78 ; 1 C. B. N. S. 188 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1208 070, 071, 672 8a..*try Velaider v. Sembecutty (1881), 6 App. Cas. 304 ; 60 L. J. P. C. 28 ; 44 L. T. 895 149 Satterthwaite r. Powell (1838), I Curt. 705 174 SaunderM, Re (1805), 35 L. J. P. & M. 26; L. R. 1 P. & 1). 16 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 1027 ; 14 W. R. 148 702 Saundera f. Bates (1857), 1 H. & N. 402 189 Saunders f. Cramer (1812), 3 Dr. & War. 187 <;09 Saunders v. Mills (1829), 3 M. & P. 520 ; BinK- 213 245 Saanderat'. Saunders (1818), 6 Notes of Cases, 518 143 Saunders r. Topp (1849), 4 Kx. 390 ; 18 'j. J. Kx. 374 089, 090 Saunderson v. .Jackson (18(10), 2 B. & P. '238 ; 3 Ksp. 180 ; 5 R. R. 580.. 074, 075 Sauudorson v. Jud^e (1795), 2 H. Bl. 509 ; 3 R. R. 492 155 Savage f. (1780). 1 Doug. 350, n. 4 151 Savage v. Binney (1834), 2 Dowl. 043 34 1 Savage r. Canning (1807), I. R. 1 C. L. 434 188 Savage r. Ilutehinson (185.5), 24 L. J. Cli. 232 ; 2 Eq R. 308 1030 Savery r. King (1850), 5 H. L. C. 02 (, 0.55, 050; 2 Jur. N. S. 503; 25 L.J. Ch. 482 137 Sawyer v. Birchmore (1835), 3 My. & K 672 593, 608 Sawver v. Kifert (1820), 2 Nott. & M'C. 511 250 Sawyer v. Maine Fire and Mar. Ins. Co. (1839), 12 Mass. 291 1147 Save and Sele Peer. (1840), 1 II. of L. Cas. 607 101, 109:1 Sayer r. Olossop (1848), 2Ex. 409; 17 L. J. Kx. 300 1229 Sayer v. Kitehen (1791), 1 Ksp. 200 1191 Sayer v. Wagstaff (1842), 5 Beav. 402 ; 13 L. J. Ch. 161 ; 3 Jur. 1083 . . 9i3 Sayers v. Walsh (18 18), 12 Ir. L. R. 435 615 Sayre v. Hnghes (1808), L. R. 6 Eq. 370 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 401 ; 10 W. R. 002 ; 18 L. T. 347 ; : 008 Bayward v. Stevens (1854), 69 Mass. (3 Gray), 97—102 757 The referenceit are to paye», not to paragraph), ' — TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. clxxxiii PAUB Siiiiifo V. Farraiit (187.)), 44 L. J. Kx. .'iO, 230 ; L. R. 10 Ex. 338 ; 33 L. T. •278 ; 23 W. U H »() 772 S<!(ilim .'. Ki'y (18 10), II A. & K. HI!) ; 3 P. & I). 605 108 Sciiriiirmii^fii v. HUi\n\) (1880), i> C. 1'. D. 29i) ; 40 L. J. U. T. 074 ; 42 L. T. 804 ; 28 \V. It. (11) 1 770 K(!li(>ilii«l c. Kiiirlmini (170!»)- 1 Boh. & P. 388 37 SiiliiUl.y r. VVchU'iiIk.Iz (1870), 40 L. J. Q. U. 73 ; L. K. 6 Q. B. 160; 24 L. T. i)3; 19 W. H. .')87 1M7 H<hmfUz V. Avery (18,'il), 1(1 Q. B. nr>'> ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 228 ; 15 Jiir. 201.. 759 S<ihii<'i(l(T r. NorriH (1814). 2 M. ic Sri. 2H(i ; 15 It. It. 250 67*^ 8<ili<>li(l(l, Kx luiito, In r.) Firth (1877), (i Ch. D. 230 ; 40 L. J. Bauk. 112 ; 37 K. T. 2H I ; 20 W. H.. 9 900 8«ai(ifii'lcl r. HcHj) (1859), 28 L. J. Cti. 104; 27 B.'iiv. 93; 1 Jiir. N. S. 10(17.. 800 Schi.ticlil r. LnmlcHloroutrh (Lord), (1895) 14 11. (Murcli), 233; (1H95) 1 (i. B. 5;i0 ; 04 L. J. Q. B. 293 ; 72 L. T. Ki ; 43 \V. R. 331 i,U. [1205] iSclioloK I'. Chndwirk (1813), 2 M. & Bob. ,507 140, 511 SdholoH r. Hilton (1842), 10 M. Ac W. 16 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 229; II L. J. Kx. 332 832, 833 Schohiy f. (}(M).lnmn (1823), 1 Binff. 349 : 8 Moon-, C. P. 350; 1 C. \: P. 30.. 501 Scilioli'y r. Wiilton (1S44). I2M. & W. 514; 13 L. J. Kx. 122 492 8(!liultz r. AHtloy (1830), 2 Bing. N. C. 544 ; 2 Scott, 816 ; 1 1Io(1ki'h, 642; 7 C. & P. 99 547, 1205 Sfihwiillx', Till) (1801), LiiHh. 239 ; 14 Moo. P. 0. C. 241 ; 4 L. T. 100. .. . 178 8(ioont'H V. Murrcll (1839), 1 Bi-iiv. 251 112 Soorcll V. Boxall (1827), 1 Y. & J. 390 (>87 8wtt V. Bcntl.-y (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 244 ; 1 K. & .T. 281 ; 1 .Tur. N. S. 394.. 1150 S(!ott V. BourdillioM (1800), 2 Boh. ic P. N. R. 213 ; 9 R. R. 014 703 Scott r. Brown (1892). 4 R. 42; 'Hi. B. 724; 01 L. J. Q. B. 738; 41 W. R. 110; 07 L. T. 782; 67 J. P. 213 ... 7 Scott V. Claro (1812), 3 Ciiinp. 230 293 Scott V. CoMinionwoiilth (1893), 42 Am. St. R. 371 AM. [5(i9] Scott f. Crawford (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 1031 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 781 645 Scott V. Fcnoulhctt (1784), 1 Cox, (^i. R. 79 803 Soott V. Irving (1830), 1 U. & Ad. 005 158 Scott V. Joni'H (1813), 4Taun. 805; 14 R. R. 080 289, 318 Scott V. Lifford (1808), 9 Kust, 347 ; 1 Canii). 2Ui 32 Scott V. Loud. Dock Co. (1805), 34 L. J.Kx. 220; 3 H.& C. 590; 13 L.T. 148 103 Scott V. Marshall (1832), 2 C. & J. 238 ; 2 Tyr. 257 ; 1 h. J. Kx. 97 496 Suott V. Miller (1859), 1 JolniH. 328 966 Scott V. Oxford, Ld. (1808), Pcako, 1 70, n. a ; Bull, N. P. 7 244 Soott V. Pilkiiigton (1802), 31 L. J. Q. B. 81 ; 2 B. & 8. 11 ; L. T. 21 1140, 1164 Scott V. SainpNon (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 491 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 380; 40 L. T. 412; 30 W. R. 541 ; 40 J. P. 408 256 S(!ott V. Scott (1859), 1 8. & T. 258 703 Scott V. Shearman (1775), 2 W. Bl. 977 1103 Scott V. Stannliuld (1808), L. R, 3 Ex. 220 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 155 ; 18 L. T. 672; low. R. 911 1099 Scott V. Waithnian (1822), 3 Stark. 108 1213 Soott V. Walker (1853), 2 K. & B. 555 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 404 ; 17 Jiir. 916. . 1185 Scoulerv. Plowright (1850), 10 Moo. P. C. R. 440, 444-440.. 140 Scruttonv. Childs (1877), 30 L. T. 212 740, 700 Sea Nymph, The (1800), LiiHh. Adm. R. 23 176 Soago V. Deano (1828), 4 Biiig. 469 ; 1 M. & P. 227 ; 3 C. & P. 170 754 Sealo-Hayno f. Jodrell, (1891) A. C. 304 ; 05 L. T. 57 740 Seaman v. Netherclift (1876), 1 C. P. D. 540 ; 45 L. J. C. 1'. 798 ; 34 L. T. 878 ; 24 W. R. 884 865 Soarlo V. Barrington, Ld. (1728), 2 Str. 826; 8 Mod. 278 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 1370; 3 Bro. P. C. 593 447, 451 Searle v. Keevcw (1797), 2 E«p. 598 091 Searlo r. I.averick (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 122 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 43 ; 30 L. T. 89; 22 W. R. 307 772 Searlo v. Prieo (1810), 2 Ilagg. Conn. 189 603 Searlo V. RcynoldH (1800), 7 B. & 8. 704 ; 14 L. T. 618 107 Vol. I, end* with page 636. n clxxxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOK Soarles v. Scurlett, (1802) 2 Q. B. 56 ; 61 L. J. Q. E. o73 ; 60 L. T. 837 ; 40 W. R. fiiKi ; 56 J. P. 789 1005 Seddonf. Tutop (1796), 6T. R. 607; 1 Esp. 401 ; 3 R. R. 274 1123 Seod f. Higs'ina (I860), 8 H. L. Cus. 550, 561, 565 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 314 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1264 43, 47 Selhy !■. Harris (1698), 1 Ld. Raym. 745 lOlM, 1(144 Selby V. Hills (1832), 8 Bing. 166 ; 1 Dowl. 257 ; 1 M. & So. 253 ; 1 L. J. C. P. 55 866, 870 Salby V. Selby (1817). 3 Mer. 2 ; 17 R. R. 1 Seldon v. Williams (1839), 9 Watts, 9 Selfe V. Isaacson (1858), 1 F. & F. 194 9i; Sellers r. Till (1825). 4 B. & C. 855 Sells V. Hoiire (1822), 3 B. & B. 232 ; 7 Mooro (O. P.), 36 Soils V. Sells (1860), 29 L. J. Ch. 500 ; 1 IJr. & Sm. 42 ; 8 W. R. 327 .... Selraea v. Judge (1871), L. E. 6 Q. B. 724 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 287 ; 24 L. T. 905; 19 W. R. 1110 Selway r. Clwppell (IS4I), 12 Sim. 113 : 10 L. J. Ch. 323 Solwood r. Mildmay (1797), 3 Ves. 306 ; 4 R, R. 1 Selwyu's case (1831), 3 Hiigg. Ecc. 748 Senior r. Arinytage (1816). Holt, N. P. R. 197 ; Serle v. Norton (1S41). 2 M. & Rob. 401, 401, n Sct(m V. Slade (1802), 7 Ves. 275 ; 3 R. R. 124 Sewell V. Corp (1824), 1 C. & P. 392 Sewell V. Evans (1843), 4 Q. B. 626; 12 L. J. Q 604 17 R. R. 627 ['/) B. 276; 3G. \ 0. 1218, Seymour c. Maddox (18 U), 16 Q.-B. 326 : 20 L. .T. Q. B. 327 Shiiftesbury, Ld. v. Digliy, Ld. (1676), 3 Kcb. i,:n Shall Mukhmn Lall v. Nawab Im. Dowlah (IS65), 10 Moo. Ind. App. C. 362 Shand v. Bowes (1877), 1 Q. B. D. 470 : 45 L. J. 0. B. 507 ; 2 455 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 561 ; 36 L. T. 857 ; 25 W. K. 730 Shankland r. City of Washington (1831). 5 Pet. 394 Shannon v. Biadstreet (1S03). 1 Sch. & Let". 73 ; 9 R. R. 11 . . Shapcott V. Chappcll (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 58 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 77 183 App. Cas. 32 W. R. Shardlow v. Cotterill (1881), 20 Ch. D. 90; 51 L. J. Ch. 353; 45 L. T. 572; 30 W. R. 143 670 Sharman v. Brandt (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 720 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 312 ; 19 W. R. 950 Sharp V. Carter (1735), 3 P. Wms. 375 Sharj) V. Leaidi (1862), 31 Beav. 491 ; 10 W. R. 878 ... Sharn v. Newshohnc (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 713 ; 8 Scott, 23; 3 Jur. 581 ; 9 L. J. C. P. 211 Sharp V. Scosfing (1817), Holt. N. P. R. 541 Sharper. Bingley (1817), 1 Mill. R. 373 Sharpe <-. Lamb (1840), 11 A. & E. S05 ; 3 P. & D. 451 ; 4 Jur. 905 . .SIO, Shatwell v. Hall (1842), 10 M. & W. 523 ; 2 Dowl. N. 8. 567 ; 12 L. J. E.K. 74 Shaw, Ex parte (1821), Jao. 270 Shaw V. Att.-Gen. (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 156; 39 L. J. P. 81 ; 23 L. T. 322; 18 W. R. 1145 Shawr. Bwk (1853), .S F.x. 392 Shaw V. Bran (1816). 1 Stark. R. 319 ; 18 R. R. 772 Shaw V. Broom (1824), 4 Dowl cfe R. 731 511 Shawt'. Gould (186S), L. R. 3 H. L. 55; 37L. J.Ch. 433; 18 L. T.833., Shaw V. Markham (1791), Pea. R. 165 Shaw r. Neville, cif 'd Grecnleaf on Ev. 15th ed 369 Shavf. Pioton (1825), 7 Dowl. & R. 201 ; 4 B. & C. 715 Shaw V. Port Philip Gold Mining Co. (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 103 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 369 ; 60 L. T. 685 ; 32 W. R. 77 1 Shaw r. Shaw (1802). 3 1 L. J. P. & M. 95 : 2 S. & T. 6i2 Slieiirman i'. Pvkt (1 724), cited 3 Curtcis, 539-542 Sheari In go<ids of (1881'), 60 L. J. P. 15 ; 43 L. T. 730 ; 29 W. R. 445 ; 45 J. P. 308 (^74 7S;' ,918 151 906 749 226 910 S02 174 708 32 o;5 1178 1219 778 900 711 42 758 670 1232 (.72 608 901 137 377 973 927 475 227 321 1143 272 135 ,513 1144 317 098 542 587 873 7oa 707 The re/i-reneet are to pages, not to partigrapht. TAHLE OF CASKS CITED. clxxxv FAQB Shedden v. Att.-Gen. and Patrick (1861), 30 J . J. P. & M. 217 ; 2 S. & T. 170 408, 409,412, 41.'), 1103, 1109 Shodden v. Patrick (1854), 1 Macq. 535 ; 1 Patersou, 332 1132, 1133 Bheehy f. The Profess. Life Assur. Co. (1853), 13 C. B. 787; 22 L. J. C. P. 244 1148 Sheen V. Bunipstead (1863), 2 H. & C. 193; 32 L. J. Ex. 2" 8 L. T. 832 ; 11 W. R. 734 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 242 242 Sheffield & Manch. Ey. Co. v. Woodcock (1841), 7 M. & W. 574 ; 2 liailw. C. 522; llL. J. Ex. 26 541 Sheldon v. Clark (1806), 1 Johns. 513 267 Shelly V. Wright (1737). Willes, 9 9i Shelton v. Braithwaite (1841), 7 M. & \V, 436 ; 5 Jur. 28 32, 671 Shelton .'. 8prinj<ett (1851), 1 1 C. B. 452 108 Shephard v. V. viie (lS63i, .i N. R. 580 ; 16 C. B. N. S. 132 ; 33 L. J. C. P. l.')8; lOL. T. 193; 12 W. R. 5Sl ; 10 Jur. N. S. 540 124,791 Shepheard v. Beetlmm (1872), L. R. 2 P. & D. 384 ; 41 L. J. P. 44 844 Slu'i.hcrd r. Chewter (1808), 1 Camj). 274 ; 10 R. R. r.!U 552 Shepherd v. Currie (1816), 1 Stark. R. 454 154 Shepherd v. Hills (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 6 ; 11 Ex. 55 76 Shepherd v. liodsinan (1852), 18 Q. B. 316 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 263 : 16 Jur. 948 649 Shepherd v. Maekoul (1813), 3 Camp. 32(i ; 14 11. R. 752 166 Shepherd r. Pyhus (1842), 3 M. & Gr. 880 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 434 ; 1 1 L. J. C. P. 101 776, 777 Shepherd f. Sharp (1856). 25 L. J. E.\. 254 ; 1 H. & N. 1 15 228 Sheplierd v. Shorthoso (1719), I Str. 412 10 JO Sheppard v. Gosnold (i673), Vaufrh. Kill 792 Sliei'iduu and Kirwau'-s case (1811), 31 How. St. Tr. 673 295 Sheridan r. The New Quay Co. (1858), 28 L. J. C. 1*. 58 ; 4 C. B. N. S. 618 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 248 546 Sherlock v. Passman (;83(i), 7 C & P. 292. 293 ;i9, 259 Sliernian r. Sherman (1787). 2 Veru. 276 526 Sherratt v. Montford (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 688 ; L. R. 8 Cli. 928 ; 'Jl \V. R. 719 7:'3 Sheiriufrton's ea-so (1S3M). 2 Lew. CO. 123 5'16 Sherrin','t(m r. Jeruiyn (182^), 3 C. & P. 37 1 1203 Shickeruell r. Hotham (1854), 1 Kav, 6(i9 713 Shiel V. O'Brien (1872), 1. R. 7 E(i."64 704 Shields V. Boucher (1847), 1 Ue G. i Sm. 51 418, 419, 420, 421 Shiells V. Blackburne (1789), 1 H. Bl. 158 ; 2 R. R. 750 39 Sliiels V. Cannon (1865), 16 Ir. C. L. R. 588 777 Shileoek (should be Sherlock) v. Passnuiu (1836), 7 G. & V. 292, 293 . . . .39, 259 Shipworth r. Green (1725), 8 Mod. 311; 1 Str. 610 92 Shirley v. Todd (1832), 9 Green!. 83 511 Shore v. Bedford (1843), 5 M. A: Gr. 271 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 138 602, 607 Shore v Wilson (l8l2). b CI. & Fin. 355, 525 741, 744, 761, 76.', 763, 764, 784, 788, 789, 790 Short V. Lee (1821), 2 Jac. & W. 464 . . . .,396, 434, 435, 437, 441, 442, 443, 447 Short I'. Stov (1836), cited Ro,Meoe. N. P. Evid. 65, 80 628 Short V. WiilianiH (1835), 4 Dowl. 357 16 Shortredec. Cheek (1834), 1 A. & E. 57; 3N.&M. 866; 3 L.J. K.B. 125. .670,671 Shott V. Strealtield (1830), 1 M. & Rob. 8 372 Shower «•. Pilek (1849), 4 Ex. 478 ; 19 L.J. Ex. 113 ... 639 Shrewsbury's (Lady) case (l(il2), 2 How. St. Tr. 773 573 Shrewsbury Peer. (1857), 7 H. L. C. 1 3uu, 4uo, 414, 425, 426, 1047, 1092, ua, 1C24 Shropshire Union Ry. & Canal Co. r. R. (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 496; 4S L. J. Q. B. 31 ; 32 L. T. 283 ; 23 W. R. 7ii9 1076 Slnittleworth v. Le FlemirK (1865), 19 C. B. N. S. 687 ; 34 L. J. 0. P. 309 ; 1 1 Jur. N. S. 840 : 14 W. R. 13 76, 722 SibberinK v. Balcarras (1860), 3 De G. & Sm. 735 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 262 ; 14 Jur. 753 128 Sichel I'. Lambert (1864), 16 C. B. N. 8. 781 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 137 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 617; 12 W. R. 312 129, 149 Vtl. J. tndi with page 636t t'i 4 clxxxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. riaa Siddonsw. Lawrence (1879), 4 Ex. D. 176; 48 L. J. Ex. 446; 40 L. T. 796 ; 27 W. R. 791 41 SiddoiiHw. 8hoit(1877), '2C. P. D. 572; 46 L. J. C. P. 795 ; 37L.T. 230.. 114 Sidobottom V. Adkiiis (1858), 27 L. J. Ch. 152; 30 L. T. 163; 6 W. R. 97 964 Sideways V. DyNon (1817), 2 Stark. 49 956, 1191 Sidmouth v. Sidmouth (1840), 2 Beav. 447 ; 9 L. J. Ch. 282 666, 806 Sidney, Algernon, cane of (1683), 9 How. St. Tr. 854 385 Sidwell V. MaHon (1857), 2 H. & N. 306 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 407 ; 3 .Tiir. N. 8. 649 711 SJevewright v. Archibald (1851), 17 Q. B. 115 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 529 ; 15 Jur. 947 297 299 Siggers V. Evans (1855),' SE*. & b! 307 ; 3 C. L.' R. 1209";' 24*1". J.' Q.' B. ' 706 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 851 639 Sikes V. Wild (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 325 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 375 ; 1 B. & S. .■iS? ; 4 B. & S. 421 ; 8 L. T. 652 ; 1 1 W. R. 954 773 Silberman t'. Clark (1884), 96 N. Y. 524 763 Silkstone and Dodsworth Coal and Iron Co., Rt Whitworth'H case (1881), 19 Ch. D. 118 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 71 ; 45 L. T. 449 ; 30 W. R, 33 845 Sillickf. Booth (1841), 1 Y. & C. C. C. 117; 11 L. J. Ch. 41 173, 175 Sills «. Browp (1840), 9 C. & P. 601 340, 935 Silver v. Stein (1852), 21 L. J. Ch. 312 ; 1 Drew. 29.) 1151 Siinmc. Anglo-Amer. Tel. Co. (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 188; 49 L. J. Q. B. 392 ; 42 L. T. 37 ; 28 W. R. 290 ; 44 J. P. 280 541 Siminond.s, Ro (1842), 3 Curt. 79 094 Siminonds r. Andrew.s ( 1 839), 1 Jebh & Sy. 53 1 7 Siinmondst'. Huniblo (1862). 13 C. B. N. S. 258 : 9 L. T. 108 690 SimmondR v. Simnionds (1847' 5 Notes of Can. (Ecc. & Mar.) 324 631 SimmonH v. London Joint Stock Bank, (1891) 1 Ch. 270 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 313 ; 62 L. T. 427 ; 03 L. T. 789: 39 W. R 449 ; (L«92) A. C. 201 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 723 ; 66 L. T. 625 : 41 W. R. 108 ; 56 J. P. 044 390 SimmonH v. Mitchell (1881), 6 App. Ca«. 156 ; 60 L. J. P. C. 11 ; 43 L. T. 710; 29 W. R. 401 ; 45 J. P. 237 929 SimmonHv. Rudall (1850), 1 Sim. N.S. 115. 136, 137; 15 Jur. N. S. 162. .142, 1192 SimmonH v. Simmonn (1847), 1 Roberta. 566 502 Simms v. IlenderHon fl848), 11 Q. B. 1015 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 209 348, 1037 Simons r. Great West. Ry. Co. (1857), 18 C. B. N. 8. 805 ; 2 C. B. N. S. 620 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 25 722 Simons v. Patchett (1857), 26 L. J. Q. B. 195 ; 7 E. & B. 508 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 742 780 Simpson r..Dendy (1860), 8 C. B. N. S. 433; 6 Jur. N. 8. 1197 112 Simpson v. Dismore (1841), 9 M. & W. 47 ; 1 Dowl. N. 8. 357 ; 5 Jur. 1012; 11 L. J. Ex. 137 1217 Simpson v. Flamank (1807). L. R. 1 P. C. 463 ; 36 L. J. Eec. 28 77 Simpwm f. Fogo (1800), 1 J. & H. 18 ; 1 II. & M. 195 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 403 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 249; 11 W. R. 418; 8 L. T. 01 1103, 1146, 1147 Simpson v. Grayson (1892), 26 Amer. St. R. 52 254 Simpson f. Lond. Gen. Omnibus Co. (1873), 42 L. J. C. P. 112 ; L. R. 8 C. P. 390 : 38 L. T. 560 ; 21 W. R. 505 771 Simpson v. Margitson (1847), 11 Q. B. 23 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 81 ; 12 Jur. 166 16. 741, 763, 784 Simpson v. Pickering (1H34), 1 C. M. & R. 529; 5Tyr. 143; 4 L. J. Ex. 20. 1112 Simpson V. Robinson (1848), 12 Q. B, 511 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 73; 13 J'ir. 187 245, 523, 5i7 Simpson v. Smith (I822), 2 Ph. Ev. 397 942 Sims f. Marryat (1851), 17 Q. B. 281 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 454 4, 775 Simsf. Tlionias (1841). 3 Ir. L. R. 417 1147, 1154 Sinclair v. Baggaloy (1838), 4 M. & W. 312 ; 1 H. & H. 294 ; 2 Jur. 683 ; 7 L.J. Ex. 305 146, 147 Sinclair r. Eraser (1771), cited 20 How. St. Tr. 468 ; 1 Doug. 4, n 1154 Sinchiirf. Sinclair (1798), 1 Hiigg. ("oust. 297 ,. 1145, 1150 Sinclair V. Sinclair (1845), 13 M. & W. 040; 14 L. J. Ex. 109 48^, llll The refm-encu are to paget, not to parofrapht. TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxxvii PAOB Sinclair r. Stevcnsou (1824), 1 C. & P. 585; 2 Biug. 514 ....310, 311, 747, 1)27, 9J8, 900 Singleton v. Barrett (1832), 2 C. & J. 368; 2 Tyr. 409; 1 L. J. Ex. 134 293 Singleton v. St. Louis, &c. (1877), 66 Mo. 63 763 Singleton v. Tomliusou (1878), 3 App. Cas. 404 ; 38 L. T. 653 ; 26 W. R. 722 701 Sinquasi, The (1880), 6 P. D. 241 ; 50 L. J. P. D. & A. 5 ; 43 L. T. 768. . 178 Sioidet V. Kuezinski (1855), 17 C. B. 25' ; 25 L. J. C. P. 2 282 SiHHonH V. Dixon (1826), 5 B. & C. 758 ; 8 D. & R. 526 105 Skaife V. Jackson (1824), 3 B. & C. '21 ; 5 Dowl. & R. 290 487, 5r;2, 744 Skeet t'. Lindsay (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 249 ; 2 Ex. D. 314 ; 36 L. T. 98 ; 25 W. R. 322 711 Skeltonv. Cole (1857). 4 De G. & J. 587 671, 672 Skelton v. Hawling (1749), 1 Wils. 'i58 5:52 Skilbeck v. Garbott (1845), 7 Q. B. ;i46; 14 L. J. Q. B. 338; 9 Jur. 939. . 155, 158 Skinner V. Great North. Ry. Co. (1874), 43 L. J. Ex. 150 ; L. R. 9 Ex. 298 ; 32 L. T. 223 ; 23 W. P. 7 1186 Skinner v. Lond. & Bright. Ry. Co. (1850), 5 Ex. 787; 16 Jur. 299 163 Skipworth v. Green (1725), 8 Mod. 311 ; 1 Str. 610 92 Skrine v. Gordon (1875), Ir. R. 9 C. L. 479 49 Skuse V. Davis (1839), 10 A. & E. 635; 2 P. & D. 550; 7 Dowl. 774 ; 8 L. J. M. C. 75 1073 Skyring v. Greenwood (1825), 4 B. & C. 281 ; 6 Dowl. & R. 401 ; I C. & P. 517 542 Slack «. Buchannan (1790). Pea. R. 5 510 Slack V. Bustocd (1850), 6 Ir. Ch. R. 1 694 Slade V. Tucker (1880), 14 Ch. D. 824 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 644 ; 43 L. T. 49 ; 28 W. R. 807 695 Slane Peerage (1855), Pari. Min. Pt. 2, p. 49 ; 5 CI. & Fin. 41 422 Slaney v. Wade (18;!6). 1 My. & C. 338 ; 7 Sim. 595 409, 416, 423, 424, 425 Slater v. Hodgson (1846), 9 Q. B. 727 : 2 Now Sess. Cas. 488 430 Slater v. Lawson (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 396 493 Slatori'. Nolan (1870), I. R. 11 Eq. 307 137 Slatterio r. Pooley (1840), 6 M. & W. 664 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 8 ; 1 H. & W. 16; 4 Jur. 1038 291, 292, 486 Slaymakor c. Gundacker's Ex. (1823), 10 Serg. & R. 75 493 Slaymakor i'. Wilson (1829), 1 Penrose & Watts, 216 1220 Sleght r. Rhinelauder (1806), 1 Johns. 192 765 Slingsby v. (Jrainger (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 283 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 616 741, 801 Sly f. Sly (1877), L. R. 2 P. D. 91; 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 03 444, 445 Small V. Nairne (1849), 13 Q. B. 840 ,355 Smallcombe r. Bruges (1824), M'Cl. 45 ; 13 Price, 136 498 Smart r. Harding (1855), 15 C. B. 652 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 76 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 311 682 Smart v. Hyde (1841), 8 M. & W. 723 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 60; 10 L. J. Ex. 479 769 Smart v. Morton (1855), 6 E. & B. 30 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 260 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 826 114 Smart r. Rnyner (1834), 6 C. & P. 721 271 Smart r. West Ham Union (1855), 10 Ex. 8U7 ; 3 C. L. R. CMO ; 24 L, J. Ex. 201 041 Smartlo i'. Williams (1695), 3 Lev. 387 ; 1 Salk. 280 1214 Smeo V. Bryer (1848), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 604 ; 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & iSur.) 406 P'^P Smeo i>. Smee (1879), 6 P. Div. 84 ; 49 L. J. P. 8 ; 28 W. R. 703 ; 44 J. P. 220 262, 263 Smith's Estate, Uo, Brids(m v. Smith (1870), 24 W. R. 392 534 Smith, lie, OswoU v. Shepliord, (1892) 67 L. T. 04 134 Smitli and xioddard v. Ridgway (1806), 2 H. & C. 37 ; 4 H. & C. 577 ; 35 L. J. Ex. 198; L. R. 1 Ex. 331 803 Smith, Knight & Co., Re (1809), L. R. 4 Ch. 421 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 710 .... 815 Smith, Mary, case of (1010), 2 How. St. Tr. 1049 557 Smith ». Ad'kins (1H72), L. R. 14 Eq. 402 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 628 093 Vol. I. ends with page 036. ' I mm i '■••ft hi clxxxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAnE Smith V. Andrews, (1891) 2 Ch. fi78 : f)5 L. T. 176 70, 1173 Smith V. l?iit,tiimM (18r)7), 2(i L. J. Ex. 2;!2 92 Smith V. niittoiiH (18;M), 1 M. ic Rob. 311 140, *t>l Smith V. Bt»(liirll (1807), 1 Oamp. M) 517 Smith 1'. 1)1<. of Hoiiufoit (!8.12), 1 Hiud, MO; i;5 L. J. Ch. 33; 1 I'hill. 20!).. 1183 Smith r. «iK^'H (I8:i2), T) Sim. 31)1 ; 2 L. J. Ch. 101 482 Smith f. Hird (1839), 3 Howl. Oil 476 Smith V. niakcy (1807), 8 H. & S. 101 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 320 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. ir)0 ; \fi W. K. 4il2 : 13.'), 4:i7, 4.55 Smith t'. Hliiiidy (18J!»), Uv. .V M. 2.VJ 479 Smith V. Brain (18r)l), 1(1 Q. B. 21 1 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 201 ; If) ,Iur. 287 .... 202 Smith V. Braiidram (l84I), 2 M. & Gr. 2.'.0 ; 2 Suott, N. II. SS!) ; i) Dowl. HI; .5 Jur. 1 73 194 Smith r. Brownl<)w,Ld.(18()9), L. R. 9 E(i. 241 ; 21 L.T. 739 ; 18 W. R. 271 390 Smith i: Biillcr (18,,')), L. R. 19 Ecj. 173 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 09 ; 31 L. T. 873 ; 23 VV. R. 332 Smith V. Burnham (1838), 3 Siniiii. 438 818 82 148 ,'548 785 Smith r. Caiiiiaii (18;)1), 2 K. & B. 35; 22 L. J. Q. B. 291 ; 17 Jur. 911.. Smith r. CartwriKlit M851), Ex. 927 ; 20 E. ,1. Kx. 101 Smith V. Chester (1787), 1 T. R. 051 ; 1 R. R. lil-') 517. Smith V. Vuiuhr (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 878 ; 9 Ch. I). 1 70 , 27 W. R. 1 19. . Smith r. (;ramer(18;)5), 1 Bin;,'. N. (/'. i'85; 1 Scott, 54 1 ; 1 noilf,'es, 124.. 377, 381 Smith V. Crooker (1^09), 5 Mass. 538 1196 Smith V. Dauiell (1875), 44 L. J. Cli. 189; L. R. 18 Ecj. 049 ; 30Ji.T. 762.. 699 Smith )'. Davies (18:10), 7 C. & P. 307 2.59 Smith V. Do Wruitz (1825), Ry. & M. 212 512 Smith V. Doe d. Jersey (1819). 2 B. Ac I'. 592 ; 1 It. & B. 97, 100 39 Smith r. Diiidiam (1829;, 8 ri(^k. 240 1201 Smith V. East India Co. (1811), 1 I'liill. 50 018 Smith r. Evans (1851), 1 Wils. 313 700 Smith r. Eell (1841), 2 Curt. 007 000 Smith r. Flanders (1880), 129 Mass. 322 711 Smitli r. Eorty (1829), 4 C. & 1". 120 710 Smitli V. Harris (1845), 1 Roberts. 202 7(iO Smith r. Hayes (1807), I. R. 1 C. L. ;;33 523 Smith r. H.'ndersou (1842), 9 M. & VV. 798 ; 11 I,. J. Ex. 315 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 245 1217, 1218 Smith v. Ilowdeii(1803),2 N(!W R. 30; 14 C. Jl N. S. 398 113 Smith .'. Hudson (1«05), 31 L. J. (i. B. 1.45 ; B. & S. 431 ; 12 L. T. 377; 13 W. R. 083 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 022 092 Bmitli V. HuKhes (1871), L. R. Q. B. 597 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 221 ; 25 L. T. 329 ; 19 W. R. lO.V.) 770 Smith ('. Husim (1811), 1 rhillln.<ire, 291 37;i Smith V. James (18(il), 1 1 C. B. N. S. 02 ; 5 L. T. 525 ; 10 VV. R. 131 . . 72(i Smith r. .Tettries (1821), 9 IViee, 257 2(i7 Smith V. J.tlVyes (1810), 15 M. *c VV. 501 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 325 783 Smith V. Jolms.m (1812), 15 Kas(, 213; 13 R. R. 449 1124 Smitli r. Keal (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 340; 47 L. T. 142; 31 VV. R. 70 390 Smith V. Keating (1849), C. B. 130 85 Smith f. King, (1892) 2 Q. R. 643; 07 L. T. 420; 40 W. R. 642; 60 J. r. 775 718 Smith r. Knowoldun (1841), 2 M. & dr. 501 ; 9 Dowl. 402; 10 L. J. C. P. 120 187, 188 Smith t). Eaiie (1821), 12 Serg. & R. 81 927 Smith V. List<T (1895), 15 R. (.Mar.), 410; 04 L. J. Q. B. 154 ; 72 E. T. 20 . . 1001 Smith V. Lloyd (1854), 9 Ex. 502, 674; 2 C. L. R. 1008; 23 li. J. Ex. 191 118 Smith r. Lovell (1850), 10 C. B. 0; 1 L. M. & P. 794 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 67 ; 1 5 Jur. 250 202 Smith r. Ly(m (1813), 3 Camp. 405; 14 R. R. 810 49ti Smith r. ^IaIllelHlek (1780), 1 T. R. 441 ; 1 R. R. 247 050 Smith V. Marrable (1812), C. & Marsh. 479; 11 M. & VV. 6; 12 L. J. Ex. 223 273, 776 Li '" 7 The refereiicei art to pages, not to parayraphi. TABLE OF CASi:S CITED. clxj XXXIX I'AOB Smith r. Maraack (181S), a C. B. J86 : 6 Dowl. & L. 363 ; 18 L. .T. C. P. (),") ; 12 .lur. 1CV)0 r)4" Smith i: Martin (1S41), 0. Ac Marsh. oS ; 9 M. * W. 301 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 4 1 S 'J (> 1 Sinitli r. Mattiiows (IS(il), 30 L. J. Ch. 445 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 378 ; 4 L. T. 'iCd; 9 W. U. (i 1 1 0(i5 Smitli V. Morgan ( I SS9). -J M. 4 ]{..!.. '.il 495, 9'J3, 9J.'i Smith i'. Mullctt (1S(I9) 2 Camp. -JoS ; UK. U. (!<) I 31 Smitli i: N.-alo (1H.')7), 2 C. B. X. S. 67 ; 'M> L. J. C. P. 143 ; 3 Jur. N. S. old 07') (ISO, 778 Smitli r. Nicolls (1839), 5 Bliijr- N. C. 222; 7 Scott, 147; 7 Dowl. JS'J ; 1 Am. 474 1 142, 1 1:.2, 1 l/iri Smith r. To..!.' (IHiri. 12 Sim. 17: 10 L. J. (1i. 192 713 Smith r. Ilnvstdii (ISll), 8 M. & W. 3S(> ; 1 I),>\vl. N. M. 121 ; 10 L. J. K.\. 437 ....". 1121 Smith 1'. Kiimm.'iis (isn7). 1 Camp. 9 1102, 1109, 1110 Smith V. SiiiiiKlMiry (18321. .'. C. A: P. 19(! 1222 Siiiilh r. S. udd.T (1824\ 1 1 Sit^;. \- K. 32'> .')04 Smith V. Shaw (1829). 10 B. At C. 277 ; o M. & H. 22.') 227 Smith /'. Simmi's (179.")), 1 Ksp. 330 iMl Smith V. Slcaj) (1813). 1 C. 4 K. 48 310 Smith r. Smitli (1733- 1), 2 Str. O.VJ (538 Smith r. Smith (lliisoii (ISIP, 1 Phillimcrc 294 373 Smith r. Smith (lH:!(i), ;j Hinjr. X. C 29; 7 C. & P. 101 AlO Smith c. Smith (18C.0), 35 L. J. P. 4 M. 0.') ; L. U. 1 P. & 1). 143 ; 14 L.T. 147; 14 W. 11. (118 (i9.-), 097 Smith r. Smith (187ii)„ I. R. 10 Vai. 273 304, 419 Smith r. Suiiiiaii (1829), 9 B. & O. 501 ; 4 M. A: U. 45.). C80, 087, 089, 090, 091 Smith r. Suiii(lK<' (1801). 4 Ksp. 20; K. K, 837 1143 Smith i\ Tayhir (ISO,-)), 1 Hos. 4 P. N. U. 190 151,519 Smith f. Tciil.itt (1807), L. R. 1 P. i 1). 398, 434; 30 L. J. P. 97 ; 10 L.T. 841; 10 W. K. 18 170, 410, 423 Smith t'. Thai;krmy (ISOO). L. R. 1 C. P. 504 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 270 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 545 ; 14 L. T. 701 ; 14 W. R. 8:}2 114 Smith V. Thomas (1835), 2 Bing. N. C. :J80; 1 Ilodjros, 355 . 4 Dowl. P. 0. . 333 207 Smith V. Thimipson (1840), 8 C. B. 4 1 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 314 44 Smith r. Thorn.; (1852), 21 I.. J. Q. B. 199; 18 Q. B. 134; 10 Jur. 332. .710,712 Smith V. Tomhs (18;i9). 3 Jiir. 72 082 Smith f. TruNcott (1843), I Dowl. & L. 530 ; 6 M. & Gr. 267; 12 L. J. C. P. 330 832 Smith r. Vosh (1857). 2 H. \- N. 97 ; 26 1.. J. Kx. 233 6 Smith r. W.-h.ster (1870), 45 L. J. Ch. 528 ; 3 Ch. 1). 49 ; 35 L. T. 44 ; 24 W. U. 89 I 067 Smith V. Whittinfrham (18:t3), C. & P. 78 435, 508 Smith r. Wilkiiis (1833), C. A: P. 180 231 iSmith V. Wilson (18:(21, 3 B. & .Vd. 729 704, 705 Smith r. Wint<T (1852), 12 C. B. 487 ; 21 L. J. C. P. l.VS ; 16 .Tiir. 908 . . 222 Smith V. YomiK (1808). 1 Camp. 439 293 Smithson's, Sir lIuKh, riM" (umlat«-<l), citcl Hull. N. P. 2-'S lo: 8 Smyth 1. AniliTNon (1819), 7 C B. 21 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 109; 13 Jiir. 21 1 . .222. 400 Smyth V. Wilson (1841), 2 .l<-hb & Sy. 660 89, 92 Smythor. Ba.iks (1797), 4 Dall. 329 800 Snt'ljfrovo r. Martin (1822), 2 M'C. 24 1 511 Sii.ll c. Finch (1803), 32 L. J. C. P. 117 ; 13 C. B. N. S. 651 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 333 ; 7 L. T. 747 152 Siidlin^jT V. lIuntiuKHcld (1834), I C. M. & R. 20; 4 Tyr. 606; 4 L. J. Kx . 232 681 SiiowluiU r. U(MHlri()kc (1833), 4 B. A Ail. 511 490 Siiowdon f. Smith (1811 ), cito«l 1 M. Ac Sd. 286 >)r>r> Soar r. Foster (1758, should bo 1858), 4 K. & J. 152 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 400 . . 006 Houicty, &c. «•. Whoclcr (1814), 1 New Hamp. 310 122 V»i. J. muU with pag* 636. 1 i w cxc TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAoa Solicitor, In re, A (1880), 14 Cli. D. 162 834 Solicitor to the Treasury v. White (1886), 55 L. J. P. 79 12 (2 Solly V. Hinde (1834), 2 C. & M. 616 ; 4 Tyr. 305 748 Solomon, Re, Ex parte Dressier (1878), 9 Oh. D. 252; 48 L. J. Bank. 20; 39 L. T. 377 662 Solomon V. Vintners' Co. (1859), 4 H. & N. 585 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 370 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 1177 115 Solomons v. Campbell (1822), cited 1 St. Ev. 177 924 Solway, The (1885), 10 P. D. 137 ; 64 L. J. P. 83 ; 53 L. T. 680 ; 34 "W. R. 232 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 482 388 Somerset, D. of, v. Fogwell (1826), 5 B. & C. 876 ; 1 D. & R. 747 1 1 1 Somerset, D. of, v. France (1727), 1 Str. 662 232 Somerset f). Hart (1884), 12Q. B. D. 360; 53 L. J. M. C. 77: 48.T. P. 327.. 107 Somerville v. Hawkins (1861), 10 C. B. 683 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 131 ; 15 Jur. 4.50 46, 1 1 1 Somerville v. Somerville (1801), 5 Ves. 750 , 5 R. R. 155 17!) Somes V. Skinner (1825), 3 Pick. 52 90 Soper V. Dibble (1690), 1 Ld. Raym. 175 6 Sopwith V. Sopwith (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 131 ; 2 S. & T. 100 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 554; 4 L. T. 256 1110 Sotheran v. Deuing (1881), 20 Ch. D. 99 70ft Sotilichos V. Kemp (1848), 3 Ex. 105 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 36 766 Souchr. Strawbridge(1846),2 C. B. 814; 15 L. J. 0. P. 170; 10 Jur. 367.. 681, 682 Soule's case (1828), 5 Greenl. 407 893 Souter 1-. Drake (1834), 2 B. & Ad. C92 ; 3 N. & M. 40 773 South-Eastom Ry. Co. v. Warton (1802), 31 L. J. Ex. 515 ; 6 H. & N. 520 94 South of Ireland ColUery Co. v. Waddle (1869), L. R. 4 0. P. 618 L. J. C. P. 338 Southall V. Rigfr (1851), 11 C. B. 481 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 145 ; 15 . Southampton case (1833), Cock. & R. 1 13 ; Per. & K. 225 Southampton Dock Co. v. Richards (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 418 ; 1 Scott, N. R, 219 38 ...640, 641 706.. 201 496 1177 Southampton. Mayor of, v. Graves (1800), 8 T. R. 690 ; 6 R. R. 480 .... 995 Southard v. Wrexford ( 1 826) , 6 Cowen , 254 962 Southeei'. Denny (1817), 1 Ex. 196; 17 L.J. Ex. 151 189 Southey v. Nnsh (1837), 7 C & P. 632 917 Southwark Bridge Co. r. Sills (1826), 2 C. & P. 371 643 Soiithwark Water Co. v. Qui'ik (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 315 ; 47 L.J. Q. B. 258 ; 26 W. R. 341 595, 1186 Southwell r. Bowditch (1876), 1 C. P. D. 100. 374; 45 L. J. C. P. 630; 34 L. T. 133 ; 35 L. T. 196 ; 24 W. R. 275, 838 769 Southwick V. Southwick (1870), 2 Sweeney, 234 589 Soward v. Leggatt (1836). 7 C. & P. 615 258, 259 Sowerby v. Butiaior (1834), 2 C. & M. 371 ; 4 Tyr. 320 758 Spadducini v. Koary (18S9), 21 L. R. Ir. 553 914 Spadwell V. (1730), cited Berke? j Peerage, 4 Camp. 410 419 Spaight V. Tedcastlo (1881), 6 App. Cas. 217 ; 44 L. T. 589 ; 29 W. R. 761; 4 Asp. M. C. 400 178 Spaight f. Twins (1868), 13 Ir. C. L. R. 416 116S Spargo V. Brown (1 ^29). 9 B. & C. 935 435, 487 Sparrow v. Farrant ( 1819), 2 St. Ev. 517, n 1227 Sparrow v. Hill (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 362 ; 8 Q. B. D. 479 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 675 ; 44 L. T. 917 ; 29 W. R. 705 42 Spartali t'. Bonetike (1850), 10 C. B. 212 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 293 756, 769 Spears v. Hartly (1857), 3 Esp. 81 ; 6 R. R. 814 79 Spcnoo V. Dodsworth (1891), 60 L. J. Ch. 708 ; (1891) 1 Ch. 657 ; 64 L. T. 282 ; 39 W. R. 302 Spenco r. Healey (1853), 8 Ex. 668 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 249 Spenco t>. Stewart (1802), 3 East, 89 ; 6 R. R. 549 Spenceley, In the goods of, (1892) P. 255 ; 61 L. J. P. 133 Spenceley r. Do Willott (1806), 7 East, 108; 3 Smith, 289 947 Spenceley v. Schulenburgh (1806), 7 East, 357 007, 608 914 750 869 1104 Tht refertneu art to pages, not to paragraph*. TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXCl PAOH Spencer «'. Rnrough (1842), 9 M. &W.42S; 6Jur. 154; 11 L.J. Ex. 378.. 476, 476 SpeiK^ert'. Hilling (1812), 3 Camp. 310 323 Hpencer v. Newton (1837), 6 A. & E. 623 ; 1 N. & P. 818 ; 1 Jur. 52 . .867, 8ti8 Spencer r. Thompson (18.')6), 6 Ir. C. L. R. 537, 565 158, 243, 1 111 Spencer v. Williams (1871), L. R. 2 P. & D. 230; 40 L. J. P. & M. 45 ; 24L.T.5I3; 19 W. R. 703 1106 Sperling, Re (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 25 ; 9 L. T. N. S. 348 ; 12 W. R. i554 ; 3 S. & T. 272 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1205 700 Spice V. Bacon (1877), 2 Ex. D. 463 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 713 ; 36 L. T. 896 ; 25 W. R. 840 '..; . : 162 Spicer v. Burg-^ss (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 129 ; 4 Tyr. 598 1203 Spicerf. Coop?r',i341), 1 Q. B. 424; 1 G. & D. 52 ; 5 Jur. 1036 763 Spiol-rnell v. Hotham (1854), 1 Kay, 669 671 Spieresv. Parker (1780), 1 T.R. 141 ; 1 R. R. 165 85 Spiers v. WilUson (1808), 4 Cranch, 398 288 Spill V. Maule (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 232 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 138 ; 20 L. T. 675 ; 17 W. R. 805 Ill Spindler, Re, »<< Ex parte Rolfe. Spittle V. "Walton (1851), L. R. 11 Eq. 420 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 368 ; 24 L. T. 18 ; 19 W. R. 405 896 Spollan V. Majrau (1851), 1 Ir. C. L. R. 700 710, 713 Spong V. Wright (1842), 9 M. & W. 629 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 144 712, 713 Spoouer V. Juddow (1848-50), 6 Moo. P. C. R. 257 19, 225, 227 Spooner v. Payne (1847), 4 0. B. 328 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 225 328, 1214, 1216 Spragge's case (undated), cited 14 East, 276 318 Spratt V. Harris (1833), 4 Hagg. Ecc. 405 1161 Sprigge V. Sprigge (1868), 38 L. J. P. & M. 4 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 608 ; 19 L. T. 462; 17 W. R. 8 143 Spring, The (186b), L. R. 1 Adm. 99 ; 14 W. R. 975 6 Spring V. Eve (1677\ 2 Mod. 240 20 Spring V. Lovett (1831), 11 Pick. 417 757 Spurr V. Trimble (1818), 1 A. K. Marsh. 271 172 Squire f. Campbell (1836), 2 Cooper, 114 750 Srimut Rajah v. Katama Natchiar (1866), 11 Moo. lud. App. 50 1123 Stace V. Griffith (1869), 6 Moo. P. C. N. 8. 18 ; L. R. 2 P. C. 420 ; 20 L. T. 197 47, 618, 619 Stackpole v. Arnold (1814), 1 1 Mass. 27 652, 744, 758 Stackpole v. Howell (1807), 13 Ve«. 417 ; 9 R. R. 200 144 Stackpoole v. The Queen (1875), I. R. 9 Eq. 619 398 Stafford's, Ld., case (1680), 7 How. St. Tr. .459 624, 973, 974 Stafford Peer. (1825), Pari. Min. 4 413, 416, 423 Stafford v Clark (1824), 2 Bing. 382 ; 9 Moore, C. P. 724 ; 1 C. & P. 24, 403 1 124 Stafford, Mayor of, v. Till (1829), 4 Bing. 76 ; 12 Moore, 260 97, 643 Staines v. Stewart (1862), 31 L. J. P. & M. 10 ; 2 S. & T. 320 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 440 705, 747, 950 Staintonw. Chadwick (1851), 3M. &G. 575; 13Beav. 320; 16 Jur. 1539.. 1183 Stainton and Wife v. Jones (1779), 1 Doug. 380, n. 96 7 Stalworth v. Inns (1844), 13 M. & W. 466 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 428 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 81 ; 9 Jur. 285 1039 Stamford Bank v. Smith, (1892) 1 Q. B. 765 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 405 ; 66 L. T. 306 ; 40 W. R. 355 ; 56 J. P. 229 713 Stamford, Ld. v. Dunbar (1845), 13 M. & W. 822, 827 119 Stammers t: Dixon (1806), 7 Ea.st, 200 ; 3 Smith, 261 ; 8 R. R. 612 791 Star.cliff v. Hardwicke (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 1, 12 ; 3 Dowl. P. C. 762 ; 5 Tyr. 551; 1 Gale, 127 152 Standago v. Croighton (1832), 5 '~'. & P. 406 606 Standard v. Baker (1785-6), cited Tidd's Prao. 858 836 Standeuf. Chrismas (1847), 10 Q. B. 135; 16 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; 11 Jur. 694 1169 Standen v. Standen (1791), Pea. R. ■* " ; 4 T. R. 469, n. ; 6 T. R. 331, n. .436, 621 Standish v. Ross (1849). 3 Ex. 52'* . 19 L. J. Ex. 185 649 Standley, Re (1849). 1 Roberts. 755 ; 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 69 . . 698 Stanger v. Searle (1793), 1 Esp. 15 1221 Vol. I. ends with page 635. m m ; IV cxcu TABLE OF CASKS CITED. PACK Stanhope v. Nott (undated), 2 Swans. 221, n 609 Stanley v. Dowdeswell (18741, L. R. 10 0. P. 102 ; 23 W. R. ;;89 672 Stanley v. Stanley (1862), 2 J. & H. 491 , 10 AV. K. «67 801 Stanley v. White (181 !), 14 East, 338 ; 12 E. R. 514 232, 234, 623 Stunsfield v. Hobson (ISiVi). 10 Beav. ''36 ; 3 Dd G. M. & G. 620 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 4r)7 ; 20 L. T. 301 ; 1 W. R. 21G 720 Stanton r.Collior (1854), 3 E. &T5.274; 23L. J.Q.B. llfi; IS.Tur.N. S. 050.. 664 Stanton v. I'ercival (1854), o H. L. Cas, 257 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 3(i'.) 492 Stanton v. Styles (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 575 ; 5 Ex. 578 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 33G. . 1121 Stanwix's, Gen., case (nee R. v. Hay, Dr.). Stapleton r. Oofts (1852), 18 Q. B. 367 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 246 879, 887, 892 Stapleton v. Ilaymen (180.5), 33 L. J. Ex. IVD, 2 11. & C. 918; 12 W. R. 317; 10 Jur. iST. S. 417 651 Stapylton v. Clonffh (1853), 2 E. & B. 933 ; 2 C. L. R. 26G ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 5; 18 Jur. 00 437, 151, 4G0 dtartup V. Maodonald (1841), 2M. & Gr. 395; 2 Scott, N. R. 485 ; (1843), 6M. &Gr. 619; 7 Scott, N. R. 209 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 477 33,34 Stat«, The, v. Adams (1789- 180G^ 1 Hayw. 403 120 State, The, v. Atkinson (1894), 42 Am. St. R. 877 t'l,/. [r.S] State, The, v. Boswoll ( 1 S20), 2 Dov. 209 972, 973 State, The, t'. Buio (1875), 43 Tex. 532 027 State, The, f. Center (1802), 35 Veni. 378 590 State, The, v. Clifford flHO.'), 42 Am. St. R. 518 yhM. [GS, 580] State, The, r. Do Wolf (1830), 8 Conn. 93 897 State, The, v. Freeman (1824), 5 Conn. 348 017 State, The, v. Ilayward (1819). 1 Nott & M'C. 547 627 State, The, r. Heid (1874), 57 Mo. 252 027 State, The, v. Johnson (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 105 Jf/</. [408] State, The, v. Mc.Ke.in ( 1 873), lUi Io\,a, 349 635 State, The, v. Holier (1820-34), 1 Dry. 26:' 627 State, The, v. Rawls (1820), 2 Nott & M-C. 331 528 State, The, v. Stinson (1844), 7 Law l.'eporter. 383 169, 903 State, The, v. Whisenhurst (1823), 2 Hawks. 458 906 State, The, v. Wood (1873). 53 New Kami). 484 616 Stattuck . The State (1858), 11 Iiid. 473 616 Staverton v. Ashburtou (1855), 4 E. & B. 52G; 24 L. J. M. C. 53; 1 Jur. N. S. 233 1136 Stead V. Dawber (1839), 10 A. & E. 57 ; 2 P. & D. 447 752 Stead i>. Heaton (1792), 4 T. R. 669 440, 441 Steadman v. Duhamel (1845), 1 C. B. 892 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 270 646 Steamship Co. "Norden" i-.Dempsey (1876), 45 L. J. C. P. 764 ; 1 C. P. D. 654 ; 24 W. R. 984 158, 763 Stearine, &c. Co. v. Heintzmann (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 60 ; 11 L. T. 272 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 881 937 Steam v. Mills (1833). 4 B. & Ad. 657 ; 1 N. & M. 434 653 Stebbingf. Spicer(lS49), 8C. B. 827; 19 L. J. C. P. 24 168 Stedman v. Gooch (1793), 1 Esp. 6 1035 Steel V. Prickett (181<t), 2 Stark. B. 463 112, 397, 402 Steel V. State Line Steamship Co. (1877), 3 App. Cas. 72 ; 37 L. T. 333 . . 771 Steele, Re, May v. Wilson (1868), 37 L. J. P. & M. 68 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 575; 19L. T. 91 ; 17 W. R. 15 709 Steele v. Howe (1849), 14 Q. B. 431 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 89 ; 14 Jur. 147 ... . 787 Steele v. Mart (1825), 4 B. & C. 273 756 Steele v. Stewart (1843-4), I Phill. 471 ; 14 L. J. Ch. 34 ; 9 Jur. 121 .... 699 Steevens's Ho.sp. v. Dyas (1863), 15 Ir. Ch. R. 405, 420 142 Steiglitz V. Egginton (1815), Holt, N. P. R. 141 ; 17 R. R. 622 645 Steinkeller v. Newton (1840), 1 Scott, N, R. 148 ; 8 Dowl. 579 ; 9 C. & P. 313 325, 355, 356, 923 Stephen V. Gwenap (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 120 435 Stephens v. Foster (1833), 6 C. & P. 289 928 Stephens v. Heathcote (1860), 1 Dr. & Sm. 138 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 529 495 Stephens v. Pinney (1818), 8 Taun. 327 ; 2 Mo„ro. 0. P. 349 287 Stephens (should be Stevens) v. Webb (1835), 7 C. & P. 60 274 Tht reference* art to pages, not t) paragrapli*. S S S s s s s s s S' Si Si Si SI S( St St St St St TABLE OP CASES CITED. cxcm FAOB Steuart v. Gladstone (1878), 7 Ch. D. 394 ; 47 L, J. Ch. 154 ; 37 L. T. 575 ; '20 W. R. 277 487 Steveu8 V. Clark (1842), 2 M. & B jb. 435 481 Stevens v. Lloyd (1829), 1 M. & M. 292 1195 SteveiiB V. Midi. Ry. Co. and Lander (1854), 23 L. J. Ex. 328 ; 10 Ex. 352 ; 2 C. L. R. 13U0 ; 18 Jur. 932 643 Stevens v. Thiiuker (1793), Pea. R. 187 499 Steward v. Eddowes (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 204 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 311 ; 30 L. T. 333 ; 22 W. R. 534 668 Steward v. North Metropolitan Tram Co. (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 556 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 157; 54L. T. 35; 34 W. R. 316 ; 50 J. P. 324 191, 192 Stev *rt. Re (180;i), 3 S. & T. 192 ; 4 S. & T. 211 ; 32 L. J. P. & M. 94 . . 701 St wart V. Alison ^1821), 6 Sorg. & R. 324 1178 Strwart V. Anfe'lo-Califor. Gold Min. Co. (1852), 18 Q. B. 730 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 393 643 Stewart v. Bulkis Co. (1883;, 53 L. J. Ch. 760 ; 60 L T. 479 ; 32 W. R. 676 347, 845 Stewart V. Cauty (1841), 8 M. & W. 160; 2 Railway & C. Oas. 616; 10 L. J. Ex. 348 37 Stewart v. Forbes (1849). 1 H. & T. 461, 472 ; 1 Mac. & G. 137 ; 19 L.J. Ch. 133 160 Stewart t'. Steele (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 609 ; 5 Scott, N. R. 517 ; il L. J. C. P. 155 818 Stewartson v. Watts < 1839), 8 Watts, 392 388 Steyner v. Droitwich '1690j, Skin. 023 ; 1 Salk. 281 ; 12 Mod. 85 1179 Still V. Halford (1S14), 4 Camp. 19 1039 Stimson v. Farnham (1871), 41 L. J. Q. B. 52 ; L. R. 7 Q. B. 175 ; 25 L. T. 747 ; 20 W. R. 183 549 Stoate V. Stoate (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 102 ; 2 S. & T. 223; 3 L. T 756. . 1110 Stobart V. Dryden (1836), 1 M. & W. 615 ; 2 Gale, 146 ; 1 T. & G. 899 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 218 3fpS, 446, 465 Stobart v. Todd (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 956 ; 2 W. R. 617 ; 2 Eq. 1144 ; 18 Jur. 618 1036 Stobell (should be Stokell) v. Niveu (1889), 61 L. T. 18 671 Stock V. M-Avoy (1872), L. R. 15 Eq. 55 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 230 ; 21 W. R. 620 ; 27 L. T. 441 666 Stockbridge v. Qui..ke (1853), 3 C. & K. 3U5 1047 Stockdale f. Hansard (1839), 2 P. & D. 1 ; 9 A. & E. 1 ; 3 Jur. 905 4 Stocken w. Collin (1841), 7M. & W. 515; 9 C. & P. 653 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 227.. 31, 154 Stockfleth V. De Tastet (1814), 4 Camp. 11 ; 15 R. R. 720 516, 517 Stuckil V. Punshon (1880), (i P. D. 9 ; 60 L. J. P. 14 ; 44 L. T. 280 ; 29 W. R. '2:4; 45 J. P. 159 701 Siockton V. iJemuth (1838), 7 Watts, 39 388 Stockwell V. Ritherdou (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 409 705 Stoddart v. Grant (1851-2), 1 Macq. 171 ; 1 Paterson, 122 704 Stoddart. v. Manning (1828), 2 Har. & G. 147 909 Steer, In re (1884), 9 P. D. 120 ; 51 L T. 141 ; 32 W. R. 1005 ;<52 Stoever v. Whitman (1814), 6 Binn. 417 705 Stokehill ('. Pettiugell (1852), 21 L. J. Q. B. 2J9, n 879 Stokes V. Bate (U.2ti), 5 B. ic C. 491 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 247 113.) Stokes V. Dawes (1826), 4 Mason, 268 423, 1 102 StokFs V. Grant (1878), 4 C. P. D. 25 ; 40 L. T. 36 ; 27 W. R. 397 187 Stokes e. Heron (1845), 12 0. & F. 161; 9 Jur. 563 144 Stokes V. Mason (l808), 9 East, 426 19 Stoker V. Salomons (1851), 9 Hare, 79; 20 L. J. Ch. 343 79 Stokes V. White (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 223 ; 4 Tyr. 786 872 Stonard •. Dunkin (1810), 2 Camp. 344; 11 R. R. 724 545 Stone's case (1661), Dyer, 216, pi. 50 560 Stone, Jemes, Re (186«), 1 S. & T. 238 142 Stone V. Blackburn (1793), 1 Esp. 37 909 Stone V. Forsyth (1781), 2 Doug. 707 1046 Stone V. Greening (184»), 13 Sim. 390 804 Vol, I. tftd* with page 636. ■!l 1 -J ■ • • it! CXCIV TABLE OF CA«E8 CITED. PAOB Stone*. Motcalf (1816), 1 Stark. 63 765 Stone V. Whiting (1817), 2 vSt<irk. R. 2.3.') ; 19 R. R. 710 660 Stones V. Byron (1846), 4 Dowl. & L. 393 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 32 ; 1 Bivil Ct. R. 248 ; 11 Jur. 44 909 Stones V. Monhem (1848), 2 Ex. 382 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 21.') 303 Stooinvoart v. Ponin.miliir and Oiiontal Steam Nav. Co. (1880), 6 App. Cas. a76 ; 52 L. J. Adm. 1 ; 43 L. T. 610 ; 29 W. R. 173 , Sttiop's ease (17fl9), Addis. 381 Sto-r V. Scott (1833). 6 C. & P 241 «iO Stoihert r. James (1843), 1 C. & K. 121 612 Stott V. Fairlamb (1883), 53 L. J. Q. B. 47 : 49 L. T. 525 767 Stoveld V. Hugh-i (1811), 14 East, 308 ; 12 R. R. 523 691 Stowo V. Querner (1870), L. R. 5 Ex. 155 ; 3U L. J. Ex. 60 ; 22 L. T. 29 ; 18 W. R. 466 26 StowoU V. Robinson (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 928 ; G L. J. C. P. 326 ; 6 Scott, 196 763 Stracey v. Blake (1835), 7 0. & P. 404 474 Straoy v. Blake (1836), 1 M. & W. 168 ; Tyr. & G. 528 607 Stratt'on's Exors., Ex parte. North of England Joint Stock Bunk. Co., Re (1853), 22 L. J. Ch. 194 ; 1 De G. M. & (J. 57(! ; Ifi .Iiir. 43:. 541 Straker v. Graham (1839), 4 M. & W. 721 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 86 ; 7 Dowl. 223 . . 617 Straker v. Reynolds (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 262; 58 L. J. Q. B. 180; 60 L. T. 107 ; 37 W. R. 379 855 Stranks v. St. John (1867), 36 L. J. C. P. 118 ; L. R. 2 C. P. 370 . . . .619, 773 Stratford v. Greene (1810), 1 Ball & B. 296 1013, 1014 Stratford and Morton Rail. Co. r. Stratton (1832), 2 B. & Ad. 518 91 Stratton v. Rastall (1788), 2 T. R. 366 93, 552, 744 Stranss v. County Hotel Co. (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 27 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 25 ; 49 L. T. 601 ; 32 W. R. 170 162 Strauss t'. Francis (1860), L. R. 1 Q. B. 379 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 133 ; 7 B. & S. 365 608 Streathley, In the goods of, (1891) P. 172; 60 L. J. P. 56; 39 W. R. 432 Streoter v. Bartlett (1848), 5 C. B. 5(>2 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 1 10 Stringer v. Gardiner (1859), 27 Beav. 35; 4 De G. & J. 468 ; 758 28 L, 700 ..1044, 1210 J. Ch. 799,800 Strode v. Russel (1708), 2 Vern. 621 789, 794 Strong r. Dickenson (1836), 1 M. & W. 490 ; 2 Gale, 83 ; 5 Dowl. 99 ; 1 T. & G. 683 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 231 806, 867 Strong V. Fo.ster (1855), 25 L. J. C. P. 106 ; 17 C. B. 201 758 Stronghill v. Buck (1850), 14 Q. B. 787 ; 14 Jur. 741 94 Strother v. Barr (1828), 2 M. & P. 207 : 5 Bing. 136 277, 280, 286, 288 Stroud, Re (1849), 8 C. B. 518 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 117 1160 Strutt V. Bovingdon (1803), 5 Esp. 50 ; 8 R. R. 834 324, 353, 1114 Stuart t>. Balkis Co. (1883), 63 L. J. Ch. 790 ; 50 L. T. 479; 32 W. R. 676 .347, 845 Stuart V. Lovell (1817). 2 Sta.k. R. 94 ; 19 R. R. 688 219, 245 Stuclcy V. Baily (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 483; 1 H. & C. 405; 10 W. R. 720 757 Studdy V. Sanders (1823), 2 Dowl. & R. 347 551, 610 Stukcley v. Butler (1615), Hob. 171 800 Sturgo I'. Buchanan (1839), 2 P. & D. 573 ; 10 A. & E. 598 ; 2 M. & Rob. 90 315, 483, 485, 975 Sturgeon v. Wingfleld (1846), 15 M. & W. 224 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 212 96 Sturla V. Freccia (1879), 12 Ch. D. 411 ; 5 App. Cas. 623 : .50 L. J. Ch. 86 ; 43 L. T. 209 ; 29 \V. R. 217 ; 44 J. P. 812 458, 1092, 1167, 1174 Sturm V. Jeffreo (1S47), 2 C. & K. 442 314 Sturt V. Blagg (1847), 10 Q. B. 906, 008 46 Suffell V. Bank of England (1882). 9 Q. B. D. 655; 61 L. J. Q. B. 401 , 47 L. T. 146; 30 W. R. 932; 46 J. P. 500 1194, 1195 Suffield V. Brown (1804), 3 New R. 343, 344 ; 33 L. J. Ch. 259 ; 4 De G. J. &S. 185 115 Suffolk Witches (1665), 6 How. St. Tr. 647 657 Tlie references are to pages, not to paragraphs. TAULl' OP CASKS CITED. cxcv PAOB Suirden v. Lord St. LeonardH (1870), 45 L. J. P. D. & A. I : 1 P. Div. 154 ; 34 L. T. 309 ; 24 W. K. 479 143, 307, 356, 790 SuKK «'• Bray (1885), 54 L. J. Ch. 132 ; 51 L. T. 194 314 SuiHHCv. Lowthcr(1843). 2 Hare, 424; 12 L. J. Ch. 315 806, 808 Sullivan v. Galbraith (1870). 4 Ir. Eq. 582 144 Sullivan v. Sullivau (1870), Ir. ]l. 4 P^q. 457 789 Summers, Re (1850), 7 Notes of Cas. (Eccl. & Mar.). 562; 2 Roberts. 295 697 Summers r. Griffiths (1860), 35 Bnav. 27 137 Summers (Mhoiild be Simmons) v. London Joint Stock Bank, fl891) 1 Ch. 270 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 313 ; 62 L. T. 427 : 63 L. T. 789 ; 39' W. R. 449 ; fl892) A. C. 201 ; 61 L. J. Cli. 723; 60 L. T. 025; 41 W. R. 108; 66 J. P. 044 390 Summers r. Moorhouse (188J), 13 Q. B. D. 388 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 5b4 ; 51 L. T. 290 ; 32 W. R. 826 ; 48 J. P. 424 756 Summers v. Moseley (1834), 2 C. & M. 477 ; 4 Tyr. 158 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 128. . 942 Sunimersett v. Adamson (1822), 1 Bing. 73 293 Sumner r. AVilliams (Dudley v. Sumner) (1809), 5 Mass. 444 372 Sunderland, Re (1800), 35 L. J. P. & M. 82 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 198 ; 14 L. T. 741 ; 14 \V. R 971 701 SunderlaTid'.s, Hodgson's, Kirkwood's, and Martin's cases (1830), 1 Lew. C. C. 102 248 Suroome r. Pinnigor (1853), 3 De G. M. & G. 571 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 419 ; 17 Jur. 196 679 Surplioof. Farnsworth (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 676; 8 Scott, N. R. 306; 13 L. J. C. P. 215 774 Suse V. Pompe (1860), 8 C. B. N. S. 638 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 75 ; 7 Jur. N. 8. 106 I 9 W. R 15 781 Sussex Peerage case (1844), 11 CI. & Fin. 114-117 ; 8 Jur. 793 ... .7, 51, 411. 422, 434, 435, 430. 437, 407, 936, 937, 958 Suter V. Burrell (1857), 2 H. & N. 807 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 193 311 Sutton V. Ainslie (1852), 1 Maeq. 299 ; 1 Paterson. 72 348 Sutton ». Buck (1810), 2 Taunt. 302; 11 R. R. 585 110, 117 Sutton i>. Ciceri (1890), 15 App. Cas. 144 ; 02 L. T. 742 742 Sutton V. Devonport (1858). 27 L. J. C. P. 54 109, 520 Sutton t'. Gi-egory (1797), Peako. Ad. C. 160 ; 4 R. R. 899 464 Sutton V. Johnstone (1787), 1 T. R. 493, 784 ; 1 Br. P. C. 76 ; 1 R. R. 257 . . 30 Sutton r. Sadler (1857), 26 L. J. C. P. 284 ; 3 C. B. N. S. 87 ... .10!), 170, 262 Sutton r. Suttxm (1882), 22 Ch. D. 611 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 338 ; 48 L. T. 98 ; 31 W. R. 372 721 Sutton V. Tatham (1839), 10 A. & E. 27 ; 2 P. & D. 308 ; 8 L. J. Q. B. 210 158 Sutton V. Temple (1843), 12 M. & W. 64 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 17 774, 776, 776, 777 Swain v. Lewis (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 261 ; 5 Tyr. 998 317 Swan V. N. Brit. Austral. Co. (1863), 2 H. & C. 175; 32 L. J. Ex. 273; 2 NewR. 621: 11 W. R. 802; 10 Jur. N. S. 102 641, 1205 Swan's case (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 075 ; 18 W. R. 447 843 Swann v. Phillips (1838), 8 A. & E. 457 ; 3 N. & P. 1017 ; 22 L. T. 854 . . 719 Swanne v. Taatt'e (1845), 8 Ir. L. R. 101 817 Swansea Bk. v. Thomas (1879), 48 L. J. Ex. 344 ; 4 Ex. D. 94 ; 40 L. T. 658 ; 27 W. R. 491 139 Swansea v. Ry. Co.m'. Budd (1800), L. R. 2 Eq. 274 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 031 ; 14 W. R. 663 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 501 1189 Swatman v. Ambler (1852), 8 Ex. 72 : 22 L. J. Ex. 81 C76 Sweeney v Spoouer (1863), 32 L. J. M. C. 82 ; 3 B. & S. 329 ; 7 L. T. 023; 11 W. R. 204 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 091 894 Sweeny v. Promoter Life Ass. Co. (1863), 14 Ir. C. L. R. 476 638, 639 Sweet r. Lee (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 452 673, 075, 783, 784 Sweeting v. Fowler (1815), 1 Stark. R. 106 1(38, 217 Sweeting v. Pcarce (1861), 7 C. B. N. S. 449 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 634 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 109 ; 6 L. T. 79 ; 9 W. R. 343 168 Sweetland v. Sweetland (1805). 4 S. & T. 6 ; 24 L. J. P. 42 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 182; 11 L. T. 749; 13 W. R. 604 699 Vol. I. ends with page 635. iiir ■ i Is cxcvi T\m.V. OF CASKS (ITKD. PAOK Hwi'maH r. Berk flfl22), R Hitk. & R. 305 ll;ti» 8*ift r. J)..aii (IHIO), (l.IdliiiM. 5'i.l (>10 Bwift r. Kynw (KiHd). Oro. Ciip. ftlH 80'2 Swift 1'. JfWfHhiiry (1H7 1). 4:1 I- .1. Q. B. 60 ; L. U. !) Q. H .101 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. ftC, ; ;{0 L. T. 31 ; 22 VV. R liUi 71» Swift V. MTi.Timn {I8IH), 11 Fr. K.]. R. OOi 1H7, UiM. 1051. lUiH, 1173 Swift r. I'amicl! (1HH3), M Oh. 1). 21(1 ; IH L. T. 351 ; 31 \V. R. ')J3 731 Swift V. Swift (1H32), 4 }\'>Hif. (K<c.) LVl 901, 'MVl Swift r. Wiiit.rhoMmni (1S73), 12 ]j. J. U. H. Ill ; L. R. 8 Q. H. 2JJ 71H Swiiicy c Barry (183.i), Joiicn, lOU 11!I9 Kwiiifon r. L(l. ChcltiiNfonl (18(10), fi IT. & N. 800; 2!) L. J. Kx. 382; (! Jiir. N. S. 103.'); 2 L. T. 40(i ; HW.R. r,\r, 201, /J08 Swliifi'ti V. Swiiif.ti (I8,')7), 2r, h. J. C. r. 303; 20 L. J. C. P. 97; 1 C. B. X. S. 301 ; 3 Jiir. N. S 85 .107 HwiniKTtoii r. Staflnnl, M. of (1810), 3 Tiiun. 91 430, lor.O Swir.; >: Vthumh (1877). 3 App. Cum. 100 ; 47 h J. P. 0. 18 ; 37 L. T. .■).')4 .'•.80 Syl.rav f. Whito (1830), 1 M. & W. 43.'); Tyr. He (Jr. 740 ; 2 Oali". 08 ; r, L. .1. Kx. 173 499 Sydi'iihamr. Rami (1784), 3 DouK. 429 814 SV<TH r. .ToiiuH (1818). 2 Kx. Ill 7()8 HykiM. R.^ 1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 17 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 20 ; 28 L. T. 142; 21 \V. R. 410 142 Syk»« V. Dixoii (1839), 9 A. * 1'). 093 ; 1 P. & I). 403; 1 W. W. & H. 120. 009 Syk.M r. Diuibiir (1800), 2 Scilw. N. P. 1081 016 Sylpli, Tho 1 1 843-4), 2 NotoH of (!aH. {Kvr.. & Mar.) 80 1 122 Sylv.'HtfT V. Jlall (1825), Ry. & M. 255, ii 272 SymmoiiH r. Blako (1835), 1 M. & Rob. 477 244 SymoiidH V. (JaMlij^ht and Cokn Co. f IH 18), 1 1 Bcav. 283 52(1 SymoiiilH V. Lloyd (1859), C. B. N. H. OlJl 704 SyinoiiB f. Rt-oH (1870), 1 Kx. D. 410 1118 T. V. D. (faWly cnllod D.) (1800), L. R. 1 P. & D. 127 128 Talbot, Lxl. f. CiiHack (1804), 17 Ir. (J. L. R. 21 3 924, 925 Talljot t'. HodKMon (1810), 7 Tuun. 251 ; 2 MaPHb. 527 134 TallM.t I. lIodMoii f 1810), 7 Taiin. 2.;, ; 2 M.r "i. 527 1209 Talbot V. I>!wiH (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 495 ; 5 Jyr. 1 398 TttUx.t f. S.K'inan (1801), 1 (Jran.ib. 1 1093 Talbiitt V. Chirk M840), 2 M. & liob. 312 246 Tumvttco V. LiicaH (1802), 1 B. & H. 185 ; 3 B. (fie H. 89 ; 30 I,. .1. il B. 234; 31 L. J. Q. B. 290; 4 L. T. 400; I.. T. 0!)7 ; 10 W. R. 733 ; 7 .Jur. N. H. 1 100 42 TancriKl v. DolaKoa Bay Ry. Co. (1889), 23 <i. B. I). 239; 58 L. .7. «i. B. .549; 01 L. T. 229 ; 38 W. R. 15 (iSl Tanbutn v. NicbolHon (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 501 ; 1. R. C. L. 188 158 Tarin v. Taiiii (1803), 2 N«!W R. 4 12 802 Tnnn.rt;. Smart (1827), B. & 0. 009; 9 I). & R. 549 710, 712, 714 Tanner v. Taylor ( 1 750), .;it<^l 3 T. R. 754 924 Taplin v. Atty (1825), 3 BImj^. 104 ; 10 Mooro (C. I*.), 504 311 Taj.lin f. Fh.rcnrf) (1851), 10 C. B. 744 ; 20 L. .1. C. I'. 137 ; 15 .Jur. 402. 038 Taplin« v. .fouim (1805), 11 H. L. Can. 290 ; 20 <;. B, N. H. 100 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 342 ; 1 1 .Tur. N. S. 309 ; 12 L. T. 555 ; 13 W. R. 017 76 Tapp V. !>•., (1803), 3 B. & P. 371 82 Tarhitoii v. Sbin>fl.;r (1819), 7 C B. 812 1203 Tarleton r. Tarhttoii (1815), 4 M. & Sol. 20 1142, 1154, 11515 Tarltoii V. FiMbor (1781), 2 Doii^. 071 872 Tarjih-y v. BlaUiy (1830), 2 Binj^. N. C. 437 ; 2 Srott, 042 ; 7 C & P. 396 ; Hf)«lK'-«, 414 24S Tarti! V. Darby (1810), 15 M. & W. 001 ; 15 L. .1. Kx. 320 0.58 TathaiM >'. I)riun?Mond (1804), 33 L. .1. Ch. 438 ; 2 II. & M. 202 HM TatUTMiilI V. Koarnley ( 1 850), 1 7 C. B. 308 282 TatUrnthall v. Nat. SloainMhip Co. (1884), 12 (i. B. I). 297 : 53 L. .1. Q. B. 332 ; 50 L. T. 299 ; 32 W. R. 500 ; 5 AHp. M. C. 200 771 Tht refereneet art to paff0>, not to parngrapht> TABLE 01^ CASKS CITED. Tiitltiti, Ex imrto, Ro Tliorp (1881), 17 Ch. D. 612; m L. J. Hi. 702 ; 4.') L. T. HI) TiivliT r. VViif.TH (IH17), 7 Tiiuii. :t7t : ■> MarHli. .'),'.! : IH K. U. VM TuVlciir r. Wil.liii (1808), L. H. a Kx. :)()H ; ;i7 I-. .1. Ex. 17a ; 18 L. T. (if).'i ; 1(1 W. K. 1018 TavltxM'. llW'<(18-''<). 1 !'«'»• 61" 'lujlor, Ex i-iiit.' ( I8.'()), 1 Jiio. A: W. 48a 1 Tiivlor, K.' (1812), '.> I'liiK". t'H TiiVl'ir, Kf (18i)l). 2 HolicrtH. 711 Tnyic.f, |{.', Climk c. lliminioiul (1887), a» Ch. D. 2.'),') ; M\ F.. .1 Ch. 171 ,^(1 1,. T. (ii'.> : a;) W. li. I8ti Tiivlor, In triioiiH (if (1S!)0). (la L. T. 2ao Taylor r. Hanl.iy (1828), 2 Him. 2ia ; 7 L. J. Ch. ((). 8.) 0.5 a, 18 Tajlor c. Ihv'vh (17r.»). 1 Yen. hcii. 2'J7 ('nil, Tayl.ir v. lUackhiw (18a(i), a Hiii^f. N. C. 2ar) ; a Scott, (ill ; 2 lIodjfi'N, 221 Taylor r. HowcrH (1S77), Ui L. J. Q. B. au ; I Q H. I). 21)1 ; a4 L. T. !)MS ; 21 VV. K. 111!) Taylor c. BriKK« (1827), 2 C. & V.Mr>- M. \- M. 28 TaVlor i: Hiny.'Hn (18.)'.)), r> H. \- N. 1 ; 22 L. .1. Ex. 7 Taylor r. Cariu'iitcr (ISI(i), 2 Wooill). & M. r, Taylor v. tnciUMoii (1811), 2 Q. It. loai ; a Kailw. CaH. (lo ; 2 U. Ac 1). atC. ; II (!1. & Kin. (ilO ; N .Tnr 8aa 10'..8, Taylor r. Colo (I7!M»\ 7 T. U. a, n. ; J 11. K. aoa 4 24, Taylor v. Vtwh (1820), 8 IVifi", (:.V2 122(!, Taylor r. Croki-r (ISoa), 4 Esp. 187 Taylor v. D.'vcy (18a7), 7 A. & E. 4()i) ; 2 N. & 1". 4(i!) ; VV. W. \- 1). 04(5 ; 1 .Iiir. 8.12 Taylor f. Dii.lork (181.')), 2 I'hillini. 2(il Taylor v. Eorstfr (182.')), 2 C. \- 1'. IH-') .'iOO, Taylor v. tit. Intl. IVii. Ky. Co. (18iV.)), 4 Do (1. & J. iuM) ; 28 L. J. Ch. 7(li) Taylor r. llawkina (18,')1), 1(1 Q. It. a()8 ; 20 L. J. Q. It. aia; 15 .Tiir. 74(1 4(1 CXOVll I'AOK 848 (i3h MA 277 047 a7a (1U9 7i)3 70.5 , 21 080 (100 01 7()a 7.-.8 a24 74(1 iia7 11. ")H 1227 .V17 401 174 , 1)09 111 Taylor r. llor.lo (17.')7). 1 Burr. 107 laa Ta'vlor r. lIuKh.'H (1844), 2 .lonos \- Ea T. 24 .'>41 Taylor v. llnmiihri.n (1H(14), 17 ('. M. N. S. Aao ; a4 E. .1. M. C. 1 ; 10 ■tur. N. H. 1 IM ; 111,. T. a7(i ; la \V. K. 1.1(1 '263 Tpylor .'. .lohiwton (1882), .ll E. J. Ch. 870; 10 Ch. D. 4(ia ; 4(1 E. T. 219; :')() \V. I{. MH 137 Taylor r. Kinlo.'h (181(1), 1 Stark. U. 17i") 147, 498 Tavlur r. Eaxyson (182S), a C. & V. iVia 'jlO Taylor r. EinU-y (18(10), 2 J)o (1. E. & J. 84 ; 20 E. .1. Ch. .)a4 : 8 W. K. 7ai) 683 Taylor r. Jl.mdH (ISd.l), 34 L. J. Ch. 203; 4 Do U.J. & S. Ml ; 13 W. U. 304 ; 1 1 .lur. N. S. 1(10 (193 Tiivlor r. MoH.Oy (18.13), (1 V. & V. 273 1103,111)4 Ta'ylorr. Nfotlhani (1811), 2 Taiin. 278; 11 K. It. .'■)72 Htl, 97 Taylor r. Nicholln (1840), (1 AE \- \V. 0.^ ; 8 Dowl. 242 ; E. J. Ex. 78. .732. 733 Taylor f. I'arry (1840), I M. & (ir. (104 ; 1 Scott, N. K. 570 234, 803, 1002 Taylor v. Kichanlmm (1853), 2 Drew. 1(1 7(t Ta'vlor v. Kohh (1832), 3 Yorker, 330 (109 Taylor «•. Smith (1802), (U E. ,1. i.i. It. 331 ; 07 E. T. 30 ; 40 W. E. 4,S0. . (172 Taylor •-. Stray (18.')7), 2 C. It. N. S. 17.^, 107 ; 20 E. .1. C. V. 287 ; 3 .Iiir. N. 8. 9(14 l/)8 Taylor v. Wakclidd (IS.IO), K. & It. 7(1.') 090 Taylor v. Weld (18001, 5 Mmhn. 1 1(1 740 Taylor v. Williiim (WilliauiH) (1830.31), 4 M. & l\ M ; 2 It. & Aid. 84.') . . 372, 500, 832 Taylor v. Witluun (1870), 3 Ch. D. 005 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 708 438 Teal .'. Aiity (1820), 2 It. & It. 99 ; 4 Mooro (C. 1'.), 542 087 TcmiuTli'y r. Scott (1832), 8 ItinK- 392 ; 1 M. & Sc. (101 818, lO.tO Vol. I. tndt with pag* (136. iiiit'illl i I CXCVlll TABLE OF CASES CITED. Tempest, Ex parte, Ro Craven (1870), 40 L. J. Bank. 22 ; L. R. 6 Ch. 70 ; 23 L. T. G50 ; 19 W. R. 137 , Tempest v. Fitzgerald (1820' , C B. & Aid. 680 Tempest v. Kiluer (1845), 2 C. 3. 300; 15 L. J. C. P. 101 ; 3 Dowl. & L. 407 201 82 G89 , osri , 809 1205 159 1004 1004 947 128 189 GO 1103 253 1205 750 1107 1221 Temple, Ex parte (1H14), 2 Ves. & B. 395 806 Temple v. Tullen (1853), 8 Kx. 3S9 : :'2 L. J. Kx. 151 38, Teiinaiit, Ex parte, Re Howard (1877j, 6 Ch. D. 303 ; 37 L. T. 284; 25 W R 854 Tcnnant v. Boll (1816')", 9 Q.' B.684'; ioL. J." M." oVlii "; ' io'jur.' Dili' .'.37, Tennant i'. Creston (Overton) (1840), 2 New S-8.s. Cas. 425 ; 8 Q. B. 707 ; 15 L. J. M. C. 105 ; 10 Jur. fiOO Tcnnant v. Hamilton (1839), 7 CI. & Fin. 122 ; McL. & R. 821 T.-nnent i'. Noil (1870), I. R. o C. L. 418 Tennyson v. O'Brien (1855), 5 E. & B. 497 Terrett v. Taylor (1815). 9 Cnmoli, 43 Terry v. Huntington (10()9), Hardr. 480 Terry v. Hutchinson (1808). 37 L. J. Q. B. 257 : 9 B. & S. 487 ; L. R. 3 Q. B. 699 ; 18 L. T. 521 ; 16 W. R. 932 Texira v. Evans (undated), cited 1 Anst. 228 ; 2 H. Bl. 140 ; 4 T. R. 320 ; 2 R. R. 399 Thames Iron Works Co. v. The Royal Mail St. ['aoket Co. (1862), 13 C. B. N. S. 358 ; 31 L. J. C. F. 169 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 100 Thanct, E. of v. Forstrr (1683), T. .Tones, 224 Tnarpe v. Gisbunie (1825), 2 C. & P. 21 Tharpe v. Stallwood (1843), 5 M. & Or. 768 ; 6 Seott, N. R. 715 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 241 ; 1 Dowl & L. 24 ; 7 Jur. 492 227 That(!her v. Waller (1675), T. Jones, 53 340 ThelluHon v. Cosling (1803), 4 Esp. 266 1093 Theobald v. Criohmore (1818), 1 B. & Aid. 227 227 Theodor Komor, The (1878), 3 P. Div. 162 ; 47 L. J. Adm. 85 ; 3S L. T. 818 ; 27 W. R. 307 1186 Thotford V. Tyler (1845), 8 Q. B. 95 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 33 ; 10 Jur. 68 .... 169 Thotford's case (1719), 12 Vin. Abr. 90, pi. 16 1050, 1175 Thin r. Richards (1892), 2 Q. B. 141 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 39 ; 66 L. T. 327 ; 56 J. P. 596 770 Thorn V. Bigland (1853). 8 Ex. 726 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 243 201 Thomas, In the goods of (1871), 41 L. J. P. & M. 32 ; 25 L. T. 509 ; 20 W. R. 149 439 Thomas, Re (1859), 1 S & T. 255 ; 28 L. J. Prob. 33 69H Thomas Blyth, The (1860), L\ish. A<lni. 16 177 Thomas v. An-loy (IS116), 6 E.sp. 8(1 84, 283 Thomas r. Bro^n (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 714 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 811 ; 35 L. T. 237 : 24 AV. R. 821 538, 671 Tliomasf. CliurUm (1H62), '2 B. & S. 475; 31 L. J. Q. B. 139; 8 Jur. N. H. 795 ; (i L. T. 320 869 Thomas v. Council (183S). 4 M. & W. 267 ; 1 H. & H. 189 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 306 379 Tliomast). Cook (1818), 2 Stark. (N. P.) 408; 2 B. & A. 119; 20 R. R. 374 128, 660, 661 Thomas ». Cooke (1828), 8 B. & C. 728 ; 3 M. & Rv. 444 678, 679 Thomas v. David (1836), 7 C & P. 350 918, 950 Thomas v. JOvans (1802), 2 Kast, 488 705 Thomas v. Foylo (1803), 5 Esp. 8S 116 Thomas V. Fredericks (1847), 10 Q. B. 775; 16 L. J. Q. B. 393; 11 Jur. 942 638 ThomiiH V. .Tonkins (1837). 6 A. & E. 825 ; 1 N. & P. 587 ; 1 Jur. 261. .396, 398 Thomas v. Kot.toric'.lie (1749), 1 Ves. sen. 333 1106 Thomas v. liowis (1878), 4 Ex. D. 18 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 7 ; 39 L. T. 669 ; 27 W. R. Ill 173 Thomas «>. Morgan (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 496 ; 4 Dowl. 2J3 ; 1 Uale, 172 ; 5 Tyr. 1085 515 Thomas v. Newton (1826), M. & M. 4H, n 969 Th* rt/ertnee.1 are to pni/es, not lo pariijrapha. TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXCIX FAQB Thomas «. Packer (1857), 1 H. & N. 669 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 207 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 143 o 169 Thomas v. Rawlings (1859), 27 Beav. 110 697, 598 Thomas v. Sorrcll (uiidiited), Vau«h. 351 C38 Thomas v. Stephenson (1853), 2 E. & B. 108 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 258 ; 17 Jur. 5!»7 227 Thomas v. Thomas (1796), 6 T. R. 671 ; 3 R. R. 306 794, 799 Thomas v. Thomas (1811), 2 Camp. 647 524 Thomas v. Thomas (1860), 2 Dr. & Sm. 298 173 Thomas r. Williams (1830), 10 B. &C. 604 678 Thompson, Ex piirto (184.>). 6 Q. B. 721 998 Thompson, Goods iif, Ro (1887), 12 P. D. 100; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 40; 57 L. T. 373 ; 35 W. R. 384 413 Thompsons. Bowyer (1863), 2 Now R. 604; 11 W. R 97.); 9 Jur. N. S. 863. . 720 Thompson v. IJonaldsou (1800), 3 Esp. 63 ; 6 R. R. 812 1 104 Thompson v. Fiilk (1852). 1 Drew. 21 601 Thompson «'. Gardiner (1876), 1 C. P. D. 777 297 Thompson 0. Gibson (1841). 8 M.&W. 285; lOL. J.Ex. 21 1 ; 9lJortl.717 .. 1073 Thompson v. Hopper (1856), 25 L. J. Q. B. 240 ; 6 E. & B. 172 771 Thompson v. Uiv.y (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 283 162 Thompson v. Lambe (1802), 7 Ves. 588 482 Thompson v. Mosely (1833), 5 C. & P. 502 231, 321 Tliompson v. Nye (1850), 16 Q. B. 175 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 85 ; 15 Jur. 285. . 256 Thompson v. Ro.ss (1858), 29 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 6 II. «& N. 16; 5 Jur. N. S. 1133; 1 L. T. 43 253 Thompson v. Small (1845), 1 C. B. 328 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 157 152 Thompson t'. Trail (1826), 2 C. & P. 334 ; B. & 0. 36 ; 9 D. & R. 31 .. 152 Thompson v. Troviiuiou,( 1691). Skin. 402 377 Thompson v. Waithman ( i856), 3 Drew. 028 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 134 490 Thomson v. Austen (18231. 2 Dowl. & Ry. 361 479, 614 Thomson r. Davenport (1829), 9 B. & C. 78 ; 4 M. & R. 110 520 Thomson f. Hull (1852). 2 Robertson, 426 097 Thomson v. Harding (1853), 2 E. & B. 630 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 448 510 Thomson v. Hompjnstall (1849), 7 Notes of Gas. (Ece. & Mar.) 141 ; 1 Roberts. 783 798 Tliomsou V. Wilson (1818). 2 Stark. 379 656 Thorington v. Smith (1868). 8 Wall. (U. S.) 1 763 Thomdike v. City of Boston (1810), 1 Meto. 242 377 Thome v. Jackson (1846), 3 C. B. 661 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 87 ; 4 Dowl. & L. 478 17 Thome v. Tilbury (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 407 ; 3 H. & N. 534 645 Thomos V. White (18;i5), Tyr. \; «ir. 1 10 531 Thornhill v. ThornhiU (1820), 2 Jae. & W. 347 814 Thornton v. Clharles (1836), 2 M. & W. 809 298 Thornton v. Kempstur (1814), 6 Taun. 786 : 1 Marsh. 355 ; 15 R. R. 658 . .297, 299 Thomt<m f. Moux (1827), M. & M. 43 297 Thornton r. Place (1832). 1 M. & Rob. 218 1122 Thornton t'. Roy. Ex. Ass. Co. (1791). P.ia. R. 25 935 Thorp. Re, Ex parte Tatton (1881), 17 Ch. D. 512 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 792 ; 46 L. T. 89 84S Thorp V. Holdsworth (1876). 45 L. J. Ch. 406 ; 3 Ch. 1). 637 224 Thorpe «•. C<inpcr (1828), 5 BiiiMf. 129 ; > M. k P. 245 ; 2 Y. & J. 445 1123 Thorpe V. Mii.wiulay (1820). 5 Madd. 229 961 Thresh v. Rake (1794), 1 Esp. 53 752 Thunder «'. Warren (1845). 8 Ir. Law R. 181 285 Thurbaine et al. (1664), llardr. 323 543 Thurlo V. Miidis<m (1655). Sty. 462 1214 Thurston v. Slatford (1700), 1 Salk. 284, 285 357 Thurtell's case (tindatod). cited 8 C. & P. 284 8,S9 Thurtell ♦>. Beaumont (1823), S Moore, C. V. 612 ; 1 Hintf. 339 105 Thwaites fi. Foreman (1844), 1 Coll. 409, 414; 10 .Tur. 183 144 Thwttites V. Richardson (1790), Pea. R. 16 ; 3 R. !i. 645 488 Vol. J. *nd» with pagt 636. cc TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAQX Thwaites v. WUding (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 4 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 49 L. T. 396 ; 32 W. R. 80 723 Thynne, Lady E., v. Ld. Glengall (1847-8), 2 H. L. Cas. 131 679, 806 Tichborne case (1871-2). MS. 28th Feb. 18V2 55, 608 Tickel V. Short (1750), 2 Ves. sen. 239 1525 Tickle V. Brown (1836), 4 A. & E. 378 ; 6 N. & M. 230 ; 1 H. & W. 769 . .446. 5\n Tidey v. Mollett (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 298 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 235 ; 10 L. T. 380 ; 12 W. R. 802 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 800 619 Tidmarsh v. Grover (1813). 1 M. & Sel. 735 ; 14 R. R. 563 1194 Tiemey v. Wood (1854j. 19 Beav. 330 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 895 ; 2 W. R. 677 . . ^65 Tiprhe v. Tighe (1877), I. R. 11 Eq. 203 1151 Tildesley v. Harper (1876-78), 7 Ch. D. 403 ; 10 Ch. D. 393 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 495 ; 39 L. T. 552 ; 27 W. R. 249 186, 188, 221, 224 Tiley v. Cowling (1701), 1 Ld. Raym. 744 1117 Tilghman v. Fisher (1840), 9 "Watts, 441 520 Tillotson, Ex parte (1816), 1 Stark. 470 871 Timson v. Wilson (1888), 38 Ch. D. 72 ; 69 L. T. 76; 36 W. R. 418 .... 22 Tindall v. Baskett (1801), 2 F. & F. 664 270 Tinley v. Porter (1837), 6 Dowl. 744 ; 2 M. & W. 822 832 Tinn v. Billingsley (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 253 ; 3 Dowl. 810 474 Tippet's ca.se (R. v. Tippet) (1823), R. & R. 509 560 Tippets V. Heane (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 252 ; 4 Tyr. 772 714 Tippins V. Coates (1847), 6 Hare, 16 971 Tirzah, The (1878), 48 L. J. P. D. & A. 15 ; 4 P. D. 33 177 Tisdall V. Pamell (1863), 14 Ir. C. L. R. 1. 27, 28 433, 1167, 1168 Titus Gates' case (1685), 10 How. St. Tr. 1185 877 Tobacco-pipe Makers' Co. v. Loder (1851), 14 Q. B. 765 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 414 ; 15 Jur. 1194 71 Toby V. Lovibond (1848), 6 C. B. 784 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 769 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 201 ; 12 Jur. 436 1160 Tod f. E. of Winchelsea (1828), 3 C. & P. 387 141, 284, 353 Todd V. Kerrich (1852), 8 Ex. 161 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 17 Jur. 119 36, 1 53 Toddf. Reid(1821), 4 B. & Aid. 210 158 Todd V. Winchelsea, Ld. (1826), 2 C. & P. 488 ; M & M. 12 141 Toft V. Stephenson (1851), 1 De G. M. & G. 28 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 129 ; 16 Jur. 1187 720 Toker v. Toker (1863). 31 Beav. 629 ; 3 De G. & 8m. 487 ; 8 L. T. 525, 777 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 322 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 370 137 Toleman v. Portbury (1869), 39 L. J. Q. B. 136 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 288 ; 22 L. T. 33 ; 18 W. R. 579 260, 622 Toleman, Re, Ex parte Bramble (1880), 13 Ch. D. 885 ; 42 L. T. 413 ; 28 W. R. 676 321 Tollemache, Re, Anderson, Ex parte (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 606 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 383 ; 52 L. T. 786 1013, 1110, 1114 Tollemache, Re, Ex parte Edwards (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 415 435, 629 Tollemache V. Tollemache (1861), 30 L J. P. &M. 113; I S. & T. 667 .. 1144 Tolman and Ux v. Johnstone (1860), 2 F. & F. 66 949 Tomkins v. Att.-Gen. (1813), 1 Dow, 404 1050 Tomkins Saltmarsh (1826), 14 Serg. & R. 276 378 Tomkins v. Tomkins (1859), 1 8w. & Tr. 168 48 Tomkinson v. Staight (1856), 26 L. J. C. P. 85 ; 17 C. B. 697 ; 2 Jur. 354. . 690 Tomlinson v. Gell (1837), 6 A. & E. 564 ; 1 N. & P. 588 ; W. W. & D. 229 678 Tompson v. Williamson (1831), 7 Bligh, 432 160 Toms t'. Cuming (1865), 7 M. & Gr. 88 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 910 ; 1 Lut. Reg. Cas. 269; 14 L. J. C. P. 58; 9 Jur. 91 711, 726 Tomsou ti. Judge (1855). 3 Drew. 306 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 929 ; 2 Eq. R. 1141 . . 137 Toogood i'. Spyring (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 181, 193 ; 4 Tyr. 582 Ill T<x)kert). Smith (1857), 1 H. & N. 732 654 Topham v. M'Gregor (1844), 1 C. & K. 320 324, 925 Toppiu 1'. Lomas (1855), 16 C. B. 145 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 144 682 Topping, Ex parte. Re Levy and Robson (1865), 34 L. J. Bank. 44; 12 L. T. 787 ; 13 W. R. 1026 715 The re/erencet are to ptyet, not to paragrapht. J*,# '- TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCl PAOB Torriano ». Young (1833), 6 C. & P. 8 169 Tottenham's Estate, Re (1869), Ir. E. 3 Eq. 628 86 Toulmin v. Copland (1848), 2 PhiU. 711 1117 Toulmin v. Price (1800), 5 Ves. 238 308 Touixet V. Cripps (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 667 ; 27 W. R. 706 675 Tovey, In re (1878), 1 P. Div. 150 ; 45 L. J. P. 78 ; 34 L. T. 856 ; 24 W. R. 539 701 Tovey v. Lindsay (1813), 1 Dow, 117 1143, 1144 Towers v. Newton (1841), 1 Q. B. 319 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 106 ; 9 Dowl. 576. . 871 Town of Union v. Bermes (1882), 44 New Jersey Reports (Law), 269 508 Towne v. Campbell (1847), 3 C. B. 921 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 104 35 Towno V. Lewis (1849), 7 C. B. 608 152 Towne v. Smith (1845), 1 Woodb. & M. 116 1151 Townend v. Drakeford (1843), 1 C. & K. 20 297, 298, 299 Townley v. Watson (1844), 3 Curt. 761 ; 3 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & M.) 17. . 707 Townsend v. Ives (1748), 1 Wils. 216 1215 Townsend, M. of v. Strangroom (1801), 6 Ves. 339 ; 5 R. R. 312 749, 750 Townsend v. Weld (1811), 8 Mass. 146 759 Townshend Peer. (1843), 10 01. & Fin. 289 422 Toymbeev. Brown (1849), 3 Ex. 117; 18 L. J. Ex. 99 76 Tracy Peer. (1839), Min. Ev. 18 1167 Traoy Peer. (1843), 10 CI. & Fin. 191 422, 423, 425, 931, .226, 1228 Trattord v. Blanc (see In re Truefort). Trail V. Baring (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 521 ; 4 GifF. ^85 559 Trasher v. Everhart (1831), 3 Gill & John. 234, 242 61 Traversf. Blundell (1877), 6Ch. D. 436; 36 L. T. 341 801 Treacy v. Corcoran (1874), I. R. 8 C. L. 40 139 Treeby, Re (1875), L. R. 3 P. & D. 242 ; 44 L. J. P. & M. 44 706 Tregany v. Fletcher (1696), 1 Ld. Raym. 154 19 Trelawney v. Colman (1817), 2 Stark. 193 147, 375, 376, 930 Treraain v. Barrett (1816), 6 Taun. 88 ; 1 Marsh. 463 ; 16 R R. 584 .... 818 Trench v. Doran (1887), 20 L. R. Ir. 338 746, 784 Trent v. Hunt (18 i3), 9 Ex. 14 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 318 ; 17 Jur. 899 98, 152 Tress v. Savage (1854), 23 L. J. Q. B. 339 ; 4 E. & B. H6 ; 2 C. L. R. 1315 ; 18 Jur. 680 655 Trevanion, Re (1850), 2 Roberts. 311 700 Trevivan t-. Lawrence (1704), 1 Salk. 276 ; 2 Smith, L. C. 664 89 Trewhitt v. Lambert (1839), 10 A. & E. 470 ; 3 P. & D. 676 588 Tribe v. Tribe (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. 132 ; 1 Roberts. 775 6:)o Trickett v. Tomlinson (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 663 ; 7 L. T. 678 538 Trimbey v. Vignier (1834), 1 Bing. N. C. 151 ; 4 M. & Soott, 695 : 6 C. & P. 25 62 Trimble v. Hill (1879), 5 App. Cas. 342 ; 49 L. J. P. C. 49 ; 42 L. T. 103 ; 28 W. R. 479 620 Trimlestown, Ld. v. Kerarais (1843), 9 CI. & Fin. 763 . .431, 435, 443, 445, 486, 1207 Trimmer v. Bayne (1802), 7 Ves. 518 ; 6 R. R. 173 794, 805, 806 Trist V. Johnson (1833), 1 M. & Rob. 250 ;U4 Tronson v. Dent (1863), 8 Moo. P. C. C. 419 179 Trotman v Wood (1804), 16 C. B. N. S. 479 778 Trott V. Skidmore (18t0), 2 S. & T. 12 ; 29 L. J. P. 166 ; 8 W. R. 690 ; 6 Jur. N. 8. 760 698 Trotter v. Maclean (1875), 13 Ch. D. 6H0 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 256 ; 42 L. T. 118 : 28 W. R. 244 168, 460 Trowbridge v. Baker (1823), 1 Cowen, 261 618 Trowel t-. Castle (1661), 1 Keb. 22 1192 Trowell v. Shonton (1878), 8 Ch. D. 318 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 738; 38 L. T. 369; 26 W. R. 837 680 Trower acd Lawson's case (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 8 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 468 845 Truefort, In re, Trafford v. Blano (1885), 34 W. R. 66 ; 63 L. T. 498 . . 188 Trueman r. Loder (1840), 11 A. & E. 6U0 ; 3 P. & D. 567. . . .765, 767, 781, 783 Trulook f. Robey (1841), 12 Sim. 402 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 343 72O Truro, Lady, Re (1806), 35 L. J. P. & M. 89 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 201 ; 14 L. T. N. 8. 893 ; 14 W. R. 976 70I Fel, I. end* with page 636. .;t ceil TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAa9 Trudcve v. Burton (1824), 9 Moore, C. P. 64 606 Trustee Relief Act, Re, Higgins' Trusts (1861), 2 GiflP. 562 ; 30 L. J. Ch. 405 632 Tucker f>. Barrow (1828), 7 B. & C. 625 ; 3 C. & P. 90 ; 1 M. & R. 618 ; M. &M 137 517 Tucker v. Burrow (18G5), 34 L. J. Ch. 478 ; 2 H. & M. 515 ; 13 W. R. 771 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 485 666 Tucker v. Good {see Re Bonner) . Tucker v. Maxwell (1814), 11 Mass. 143 552 Tuckey v. Henderson (1863), 33 Beav. 174 805 Tuff V. Warman (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 740 ; '26 L. J. C. P. 263 : attd. 5 C, B. N. S. 573 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 322 ; 6 J.ir. N. S. 222 6 Tuftonv. Whitmore (1840), 12 A. & E. 370 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 405 355 Tugwell V. Hooper (1847), 10 Bea\. 348 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 171 607 TuU V. Parlett (1829), M. & M. 472 748 Tuiiock t'. Dunn (1826), Ry. & M. 416 492 Tunnicliffe v. Tedd (1848), 6 C. B. 553 ; 17 L. J. M C. 67 1073 Tupling V. Ward (1861;, 30 L. J. Ex. 222; 6 H. & N. 749 ; 4 L. T. 20; 9 W. R. 482 964 Tupper V. Foulkes (i861), 30 L. J. C. P. 214 ; 9 C. B. 797 ; 3 \. T. 741 ; 9 W. R. 340 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 7(i9 645, 646, 1206 Tupper V. Tupper (1855), 1 K. & J. 06.5 ; 1 Jur. N. 8. 917 708 Turley v. Thomas (1837), 8 C. & P. 104 6 TumbiiU V. Janson (1878), 3 C. P. D. 264 ; 47 L J. C. P. 384 : 26 W. R. 8;- 818 Turner's oase (1664), Kel. (J.) 30 1126 Turner, Re (1872), L. R. 2 P. & D. Wi ; 27 L. T. 322 ; 21 W. R. 38 . . . . 143 Turner, Ee, Glenistor v. Harding (1885), 29 Ch. D. 985 ; 53 L. T. 528 . .421, 1170 Turner v. Ambler (1847), 10 Q. B. 262 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 158 ; 6 Jur. 346.. 30, 703 Turner v. Barlow (1863), 3 F. & F. 946 16 Turner v. Cameron's Coalbrook Steam Coal Co. (1850), 5 Ex. 932 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 71 98 Turner v. Collins (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 329 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 558 ; 25 L. T. 374 136 Turner v. Crisp (1728), 2 Str. 827 448 Turner v. HeyUnd (1879), 4 C. P. D. 432 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 635 ; 41 L. T. 556 41 Turner V. Mason (1845), 11 M. & W. 116 ; 2 D. & L. 898; 14 L. J. Ex. 311 153 Turner ». Pearte (1787), 1 T. R. 717 910 Turner v. Power (1828), 7 B. & C. 626 ; M. & M. 131 285 Turner v. Walsh (1881), 6 App. Cas. 636 ; 60 L. J. P. C. 55; 45 L. T. 50.. 124 Turney v. Dodwell (1854), 3 E. & B. 136 ; 2 C. L. R. 666 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 18 Jur. 787 717 Turquand v. Fearon (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 280; 48 L. J. Q. B. 341 ; 40 L. T. 191 ; 27 W. R. r,96 187. 220 Turquand v. Knight (1836), 2 M. & W. 100 ; 2 Gale, 192 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 4. 691, 692, 59 », 695, 611 Turquand r. Wilson (1875), 1 Ch. D. 85 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 104 : 24 W. R. 66.. 534 Turrill V. Crawley (1849), l.i Q. B. 197 : 18 L. J. Q. B. 156 : 13 Jur. H78.. 162 Turton r. Barber (1874), L. R. 17 Eq. 329 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 468 ; 22 W. R. 438 602 Tussaud, Re, Tussaud v. Tussaud (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 849 ; 9 Ch. D. 363 ; 26 W. R. 874; 39L. T. 113 805,806 Tutton t'. Darke (1860), 6 H. & N. 649, 650 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 271 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 983 ; 2 L. T. 361 16, 20 Tweedale, Re (1874),L. R. 3 P. & D. 204; 44 L. J. P. 35; 31 L. T. 799. . 142, 702 Twemlow v. Oswin (1809), 2 Camp. K5 ; 11 R. R. 670 175 Twiss V. Baldwin (1832), 9 Conn. 291 201 Twyman v. Kuowles (1863), 13 C. B. 222 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 143 ; 17 Jur. 238 277, 288 Twyno's caKe (1602), 3 Co. Rep. 80 ; 1 Smith, L. C. 1 136 Tverman v. Smith (1866), 26 L. J. Q. B. 359; 6 E. & B. 719; 2 Jur. N. S. 860 , 643 The refeienett ar* to paget, not to paragraph*. TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCIU PAOB Tyers v. Eosedale and Ferry Hill Iron Co. (1875), 42 L. J. Ex. 185 ; L. E. 8 Ex. 30.T ; 29 L. T. 751 : 21 W. R. 793 7o2 Tyler v. Uliner (1815), 12 Mass. 166 1096 Tyler r. Yates (1871), L. E. 11 Eq. 265; 19 W. R. 118 : 23 L. T. 447 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 768 ; 6 L. R. Ch. 665 ; 25 L. T. 284 ; 19 W. E. 909 137 Tyrer t). Henry (1860), 14 Moo. P. C. C. 83 ; 3 L. T. 219 185 Tyrwhitt v. Wynne (1819), 2 B. & A. 554 235 U., ffllsely called J. v. J. (1867), L. E. 1 P. & 15 461 ; 16 "W. E. 518 ; 37 L. J. P. &M. 7 631 TJdnv r. Udny (1869). L. E. 1 H. L. fSc.), 441 179 Ulverstone Union v. Park (1889). 53 J. P. 629 621 Underwood v. T^rd Conrtown (1804), 2 Sch. & Lef . 67 616 Underwood v. Wing (1854), 19 Beav. 459 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 159 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 293 174 Unffley v. Ungley (1877), 4 Ch. D. 73 ; 6 Ch. D. 887 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 189, 854 679 Union Bank of London v. Lenandon (1878), 3 C. P. D. 343 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 409 651 Unity Jt. St. Mutual Banking Assoc., Ex p.irte. Re King (1858), 3 De G. & J. 63 : 27 L. J. Bank. 33 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1257 541 Upton V. Hume (1893). 41 Am. St. E. 863 245 Urquhart v. Butterfield (1888), 37 Ch. D. 357 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 521 ; 67 L. T. T80 ; 36 W. E. 376 7, 173, 507 Urquhart t . Macpherson (1878) , 3 App. Cas. 831 746 U.S. V. Battiste (1835), 2 Sumn. 243 25 U.S.*. Breed (1832), 1 Sumn. 1.59 764 U.S. V. Buford (18.i0), 3 Pet. 12 1178 U.S. V. Cushman (1836), 2 Sumn. 426 1115 U.S. V. Gibert (1818), 2 Sumn. 19. 80. 81 279 U.S. V. Gooding (1827), 12 Wheat. 469 382 U.S. V. Hanaway (1851), 2 Wall. .Tr. 139 626 U.S. V. Havward (1815), 2 Gall. 485 , 267 U.S. V. Leffler ^1837), 11 Pet. S6 748 U.S. f. MR«e (1867), 37 L. J. Ch. 129 ; L. E. 3 Ch. 79 ; IS W. E. 377; 17L. r. 428 966 U.S. V. Moses (1827). 4 Wash. 726 614 U.S. V. Eeybum (1832), 6 Pet. 352 277 U.S. t'. Spalding (1822), 2 Mason, 478 1199 U.S. V. Wasrner (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 634 ; L. E. 2 Ch. 585 ; 15 W. E. 1026 ; 1() L. T. 646 3 U.S. V. Wood (1818), 3 Wash. 440 354 U.S. V. Wood (1840). 14 Peters. 430 628 Usticke V. Bawden (1824), 2 Add. 125 709 Utterton v. Robins (1834), 1 A. & E. 423 701 Uxbridge, Lord, v. Staveland (1747), 1 Ves. sen. 56 961 Vachee v. Cocks (1829), M. & M. 353 377, 379 Vacherr. Cocks (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 147 1212 Vail V. Rice (1851), 1 Seld. (N. Y.), 155 782 Vaillant v. Dodemcad (1792), 2 Atk. 524 595, 603, 965 Vale r. Oppert (1875), 10 Ch. App. 340 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 579 ; 33 L. T. 41 ; 23 W. E. 780 321 Valentine v. Piper (1839), 22 Pick. 90 1219 Vallanoe v. Dewar (1808), 1 Camp. 503 ; 10 E. E. 738 : 66, 782 Valleer. Dumergue (1849). 4 Ex.290; 18 L. J. Ex. 398 1147 Valpy V. Gibson (1847). 4 C. B. 864 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 241 671 Vance v. Lowther(1876), 45 L. J. Ex. 200 ; i Ex. D. 176 ; 34 L. T. 286 ; 24 W. E. 372 1 194 Vance v. Vance (1871), I. E. 6 C. L. 363 523 Vandenburgh v. Spooner (1866), L. E. 1 Ex. 316; 35 L. J. Ex. 201 ; 4 H. &C. 619; 14 W. E. 843 671 Vol. I. end* with page 635. m m CCIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. VAOB Vander Donokt v. Thellusson (1849), 8 0. B. 812 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 12 938 Vandevelde f . Lluellin (1661), 1 Keb. 220 872, 873 Van Dieraen's Land Bank v. Victoria Bank (1871), 40 L. J. P. C. 28; L. R. 3 P. C. 526 ; 19 W. R. 857 38 Vane's, Lord, case (1743-4), 13 East, 171, n. (a) ; 1 T. R. 697; 12 R. R, 317 ; Preface, vi 893 Van Omeron v. Dowiolt (1809). 2 Camp. 44 ; 11 R. R. 656 4, 20, 157, 1093 Vanquelin v. Bouard (1803), 15 C. B. N. S. 341 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 78; 9 L. T. 582; 12 W. R. 128; 10 Jur. N. li.SGO 1151, 1154 Van Reimsdyk v. Kane (1813), 1 Gall. 630 380, 494, 496 Van Sandau v. Turner (1845), 6 Q. B. 773, 786 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 154 ; 9 Jur. 296 20, 533 Van Straubenzee f. Monok (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 21 ; 3 S. & T. 6 .... 701 Van Wart v. Wolley (1823), Ry. & M. 4 606 Varicas v. French (1819), 2 C. & K. 1008 328 Vasier. Delaval (1785), 1 T. R. 11 616, 617 Vater's Trusts, Re (1887) W. N. 1887, at p. 128 1171 Viiughan's cane (16'J6), 13 How. St. Tr. 485 ; Post. C. L. 246 236 Vaughan v. Hancock (184G), 3 C. B. 706; 16 L. J. 0. P. 1 ; 10 Jur. 926 682 Vaughan v. Martin (1796), 1 Esp. 440 925, 926 Vaughau v. Worrall (1817), 2 Madd. 322 ; 2 Swans. 400 910 Vaughtoii r. Bradsliaw (1H6()), 9 C B. N. S. 103; 30 L. J. C. P. 93 ; 3 L. T. 373 ; 9 W. R. 120 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 468 1073 Vaux Barony (1836), Min. Ev. 67 1040 Vaux Peerage (1824), Pari. Min. 44 423, 425 Vaux V. Sheffer (1852), 8 Moo. P. C. C. 75 1122 Velasquez, The (18()7), L. R. 1 P. C. 491 ; 1 Moo. P. C. C. 426 ; 36 L. J. Adra. 19 ; 4 Moo. P. C. C. (N. S.), 426 ; 16 W. R. 89 178 Vonables v. Schweitzer (1873), L. R. 10 Eq. 76 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 389 ; 28 L T. 462 844 Venafra v. John.wn (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 316 57t* Vent V. Pacey (1830), 4 Russ. 193 601 Vernon, Ewens & Co., In re (1886), 32 Ch. D. 165; 54 L. T. 365; 34 W. R. 606 665 Verry r. Watkins (1836), 7 C. & P. 30S 254, 257, 951 Vice V. Lsdy Anson (1827), M. & M. 97 ; 7 B. & C. 409 ; 1 M. & R. 113 ; 3C. &P. 19 314 Vickersv. Hertz (1871), L. R. 2 H. L. (Sc.) 113 116 Victoria, The (1867), 1 Ir. R. Eq. 336 ; 37 L. J. Adm. 12 178 Vincent v. Bp. of Sodor cfe Man (1851), 4 De G. & Sm. 294 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 433 ; 15 Jur. 365 ; 5 Ex. 683 ,^ C!'3 Vincent v. Cole (1S28), M. & M. 258 ; 3 C. & P. 481 280, 286, 287 Vines v. Arnold (1849), 8 C. B. 638 1124 Viney v. Barss (1796), 1 Esp. 293 231 Vinnicombe f. Butler (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 18 ; 3 S. & T. 580 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1109 ; 13 W. R. 392 697, 698 Violett t'. Patton (1809), 5 Cranch, 142 069 Viret V. Viret (1880), 50 L. J. Ch. 69 ; 43 L. T. 493 680 Vivian v. Little (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 370; 62 L. J. Q. B. 771 ; 48 L. T. 793; 31 "W. R. 891 ; 47 J. P. 566 1111 Volant r. Soyer (1853), 13 C. B. 231 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 83 321, 598 Von Stentz v. Comyn (1848), 12 Ir. E. R. 622, 642—645 140 Vooght V. Winch (1832), 2 B. & Aid. 602 89 Vowlesw. Young (180G), 13Vc8. 147; 9 R. R. 154 413, 415, 416, 424, 425 Vulliamy v. Huskisson (1838), 3 Y. & C. Ex. 82 ; 2 Jur. 6)6 418, 423 WArDEL, Ex parte. In re Lutscher (1877), 6 Ch. D. 328 ; 36 L. T. 345 ; 26 W. R. 9 848 Waddington v. Bristow (1801), 2 B. & P. 452 686 Wade V. Nazer (1848). 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 46 705 Wad« V. Simeon (1845), 2 C. B. 342 910 The refermeet art to pagti, not to paragri'pht. TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCV PAGE Wade V. Tatton (1856), 25 L. J. C ^ 240 ; 18 C. B. 371 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 491 . . 719 WHdeer v. llast India Co. (ISSG), 8 De C . M. & G. 182 ; 2 Jur. N. 8. 407. 618 Wadley v. Baylisa (1814), 5 Taun. 752 ; 15 Rev. R. 615 791 Wadsworth v. Bentley (1854), 23 L. J. Q. B. 3 ; 1 L. & M. (Bail Court), 203 ; 17 Jur. 1077 1122 Wadsworth v. Harashaw (1819), 2 B. & B. 5. n 593 WadHWorth v. Marshall (183J), 1 0. & M. 87 : 3 Tyr. 223 816 Wagstaff r. Wilson (1832), 4- B. & Ad. 339 ; 1 N. & M. 1 606 Wiiini'. Bailev(1839), 10 A. & E. 616 ; 2 P. & D. 507 308 Wainmanf. Kvnman (1847), 1 Ex. 118 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 232 715 Waithmau v. \Vakefield (1807), 1 Camp. 120 ; 10 R. R. 654 160 Waithman f. Weaver (1822), D. & R. N. P. 10 ; 11 Price. 267 255 Wakefield v. D. of Buccleuoh (1866), L. R. 4 Eq. 613 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 763. . 114 Wakefield v. Ross (1827), 5 Mason, 18 ; 9 Dane, Abr. 317 903 Wakeman r. West (1836), 7 C. & P. 479 1108 Wakley v. Johnson (1826), R. fr M. 422 246 Walcot V. Alleyu (1819), Milw. Ecc. R. (Ir.) 69 170 Walcott V. Amerioan Life, &c. Soc. (1891), 33 Am. St. R. 923 Add. [105 Walcott V. Hall (1810), 6 Ma.s8. 514 25 Waldridge v. Kennison (1794) 1 Eap. 144 515 Waldrouf. Coombe(1810), 3Taun. 162; 12 R. R. 629 1178 Waldron t). Jacob (1871), I. R. 5 Eq. 131 673 Waldron v. Tuttle (1828), 4 New Hainp. 371 413 Waldron v. Ward (1654), Sty. 449 603 Waldy V. Gray (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 238 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 394 ; 32 L. T. 531 ; 23 W. R. 676 357 Walford V. Fleetwood (1845), 14 M. & W. 449 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 271 19 Walker's case (1586), 3 Co. Rep. 23 509 Walker's case (1788), 1 Lea. 498 906 Walker, In re. In re Jackson (1885), 53 L. T. 660 ; 3t W. R. 95 621 Walker v. Bartlett (1856), 18 C. B. 845 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 643 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 263 684 Walker v. Beauchamp, Lady (1834), 6 C. & P. 652 303, 409 Walker v. Bradford Old Bk. (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 511 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 280; 32 W. R. 645 651 Walker v. Broadstock (1795), 1 Esp. 458 444 Walker v. Butler (1856), 26 L. J. Q. B. 377 ; 6 E. & B. 506 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 687 714 Walker v. Gardner (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 371 733 Walker v. Gode (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 172 ; 6 H. & N. 594 524 Walker v. G. W. Ry. Co. (1867), 36 L. J. Ex. 123 ; L. R. 2 Ex. 228 ; 16 W. R. 769 641 Walker v. Milne (18491, 11 Beav. 607 ; 18 L. J. Ch. 288 684 Walker v. Moore (1829), 10 B. & C. 416 773 Walker v. Poole (1882), 21 Ch. D. 835 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 840 914 Walker v. Richardson (1837), 2 M. & W. 882 ; M. & H. 251 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 229 128, 669, 660, 662 Walker v. Webb (1797), 3 Anst. 941 870 Walker v. Wildman (1821), 6 Madd. 47 599, COl Walker v. Wilsher (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 335 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 501 ; 37 W. R. 723 42, 506, 514 Walker v. Wingfield (1812), 18 Ves. 443 ; 11 R. R. 232 1049 Walker v. Witter (1778), 1 Doug. 1 1166 Wall's case (1872), L. R. 16 Eq. 18; 42 L. J. Ch. 372 166 Wallace v. Brookley (1837), 5 Dowl. 6P' 732 Wallace t). Cook (1804), 5 Esp. U7 1049, 1172 Wallace v. Fielden (1851), 7 Moo. P. 0. C. 398 179 Wallace v. Kelsall (1840), 7 M. & W. 2"' ; 8 Dowl. 841 ; 4 Jur. 1064 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 12 487, 552, 744 Wallace v. Pomfret (1805), 11 Ves. 647 ; 8 R. R. 241 806, 807 Wallace V. Seymour (1871), Ir. R. 6 C. L. 196, 219, 343 704 Wallace V. Small (1830), M. & M. 446 615, 711 i M t Vol, I. *nd* with page 636. ijliil' ' CCVl TABLE OF CASES CITED. m vAoa WaUer v. Lacy (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 54, 71 ; 8 Dowl. 663 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 186; 4 Jur. 435; 9 L. J. C. P. 217 71:), 71* Wallis V. Littell (1861), 31 L. J. C. P. 100; 11 C. B. N. S. 369; 8 Jur. N. S. 745 ; 10 W. R. 192 746 Wallis V. Smith (1882), 21 Ch. D. 243 ; 47 L. T. 389 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 146 ; 31 W. R. 214 44 Walpole V. Alexander (1782), 3 Doug. 45 865, 866, 867 Walroud v. Hawkins (1876), 44 L. J. C. P. 116 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 342 .... 622 Walsh V. Nally (1877), I. R. 11 O. L. 337 732 Walsh V. Trevanion (1850), 15 Q. B. 733 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 458 740 Walsh V. Wilson (1851), 1 Ir. Eq. R. 610 867 Walsham v. Stainton (1863), 2 H. & M. 1 599 Walsingham, Ld. v. Goodricke (1843), 3 Hare, 124 693, 601. 602 Walter v. BoUman (1839), 8 Watt», 544 468 Walter v. Cubley (1833), 2 C. & M. 151 1195 Walter p. Haynes (1824), Ry. & M. 149 156 Walters v. Morgan (1792), 2 Cox, Ch. 369 682 Walters v. Rees (1819), 4 Moore, C. P. 34 869, 871 Walton, Ex parte. Re Levy (1881), 17 Ch. D. 756 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 662; 45 L. T. 1 ; 3U W. R. 395 662, 741 Walton V. Chandler (1845), 1 C. B. 307 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 802 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 149 ; 9 Jur. 257 732 Walton V. Green (1825), 1 C. & P. 621 500, 501 Walton V. Hastings (1816), 4 Camp. 223 ; 1 Stark. 216 1194, 1203 Walton V. Shelley (1786), 1 T. R. 296 877 Walton V. Waterhouse (1672), 3 Wins. Saunders, 417a 96 Wambough v. Schank (1807), 1 Penningt. 229 172 Wankford v. Fotherley (1694), 2 Vern. 322 539 Ward V. Day (1864), 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 96, 101 522 Ward V. Dey (1849), 33 L. J. Q. B. 3, 2.54 ; 4 B. & S. 337 ; 6 B. & S. 359 ; 10 L. T. 578 ; 12 W. R. 829 937 Wardr. Gamgee (1891), 66L. T. 610; 40 W. R. .S9 915 Ward V. Hobbs (1878), 4 App. Cas. 13 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 40 L. T. 73 ; 27 W. R. 114 777 Ward V. Johnson (1807), 13 Mass. 148 1115 Ward V. Londesborough, Ld. (1852), 12 C. B. 252 158 Ward, Ld. v. Lumley (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 322 ; 6 H. & N. 87 059, 1197 Ward V. Pearson (1839), 5 M. & W. 18 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 163 ; 7 Dowl. 382 . . 187 Ward V. Pomfret (1832), 6 Sim. 475 ; 2 L. J. Ch. 22 447 Ward V. Ryan (1875), 10 Ir. R. C. L. 17 97 Ward V. Sinfield (1880), 49 L. J. C. P. 696 ; 43 L. T. 252 948 Ward f. Ward (1848), 11 Beav. 377 1045, 1132 Ward V. Wells (1809), 1 Taun. 461 ; 10 R. R. 581 328, 1213 Warden. Warde(1851), 3Mac. &G. 305; 21 L. J. Ch. 90 602 Warden v. Fermor (1809), 2 Camp. 282 1216 Warden v. Jones (1867), 2 De G. & J. 76; 27 L. J. Ch. 190 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 26f '3 Beav. 487 679, 680 War Juraberlege(18.55), 20Beav. 503; 24L.J. Ch. 630; 1 Jur. N. S. 745 683 Warickshall's case (1783), 1 Lea. 263 ; 2 East, P. C. 658 557, 558, 662 Waring r. Waring (1848), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 341 ; 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 394 263 Warmsley v. Child (1749), 1 Ves. sen. 141 308 Warner v. Mosses (1881), 50 L. J. Ch. 28 ; 43 L. T. 401 ; 29 W. R. 201 . . 349 Warner v. Willington (1856), 3 Drew. 523 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 662 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 433 671, 672, 675 WarraU, Re, Ex parte Cossens (1820), Buck. 531 970 Warren v. Anderson (1839), 8 Scott, 384 1218. 1220 Warren v. Stagg (1787), cited 3 T. R. 591 752 Warren r. Warren (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 250 ; 4 Tyr. 850 155 Warren Hastings' case (1788), cited 30 How. St. tr. 492 ; 2 Ph. Ev. 451. . 1179 Warrender v. Warreuder (1834), 9 Bli. N. S. 89 ; 2 CI. & Fin. 488 1144 Warrick V. Queen's Coll., Ox. (Betts v. Thompson) (1867), 40 L. J. Ch. 785 ; L. R. 6 Ch. 732 ; 25 L. T. 254 ; 19 W. R. 1098 994 27i« references are to pages, not to paragraphs. I 1 ' J TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCVU PAOB Warriner v. Giles (1734), 2 Str. 954, 1223, n. 1 1080 Warrington v. Early (1853\ 2 E. & B. 763 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 47 ; 18 Jur. 42. 1194 Warwick v. Bruce (1813), 2 M. & Sel. 205 : 6 Taun. 118 ; 14 R. R. 634 . . 686 Warwick v. Foulkea (1844), 12 M. & W. 607 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 638 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 109 ; 8 Jur. 85 244 Warwick v. Hooper (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 60 622 Warwick v. Queen's CoU. (1871), L. R. 3 Eq. 683 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 505 ; 18 W. R. 19 ; 23 L. T. 63 394, 398 Warwick v. Rogers (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 340 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 1 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 113 1200 Waaon v. Walter (1869), 8 B. & 8. 671 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 34 ; L. R. 4 Q. r,. 73 ; 19 L. T. 409 ; 17 W. R. 169 4 Waterford, Estate of M. of, Re (1871), Ir. R. 6 Eq. 434 768 Waterford, Corp. of v. Price (1846), 9 Ir. L. R. 310 1175 Waterford Ry. Co. v. Wolsely (1851), 1 Ir. C. L. R. 444 1176 Wfiterford, Wexford, Wicklow and Dublin Ry. Co. v. Pidcock (1853), 8 Ex. 279 ; 7 RaUw. Cas. 439 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 146 ; 17 Jur. 26 1176 Waterloo Bridge Co, v. Cull (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 75 ; 1 E. & E. 213 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 464 112 Waterman v. Soper (1697), 1 Ld. Ray. 737 114 Waterpark v. Fennell (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 650 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1135 ; 7 W. R. 634 791, 792 Waters v. Earl of Thanet (1842), 2 Q. B. 757 ; 2 G. & D. 166 ; 6 Jur. 708 712 Waters V. Howlett (1831), cited 1 A. & E. 8 371 Wdi-rs V. Thorn (1856), 22 Beav. 547, 556, 557 68 Waters v. Tomkins (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 723 ; 1 Tyr. & Gr. 137 714, 717 Watkins, Ex parte (1762), 2 Ves. sen. 470a 1150 Watkins, Re (1865), 35 L. J. P. & M. 14 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 19 701 Watkins v. Morgan (1834), 6 C. & P. 661 191 Watkins v. Na8h'(1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 262 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 505 1204 Watkins v. Rymill (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 178 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 121 ; 48 L. T. 426 ; 31 W. R. 337 86 Watson V. Clark (1813), 1 Dow, 336 ; 14 R. R. 73 176 Watson V. Gray (1880), 14 Ch. D. 192 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 243 ; 42 L. T. 294 ; 28 W. R. 438 ; 44 J. P. 537 113 Watson «. King (1815), 1 Stark. R. 121; 4 Camp. 272 173, 1049, 1172 Watson ti. King (1846), 3 C. B. 608 506 Watson r. Lane (1856), 11 Ex. 769 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 101 97, 98 Watson V. Little (I860), 29 L. J. Ex, 267 ; 5 H. & N. 472 1097 Watson V. Spratley (1854), 10 Ex. 237 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 63 683, 684, 685 Watson V. Threlkeld (1798). 2 Esp. 637 ; 5 R. R. 760 589 Watson V. Wace (1826), 6 B. & C. 153 642 Watson V. Watson (1864), 33 Beav. 574 806 Watson V. Woodman (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 721 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 57 ; 24 W. R. 47 387 Watters v. Smith (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 892 1115 Watts V. Ainsworth (1862), 3 F. & F. 12; 1 H. & C. 83; 31 L.J. Ex. 448 ; 6 L. T. 252 675 Watts V. Fraser (1837), 7 A. & E. 323 ; 1 M. & Rob. 449 ; 7 C. & P. 369. .245, 246 Watts v. Kelson (1870), L. R. 6 Ch. 166 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 126 ; 24 L. T. 209 ; 19 W. R. 338 115 Watts V. Lawson (1830), M. & M. 447, n 515 Watts V. Thorpe (1808), 1 Camp. 376 498 Waughr. Bus8ell(1814), 6Taun. 707; 1 Marsh. 214, 311 ; 15R. R. 024. 1196 Waugh V. Carver (1793), 2 H. Bl. 235 ; 14 R. R. 845 Ihd Waugh V. Cope (1840). 6 M. & W. 824 714 Waymaut). Hilliard (1830), 7 Bing. 101; 4 M. .& P. 729 515 Waymell v. Reed (1794), 5 T. R. 600 ; 2 R. R. 675 747 Weale v. Lower (1672), PoUexfen, 67 170 Weallt). Rice (1831), 2 Russ. & My. 251; 9 L. J. Ch. 116 806, 807 Weaver v. Price (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 409 UOl Vol, I. tndt with page 635. . .» CCVIU TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOB Woibb' 8 Estate, Re (1870), Ir. R. 5 Eq. 236 171 Webb, Re (1856), 1 Deane, Eco. R. 1 694 WeVb V. Austiu (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 701 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 419 ; 13 L. J. C. P 203 98 Weab V. Bird (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 841 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 335 ; 8 Jur. N. S 621 125 Webb V. Byng (1855), 1 K. & J. 580 786 Webb V. East (1880), 5 Ex. D. 23 964, 1182 Webb r. Fox (1797), 7 Tr. 391 ; 4 R. R. 472 116, 117 Webb V. Haycock (1854), 19 Beav. 342 421 Webb 1'. Heme Bay Improvement Com. (1870), 39 L. J. Q. B. 221 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 642 ; 22 L. T. 715 5-11 Webb V. Manch. and Leeds Ry. Co. (1839), 4 My. & Cr. 120; 1 Railw. Cas. 576 932 Webbt). Paternoster (1620), Palm. 71; Rolle, R. 143; Noy, 98; Poph. 151 ; Godb. 282 638 Webb V. Petts (undated), Noy, 44 398 Webb V. Plummer (1819), 2 6. & Aid. 746 781 Webb V. Smith (1824), 1 C. & P. 337 488, ,i95 Webb V. Taylor (1843), 1 Dowl. & L. 684 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 24 ; 8 Jur. 39 . .869, 871 Webber v. Corbett (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 164 ; 16 L. R. Eq. 515 ; 29 L. T. 365 793 Webber v. East. Ry. Co. (1840), 2 Mete. 147 932 Webber v. Lee (1882), 61 L. J. Q. B. 1/4, 485 ; 9 Q. B. D. 315 682 Webber v. Stanley (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 698 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 217 803 Webster v. Bray (1848), 7 Hare, 159 160 Webster v. Cecil (1861), 30 Beav. 62 760 Webster v. Cook (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. 542 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 753 ; 13 W. R. 1001 137 Webster v. Lee (1809), 6 Mass. 334 1123 Wedderbume's case (1746), 18 How. St. Tr. 425 ; Post. C. L.-246 236 Wedge V. Berkeley (1837), 6 A. & E. 663 ; 1 N. & P. 665 ; W. W. & D. 271 31, 39 Wedgwood's case (1831), 8 Greenl. 75 1173 Weeks v. Argent (1847), 16 M. & W. 817 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 209 ; 11 Jur. 525. .602, 607 Weeks v. Maillardet (1811), 14 East, 568 1205, 1206 Weeks V. Propert (1873), 4? T .. J. 0. P. 129 ; L. R. 8 C. P. 427 ; 21 W. R. 676 780 Weeks V. Sparke (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 686 ; 14 R. R. 646 .... 391, 396, 398, 401 Weidman r. Kohr (1818), 4 Serg. & R. 174 4»3, 610 Weidner t\ Schweigart (1823), 9 Serg. & R. 385 154 Welch V. Barrett ( 1819), 15 Mass. 380 464 Welch V. Mandeville (1816), I Wheat. 233 488 Welch V. Nash (1807), 8 East, 394 ; 9 R. R. 478 1136 Welch V. Phillips (1856), 1 Moo. P. C. R. 299, 302 143 Welch V. Seaborn (1816), 1 Stark. R. 474 154 Weld V. Hornby (1806), 7 Ea«t, 199 ; 3 Smith, 244 ; 8 R. R. 608 :9J, 792 Welfare v. Lond. & Biigh. Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 1,93 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 241; 20L. T. 743; 17 W. R. 1065 16b Welford v. Beezely (1747), 1 Ves. sen. 6 ; 1 Wils. 118 674 WeUand Can. Co. v. Hathaway (1832), 8 Wend. 480 293, 529 Welland v Ld. Middleton (1844), 11 Ir. Eq. R. 003 1050, 1054, 1173 Wells V. Fisher (1831), 5 C. & P. 12 ; 1 M. & Rob. 99, and n 890 WeUs V. Fletcher (1831), 5 C. & P. 12 ; 1 M. & Rob. 99. and n 890 Wells V. Horton (1826), 4 Bing. 40 ; 12 Moore, C. P. 176 682 WeUs V. Jesus College (1836), 7 C. & P. 284 398, 401 Wells V. Kingston-upon-Hull (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 402 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 257 ; 32 L. T. 615 ; 23 W. R. 662 641, 683 WeUs V. Wells (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 681 ; L. R. 18 Eq. 604 ; 31 L. T. 16 ; 22 "W R 893 . 741 793 Welman t. Welman' (ISSo/.'isCh.D.' 67b; 49 L. J. Ch. 736; 43 L.T. ' U6 139, 749 The re/erenoea are to page*, not to paragraphs. TABLE OF CASES CITED, CCIX PAOB ■VTelstead r. Lew (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 139 27, 496, 511, 614 Wfimyss V. Hopkins (1875), 44 L. J. M. C. 101 ; L. R. 10 Q. B. 378 ; 32 L. T. 9 ; '23 W. R. 691 1131 Wenman v. Miiokonzie (1855), 5 E. & B. 447 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 44 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 1015, 1019, n 406, 1116, 1161 Wentworth v. Lloyd (1864), 33 L. J. Oh. 088 ; 10 H. L. Cas. 689 ; 10 L. T. 767 ; 10 Jur. N. 8. 961 109 Woquclin r. Wequolin (1830), 2 Curt. 263 353 WcNt, Re (18U2), 32 L. J. P. & M. 182 ; 12 W. R. 89 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1168 699 West V. Buxendale (1850), 9 C. B. 141 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 149 30, 189 West f. Blukewiiy (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 729; 9 Dowl. 816 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 199; 15 Jur. 451 : 10 L. J. C. P. 173 644, 750, 751 WcHt V. LawJay (1805), 2 Ir. R. Eq. 517 801 West V. Moore (1807), 8 East, 343 ; 9 R. R. 460 145 \Ve.st V. Kay (1854), 1 Kay, 385 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 44V ; 2 Eq. R. 431 ; 2 W. R. 319 693 West V. Steward (1845), 14 M. & W. 47 1202, 1204, 1205, 1206 West Cambridcre v. LexinKton (1824), 2 Pick. 536 443 West of Canada Oil, &c. Co., Re (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 683 ; 6 Ch. D. 109 ; 25 W. R. 787 345, 917 We,st Cornwall Ry. Co. v. Mowatt (1850), 15 Q. B. 521 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 478 : 15 Jur. 101 ; 1 Drew. 247 1176 West Jewell Tin Mining Co., In re (1879), 10 Ch. D. 579 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 425 ; 40 L. T. 43; 27 AV. R. 310 1233 West of Eng. Bk. v. Canton Ins. Co. (1877), 2 Ex. D. 472 1 180 West London Com. Bk. v. Kitson (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 2i8, 345 ; 13 Q. B. D. 360 ; 50 L. T. 656 ; 32 W. R. 757 780 Westoby v. Day (1853). 2 E. & B. 605; 22 L. J. Q.. B. 418; 18 Jur. 10. .7, 11 16 Weston, Re (1869), L. R. 1 P. & D. 633 ; 38 L. J. P. & M. 53 703 Weston's case. In re (1879), 10 Ch. D. 579 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 425 ; 40 L. T. 43 ; 27 W. R. 310 1233 We-ston V. Ernes (1808), 1 Taun. 115 756 Wetherall, Ex parte, Middleton v. Pollock (1876), 4 Ch. D. 49 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 39 ; 35 L. T. 608 ; 26 W. R. 94 539 Wetherell v. Langston (1847), 1 Ex. 634 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 338 675 Wey V. Yally (1704). 6 Mod. 194 8 Wlialey v. Carlisle (1866), 17 Ir. C. L. R. 792 18, 441 Whalley r. Pepper (1836), 7 C. & P. 506 872 '.VTiaram v. Routledge (1805), 5 Esp. 235 ; 8 R. R. 851 1 191 W;iarram v Wharram (1863), 33 L. J. P. & M. 75 ; 3 S. & T. 301 ; 10 Jur. K S. 499 ; 10 L. T. 163 ; 12 W. R. 889 307 Wharton Peer. (1845), 12 CI. & Fin. 301 1035, 1092 Wharton v. Mackenzie (1844;, 5 Q. B. 606 ; 1 Dav. & M. 544 ; 8 Jur. 466; 13 L.J. Q. B. 130 49 Wliateley v. Spooner (1857), 3 K. & J. 642 786, 796 Whatman, Re (1805), 34 L. J. P. & M. 17 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1242 801 Wheatcroft's case (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 853 ; 29 L. T. 324 626 Wheatley v. Williams (1836), 1 M. & W. 533; 2 Gale, 140; 1 T. & G. 1043; 5L. J. Ex. 237 609,611 Wneaton v. Maple (1893), 3 Ch. 48 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 963 ; 68 L. T. 641 ; 69 L. T. 208; 41 W. R. 677 119 Wheeldon r. Burrows (1878), 12 Ch. D. 31 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 863 ; 41 L. T. 327 ; 28 W. R. 196 116 Wheeler. In re (1880), 49 L. J. P. D. & A. 29 ; 42 L. T. 60 ; 28 W. R. 476; 44 J. P. 285 706 Wheeler v. Alderson (1831), 3 Hagg. Ecc. 687 140, 371, 930 Wlieeler v. Atkins (1805), 5 Esp. 246 365 Wheeler v. Collier (1827), M. & M. 125 671 ■\Vheeler v. Fox (1841), 3 Ir. L. R. 302, n 869 Wheeler v. Lp Itarohant (1881), 17 Ch. D. 681 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 795 ; 44 L. T. 632; 46 J. P. 728 694, 1183 Wheeler V. Lowth (1710), Comyn's Dig. tit. "Evid.,"c. 1 1035 Wheeling's case (17G9), 1 Lea. 311, n , 560 Vol. I. endi wiih page 635. il ^■•ti 1 I ■ : .! til ccx TABLE OF CASES CITED. I'«* PAOH Whicher, Re. Stevens, Ex parte (1888), 6 M. B. R. 173 84'J Wbicker v. Humo (1859), 28 L. J. Oh. 396 ; 7 H. L. Cus. 124 ; 4 Jur. N. 8. 933 179, 180, 1105 Whiffen v. Hardwright (1848), 11 Beav. Ill 614 Whippy V. Hillary (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 399 ; fi C. & P. 209 712 Whitrtler v. Foreter (1833), 32 L. J. C. P. 161; 14 C. B. N. S. 248; 8 L. T. 317: 1 1 W. R. 648 fi46 Whitaker v. Izod (1809), 2 Taun. 115 321, 969 Whitaker r. Tatham (1831), 7 Bing. 628 ; 6 M. & P. 628 794 Whitaktri'.WiHbey(1852),12C.B. 56,69; 21L. J. C. P. 116; 16 Jur. 411.. 19, 84, 136, 283 Whitcomb v. Whiting (1781), 2 Doug. 652 ; 1 8m. L. C. 555 488 White, Re (1850), 2 Roberts. 194 698 White, Re (1861). 30 L. J. P. & M. 56 142 White f. Birch '1867). 36 L. J. Ch. 174 : 15 W. R. 305 ; 16 L. T. 605 . . 801 Whiter. Cuyler( 1795). 6 T. R. 176; 1 Ewp. 200 ; 3 R. R. 147 646 White V. Dowling (1845), 8 Ir. L. R. 128 600 Whiter. GreeniHh (1861), 11 C. B. N. S. 209; 8 Jiir. N. S. 563 648 White r. Hawn (1810), 5 Johns. 351 906 Whiter. Lisle (1819), 4 Madd. 214 396, 398 Whiter. M'Dermott (1872), I. R. 7 C L. 1 144 White p. Morris (1852), 11 C. B. 1015; 21 L. J. C. P. 185; 16 Jur. 500 .. 481 Whiter. Parkin (1810), 12 East, 578; 11 R. R. 488 754 Whiter. Proctor (1811), 4 Tauii. 209; 13 R. R, 680 730 White V. Rcpton (1844), 3 Curt. 818 702 White r. Sayer (1622). Palm. 211 708 Whiter. Sharp (1844). 12 M. &W. 712; 13 L. J. Ex. 215 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 10.".9 ; 1 C. & K. 348 ; 8 Jur. 344 1039 Whiter. Smith (1841), Arm. M. & O. 171 977 White, Ex parte. White r. Tommoy (1853), 4 H. L. Cas. MA 11.13 White r. Trustees of the British Museum (1829), 6 Bing. 310 »i9G White r. Wils<,a (1800), 2 Bos. & P. 116 757 ■\Vhite r. Wilson (1806), 13 Ves. 87 ; 14 Ves. 151 170 White's case, R. v. White (1823), R. & R. 508 560 Whiteacre r. Symonds (1808), 10 East, 13 ; 10 R. R. 224 47 ■VVliitehead r. Clifford (1814), 5 Taun. 518 660 Whitehead r. Scott (1830), 1 M. & Rob. 2 289, 318, 372 Whitehead r. Tattersall (1834), 1 A. & E. 491 499 Whitehouse r. Hemmant (1858). 27 L. J. Ex. 295 1231, 1232 Whiteleyr. King (1854), 17 C. B.N. S. 756; 10 Jur. N. S. 1079; 11 L.T. 342 : 13 W. R. 83 143 Whitelocke v. Baker (1807). 13 Ves. 514 ; 9 R. R. 210 408, 4i;{ Whitelock V. Musgrove (1833), 1 C. & M. 611 ; 3 Tyr. 641 1216, 1219 Whitffleldr. Brand (1847), 16 M. &W. 282; 16 L. J. Ex. 103 288 Whitfieldr. South East. Ry. Co. (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 229 ; 1 E. B. & E. 1 16.. 1 1 1, 643 Whitford v. Tutin (1834). 10 Bing. 395 ; 4 M. & Sc. 166 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 53 286 Whitlev r. Gou-rh (15.JG-7). Dyer, 140 658 Whitmbre v. Humphries (1871), L. R. 7 C. P. 1 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 43; 25 L. T. 496 ; 20 W. R. 79 116 Whitnash v. George (1828). 8 B. & f!. 556 437, 608 Whitney v. Boordman (1875) , 1 IS M.is.s. 242 763 Whittaker r. Edmunds (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 366 ; i A. & E. 6;}8 261 Whittaker v. Jackson (1864), 33 L. J. Ex. 181 ; 2 H. & C. 926 ; 11 L. T. 155 , 1 1 13, 1 1 19, 1120 Whitting. Re, Ex parte Hall (1878), 10 Ch. D. 815; 48 L. J. Bank. 79; 40 L.T. 179; 27 W. R. 385 651, 6.52 Whittuck r. Waters (1830), 4 C. & P. 376 419, 424, 1047 Whitwell V. Perrin (1858), 4 C. B. N. S. 412 179 Whitwell r. Wyer (1814), 11 Mass. 6 479 Whitwill r. Scheer (1838), 8 A. & E. 301 ; 3 N. & P. 391 ; 7 L. J. Q. B. 244 189, 192, 194 Whitworth's case (1881), 19 Ch. D. 118 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 71 ; 45 L. T. 449 ; 30 W. R. 33 845 The references are to pages, not to paragraphs. TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCXl VKOH Whyman r. Garth (1853), 8 Ex. 803 ; 2'2 L. J. Kx. 316 1208 Whyto V. AhrenH (1884), 26 Cli. D. 717 ; 50 L. T. 344 ; 32 W. R. 049. . . . 1188 Whyte V. Rose (1842), 4 P. & D. 199 ; .t Q. B. 495 ; 2 O. & D. 312 17, 19. 1133, 1151 Wiokens v. Goatloy (1851), 11 C. B. 666 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 50 ; 2 L. K. & P. 572 18 Wickham f. M. of Hiith (18(5), 35 L. J. Ch. 5 ; L. R. 1 Eq. 17 ; 35 Beav. 69; 13L. T. 313; 14 W. R. 21 ; llJiir. N. 8. 988 "31 Wickham V. Hawker (1840), 7 M. & W. 03; lOL. J.Ex. 153 038 Wickham v. Loe (1848), 12 Q. B. 620 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 21 ; 12 Jur. 628 . . 1 125 Wickham v. Wickham (1855), 2 K. & J. 478 077 Widdows' TruHts. Ro (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. 408 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 380 ; 24 L. T. 87 ; 19 W. R. 468 101 Wiedcman v. Walpole, (1891) 2 Q. B. 534 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 702 ; 40 W. R. 114 525, 881 Wider v. Schillizzi (1850), 17 C. B. 619 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 89 776 Wigglcsworth v. Dallison (1778), 1 Doug. 201 ; 1 Blij,'li, 287 ; 1 Smith. L. C. . 763 Wi>,'ht's Mortgage Trusts, Re (1873), 43 L. J. Ch. 00; L. R. 10 Eq. 41 ; 28 L. T. 491 738 Wihonr. Law (1821), 3 Stark. 03 1170 Wiko r. Lightucr (1824), 11 Serg. & R. 198; Swift, Ev. 143 972, 973 Wilbur V. Seidell (1820), 6 Cowon, 162 328, 364 Wilby V. Elgeo (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 497 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 254 ; 32 L. T. 310 711, 722 Wilby V. ElHton (1849), 7 Dowl. & L. 143 ; 8 C. B. 142 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 320 ; 13 Jur. 706 223 Wildes V. Dudlow (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 341 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 198 ; 23 W. R. 435 679 Wiles V. Woodward (1851), 5 Ex. 557 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 201 94 Wilkes V. Hopkins (1845), 1 C. B. 737 ; 3 Dowl. & L. 181 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 225 476 Wilkin V. Reed (1854), 15 C. B. 192, 19S, 205 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 193 ; 18 Jur. 1081 40, 191, 193 Wilkins v. Jadis (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 188 ; 1 M. & Rob. 41 33, 521 Wilkins v. Stephens (1842), 1 Y. & C. (Ch.) 431 006 Wilkinson, In ro (1881), 6 P. Div. 100 ; 29 W. R. 890 ; 45 J. P. 710 707 Wilkinson v. Evans (1806), 35 L. J. C. P. 224 ; L. R. 1 C. P. 407 ; H. & R. 622 ; 14 W. R. 963 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 600 673 Wilkinson v. Gordon (1824), 2 Add. (Ece.) 152 1116 Wilkinson v. Johnston (1824), 3 B. & C. 428 ; 6 D. & R. 403 1200 Wilkin.son v. Kirby (1864), 23 L. J. C. P. 224 ; 15 C. B. 430 ; 2 C. L. R. 1387; 1 Jur. N. 8. 164 1119 Wilkinson v. Storey (1839), 1 Jebb & Sy. 509 44 Wilkin.son v. Verity (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 206 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 141 ; 24 L. T. 32 ; 19 W. R. 004 71 Willesford, Re (1842), 3 Curt. 77 701 William.s, Ex parte (1824), 13 Price, 673; M'Clel. 493 811 Williams, Re (1865), 36 L. J. P. & M. 2 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 4 698 Williams V. Armroyd (1813), 7 Cranch, 423 1150 Williams v. Ashton (1800), 1 J. & H. 115 142 Williams v. Bryant (1839). 5 M. & W. 447 ; 7 Dowl. P. C. 602 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 47 216, 543 Williams v. Byrnes (1863), 2 New R. 47 ; 1 Moo. P. C. C. 154 ; 8 L. T. 69 ; 11 W. R. 487 671 Williams v. Callender (1810), Holt, N. P. 307 255 Williams v. Comm. (1879), 91 Pa. St. 493 627 WiUiams v. Davies (1833), 11 Q. B. D. 74 ; 52 L. J. M. C. 87 ; 47 J. P. 581 272, 273 Williams v. E. Ind. Co. (1802), 3 East, 192, 201 ; 6 R. R. 589 ; Bull. N. P. 298 105, 260 Williams ». Evans (1853), 2 H. & N. 771 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 176; 1 E. &B. 727.. 704 Williams v. Evans (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 319 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 547 ; 32 L. T. 359 ; 23 W. R. 460 688 Vol. I. ends with page 636. .! II Av ;ti' t i) ccxu TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAOB Williams f. Evton (1859), 4 H. & N. 357: 27 L. J. Ex. 176 .. ,,....122, 1039 Williums r. Farriiijrton (1789). 2 Cox (Cli.) 202 965 Williams f. Geaves (1838), 8 C. & P. 592 437, 438 Williams r. Urifflth (1849), 3 Ex. 335; 18 L.J. Ex.210 711 Williams v. GriffitbR (1839), 2 C. M. & R. 4(i ; 1 Gale, 65 ; 5 Tyr. 748. . .. 715 Williams v. Gutuli (1857), 14 Moo. P. C. C. 202 6 Williams v. Hulie (1663), 1 Sid. 131 ; Swift, Evid. 512 919 AVilliams v. Inncs (1808), 1 Ciimp. 364 ; 10 R. R. 702 498 Williams t'. Jones (1841), 11 A. & E. 643 227 Williams v. Jones (1849), 7 Notes of Cases, 106 143 Williams v. .Jones (1887), 30 W. R. 573 754 Williams v. Jordan (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 681 ; 6 Ch. D. 517 ; 26 W. R. 230. 671 Williams v. Lake (1859), 29 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 2 E. & E. 349 ; 1 L. T. 56 ; 6 Jnr. N. S. 45 671 Williams v. Lucas, (1892) 2 Q. B. 113 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 595 ; 66 L. T. 706. 310 Williams «'. Morgan (18.50), 15 Q. B. 782 277, 398 Williams v. Morris (1841),' 8 M. & W. 488 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 126 638 Williams v. Mudie (1824), 1 C. & P. 158 : Ry. & M. 34 593 Williams v. Pigott (IS48), 2 Ex. 201 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 196 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 544 ; 12 Jur. 313 641 Williams r. Scottish Widows' Fund (1888), 52 J. P. 471 ; 4 Times L. R. 489 172 Williams v. Smith (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 496 32 Williams v. Steele (1835), 4 La-w Roc. (1st Scries) 169 870 Williams r. Stern (1879), 5 Q. B. D. 409; 49 L. J. Q. B. 663 ; 42 L. T. 719 ; 28 W. R. 901 751 Williams v. Swansea Canal Navig. Co. (1S68), L. R. 3 Ex. 158 1068 Williams v. Thomas (1862), 2 Dr. & Sm. 29 ; 31 L J. Ch. 674 ; 7 L. T. 184; a Jur. N. S. 250 506 Williams v. Tyley (1858), Johns. 530 706 Williams t>. Walsby (1803), 4 Esp. 220 645 Williams v. AVheeler (I860), 8 C. B. N. S. 316 681 Williams v. Wilcox (1838), 8 A. & E. 314 ; 3 N. & P. 606 ; 1 W. W. & H. 477 1231 Williams t'. Williams (1693), Carth. 269 5 Williams t\ Williams (1798), 1 Hagg. Cons. 304 183, 502, 656 Williams V. Williams (1863), 32 Beav. 370 606, 806 Williams t'. Williams (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 854 679 Williams v. Williams (1877), 8 Ch. D. 789, 793 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 857 ; 27 W. R. 100 ; 39 L. T. 180 146, 704 Williams v. Williams (1806), L. R. 2 Ch. 15 268 Williams v. Williams and Padfield (1866), 35 L. J. P. & M. 8 ; L. R. 1 P, & D. 29 ; 13 L. T. 610 501 Williams v. Wilson (1853), 9 Ex. 90 ; 1 C. L. R. 921 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 17 . . 1160 Williams v. Younghusband (1815), 1 Stark. R. 139 303 Williamson v. Allison (1802), 2 East, 446 200, 201 Williamson v. Barton (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 170; 7 H. & N. 899; 8 Jur. N. S. 341 ; ,-) L. T. 800 758 Williamson (Wilkinson) v. Scott (1821), 17 Mass. 249 552 Willingham v. Matthews (1815), 6 Taun. 358 ; 2 Marsh. 57 866, 869 Willius V. Smith (1854), 4 E. & B. 180 ; 3 C. L. R. 16 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; I Jur. N. 8. 163 713 Willis f. Bernard (1832), 8 Bing. 376; iMo. &Sc. 684; 1 L. J. C. P. 118.. 375 Willis t'. Jemegan (1741), 2 Atk. 252 625 Willis «. Newham (1830), Y. & J. 518 717 Willis V. Peckham (1820), 1 B. & B. 515 ; 4 Moore (C. P.) 300 820 Willmanf. WorraU (1838), 8 C. & P. 380 1216, 1220 Willmett V. Harmer (1839), 8 0. & P. 696 105 Willock V. Noble (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 680 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 345 ; 32 L. T. 419; 23W. R. 809 709 WilloMg .ny V. Willoughby (1787), 1 T. R. 772 ; 1 R. R. 397 6, 21 Wilk.on, h , Nicholson, Ex parte (1880), 14 Ch. D. 243 ; 49 L. J. Bank. 68 849 The reference* are to pages, not to paragraphi. 511 ? TABLE OF CASKS CITED. CCXIU i Wilson r. Allen (1820), iJac. & W. 611,620 126 Wilson V. Beddard (1846), 12 Sim. 28 ;oi) Wilson V. Boerein (1818), 15 Johns. 286 465 Wilson v. Bowie (1823), 1 C. & P. 10 2b9, 1191 Wilson V. Butler (18:J8), 4 Bing. N. C. 748 ; 6 Scott, 540 ; 8 L. J. C. P. 143. . 89 Wilson t». CoUum (1881), 9 L. R. Ir. 150 • 1213 WUson V. Do Coulon (1883), 22 Ch. D. 841 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 248; 48 L. T. 514 ; 31 W. R. 839 347 Wilson V. Lady Dunsany (1854), 18 Beav. 293 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 492 ; 18 Jur. 762 1152 Wilson V. Finch-Hiitton (1877), 2 Ex. D. 336 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 489 ; 36 L. T. 473 ; 25 W. R. 537 776 Wilson V. Ford (1868), L. R. 3 Ex. 63 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 60 ; 17 L. T. 605 ; 16 W. R. 482 166 Wilson V. Hoaro (183!)), 10 A. & E. 236 39 Wilson V. Mitchell (1813), 3 Camp. 393 600 Wilson V. N. & Banb. Ry. (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 477 ; 20 W. R. 938 ; 27 L. T. 507 602 Wilson V. O'Leary (1872), L. R. 12 Eq. 525 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 709 805 Wilson V. Rastall (1792), 4 T. R. 460 ; 2 R. R. 515 594, 595, 598, 603, 607 Wilson V. Robinson (1845), 7 Q. B. 68 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 196 ; 9 Jur. 726 . . 245 Wilson V. Rogers (1745-6), 2 Str. 1242 992 Wilson i). Sewell (1766), 4 Burr. 1980 658 Wilson V. Sheriffs of London (1620), Brownl. 15 871 Wilson V. Turner (1808), 1 Taun. 398 : 9 R. R. 797 506 Wilson V. Wallani (1880), 6 Ex. D. 155 ; 49 L. J. Ex. 437 ; 42 L. T. 375 ; 28 W. R. 597 ; 44 J. P. 475 662 Wilson V. Wilson (1883), 6 P. Div. 8 ; 49 L. T. 430 : 32 W. R. 282. . . .341, 348 Wilson's Trusts (1865), L. R. 1 Eq. 247 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 243 1143 Wilton V. Dunn (1851), 17 Q. B. 294 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 60; 15 Jur. 1104 .. 98 Wilton V. Webster (1839), 7 C. & P. 198 376 Wiltshire v. Sidford (1827), 1 M. & R. 404 ; 8 B. & C. 259, n 113 Wilt/ief. Adamson (1789), 1 Ph. Ev. 357 526 Windle v. Andrews (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 690 ; 2 Stark. 425 731 Wing V. Augrave (1860), 8 H. L. Cas. 183 30 L. J. Ch. 65 174, 741 Winn V. Bull (1877), 47 L. J. Ch. 139 ; 7 Ch. D. 29 ; 26 W. R. 230 673 Winn V. Patterson (1835), 9 Pet. 663 429 Winsor v. Durnford (1848), 12 Q. B. 603 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 14 ; 12 Jur. 629 lOU Winsorv. R. (1866), 35 L. J. M. C. 161 ; 7 B. & S. 490 ; L. R. 1 Q. B. 390 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 276 ; 12 Jur. N. 8. 561 ; 14 L. T. 567 ; 14 W. R. 696 883 Winter v. Miles (1808), 10 East, 578 ; 1 Camp. 475, n. ; 10 R. R. 391 4 Winter v. Wroot (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 404 376 Winterbottom v. Ld. Derby (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 316 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 194 ; 16 L. T. 771 ; 16 W. R. 15 125 Wintle, Re (1870),L. R. 9 Eq. 373; 21 L. T. 781; 18 W. R. 394 1171 Wisden v. Wisden (1849), 6 Beav. 649 816 Wise V. Great West. Ry. Co. (1856), 26 L. J. Ex. 258 ; 1 H. & N. 63 722 Wiseman's case (1824), Macq. H. L. Prac. 631 502 Wishart v. Wyllie (1853), 1 Macq. 389 Ill Witham v. Tii> lor 0876), 3 Ch. 1). 605 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 798 ; 24 W. R. S77. . 438 Withnell v. Giirtham (1796), 6 T. R. 388 ; 1 Esp. 324 ; 3 R. R. 218. . . , 397, 792 Witmer v. Schlatter (1830), 2 Rawle. 359 1098 Witt t>. Witt and Klindworth (1862), 3 S. & T. 143 ; 32 L. J. Mat. 179 ; 8 L. T. 175 ; 11 W. R. 154 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 207 374 Woganr. Small (1824), 11 Sorg. & R. 141 931 Wolf V. Wveth (1824), 1 1 Serg. & R. 149 354 Wolfe v. ■V\''ashburn (1826), 6 Cowen, 261 1178 Wolff V. Koppol (1843), 6 Hill, N. Y. R. 458 6" 7 Wolff V. Oxholm (1817), 6 M. & Sel. 92 1146 WoUastou «'. Hakowill (1841), 3 M. & Or. 297 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 593 ; 10 L. J. 0. P. 303 296, 909 Wolton*. Gavin (1860), 16 Q. B. 48; 20 L. J. Q. B. 73; 15 Jur. 329.... 148 Fol. 1. *ndt with page 636. •u '. H i CCXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. PAoa Wolverton Mortgaged Estates, Re (1877), 7 Ch. D. 197; 47 L. J. Ch. 127; 37 L. T. 673 ; 26 W. R. 138 798 Womersley v. Dally (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 219 230 Wood, Re, Ex parte Luckes (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. 302 ; 41 L. J. Bank. 21 ; 26L. T. 113 82 Wood V. Anglo-Italian Bk. (1^76), 34 L. T. 2.').') 1189 Wood V. Duke of Argyll (ISiS^. " M. & Gr. 932 ; 7 Suott, N. R. 885 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 96 640 Wood V. Beard (1876), 2 Ex. D. 30 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 100 ; 35 L. T. 866 .... 649 Wood V. Braddick (1808), 1 Taun. 105 ; 9 R. R. 711 386, 488 Wood V. Cooper (1845), 1 C. & K. 645 923, 925 Wood V. Drury (1099), 1 Ld. Raym. 734 ; Holt, 731 1209 Wood V. Fitz (1820), 10 Mart. 196 14 Wood V. Jackson (1831), 8 Wond. 9 1140 Wood V. Lake (1751), Sayer, 3 638 Wood V. Leadbitter (1845), 13 M. & W. 843 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 101 637, 638 Wood V. Mackinson (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 273 942 Wood V. Manley (1839), 11 A. & E. 34 ; 3 P. & D. 5 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 27 . . 638 Wood V. Midgley (1854), 5 De G. M. & G. 41 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 553 ; 2 Eq. Rep. 729; 2 Sm. & G. 121 670, 730 Wood ti. Peel (1844), Ex. Midd. Sitt. T. T. 1844 361 Wood V. Priestner (1866), 4 H. & C. 681 ; L. R. 1 Ex. Ch. 66 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 42 786 Woodv. Rowcliffe(1851), 6Ex. 407; 20 L. J. Ex. 285 804 Wood V. Scarth (1856), 2 Kay & J. 33 749 Wood V. Smith, Re City of Cambridge (1874), 43 L. J. Adm. 11 ; L. R. 6 P. C. 451 ; 30L. T. 439; 22 W. R. 678 178 Wood V. Underbill (1847), 6 How. S. Ct. R. 1, 4 43 Wood V. Wood (1867), L. R. 1 P. & D. 309; 36 L. J. P. 34 ; 15 L. T. 593 143, 307, 709 Woods V. Woods (1844), 4 Hare, 83 ; 14 L. J. Ch. 9 601 Wood's Estate, Re (1863), 2 New R. 16 ; 1 Do G. J. & S. 465 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 400 167 Woodbeck v. Keller (1826), 6 Cowen, 120 623, 627 Woodbridge v. Spooncr (1819). 3 B. & A. 233 ; 1 Chit. R. 661 767 Woodcock V. Houldsworth (1846), 16 M. & W. 124 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 49 ..155, 932 Woodcraft v. Kinaston (1742), 2 Atk. 317 1019 Woodfiue, Re (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 832; 38 L. T. 753; 26 W. R. 678.... 945 Woodford V. Whiteloy (1830), M. & M. 617 307 Woodgate V. Potts (1847), 2 C. & K. 457 270 Woodham v. Edwards (1836), 6 A. & E. 771 ; 1 N. & P. 207 ; 2 H. & W. 443 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 38 7,8 Woodley, Re(1864), 3S. &T. 429; 33L. J. P. 154 699 Woodley v. Coventry (18631, 32 L. J. Ex. 185 ; 2 H. & C. 164 ; 8 L. T. 249 ; 11 AV. R. 699 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 648 646 Woods V. Dean (1862), 32 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 3 B. & S. 101 ; 7 L. T. 661 ; 11 W. R. 22 521 Woods V. Lamb (1806), 36 L. J. Ch. 309 109 Woods t'. Woods (1802), 2 Bay. 476 172 Woodward, Re (1871), L. R. 2 P. & D. 206; 40 L. J. P. & M. 17 ; 24 L. T. 40 ; 19 W. R. 418 706 Woodward v. Buchanan (1870), 39 L. J. Q. B. 71 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 285; 22 L. T. 123 229 Woodward v. Catton (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 44 ; 6 C. & P. 489 ; 4 Tyr. 689 1006 Woodward*. Larking (IHOI), 3 Enp. 286 652 Woodward f. Leavitt (1871), 107 Mass. 463 616 Woolamw. Heam (1802), 7 Ves. 218 ; 6 R. R. 113 744, 760 WooUey V. N. Lond. Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 602 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 317; 20L. T. 813; 17 W. R. 650, 797 1186 Woolway V. Rowe (1834), 1 A. & E. 114 ; 3 N. & M. 849; 3 L. J. K. B. 121 610, 612, 513 Wootluy V. Gregory (182H), 2 Y. & J. 636 069 Worcester's, L'Kvesque do, case (1694), Moore, F. 300; Poph. 81 6 2'lie re/cicnccn ar« to pagva, not tu panujiaphi. TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCXV PAGE Worlichv. Massey (1605), Cro. Jac. 67 19 Woreley f. Filisker (1620), 2 Eoll. Rep. 119 21 WorthinKton v. Grimsditch (1845), 7 Q. B. 479 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 52 ; 10 Jur. 26 714 Worthington v. Hylyer (1808), 4 Mass. 196 802 Wortliington v. Moore (1891), 64 L. T. 338 1211 Worthington v. Sudlow (1862), 31 h. J. Q. B. 131 ; 2 B. & 8. 508 ; 6 L. T. 283 ; 10 W. R. 621 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 668 780 Worthington v. Warrington (1848). 8 C. B. 134 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 350 .... 773 Wotton, Re (1874), 43 L. J. P. & M. 14 ; L. R. 3 B. & D. 159 699 Wrayv. Steele (1814), 2 Ves. &B. 388; 13 R. R. 124 666 Wray, In re (1769, should be 1876), Ir. R. 10 Eq. 266 140 Wright, Re (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 104; 4 S. & T. 35 699 Wrightv. CoU8(1849),8 0. B. 150; 19L. J. C. P. 60 1165 Wright «. Court (1825), ,2 C. & P. 232 385 Wright V. Crookes (1840), 1 Scott, N. R. 685 747, 757 Wright V. Doe d. Tatham (1834), 1 A. & E. 22 . . . .278. 279, 324, 326, 369-371, 379, 380, 392, 1113, 1216 Wright V. GofE (1856), 22 Beav. 207 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 803 ; 4 W. R. 522 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 481 749 Wright V. Graham (1848), 3 Ex. 131 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 29 1039 Wright V. Holdgate (1850), 3 C. & K. 158 101, 621 Wright V. Lainson (1837), 2 M. & W. 739, 743 ; M. & H. 202 ; 6 Dowl. 146 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 197 147 Wright V. Littler (1761), 3 Burr. 1255 ; 1 W. BI. 349 464 Wright V. Lond. Gen. Omnibus Co. (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 429 ; 2 Q. B. D. 271; 36L. T. 590; 25 W. R. 647 1130 Wright V. Ld. Maidstone (1856), 1 K. & J. 701 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 623 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 1013 308 Wright V. Mills (1859), 4 H. & N. 488 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 223 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 771 84 Wrightv. Netherwood (1793), 2 Salk. 593. n. (n); 2 Phillim. 266-277, n. (c) . . 174 Wright V. Pearson (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 582; 38 L. J. Q. B. 312; 10 B. & 8. 723 ; 20 L. T. 849 ; 17 W. R. 1099 • 516 Wright V. Pulham (1810), 2 Chitty. R. 121 1095 Wright V. Rogers (1869), 38 L. J. P. & M. 67 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 678 ; 21 L. T. 156 ; 17 W. R. 833 697 Wright V. Rudd (1832), cited 1 Ph. Ev. 172 398 Wright V. Sanderson, "Times" 28 Feb. 1884 (C. A.) 697 Wriglit V. Sarmuda (see Wriji ( r. Netherwood). Wright V. Shawcross (1819). '^ H. & Aid. 501, n 32 Wright V. Snowe (1848), 2 De G. & Sm. 321 539 Wright V. Stavert (1850), 29 L. J. Q. B. 161 ; 2 E. & E. 721 ; 8 W. R. 413 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 867 682 Wright ti. Vanderplank (1856), 2 K. & J. 1 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 753 ; 8 Do G. M. & O. 133 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 599 136 Wright V. Wilcox (1850), 19 L. J. C. P. 333 ; 9 C. B. 650 ; 14 Jur. 746 272, 274 Wright V. Woodgate (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 573 ; 1 Tyr. & Gr. 12 ; 1 Sale, 329 . . Ill Wright V. Wright (1831), 7 Bing. 457 696 Wrightson t'. Calvert (1860), 1 J. & H. 250 803 Wyatt, Re (1862), 2 S. & T. 494 ; 31 L. J. P. & M. 197 701 Wyatt V. Batemau (1836), 7 C. & P. 5H6 329, 1210 Wyatt V. Gore {1816), Holt, N. P. R. 299 618 Wyatt V. Harrison (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 871 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 237 114 Wych V. Meal (1734), 3 P. Wms. 311 495 Wyldt). Hopkins (1846), 15 M. & W. 617; 16 L. J. Ex. 25 540, 541 Wyllie V. Mott (1827), 1 Hagg. (Eco.) 34 846 Wyndham's Divorce bill (1855), 3 Macq. 64 376 Wynne v. Tyrwhitt (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 370 87, 442 XKNOsr. Wickham (1866), L. R. 2 H. L. 296; 36 L. J. C. P. 313; 16 L. T. 880 1204 Vol. I. ends u:\th page 035. t ■■ ■ > . t iWlt>t^ ccxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. ui FAOB Tabsley v. Noble (1697), 1 Ld. Ravm. 190 496 Yarborough v. Bk. of England (isi'i), 16 East, 6 ; 14 Rev. R. 272 ; do. Troface v 643 Yardley v. Arnold (1842), 10 M. & W. 145 ; 2 Dowl. N. 8. 311 ; Car. & M. 434 ; 6 Jur. 718 909 YatoH, Ex parte, Ro Smith (Isr.S), 27 L. J. Bank. 9 ; 2 Do G. & J. 191 . . 1194 Yatort V. Ciinisew (1828), 3 C. & P. 99 485 Yatos V. Muddan (1851), 3 Mao. & G. 632 : 21 L. J. Ch. 24 ; 16 Jur. 45. . 144 YateH V. Pym (18I(i), 6 Taun. 446 : 2 Marsh. 141 ; Holt, N. P. 95 .. ..766, 781 Yates V. Thomson (1835), 3 CI. & Fin. 677, 580 62 Yeav. Fouraker (17C0-1), 2 Burr. 1099 714 Yearsley v. Heane (1845), 14 M. & W. 322 : 3 Dowl. & L. 265 872 Yearwood'.s Trusts, Ro (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 488 ; 5 Ch. D. 545 ; 26 W. R. 461 621 Yeatman, Ex parte (1835). 4 Dowl. 309 694 Yeatmau v. Dempcey (1861), 7 C. B. N. S. 628 ; 9C. B. N. S. 881 ; 9W. R. 743; 7 Jur. N. S. 1245; 29 L.J. C. P. 177 836 Yeats V. Yeats (1852), 16 Beav. 170 803 Yelverton i'. Yelverton (1867), L. R. 1 H. L. (So.) 218; 4 Macq. 746; 10 .Tur. N. S. 1209 ; 11 L. T. 118 ; 13 W. R. 235 876 Yeomans v. Williams (1865), L. R. 1 Eq. 184 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 283 639 Yorke v. Brown (1842), 10 M. & W. 78 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 283 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 410 1165 Yoter V. Sanno (1837), 6 Watts, 166 619 Young, Ex parte. Re Kitchin (1881), 17 Ch. D. 608 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 824 ; 46 L. T. 90 608 Young t'. Black (1813), 7 Craneh, 605 1118 Young V. Cawdroy (1819), 8 Taun. 734 653 Young f. Clare Hall (1851), 17 Q. B. ,529 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 12 ; 16 Jur. 81 . . 446 Young V. Cole (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 724 ; 4 Scott, 489 ; 6 L. J. C. P. 201.. 776 Young V. Honner (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 537 ; 1 C. & K. 51 1226 Young V. Corp. of Leamington (1883), 8 Q. B. D. 597 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 292 ; 8 App. Cas. 517 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 713 ; 49 L. T. 1 ; 31 W. R. 925 ; 47 J. P. 660 650 Young V. Holloway (1895), 11 R. (April) 59 ; (1895) P. 87 ; 64 L. J. P. D. & A. 65 ; 72 L. T. 1 18 ; 43 W. R. 429 .Jdd. [230] Young V. Lynch (1747), 1 W. Bl. 27 997 Young r. Murphy (1836), 3 Bing. N. C. 64 ; 3 Scott, 379 ; 2 Hodges, 144 ; 6 L. J. C. P. 180 255 Young V. R. (1789), 3 T. R. 98 ; 1 R. R. 060 237, 238 Young V. Raincock (1847), 7 C. B. 310 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 193 ; 13 Jur. 539. . 89, 93, 94 Young V. Schulor(1883), 11 Q. B. D. 671 ; 49 L. T. 646 730, 758 Young V. Smith (1808), 6 Esp. 121 490 Young V. Turing (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 603 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 752 167 Young V. Wright (1807), 1 Camp. 141 505, 606 Youngo V. Honner (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 637 ; 1 C. & K. 51 1226 Yrisari v. Clement (1826), 3 Bing. 432 ; 1 1 Moore (C. P.) 308 ; 2 C. & P. 223 3 Ystalyfera Iron Co. v. Neath and Breison Ry. ("o. (1873), 43 L. J. Ch. 476 ; L. R. 17 Eq. 142 ; 29 L. T. 662 ; 22 W. R 149 1073 ZACitAniAS V. Collis (1820), 3 Phillim. 202 140 Zichy Ferraris, Countess de v. M. of Hertford (1843), 3 Curt. 479. .097, 701, 708 /ouch Peer. (1807), Pari. Min. 207 409, 423 Zouohti. Clay (1671), 1 Ventr. 186; 2 Keb. 872; 2 Lev. 36 1203, 1206 Zouoh V. Willingalo (1790), 1 H. Bl. 312 ; 2 R. R. 770 39, 622 Zugasti V. Lamer (1858), 12 Moo. P. C. C. 331 6 Zuluota V. Vinent (1851-2), 1 De G. M. & G. 315 644 2'h» references art to page*, not to paragraph*. [REFEKESCtS ARE TO I'AliEi<.] AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. AimoT V. Plumbe 1220'^ 122018 Abbott /•• ColL'iuaii 122'J*", l:i2'J'-' Abiii<{tun ('. Nortli liridgewatcr 412' Ackk'ii V. Hickman 'Jib-, '.t78'' A(bmi c. Korr 122'.)'9 Ailams r. (Mark IM" V. Davis 8<)8" i\ Kielil 1229*', 122'j'\ 122'.M'' ('. Groenwich Ins. Co. 2.-)7<' r. Harrison f,22< /'. .Jont's IS.J'4 r. Ki'iinoy 2.'i7'- r. Lawsoii 2.-.7" i: LesbtT Wl'M' r. State 301»\ U7ii'9 r. Swansea 427* ('. Watkins 8(»H-^' r. Way 2 1-', II7'.ti'-' r. Wbet-ItT 'J78- ', '.t78-:7 AiManis r. Si-itzinger 4r)2' Ailkins r. Galbraitii 3r.H" Adior V. State 21-» Abern r. ( looilspccd ;5!ii-' Aiken r. Keniiison 2.")7< Alabama, &c;. Ins. Co. v. Cobl> 2iii Alabama, .<i;. I{. H. r. Hill .%ii' , :!().-)':< iMabania Stale Lil. Co. i- . Kvie 18:{" Albrittin r. llimtsville ■ 21" Ablerman r. IVople <;22'' AliliTinan and Council r Finlpy ._>IW Alexander r. Hiirnliani 2 I'- r. Foreman ll 7'.»" r. Kaiser {•78<-> I'. Milvvankee 21'^ r. Smoot •103 '. Ill:;--' r. U.S. ;!.'.8J' Alexander's Succession ]x:i^> Allc^luiny r. Nelson 21' Allen /'. Frost ■>2', '>•!' c. Thaxter 1I70'H i: Watson 52>-. 1I7!)'-: i\ Veater 808-» Allesbrook r. Hoaoh 122'.»« Allison r. Harrow (i22^' Alston V. State f)K8-' Amer. &c. Ass'n v. Palil SOH" American Fire In>. Co. i . Hazen 267-w Amer. &c. Ins. Co. r. Kosenaple 62i', 'V2r\ 117'.)», 117'Ji» Amer. Nat. Hk. r. Husliey 218 Ames v. McCambcr 62i'', ."j'^'s r. Snider 270' Amey r. Lonjj ]22i>* Amidon r. Hoslcy 2o7'''- Anderson r. Ames 4ti;!'* r. Fetzer 3'Jl-", :!!»l''t» v. Lonjr 257-"* r. Parl.er 427* r. State 4706, 470l^ 588^ C88»', 588'^ Andrews r. Heck l8;v-!+ r. Hoxie '2\^' V. Solomon t)22'-> Aneals r. People 078"'J Annus r. Smitli 078«'> Anbeuser-Bnscli Brew np Ass. /'. Hutmacber .■^.ISi'i Annapolis, &c. I{. 11. i>. Gantt 2.-)7-< Anon. 2r)7«* Apollon, Tlie lil'" Appeal of Hartranft C22''> Application of .Ia<!ob8 21»7 Arayo r. Currel 21» Arbuckle r. 'I'emplefon 183W, (!22' Arcber r. Helm 39r aoi-7 Arcbibald r. State 470' Armil r. Cbicajfo H'.d'""' Armor r. Stale 2.-.7^" Armstroni; r. IT. S. 2P Arnold r. Arnolil 910" oini'i r. .Jones 80H" Artbiir r. .Fames 554' f).54i-' Asb '•, Marlow r>-r- Asbley v. Hoot /■)2"» Asbley'g Adm'.x v. Martin 21'" Asbloek V. Linder .V.4*< Atcliison, &.C. K. U. r. Rlacksbirc o,|J r. (^upello 117!l'' i: Lawler 078 '. 0781 r. Parker ;!01-ii» c. Stanford 2:)7''« V. Tbul 806" , IMW* Atkeson r. Lay 2140 Atkinson v. lilair Hn8« Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Manning 1220''» I I CCXVUl Atlas Bank v. Doyle Att.-Ge'v c\ Dublin V. llalliday v. llitclicouk AtwattT V. Schenck Atwood V. Barney r. Scott Autfusta ('. Windsor Aulis c. Young Aultman v. Clifford c. Daggs Austin V. Austin V. lleiser r. Holland V. State Austlne v. People Averill v. Sawyer Avery v. Avery V. Miller Ayer v. Bell Mfg. Co. Ayrus v. Bane V. Cliisum V. Duprey V. He'.vett V, Watson AMEItlCAN TABLE OF CASES. References are to pages. 2Ttil^ 2" l»;{i U22'' 022* 688l^ 588-'^'' 808', 808-i' 808-5 80815 5o4-'! 368^1 978*" 122'J9 07851 Bacon v. Frisbce I". Inhabitants of Charlton 6221" ;;yi37 V. Towne 257'*, a'Jl*» Badart f. Foulon 52- Badgeri- Story 3585, 391" 3!tl*« Baeder v. Jennings 428i Bagley v. McMickle 18.3-;", SoS-"' Baiilev, &c. Co. v. Saranac, &c. Co. 8085 Bailey v. Bailey 978<> I,'. Kalamazoo Pub. Co. 21''^ B.iin I.. Walsh 358" Baird v. Baird 808-!* Baker i\ Gausin 391'"' I'. Goldsmith S"!** V. Hall 8085 I'. Hess 554''' V. Knott '21^- r. Mich., &c. R. R. 80811 1-. Mygatt 2r-'' V. Thompson OlOi'' Balbo V. People 58815 Balch V. Smith 183" Baldridge v. Penland 4635, 463ii, 4(i3i« Baldwin v. Burt r. Short r. Tlirelkcld r. Whitconib Ball V. Gates Biillew r. U. S. Baltimore, &c. U. R. v. Glenn r. Hanilio r. Thompson r. Woodruff Baltimore Steamboat Co Bank r. Bank r. Dandridge r. Miidgett — — I'. Kutland c. Zorn 35811 2571' 3582' 358n 4()3'' 1179' 521' 07859, 978* ' 978'^n 257*' V. Brown 8O812 9781" 183'", 358-' 122n''> 3'.tl*» 0781, 978», 978»» Bank of Augusta v. Earle Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Ex- press Co. Bank of Newberry Bank of No. Amer. v. JIcElroy 2183 Bank of Northern Liberties v. Davis Bank of 11. S. v. Dandridge r. Merchants' Bank Bank of Upper Canada v. Boulton I'. Smith Hank of Utica v. Hillard Banks t\ Burnliam Bannon r. Aultman Barber v. Merriam Harbour r. Watts Barcello i'. Hapgood Barclay r. Waring Barker i-. Bradley V. Bushnell V. Com. V. Haskell V. Kuhn liarmby v. Plummer Barnard r. Roane Iron Co. Barnes v. Harris )•. State i\ Tiompowsky Barnhart v. Fulkerth Barnuni r. Barnum 427 215 2113 9101', 910i» 07881 ass-'ii 117919 808* 62* 12293 2lis 808^8 3013S 117020 117032 91018 80820 5547 39150 463i«, 46318, 40318 C2216 35818 8O&21 C22!» 58810 122013 21 Barr v. I'arr Barron v. Mason Barrow v. State Barrows r. Downs Barry v. Ryan Bartholomew v. Farwell Bartlett v. Emerson V. Pat ton Bartley r. People Barton i-. Dundas Bascom r. Smith V. Toner Bass r. Chi(^ago, &c. R. R. Bassett v. Shares r. Spofford Basye r. State Battaglia r. Thomas Battle u. Baird Battles r. Laudenslager Battre v. State Baugh V. White Baxter r. Abbott r. Ellis 1'. State Bay I'. Cook Bayly's Adm. v. Chubb Bayse 1: State Beacli V. State Bealc V. Com. Beall r. Poole Boals r. See Bcamor r. Darling Beard r. Boylan Beardsley v. Wildraan 2, 4273, 427», 4278, 4279 8082" 525, 26734 3913* 521" 1229" 46319 412" 4523 58825 46329 528 358» 301" 5548 403* 4709, gygi 368", 978*5 11 79*0 25720 521 808» 07853 18323 , 47013 , 40S'8 2P, 521" 6221* fi35i 183** 80820 80821 6221" 8082'' 078<*, 97852 47( 4638, AMEKICAX TABLE OF CASES. BeferenceB are to pages. CCXIX 41 Beardstown v. Virginia 27t)» Beasiey v. People 2o7« Beattie v. Hilliard 3o8i» Beatty v. Clement 4o2i V. Lessee of Knowler 2113, 211^ Beck iJ. Beck SOS* Becker v. Holm 52^ Beckham v. State 588^J Becknian v. Beckmaa 808^3 Iteilford V. Flowers 808-' JJediiigfleld's Case 391-' JJeeckinan v. Montgomery IJoi-^ Beenier v. Kerr 9785' Beery v. U. S. 588" , 58818, 58818, 588-'' Beets V. State 470' Bet'iiy r. Wheeler 183M, 3i)l-» Bell v. Brewster 1229« V. Chambers 978^» ^— V. Kendrick 628. 35818, 4u3Ji V. State 2139, 47010, 6881, sag*, 978i' V. Woodman 8083 Belleville Sav. Bk. v. Bornman 808^' Belmont v. Morrill 212, 2118 Belote V. State 588-^1, 688« Ben V. State 4703 Benaway v. Conyne 978", 9781" Benedict v. Flanigan 1229'5 V. Rose 257-^ V. State 6221" Benicia, te. Works u. 1 Sstes 808-ii Benjamin v. Ellinger's Adm. 183-^ > V. Shea 27(J* Bennett v. State 2119, 2573', 622^' Benns v. State 470* Benoist v. Darby Sdl^' Bentley v. Ward 46318, 4t5;}ji Benton v. Martin 808*5 Berg V. Peterson 1229^7, 1220«> Bergen v. People 588* Bergman v, Shoudy 9781, i)78S Berliner v. Waterloo 211" Bernard v. Walker 8081' Bernlieini r. DiUrell 257I8 Bersch v. State 25711 Besscn v. Southard b2^ Bethea h. Byrd 412», 412« Beyerstedt v. Winona Mill Co. 808", 808" Bickel V. Fasig OlO^i Biddis V. James 1179''^ Bieihaus v. W. U. Tel. Co. 52'^ Bigelow V. Clmtterton 21' V. Wilson 808" Bi^ler v. Reylier 62215, 022' ' Bignall, &e.'Co. r. Pierce, &c. Co. 808' Blllingslea v. Smith Killingsley i-. Hiles Biiiford r. Young Bingham v. Bernard Binns i>. State Birch V. Hale Bird's Case Birmingham v. McPoIand Bishop 1: Jones 1: Nesbitt Bissell I'. Briggs 9781 inO'^ 5541' 267'«, 25739, SOS'-* 470" 978'" 219 978' 21 •" 427^ 1179i« Bissell V. Edwards 11792', IHU'"', IWJ-^ Bituminous, &c. Co. v. Fulton 21'- Bi.xler's Adm. v. Parker 21''» Black I'. Sharkey V. Ward Blackburn r. Com. V. Crawfords v. State Blackwell v. State Blade v. Noland Bladen v. Wells Blair v Madison Co. V. .eaver Blake v. Damon V. Fash V. Hall Blunchard v. Child v. Young Bland v. Warren Blatz V. Hohrbach Bless V. Jenkins Blewitt V. Booruni Bliss V. Brainard r. Johnson Blizzard v. Hayes Blocker v. Burncss Bloom V. Cox, &c. Mfg. Co. Bloomington v. Shrock Blossom ('. Griffin Blotcky V. Caplan Blount V. Kimpton 183», 1835 5881, 5yH8, (J7ai7 4271, 427', 427^ 403^: 470» 910', 910", 910', 910« 18:;« 808-, 808'', 8081 \ SOS's :'.<)r'8 91011, 9101-2, 910'3 3918 358-'« 8081 391 '» 2701, 276» 403" 2r'8 18351 808^8, 808-27 27ti» 39 1« 257'* 9101* 522 391''2 808-" 97818 02215 ) Board of Trustees f. Misenheimer 12295 Boardman v. Lessees of Reed 412i V. Westchester, &c. Ins. Co. 3H6" 1: Woodman 257^' Bodwell v. Swan 257*' Body V. Jewson 183-'i Boehringer v. Richards Medicine Co. 391*2 Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Harrison 808^7 391-2 808-23 463-2" 5881-2 622* 978'T 46312, 6543 213-2 9781, 978-2. 978< Holds ('. Woods Bolles V. Sach.'4 Boiling V. Fannin Bonahan v. State Hondy v. Valois Bonelli v. Bowen Bonnell v. Maw ha Bonner c. Phillips Bonnet v. Glattfeldt Bonsack Machine Co. i". Woodrum 8O8-2, 808" Booby V. State 6222* Bookman v. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co. 2r'5 Boon V. State Ins. Co. V. Wethered's Adm. Born r. Rosenow )•. Weathered's Adm Bornheimer c. Baldwin Bo. .in V. Fouts Bostick V. Rutherford Boston I'. Richardson r. State Bottomlev v. U. S. Boulden r. State SSS'", Bowden v. Spellman Bowdle I'. Ry. Co. 18351 25739, 25752 978-'" 2.57« 39r2» 'J22* 2573*, 2573* 4281 2120 21-2» 257" •'■705, 47013 9785 910^ ii; i| ill ccxx AMERICAN TAIILK OF CASES. References are to pages. IJowen V. Chase V. Humphreys V. Jones V. Mo. I'iic. II. R. IJowers I'. State liowersock v. Adams liowman v. Hekia Fire Ins. Co. V. Sanborn Boyce v. Clieshire Tl. 11. Boyd V. Ladson V. State V. U. S. Boyle V. State lirabston v. State Braekett r. People Bradberry !•. State Bradford i.-. Barclay V. Floyd V. State Bradley v. Goodyear r. Kent V. M'Intosh Bradsliaw v. Combs Brady c. Ca.ssidy V. Page V. State V. U. S. V. Wilson Bragg ('. Cohvell Brakefield v. State Branilette v. State Branch r. Howard V. Texas Lumber Mfg. Co, V. Wilson Brand v. Brand Brandon Mfg. Co. v. Mors" Brazier's Case Brennan r. Vogt Brent r. State Breton v. H. B. Claflin Co. Bretz V. Mayor, &c. of Now York Brewer v. Housatonic R. K. Co. V. Porch 452'^ 8081" 2110 022ia 117!>*» 1170'!' r22!)-« 2.')7-'i 4ti:}S gio-ii 257* 470'', 4701' 470* 21"* 3!)1-"* 978*7 2Pn 688-'« 403" 910'»' 622-» 808", m'S-^ 808-s 2135 0221" 588* 42711 1229*- 47011 6221 808-!* 427" 808-^'' 0221'' 808H 9103 21J9 183*, 18.35 91019 2111 276" 078'" Bromage r. Rice Uronner v. Loomis Brooke v. Jordan Brooks V. Acton V. Clay Broscliart v. Tuttle Droughton i;. Null Urown V. Burrus V. Com. V. Deacon V. Kdson V. Fotster V. Griffltli 122958 12295" 358'«, 36811 391»» 427* C64», 554' 1 808'8 9785« 470', 470'7 808-" 1179" 30515 117918 4278 257*5 11791J 257", 97854 808--* 6226 391*' 2P5, 2139, 21*", 39138 39r'^» 3913^ 4701", 5881, 588*, 588B. 910", 97«i'>, 9783*. 97835 40318 358", 6221, 978-2«, 978-9, 1229-i-* jht 52", 5218 Hrowne v. I'hila. Bank 21" Browning v. Gosnell 978*5, 1229*^ Brnyles r. State 5545 Hrubaker v. Taylor 978", 978*", 97851 Lazarus Lnehrs Mitchell Mooers Morgan Pay son V. People V. Piper V. Prude V. Sheppard V. State Williams Wood Writ Brice V. Miller 358^ 808*' Briceland v. Com, 276' Brick (.•. Brick 808-!" Bridger v. Asliville, &c. R. R. Co. 52', 52K, 521" Bridges v. Hyatt 39132 Briffltt V. State 2138 Briggs r. Rafferty 97811, 978" r. Georgia 463' V. Hcrvey 183*» V. U. S. 1229«" V. Whipple -iV^ Rrigham r. Palmer 1229" Bright V. Knight 808-^' Brighthope R. It. v. Rogers 2572« Britton v. Lnrenz 622^ Broad Street Hotel Co. v. Weaver's Adm. 21" Brohston v. Cahill 1229 ^ 1229"" Brock V. Com. 470', 470'5 V. Milligan OlO'i, 910'^ BroUey v. Lapham 978'" Hruce v. Priest Hrimdred v. Del. Iloyo Hruson v. Clark Bryan i'. Beckley V. Forsyth V. Wear Bryce Lorillard v. Ins. Co, Bubster v. State Buchanan v. Moore Buckingham v. Roar Buckley r. Buckley Buckinaster c. Kelley , Buddee v. Spangler Buell V. State V. Warner Buford V. Bostick V. Tucker Bulger V. Ross Bull V. Com. V. Loveland BuUard v. Lambert V. Pearsall Mul linger v. People Bulman i'. Andrews Bunnell v. Butler Burbank i'. Dennis Burcli r. Harrell Burdick v. Hunt Burgess v. Burgess Burgin v. Chcnault Biirk V. Andis Burke i>. Delaney 257^' 1179* 21-", 213* 218' 1179* 117938 8082* 5881" 412* 6222, 91019 9783* , 622" 5542 2123 21'* 11795 21*) 358i«, 3913-' 470'* 1229* 978*5 OVS!", 9782«, 97831 978", 97819 6221* 2575* 9782 35822 62223 122929 18318, 122921, 12292* 97818 8082' AMEIUCAN TABLE OF CASES. References are to pa^es. CCXXl Burke v. Miller 978"^ Campbell r. Woodstock Iron Co. 122935 r. Milteiiberger 2 1'" Canfield v. Thompron 1179*3 !•. Hay 80811 , 80811 Cantey v. Piatt 1229''9 Burleson r. Collins 1179»«' Cantilfe v. Septor 122ili'J V. Goodman 4C3'ii, 403i--! , 463-^ ', 5543 Card V. State 257I'' Burley v. (ierinan-Am. Bank 403-^' Carder v. Primm 9782", 978*" Burlington, &c. liy. Co. V. Dey 21 IB Cargill V. Atwood 403* Burnett r. Henderson 21-^> Carman v. Dunham 4035 v. Simpkins 257-' Carmon f. State 2138 /■. State 257' Carnes i'. Piatt 02211 V. Thompson 12291* 122!li'' Carpenter v. Dame 35815 Burnham v. Aynr 12299, 1229-27, 1220-'« i\ Dexter 2F, 211" V. Webster 21" r. Wall 978*9 JJurns r. Fay 4«3t ,: Willey 183=8, 078'* i'. Kerr 554" Carr r. Griffin 5542 Burr V. Harper 1229-9 V. Miner 3589 r. Kase 358-^* v. Moore 97853 V. Sim 183'» , I8:F' V. Stat(! 301» Burrell v. State 257'" , 978« Carrico r. W. Va. &c. R. R. 365" Burt i-. State 391*" , 391*8 Carrington v. Holabird 01017 Burtners v. Keran SOS-ii Carroll v. Norwood 12292* Burton c. Blin 2701-! c. State 978*2 V. Dri{?g8 35819, 1179** Carskadden r. Poorman 427'* V. Morrow 808' Carson c. Smith 21' Bush r. Com. 9101* Carter c. Beals 391«, 391*6 r. Bobinson 808' r. Com. 25732 Bustin V. Bogers 4(5;r' r. Doe 122021, 122923, 12292* Jiuswell Trimmer Co. v Case 257*^ V. Jackson 1229** Butler V. Collins 2571'-' V. State 9105, uiqb, 910", 91022, 010-*, r. Com. 588^1 97853 i,'. Smith 808-' 1: Tinicum Fishing Co 183*8, 4278 V. Watkins 25717 Cartier v. Troy Lumber Co 18327 Butrick v. Tilton 42711 Carvillo v. Wostford 078ts Buttrick i-. Allen 11791* Carj V. State 2119 Butts !■. Smartwood 91013 Casat V. State 391*1 Buzard v. McAnulty 654" Case V. Case 183*'', 80821 JJyass r. Sullivan 12206 V. Mayor of Mobile 2115 Byers v, McMillan 80810 V. McGee 117921, 117927 V. Wallace 4272, 427^ 427s, 11705, V. Perew 21J8, 212" 1179' c. PhttMiix Bridge Co. 8081", 80817 Byrd v. Campbell ms-^ Cassidy v. McFarland Castello V. Casteilo Castle V. Belard 21*" 0221 2671'', 257'9 Cabiness v. Holland 554' Castncr r. Sliker 3913 Cabot v. Given 35819 Catcs I'. Kellogg 55413 Cadden v. Am. Steel Barge Co. 391*3 Catlett V. Pacific Ins. Co 11797 Cndy V. State 588--!i Caujolle c. Ferrie 18382, 427-2, 427 '2 V. Walker 0225 Caulfield v. Hermann 80817 Caha V. U. S. 21'* Cavender v. Guild 5218 Cain V. State 2V^\ 588', 68810 588^* , 588--;7 Cawtliorn r. Haynes 391*0 Caldwell 1: Davis G22« Cayuga, The 808 '1 622" Central, &c. Co. v. Gamble 2121 1: Hichmond R. R. 211-i Central Land Co. &c. i-. Calhoun 2123 Calhoun r. Richardson 8081'^ , 808-'i Central R. R. v. AUmon 978*5 V. Ross 117915 Chadron v. Glover 36611 Calkins r. State 3653 Chaffe V. Mackenzie 5547 Call V. Dunning 12291'^ Chaffee v. Taylor 1229^'5 Cameron v. Blackman 215 Chaffee & Co. i-. U. S. 46328, 46.330, 46331. u. Peck 35815 4633-2, 4633* Camp 17. Simmons 8085 Chahoon v. Com. 6227 1: State 257*5 , 257*' Chamberlain v. Bradley 1179*7,1179*8 Campbell v. Bannister 257aa , 25738 V. Chamberlain 427i. 427", 427", 42712 V. Dearborn 80819 r. Enfield 257<2 V. State 3651" , 4703, 4709, 47015, V. Sands 97827 470" , 588'-' 910« . 910-^" V, Smitli 808' 1^ m II-:* ccxxu ATXERICAN TABLE OF CASES. References are to pages. Chatnberliiin v. Torrence Cliamberlin v. Hall Chamburg t*. Jones Cliainbles8 v. State Clianipion v. Miindny Cliandler i\ Le Uarron V. Von Hoeder Clianoinc c. Fowler Cliapin r. Dobson (,'. Lapliam V. Marlborough Ciiaplain v. Uriscoe Chaplin r. Hakcr Cliapnian i-. Brewer I'. Chapman 1). Cooley V. Sutton 257''«, 257«' 808<, 1170*' . 170'8 808«' 1229««, 122951 52', 62" 21" 8087, 80813, SOS'O.SOS^-i, 808'^i 1)"8« 3!)1'«' 1229* 1229- 808''> 62'2 4276, 42712, 427 '■' 257'", 078M 808'" Charlotte i- Chouteau' 529, 521", 52i*, 52"^ Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Gisborn 808* Chase v. Lowell 391" Chattanooga 11. R. Co. v. Clowdis 301^» Cheatham v. State 635-», Goo"* V. Young 1179'* Cheeny r. Arnold 078'-' Cheever v. Brown 403'-'- r. Congdon 391'"' V. Wilson 21'^ Cheney v. Cheney 654" Cherokee Packet Co. r. Ililson 978'* Cherry v. Baker 21-- Chesapeake Bank v. Swain 21-' Chesa])eiike Ohio Canal Co. v, B. & O. Ry. Co. 21«, 211", 2ia> Chester v. Wilhelm 078'-» Chew r. Farmers' Bank fyJ2*, (',22'i Chicago Lumbering Co. v. Hewitt 4()3i7 Chicago, &c. R. R. v. Artery 978'»', 078*" V Becker SUV* V. Champion 21'^», 21-'" V. Coal & Iron Co. 978'» V. Ellis ('.221 V. Griffith 078«' Chick c. Sisson 391- Child V. Kingsbury 4128, 412* Childs r. Merrill ISS^, 622», 022'' Chirac v. Reinicker 622-', 622*", 622i« Chishohn v. Sheldon 1220'-!» Choisser v. People 18.S»i Christian v. Columbus, &c. R. R. 978" Christmas !-. Russell 1179'« (liumasero v. Gilbert 52" Church r, Ilubbart 21", 1170'^, 11 79», 1170'" Church i\\ Brattle Square v. I3ullard 183"* Churchill r. Fulliam 554" Churchman i: S.'nith 40:!'-' Cicero v. State 588< Cincinnati, &c. R. R. v. Clifford 21'* V. Granies 21-' fMty Bank «f Macon v. Kent 808" City Council of Montgomery v. Mont- gomery, &c. I'lankroad 21''^ City of Alleghaiiv r. XeKson 21'* City of McPherson r. Nichols 21'* City of St. Louis v. Roche 21"' City of Winona v. Burke Clanton v. Barnes Ctapp V. Banking Co, V. Ellington V. Foster V. Peck V. State Clark V. Bond V. Bradstreet c. Field V. Freeman I). Grand Trunk V. Haney V. Ilayward V. Hills V. Owens V. Perdue v. Sanderson V. State Clarke v. Bank V. Canfield V. Courtney — — V. Kelsey c. Magruder Clator V. Otto Clegg V. Levy Cleland v. Applegate Clem V. State Clemens v. (\)nrad Clement v. Cureton c. Packer Clements i;. Hunt c. Kyles V. McGinn V. Moore demons v. State Cleveland v. Burnham Cleveland, &c. R. R. v. Brown v. Mara ('. Perkins V. Wynant Cliquot's Champagne Coale V. Hannibal, &c. R. R. Coan u. Flagg Coapstick v. Bosworth Coates V. Sulau Cobb V. Boston Cobleigli V. McBride V. Young Coder v. Stotts (^odman v. Caldwell Cody I . Conly Coffin V. Bucknam )'. Grand Rapids, &c. Co. V. 'Vincent 21", 2115 621" 8081 2705 6547 '.i78»9 e36« 978« 305* 622'-! 1229a8 5548 80814 2762, 276», 2761", 412" 18317, i220''2* 1179*" 1229'^" 470* ]170'3 183*' 428'' 808« 46.3" 1179 « 463-"'« 183" 97830, 978*1 2* 4W, 412* 427* 412*, 412B, 412i« 910* 2782, 27611 588'Ji 808'^5 391*' 39r-2" 358-^3 2V^ 391" 257'-!* 1179" 808'^ 257*6, 257*» 9781, 978'^, 9781" 39r-» 18381, 18345 35823 40.38 12293;:, 1220'6 4526 2761'^ 978" Coffman r. Niagara, &c. Ins. Co. 3581* Cogswell V. Dolliver 4637, 4(,?,-^i Cohen ir. Cohen Coit ,: Millikin Coker r. Hayes ('. Scheiffer Colburn r. Groton Cole r. Cole V. Com. V. Dial 257'* ♦ 21'2, 11792 622''*i, 978'''5 978'^* 5548, 5541", 5881, 5881" 554"', 022» 257* 4632, 4635 AMERICA X TA RLE OF CASES. ccxxia ReferenceB are to pagei. Cole V. Fall Brook Coal Co. 365', 3ti&« Com. i: Dowing IKIMr V. Hiulley 808''' r. Eastman 1229*S 1229", l22!Ht» V. Hijwe 808' ,: Eddy 270«, 27611 .. 1-. Lake Shore, &c. U. It. 18327, 978.0 i: Emery 35812 1: State 4701" V. Fenno 218» Coletjrove v. N. Y. &c. R. R. 528 V. Ft-rrigan 25711, 25712 Coleman v. Com. 52', 91021, OlO'" V. Ferry 218'» V. Frazier 452', 452«, 452'" V. Flood 58«it> I'. People ('. Southwick 2o7>» V. Follansbce 9781* 8!)l*i V. Ford 9780, 9788, 97810 v. State 978'"', 122912, i22i)U V. Funai 5545 Coleman's Caae 910*, ".tlO< V. Galligan 978t9 Collagan v. Hums 3913, 391S V. G" 5541 Collette V. Weed 80816 V. Goudnow 978^3 Collier v. Cogging 554' 52tt V. Simpson 1229-» V. Griffin 6223 V. State 4705 V. Ilackett 39110, 39119, .391^4 Collins V. Corson 80820 V Hall 25711 V. N. Y. Central, &c. R. R. 257'^'^ V. Haney 4705, 47oi» ('. Robinson 622' >'. Hanlon 68812 V. Stanfield 80828 V. Hardy 257-'» V. Waters 39130 V. Hawkins 978« Collins Bros. ])n _, Co. V. Graddy 46318 v. Hay den 1179<*, n7i>i» Colquitt V. State 39P I'. Heath 2701* Colton, &c. Co. V. Swartz 808' V. Hill 218» Columbia Planing Mill Co. v. Ins. Co. 554' 1: Holmes 2578, o;j5'> Columbia, &c. R. IJ . c. Hawthorne 62* V. llourigan 978'S Columbus Omnibus Co. t). Semnies 218* — r. Howe 58812 Combs n. Com. :}58i-' r. Hudson 9782T V. Winchester 978«, 97852, 978*> V. Hutchinson 9101, 9]()>i Comer v. State 910' V. Jackson 257i» Commercial Bank }. Dunham 12292 r, James 58823, 978-.» Commissioners v, Leggett 3918^, 3!)r"* ),'. Jeffries 1835* — ^ V. Verbarg 554' i\ Jeffs 9781') Com. v. Abbott 257 '2 V. Johnson 267'», 5882& (•. Autlies 521, 523 V. Keith 910^1 V. Bean 978« 1: Kendall 257'» V. Billings 97832 V. Kenney G88» 1'. Blood 183", 35822 V. King 2184 V. Boimer 978-"' V. Kipling «35« V. Borrough 588** V. Knapp 588", 58821 V. Bosworth 635*, 635«, 035' I'. Kneeland 21-25 V. Bradford 5883 i>. Lawler 25753, 25754 1: Brown 588S 5885, 97817, 0782-2 V. Lynes 52«, 52', 9103, 910', 910', 1>. Burke 91012 910-22 V. Campbell 257<. 5882 V. Marzynskl 2125, 2187 V. Carey 47018, 9106, 910', 9108 V. Matthews 4709, 4701', 470" V. Casey 470' V. McGorty 1832» V. Cliabbock 452' V. McGrath 1833t» t: Chaney 978^'i V. McKie 276» — ^ V. Chase 6350, n79»9, 117950 V. McManus 521 1'. Choate 2182, 2572>, 276' V. Merriam 267» V. Churchill 2.57^' V. Minor 2701* V. Clark 5883, i22i)<8 1 . Morgan 0783' r. Cleary 622* V. Morrell 0783* V. Coe 528, 2579. 1229", 122'.l''>, i: M'Pike 39110, 39119^ 3914U 1229<^ r. Mullins 52T V. Cooper 47012, 47013 1'. Murphy 25717, 9in-J0 V. Corkin 2578, 2572" ('. Myers SSSi-i, 58816, 5881T V. Coy 5881S V. Nagle 2573« V. Cuffee 5885, fjggi'i, 5881!' I'. Nef us 122928, 122929, 12204* — — V. Culver 526, 58826, 58827, 588« V. Nott 5881* 978W V. O'Brien 257-2» r. Dam 2183 i: Peckham 213* 2141 V. Phillips 11793a I 1 lit I I .1 I ,Mi'i3 M CCXXIV Com. V. Pollard c. I'opo r. I'orter I', lieynolds V. liuberts i: KobinsDii V. Ku88ell I-. I{>an V. Samuel r. SHiiborn r. Scott V. Scgo r. Shepherd V. Silcox r. Smith AMEIUCAN TABLE '^F CASES. C8816, 5881' V. Sturtivnnt V. Suilivaii i: Thompson r. Towle i: Trtl'etlitii V. Vose ReferenceH 035' 368^ am' ;W1« 470"', 4701'', 470'\ 47(li" 62^ 257»^ 2o7'^ 'Jo7-'" f)88-''* '.'67^- 270' 688'* 257'-i\ ;)«■>"■ 588>\ GSH'i" 47()'' 588'^«, yioi-, 078*'' 301-'- 9783", !)78*« 183''", ''70'', 470>», <.I7813 27(i" 688*, 588" 301*' r. Webster 267»", 366", SOd-"", 1220^ r. Weicli 3r)8< r. Welsh 078-' r. Wentz 022-'' 1-. Wiieeler 21-' r. White 257"' I-. Whittaker 183-'' V. Williams 52" Commissioners r. May 21'- Comparet I'. Jernegan 1170'- Comstock i;. Iladlynie Ecclesiastical Society 270', 270", 301*" I-. Smith 218*, 078*' r. State 301"> Condit V. Blackwcll 52» Confederation Life Ass'n of Canada 1-. ( CDonnell 452" Conpar v. Chicago, &c. R. R. 9783'', 97»'* Congdon r. Howe Scale Co. Con key v. People Connell v. Vanderwerken Conner v. State Conn. I'. Mead V. Penn. Conn. &c. Ins. Co. v. Schwenk V. Smith Conrad v. Griffey Consaul v. Sheldon 368^, 0785-, 07855 Conseqiia v. Willings 1179'' Conway i-. State 5545, n78'i Conwell V. Springfield, &c. R. R. 808-i-' Conyers >■. State Cook V. Ashmead r. Brown r. First Nat. Bank V. Grange V. State 58812, 9781^ 978i», 978l^ 9782* V. Union R. R. Co. 52" 1'. Wood 1170'* Cooke v. Wondrow 1229i\ 122918 Coon V. People 978'^5 are to pages. Coon c. Swan Coonroil r. .Madden Cooper r. Dedriuk r. Morrell r. Slate (^opes r. I'earce C'ornelins r. Com. Cornett i\ Williams Cornwall r. State (^orse c. Peck Corsen v. Dubois Corser v. Paul Cortland Mffj. Co. v. Costeio V, Crovvell Couch r. Woodruff Coulter V. Am. &c. E.x. Co. Count Joannes r. Bennett Countryman r. Bunker County of Johnson c. Wood ("oveney v. Tannahill Covert r. Ilerfzou 358* 25735, 257*^ 808" 022^^' 412" 403-« 183'i' 978*" 2708 4()3i'' 978*" 1229^ 022- 622's ^68" I83''.i 403I-! 978'-, 078'" 427' 078'-' 858'', 1170''' 088'- 808-, 8(I8-' 1220* 654*, 554\ 654', 554'* Piatt 978" 2&7'', 403^-, 1220**, ]229*» 808'' 0782', 9783. 358*' 40315, 4o;;;ii 808« 0226 427I" Coviiidton Drawbridge Co. y. Shep- herd Cowan r. Abbott r. Sapj) Cowden v. Reynolds Cowley r. People Cox r. Kayres r. Jones r. Morrow V. People r. Peterson r. Kust I'. State Cozzens v. liiggins Crafts I'. Com. Craijf c. Brown V. Proctor f. State Cramer r. Burlington 211*, 18:^19 80811 80810 078-'' 21% 9782«, 978''"', 078-'? 1170" 218, 219, 62», 52'", 6212 58818 808" 1179*8 3911, 3012, 391", 391", 4121" 213S 6366, 6367, 9785'' 117912, 11792!J 270" 257*6, 25752, 39115 622^5 Crane i'. P2lizabeth Library Ass'n V, Lessee of Morris Craufurd i-. Blackburn Crawford v. Branch Bank r. Elliott Cre.s.swell v. Jackson Creswell v. Slack Crosby r. Berper Crose V. Rutlcdge Crosman i-. Fuller Cross V. Bell V. Cross V. Riggins Crouch V. Eveleth ('rouse I'. Hoi man Crow I'. Watkins Crewe I'. Colbeth Crowninshield v. Crowninshield Crozor i-. New Chester Water Co. Crump V. Com. Crusen v. State 8082 18321 4271, 4271" 1179*3 1229"fl 4(1,^38 622", 622", 12295 0222 8082'J 18328 62224 6225, 62212 39iai 18332 80820 6541 2708, 2761* 3585, 858" 4701 6364 AMERICAN TABLE OK CASES. Refereiicei uo to pages. ccxxv Crutclier i-. Muir «08"» Cry§tal Ice Mfg. Co. v. Son Antonio Aits'n 9"S'' Ciil.ly r. Hrown 427', 427^, 427- ("ndiifv V. Ciiilnoy •'51'1*'| Culliimii.s V. Limlsiiy W)8" CiilvtT ... Murks 4639, 4(j;}:» L\ Scott, &f. Lumber Co. (>78' Cumbcrliind, &c'. Ins. Co. v U. Co liiltinan,nr.Hi-, 358-- i<. Mau- 52' 40:i''' 21-" 1220", 122!)i» 2o7^", 257*" 4031, 4(;;{:.i 427'' 183", 452", 4f)2» 11 71)^' 412-i, 412" 2f)7' 910", OK)'.' 010' U. CumberlniKl, &c. H guns Cumiiiiiifrs V. Nichols V. >Si()iie Cunliflfc r. Sefton Ciiiiningliiini r. State Curren i-. (Crawford Carrie r. Stairs Currier v. (iale Curry r. Hnyinond Curtis ('. Aarunson c. State V. Strong Clurtiss V. State Cusliing r. Nantnskct Beacli R. 11. 1170' V. Kico 808^' Custeau v. St. Louis, &c. Co. 80H» Cutter I'. Caruthers 21-- r. State 183'' Cuviliior i-. Browne 6541^ Cuyler i>. Ferrill 2ia« D.\nNEY I'. Mitchell OlOi" Dado V. JEtna. Ins. Co. 358i« Daggett V. Shaw 412", 412' V. VVilley 412" Daily v. N. Y. &c. R. R. 470' V. State 21" Dakota v. O'Hare 12208>, 12293'i, 122!)53 Danfortii v. Tenn., &e. U. 11. SuS" Daniels f. Woonsocket 554'', 554''' Dativille, &c. Plank-Road Co. v. State 21" Darby v. Roberts 183", 554' Darling v. Hitclicock 21^ Darrow v. Pierce 358''' Davenport i-. Cummings 2' V. McKee 978', 978', 978"' V. Ogg 978", 978", 978^-', ^IS^* Davidson v. Arsineau 978-'i V. Nicholson 270" i: Peticolas 21*^ V. State 9105, qiq', 91022 V. Young 808-'" Davie v. Briggs 18338 Davis V. Alston 1229', 122918 V. Bank of Fulton 21i'» V. Best 211''' V. Byrd 978" V. Canada Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co. 910", 91018 V. Cook 97826 V. Crookston, &c. Co. 80828 V. Dunham 12292 Davis r. Franke r. Fredericks r. Hopkins r. McKnaney I'. McSherry r. Pearson i". Rhodes IK Boby V. Sanford ^— v. Sigourncy V. State Dawson r. Dawson r. May all Day r. Cooley f. De Cousse I'. Moore I'. Stickncy Deacon v. Schreve Dean c. Stone De Arnian i-. State Do Baker v. So. Cal. Deeary r. Poirier De Cells v. U. S. 257»9, 257*" 1220''2 8081" 212'' 80H-;'' 122022, \2->\)'* 117932, 1179'-' 97H'2 403*, 4G35, 403', 4(i:!i'' 358-' 35822, 391»2, 978'-"', 078'' 212 J 4271 07H''i 214' I179«, 117!t"> 978W C2224 11792* 257'" R. R. 21« 978*9 21'ii De Haven v. De Haven 427i, 427", 427", 42712, 9782U, <j78''" Dc Jarnette v. McDaniel 18;>''' Delafield v. Hand aP, 1179"' Delano i'. Jopling 21" De la Hosar. State 211'' De Lavaletie i-. Wendt 8082ti Delaware, &c. K. R. i'. Converse 52^ Demerritt v. 1." ndall 3G52, ,305» Denioiroy v. ^\ alker Denipsey i\ Kipp Den V. M'AUistcr Denmark, Griswold v. Pitcairn Dennett v. Dow Denning v. Roome Dennis i". Weekes Dennison v. Miner Denton v. Peters f. State Denver, &c. R. R. v. Wilson 5542, gyaio Denver Tramway Co. r. Owens 0221* Derk v. Northern Central R. R. Deshon i;. Merchants' Ins. Co. Des Moines Savings Bank v. Col- fax Hotel Co. 3012» 8081 36818 212 9782', 978'2 1179" 3»1«> 554" 808-20 391*5 97838 978'2« 554* 21'2* ■Van Stein- 62', 978M 622" 21-22 978M 2571" 21" 6225 Diamond v. Northern, &c. R. R. 2572* Dicken v. "Winters 40318, 4(5344 Dickerson i-. State 588-2. sgHis Dickinson )•. Glenney 808-2* Dickson i-. Waldron 9102* Diehl V. Rodgers 91021 Dietrich i-. Mitchell 0220 Diggins' Estate, Jn re 1229» Dcspau c. Swindler Detroit, &c. R. R. v. burg Denser i'. Hamilton Devine r. Burleson Devlin 0. Crocker Devoto !'. Com. Dewees v. Colorado Co, DeWolf V. Strader ill M I CCXXVl AMERICAN TAIILK OF CASES. Beferencea are to i)agei. Dillartl v. Scruggs 3016 Drohn v. Brewer 978»» Dillingliam v. Snow 4121'' Druniinond v. Hopper 183'-!« Dillon V. Howe 3581^ Driiniright v. State r.88' ('. Mattox 1170" Dubois r. Baker 30ff>, 122'.l"i Dimick v. Downs 257 ♦' V. Fanteaux 21" Dinckler v. Hacr 808-^' Ducker v. Whitson 078'-"' Dismiikes v. Stiilo 301!' Duck wall c. Weaver 978»i, 12201S Ditch V. VolUmriU 808" Dueoign r. Shreppel Am> Division of Howard Co. 21" Dudley V. Grayson 1170*1 Dixon V. Niccolls 21-.-J V. McCluer 257'*' i: State 470'', 470'- V '.miner 1221)19 iJixon- Woods Co. r. Phillips Glass DulTy i: I'eople 521, {iggii, r,HH'-'» Co. 808'J Duke of Cumberland v. Graves IS^''', Dobbins v. BInnchard 808' 18a" Dobson /•. Cotliran 07H"i Dumas v. State 4701', 47016 Doctor Leyflflil's Case artH" Dunbar v. Marden 12201", 1220"* Dodge ('. Kiene 808'1 V. U. S. 3581" V. State OlW-i Duncan v. Beard 1831'', 1220'^', 1220-'', Doe i\ Henyon 122'.)'-'- 1220'---', 1220« r. Hbit'knian "2i-'" r. Freeman 117'.)''' i: Kslava 21'' Dunham v. Riley 1 220'' V. Ford 30r"' Dunlap ''. Daughert\' 11*70« V. Newton 12205«, 12 20«'. 122'.l«i, — Waldo 1170-'" 1 229'-», 122<.l''"' Dii; 1 I-. Altman 078'3 r. Iteagan 07HJ'' .•. State 3tlf)\ 391", 391", 4709, f-i8« 122'.t"i Dumiell r. Sowden I220i i: Wilson 1220- Du I'oiit r. Davis 427< Doc d. Arnold v. Aiddjo 4270,427" Dupoy.ster r. (iagani 427», 427 '•' Doe d. Dunlap r. Servos 427H Diiree r. Brown 2|W Doe il. Hagernian r. Strong lo3-«' Diiren v. Houston, &c. R . Co. 2I» Doe d. Maeleni r. 'I'urnbull 1220'^'.! Durfee 1'. Abbott 40:1-;'' Doe il. I'errv v. Newton 1220''> Dnrgln r. Danville 18:!'-» Doherty c Ilill 808J Dnrkee c Lcland 1220* Dole i>. Wilson 21" ..•. Vt. Central It. R 3.'-)8l» Doles r. State SUl'i: Diirkheiiner r. Hellner 40311 Dol|)li I'. JJarney 21" Diirkln r. Col l.igli 80815, t:(iHi4 Donulioo V. Scott «78^s Durr r. i'l>;i.sr 81»8» Donkle r. Kolin 010'* Datlllct (. Ml.mclmrd 1170< Donnelly r. State 3!H", 470»,470>'',07H-", On; I'lii .-. W( odnian 078'''* 078*' Dweliiii(*, i<c. Ins. Co. I' Shaner 80K-' Doolin r. Com. 470" Dwelly 1. D«c'ly 0101", <)1(|1!) Dooii r. Donahcr 1220' Dyer i yredericks 3G8'." r. Kavey 654'^ r. , ,Hst 21J8 Dorr ('. 'IVpniont Bank 27((i' V. Moiris 078'-'' Dorsey i'. ("lapp 267;'" Holy r. Smith 4ii;!''-! Kai; \n r, Slate 21"H Doiiil r. Held 122'.(''' Fiigle r. Kinmet 183Sf', ik;!:m Dougherty r. MeMinus .•{'.»H Kiiiiies 1'. Manies 183».i DoiighiK r. Leightoil 078' l'",arl /■. 'I'upper 301''" DoiiglasH 1'. Hart 4(;3''' Karle c. Karle 301" r. Mitchell 18:1-:'' r. Kice 808'-'' Doiilhitt V. Stinson 2|.iJ Kiirly V. Com. 5881", r,K8"' Dow r. Tiittle 808' Kason r. ('ha|iman 257«", 257'" Dowd r. Will son 1 8;'. n F.ast Hraiidywine, &c. H. K.r. Kaiick 5.51^ Dowlen 1'. State .•JOI''" KiiKterdiiy v. KillMini Oil)'-!, Olll'' Downer r. KowcU 978" , 078I-! Fast Line. \c. U. K. v. Scott 2r.7''". 257" Dowtniii r. ('()iinell(>o .'(OI-"' Faslinan <\ Martin 427«, 427'' Doyle '■. Village of Bradford 21 '», 21''" r. Moullon 4(13'' Drake r. (ilovcr ' 52'" r. Kiiihvay Co. 554 '« r. Stale .T)")- '. ;i!)i ' ', i'i)'' — — ■ V. lioland wm--"* Draper -■. Diaper IMO--. IHO", iMD' 1'. Shaw my;"' r. IidiabitantB of Hatfiolii r.r.t', F.ant 'reiitieHsee, &e. II. I{. r, Matoy 470'' 6541", i'>')|ii r. Stewart 27(1' Drrw r. Sutton ilOjif' l''ai>twood r. I'eople 3(15"* DriscoU r. I'eople :{0F Katon r. Hall 1I70«* % AMERICA X TABLE OP CASES. CCXXVU Eaton ('. Jervis ('. 'riiliimdge Kbersole i: Kiiiikin Kborii r. Ziiiipelinan Eby r. Winters Eckel r. Ki;kel References 427>, 427", 427'^ (522' 3u8-<, 1220'', 122!»''4 Efker r. First Nat. Bank of Windsor 21-» Kckerly v. Alcorn IHii^ Kckfor.l r. Herry 808i» Kctor r. Welsli 654'' Eddy r. Gray .'{(15* Kdelen r. UoukIi 1229-7, 122'J-'« Edcii r. liourdinan lOdwards r. Common Council r. Jones ('. Ottawa U. Nav. Co. r San Jose, &c. Co. r. Warner Eel Kiver Draining Ass'n u. Topp I')liie, Kstate of Elirisniun r. Scott Eiiand r. State Eilert r. (ireen Bay, &c. R. R. Eiscnioni v. C'iuni Eidrid);e i^. Knott - — c. State ElkiiiH V. Melvean Ellicott I!. I'earl Elliott r. Dycke u2' 3r)5'' 1179-'a 257-'« 2V« 257"* 21'* 270-' 978^ 97H''^ 688^ 52' 427" 2577 3!»1« 412^ 978.i- 4:!(i-'' 427' r. IVirsol V. Van Buren Ellis I,, iiiitr r. Park I!, lieddin r. Smith r. State Ellis's Kstate, in rr Kllniaker r. linckley (,'. Franklin Ins. Co. ICIhnore i>. Mills Ellsworth r. Potter Elmer r. Fessendcn Elniondortrr. (^armichnel Elofrson r. Lindsay HIsenratli i\ Kallmeyer I'.lwell i: Mersick I'. Walker Flwodd r. Flannigan Kniery r. Uerry r. Twonihly Emniett r. Peiioypr Kmmons r. May ward Empire \\(if. Co. n. Stuart 427', 127" 358^;Jo»^.■;!»l•'"• 117!H< •JlJi 2 1 '■' I22',t'-' 52" I17'.t-'' 978^', 978'' 808^ 117'.t" '"78" 34 1 'J 1229-' 808-'' 1229"' 358" ;!5H-'< 211.-., 21 '7 1179'-' 1229'", 122'.i''< 808', 8()H" 27(1H 1229' Empire State I'hosphate Co. v. IIcIKt 808 i Endaily c. Stale EndiTs r. .McDonald I'.nficld c. IJIin^ton Fn^'lish r. Sprague Knnis r. Smith i 1179", 2", 52", 3581-!, Kiislow r. Mitchell Knterprisc Soap Works iv Savors F.phland r. Mo. Pic. Bv. Co. " Fquitable, &e. Ass'n i.'MeCluskey 257 1 ■» 2 1 '"' 1179'- 117',t"- 1179H, 117'.)" 1229-'" 5'.'-' !t78'-' .".91--'. 301* are to pages. Erickson r. Brookings Co. 808" V. K. R. Co. (ir.i' Erie U. H. c. Heath \.>-2'M Krissman i-. Erissnian 078''', U78-'' Eskridge v. Cincinnati, &c. R. R. 257- 1'. State 5a8''« Estell I'. State ;>U1^» Estrella, The 1179" Ethier c. Homier 622'", t)22" Etna I'. Brewer Ettinger r. Com. Eureka Springs li'y v. Timmons Evans r. Browne I'. Kvans V. Hettich V. Koons I'. Montgomery (•. State Kvansich r. \l. K. Kvanston r. (iunn Evarts v. Middlebury Kwing r. Bailey r. Saniloval, &c. Co, I'. Smith .i!)!' 554' 52'» 21" oioi» <.llO-'« 257- 554< 470'". OSS"', (;35'» 257*>, 978i7 1179' 3r,5'* 910'-', 9101'', 910" MlK-'i 808-1 'aiivan v. Russell 'aires r. Co(;krill 'airly c. Fairly 'alke r. Fassctt 'anchor r. De .Montogro irmers' Bank c. Whitehill arrar r. Bates 'arrow r. Nashville, &c. R. R. 'arwoll r. Tylor ash >: Ulake 'aucot r. Nichols 'aulkner r. Kondoni auiitleroy r. Hannibal axon r. ilollis iiy r. (iray — c. Harlan — r. .Miville oalherman r. .Miller CO r. Taylor 'oemstcr r. Uingo 'ell I'. Young 'elsontlial r. State 'fit ('. .Vniidon 'oltz ('. Walker 'cnno r. Weston 'onton i: Miller — r. .Slate 'erdinand r. ,S(ate 'crguson I', llarwood 8()H-,i-! 18317, 078-", 978-'-', 1229^1, 1229J-i, 1229-'< 808'' — r. McHean — r. WalTorly 'cron r. D<uiolly 21'" 4tY.\-'' 1179''' 218' 1229" 257" 078" 21'- 40312, 403", 4f,;{'" 808^ ;59l'« 21-!' 358''' 122iK''' 2r-'7 183", 1229-'' 257-'-> 391« 808-1 554* 1179" 2 pis 21 "' 1179^% 1179-:", 1179''^' t'i2'2' 80S-' J 1179' 45-Ji 21-' 'iold r. Hoynton 'iolds r. State 'ife '•. Com. 270", 270', 588", SSS'-"', 588-'" 'Itleld r. liichardson 3<.ir'' 'ilo i: Springel 3.''i8-'i inch t'. Alston Ib^ |SI 1:11 iV'' CCXXVlll AMERICAN TABLK OF CASES. i 'i References are to pages. fl78i, 978* mo* 808" 808^ 808-3 80tti9 808' B'k of Williams- '.»78i, 978-^ 4«3» 808-* 257»^ 1179^ 4525 r.2i^ 978i«, 412' 010'>, Finch V. Barclay Finncgan i-. Dugan Fire Asso'n v. Wiukliam Firi.' Ins. Co. i-. Wickhani First >'at. Bank v. Ashnicad i: Dunn I'. First Nat port r. Iluber I'. Kingsley t: I'ost Fischer Leaf Co. i-. Whipple Fisher i-. Conway V. Mayor V. Ulhnan Fitch r. Chapman Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, &c. Con struction Co. Fitzgibhun v. Brown Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick Flagg V. Mason Flaiiagin v. State Flanders v. Merritt Flanigin v. Washington Ins. Co. Flattery v. Flattery Flenii'-'g c Springfield . r. Yost Fletcher v. Boston & Maine R. R V. Fitchburg R. K. r. Fuller V. Perry I-. State Flower v. Balto. &c. R. R. Flowers r. Fletcher Floyd r. Tewksbury Floyd's Heirs r. Johnson Flynn r. Coffee Folks i: Burnett Follain v. Lefevre Follanshee v. Walker Folsoni r. Cook 1'. Manchester Fonda r. Burton Foot c. Bentley Foote V. Cohb Forbush v. Goodwin Force v. Martin Ford i: Cunningham r. Ford r. State Fordyec r. McCnnfs Forgey v. First Nat'' Bank Forrester r. State Forsyth r. Charlebois Fiiscue V. Lyon Foster, /« re V. Cleveland, &c. R. R. ('. Collncr r. llnll — — V. Neilson V. Newbrough Fougup V. BurgeM Fournol v. Duvert Fonts r. State Fowler v. A^lna Fire Ins 978" , 4129 no^-' 183''i 21" o;55* 4631" 97816 62« 183" 1220' 6881 3651' 12'29»^ 4282 2129 183»' 391", 391« 212* 622'i\ 9101' 183*» 622*8 8081 1229i» 8081 978»i 36813 257«, 257*'' 078W 891« 122fH» 80 r» 622* 21»' 078" 358*1 1229*" 622*, (1229 n* 8081" 391» 1229" 5«8i« Co. 267*' Fowler c. Simpson 427' V. Stirling 808' • Fowles r. Allen 554', 55413 Fox I'. Com. 21 '9 r. Peninsular, &c. Works 3".)1»'- i: Keil 1229', 1229', 122'.|i* Fralick r. Presley 078'" Franiinghani Mfg. Co. v. Barnard 452'* Franklin v. Franklin 257*, 978^'' Franklin Bank v. Steam Nav. Co. 978*9 Fraser r. Fraser 078', 9788 V. State 588- i\ Sutherland 022" Frnzier v. Pennsylvania R. R. 257'*, 267" V. State 978'i'' Frear v. Drinker 9101' Freeh i'. Phil. &c. R. R. 276" Fredrick v. State 5882* Free r. Buckingham 078''2 Freeman r. Bass 808* V. Brewster 622" r. Tliayer 183« Freeny r. Frecnv 91 0''' Fremont Butter.' &c. Co. v. Peters 978« Fremoult c. Dedin 11799 P'rench v. Ryan 25719 V. Sale 267»9, 257'"* V. White 2571' J'. Wilkinson 365' Frese v. State 21"* Frick I'. Barbour 183''" Friend v. Ilaniill 257" r. Miller 1170i», 1179« r. Smith Gin Co. 1832» Friendly v. I>ee 978' Frink & Co. i: Coe SOI*, SOI** Fritz V. Burriss P78i Frome i: Dennis 391'' Frost r. McCarger 267*', G78" Frye r. Barker 403' Fudge V. Payne SOS'" Fulkerson v. Murdock 1832« Fuller V. Fox 1229** f. Hampton 5541", 65412 V. Linzee 183*2 Fulton r. Central Bank of Pittsburg 078'«, 978« Fulton Bank v. Stafford 078'" Funderhurg i'. State 257" Funk V. Babbitt 978*i r. Ely 4fl;]2< Furbush i-. Goodwin 8O8I' Furguson v. Wright 183" Furhman v. Mayor, &c. of Iluntsville 21" O., C, & S. F. R'y Co. V. Jones Oady r. State Gaffney r. People Gage V. Campbell V. Lewis Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Mining Co. r. New Orleans r. Hcif V. Scott 808» 2127 978*« 35819 80821 42711 427" 891*1 122012 !i AACERICAN TABLE OF CASES. CCXXIX References are to pages. Arispe Gallagher i-. Market St. R. R i: State (iiillc c. Toile (i;ilvestoii, &e. R. R. w /•. Johnson (hilvin V. Palmer (iainniage v. Moore (janahl i;. Shore Ganilolfo r. State (iannon c. People (ianton r. Size (iarden City Sand Co. r. Miller Garilere v. Columbiiin Ins. Co 211-J 62-21 i 21" 117i»" 808-* 40^8 25789, 257", 2o7« 022* 4o2< 1170-:i 117'JiB Gardiner v. People Gardner r. Collector i\ (\)nnelly ('. Crenshaw r. Kberhart ('. Frieze Kellogg 305'''', 3fi5-!i 211' 9782«, 978" 2o7-i 21-2, 35si8 ;]91'", oio« I'. Lewis 52'- Garneau v. Port Blakely Mill Co. 117yt- Garner r. Myriuk 554'^ Garrard r. State 588-'", 588--'', &88^« (Jarrells r. Alexander 1229''' Garrett v. State Garrigues v. Harris Garrison r. Goodale (iarvin c. State c. Wells Garwood i-. Hastings (jates i». Johnson Co. Gaul c. Fleming Gaunt ir. Ilarkness 1229'8 I'. State Gavit r. Snowhill (Jay r. Rogers 1179'5, 1179", 1179" Gaynor r. Old Colony It. R. Co. 62' Gebb c. Howell Gebhart r. Shindle Gelir r, Fisher Geist r. Detroit City Ry. Gelott r, Goodspeed George c. Joy 9781, 9784, o78«, 978' (ieorgia, &c. Co. i'. Reid 808i» Georgia, &i'. R. R. v. (iaines German Nat. Rank v. Rums ''. Leonard (ierrish r. Sweeter (tihbons I'. Kliin r. Wisconsin, &c. R. R. Gibbs V. Gilead, &c. Society tiibney c, Marclmy Gibson V. Mnnuf'rs' Ins. Co. r. Robinson L<. Stevens r. Trowbridge Furniture Co. 257", o54' 1179'* .'J91« 36oi'-', 305^' 211' 183M, 183'- 21 iJ 27t)H 12294', 1229'" 3(io', 31!')' 1179-7 BOH-i- 91011 427' 21 '■' 12291'-' (iilbert i-. Porter Gilchrist r. Beswick V. Brooklyn Grocers' Assoc. ('. Martin Gilchrist & King v I Giles v. Morrow f. V'andiver ! Gill f. State Gilliam v. State I Gilliland v. Sellers I Gilman r. Riopelle I Gilmanton i'. Ham j Gilmore v. Baker Co. i Gilpin I'. Greene ' Gilpins i;. Consequa I Ginnath v. Blankenship (iirdlestone v. O'Reilly I Gizler r. Witzel I Gladdish r. Godcliaux j Glass i: Bennett I Glasscock r. Hughes ; Gleason c. Kinney Gleeson v. Wallace Glen Brick Co. r. Shackell Cilenn r. Hoosevelt Mnnuf. Martin & West 01020, '2m 2l*u ISS'"' 463^ 654'' 664», 55411 SOS-^" 257-» 52J 654'' 5215 11 79-^ 2 1'' 1229'^. 1229''« 183'" Olddings c. l)av Gilbert r. Campbell ((22i" r. Flint, &c. R. R. 21"* I'. Gooderlmin 978"* r. Moline Plow Co. 358" • V. Moline Water Power & Mfg. Co. 2\*> Glenn's Adm'r <-•. Express Co. Glidden v. Dunlap (ilobo Works . Wright 403'^i boow 4U318 4529 452' 183W 554* 910^4 257*« 21^ 11795 3051 1179*1 808-« 808* 52'i 218 2761 8()8-a 391" 18317, 1229^4 40313 1229« 1229''i 358-'--i 1220'2, 1229M 1179-i'' 2* 62'' (joddard c. Gardner (ioins V. Moberly (jolden I'. Knowles Goldsmith i'. PicarJ r. Sawyer Goldstone i: Davidson (ioltra V. Sanasack (ionzales ;;. Koss Gooch V. Connor Goodall .. State (iitod'j . Riley (iooding V. Morgan Goodman i-. .lames (loodnow r. Parsons (ioodrich r. Weston Goodrich's Case Goodrum v. State (ioodwin '•. Appleton 1: Garr r. Jack r. State (ioodwin, &c. (^o.'s Appeal Goodwyn v. (loodwyn Goodyear r. Vosburgh (loodycar Rubber Co. v Gordon r. Montgomery r. Parke & Co. r. Price r. Searing r Twi'eily Gordon's Case Gorgas r. Hertz Gorlmni v, AuerswalJ r. Canton V. (iorham Gormley r. Day 622", 02216, 02217 978i« 52" 257-'», 808» 216 1179» 808-" 21« 21»» 803« 470", 978" 808'» 21«, 21'", 2121, 21'a 1179« 5541, 5o4ij 3581* 1179i« 6221 2l« 42S> 688-» 622' 117i>« 1220*', 1220W Scott Co. 978"'» 21 1« 8081* ]22!t'T 858i» 1229'« 358U 554T 391« 301« 2* 21" llilr t'CXXX Gomilcy V. Uthe 1171)'' (i(>88 >'. Froiiian 022^" (ioulil r. Oawford 910'", yio^» r. Ins. Co. 5u4H i: Mc(;jirty yj.\>{n I'. Kniitli aiti'" Gove r. Downer 21-» (Jovenior c. Roberts 308-' (ioza V. Hrowniiin 12299, 1229<'^,12:Ji»'' Grace v. McArtliur 207" (iriigi; r. Learned 117'Ji7 Graliain v. Anderson 21>», 21^< V. Campbell 3581-! V. Chrystal 257^* V. Nesniitli 122'.)"> 022' V. State 257:1^ r. Williams 21» Grand Tower, &c. K. 11. V . Walton SOH-i, 808- ' Grand Trunk Uy. Co v.M icliardson 218- Grangers' Ins. Co. v. Brown S'.tl'" Grant r. Coal Co. 62 ", 1179", 117!>''» V. Frost 8»8i- V. Hill 1171HB V. I!!!<;llCB 80811 r. State 21», 21-!>, <.)78i» Grauley v. ,Iermyn 3r.8i- (ivnves r. Mattle Creek COu", 3051' r, Keaton 21" ' '■. j'eo|>le m^i. 47(»!' AMERICAN TAHLE OP CASES. KefRreiieeB are to pages. (Jrittits r. Ivery 12290', 1229«« (irinies r. Kddy 21"« 1: Martin 978" r. State U10» (iriswold ('. Gallup 21** (irob r. Cusbnuin 21*'* Groome r. < )(lKen City 808« Groover r. Coffee 1229" (iross r. Drager 808'-' (irover r. Grover 11 79-* (iruniley r. Wel)b 808i» Giijiy f. Majruire 022*'' Guidery r. Green 808", 808*', 808* (Juilbeau r. Mavs 1179" Gulf, &c. II. U. Co. t;. Ellis im" r. Johnson 978*l' V. Jones 808« r. Nelson 3(i6" r. Howland 2r)7'' Gidick r. Gulick (f22» Gulliver v. Fowler 808«, 808-' (iulzoni V. Tyler 12J9*'' Gumiing Co. v. Cusack 910" Gurley v. I'ark 022» Guyette r. Bolton 808" t: I'RVis 117".)'* v. i\k'l..uighlin ;!91''< V. IVntland «22i', 0221", 1229f' Greany v. Long Island M. \i. 27(i'' Great West. Uy. Co. v. Bacon 270* Green «;. Bedell 391*« V.Benton 1179* V. Caulk 9"8«, 9780, 978", 978", 978i". 078" V. Cawthorn 39^'' V. Randall 808-'» v. State B88I", C88'« r. Terwilliger 1229<-'. 1229'« I-. Van lluskirk 21'" Greenleaf v. Dubuque, &c. R. R. 427", 427", 427 '< Greenwood v. Fontaine 1179*^, 1179<' Greer i-. Ricliardson Drug Co. .■»')8'" Gregg V. Forsyth 1 1JO' !•. Jamison 978«' r. Mallett 18.r4, 1«:^'«, 18:!« r. State 588>8, f)88'", 978'*, 078"-' (Jregory '. Raugh 21-''- 267 —^ r. riianibers r. Tliomas Grt'llicr r. Nralo Grennnn r. McGregor Gress Lumber Co. v. Coody (iriilcr I". Clopton Grierson r. Mason Griffln r. Smith V. State ;191«', :191««, 1220 Grifflth I'. Williams », 2.'.7-'* 2r)7'" 12211'' 21-'> 8(»H'> 808-'' 808-'« 022- 122! I'". l*22'.t'" 122!K'f', 1229'"' Haiikkty I!. State Hacker r. Young llackett r. IVoiile I'ndfidd V. .L-'neson Iliidji) r. Gooclen Ilmlley 1'. Carter Ilnerle v. Kreilin Ilagenloclier v. Coney R. R. Ilaggui c. Ilaggin Haines r. Hanralian ('. Territory Halbert v. Skyles Hale r. Ard r. I{()S8 Hall V. Anier. Masonic, &c. Ass'n V. Brown V. Costello I', (didden I . Ilougbton I'. Manchester f. I'helps V. Rixey r. Vanderpool Hall's Deposition Ilallerr. Clark Halsoll V. Musgnivo Ilalscy r. Sinsebaugli Ham I'. Ham Handiiirg r. Wood & Co. Hamcl c. Amyot Hiiniil I-. Knglaiid Hamilton r. Clark r. Holder r. Liverpool, &c. Ins. Co. r, IVople 21=", 257'"' 588< 1179" 47(H 21» 25781, 25763, 9786« 301« OlO" Island, &e. iiOli* 621* 62l^ 62i» 078'", 978-* 21" 1179'» sort* 6r)4» 62 '6 403", 4C3"& 978-», 978™ 1179« 1229' C22« 183", 183-* 183'" 910'» 808-' > 078'^ 978" 2iai 21'- Hammett Hamniil c, 21 267» «23T 808" 978'» 62' 257". 022" . Little Rock, &C.R.R. Co. 21'* State 470» AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. Reference! are to page*. ccxxxi Hammond i-. Varian ISliO-"^, 122!»ai llftiiniiond's Case laJU'" Ilainiiiond's Lessee i-. Inloes 21'| llanawalt c. State 365^ Hancock v. American, &c. Ins. Co. ISJJ^ r. (^ook V. Ilintniger Handy v. State Hanks v. Uliuads llanley i'. DouoKliue Hanlon v. Doliurty Hanna v. Ilanna Hnnney v. Com. Ilainiuin r. Helchcrtown Hanover It. K. r. Coyle Hanrick v. Andrews 4r>-« 4tJ3'>, 46.J« ;V.ll'' 078*', 'J7«»» 21«,-M'-, 21': 0:i2^, (122" 3'J1>* ioi 022-< 3!»p: 11 ;'•'••! Hanriot r. Sherwood 1229''*, 1229««. \T2'.)*- Hanselnian c. Dovel UIO-"' Hansen v. Miller U7»" Hanson i: Mean C22* V. (Uiiatovicli 183''' I'. So. Scituate 21'" Happel V. Bretliaucr 117U" Hard v. Brown 31)1'* u. City of Decorah 21'- Harding v. State 588'^ Hanly v. State 52' Hargrove w. Adcock r22'.i'- Harkness o. Sears 80t(" Harlan, &c. r. Howard, &c. 428'. 428^ 428 = llarland ly. Kastnian 427', 427", 427" r. Dail 3'Jl« I). Howe UTJ^ Harriman v. Brown 412* Harrington i'. Inhat'tants of Lincoln •>'>>', 5549, oJl"', 5.->4" . 1: State 183-», 2.-)7" Harris c. Harris 270' ' 0. Holmes 21 8^ r. Hoskina 122!>^ V. Howard 2.-i7* r. Johnston 80.Sii 0. State 237's ".t7fr'' Harrison r. Knwan ii78*' Hart w. Bait. & O. It. R. 21", 2I« c. Bodloy 21" r. Kendall 4.VJ' V. Livingstou 40:P' IK Slate •jlj; ". Yunt 368«, 3.')8». 3:)«': ilartforil r. I'almer !•;»", '.MO-!' Hartford Bridge Co. i». Granger iVd''' Hartford Fire Ins. Co. r. Ilcvnold* i>22'«. <')22'''. ((22", ItKt-' Hartigan v. International Society .t'lH' Ilartranft's Appeal r>22': Hartslield r. State <t78-' Harvey i'. I'oiiny packer 8()8'^' V. Sniitli 2' 1: Sidlcng 8fl8* I'. Thorp :',."»«" Harwood c. Miilry 403*, 4(W' ■ Haseltine r. Concord R. R. 2.'.7''-'> llRnkiJl r. (^)ln. 27<P Hassard r. Municipality No. 2 21" Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. IBS**, 183«», 183^1 Hatch r. Dunn 21** Hatfield i-. St. Paul, &c. R. 36uB, 305'^, •Jljo'* Hatt V. Nay 267" Haughey r. r'trickler 218'' Hawes v. State 1220«. Hawkin.s c. Grimes 1: James r. Sumter V. Thomas Ha worth t;. Norris Haycock f. Greuf Hayes r. Adams Haynes r. Mcltae r. Trenton Iliivs r. Northwestern Bank of Va Hazic'on v. Union Bank of Colum- bus 1220^ , •.229^1', 122!»«'' 183*J, 257". 257*« 122!>^« 218.« 122'J« 21^' 808" 122i)'» 1221K'' 183-'" 3«.')I 21'^ Hazzard v. Vickery Headman 1: Rose Healy r. Moule Hearst v. I'ujol Huaston c. IMncmnati, &c Heavenridge v. Mondy Hebbard t'. Haughian Heddeii I'. Roberts Heddles r. Chicago, iScc. It Hedge 1-. Clapp He<lricks r. Morning Star HelTron i-. Gallupe Hcidenheimer v. Johnson Heinemann 1: Heard Heister r. Davis Helm f. State Helton ('. Alabama, &c Hemenway r. Smith Hemingway c. Garth 1: State Hemmens v. Beiidey Hempstead r. Iteed Henderson t: Cargill r. Hackney r. State '•. Terry Hendricks r. State Henry r. Bisliop Henshaw r. Davis Henslcy r. Tarpey llenthorn .-. Doe 21», Herbst r. Lowe Hermann r. State Hernandez r. State Herrick r. Swomley Herring '•. Rogers '■. Skauirs HiTster r. IL-rster Hester r. State lle.rltt r. Clark r. I'igott Hewlett r. CiwV Hickey >'. HinH<lale Hickman v. Hickman 122iH» 21' 122'J-'' R. It. 21'-! 808-> b22\ 022'' 183-2 R. i)78''' »78-'» 808" ()22« 462', 4r)2« 270-', 270'' '■•^2" 452' R. R. 3!»1 » 022", 622'" 078-s 978-" 18;!-" 978^* 1179" 427».4278,42.'", 427''» 122012 lOOfliW 183«,"978*«, {n'n''i (1227 085' 122'.t' 403\ 4t)3' 21' 2P', 1170^', 122'f^' 3ti.-."'' IHIl" 122!>«* 1220*', 1220*1 0-S*" m)i<'» 978" 1)78*' 122'.»'« 428*, 421" r.:>4* 808** im ccxxxu AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. References are to pages. Hickman v. Green Hickuk l: Sli>.>lburne Hickory i-. U. S. Hicks V. Leaton V. State Higbee i'. Dresser Hif(ginbotliani v. Campbell Higgins V. Carlton Higgs {-. Sliehee Higliam r. Kidgway Higley v. Gilmer Hildeburn i: Curran Ilililreth v. Aldricli Hill f. Bacon r. Com. ('. Klridge V. Gust V. North V. I'ostley r. Proctor • V. State ant 1229««, 122'J«a 808" 2673 622'^ 621 978°« 4fi:i*' 3!)1*» 257'" y785-' 978-^1 4709 81tl'" 978<« 910'''^ 4125 4701, 47018, 9788, gygB^ 97s<i, 978'8 r. Whidden 808*i Hill, F. H. Co. V. Sominer 463if- Hillary v. Waller 188'3 Hilts ». Colvin 358i, 117!H< Hilyard v. Township of Harrison 1229* Himmelmann v. Uoadley 21'9 Himrod v. Bolton \22\!^i — - i\ Gilman 12295«, 12208^ Hinchnian i'. Keener Hinckley v. Beckwith Hinde v. Valtier Hines V. Cora. ——- V. Driver Hinkle v. State Hinncmann i;. Rosenback Hipes r. Cochran Hissrick i-. Mcl'lierson Hizer V. State }IobbM V. Memphis, &c. R. Co. Hodges V. Coleman Hoefling v. Hambleton Hoffman >•. Bloomsburg, &c. R. R. Hugan r. State Holt I'. Moulton Holbrook v. Gay Holcomb V. Holcomb OlQi, OlO-ii Holder v. U. S. Hollenbach v. Fleming I'. Schnabel Hollenback v. Todd Holly V. Burgess V. State Holm r. Colm.in Holman t>. King Holmes V. Coryell r. Goldsmith V. Johnson r. State 122<.>38 2|M 211" 4705 80P-'i 9781" 8086 21il8 4(J3i'> 211H 2117 39l»i 3681" 3<I6" 267<'' 1229* 4m-^ 9I0-", 910-i', 910* 97K'', 97817 1220-, 1220i'^ 21" 0227 257''«, 267M. 267«« 9101'', 910^1 521*. 62ii 3685 1229»«, 1229»*, 1229« 183»< 26789, 257", 688i», 1175)7 Holt V. Jarvia 391" V. Moore 8081* Ilomans v. Corning; 2i Home Ins. Co. c. Baltimore Ware- house Co. 564' Homer i-. Cilley 1229«, 1229" V. Wallis 12297, 12291", 1229i», 122yi« 12291s, 122919 Hood V. Bloch 365" 1'. Tyner • 564i* Hooper v. Taylor 4(53i' Hoover v. Cary 391* V. Gehr 463", 463", 463i*, 4«3i», 4(!3« Hope V. Balen Hopkiiis V. Megquire Hopkinsnn v. Leeds 122927 V. Turner's Falls Co. 412« Holspy (-. State 267», 267««, 267« Holston, &c. Co. V. Campbell 808" Holt V. L^it eOBJ* 8087 1229'a 978-w 39181, 68811 6641 808-^8 4528, 452«. 4527 62», 6218 4G3» 808* 267* 97888, 978'M 40318 21" 4278 9781, 978*, 9784 622', 022* 117919, 1179* 117!H<* 18.3" 1179" ()22« 1179^8, 1179«' 218* 4278 18386, 183*", 910« 368i'», 36811 ]229i 358i» 368i« 358*, 9788«, 978 o Hopt V. Utah llorniann v. Wirtel Horn v. Hansen Horsford v. Rowe Horton V. Keed Hough )■. Henk V. People's Fire Ins. Co. Ilonghtaling v. Kilderhouse Houghton V. Jones V. Paine Houlton 1: Chic, &c. R. R. V. Manteuflel Houston, &c. R. R. v. Burke Houx V. Blum Iloiize I'. Houze Hovey v. Sebring Howard v. Coon V. Copley V. Gemming r. Moot I'. Russell V. State Howe v. Fleming Howell r. Ashmore r. Huyck Howley r. Whipple Howser I'. Con). Iloxsie V. Empire Lmnber C .. 391^ 1229'i7 Hoy V. Morris ' t)22i* Iloyt ('. Am. Exchange Bank 12'J9''i >:. McNeil 52'<» .). Russell 21», ai**. 21« Hubbard v. And., &c. R. R. 267«> V. Greeley 8(18* V. Hubbard 97817, <,;a*i r. Russell 368" Ilubhy V. State '.i78« Huckestein v. Kelly 8(»8« Huekins v. Ins. Co. 978» Hudson r. State 2182, 4701, 4707, (I22-* Huetteman r. Viessehnann 664^ Huffman 1: Cartwright 554* r. Click 391« Hughes V. Kogers 12290i r. Sandal 8OHI V. Southsm Warehouse Co. 358*" AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. CCXXXIU References &re to pages. Hull ,: Lyon «22i8, 62217 Iliimble V. Schoemaker 978-' Humeu. Scott 257« Humes c. O'Bryan 452», 462', 554* Hiiniphrey v. Burnside 213i Hiinnicutt v. Peyton 412s, 412>' ,: State 4706. 470»» Hunscom v. Hunscom 910i^..91O" Hunt V. Luqucre 1220-« r. Order of Chosen Friends 1179'» Hunter v. Gibbs 0786» V. N. Y. &c. R. R. 21», 21-'» y. State 3!»1« Huntley r. Whittier Hurd !•" People Hurlburt r. Hall Hurley r. O'SuUivan llussninn v. Wilke Hussoii V. Fox Muster v. Davis Huston's Estate Hutcliins r. Hebbard Ilutcliinson c. Hutchinson r. Wiieeler Hutchison t-. Patrick Hutto V. State Hyde v. Shank V. Woolfolk Hyde Park v. Canton 183»3, 1838' Hynes v. McDermott 1835« 470* 978" 276" 8081 1229-^ 022* 40311 808'^ 808* 0786'' 358'» 1220'* , ]83J«, 010^* P220« Irish I'. Horn Iron Mfg. Co. v. Gaskell Isaacson v. N. Y. Cen. R. Israel v. Brooks Ivy V. Yancy 46311 21W 21" 2u7'* 18;jw Jack v. Martin Jackling v. Edward Jacks f. Stinipson Jackson v. Blanshan ■ V. Boneham ■ V. Brooks • V. Burtis • V. Burton ■ r. Chicago, &c. R. H I vsiGi V. Brown P229'' Iliinger i-. State 365'^i, 36&« ' Illinois, &c. Co. v. Bonner 358i* i i: Langdon 39l-'9 i r. Murphy 5i2'^ i v. Suttoi. 39136 j I III lay I'. Rogers 622-1 j Independence i: Pompton 427* Indiana Car Co. r. I'd , ker 365«, 365*1 Indianapolis, &c. R. (Jo. v. Caldwell 211^ r. llorst 276», 270» V. Stephens 21"> Ingalls V. State 183i« Inglis V. Hughes 21 1^* Ingraham i: Hart 621", 5.JU Ingram i\ State 211" , Inhabitants o; Springfield v. Wor- cester 218 j Inninn v. Foster 267** Ins. Co. of No. Amer. c. Fo'-cheimcr 21l^ 629, 62i» Ins. Co. f. Baker 1179'i r. Mosley 39l», .191", 8911". Sitl'ii, ' 391*, 391W, a-)l« V. Weide 46;T^i International, &c. R. R. v. Anderson 89118 V. Dawson 808** V. Pasture Co. 391" V. Hagsdale 654', 5541" , Ireland v. Cincinnati, &c. R. R. 267* Irish V. Dean 808" Cooley c. Filleau I!. Gridley V. Jackson ». King c. Kingsley V. Lar.iway V. Lewis V. Pliillips 1'. State V. Swope c. Waltermire Jacksonville, &c. It. I{ Land, &c. Co. Jacobs r. Duke V. Hesler V. Whitcomb James r. Wiiarton Jameson r. Conway Jaques c. Ilorton Jaquith r. Scott Jarvis i-. Robinson V. Vanderford Jaspers v. Lano Jefferds v. People Jefl^ries v. Harris Jemison v. Planters & Bank Jenkins v. Eldridge r. Kinsley I'. Lykes I'. Pepoon '•. State Jenkinson v. State .lenne 1: Marble Jennings r. St.irdevant Jensen v. McCorkell Jester v. Steiner .lewell .'. Center V. Jewell Joannes v. Bennett Joaquin v. Budd .lockumsen v. Sufl'olk Suv Joe V. State Johnson V. Blanshaw V. Day r. Drew V. East Carolina, &c. R. R. V. Holliday 21 :» li;2'J^ 52* 183", 18318, 1229^1. 1229**, 1229'^ 391'» 1229*9 12296 1229», 1229i» 427«, 427", 622i» 97856 910" 62'', 427* 1179*1 1229*> 1229*' 257*T 1229*» 688«, 97819, 978-« 978*' 18.3^* V. Peninsular 257« 257* 022* 391*1 463*», 463'' 554''« 3581* 41 2W 21* 1229*2, 122(»«i 978»* 5881- 257« Merchants 21 1» 978*9 inos" 52* 117919 G35*, 9781", 97HU 622*. 622W 6221 622' 18:1** 1229*' 21* 4276 I8;i*> 21 •■'4 183"« 688« 1229-» 654* 1179^ 808'« 5646 Bk. 1'! • }\ ill t I CCXXXIV AMERICAN TAllLK OF CASES. RefereiiceB are to pages. Johnson ;•. Hudson K. U. U. Co. 21*', 21»« V. Mason 122'.)i'^ ; I'. Merithew 183«, l»a'» ! f. State 2r)7<", ;Ji)F-, 6H8'', 58«i", ' DSaJ", 688'», 0L'2-i=', i»l()", ItlO'", DlO'ia U78l^ 'J'.H*", »:8M «. Trinity Cliurcli !So. 654" 1.. VViitsJn 9101" V. Wiley in»^, !)78« : Johnston !•. Farmers Ins. Co. U78", 1)78' V. lledden 21^ Jones V. Blount 1221)'*' V. Brewer 122'J»'i V. Com. 391'» u. Cordele Guano Co. 1179" V. Ducliow 257^fl V. Kast Tenn. U. U. Co. &2< u. Gale's Curatrix 21"* r. Hays 21 "> V. Hen8l;all 463«, 40:iH c. Howard 452>, 452" V. Jones SSS-'i^, 306», 305'', 427» V. Lake View r. Malvern Lumber Co. V. Meiindy 1'. M'Neil 1?. Phelps V. Portland V. n. R. V. Randall r. Roberts V. Simpson V. State 21 8r 257'w, 257^', 391-*', 470», 470»», 470">, 4701', 022", 978«, 978>i, 1229<''' 1'. Swearingen V. Townsend V. Tucker Jordan i: Faircloth V. Osgood Joseph ('. National Bank I'. Ostell V. State Joslin !•. IjB Baron Juilliard r. Chaffee Jumpertz r. People Justice t'. State 21ii 978" 1179*' 978« 122'.t''6 391'» 910>'' 1833. i»34 1229*'' 276'" 52'-', 808« 391<« 62« 12299 257" 1229<5 808' 035« 62'> 8081, 808* 12296', i220«2 470" Kaelin I'. Com. 554^ Kahn v. Traders' Ins. Co. 5541^ Kansas, &c. R. R. Co. v. Foster 52" r. Miller 183« V. Phillips 21« V. Richardson 52* Karr f. Jackson 1179''" r. State 1229^', 1229'-'» r. Stivers - 403°, 403i'' Kaut V. Kessler 022' Keagle r. Pcssell SoS**" Keanr. Rico 1179" 1179ii Kearney v. Farrcll •.m^ c. "Mavor, &c. of N. Y. 808II, 3582" ,: State 2",^ Keiito* r. Dinunick 022' Keefer v. /immerman 1229" Keerans r. Brown 978", 078«« Keith V. ilay<lcn 21'» V. Lothrop 1229^«, 1221)»6 V. Stiles 1179" V. Wilson 978", 978=". 978« Keller i-. Stuck 183'» Kelley r. Owens 270* u. People 688*, 688S 1'. Saltniarsh HOS* 1'. Storey 21'» Kellogg v. Tompson 8081 Kelly V. Carter 808'^ V. Dunlap 1229" i\ Leachman 8086 V. McGuire 421*, 427^ 427'i V. Oliver 8()8« r. Peoi)le 9781'', 97818 r. State 265« r. Stone 978« Kelsea v. Fletcher 978-, 97810 Kelsey i'. Ilanmer 1179*2, 122y^«, 1229J6 Kclton V. Hill 403* Kendall v. Collier 1229'", 1229* V. Field 4«3ia c. May 010», 910-1. .jioa Kenidton v. Rowe 3056 Kennard v. Kennard 52», 62'-', 6216 Kenncbrew v. Southern, &c. Co. 62i« Kennedy i-. Com. 2128 V. Doyle 403'«, 463* ', 463«, 11791 V. Lubold 412*, 4126 V. U. C. & B. 11. Co. 391» f. Reynolds 1179** V. Upshaw 122981 Kenney r. Van Home 11791" Kuiinon r. Gilmer 257*» Kenosha Store Co. v. Shedd 212» Kent I'. Mason 391« V. State 97862 V. White 2762 Kentucky, &c. Bridg s Co. V. Hall 808» Kentucky Cen. R. K V. Barrow 257^* Kcppel V. R. R. 'M« Kermott v. Ayer 21« Kern i-. Brldwell 365» Kernin )■. Hill 12296* Kerr v. Freeman 2768 Kessel v. Albetis 21" Ketchum i'. Am. &c. Ex. Co 270i» V. Brooks 35816 Keyser v. Coe 21:12 Kibby v. Harsh 80819 Kidd V. Ward 18329 Kidder i-. Blaisdell 2121. 2122 Kierstead v. Brown 554', 52418 Kilburn r. Bennett 391»», 391*^ 391« Kile r. Ycllowhead 212« Kilgore r. Stoner 1179» Killebrew v. Murphy 2182 Kilpatrick.!'. Com. 212*, 47(y8 Kimball r. Davis 978*9 V. Morrell 122926 King I'. Colvin 2708 V. Donahoe 12296' r. Donahue 1229« i^ '•-■■I.' I AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. References are to pages. CCXXXV I King V . Doolittle Duke Kriswell Gallun Marring worth Holt 117'.)3" 412» •JIM 1229''' 1179', 1179« Inhabitants of Bathwick 122»" r. Kent's Heirs 'il-ii V. Little IHS"* V. N. Y. Central, &c. 11. R. 305» V. Ruckman 257"' V. Sears 1229^' V. State 39123, 4706, f,88>2, <JW^ V. Wortliington 3588, 910-* Kingliorne /•. Montre»' Teleg. Co. 358'" Kingman n. Cowles 117'J*', 1179-" Kinnard Co. «;. Cutter Co. 808'" Kinney v. Farnsworth 412", 554''' V. Flynn 1229', 12298, 1229'^, 1229"' V. U. S. 463-« Kirby v. Com. 391''' Kirchgraber r. Lloyd 267'' Kirkland v. Sniitii in9« Kirkpatrick v. Clark 808^1 Kiser v. CarroUton Dry Goods Co. 808^ Kissniti V. Forrest 978^7 Kitner v. Whitlock 270'^ Klare c. State 21'"* Klein v. Lawdman ISS'*, 18339 V. Russell 358-« Kleinmann v. Gieselmann 358" Kline V. Baker 62", 52i«, 52i5, 62i« Knight V. Ho>i3c- 257«, 267''" Knode v. Williamson 257*" Knowles i-. Crainpton 3652', 306^^ Knox V. Silloway 1179<', 1179« Koehler v. Buhl 978*' Koehring ». Muemminghoff 808* Koenig c. Bauer 978*5 Koons V. State 1229'* Kornegay p. Kornegay 1229"' Kostenbadcr v. Peters 808'" Kotwitz V. Wright 463" Kracke v. Ilomeyer SOS-' Kriiger v. Pierce 97 8'''' Kramer v. Goodlander 412* Kraiiich v. Sherwood 808'^' Krebs v. State 470* Kreuzberger v. Wingf5eld 808^ Kreuziger v. Chicago, &o. R. R. 39r«, 3913'' Kuglar It. Garner 391*^ Kuiider i'. Smith 978', 978» Kusch V. Kusch 910"* Kutcher v. Love 55412, 554"' Lacy v. State 391« La Fayette Bank v. Stone 1179", 1179W Laing r. Raine 1229'- Lake Merced Water Co. v. Cowles 2r" Lake Shore, &c. H. R. v. Bangs 52' r. Rosenzweig SOI'" V. Squire 8082^ Lamagdelaine v. Tremblay 2672^ Lamar v. Micou V. Pearre Lamb v. State V. Ward Lambright i: State Lamoreaux v. Atty.-Gen. Lampton v. Haggard Land v. Patteson Lander i-. People v. Seaver Landis v. Turner Lane v. Bryant V. Cole Lanergan v. People Langley v. Wadsworth Lannark v. Dougherty Lanning v. Chicago, &c. R. R Lansing v. Russell Lapowski v. Taylor La Roche 1: O'Uagan Laros v. Com. La Salle Co. v. Milligan Lasher v. State Lassing v. James Lassone v. Railroad Lathrop v. Stuart Laughlin v. Fidelity Ins. Co. V. State 978' Laughran v. Kelly Laurent v. Vaughn Lavalle v. People Lavcrenz v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Lawder v. Henderson 9783*, 978'* Lawrence v. Dole 8082* v. Du Bois 80819 V. Kimball 452^ V. Tennant 412', 412* Lawson v. Glass 978«, 978', 978" 1'. State 257** Lazard v. Merchants', &c. Co. Lazare v. Jacques Lazier v. Westcott Lea V. Kilburn League i'. Thorp Learned v. Corley )'. Tillotson 1'. Tritch Leathe v. Bullard Leather C ■. v. Hardware, &c. Co. Lcavitt V. v. 'itler Leo V. Fowler V. Tinges Li'fevre v. Lefevre V. State 58826 Lefferts >'. Brampton Legg's Case Lehman Bios. !-•. McQueen 27ft2 Leiber i'. Com. Leland i,-. Wilkinson 21"i 39180,4522, 11 79'" 036* 978"* 688» 427" 2127 21'» 39 U 2672" 403', 403'* 39126 1229' 554" 978** 3057 26726 11792T 1229'" 8082, 808'* 688« 211* 2132 808* 4033J 219, 183** 8081' , 978" 036» 391*1 2113 62* 808" 80821 2113 391*9 1179*8 183»* 664* 80829 80828 62" 2123 808« 9782" 80828 . 68827 12292 18.'!8 . 27fi" 470*, 4707 21'* Leonard v. Allen 25733, 2573*, 25739^ 257*' V. Kingsloy 978" Leport V. Todd 18.3'i Lesher f. Levan 1229' Leslie v. Hanson 4fi3'7 Lessee of Allen v. Lyons 2129 ■ fT I ^ : ' \\\^- I'H- ■Mil ' ! ill ! I m CCXXXVl AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. Beferenceg Lessee of Scott v Ratliffe aoi*' Lester v. State 588>^, 5881" Levers c. Van Busk irk 022'" Ix-vy c. State 21", 21>i, m5!^'>, 3l)|" 'J78'" 808 >» 21", 2r" y78' Lewis, In re Lewis r. Barker i: Bnyliss r. Harris V. Kriiiner 4Go'' V. McCluro 21'^ V. Meginniss 4(Y.i-* V. State 21-', 470", 470i« V. Supervisors 21'''' i: Wintnxie 21-^ L'Herbette c. I'ittsfleld Nat. Bank 257" Libby v. Brown 452'i Liddle r. Old Lowell Bank 078", 978»'' Liddon i: Ilodnett 117',t'' Liggett !-. Glenn 022''' Lightfoot r. People 257'' Lilly V. Waggoner ISIF- Lincii V. Lincli 301«',3<JP' Lincoln r. i',;>.ttclie 21'2, U1'J\ 1170'" Lind c. Lind 183" Lindauer r. Meyberg 358'' Lindley f. Dakiii '2* Lindsay r. Iliiniburg, &c. Ins. Co. 62''' f. Williams 21*- Lindsey r. Atty.-Gen. 21'" Lingo V. State 022'' Linnell v. Sutherland 40:5" Linsley c. Lovely 808'^, 978*« Litchfield v. Merritt (i22-^ Little V. Cook &m'^'^ I'. Downing 183l^ 403« V. Kogers 122!f*" f. State 39 !« I'. Tlionipson 27(y Little's Case 391"' Littlefleld c. Rice 463i« Little Rock (iranite Co. n. Dallas Co. 4(!3" Little Rock IJy. Co. w. Leverett 391" Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 21 '7 Livingston v. Arnoux — V. Kiersted — — V. Roberts — V. Wood Livingstone v. Gartshore Lockhart v. White Lock wood r. Crawford Loeb r. liicharJson Lofton r. Stcrrett Loggins V. State Loliman v. State Londonderry v. Andover Long t: Colton Pntton V. Slate Longabaugh i*. R. R. Lsomis V. Bedel V. Stuart 462' 910', 910^' 978« 808'« 622" 18338, i«3.ifl 21-'» 808''«^ 5546 21*5 427», 427< 412- 257" Virginia City, &c. 2572* 1179«, n79«' 4fl3i« nre to p»gea. Lord I'. Am. &c. Ins. Co, Loree v. Abner Lorenzana t'. Camarillo Lottawanna. The Louden v. BIythe Louisville, &c. li. R. c. B f. Hall V. Hurt 1-. Let son V. Orr V. Richardson V. Terrell V. Wood V. Wright Loveli r. Payne Lover.idge v. Hill Low V. Mitchell Lowe V. Lowe r. State Lowell V. Todd Lowry r. Cady r. Moss Loyd r. Hannibal, &c. R. Lucas c. Flinn Luce i". Coyne r. Foster Tucker r. Com. Luke V. Calhoun Co. Lull r. Cass Lumpkin r. Murrell Lund V. Tynsboro Lunn V. Scarborough Lunsford i-. Dietrich Lurton v. Gillian) Lush V. McDanitI Lycoming. &c. Ins. Co. v. Lyman v. Philadeljihia Lynch r. Cronan r. Moore Lynde r. Judd Lyon V. Lyon V. Manhattan u. R. V. Marine V. Prouty Lyons v. Gregory uck — — V. Wadharas Lopez v. State 858", 5542 9101 808'9 21 '0 554'^ 216 391'! 391"> 3'.)1»» OTHH 183 19 358 '2 257", 257"» 978« S06» 6547, 65411 276* 0228 257'»' 97820 5882', ^agi-i 183^T 3581 452*, 4.'^i28 305*', 3t)5ia 978"» ]220<2 8082S 2114 21»6 80821 3918, 30128 122021 257» 1179» 80184, 301»" Wright 5215 267^9, 2576" 4035 257*2 1229» 588» 805» 2i8« 0228 1179" R Mabley v. Kittleberger Macdonalil r. Dana Macev v. Titcombe Mack" V. State .MacKinzie v. Stretch Maclean i-. Scripps Macomber r. Scott Madden v. State Magee v. Allison I'. Burch V. Scott Magie i". Herman Magill I'. Stoddard Maguire >-. Middlesex Ry. Maier i-. State Mailler v. Ex. Propeller Co. Major r. State MaJcomson r. O'Dea Mallory v. Ohio Farmers Ins. 39124 8081" 21'i 39122, 3912« 5541W, 5541a 35828 122046 183' 808*, 80828 3582 117987 358'6 80828 2571 2188 2572 2118 4281 1229*1 i Co. AMKiaCAX TABLE OF CASES. CCXXXVll Mnllnry v. State Miiiiclfl r. Swiin Laiul Co. Miiiitte r. Iloliucs Maiiiatcf Bank r. Se.vniour Mann BoudDir C'mt Co. v. IJupre Manning r. Maroiii-y r. I'ippi'n Manufacturers, &c. Bank c. Baack Miniufiicturint? Co. v. Bennett BeferenceB are to pages. 21- Marbnry i-. Madison Alarcly v. Sliults Marcy v. Stone Mardos v. Meycre Mark i\ Hastings c. Mcrz Marks v. Sullivan Marsh i*. Case V. Davis V. Hand I'. Whitiiiore Marsliali v. Baker i\ Brown V. (Miicajio, v*ii'. B. K ,: (}. E. 11. H. Co. V. State Marshall l.ivery Co. i Martin r. Anderson I'. Bowie r. Brown nss'- 301 '■' 8t)8i- 188i« 117U--'' c. Klliot r. Ilardesty r. Martin V. Nichols r. I'ayne Martindale v. Falkner Marvin c. Uichniond )■• State Marx i". People Mask V. State Mason c Fuller Massey v. Bank r'. State Mathes i>. Bobinson Mathews v. Yerex Matlock V. Glover Matter of Hall's Deposition Matter of Page Matter of Ridgway Matter of Will of Snelling Matteson r. Noyes r. N. Y. Cen. R. U. Matthews r. Hoagland V. Holmes r. Huntley «. Park I'. Sheehan Matthowson r. Burr Matthis V. State Mattice r. Allen Mattison r. Chicago, &c. 11. U Mattox r. U. S. Mauernian r. Siemerts May I-. State Mayer v. Dean Mayes i\ State ()2-2' <J78', 1)78', l>78ii 12i:H" :5:)8«, 86*1 257'», 257*' (522-" 4oa« 808-' 368" l8:'.i 808^" 3'JP'- 470' 470- 257^' 27011 IKll" 808'i 3t;5iJ 257" 2120^ 21-!' 4631* 5218, 1179",! 1791'' 183f, 183', 183* 55411 635' 978*^ 078^'-', 978^'« 427« McKelry 122017 588'ii 463'' 910*' 122954 183*' 3:tiai 183<'' 078»- 358'-« :•.'.» 1*' 622'', 022' Mayhew v. Thayer t)78»», 978" Mavo V. Dwitjlit 808''» — ■- /•. Foley 62216 Mayor, «&c. of Baltimore c. State 21* Mayor, &c. of N. Y. i>. Second Ave. K. B. Co. 4031", 4(5,'}32 Maysville, &c. K. U. v. Pellani 808« Maxham c. Place 022* Maxwell 1: Hill 39H* V. Wilkinson 978", 078" McAllister c. McAllister 122yii» McAmore v. Wiley 910^, 910", 910", 910". OlO-"" McAndrews v. Santee McBride c. People MeCall V. U. S. McCiiniant r. Boberts Mc(*artee v. Camel McCarthy c. Burtis McCarty v. Coffin McCathern r. Bell McCausland r. Fleming McColloch r. Gore McClaugherty c. Cooper MeClerkin c. State Mc(;io8key r. Davis McCUui'e f. Pursell McComl)s I'. Foster McCormick c. Cheevers V. Ilerndon M'C^orinick r. Sisson McCrady v. Jones McCraw v. Gentry McCrcary i'. Turk M'Creary v. Grundy McCullock c. Dobson M'Cutcheon i-. M'Cutclieon McDaniel c. State McDonald v. Carnes V. Com. V. 'i)eCairl c. McDonald I'. Sa'-oy I'. Unaka Timber Co. V. Western R. R. McDonough r. O'Neil McDowell V. Preston McICIninrray v. 'I'urner MclClwee Mfn. Co. v. Trowbridge McEweii /'. Portland r. Shannon McFarland r. Fricks W)8i» : r. Shaw 257-'^ 1 McGhee, &e. Co. r. Hudson 21-'', 52" McGibl)on r. Burpee 8081' I i'!i'(Jinne8s v. Kennedy 257''^ McGinnis v. Allison 978<« MjGrath v. Seagrave -^ 978"* McGregor v. Hudson 808» II. McArthur 470' r. Montgomery 52' I V. Wait 6881', 588« 978i« 1 McGuire v. People 80821 i I.. Sayward 891" 1 McHargue v. Com. 554- 4701* 4121 ino'i 183'» 1179^7 257''3, 257'" 8081' 41211 978'>' 1170 » 117911 270' 27iii 1229^' 808" 808i:» 62'' 3581-' 12297 358* 257** 978"' 257''-' 257'\ 257*' 463''' 257''« 21'^' 1229", 1229 •* 2578* 391" 21»" 183^" 554* 55411 183^* 910i« 117919, 1179^-' 470' 2136, 276^ 36817 8081'' 1229'« 1179«'> 3916'> 257-'' 358*' 122'.r-!i' 9106, giO-**, 910^' 1179«« 470» ■['■■' ill ■ IS '?.il ■ itiE ■ I i'f i hi CCXXXVIU McHugh V. Dowd r. (iallaKlicr Melntire v. Lvvcring Mfliitotili V. I^e Mclnlurfr. >State AMERICAN TABLE OP CASES. References are to psRei- 21 8080 267^ « 21JU 3itl'» 588» McKi-e V. I'eople McKeitfiie r. .Janeavillo 301*«, SOls*, JV.Il ••' McKeii/ie r. Sln-tcli McKiMtiii* ('. Hariics McKicI i;. Ueal Estate Bank McKiriley t: Irvine McKinney r. Nuil McKinnon r. Bligg c. NorcroKit McKivi'tt V. Cone McLane r. Juhnson McLaiiglilin v. McDevitt McLean i-. Clark r. McDont'll r. Stale Mcl^llaii i: liicliardson 27f 120.J4,-. •21 lit 1221)"' P78«, il78''« 21'«, ;!r)8-! 978», U78" 8()«'| 8()8-!i 117!H-! 470", 470'', iilO''' 322-1 31)11' McLi-od V. Ginther's Atlni. 31)li', .iDl^ McMaster i-. Scriven 0221'' Me.Matli v. Slate 31)l<^ 3l)l<» McMillan v. Baxlev 3r)8-i SlcMurray v. St. Louis Oil Co. m»^'' McMiirrin r. Hi^by 3'Jl", SW McXeely r. Duff <J78i McNeil V. 0'(.'<)nnor 427- McNeill V. Donoliue 1)58' McNerney i". Heiidinfr U78''i McXicliol V. I'aciHc Ex. Co. 21-« McNutt r. McDonald f)u4- M'Xutt r. Young 2&7'" Md'hail v. Johns*.. i)78<'' Mcl'licrson r. State 47()H McQueen v. People's Bank 270- V. State 47011 McQuigan r. Delaware, &c. H. H. Stiu" McKeynolds v. Longenberger 3581-, 122yii, 122!)--' McSliane, Henry, Co. )•. I'adian 808' McTapgart f. Tlionipson 31)1^' ~ " " 1229", 1221)17 022-!'' 9101- 5541 6221 1221)1- 89M 1220''3, 1221) « 403", 4C.:'.i'' 5r.4' 078'i 1221)''" 1221)1* 808-'''' ^);!5^ ():!•)•' ii7yi», 1171)-" 214 808'^ 21 1« 8(»8-5 3f.8i3 391^ McVieker t: Conkle Meade v. Smith Mealer i-. State Mears r. (Cornwall Mechelke v. Branier Meilary r. Catliers Medley r. I'eople Meihvay i: U. S. Meeth /•. Hankin Brick Co. Meguire r. Corwiue Meixsell »•. Freezor Melby r. Osborne & Co. Melclier r. Flanders Mellish c. Tiobertson Melton V. State Melvin v. Lyons Merchants' Bank l: Hall r. Mc,\n\ilty r. .McOraw r. .Morrison Mercier v. Harnnn Merkle t-. Bennington Merrifleld i\ Robbing 52'8, 1179i''» Merrill v. Dawson 21 '« I'. Ithaca, &c. R. R. 078«, 978i' Merritt v. Straw 1221)" Mcrshon i'. State 2f')7'"' Merwin r. Arbuckle oDH'' r. Ward 183'^' Mewster I'. Spalding inD"" Meyer v. School District 1179« Miami Turnpike (^o. v. Baily 365*, 3(!i'i", Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co. t: Wil- liams 808>s Middleton v. Mass. 1229-'6 Miles i: Edelen 2i r. Loomis 1220)», 1220f'M220n8, 1229<'« Miller v. Brown 207"* - r. Davis 8()8'» i: Fletcher 8(i8» i: Goodrich, &c. Co. 808' iniH**, 1179^9. 11 7i)'» y. Hale I'. Jones r. MacN'oagh r. Miller V. I'almer r. I'roctor I'. Heinhurt r. Shay 183-', 1229''", 122!)«;* 21''i, 621", r.2ii 808''*' 808* 18:;« 1179" 4fl3>«. 4ti3i« State 257'-, 4709, 470i«, 5546^ 5}<8'^ 1: Texas, &e. Hy. Millington r. Millington Million r. Com. Mills r. Duryec Millsaps I). Merchant's, &u. Bank Milniine r. Burnliam Mima Queen r. Hepburn Minis r. Sturdevant r. Swartz Minchin v. Minchin Mink r. State Minneapolis, &c. 1{. R. Co. Minneapolis Times Co, Minnesota r. Barber Minor i-. Tillotson Mississippi, &c. R. R Missouri, &c. R. R. v. r. (Jcrnan r. Johnson Mitchell r. Bridgers r. Kingman I', Sawyer Mitelium v. State Mobile, &o. Ins. Co. v. McMillan Mobile, &c. K. R. r. Aslicraft 21:14 1229'»' 470>« 1171)19 808« 808« ;;!)|ai 978'1 2V, 21» 8fl8-« 622''» Home Ins. 808', 808" Niniocks 3.'J8'5 21'« 358' m\-» 3!'1« 35819 305", 301" 1179'W 808« JI78» 391", 3919 808' 257 "> . i". Arispe Cocreham & Birmingham R. Mohile Lndd Mobley r. Hamit Moekahee v. Com. Modawell r. Holmes iMoffct V. Moflet Mottiii V. yEtna Axle, &c. Co. MofHt ''. Miiness I'. Witherspoon Moline-Milburn Co. i'. Franklin R. ('. 2129, SH" 257''9 470'" 21'" 270'^ 218* 8088 427* 257."» k % AMERICAN TAlUiK OF CASES. CCXXXIX M Referenvea Moline I'low Co. r. Hrnilun '21H' Molyneaux r. Ccillk-r 554', 554" Moimlmi. -•. Worcfstur 257«, HUH" Mcmuy I'. Turniiiseeil '■il-^ Montee r. Com. 5'2i MDiitfortonw. Bondit 808" MontBomcry r. Allun 554' i;. Hevaiis ISo**' w. Dt'cley '<il' ,,.. PickLTiMR 622"' r. Suhockey W)«-^' r. State 470». 470'* Moiitj?omery's Case 470'- Montjoy r. Sttito '21-"' Moody y. Rowell 078-'", 0783', 97888, 1229''' MootTS v. Blinker 427'' MooK V. Randolph 21"' Mooney c. Kennctt 21"' V. Olsen 391« 30H' 'J78'- 554" 52'^ 52i« 122'.)'" 80H-!' are to p>K«i. Mosli-y I,'. Ins. Co. r. Vernioiit, &c. Ins. Co, M(>!i!i V. (ireen Mobsman c. Forrest Mowell i». Van Biiren Muditill Miniii^ Co. r. Watr(>U8 Muldoon ('. Delinu Muliiado V. Brooklyn City R. U y iillanphy Sav. Bank r. Scliott ;!58» ;i.".M'« Adillun r. Morris 1170'-, 117'.»"« Moore r. Chicago R. R. Co. c. Gaus ■ I', (iwynn ('. Faliner V. Hush I!. Smead V. State V. U. S. 1'. Wingate Moorman r. Collier Mora I). People Mordeuai i'. Bcal Morehead v, State MofL'land v. Lawrence Morelock r. State Morey v. Iloyt Morgan v. Burrow V. People I'. I'lirnell V. Roberts V. State 257''' 80K' 470S 470i«, 470H 1220^-, 122U"" 022' 80K-» 470*, 58H' 358^ 358", 3o8'» 257*' 470"' 358" 21-'" 358"' 427'', 427«, 427"-' ItlO" , 257'«», 257'", 257^, 470-', 470", 470'' 654-' 427-i 39 1*' 427* 403", 463>'', 4(i.}"' 1: Columbian, &c. l)ock_,Co. 1)78> 1: Davidson 21" c. Edwards 21*" V. Leesee of Ilarmcr 21''^ Morrell c Cawley V. Foster V. Morgan Morrill c. Foster r. Graham Morris r. Briggs (». Patclim i>. Wadsworth Morrison v. Dolorimier ('. Jackson V. Sturges Morrissey v. Ingham Morrow v. Parkman Morse i-. Congdon V. Kice V. Weymouth 1: W( odworth Morss V. Morss Morton v. State Moseley'B Adm'r v. Mnstin 117!)-!" 117'J''' H78-'* 358", 358", :'.58-'J 2W 122!)- .Sltl'"' 910" 408" 808" 52'i 358'" 910'" 391*" 21^5 21«T 257* 622', 022" 257 •» b08" 305> \iuller 1;. Dows r. St. Louis Hospital Ass'n Miillery v. Hamilton Munn c. Burch Muiins ('. Diipont Miinroe v. Douglass Munsbower r. State Miirphey v. State .Murphy v. Com. 1: Hendricks IK People I'. State Murray r. Lcpper I'. Marsh i: Murray I'. Polglase Muse V. Richards Musick r. Barney Mutual Life, &c. v V. Hillman V. Robinson 0. Tillman Myer c. Grafflin Myers c. Carrie r. Knabe Mynatt t;. Hudson Myron v. Union R lH:tii» 978'i» 427* 21* 122i>' 52'' 21W uno 978-'* 022^ 21--i 588', 588"'' 688*, 5885, 5aa", 978'^ 1h;J-» 1179'* iss'"', i8a*'> 11795 2)23 117!»"i 427* 391*'^ 21-w 403-" 257*' 30ia» 267** 808'» Blodgett R. Xaanks v. State IHO** N'ason v. .Jordan 358'* National Bank, &c. i-. Gray 1229« V. McManigle 183"''> National Car, &c. Builder c. Cyclone, &c. Co. 8081 National Cash Hog. v. Pfister 808", 808-'i National Ulster Co. Bankr. Madden 978'' Naiimberg v. Young 808*, 808"', 808'* Neaderhouser r. State Neal V. Neal r. Patten Neeb v. McMillan Neese v. Farmers Ins. Co. Nelnis V. State Nelson r. Becker i\ Davis /•. Ladd r. State r. Weeks Nesliit i". State Nesbitt r. Cavonder Neville v. Northcutt Nevin V. Ladue Newcoinb i-. Griswold V Wallace Newell V. Newton 12293' 2i« 978^< 622" 978*1 21» 1229t« 022" h08-''> 21^4 62>, 9781*, 078 « 808" 470'» 808i» 4(i:!» 21 "• 978*'> 808-'* ai-'s 1 I fl IH ocxl AMEUICAN TABLE OF CASES. References Newell I'. Nichols 183'" Ni'wliiill -. AppU-tun liij7'' r. Ji'iikins 6SH" New Hiivfii Co. r. Goodwin 403-', 40.!"' Ni'w Httveii County Hank r. Milclicll 18:5» Now Jersey, &e. (yti. i: Suydiun 117'.»*'' Newman r. l)od^oll oOl*'' I'. Jenkins Wi^ New Miit'ord u. Slierman 81)1*' New Portland r. Kinjjfield 978*' Newg I'nh. Co. r. Huiier !t7«*' New York Dry Dock >: Iliiks 117!)»' N. Y. Mutual, &c. Ins. 8tron); are to psges. ' Oideyer r. Dernlieim i Olive c. State j Oliver r. I'ate Oinistead r. Hill V. Wlnsted 15ank I Olson r. IVterson j Omnium Securities Co. v. liieliard- ! son < >pj)enlieiin i'. Wolf Ordway r. Conroe 1 r. Havnes 808« 2f)7-'>' 2< •.t78-'» u54" •2\" 117'.)-i, 117!»'' '.•78i« Nicliols r. Ilaynes r. Vinson r. Webl) Nickerson r. Uouhl f. Spindell Niles V. Spra^ue Nixon r. McKinney V. I'aliner Noble I'. DoiiKlass Norfolk, &c. H. H. c. Uroscclosc Norman v. Waite Norris r. Cargill r. Harris V. Ins. Co. North Hank v. Abbot North Hrooktield r. Warren Co. f. Arni- 257 1» 40:!'' 40.;" 4t)3-» 218^ -21 H' IJoM'' 117!>=" iJ57« 267*', 2.-)7<i IK'.'i < )ret;on Steamship Co. i-. Otis IK)''', ;!r)8i» 117'.!'.! am-' 1178'^' 62". 52'- 27tl" 4.MI" 427^ 427", 427» Northern Pac. U. U. r. Urlin n78-'«, 078" Nis'tliwestern Fuel (.'o. v. UruuH. 8(18'', H)8'' Northwestern M'f'g Co. i-. Chambers 21 J" Northrop, The Northrop c. Hale Norton r. Ladd r. Perkins Norvell r. McHenry Norwood i: Kentield Noyes V. Ward Nunes i*. Perry Nunne v. Mayes Nut© V. Nute Nye V. McDonald Orinan c. State < )rr r. Lacy Orton r. McCord Osborne v. Allen V. Forshee r. Stringhnm Ostrander r. .Snyder Otey c. Hoyt OttV. Soulard Over r. Schiitling Owen V. Boyle Owens r. Hull S()8" 427 2P' 427', 427«, 427\ 427", , 427>'', 427''' 1)10", IIIO'J <J78" 078-'«, ft7K«' 412" r22r"' 427''' 078" Jl» Oak Leather Co, v. Union Bi.nk 52'^ Oakes V. Harrison 270'', 27tli» Oaks.'. Weller 18:1''^ Ohert'. nialock TO' O'HIenis r. State 2ft7'* O'Hricn v. Com. 2A7''' I'. Frasier 257"* r, Krockinski 21^-' Ocean Ins. Co. r. Fields 21" O'Connor -. Chicago, &c. U. R. n!)l"' Odiorne r. Hacon IK".!'-'' Ohio iv liinchman 21'' Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Delmlt 21», 21 ^ Ohio « Miss. U. li r. Wlie«ler IHH'" Ohio K.Co. r. Hidge 21'-' Ohlert V. Alderson 808-' v. Kansas City, &c. K, K. I'. State Owers r. Olatlie Co. < >wing8 r. Siwed Pahst HnEwiKO Co. v. Smith PaclHu Iron Works ••. Newhall Packard r. Dunsmore r. Hill 1179''^, Paddock v, Salisbury Page i: Osgood r. Parker Pagett r. Curtis Paige f. Carter Paine r. Sclieiiectady Palmer r. Aldridge V. Atchison, &c. H. R. V. Haight c. State I ..ncake i'. Cauffman Pa|)e I'. Wright Pajiin I', Hyan Parent c. Walmsley's Adm I'arish r. Pcrliam Parke '•. Mears Parker r. Carter 022' 218 622^ 022* 18*'* '.»78'» 808-8 8(18" 12-J!M* 21" 2' 529, 521.1, 5214 21'^', 21'" 3ti5i'.«. Htiu'a »t78'a ;{58-» 117!)" 1170" 808' 122!l'6 11 7»"' 2573'' 270H r. Cleveland r. Davis i: F.iikIow r. Hardy IV Logan r. State Parkhiirst r. Mctirnw I-. Van Coiirllandt Purkinson .'. Nashua Parliman r. Young I'arsons i . State Partin v. State Patcheii V. Park 391», 801»\ 3'Jl'", »78« 21« 078', 'J78». 078T 21" »» 52" 078'» 588a> 8»(8'» 267" 21« 21' 8088 1220' 022*, 022' ', 022'^ 022>«, 022'» 1170« m«a 8tt0» 2« 808*> oio», nic, oioi«, ".(78-''< 18;J^«, 022' 867* «8A« 010* 078" 1 AMKUICAN TABLE OF CASKS. ccxll Refereucea tre to pages. Patrick t-.Oibbs 1170-!' People f. Denby 978<-^ r. Ilallutt 626 r. Devines QW^, 97a'» V. Ji;ck 4U3X f. Dillwdud y7«'», 978'" rutti'ii c. (ilover C22'' c. Diniock 267" c. Moor 622i« V. Diiliring 910's, 910"* I'atlurson /•. Com. C3u« V. Klyeu 978'^ ('. M'(':ni!i|iiii(l 21'i» i: Ksirado 688* Tattison r. Xorris 564'" V. Kiting 21'-' I'livey <•. I'livi'y 122i»*- r. Kvans 257- "i, 0.16\ U36< I'awasliick, Tlic 62», I17!i'' r. F.verliardc 267'' I'ayiie '•. rr.atlwi'll 21 ■^1, -Jl-", 18:;:" /•. Fair 267-'>', 267 "• c. Troy & Uoston K. U. 6J« V. Flyini 688'- I'fttcf r. .Ii'iikiiis •l.Vi' r. Fulton Fire Ins. Co. 427- IVH^ler r. Stablus 8(m'" r. (iarl)Utt 270'',27(i''' Peak V. State 470" r. (ilenn 470 ,47(K', 47(1'- IVarl I'.All.n 122'.>', 122U'^ r. (ioiiilaicz 368', Mii\ 305-!J IVargon r. Darrington o,»i*', 3!)r" r. (irahani 978^ I'euk c. Bi'ckwitli Ht)«-< f. (ireen 978i'i r. Clark 412" r. (irunxig 470", 470'» 1'. .Icniitoii 80«''> r, Ilanifan 'J78M r. I'ieroo 4<i3i ' r. Ilawes 47U1 i: IJitcliey 978^*, U78'« r. Haves 6224 V. Kyan 654'' r. IlitV 078™ V. Valt'iitiiie 1(53 -^978>, 1)78'. 'J7H" 391*', 470'^ IVek c. ISooiiu 622" r. Hoy Vea 688-" Tell r. Hall IKlw 022 •' I'ultier'.s ("age 21" r. Hiilbut 022-' IVltoii c. Scliiiiidt f)*-)!' r. Jacobs 07h« Pelzer M'f'n Co. /• Sun Fin- Office 3r.M-' /•. dolir 21"' I'eiit'f r. MakepcaLv ;).'.4'' r. Jtnu'g 267" r. \Vaiij:li (CJ.JIH V. Koeley 078'-^ Penitentiary ('o. r. (iordon 27(l'» c, Keith 078^' Penn. Co. v. Coiilan 62^ r. Kennedy 978' 1'. Dolan 8(>8-- i\ Knapp 267-' 1'. Ilorton 21-' i: Knickerbocker 470" c. Ncwiiieyer Penn. U. It. r. Lyons 3(J6«, 30 J", 07H-''' V. j.antbert 62" 391'" r. Langtree 010^' Pinn, l{. K. Co. v. Uitf' Icr o2^' i\ J<iii/.ey OIC , 910«, 910-=» Pengiiolii K. U. c. ScliuJIir :56H''' 267^" People r. Allien 117'.i»' r. Macliiin »7.'S'» r. AnderMon DTK*' r. Mackinder (•.88* '•. Atkinson C22'', 022 '• r. Mather 978-', 978Jn 1'. Austin 97«''-' c. Matleiiiui Slid'' f. Darric ()><8'< c. McConnel ■2\u 1'. HarriiiKcr H(»«' 1'. McCrea 39 iw r. Itidilli'inan 122'.t'^' c. McCloin 688i» c. Ulakeley 122" — — c. M'tiarren 910", 910'-, 910'« V. noscovitoh 978" ', 97H---', 078-' — ^ 1'. Mi'Nair {)W^ — — »'. Ilrooks 21", 97K'- 1'. MeC^uaid 62^, 621'. 62" I'. Miiclianan (122". U7H*' ^-— r. Mexervey 391 X i\ Hiiddentieck 305 , .'Kri'", Jldo'" r. Mcthvin 2.-.7*« c. KiimIi 2.'.; ■" r. Mills 257"* 267'", 978M I'. Carney c. Caiisiily 8('i.'>', ."iCitV' r. Miiick IK'.H* 68H-* r. Moelt 26 r" 68H''"' •'. Murphy 978'' ^— ('. (^llllKC 470" r. o'llrien tl!!6» 2 1.- aii.. r. O'Neil o:i.V V. Clarke 688'" »', o'Sullivan 267^301«' 978'" lt78li« OiniJ, <(78«'' i: Park 01(K»I 1229". 122'.f^' r. Parker 122'.»-' i: r\ist<>llo 036', (13.'i* r. Parlon 68«« 1'. Court »78''' 470" — — 1'. Daniels r^HH' (• Pinckney 122(»*» 267 ". 267*', i-(y V. Poller 21« :> I' coxlii AMERICAN TAULE OP CASES. Beforencei are to pages. People 1'. Quanstrom 910"* V. liainiruz 688>«, 588i'' r. Ufutor, &c. of Trinity Cliurcii ITM'^ Kubinson Uoilerigaa Saflbrd Saiiclii-z Sclir^vcT Suvuraiice 8liva .Siniongen Siiiipsuii Skeulian Kiiiitli S(»ti) St()ke8 V. Strybe V. Supirior Court of N. Y Siitlierland 'I'lirall Tyler Vernon Wells Went/, Westbrook White c. Williiims V. Woleott — • 1'. Wooil r. Yduiik I'eiiria. &i:. It. \i. v. Riee I'epper c. Barnett r. V. i: i\ V. r. V. V. V. V. ■ V. r. ■ f. 688" 6»»''< 1)78'': 4"0'J 270' 122'J»' SUV 688" 470« 978-" •J 10' , &88*' 18;{' 2* 978'^ 088" 2&7"» 3911'', 47(»^ o;J5> 688\ 588" Ultl-"' 2r)7--i>', 2->7''« 21'">, U78*> fihS'x, 688''' ;wi« (122-'-'i Phillips V. Kelly 39I»« V. People 257«6, 267'« V. State (i;{5« V. Trowbridge Furniture Co. 308", Pho'iiix Ins. Co. v. Moog Plia-nix Pub. Co. Riverside v iiig Co. St)"." P22iP, P22'.l-*, 122',>=", 1220- Perdicaris v. Trenton City Bridge Perfi iling r. State Perkins c. Concord R. R. /•. W\.8t Perrin r. State I'errv c Dubuque S. W. R. Co. ■/•. Hill r. MiiHiiey — — c. Moore r. New Orleans, &c. R. Co. — r. Newton '•. Riindidl 21'* 3m^' 39 F', f>or, 5.-)4", 654" 808''' 358" 2> 808" 978''" 978« 1229* 022', (122- r, .Simpson Waterproof Mgt'. Co. oiVl'* i: State (122'«, f.22" Peter r. TliickHtun Pelerlioff, Tlie IVterson, /•.'.!■ ixntf Petemon c Morgan 2")7'''" >: Slate IVtrie r. Cohnnbia, &c. R. H. l'eu>rli r. Davis Peyroux r. llciward I'lielan r. (iardner Plienix, iV:!'. Ins. Co. c. Merchants, &v. Ass'n r. Sliopinaker Philadi'lpliia r. Rule Philadelpliiii, \i'. R. R. v. Lehman 391 •■' 217. .J|:ii 2r-M 2r,v^ 52" 391 -•' 808'" 21» 808-^' 858" 022' 3(I5'' 21" I'iekard c. Bailey Pierce i: De Long I', lloffnian I'. Indseth i: Kimball V. Newton r. Nortliey V. I'iercc I'. State Pierson v. Haiti Pike V. Crehore I'illard v. Dunn I'illow V. Thomas Pillsbury r. Locke Pinkham v. Benton V. Cockell Pinney i.-. Jones I'inney's Will Pirie 1-. Wyld Pitt t'. Kmniong I'itts r. Allen r. State Pittsford V. Chittenu <m I'iziirro, The I'lank Road Co. v. Bruce I'latt V. Ilaner I'lummer v. Currier r. Eastern R. R. r. Ossipee I'olk V. Bntterfleld I'ollock r Pollock V. Willcox I'ool I-. Chase I'orath V. State Porter r. Hale I'. ■Indson V. State 978'", r. WhIiz I'. Waring r. Wilson PorlUKal, Church r I'nst t'. Supervisors I'otter r. Inhabitants of Ware 183» 183-^« Cloth- 808 '♦ 62'», iivyi* 1221K'H 257" 21^, 2P', 52>' 21>» 257" 1229 '», 1 229*7 5648 521 21 '0 117i>^' 1225»w 02-2* 403'*, 4ti3"' 978* 122'.^'>', P229'" 39P 39D'> f 54", 554» 3581" 808« 588-, 588" (122'W 183« 183<« 11 TO" 654", 554'a 52* 267", 39ia« 52» 978'« 358'» 808»'> 035*, (135» 358-"" 21«, 403'» )78", 9781" 391'' Ilubbart (', Stinipsoii ;i91««, 978'W, 978''« V. Mellin I'lMigade r. \iyan Powell r. Blat'kett I', (idvernor r. Tarry 1,1. Wnllace power r. Howdlc Powers V. McKenzio — — r. Presgroves 21 1» 1229'^ft 2ii 1179''« 910". 910i« 6641 21" 122117 89 iw 6541 358» 2r» 1229<a 257«», 257W, 257«, 257*« V. Rnssoll Prairie School Township v. Ilnselen 808"', 808" AMKUlCAif TABLE OF CASES. ccxliii Befereucei are to page*. Pratlier v. Palmer 183» Ray V. DIackwell 808B 1-. WilkeiH 808" r. l'a»tle 463'», HKi'-i I'ratt r. Audrewg 207* Ruynliam r. Canton 1170'^ .•. LaiiKdoii b08-« Ray nor i: Lyons b08"» ,: Wliite nii", dtia^' Read i: Com. 022^ rri'e|>t'r r. Keg. 52 •• Real I'. I'eople 078«», •J7»'* I'rell /'. McDonald 21" A'e AsHignnient of Itca :158" I'rescott I'. Ward a78<' itedfleld /-. Gleason 808', 808'* I'ricc r. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 21W Redlicli f. Daurlee 40:J>* ('. Oarland 4t;3», 4(Wi'-» Reed c. WiUon 2D, 2r-'» r. Hiuliinond, &c. II. U. ;jo8''' Reese r. Reese 1221)3> r. State 6881J I'. Strickland 808^ V. Torrington 4&.f> Reeve r. Dennett 218^ I'rii'st I'. Glenn 117U" f. Liverpool, &c. In«. Co. 270* I'riinni c. Stewart 18;JM, jjoisi Reeves v. State 8u»> Prince c. Ulackburn 122'J'-' R. r. Andrews 636« r. Sniitii 463", 40;;-- i: Beckwiih 635«, 0:55"' I'ringie r. Pringle yiQi'-' c. Berube 'JlO'i' I'rintup r. Pattuii 654-' i: Clittsson 2571^, 257''» Prior r. State 2o7» V. Doyle 588-1 Troclor r. Iloughtaling 2o7'« r. Mailloux 183*, 078" !•. Old Colony It. It. 654*, 554-' 1: I'ahMali-Gay DIO" I'riiltt r. Cox 2573' r. Peltier 470>» Pucitett r. State 21", 257-" r. Perry 0356 Pulleii ('. Ilutcliinson 1221P V. Reaney 470''' Pullman Palace Car r. Harking <J78*' c. Romp 588H Purdy c. Piinly •JKtw r. Smitii 4708, 47()9 Piisey V. Wright 270'i V. Sparlmm 470«, 470", 470" Putnam v. Goudall a58-' V. The Minnie 21» Reid r. McWhinnie 21« si'W Qi;iMnv I'. Buzzell 122fl", PJSOK, 12201' r. Reid .•. Warner 1229-i' 257" 1229'5, 122'J'« Reinhart c. Miller 122!>'6 IIaucliffb v. Ins. Co. I179«, 117'J« V. Oconto Co. 808* UaddytTe r Rarton 55 »i Reis r. Ilellman K» Itader i\ McKlvane 8t)8i' Reitz r. Stale 86u^ Kadford c. State 470'> Renaud c. Abbott 21" Uadley r. Seider i)78''^ Renier c. Dwelling-liotise 808« lulling r. Com. 470' Renner 1). Dank of Columbia 358'* Kailroad c. Crider 27«'< Rex V. (^lewes 257 1* Uailway Co. v. Ueelcr 808' i: Inhabitants of Ilarringworth P221t" r. Cronin 358'" r. .Morgan 1221K* r. Henderson 403-'' 40.T^«, 4(i8W r. ( trieby 18:J'» r. Merrick 301'J, a"Jl»> i: Plummpr 183' 1: McKcniia 52'' Reyburn r. Deloiti 1221>'«', 1220« V. .Murphy 403", 40:1"' Reynolds r. Loiigenbcrger 183'T i: Strout 52' r. Manning 554', 554" r. Wliitton mi''-' r. Robinson 808« Kains (■. !<tate 588-« c. SchalTcr 010*> liainwater r. KIniore o78''' Rhoades r. Selin 1170"', 122'.ti> ltiil|ili r. Drown :i58i» Rieard r. Williams 18:i'« lialston i: Miller 412" Riee 1'. Rice «22» Itiiiid r. Dodge 452-' r. Sli04)k 8l*» Kaitlal r. Yates 022" : Rice's Succession tm Kan. hill r. Connecticut River R. R. 52* i Rich r. KIdreilgo 4M* '•. Turner 808" : Richards r. Day 808» l<aiidi)l|ili r. Louglilin 1 220", 122',H'i j .•, KIwell I8;i'» r. Wdodntock 1178" i r. Noyes 554', 5.'^i4>'> K.'iplev 1,'. Klugli 808" Hichardson r. Deebo 808>«, 80HI1 Katlilt >'. Vandikes 0101' ' r. Hoston 428'" Kaw r. People 2 1 •"' <•. Kmrry 4fl:l«, 4ti:iia Kawley r. Drown 18:)M 1'. Kelloy 1)78<« !!aw Maiif'g Co. r. Townseni :i.-,8ii r. Milburn 2I8«, 358* l!ii<vson r. Ilnigh ;mi" r. Newcomb ]2i!M9 Uay r. Bell U78« V. Robbing 358-i* CCXllV AMERICAN TAIJLE OF CASES. Kefereiicea Br« to pages. Uiehiiiond r. I'attorson llT'.t-' Wogers /•. Stale 21-", <JW-' Kicliiiiuiul, &L-. K. K. 1-. (,'liiiilns» JJOi')", r. Struub bus-, HOh'' ;jtio'-, ;>ii6", ;!().!>'•' r. 'lyley 122'.l«-' Kiddle r. Iliidgiii.s WW ' Koll r. St. Loiii.s Smelting Co. 52" Uiilgil<>- r. .Iiilingon I •-'•21 »-••', 122!»-'' liidlins r. Henry 117'.t'« liit'iiuT /■. Kict' hOH' lionan r. hugan 2r"' Kijrgg r. I'owell 12 2'J-', \)i2<.r\ \-22W'' Uoop r. (lark 1170-1, 1170-^7 liik-y i: .lolinston (i-JL'ii Koosa r. H()>ton Loan Co. 301'*' i: .Mayor WW" Iioot r. King inoi" i: I'ierce ■n2" Kose i: First Nat. Hank 1220'", 1220"', r. Triunor »t)8'* 1220'' liindgi- r. liri'ck W,fi r. Otis 078*", '.I78'' r. Wi.lker W.l^-' ?'. VVinnsboro Hank 122'.»*> Kiplcy f. St'lignian 808^" liosebooni r. Itillington 452^' V. Warren 21.M Uosenbauin r. Stale nui« Ui8k r. Slate •Mo- Koseiikrans r. Itarker 257'M Kiteliie r. ( atlin •2 If. Hosintlial r. Walker 183^' r. Holbrooke (S-.""' Koss r. Austin 21-«, 21'" Hixfor.1 r. Milic-r IKV" r. Mo.swell 21*. ]{ol)b (. Hewitt f).'.-!'' c. Hulder OKI'" ]{ol>l>iii8 r. Uobbing ii;!.v I-. Slate 267", :Ji>l- r. Springfield 'JTH'"' r. White 301.« V. State f.2', JTO'" Rolen r. Slate 470'« Robert's Appeal or.4J Kothrock c I'erkinson 1170''^ Koberls r. Com. 078"'', '.i78-'« Ki)U])ell ('. Ilawg 1220''" /•. Di.xon 257-', ;558» li.W' Ronsey r. Wood 2lii. 117»=!« r. Miller 078'" Hout r. L'iley 122JV.9 r. Mullenlx WlH-" Itowell r. Fuller 1229". 1220'- r. Ogdensbnrg, &c . K. R. ;Mi.V' r. Newton Hlh'' ltolH.>rt8on r. Lynch .•!68"* Kowt r. Kile 122'.t''* r. Miller V2'i'M'> Kiiyal ('. Chandler 412" Koblnson i: Adams ;«»l" lioyal Ins. Co. i. Suliwing 27(J'-, 27«'* ,: niakely 427M Kuan r. Terry 257'^" — — t'. (Mindwick (■)22'! Riidd r Frank (•,22''' c. Tnttcr 3581'* Kndolph ('. Lane 35h-<» c. Dana !H(»-'-' Knfer r. Slate 588-» r. Dibl.lo 463". 4(i:;'« Kullinan >•. Harr 858» r. (iailier 18:i'- IfuhitT r. People .1fl5-'» 21M17yM17!»'i Ru:upli r. Stale 122«« — r. livers 80M" Ituscli r. RiH^k Island 078' ■ 1'. Ilutehingnn '.I7«'" Uusher '■. StJile 588-!'' r. New Hruiiswick U. U. '2-'t'-> WusM'll r. Huekley 183«», 183'i" r. Peru, vie. K. U. «7H^' r. Cliundi H08W 1'. Heynohls U78-"' /'. Martin 21* 1'. |{ol>in8on 27(i'» iv Sargent 21M c. State 257*", 207'' Uyan /•. 0'(,'oniier 80H-" r. Sttiart 654', r>.v^' r. People 078" Hoeeo r. Stnto (122-' r. Slate MH't Hoelic r. Fra«cr 27tl'' Kyerson r. Abinglon 078*« lloeke-'s Estate v2->^y> Kocikwell r. Tavlor .'1!)1«« lloekwood r. I'onndstone OT8«. »"8*' Saiiiinokr r. People iss--* Koden r. Brown ;)58iJ St. Louis, &e. K. R. c. Dea rborn wm" Roderigas c. Ea§t River Saving! /•. Dobbins ;MI5'.i Instn. 183* 1'. Kexniad 01»'» Rodgers r. Trnok awj' c. Sweet 07M7 Rodrian r. N. Y, .«<• R. K. 5." i\ 'I'lionias 654* Rodrigiu'Z V. Espinosa 301 «i r. Weaver 52». 52"' Roo r. Roe 122!K>' St. Paul, Xe. Ins. (^). ■• Ciottbclf 078* Rnnors r. Crn\n nur"' St. Vrain Stone Co. v. Denver, &c. r. 1)0 Uardelcben. 4c. Co. 301*', 427i", 11. R 808^* 42711 Salnzar r. Taylor I220-", 122»»J (Vi'I* Salem (iravel Road Co. c. IVnning- 1I7',»'' ton 801*. BOl*' r. Ulttcr 1220*", 22O'»M22ft^,1220«J Salomon v. State SI" AMEKICAX TABLE OF CASES. ccxlv Refereucea Sallsman v. N. Y. &c. U. R. Srtiiiple V. Frost SainpuDii 0. Noble V. Overton Sam Sloan, Tlie Simliorn r. Murphy Siiiiclioz I'. IVople Santlers v. Heister ■ V. State r. Stokes r. Wrtki'Weld SnniU I'. Slate Saiikey r. Cook SantaAnn r. Ilarlin Santissima Trinidail Saraliass v. Armstrong Sarbacli r. .loncs Sargent u. Ilampilcn Sartoriiis i*. Stale Sasscer r. Farmers' Itank Sauls V. Slate Smus«v r K. U. Saviiiuiiili, &v. K. R. r. Gray r. llolliind Savi'laiid v. (Jreen Sawyer r. Kifert w. Kriiert Sayres r. Allen SciiU'< I'. Deslia Selialler r. State Scliascr r. State Seiieiner c. Minneapolig, &c. R. R. »0b'- ilJii ' llT'.l!' 117'.l'4 ma - 97H^' ;wi»t 'J1H« 078>. !>7«9 I'i-JO'-, 12^>», 122;»«6 y7«" •Jl» •21:11 9102. !tll|ii 022*, 022", f.22'' •.t7h-' 21 •, •.I7h' /■.KM'' 2.-)7'- l«:!-» 358"'. .'•..'.4 ' 2.'i7" 2ri7W 3<.H-"» 2:i7'" Scliell r. I'liimb Sclilatr r. Louitiville, &c. R SchlatiT r. Winpeiniy ScliK'iicker r. State Schlielit r. State Selilosii r. Ili8 Creiiitori Sclimult V. N. Y. &c. Ins r. State Sflinerlzell i'. YoiniR St;liO('n r. Sunilerlanil S 'liocil Dint. I'. Ins. Co. 1: 'liittle School Furniture Co. r. School l>i«l S(rlirif<lh"y r. Stiite Schroeiler r. Chicago, &c. Sc-huhka);el v. DierNtoin Schuchanit r. Alle.iii Si-huliz '■. Chicago, &c. R. Schuylkill Co. >•, Cuplcy Scotiilil I). I'arlin, &c. Co. Sooggin f. Dalrymple Scotia, The Scotlaiiil, The Sioit IV Kletchcr r. Iliileniiliurg — — I'. Jackfion I'. Waitlinian V. Wood ScoTille I'. UalJwia Co 2.>7« 2r-', 21" t7S'», {t7«-^' .). ii'.M " 'J78" «7,s*« 21'- 2> 2.')7'i; 270^ I7!H< 1 21 >■ WW"' Jlii 'J I'' insM" Warsaw 62" are to pages. Scrogpin 1: McClelland r. Wood Searcy r. Slate Seargeant r. Seward Searls /■. Knapp Sears r. Ilayt Seavy r. l)earborn Sebree c. Dorr Secor r. I'estana Secri^t r. (ireen r. Petty Seef 1: State Seeley v. Kngell Scguin c. Rouhon Seiber r. I'rice Seip's Estate. I'robst'a Appeal Seidell r. Myers V. State SeUera Estate Seniple r. Ilagar S-niell v. State Serviss r. StiK'kstill Settle r. Alison llTft-V Seventh Day, &c. Ass'n. v. Fisher Seward i'. (iarlin Seymour r. ''owing Shafcr r. I.,acock c. State Shaffer V. McCrackin ShalTiier r. Com. Shafter r. Evans Shailer v. Hiimsicad Shallcr r. Mraiid Slianfelter r. Baltimore Shank V. Coulthard 02" H(IH-1 688'», 588«» l)lii>« 21*1 81tl< 27G>, 27(1", !»7««i 35S». ;i68" 6&4', o-.i* 117'.tai oj-.a 21^" r.2' 97«" m»i> (122* 808'» t)22'' 8081 218 {(78S» inir--* :t58« a»i" 27tl« 4t');!it' 257"» r)2« .loi'tx, n9i«\ :!'.ti« 122y'", 122tt-« 21" BOS^ Shaw I-. Bryant r^iW'S c. I'.mery *^67'W »>. Stale 'i\'^ !•. Susquehanna Doom Co. ii'M-^ Sharp c. Johnson 183W .IBS") Shearer »'. Stale 27('>* Shearman /•. Akins 452* Sheihurnc Fidls Nat. Ok r. Townsley ls;i'>i R. R .-Um" aoii", ;to.'." 022' 21M R. 80H" ".»1(>^' 183<", 6;.4'-'. W>4" 412« 21», 21»" 21' 257^- 02-/^ 21 '• 1221 >^> 270> ' 183* Shellon '•• Hampton U78*' . »7H-'« r. State 022- ' Shcpard r. (iiddings 3ri8>» r. Mo. &c R, R. 306'^, 306", 80oi» Shi-panUciM r. Perkins '2T(1'* Shephard r. State 6H8« Sheplurd •'. Buscli 808" Sherff r. Jacobi 808-1 Sherman r. Cronhy 452'! Shernil >•. .Murray 0|1A SlierwiH>d r. Ilouslon n9r-i'. 1179-1 Shlilds I-. Ciinninghain U78*- , l»78<'i Slii«<1et 1: Com. 6881" Shirwin v. People 2u7''" Shoemaker v. Kellog 4o:{is <•. Stiles 80810 ShiN-nbergcr r. Ilackman 358'" , ar.8« Shorb r. Kinzie 122»>'3 Shorey r. Ilussey lt78-7 Sh.ire r. Wiley 403« 4(J3»>, 078*. 978' Shown !•. Barr 1171M» V. Mc.Mackin lb3«> M i iiiM • :!-!«- 1 : 1 ' it ft ccxlvi AMERICAN TAULK OF CASES. Reference! are to page*. I .'',, ) ith Slirowdcrs i». Harper MiroytT V. MilltT Sliutirick r. State Sliiiriltir V. 1'arkiT Sliutt; ('. 'i'hoinpHUll Sibley r. Sinilli r. Wiirtle SiilekiiMi i: \Vaba8li,&u. U. U, Sill r. Ki'i-M- Silliiniiii r. riiornton Siniiiioiig c. Truiiibi) SiiiiiiiR r. Quebec, &c. R. It I'. So. KxprcBH Co. Simon i\ Stiite Simons ". Norton I'. People i: Stale Singer Mfj:. Co. i>. Clay I'. LeeiU u. MeFarland Sitlcr I' (Jelir Skclton V. Liubt & Power Co Skinner v. Skinner Skipwortli .•. Deyoll 4(W", 4(i:F'. HW*' Sliittery r. I'eople 654'', 5H8'' SlauKliter r. IJernar.Jii llTlt'-' SleefHT I'. Van Miililleswortli 257*' Sloan I'. N. York Central 078", <»7«'«, ()7H"'- r. Thompson I'-W", 12a!l"' Sloeovicb i\ Oriental Mut. lUB. Co. 21'' 2ri7''« !»7rt*^' 4121 1 305>-, ;i(Io" ti22'i 305'^ :{tir,i'' I22!>'" '62''^ 2110 21 n f)2'- 022-" 117'.H< 470" M' 122!K'' 4();i''' 122!»'-! 4(liW7 '.»7H-'7 UIO'" 1229* SloHNcn i: l{. K. 2:>7* Sluby I'. Cliamplin 122!»"' Small f. Clfwley 27«"', 27il''J Smith i: Allen JIoH" V. AhImjII 122'J", 1221»"'* ■ 1'. IthiKKO 117'.t", 117'.»." i: Urown 8o«'^ ;t.-iHi-' 1'. Hutler WtH'^ i: Coffln ow-, yi»»''' «;. Com. 3'J14', ohH-J V. ('room iK;{t» r. CuNliman 1I7'.I<' ». Khanert 1I7H*' r. Killer 117!»'« r. l-'cniier 122'.».w f. KilxKerald HOH' w. KorreHl 4I2« r. Kowler f)/>l'« II. ( Jeer 427''' V. (iilliim 27tJii r. Kaniler 117'.('» I-. Kiiowlton IMIF- r. Kane 408*>. 4oa'". ':hii •'. iMUg W(Ml« i: Metropolitan H. R. »7H<H r. Monro 27(l« 1'. .MiiHiettor WW*' >K N. H, Society 2f>7'«, .-HM*' r. NowelU 412" 1'. ( till ( 'olony, &p. R. R. 267"', 2r.7J'' — — r. I'alnier ^rd- I'. I'atteririii 427" „. Poller 11711"; — — I'. Powuri 11 7'.*'' r. Putnam 301«, 463-« Redden 117l"» Rentz 4(!a-« c. Royalton ',»7H''' r. Sanford 4(j;j'«, 4(W"' c. Satterleo Myf I'. Savin^H Bank l!22''' ('.Shell 654', f.r)4" V. Smith 183a-", ih^ht, h;.,*! i: Speed 21'", 21" r. Statu 267«, 3682, 368", 47(1"», &«8'^', l)78"', !»78<« I'. Stevens 21"'' i>. Swan 122i»^* 1. WeHt 117!t«* /•. Whittier SOF', 391<", 664' r. Zent 270' Smitha r. Klournoy's Adni. 2r'«', 21'^' .Smoot I'. liiiHsell 62"''' Snciiler v. Patterson 8(t8* Sno<l},'raii8 r. t.'om. 078'^ Snow V. Alley 808" V. Grace 267«, 2.-i7« Snyder r. Snyder l>78'* V. Stale 688'> Soap8 v. Eiehburg 654'^ Soeieta llaliana r. Sulzer 808" Solary r. Webster 808» Soiila r. Jarrow 12211"* Solomon V. Dreschler 27<l'' I'. Hughes 21'' Solomon, &c. R. R. v. Jones 978', •.»78', <J78H Solver V. Ronianet Soruerti i'. State r. Wrijfht Sonierville c. Winibisli Somerviile, &c. R. li. c. Dougbty Sophia, The SouIp r. Itruce South Kana. R. R. Co. v. Robbins South & N. Ala. R. R. Co. r. Wood Southern IJell Tele. Co. r. l^ynuli Siiuthern ExpreHK (.'o. v. 'I'hornton Southern, &u. Inn. Co. r. Wilkinson S. W. School DiHlrict of Rolton f Wlltiiims Soulhwick r. South wick Soiithwortb I', lloag SpaidH r. Barrett Spalding; r. Lowe Sparfr, II. S. Sparhawk r. Sparhawk Sparks r. Com. r. Sparks SpauliliiiK r. flood i\ Vincent Spaunhorst r. Link Spearman «. State Spears r. Burton r. Forrest r. International Ins. Co. r. Lawrence 21« 21>» 463" 21'' «78« 808" 267*' 267'» 21H7 3(I6i'' 1220*' 427» .S()eer r. Coale Speiieer r. (.'uriis 412« ()22'« 270' 8(IK*' 910" 688«, 688"* 9HM> 31tl*« 2 1*, 27«^ 022'', l'.22'' 270'« 62'«, 1170'". 1179'* 978<", 978*" 688''« 183'» 267" 267" .•i:.8"» 412«, 412" 21*i fl AMERICAN TAULK OF CASES. ccxlvii Reference! Spencer >: Fortescue HOI* c. I-niiKdon 1179*', 1I7".C^' ,!. New York, &c. K. K. 'Ml* V. Hoppr IHIJM, ih;}W Spt'ii({lcr r. Williams 21™' Spolin r. MinHOiiri, &c. It K, 078^'', 'J7K" .S|ir,'i(lliiiK ••. Conway 03'2'' SpriiKins r. White 62''' S|)riiKUi> >•■ Sprajfuo 122'.t'''' SpriiiKfleld, &c. K. R. i: AlU'ii SOU* " Siiiiiri' i: Stnto IttJP* Stttckiis r. N. Y. R. R. 62" SliiKor I'. Pass. Ry. Co. G2* StiiiliiiKB 1^. (iottschulk '1U:)I>, 80»i'i c. Iliilliim 022" r. State S'.tl*" Stftiii|H'r r. (irifflii 257", •.(78" SlaiiBleiii r. Stale 117!)'". 117'.t" Stiipii'N r. Edwards, &c. Co. 808', 8»)8>« V. Llano Co. IKl'" r. Woliln){ton Stapk-ton >■. Kin^ Starkey i: IVople Siarr r. Coin. Slarratt r. Mullen State r. Ahlxitt 1*. Ah ('huey V. Aldricli I'. Allen V. Alston I'. Anderson V. Anitelo r. Aridier — — I'. Arnold c. Ayer I'. Hadey r. Maker I'. Italdwin r. Itaninler r. Hanks I'. Barber V. liartlett are to pages. State I'. Brown c. Bruce V. Butiington V. Burton I'. Beal I'. Beoho I'. Iti'hrnian V. Belcher r. Ilelknap '■. Belton c. Benner V. Bertin I'. Blackburn ,'. Blake r. Bli/e I-. Bloom r. BoKwell I', Bowe i; Bowen r. Bowman n. Boy<l I'. Branhani r. BraNcainp i: Britt r. Brookuhire V. Itnmghton 808^' BOS*" 470" 47()>« 27»VJ JJ1J6 80f)i" 470" 2f)7< C88", 688<», fiSH* 1»78«" 2r)7''", '.I7rt''* a»)6"', 470'' 022-'* 21" 022^' y78" 470* 1179«, 1170«', 1I7!H« 1I71H' 2r.7<« fl22'"', 022-' 801'', :wi'', lUir'", 170^ f)H8« 910'", '.iin'* 022«, 978*, 07H''", '.t7H«'' ;ic..".'" 470'", 170" ;i>>i<" »:t:.J 267''«', 2r."f-' 2r)7«" 088-' 2 1 '-" i>HH* 21" 088» 688*, ..HS'f- 2 1'" ;10.V' 078", 978^'' f)88'^ GSS', GSS*", 808", 8089 064", 6H8''i t;22'' 664'' . r. Cadwell f)227 •I-. Cain 368-', :!!»l'" B. Cake 117y*MI7'.t« V. Caldwell 470" I'. Calhoun 022* ' V. Callahan (i:!6" r. Cameron 470'* V. Carr 688'", 122!t-" I'. Carrick 688', 688^, 6^8••" V. Cass 8<W-' r. Center 470'\ 470'«, 470''', 470", tl22'' — V. Central, &c. R. R. — r. (^ImmbiTlain — I'. (^haml>cr8 — e. Church — I'. City of Dubuque — I-. Clark — II. (Clifford Clinton Clothier Cole Col well Cook C(M)per I'. Coupenlmvcr r. Crab c. Crawford I'. Crockett Cronin ('r< •■•"in Cr.. Crowson Daley Danforth Daniel Darnell David Dawson De «iraflr Delesdenicr Denny District Board Doni'lon Dooley Dooris DoMKlass Drake Duncan Dunwell Kddon Edwards ■ I'. ■ I'. ■ I'. ;i.>8'-i ih;;--" 688', yio-jo 2 1'"' 2 1 "• 301*', 117j''' 688"* 1220''', 122!>"' 117'.l*'i 62* Elllotte KIIwikmI Evans Kasiiett Fells Fil'/huKh Kilxnimmons Kulweil 078" 910" 21" fi-i-w' fi.15', OKP* 270", 27tl'» 6r)44 4703 62' 27(1* 588"', 688'W 2ri7'" :«1,-)* 470'J 688'^ 1229"! «;t6« 68816, 12-20" J 21" 21'" 978*6 688'.M 117'.t'" 267'", 91 Of', 01 iy> 688'*, 688", .'■>HH'" 6HH-'« 21*) 470* 688", 910', PIO», 010--J 0IO« 470'", 470'^ 470'» '.i78«» 27C,'i« ft22'J", •122''' WH''''. fiKHW 470', 470'» 978'-', 97Si» 267'» ccxiviii AMKUICAN TATtLK OF CASES. Rnfereiii^oa are to pkgei. I'tnH State V. Foot You 470«, 470", 470>'i State 1-. Kidd 022^ V. Ford '2.'>7'" . Kimball iHir" r. Fox ;{',(H« 1 . Kindle 470'',470" V. Frct'iimn 301*", '.t7S<« , KinK 267»» ,257*", . ■«•!•' rj-i'.K'" 1 . Kingsbury 97H« r. (Jiirrctt n<).-)*', fjHK-' . Kinli'y l»7H<'i r. (iarvi-y 688->, r,hK---!, f)hK« . Kiniipy ;i'.tl*' i: (iiiy 1-J2'J'«, lU'JU"' V . Kiia|ip 267'* 267''», 267*", ;{(!r.", I', (ii'dicke liitl"' 3051", :!<.tl*' r. (ii'or^u 688', GKH'", !l7h'* 1 . Knowlcs 688» V. UiTiiiun &88-, f)8K' 1 . Koontx ]22!tw — — r. (ieHt'll I»7H-'" . Laii^ford 910' /•. (iilo 470"' 1 . Lanier 267« c. (iiliimn 588- 1 . La|)aKe 267'* r. (ilyiidcn 6881 t . Lei- Doon 9781'. <)7K^-i f. (Jl villi 078"'' Lewi 183**, 978*" — — I', (ioilw \ «2'2*' ,it. .ifleU: 0366 1»78" ^I'jrr3 688'T — — r. (iorliam 688"i, r)88-!'- , .1 !»78« —^ V. (ioNROtt 688>'' /ison 588>, 688-'' r. ( ioyotte 21 wi . N . :;i)ii Coi V Ct. 21-' r. Oriiy ol'^-' •. Martin 978*' c. Gri'Kory .'tUl-! . Mayes 078M r. (iuriice 368i«, 368-!< •. McAllister 267« r. Iliibib 688"' •. McHryde 62' V. Unnan 078>'', 978», 0781!', 'J78-!' •. McClain 3111 r. IlalHti-ad IJ-W* '. McDonnell 6882, 688" — — 1'. Ilaiiiiibul, &c. It li, W.ii* •. McCahey 078*'', 97H« r. Hiinsi'ii 688'" '. McCIU ;;r.82i c. Iliirnravo :ji»h> •. Medlicott 470'. no'-' 1". Ilitrpor 47(>'' 1 •. N'ellican tl22-» . I'. Harrison 688--I •. Merrill 2.-.7-'" r. lliirvi-y 1229-', 122!H" ■. Mc.vherter 02-J" I'. lluNtinga 122'.t'''" i;. Mi.hael 910*. 91(K> , 910", 9 K »--■«, ^-^ r. Iliiwii ".I78*'' '.HO * 2i»7, tiisn' •. Miller C36<. 036«, t;:;6« V. Ilaywiinl 0:!iV '. Miiinick 21"* 1". Ilazlcton (•.22« .— . •. Mitcliell 688'2 c. 1 IfdKepatIi 622', ■.)'.•)"' ■. Molier ' (i;!6> ,: llci'd «:!')- '. Montgomery 078'* 18:i'", 18:{<'' •. Morris 21* 21« — — r. Ilirscll 27<V' '. Morrison 27(i* V. HodRO 62', 18;{''" •. Moy Looke 62'" r. Hollinsclu'it 688' '. Munson 688» 868" 40316, 4(|;pr) (,7j^M '. Murfrcesboro 21 '2 • I'. Morton :i(i.v, ;!".tl'' '. Murray 2o7''», 68H« — — I'. Howard 301«, 6.-.l'i, r)SH«, '. Nasli 4701H 'JW^, 'Jl(»-i •. Neil! Id 0-0 r. Hoyt r.*.'2'' '. Nettlebush r,(Y^ —— V. Hiitcliinflon 1171»«J '. Nilea 391*^, 31il« — - 1'. Iiitox. Liquors ;>l'Jn •. Nixon 978" i: Jackson 621" •. Noelon 470», 470K V. Janii'i 6221T >. Norris 07H'" 21", 2111 '. Nortlirup 267"' r. .TefTerson 267''<' V. I'earce 9102< — r, .loost 427" >. IVnninKton 2121. I.IIOI!) r. JoluiHon '21-''. 26712, 4701", 47(»i«, •. Perkins 267* ■, 267", 664' MO"' f.88"', 688-», tl78« '. I'ettaway tyj.m ,: Jolly iun-'n •. riiair 40324, 4fMii r. Jones 27G'\ 391«<, .10l<\ :wi*', 470^, 688'^, 688'^» •. I'lielps -. rinllips 0102> 688« — - r. Jordan 'J7811 •. Pike .Vii OlO" •. I'lym 183" 1B3»*, is:!<' t'. .hirclie 621 r. Pool 470' V. Killy isaw 1'. Powers 21*", 2121 m Sh^ suite V. Pratt 1^. lingsilale r. Kawls i: Kay c. liaymond V. Ked r. Heed V. liiglitg r. liixirigues c. Uugurg r. Hood I'. Iiui;an f. Itussell c. Kalge V. Saunders c. SayiTS r. Seliilling r. Scott c. Severson c. Seymour r. Slirtfl'er i: Sliaw r. Slielton r. Sliiiford r. Sibley c. Simon i>. Smilii I'. Snow r. Soj)er V. Sparrow I'. Spenco r. Stade r. Staley r. Stallings r. Stitnley c. Staton r. Sti'bbins — ^ I'. Stepben I). Sterrntt 1'. Stokeley I'. Streeter r. Sullivan r. Swayzo r. Swift r. Talxjr V. Tnlbert V. Tally r. Tatro /•. Taylor c. Terrell I'. Thomas r. Tlionipson r. Tilgliman r. Tompkins r. Trivas r. Turner i: Tweedy r. Twitty V. Ulrioh I'. IJmblo r. Underwood r. Viiigneur i: Vann AMERICAN TAULK OP CASES. R«fere»ceii are to page*. State i^. Vaughan V. Vollander 978" 078" 078« 183«,188'>,368',0;{6' 58H' 267*', 470'", 561», 688* 18;!" 688i' 688'' 267«'' 470», (CJfV 078". 078''" 470<, 470'«, 470" y78»» 1229"> 62' S686 470'S 27fr' 47(H 267* 688* 478», 470'''. 47(t'« 3(16* 62' 022*' 78", 978'*, 078'», !»78'«. 078" 1220'" 1170i:> 078** 267"' y78''''i 078" 035*, 0:{.V 62« 622*, 622'''', 022'* t)22^'» fl35», 035' 470' 18H' 4701" 257-* 470' «22''' 68»n , 978", 078*" ' 47(»«; 257«, 078'" I 2\^, 1220«', 1221M ! 52" I 1220«», 122()»', 122!t«i, 122l>"-' 470'* •122' 470* 1179", 1170'^ 2I« 470' 010», OIO'" 68tf", 588** Wagner r. WaUh • I'. Walters V. Walton c. Ward ■ r. Warner r. Warren i". V. V. V. i\ i>. V. r. V. V. V. V. V. i>. Watson Watt Walters Way Weiners Wcldoii Wells Went worth West fall White Whitson Whiitier Whitwortb Williams /•. Wilner V. Wilson 0. Wingo r. Winningham V. Winston o. Wood V. Woodrutr r. Woodside i>. Wright r. /ellars State Hank r. Cnrran Steamboat Co. c. Hrockett Stearns r. Doe r. Mall V. Merchants' Bank Stoddard v. Durton Stokes f. Dawes f. Mackcn V. I'eople —— r. State Stone u. Hunt V. Ins. Co. V. State Stow r. Converse Stcwe r. HiHliop Stebbins r. Duncan Steeil I'. Knowlcs Steele v. Lord r. Wood Steeples v. Newton Stein (■. Bowman Stelner r. Jester V. Snow r. Stranum SteinbofT i'. M'liae Steinmetz v. Versailles Turnpike Stephen v. State ccxlix 470i» 0I(».«> 2H, 21» 21*', 2I*'», 47(t» 078^' 257», 257'*. 078** 47(t' 7', 078"*, 1229**, 122IHH 3'.tl*' 078» ti;]5*, C35», 078*0 688'* 427'^ 257'' :kJ5'» OKM lai*. o;!5« 257"', 588'T 470:, 010" 0J2'l 470* 910*, 910».01»--J, 0I()*« 078"» 21'«, 470'T I8;!« 18;!*', »7()', 470^', 47(»'» 27f.7 588'* 5H8-'« ((.'(51 .•!tl5« 010"* 183*» y78"'' 21 '» 301-'' .•i58*'« 808« 970-'", 07H-', 078*» I8:t^« 427" 2I» 427'", 078*'. 078*-> laSi^ 257*". 257*» 270» 978"« Sgi", 688''^ 257« 554'* 358''« 368", 36HJa 358a' 3586, 4(j;;JH, 022-^ OlO'T, 654> 257" f.22' 1220*' 1170*' 1220<» 808'» 21 « 21-'* m Stephens c. Bernays Stephenson i;. Bannister 11 79", 1170^<* 1179^ lH!''!=ii 9i ii h ■ < ■I' '. ool AMKKK.'AN TAULK OK CASES. StiTtz r. Stewart Stfttiuur V. White Sti'vi'iiH 1'. Koniiir — V. McNaniara V. Mik'H — V. n. H. II. State V. Sttjveiu V. TuW .Sti'veiirton I', Hoy I.', suite Stewart i-. Kverta V. Scott — — V. SoniiL'horn — — V. Swaiizy Sticr V, Osknloosa Stiles >'■ KaHliiian I'. KMtnbriiok Stinelifielil r. Kniurgoii Stindc ". (■(Kxlricli Kidgway Kuf«roni:ea 1831", ih;i»i •Ml'-' 368 -a ;ii)8'ft 368", ;i(I.JJ- ilDl'''' ao8'i' 117l)'^ 117»'», 117'.»'". 1171)^', 1171)'* 21" o;ir>< 078" ]8:t''7 18;J'^ 183«, 18:i''' «re to pagoi. SwHiiii r. Il(>u8mnn UIO" Sweet i: Slieriimn 257'", \)~W'* Swi'i((«rt i: liicliarda I'J'Jl*'''* Swift r. Mum. &c. Co. ai>l« Swift Kietiric lAf^Ut Co. v. Grant 078M Swinit r. French 427'" Swinnerton r. Columbia Ini. Co. 21*', 21* Synie v. Stewart b'I\ &2'» St(M'kbriilKe i: West StoukbridKu SlokcH V. II. S. Story i>. Kimball r. I<<ivett Stralton ''. Ilawkw StrauHS c. Hodeker r. (iroBS Street V. State Strickler i>. Burkliolder Strinijfellow v. State Strode t'. (-hurchill Stroii({ i>. Bradley I'. Brewer Slrotlicr r. (Christy V. liUcas Stroud I). Tilton Stuart r. Havens Stubbs V. State Studley ». Hall Stud«till I'. State Stiill I'. ThonipHon Stiinnn r. Huniniel Slurla V. Freccirt Succession of Delauhaise ''■ Magin nis Succession of .Fustiis Sur'cession of Morvant Sullivan r. Collins V. Coin. r. I lense I'. Kuykendall r. I.ear r. State V. Sulliviin Sumner r, Hiiiir Sun Accident Ahs. r. King SuKi|iH!lianna, &c. Ins. Co. t dorf Sutton I'. .Tohnslono Swain V. (Jliciicy - V. Comslock Swan V. Humplireys u. Morgan 1171»'« I22!»'"' 117!>w I221r- 3riH" 8(»8-^i 808'"' 267', 2f)7'^' 27tr' f»78* inic", ii-ir* 117!l»'* 122l»-i' 117IM* 122(V'^ r-WIK-e 403", 40:5», 403"', 4(J3« a(i6»", 806", ;Mi6i» 21i» «22W 21« ;]«i6'' 11 70" 27«« 11711'"' 1229", 122H''''' 808'' 470» 21" 183"' 808« 470« IP.O^' 978M, "I?*"* •.)10"< Mar- 368», SiW-) 62'^' 403'^ 4«3^' 211.1 fl22'" 462" TviT r. H'lll Talbot c. Seaman Talbott r. Hedge Tains V. Bullitt Tarbox v. State Tate I'. I'enne v. Tate Taulnian c State Taylor, AV Taylor ». Bank V. Crockett r. Fvans I', (iodfrey /'. (iould r. Horsey .•. reck .-. K. U. r. State 391* fi2'\ 117U» 12293*, ]2'.".fW 2I8« 267'" «22» 4&2«, C22'», 022'«, (136< 91()'» 891 » 1179W 808*', wm 022? 462* 891U 664' 301", 664 1» 688', 688'«, 688-', 078", 97h"' (;22"'' 688» 1229'" 267" 257«'', 267M 62« 470< Ilell- 27(1'» 21"» 664", 664» 267« R Tays i: Carr Teacliont r. People Teall r. Van Wy«!k Tedeiis c. Sehiiiners Teese v. Huntiii|{don Teipel v. HilsendeKcn Temple V. State Temple St. Cable K. man Templeton i>. Morgan Tennant v. Dudley Tenney r. Tuttle Tennis v. Rapid Transit Ry. Co. :W\'^ Teiisley r. I'enniman 368'* Terra ilaiite R. R. r. Stoekwell :S68i> r. V<ielker 62'' Terrill r. Bcccher 4(J3'^ 4()3» 'I'erritory r. Fly 122J1' Terry i: Birmingham Nat. Bk. 403" Tessmaii ('. Supreme Comn'iiindery ll7tX^' Tessniann n. I'liited Friemls 1179" Tt'wksbury c'Vicliulenberg 21"* Texas, &e. Coal Co. e. Liiwson 403", 978» Texas, &e. R. R. i: Barron 8W1»« c. Black 21«l v Chapman 62< V. Robertson .191 '• Thayer c Boyle 267*. 267" Tlieilmnnn r. Burg 21 It Third Nat. Bank c. Owen 978' Thoni r. Hess 564>-', 664'» Thomas c Com. 21'". 2r« r. Dunn 1229* v. Haniniond 808' >: llerrall SOI"" V. (iago 664« AMKItlCAN TAULK OK CASKS. KeferoiK'Os are to paK"*- Tlinmni r. Ciriflin r. Keniuuly r. I'eoplu I'. State r. ThoinnN Tlininpitdii i>, Bfll c. Kisxtoii I'. Kriu Kail way Co. V. liiTniiin Valley K. Co, ,: llnskuH '•. IhIi i: Maxwell r, Miianer r. Stnto V. Stownrt r. Wcrtz Tli()iii8(>n I', I'ortcr (W2" HOM-' IW, 267'w. IT)?'* lli-J'.t" 1h;!>- w»«-'i iip" .•HM'*' WW" llV'.t". IIT'.M' 1»7H'-. '.ITH*" 21», llTil^, II7iii» »7H" 4(5.')l, 403«. •lO.J'a TlioiiiNoii-IIouHtoii Elcutric Co. r riiliner .n.W*' TliDriiton r. Thornton 1)7SW, Jl7«f""' 'riirirp V. (ioi'woy (122" 'riiruslier i'. Kvurlmrt 62'*, W'' r. Ingram IHO", 117'J'''. 1I7'.»•'^ ll7'J-», ll71t-7 ThrcadKill v. White &rt\i 'riiiirnian i<. Caiiu'ron 117'.>'" 'I'liiinnond i'. (Mark wm* 'I'liurdton r. Mastorion 1220«, 122".t-* r. Whitney 010", IMO'-' Tilihalsi V. IfDunil :!oK" Tilk r. I'arHon* :(Hl" 'rilli.-, 'I'ho ih:i« 'l"illoti<on I'. Warner 1170''», 1 WiC' r. WohJwr ll7'.t'' TiiiKley r. Kairhaven Land Co. ;i'.M " Tinker r. State 21''» TiHclale r. Conn. &c. In*. Co. !«;»'■"' Titus r. Ash 257", '2u''^, '.•78'" Tolmcco Co. I'. MuElwco A') I'* Tohins r. Treist 07H'- Tol.in r. Sluur IS/F*. ;!'.tl»'' Todd r. Itowlcv 257*' Toledo, &f. M.'n. V. Bailey '.t7S'J Tolinan v. Knier«on IhW", 18.T», 1221t*' r. Wiird WW-t ToLson I'. Iidand, &<!. Congting Co. 270'' Tome i: I'arkeriliurK Branch U. It. 122'J-", V22f.V^ Tondinson r. (Ireenfluld 21*' ToinH r. Heche (122" Tooker r. (iornier 551' Toole r. Nieiiol 1I7«»' Tooiiier I'. <tnilMiion •l(t;i<'> Toplitz r. Iledden *MH** Torlierti'. WiUon 1I71)-'" Tottenc. II. S. (122'" Towie r. Hhike :H»1 *' Town of So. Ottawa i'. IVrkins 21'" TowiiMi'iid r. State fi2' Traction Co. c Hoard of Wnrku 11711', 1171V*'. 1171)11, ii7<HJ, H7'.i<'' Traniincl! c Ilndnion 452" r. McDade l)7K*> I'. I'ilnriin WW' TravollcrH Inn. Co. i-. Sheppnrd 391'«,;«)1"* I Traviii r. Hrown Trcnicr r. Stewart Trinihle r. Kdwarda Trout I-. Virxinia K. It. Trujillo r. Terr. Tucker r. Constable c. Donald /'. Kiiicli c. Hyatt ('. IVaHleo c. Smith f. State r. WeUh Tudor Iron Works i>. Weber Tufts r. Charlcstown Tnley r. Harton 80H' Tully r. Kitchburn U. K. Tunstall r. ('oltb TurnbuU v. I'ayson cell 1221V''' 21" 21"', ;158" 52'' 078-', '.t78-:.' ;('.»i'' (122'' 122'J'''' 2W, .•t'.tl'' 4I2», n2'» 21" U78'» 805'' 554" wrn'T !t(l5'J r. Kichardson Turner r. Dewiin c. Kish V. Lulling r. State i: Turner r. Waddington r. Warren Turner's Kstatc Tiirney r. State Turnipseed o. Hawkins Turnpike ('o. r. lleani Tuttle I-. Fitchliurg K. U. I', (iridley I'. Hainey Tutton r. Darke Tyhh-n r. Hiillen Tyler c. Flanders c. Old Colony U. R. r. Todd Tyson r. Uootli 808" :i»i5"<, 122!l'\ I221>"» •2l\ 1171»'", 1171V'-. Il71t'» 21H' 452'' 21" 257" 306'», 47()» 8()8-'> 117'.t" (122" (»22» 078'" 1221M> 257" 257' 010", '.»I(»" 2r« 1221>'» 427' :iiir* 1221H7 267'« Ui.oKHzooK i: Com. 2W; ;jr.5» lldy I'. Stewart 52", '.Wt'^ I'fford r. Spaiilding 52"'' ridman /•. Arnlioldt.&c. Brewing Co. 18;5'i nimiiii r Hahcock 122'.)"? Union r. IMaintlehl 427", 427* I'nioii Hunk r. Kiiapp 4(1:1'", 4(1:1^ I'nion I'ac. K. U. v. Botsford :!(I5', ;JC.5'>, ;i()5"' — I'. Kcese I'nion Stove Wks. I'lils ». Arnoux 1' S Clwirllon I'. Aiiiedy ;i(15'« 1»78« 808'' <.t77" 117!V'« 21"" I's;!* isn*", l8:i''« 52> 21" ((MM) American OoUi Coin ■ I'. Anthony ' r. Halicoirk ' r. Haltlste •r. Heche 21', 21-'". I17!V* ■ r. Hredenieyer 257'"'', 257''' i: Hritlon :t58i" r. Hums 21-!' c. Charlos 022" .•. Collins JW6» llilit'l :^iii 4* * AMKIMCAN TAHLR OF CASKS. 1 1 j 'U KefereiirflH are tn ptgei. U. S. V. Ducourncau 21"" Vicknair i^ Trngclair 8n8J", ditf'" c. Fuller 21", 21'" Vickgburg U. K. «. t )'Brien atH '". .'I'.il "', —— V. (■(><iiiiii({ WVi aui-', '.tTM^i i\ (iunncll 267*' /•. Putnam H'.il"'' i: llaiiwiiy oar.i Vijjnie v. Mrady 8(»8.» V. llanii'H (•.«6" Vi^uH r. O'liannoii 27(1» r. 1 lay ward 27ti< Nillajie of Ponca »•. Craw ford 'iSW" V. Illlltll 47(t' VilhiKf of Winoohki v. Gi key 21 1« 1'. Jac'kiilow 21 M Vinal r. (iilinan 4:«t'» I', •lack.xoii 2 Hi Vincent v. Siata \nW; OlO", 1II0--J I'. Jolin-; 21^ 1170», inSH"' ViniiiK r. Baker 18:r-* a. jDurilinc J5'.»F'i Vinton <•. Peck ?A\N\ Vl'l^f't, 1229«. 122iri V. KIrkwiMMl r>H«i Violet V. Bose 1221 1^" 21 u Volkenaiid r. Drum 808-'» .-. Mayflild WMl' Voorhies r. IlennenHy 808^" r. MoHi'g «22« Vosburnh r. Thayer 4fl.T', 4r,.:« V. Niirdullo JJ'.tH^t VoHc V. .Manly n7it-'« /•. Nott 688>«, 6HK-'i Vrietg r. Hmkko 27(i"> r. I'alriier 2H i;. Heyburn ;;r.K-i !•. Keyni-g 21' Wadi.ki.i: v. N. Y. Sc. B. B. 8nr« V. Kiciiard 5«H-'-' WaddinKhiini r. Iliilett 257«, 2f)7« c. Ititcliie 21" Waddinf^ton v. CoiiKing 122'.^'" f. KoKg 183««, 1HH*7 Waddle r. Owen MIH' !•. Sfliiii'ider 470' < Wade r. State nio«, iMO" c. 'reschiiiuker 2im. Wakefield v. Boss lilO", Ul()''» V. Turner 21'" WailiritlKe r .loiieg 427' <•. Inion I'nc. K. U. 21-<1 Waideler. N. V. (Vn. &c. R. 470' r. Vim Liiiveii r,:jiy> VValden r. Canfidd 2r" ,: VaiisK'klo 2G7« 257", Vf."'" V. Finch <I78-'^ — — r. WJKKiiiH IHiJJ', 1I7!)'' Walker r. Allen 2111ft V. Williams 6H8'" V. ("urtis r)2" V. Wood fl;{6i, ^•.:^^)J r. Detroit, &c. B. U. 270", 1>78'" i;. S. Bank r. Biini:.n 4(W»-i V. Greenlee ;J68i U. S. SiiKar Hefinery v. E. P. Alli« r. MnrBeilles 4621 Co. 3r)8'> V. Murray 427» U. S. Vinegar Co. v. Foclirenbach 117»'-^ V. Sanborn (122' V. State 470-, [i&8i, 010*. f»l(»i«. Vaiii.e v. RrackonBeik 2119, 21-* r. .Steele 122'.l«» Valentine c. I'ipor 18.'5^^ 122'J5" V. Stetson f)2''' Van Alotyne »•. Smith tl22^ Wt8-'i — V. Wheatly 8(I8-H Van Bokkelen v. Taylor H(W', mit^' Wall r. l)ov(.y 4(];5ii, 4(iii« Van Himkirk v. Mulock 1171t", IK'.M-i Wallace r. Fletcher 183*', 18:(<H Vance v. Vance 2'')7'" !•. Ilarrig 18;5-'« Vamlcrlin i> ilovia W)8'' r. Howard 427« Vandorvoort /•. Coiimibian In».Co. 1170W I'. Kennolly 218* Vanderwerkcr r. People 2r.*' r. State 4701* Van DeiiKen r. Turner 412'' r. Towngcnd «f)8" Van (;iinden r. Vn. Coal & Iron Co. 8f.Hii White 2r,76< Van Kirk i: Scott 808' Waller i-. Klevei-th School District it-Wi* Van Hi per r. Morton 117!ti V. Graves 2* Van Sickle r. Gibson 427" Walgton r. Com. 4701S 470*i>* r. People P22JK"' Walter r. lloelTner S»78'« Van Storch v. Griffin 2.-)7*' Walton r. Coulsoii 1831 7, 122',ii', I22!ti», Van Svckcl v. Dalrymple 808'" 122!)-'i, 1221t'K' Van Wyck v. Mclntogh 1220", 122fV'', Ward, Kstate of 4(i:!-" r^aiK-", i22<««=' Ward V. Henry 21 19 VnnK'n Case 470", 47016 1'. Mclntogh 18H« Vamlne v. Wilding IKi'i* c. Saunderg ino"", ii7'.»«« Vau|;lian c. Com. 4701-, WX^* r, State 6881* r. State ♦i:ir^ c. Vounp; !»78''' Velfen >■. Carmack 808*> Ware v. Ware 276". 270i« Viall I'. Smith 427», 42711 Warener i". Kin);f)mitl 1170» 117<.t« Vickers v. Battershall 8(>8''» Waring i-. U. S. Telg. Co 664* W( AMKKK'A.N TAHLK OF CA.SES. I'l'liii Warlick r. Wliite WuriiiT r. Colli. r. State Warri-ii r. Cliapnian c. (iabrit'l WaitlniliaiiKli c. Kiitrikvii WHHiiiiiKloii I'. Stall- Watfriiiaii r. Wliiiiiey WalkliiN r. Iloliiiaii /■. I'aiiK- WatroiiB r. McOnw WatKim r. liruwHtur r. (Join. ,: Millor r. Tindal V. Walker Wattti I-. Kilburn /'. Owens Waii-kon-cliaw-iU'ck-knw r Wi.y c. Uiitterwortli r. t'ross WeHtlieruly v. W'eatlifi-.sly Wi'aver »'. (iaingvillo i: McKllieiior r. Wliil.Iuii Wi'lil) V. State Wi'l)l(er I'. Dunn WelKT r. Cable l{y. Co. r. Illin)( Webster r. ('allien c. Wootilbnl Weiluwood'g Ciiso Wcekit i». MciUer Weitnmn c. 'I'liiot Welch 0. Abbot Welder e. Mc(7onib 306", ;itir)-' lIT'.t'" 1»7«-''' 07H-», II78* llT'.t';' \)~H*!; 1»7H'» .'!'J|'», ;l',M" 1I71M ll7'.i-'i il»l'", 4'1'\ \'2-M» ((:;.)«, (CliV HOH"", 1»7.S', '.»7«" ih;i'" 21-, 117'J'«, n7!t«, U7i»'i r-'-_'i»\ i2'j!ii" Re(er«ii<'«i am to iwgea. WliilHker i\ Sulinbury U.S. •J27" it7H''' (•.22--' 4tl;ii« HOHl'i W1H"> •-M-' 12-", I"' '.t78'^ '.t7H-:< 62" HOHA 11 7111' HOH-M 1171M' WI8'« I'JJ'.t-i 078", '.t7H"" 1171)^' Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway aOH'', 6.^)4 n Wells w. Hatch •ItCliJ r. Jackson Iron Mfg. Co. 21>«, 21'' WellH, &c. K.\. r. Fuller 8')H» Welsh V. Barrett -IBIV*. 4(i:r'-i r. State 270' Weiiilellc. Abbott 412\ 117'.»''i Wendt r. St. I'.uil 078««, 078'"', '.178'" Wentworth r. Wentworth 18:1"' Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co. :J!)P. H'.tl'' West r. Fleek H(I8" f. State \SS-\ 18.T''J,452',47(y', 122H-'-. 12211'" Western U. Tel. Co. v. Cline JJoS'', :!.'iH-i I'. Collins nriHii r. Ilenilerson oltj'"* r. Shutter :;r)H"i r. Stevenson .'i.')H' Wetherbee r. Dunn 21" I'. Xorris 2J7*' Welzler r. Kelly *!«' Wli.trton I'. DoiiglasB 8M*-< Wheat i: State 27tt'' Wlieel.lon r. Wilson 2' Wheeler c. WeliMer 21^« Wheeloek c Boston & Albany R. Co. .V2-> Whelan i'. I.yneh HUlw Whitaker i;. I'arker 1221H« -•. White Wliiteher r. Sbatluck White r. Ballou r. Com. r. Dwiiiel r. Flelliiiitt I22y'*, l^21»'^ .»i,;i-'' ;iii|'" 'JlO', iiKI" 11 TIM" l,s;[''' i: Milwaukee City K. U. aOi". .•;().)'- r. I'litciiix Ins. Co. 21-" r. SdIoiiioii 12211'' r. State 688' ', 978-', 1)78-"' r. Sirollier 427'^ i: Whitney 40;{<, 4Cii'», Hi::-' r. Wood 122U" White Suwiii); Machine Co. v. Gor- don 1220<'> Whitehead v. Jessup 808» r. Park 808'' Whitehoiise i\ Biekford 117!t'-''. 117'.t'^ WhitiiiK .'. Nieholl 18:i'», 18;i»'\ 18;!'" Whitley >: Imj. Life. v<,c. Co. 18:!'" i: State 47(1'" Whitman r. Morey 1'78-' r. Shaw 12211-' (-.State 21'-', 21" Whitmore v. Dwelling House Ins. (;o. 18;!'' Whitiiev V. Bacon 412' r. Bayley :i.'>8" c. Clark 8081' r. (iauche 21" r. Thacher .'K»l"-- r. Wall 808* Whitoii e. Albany, &c. Ini. Co. '2V^, 2H' 117'J', 1171." Whittier i-. Franklin 2.">7*- Whitton r. Stale 18;!< Wickencanip ».'. Wickencainp 07.->'* Wickersimm e. Johnston 52'', 1170H, 117'J-*', 117»»^ Wijrjjin r. Pluiner 1221t-'' Wi^r^il,H Kerry Co. i-. C. & A. It. Co. 21'* Widnlesworth r. Steers 808-"" Wike )'. Lijjhtner 267"' Wilber r. Kieholtz 122!t"- Wilbur r. Flood 078* 078 '1 Wilburn d. State ,n68i' Wilcox r. Henderson 27<|i- »'. Cnti- 808'" Wibler r. Cowles 27f.'' Wildriek r. Swain 80S'ii Wiley «. Athol ;!0i'' V. Kwalt «08*>, 808^1 Wilhelmi r. lA>onard 1I78'« Wilkerson r. State 470«, 022* Will of Khie ]8:iw Willett V. Kich 270" Williams V. Brickell a68»", ;V^8l' )'. Com. ;ioii t>. Conner V>'vr'.i 1'. Deen 1220^- V. Finlay C2». 62"! ('. Fisher 8081 r. Urealy 62* m Ml liif iiiifi ccliv AMEUUUN TAIILK OF CASKS. Re(i<ranci» •!« to pagsf. . 1 ,1 Willinma ; . Groy r. (lunter I'. .Ifiikina V. Mitcliull f. Mowvr I'copio 36b", 3&8'> mi" S(W'" 664 > Slate 21=". 2r;i, 2r>7««, fJ'S' 6HH"^. r.««"', 688^' 688*,U10*',«78^', 122".!*». I221t"" I-. Waucr »7«' f. WalkiT 1»78-' i>. WiiiLTi n"i8>«. wiH'i r. Wilki'n 117»M', Il71»w c. WilliHIIIR WilliiiiiiHun I'. Hrniidciihorg .'. CuniliriilKi! H- K, Williiik >. Mili-M WilliH /•. Stiito Willllll^lllly II. Carlctoii c. iH'Wi'jr Wills V. Slut.' WilliUT r. Inrill'l Wiliiiiiixtdii r. MiirlinKtnn WilHoii I'. Iii-uiu:liuiii|t .'. Itiicrcni - c. ( 'Hr|i('iiti>r'ii AUin'r r. |)wn . . Dcrr r. (iiKiilin r. (irHiiby - I'. lli)(ll('U c. Mc(Mi>iiny . . M.-lvin — — r. Miiim'H|i()liN, &t'.. I c. I'liii-iiix, &u. Co. f, ToWlTI V. Stale n7'.»*' •'!■-■? ll"'.!'" 6l!8*>, MH-' 2l8t 47(»», 1»7H<" •lt):i" r. Vim Ia'UI' r. W"K,.r —— r. \\ Niiii r. WrlKlit Wilt r. Hir.l r. CiilliT \Viiiiliii>li I'. Slnlo Wiiiicr I'. Smilli Wilirll r. .N'ciriniui Wiinlir I' l.itllc Wiim . Aliliiill Wiiiiii|iiitfiiKi'i' I<iik(' 427* 47(»i W»8'" 8(m", KOH" 4n;i''' :i!ii*' WIH I HUH''" 27«>" l{. ;iri8"', :i.')8" 1I7U-!-' 8(W'" i67«", 267", •.t7H«'', lt7N'\ 1(7 H« 2r'»", as-"", ■■■■r, r.'2i»-; ia;j', 4«:i''. m' Wiimliiii I', fiinP'T Wlll»|l'« !• ('ill t 1 llrixkfll Wiimtoii >'. liroiviiiK Wiiiiirit r Karl Wimjiiin r l(i>i'Vi'ii Wi»i' r. W \ nil WiKIIIIIIII !■ N I'uc H H WilcliiT r. Mi'I.iiiikIiIiii Wllllil' I Unwi' Wiiliiirn '' lli-ii«liiiw Willi' I'. i.nrliiiiiiii 1 I'i'rrviimii Wolff V. Dyir ill;!'* t.'.Hl'' firil"' f.-.f"> 12VMI"" ' ■J2'.i''''', iVj'.i"' ' "iwi', :!,''i8" 122'.»"' 427^ ;ir.K", .•s.-.Mi ' (.'(). r. Viitlllir ".M", 2l-''. 21" 18; I'" AM', »78"» 81 IM'^ HOHJ I22'.t-' 127^. 427'. 127' jiriM"', ;i.'i8" 427', 4ti;t'" •Mb', ;i(i:.' H22I" .'t;.H'7 267'' W>8» 21" Wolfe r. McMillan Wdltfr. Van lloimen Woinack r. licnriiiaii r. Wainl.U- WiiniliTly r. Iliilincii Lumber Cu. WockI v. ('Iielwuiiii I', ("iillen V. Mc(iuire's Children I'. Moriarty — r. r. s. W llH'i'k r. Keller WiiiiilliriilKe. &c. Co. v. Hiller 808« tt78<» IK*'", 117'.»''» Kllh« Wt8» 1122' :».i8'«' l»78ft» 8118^ 2ri7i» r.;j6i, ii;i6» n7'.t« Wouilbury r. Dintriet of Columbia 1)78'*, II78W f. Wooilliury 4t.:!" Wooilbury (iranilc Co. r. Milliken Ct'^' Wooilfonl I . VcCleiialiaii 12.'ll ', r.'2'.t-" Wiioilnian r. Sr^iir Woiiilrii'k r. Woodriuk WoniU I', naiika r. rcoplo I . Wililer Wiioilwiir'l I'. CliicaRo, &c r. llnncoi'k r. I.envilt Wiioilwnrlli I. Mills Wiiolfork i: Slali- WoolKy r. 'rnmii'i'it Wiiiilverloii I' Siiiiuier ' VooHler r SiHir Woolen r. WilkiiiM iVorcexler .N'al. Itaiik v. r. NorllilioriiU|;li WiirLiiiKnii'ii'ii Itiink Wiirlcy, Ailiii. I'. Ilini'Mian WiiriiiHilorf r. Di'iriiil, &u. Ity. Wi>r||iiiiKii)n r. Scribner Wriiy r. Wniy Wri'ire r. Winlcott Wriulil r. liny r. Ilawkinii r. ilerm-V I III. Hr. Tel. Co. I'. MrKee U It. 122'.ti». 1221I"' 1)7 8«« 1 1 7'.H<'i 2fi7'« 2 1*' 21 " «22-'« 2/i7^« 2ri7'«. fiHMJ 1178'* •, ll7'.i''' IMO'" ;r.ti''i 47(1' 21 • 117!!' 2I'« 1h;p« 2fi7'' Cheney Con Verve Wroe l'liilli|i« Skinner Smif Wrij;lit v Stale Wynn e. Cily, \f Wynne r. Stale (122!'. (122" I8;i'i 664'. !<W> H(IH''' 21", 2I''' I22<.f" (122« 2 1 ■■''• l8:i-t fih8« 21 8«, 2;(1'" 2r.7w, 47(»'», 4V0''. •.•78". u. It ;i..8« WI6'* VATK.ar. Slate r>8W". r.88J'. IV Ynlei. r.'21H« Veamley'ii .\|i|m'iiI 4(l!l''' Veal. Ill ••. Try ai'. 21" Veil iv Lane 2I« V.rVi" !■. Naliomil Hank 2I» York r. IVnue li78''« Viirk. Hif. K. Co. V. Winani 21' ViMin I' l.amiint -i(W Vminjf r. Hank of Aluxainlrla 1170*' V. Hrailv 1'7H«'' r. Cluiniller 117U'^ YouiiR !• Clapp V. {\»n. i: Jiiliiivon r. M»kf|K)»ce c. W.mmI Yotiiigu V. Uuilbe«u AMKUICAN TAHI.K OK (;AH1<><. KefereUL'U wra tu pfit, IH:!*" Youiik« <■ lIi'iTiivr b88"* mlr' 978'" 117U*' YuUlil r. Uuwi-ll Ztti.t II ('. Ilirt /vllfrtiiii'li I'. AlltMibirg i^uliluwiki V. bttttu crlv «7h" I ( ccxvii ) TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. FAIUOBArnB ((() »E«1.2,o. 10 916 46K(l. .1 1488, M89 '26 H. 8. c. i:i, HR. 2, 13 200 v.. M 963a 27 II. H, o. IB 1120 1 & 2 r. & M. 11. 13 8KH 2& 3 P. & M. o. 10 888 CKI. c. 9, H. 12 I24(i, 1270 v.'Hi 1120 13 Kl. <•. ft I.-iO 31 Kl. <!./»,». 5 7.'iu IJ. 1,.!. 11, n. 2 200 7 J. 1,0. 12 709 21 J. I, 0. 10 73, 091, 744 H. 3 73, 716 10(;. 1, <!. 18, Ir 888 12('. 2, 0. 24, HH. 8, 9 UK) 14 & 16 0. 2,.!. 2, Ir 1770 17 & 18 C. 2,0. 2, M. .'.. Ir 1770 19 (1. 2, o. (•), H. 2 200 22 & 23 C. 2, f. 10 1(18 2» (;. 2, 0. 3 1000 M. 1 1001, 1019, 1107 •. 2 1001 1. 3 1002, 1107 a. 4., 1019, 1021. W\l, lOiltiA, 1009, 1107, 1143 ■. 6 1062 M. 7, 8, 9 1010, 1107 a. 17 ....loio, 102.>. 103011, 1039a. 1013. 1011. loi,'>, 1107 0. 7, H. 446 7 W. 3. o. 3 9.".S H. 1.. 1188 a. 2 800, 9,'>2,\ n. 4 O.ViA iw. .'i, "tl •>. 8 M2fl, 06(1 0. 12, Ir 1000 n. 1, Fr 1001, 1001 a. 3, Ir lO.V.' HH. 10, 11, 12, Ir 1010 a. 21, Ir 1020 PARAOBAPm (}f) 11 4 12 W. 3, o. 7, B8. 8, 9, 10. . 1714 12 & 13 W. 3, o. 2, a. 3 14.68a 13 W. 3, o. 3, a. 2 968 4 A. n. 16, M. 20 1110 6 A. o. 18, H. 2 KI.ViA A. 0. 2, Ir 1127 0. 7, H. 3 76 c. 18 200 0. 3ft, a. 17 1062a 7A. 0. 11 76 0. 20 1127, 1C.62B a. 1 1110 0.21 968, 1373 a. ft 886 M. 11 1360, 1373, 1488 10 A. o. 18 1863 1 U. 1, Nt. 2, 0. 6, aa. 1, 6 1714 a. 8 76 8 O. I, o. 24, a. 1 1714 no. 1, c. 30, M. 16 127a 2 a. 2, 0. 23, H. 23 4.60 4 (J. 2, V. 37, H. 9 1714 6 (J. 2, V. .30, M. 1 286 8 (}. J, c. (i, a. 21 166'.'A 9 0. 2. <!. .'■), Ir 1011 11 (J. 2, v. 19, H. 14 981a MH. 20, 21 316 1ft (>. 2, f. 34 290 17 O. 2. «i. 3. a. 2 30 H. 3 1604 18(1. 2, <•. 30 1714 26(1. 2, (>. 14, Ir 1611 2 (i. 3, c. 28 1070 6(1. 3, p. 21, a. 1, Ir 1488 eu. 3, 0. 36 371 c. 63, a. 3 968 9(». 3, 0. 16 74 11 it 12 O. 3,0. 8, Ir 1648 12 (J. 3, o. 19, K. 3, Ir 1611 0.24 1714 >'•/. /. tndt MiM 4 U7I. IJMH ItfH h I CCXVlll 13 O. 3, 0. 6" TAMLK OF STATII'I F:!* CITED. a. (4 . PABAOnAI'IIH 'f^ ,'.IM» aw ific:. mi) ftoo 24 (. IA-24 lit) i:«i» 1 110 1 ili, M. 74, 76 i:i'2» K.H'. Aim •. 81 500, 1324 26(1. 3, o. 67 1324 «. 2H r>oo H. :J8 IH.'.l 27 a. 3, o. 16, H. H, Ir i.i4 U •.Via. 3, 0. 60, w. 1, 2, 3, 4 42 33 <r 8, I!. 62, a. 62 1333 o. 07,11. H 70 S4 (;. 3, o. 04 1676, lOHO 37 (>. 3, 0. 70, «. 1 1714 «H O. 8, n.26,i.a 1270 o. 87 7H7 10 k 40 U. 3, n. 03. . . .867, 96H. i:U>0, 1373, 14HH 11 (!. a, II. 00, H. (I. 100, H. 11 M. 33, 34 H. 36 42 G. 3, r. H6 N. 3 600, 1324 c. 107,a. 1 371 43 U. 3. «. .'.H HO, HI I-. 140 1272, 1276 44 (J. 3. .!. 102 1272, 1274 4.'. (I. 3,(1. 02 I20H H. 3 l2fU N. 4 12111 40 < J. 3; 0. 37 1403 ftO (I. 3, P. 102, M. a, Ir 47V, 400 62 O. 3,0. 140 MHO, lilOO a. 1 001 ■. A 061, 1604 A3 O. 3, r. 127, «. 1 I2H7 r. 141 H46 64 (i. 3, (!. 60, N. 4 1107 r,f,(i. 3, 0. 104 370a AO(i. 3, V. 87. ». 3, Ir 472, 400 <•. 160 1714 67 I). 3, c. 00, N. 1 2H2 AOO. »& 1 (1. 4, II. 1,11. 7 70 n. 4, *. H 14HH I A 2 O. 4, (1. 24, Ir. . .HMO, 062a, 060 N. 2, Ir HOT. 06H, 1.360, 1373, I4HH 3 O. 4, PARAORAPIIR m) u. :iO, m. 1. 2, 3 1I20A, 1401« MH. 6, 1401c ■ •••••••I o. 120, HM. 66, 67 NN. 72, 73 4 (}. 4,fl. 76, N. 21 .. 6 G. 4, 0. 83, « n. 84, R. M. 24 . , n. 06. Ha. 2, 9 u. 113. H. .. G. 4, c. AC, N. n. 10 a. 21 aa. 23, 24. .668, 660, 600 7 0.4, 0. 46, aa. 4, 6 1601, 1778 a. 293 a. 13 73a n, 04 HHM a. 2 4H4 a. 3 484, a03 a. 4 402 N. 1234a 003 1604 70 1371 22 1267a 1012 1203 1714 1604 1604 1373 a. 14 N. 10 a. 20 a. 22 203 206 2H0 1263 a. 23 1264, 1260 aa. 24, 26, 27 1264 a. 20 r;67 a. 28 1267a a. 3t 1234a 7 ft 8 G. 4, 0. 27 . . .... 371 a, II .. .... 1012 0. 20. a. 26 .. . . . 200 «'. 63, a. 42 .. ... 1488 a. 74 .. ... 1322 OG. 4, 0. 14, a. a. 1.... 3 4 .... .73, 600, .QUI 744. 746. 771, 1073 , t>!i2, <iU3 .'44 ' m4 a. a. 6 ... 7 .... 1034 n, U (• . '16, 1107 ... 1020 0. 16 .. .220, 24H 0. 31 . . HI a. 2'i . . . 200 <1. 41, HH •.. 64, li a. 2 . 0. 20, .Ir.":: 30 . . . 20.1 ... HHH ... 12.16 a. I, Ir 402, 001, 12.34a a. 0, Ir 001 a. 34. Ir 12.14a 0. 60, a. 4 70-8 M. 282, 1714 n. 77, a. 2 lAOl M^frfmm mn ttp»r»tT»pkt {\\) mi /mfm. TABLE OP STATUTES CITKD. COX IX 10 (1. 4, rAKAOBAnu (to r. 34, •.23,Ir 1371 o. Ao, *. 03 ivn I'., ctxiv 1067 11 (). 4ft 1 W. 4, o. '^0, tMi. 4H AC lOAI f. 40 1(57 .1. 08 1000 1 W 4 0. '22 600, 1680 M. 'i 1311 «. 1273 1 t 2 W. 4, 11. aj, •. 23 n.'.R N. 30 410 H, 42 377 c. 37. (Mt. 23.24 1096 •1. 44, n. H, Ir I.123 r. .'.M 847, 1074 c. U«vl 1067 2 W 4 0. 1, M(. 16, 20, 22 . . . .1480, 1000 a. 31 1121 n.'it 1011. 1048 c. 4 801 •. 10. •. 3 373 3* 3 W. 4. 0.71, M. 1, 3, 3 ..76a, inu2, 1107 Mil. 4, 7 76a ». 76a, 120 r.87, n. :«2 1011. lO.Vi c. 1(3. N. 1 1287 r. 100 74a H. I 1002 «. 8 120 • *4 W. 4. c. 16 47. 1107 «. 2 S77 0. 22, M. 20, 27, 20 1.TJ9 c. 37 74a M. 2, ID. 17, 21. 36, 20, .10 33 74a a. 14 1088. 1107 •. 2H 7«A. 747 N. 40 74a, IU88 0.41,1.. 7 1398 H. lU 1282 fl. 42 r^An A'rrDfn), l:i44 11.3.. 7611.092. 7 16, 1000. 1107 •.4 T.'.n «. 6 ....7fth. 092, loim. 1107 a. II 840 tm. 23, H ^20 n. 30 |.^83 •.74 1060a M. 41, 4(1, 49 1.33 N*. li\, .V2. 69 !I23 0.87, N. 1 1137 «. 2 1127, lor.l a. 4 imil 4 ft 6 W. 4, r<.RAOiui-n)i (f }) o. "2 I.'>9 c M M. 10 II ■•till c. 30,11. 13 64 o. 70 1103, i;tll» ». 18 1604 M. 70. 81 1103 V. 92. n. 79. Ir 1640 6&0 W. 4. o. 60, H. 40 I.VII a. 73 1071 o. 84 1(179 IS. 66 1(162 0. 03 i;«H9 c. 09 1.119 tt. 7 979 Oft 7 W. 4. o. 14 1648 n. 2 i;u6 0. 71.11. 04 1(101 o. 76, ». 30 1318 c. 70, ». 19 146(1 o. 86 70 • 6 1604 «. 23 1110 ». 37 1011 n. 80 1696 n. 31 1 1 10 i. 36 1604, 1001, Kill ». 37 1604 N .38 .. 0, 1001, 1011, 1774, 1776 <•. 90 1319 N. 6 1604 o. 100 1293 «. 10 I2!t;i M. 19 0, 1640 ». 21 1640 c. Ill 362 o. 114 1449 II. 4 MUM o. 116 I.'i84 •.29 119 n. 110,11. 106. Ir 1263 M. 100, 107, Ir 1267a 7 W. 4 ft 1 V. 0.32, a. 6 KIM ». 8 1776 0. 30. M. 1, 9 1069 n. 7 104 aa. IV, II lO.'iO a. 13 1061 a. 13 lo.'.ii aa. 18 30 loiwi a. 21 1009. 107(1 a 32 1072 aa. 34 33 Ijiii a. 14 104, 1060, 1070 e.in 74* n. 30. M. 36, 20 I7| w. 27, 28,^1, 43 .... 1714 •'.44 |-.'64 i i ' .Wjm^ ^ .1 Kid?''* ^ '^7%tJii 1 m:mM . w^ ".. ' ^^\- rw. t. «.J^ wM i 07t. I !, 1 i 1 t ccxx TABLE OP STATUTES CITED. 7 W. 4* c. M) 0. H», 0. HA. 1 V. HK 1,2 ». i ... H. ;j . . . , H. 11 ., PABAO&AriU Hi) i;»ju 1504 HI HO 209 8H,HH. 2, 3 1714 1714 1714 I • •*•••• 1310 0. Ul N. 62 I 42 V. o. 2.'). M. 2 o. hi, H. 121, Ir. 0. 77 1380a b. 04 14H0, 14H4, 1601 MH. 1,2, 20 14H5 «. U80 M. II 6 n. 12 1480, IMS H. 13 lfi:i.' fl. oi IflAV 0. 10ft I3HH 0. 110 I«,'>2 H. 10 14010 Sft3V. 0. 11, NM. 3, 8, 1401(1 M. 4 lfl.'.2 0. 47, H. 24 1(170 0. 71. H. 40 17.'>7 1 <s. H4 a«4 V. 0. 0. n 0. 22 0. Ill, it. 1 0. 60,H. 1 M. 2 H. ;i R. 4 «. 6ft 0. Tl.it. /i e. H2, «. 2 o. 02 H. ft KM. 0, 20.. . NN !). 10. II H.-<. 12 1)).. H. 17 c. 07. HM. 7—10 0. W; Ir K 12, Ir. . M. 4H, 'Itl, I MM. ft I, .'i2, I •. 0:i, Ir. . . ■. <H, Ir. . «. n7. Ir. ., 1310 ICll ,jOO Iftxi 1317 Hill 1402 11.12 !.V:'i ;<i MOlo l.'i04. I. '.02, Iftltft Ift0< Ifti»2 ...0, 1001, Dill ir.ill, Kill I.V.Ml, Kill Ki.'ii! l.iNO, Ki.i2 n 20* , ■^2» ... I '. ' » (.'.k;i 12!l'f 1311 VVJi, 71, Ir 1272 «. MH, NH. 12 n. 110, M. 7 4 ft ft V. n. 4ft, UN « ft (> V. o. 27, a. 14 0. 3H 127, Ir. 13, 14 Ki.V. .1;.:) 17H fi ft V. PARAOBAPnS (f f) 0.46 008, 1110 a. 11 ....lft04, 1605, 1601, 177H 0. 61, a. 1 ..867, 0ft8, I3r;0, 1373, 148H a. 2 I<ft8 0. 67 1310 0. 00 614 0. HO, Ir !0«3a o. 07, M. 3 314 H. 6 73a c. I08,H. 29 lUOl 6ft 7 V. 0. 18 180 HH. 6, 8, 13, 14, 10, 18, 20 1604 aa. 7, 17 1102, 1107 HH. 3ft, 60, ftl 1203 a. 48 l.'.Oft a. 40 1604, IftOft a. 02 1102, 1107 HN. <i(i, (18 1640 H. 100 1102 0. 22 1378 0. 38, H. IftHO M. 14 Ift4(( c. 54, Ir VU, 108H c. lili U20A, 149IU <i. (iH, H. 17 372 0. 73, N. 8 112(1 HH. 11, 23 ... Ift04 a. 20 1120, lft04 a. 37 4ft0 0. 82, H. ft 1312 HM. 0, 7 1312 0.8ft 1270, 1347 P. 1 13AI 0. 80, M. 10 KiOl, 1/; , H. 20 :i72 H 23 1000a, 1107 H. 2H 1710 c. 01 17 1!. 0(i. n. 2 H:)| 0. 0(1, H. II h;j H. 7 lift. ooii. 007 o. 08, H. 4 600, I.V.3 7 & M > i-.'i Hftft o. 12, H. H..lft()l, iMlft, ICOl, I77H 0. 22. HH. 2, .'! 372 (1. 27, Ir 74a, 1088 .. 27. H. 13 . 70 (1.20 7(1 0.32, «. 16 1(W13a 0.33, n. a 180 « 4\ H. 'i 76a, 1204 ",•..', aa. 30-3(1 il21 c '.> 1001, loo.l n. 7i' aa. 3, 4, 13 ..,, '.191 - M, .X 2, 14, Ir Ift04 ^ 43 Kill Me/rrtnen art It puraifr,i^hi ■,)}) nut JMtf—- TAnr.K OF STATUTE CITED. CCXXl 7 4 8V. PAIUORA.'IIR {§^) o.Hl,»w. 48, 78, Ir 7« w*. W, 7lJr. ..IftUA, l«Ol m. (in— 70, Ir 1504 0. 86, H. I'J Ipp. H. W l.'l!»(l 0.80 HH«, 1000 0.01. n. 71 I'M 0. 101 IHO, 1011 H. :I3 1604 H. 00 1001 H. 70 laio M. 7.t 1110 0. 106, M. 711 74 0. 100, H. 40, Ir 12A;1, 12r,4 HH. 41, 4'2, Ir rj.'i7A 0. 107,H. 11, Ir 1644 CI. 110, NX. 7,26 410 8&0 V. c. 10 1747a H. 061, 904. 1767a 0. 10,8. 7 10:i0 H. 10 1604. ia;(7A ■N. It, \'i 10»7a H. 1 1 080 H.-2H 1781 «. 40 lOOl iw. 46, 03, 116-110.. 1604 ■.07 0H7 «. OH 1600 UN. rJ4 127 I0.')6 H. l;iO 180 M, 101 1604 0. 17, H. 101 17H2 H. 106 1604 0. 18, HN. 10, 17 lOII, 10:I7a M. .■)0 I.'k'ioii M. OH 1074 H. 70 l-M H. 160 1604 0. 19, H. 142 1604 o. 20, MM. 0. 102 l.')04 M. 10 1001 Ml. HO, 07 1011 «, 107 16(14 KM. I OH 111 1000, lO.'ill 0. :<:{, HH. 0, I6;i 1,104 11. :i7, H. 10, Ir loo:iA o. 76, H. 2 HHl o. 77, H. 3 372 o. 80, H. 34 OOKa o. 101. HH. 0, 7 1067 0. 100. H. I 001 HH 2, 3 002 e. 100, H. 1466 H. 18 040 o. 112, MM. I. 2. 3 l.'IO •. 113 ..7. 1624. I6H4. 1001, 1011 N. 1 ....7, 14. I6H0, 1001, lOMU, ton, 1031, 1 06211, I0,'i6, 1067 a. 'J 7, 14, 1.680 Vol. J. etuti 8 & v. PARAORAPIIi ((f) 0. 113, R.3..6,7,l8,1.623,l.V2U,167l H.4 7 H. 6 7 0. 118, MM. 2, 140 1001 HH. 0. 30,40, l.^iO. 104. 1329 HM. 104, 106. 167 1684 o. 128, H. a 372 & 10 V. o. 3, H. 13 1604 11.4. Ir 1003a 0. 37, HH. 22. 28, 32-3.6, 44, ir 1290 c. 30, H. 1604 c. 70 1.584 o. 74 1604 H. 13 1690 o. 87, H. 6. Ir 1604 0. 93 1097 H. 3 73 c. 96, H. S.-i 1348, 1361 0. lO.'i, H. 2 Ifill. 1068 M. 4 l.'iOO. 1011 10 & II V. 0. 10, HH. 11, 21. 20 1300a o. 14. HH. 7, 8, .12 1011 HH. 42—49 1067 B. 60 1604 H. .'>8 1604 O. 16. H. 3H 1604 M. 46 1.604 0. 10, HM. 31, M. 70, HH-00. I6U4 HH. 90 9(i 1067 H. 110 1604 0. 17, HH. 7. 10 1611 HH, 21. 00 1604 0. 27, HH. 7. 10, 20 1011 •.60 16«H MM. 83-90 1067 M. or 1.604 0. .12, H. 00 IHO c. 34, H. 20 1011 HM. 200 207 1067 H. 214 1.604 ri. 42 1001 V. 06, MM. 7. H 1011 H. 00 l.'iOl «•. 00. H. 1011 o, 70, M. 4. Ir lOO.'U 0. 80. H. 71 1067 H. 77 I.'>0» 0. '.10. H. 3. Ir •>, 1 100 N». 12. IH. Ir 1100 H, 19, 20, Ir. ,,I:IO0a, 132tf 0. 109, s. I, « HH. 10. 20 1.604 HM. n,2i,2o..i:to9A. i:i2» 0. ill I.6H4 n A 12 V. 0. 12 1714 H. 10 1263 0.31, MM. 2,9 not utth t 971. CCXXll TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 11 & 12 v. FABAORAPRM (|}) 0. 42 399, 888a, 1316 H. 1 1234a H8. II— lA 1318, l/i62A H. 10.. 1234a, 1260,1316,1318 ■. 17..472,47U*, 4H4,4»(), HH9 ■. 18. .888a, H80, 890, 80:), 8U4 ■. 20.. 484, 8H8a, 8HU, 1234a, 123.'>, 120U a. 21 3ft H. 27 1488 11.28 HH8a. 8»2 ■.34 4U3 8oh. K 1318 Hoh. M 479a Hoh. N. ..888a, 889, 893 0. 43 lolO, 1317 a. 3 1318, 16(t2A a. 4 293 a. 7 1234, 1317, 1318 a. 11 70 H. 14 101ft a. .3ft 1317 H. 30 7ftii 0. 44, H. 9 312, aift H. 41 1072 o. 40. a. 4 248 0. 03, a. 3ft o. 83, M. 1121, 1011, 1048 a. 14 1121, 1611, 1048 o. 99 1A84 0. 110, aa. 11,09 1011 o. 118, H. 3 70 0. 121, 8. IK 372 o. cUiii. a. 258 1321 13 & 13 V. o. 1, a. 3 Ifl7ft a. 1000, 1001 a. 10 1001 0. 16, a. 8, Ir 7:iA o. 40 -HH a. 1 1102a. 1107 8.2 11112a 0. 68 Ift93, 159.' <01l KM. II, 12 lUUl, ttill a. 18 1601, Hill a. 20 1600 0. 77, a. 2. Ir HM. 43, 49, Ir 1704 0. 78. a. 9 101 1 o. 89 14, 1100 0. 97. H. 20 1057 0. 100, M. 117 I4A8A a. 118 1351 a. 200 1458a 0. 109, .1. 12 1047 a. 14 1542 HN. 17, 18 1647, 1650 13 & 14 V. V. 17, H. 3 994 c. 28 1110 0. 29, H. 4 1052 13 ft 14 V. VAiuaRAPni (fO 0. 29, at. 6, 7 1011, 10.52 0.36,1.46 1882R o. 43 1293 0. 08, Hoh. A. •••i.t 17 0. 69, Ir 1604 aa. 20. 33, 76, Ir 1103 aa. 56, 57, Ir 1293 m. 79, 81, Ir 1640 r. 113, Ir 180, 1102 a. 114, Ir 180 0. 72, a. 9 1011, 1653 a. 45, Ir 6 .i. 47, Ir mil H. 52, Ir 1.504 n. 74, a. 10 lOll 14 & \o \. y. 19, a. 5 80, 1708 a. (4 1264 o. 40, .t. II 1110 a. 21 IHOO a. 22 1595, 1000 c. 42, H. 1121 n. 19, MH. 4, 5 l:»29 0. 66, M. I 1254 a. 2 1251, l-.'OO aa. 4, 6, 1257 H. 7 1257a H. 8 1257a c. .'>fi. a. 2 IHO V. 57, Ml. 10, 97. 110, 114, Ir. 1554 H. 19, Ir 702 a. 30. Ir 1704 f, 102. Ir i:i48 a. 100, Ir 247 a. 107. Ir 1544 N. 108, Ir 1700 o. 04, H. 1 l.')9(l, lO.iO H. 3 1 l!'0, 1011 II. (iti, N. 10. 17, Ir. ..lliOlU. 11129 f. !'2. H. 13. Ir 5 0. 'jj, Ir 3'j9, 8H8a H. 10. Ir 70 aa. 13, 44, If 12.34 A a. 14, Ir 36, 888a, 1488 0. 94 560 a. 18 1361 HM. 31, 40 1293 H. 45 1504 0. 99 10, 1347, 1359 a. 1 1347, 1349 aa. 2, 3 ....1349, i:ift7, 1300 a. 4 1355a 1. 7 ....10,438, 1628, 1.5.50 1. 9 1557 ■. 10 1667, 1558 a. II 49, 1557 a. 13 I57S, 1011 1. 14 1677, I6K!I, 1AU9A. tool, 1011 ■. IC 1.380 a. 18 1550 Ue/ertttett ar* to punufrapht ({}) nut puf/ti. TADLE OF STATUTES CITED. CCXXUl 14 ft U V. PABA0BAPII8 m) 0.69, a. 19 4U, IAA(S 0.100 '248 «. 1 ....24H, 280, 280, 203 M. 2, 3 248 fl. 9 200, 1708 §. 10 209 a. 12 1706, 1707 0. IH 287 ■.22 1573, lOri •. 23 280 R. 24 204, 280, 284 ». 2.') 248, 280 0. 106,11. 10 1103 H. Vi 1702 0. 106 1466 16 & 16 V. (!. 24 1067 DM. 1, 2 lOrtH 0.27,11. 1 1347 a. 2 . . H. 4 .. 0. 28, a. 1 . , fl. 66, H. 7 .. 1347 1477 6 1638 0. 67, a. 8 1320, 1466 a. 12 1326 0. 83, Ir 1605 0. 76, aa. 34, .Vi, 37 221 aa. 80, 81 n.Vi m. 106-108 1604 a. 114 666, 6.'>9 •.222 221 0. 77, a. 1 l.')H2 o. 86 1677 a. 18 1701 aa. 40, 63 221 I p. 87 I«ft 17 V. 0. 20, aa. 3, 4, 6 a. 6 0. 30, a. 9 0. 3.1 0. M, a. 6 . . 1504 1347 1347 1276 1601 1611, 1648 c. 83 680, 7660, 1361, 1369, U67 a. 1 1361 a. 2 1361, 1.166a, 1362 a. 3 909*. 13'.1 1347, 1351 1601, 1778 ....IOOOa, 1107 1321 661, 1344 ...73, 75n, 601, 692, 746, lOliO ,..76ii, 001, 6'.I2 ..76n,69l,602, IdOO •. 24, Ir 75n, 601,692, 744, 745, 1073 a 60, Ir. ... 314 aa. 86-91,231, If.. . 221 a. 4 0. 112, a. 12, Ir. . a. 36, Ir. a. 66, Ir. . a 118, a. 3, Ir. .. a. 20, Ir. . aa. 21, 22. a. 23, Ir... 16 ft 17 V. PAiuoiurna (t() 0. 134, a. 8 U}»i 0. 137, a. 6 <• a. 8 1601 aa. 10-14 1329 a. 61 1604 17 ft 18 V. o. 26, Ir 1373, 1488 a. 31, a. 7 1093, 1107, 1666 o. 34 1262 0. .18, aa. 6, 1466 o. 47 1398 c. 80, a. 68 1001, 1011 0.81, a. 46 20 0. 90 845, 1435, lOiHi, 1712 0. 102, a. 10 12.'>l, 1714 a. 12 1260 a. 13 1264 a, .15 1466 0. 126, a. 1 846 a. 22 1404, 1426 a. 21 1440 a. 24 1446 a. 26 1437 a. 27 1869 aa. 61, 56, 66, 67.... 621 a. 62 621 a. 63 621, 1329 a. 64 621, 1.120 a. 68 669 a. 60 1329 a. 65 1692 a. 87 437 a. y6 221 a. 103 1446, 1869 18 ft 10 V. 0. 15, aa. 2. 3 1491a aa. 12, 14 1126 o. 30, H. 10 1110, 1839 o. 43 104 0. 6.1. M .10 1601 u. 81, H. 11 1611, 1621a «. 87 1050 i\ lil| n. 3 •••••••••••#•* 86 0. 119, a. 82 1667 0. 120, a. 22 180 a. 60 1696, 17H2 aa. 61, 198, 199 1604 a. 149 976 a. 203 1057 a. 222 1IC6 0. 124, aa. 4, 6 6, 1601 a*. 6- 1329 a. 42 1127 H. 44 1604 10 ft 20 V. e. 14, Ir 1106 0. 26, a. 2 1611 0. 36, Ir 1663a 0. 47, a. 16 10.19 a. 41 OHO 0.60, H. 6, 8(! 103011,1084 m i*! rd. I. md* mtk \ 971. CCXXIV TABLK OF RTATirrKS CITED. l>\ }' -h 19 ft 20 V. l-ABAdlUI-IIR (if) o. (HI. H. 17, 8« 1H7 (!. (it '.'UO c. 7ii. H. 4 i:i HM. «7, 7'», HO. 147 .. lA.'iO H. lOj i:i.')ii H. 174 13, I.Vj'J 0. 04 ft 0. OH. H. 2 l«Ol c. 07 74.'). lO.JOii M. 8 10-Jt, lU3(lii, 1107 ». 7:i I. 10 7.'>H •. 13 ....73, 7»ft, 771, 1073, 1107 H. 14 600, 74.1 0. lOj, N. ■.'!. Ir 1431 K. •J7, Ir 144U MM. ."iG Ml, Ir .'121 N. OH, Ir 142(1, 1440, IHdO 0. 108, M. '1 1270 0. 113 1313 o. 110, M. 24 1011, IU2U 20 St 21 V. •!. 3 1714 0.(10, H. 120, Ir 12H9 MM. 207, 2(m, If I0l.'i MM. 271. 272, If 1013 «. ;I0U. Ir 1.100, I4.1HA •. 307, Ir I.'UK) a. 30M, Ir 1280 MM. 334,33.'), Ir H2(U ■. 3(>l, Ir lft4H «. 3)12. Ir 0, 14 M. 3(1.'), Ir 40.'i M. .360, Ir 130H M. 'W.'!, Ir ll.iH* «. 77 42ft, 800, I7ft0 M. 22 M. 24 I2H3 M. 20 1810 M. 30 1810 MM. 01- O:' 17ftU MM. 04, C.l 1700 MM. m (iH 1487 M 00 1689, IftOO M. 80 1714 M. 81) 1487 o. 70, Ir 1768 M. 27, Ir 6 M. 20, li 1288 a. 31. Ir IHIO M. 42, Ir 1810 ■M. 0.'. 67, Ir 17fttt •.08 17(10 MM. 71 73, Ir 1487 a. 74, Ir l.Wt, l.MHl M. 01, Ir 1714 M, 00, Ir 1487 0. 86 708, 1283 ■.7 1076 20 & 21 V. PARAOBAPni (ff) 0. 8.'>, M. 13 6 M. 10 049, 1075 M. 37 040, 1076 M. 31 1(176 M. 33 ....109, 172. 3A8. ft82. 8.')l, 040, 1410 HN. 41, 43, 40 1364 21 ft 22 V. 0. 2ft 1604 H. 3 IflOl c. 42, Ir 7.')A, 1002 o. .'XI, MM. 12, 13 1688 o. 72, MM 8. T.i, Ir MM. .')!, 8.'), Ir 86 0. 78, M. 2 1279 0. 00, M. 27 1(118 M. 31 .S03 M. 32 173, 308 M. 31 .308 M. 37 1611, 1040 M. 40 37(lA 0. 03 1076 MM. I, 2 .'>»4 0.06, K. 23 1283 M. 27 1 187 n. 08, N, 4 , 6 22 V. o. 20 1314 M. 6 1316 22 & 23 V. n. 17 1200 r. 36, N. 12 lilO o. 03 6 23 ft 24 V. 0.4, M. 0, Ir l.M»6, 1001, 1777 o. 38 Kl.Vi M. 13 l()8i> 0. 63 74 o. 83. Ir 104 I!. 107, H. ;r.'. Ir 76 !■. 120, H. 3(1 221 0. 127, MM. 18. 22 1(1.39 c, 1.34, H. .'i 76o 0. ll'.\ M. 1186 o. I.')4, M. 4, Ir 1001 M. 6, Ir 100 M. 0, Ir 809 MM. 7. '.I, Ir 1003 n. 23, Ir 426 a. 24, Ir 123 ■. 41, Ir 1176 a. 42, Ir 1176 M. 13, Ir 807 a. 47, Ir 17H M. 104, Ir. . .0'.i2, KM) I. 1003 M. 106, Ir lool, 11103 Siih. II., Ir 1001, 1003 24 ft 26 V. r. 6, Mv 18, 10 372 V. M 1646 M. 14 e lU/ireneu art to pitriiyiaph' (^}) nol ;niyr>. TAUI.K OF 8TATUTI':8 CITKD. CCXXV S4 k •ili V. PAiudiuniN (J4) o. 10, ». 17 6n, imo •.IB Mi ».i\ riH.t 0. n A o.ai 74 0. U4, M. I 17117 0. Uft KJ, HOI 0. 1)0 173, U.'iHa MM. 6, U :i32 N. 10 'JUO M i:» 371 MX. M, »A, 0.'), eu 37'2 «M. -.'4, 20 Wi ».'M I4.M «. 'iV 'in, M-'iA ». 30, 31 JOI MM. 3'2, 74 286 MM. 40, 4J, r>6, 01, 07 .. 20U M. 41 iOO, 1708 ■M. 43, 47, 4H, AO— .V2. 73 1714 MM. 44, 40 43. 1714 a. .')8 3.'..;, 372 *. 60 280 M. 71 287, 3:11 •.72 1707 MM. 75 84 Ho/i, 1714 M. 8^ H.'.Sa, 1714 R. 80 14ftA, 1011:1, 1714 •. 87 1714 ■. 88 201, 1706, 1707 ■. Ill 1700 M. 02 3;»H M. 1)1 2(11 M. llMt 1710 M. 110 .3.'i2. 1012 H. 121 ia.i4 0.97, MM. I A. 0. It, 14, 17, 211, 3(1, Xi, ;i.'>, 42, 43. 47 1714 ' H. 20, 21 280,371 •. Al 280 •.00 2114 •. 07 1710 •.77 12A4 0.98, KM. 0, 10, II, 14, 10, 17, 18, III 372 •M. 27, 28, 20 r •.42 201, lOH • 43 291 •.41 201 H. fil I2A4 0.99. «.. 2, 3 1714 MH. 0, 7 372, 1714 •.8 . . . . „ ;i72 •.12 I70A •M. n, 19 ;«72 »M. 21, 2A 372. 1711 •, 20 AA(1 •. 37 3A2, 1012 •.42 12A3 24 ft 2ft V. PAnAaRAPiii (H) 0. 100 hi M. ft, ll-lft, 18,21.22, 28, 29, 32, 33. A8, 61 1714 i. « 2.HH ■. 2A 260, 17(18 MM. 42, 43 lOlft ••. 44, 4A 101 A. 1710 •. 48 104. 1,'iAOn 1714 •. A2 13A0B H. A3 I3.A0II, 1371 «. Al i:i,AOii. 1371 ». AA 13A0B ■. A7 172. 200 •.60 110, 269 M. 77 12A4 0. 104. M^. 10, 11 AOO 0. 114 10024 M. 3 I06S 0. 134, MM 1(12, 180 14A8A ». 203 1A48 M. 204 0. 14 M. 211 1300 25 k 26 V. 0.63. H. 125 MM. (18. 70. 71 1611 M. 123 rt 0. 50, M. I. Ir 700 M. 2, Ir 123 «. 63. MM. 2A. 26. 28 5 «. 07, M. 22 1011 c. 08, M. 3 1107 M. 4 IA()4, 10(11 •. 5 lAdl, 10(11, 1778 0. 89 080, 080, lAOO MM. II, 10 0S» •. 18 410, 1031 M. 22 1030 •M. 2 A, 20 177H ■.31 1031 ».:Vi I.AO4 •.37 1778 MB. 47, 65 080 M. 01 1001 •M. 02, 03 180 a. 04 IIO.'.A a. (!7 lAOfl, 1781 •M. IIA, 120. 138 1286 •. 12.'. 0, 14 •. lAI 1781 •. 174 ....IA04, lAOA, 1001, 1631 M. 102 1631 o. 104, H 12 14 20 k 27 V. u. II. H. A. Ir 6. lAlU, 1601 M. AO ,'.2. Ir 1,')04 0.27, MM. 2, 3. Ir 1504 M. 10, Ir 70, 1605 r. 41. MM. I, 4 187 ill! % t'»l. J. tndi with jl 971. ^. •i>. ^ s>^\% IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) fe /. / i/u 1.0 I.I 11.25 ^^ m 1 1^ Ilia ^ ti& ill M U IIIIII.6 V] <^ /^ ■> o /a 7 /A Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. MS80 (716) 873-4S03 m ^1 iV \\ "% \^ ^ o"^ k 1 ^ \ ^ O^ k % ccxxvi TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 26 & 27 v. PAIUQRAPHS (§§) 0. 49, 8. 2 6 88. 30—33 1121 c. 66 1601 C. 65, 8. 24 1601 8. 29 1611 c. 87, 8. 4 1600 c. 88, 88. 3, 5, Ir 6 C.90, Ir 1601 c. 100, 8. 1, Sc 796 8. 2, Sc 123 0,114, 8. 33, Ir 6 8. 38, Ir 1309a, 1329 0.118, 8. 22 1039a 0. 119,8. 5 1465 c. 125 150, 709, 916, 1246 27 & 28 V. c. 19 989 c.37,8. 10 372 c. 48, 8. 5 1657 c. 53, 8. 5 248 88. 6, 8, 10 1316 8. 24 76 8. 35 73a 0.77, 8. 7 1593 88. 8, 10 1695, 1600 8. 9 1504 0.96 73, 1697 0.97,8. 5 1601, 1775 8. 6 1.504, 1601 0.99, 8. 43, Ir 1276 8. 48, Ir 247 8. 49, Ir 248 8. 57, Ir 1554, 1672 o. 101, 8. 12 1671, 1601 0. 112, 8. 1 1652 0. 113, 8. 33 1657 c. 120, 88. 18, 30 1611 c. 121, 88. 20, 00 1611 28 & 29 V. o. 18, 8. 1..1426, 1427, 1437, 1445, 1446, 1449, 1869 B. 2 1431 B. 3 1426 B. 5 1446, 1449 8. 6 1410, 1437, 1612 8. 7.... 392, 414, 435, 1839, 1847a 8. 8 1869, 1874 B. 10 1869 0, 27, ss. 3, 5 1611 0. 60, Ir 796 8. 7, Ir 123 0. 60 796 8.2 123 c. 63, B. 6 9 c. 72 1051 c. 78 995a, 1504 c. 86 184 0.88, Ir 1611 «. 56. Ir 6 c. 104, H. 34 1359 28 & 29 V. VABAOBAFHB (${) c. 112,8. 1 1051 c. 113, 8. 2, Ir 1663a 29 & 30 V. c. 44,88. 21, 23, Ir 1657 c. 49, 8. 20, Ir 1601 8. 21, Ir 6 c. 52, 88. 1, 2 1258 c. 66,8. 7 1309a, 1329 c. 84,8. 12, Ir 1126 88. 15, 26, 29, Ir 1504 88. 28, 32, Ir 1639 c. 97,8. 7,Ir 1601 8. 12, Ir 1778 c. 108, 88. 7, 8, 9, 12 1504 c. 109 5, 1930 8. 48 269 B. 54 76 B. 61 1293 8. 66 ....1293, 1334, 1338 8. 92 1360 0.112 500 c. 117,8. 4 1011 8. 33 1601, 1611, 1663 c. 118,88. 7, 9, 46 1611 8. 24 ,. 1601 8. 29 1601 8. 30 1611 30 & 31 V. c. 35, 8. 2 1260 8. 3 490,1236, 1260 B. 4 1236, 1200 8. 5 1200 B. 6 491 8. 7 491 0. 44, Ir 1577 8. 102, Ir 1577 0. 58, 8. 172 76 8». 175, 179—181 .... 1316 C.69 127a,371 0. 70,88. 3—5, Ir 1485 88. 17, 19, Ir 1480 8. 18, Ir 6 88. 19, 20, Ir 1533 C. 101, 8. 61 1601 c. 105,8. 4 1293 0. 114, Ir 1546 8. 21, Ir 6 8. 41. Ir 521, 1810 B. 50, Ir 139a B8. ,52, 09, Ir 1283 8. 57, Ir 12 8. 66, It 562 8. 104 1282 C. 116,8. 1 1707 c. 131,8. 37 989 c. 134,8. 17 372 31V. c. 4, 8. 1 163 31 & 32 V. c. 20, Ir 644 c. 25,88. 6, 8, 36, Ir ICll R^trencet ai* to paragraph) (}}) twt pagei. TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. CCXXVU tl ft 32 V. (), 26, 8. 18, Ir. . 8. 23, Ir. 0.37 c. 45 FASAOBAFHS (^§) 1601 1601 8. 24, Ir 1611 14, 1527 B. 2 5, 15, 1527, 1662 8, 3 1527 B.4 7, 1527 8. 5 15, 1527, 1662 B, 6 1527 , 1778 8. 61 1564 c. 59, 8. 29, Ir. ..1601,1611,1663 c. 86,88. 1, 2, Sch 999 c. Ill 6 o. 118,8. 8, subs. 4 72 o. 119,88. 39, 47 1596 8. 126 1795 0. 121,8. 13 1638 0. 125,8. 15 1326 8. 31 1293 B. 32 1293 8. 33 1611 8. 34 1246b 8. 56 1326, 1455 32 & 33 V. c. 24 1456 c. 41, 8. 18 147a, 409, 1600 0.66,8.47 72 8. 49 1329 8.57 180 0. 67, 88. 4, 5 372 8. 6.... 73a, 315,831, 15550 1710 o. 62,8. 11 286, 372, 898 8. 12 286, 372 8. 17 1255 8. 18 1260 8. 19 292 88.24,25 nil 88. 26, 27 ....U20a, 1491b 8.28 1491b 0. 67, s. 45 72, 1777 8. 64 1601 8.65 180 88. 67—69 1504 c. 68 950, 1350, 1355, 1685 8. 1 1351 B. 2 964a, 1355 8. 3 1355 0.71,8. 15 1039a 8.97 898 8. 107 1548 8. 109 6, 14 8. 127 72 0. 81,8. 6 1611 0. 89, ss. 10, 11 1260 0. 92, It 6, 1309a, 1329, 1601 8. 14, Ir 1778 0. 102, 8. 13 1777 c. 115, ss. 6, 8, 11, 15 1601 0. 117, s. 1 1638 33 & 34 V. PARAORAPIIS (^) 0.14, s. 12 1627, 1601, 1611 0. 19 1611 0. 20, s. 11 1604 8. 15 995a 0.23, 88. 1, 31 954 8S. 10, 18 1016 C.28, 88. 4, 8, 9 1097 0.35 1153 88.2,5,7 159 c. 46, 88. 31, 41,Ir 19 8. 58, Ir. ..148, 809, llOU 0.52 1313, 1561 s. 5 1663a 8s. 14, 15 1560 0.75,8. 30 1781, 1782 8. 64 1611 8.81 180 8. 83 1527, 1611 8. 87 1504 0.79,8. 21 1527 o. 90, 8. 9 372 .. -il 1119, 1611, 1653 8. 7 1611, 1653 0.93 1016 8. 12 1689 0. 98, 88. 18, 22 372 0.99 1456 0.110, 8. 11, Ir 6 34 & 36 V. 0.25, 8. 5 1663a 0.31, 8. 13 1611 o. 41, s. 20 183 8.38 372 0.43, 8S. 27,46, 50 1611 8.69 180 0.49, 8. 6, Ir 1283 8. 17,Ir 12 0. 65, 88. 12, 18, Ir 1504 0. 70 1504 8. 2 1329, 1527. 1762 8. 6 6,1106, 1627 0. 78,88.4, 7, 11, 16 1329 c. 83, 8. 1 1281 0. 96, 8. 20 375 o. 97, 8. 1 1096 0. 112, 88. 9, 20 362, 1612 8. 15 1371 8. 18 1612 8. 19 346,353 0. 113, 88. 23, 37 1504 8. 25 1(157 c. 116 1488 35 & 36 V. 0. 10 1774 c. 23 15!(5 c. 24, 83. 1, 6 1611 0. 33 1504, 1601, 1777 0. 44, 8. 11 72 c.46,8. 1 1293 Vol. I. ends with j 971. * ! M • 1 CCXXVIU TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 36 & 36 V. FABAOBAPHS (^f) c. 48, 89. 2— 4,Ir 119^ 1771 8. 3, Ir. .. 119, 1663a o. 57, s8. 11, 12, It 286, 372 . 8. 17, Ir 1255 B. 18, Ir 1260 8. 19, Ir 292 8S. 23, 24,Ir 1111 0.68, 8. 6, Ir 6, 14, 1289 88. 52, 53, Ir 83 88. 57, 58, Ir 1750 88. 73, 74, Ir 1276 88. 91, 121, It. 1015 88. 97, 98, It 1013 8. 116, Ir 1749 8. 124, Ir 19 0.65, 8. 4 951, 964, 1757a 0.69, 8. 2, Ir 1657 8. 4, Ir 6, 1106, 1657 8. 5. Ir 1329, 1657 0.76, 8. 59 1657 8. 63 76, 1360 8.71 180 0.77, 8. 30 1657 8. 34 76, 1360 8.39 47 8.40 180 C. 93, a. 8 115 8.23 272 8.24 1099,1107 8. 25 123 8.31 372 0.94, 8. 51 1360 8. 58 1601 8.70 180 36 V. c. 9, 8. 5 591,964 36 & 37 V. c. 33, 8. 3 1782 c. 36, 8. 5 1600 8. 6 1531 0. 48, 88. 21, 25 1329 8. 30 1596 8.35 180 0. 60, 8. 4 1561 0.66 7,1262 B. 3 1456 8. 16 675 8. 24 5 8. 25, subs. 3 156 subs. 4 193, 1014 fiubs. 5 176 8ub8. 6 997 subs. 11 ..5, 1497,1854 B. 34 2lB 8. 50 1798 8. 57 1292, 1798 s. 61 8. 87 19, 1639 B. 89 1315a, 1811 8. 91 39 0. 71,8. 45 1657 O. 77, 8. 22 1601 36 & 37 V. pabaobafhs ($$) c. 86,8. 24 1611 0. 89, s. 14 15) 37 & 38 V. c. 35 1344 c. 36 1714 c. 42, 8. 20 1601, 1611 8. 42 1013 c. 50, 88. 1, 2, 5 830, 1689 c. 67 74a, 127, 747, 1088 8. 7 747, 1088, 1107 88. 8, 9 10S«, 1107 c. 62 104, 740 8. 2 1084 c. 64, 88. 1, 2 1347 c. 67, 8. 8 1657 c. 69, 88. 35, 36, Ir 1601 c. 78 129 8. 1 75, 129 8.2 129 c. 81, 8S. 5, 10 1542 0.84,8.2 6 c. 86 724a 8. 9 1288, 1309a c. 87, 8. 1 1329 c. 88, 8. 32 1504, 1601 s. 38 1776 8.46 76 c. 94, 88. 13, 34 74a c. 96 1347,1491c 38 & 39 V. c. 14, Ii' 1663a 0.17,88.34—38,84 1657 8.60 1601 8.85 180 C.22, 8. 8 179 B. 9 1527 0. 25, 88. 4, 7—9 372 c. 65 372, 1504, 1601, 1783 8.7 6 88. 44, 80, 90, 113, 141, 157, 164, 167, 169, 172,182—188,314, 326 1657 e. 59 183 8. 60 372 8. 76 1601 88. 130, 135, 207 1527 8. 174 995 88. 219, 237 1504 8. 223 1600 8.252 76 8.280 6 0. 57, s. 27, Ir 1638 c. 59, Ir 1485 88. 9, 10, Ir 1533 c. 60, B. 10 1601 8. U 1611 8. 13 1611 8. 14 1504 B. 15 104, 1611 ll^erences are lo paragraphi (}M not pagtt. TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. CCXXIX 88 ft 39 V. PAEAOBAFHS (§§) c. 60, s. 16 1013, 1015 8. 22 1293, 1814 subs, (b) 1309a s. 30, subs. 11 180 s. 39 1601, 1609 0. 63, B. 21 1360, 1611 0. 66 1084, 1344, 1764 0. 70, 8. 14 1611 0. 77, Ord. XXXI 521 s. 14 1639 8. 18 675 8.22 1881D 0. 83, 88. 5—7, 22 995a 8. 23 1778 s. 24 1504, 1778 0.86,8. 11 1360 0. 87 1611 8. 18 125 8. 80 1611 8. 104 1004 88. 107, 120 6 88. 109, 110 1293 8. Ill 19 0.89,8.4" 180 c. 90, 8. 10 1182 39 & 40 V. 0. 36, 8. 10 1106 88. 36, 37 1329 88. 177, 180 116 88. 178, 191 372 8. 227 1322 s. 257 76 8. 259 372, 1359 8. 261 171 8. 263 15550 o. 37, Ir 74 0.45, 8. 7 1611 c. 48 1608a o. 61, s. 34 964b 0. 63, Ir 34 c. 80, g. 4 372 40 &41 V. 0. 14, 8. 1 1360 0.18,8.48 148 0. 21, B. 6 6 8. 51 1527 0. 25 1504 8. 16 1639 8. 19 1596 8. 20 1596 0.26,8. 6 1601, 1631 C.41 1526 8. 3 19, 1527 8.4 6 8. 6 19 0.48,88.4,9 6 0.49, 8. 4, Ir 6 8. 11, Ir 1309a, 1,329 8. 23 1309a 8. 43, Ir 35a. 1668 B. 67, Ir 1663a 40 & 41 V. FABAOBAPHS (^§) 0.65 ICOl 0.66, 8. 3, Ir 1276 8. 31, Ir 1777 8. 32, Ir 1601, 1777 0.57, 8.21, Ir 1262a 8. 27, subs. 4, Ir 5 subs. 0, Ir 5 8. 28, subs. 3, Ir 156 subs. 4, Ir 1014 subs. 5, Ir 176 subs. 6, Ir 997 subs. 1 1 , Ir. . . 5 8. 34, Ir 1283 0.59, 88. 1, 18 1498 88. 4, 6 1839 8. 17 1777 a. 18 1611 8. 22 1039 o. 63, s. 6 1611 0. 77, Ir 521 41V. C. 8, 8. 20 1657 0. 12, s. 1 372 8. 3 1360 c. 15, s. 19 , 372 0. 16, SH. 27—30 1611, 1640 8.79 180 8. 91 76 8. 92..372, 1555c, 1611,1640 41 & 42 V. 0.26, 8. 13 1.504 s. 36 1293 0.31,83.4,5 H20a s. 10 1110, 1654 8. 11 iriOA 8.12 1491n 8. 16 1540 0.33, 8. 5 173 ss. 11, 29 16;i8 o. 38 1186 c. 49 H4a 88. 37, 41 1611 0.62, 8. 13, Ir 6 88.41,54,91,100,103, 105, 129, Ir 1657 8. 69, Ir 183 8. 70, Ir 372 8. 201, subs. 1, Ir. .. 995 8. 223, Ir l«-)7 8. 250, Ir 70, 375 8. 265, Ir 1527 8. 267, Ir 180 0.67 1313 0.74, 8. .58 1527 0.76, s. 12 180, 1105n c. 79 1293 42 & 43 V. 0.8 1595,1601 o. 9 1 80 0.11,88.2—11 1608A 0.31, s. 4 372 I Vol. I. endi with § 971. m ' IHrh ccxxx TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 42 & 43 V. FABAORAFHS (§§) 0.49 1234a, 1258 ss. 10—14 1615 8. 10, eubH. 5 104 8. 19 1237 8. 22 1555 8. 24, subs. 2 35 8. 27, subs. 4 1615 8. 28 1258 8.29 18 8. 31, subs. 6 1555 8. 36 1234, 1318a 8.39 375 8.41 15860 Sched. 2 1319 0. 60, s. 4, Ir 1120a 8. 8, Ir 150a, 1120a 8. 11, Ir 1120a 8. 16, Ir 1540 " 1 831 8. 3 1675 V. tn 1246b c. 78 1599a 8. 5 ....1119, 1120, 1120a, 1122, 1264, 1268 88. 5—8 14910 43 & 44 V. c. 9, 8. 1 16 c. 13, 8. 36 76 c. 19 1600, 1601 0.42, 88. 1, 2, 3, 8 1182 8. 4 73 8. 7 180 0. 45, 8. 2 104 0.47, ss. 1, 3 1175 44 V. c. 12, ss. 38, 39 975 88. 26—43 860 44 & 45 V. c. 20, ss. 6, 7 1527 o. 24, 8. 4, subs. I 15860 subs. 3 1252 0. 36, 8. 5, Ir 1290 8. 9. It 1488 0.37,8.25 116 8.26 180 0.41, 88. 3, 7 129, 1174 8. 30 1015 88. .55, 56 96 B. 67 180 Soh. II. Pt. Ill 129 0.44, 8. 8 1097 c. 49, 8. 42, Ir 6 8. 48, subs. 3, Tr 1293 8. 50, subs. 2, Ir 19 C. 68, 88. 28, 44 1293 8. 29 1378 8. 52, subs. 3 1378 8. 52, subs. 4 1382 8. 53, subs. 7 566 8.56 269 8. 60, subs. 8 1276 44 & 46 v. FABAQSAPB8 (${) 0. 68, 8. 63, subs. 7 1278 8. 69 6, 1530 8.70 5 subs. 1, 3 6 8.80 1601 B. 124 1490a B. 126 1293, 1334, 1338 8. 126, subs. 1 .. 1252, 1293 subs. 2 1378 subs. 3 1293 88. 127, 128 49a 8. 142, subs. 3 1714 8. 154 1596 8. 156, subs. 1, 2 .... 372 subs. 3 1360 8. 157 1611 8. 161 76 8. 162, subs. C 1611 8. 163, subs. A 1601 subs. B 1696 subs. C 1630 8ub8. D 1638a subs. E 1601 subs. F 180 subs. G 1601 subs.H.....'.. 1601 8. 164 16U 8. 165 1655a 8. 170, subs. 1 73a subs. 2 831 8. 172, subs. 1 1696 88.175,176,177,178.. 6 8. 179 1334 subs. 1, 20.... 6 subs. 6 6 subs. 11 1530 8. 180 6 8. 190 5 0.59 ..,.6,220,621,1791,1810 0. 60, 8. 6 1260 8. 13 1504 8. 16 1601 c. 62, 8. 3, subs. 2 1038 8. 9 1638 0.69, 8. 15 1252 8. 27 1262 8. 29 479, 1562 46 V. 0.9 1524, 1527 8.2 1523, 1527 B. 4 1627 0. 10, ss. 5, 10 1630 46 & 46 V. c. 26, ss. 10, 17 1323 0. 38 6 8. 42 1601 8.48 6 8. 66, subs. 9 6 c. 39, s. 2 1640 8. 7, subs. 7, 8 1640 c. 43, 8. 4 1195 References are to paragraphs (§j) not page*. TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. CCXXXl 45 & 46 V. PAEAQBAPH8 (§§) 0. 43, 8. 8....I0OA, 1120a, 1491b, 1654 8. 10 1110 8.11 1491b 8. 16 1491b c. 48, 8. 27 1601, 1611 c. 49,8. 44 1601, 1611 8.46 73a 8ubs. 3 831 o. 60, 8. 22, subs. 5, 6 1783 8. 24 1657 8.78 76 8. 94, subs. 1 1293 subs. 2— 4 .... 1293 6. 219, subs. 1 76 8. 226 73a, 315 8. 233 1504 0.61,88. 10, 11, 12 1168 8. 13 169, 170, 1168 8. 14 1168 subs. 4 16 8. 17 1094 B. 19 1822 8.20 1836 B. 30 148, 368 subs. 2 369 8. 46, subs. 2 30a 8. 49, subs. 12,13.... 30a 88. 61, 52 1110 8.54 851 8,58 853 8.60 72 8. 63, subs. 3 1828 88.69,70 437 8. 74, subs. 2 30a 88. 76—82 31 8. 86, subs. 2 30a 8.89 16 8.94 1110 Sch. I 1110 0. 72, 8. 11, subd. 2 1608a 0. 75 1015 88.1,2 770,1016 88. 12, 16 190, 1371a 88. 14, 16 830, 1689 8. 168 1360 0.77,88.3,4 180 46 V. 0.3, 8. 2 1714 8. 4, subs. 2 1360 c. 7, 8. 6, Ir 1120a 8. 8, Ir H20a, 1491b 8. 10, Ir 1110 88. 11, 16, Ir 1491b 46 & 47 V. 0.22 1778 8. 17 1596 8. 30 1564 c. 36, 8. 2 1329 8.30 1663a 0.49 221, 544, 560 46 & 47 V. PAEAOHAPHS ($$) 0.61 1246b, 1455 8. 3 1714 8.61 76 8. 52 1707 8. 53 1254, 1714 subs. 2 1360 subs. 3 1611 8.62 180 c. 62, 8. 4, subs. 1 809 8.11 180 8. 13 1549, 1747a 8. 16, subs. 4 14^1 8. 17, subs. 8 ..1458a, 1491 8. 18, subs. 9 72 8. 20, subs. 2 ..1649, 1747a 8. 21, subs. 4 1748 8.24 1458a B. 27, subs. 1—3 1289, 1390, 1458a subs. 6 519 8. 30 1750 8.31 202 8. 32, subs. 2 1750 B. 35, subs. 3 1747a 8.43 169, 1016 8. 44, subs. 3 1039a 88.47,48 83 8. 54 1015 8. 65 1013 8. 66 1013 8. 68, subs. 2 1386 8. 71, subs. 4 1491 fls. 79, 80 1491 8. 82, subs. 3 1749 8. 92 19 8S. 93, 100 246 8. 106, subs. 5 519, 1398 8. 110 1289 6. 113 748 8. 127 19, 1549 8. 132 1649, 1747a 8. 133 1552 8. 134 1548, 1748 8. 135 ir^52, 1566 8. 136 495 8. 137 6, 14 B. 138 1550 8. 140 1751 8. 142 180 8. 149, subs. 2 ..292, 1255, 1260 8. 163 286, 292, 372 88. 104, 166, 167 ... 292 8. 166 292, 1255 8. 168 1015 Sch. 1 1101, 1552 Sch. II 1386, 1491 c. 67, 88. 23, 55, 76, 78, 114 . . 1775a s. 29 315 s. 30 562 88. 31, 96 1611 Vol. I. ends with } 971. !i ccxxxu TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 46 & 47 V. PABAOBAPHS (§§) c. 67, B. 49 1611 8. 52 1504 (!.84 6 B. 87 998 8. 88 1504 B8. 89, ICJ IGOl 8.97 180 0.61,8.28 180 88.33,41,54 34 47 & 48 V. c. P, 8. 25 1293 c. 12 1657 0. 14 190 8. 1 1360, 137U c. 18 6 c. 30, 8. 3 1526 c. 39 5 c. 43 1102a, 1371 0.64,88.9,20— 22,31, 32, 45. .1652a 8. 51 1127 C.61, 8. 16 1262a c. 70, 8. 30 1254, 1260 c. 76, 8. 15 1527 48 V. c. 4 1652a c. 8, 9. 7, 8ub8. 1 1596 8.8 5 c. 18 372 48 & 49 V. C.27 1293, 1814 c. 36 1601 6. 6 1527 0. 63 1775a 0.69 81, 1389b 8. 4.. 104, 1359b, 1389c, 1714 88. 5, 7 104 8. 9 13890 88. 10, 18 1254 8. 20 13,59b 0.70 1564 c. 74, «8. 2—5 1314 49 V. c. 5 1527,1601 c. 8, 8. 5 6 49 & 50 V. c.48,8.26 173 60 & 61 V. c. 20, B. 12, Ir 1663a 0. 28, 8. 10, 8ub8. I 1360 8.15 76 8. 17 1180 0.49 6 o. 55, 8. 16 35a, 1668 0. 68, 8. 62 76 8.71 47 0.71, 8. 4 901 8. 6 901, 1234a B. 18, 8ubs. 5 1488 B. 19, subs. 2 1290 B. 20 ?83 88. 21—23, 26 1290 51 V. PAKAOSAPRS m) 0. 3 ..74, 75b, 150, 168, 315, 500, 98lA, 1016, 1019, 1110, 1324, 1611 51 & 62 V. c. ':o, 8. 2 6 C.41 72, 1601, 1777 8. 40 180, 1596 8. 79 14 c. 42, 8. 4 1119, 16.i0 0.43 1348 8. 28 1554 8. 78 1686b 8. 81 1704 8. 87 246 ss. 88, 93 1719 8. 104 1417 8. 110 1291 B. Ill 1291, 1403 8. 115 [^Add. 1719] B. 116 38 88. 133—137 1850 8. 164 1316a 8. 180 6 0.46, 8. 1 1382, 1389 8. 2 1382 8. 3 1382, 1384, 1388, 1,388a B. 4 1382, i389 8. 6 1388 c. 50, 8.21 998 c. 64, 8. 9 1359a 52 & 53 V. c. 7, s. 11 976 o. 10 11, 12 8. 6 1567 0. 21 144a 0. 30 6, 1601 >,. 2 1329,1601 88. 3—5, 7 1601 8. 6 6, 1601 8. 11 1329 0. 45 123 c. 49 1583 88. 8, 18 1292 c. 63 888a 8. 9 5, 16, 1523 63 V. 0. 6 1100, 1674 s. 9 1320 8. 114 1327 B8. 144, 152 1601 8.327 180 8. 332 1320 63 & 54 V. c. 19 1110 0. 21, 8. 1, 8ub-8. 2 1601 8. 3 .. , 1600 B. 4 1595, 1601 8. 6 1601 8. 6 1596 8. 13 1600 Lt References are to paragraphs (§^) not pages. t- '. ' i ■. TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. CCXXXlll 63 & 54 V. PAKAOBAPHS (§}) c. 21,8. 2, 171 0. 27 1<'>S6 0. »3 220 0. 37 17 0. 30 74r) 0.67,8.2 34 0. 71, s. 3 IflSO 8ub». 4 i:oi subs. 13 ....72, l;j')0, 1748 subs. 17 1015 a. 8, Bubss. 2, 6 .... 1551 8. 10 1750 8. 13 1013 8. 22, subss. 1. 3 1101 8. 26 286, 372, 898 8. 27, subs. 2 1458a 64 & 66 V. 0. 10 1127 0. 38, S8. 13—15. 18 372 0. 39 397 8s. 12, 13 1763 8. 14, subss. 1, 2, 4 397 B. 15, subs. 3 397 s. 36 72 s. 72 446,724b Sched 998a, 1043, 1850 c. 64, 8. 14 1601 0.64 1110, 16.52b Sched. 1 1652b 0. 65, Sched 1320 0. 67 17, 1088 0. 69, s. 1 1527 c. 70, 8. 7 1371 65 V. C.4 949 c. 9 1455 c. 10 3a, 1000 r &56 V. 0. 19 ..425, 500, 860, 1426, 1714, 1759, 1839 0. 23 1595, 1601, 1611 ss. 1, 11, 21 1600 s. 16 1622 K. 17 1611 0. 30 115 8. 26 180 c. 32 906. 1360 s. 2 1287 8. 6 76 8. 9 1287, A/ip. C. 55, 8. 475 ..1260, 1318, 1.562a c. 64 1281 66 & 57 V. c. 39, 9. 43 . 1013 0. 53. S8. 26, 32 1764 0. 61, s. 1 73a, 315, 831 8. 2 73a, 315 0. 63, 88. 1, 2 842 8. 4 1231 66 & 57 Vict. PABAOBAPIIS (§§) c. 63, 8. 7 76 0. 71 745 8. 4..1021,1030d, 1043.1044, 1045, 1143 subs. 1..1020, 1025, 1039a subs. 2 1020 s. 12 1177 8. 14 1177a, 1178, 1179 B. 29, subs. 4 33, yldd. ss. 60, 62 lO'zO c. 73, 8. 3 14 57 & 58 V. c. 8, 8. 7 73a 0.27 1389b c.41,8. 12 1359b 8. 15 1389D 8. 17 115a • 8 18, subs. 3 76 o. 46, s. 57. subs. 1 (b) 180 0.48 1182, 124fiB, 1254, 1258, 1260, 1293, 1326, 1360, 1455 c. 56 312, 1608a o. 57 76 8. 5 1611 8. 10, subs. 5 1778 8. 37 ICOl 8. 46, subs. 5 1611 8. 48, subs. 1 1611 subs. 3 180 8. 62 372, 1178 8. 53 372 8. 57 (3) 1360 c. 60 1546 ss. 2, 3 998a e. 10 1623 88. 24, 39, 40 998a 8. 64.. 1504, 1601, 1623, 1778 8. 77, subs. 6 998a 88. 92, 93, 96, 99 1623 8. 100 1601, 1623 88. 101, 103, 104 1623 8.107 1098,1107 88. 113-116 1098, 1107 8. 117 1601 8. 122 1098,1819 s. 123 454 s. 124 1098 8. 136, suos. 3 1601 8. 137. subs. 2 1584, 1601 8. 138 1098 88. 174, 208 1601 8. 229 1623 8S. 23U -241,. 1595, 1600,1778 8. 239, subs. 6 1601 88. 242, 243 1595, 1600 8 251 1595 8. 256 1504, lr95, 1001 8. 272 1023 88. 310, 334 1601 8. 362 1657 8. 365 10 I,',. Vol. J. endi with § 971. ■i I CCXXXIV TABLE OF STATUTES CITED, 67 & 68 V. PABAORAPnS (^) c. 80,88. 3C9, 370 1098 8. 371, »ub8. 3....1098, IfiOl 88. 373, 374 1778 88. 387, 39.5 1601 M. 391— 408, 41'2 1098 8.407 1819 B. 416 1601 8.418 5 8. 419. ...5, 206, 1596, 1601, 1700 8. 436, subs. 2 1601 8. 4.58 1182a 88. 464, 465 1329 8. 471 1623 88. 475,479 1421 8. 484 1601 88. 502, 503 208 8. 651 1601 8.633 208 57 & 58 V. PAnAORAPHR (J}) o. 60, HH. 680. 082 1254 H. (i«3 76 H. 691 1564,1601 H. 692, BUbs. 3 998a K. 69+ 1839 8. 695 1601 8. 697 1360 8. 700 1264 B. 719 1696, 1601, 1623 B. 729 1329 88. 742, 745, 8ubB. 1 E. , 998a 58 V. 0. 7, 8. 7 [6, 1530 Add.] c. 9 [1527 Add.] 68 & 59 V. c. 24, 8. 6 1360 0. 26,88. 6,7 nOi Add.} 0.28 1360 0.40,8.2 1360 Xrftrtneu art to jfaragrapht (})) notfaftt. ( ccxxxv ) RULES AND FORMS OF SUPREME COURT, 1883, CITED. m rASAOBAFHB (§§) O. V. r. 7 1668 rr. 12, 13 1686 ,0. VIII. rr. 1, 2, 3 1586 O. X. r. 1 1586a O. XII. rr. 26, 26 789 O.XIV 38 O. XVI 221,222,226,1811 r. 1 226 r. 4 226 r. 9 462 r. 11 228 r. 12 226 O. XVIII. r. 2 101 O. XIX 221, 222, 226, 299 r. 2 300, 462 r. 4 300, 727 r. 6 1799 r. 12 311 r. 13 ....301, 308, 824, 829 rr. 14— 16 301 r. 17 302 r. 18 ....300,302,304,369 r. 20 306 r. 21 1786 r. 25 109, 368 O.XXI.r.6 307,313 r. 19 311 r. 20 1691 r. 21 301, 371, 388 O. XXII. r. 1 831, 832 rr. 2, 4, 6, 7 831 0. XXIII. r. 6 301,308 O. XXV. rr. 1, 2 91, 306 rr. 2, 3, 4, 6 828 O.XXVI.r.l 1719 O. XXVII. r. 2 83,383 r. 13 ..300, 302, 824, 829 O. XXVIII 221, 222, 226, 304 0. XXXI 531,1500,1792 r. 1 1466 r. 6 1467 r. 8 442 r. 12 1799 r. 14 1791, 1798 rr. 15, 17 1787 r. 19 1494 rr. 20, 25, 26 1799 r. 24 623, 731 O. XXXII 724a (i), 724a (ii) r. 1 ....724A(i), 724a (ii) r. 2.... 724a (i), 724a (v), 724b r. 3.... 724a (i), 724a (V) FABAOBAPHa (§}) 0. XXXII. r. 4.. 724a (i), 724b, 724h, 7241 r. 6 724K r. 6 724H, 827 r. 7 724H, 7241 r. 8 448 r. 9 456a O.XXXIII.r.2 711 r. 3 711,812 r. 6 1403 0. XXXVI. rr. 2— 7a 21b r. 6 1417 r. 12 1719 r. 30 1686 r. 36 1431 r. 37 344, 366, 360 r. 38.. 1427, 1434a, 1446 r. 44 2lo r. 48 662 r. 49 1292 r. 60 1798 r. 67 383, 1310a 0. XXXVII 60lA, 604, 1285 r. 1..604, 615, 1394, 1395, 1843a, 1861 r. 2 1396a r. 4....627, 1 17, 1536, . >37. ' '38 r. 5.. 603, 604, 5, 646, 12 10, 1677, 1' U, 1 r. 6a 604 r. 7 1286, 1310 rr. 8, 9 604, 1310 rr. 10, 11 604 rr. 12, 16..504,546, 1677 r. 17 604, 1310 r. 18.... 472, 600a, 602, 604, 615, 1580 r. 19.. 1285, 1386, 1396b rr. 20— 23 504 r. 24 604, 1396F r. 25 470, 604 rr. 26, 27 1239 r. 28 1284 rr. 29, bO 1241 a r. 31 1241 rr. 32, 33 1244 r. 34 1242 r. 35 644 rr. 36, 37, 38 .... 54o rr. 39, 40 60" rr. 41,42,44-46,49 607 Vol. I. ends with i 971. CCXXXVl TABLE OF RULES AND FORMS. PABAQBAPHB ({^) o. xxxvin. r. I \:m r. 3 ....139(iii, i;i()(io rr. 4,6 i;«6is r. ..12, 1390k, 1')(1C rr. 8, 12, 13 139()D r. 11 139GO r. ir)..1390F, 1447, l.'>38 rr. 16, 17 1396f r. 27 389 r. 28 1396a, 1429 r. 29 1396a O. XXXIX. r. 6 lS82n r. 8 397 0. XLL r. 1 l.')80 O. XLII. rr. 20, 21, 24 1686 O. XLIV. r. 2 12G9 O. XLV. r. 7 1692 O. L. rr. 3 -6 500 O. LI. rr. 7, 8 21 O. LV. r. 10 1284, 1386, 1396e r. 17 1284, 1386 O. LVIII. r. 4 24lA, 1883a O. LTX. r. 7 1882b O. LX. r. 3 1485, 1599a O. IjXI. r. 1.... 6, 1119, 1120, H20a, 1122, 1268, 148.5, 1491a, 1491b, 1491c, 15.39, 1.540, 1699a, 1611, 1647, 1653, 1654, 1668 r. 6 1386, 1396k rr. 6, 7 6, 15, 39 r. 9 1611, 1653 rr. 17, 18, 23, 24 1491a r. 28 1534 O.LXIV.r. 1 16 r. 11 446, 1.586a r. 12 1586a FABAOaAPHS (§{) O. LXV. r. 1 39 r. 12 38 r. 27, par. 9 ....1247, App. pur. 20 462 par. 25.... 128 4, 1386 par. 37 ^Ipp- pars. 63,54 1538 O. LXVI. r. 1 442 O. LXVIL rr. 1— 9 1586a r. 3 180 O. LX VIII 1.500, 1782 r. 1 21c, 246, 666 r. 2 245 O. LXXI. r. 1 39 O.LXXn. r. 2 App. Appendix B. Form 11 724a (v), 724o 12, 13 72411, 7241 14 442 Appendix C. Form 7 101 Appendix G. Form 21 1239 Appendix J. Forms 1—7 1239 13 611 Appendix K. Form824,26 1798 36— 37b 504 Appendix 0. .. 1380, 1387 EULES OF SUPREME COURT, OCTOBER 1884, CITED. PABAQBAFHS (§§) Rule 6 504 16 1882b TABLE OP COUNTY COURT RULES AND FORMS CITED. PARAaBAFHS (§6) 1889. O. IVa. r. 30 1248 O. Vll 1291 O. IX. rr. 7, 8 724i O. XII. r. 3 566 O. XIV 246 O. XVIII 131.5a rr. 1, 2 1291 r. 3 1397 r. 6 724o r. 8 1879 r. 10 1397 PABAQBAFHS (§§) 1889. O. XVIII. rr. 13—28 .... 620 r. 16 1291 O. XIX. rr. 1— 9 1397 1892. O.XXVIa 1692 1889. O. La. rr. 6, 28 App. rr. 30, 31 App. 1889. Form 90 724o 92a, 92b 724i 145a, 146a 1291 147 1291 1892. Form 156 1692 References are to paragraphs (§§) not pages. ( ooBzxvii ) ADDENDA AND ERRATA. %* The additions in the Addenda following bring the decisions in English Cases down to 3lst July, 1895; in Irish Cases to thost contained in the Law Reports (Ir.) up to and including the July Number of those Reports; and in American Cases down to and inclusive of those contained in Vol, XLII. of the Am. St. Rep. English legislation is also noted up down to 31st July, 1895. PAOB 4, at end of note " add— "Ab amended by 58 V. c. 7 (' The Army Act, 1896 ' ), § 7." 16, line 2 from bottom of text. Before " matters of history " insert — " as to." 34, line 6 from top. After "much discussed'" insert — "By 'The Sale of Goods Act, 1893,' it is expressly enacted (affirming the previous common law) that ' what is a reasonable hour is a question of fact' '*." Insert as note 2»— " «» 66 & 67 Vict. c. 71 {' The Sale of Goods Act, 1893'), § 29, subs. 4." 17, in notes. At end of note ^, after "Cooke v. Wildes, 1885," insert — "And this is so even where a Corporation is defendant (as to which, see post, } 981) : Neville v. Fine Art, &c. Co., 1895." At end of note », arfrf— "see also R. v. Baker, 1895 (C. 0. R.)." 68. At the end of § 69, add a netv sentence as follow* — "The circumstances must be such as to produce moral certainty, to the exclusion of every reason- able doubt. ' Moral certainty and the absence of reasonable doubt are in truth one and the same thing."* In the notes, add—'* * People v. Carlton (Am.), 1894 ; State v. Atkinson (Am.), 1894 ; State v. Clifford (Am.), 1892." ^ " ' See cases cited in note ", especially State v. Atkinson (Am.) 1894." 70, line hfrom top. At end o/§ 71 add — "It is at least questionable whether a conclusive presumption can ever be raised in support of a criminal charge.'*" In notes, add—'' '» In America it has been decided that it cannot be ; see note in 36 Am. St. Rep., p. 689, to People v. Cannon (Am.), 1893." 76, in note », instead o/3 # 4 Will. 4, "c. 27," read—"o. 42." 78, line 6 from bottom of note. Instead of 9 Geo. 4, " o. 69," read—"o. 69." 80, liv 5 from top. After "deadly weapon;'" insert — "an intent to do it maliciously is in point of law inferred from an indictment ' for unlaw- fully publishing a libel ' ; 3» " In notes, add as note '» the following — " '• And an indictment for ' unlaw- fully publishing a libel' is good without an averment that the defendant published it 'maliciously' ; R. v. Munslow, 1896 (0. C. R.)." I t! iiti IB fit ccxxxvlii PAoe ADDENDA AND ERRATA. 1:1' 100, iu note » after " (48 & 49 Vict. o. 69)," imleadof'ii'' read—" } 3." In the 3rd line of note '*, after "ante, $ 42 " imerl — " He may also be a member of a f riei-dly society ; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 60 (' The Friendly Societies Act, 1875 '), § 16, 8ubH. 8. By ' The Friendly Societies Act, 1895 ' (68 & 69 Vict. c. 26), § 6, the nominee of an infant over sixteen may give a valid receipt, except when the infant is known by the society to have been marriea since the nomination. The infant member must, by ibid. § 7, be over cue year of age, and may, if over sixteen, by himself, and if under sixteen, by parent or guardian, execute instruments, &o., and give receipts." 106, line 1 1 from bottom of text, and at the end of ^ 112, add — " In accordance with this principle it has, in America, Lenn held that in a civil action {e.g. oa a policy of insurr.nce) when there is no evidence as to its cause, a death must be presumed to have been natural, and not to have been a suicide, since suicide is a felony.*'" In notes, add as note *» — " *» Walcott v. American Life, &o. (Am.), 1891." 113, in note *, after "see id." add — " Nor, semhle, does any arise unless it appear that the ditch was artificial ; Marshall v. Taylor, 1895 (C. A.)." 116, in notes. At end of note * add — " But ' Hiring Agreements ' are not within the Factors Act, and that Act does not enable a hirer to pass the property in goods for which he has not paid : llelby v. Matthews, 1895 (H. L.). Payne f. Wilson, 1S95, having followed the decision of the Court of Appeal in Helby v. Matthews, which was reversed by the House of Lords, would ajpear not to bo now law." 125, in notes. At end of note "^ add — "As to the form in which the question whether they will presume a lost grant should be left to a jury, see O'Kttue V. O'Kane (Ir.), 1892." 167, in notes. At the commencement of note *, insert — " See 'The Judicature Act, 1873 ' (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), § 25, subs, iv." 169, in note ' line 6, after "Parsons v. Hayward, 1862," add — " and Brown v. Wren Bros., 1895." 177, tn text. Strike out the reference "S" with the note at bottom. 181, in text, line !> from bottom. Insert "the disputable presumption of fact that a person's life continues for u rea.sonable time after ho has last been heard of,«» or the." In notes, insert us note *• — " ** In the Goods of Connor (Ir.), 1892." 186, line 6 from lop. KStrHc ant the words " New Rules of." 196, line 10 from lop of (i\rt. Slriie out the icords "} 2 of," and in bottom line, after " in," and before " criminal," insert the ivord — "certain." 220 »w text, line 4 jrom top. After ^ 293 insert a new piragraph, as follows : — " §i!98A. The rule that the evidence must bo confiuod to the issues does not, of course, exclude testimony bearing on one or more only of several questions ruisod by an issue wliich is of a complex nature ; '• thus, for instiinco, it may be shown that a defendant was negligent because, to his knowkvlgo, other accidents had previously arisen from the same condition of things"' (as, e.g., that he knew a maehino to ho in a dangerous condition because h(> was awiire that athirs had been injured by it previously to the aciiideut to the plaintitt) ; that the scienter (as it is commonly called) must bo imputed to him because its owner kept a dog or other animal after becoming aware that it had attacked others ; and the existence of nuisances can only be shown by proof of the mis- chief whioli the thing complained of has done to others of the public, as well as to the plaintiff or prosecutor. See also post, ^ 33() et sei^." In line 4 from top, after the irords " justcitetl," in.sert, " fu which ovidcnco was rejected as irrelevant." Ill no/is, iiisirt us note '•— " •• Brewing Coy. v. Beaucr (Am.), 1893, and see also Brown f. Eastern, &c. lly. 1889 (C. A.)." Itinert UK nut' "> — " "> Blumiugtou v, Legg (Am.), 1894 ; sec also cases iu preceding nolo." ADDENDA AND ERRATA. CCXXXIX IPAOB 230, in notei. At the md of note * add — " As to the application of the rule in tha Probate Court, see Young v. Hollo way, 1894 " 253, in note ''fur Order "XXVI.," read— Order "XXXVI." 299, in notei. At the end of note ' add — " As to pn of probate granted under the old law, see post, § 1689." 332, in text, line Gfrom top. After the words "permanently insane," and before note "*," imert the words — " or kept out of the way." 335, line ifrotn top. Strike out the word " oould " and insert the word — " can." At end of note » add—" See also R. v. Mitchell, (1892), cited post, § 491." 339, »»• notes. In note * at commencement of note, insert — " See ' The Coroners Act, 1887' (50 & 61 Vict. c. 71), § 4, subs. 2. Corresponding provisions were originally contained in 7 Geo. 4, o. 64, § 4, and are applied." Strike out the whole of line 1 of note '. 368, in text. At the end of § 569, after the word " will," insert note "*." 376, at the end of note * add — " In America an attempted definition of res gestet is, that the res gesta consists of ' the circumstances, facts, and declara- tions which grew out of the main fact, are contemporaneous with it, and serve to illustrate its character.' See Pinny v. Junes (Am.) 1894." 435, in text, line 5 from bottom. Strike out the word " pecuniary." 460, at end of note « add—'' and Anchor Milling Co. v. Walsh (Am.), 1891." 468, at end of note * add — "The view stated in the text as once prevalent in England is still held in America. See State /•. Johnson (Am.), 1893." 472, in notes. At the end of note * add—" By Order LXVIII. r. 1 (d) ' proceed- ings for Divorce or other Matrimonial causes ' are expressly exempted from the operations of the R. S. C. 1883." 477, in notes. In note ' after " 1889," insert—" Ord. XVIII." 506, line 6 from top. Instead of " § 774.'" read—" §§ 774—82."" 616, in notes. In note ' after the words " Robson v. Alexander, 1828," insert— " B\it the law has been said to be otherwise as to confessions obtained by illegal duress, &o. ; see post, } 883." 545, at commencement of note ' insert — "Henderson v. Williams, 1895 (C. A.)." 546, in notes. At the comtneneement of note ', insert — " Royal Bank of Scotland v. Tottenham, 1894 (C. A.)." 668, in notes. At the end of note ", add — " Secus in America ; see Cook t'. State (Am.), 1893, where the confession having been obtained by untruly tolling the prisoner that he had been actually seen to do the criminal act with which he was charged, was rejected.' 669, i» notes. In note ', strike out the last ientence, namely, " But this case would seem not to be law," and insert — "This decision is in accordance with subsequent American authority ; see Scott v. Commonwealth (Am.), 1893, cited post, \ 910." 671, in notes. At the end of note *, rtrfrf—" Compare the law as to admissiom made under duress, ante, J 798." 673, at commencement of note ", strike out " Tlie " and insert — " See the." 580, in notes. At the end of note *, insert — " Not only (io those many authi<riti(»8 support the proposition in ilm u-.\i, to which the autlior took cxri'ptiiiii, but the law in Anieric:! is tho same as the English law is goncnilly taken to bo. Stjitc v. Clittord (A.m.), 1892." 684, innate''', instead of "'J Geo. 4,0. 74," &c., rcarf—" 9 Goo. 4, o. 5 4,§ 4 (cited ante, § -192), and } (i, Ir." 690, in notes. At the end of note *, add — " But in America evon a letter, written V)y an accused, whiiii in prison, to his wife, and voluntiirily given up hy her, is considered to be a (^oiifideiitiiil e(nniiiunicati(>n between u bus- band and wife, and is therefore not lulinittixl in eviden(M> against the husband. See Se.ott f. Conmumweallh (Am.), 181)3. There is some authority in Knglish law for a similar view ; see R. v. Pamenter, 187'2, cited anti, ^^ 881, n." 804, in notes. In Une 1 of uole '\ instead of " Hth cd.," read — " loth ed." ^',ii| m ccxl ADDENDA AND KRRATA. PAOK 619, iff notti. At the end of note ', add-—" Latter «. Gulden is at pNwnt tbe subject of appeal to the House of Lords." 639, in notes. In note '", in linet 3 and 4 from bottom, inttead ({^"the Metro- politan Board of Works," r*arf— "the London County Council" ; and at end of note insert — " and 51 & &2 Vict. o. 41 (' The Local Government Act, 1888'), §40 (8)." 643, in noten. At end of note ', add—" and (also an action against a corporation for libel) Neville v. Fine Art, &o., 1895." 644, tM notei. At end of note ^, add — " In America it is held that where a corpo- ration makes a contract -which is ultra vires or unsealed, of which the defendant has already had the beneftt, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to difafOrm the contract, and to sue upon a quantum meruit for the value of the work done ; see Bmnswink Gas, &o. Co. v. United Gas Co. (Am.), 1893 ; and also Kadish v. Garden City, &c. (Am.), 1894." 661, in notes. At the end of note ^, add — " see post, § 1110." 673, innotes. At theendofnote\ add— '•Chipper&eld.v.Ca.rteT,l895 (Wnght,J.)." 679, in text, in line i from top. At end of 4 1034b add — " The provisions of Lord Tenterden's Act'* must be considered in connection with those con- tained in the Statute of Frauds on the subject of guarantees." In notes. As tiote '», insert — " '• 9 Geo. 4, o. 14. These provisions are set out and diHcussed post, §§ 1085 ct scq." At the end ofnote^, add — " Re Eyre, 1895 (Romer, J.)." 688, at end of note ^, add—- ■ neither is an ag^ement by an artist to paint a picture such 8 contract: Isaac v. Hardy, 1884 (Mathew, J.). In both these cases cne contract is, in substance, one for the sale of goods, and theref(/ro must be in writing, if the articles be of the value of £10 or upwards." 689, at commencement ofnote*^ add— " Abbott & Co. v. Wolsey, 1895 (C. A.)." 690, tM text, line 1 at top. Hefore the word "marking," add — "taking of a sample from the bulk'", or the mere " ; and in line 2 from top, instead of "This Act," read—" each of thewe Acts." In notes, insert as note '•— " '» Abbott & Co. v. Wolsey, 1895 (0. A.)." 699, in notes. At the end of note *, add—" Royle v. Harris, 1896." 72t , at the end of note ', add—" Tliis Act (see § 4) extends to Scotland." 724, in notes. Strike out at end of note \ " 369, 371, 391, 408, 412," and insert— " 392 et seq., especially 395, which latter suction requirep such ajjree- meut to be made before a Superintendent." 728, at commencement of § 1106, insert — "The London County Oouncil now exerciMCH the functions formerly possessed by the Metropolitan Board of Works'*." In name line sfrikfimt "is," and insert — " was." In miles, insert as note '■ the fullouing — " '• See 61 & 62 Vict. o. 41 (' The Local Government Act, 1888 '), § 40." 729, in note ', instead of " Corporation of London v. Judge," read—" Corpora- tion of Dublin v. Judge." In same note, immediately before "'The Voters Registration Act,' " insert—" ' The Truck Acts,' ante, } 1096." 734. Instead of " § 1117," read—" §} 1117-18." 737, i>« Hue 5 in text, delete "of." 779, in text, line 1 from bottom. After " annexed by the " insert — "common." 780, in text, in line Sfrom top [being frst line of\ 1 184), and in line \Q from bottom, between 'he words "the" ^- "law" insert {in each place) word — "common." 781, in text, line i from top {being frst line of ^ 118G), between the words "the" and " law " imert the word—" common." 809, in text, on bottom line. After the words "summons'" insert — "or, if necessary, by Crown Office subpoena." hi note '', xnstend of " 32 & 33 Vict. c. 49" read—" 42 & 43 Vict. o. 40." 812, in text, lint Vifroin bottom of text, fur " from " read— "io attend." lii ADDENDA AND EKUATA. CCX FAOR 819, in notu. In note ', strike out " Ord. IVa." and read—" Ord. La," 8-ir), in notes. In note ', line 2 nf note, instead of " ^ 50() " rea-/—" ^ .504." In note ', strike out the lant fnur tvords of note, tiamchi — "citod ante, ^ flOG." 8-)l, in notes. In note ', serund line from bottom, strike out the tvords " a fow of tho principal of hucIi " at the //<i/iiiiiinj/ of such note, and insert in its place the fulloninij — "MoHtof tlio i)riii('ipal provinioiiH by which tlio attoudancu of w'tnosNi'M before various tril)unalM may bo necurod, ■"'ill bo pimiiuTatod on a later i)ii<!rc (hco post, § 1329, noto ", p. 8(i:!). The followiii^f uote must aeoordiiiffly bo read in conjunction with tin; noto just referred to. ]iiit in addition to the provisions mentioned in that note there are also." 8")7, in notes. At end of note *, insert — " § 24." 87G, in notes. In note cominif over from previous pui/r, in line i) from top of se/'ond column, after " by ^ 2 that," insert — " in future in Scotland." 877, in notes. In note ^, line 10 from bottom, after the word "See" insert the words — "for existin;? law." 893, at end if note '^ add — "In America she is oven allowed to prosecute her husband for perjury contained in an affidavit made and used by him afi-iiiust ' licr in the course of divorce proceedings : Dill v. l\'(ii)le (Am.), liS94." 905, in column 2, line 15 of note cominy over from previous page, strike out " And," and in same line, after theu-ord "Scotland," insert — " Covenanters aud." At end of note*, add — "It will bo noted that, as it contains no word.i restrictiiif^ its operation, this Act extends to Scotland and Ireland." 948, at end of note ' add — " and if the statement be relevant, the witness if ho swear falsely may be indicted for perjury : II. r. Baker, 181)5(0 CIl.)." 9(13, in notes. At the end of note eomin;/ orcr fro"i previous pai/e, add — " Jnilemiiity clauses to witnesses f^iviiifc evidence are also coutainod in 'The ^ler- chandiso Marks Act, 1S87' (50 i: 51 Vict. c. 28), J 19 (2); 'The I'oi.soned Grain Proliibition A(^t, 18(13 ' (20 A: 27 Vict. c. 113), \ a ; and in ' Tho Record of Title (Ireland) A.'.t, 1S05 ' (28 & 29 Vict. c. 88), § 59." 9G8, in text, in line ^ from top. At end if \ 1400, add - " Hut the (Toss-oxaininer is bound by the witness's evidence, and cannot contradict him except on a point which is relevant to the issue." Line I'lfrom top of text. After "disfrracehini." add -note refirence "(«)." In notes, before note ', add fool nut c {a), as follmrs ; — "(a) And this is the practi(!e in Ameri'ja. See Carroll v. State (Am.), 189.1." 1001, in column 1 of note cominij onr from previous paije^ before I he words ^" Charitji Trustees,' " insert — " 'JJoroui/h .■tccouuts aud Jloeunwiits.' See 'Municipal Corporations.' " 1002, in notes, lu column 1 of note comitnj orer from previous pai/e, before the uords "'The fricndli/ Societies Act, 1875,'" insert — "'Freemen's Roll oi li I'orough.' See ' Municipal Corporations.'' " /)( column 2 of same note, after " Turnpike'" and before "Jurors' Lists," insert — "' Incorjioraled Lair Noeieli/'s Doriiiii' uts.' See title ' Solicitor.'" 1003, in column 1 of note. Itefore the words " ' The Miicha,:t Shippinij Art, 1894,' " tnserl — " • London I 'oiiuli/ Council,' see post, lj{ I59b 1, n., aud infra, ' Tht Metropolis Manayemcnt Act.' " 1005, in notes. After the word " infra," 'in top line of column 1 of note, insert — " See also ' I'alualiou Lists,' infra." 1008, rt/(«rf()/4//i/iw/;/)«//i/«/')"''''~"'""lt'''u Documentary Evidence Act, 1895, *•" Y/i notes, as *» add" '« 58 V. r.. 9." 1009, in notes. At the bottom if sebntule in note *, add in column 1 — " 'The Board of Agriculture.' See ' 'J'hc Documentary Kvxdence Act, 1896 ' (58 Vict, c. 9)" ; and also add iu coluiuu 2 of schedule — " Tho President, Sectretarj', or any ineniln'r of the Hoard, or any person authorized by the President to act on behalf of the Secretary." Wll, in notes. In note " incoluiun 1 of note, in line '1 from bottm>', after "subs, (c)," vnert—" as amended by 58"Vict. o. 7 ('The Army Act, 1895 '), aud iu," tmd slrik* out the word "and" in same lint. ! M i \'.\ 1 : 4 iii i ! V HIM ccxlii ADDENDA AND ERRATA. PAOK 1010, i« <#a:/, /i«e 3 /rom io«oOT. After the wordii " dnminiGiitH which," infen — "formerly belongwl to the old Commou Law sido of the Ckjurt of ChaniMTy, and now." In line 2 from bottom utrxke out the word " which," and the word " now," Itt note ' strikeout the tcordu " whitih fjrivo," and mihutititte the word "jfavo" ; andiniaine note after the word " dIhc where," insert -" Pout, § 1047, n.," and strike out the remainder of the senttnee down to " exonuswl." 1047. at end of line 6 from bottom of eiiliimn 2 of note. '', insert — " But in pedigree caHOH Huch Ijuokrt may HumotimeH be adniiHHible ; Het^ i>UKt, ^ 1709." 1050, in nctei. In column 1 of note eominij over from previous pai/e, before " ' Corpo- rations,^ " insert — " ' Jlishop's liei/isters.'' See infra, ' luelesiastical Docu- ments ' ; ^Chapter House ICeijislers,' Heo infra, ' Kcelesiastieal Documents.^ " Also in last line of note comint/ over, before "'Vestri/ hooks,'" insert — '" yWrie;-*.' Set? MU|)rii, ' Ecclesiastical llucuments.' " 1073, in notes. At end of note '' add—^' but ii joint tort fcu.sor will not be roloasod. Dyerf. Munday, 189.') (C. A.)." 1077, at end of § 1637a, add — " We have aeon" that under certain circuinHtances juHiicoN are al.so empowered to correct (UTorH in b()()i{.s of reference, &o." In notes. Add, as note " — " " See ante, § 101 1, n." 1078, in line ^ from top, after " Burgeons," add note " {«)•'" As note " (a) " add-" («) Se«; ante, § 173, n." inai, -t com. of ^ 16.')2, before "JudgmentH," insert — "in the sixth place." 1080, in text. In first line of ^ 1052a, strike out " Hixth," and insert — "seventh." 1087, at eommeneement of J 165'in, strike out " seventhly," and insert — "eighthly." In first line if ^ 10.').'t, strike out " eighth" and inurl-" ninth." 108H, infest line of J 16.')4 strike out " t(!nth," and insert— " eleventh." 1090, in col. 1 of note ', hefnrr • ' ' Dublin I'orporaltiin,' " insert — " As to bye-laws of English common lodging-houses, see infra, sub tit. ' Public Health Act.' " In column 2 of note ', a/'ter " London County Council," insert — " (by 51 & 62 Vict. c. 41, § lOl"." In column 2 of note ', transfer the title " ' The .Mrtroimlis Water Act,' " now misplaced at end of note, and make it come in iiiimedialeli/ before " Mines." 1103, in first line of text, after the leord " obje(^tioMs " insert note " (a)." In notes, as foolnute (n), insert—'^ (a) ' A judgment in rem ' has, in Ireland, been iefine<l as a ju<lgment by a (Jourt having s])ecial jurisdiction over tlie subje(-t nuitt«,'r. tjee MacDonail r. Alcorn, 1894 (Ir.)." 1 114, in miles. At end of note '■', add—" As to an a(M|iiittal, see post, § 1722." 1 122, ill seioiiil line from lop of column 2 of note '', after " is," insert—" (See J 25, subs. 9 of.Iudiiuture Act, 1873", being 30 iV: 37 Vict. e. 00)." 1138, in niile'\ afler "jirevads)," mite slum Id mid " 'V\\i' rules giving a non- suit the efl'eit of a verdict for defi'iiilant liav(! been abrogated both in the High Court and in the ('ounty ('ourt (see .Annual (/'ounty ('ourt I'ractire for 1892, i>. 21"). See 51 *c 52 V. v.. 13, ^ 115, as to <'osts on suing in a sec;ond action after judgment recovered in another court." 1107 (" nolix. At end of mile-, iiilil " Such liooks are in general not admi.ssililo as eviden(!e, ante ^ 1592, n." 1173, i" /'■''. /" i-neHfrom liot/om, after " Hoartl of Worl<s, " i//«r< — "(now tile Tjondon County (Jouncii)." In miles. At end of note " add — " 51 k 52 Vict. c. 41, ^^ 10." 1182, in miles. At end of note '■', mlil, "Hut see A.-(l. r. North Metropolitan Tramways Company, 1895 (('. A.)." 1205 in niilri. In milr ', nl'lir •' Wentworth, 1880," iiisrr/ " Hut the acceptor will not Ih! liable beyond the amount origin.illy lllleil in, when lie uci eiitcd it, on a bill wliieli ijn coiisei|uence of sueli acceptor failing to observe how tin' bill had been tilled in) has I ri alten^l to a larger amount, .iiid this even though the stamp on llie bill will cover the hiigiT funi. Scholtii'ld /'. Lord lioiKh'sborough, 1895 (C. A. diiM. Lopes, li.-l .). In titu 10 from lop of eol. 1 of note \fur "indeed," read—'- too." PRACTICAL TREATISE ON TlIK LAW OF EVIDENCE. PART I. NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE. CHAPTER I. PRKLIMINAKY OHSKRVATIONS. si 1.' EviDExcK, ill Law, iiicliult!s till iho legal moans, oxcliisive of mcro arguinont, wlii(;h tend to provo or disprove any fact tho truth of which is submitted to judic'al investigation. It and the word jn-oof are often used as synonyms. Accurate logicdaus, however, apply the latter terra rather to the effect of evidence, than to ((vidonce itself.'^ That high degree of evidence which is called (ienumHt ration excludes all possibility of error, and nuitheraatical truth alone is susceptible of it. 8uch evidence cannot bo obtained in the investigation of matters of fact, of which tho most that can ever be said is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them.' lu trials of fact, therefore, the true question is not, whether it is ]>ossiblo that the testimony may be false, but whether there is sulliciont i)robability of its truth ; that is, whether the facts are proved by competent and satisfactory evidence. 51 2.'* V>y eoDipvteut (or admissible) evidence is meant that which the law re(pures, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular (iase — such, for instance, as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By Hdtinfuctory evidence, sometimes called siiffieirnt evidence, is intended that amount of proof which ordinarily satisfiea an unprejudiced mind beyond • Or. Ev. § 1, in p;r<mt part. '^ Soo Wills, ('ir. Kv. 2 ; Whatdly's liOf^. h. ii. c. iii. § 1 ; N. York tiv. ('odd, § l(i(;o. " Sco (]iiml). Oiiido, 121. Even of iniitlii'iimt IcaltruthB this writor juBtly T. — VOL. I, 1 nnnarks, that, thoiit^li capablo of do- inoiiHtration, tlii<y aro luluiittod by most iiicii Holtdy on tho moral evidcuce of general notoriety. Id. H)(i. Sea N. Yolk Civ. (::odo,'§ Kili'J. * Ur. Ev. § 2, almost verbatim. \\\ ' i 1 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. [part I. reasc lable doubt. The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined ; the only legal test of which they are susceptible is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of an ordinary man ; and so to convince him that he would venture to act upon that conviction in matters of important personal interest.* Questions respecting the competency or admissibility of evidence are entirely distinct from those which respect its sufficiency or efEect. The former are exclusively within the province of the court ; the latter belong exclusively to the jury.' § 3.' The law of Evidence may be considered under three general heads, namely, First, The Nature and Principles of Evidence; — Secondly, The Object of Evidence, and the Rules which govern its produotion ; — And, Thirdly, The Means of Proof, or the Instruments by which facts are established. We will also, in connection with the first head, consider what matters the courts will notice without proof; and in connection with the second and third heads, offer a few observations respecting the functions of the judge, as distinguished from those of the jury. § 3a. The present is a convenient place to mention that by the Short Titles Act, 1802 (55 Vict. c. 10), short titles are gi-en by statute to various Acts of Parliament (no less than 840), ana that in the following pages this short title is stated between inverted commas ; while the technical reference to the Act is also added, one or the other of these references being placed in brackets. Moreover, where a statement in the text is founded on a decision of the House of Lords, it is marked " H. L.," while if founded on one of the Courts of Appeal or Privy Council, it is marked " C. A." or " P. C," American cases being dif ' inguished by the mark "(Am.)," Irish cases by " (Ir.)," and Scotch authorities as " (Sc.)." On the other hand, if it is founded on a diction of a particular judge, his name is generally given in brackets after that of the case in wliich it was uttered (wliether at Nisi Prius or in the course of a judgment given in banc). The date of every case which is important in estimating its value is given, and every known reference to it will be found in the Table of Cases. > 1 St. Ev. J78. » 1 Ph. Ev. *i ; Carpenters' Co. v. Hayward, 1780 (Buller, J.). ' Or. Ev. § 3, iu great port. • V. />. - 'I'liis mill siiniliir reforonces throughout the work aro to'Thillipps and Aniould on EviiltMico." •> i;HAP. I.] AMERICAN NOTES. 5i AMERICAN NOTES. § 1. Evidence Defined. — Evidence is that which shows. Legally, it is any fact which, either directly or mediately, tends to show to the mind the truth of a fact or proposition submitted to legal inves- tigation. Miles V. Edden, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 270 (18G4); Schloss v. His Creditors, 31 Cal. 201 (1866). This definition includes both direct and circumstantial evidence, though as was said in an Iowa case (Davenport i\ Cummings, 15 la. 219, (1863), "direct and positive evidence cannot with a critical regard to accuracy be spoken of as tending to prove an issue." If believed, it proves it. " Fact." — The definition of " evidence " is obviously incomplete until the term "fact" used in defining it is itself defined. But "fact" is a term exceedingly difficult of definition. So difficult, that Sir James Fitz-James Stephen frankly abandoned it. In the first edition of the "Digest of the Law of Evidence" "fact" is defined as, " (1) Everything capable of being perceived by tlie senses ; (2) Every mental condition of which any person is con- scious ; (3) Every part of a fact is itself a fact." As pointed out by a careful (tritic in the " Solicitors' Journal " (20 Sol. Journal, 865), (1876), this definition on application breaks down, — e. y. when attempted to be incori)orated into the rule that evidence can only be given of facts in issue or facts relevant tliereto. The "fact in issue" may be, for example, the existence of negligence, something clearly not " capable of being perceived by the senses," nor yet a "mental state of wliich a person is conscious." The force of tliis criticism was promptly recognised by Mr. Stephen, who contents himself in later editions with the statement that " fact inohules the fi'.ct that any mental state of whicli any person is conscious exists." This is apparently correct. What A.'s motive was in taking a mortgage or otlier transfer is a question of fact for the jury. Wlu'i'ldon /•. Wilson, 44 ]\[e. 1 (1S,"')7) ; Hamburg v. Wood & Co., (')() Tex. 108 (1886). For tlio same reason, "where tlie intent with wliich an act was done becomes material, it is proper to ask what it was." Over c. Schiffling, 102 Ind. 101 (1885); l^arnhart r. iMilkerth, <)3 Cal. 407 (1S<)2) ; Stevens i\ Stevens. 150 iMass. 557 (I.SSO). So purpose is a cpiestion of fact. Honians v. Corning, <>0 N. H. 418 (ISSO). The same cases hold tliat the person wjiose mental state is in (^lestion may properly testify as to it. But wliat a witness supposed A. tiionght as a motive fur wliat A. did, is not a (•(impetent in(piiry. " dingli /•. Dowd, 88 Mich. 412(1801); Cl-'nient '". Cureton, .36 Ala. 120 (ISOO). For a similar reason, a witness cannot be asked what A. " un(le^^^tood " by a designated parcel of real estate. "It must be dilKcult, to a degree bordering on tiie ;' '41 ft i ';: Oi AMKIMCAN NOTKS. [I'AKT 1. Bfi i ii ■'• V ' ■rt ' li/! impossible, for one person to testify, of liis own knowledge, wliiit the untlerstiincling of another was, to any given question. Sueh testimony is not to a faet; it must be merely an opinion, a con- jecture as to a fact. Clearly this is as far as ])ossible from legal testimony." Gorham v. (Jorham, 41 Conn. 242 (1«74). Without attempting to define '• fact " it may be suggested that the fundamental idea of "fact" is that irhi'rh c3-isfs. As a thing cannot botli be and at tiie same time not be, tliat whicli exists is the truth or fact of the matter. About this central thought of real or true existence, seem to cluster various uses, all associating with tiie word "fact" the ideas of truth, verity, accomidishment, actually happening, &c. Thus the Latin fart k in imjdies some- tldng done, an act or deed, something accomplished or dor.o. The same word, factinsi, rej)resents the instrument of conveyance which actually accomplished the transfer of land, — a "deed" as now called. Probably the phrase " free act and deed," like nuuiy other similar formulas is tautological, the words having nearly the sanu' me;ining. So an officer dc facto is one in actual existence ami dis(!harging certain functions, \shatever the rights of the dc jure chiiiuant maybe. Tiie colhxiuial use of the word "fact" will be most often found to embody the same conception of actual, real existence. This conception of fact is by no means limited to tangible objects or those ])erceived by the senses. Tlu? phrase goes fui'ther, for the purpose of including mental processes. A thouglit, intention, emo- tion ; any mental state or feeling; the trutli of propositions phrased by the intellect, are matters of "fact." Whatever has existence is a fact. A question of fact is an inquiry into the truth or existence of something. It is of course only sucli as are in issue that are the subject of evidence. It may be objected that under this definition the existence of a rule of law is a question of i'\ct. Strictly speaking, such is the case. Where no special considerations are involved, — for example, in regard to the law of foreign countries, or, in most instances, Uie law of other States of the Union, — this is recognised to be true. The existence of a rule of law of a foreign state or country is purely a (piestion of fact, and appropriate evidence is intioduced to prove it as a fact. For especial reasons, the existence of the rules of law or standards of comluct which any domestic tribunal is established to enforce in its own jurisdiction, are not legally treated as other matters of fact, to be established by evidence, but are within the duty, knowledge, and perception of the judge, without need of the intervention of evi- dence. These matters of fact are separated from others and called matters of law, judicially noticed by the Court. See post p. 2P. Not only are such rules of law as are judicially noticed by the I CIIAl". 1.] AMEKICAN NOTKS. 08 Court excluded from the definition ot fact, but also that part of the method of procedure whicli consists of reasoning from the facts established by f . deuce to the ultimate facts in issue. This is the faculty of judgment, the formation of an opinion. It is the same fcaculty as is exercised by the expert witness, and is, under these circumstances, called "Matter of opijiion." Excluding from the entire list of facts as above illustrated those which are " Matter of law " and " ]S[att.er of opinion," we have a residuum which for want of a better name, or more precise detiuition, we call "Matter of fact." A DotiBriE ^Mkanixo. — The phrase "evidence," even as used by the Courts, frequently presents a double meaning and more or less consequent confusion, ''"le phrase is used to designate (1) The effect of relevant facts upon the facts in issue, — e. ij., the fact that A. has .always paid for food ordered in his name by B. is said to be •'• evidence " of I).'s agency, if such agency be a fact in issue ; (2) The statements of witnesses (or other means) by which these r( levant facts are, in the first place, themselves sought to be establislied, — e. f/., in the above instance, statements of witnesses that they have been paid by A. under the circumstances mentioned, are also said to be " evidence " of such paynient. Strictly speaking, the correct use of the phrase is the second. The probative effect of relevant facts is a matter of logical reasoning. "Evidknce'" and "Pkook." — "Evidence" and "proof" are so frequently confused as to emphasis'^ the necessity of avoiding collo- quial equivalents for technical words. The confusion is so common that a request for a ruling that a confessedly competent fact tending to show negligence in an action where negligence is in issue, " is not in itself y^/'oo/ of negligence " was held properly refused (Perry /'. Dubuque S. W. I{. Co. 30 la. 102 (1872), as a ruling calculated to mislead the jury. The Court say the instruction requested laid ilown "a correct legal principle. ... In a legal sense /jjw*/ signifies the effect of evidence as contradistinguished from evidence which implies the medium or means of proof. But in ordinary language the terms are, used interchangeably." So where a statute required "proof" of the publication of a notice and the Court allowed such publication to be proved by attidavit, the ruling was sustained on the ground that there is " an obvious difference between the words evidence and proof. The former, in legal acceptation, includes the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investiga- tion, is established or disproved. The latter is the effect or result of evidence. These words are often -ised indifferently as expres- sive of the same thing." " Testimony." — A similar confusion follows the frequent use of the word " testiraouy " as synonymous with " evidence." They !■:*;■ 2« AMEHIC^Vl^ NOTES. [I'AUT I. are not synonymous. The distinction between them is well stated in Lindley i>, Dakin, Hi Ind. iidH (ISoD). In the upper court the record recited that it embodied " all the testimony taken in the Court below." Held : that this could not be so construed as to amount to a statement of setting out the evidence, "'•'"'^timony is not synonymous with evidence. It is but a sp class or kind of evidence. Testimony is the evidence given uy witnesses. Evidence is whatever may be given to the jury as tending to pvove a case. It includes the testimony of witnesses, documents, admis- sions of parties, &c." Tiiis is cited with approval in Harvey v. Smith, 17 Ind. 272 (1801). "CuMULATivK EviDEXCK." — Some difference of opinion exists as to what evidence is to be considered cumulative. It is not disputed that cumulative evidence is correctly defined in Parker v. Hardy, 24 Tick. 246 (1837) as " additional evidence of the same kind to the same point." But the cases, while agreeing as to the rule, differ as to its proper api)licatiun. Certain authorities hold that where a fact is in issue, any evidence tending to prove that f.act is cumulative to any previous evidence tending to prove the same fact, even though the later evidence differs somewhat in its character from that which has preceded it. For example, the turning-point of the case being whether a certain bill of exchange had been left at a bank for collection before noon of a certain day, and evidence of time of the leaving being gone into by various witnesses, newly discovered evidence that a clerk, whose duty it was to register the receipt if received before noon, did not register the receipt until the following day, because not received until after noon, was held cumulative. People v. Superior Court of the City of New York, 10 Wend. 285 (1833). The Court intimate that evidence that the plaintiff had been in such other places at the time in ques- tion as to render the deposit impossible as and when he claimed it, would not be cumulative. So where the fact in issue is the existence of a partnership between the plaintiff and defendant, newly discovered evidence that certain foods were ordered sent in a way tending to show a partnership is said to be cumulative, because it " tends to support the fact or issue which was before attempted to be proved upon the trial." Olmsteail v. Hill, 2 Ark, 34G (1840). So evidence tending to discredit a witness by showing contradictory statements is cumulative to other evidence tending to discredit the same witness in another way. Glidden v. Dunlap, 28 Me. 379, 383 (1848). On the other hand, other American courts incline to the view that evidence tending to establish a fact in issue in a particular way is not cumulative to evidence tending to establish the same fact in a different way. For example, the question being whether A. had authorised B, CIIAI'. 1.] AMERICAN NOTKS. 26 t ) sell a certain horse, and much evidence other than admissions of tiie plaintiff having been received, a new trial was granted lor newly discovered evidence that the plaintiff had a<lniitted the author- ity in dispute. The Court, by Morton, ./., say, "This, therefore, is a new kind of evidence, and although it is additional to other evi- dence tending to prove the same jjosition, yet it is not cumulative b:'cause it is of a different character tending to establish the same general result by ])roof of a new and distinct fact." Parker v. Hardy, 24 I'ick. 240 (1837). The same result is reached in Waller i\ (Jraves, 20 Conn. 305, 310 (1850), where, in an action of libel, aufl in support of the defence that the libellous language was inserted without tlie defendant's consent and without his knowl- edge, newly discovered evidence of an indei)endent witness tluit he himself inserted the libellous matter, was held not cumulative to the defendant's denial that he used the libellous epithets in the article as written by him. Church, C. J., speaking for tiie Court, says : — " There are often various distinct and independent facts going to establish the same ground on the same issue. Evidence is cumulative which merely multiplies witnesses to any one or more of the facts before investigated, or only adds other circumstances of the same general character. But that evidence which brings to light some new and independent truth of a different character, altliough it tend to prove the same proposition or ground of claim before insisted on, is not cumulative within the true meaning of tlie rule on this subject." As an instance of their meaning, the Court take the case of an executor resisting a claim based on an .alleged note of the deceased, and after an adverse verdict discover- ing a receipt in full, or learning of the plaintiff's deliberate admis- sion of payment. " There could be no question," they say, " in such a case, but a new trial should be granted, although the new facts go to prove the former ground of defence." It would seem that the weight of reasoning was in favour of the position taken by the Massachusetts and Connecticut cases. The extent to which cumulative evidence is admissible is discre- tionary with the Court. A party will not be permitted unduly to waste time by multiplying witnesses to the same fact. § 2. Competent Evidence. — Competent Evidence is that which is admissible, as tending to prove the existence or non-existence of facts in issue. The definition points to a central fact in the law of evidence, viz., — that it is based upon logic. In fact, the modern trial is an appeal* to the test of reasoning, as the result of a long historical development from other tests of truth, more mechanical, sacramental and formal, used by ancestors more or less remote. The rules of correct reasoning are at every turn regarded as essential to the due administration of jud'cial functions. The Court is charged with the duty of enforcing this rule of correct logical reasoning. : i m ™- , II 1 s i in 1 ji' 20 AMKUICAN NOTKH. [I'AUT I. If its coadjutor in trials of fact, the jur}', sees fit to depart from siicli a line of reasonin;,', wht-thcr under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other improper motive, it is the duty of the Court to correct the fault, even to the extent of nullifying a verdict which appears to have been reached under such intluen(!e. The duty is not, it will he observed, to enforce the particular reasoning whieli commends itself to the Court. It is sutticient that a line of corre(tt reasoning has been adopted by the jury, even if the Court itself would have adopted a ditt'erent one. If the verdict is justified on logical principles, it usually will stand. If the verdict is not so justified, it is the duty of the Court, in discharge of its responsi- bility to enforce the use of correct reasoning (even, iis has been said, if not tlie Court's view of the particular line of correct reason- ing it would adopt for itself), to set the verdict aside. It naturally follows that a Court charged with the responsibility of insisting on the observance of the rules of logical reasoning will permit the jury, which it holds within these rules, to consider only such facts as meet the same requirement, /. e., which have a logical tendency to establish the existence or non-existence of the fact or facts whose existence is in issue or in dispute. This rule is not only a restriction upon the admissibilit}' of facts in evidence, but it also states the test which makes them admissible. As has been said, it is the fundamental rule of evidence that all facts whicdi logically pi eve or disprove the existence of facts in issue, are admissible. Consideration of the law of evidence so largely consists in exam- ining the established exclusit j of properly logical evidence, and the instances in which these exclusions themselves do not apply, that this first and principal rule of the law of evidence — that evidence logically tending to establish the issue is admissible — is frequently lost sight of. Uidess a special reason be shown for excluding facts with a logically probative tendency, such facts are admissible. Kklkvanty. — This logical relation of one fact to another, is termed " relevancy." Of this the law furnishes no test. The test is furnished by the ordinary principles of logic or a conscious per- ception of the relation. A legal definition of relevancy was indeed courageously attempted by Sir James Fitz-James Stephen in the first edition of the " Digest of the Law of Evidence," based largely on the relation of causation. This definition was abandoned. The amended definition seems free from objection. Two facts are rele- vant to each other when so related " that, accordijig to the common course of events, one, either taken by itself or in connection with other facts, proves or renders probable the past, present, or future existence or non-existence of the other." (Dig. Law of Evid. Art. 1.) TiiK RuLK FuKTHKU EXAMINED. — Such being the fundamental rule of evidence, that all evidence logically probative is admissible, CHAI'. I.] AMKUK.'AN NOTES. tlie I'uither law of ovidcnco consista of exchuliiig certain facts ot the evidence otherwise atlniissible under this fundanitMital general rule. Tiio law of evidence becomes, therefore, so to speak, a series of exclusions. These owe their existence principally to two lines of considerations, — (1) The necessity for trying eases witiiin reasonable limits of time ; {'J) The presence of the jury. These two considerations may be examined briefly. (1) LK(iAL ItKr.KVANOY. — The search for abstract truth, scien- tific or otherwise, is not usually limited in time. No fact relevimt at all is too remotely relevant to deserve consiileration. No press- ing i\ecessity usually exists that the precise fact should be ascer- tained this year or next year, or, indeed, within the next century. Under such conditions, logic is given its unimi)ede(l course. All facts logically relevant demand and receive consideration. Hut the course of trials in Courts of law by no means admits of sucli extended search into the minutiie of proof. The tribunal sits for a limited time, and frequently is called on to dispose of many contested matters within that period. The proceedings are expen- sive, both to parties litigant, to those awaiting their turn (often with witnesses held from gainful occupations by a comjjulsory i)ro- cess), and to the government through the pay of jurors, Court officers, itc. There is a recognised necessity that matters sliould be as speedily disposed of as the interests of justice will admit. This consideration was neatly put by Rolfe, H., in Atty.-Gen. /'. Hitchcock (1 Kxch. 91, (1847). "The laws of evidenire on this subject, as to what ought and what o>ight noc to be received, must be considered as founded on a sort of comparative consideration of the time to be occupied in examinations of this nature, and the time whicli it is practicable to bestow upon them. If we lived for a thousand years, instead of about sixty or seventy, and every case were of sufficient importance, it might bo possible, and perhaps proper, to throw a light on matters in whicli every jiossible question might be suggested, for the purpose of seeing by such means whether the whole was unfounded, or wliat portion of it was not, and to raise every possible incjuiry as to the truth of tlie statements made. But I do not see how that could be; in fact, mankind find it to be impossible. Therefore some line must be drawn." (2) Fkak of TiiK Jury. — A very distinctive feature of the English law of procedure, of which the law of evidence is ])art, lies in the fact that a jury frequently takes a share in tlie trial of causes. It involves no disparagement to the benefits, real or assumed, of tlie jury's presence to say that obvious dangers to the administration of justice have always been recognised as arising from it. Tin? average jury is composed of men selected by chance from the general community, brought together for a short time and for a limited object, with minds usually entirely untrained in the dif- |-r:i:i I 23 AMERICAN NOTES. [part I. ficult art of justly balancing the weight of conflicting statements. Jurymen, almo; i; of necessity, are seldom given to reasoning with logical exactness, and are therefore apt to jump across logical chasms or breaks in a chain of ))roof ; especially at times when sympathy or prejudice is aroused, or the fascinating process of adjusting or, as it were, dovetailing together separate pieces of evidence is nearly completed, and only fails for lack of a little imagination. Above all, tiie jury at all times has been, as is natural with so casual a tribunal, but little impressed with any feeling of resi)onsibility for maintaining the integrity of legal rules or the influence of precedent in the .administration of justice. It has accordingly usually manifested a strong tendency to over- look the n)()re important remote consequences of maintaining a general rule for the purpose of relieving the hardship of individual cases. ExcLL'sioNs. — For these and similar rc^asons, the law of evidence excludes much evidence logically relevant, either (1) By applying a higher standard of relevancy than mere logic by requiring a certain high grade of probative effect, which may be called legal relevancy; and (2) By absolutely excluding certain facts both logically and legally relevant. What facts are so highly probative as to comply with the standard of legal relevancy cannot be reduced to a definite ride. The innumerable rulings on the subject will be found to depend rather ui)on the personal views and mental processes of particular judges than upon any more definite rule. The positive exclusions, on the other hand, generally admit of definite state- meub. rt CHAP. II.J MATTEKS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. CHAPTER II. MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED, WITHOUT PROOF. Im § 4.' All civilised nations, as members of the great family of sovereignties, give political acknowledgment of each other's existence, and general public and external relations. After such acknowledgment by their own country, the existence and titles of a state are recognised by the public tribunals and functionaries of every nation in the civilised world.' If, upon a civil war, one part of a nation separate from the other, and establish an inde- pendent government, the newly-formed nation cannot be recognised as such by the judicial tribunals of other nations, until it has been acknowledged by the sovereign power under which those tribunals are constituted.* The judges of each nation are bound, ex officio, to know whether or not their government has recognised a nation as an independent state.* § 5. In like manner the judges must recognise, without proof, the common^ and statute law,' and all legal claims, demands, estates, titles, rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities existing by » See N. York Civ. Code, §§ 1705, 17()(i. * Qr. Ev. § 4, in gioat part. ' United States of America v. Wagnor, 1867 (Ld. Chelmsford, Ch.). Hut the existence of States unac- kuowledged by the government must bo proved by evidence, showing that thoy are associations formed for mutual defence, supporting their own independence, making laws, and hiiving courts of justice. Yrisari v. Clement, 1826. ♦ City of lieruo v. Bk. of Eng., 1804. » Taylor v. Barclay, 1828. There it was ialsolj' alleged in the bill, with the view of preventing a demurrer, that Guatemala, a revolted colony of Spain, had been recognized by Great ]3ritain as an independent state ; but the V.-C. took judicial notice that the allegation was false. See, how- ever, contra, Dolder v. Bk. of Eng., 1803. as to which qy. * Hein. ad Pand., L. xxii. t. iii. §119. "< R. V.Sutton, 1817; "The Inter- pretation Act, 1889 " (52 & 53 V. c. 63), § 9. As to private Acts of Pari., see 8 & 9 V. 0. 113, S 3, cited post, S 7. 8 b2 i '411 Mm LAWS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. [part I. the common law, or by any custom, or created by any statute ; ' the rules of equity, and all equitable estates, titles, rights, duties, and liabilities'' (while whenever the rules of equity and of the common law differ, those of equity must prevail') ; the law of nations, the law and custom of parliament, and the privileges and course of proceedings of each branch of the legislature ; * the pre- rogatives of the^ Crown,' and the privileges of the royal palaces ; *• the maritin: , law;' the ecclesiastical law;* the articles of war, whether in the naval,** the marine, or the land service,'" including those made for the government of the forces in India," as well as the auxiliary forces, — that is, the militia, the yeomanry, and the volunteers,'^ — and also the reserve forces ; '' the rules of procedure made in pursuance of § 70 of the Army Act, 1881, " whether signified under the hand of a secretary of state" in relation to the army," or promulgated by the admiralty with respect to the marines ; " royal proclamations, such being acts of State ; '* the » 36 & 37 V. c. 66, § 24, sub-sect. 6 ; 40 & 41 V. c. 57, § 27, sub-sect. 6, Ir. * See 36 & 37 V. c. 66, § 24, sub- eect. 4. See, also, as to Ireland, 40 & 41 V. c. 57, § 27, sub-sect. 4, Ir. 3 See 36 & 37 V. c. 66, § 25, Bub-sect. 11. See, also, B\istros v. White, 1876, C. A. ; and Palmer v. Palmer, lfS85. See, also, as to Ireland, 40 & 41 V. 0. 57, § 28, sub-sects. 11, 29. * Lake r. King, 1667 ; Stockdale V. Hansard, 1830; Wason v. Walter, 1809; Cassidy V. Stouart, 1841 ; Case of the Shelf, of Middlx. 1840; Sims V. Mnrryat, 1866 ; Bradlaugh v. Gos- eet, 1884. » R. V. Elderton, 1703. * Id.; Winter r. Miles, 1808; Att.- Gon. V, Donaldson, 1842. Ilampton Court has ceased to have privileges as a roval palace, Att.-Gon.i;. Dakin, 1869; "R. V. Pousonby, 1844. ' Chandler v. Grieves, 1812. » 1 Roll. Abr. 526 ; 6 Vin. Abr. 496; Sims v. Marryat, 1866 (I<d. Campbell). » 29 & 30 V. 0. 109 ("The Naval Discipline Act, 1866," amended by •'TIiG Naval Discipline Act, 1884,'^' 47 & 48 V. c. 39). '" See § 69 of "The Army Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V. 0. 68). As to printing of, and amendments to the above, see 48 V. c. 8, § 8. See, also, as to the Articles of War, § 179, sub -sects. 1, 20, of the same Act as to the Royal Marino.". The latter articles, it is presumed — though the Act is silent on the subject — must be judicially noticed. " Id., § 180. » Id.,§§ 175—178. " Id., § 190, sub-sect. 9. " Id., § 70, sub-sects. 1, 3, amended bv 49 V. c. 8, § 5. ■'« Id., § 179, sub-sect. 6. '• Dupays v. Shepherd, 1698 (L<1. Holt). In Van Omoron v. Dowick, 1809, Ld. Ellenborough refused to take notice of a proclamation, on the pround that the Gazette containing it was not produced. The latter case docs not go the length of the mar- ginal note, but simply decides that, when a judge's memory is at fault, some document must be at hand to establish the fact he is called upon to notice. Copies of royal proclama- tions, if purporting to be printed by the Queen's printer, are admissible by 8 & 9 V. c. 113, § 3; see post, § 7. They may be proved, also, in a variety of otlier ways. See 3 1 & 32 V. 0. 37, § 2, cited post, § 1527. CHAP. 11.3 CUSTOMS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. general practice of conveyancers ; ' the custom of merchants,' — at least wliere such custom has been settled by judicial determiua- tious," — such, for example, as the lien which a vendor has on goods remaining in his possession for unpaid purchase-money ; * or the general lien of an innkeper on all the property belonging to his guest for the entire amount of his bill ; * or the general lien of bankers and factors on the securities of their customers in their custody ; ^ or the practice of drawing bills of lading in sets, and of dealing with one of a set as representing the cargo independently ' Willouffliby V. Willoughby, 1787 (Ld. Ilardwicke) ; Doe v. Hikler, 1819; Voev. Plowman, 1819; Eowo v. Grenfel, 1824 (Ld. Tenterden). Ld. St. Leonards, in 3 V. & P., 10th edit. (18.'59), at p. 28, observed (the passage does not appear in recent editions, in consequence of the chapter on the subject of Attendant Terms, having become of little practical importance), "It matters very little what is the opinion of any individual convey- ancer; but the opinion of the con- veyancers, as a class, is of the deepest imjiortance to every individual of jjroperty in the state. Their settled rule of practice has, accordingly, in several instances been adopted as the law of the land, not out of respect for them, but out of tenderness to the numerous purchasers who have bought estates under their advice." See, also, Howard v. Ducane, 1823 (Ld. Eldon) ; Re Rosher, 1884 (Pear- son, J.). ' Erskine v. Murray, 1728 ; Soper V, Dibble, 1696 ; Carter v. Downish, 1687 ; Williams v. Williams, 1693. ' IJarnett v. Brandao, 1843, where judicial notice was taken of the general lien of bankers on the secu- rities of their customers in their custody, and Ld. Denman (pronounc- ing the judgment of the court) said, ' ' The law merchant forms a branch of the law of England ; and those customs, which have been universally and notoriously prevalent amongst merchants, and have been found by experience to be of public use, have been adopted as a part of it, upon a trinciplo of convenience, and for the enefit of trade and commerce : and when so adopted, it is unnecessary to plead and prove them. They are binding on all without proof. Ac- cordingly we find that usages affect- ing bills of exchange and bills of lading, are taken notice of judi- cially " ; and then gives as in- stances the judicial recognition of the genera! ''"n nf factors and bankers. This judgment was after- wards reversed by the IIou.se of Lords (see Brandao v. Barnett, 1846), but that portion of it which relates to judicial notice of the general lien of bankers was affirmed. In Edie v. E. India Co., 1761, Mr. Just. Wilmot observed, "The custom of merchants is part of the law of England, and coiu'ts of law must take notice of it as such. There may, indeed, be some questions depending upon customs amongst merchants, where, if there be a doubt about the custom, it may be fit and proper to take the opinion of merchants thereupon ; yet that is only where the law remains doubt- ful, and even then the custom must be proved by facts, not by opinion only; and it must also be subject to the cont ol of law." In support of the proposition that evidence can only be taken as to mercantile custom where the law is doubtful, the learned judge says, that Ld. Mansfield, with Denison and Foster, JJ.'s, re- jected the testimony of witnesses to prove the usage, solely on the ground that the qxxcstion had a I read 1/ been solemnly settled, by two adjudications in the courts of law. See also Jones V. Peppercorn, 1859. * Imperial Bk. v. Lend, and St. Katherino's Dock Co., 1875 (Jessel, M.E.). » Miilliner v. Florence, 1878, C. A. • See cases cited ante, n. ', supra, p. 5 ; also Lond. Chart. Bk. of Aus- tralia V. White, 1878. I. ■ ( ! !'l CUSTOMS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. [PaRT I. of the rest;' or the usage among money dealers -^f treating scrip certificates payable to bearer, whether of a foreign Government or of a company, as negotiable instruments transferable on delivery ; * or the custom of hotel-keepers holding their furniture on hire ; ' the customs which regulate the special descent of gavelkind and borough English lands,^ and it seems any other custom incident to such tenures ; ' the custom or law of the road, viz., that horses and carriages should respectively keep on the near or left side ;^ and the following Tules with respect to navigation,— first, that ships and steamboats, on meeting " end on, or nearly end on, in such a manner as to involve risk of collision," should port their helms, so as to pass on the port, or left, side of each other ; next, that steam- boats should keep out of the way of sailing ships ; and next, that every vessel overtaking another should keep out of its way.' Every court will moreover take judicial notice of matters appearing in its own proceedings. Therefore, if in the course of a case it appear that an indictable conspiracy has been committed, it will take ' Sanders v. Miiclean, 1SS3. • Goodwin v. Robarts, 1(ST(>, II. L.; Rnmball v. Mctrop. 15k., 1H77. » Crawcour v. Salter, 1.SS1, 0. A. « 1 Bl. Com. 7(5; l»oo v. Scuda- moro, no.i; Crosby r. Ilothoriiigton, 1842 (Tindal, C.J.). » llidor r. Wood. 18.j-j (Wood, V.-C), foUowinj; I'avuo v. Barker, lf)59. Soo also 3G & 37 V. c. m, § 24, sub-Hect. G. ' See Litnuo v. Bray, 1814, as to carriugoH, and Tiirlcy v. Tliomas, 1837 (Colorid;^!', J.), as to saddle horses. See also 14 & lo V. c. 92, § 13, Ir. The rule lias been em- bodied by Professor Selwyn, in what an Mtoniau would call " Loiif;s an>l Shorts:" — " Sed ])r(!Cor hoe jiosthae rominiscero, rnrin; siiiixfniin : I 'ex- tram oecurrenti lin((iiere norma jnbet." In l''ranee the hiw of the road is dilVerent, and horses and carriajjes jiass on the otY side. ' The l{e}j;nlations for I'reveiitinfi; Collisions at Sea. containing; the rules concerninj^ liKl'^^i f"f< *<if?"als. steer- infj; and sailing', were embodied in a table issued ori^finally under § 25 of 2o & 2(> V, c. (13. since re])ealed by •' The Merchant Shipping A('t, WM^' (:>1 & .')S V. c. ()!)), which substitutes for it 1(1., §418 (I), andot two(Jnlers in Council, dated re.spoctivoly Hth August, 1884 (printed 9 P. iV. 247), as to British ships and boats, and 14th August, 1879 (printed 4 P. I). 241), as to foreign ships. As to how these regulations are to be p\iblished and proved, see § 2(> of tlie original Act, and for this § 419 {r>) of "The Merchant Shii)ping Act, 1894," is sub.stituted ; and by §28 of the original Act (§ 419 (3) of "The Merchant Shipi)ing Act, 1894 "), any damage arising from the non-observance of these Hi'gulations shall bejjrima tiK^ie j)resunied to have been caused by the wilful default of the j)er.son in charge of tlu! deck of such sliij). See jiost, § 2(»(i ; Cien. St. Navig. Co. r. lledle'y, 18()9; Dryden r. Allix, 18(13; The Concordia, 18(1(1 ; The Sj)ring, 18(1(1. As to the ])ri()r law, see ( 'had- wick V. City of I'ubliu St. Packet Co., 18.)G;" Smith r. Voss, 18,<7 ; Zugasti V. Ijamer, 18,')8; Maddox c. Fisher, 18,)1; Williams r. dutch, 18:)7; Tuff i'. Wariuan, 18.n. See Morrison v. Gen. St. Navig. Co., 18,)2; Gen. St. Navig. t'o. u. Mor- riso!i, 18,5G; Gen. St. Navig. (^o. V. Mann, 18,j,'); Lawson v. Carr, 18.)(); Churchward c. Palmer, 18,j(i; Till Plata, 18ao; Morgan v. Sim, 1858. H .b CHAP. II. 1 l-AWS AND CUSTOMS OF FOKEIGN STATKS. judicial notice of the fact though it be not pleaded.' It will also judicially notice the particular customs which have been tried, determined, and recorded in such court.* The customs of London, which have been certified by the recorder,' such, for example, as the custom of foreign attachment * — the custom that every shop is a market overt for the sale of goods of the same kind as usually sold there * — the custom that mamed women may be sole traders * — and the custom which defines the nature of a liveryman's office,' — will be judicially noticed by the courts in which the certificates are recorded.* No one court can, however, take notice of a custom merely because it has been certified to another.* Neither can judicial notice be taken of the usages prevalent among mining partnerships conducted on the cost-book principle, for the judges cannot determine without evidence the meaning of the term " cost-book principle." "• Nor, again, will the courts take cognisance of the laws, usages, or customs of a foreign state ; and even the laws of the colonies," or J/^r'^ey,''^ Guernsey, or Scotland, must be proved as facts,''' unless steps have been taken, either under the ' Scott V. Brown, 1892. * See Cniwcour v. Salter, 1881, C. A. ' Crosby r, ITothoriiifjton, 1842 ; Bniiii V. Knott, 1842 ; Blacquioro v. Hawkins, 1 780 (Ltl. Mansficjld). See Blunt i;. Lai'k, 18j7. Uncortifiod customs of Jjondon must be proved in the lli^h Court, tlu)U{,'h they will bo judicially noticed in the City Courts : Stainton and wife v. Jones, 177!» (lid. Mansfield). So, also, the (i. B. ])iv. in Ireland will not judi- cially notico a custom of the l-ord Mayor and ShcriiY's Court in Dublin, unless certilied by the recorder : Siiunionds r. Andrews, ISIi!) (Ir.). * C'l^rtilled by Starkey in 22 Kd. 4. See I Koll. Abr. iJo4 Iv 5 ; Hruce v. Wait, 1S4(); Crosby r. Iletherin^ton, 1M42: Westoby r. f)av, IHM. » (Vrtitied by Sir l). Coke, 5 Hep. 8;t /) (rather fuller, us L'10ves(|uo do Worcester's case, l.')!)4). Seo Jjynns V. ])(( Tass, 1840. See, also. Crane V. London Dock Co., 1804; IIiw- greavo i'. Spink, 1892. * Lavio J'. }'hillii)s, 17()i). Local cufltouiH, as that of carting whores in liondon, and foreign attuchnient in Bristol, Exoter, Liverpool, and Chester, need not be sot out on the r»*cord of a court of tlio city, as thoy are judicially noticed in the court's and of the respective cities (1 Dougl. 380, n. 90), as they also wUl be in a court of error. See Bruce v. AN'ait, 1840. ' King V. Clerk, 109,") ; cited (Parke, B.) iu Piper v. Chai)pell, 184.J. " The customs as to distribution of the personal estates of ir.testate free- men in London, York, and otlu>r j)laces, are abrogated by 19 & 20 V. c. 94. » Piper V. Chai)pell, 184 J (I'arke, B.). '" In re Bodmin United Mines Co., 18,-)(). " Prowso r. The European & Amor. St. Shipi>ing Co., ISfU). " Brcnau's case. 1847 fPattcson, J.). '•' Urquhart v. Butterfield, 1888, C. A.; Dalryni])le c. Daliymple, 1811 ; Mostyu f. Pabrigas, 1774 (Ld. Mansfield); Sussex Peer, case, 1.S44 ; Maloi^. B(d)erts, 1800 (Ld. Kldon); 11. r. Povey, 18oo ; Woodham v. Ed- !! SEALS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. [part I. British Law Ascertainment Act, 1859,^ or under the Foreign Law Ascertainment Act, 1861,'* to obtain a legal opinion on the subject from a superior court of the country whose laws are under dispute.' The laws of Ireland being substantially the same as those of England, except where varied by statute, a very able judge has suggested that the English courts would probably judicially recognise them.* § 6. The courts will also judicially notice the following seals : — the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, and the Great Seals of England, Ireland, and Scotland respectively ; * the Queen's Privy Seal and Privy Signet, whether in England, Ireland, or Scotland ; ^ the Wafer Great Seal, and the Wafer Privy Seal, framed under the Crown Office Act, 1877 ; " the seal, and the privy seal, of the dujhy of Lancaster ; the seal, and the privy seal, of the duchy of Corn- wall ; * the seals of the old superior courts of justice ; and of the Supreme Court, and its several Divisions ; the seals of the old High Court of Admiralty, whether for England or Ireland ; ^ of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury ; '" and of the Court, of the Vice- Warden of the Stannaries ; " the seals of all courts con- stituted by Act of Parliament, if seals are given to them by the Act ; '^ amongst which are the seals of the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial causes in England ; *' of the Court for Matrimonial causes and matters in Ireland ; ^^ of the Central Office of the lloyal Courts of Justice, and of its several Departments ; '* of the Principal Kegistry, and of the several district Registries of the Supreme Court of Judicature ; '® of the Principal Registry, and of the several district Registries of the old Court of Probate in wards, ISIJG; Wey v. Tally, 1704; Story, Confl. § G'.il, and cases cited in n. See also post, §§ 48, 1423 — 1425. » 22 & 23 V. c. 63. » 24 & 25 V. 0. 11. • See Lord v. Colvin, 1 860 ; Login V. Princess of Coorg, 1862. • Eeynolds v. Fenton, 1846 (Maule, J., explaining Ferguson v, Mahon, 18;59). » Lord Melville's case, 1806. • Foggassa's case, 1349, cited in Olivo V. Quin, 1658 ; Lane's case, 1687. ' 40 & 41 V. c. 41, § 4. « 26 & 27 V. 0. 49, § 2. » Green v. Waller, 1703; 24 & 25 V. c. 10, § 14, now repealed by 44 & 45 V. c. 59 ; 30 & 31 V. c. 114, § 21, Ir. '" Kempfon v. Cross, 1735. " 6 & 7 W. 4, 0. 106 ("The Stan- naries Act, 1836 "), § 19. " Doe V. Edwards, 1839. " 20 & 21 V. c. 85 ("The Matri- monial Cansos Act, 1857 "), § 13. '* 33&34 V. 0. 110, § 11, Ir. '» R. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXI. rr. I, fi 7 '>«'36&37 V. c. 66, §61. 8 CI! M\ II.] SKALS JUDICIALLY NOTICliD. England ' and of the i)rpsent Court of Probate in Ireland ; ' of the old^ and new Courts of Bankruptoy;* of the Insolvent Debtors' Court,^ now abolished ; of the Court of Bankruptcy and lusolvenoy in Ireland" (which, since the Gth of August, 1872, has been called " The Court of Bankruptcy in Ireland) ; " ' of the Landed Estates Court, Ireland ; * of the Record of Title Office of tliat Court ; ^ and of the County Courts.'" Courts of law also judi- cially notice the seal of the corporation of London.'' The seal of a foreign or colonial notary-public will not generally be judicially noticed, altbough such a person is an officer recognised by the whole comniercinl world.'* Various statutes render different other seals admissible in evidence without proof of their genuineness.'* • 20 & 21 V. c. 77 (" The Court of rroLato Act, 1SJ7"), §22. « 20 & 21 V. c. 79, § 27, Ir. 3 Seo 24 & 25 V. c. 134, § 204, and 32&;i3 V. c. 71, § 109. • See 46 & 47 V. c. 52, § 137 ; and the Bankruptcy Rules of 1883, r. 12. See, also, r. 14, as to seals on "otliee copies." ' Doe V. Edwards, 1839. • 20 & 21 V. c. 60, § 362, Ir. ' 35 & 36 V. c. 58, § 6, Ir. 8 21 & 22 V. c. 72 (" The Landed Estates Court (Ireland) Act, 1858 "), § 8, Ir. 9 28 & 29 V. c. 88, § 56, Ir. '" 51 & 52 V. c. 43, § 180. " Doe V. Mason, 1793 (Ld. Ken- yo!i). '- Re Eavl's Trusts, 1858 ; Re Davis's Trusts, 1869 (as to seal of a foreign notary public) ; Nye v. Macdonald, 1870 (as to seal of colonial notary public); see, however, contra. Anon., 1799; Hutcheon v, Mannington, 1802 ; Colo V. Sherard, 1855 ; and Furnell v. Stackpoole, 1829 (Ir.). " Such as the seals of the Local Ooverninent Board for Eng. ind (34 & 35 V. c. 70, § 5) ; or Ireland (35 & 36 V. c. 69, § 4, Ir.) ; of the late Poor Law Board. 10 & 11 V. c. 101 " The I'oor Law Board Act, 1847 "),§ 5; 1 & 2 V. c. 56 (" The Poor Relief (Ire- land) Act, 1838"), §121, Ir. ; 10 it 11 V. c. 90 (" The Poor Relief (Ire- land) Act, 1847 "), § 3, Ir. ; of the late Local Boards of Health (11 & 12 V. c. 63, § 35 ; 21 & 22 V. o. 98, 8. 4) ; and of Urban Sanitary Authorities (38 & 39 V. c. 55, § 7) and Joint Sani- tary Boards (38 & 39 V. c. 55, § 280 ; 41 & 42 y. c. 52, § 13, Ir.); of the now abolished Commissioners for the Sale of Encumbered Estates in Ire- land (12 & 13 V. c. 77, § 2, Ir. ; see 21 & 22 V. c. 72, § 23, Ir.) ; of the Land Registry Office in England (seo 25 & 26 V. c. 53, § 123; see also 38 & 3!» V. c. 87, § 107), whether established under the Act of 1862 or under that of 1875; of the District Registry Offices created under the Act last re- ferred to (38 & 39 V. 0. 87, § 120) ; of the Office for the Registration of Assurances of Lands in Ireland (13 & 14 V. c. 72. § 45, Ir.) ; of the Irish Land Conimi-sion (44 & 45 V. c. 49, §42, Ir.); of tlieUeneral RegisterOffice in England (6 & 7 W. 4, c. 86, § 38 ; see 3 «& 4 V. c. 92, § 9), or Ireland (26 & 27 V. c. 11, § 5, Ir.); of the Charitv Commissioners for England and Wales (16 & 17 V. c. 137, § 6; and see 18 & 19 V. c. 124, § 4, amended by 50 & 51 V. c. 49, and § 5 thereof as to copies and certified extracts, and the presumption that sealed copies are originals) ; of the Railway Commissioners (51 & 52 V. c. 25, § 2) ; of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works and Public Buildings (15 & 16 V. c. 28 ("The Commissioners of Works Act, 1852 "), § 1 ; 37 & 38 V. c. 84, § 2) ; of the Board of Agi'iculturo, which, speak- ing generally, now discharges the duties of the old luclosure Commia- ! ; <{M'n 9 m I ii DOCUMENT/ IIY EVIDENCE ACT, 1845. [I'AIJT •. §§7 — 8. The Documentary Evidence Act, 1845^ extended the principle of admitting in evidence official documents without formal proof, to a numerous class of cases. That statute enacts, that " whenever by any Act now in force or hereafter to be in force, any certificate, official or public document, or document or pro- ceeding of any corporation or joint-stock or other company, or any certified copy of any document, by-law, entry in any register or other book, or of any other proceeding, shall be receivable in evidence of any particular in any court of justice, or before ajiy legal tribunal, or either House of Parliament, or any committee of either House, or in any judicial proceeding, the same shall respectively be admitted in evidence, provided they respectively purport to be sealed or impressed with a stamp, or sealed and signed, or signed alone, as required, or impressed with a stump and signed, aa directed by the respective Acts made or to be hereafter made, without any proof of the seal or stamp, wher«^ a seal or stamp is necessary, or of the signature, or of the official character of the person appearing to have signed the same, and without any further proof thereof, in every case in which the original record could have been received in evidence." By sect. 2, sioners, Copyhold Commissioners, iind Tithe Commissioners (45 & 46 V. c. 3H ; (see 52 & 53 V. c. 30 ("Tlie Board of Agrieulture Aot, 1889"), cspt'i'iiiUj' § (i, and sec also •'The Settled Lund Act, 1882" (45 & 4() V. c. 38), amended by "The Settled Land Act, 1884" (47 & 48 V. c. 18)) ; of th(> respective Commis- sioners for the Universities o'' Oxford and Cambridge (40 & 41 A[. c. 48, §§ 4, !») ; of the Prison Commissioners for England, and of the Ueneral Prisons JJoard ior Ireland (40 & 41 V. c. 21, § (J, and c. 40, § 4, Ir.); of the special Commissioners for Lish Fislieries (2() & 27 V. c 114, *^ 33, Ir. ; contiiiu.'d bv 31 & 32 V. c. Ill ; and amende^! by ,32 & 33 V. c. 02, Ir.); of the Comniis>ion(!rs of I'ublio Works in Ireland, at, least for the purposes of the 1 )rainage Acts (20 & 27 V. c. 88, ^§ 3, 5, Ir. ; 20 & 30 V. c. 49, § 21, Ir.), and of "The Settled Land Act, 1882" (45 & 46 V. c. 38, §§ 48, 65, sub-sect. 9) ; of the office established under " The I'atents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883" (46 & 47 V. c. 57, § 84); and of the llecord Ofiice, whetlier in England (1 & 2 V. c. 94 ("The Public Kecord OHice Act, 1838"), § 11) or in Ireland (;}() & 31 V. c. 70, § 18, Ir.). In all proceedings, too, under the winding-u]) clauses of the Comjianies Act, 18()2, the seal of any oliice of the Court of Chancery, or Bankruptcy, in lOngland or m Ireland, of the Court of Session in Scotland, or of the Court of the Vice- Warden of the Stannaries, when aj)- pended to any document made, issued , or signed under those clauses, or any official copy thereof, must be judi- cially noticed (25 & 2() V. c. 89, § 125). ' 8 & 9 V. c. 113. The autlior naturally felt satisfaction in refer- ring to this statute, as he originally suggested to the Law Amend. Soc. the alterations embodied therein, and prepared the bill founded on them, which was earned by Ld. Brougham. 10 CHAP. II.] PIIOOF OF COLONIAL LAWS. " all courts, judges, justices, roasters in chancery, masters of courts, commissioner's judicially acting, and other judicial officers, shall henceforth take judicial notice of the signature of any " judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature,' "provided such signature be attached or appended to any decree, order, certificate, or other judicial or official document." By sect. 3, " all copies of private and local and personal Acts of Parliament not public Acts, if purporting to be printed by the Queen's printers, and all copies of the journals of either house of Parliament, and of royal procla- mations, purporting to be printed by the printers to the Crown, or by the printers to either House of Parliament, or by any or either of them, shall be admitted as evidence thereof by all courts, judges, justices, and others, without any proof being given that such copies were so printed."* § 9. As to colonial laws, an Act of 18G5' provides that " the certificate of the clerk or other proper officer of a legislative body in any colony, to the effect that the document to which it is attached is a true copy of any colonial law assented to by the Governor of such colony, or of any bill reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure by the said Governor, shall be prima facie evidence that the document so certified is a true copy of such law or bill, and, as the case may be, that such law has been duly and properly passed and assented to, or that such bill has been duly and properly passed and presented to the Governor ; and any proclamation purporting to be published by authority of the ' "The Judicature Act, 1873" (;3fi & 37 V. c. (i(i). " V>y § 4, forfjeiy or false printing any of tlio doininumts roferreil to iiliovo (or, by ;U & 152 Vict. c. .'57, 5 4, cited post, § l.')27 in noto. any in'oclamation) is made a felony, jmnishublo by penal soivitude, or inil)iis()nment for not less than a year ; and it also is provided that, "whenever any such document as before mentioned shall have been received in evidence by virtue of this Act, the court, judge, commis- sioner, or other person oflficiating judicially who shall have admitted the same, shall, on the request of any party against whom the same is so received, be authorised, at its or at his own discretion, to direct that the same shall be impounded, and be kejit in the custody of some olHcer of the court or otlier j)io|)er pers(m, until fuitlier order touching the same shall 1)0 given, cither bv such court, or the court to which such master or other ollicer belonged, or by the persons or person who con- stituted such court, or by some one of tlie ec[uity or common law judges of the s)ii)erior com is at Westminster, on appli(!ation being made for that pur])()s(\" § ii enacts, that the Act shall not extend to Scotland. See 24 & 25 V. 0. 98 ("The Forgery Act, 1861 "), ^§ 27-29. 3 28 & 29 V. c. 63 ("The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 ";, § C. 11 m f ; m ^;n. FOREIGN AND COLONIAL DOCUMKNTS. [PART f. Governor in any newspaper in the colony to which such law or bill shall relate, and signifying Her Majesty's disallowance of any Buch colonial law, or Her Majesty's assent to any such reserved bill as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of such disallowance or assent." § 10. As to foreign and colonial documents, Lord Brougham's Evidence Act of 1851 ' enacts, that *' all proclamations, treaties, and other acts of state of any foreign state, or of any British colony, and all judgments, decrees, orders, and other judicial proceedings of any court of justice, in any foreign state or in any British colony, and all affidavits, pleadings, and other legal documents filed or deposited in any such court, may be proved in any court of justice, or before any person having by law or by consent of parties authority to hear, receive, and examine evidence, either by examined copies, or by copies authenticated as hereinafter men- tioned : that is to say, if the document sought to be proved be a proclamation,^ treaty, or other act of state, the authenticated copy, to be admissible in evidence, must purport to be sealed with the seal of the foreign state or British colony to which the original document belongs ; and if the document sought to be proved be a judgment, decree, order, or other judicial proceeding of any foreign or c lonial court, or any affidavit, pleading, or other legal document filed or deposited in any such court, the authenticated copy, to be admissible in evidence, must purport either to be sealed with the seal of the foreign and colonial court to which the original document belongs, or in the event of such court having no eeal, to be signed by the judge, or if there be more than one judge, by any one of the judges of the said coiu-t ; and such judge shall attach to his signature a statement in writing on the said copy that the court whereof he is a judge has no seal ; but if any of the aforesaid authenticated copies shall purport to be sealed or signed as hereinbefore respectively directed, the same shall respectively be admitted in evidence in every case in which the original document could have been received in evidence, without any proof of the » 14 & 15 V. c. 99 (" The Evidence c. 60), and 14 & 15 V. o. 99 (" The Act, 1851 "), § 7. Evidence Act, 1851 "), as to proof ' See § 365 of "The Merchant of proclamations by governors of Shipping Act, 1894 " (57 & 68 Y. colouieB under the first-named Act. 12 OIIAP. Il.J FORKIGN AND COLONIAL DOCUMENTS. seal wliore a seal is necessary, or of the signature, or of the truth of the statement attached thereto, where such signature and state- ment are necessary, or of the judicial character of the person artpearing to have made such signature and statement." § 11, The Commissioners for Oaths Act, 1889,' enables affi- davits, &o., to be sworn abroad before consuls, &o. § 12. Order XXXVIII. of the E. S. C, 1883, provides, in Rule 6, that "all examinations, affidavits, declarations, affirma- tions, and attestations of honour in causes or matters depending in the High Court, and also acknowledgments required for the pur- pose of enrolling any deed in the Central Office, may be sworn and taken in Scotland, or Ireland, or the Channel Islands, or in any colony, island, plantation, or place under the dominion of Her Mdjcsty in foreign parts, before any judge, court, notary public, or person lawfully authorised to administer oaths ^ in such country, colony, island, plantation, or place respectively, or before any of Her Majesty's consuls or vice-consuls' in any foreign parts out of Her Majesty's dominions, and the judges and other officers of the High Court shall take judicial notice of the seal or signature, as the case may be, of any such court, judge, notary public,* person, consul, or vice-consul, attached, appended, or subscribed to any such examinations, affidavits, affirmations, attestations of honour, declarations, acknowledgments, or to any other deed or document."* § 13. Again, the Bankruptcy Act for Scotland^ (passed in 1856) facilitates the proof of certain Scottish judicial documents by enact- ing, in § 174, that "all deliverances," — which term includes all orders, warrants, judgments, decisions, interlocutors, or decrees under that Act,' — " purporting to be signed by the Lord Ordinary, or by any of the judges of the Court of Session, or by the sherifE » 52 V. c. 10, post, Vol. II. * In Baillio v. Jackson, 1833, the Lords Justices refused to take judi- cial notice of the signature of the Hegistrar of Deeds iu St. Vincent to a certificate, he admittedly having no authority to administer an oath. ^ I." there be no consul or vice- consul accessible, an affidavit made in foreign parts may be sworn before a notary public. Cooke v. Wilby, 1884 (Chitty, J.). * See ante, p. 9, n. •'. * See "The Commissioners for Oaths Act, 1889" (52 V. c. 10). And see, also, Brooke v. Brooke, 1881 (Fry, J.). Similar clauses to the rule above are also contained in ' ' The Court of Ad- miralty (Ireland) Act, 1867" (30 & 31 V. c. 114, § 57, Ir.), and " The Matri- monial Causes (Ireland) Act, 187.1 " (34 & 35 V. c. 49, § 17, Ir.). « 19 & 20 V. c. 79. '§4. 13 WHAT SIGNATUUKS ARK JUDICIALLY NOTICKD. [PAUT I. [or slioriff substitufo],' as well us all oxlractfi or oojiics thereof, op from the hooks of the Court of Session, or the Sheriff Court, pur- porting to bo signed or (jertified by any clerk of court, or extracts from or copies of registers purporting to be made by the keeper thereof, or extractor, shall be judicially noticed by all courts and judges in England, Ireland, and Ilcr Majesty's other dominions, and shall be received as prima facie evidence, without the neces- sity of proving their authenticity or correctness, or the signatures appended, or the oflicial character of the person signing, and shall be sufficient warranty for all diligence and execution by law com- petent." § 14.* In America, the signature of the Chief of the Executive of the State is recognised without proof.' In Louisiana, also, the signatui-es of executive and judicial officers to all official acts are similarly treated.'' The English doctrine on this subject is difficult of definition. On the one hand, judicial notice will be taken of the royal sign manual,*" and of matters stated under it ; of matters stated in the certificate of a principal Secretary of State,*" and of the signatures of the judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature, and of the old superior equity and common law judges, if appended to any judicial o^* official document.* The legislature has moreover provided that judicial notice shall be taken of the signatures of the judges, commissioners and registrars of the old courts," and of the judges and registrars of the Courts'' of Bankruptcy in England, and of the judges, registrars, and chief clerks of the Coui't of Bonkruptcy and Insolvency, now called the Court of Bankruptcy," in Ireland;^ and has also directed that in all proceedings Under the winding- up clauses of the Companies Act, 1862, judicial notice shall be taken of the signatures of the otficers of the old Courts of » 19 & 20 V. c. 79, §4. * Gr. Ev. § 6, in part, as to first four lines. ' Jonesv. Gale'sExora., 1817(Am.). « Id. ; Wood V. Fitz, 1820 (Am.). *" Mighell V. Sultan of Johoro (1893), see also post, § 1381 ; Lord Melville's Case (1806); 11. v. Miller (1772), and R. v. Gully (1773). In neither of the cases last-named was any question raif^od as to the neces- sity of proving the signature to be genuine. » 8 & 9 V. 0. 113, §2, ante, §7. « 24 & 25 V. c. 134, § 204 ; 32 & 33 V. c. 71, § 109. ' 46 & 47 V. c. 52, § 137, cited ante, p. 9, n. ". 8 35 & 36 V. t. 58, § G, Ir. 9 20 & 21 V. 0. 60, § 362, Ir. 14 CIIAP. 11.] GAZiyiTKS WMKN JITDICIALLY NOTICKI), ChiuK'orv in England or Iroliind, or of thd Courts of Bankruptcy in I'lnj^land or Ireland, or of tlm (Jourt of Sossion iii Sijothind, or of tilt) rcgiwtriir of the cotirt of tlio Vioo- Warden of tlio Stannaries, wlionevcr such signatures are subscribed to any doeuiuent made, issued, or signed under such clauses, or any (jflioial copy thereof,' and that the signatures attached to certain other documents ren- dered admissible by statute, need not be proved.'" On the other hand, it has been said that the (Jourtswoidd i)robably not recognise the signatures of the Lords of the Treasury to their oflicial letters.'' Many bodies are, too, by particular statutes, created corporations and given a seal, for instance. County Councils ; ' yet in each such case the seal must, in the absence of statutory provi- sion that judicial notice shall be taken of it, be formally proved." § 15. The judges will take notice of the London, Dublin, or Edinharqh Gazette on its mere production, and iL is unnecessary to prove that it was bought at the office of the Queen's printer, or to offer any evidence as to whence it came.' § 16.* It is unnecessary to prove facts which may certainly be known from the invariable course of nature ; such as that a man is not the father of a child, where non-access is already proved until within six months of the woman's delivery." Nor is it necessary to prove the course of time,'" or of the heavenly bodies." Public divisions of time, too, need not be proved, such as the ordina'-y public > 25 & 26 V. c. 89, § 12^. '« 8 & 9 V. c. 113, § 1, ante, § 7. A partial list of the more important of these documents will bo given in Part iii. Ch. iv., on Public Docu- ments. In ])ractice, no proof is re- quired of the handwriting of the governor of Holloway pi-ison (25 & 26 V. c. 104, § 12), which for all pur|)o.so8 of law is now regarded as thi' (iueon's Prison. See Alcock v. Whatmoro, 1840; Short r. Williams, 1835; Fogarty V. Smith, U3J. » R. V. Jones, 1809 (Ld. EUen- boroiigh). See 12 & 13 V. c. 89 (" The Trensurv Instrnmonts (Signa- ture) Act, 1849"), cited post, § 1106; and 31 & 32 V. c. 37, cited post, § 1527. •51 A 52 V. c. 41 ("The Local Govornmont Act, 1888"), § 79. No ir) seal is given to parish councils, though they are incorporated. See 56 & 57 V. c. 73 ("The Local Govern- ment Act, 1894"), § 3, sub-sect. 9. • See, further, post, § 87. » R. V. Forsyth, 1814 ; 31 & 32 Y. 0. 37, §§ 2, 5, cited post, § 1527. See R. V. ilolt, 1793. The case R. v. Wallace, 1865 (Ir.), can no longer be relied upon, see post, § 1527. * Or. J]v. § 5, in part. ' Heathcoto's Divorce, 1851, H. L. ; R. V. Lulfe, 1807. '« See r.ury v. Blogg, 1848. " However, in Collier v. Nokes, 1849, Wilde, C.J., is reported to have held that he could not judicially notice at what hour the sun set in the month (if November. See, also, Tut- ton r. Darke, 1860 (Pollock, C. B.). Sed qu. ? .! 'I I I I 1 '''-■ 1 1! !,■ ■ ^ : MATTKKS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. [part I. fasts and festivals ; ^ the commencement or ending of the legal sittings;^ the coincidence of the years of the reign of any sovereign of this country with the years of our Lord ; * the coincidence of days of the week with days of the month ; * the order of the months ;^ the meaning of the word " month." ^ The meaning of words in the vernacular language^ need not be proved; the word " time," for instance, unless specifically stated, indicating in Great Britain " Greenwich mean time," and in Ireland " Dublin mean time " ; * and the word " distance " being, except under special circumstances, taken to mean distance measured as the crow flies.' Nor, again, need formal proof be given as to the legal weights and measures ; ^^ nor the positive value of the coin of the realm ; " nor its relative value at different periods of time ; '^ nor matters of history affecting the whole public.*' § 17.'* Courts also recognise the principal geographical divisions. » 6 Vin. Abr. 492, pi. 8-44, » 6 Vin. Abr. 4510, pi. 32. ' Holiiuin V. Bun'ow, 1702 ; R. v, Pringle, 1840. * (J Yin. Abr. 492, pi. 6, 7, 8; Hoyle V. Ld. Cornwallis, 1720; Pago v. Faucet. 1591 ; Harry v. Broad, 1704; Brough V. Parkins, 1703 (Ld. Holt). Thus tho court is bound judicially to notice what days of the month fall on Sundays: Hanson v. Shackelton, 1835 ; Pearson v. Shaw, 1844. » 11. V. Brown, 1828. • This formerly, at common law and in equity (sec Cons. Ord. Ch. 1H()0, Ord. XXXVII. r. 10, now an- nulled), used to mean four weeks, but meant a calendar month when used in the ecclesiastical courts (Bluck V. Rackman, 1846 (Knight- liruce, V.-C); Man v, Ricketts, 1845 (Lord Lyndhurst) ; Simpson V. Margitson, 1847 ; Johnstone v. Hudleston, 1825 (Bayley, J.) ) ; in mercantile transactions in tho city of London (Turner v. Barlow, 1803 (Erlo, O.J.)); or in bills of ex- change or promissory notes (45 & 4() V. 0. 61, § 14, sub-sect. 4, and § 89) ; or in any statut(» passed after the year 1850 (TIki Interjjretation Act, 1889, of 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, § 9). Ancl month, when used in tho Rules of the Supreme Court (Ord. IjXIV. r. I), or iu any j udgmeut or order of 16 that court (Id.), unless words bo added showing lunar month to be intended. As to the meaning of " ca- lendar month" as applied to imprison- ment, see Migottii;. Colville, 1879. ' Clementi v. Golding, 1809, as to the meaning of the word "book"; Com. V. Kneeland, 1838 (Am.) ; R. v. Woodward, 1831. In the last case the judges unanimously held that they were bound to notice that hxiua were a species of puhe. So in R. v. Swatkins, 1831, Patteson, J., after conferring with Bosunquet, J., judi- cially noticed that hurlci/ was corn, in an indictment for arson under the Act just mentioned. In R. v. Beaney, 1S2(), however, the judges refused to notitie that a ailt was an animal of the horse species. » 43 & 44 V. c. 9, § 1 ; formerly local time jjrevailod, see Curtis v. March, 1858. » Mouflet V. Cole, 1872. '» Ilockin V. Cooke, 1 791 ; O'Don- nell r. O'Donnell, 1878 (Ir.) ; 41 & 42 V. c. 49. " (Hossop v. Jacob, 1815; Kearney V. King, 1819. " Bryant v. Foot, 1848. " See Read v. Bishop of Lincoln, 1892, post. § 1785; Bk. of Augusta V. Earlo, 1839 (Am.). '♦ Or. Kv. § 6, as to first seven linos, in great part. CHAP. II.] MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. Thus they judicially notice the territorial extent of the jurisdiction and sovereignty exercised de facto by their own government ; ' and the local divisions of their country, such as states,* provinces,' counties,^ counties of cities, cities,^ towns, parishes, and the like, so far as political government is concerned or affected ; and when dealing with questions of navigation, the geographical positions and the names of places as shown on the Admiralty chart.® But courts are not obliged to judicially notice mere local divisions, nor their precise limits (further than they may be described in public statutes '). Accordingly they have refused to notice judicially that " a part of the coast called Suffolk " was not in Kent ; or that *' Orfordness, in the county of Suffolk," was not situated between the North Foreland and Beachy Head ; * that a particular place is within a certain city ; ' or that a particular town is within a certain diocese ; '" or that a street mentioned in the pleadings is a public thorodghfare, though the word " street," via strata^ would rather imply that it was ; '^ or that a particular street is not in a certain county, though it be notorious that a street bearing the same name is in another county \^^ or that a city 1 See "The Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890" (53 & 54 V. c. 87), legivl- iziiif? acts (lone in doiiiinioiis ticc^uirod by (5 & 7 V. c. 94, treaty, capitula- tion, grunt, usage, suH'erunco, or other lawful means. One of Her Majesty'h principal secretaries of state, in answer to question put by any court in the Uuoen's dominions, is required, within a reasonable time in tliat behalf, to cause projjcr and suflicient answers to be returned to all swell ([uostions, which answers shall, iiiKiii jiriidudioii tlieriof, be Jinnl ami roiicliislve tviilmce, in the suit or otl r proceedings, of tho several matters tliorein contained. ■■' Why to V. Rose. 1842. There tho Ceiiit noticed, that by "tho kingdom of Ireland " was meant that part of tlii^ United Kingdom called Ireland. ^ Id. *__ iJeybel's case, 1821. In 2 Inst. 6.)7, it is said "the King's courts" "tnke notice of all the counties of England." In K. v. Isle of Mly, 1S,)0, tho court judicially noticed that the Isle of I'lly was a division of u county in the nature of a riding, T.— VOL. I. 17 and, as such, prima facie liable to repair bridges within it. In Harris V. O'Loghlen, 1871 (Ir.), tho M. R. took judicial notice of the baroniea in an Irish county, such baronies having been enumerated in 13 & 14 \. c. 08, Sch. A. (repealed by £4 & 5j V. c. (57). * R. V. fSt. Maurice, 18,)1. • lUrrell v. Dryer, 1884. ' Deybel's case, 1821; Fazakerley V. Wiltshire, 1720; R. v, Burridgo, 17;io ; Thome r. Jackson, 1846. » Deybel's case, 1821. In Kirby V. llickson, 18,)(), the court refus(!(l to take judicial notice that I'ark Street, Grosvenor S(iuare, in Middle- sex, was within twenty miles of Russell Square, in the saino county. " In Hrune v. Thoinjison, 1842, where the ]>laintirt' was nonsuited for not proving that the Tower of London was within, tho City of London. '" R. V. Simps(m, 1738. » Grant v. Moser, 1843 (Tindal, C.J.). " Humpiin^ys v. lUidd, 1841. So© TLoruo V. Jucksou, 184(j. Vh 1 1 ' i i \ 1 yi m MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICKD. [part I. mentioned in a document is in a particular country, even though it appear that one with a similar name is the capital of such country.^ They have, however, noticed that the Queen's Prison is situated in England. - § 18.^ Ine courts will, too, judicially recognise the political constitution or frame of their own government ; its essential political agents or public otfioors sharing in its regular adminis- tration ; and its essential and regular political operations and actions. Accordingly, all tribunals notice the accession and demise of the sovereign of their country ; * the heads of depart- ments, and the principal officers of state, whether past or present ; * the marshals and sheriffs, but not the deputies of these func- tionaries ; " the existence of a war in which their country is engaged, at least when such war is recognised in public proclama- tions or Acts of Parliament ; ' the days of special public fasts and thanksgivings, when recognised in like manner ; the stated days of general political elections ; the date and place of the sittings of the legislature ; * and, in short, " all public matters which affect the government of the country." ^ And though they were not formerly so,'" the journals of either House of Parliament are now evidence, if they purport to be printed by the official printers." But the courts will not recognise private orders made at the council-table ; '- nor, it seems, any orders of Council, even though they regard the Crown and the government.^^ ' Kearney v, Kinp, 1819. There it W118 held that a declaration on a bill drawn and accei)tcd at Dublin, to wit, at Westminster, for 342/., must bo taken to bo on a bill drawn in I'liijiland for l']nj:;lish money, and that th(iiofor(( proof of a bill drawn at I )iiblin in Ireland for Irish money, wliich is of less value, was a fatal vurianco. * Wickens V. Goatly, 1851. ' (!r. VW. § (j, in part. * IIolmaTi V. Burrow, 1702 ; R. v. Priii-hs iNld. " li, ('. Jones, 1809; Bennett v. The State of Tennessee, 1820 (Am.) ; Wliiiley ('. Carlish", ISGO (Ir.) (wlier.. tlie eoiut jiidieially noticed that hold lluwkesliury had been foreign minister iu 1803). « See Grant v. Bajj^o, 1S02. ^ Dolder ?;. Ld. Huntingtiold, 1805; R. V. Do Borenjjor, 1814. When war is neither publicly proclaimed', nor noticed in anj' statute, its existence is soli'lv a question for the jurv: 1 Halo, 1()4 ; Fost. C. L. d. I, c. 2,§ 12. The existence of war between forei^^n countries will not be judicially no- ticed : Dolder v. Ld. Iluntingfield, 1805 (Ld. Kldon). » K. r. Wilde, 1069 ; Birt v. Roth- well, 1097. » Taylor v. Barclay, 1828. '" ]{." r. KnoUys, 1694. » 8 & 9 V. c.'llU, §3, (jited ante, §7. '» 6 Vin. Abr. 490. '' Att.-fieii. V. Thoakstone, 1820. See post, §5 1527, 1664. 18 l^itfH CIIAI' II.] MATTi.ItS JKDK'IAIJA' XOTICKD. § 19. Lastly, each Division of the Supreme Conrt is bound to jiulicially notice its own rules and course of proceeding ; ' the rules and practice of the other Divisions ; ^ and also the limits of their respective jurisdictions,^ — as, for instance, that the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division has so far jurisdiction over the personal estate of an intestate British subject, whether situated in Ireland, the colonies, or any foreign country, that it may grant letters to administer such property, and must do so before tlio administrator can sue in any English Court in respect thereof.* All courts will further notice the privileges of their officers^ and solicitors,'^ a term which now includes both "attorneys" and " proctors" ;'' and also the fact that the assizes, though constituting for some purposes one legal day, may be continued from day to day with or without adjournment, and often occupy several natural days ; * the existence of courts of general jurisdiction ; " the powers of the Ecclesiastical Courts ; and the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts,'" togetiier with all general rules under that Act, whether made by the Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the President of the Board of Trade, for carrying into effect its objects," or made by the Board of Trade, for regulating matters of an administrative character under it, if printed by the Queen's printers, purporting to be issued under the authority of the Board.'^ Judicial notice must also be taken of the rules made under the Bankruptcy (L'oland) Amendment Act, 1872.'* Certain other rules made under statutory authority are likewise judicially noticed.'* ' Dobson V. Bull, 167G ; Pugh v. Eobinson, 178(). - Lane's case, 1587 ; Worlich v. Mus.suy, IGOo ; Mounson v. Hoiirn. KMS; Roidy v. Pierce, 18(>1 (Ir.) (L'ipot, C.li.) ; Culdwell v. Hunter, l^■^s. ^ Doo V. Cuperton, 1829. Sec SiKioner ?'. Juddow, 1848. * SeoWhvte c. Edso, 1842. » ()f,'lo r. Norclille, 1708. « Stokes V. Miison, 1808; Chatland V. 'rhonili'v, 1810; Ilunter v. N('ck, 18-11 ; Wiiifnrd /'. l-'leotwood, 184o. " Jud. Act, 187;{ (3() & 37 V. c. (J6), §87. » Wlntiikcr r. Wioboy, 1852. • Tivgauv r. Pletclier, 1()9(). >" 4G & 47 V. 0. 52, §§ 92 et soq. » Id. § 127. " Bankruptcy Rules, 188;J, r. 257. " ;J5 & 30 V. 0. 58, § 124, Ir. '* The i)rincipal of these are rules niacki by the Board of Trade under "The Gas and Water Works Facili- ties Act, 1873" (3(5 & 37 V. c. 89), § 14 ; tliose made either by Order in Council, or by the Coniniitttio of Council, un(U'r "The Crown Office Act, 1877" (40 & 41 V. c. 41), §§ 3, 5; tlioso Juade bj' tlio Lord Chan- cellor, un(Un' " Tlio Sumniarv Juris- diction Act, 1879" (42 it 43 V. c. 49), § 29 ; tliose inado by tlio Lord Cliancellor with the assistance of the Rej,'istrur, under "The Land Trans- fer Act, 1875" (38 & 39 Y. c. 87), § 111; those made under "The 19 o2 I II I : !1 REFRESHING MEMORY OF JUDGE. [part I. ill § 20. It is not clear whether or not the judges of the Supremo Court of Judicature are bound to notice who are the judges in inferior courts of record. The weight of American authorities is in favour of recognising them ;* but the Court of Queen's Bencli once refused to notice who was judge of the then Court of Review.- The Supreme Court will not, unless when called upon to review their judgments,^ take cognizance of the customs and proceedings in inferior courts of limited jurisdiction,* except so far as they are regulated by statute.* § 21.' Where matters ought to be judicially noticed, but the memory of the judge is at fault, he resorts to such means of refer- ence as may be at hand, and he may deem worthy of confidence.^ Thus, if the point be a date, he may refer to an almanac ;* if it be the meaning of a word, to a dictionary ;^ if it be the construction of a statute, to the printed copy ; or, in case that appears to be in- correct, to the parliament roll.'" In some instances, the judge has refused to take cognizance of a fact, unless the party calling upon him to do so could produce at the trial some document by which his memory might be refreshed. Thus Lord Elleuborough'^ once declined to take judicial notice of the King's proclamation, the counsel not being prepared with a copy of the Gazette in which it was published ; and in a case in which it became material to con- sider how far the prisoner owed obedience to his sergeant, and this depended on the articles of war, the judges thought that these ought to have been produced.'^ In other cases, the courts have themselves made the necessary inquiries, and that, too, without Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act, 1870," either by the Court t r Land Cases Reserved, or by tht? Privy Council in Ireland (:i3 & 34 V. c. 4(5, §§3l, 41, Ir.) ; and those made by the Irish Land Commission (see 44 & 45 V. c. 49, § 50, subs. 2, Ir.). ' Hawks V. Kennebec, 1811 (Am.); Ripley y. Warren, 1824(Am.); Despau V. Swindler, 1825 (Am.). * Van Sandau v. Turner, 1845. 3 Chitty V. Dendy, 18;J5. * R. V. U. of Cambridge, 1736, where the court refused to notice that the University Court in Cam- bridf^o proceeded according to the ruluu of the civil law. iSee, also, Lane's case, 1587 ; Peacock v. Boll, 16G7 ; and Dance v. Robson, 182'J. 5 As, e.g., the Court of the V.-Ch. of Oxford, now regulated by 17 & 18 V. c. 81 ("The Oxford University Act, 1854"), §45. • Or. Ev. § 6, as to first three lines. 1 Gresi. Ev. 295. * Page V. Faucet, 1591. Soo Tutton V. Darke, 18«0. ' Clementi v. Gokling, 1809. '" R. V. Jeffries, 1722; Spring v. Eve, 1677. " In Van Omoron v. Dowick, 1809. " R. V, Withers, undated (Bullor, J.), cited in E. v. Holt, 1793 (Duller, ;i: 20 C'lIAl'. II.] R::ruKSHixG memory of judgi:. stiiitly oonfining their researches to the time of the trial. Tims, where ' the qxiestion was, whether the I'ederul iiopubliLi oi' Ceiitral America had been recognised by the British Government as an independent state, a Vice-Chancellor sought for information from the Foreign Office ; in another case, the Court of Common Pleas directed inquiry to be made in the Court of Admiralty as to the maritime law ; ^ and the same Court also once made inquiry as to the practice of the Inrolment Office in the Court of Chancery;* while Lord Hardwicke * asked an eminent conveyancer respecting the existence of a general rule of practice in the latter's profession. i;l1 > Taylor v. Barclay, 1828. See, also, The Charkieh, 1878. « Chandler r. Grioves, 1792. ' Doe I'. Lloyd, 1840, acting on the authority of Worsley v. Filisker, 1620. * Willoughby r. Willoughby, 1787. See, also, Ex. S. 0. 1883, Ord. LI. rr. 7, 8. 21 m lii 211 AMEKICAN NOTES. [part r. AMEKICAN NOTES. § 4. Judicial Notice. — (Jertiiin facts a judge or jury will adopt as the basis of action without requiring the party to whose case they are essential to prove them by evidence. Tiiese facts, while having the common feature that a judge will not require them to be proved because he knows them already, are of two classes. Some facts the judge is bound to take notice of or, in other words, know, at his peril. If he does not treat them as proved, in any case in which they are relevant, such (!onduct is error in law. The ])arty aggrieved by a failure to recognise and adopt matters which tlie judge is bound judicially to know, may have the error cor- rected, upon proper proceedings, in a superior court, for all judges in the jurisdiction are equally bound to know them. Strictly speaking, it is not the duty of counsel to suggest them. It is the duty of the court to know them. Another class of facts the judge is not, as before, bound to know, but as judges (and other men) usually know them lie may fairly be assumed to know them. If a particular judge is not actually aware of any particular one of these facts, he may c ae may not, as he sees fit, inform himself from any source, inchu .ig the ])arties to the action. If he does not clioose to inform himself, it is the duty of counsel to supply him witli the needed information. If tlie court still declines to know such tact, it nuist be proved in the ordinary way or the jiarty will lose tlie bcnetit of it, without redress in a superior court. Such facts are usually those of common knowledge. The judge in any particular trial has a dual capacity. He is, in the first place, a part of the administration of government, estab- lished for the ])urpose of enforcing certain standards of conduct, reasoning and liabiliiy, rules of law or practice, which have been establislied by tlie sovereign power of the jurisdiction in which the court is sitting. In the second place, he is an intelligent mem vcr of the eomiiiunity in which he resides. As such, he knows what is generally known to others in the coiiiiiiunity. These facts, usmdly not disputed and capable of easy verification if disputed, may, as a rule, be safely assumed to lie true unless and until disputed or dis- proved. In otlnn' W( rds. tluM'e is in nuiiiy cases no need for jiroving to a person of average intelligence what every one assuiu' s to be true, unless the fact is disputed. As Lord EUenborough said in Peltier's Case (L'S State Trials, (Jlfi) (I8O0), speaking of an admission that Napoleon liuonaparte was Chief Consul and France and England at peace on a certain date, "They were capable of easy proof if they liad not been admitted. Their notoriety seems to render the actual ])roof very unnecessary." The division into two classes of the facts which, as is said, need < :1A1'. II.] AMERICAN NOTKS. 01; not be ])roved, because judges already know them, follow with goueral correctness this division between the official and jjersoual capacity of judges. In other words, matters of law or established by law are mi'tters of required cognisance; matters of fact are the .subject of optional cognisance. When it is said a judge takes judicial notice of the statute law of his state a somewhat different thing is meant than when it is said that he knows, without ])ro()f, the date of the battle of J ^xington. The judge may really be equally ignorant on both these points. The statute in (question may but just have been enacted and the actual knowledge of it confined to a few officials at the seat of legislation. The judge may n(>ver have read or heard the date of the battle. iJut the fact of the statute he must know at the peril of committing error. The other fact he may be assumed to know ; but if he does not, he com- mits no error in law in refusing to assume its tr\ith as part of a decision. The one refusal may be rectified in an appellate or superior court. The other will not. For example, in a case where both the court and parties assumed the existence of a law which had been repealed, relief by a new trial was granted although the point was not taken at the triah lielmont 0. ]Morrill, G<) ^le. 314 (187<)). IxTKKN ATioNAL IvKLATioxs. — Auioug the facts established by law of which courts, as ])art of the administration of government, are bound to take judicial notice are the existence of other nations, their sovereignty and forms of government, and the seals and other usual emblems or indicia of such sovereignty or government. Courts take cognisance of the great seal of any nation recognised by tlu; govern- ment under which the Court is acting, e. (/. Portugal, Cliurcli r. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 18C) (1804); Dennuirk, Griswold i-. I'itcairii, 2 Conn. 80 (1810) ; Lincoln v. Battelle, Wend. 47;". (1831). Such a seal is said to ''prove itself," Watson v. Walker, 23 X, J I. 471. 4i)() (ISol), sp(!aking of tlie great seal of Englaiul. The same rule applies in the courts of one state of the Union to tlu' great seal of a sister state, e. ;/. of a copy of a Maryland statute ;mthenticated by the great seal of ^Maryland when offered in a court in Pennsylvania, U. S. r. Johns, 4 Dall. 412 (1800) ; so in New York of a .Michigan record, Coit r. IMillikin, 1 Denio. .'}7(> (1845), and in Elaine of a Massachusetts record, Kobinson r. (Jilnian, 20 -Me. 2'j.> (1841). It was held in Coit c. Millikin that the seal required must be one good at common lav, "an impression upon wax. wafer, or some other tenacious substance," and that, in the absence of an enabling statute, "an impression upon paper alone (as in that case) is uot a seal." Hut see Pierce v. Indseth, 10(5 U. S. 540 (1882) roufni. The seal of the United States government will h? recognised i:i a state court. Yount v, Howell, 14 Cal. 4G5 (1859) ; and ti'.e seal of 2P AMERICAN NOTES. [PATIT I. :-i^V 1 = a state in the courts of the United States, U. S. v. Amecly, 11 AViieat. 31)2(1820). The seal of a district court of the United States i)roves itself citlier in a state or federal court, and the reeords of sueii court need not be ])roved in any other way than under the seal of the (;ourt as afhxed by the clerk. The rule is thus clearly and succinctly stated : — " Circuit ami district courts of the United States certainly cannot be considered foreign in any sense of the term, either in resjject to the state courts in which they sit, or as respects the circuit or dis- trict court of ai'.otl'.er circuit or district. On the contrary, they are domestic tribunals, whose proceedings all other courts of the country are bound to respect, when authenticated by the certificate of the clerk under the seal of the court, the rule being that the circuit court of one circuit or the district court of one district is presumed to know the seal of the circuit or district court of another circuit or district, in the same manner as each court within a state is })re- suuuhI to know and recognise the seal of any other court within the same state." TurnbuU v. I'ayson, Oo U. S. 418 (1877) ; Womaok r. Dearman, 7 Porter, ol3 (lH.'58). " It will not be denied that the con- stitution of the United States and the laws of congress passed in pursuance thereof, will be judicially recognised by the courts of this state. The several courts of the United States are called into exist- ence by act of congress under the constitution, and their powers and duties specifically defined by statute ; such courts, therefore, together with their seals, will also be judicially recognised." Adams v. Way, 32 Conn. 419 (IBGO). The great se;il of the Province of Upper Canada of itself imports verity. Lazier v. Westcott, 20 X. Y. 140 (1802). So the courts of a nation will so far take cngnisanoe of the sove- reignty of insurgents recognised as belligerents by the executive or legislative hranches of the government as to decline to inquire into the title or commission of their public vessels. Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 335 (1822). In a case where the condemnation of a vessel for a fraud on the revenue laws of St. Domingo during the French occu])ancy of the island was a fact in issue, the attestation of the proper British author- ities who had subsequently conquered and then held the island, was deemed sufficient, though " certified only under the governor's seal at arms, instead of a colonial or public seal." Hadfield v. Jameson, 2 Muuf. (Va.), r.3, 70 (1809). Probably this knowledge on the part of judges of the international relations of the government under which they act is, historically, a survival of the ideas of the time when judges sat as the direct rep- resentatives of the king ; and might therefore be required to know what the king himself knew in other branches of his sovereignty, «. ff. his relation to other nations. I Mi CU.W. i!.j AMKiaCAN ^oTi:s. 2^4 So tlu' limits of the nation is I'iithcr a political tliaii a Ic^'al ques- tion, tlie action of the exeinitive (M)ntrclling that of tlie courts, who will supiKJi't the action of the co-orilir.atu branch of the government. Foster v. ^'eilsoii, 1 Peters, 25^ (JHlii;). It is, therefore, for the executive or legislative branch of rjovern- nient to take the initiative in tlu'se international matters. Courts will decline! knowledge of the existence of sovereignties not yet rec- ognised by the executive and legislature. The rule is tiiat " where tiie political authorities of the State have actually claimed andexer- cisi'd jurisdiction over i)articular localities . . . the courts are thereby concluded, and have only to declare the fact and govern tliemselves accordingly, without undertaking to pass on the validity of such claim." State r. Wagner, Gl ]Mt. 178 (187o). "The seal of such unacknowledged government cannot be permitted to ))rove itself; but it may be; proved by such testimony as the nature of the case admits." U. S. r. Palmer, li Wheat. ()1(), 034 (1818). I'l'BMC Laws. — It being their first and distinctive duty, as part of the government, to enforce certain established rules of law and general standards of conduct, courts are required to know, with- out ])roof, the laws and standards they are constituted to enforce. Speaking generally, and disregarding private statutes and acts of local a])plicatiou, courts take judicial cognizance of the existence and scope of all legal rules to which they are commissioned by the sovereign of tlieir country co compel obedience. Law of Nations. — The law of nations being part of the public law of each jurisdiction receives judicial notice. So of the rules of navigation adopted by commercial nations. The Scotia, 14 Wall. 171 (1871). As the court in that case say: " Foreign municipal laws must indeed be proved as facts, but it is not so with the law of nations." For the same reason, what is part of the general law merchant " is matter of law for the court," — /. e. will be judicially noticed. Jewell v. Center, 25 Ala. 498, 505 (1854). For "the principles of the law merchant . . . have become a part of the common law." j\Iunn r. Burch, 25 111. 35, 38 (18G0). Or, as the court in a New Jersey case (Reed r. Wilson, 41 N. J. Law, 20 (1879) say, in taking judicial notice that a note payable on a certain day was properly protested on the day previous : '•The court must take judicial notice not only of the law merchant, which is a part of the common law, but also of the almanac, from which it appears that the 15th day of December, 1872, fell on Sunday." To same effect, Sasscer v. Farmers' Bank, 4 Md. 409 (1853) holds that Sundays and great festivals such as Christmas are dlfs non Jiirldicl in commercial usage. It has, however, been held that while the general maritime law is the basis of the law of the United States, it is, having no inherent force of its own, only so far operative in any country as it has been i 'I 1.1 1 ! Ill 1 1 1 216 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AUT I. adopted by the laws and usages of the country. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 008, 573 (1874); Tlie Scotland, XOo U. S. 24 (1.S81). As courts of admiralty are tribunals recognised by the law of natious, their seals need not be proved. Thompson v. Stewart, 3 Conn. 171, 181 (1819); Yeaton . Fry, 5 Cranch, 335 (1809). So of the general customs of trade. "We cannot close our eyes," say the supreme court of the United States, "to the well known course of business in the country." Bank of Kentucky c. Adams Express Co. 93 U. S. 185 (187G) ; Wiggins Ferry Co. r. C. & A. K. Co., 5 Mo. App. 347, 375 (1878). But the custom, to be noticed without pri of, must be one of the commercial world. A com- mercial custom adopted by local autliority, e. ;/. a broker's boanl, must be proved. "The court will not take judicial cognisance of tiiose rules, unless they are rules or usages of trade and commerce, which would be recognised without their adoption by any ])articul;ir board or association." Goldsmith v. Sawyer, 4(5 Cal. 209 (1873). The New York courts jilace " the general course of business in a community, including the universal practice of banks " in the secoml class ; i. e. among matters of optional cognisance •' of wliic^h courts may take judicial notice." Merchants Bank v. Hall, 83 N. Y. 3.'!8 (1881) ; Yerkes i>. National liank, 09 N. Y. 382 (1877) ; Hunter v. N. Y. &c. K. K.. IIG N. Y. 615 (1889). Wiiere the indicia of title to certain goods to be forwarded were assigned to a merchant to secure liis advances, tlie coui't say tliat it is "tlie usual course of the great inland commerce " for agricultural produce between the Mississipjii Valley and markets. " It has existed long enougli to assume a regular form of dealing and it embraces such a wide extent of territory and is of sucli general importance, that its ordinary course and usages are now publicly recognised and understood ; and it is the duty of the court to recognise them, as it judicially recognises the general and estab- lished usages of trade on the ocean." Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384, 399 (1850). Of a custom for merchants to exchange mutu.al credits, the supreme court of Michigan say: — "We must take judicial notice of a custom which is familiar everywhere." Cameron f. Blackman, 39 Mich. lOS (1878). The powers of a notary public, being an officer recognised by the law merchant in the ])rotest of foreign bills of exchange, will l)e noticed by the court and his "seal proves itself in all countries where the law merchant ])revails, and it is only necessary that it should conform to the law of the place where the notary acts." ( )rr /•. Lacey, 4 McLean, 243 (1847). " The court will take judicial notice of tlie seals of notaries public, for they are officers recognised by the commercial law of the world." Pierce /;. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546 (1882); Delafield v. Hand, 3 Johns. 310, 314 (1808). CHAP. II.] AMKIMCAN NOTES. 21' See also Brown v. Pliila. Hank, G S. & K. 484 (1821). The recognition does not extend to tlie power to attest deeds. Nye V. McDonald, 2 JjOW. Can. Jurist, 109 (1857). Neese v. Farm- ers Ins. Co., r,r> la. 604 (1881). l)Ut the courts will not recognise without proof the right of other officers empowered by local laws to protest negotiable instru- ments, <: g. a huissier in France. Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 177, 178 (182!>). So of the certificate of a consul. Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 186 (1804). In certain cases a no.L.i'ial seal has been considered a sufficient certification of the proceedings of a foreign court. Yeaton v. Fry, o Cranch, 335 (1809); Fellows v. Menasha, 11 Wise. 558 (1860). While a notarial protest of a promissory note is not, strictly speaking, an official act, such protest duly anthenticated by his signature and seal is competent secondary evidence, after his de- cease, of the facts stated in the protest, " because it is in the usual course of their duty and business to keep such memoranda." Torter I". Judson, 1 Gray, 175 (1854). The seal may be made directly on the paper witho\it wax or other adhesive substance. Pierce u. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546 (1882). This judicial knowledge of the law merchant cannot be so far extended as to embrace local customs. The local customs of miners as to location of claims must be pro^^ed by competent evidence. Sullivan v. Hen; e, 2 Col. 424 (1874); Tougade o. Kyan, 21 Nev. 449 (1893). The usages and customs of Indian tribes " must be regarded as facts, and must be averred and proved like any other material facts." Turner v. Fish, 28 Miss. 306 (1854). Courts will require proof of local rights in water for irrigation purposes even when such rights have been recognised by statute. Lewis <>. McClure, 8 Oreg. 273 (1880). But see Amer. Nat. Bk. r. Bushey, 45 Mich. 135, 140 (1881) that the customers of a bank will be assumed to know the " ordinary rules and necessities of business." Fkdkkal Laws. — The constitution of the United States being the supreme law of the land, all courts, state and national, take notice without proof of certain public acts done in the exercise of the powers conferred by that instrument. Constitution- ok thk Fkoekvl Govkknmkxt. — Courts are required to take notice of the office of president of the United States, its incumbent and his signature. So in speaking of a United States pater ; to lands, the supreme court of California say: "The patent proves itself and requires no authentication other than the signature of the president and the seal of the government. The court takes judicial notice of both signature and seal." Yount v. Howell, 14 Cal. 46.5 (1859). Wliere a patent was signed by an acting commissioner of patents, it was held unnecessary to aver or prove that he was legally entitled i : U Hii 'm\ 2r AM Ki. I CAN NOTKS. [l'AI!T I. to act in that capacit}-. "Tlio court will takt; notice judicially of the |iersons who from time to time preside over tint patent otliee, whether permanently or tninsientl}', and the prodnetioii of their commission is not necessary to support their othcial acts." V(nk vVc. ]{. Co. r. V.'inans, 17 ITow. .']() (lsr>\). " State courts are bound to take judicial notice of the existence of the federal courts." Minis v. Swartz, 37 Tex. 1.'5 (1.S7U); Hoadman *•. Uose, (13 (Ja, 4.'8 (1<S7".»). "We all know that the circuit courts of the several states are courts of general jurisdic- tion, as well as we know that courts of justice of the peace are not; and why should judges assume a degree of ignorance on the bench which would be unpardonable in them when off of it '.' " Jarvis r. JJobinson, L'l Wise. oL'.'J (18(i7). So of the existence and powers of the president of the United States. The proclamation of the ])resident of the United States is " a public act of which all courts of the United States are bound to take notice and to which all courts are bound to give effect." Armstrong v. U. S., 13 AVall. 1^4 (lcS71). So of the departments uf state, and public acts in pursuance of their legal powers, e. <j. the instructions of the navy department to the naval commanders of the Ignited States. The Teterhoff, Blatch. I'r. Cases, 463, oOO (isr,3). lint courts "are not bound to take official notice of the rules adopted for the regulation of the different departments of the federal government or those establidied by the board of land commissioners or surveyor general of the United States for Cali- fornia." Heush^y v. Tarpey, 7 Cal. 288 (1S57). Otherwise of the action of the federal land office when regulated by statute, liige- low V. Chatterton, 51 Fed. Kep. 614 (18i)2). As treaties properly executed under constitutional prerogative are part of the law of each jurisdiction in the United States, all courts take judicial notice of them. Thus, in an action of slander charging a murder in Ireland judicial notice will be takei\ that under the " Ashburton treaty " between Great Hritain and the United States, murder is an extraditable offence in this country, ^lontgomery v. Deeley, 3 Wise. 709 (1854). The effect of the treaty of Paris, ceding Louisiana to the United States, is judicially noticed in relation to the land titles of that state. U. S. v. Keyner, 9 How. 127 (18o0). The rule includes treaties between the United States and Indian nations. Carson v. Smith, .5 Minn. 78 (1860) ; U. S. v. Ikebe, 2 Dak. 292 (1880); Lewis v. Harris, 31 Ala. 689 (1858). But where a treaty confers authority upon certain persons to do certain acts, courts, while recognising the existence of the authority without proof, will require proof of the manner in which the author- ity was, in point of fact, exercised. Thus, where a right to select a certain amount of land was conferred by a treaty with the Chip- CIIAI'. II.] AMKKKWN NOTKS. •2V jti'vvii Indians, proof was required of the manner in wliicli tlie right wan exercised, when tliat fact was material. Dole v. Wilson, Iti ^linn. r>-r> (^lf<71). The publie aets of eongress, for similar reasons, are within the judicial knowledge of all courts, state and national. Cox V. iMorrow, 14 Ark. (W6 (18r»4). For example, judicial notice is taken of the natioiuil bankrupti^y law. Morris c. Davidson, 49 Ga. oGl (ISTii); Minis v. Swartz, JiT Tex. V) (\H72). Even if such public act of congress relates to the District of Columbia, liayly's Adni, v. Chubb, 10 (.Iratt. 284 (1«G2); or concerns exclusively the municipal affairs of the District of Cohunbia. Chesapeake Ohio Canal Co. v. ISaltimore & Ohio Kail- road Company, 4 Gill & J. 1, 63 (1832). Therefore where the laws of Maryland were by act of congress continued in the District of Columbia, the courts of Virginia take judicial notice of these laws. I'.ird's Case, 21 Gratt. 800 (1871). So of the acts of congress relat- ing to the "disposition of the public lands, and the kind of evidence furnished to a purchaser and the system of surveys adopted for those lands by congress." Gooding ?j. ^lorgan, 70 111. 275 (187.'i) ; Semple V. Hagar, 27 Cal. 1(53 (18(15); I'apin v. Kyan, 32 Mo. 21 (1862); Wright r. Hawkins, 28 Tex. 452 (1866). So it is the duty of the state courts to take cognisance of the United States internal rev- enue laws and dismiss an action invalidated by such laws, though the point is not relied on by tli parties but is taken by the court .1UU sjtonti'. Kessel r. Albetis, 56 Harb. 3(i2 (1870). Where <!on- gress has conferred upon a department the power to prescribe rules and regulations, courts will take judicial cognisance of the latter. Caha V. V. S., 152 U. S. 2U (18<)3). Following analogous decisions, it is held that where the substance of the statutes of arother state are incorporated in a public act of eongress, state courts will take judicial notice of such statutes. Flanegin v. AVashington Ins. Co., 7 Pa. St. 306 (1847). Domkstk; Puhlic Laws. — Courts not oidy recognise, without proof, the existence of treaties and congressional laws which they are required to enforce ; they also recognise all public laws passed by the appropriate branch of any state government under which the court is organised. State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 300 (1861); Gird- lestone /•. O'Reilly, 21 Q. B. U. C. 409 (1862) ; Iidiabitants of Spring- field I'. Worcester, 2 (Uish. 52 (1S4S) ; U. S. r. Fuller, 4 N. :M. .'^58 (1889); Division of Howard Co., 15 Kans. 194 (1875); Griswold v. (Jallup, 2J Conn. 208 (1852); Parent r. Walnisly's Adm., 20 Ind. 82 (1863); Evans, Auditor, v. Brown, 30 Ind. 514 (1869); Dolph v. Barney, 5 Oreg. 191 (1874); "and where one state recognises acts done in pursuance of the laws of another state, its courts will take judicial cognisance of those laws, so far as may be necessary to determine the validity of the acts alleged to be done in conformity with them." Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall. 513, 531 (1869). ii Hi: \M 0^9 AMERICAN NOTES. W' mil [part r. Wlien the courts of one state liavo taken judicial cognisance of the laws of another they will "until it is proved tliat the law has been changed . . . presume it still exists." Graham v. Williams. 21 La. Ann. 594 (ISO!)). Tlie courts of Canada take judicial cognisance of the acts of the Provincial legislature even though locally limited. Darling v. Hitcluiock, L'o (}. ]?. U. C!. MV.i (18GG); and Canadian Admiralty Courts are "bound to take judicial notice of an order in council from which the court derives its jUrisdi(!tion." Keg. i>. The Minnie, 4 Can. Exch. ir>\ (1S<)4). The rule requires judicKu knowledge of such public laws of any state or country of wliich the jurisdiction formed part as were iti use wliile the union continued. Cox ». Morrow, 14 Ark. ()().'} (1S54); Arayo w. Currell. 1 La. Kep. 528. 541 (I.S30) ; Stokes m. IMacken, 02 ?.arl). 145 (ISOl); llenthorne r. Doe, 1 I'dackf. 157 (ISL'l); Delano r. Jopling, 1 Litt. 417 (1S22); U. S. r. Kitchie. 17 How. 525 (1854); Otto /•. Soulard, 9 Mo. 57.'^ (1845); Doe v. Eslava, 11 Ala. 1028 (1847). It is on the same principle tliat American courts take cognisance of tlie ('(Miimon and . tatutory laws of England in force at the time of the licvolution, — so far as suitable to tlie new conditions. Ocean Ins. Co. V. Fields. 2 Story, 59, 75 (1S41). So the courts of a territory are rt^cpiired to know the public laws of the territory, and if the going into effeiit of such a law is dependent on lapse of tinu' or other condition, must notice tlie condition and its being complied witii at any particiil'v time, lloyt v. Iiussell, 117 V. S. 4(»1 (1885). The feder, 1 courts, for the same reasons, take judicial cognisance of the ]>-,;Mic ivcts of congress. I'J. fj. The National j>ai.!ci'uptfv Act. Lathrop ;;. Stuart, 5 McLean, 167 (1850). So courts will notice repc ling laws equally with other laws. State V. O'Connor, 1-'? La. Ann. 480 (IS5S;. So of the amendments to tlie constitution, Graves v. Keaton, .'3 Cold. (Tein.) 8 (1806). Ill general, tlie laws of a sister state must be ju'oved as facts; see post )-. 52'". llauley r. Donagliue. 1 l<"> V. S. I (188."i). It is usually not dilVieult to recognise a public act. As a rule it applies to all parts of a state. Hut this is not essential. " It is a public act if it extends to all persons within the territorial limits described in the statute." lycvy /'. State, (! Ind. 281 (18.^5). .\n act for the survey of a tract of land is special. Allegheny *•. Wilson, 25 I*a. St., 'XVI (1855). liut see Dun'u ;•. Houston &c. !{. Co., 80 Tex. 287 (189.".). Tiie court will not take judicial notice of the stages of the passage of a publico act, as set out in the legislative journals. The journals must be offered. Hut, like other public documents, " they prove their own cMAr. II.] AMERICAN NOTKS. 2110 authonticity." Grob v. Cusbman, 45 111. 419 (18G7) ; Stall v. Druny, lis Inil. 44!) (188S); Chesapeako &c. Canal Co. c. Baltimore &c. ]{. K. Co., 4 dill &. J. 1, G3 (1S31'). liiit wlu'ther a statute •' be a law or not a law, is a judicial ques- tion, to be settled and determined by the courts and judges. . . . When once it became the settled construction of the Constitution of Illinois that no act can be deemed a valid law, unless, by the journals of the legislature, it appears to have been regidarly passed by both houses, it became the duty of the courts to take judicial notice of the journal entries in that regard." Town of South Ottawa r. Perkins, 1)4 U. S. L'GO (187()). Courts may examine the original roll in Secretary's office and any other sourc(>s of infor- mation, liowen *•. ]Mo. Tac. It. II., 118 Mo. 541 (189.")) ; .Moog r. Kandolph, 77 Wii. 597 (1884). To determine the existence of a statute or when it went into effect jiiilges " have a right to resort to any source of information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such question, always seeking first for that which in its nature is most appropriate, unless the positive hiw has enacted a different rule." Gardner /». Collector, G Wall. 499 (1867) ; Soniers r. State (So. Dak.), 58 N. W. 804 (1894) ; State r. liailey. IG Ind. 4G (18G1); Pierson r. Ikiird, 2 Greene (la.), 235 (1849); Berliner v. Waterloo. 14 Wi.sc. 378 (18G1). Certain laws applying only to a limited portion of the state are considered public because they apply to all citizens of the state. For example, in a Massachusetts case, I'arsons, C. -I., speaking of an a(!t for tht^ preservation of bass in a certain river in the present state of Maine, says, " We are of opinion that the statute referred to is a public statute. It is obligatory on all the citizens, anil they must notice it at their peril. We must, therefore, e,v offirio, take notice of it. Indeed, all the laws regulating the taking of fish are made for the ])ul)lic benefit, to preserve the fish, and are public statutes." lUirnham r. Webster, 5 Mass. 2GG (1809) ; so where an act forbidding any but specified ])ers(ms from surveying or marking lumber in a certain county in Maine, and all ])ersons from buying or selling lumber not so marked, was attacked as unconstitutional, the court say : " It is true that public acts are usually general in their character and operation, and equally applicable to all parts of the state. There are other acts which are considered as pul)lic acts, of which all persons are bound to take notice iqion their jieril, and yet they are local, because the violation of them is and must be local. . . . Nothing appears which indicates that the law was not intended as a pid)lic benefit, of which all the citizens of the stiite, as well as others, might eipially i)!irticiitate." Pierce it. Kimball, 9 (irceiil. 51 (18.'>2). So an act antliorising riparian proprietors of a section of Maryland to extend their ownership by I ' I \ u • I . 1 I m n i(- I M 1' 2111 AMKlilCAX NOTES. [part I. improvements into public waters "operating as a grant of the public domain, and aifecting tlie rights of navigation and fislicMy, by allowing improvements to be made out into navigable water,'' was said to be entitled to be "judicially noticed by the court as a public law." Hammond's Lessees i>. Inloes, 4 Maryland, 138, li2, (1853). On a criminal charge of selling "one pint of whiskey for 5 cents, not for mechanical or medicinal purposes," in violation of a statute applying to three towns in a certain county, forbidding sales of so small a quantity, except for these purposes, the defend- ant objected that the statute was not set out in the complaint. In overruling the objection, the court say, " Although local, it is not a ])rivate statute. To constitute a statute a public act, it is not necessary that it should extend to all parts of the state. It is a public act if it extend equally to all persons within the territorial limits described in the statute. The court was bound to notice that statute without pleading." Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281 (1855). The same rule is applied where a general " Local option " law is passed, and the operation of the statute is dependent on an election. State v. Cooper, 101 N. C. 684 (1888). "There are statutes that are local in one sense which are never- theless public statutes ; for it is not necessary to constitute a statute a public act that it should be equally applicable to all parts of tlie state. It is sufficient if it extend to all persons doing or omitting to do an act within the territorial limits described in the statute." Hretz V. Mayor &c. of New York, 6 Ilobertson. 325 (1868), a case hold- ing that a statute conferring on the supreme court jurisdiction of actions against the corporation of New York city, was a public statute. So a statute creating a public office is a public statute. State V, Jarrett, 17 Md. 309 (1861). So a joint resolution imposing a duty on a public officer is a publii^ statute and will be judicially recognised. State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. 76 (1851). The courts of Lower Canada take notice of acts j)ublished in the official gazette. Dubois V. Fanteaux, 7 Rev. Leg. 430 (1875). A statute changing the name of a township "is a public local one, of which the court takes notice." State v. Cooper, 101 N. C. 684 (1888). MuNicii'AL Corporations. — The case last cited is an illustration of the general rule tluit, as municipal corporations are not so nuich local legal entities with certain powers as they are instrumentalities for carrying on the functions of government, legislative acts creat- ing, enlarging, or otherwise modifying such local municipalities and defining their powers, though necessarily of limited territorial apjtlication, are public acts of which the courts take judicial notice. Albrittin c. Huntsville, (!0 Ala. 486 (1877); Macey /•. Titcombo. 19 Ind. 135 (1862); Stier /•. Oskaloosa, 41 la. 353* (1875); I'rell /•. McDonald, 7 Kans. 426, 445 (1871); State v. Murfreesboro, 11 CHAP. II.] AMERICAN NOTES. 2212 liuniph. (Tenn.) 217 (1850) ; Gallagher v. State, 10 Tex. App. 469 (18SI) ; Alexander v. Milwaukee, 10 Wise. 247 (1862) ; Fauntleroy ,'. Hannibal, 1 Dill. (U. S.) 118 (1871) ; People r. Potter, 35 Cal.llO (1808) ; Jones v. I^ke View, l&l 111. 663 (1894) ; Briggs i\ Whijjple, 7 Vt. 15, 19 (1835); liituminous &c. Co. v. Fulton, 33 Pac. Itej). (Cal.) 1117 (1893). For this reason the charter of a village cor- y)oration is a public law. Village of Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282 (1S77) As in analogous cases, a special statute of village incorporation wliich is declared in the act itself to be a public statute will be noticed without proof. Gormley v. Day, 114 111. 185 (1885). The rule applies to prior acts of incorporation since superseded. Swain v. Comstock, 18 Wise. 463 (1804) ; by the same or a former government. Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220, 231 (I860). As the court say in Prell v. McDonald, (7 Kans. 426 (1871) : "In chartering such corporations the state in one sense charters a portion of itself. Such corporations are simply instruments in the hands of the state, made use of for the better protection of rights, the administration of justice, and the enforcement of the laws." Tins judicial knowledge extends to similar acts of a former govern- ment of the state. " San Francisco having been constituted, by a j)ublic political act of the former government, a pueblo, wc^ must take judicial notice of its existence, powers, and rights." Payne i*. Tread- well, 16 Cal. 220, 231 (1860). The case is different only by being stronger where municipalities, e. {/., towns, arc created under a general law, " conferring uniform and general powers on each." Aldermen and Council /•. Finley, 10 Ark. 423 (1850); Uriggs v. Whipple, 7 Vt. 15 (1835). Courts take judicial notice of such incor- porating statutes as being public statutes, "lint the fact that a particular village or town has availed itself of tiie provisions of these statutes, and became incorporated tifi they autliorise, is private in its character, and we knov/ of no principle of law which would require or ai horise the courts to take judicial notice of it." Hard v. City of Decoiiih, 43 la. 313 (1876) ; Kousey i>. Wood, 47 Mo. App. 465 (1891). Raii.koads. — The existence of a general railroad law stands on tlie same footing as any other public law and is noticed as such. Hcaston i>. Cincinnati, &c. R, P.. 16 Ind. 275(1861). Put statutes incorporating particular railroads have been held to be jirivate. They are said (Oliio R. Co. v. Ridge, 5 Plack. 78 (1839) to "operate upon particular persons and private concerns." Atchi- 8(in, &c. R. K. V. Hlacksliire, 10 Kans. 477, 487 (1872) ; Perry c. New Orleans, &e. Railroad Co., 55 Ala. 413, 426 (1876). Put see Hall V. Prown,.^ X. H. 93 (1877); Caldwell ,:. Richmond R. H., 89 Ga. .55(» (1892), ronfnt. In Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Tex. 452 (1866), it was held that a i V 2113 AJMERICAN NOTES. [part T. land grant or reserve to aiil tlie construction of a railroad is a public act, though printed among tliu private laws. " In the ease of public corporations created by public lawo, the court is officially to take notice of the corporate character." Winnipiseogee Lake Co. v. Young, 40 N. H. 420 (18G0). So of other public corporations. M >/., the existence of the state bank of Arkansas need not be proved in the courts of that state. McKiel V. Keal Estate Bank, 4 Ark. 592 (1841). So of the Bank of Tennessee, Sliaw v. State, 3 Sueed (Tenn.), 8G (ISoo). The courts will recognise bank ohn.rters as public acts of whicli they are obliged to take judicial notice. Davis v. Bank of Fi on, :il Ga. ()<) (1800) ; Bank of Newberry, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 495 (13^-)) ; Hays V. Northwestern Bank of Virginia, 9 Gratt. 127 (1852). And acts in amendment thereof. Jemison v. Planters and iMer- chants Bank, 17 Ala. 754 (1850). The rule extends to a case where an insurance company was by statute made a bank of discount and deposit. Gordon v. Mont- gomery, 19 Ind. 110 (18G2). Stati'tory .Moi)Ik;<ati(>n'.s. — Counts may be required by statute to take judicial cognisance of private laws. Bixler's Adni. v. Parker, b Bush, '(Hi (1807). Speiiking of such a private law, the Virginia court of appeals say: "The judicial notice we are to take of it, is the same witli that wliidi we give to laws of a general and public nature." Somerville v. Wimbish, 7 Gratt. 205 (1850). Where a public statute requires cognisance of particular facts, e.ff. the result of local option (li(pior) elections such cognisance will be taken, "and since no sources of information are pointed out, it is incumbent on this as well as all otlier courts to inform itself by recourse to any and all sources of information." Puckett i: State, 71 .Miss. 192 (1893) ; Thomas i\ Com., 90 Va. 92 (1893). But see also Whitman v. State. 80 .Md. 410 (1894). So if a statute incorporating a private corporation declares itself to be a public statute, the courts will take judicial cognisance of it. Beaty v. Lessee of Knowles, 4 Peters, 152 (18,'}0). So whert> the statute does not require that ])rivate acts should be specially pleaded, llalbert v. Skvles, 1 A. K. Marsh, (Kv.) 3(>8 (1818) ; Hart v. Bait. & O. R. R., P^ W. Va. XM\ (187.'!). When; a private statute is recognised and amended by an act declared to be public, courts will take judicial notice of the original statuti-. Lavalle v. People, 6 111. Ap. 157 (1880). So an ad(iitiou to a public act is itself jmblie. Belmont v. Morrill. 09 Me. 314 ("1879). Tile repeal of a ])ublic law is itself public. State v. O'Conner, 13 La. Ann. 487 (18.~»8). Where particular far-ts are established by public statutes, the court of course take notice of such facts ; e. g., the character of i CHAl". :i.] AMEItlCAN NOTES. 21H cortain building's as public houses under the <janiing laws. Grant V. State, L'7 S. W. IL'7 (Tex. 1894). So of the establishment of a orobate eourt in a certain county. La Salle Co. v. Milligan, 143 111. 321 (18'J2)- I'lie courts of Canada take cognisance of facts published in tlie ottiiMal gazette. Sinnns v. Quebec, &c. K. 11., 22 Low. Cau. Jur. 20 (1877). li follows from what has been said that, except in these instances of legal requirement, courts do not take judicial notice of ])rivate statutes. Leland o. Wilkinson, 6 Peters, 317 (1832). So of the incorporation oi jirivate corporations. ' Workingnien's I'.ank v. Con- verse, 33 La. Ann. 9(53 (18S1) ; Broad Stree^. Hotel Co. v. Weaver's A dm. 07 Ala. 2G (LS7(J) ; Danville &c. Flank-Road Co. v. State, 16 Ind. 45(5 (18()1); Terdicaris v. Trenton City Bridge Co., 29 N. J. Law, 307 (18G2). In cases where the statute incorporating a bank or other institu- tion declares itself to be a public act, that fact al me is sufficient to require the courts of the same jurisdiction to take judicial notice of it. Buell V. Warner, 33 Vt. o7(» (ISGl). So of a railroad. Cincinnati, &c. K. 11. r. Clifford, 113 Ind. 4G0, 467 (1S87); Hammett v. Little Bock, &c. it li. Co., 20 Ark. 204 (18o9) ; Western &c. B. li. v. Roberson, 61 Fed. Bep. 592 (1894). ')r a statute may require courts to take judicial '"^tice of village organisations as public acts. Doyle v. Village of Bradford, 90 111. 410 (1878). Or of the incorporation of proprietors of lands. Beaty V. Lessee of Knowler, 4 Tet. 152 (1830). In other cases where a statute "equires courts to take judicual notice of an otherwise private statute it will be the court's duty to take such notice. Eel liiver Draining Association v. Topp, 16 Ind. 242 (1801). So courts take judicial notice of all statutes except those which declare themselves to be ])rivate if such is the requirement of the state constitution. Covington Drawbridge (Jo. v. Shepherd, 20 How. 227 (1857). Courts do not take cognisance of other ])rivate statutes. City of Allegheny v. Nelson. 25 Ba. St. 332 (1855). For examph", the in- eorijoration of a turnpike by a special act. A/lter of a corporation under a general law. Danville, &(>,. Blank Bd. v. State, 16 Ind. 456 (ison. So the sujierior judiciary of a state will )u)t take cognisance of city, town, or county ("'dinanees, or by-laws. Furuian v. Mayor, &e. of Huutsvillo, 54 Ala. 203 (1875) ; Hassard r. Municipality No. 2, 7 Li. Ann. 495 (18.-.2); State w. Oddle. 42 :\ro. 210 (1808) ; City of McThersou v. Xichols, 48 Kans. 430 (1892). (iarvin v. ^V.•lls, 8 la. 2S0 (18.V.)): Lucker i\ Com., 4 Bush (Ky.) 440 (1868):. City of Winoiui I). Burke, 23 Minn. 254 (187r») ; Mooney t'. Kennett, 10 Mo. 1: m 1 L ' w 21^5 AMERICAN NOTES. [part I. 551 (1854); SJianfelter v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 483(1894); City of St. Louis V. Koche (Mo.), 31 S. W. 915 (1895); Toiter v. Waring, 09 N. Y. 250 (1877). 8o of the regulations of a canal board. Palmer v. Aldridge, 10 Barb. 130 (1852). But it is within the reasoning by which courts take judicial cognisance of laws which they are constituted to enforce that the same municipal ordinances which must bs proved before a superior court of judicature are recognised without proof by the courts of the body which passed the ordinance. State v. City of Dubuque, 11 la. 407 (1800). So though the court will take judicial cognisance of the charter of a municipality and of its power to make by-laws, the existence of any particular by-laws so made must be alleged and proved. Case V. Mayor of Mobile, 30 Ala. 538 (1857) ; Sherrel v. Murray, 49 Mo. A[)[). 233 (1892). So where, by statute, a county board was au- thorised to prescribe by order entered on its records such animals as could legally run at large, if such orders exist that fact must be alleged and proved. In the absence of such allegation and proof, cases will be determined by tiie general rules of law, unaifected by the statute. Indianapolis ike. K. Co. v. Caldwell, 9 Ind. 397 (1857). The reason of the rule is partly given in Porter /*. Waring, 09 X. Y. 250 (1877), where the ('ourt say that a contrary rule "would 0[K'n the door in many cases to mere conjecture, and involve an inquiry as to local enactnunits; tiie time when they took effect ; the priority of the same, and their application to the case in litigation; which it would be difficult to dispose of without proof and which are not properly included witliin the ordinary scope of judicial knowledge in the determination and trial of cases.'' Of course, the court, ce f/rnth, may look up the ordinance for itself, as was done in Hassard v. Municipality No. 2, 7 La. Ann. 495 (1852) ; and it has been held that where an inferior court is re- 'luired to take cognisance of local statutes, the appellate court should do the same, on hearing of the appeal. Solomon c. Hughes, 24 Kans. 211 (1880). The statutory permission to prove a by-ln'-, ordinance, &c., by a» I)rinted copy properly authenticated does not affect the rule. City of Winona v. Burke, 23 Minn. 254 (1870). Judicial Co(}nisaxck ok State Law by Federal Courts. — Not only do state courts take notice of the laws of the United States but the federal courts take cognisance of state laws. Thus, the circuit courts of the United States take judicial cognisance of the public laws of any state of the Union, when relevant to the issue, though such state is not within its immediate jurisdiction. The reason is stated by Story, J., in Owings v. Hull (9 Peters, 007, 024 (1835)) where it was held that the circuit court of the United States for Maryland was bound to take judicial cognisance of the .4"t CUAl'. II.] .1 AMERICAN NOTKS. OJIO laws of Louisiana as to the possession of a notarial instrument executed in 'Sew Orleans. "Tlie circuit courts of the United States are created by congress, not for tlie purpose of adminis- tering tlie local law of a single state alone, but to administer the laws of all the states iu the Union, in cases in which they re- spectively apply. The judicial power conferred on the general government by the constitution extends to many cases arising under the laws of the different states. . . . That jurisprudence is then, in no just sense, a foreign jurisprudence, to be proved in the courts of the United States, by the ordinary modes of jjroof by which the laws of a foreign country are to be established, but it is to be judicially taken notice of in the same manner as the laws of the United States are taken notice of by these courts." See also Elwood V. Flannigan, 104 U. S. o(j2 (1881); Merrill v. Dawson, Hemp- stead (C. Ct. of Ark.), 5()3 (1848); Ilinde v. Vattier, .5 Pet. .398 (18.U) ; Jones v. Hays, 4 McLean, oL'l (1849) ; Hanley v. Donaghue, IIG U. S. 1 (1885). The rule extends to state statutes. Merchants Nat. lik. v. McCJraw, 59 I'ed. Hep. 972 (1894). So, following the analogy of the state courts, the federal courts will judicially recognise the law of any foreign country, establishing land titles in any state once l)art of that country. U. S. v. Turner, 11 How. GU.3 (1850); Loree V. Abner, 57 Fed. Hep. 159 (189:3). In like maimer, the supreme court of the United States exer- cising an appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts of the United States takes the same judicial cognisance as to state laws tiuit the circuit courts themselves do. It is accustomed "con- stantly to take notice of and administer the jurisprudence of all the states!" Owings (•. Hull, 9 Peters, G07, G24 (1835), per Story, J. "Needing no averment or proof." Hanley v. Donaghue, 116 U. S. 1, 7 (1885) ; Carpenter r. Dexter, 8 Wall. 613 (1869). As is said in Hailey v. Donaghue (u/)l supra), "whatever was matter of law in the court appealed from is matter of law here, and whatever was matter of fact in the court ajipealed from is matter of fact here.'' "The law of any state of the Union, whether depending upon statutes, or upon judicial opinions, is a matter of which the courts of the United States are bound to take judicial notice, without plea or proof." Lamar v. Micou, 114 U. S. 218 (1885). Where the supreme court of the United States entertains a writ of error to a state court of last resort it takes the same judicial cognisance of the public laws of the state of the court said to be in error that the state court itself would take, " needing no averment or proof." Hanley v. Donaghue, 116 U. S. 1, 7 (1885). Under these circumstances of a writ of error to a state court, the supreme court of the United States has, it will be noted, a nar- rower range of judicial cognisance than when sitting on ap])eal !l •I i 211' AMEUKJAN NOTKS. [I'AUT I. from a circuit court of the United States and "does not take judicial notice of the laws of another state, not proved in tliat court and made part of the record se"*; up, unless by the local law that court takes judicial notice of it." Liverpool Steam Co. v. rhenix Insurance Co., 129 U. S. 35)7, 445 (18S8) ; Hanley v. Donaghue, 116 U. S. 1 (1885) ; Kenaud v. Abbott, 116 U. S. 277, 285 (1886). " The courts of the United States take judicial notice of the laws and judicial decisions of the several states." Cheever v, Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (1869) ; Elwood v. Flannigan, 104 U. S. 562 (1881); Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 397, (1888). But while it is the duty of these courts to take such cognisance, tiiey may by rule or otherwise compel litigants to assist them in so doing, e. g. by setting out in their briefs all statutes relied upon. Scliool Dist. V. Ins. Co., 101 U. S. 472 (1879). "Fedkkal QuKSTioN," — Wiierc in a state court the provision of the federal constitution requiring "full fai*;h and credit" to be given to the "jjublic acts, records, and judical proceedings" of another state is involved (Const. U. S. Art. IV. sec. 1, Stats. 1790, 11), the state court will take tiie same judicial cognisance of tlie laws of the state tlic validity of wliose acts is in question that it takes of its own laws. The reason on which this rule is based is succinctly stated by the supreme court of Pennsylvania in Ohio v. Hinchman, 27 I'a. St. 479 (1856). "A judgment of this court, adverse to tlie right arising out of tlie federal constitution and legislation, would be reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States, and there tlu; states of the confederacy are not regarded as foreign states, wliose laws and usages must be proved, but as domestic institutions wliose laws are to be noticed without pleading or proof. It would be a very imperfect and discordant administration for the court of original jurisdiction to adopt one rule of decision, while the court of linal resort was governed by another; and hence it follows, that in questions of this sort, we shall take notice of the local laws of a sister state in tlie same manner the supreme court of the United States would do on a writ of error to our judgment." To same effect is Vaino ;>. Schenectady Ins. Co., 11 II. I. 411 (1876). FoKKKiN Laws. — Judicial notice cannot be taken of foreign laws. As a general rule they must be alleged and proved like other facts. See jjos^ p. 52"*. The highest court of a state may be required, by statute, to take "judicial notice of tlie laws and the statutes of our sister states." Ilobbs V. Memphis & Charlestown li. Co., 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 873 (1S72V ClIAI'. II.] AMEKICAN NOTES. 2118 Notice is not taken even when the foreign law, e. g. establislied rate of interest in other states, is printed as part of the general statutes of a particular state. Insurance Co. of North Anieiica v. I'orcheinier, 86 Ala. 541 (1888). if the foreign law is made part of the record in error before the supreme court of the United States it will be considered. Green V. Van l^uskirk, 7 Wall. V^^ (1808). CooRDiNATK BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. — For reasous ana- logous to those requiring state courts to recognise the existence and composition of the national government and its international relations, all courts recognise the existence and composition of the gove iiment by which they are constituted, in its executive, legis- lative, and judicial branches. " It is certainly true that the courts will judicially recognise the public officers of the state, under wliose laws and organisation they act as the cliief executive, tlie heads of de[)artments ; judges of courts of general jurisdiction; attorneys, for tlie state, sheriffs, and we see no reason why clerks of tlie courts should not also be included." IMajor v. State, 2 Sneed (Tenn.), 11 (1854), — a case deciding that where the clerk of the circuit court in one county transmits papers to the circuit court of another county, on a charge of venue, the seal of the court is not essential to tlie authentication of the transmitting clerk, wliose signature will be judicially noticed. Courts will not require proof of the signature of the governor of their state or the date of his election and inauguration. Wells v. Jackson Iron j\Ifg. Co.. 47 N. H. 235 (18(J()) ; Dewees v. Colorado Co.. 32 Tex. 570 (1870) ; Hizer «. State, 12 Ind. 330 (1859). " The court must take judicial notice of the changes made in the executive department." Lindsey v. Atty.-Gen., 33 Miss. 508, 528 (1857). And courts will notice the accession of the df facto governor. State v, Williams, 5 Wise. 308 (18r)G) ; and his appointment of A. as a district judge. ])e la Kosa v. State, Tex. Crim. App. (1893), 21 S. W. Kep. 192; and of the public proclamations of the governor, c ij., in calling for troops. Hanson v. South Scituate, 115 Mass. 3556 (1874). So it has been held by the supreme court of Louisiana that the signatures of former Spanish governors of ti. Mr state need not be proved. Jones ■(,'. Gale's Curatrix, 4 Martin, G35 (1817). Courts "are bound judicially to know who are the sheriffs of the several (bounties." Ingram v. State, 27 Ala. 17 (185.5) ; Alexander v. Hiirnham, 18 Wise. 199 (1804); Tiiomi)Son f. Haskell, 21 111. 215 (1859) ; and their signatures. Wood ik Fitz. 10 Martin, 190 (1821). A eourt will take judicial notice of tiie civil officers of the county in wliich it holds its sittings. Thielmann ;>. IJurg, 73 111. 293 (1874) \ and so of tlie signature of the recorder. Scott v. Jackson, 12 La. Ann. 640 (18.57). So of the registers of the several counties of tiie state. Fancher o. Ue Montegre, 1 Head, 40 (1858) ; and the levee tax- ^„ % ■ .i 'i- ' m ■>. ii. 1 \ 1 1 1 :,;■; 21'" AMKHICAN NOTKS. [I'AliT 1. I i t^ If oolloctor. Tenipleton v. IVIorgaii, IG La. Ann. 438 (1862) ; Wetlien- bee V. Dunn, '6'J Cal. lOG (18(!7). "Courts are authorised and required," say tlie supreme court of Alabama, "to t;ii<e judicial notice of the v.irious commissioned officers of the state, and to know the extent of their authority, their otficial signatures, an<l their respecuive terms of oHice, — when such terms commence, and when they expire. The dates of these commissions are matters of jmblic record in the executive department of the state government, being accessible to intpiiry by all who may be concerned, and the law iixes the duration of each official term." Cary v. State, 7(5 Ala. 78 (1884); P.ennett v. State, 1 Mart. & Yerg. 133 (1827). Tlie supreme court of California holds that " the courts will take judicial notice of the officers of a county and the genuineness of their signatures ; and when the law provides for the appointment of a deputy by one of tliese officers, courts will also judicially recog- nise such deputy and the genuineness of his signature." Himmel- mann v. Hoadloy, 44 Cal. 213, 22G (1872). So the Pennsylvania courts titke jiulieial notice of aldermen as public officeu Fox V. Com., 81* Pa. St. 611 (1875). Illinois courts take cogi. "iu;e who are justices of the peace; Graham v. Anderson, 42 111. .^M (1867) ; and other civil officers, lirackett v. I'eople, 115 111. 29 (188."»), including "justices of the various courts of record of the Srate, and of their terms of office." Vahle v. lirackenseik, 145 111. 231 (1893). Probably Courts will not take cognisance of the official character of a deputy maishal. Ward v. Henry, 19 Wise. 76 (18()5). They will not recognise the official character of a deputy sheriff. State Hank r. Curran, 10 Ark. 142 (1849) ; Land V. Patteson, Minor (Ala.) 14 (1820), he not being "commissioned in the name of the state or required by statute to take any oath of office." But where a statute authorised a superintendent of .streets to ap])()int deputies, the courts of California "judicially recognise such deputy and the genuineness of liis signature." Him- nielmann v. Hoadley, 44 Cal. 213 (1872). A deputy auditor general, "being a state officer known to the law," will be judically recog- nised. People V. Johr, 22 Alich, 461 (1871). Where the terms of all justices of the peace by law expire on a certain day the court will take notice of that fact. Stubbs v. State, 53 Miss. 437 (1876). So the courts of Indiana " t.ake notice, as matter of law, that the trustee of a civil township is also trustee of the school township. Inglis r. Hughes, 61 Ind. 212 (1878). Such cognisance includes knowledge of the general elections at which such officers are voted for. State v. Minnick, 15 la. 123 (1863) ; Ellis v. Reddin, 12 Kans. 306 (1873). The reason is prob- ably that given in Davis v. Best, 2 la. 96 (1853). "The An-^nist election is established by law, and the time it is held shoidd be c:i..i'. ii.J AMEKICAN NOTKS. 2120 judicially taken notice of." See alsc Hiirnott r. Henderson, 21 Ti'X. i">.S8 (IS.W) ; Lewis v. Supervisors, 70 111. 65il87.'5). Of these re(iuirenieMt3 of jiidiciiil kiiowleiljje, tlit^ supreme eourt of Alabama say (Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. L'.'i7 'IS.S.S): "Tliiseo<,Miis- ance may often extend far beyond the actual knowledcje, or even llie memory of judges, who may therefore resort to sueli documents of reference, or other authoritative sources of information as may be at hand, and may be deemed worthy of confidence." The cimrt will not take cognisance of who are town constables. The fact is not " of pulilick notoriety." Doe v. lUackman. 1 I). (Jhipnian (Vt.) 1(19(1707). Statutory GiuxiKAiMiv. — Courts are required to take judicial notice of geographical or administrative subdivisions of the sovereignty by which they are constituted. Vanderwerker v. I'eojile, ;•) Weu'd. oSO (18;i(l) ; McDonald v. DeCairl, 1 Chan. Cham. U (ISr.O); State r. I'owers, 25 Conn. 48 (1856); State v. Wagner, 01 :\le. J7S (lS7;i); Com. v. Desmond, 103 Mass. 44;") (18()1») ; Winuipiseogee Lake Co. v. Young, 40 N. H. 420 (I860); U. S. r. lieebe, 2 Dak. 292 (1880) ; Smitha v. Flournoy's Adni., 47 Ala. :nr> (1872) ; Martin v. ^Lirtin, nl Me. 366 (1863) ; Chesajieake &> Canal Co. v. I'-altimore &c. K. 11. Co., 4 Gill & ,T. 1, 63 (18.'52)' lioston v. State. ."> Tex. Ai)p. 383; Woodward v. Chicago &c. K. 11., 21 Wise. 309 (1867). ''Courts take notice of the local divisions of the state, as into counties, cities, towns. &o., and of the relative position thereof, but not of the precise boundaries and distances. And they are not bound to take judicial notice of the local situation and distances of the different places in counties from each other." Goodwin i'. Ap])leton, 22 Me. 453 (184.S) ; Doyle v. Village of Bradford, 90 111. 416 (1878); Bo.ston r. State, T) Tex. App. 383 (1879); Gooding v. :\Iorgan, 70 111. 270(1873): Martin t-. Martin, 51 Me. 366 (186.3). But the sujjreme court of KLode Island, without citation of author! ties, hold that "the courts are bound to take cognisance of the boundaries in fact claimed by the state." State v. Dunwell, 5 R. I. 127 (18")")); and that of Iowa judicially knows that Kace Island is in the jurisdiction of the adjoining state of Illinois. Gilbert v. :\Ioline Water I'ower & :\I'f'g Co., 19 la. 319 (1865). So of the popu- lation of a county according to the United States census, if the legislature has claspif ed counties on tliis basis. Woniester Nat. r.ank r. Cheney, 94 111. 430 (1880) ; State v. Marion Co. Ct. (Mo.), 31 S. W. 23 (1895). Judicial notice is taken of population as fixed by the census. Hawkins *'. Thomas, 3 Ind. App. 399 (1891). So a territorial court is required to take cognisance of the limits and relative distances of the territory, Hoyt ?•. Russell, 107 U. S. 401 (1885). So far as the limits of county jurisdiction depend upon the construction of records, "it is purely a question of law for the court." State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 178 (1873). II I iii >( ^\. \m ; M 21« AMPMUCAX NOTES. [PAUT I. I I Wliere a statute declared certain liouses to be public, tlic (;ourl; will "recognise sucli houses to be public places." (Jrahaiu v. Williams, 27 S. W. Kep. 127 (1894), (CJriin. Ct. Appeals of Tex.). " Judicial knowledge of the location of towns is limited to suuli places as are recognised by general statutes." Field v. State (Tt^x.), 24 S. W. Kep. 407 (180.3) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Horton, UV2 fnd. 189 (1892). The public political act may be one by a former govern- ment, establishing the municipality. Payne v. Treadwell, 1(J Cal. 220 (18G0). Courts are not required to know that a place is within a particular county. Poston r. State, 5 Tex. App. ;iS3 (1879) ; Cain v. State, (Tex.) 2') S. W. Pep. 1119 (1894). Put see Gooding r. Morgan, 70 111. 275(1873); Kidder v. Plaisdell, 45 Me. 461 (1858); Com. ,>. Wheeler, 1(>2 Mass. 429 (1894). But they may do so if they see tit. " The court can take judicial notice of the lines of counties and the towns embraced in tiiem." Steinmetz r. Versailles Turnpike Co., 57 Ind. 457 (1877); Ham i>. Ham, 39 Me. 263 (185.".); State /•. Powers, 25 Conn. 48 (l.S5()) ; Smitha v. Flournoy's Adm., 47 Ala. 345 (1872); Lewis v. State, 24 S. W. (Tex.) 903 (1894); and also that it is a railroad termi- nus and has a post office. Central &c. Co. ik Gamble, 77 Ga. 5«4 (188G). Where the location of a place is referred to in public statutes the location must be recognised without proof. Solyer v. Romanet, .52 Tex. 562 (1880); Martin v. Martin, 51 Me. .'366 (1863); Peoi)le . :tting, 99 Cal. 577 ( 1893) ; Peophi v. Curley, 99 Mich. 238 (1894). So of the distance of a town from the county seat. Pruson i: Clark, 151 111. 495 (1894). See also State /•. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388 (1894). Courts of California will take cognisance that there is only one city of 100.000 popidation in the state. In re Constitutionalitv of Senate Pill 293, 39 I'ac. Kep. 522 (1895). In an Alabama case, King /'. Kent's Heirs, 29 Ala. 542 (1857), the court state that as a certain town is mentioned in the state constitution as the capitol and in otlier pvd)lio acts, they are " bound " to know tliat it is in Alabama and also that as an act of congress establishes a land office tliere and it " has long been notoriously known and recog- nised " as a land office, they " are authorised " to take notice of the same fact. In a later Alabama case, the court take the same view. " The }mblic acts apprise us that Mobile is a municipal corporation of Alabama and where it is situated." Alabama &c. Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 57 Ala. 547 (1877). See also to same effect, Houlton v. Chic. &c. K. P., S() Wise. 59 (1893). So a court will take notice of Indian reservations within their jurisdiction, and of the laws and procla- mations establishing or regulating them. U. S. v. Peebe, 2 Dak. 292 (1880). CHAT. II.] AMKItKAN NOTES. 2132 And tliat tlio Indian Territory is beyond the jurisdiction of T('x;u. Conner v. State, '2'.i Tex. App. 37S (KS87). For the same reasons, in many of the western states of the Union wiiere luditieal subdivisions, as well as the foundation of land titles, rest on government patents based on official surveys, the existence and location of the lines of such survey are among the facts of which courts are required to take cognisance, ^fossman V. Korrest, 27 Ind. 1,3.'? (1806) ; Desire y. Burleson, 35 Neb. 238 (18U2) ; Atwatcr v. Schenck, 1) Wise. 160 (1859) ; Quinn v. Cham- pagne, 38 Minn. 322 (1888) ; Wright v. Vhillips, 2 Greene (la.) 191 (1849); Gooding v. :Morgan, 70 111. 275 (1873); Gardner v. Kber- hart, 82 111. 316 (1876) ; Murphy v. Hendricks, 57 Ind. 593 (1877) ; Money v. Turnipseed, 50 Ala. 499 (1874) ; Muse v. Kichards, 70 Miss. 581 (1893). So of the relation of a certain town to a prin- cipal meridian will be noticed. O'Brien v. Krockinski, 50 111. App. 456 (1893). The United States supreme court say : " It is a matter of which this court will take judicial notice, that, by law, the country is divided into collective districts for internal revenue purposes, and in some states there are several of these districts with dofined geographical boundaries." U. S. v. Jackson, 104 U. S. 41 (1881). As to proof of these lines, as matters of public and general interest, as an exception to the rule against hearsay, see post, p. 412'. Rules of rRAcTicE. — Courts take cognisance of the rules of practice established in their own courts. " And of the times when and the places where its sessions ap- pointed by law are to be held." Kidder v. Blaisdell, 45 Me. 461 (1858) ; Lindsay v. Williams, 17 Ala. 229 (1850) ; Boss v. Austill, 2Cal. 183 (1852). " Judicial notice is taken of the number of days the court is in session at each term." Fabyan r. Ilussell, 38 N. H. 84 (1859) ; Durre v. Brown, 7 Ind. App. 127 (1893). But see Gilliland v. Sellers, 2 Oh. St. 223 (1853), contrK. "This court judicially knows that the fall term of the circuit couit of Lowndes County begins on the fourth ]\Ionday in October in each year, and may continue three weeks : and that November 5th, 1873, was a day of the second week of said term." Bodgers r. State, 50 Ala. 102 (1874). To same effect, Spencer v. Curtis, 57 Ind. 221 (1877) ; Davidson v. Peticolas, 34 Tex. 27 (1870) ; Lewis v. Wintrode, 76 Ind. 13 (1881). Courts will not take notioe of the rules established by inferior tribunals. Cutter v. Caruthers, 48 Cal. 178 (1874) ; Cherry v. Baker, 17 ]\Id. 75 (1860). Or of their adjournments. Baker v. Knott, Supreme Court of Idaho, 35 Pac. Bep. 172 (1893). Courts are required to take judicial cognisance of th'^;ir own records in a prior stage of the same case. Dawson v, DawFon, 29 ^lo. App. 521 (1888) ; Searles v. Knapp, (So. Dak.) 58 N. W. 807 (1894) ; State **» I ■ U .it m L'l-'^ AMi:i;i''AN NOTKS. [i'.m:t t. iHi i ^11 ■it r. ririch, 110 Mo. .'{.")(» (1892); State" /•. lioweii, 10 Kans. 47.'> (ISTC): rai,'t'tt r. Curtis, 1") La. Anil. 4")! (ISGO); llolh'iihacli '•. Sclinalu'l, lOl Cal. .'{12 (1S'.»4); Veil r. Lane. 41 .Ark. ").'{ (l.SS;!); Sccrist r. I'.'tty, lO'.Mll. INS (1.SS3); State /•. Schilling, 14 la. 4.m (ISC.L'); Leavitt «'. Cutler, .')7 Wise. 4(1 (187")). Kveu in a ease where the pr()cee(liii<xs against the garnishee and the principal dei'endant were " virtually a portion of the same reeord." Karrar **. Hates, iio Tex. V.y.i (ISSl) ; Kenosha Stove Co. v. Shedd, H'J la. r>U) (ISOl). 15ut courts are not rerjuired to take judicial cognisance of their own records in other cases. National Uank of Monticello r. llryant, 1.". Hush (Ky.). 4l;> (1S77) ; Grace r. I'.allou, 4 So. Dak. '.VS.', (l.S<>;5) ; McCorinick v. Ilerndon, ('►7 Wise. (i4S (18.S7). See also, /// /r San- derson, r.l Fe.l. Uop. r.O (181)2). Indeed a California case, speaking of another pending petition against the defendam in the case at bar, go so far as to say : " We ap))rehend that the court could not under any circumstances take judicial notice of tho fact, except it were for nu-re calendar purjjoses.*' Lake .Merced Water Co. *•. Cowles, .')1 Cal. 215 (ISGll). So an aflidavit in another case cannot he judicially noticed by the judge, though admissible in evidence if offered and the judge, in point of fact, personally reniombers the affidavit, llaker v. .Mygalt, 14 la. i;51 (ISr.'J). In the sanm way, a court cannot take judicial notice of the con- nection existing between two cases on its docket. Hanks v. liuriuua, (il Mo. 7(i (lS7r»). " Hut the courts of one state cannot judicially take notice of the laws and practict; of another."' Newell «•. Newton, 10 Pick. 470(18.'{0). Courts will take judicial notice who were its members at a par- ticular time and "the term fixed by law for the conimencement of its sessions." (Jilliland v. Sellers, 2 Oh. St. 22;{ (IS.".;?). .\nd courts will take notice who ,ire their officers. Central Lainl Co. &c. r. Calhoun, 1(5 W. Va. ;;('.l (1880) ; Mont joy /•. State, 78 Ind. 172 (1881; , Norvell r. Mcllenry. 1 Mich. 227 (1840) : Dyer »•. Last, Til 111. 179(1861)). And of their signatures. Hutdl v. State, 72 111. r)2;i(18«0,. Whether 'ourts are retpiircd to take official notice of the pi'i-sonni'I of inferioi courts is in dispute. " The court are bound to take notice of all public acts and laws, without d(»ubt ; but whether they munt know who are the justices or the clnef justices of inferior tribunals certainly admits of question." Hiidey r. Warren, 2 Pick. 092 (1H24). In Davis r. McKnany, loO Mass. 4r>l (IHitO) the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts declined to take judicial cognisance of the clerk of a police court, deciding that the record itself should show liis official character. On the contrary, the Kentucky court of appeals recognises who are judges of the circuit courts of that state. Kennedy v. Com., 78 Ill niAP. II.] AMKKICAN' N'OTKS. •Jl-» K V. 147 ( ISSO). So tlio Illinois court of appeals, KusspII v. Saigt-iit, 7 ill. App. *.KS (ISSO). The supreme court of l'eiiiisylvaui;i, after some review of the authorities, are " dispo.sed to take judicial notice" of the constitution of an inferior court. They treat the question as one of optional cognisance. " The rule,'' they say, " is that courts will take notice of what ought to be generally known within the limits of their jurisdiction. There seems to us to be as nuich reason for our having knowledge of who are in fact the judges of our constitutional courts, as for our having judicial knowledge of the lieads of departments, sheritt's, etc., knowledge of whom is always presumed."' Kilpatrick c. Com., 'M I'a. St. H»8 (185S); Cincinnati, &c. K. 11. V. Grames, 8 Ind. App. 1 12 (1893). Hut see County of San .foa(piin r. I'.udd, '.»C Cal. 47 (1892). Courts when reciuireil to take cognisance of facts which they do not actually know are constrained to resort to any ajjpropriate source of information. " Infornuition to guide their judgment may be obtained by resort to original documents in the public archives or to books of history or science or to any other proper source." Iloyt /'. lUissell, 117 U. S. 401 (188")); Gonzales /•. lloss, IL'O U. S. (iOo (ISSO). The Maryland courts " take judicial notice of the tribunals created by the constitution." Tucker r. State, 1 1 Md. .*{L'2 (IXof). In Louisiana, courts recognise the signature of all justices legally appointed by the governor. Despau /•. Swindler, 3 Martin, n. s. 7(»r» (IHL'5). This is in accordance with the general rule jjrevailing in that state : " We have more than once held that we would not recpiire evidence of the official capacity of functionaries commissioni'd in this state, and would take notice of tlui oftioes held by them." Kollain *•. Lefevre. ."> Kobinson, !.'{ (IH4L'). So, in that state, when court ofli- cers take a bond in pursuance of law and file the same in court, no proof is ne:'ded of the officer's signature. Wood r. Kit/., 10 Martin, llKl (IHL'l). And ,so the suiu-eme court of Alabama takes judicial notice of the resignation of a (circuit judge, though without assigning any reason for tiieir decision. Kr jxirtr Peterson, .".."> Ala. 74 ({H.-tM). The Illinois courts take judicial notice who are the justices of the peace in their respective ccninties. (Jraham r. .\nder.son, VJ 111. ."»M (lM(i7). .\lso who are the ju<lges of inferior courts. Vahle v. jiracki'iis-ik, I4."i 111. L'31 (ISO.'!); also the date of their ceasing to hold the ofJice. I'eojde »•. MeConnell. ITm 111. 1<)L' (18%). The Kings l?cneli of Lower Canada holds that courts will notice the appointment of one of their otHcers to be judge of another court. I'Xv r. Miville, 2 Uev. de Legis. 333 (IMH'.). Notice will be taken of the jurisdii'tion of an inferior court as regulated by statute. Nelson f. Ladd, 4 So. Dak. 1 (IM<)3). I ' ,1 t '1^1 :>1 HI ilF* ■::il il I 2126 AMERICAN NOTK- [part I. LA\uuA(iB. — Courts take judicial cognisance of the ordinary meaning of words in the vernacuhir. IMobably they are required su to do. Com. r. Kneehind, I'O I'iek. L'()(j, 'Jil (1838) (" blasphemy ''; ; Hill V. liacon, 43 111. 477 (1807) ; Adler v. State, 55 Ala. IG (187C.) (••malt liquor"); Shubrick u State, 2 S. C. 21 (1870) ("sow"); State If. Abbott, L'O Vt. 537 (1848) ("steer"). " We take judicial notice of the true signiHcance of all English words and jdirases, and may resort for aid to any a])i>roj)riate books of reference." Grennan v. MclJregor, 78 Cal. 258 (1H8<)). The court may decline to liear evi(U'nee ooncerning the siguiH- cance of words, the meaning of which it judicially knows ; e. y. in a Massachusetts case, on trial of a complaint for violation of tlie Sunday law by keeping open a tobacconist's store, the defendant claimed tliat he was lawfully selling "drugs and medicines," and offered evidence of experts to show that tobacco and cigars liad "a medicinal effect on the human system." The presiding justice excluded tlie evidence, and an exception to this ruling was over- ruled. "The court has judicial knowlec -e of the meaning of com- mon words, and may well rule tiuit guns and pistols are not drugs or medicines, and may exclude the opinions of witnesses who offer to testify tliat tliey are." Com. y. Marzynski, 14'.) Mass. 08 (1881)). See also Mattiiews' /•. I'ark, 159 Pa. St. 579 (1S94). The court may not only refresh its memory by reference to dic- tionaries, etc., but may permit standard authorities, e. (/,, Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, to be read to the jury for its definition of a disputed word. Adler ik State, 55 Ala. 10 (1876). The court must study out the meaning of terms ; r. ij. " Congre- gational." Atty.-(Jeii. ('. I)ul)lin, .'58 X. II. 459 (1859). Hut may re- quire aid from the parties. School Dist. «'. Ins. Co.. KM U. S. 471' (18711). And use tiie testimony of experts. Atty.-Gen. o. Dublin, iihi SHin'tt. Ill a New York ca.se, the court withoiit i)roof rendered judgment for the dollar value of a number of English •' pounds." dolinston r. Hedden, 2 Johns. Cases, 274 (1801). Wlietiier ccmrts will notice customary abbreviations is more in dispute. Apparei'.tly, tins species of knowledge is more nearly analogous to tliose wliere cognisance is optional with the court, /. <'., dependent upon tlu* knowledge or feeling of tlie jinrticuhir judge. In an .Vlabama case the ctourt say it "must judicially take notice of such ablireviations as ' Adm'r.' or acknowledge? itself incompetent to understand tlu; commonest writings." Moseley's Adm'r r. Mastin, 37 Ala. 21li (18(')]). So the usual abbreviations of jiroper names will be noticed. Stephen v. State, 11 (Ja. 225, 240 (1m52) (".las.") ; Weaver /-. McKllienor, 13 .Mo. 89 (1850) (" Christy ") ; Sparks v. Sparks, 51 Kans. 195 (1893) ("Dan"); Studsill c. State, 7 (Ja. 2, (1849) C'Thos."). CilAI'. II.] AMERICAN NOTKS. 2120 On the other hand, the supreme court of Texas was unabh' judi- ci;illv to know that " St. Louis, Mo. " meant St. Louis in tlie state of .Missouri. Ellis o. Park, 8 Tex. 205 (1«5L'); or that "N«"\v Or- leans, lia." meant Xew Orleans in the state of Louisiana. Kussell v. Martin, 15 Tex. 238 (185o). Apparently these two cases rest on an erroneous application of a jjrior ease in the same court, Andrews /•. lloxie, ") Tex. 171 (1849), where the court decide that they cannot judicially know that "The city of New Orleans," without more, means the city of that name in Louisiana. This apparently is cor- rect. Most people in the L'nited States know that there is a city of New Orleans in Louisiana. Whether there are other cities of the same name elsewhere is not, perhaps, so generally known as to dispense with proof. Slang and phrases of peculiar or local usage must be proved. Li the case of Mayor &c. of Baltimore i\ State, o(> Md. .'>"(•, 4<>8 (LSoD), where the legislature of Maryland had assumed control of the police force of Baltimore by the appointment of commissioners under a statute, providing "that no Hlack Iiejjublican or endorser or ap- prover of tlie Helper Hook "' should be appointed to any otiice under the board, tiie court say : " We cannot understand, olHcially, who are meant to be affected by the proviso, and, therefore, cannot express a judicial opinion on the question." Hut the court will take judicial notice of the phrase '"gift enter- prise" as used in a criminal statute. Lohman /•. State, 81 Ind. 15(1881). And officially notice tlui meaning of the initials C. O. I). State v. lutox. Liquors, 73 Me. L'78 (1881.'). Hut, on the contrary, the Mis- souri court of api)eals "do not know that the mejiniiig of the abbre- viation ' ('. O. 1).' as u.sed by expressmen, is sufficiently a matter of common kmiwh^dge that the circuit court could take judicial notice of it," and hold that its meaning is a question for the jury. McNichol w. I'acitie Ex|tress Co., V2 Mo. App. 401 (188L'). ("nurts will notice surveyor's initials, not jtretending " to be more ignorant than the rest of mankind." Kile r. Vellowhead, 80 111. L'08 {lS:r,). liut the courts of Minnesota refuse to take cognisance of the mean- ing of " S« X. K.* and X. W." S. K.* " Keith /•. Hayden, L'C) .Minn. 211; (1S7'.)). To the same effect. Power r. Howdle, :\ Xo. Dak. 107 (iS'.i;!). So 11 foreign language nuist be jiroved ; r.r/., in a case where defendiint was convicted of rape upon a woman named " Kurkwiski." and there was evidence that her name was written Kurkowiski, tht! court refused a motion in arrest of judgment, which was apjiroved on report to the upper court. " Tliere is no evidence tending to sliow that, though pronounced Kurkowiski, it was not l)roiierly spelled Kurkwiski. The courts of this state cannot take judicial cognisance of the proper ortiiograidiy or j)ronuneiation of ifi^i i-ir 2127 AMERICAN' NOTKS. [PAKT I. M '1 iiaincs in the I'olisli huigiuigL'."' State v. Johnson, 20 Minn. '.)]('» (1S71)). ('lucuLATiNo Mkdium, etc. — The conrt and jury will take notiep, witliout proof, of tlie legal coins made at the mint of the United States, pursuant to law and of foreign coins made curr iit, by law. U. S. v. Burns, "> McLean, !'.'{ (1841)) ; also of what is It'i^al tender. Chesapeake liank v. Swain, 29 Md. 483, 502 (18C8) ; Daily V. State, 10 Ind. ~>'oii (18.")8). Also that United States notes "are l)rima facie of a eommereial value efpial to that imputed by their face." Gady i>. State, 83 Ala. ol (1887). So courts take notice of the nature and denominations of the circulating medium. Lampton v. Haggard, 3 Monr. (Ky.) 14S) (1820) ; and that there aie " classes of notes and bills in circulation as money " other than bankbills. Hart v. State, 55 Ind. 599 (1877). That " nic^kels '' are of value need not be proved. Mallory i>. State, 62 Ga. 104 (1878). But in a case re<iuiring damages to be assessed according to the value of the bank notes of the Bank of the Com- monwealth, the court say : " We are not at liberty to take judicial notice of the value of tht> paper of the bank at any particular time." Feanster v. Ringo, 5 Monr. (Ky.) 330 (1827). To same effect, as to depreciation of Confederate money, .see Modawell v. Holmes, 40 Ala. 391 (1807). That there was depreciation will be noticed. Keppel r. K. K., Chase's Dec. 107 (1808). But the American courts will not take notice of the value of Canadian currency. Kermott V. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181 (1803). Courts recognise also, without proof, the legal standards of weights and measures prevailing in their parti(!ular jurisdictions. Courts recognise the capacity of a "pint." lieid i'. McAVhinuie, 27 Q. B. U. C. 289 (1868). Matters of Optional Cogniaance. — The rule which allows a court, in its discretion, to know, without proof, certain facts rele- vant to the issue, Ijecanse undisputed and generally known, per- forms much the same ofHce in the trial of causes, as do the rules of pleading. It relieves the administration of justice from the con- sideration of matters on which the jjarties are agreed or which they do not care to contest, and eiuibles the tribunal to devote its entire attention to the real points in dispute. In every trial of an issue of fact one or more ))roposition3 are in dispute between the parties. Involved or connc<;ted with the i)roof or disproof of these are often found relevant facts whi<'h are not disputed. Tliey are usually facts of notoriety, fre(iuently capable of licing st'ttleil, one way or the other, with slight exertion. To expe- dite business, as well as to avoid the anomaly of solemnly proving what is not really disputed, (and generally every one knows to l)e as stated), the court will usually dispense with the necessity of prov- !•; CHAP. 11.] AMERICAN NOTES. 2] 28 ing such fact and assume it to be as claimed until proof is de- manded. The court wid instruct the jury on this basis. Aijparently a party has the right to disput . such a fact, even at tlie risk of a I'-JW trial if the jury be persuaded contrary to tiio court's knowledge. Such judicial cognisance is not usually taken in respect to mattcMS in issue. "A matter which could legitimately be tiio subject of in(iuiry in a court could not well be said to be so well establislied and to have acquired such notoriety as to come within the judicial knowledge of the court." Chicago »S:c. K. K. v. Champion, JJU N. E. (Ind.) 874 (1892). As facts of judicial cognisance are usually those of notoriety, equally open to all, the jury may be assumed to know them ecpially with the court, even without the aid of an instruction from the bench. Facts ok thk Almanac. — Whether '' e facts stated in the almanac are of optional or required cognisance is not entirely clear u[)on the American authorities. The permissive form of expres- sion is usually employed, and that fact has controlled the classitica- ti(Ui. There is much, however, in the dirtiun of I'ollock, C. I?. (Tutton 0. Darke, 5 II. & N. CM (IHOO). "The almanack is part of the law of Enc;land." A reputable almanac may be introduced in evidence to sliuw the time of the rising of the moon on a certain day. Case V. IVrew, 40 Hun, N. Y. Supreme Court, 67 (188';; Mun- sliower ". State, 5") Mil. 11 (1880); the hour of sunset on a certain day, St ,0 r. Morris, 47 Conn. 171) (1871t); or the hour of sunrise, People IK Cliee Kee, 01 Cal. 404 (1882). The almanac is not used as evidence of the fact stated. It merely reminds tiic tribunal of a fact which it already is supposed to know. "Tiie almanac in such cases is used, likit tht; statute, not strictly as evidence, but for the purpose of refreshing tiie memory of tlie court and jury." State v. Morris, 47 Conn. 174 ( 187'.>). indeed, the alnuinac need not be introduced in evidence at all to l)e available to the party who relies on a fact stated in it. Counsel are entitled t. refer to such fact in argument and to cite the almanac in support of it. "However often departed from as a matter of cfjuvenience, the rule is that matters of which judiiiial notice is taken, including th(> dates in the almanac, do not recpiire to be ])ut in evidence at all." Wilson /•. Van Leer. 127 Ta. St. ."hI (1889). "The fact [time of sunrisi'] for the ))roof of wiiich t' >> almanac was offered, was one of those facts of which a court may take JMiIicial notice; formal proof of it was therefore unnecessary. It woidd have been sutKcient to have called it to the knowledge of the judge at the trial ; and if his memory was at fa\ilt or his information hot sufticMcntly full and precise to induce him to a<'t U|)on it, he liad the right to resort to an ahnanac, or any other book of reference, I! 1 \ ;i , . |, j .' i ' i it ■1 1:] il ' i n ■ i : i oyjii AMKKICAX XOTKS. [I'AUT I. for tlio pur|)Ose of siitisfyiiig himself about it; and such knowhvlge wouhl havu boon ovidonco.'' l'eu{)lo o. Cliee Koi, (il Cal, 404 In like mannor, the coincidonco of tli* days of the week with those of the month will be noticed. *• It is the duty of the court to notice tiie days of the week on \viii(di particadar days of the month fall." Philadelphia &o. K. K. v. Lehman. 06 Md. L'09, l,"J(i (ISSl) ; Wilson r. Van Leer, 1 "J? I'a. St. .'mI (ISS'J); Mcintosh /•. Lee, 57 la. .'JoC) (ISSl); IJrennan *-. Vo,!,'t, ".>7 Ala. (»47 (181)2); Ecker v. First Nat. I5k. of Windsor, ()4 .Md. L".»L' (188.")); lioeil r. Wilson, 41 N. .]. Law, lit) (1870) ; First Nat. Tank &o. r. Kingslev. 84 Me. Ill (181)1); Williams u. lirandenbert,', Ind. App. 5)7 (18'Jl')- ^loi'g^iu V. r.iirrow (.Mi.ss.), IG So. 401,' (IH'JI). For the same reason the regular procession of the seasons need not lie proved but Avill be judicially recognised. Koss v. lioswell, <)(» Iml. L'.'i.T il877); Tomlinson r. Cireentield, .'U Ark. oo7 (1870) ; I'atterson r. McCaiisland, ."i Hland (Md.) Chan. (59 (1830) ; Loeb /•. liichardKon, 74 Ala. .'511 (188.')). For example, that cotton is not planted in January. Wetzler v. Kelly, H'A Ala. 440 (1887). lUit a court cannot be required to take cognisance of a tiuctuating event, e. //. the i)articular time of ripening of any particular crop ut a partic\dar place under the vi(Mssitudes of any particular season. Dixon r. Niccolls, IV.) ill. .'572 (18(l(i). Or that each concicntric layer oF a tree denotes a year's growth. I'atterson /•. McCausland, i{ Hland (Md). Chan. (>1) (18.'{0). Or that the " pasture season " ends at " any particular day or time." (Jove e. Downer, oS) Vt. 139 (188(5). So tlie courts will take judicial luitice of the facts set forth in the almanac as to the rising oF the moon. Case /•. I'erew, 4(5 Hun, r)7 (18S7): .Munshower r. State. .V. Md. 11 (18,S0); Mobile & nirming- liaiii li. i{. V. Ladd.'.>2 .Ma. 2H7 (1890). The hour of sunset. State V. Morris, 47 C.nin. 179(1879). Sii courts may take cogni.sance of other usual manifestations of natural laws. r. ;/., tiie normal limits in height of a human being. " We know that the average height of man is less than six feet. That tlie average length of the body from the lower en<l of the •spine to the top of the hiiad is less than thirty-six imdies. That the uieasurtMuent varies but little in adults, and that the chief dilTerence in the height of men is in the h'ngth of their lower limbs." Hunter /;. N. V. .S:c. it K., 11(5 N. V. (51.-), (522 (1889). Or of the 01 iinary length of human life. Schefller *•. Minne- apolis &c. I{. !!.. 32 Minn. f.LS (1881); .lohnson /•. Hudson K. K. K. <:o.. () Dner, (;;;3. ()18 ( lS,-)7) ; Lt'ssee of .Mien r. Lyons, 2 Wash. 47") (1811) ; Floyd's Heirs /•. Johnson. 2 Littell, 109 (1822). The court may use the ".Mortalitv tables." Kansas City Ike. U. U. Co. r. I'h'illips. 98 Ala. l.V.l (1892). Mat sc I'rice c. (ionn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 Mo. App. 281 (1892j, rmitra where the court decline to tako CHAl'. II.] AMKKICAN' NOTKS. 2130 c()gnisn.nce of the value of an insurance poliey, established in this Wiiv, "(lepeniling partly on extraneous facts and partly on tiic ac- curacy (if an intricate computation." 'I'lie court will judicially noti(!e the usual limits of the period of gestation. Whitman r. State. 34 111. 300 (1870); Konan /•. Dugau, iL'i; M;iss. ITC. (1S7'.)). liisTinticAL, Kacts. — An instance of facts of optional cognisance is tound in matters of public history-. Such as the existence of the late civil war (between the United an<l Confederate States of America). Woods r. Wilder, 43 N. V. 104 (1870) ; Iron Mfg. Co. r. Caskell, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 742 (1879); Bishop r. Jones, 28 Tex. 204 (ISOC)). And of the particular acts whicdi led to it. Swinnerton r. (!olumbia Ins. Co., 37 X. V. 174 (1807). Or happened during its continuance, Cuyler r. Ferrill, '. Abb. (V. S. Circ. Ct.) 100, 178 (1807); Buford v. Tucker. 44 Ala. 80 (1870). So the courts will notice the issuance and general value and ])rogressive depreciation of the Confederate paper currency. Lum])kin i\ Murrell, 40 Tex. /»1 ( 1870), But it is error to take judicial cognisance that in a j)articular county it was hazardous to ]iersou or projierty to hold certain political views. "Tins fact onglit to have been proved, and not been thus assumed by the court as a historical fa(!t, of which the court could take judicial notice.'* Simmons r. Trund)o, W. \'a. 308 (1870). Of tlie course of trade to which the war gave rise. The Northrop, Blatch. I'r. Cases, 23."> (1802) 'I'he Peterhoff, Blatch. I'rize Cases, 40."., .".OO {180;>). The sending t.. gold to a premium. V. S. v. 4000 American Cold Coin, 1 Woolw. 217 (1808). And of the financial and social condition in which it left the Confederate States. "The general and common condition of the country and its people is a part of its history. This is presumed to be kiu)wn to courts and to everyone." Ashley's .\dm'x v. Martin, TiO Ala. 537 (1873) ; Foscue V. Lyon, o.l Ala. 440 (1870). So slavery was recognised as existing in certain states as part of th»> history of the country, .lack /•• Martin. 12 Wend. 311, 328 (18;!4). Sn tlie abolition of slavery will b(> judicially noticed. Ferdinand i>. State, ;>'.» .Via. 700 (1800). And the interdicting of eommerei;il intercourse during the pendency of hostilities. Kice r. Shook. 27 Ark. i;{7 (1S71). But notice will not be judicially taken of the ri'litive positions of the opposing armies at any i»arti(!ular period of the war. Kelley if. Storey, Heisk. 202 (1871 ). ( »r of the military ordi'is issueil by a ])articular commander. Burke r. Miltenberger, 10 Wall. ."10 (187;!). The courts of (ieorgi;. take judicial notice of "Shernian's march to the sea." and its date. Williams *•. State, 07 Ga. 200 (1881). So the ailo]itinn of the jlritish order in council (regulating lights on Vessels and the rules of navigation) by other commercial nations •\ ! H 1 11 1 t '■ ' 1 2181 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAHT I. will be noticed as a historical fact. The Scotia, 14 Wall. 171 (1H71). So judicial notice will be taken in Illinois of historical facts attending the settleiuent of Dakota. Miller v. MacVeagh, 40 111. App. 532 (1S<)1). In taking notice of Col. .J. C. Fremont's career in California in 184(5 and 1847 the United States Court of Claims say: "The court will take judicial notice of the leading and controlling events in the h.istory of the country and of the official relations of the piincipal actors therein to the governuK'nt; and, in elucidation thereof, also of loss important transactions of general and public interest imiiu'diately 'Mine' leJ therewith, when they have passed into commonly receiv n itl.'cntic history." De Celis v. U. S., 13 Ct. of Claims, 117(18,. Tiie court can take tice o" the results of the census "and resort for information to ajipro ^^ i "^e documents of reference." Peojde P. William.s, G4 Cal. 87 (1883); State v. Uraskamp, 87 la. nm (1893). So the court will take notice that in 1844 the Methodist Episco- cal church of the Uinted States was divided. Humphrey v. Burn- side, 4 Bush (Ky.), 21") (1808). To the contrary e'fcct is Sarahass v. Armstrong, 1(5 Ivans. 192 (1870). Cognisance will be take.i of county history relating to the choice of a county seat. Ivoss v. Anstill, 2 Cal. 183 (18,12). But see, to the ( ffect that notice will not be taken of the date of the organisation of a county, Triud)le v. Edwards, 84 Tex. 4U7 (181)2). "Courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety rectir to the history of the times when it was passed." U. S. v. Union Pacific K. R., 91 U. S. 79 (187")). wiiere the construction of statutes relating to the Union Pacific Itiiilroad was aided by con- sideration of the circumstances under which, the road was projected. "The history of a cotuitry, its to|K)graphy and comlition, enter into the constru(!tion of tlie laws whidi are made to govern it, and we must notice these facts judicially." Williams c. State. 04 Ind. ruhi (1878) ; Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 270 (1873) ; Ohio Life Ins. Co. IK Debolt, 10 How. 41() (18")3). So the early history of the settlement of the country may be noticed in deciding (juestions of jurisdiction as based on occupancy and acts of ownership. Key.ser v. Coe, 37 Conn. .197 (1871). Naturally, courts are especially apt to take judicial notice of the history of their own state, llenthorne v. Doe, 1 Blackf. 107 (1822); Hart r. Bodh'v, Hardin (Ky.) 98 (1807) ; Walden v. Canfield, 2 Kob. (La.) 400 (1842) ; I'aiiie r. Treadwell, !(> Cal. 220 (1800) ; Lewis v. Harris, 31 Ala. 089 (LSilS); Gonzales v. lioss, 120 U. S. 005 (1887> CIIAI". II.] A.MKKKAN NOTKS. i:l-" So of tlio buildiiijj; of the first j^rcat state railroad. Hurt v. Bait. & (). U. U.. W. \'a. .'WS (1S73). And so also of tlu! liistorical source of land titles in their particu- lar jiirisiliotion. Smith v. Sti'veiis, 82 111. r»r)4 (1S7C) • I'lDimer r. i'hiilip.s, 77 .Ma. 4L'7 (1884) ; K.-yser v. Coe, 35 Conn. r>\)7 (1871). A treaty of ccs.sion of territory from one state to another, and the cxtinijriiishnient of the Indian title in the sanic, may be judicially noticed. Howard v. Moat, 01 N. V. 2G2 (1870). So ••tlif history of the Six Nations of Indians is a part of the history of the state, of which the courts will take notice." l/iiiL Notice has been taken of the exi.sten(!e and conditions of land- grant contracts. Hatch V. Dunn, 11 Tex. 7(IS (1854). And the cession of territory by a state tt) tiie United States will be judicially recognised, probably, also, on other grounds. Lasher V. State, ."50 Tex. App. 387 (1891). So the surrender of the office of governor will l)e reiiognised. State v. Boyd, .'U Neb. 4.*ir) (181>1.'), But tlu! historical fact should not be such as "concerns iiidividu: or mere local communities." McKinnon v. Bliss, LM N. Y. 21." (18()0). So the action of one of the ])ublic officers in making military records of the nuister rolls of the state's volunteer regiments will bo noticed. "It is part of the history of the state of which ' j must take notice." Commissioners f. May. G7 Ind. r>G2 '1879). And that the state remained loyal during the American war ' the l{el)ellion. Douthitt c. Stinsou. G'.', Mo. 2(58 (1870). Or was under military nde. (rates r. Johnson Co., 'M Tex. 144 (1871) ; Killebrew V. Murphy, 3 Hei.sk. WO (1871). Though these are matters of judicial cognisance where the court, if in doubt, may resort to any desirable method of refreshing his knowledge, such historical facts have been occasionally treated as to be established by evidence, and a distinction has been taken ; — to the effect that historical facts " of general and public notoriety " may be established by " reputation " or proved by " historical works of known character and accuracy," while the work of a living author in reach of com- pulsory process can be proved by summoning the author himself. Morris v. Lessee of Harmer, 7 Bet. 5r»4 (183.'i). See also Whiton v. Albany &c. Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 24 (1871). If these historical facts are disjuited and made part of the issue between the parties, "some evidence of them must be adduced." McKinnon r. Bliss, 21 N. Y.20C (1860) ; Gregory v. Baugh, 4 Rand. (Va.) Oil (1827). Courts are justified in judicially knowing the current history of the times, — for example, the court will understand that to say of a clergyman "that Iowa Beecher business of his lost him a situation," is an imputation of adultery, "inasmuch as courts have no right to be ignorant of the meaning of current phrases wh'ch everybody ! .; I I ■\Mm Hi .It 1 1 Ui 21S3 AMEUlt^AN NOTICS. [I'AKr I. ■I . . \ else imderstiands." liailey v. Kalamazoo Tub. Co., 40 Midi. 251 (1871)). So that "sack" means a fund used for politieal corruption. Edwards v. San Jose &c. Co., '.»9 Cal. 431 (LSO^J). Courts will take eo[(nisani;e tliat private and town boundaries have "almost, if not quite uniformly, been run out according to the nuignetie meridian." Wells V. Jackson Iron Alfg. Co, 47 N. II. -.'{o {18(](>). In the same way courts may take cognisance of the state of local feeling due to recent events, (leiat v. Detroit City K'way, 91 Mich. 44G (1892). That companies of a certain class are incorporated in a certain way is said to be "a matter of public history" which the court "cannot refuse to notice." Ohio &c. Co v. Debolt, IG How. 43o. So " that there was a great complaint of tax collectors . . . specidating in warrants." Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. li7G (1873). Of the differences of christian sects, and between the King James and Douay versions of the Bible. State v. District Hoard, 70 Wise. 177 (ISUO). In Hank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 519 (1839), at page 590, the action of certain corporations is spoken of as " a matter of history which this court are bound to notice " as if the judicial cognisance were not optional. Probably this is an inadvertence, unless, as sometimes used, the constraint spoken of is a moral rather than a legal onv. (iKooKAi'HicAi, Fai;ts. — "We recollect of no decision that the courts are ex officii) to notice tiie great lakes, rivers, and mountains of the state as parts of it, and lying within its limits, but it can hardly be doubtt>d tliat the courts would notice, of course, the great geograpliical features of the state." Winnipiseogee Lake Co. V. Voung, 40 N. 11. 420 (18G0) ; State v. Thompson, 85 Me. 189 (I891i). Tiie question as to whetlier a place has been recognised by the legislature as within a certain county, presents nothing for a jury to try. It is for the court alone. State c. Wagner, Gl Me. 78 (1873). Even in the absence of express legislative recognition the (piestion is one for tiie court. " A criminal might as well call for the opinion of the jury upon the regularity of tlie judge's commission or the validity of tlie election of the governor by wiiom he was appointed. The administration of justice becomes possible only by assuming that certain things have been regularly and definitely settled, and are so to remain." State w. Wagner, Gl Me. 178 (1873). The .Michigan Supreme ('ourt say of the contention that it should not judicially notice "Lake St. Clair" in that state tliat it "is not worthy serious consideration."' People v. lirooks, 101 Mich. 98 (1894). So the supreme court of Wisconsin "take notice of the fact that the capacity of many snudl navigable streams in this state to float logs and lumber into the larger streams below and to market has been greatly increased by the erection of dams across them." ^•!IAI'. II.] AMElilCAN NOTKS. 21** 'J'ewksbuiy v. Suliulenborg, 41 Wise. 584 (1S77). Hut wIhtc tlioro are no jmis(lictiun.il faiits, e. ;/., a criuui in a vessel at sea, the question whether the spot of tl>e occurrence is within the boMiidu- ries of thn state is one for the jury. U. S. v. Jackalow, 1 Hhiek (T. S.) 484 (18G1). So of tlie boundaries of a city, and the course, &e., of a river fre- ([uently mentioned in the statutes of the state. J)eJ?aker v. So. Cal. K. K. (Cal.) .'59 I'ac. GIO (1«<)5). The position of a long established railroad is a geographical fact of which judicial cognisance is taken. Miller v. Texas &e. Ky., 83 Tex. 518 (1892). And of their termini, (lalveston, &c. K.IJ. r. .lolmson (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 428 (1895). So a court will take notice that a deponent resided more tlian thirty miles from the place of trial. Hinckley v. lieckwith, 2.'i Wise. o28 (1808). Ur more than one hundred. iMut. &c. Life Ins. Co. V. llobison, 58 Fed. llep. 723 (189o). In a late Illinois case it is said that "the court will take judicial notice of the geography of the country, and that Hatavia was oidy some two mihfs distant from the court-liouse at Geneva, where the court was held." Hruson v. Clark. 150 111.495 (1894). In Indiana, speaking of the Mississippi and its navigable tribu- taries, the court say : "The courts take judicial notice of such streams, as they form part of the geography of the countiy and their navigability is known as forming a part of the common public history." Neaderhouser v. Stite, 28 Ind. 257 (18(;7). In the case of IVyronx v. Howard, 7 IVt. 324, 341 (183.".), the court say : " We think wo are authorised judicially to noticu- the situation of New Orleans, for the j)urpose of determining whether tlie tide ebbs and flows as high up the river as that place," citing The Ajwllon, 9 Wheat. .302, .'574 (1824); V. S. r. La Vengeance, ;i Dall. 297 (1796) ; Trenier /•. Stewart, 55 Ala, 458 (1876). So, that the Mersey is a tidal river. Whitney r. Gauche, 11 La. Ann. 432 (1H5(;). In a Massachusetts case, the court say: "We think that the superior court might take judicial notice that the Connecticut liiver, above the dam at Ilolyoke, does not. eitln'r by itself or by uniting with other waters, constitute a public highway over wiiich commeree may be carried on with other states or with foreign countries, although, if the court had entertained any doubt on the sid)ject, it might havti required evidence to be produced." Com. r. King, 150 Mass. 221 (1889). So the courts of Michigan know judicially that all of the St. Cliiir Kiver is not in Michigan. (Jummings v. Stone, 1.'? Mich. 70 (I8(i4). And those of Alabama that no i)art of the Talla])oosa Hiver is in the city of Montgomery. City Council of Montgomery v. Mont- gomery &c. I'lankroad, .'U Ala. 7G (1857). \'\m 1 , 31 > l< ( 1 . II I ' I It 21 an AM Kit IC AN N()TK8. [I'AIIT r. It lias beon liappily said (1 Wliart Kvi«l. § 3.'{n) that in tliis connection tho niinntencss of tlio knowledge expected "is in inverse proportion to tiic distance." Til lilts of Alabama take notice that in a certain county all the rivers are of fresh water. Walker v. Allen, 7- Ala. 4')() (ISSI'). Hy statute the courts of California are rerpiired to take coj,'iii- sancc of the .streets of San Francisco. Uraily v. I'age, .W Cal. 't'J (l.SSl). The courts of Indiana decline to take judicial cognisance that a railroad did not extend into a particular (bounty, there heing no law on the subject. Uut such notice is taken of the geographical position of a certain station. Indianapolis &u. II. K. /'. Steiihens, I'S lud. 4'1\) (1.S67). Hut whether a particular section of a state is "arid" within the meaning of an irrigation statute is a question of fact. JMcGhee &c. Co. If. Hudson, So Tex. oS? (1S«.)3). Courts will take notice tliat the territory of a town has been incorporated into a city, but not that the plotting of lots is the .same. Ritchie i\ Catlii'i, SO Wise. KM) (ISI).".). So of the inimber of railroads centering m a particular town. Texas &c. Kd. r. Hlack. 87 Tex. 1C>0 (INDI)! (Common- I'iiockktiks ok Mattkk. — Among the facts which courts will, in their discretion, consider established witliout the iiiti'o(lu(!tioii of evideiKH' are many of the ordinary mechanical, chemical, or industrial processes, as commonly known and carried on in the community. For example, ".V court cannot refuse to take judicial cognisance that jihotography is the art producing facsimiles, or representations of objects by the action of light on a prepared surface. As such it has been .so long recogni.sed, the mechanical and chemical process employed and the scientific prin- ciples on which it is based are so generally known, that it would be vain for a court to decline cognisance of it." Luke v. Calhoun Co., .'52 Ala. 11") (lS7r»). "The process [[ihotograjdiy] has become one in general use, so common that we cannot refuse to take judicial cognisanc(! of it as a proper means of producing correct likenesses." Uddeizook v. Com., 7(5 I'a. St. 340 (1S74). "We do not fail to notice, and we may notice judicially, thui all civilised communities rely upon photograjihic pictures for taking and pre- senting resemblances of persons anci animals, of scenery and all natural objects, of buildings and otlier artificial objects." Cowley r. People, S3 N. Y. 464 (1SS1); see also Cozzens v. Higgins, 1 Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. 4r.l (ISGC). So the nature and operation of elevated railroads may be judicially noticed. Bookman v. N. Y. Elevated K. It. Co., 137 N. Y. 302 (1893). Among matters of common knowledge in the natural world of which courts require no proof is the freezing of substances in a CllAl". 11.] AMEUIOAK N()Ti:S. 21-w cliaiiiiHT, till) atniosplipre of wliicli is not in contact with the fncz- iiij,' i'orut', and ii patciit for a devioe imii bodying that j)iiiiciiih' is void, tiiim,i,'ii tlic (li'ftMicc is not irlied on in the pleadings. JWown v. J'iper, 91 U. S. ;;7 (l^TC). So of llie nomnion hahit of coniprcssiiij,', for "the convpniciipo of tradi'," several iiackagcs of various conuiiodilifs, wool, fcatliiTs. plug tol)a(!i-o, etc., into a si'iglc parcel. King r. ( Jallun, It)'.) V . S. 1)'.) (IMh;*). jiiit the supreme court of Indiana refuse to take notice of the action of a freight car under certain conditions. " The natural laws of wliicli courts tak.' judicial notice are such as are of uniform occurrence and invariable in their action." Chicago, &c. 1{. IJ. v, Cliami.ion. :51,' N. K. Kep. H74 (IS'.)li). So the fact that the valiu! of unimproved fleeces is deiireciated by the undue (luauiity of hair on the belly, flanks, etc. of the animals. '• is common knowledge, taught by all text-books on sheep, and within tiie judicial cognisance of the courts." Lyon c. .Marine, iV) Fed. Jtep. 1)<;4 (I.S'.)3). .Mis( I'.i.i.ANKoi s .Mattkks. — It is natural that many facts of which courts are at times and in their discretion content to take j\iili- cial cognisance do mit admit of precise tdassilication. Indeed, many of thi'Mi depend rather upon the jiersonal views of the individual judge tlian upon any nu)re deHnife rule. Facts which are so generally known that every well-inf(U'med ])ersou knows them or ought to know them, need not be |)roved, ami will lie judicially recognised without proof. In a ca.se where the supp'me court of Alabama take notice; of the '• Anu-rican Table of -Mortality " as a basis for the calculation of annuities dependent on the probability of human life, it is said : " This cognisance uuiy extend far beyond the actual knowledge or even the nu'uiory of jiulgcs, who may therefore resort to such documents of reference or other authori- tative .sources of information as may be at hand and nuiy be deemed worthy of confidence. The rule has been held in many instances to embrace information derived informally by inquiry from experts." (iordon (>. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 1.*;3l; {\HH3). The fact that the great inland transportation of the country is largtdy done by connecting lines, each forwarding goods for a continuous carriage, m;iy be jiuli- cially noted. McDoiuild r. Western K. ).., 34 N. V. 497 (IhV.O) ; r.urlington, &c. ll'way Co. c. Dey, 8L' la. A2 (1891). So the ten- dency of objects to frighten horses '• is '- rtof the (common kiu)wle(lge j)ossessetl by all intelligent i)ersons of mature years." Clevelaml, &c. U. \{. V. ^Vynal.^ 114 Ind. .^2") (1SH7). The usual di. ition of a voyage across the Atlantic is " part of the experience and cummon knowledge of tlie day and as such are legiti- mate grounds for the judgment of the court." Oppenheim v. Vi olf, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) Ciian. 571 (184G). So of the rapidity of travel made possible by modern inventions. Hipes v. Cochrau, 13 Ind. 175 I t ^m m 0-|fl7 AMKKICAN NOTK8. [I'AIST (1M."»{)). And the custom of tlirougli olioeking passengers' liuggagc Isiuicson V. N. V. On. !{., 94 N. Y. :,'7H (ln«4). Ha tlie (!uint will take notice that cigars are not "drugs and medicines." "Ordinarily whether a substance or artich' comes within a given description is a question of fact, but some facts are so obvious and familiar that the law takes notice of them and receives thi'iM into 'ts own domain. . . . Cigars are mainifaetured articles familiar to everylMxly." Com. r. Mar/.ynski, 149 Mass. (W (1«H'.(). So the court " must take judicial notice of the nature and (piali- ties of toliaeco.' Application of Jacobs, 9« N. V. DM, ll.'J (iMHo). Tiie peeidiar nature nH lotteries and the method in which they are carried on will be judicially noticed. Salomon r. State, I'M Ala. M.» (iHoC). Courts will notice the variation.* of the magnetic nu'ridian. Hryan V. Heckley. i\ Litt. (Ky.) 91, 95 (18(19). No |)riiof is needed that an assault with a loaded ])istol aiul a h<ie IS an assault with a deadly weap(»u. •• A hoe, both in ]in;iular and legal signilication, is /*»■/• sr a deadly weapon, — lully as much so us a loaded ]iistnl or an axe." Hamilton /'. People, 1 1;{ 111. ."{4 ( iHS.'i). In White o. I'hu'iiix Ins. Co.. M.'J .Me. L'7'.t (ISUl) the court in takiu;; cognisaiu'e that vui'ating the premises increast-d tlie risk, declared tli:it expt-rt eviden-.-e to prove it •' was incompetent and uinieeessary," Kvidence is not needed that coal oil is inllamri.ible. "(Jourts do not .eipiire proof that lire will burn, or powder explode, or gas illn- minat •, or that many other processes in nature and art pntibm- certain known <'tftetH." State c. Il.iyes, 7S Mo. .'ttt? (I««.'i). Hut t'.i' supreme court of N'ermont, in construing an insurance policy, ViVi r.'fused to take judicial notice that "gin" and "turpeii- liuf" are " intlammable liipuds." Mosley /•. Ins. Co., o'l Vt. 111? {\SH-J). In the sanui whv, speaking of a statute forbidditig the mainifac- ture ot' oleomai'gannc and butlerine. the supreme court (d' Micliig.in say : " We are not called upon or qualilied by any knowledge which Wf possess to determine the merits itr delects of the well-known substances which this statute was intended to -^iippress." N'orth- wesle-.i Ml'u'. Co. r. Chandlers. oS Midi ."Hi ( lSM.1). The siipreiiii art of .Mabama, after laying down the rule as to what nuitters ;ire of what is "sometimes called juilieial knowledge, frerpieiitly. coiimiou know ledge," as that "all men know tliem :nid iherel'ore they n 1 nut lie jiroved," go on to .^ay thiit the rule lor measuring corn in the shock does not fall within the delinition. South \' N. Ml. l:. i;. Co. e. Wood. 71 Ala. 449 (iHM.'l). '{'he su- preme eoiiii ol .Missouri has refused to tiike notice of t!ie ilanger of I'ontagioii from Texas cattle. Uradl'onl r. Kloyd. .S(l Mo. 1,'(I7 (ImH.'I). The sam lurt later reversed this decision and cite with appr(»val tlie language of .fudge Harlan, in delivering the opinion of the CHAl'. II.] AMKHICAN NOTKS. 21« siipreiiif court of the Uiiitod States in .Minnesota r. Harber, 130 U. S. .Sl.'i (IXKU), ona similar tinestion : — "If a fact, alloged to exist, and upon which the ri>,'hts of [)artit'S dei)end, is within comiuou experienif and knowledge, it is one of which the courts will take judicial notice." Grimes >: Kddy, (Mo.), L'8 S. W. TAG (18<»4). It has Ix'en held in .Michi^;an that the fact tiiat an eni))ty box car in the limits of the highway will not frighten ordinary horses is among the " thiups which do not recjuire to be pleaded or to be made ^*ie subject of specitic proof," and that it is error to leave the ques- tion to the jury, (iilbert v. Flint, &e. K. K., 51 Mich. 4S.S (18S.'?). So ■ the court, from its general knowledge, can judicially say that whiskey is an intoxicating licjuor ; and the jury might so find ii|i(in their geiu'ral knowledge." Schlicht v. State, 5(5 Ind. 17o (IH77). (juoting with approval the language of Carmon v. State. 18 In.l. 4r»() tlSGL') followed in Kgan v. State, r.3 Ala. IGl' (187(i). In Krese v. State, 'J',l Fla. UG7 (1887), to the same effect, t!ie question is treated as a matter regarding the meaning of words, and the dictionary is relied on. Where the licjuor has l)een elassitied in a statute as "spirituous," it will be so recognised. Keid r, MeWhin- nie, '27 i). U. V. C. 1'8'» (1MJ8). So of other di.stilled litpiors. ".lurors are not to be presumed ignorant of what everybody el.sc knows Now every one who knows what gin is, knows not t)idy that it is a li(pior, but also that it is intoxicating. And it migiit as well have been oltjected that the jury could not find that gin was a liipnu', without evidence that it was not a solid substance, as that they could not find that it was intoxicating without testi- nioiiy t.i show it to be so." (!oni. i». I'eekham, 2 (Jray, Td I (I8r»|). Tlie courts of Indiana take cognisance tiiat brandy is intoxica- ting and that " the addition to the term ' brandy ' of the word ' black- berry ' docs no more than designate it as a particidar kind of brandy." Kenton /•. State, 100 Ind. r)!»8 (18S.1). So that " apple bratuly" is intoxicating "is a matter of common knowledgi' of whicli the court will take judicial luitioe." Thomas r. Com., "JO Va. UL' (ts'.i;;). On the other hand, "beer." being a generic term covering a wide range of licpiiils of ditTerent alcoholic e<»mposilion. is not judicially known to Itc intoxicating. It is necessary t. prove in any individual c;isf tlial tlif lii'cr was intoxicating or that it was of a kind judi- cially known to lie intoxicating. IMot/ e. Kohrbai'h, IIG N. Y. 4:.0(1,S,S!(); Klare r. State. i;{ Ind. 18.'! (!87;{) Miit s.'.' Nevin r. I.adiic. ;; Denio. I.'!; (1810) ; |5rilhtt /•. Stati-, T.S Wise. ;!«.» (IS8:t), loiilrn. "It seems to be well settled tiiat the word 'beer' in its ordinary sense (h'liotes a beverage whieji is intoxicating." Maier f. State. 'J Tex. ("iv. App. !.".•(•. (18<»;!); V. ^ r. Dncourneau, Al Fed. Ilcp. 1;{8(|8'.M). And the court will take eognis.ince tliat lager beer is a malt liquor. " The government miglit almost as well In- M '\ ! 1 - ; I i'SSi m« I ,-. !l 0^30 AMKiaCAN NOTKS. [taut r. n'(|uir('(l to prove tl>at gin or whiskey or bnindy is ii strong; li(|M»)r ;i.s to prove tliat lager beer is a malt licpior." State r. (ioyettc, II It. I. riOli (1.S77). And intoxicating. State /•. Clinreli (So. l);ik.), (10 X. W. li;; ( lHi)4). Hut see Kau v. People, iV.i N. \. L'77 (1S7A); Tinker c. State, 1)0 Ala. (;47 (1«!»0). Of " riee beer " tlie Georgia suiirenio court aay : " Some beverages, such as whiskey, brandy, &e., are in such common and notorious use as intoxicants that un l)roof is rerpiisite to stamp tliem with tiiis (diaraetiM-. I'lUt rice beer is comparatively a rare li(pior. Whether it will pniduce intox- ication or not ought to be proved." r.ell r. State, 01 (Ja. 1.'L'7 (1801.'). Courts in Imliana refuse to tak»^ notice that a fence sidlicient to restrain sheep will restrain liogs. Enders v. McDonald, ;"> Ind. \\>\>. 207 (ISOL'). That business men refer t(» "American Lloyds,"' "The (ireen I'louk," and the >• IJecord Hook," for tlie standing of ships will lie judi(!ially re(;ognised. Slaeovicli r. Oriental Mut. Ins. Co., lOS N. V. r)<5 (IHHS). ".Ml persons are supposed to know the curiosity of eiiildren and their disposition to play around and .dtoiit ol)jects of uimsual apptiarance." .Spengler v. Williams, (17 .Miss. 1 (ISSO). (iKNKKAi. CoNsioKKATioNS. — Sucli actiou Oil the part (d' the court in dispensing witli proof is (tptional. Proof may be; reipiired bv tlie JMilge even if the fact is not disputed by a party litigant; and he may decline to know the fact until it is proved, to his satis- facition or that of the jury. On the othi'r liaml, if he pnd'ers, the judge may satisfy hims<df of the truth of a fact by resorting to any source of information he inaychooso; «. ;/. by n'sorting to public doeumeuts not introduced in evidence. IT. S. »>. Teschmaker. J'J How. WJ, l().~) (IM.V.I); Hrown i\ i'iper, 01 V. S. 37 (1S7."'>); Whiton v. Albany etc. Ins. Co., 100 Mass. L'l (I.S7I). In so doing, he is satisfying his own mini! or conscience. IF(> is not limited to evidence which would l)e competent, if objected to, before a jury. .\ mnvspaper may be as usefid as an exem|ililicatinii under the great seal (d" state; *!.;/., in S(dielHer n. Minneapolis i'<:e. K. K., :i'2 .Minn. .")1« (IHHl), mortality tables of recogidsed staml- ing wer<! received as bearing on tlm "expectation ui' life" of a person killed by a loccmiotive. T(» the same effect, •Johnson /•. Hudson II. K. K. Co., (J Diier, (YM\, 01« (lHr)7). So a history of the Southern ('oiifcderacy, "The Lo.st (laiise," may be resorted to for dates and Rvonts. Swiiinerton v. Columbian Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. 171 (IHCu). The court may rcipiire the aid of the parties. School Dist. o. Ins. Co., 101 V. S. 471; (1870). "Nor does the fact that the information thus sought by the judge has been laid before him in tln^ jiresence of the jury without any (listiiK^t ruling that it was designotl for tho court alono, give a party m CHAI'. II.] AMKUICAN NOTKS. 2140 the riijlit to insist tliat tlio jury shall pass upon it." Stair r. Wa-ii.T, CI Mt!. 17S (isr;;); Mobile Sic. IL K. v. Luiiil, UL' Ala. L'ST (ISDO). r.ut a court is not at libi'rty, any nioro than u jury is, to supply evidence of facts in issue from its |)ersonal kno\vle(l^,'e where such fac'ts arc not part of the coninion stock of inforniation of the cum- nmnity, — as that plaintitFs lawyer had ceased Ui practise. Day /•. I)e Course. 12 Low. Can. Jur. L'Ci") (ISOS). 'i'lius where thc^ fact is relevant, that A. is a resident of another state must be proved, thou^di it is a fact known to individual nieiubers of the court. Whecder /•. Websti-r. 1 K. D. Smith (N. Y.) 1 (lS"i(l); Hrown (.'. I'iper, '.M V. S. .37 (1S7('»). So it is error for a court to refer a oast! on insju-etion because under the pleading's it apparently involved a number of items. This is matter for evidence. Cassidy /•. M(!Karlaml, 1;W .N. \. 201 (IS'.K!). lint see Secrist /•. Petty, KH) 111. 1S8 (lS,s;{), wlien' tlioro aro apparently dlrta to the elTect that a judge may supply facts not generally known, from his own knowleilgo. So courts will not take notice of tin; newspajiers pidtlished in any particular county. Atkeson r. Lay, H") .Mo. o.'JH (IS'.KJ). Speaking of the general tiMidentjy to extend the range of ()|>tional judicial cognisanco to nn-et the growth of art, science, and general knowledge, the Alal)ama suprenn- court say : "There is a pruilent liuiitatioM to be put upon this princi|ile so as to confine it t.i nuitters of a general and public; nature m- such as do not concern individuals or local e<imnuinities. The facts nnist be of such i'gc or duration as to have U'conic established as part of the common knowledge of w»dl-informi'd jx-rsona, at least." (Jeorgia^ic. K. K. /•. (iainus, 88 Ala. ;;77 (ISW); Morris e. Kdward.s, I Ohio, ISi) (IHL'3). 4 I ! ■^ TRIAL BY JUKVj LIOSS TltUbTEU NOW THAN FORMKRLY. [p. CIIAI'TER III. HOW m KSTIOVS OF VMrr TRIKI) — Kl'NfniONS OK JITOOR IN JHRV TRIALS. § '21a. Tkiai. by jury niay, at least in a nidimpiitary form, ho trat'Pfl l)iick to llu' tinios of our Saxon ancestors. In 1H4() tlio c'T.'ution of niotli'rn County ConrtH atFortlcMl suitors an opportunity of in futuro determining for tKcmselvo.^ whether their disputes ehould be settled by a single judge, or by tlio unanimous venlicit of five jurors. They by an overwh* Iming majorit}' j>ronotinr>;i in favour of the judge.' In the High Court also the tendeney of litigants tiow is to dispen.se with the services of a jury. The respective merits and demerits of Trial by Jury will be found impartially disciifsed in the Second Report of the Common Law Commissioners in JH.M}.' S21h. The prov'sions now in force in the High Court (Onler XXXVI. rr. '2 — 7a) are too long to set out at length here. They are disc-ussed in detnil in most of the Hooks on I 'met ice.' Their general (^Ifect * is that in actions <tf slander, libel, false imprison- ment, malicious |>roseeutioi., seduction, ur breach of proujise of murriage, a trial with a jury nwiy be hml by a party,' if, when he is a plaintiff, in his notice of trial, or if, when he is a defendant, ho, by notice given by him, witl' > four days !'• :. the time of tho flervico of notice of trial, or within (;uch extoiib'-i 'imo as tho court or a judge may allow, signify his desire to have the issues of foct tried by a judge witl. a jury, upnn which the same hliall be so tried; but that in all other can's trial without a jury is the normal nioile (tf trial, and a jury can only be had by special order oblaiued ' In the rminty (\>\nt Tectum ' Si-tt, <"'/., tli<> Aniiiml rincfico fer til" yciir Is'lit," ]iulilishiMl Nov., fi»r ISIM. i)p. (is.l et m<'(|, A li«t of 1S!I(, tlie followiiit; lijran's ii|i|i(>iir : — ruiifrf, uikI inattiTH uHHi^'iii«| nxclii- " .\i tioiiM lii'ti'i'iiiini'il witli II jury, HJvely to tlii> ( 'liunn'ry Ifivixioii in l.i:t0; witl'oiit u JMiy, (i77,17l." contuiiiccl in ;tti \ .17 V. c. 00, § .11. TIk' lulililioiiul cost of II jury in, iu * 'riiiiHou c. Wilson, INHH (liiiui- rl'- roiinty CdiirtM. only it. loy, L.J.). » I'j). 3 tl. 22 Cih :r'. TKIAL HY JUKY IN CUIMINAL AND CIVIL CASJiS. uii(l.>r (). XXXVl. rr. •'{,' 6,» or Tii.^ The oJl'o t of this Order has li Til that tlie number of lauwH tried in the Ui^li Court of Justice without a jury are chjsoly aiiiiroiuhing the ni. ibor of thtwe whicli are tried with a jury.* S :.Mc. In divorce onuses, by a nde ninths in July, IHSO,' tliouf,di tho ruh's fii-Ht cited are inapjilicabh'/' the action is lu'ard, if (hmmgcs bo not chiimi'd, before the court without a jury, but if »hiina}j;('8 are chiinied, a connnon jury is as of course summoned. Ju cither case any juirty may ajijily by summons for a direction that the cause he tried iu a different nuinner, or by a special jury.' Trials in the Admiralty l)ivisi<)n of the Ilij^h Coiut are almost invariably without a jury. There is, however, power ((). XXX VI. r. M) to summon a jury, though it is said never to have bueu exercised since the Jndicatim* Acts.** S 21 1). In criminal eases an acoused, either by indictm? nt or information, l»as still the right to bo tried "per legale judicium parium suorum." In eivil causes, however, the ease is widely diil'creut. S 'J','. lionl Hardwicko has observed that it is of the greatest importance to the law of Knglan<l, and to the subject, tluit the powers of the judge and jury be kept distinct." IJut important as tiiis umlouhtedly is, it is, oven at the prctient day, not very perfectly effected. The general j)rinciple, that the judgt» must determine the law, and the jury the fm-t, is not, and cannot be disputed ; '" but in the application of this principle, cmbarrasuing ' lliviiijj power to order u trial by jury ia f'imiicfrv uctiniis. * Wliitli itriM'iveK till' ri|;lit V, liiivi', on ii|>|ilii':itiiiii witliiii ten iIuvh iiftiT notii'i' of trial, ii!i order fn.' n tiiiil )>y jury in all )iiiri>ly roini lou law actions, Ji-nkinNC. itusliev, INDI (i.in.ll.v. I..J ;. ■" Uiviii^' i^eneral jiownr to a judKe to order trial Ity jury at any lime. ' 'riui judicial HtatiMti( s lor 1M1''J (|iulilMli('d NovenilM-r, \HW] hI'.ow (p. !•) tliut then- Wfre tried in tliut year, in the runmion daw and <"him- • '•rv Iiivi«ionK toy;iitlii'r, HOH iietioiiH Willi juries, and TO^I without jiirius. ' iliilua iu l)iv, uiid Mat. Cuiiikm, r. Jli.V • Ord. LXVIII. r. 1. ' .S>c) Oakley's Divoroti rructico, p. 111. • See WilliaiiiM and MriK-e, Admi- ralty i'lattici'. MU. • Si'i' reniark:4 fn the alMivo off' 't jM'r l,d. I 'airtiH, in Mi'ir.ipiditan l;y. r. .lailiHon, 1»<"7, lited powt, nolo to § ;t:.v. '" 111 U. f. The Keiinof St. A«iil>h, ITH.'i, I.d. Manslli'ld ilri'lared, "that the fiindaini'iil.il ililiiiitinn of trial ")y jury deprndi'd ii])oi! llie univerMal ina.tiin, ud c|uiestioii«in juli^ uoii ro- hpo. ideal juraton-M; ad i|i!ii'Htioiii'iii fiioti noil reM|iondi'nt jiidicnM"; itnd luldcid " W'licfo A (|ueHtioii can l»o provetl liy the t'ona o( {lUiuding, tho 2;j RESl'l-XTIVK DUTIES OF JUDGE AND JUKY. [PAUT I. questions not unfrequeutly arise, from the exp<'rioncc(l difTioulty of defining with clearness the obscure and shifting boundaries of law aud fact. distinction in proRor\-o<l upon the face of tho roconl, luul tlio jury ciinnot vDcroiirh tiiion tlu; jtiristlictiDii 4)f thu court; whun, by thn form of i>l('ii(l. inp. tho two ({iicHtioiiH urn hlciKl'Ml topt'thrr, uiirl riinnot bo HcouiiitfHl \ip<iii tln' fact) of till) rcconl, tlio dis- tiiictioii is pri'Hovwl by tho lioiuwty of tho jury. TIk' constitution trusts that, undfT tho (lircM'tion of a jiidp-, thov will not usiir|; a .iurimiiition wluch iM not in tl^ir jtrovinco. 'J'hoy do not know, and uro not prosuniud to know, tho law : they aro not sworn to di'rido th't law; they am not ro- (lulrod to dc'ido tho law. . . . It is tna duty of tho judgo, in all caaos of goncrul jubtifo, to toll thr jury how to do ri>;ht, thou^fh thoy havo it in thrir pim er to do wronj^, which is a inattor entirely Initwoon Uod and thi'ir own cuiisciciiccM." :',\ linw. ."^t. Tr. Kl.l!), 10 Mt. Mr. I[arj,'rav.>, in a noto to 1 Co. I/itt. l-'job, which is an olaliorato chs,./ on this subject, 8tat4-s th:lt " the i-Murdiittf and ilirfct Tit;\\t of dccidiiif» i,;ion ()Ui'stion8 of law is intrusted to the jiidires; that inn jury it is u^ly inriilinlitl ; that in the exercise of iliis incidental ri^ht, the hitter aro not onl; pliiceil under tho fiuperintondonco of tho fonnor, but are in some de^rtio ('<)ntrollit!)!o by them; and, therefnrc, that in all piiititsof liiw arisiuK on atrial, juries ou>;ht to show the most ri'spectful deference U> the advico iiiel recom- niendatiop of judges." ill .\;i< lint. Ml, ,lustico .^tiiry has s:ii(( : "Tho learned ( oiuiHel lor tlv piisoner con- tends thrt in I'lintinal cases, and OHjM«<'irtlly ill !!a]iital cases, the jury are the jlldfjes of tlu) la\» , as well IIS of the fact. My oiiii 'on is, that tho jury are im nioro (Uiltn's of the law HI a capital or r.M. -.'i- cii;iiinal ca.<o, upon the ph.;; i' not y^e ,;_,-^ than thoy are in ■ voiy ' Ivi! <'<,r triod ujion tho pui'T'l isi^ii''. Ji! •ch of those cases, tb.eir venliot, wl 'ti . <ie- ral, is nocessarilv coiiipo';, licdet i:iw and of fact, ami inclik''< < i'lith ii: each, they ?IH.Ntneee--,-;:,rily il(.t..i'ihini' tho law, as wuU fui tlio fa ;t. In uuob. 24 they havo tho physical power to dis- ropird thu law, as laid (town to them by tho court. But 1 deny that, in any case, civil or crinnnal, thoy have tho moral ri^ht to decide tho law according to their own notions or pluasuro. On tho contrary, I hold it tho most bacriil constitutional rif^ht of every party accused of a crime, that tho jury shotild respond as f<> tho facts, and tho cmirt ii": to tno law. It is tho duty id tho cou; t to inHtrint tho jury as to the law; and it is the duty of tho jurv to fcdlow tho law, as it is laiil dow-n by the court. This is tho ri>;ht of evory citizen, and it is his orily i)rotection. If the jury wore at liberty to settle tho law for them- sidves, tno ort'oct would bo, not only that tho law itsidf would bo most uncertain, from the dittcrent views which dilTi'ient juries niiKlit take of if, but in case of error, theie would bo no remedy or redress by tho injured jxuty; for the (uiiirt would not liav'< iMiy rif;ht to review till' law, as it had bi'en settled by the jury. Indeed, it would Im* alnmsl niipracticable t' ascertain what the law. as settled iiy tho jury, actually was. On the contrary, if the iiourt should on in laying' down tho law to the jury, tl.ere is an adei|iiiite remedy for the iujure<l iiialv by a molimi for a new trial, or a writ of error, as the nature of the jmisdiution of the par- ticular loiiit noiy rtHjiiiro. l'',very perMin acciisi'd as a criminal has » rifjhi to h- livod acordiiij; to tho }n\v of the land, the (ixml law of the land; and not by the Ihnv as a jury may nndi'istand it, or choose, from wantonness, or ignorance, oi ucci- deutai mistake, to interpret it. If I thoufi^ht that a jury were the pro|M'r judp's of the liiw in criminal luisos, I shouli' holit it my duty to abstain from the rcr^ponsibility of stntinp the lav;' to them ■,i]H)n any such trial. Hut believinjr, as I do that every citi/.en has .i rii,'ht to Is- tried by (ho la«', and accorilin)r to the law, that it IS hi^ luivili'^je and truest shield agiiinst oppi-uttsiuu auU wruni;,— I CUAP. III.J DUTIKS OF JUDGE. § 23. The duty of a judge i)rosiding at a trial by jury is four- Idld : — First, he must docido all questions res[»eoting tlie ndmissi- bility of evidence ; secondly, he must instruct the jury in the rules of law, by which the evidence, when admitted, is to be weighed ; thirdly, he must determine, as a legal ({uestion, whether there be liny evidence fit to be submitted to the jury for their consideration ; and lastly, he must explain and enforce those general principles of law that are applicable to the iM)iut at issue.' § 23a. First, then, speaking generally, all questions as to tlie ii(/ininsiliilifi/ of evidence are for the judge. It frequently happens that this depends on a disputed fact, in which case all the evidence adduced both to prove and disprf)ve that fact must bo received by the judge, and — however complicated the facts or conilioting the evidence- — must be adjudicated on by him alutu} For example, the judge alone must decide a question of wliether a confession should be excluded on account of some previous threat or promise, and to do this has to determine, first, whether the threat or promise was really miido; and, secondly, whether, if made, it was ^uffi(Jient in law to warrant the e.xelusion of the evidence •* if a dying decla- ration bo tendered, the judge alone decides whether it has been satisfactorily proved that the deceased believi'd, when he made it, that he was on the jnunt of death;* where the receipt in evidence of a deposition depends on the inability of the deponent to attend the trial, whether the sickness of the witness, or other special cause disabling him from attendance, has b»H3n satisfactorily proved;*' whetlier the declarant in a question of pedigree has been Uw\ it my <Uity to stuio ray view* fully mill 'ipoiily on the prcKi-nt mvu- Nioii." r. S. r. Hiittintc, In:».') (.Xtii.). Sill fuitliiT, OH this iiiti'it^Htiiif; siili- jcct, 2 W'vimii'H Kiiiioiinm; ItiislifU'rt ciiHc, ItiTo; l''ruii<'klin'H cuuo, l".'!l ; uixl H. r. \V Itall, I'lTO. ' Aiiioii); tlic (MwiHtionK ])r<)i>oiuiilctl l»y till' liiOi I'luiiiiini'iil to tlm juilp"* of that country in lli-ll, wuh omo, " whi'thiT till' jinlf^c or jurorn oii^ht to l>i> jtiilf^cuf till' niiitti'iM of fuct," to which the jniJjfcK rcplii'il, that, " ulthiiii^'h flic jiiroi'M lie the Mulii Hnlp'M of niiitti-r of fuit. yet the judp'H of the court lire juil(feH oi the ihdidity of the evidence, »ud uf tht ninttrrii of law arim'iiii out of tho mtme, wherein the jury oiijiht to lie ^fiiidtMl by Iheni." "J NiiIhoii's ( oil. of Stato I'liji. .JTi). M'i, Lonil. Kis.j. ' .\s to this HOC I'linton r. Williums, IMI, citeij iiifrii, n. ♦ to j '.'8. » Hiiillett -■. Smith. 1H«;{. * Se 1 Stiiik. r. :>-S.i, II. /).. 1816. ' ."Ni I'i'Milveil hy nil the jud^iH, in two niHen fit>'il liy I'liike, H,, in HiUtlett ii. Smith, isJU; imil in ono (!UHO citoil hy iiil. MllenlHiioti){h, in li. C. 11UC|(H, INK). ThcHU 1.IUMIM virtuiilly oveirule It. ,■, Woodcmik, 1"n7, where Kvre. C.H., loft tho qucHtion to the jury. • D, of Uottufort V. Cruwshtty, I«tJ«. 3{( iiHi! 'if ii DUTIKS OF JUUQE. [part I. proved to be a deconscJ iiuinbtT i>f tho family — and this evou though tho rohitionhhip of the dodarant haiipuns to bo the very queHtion at issue in tlie cause ;' anJ whether or not an attesting witness, of wlioso signature proof is olTerod, has absented liinisclf from the trial by collusion with the opposite party.' In like luanncr tho judg«» alone decides ujjou tlui adtuissibility of the evidence where the questiiu is whether a document has been didy exefuted or stanij)ed ;■* or whether it comes from the right custody;* or whether sulhcient search has been made for it to admit secondary evidence of its contents;' or whether notice to produce it has been drdy served ;" or wlu^tlier, in ^he event of its being i)roducod under notice, it be tlie origiiuil paper required;' or whether it is pro- tectctl 08 being a confidential communioaticm ;* or whether a witness objected to on the ground of unripeness or imbecility of i?und is competent to give evidence. § 24. Again, where evidence is offered of acts done in places other than the jdace in dispute, it is for the judge to decide, in tho first iii.stance, whetlier there is such a \inity of (;haractor in these different localities as to render evidence affecting tho one admis- sible with reference to the other, llo also has to pronounc^e whether acts relied on as such amount to evidence of ownership," or whether witnesses have ])rovcd a general usage in trade'" or a custom (as the case may be). 'J'he general rule is, that where evidence is by law udmissiltle for the detoimiiiation of the jxiiiit raised, the judge is bound to lay it before thf jury; but that llm (piestion whethci the evidence / admissible or not, is for the judge alone. S 24a. Whenever the rule just indicated applies, however, the credibility and weight of the oviilenco ufter it has been admitteil are entirely for the jury, who nuiy consider all tho circin.istaiKses of the case, including those already j)rovod before the judge, and give ' Dim- I'. llllvit'H, 1NI7. Seo Ilit- chiiiH r. I'.iinlli'V, IHTI. •' J'Vaii .'. I,iirkia, 1S42 (I»iiuly, ('.ll.)(lr.). » IJ.iitlctt V. Siaitli, lK^:l; DiuiH- Bon, It.). • fliiivoy I'. Mitili<ll, 1811 (I'lirk.t, li.). ' l-'ioilil.) r. llohlw, 1M.»{) (UyloH, J.); Iliiylo I'. Wiwe'iiaii, iH'to : ovi-r- fonl r. CuilcwiM, lN,")i» (Hill, J.). ruliii(x .J..nt>s c. l''i.rt, IH'JS. ,Sff .-^tiiwn ('. liiifriH r, INTO, 'li'iivti I'. iluui'H, iNiVJ. Sm), ulao, IH:{<i ll|i. ..f M.'iillir. .M.oi Wiii.ll.'Htor, It. r. IliU, \H,[ |)o.j V. Jvi'diii'', ims il.d itl'lllltUll) J.). i)itii I. Ki'iiip, 1h;U (Booanqi <^ iiurlltitt V. Suiitb, IHC) (Aldur- '" Luwis r. ALuithull, 1U14. CHAP. Ill •1 l>ITTirX OF JlTnOR. jiui li ovidenof) only tlie crodit which, upon the wliole, thoy think it (l«H<'ive«.' Tho judge ujondy dt'oides whotlier thoro is, primd f'arir, any roosou for proHonting it ut all to the jury ; and his decision on this point, if erroneous, may be reviewed by tho court abovn.' S '2-'). Scciindly,^ it is tho duty of the judge to point out to the jury any rule of law, which either renders evidence on any par- tjculiir point unncoeBsary, or which gives any particular species of evidence peculiar weight, or which defines how a certain fact must be proved. Thus, he should distinctly explain the nature of any jircsuniptions, which may apply to the point ut issue, distinguishing such as are conclusive from those which are liable to be r(!butted by counter evidence ; and again, dividing this latter class into those p'osumptions upon which the jury are bound to act, in the absence of (ionflicting testimony, and th<»He upon which it is merely exp<'tlient, or allowable, to rely. Again, if by common or statute law any document, when proved, Ixicomes conclusive evidence of the facts it states, the judge must point out to the jury that the existence of sui-h facts cannot be disputed or denied, and that the only (jucstion for their deliberation is, whether or not the document b(» duly proved. If, too, the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness be insidlicient by law to establish guilt (as, for instance, in charges of treason or jterjury), the judge must ac(piaint the jury with the nature and extent of this rule. Eve|i where a c(»nvictir)n founded upon such testimony a» the jury have before them would b(? strictly legal (as in th(« case of an a(!oomplice becoming witness for the Crown), the jtidge would not projterly dis<'harge his duty uiile.ss lie warned the jury against placing implicit reliance upon stutenu'uts coming from siieh a suspicious ([uurter. (ireat caution and tact are, however, necessary on the part of the judge if lie thinks it right (as he nuiy do) to tell the jury his opinion respecting matters of fact, since this may arouse the jealous feelings of a jury, and ex(ite them, in their anxiety to prove their ind(*pen- dcnce, to pronoimce an unjust vta'dict.' II i hi t iM ' Wi'll.fciiil I'. Levy, ISUl (I'lirko, * " I-'ew thiiifftt iiirito mo moro to J.); |)i)or. Idivifs, IHI7 (lid. Den- r((|)fl a doitrirui thiia iiitoli runt niiiii) ! Uoss c. (Innld, IH'JN. utliMii|it^ to forco it on my undfr- ' Cli'iivo I'. .)oii(<M, IH.VJ (Martin, Ntandinj?." Si«i> I)r, Cliannint^'H !».). WnrkK. Vol. III. p. :n!». L.I. • Soo Hupra. % 'li. liuo<iQ, in liis udvico to Iluttoa, J.. 27 DUTIES OF JUDGE. [part I. § 25a. Thinlly ;' the jiulgo must, at the close of each case, det('r- mine whether any evidence hiis been given on which the jury cnn properly find the question for the party on wliom the onus of proof lies; and if no such evidence exists, he ought to withdraw the question from the consideration of the jury, and direct, either a non-suit to be entered if the onus be on the [tlaintiif, or a verdict to be found if the onus bo on tliu defendant.' It is not always easy to act ui)on this somewhat vaguo rule which (hardly less vaguely) is somotimcs said to be that a judge should withdraw the case from the jury, unless there be rainondh/o evidence on which rcdHoiKiltk men could reanoiuib/i/ or fairly find a verdict.' But a judge will not often go astray if in every ilouhtful case he takes the opinion of the jury, and leaves the question, as to how far ho was justified in thus acting, to be decided thereafter by the court. And, whenever there is conflicting evidence on a question of fa(!t, he »(««/ leave the consideration of it for the decision of the jury, whatever his own opinion may bo respecting its weight.* § 26. Lastly;* the judge must o.xplain to the jury what principles of law are aj)plicablo to the point in issue. To do this correctly, he must distinguish qtiestions of law from questions of faiit, wliich is, in ordinary oases, no very diflicult task. For instance, on a charge of larceny, he lays down, as a general i-'^oosition of law, that all persons who take and remove the personal chattels of another without such other's consent, and with a felonious intent, are guilty of the crime charged ; and then, atx'ording to the cir- cumstances of the case, he e.xplains, with more or less particularity, what constitutes a taking, removing, «tc. These, obviously, are (questions of law, and together form the major prcuiiss of the syllogism. The jury decide whether it is proved that the goods Hiiys, "You Hhonld bo a light to juioiH t() ojKsn their oycH, but not n fiftii(Ut to Icail them by their iiohch." Hue. WorkH, Vol. Vll. p. '271, oil. Moiitugu. ' Seo Hiipra, § 'l'>\. » Ihdcr V. Woiiibwell. 1808; up- iirovod of anil lulopted in Metroi). Ity. Co, V. Jackson, LsTT; and lu I )'ubl. W. & W. lly. Co. V. Slattory, 1H7S (lid. UatUorloy and Ld. Ulaek- liuru). 28 » Sofl Dublin, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Slattery, 1H78 (l.d. Coleridf,'o). On the kindred (]iieHtion as to Hotting; aside verdicts which thero was no BUtlicient evidoncn to sujiport, soe Webster v. Friedeburf,', lH8(i; Solo- mon I'. Hitton, 18HI. « Dublin. W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Slattery, 1878, 11. L. Soe, also, Mctroj). Ry. (^o. v, Jackson, 1877; ]>oHt, § 37, n. *. * Seo supra, § 23. CHAP. III. J DUTIh> OF JUDUI-^ luivo l)OPn taken and romovod in snch a mannnr, and with such an intent, as the judge has jii<vliiii.-.ly iuslruiled thuiu will unioiinl to liirceny. Tliese are i|iie8tions of fact, and togetljer form the minor premiss. Lastly eonieH tho conclusion of guilt or innoeenee, whiuh may either ho drawn hy tho jury apidying to tlie facts which f/it'i/ tind tho rules of law as inter{)ret<nl hy the judgo; or hy their liiiding the facts spceinlly (hut not tho ttirrr vridvnrr on whi li tho facts aro founded'), and leaving tho court to apply tho law to suoh facts, and pronounce tho final decisifm. Simple, howover, as this process appc;irs to ho, the lino hetwecu 1 iw and fact has, in u certain class of cases, heon very indistinctly drawn, and in those, tlH»r<.'fore, the respective duties of tho judgo and jury are not clearly defined. For instance, if tho question ho whether a certain party had ]in)hahle cause for doing an act, or whether ho has done an act within a rcasonahle time, or with due diligence, it may he ditiicult to say whether the definition of what constitutes prohable (iause, rcfisouahlo time, or duo diligence, ho for the judgo or the jury, and specious arguments are not wanting in favojir of the claims of either i>arty. In truth, tho expressions jtist mentioned consti- tute neither matters of fact, nor matters of law, exclusively, hut are rather matters of quality or opinion, which aro generally termed "mixed cases." They form, in logical phrase, tho middle term, and aro alikt* common to both the premisses, which aro respectively intrusted to the judge and jury, and upon which tho ultimate decision must proceed.' § 27. It is, liowever, necessary to see how far this subject is governed hy actual decisions which have taken place on it, and aa to wliother the questions arising in particular oases ore to be re- garded as matters of law or of fact. S 2!^. First: A question of prohnhk cause must, it is now clearly established, — albeit the wisdom of tho rule has been stoutly dis- puted,* — be decided exclusively by tho judge, and tho jury can only be permitted to find whether the facts alleged in support of the presence or absence of probability, and the inferences to be ' Hul)l)iinl V. Johnstone, 1810 • Soo, on this diflicult subject, 13 (Wo(mI, K.); niirwoo«l t-. 0(x)(lright, Law Mug. 33—74; 1 St. Kv. 512— 1774 (Lil. Munsfiold); Mirea v. Sole- b'l{\. buy, 1(J7». » liistori'.Porivmiin. 1870, H. L. ; Hicks v. Fuulkuur, 1881. 29 j II 1 1 IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) h A *%° ^.. A 2t 7a 1.0 I.I 1.25 1^ lUii 2.0 ■ 4} M IIIII16 v. V ^% >:5 Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. MS 80 (716) $73-4503 / o L ^ % 4u m PROBABLE CAUSE. [PAKT r. drawn therefrom, really exist.^ Thus, in an action for a malicious prosecution, the jury, if the evidence on the subject be conflicting, may be asked whether or not the defendant, at the time when he prosecuted, Jmew of the existence of those circumstances which tend to show probable cause, or believed that they amounted to the ofFence which he charged ; and if they negative either of these facts, the judge will decide as a point of law that the defendant had no probable cause for instituting the prosecution.'^ The rule of law as to the respective functions of a judge and of a jury in such cases is based on the assumption that judges are more com- petent than juries to determine the question how far it may have been proper for a person to have instituted a prosecution.' It is equally binding, however numerous and complicated the facts and inferences may be.^ Indeed, it would be impracticable to lay down any hard-and-fast rule as to what cases are " complicated." Besides, it would be inconsistent to hold that a rule, applicable to a simple case, should not equally apply where the facts were com- plicated.' Any difficulty in the application of the rule is, more- over, more apparent than real, for it rarely happens but that some leading facts exist in each case, which present a broad distinction to the view, witliout having recourse to the less important circum- stances.^ The judge has a right to act upon all the uncontradicted t ■ ■ '-A ^ i -, i k. ' Micholl V. Williiuns, 1843 ; Pan- ton v. Williams, 1841 ; llailes v. Marks, 18(51 ; Sutton v. Johnstone, 1787; Miti'hc'U v, Jenkins, 1833; Ilinton V. lioathor, 1845 (Aldorson, B.) ; West v. Baxoudalo, 1850. On tliis subject see. generally, Abratli v. North Eastern R. C (188(i). » Turner v. Ambler, 1847. The absence, however, of belief must be proved by the jilaintilt', and cannot bo iKfcrrtMl from the mere fact that the detendant had made nse of the charge for an unfair jjurjiose : id. See, also. Broad v. Ham, 18;i}(; Ilad- drick V. lleslop, 1848 ; Hcslop v. Chapmun, 1853. 3 Fraser v. Hill, 1853 (Ld. Cran- worth). ♦ In Panton v. Williams. 1841, Tindal, C.J., observes, "Wo take the broad qimstion between the parties to be this : whether, in a case in which the question of reasonable or probable cause depends, not upon a few simple facts, but upon facts which are numerous and complicated, and upon inferences to be drawn therefrom, it is the duty o: the judge to inform the jury, that if they find the facts pi'oved. and the inferences to bo wail anted by such facts, the same do or do not amount to reason- able or probable cause, so as thereby to leave the ([uestion of fact to the jin-y, and the abstract question of law to the judge. And wo are all of opinion that it is the duty of the judge so to do." See Rowlands v, Samuel, 1850 ; Douglas v. Corbett, 185(). » l'ant(m v. Williams, 1841 (Tindal, r.J.), pronouuciug judgmeut of the Ex. ("h. » Id, 30 CHAP. III.] REASONABLE BELIKF. facts, and it is only where some doubt is thrown upon the credi- bility of the witnesses, or where some contradiction occurs, or some inference is attempted to be drawn from some former fact not dis- tinctly sworn to, that he is called upon to submit any question to the jury.' § 29. Although, as to ^^ prohahle cause" the question is for the judge, yet, on the other hand, as to the reafionahlene-sH of the belief or suspicion, upon which a party acts in causing an arrest or in detaining goods, is a question for the jury to decide.'^ Thus, if a magistrate, sued for false imprisonment, rely, under not guilty by statute, upon want of notice of action or the like, the question whether he believed, with some colour of reason, and bomi fide, that he was acting in pursuance of his lawful authority, so as to entitle him to the protection of the statute, is, in strictness, one for the jury to determine, if the plaintiff desire their opinion to be taken on the evidence.^ But if, as commonly happens, these questions be first submitted to the judge on an application for a nonsuit, and the plaintiff does not then desire them to be left to the jury, the plaintiff will be bound by the decision of the jii<l2:e, if the court think it warranted by the evidence.* § 30. The question of reasonable time is a more difficult one. Upon some subjects, indeed, of frequent recurrence, the courts, for the sake of commercial convenience, have laid down precise rules as to what constitutes this. In these cases the duty of the jury is dearly confined to the simple tosk of ascertaining whether the facts proved fall within the rules or not. !5 ;30a. For example, reasonable time for notice of dishonour of a bill of exchange means,^ — according as the parties live in the same or in different places, — either that the letter containing notice should be so posted that in the due course of delivery it would arrive on the day following that on which the writer has received intelligence of dishonour ; '' or that su h letter should be ' Michell y. WilUams, 1843(Aldor- soii, 15.). » Wedge )•. Bt-rkoloy, 1838; Annott V. Osborne, l.S4() (Ir.); Ila/.eldino v. Grove, 1844 ; Ilughos v, Buckland, 1846. * Iltizoldinn v. Giovo, 1844, supra. * Iliizcldiiie V. Orovp, 1844; Abcatli V. North Eastern Ry. Co., 1880, supra. 81 See post, § ;5S. » See, now, 43 & 40 V. c. 61 (" The Bills of ExchanKO Act, lhN2 "), § 4!», sub-8. 12, which codifies the law as stated in tlie text. See as to j)re- vious law, 18(i0, Hirschfield y. Smith, 1.S41 (Erie, O.J.). « Stocken »'. Collin. 1841 ; Smith V. Mullett, 180'J (Ed. EUenboroiigh); ■m I < . I ,1 i If 'I I I REASONABLE TIME [part I. posted before the departure of the mail on the day following the receipt of intelligence ; * or if there be either no post on that day,* or only one starting at an unreasonable hour in the morning,'' tlien on the next day (thus giving the writer an additional day). If a bill be presented through a banker, one day more is allowed for giving notice of dishonour than if it were presented by the party himself.'' The holder of a bill has in general but one day to give notice to all the parties against whom he intends to enforce his remedy, though each of the indorsers in turn has his day,'' and the holder may avail himself of a notice duly given by any other party to the bill.® And the holder of a cheque, or of a bill or note payable on demand, must, in general, present the instrument for payment on or before the day following that on which it was received ; ' though in these cases the term " reasonable time " may sometimes receive a different construction, regard being had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade, and the particular facts.* . § 31. Generally, the rule as to the time thus allowed applies not only as between the parties to a cheque,** but as between banker and customer with regard to its presentation, unless, in- deed, circumstances exist from which a contract or duty on the part of the banker to present earlier, or later, can be inferred. '*• It, however, does not apply to claims by the holder of a cheque against the drawer, unless during the delay the fund has been lost, as, e.g., by the banker's failure." AVhen, however, the rule is applicable, it matters not, so far as the liability of the Hilton V. Faii'cloiigh, 1811 (Law- ronce, J.) ; Rowo v. Tipper, ltiJ3 (Maule, J.). ' Williains v. Smith, 1819. See Sholton V. Uraithwaito, 1841. 2 Geill V. Jeremy, 1827 (Lord Ten- terdon). ' Iluwkos V. Salter, 1830 ; Bray v. Hadwon, 1816 ; Wright v. ShawcrosB, 1819. ♦ Alexander v. Burchfield, 1845 (Tindal, C.J.); Haynes v, Birks, 1804; Scott V. Litti.rd, 1808; Lang- dale V. Trimmer, 1812. See 45 & 46 V. c. Gl, §4!>. s"^'8. 13. ' Rowe V. Tipper, 1853 ; Dobree v, Eaatwood, 1827. See, however, Glad- wrll V. Tumor. 1869. ° r'hai>miiri v. Keane, 1835 ; Rowe V. Tipper, 1853 (Jervis, C".J.). ' Ricktord v. Ridge, 1810; Bod- diiigton i;. Schlencker, 1833; Moule V. Brown, 1838. See Bailey v. Boden- ham, 1864. " 45 & 46 V. c. 61, §§ 45, suoa. 2 ; 74, snbs. 2; and 86, subs. '2. » See Hopkins v. Ware, 1869. '» Hare v. llunty, 1861. See Pri- deaux v. Griddle, 1869. " Robinson v. Hawksford, 1846; Serle v. Nortou, 1841 (Ld. Abiusj-or) ; LawH V. Rand, 1857. In these caHos no time Ionh than six yeai'8 is deumed unreasonable. 32 CHAP. II\.] REASONABLE HOURS. drawer is concerned, whether the presentation for payment he made hy the party himself or hy liis banker. Thus, when an uncrossed cheque, given on the 10th of March, was paid into payee's hankers' on the 11th, and presented by them on the 12th, but the bankers on whom it was drawn had stojiped payment early that morning, the payee failed to recover the amount of the cheque from the drawer, because the presentment for payment had not been made within a reasonable time, and the bankers at the time of their failure had sufficient funds of the drawer's to pay the cheque. • Had the payee in this case stipulated that his bankers' names should be crossed upon the cheque, or had the drawer discounted his cheque in the country, the result would have been otherwise, for the drawer then would have been taken as agreeing that presentment should be made through a banker, and the steps actually taken were in conformity with this course.^ § 32. With regard to the time for the presentation of instru- nunts for payment, it has been held that, as a general rule, an instrument payable at a banker's must be presented within banking hours ; ^ and one payable elsewhere, at any time when the drawer may be expected to be found at his place of residence or business, though it be as late es eight or nine o'clock in the evening.* If, however, a banker appoint a person to attend at the olHce after banking hours for the purpose of returning an answer to a presentment, and such person does return an ansAver before midnight, no objection can be taken to the unreasonableness of the hour when the i)re8entment was made ;' and the same rule would seem to prevail if a bill be pernoiiallij prenenied to the acceptor before twelve o'clock at night on the day that it falls due.^ § 32a. With regard to a reasonable hour for a demand or tender of rent on the lami, the common law is that it must, in order to create or avoid a forfeiture, be made before sunset, this being a rule of convenience adopted to prevent the necessity of one party waiting for the other till midnight. But if the tenant actually ' Alexanders. Burchfield, 1842. » Id. (Tindal, C.J.). See 4.) & 46 V. c. <)1, §§ 76—82; and Iloywood v. I'ickeiiii}!;, 1874. » Puikor V. Gordon, 1808 ; Elford V. Teed, 1813. T —VOL. I. 33 * Wilkins v. Jadis, 1831 ; Jamo- 8on V. Swinton, 1810, Barclay v. Bailey, 1810 (Ld. Ellonboroufjh). * darnett v. Woodcock, 18 17. * See Startup v. Macdonald (1841). (Parke, B.). n ■I I ; I 1 1 .1 i 1 . 1 REASONABLK HOURS. [_PART I. meet the lessor, either on or off the land, at ani/ time of the last day of payment, and tender the rent, it will be sufficient, provided there was time before midnight to receive and count the money tendered.^ § 33. The law as to what is a reasonable hour for the delivery of goods has been much discussed.^ Where a jury found by special verdict that certain oil, which the defendant had agreed to purchase of the plaintiffs, was tendered to the defendant (who must consequently, it is clear, have been then at his place of business) at half-past eight in the evening of the last day allowed for delivery ; that there was full time for the plaintiffs to have delivered, and for the de- fendant to have examined, weighed, and received the whole before f 3xt (a Sunday) morning ; but that the time of tendering was unreasonably late, the Exchequer Chamber held (reversing th') Common Pleas, and Lord Denman dissentiente), that the plaint i if was entitled to recover. Alderson, B.,' thus laid down the general rule : — " Wherever, in oases not governed by peculiar customs of trade, the parties oblige themselves to the performance of duties within a certain number of days, they have until the last minute of the last day to perform their obligation. The only qualification that I am aware of to this rule is, that in acts requiring time in order that they may be completely performed, the party must, at all events, tender to do the act at such period before the end of the last day, as, if the tender be accepted, will leave him sufficient tims to complete his performance before the end of that day. In tho case of a mercantile contract, however, the opposite party is nut bound tv:> wait for such tender of performance beyond the usual hours of mercantile business, or at any other than the usual place at which the contract ought to be performed. The party, there- fore, who does no*" make his teader at that usual place, or during those usual hours, runs a great risk of not being able to make it at all. In this case the plaintiffs have had the good fortuae to meet with the defendant, and to make a tender to him in sufficient time. And I think, under these circumstances, that the defendant was > Startup V. Macdonald, 1841 (Pat- teson, J. ; Aldorson, B. ; I'aike, B,), reversoJ bv Kx. Ch. in 184.'<. ' Espocially ia Startup v. Mac- donald, siipiu. * In Startup v. Macdonald, 1841. 34 CHAP. III.] REASONABLE NOTICE TO QUIT. bound to accept the goods, and is liable in damages for not accept- ing them."' § 34. The law is, again, well settled as to what is a reasonable time to allow in giving a notice to quit. A reasonable notice to quit a yearly tenancy has for centuries, in legal construction, meant a six calendar months' notice,^ terminating at the expiration of the current year :^ referring, when the tenant holds different portions of the premises from different days, to the day of entry on the substantial subject of the holding.* The Agricultural Holdings (England) Act, 1883, provides that if a holding be either agricul- tural or pastoral, or both, or be wholly or in part cultivated as a market garden,* a year's notice, "expiring with a year of tenancy," shall be necessary on every tenancy whether created before or after the commencement of that Act, unless the landlord and tenant shall have agreed in uriting that this enactment shall not appl}', in which case a six months' notice shall continue to be sufficient." A mortgagor occupying by arrangement with mortgagee, is entitled not only to compensation, but to six months' notice.' § 34a. So, again, a reasonable notice to terminate service is, by ' See to same effect judgment of Patteson, J., id. ; and also the lumi- nous judgment of Parke, B., id. * That is, from one quarter day to the next but one following. The exact number of months or days does not signify. Notice on 26th March to quit on 20th September, insuffi- cient. Notice on 28th September to quit on 2oth March, sufficient. Mor- gan V. Davios, 1878. * Doe V. Spence, ] 803 (Ld. Ellen- borough). It has for the last thirty years been held in the County Courts that a week's notice to qait is neces- sary, but sufficient, to terminate a W""kly touancy. Such also is the Irish law. Sue Harvoy v. Cope- land, 1892. Tlicro appears to bo no ex])rcss decisions on the point, however, in the English Su])erior Coiu'ts. See, and compare, Jones v. Mills, 1801 ; liuffell v. Armitstead, 1830 (Parke, B.); and Towno v. Campbell, 1847. If the hiring be monthly, a month's notice, and if it be quarterly, a quarter's notice, will apparently bo necessary. Towne v, Campbell, 1847 (Coltman, J.). See also Kemp r. Derrott, 1814 (Ld. Ellenboroiigh) ; Right d. Flower v. Darby, 1786 (Ld. Mansfield); Bridges V. Potts, 1804. * Doe V. Snowdon, 1709; Doe w. Spence, 1805 ; Doe v. Watkuis, 1800 ; Doe V. Rhodes, 1848. In this last case the question raised, but not de- cided, was whether, where a tenant held a farm from year to year, — the land from 2 Feb., the house from 1 May, — a notice to quit the whole, given half a year before 2 Feb., was sufficient to entitle the landlord to recover tho whole in ejectment, on a demise dated 3 Feb. The in- clination of Ld. Al)inger's opinion appears to have been towards the affirmative. 40 & 47 V. c. 61, § o4. See also 39 & 40 V. c. 63, Ir., as to the corre- sponding law of Ireland. « 40 & 47 V. c. 61, § 33. See also §41. ' 53 & 54 V. 0. 67, § 2. 'Ml I I 35 1)2 ill i: RKASONAUI.K TIMi:. Lpart I. law, in the casra of domestio servants, — whioh term has heen held to include huntsmen,^ snd head gardeners,^ — a calondar month's warning.' This rule is inapplicable to farm servants,* clerks, travellers, governesses,' housekeepers in large hotels,® and the like. § 34b. So, the reasonable period during which a member of Par- liament is entitled to freedom from arrest on civil process has, for at least two hundred years, been fixed by law at forty days before and after each session, the rule being the same in the ease of a dis- solution as in that of a prorogation.^ § 35. Again, the reasonable time for which a party charged with an indictdhle offence may, in England or Ireland, be remanded is limited by statute to eight clear days, where the accused is re- manded by warrant, or, in England, to three clear days, where he is remanded by verbal order.* This rule does not apply where justices have power to deal smnmarih/ with a case which is also indicitable. In such a case the remand may, by express enact- ment," be to " the next practicable sitting " of the Petty ^'^essions Court, though this may be more than eight days off. If, in any case not expressly provided for, the question arise whether a party has been remanded for a reasonable time, the statutory rule would doubtless be considered by the court as furnishing some guide. But, meanwhile, the jury woull, no doubt, be called upon (as in the case of probable cause) to ascertain the existence of the facts, and to leave the court to determine, upon those facts, whether the time was reasonable or not.'" On three occa- sions, indeed — two in England," and the other in Ireland '^ — the entire question appears to have been submitted to the jury. But the latter'' of the two English cases rested upon the authority of ' NiioU V. Greaves, 1804. » Nowlan v. Ablett, 18:55. * Nowlan v. Ablett, 1 835 ; Fawcett V. Cash, 1834. * Lilloy V. Elwin, 1848. » Todd V. Keirick, 1852. See post, §177. • Lawler v. Linden, 1876 (Ir.). ' Goudy V, Buncombe, 1847 ; In re Ani^lo- French Co-operativo Soc, 18S0; Ro Armstrong, Exp. Lindsay, 1892. • 11 & 12 V. 0. 42 ("The Indict- able Offences Act, 1848"), § 21. See. as to the Irish law, 14 & 15 V. o. 93, § 14, Ir. » 42 & 43 V. 0. 49, § 24, subs. 2. '" Davis u. Capper, 1829. " Davis V. Capper, 1829 (Gaselee, J.) ; Cave v Mountain, 1840 (Li. Abinger). " Gillman v. Connor, 1840 (Ir.). " Cavo V. Mountain, 1840(Tindal, O.J.). Moreover, Ld. Abinger, who tried the cause, was, "under all the circumstances, satis^ed with the ver- 36 CHAP. III.] REASONABLE TIME. the former, and in the former no ohjection was taken at Nisi Prius to the suraming-iip of the judge, though its correctness was questioned on a subsequent motion in Banc, and at the second trial the course suggested above was distinctly adopted.* § 35a. Finally, the questions whether an arrest has been counter- manded within a reasonable time,^ or whether an executor has had reasonable time to remove the goods from the testator's mansion,' are in each case for the judge § 36. While there are fixed rules of law as to what is a reasonable time for certain matters, the question appears to be, with respect to some others, governed by no precise rules, and to be purely a matter for a jury to determine. Thus it is for a jury to say whether a crop has been left on the ground for a reasonable time, so as to enable the tithe-owner to compare the tithe net out with the remainder of the produce ; ^ whether a copy of a rate has been delivered by an overseer to an inhabitant within such reasonable time as to satisfy the Act,^ which requires it to be given " forthwith " upon demand and tender of payment;^ whether the vendor of railway shares has offered to transfer them within a reasonable time ; * whether the owner of cattle, which have strayed on land through defect of the proprietor's fences, has removed them within a reasonable time;^ whether goods purchased by sample have been rejected,'" or goods taken by distress have been sold," within a reasonable time ; whether a foreign or inland bill of exchange payable at or after sight has been presented ;'^ whether a blank stamped accept- dict," 80 that the propriety of his leaving the question to the jury coukl not practically bo questioned in the coiu't abo'.'o. 1 Davis y. Capier, 1829. * Scheibel !'. I'aiibaiin, 1799, where Ilea*^^ J., hold that a counter- mand ought to be made in the course of the day on which the debt was received. » Co. Lit. § 69, and p. 66 b. * In an action agaiast ?. sheriff lor escajjo under the old. law, which is now no longer maintainable (30 & 51 V. c. 00 ("The Sheriffs Act, 1887"), § 16; and 40 & 41 V. e. 49, § 43, Ir.) the question whether his officer had or had not been guilty of unreasDUable delay in taking the party arrested to prisoji was likewise one for the judge: Ueuton v. Sutton, 1797 (Heath, J.). * Facey ;■. llurdom, 1824. « 17 G. 2, c. 3 ("The Poor Rata Act, 1743"), §2. ' T-nnant v. Hell, 1846. « Stewart v. Cauty, 1841. • Goodwyn v. Cheveley, 1869. »« Tarker v. Palmer, 1821. " Pitt (;. Shew, 1821. '* Muilnmn v. D'Eguino, 1795 ; Fryt'. Hill, 1817. See, ante, § 30, ad fin. In det(nmining this ques- tion, the jury should bo directed to take into consideration the intercstt not only of the drawer, but of the 37 iH» ^'i i Hi iMIII m^ ' !'-^ ' ' ■ l"'-'' REASONABLE .SKILL — DUE DILIGENCE, ETC. [PAKT I. ance has been filled \ip by the holder ;' whether a voyage insured lias been commenced or prosecuted," or whether costs have been taxed, within such time.' The last-named questions, indeed, turn upon the ordinary course of business or trade, and are, consequently, matters with which the jury are peculiarly aciiuainted. § 37. Having now considered how questions of "reasonable time " are to be dealt with, when they are solely for the decision of the judge, and when thoy must be left to the jury, we next must consider how questions of reasonable skill o' care^ due dili- gence, and f/ross ney/iyenee are to be dealt with. § 37a. Now questions of the description just mentioned must, in the great majority of instances, be solely determined by the jury.'' The judges can rarely have materials which will enable them to decide such questions by rules of law. Thus, in actions against a surgeon for negligence in the treatment of patients,* against gratuitous bailees for grose carelessness in losing property intrusted to them,^ and in like cases, even when the jury have found a verdict in opposition to the opinion of the presiding judge, holder also. Ramchurn MiiUick v, Luckmecchund Radiikissen, 1.Sj4 ; Mellish V. Ruwdon. 18;i2. Soo Chart. More. Bk. of India, &o. v. Dickson, 1871 ; and Van Dieman's Land Bk. V. Victoria Bk., 1871. ' Temple v. PuUen, 1853. The question of reasoiu.blo time doos not arise when the bill is in the hands of a bo7id fide indorsee for value without notice. Montague v. Per- kins, 1853. ^ Mount V. Larkins, 1831 ; Phil- lips V. Irving, 1844, •where it was said that " no certain or fixed time could lie said to ho a reasonable or unreasonable time for seeking a cargo in a foreign ])ort ; but that the time allo'wed must vary with the varying circumstances, which may rcnider it more or loss difficult to ob- tain such ('argo." Id. (Tindal, C.J.). 3 Burton n. Griffiths, 1843. * In the Metropol. Ry. Co. v. Jack- son, 1877, Ld. Cairns.'C, in II. L., thus explained those principles : — " The judge has to say whether any facts hiivo boon established by evi- dence from which negligence ma-ji l>e reasonably inferred ; the jurors have to say whether, from those facts, when submitted to them, negligence ouf/lit to be inferred. It is, in my opinion, of the greatest importance in the administration of justice that the separate functions sliould be maintained, and should be main- tained distinct. It would be a serious inroad on the ])rovince of the jury it, in a case where there are facts from which nogligence may reason- ably be inferred, the judge wore to withdraw the case from the jury upon the ground that, in his opinion, negligence ought i.ot to be inferred ; and it would, or tho other hand, place in tiie hands of tlie jui'ors a power wliich might be exercised in the mo>t arbitrary manner, if they were at libeity to hold t!iat negli- gence might be inferred from any state of facts whatever." See, also, ante, § 22 ; Bridges v. N. Lond. Ry. Co., 1874; Robson v. N. East. Ry. Co., 187(), C. A. ; Rose v. N. East. Ry. Co., 1870, C. A. * Dooiman v. Jenkins, 1834 (Taun- ton, J.). ' Doorman v. Jenkins, 1834. 38 CHAP. JII.] REAS UBLE SKILL — GHOSS NEGI.IGKNCi:, ETC. th« court must generally refuse to grniit a new trial.' In sf)ine cases, indeed, where the question relates to matters of legal practice, as, for instance, if a sheriff be charged with neglect of duty in not executing a writ, or if a solicitor be sued for negligence in con- ducting an action,^ the judges would appear to be more competent than a jury to decide whether the facts proved amount to a want of reasonable care ; but it seems that, even in such cases, the province of the judge is merely to inform the jury for what species or degree of negligence the defendant is answerable,^ and what duty in the particular case devolved upon him, by law, or 2>ractice ; and, having done this, to leave the jury to decide, first, whether the defendant has performed his duty, and next, whether, in case of non-performance, the neglect was of that sort or degree which was venial or culpable in the sense of not sustaining or sustaining an action.^ The judges are, however, the proper parties to decide whether fines, customs, or services are reasonable,* or whether deeds contain reasonable covenants ^^ powers.'"' § 38. Questions of bona Jides,^ actual knowledge,^ express malice,^ real intention,^ or reasonable cause, next require consideration. Generally speaking, all questions of this description belong abso- lutely to the jury. To this rule there are, howover, some few exceptions. Thus, the law will sometimes presioi the existence ' Doorman v. Jenkins, 1834, per Cut., commenting on and oxjilain- ing Shiells v. Bliickburne, 1789; Mooro V. Mourgue, 1776. ^ In Godefioy v. Dalton, 1830, the judges laid down, that in an action for negligence against him, a solicitor is, generally speaking, " liable for the consequences of igno- rance or non-observance of the rules of ])ractice of this court ; for the want of care in the preparation of the cause for trial ; or of attendance thereon with his witnesses ; and for the mismanagement of so much of the conduct of a cause, as is usually and ordinarily allotted to his depart- ment of the profession. Whilst, on the otlier hand, he is not answerable for error in judgment upon points of new occurrence, or of nice or doubt- ful construction, or of such as are usually intrusted to men in a higher branch of the piofcssion of the law." » Hunter v. Cal 1847 (Ld. Denman); Reecc irby, 1821 (Abbott, C.J.); Shtiiot Passman, 1836 (Alderson, B.). * Co. Lit. 56 b, o9b; Wilson v. Iloaro, 1839; Bell v. Wardell, 1740. * Smith V, Doe d. Jersey, 1819 (Abbott, C.J.). * !See ante, § 29; and see also Wedge V. Berkeley, 1837 ; Mooro v, Mourgue, 1776; Gray v. Dinnen, 1840 (Ir.); Coxhead v. Hichards, 1846 (CresswoU, J.); Uascldine v. Grove, 1842; Hughes v. Bucklaiid, 1846, Hornv.Thoinborough, 1849; Douglas V. Ewing, 1857 (Ir.). ' Harratt v. Wise, 1830. * As in actions for malicious pro- secution or arrest. Mitchell v. Jen- kins, 1833. » Doe V. Wilson, 1809 ; Powis v. Smith, 1822 ; Doe v. Batten, 1775 ; Zouch I'.Willingalo, 1790 (Gould and Wilson, JJ.) ; Cox v. Eeid, 1849. 39 BONA FIl)i;S — MALICE — INTKNTION. [PAllT I. of fraud, knowledge, malice, intention, or justification, from the proof of other remote facts,' and whenever these presumptions are embodied in rules of law, the court will either draw the inference ■without the aid of a jury, or the jury will be bound to follow tlie directions of the judge. Moreover, in some particular cases tlie decision of questions of bona Jides, reasonable cause, Sfc, actually belongs to the judge. For example, in cases where by law notice of action is still required,' the judge has to decide whether notice of action is necessary, and consequently the question of bona Jii/es must be determined by him, and not by the jury ;^ and, on an application at Nisi Prius for an amendment, it is the duty of the judge to determine, as a matter of fact, from the pleadings and the evidence, what is the real question in controversy between the parties.* Again, questions of discretion, or of yood came, in con- nection with costs, are for the decision of the judge. Thus, where, in an action in the High Court, the plaintiff in an action of contract recovers (except by summary judgment under R. S. C, Ord. XIV.) a sum not over 201., or between '201. and 50/., or in an action of tort recovers not over 10/., or between 10/. and 201., he is, in each case, not entitled in the first event to any costs, or in the other, to more than County Court costs, unless the judge certify that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action to the High Court, subject, indeed, to a power in the High Court or at Chambers to allow costs.' § 39. The judge's discretion must, however, be exercised subjt-ct to a rule** which provides that — " Subject to the provisions of the Acts' and these Pules, the costs of and incident to all proceedings in the Supreme Court, including the administration of estates and trusts, shall be in the discretion of the court or judge: Provided * See Chap. " On Presumptive Evi- dence," post. * In many cases it is not now re- quired, but defendant must instead be given an opportunity of tendering amends. See post, § 73, at p. 72. * Kirby V. Simpson, 1854; Arnold l>. Hamol, 18o4. * Wilkin V. Reed, 1854. * See § 1 16 of " The County Courts Act, 1888" {bl & 52 V. c. 43). Whether for the purpose an action of detinue is one of tort or of con- tract depends on the facts of the par- ticular case. Bryant V. Ilerbert, 1H77, 0. A.; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXV. r. 12; Pitt-Lewis' County Court Prac- tice, vol. i. p. 110. • R. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXV. r. 1. ' These are "The Sup. Ct. of Judic. Acts, 1873 to 1879, and 1881," and " The App. Jurisd. Act, 1876." See Ord. LXXI. r. 1. 40 CHAP. III.] COSTS IN SUl'UEME COURT. c- c. id that nothing heroin contained shall deprive an executor, adminis- trator, trustee, or mortgagee, who has not unreasonably instituted or carried on or resisted any proceedings, of any right to costs out of a particular estate or fund, to which he would ho entitled accord- ing to the rules hitherto acted upon in the Chancery Division : Provided also that, where any action, cause, matter, or issue is tried with a jury, the cosh shall follow the eronf, unless the judge by whom such action, cause, matter, or issue is tried, or the court, shall, for good cKttsr, otherwise order." * § 39a. Under the above Rule, when a cause is tried with a jury, the presiding judge may "for good cai,se " deprive a successful litigant of costs, either on an application being made to him for that purpose, or of his own motion.'^ An application to the judge for this purpose should be made either during the trial, or within a reasonable time after its termination ;' and an application to the court must — to be successful — be made without undue delay, but may be entertained by the court, whether a previous application to the judge who tried the cause has or has not been mado.* In no case will either the judge or the court deprive the successful litigant of his costs unless for good cause.* The judfre, in exer- cising his discretion, tnust assume the truth of the facts found by the jury, but is not confined to the consideration of the party's conduct in the course of the litigation, and may consider such of his pre- vious acts as have conduced to the action.'' In an action in which the defendant succeeds, he ought not to be deprived of costs in the Queen's Bench Division, simply because such a result would have followed in the old Court of Admiralty.' To ascertain ' Qucere, Does this Riilo extend to the Liverpool Pas.-ago Court ? See King?'. Ilawksworth, 1879; and 36 & 37 V. c. 6G, § 91. ' Turner v. Heyland, 1879; Collins V. Welch, 1879 ; Marsden v. Lane. & York. Ry. Co., 1881, C. A. ^ See Kynaston v. Mackinden, 1870, C. A. * See Myers v. Defries, and Siddons V. Lawrence, 1879, C. A. ; Bowoy v. Bell, 1878; Gen. St. Nav. Co. v. Lond. & Ed. Ship. Co., 1877. ' Everything which increases the litigation and the costs, and which places upon the defendant a burthen which he ought not to bear in the course of that litigation, is "good cause for dejjriving jiliiintiff of lli^i costs." Iluxloy V. East London lly. Co., 1889 (Ld. Halsbury, L.C.). « Harnett v. Vise, 1880, C. A. lu Jones V. Curling, 1884, C. A., it was held, Ist, that the facts must show that it would be more just to dis- allow than to allow the costs, as, for instance, that there has been oppres- sion or misconduct on the part of the successful litigant ; 2nd, that the question of costs is one respecting which an appeal will lie. ' Gen. St. Nav. Co. v. Lond. & Ed. Ship. Co., 1877. \ .• !'ii:i lii I ' '"n 41 i.il! 11: B'S it''*. PRIVILKGKD COMMl'MCATIONS. [part I. •whether there is or is not " good cause " the judge may not look at commnnications made "without prejudice."' § 39h. Attempts to determine the '^crrni," which, in the absence of a special order, costs are to " follow," have given rise to much controversy.^ In a general way it means the result of all the pro- ceedings incident<al to the litigation ; so that among the costs which follow it will be included the costs of all stages of that litigation, — for example, the costs of a first trial wlieu a second has been ordered.^ When a plaintiff has united several independent causes of action, and has succeeded on some of the issues^ and failed on the others, the term " event " is to be read distributively, and the plaintiff will liave only the general costs of the cause, while the defendant will get the costs of those issues on which he succeeds,* although the fact of the great majority of the issues being found for the defendant ma?/ be " good cause " for depriving plaintiff of the general costs of the cause.* § 40. Questions as to the construction of written documents must next be discussed. Matters of great nicety arise in con- nection with this subject. But the clear general rule is that the construction of aU written documents is for the court alone. The construction of these is, as we have said, for the court alone so soon as the true meaning of the hwy/.s" in which they are couched, and the smrounding circumstances, if any, have been ascertained as facts by the jury ;" and it is the duty of the jury to take the con- struction from the court, either absolutely, if there be no words to be construed as words of art or phrases used in commerce, and no surrounding circumstances to be ascertained;** or conditionally, when tliose words or circumstances are necessarily referred to them. Tlio term "written documents" includes Acts of Parlia- ment, judicii.l records, deeds, wills, negotiable instruments, tigree- li ■ : » Wiill,-(>r V. Wiltshirn, 18S9, C. A. « Soi! Ci.lliiis t'. Wi'lch. 187'J, C. A. (BiaiiiwcU, L.J.) ; and Myers v, JJe- Iriis, IST!). ^ Field r. rit. North. IJy, Co., 1878; Harris r. I'vthcrick, iAtS), 0. A.; V.vs'vw r. Wri-ht, 1877, 0. A. * My<T.s V. DolVios, 1881), 0. A. ; Ellis V. Doilva, 1881, C.A.; Sparrow V. Hill, 18S1. * i'orstor v. Furquliar, 1893. « Soo Ashfnrth7-. Rcdford, 187:5; AU'xaiidi'r V. Vaudi'rzce, 1872. lUit SCO IJowcH V. Sliaud, 1877, alHriuing Shaiid I'. Howes, 187(5. ' StM! Taiiivaco v. Lucas, ISOli; Lyle ('. .Uicliai'lH, 18(1(5; D.otDevon- tihiro t'. Neill (Ir.), 1877 (I'allos, c.r..). " Kej' V. Cotosworth, 18.32. Soo, also, Lang i'. Smith, 1838, as to iiiorciiiitik) visiiyo. 42 CHAP. I...] CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. monts, and letters. A Misconstruction by the court is the proper puhjeet of appeal to a court of error ; but a misconstruction by the jury cannot in any way be effectually set right.' The effect of the rule consequently is to render > law certain. A marked instatu'c of its application occurs in the case of the construction of the s{)C(;ification of a patent, for though the interpretation of such an instrument, — relating as it does to matters of science and skill, — would seem peculiarly adapted to the practical information of jurors, the court must construe it^ after merely ascertaining from the jury an explanation of technical terras.^ Again, the construc- tion of all written contracts is for the court. Where a contract for the sale of barley was in letters, one of which offered good barley, and the other accepted the offer, " expecting you will give us fine barley and good weight," it was held, that the jury (though they might be asked as to the mercantile meaning of the words " good " and "fine"), after having found that there was a distinction between the two terras employed, could not further decide that the parties did not misunderstand each other, but that they were bound to take the interpretation of the contract, as a matter of law, from the judge.* So, too, it is for the court to decide, as matter of law, whether the sum mentioned in an agreement as to be ' Judgment in Noilson v. Hiirford, 1841. 2 Noilson V. Harford, 1841 ; Bovill r. I'imm, 1S,')6. Those oases virtuiilly ovi'rrulo llill v. Thompson, 1817, whoro Ld. Kldon obstM'vcd, that tho inlillu/iliiliti/ of the dencriiition of a i-lH'cific!iti(>n was a matter of faot. In Aiiioiioa the s-ullicioiioy of the dcscrijjtion in a sjiocilioatiou is still lolt as a (luostion of fact to bo dotoi- ininod by thi^ jury, unless the stuto- moiit bo obviously too vapuo. Wood r. Undorliill (Am,), 1847. bui in I'iU^Miind, whoro in a jiatont oatiso the want of novelty a])})ears distinctlj' from documents, such, for instance, as a ])rior patent and spooitioatiou, tht! judp', and not the jury, must notict! tlio identity of the two sup- jjosc'd invontioMM, and the consoijuont want of nnvclty in tlio second. Hush t'. Fox, l.S,')(); llooth )', Ketuiard, 1868; IJilia v, London Gaslight Co., 1860 ; Betts v. Menzies, 1859. See, toi), Betts V. Menzies, 18G2, 11. L. ; and Seed v. Higjijins, 18()(), U. L. But sec also the observations of Ld. Westbury, C, on Bush v. l''ox, 1856, and the law supposed to bo thoro laid down, in Hills v. Evans, 1862. 3 Hills c. Evans, 1862. * Hutchison c.Bowker, is,t!l, whore Parke, B., ol)served, " It is the duty of the court to construe all written instruments; if thoro an; ])rciiliar expressions used in it, which have, in })iU'ticular places oi' trades, a known meaning attacheil to them, it is for the jiinj to say what the iixiiiiiiii/ nf t/i(i.fr i:riin'K'>iiiii.< was, but for the cnrt to (li'cid(^ what tlio iii>'tiiiiii(/ of the riiulviicl was," See also Bourne v. (iatlifre. 1841 ; Urilliths v. Bigby, 1856; Hills i\ London (bislight Co,, 1858; Kirkland v. Nisbet, 1859; Montgomery v. Middle ton, 1862. 4;"i inliii i! Si i CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMKNTS. [part T. paid for a breach thereof is a penalty or liquidated damages;^ whether a letter containing no words of doubtful trade meaning, and as to which the extrinsic facts are not in controversy, amounts to a guarantee ;' or whether* a written acknowledgment of a debt,'' or of title,^ is sufficient to take the case out of the statutes of limitation. On this last subject it will indeed, in a doubtful ca^t^ be prudent for the judge both to express his own opinion, and also to take the opinion of the jury.' Moreover, whenever a document is connected with other evidence affecting its construction, the whole must be submitted to the jury together.* § 41. Letters, as mentioned in the preceding section, fall within the general rule as to "written documents."" Their construction, consequently, unless, indeed, extrinsic circumstances be capable of explaining them, is for the court, no matter how ambiguous the lan- guage in which they are couched.'" If, however, letters be written in BO drbious a manner as to bear different construi-tions, but can be explained by other transactions, the jiu-y (who are clearly the judges of the truth or falsehood of such collateral facts which may vary the senee of the letters themselves) must doeido upon the whole evidence." Accordingly, on a question whether the defendant had adopted the acceptance of a bill, the construction of a letter written by him on the subject, taken in connection with his subsequent conduct, was held to be entirely for the jury.'^ Whenever, too, a contract has to be made out partly by letters, and partly by parol evidence, the jury must deal wiih the whole question.'* If a document bo lost, and oral evidence be given of its contents, the judge must construe its meaning in the same manner as if it had been produced, but here again the jury may be asked if they > SooWallisv. Smith, 1882. » Huiiitor t). ForguHon, 1849(Wil(lo, C.J.). Fornu'i'ly tJiis was occusion- uUy Itift to tlui lury. Suo C.'riwluo v. lic.lton, 1N27 (H'cHt, C.J.). •' Uk. of Montioal v. Munstor Dk., 187G. * Son, contni, Lloyd v. Maiiiul, 1788; LiiiHcll 1'. liimncr, 18,'!,). " Moncll ('. Frith, 18:i8; Jiout- Icil'Tii I'. Raui.say, WM (Ld. Duii- iiiaii). « ] )on»'. Edmonds, 1810 (I'liiko, M.). ' Biickot V. Churcli, 1810 (I'liiki', B.) ; Mom^ll i-. Frith, 18;i8 (id.). * l?;)utl('dpo V. liainwiy, 18U,S (l,d. l)(!iniii!u); Morrcll v. Frith 18;i8; Moori! I', (jliirwood, 18lit; AHlijiitcl v, S»!n'(iiiil)(% 18,j(); Foster v. Mentor Life Ahs. Co., IH.VI. » Berwick r. llorsfall, 1858. '" Furness r. :Meck, 18()2. " MiicImmUIi r. ilaldimand, l"8rt (Buller, J.); Smith r. Thiim])son, 181!). See IaIo r. IJichurdN, |.S(i7. '- AVilkiiiHiin r. Storey, 18;;!). Suo Hiook r. lldok, 1871. '^ B(jlukow V, Seymour, 1804. 44 CHAP, in.] CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMKNTS. l)i'lioVG oral evidoiico wliiiih lias been givea aa to tlie (urourastances of tlio allcgod loss.' § 42. An excioption to the general rule of law whioh intrusts the judge with tiie construction of all written documents arises whore the writing forms the subject of an indictment or an action, and the guilt or innocence of the defendant depends upon the popular meaning of the language employed. Thus, the legis- lature, after much discussion,^ has oxi)roHsly determined^ that, on a prosecution for libel, the question whothor the particular i)ub- lioation is a libel or not, sliall always be entirely for the jury. Even hero the judge may, as a matter of advice to them, give his own opinion respecting the nature of the publication, though he is not in point of law bound to do so.* The statute here referred to is in strictness only applicable to criminal trials, but as it is a declaratory Act, its provisions liave in practice been adopted in civil actions for libel, and it has now for a series of years been the course for the judge, — who still has to decide whether the words complained of are reasonably capable of bearing the dofa- ' B(>rwick v. HorsfiiU, 1838. ''■ As to this (•oliibriitod dispute, in suiiiJDit of tho cliiims of tho judj^ea, sec R. ,K Udall, li390; 11. v. Wood- fall, 177()(Iid. MiinsHold); R. v. Doiin of St. Asiii)h, 17S;i Hid. Munsfuild); mid in supjiort of tlio rights of tho jury, li. V. Tiitchin, 1704 (Ld. Holt) ; li. V. Owoii, 17.V2 ; R. v. J)oiin of St. Asiijih, 17K.'J (VVillcs, J., and Ld. KUonborough). As to tho procood- in^js in thu llouso of Lords on tho passingof " Tho Lib.il Act" (32 G. 3, c. ()(»), soo 22 How. St. Tr. 2i)4, 2!)7. ' \V1 (J. 3, c. (id (commonly callod " l'"ox's Libol Act"), declares and eiiuL'ts (§ 1 ) that, on every trial of an indictment or infm'mation for a libel, " the jury sworn to try the issue may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty ui)on tho whole matter ^)ut ill issue ujum such indictment or in- formation ; and shall not bo re<iuirod or directed by the court or judga, before whom such indictment or in- formation shall be tried, to find tlio d(!fendant or defendants guilty, merely on the proof of tho publica- tion bj' such defendant or defendants of tho paper charged to be a libel, and of the sense ascrib^>d to the same in such indictment or information." § 2 provides, that, " on every such trial, tho court or judge, beforti whom such indictment or information shall bo tried, m/ki/I,' according to their or his discretion, give their or liis opinion and direi;tions to the jury on the matter in issue between the King and tho defendant or defen- dants as ''n other criminal cases." § 3 ^)rovide.- that a jin-y nuiy find a special verdici , "ti-? §4 reserves to defendants a right to move in arrest of judgment. * Per Parke, B., in Parmitor v. Coupland, 1840. • It has boeu said that tho word " shall" should hero be interprotod as if the word " may" hud buon used. Uaylis v. Luwrenco, 1840 (lattloduie, J.). liiilfi i , il I i LI B EL — TH REA'n:X I NG LETTI:RS. [part I. matory meaning ascribed to them by the plaintiff,'— to firet give a legal definition of the offence, and then leave the jury to deter- mine whether the writing complained of falls within that definition or not.' It is, indeed, not absolutely necessary that the judge should explain what constitutes a libel, but he may leave the whole question without reserve to the jury.' If, however, they find a verdict against the defendant, either on an indictment or an action, the court will arrest the judgment, where the writing on the face of it is not libellous.* § 43. The respective duties of the judge and jury on indictments for writing threatening letters ' are not very clearly defined. In some cases the jury have been permitted, upon examination of the paper, to decide for themselves whether or not it contained a menace.^ In other cases, the question appears to have been ex- clusively determined by the court ; ' while on a few occasions the opinion of the jury, and of the judge, have been both alternatively taken.^ On a question as to ti <^ construction of a writing written by defendant and alleged to be libellous, other libels by the defen- dant are admissible''* both as to construction and to show malice.'" § 44. In connection with the subject of libel, it should be men- tioned that it is a question of law for the court whether a eoinmuni- cation be privileged or not. If, indeed, the privilege claimed be of a character that it is on public grounds regarded as almolute,^^ the jury must first determine what the circumstances were under which the communication was made, and also whether such communica- tion was made bom file. They ought to find bona Jiden unless the evidence be sufficient to raise a probability that the communication was colourably made.'^ After they have found the facts and deter- ' Hunt V, GoiiiUiiko, IH'.'J ; Start V. Uliifif,', lfi-47 (Wihl.N C.J.). 2 I'iiiiiiitcr >\ Coiiplaiid, 1H40. ' Kiivlis II. Liiwreii(^((, 1.S41. • llc'uiiio V. Stowoll, 1S4(); Gold- stein V. Foss, 1H27 ; I'liniiitoi- v, Coupland, 1840 (AldoiHon, H.). ° As to wliioh, Hoo 24 & '2") V. c. 9() (" Tho Ijiimfiiy Act, IHOl "), •§§ 44, 40. • 11. V. Oirdwood, 1770. ' R. V. Smith, l«4i) ; R. v. Pick- ford. 1h;jo. • R. V. Robinson, 1706; R.v.Coady, 18H2. " I'lolton V. O'nrii-n, 188,",. •" iJiirrott V. l.on.i,', iN.il, II. L. Tlioujj;li tho jury iiro iisiinlly cati- tioncd not to ;j;ivt) diiiiiiiiics for thoin, tho omission of sucli caution is not ii misdirection. Darby v, Ouaoloy, 18,j(). " As to such ubsohito jtriviiegc, 800 Dawkins v. I'uulct, lisdi); and Dawkins v. lid. Roknby, 187.'{. " Taylor I'. Hawkins, 18.51; Somer* villo i;. Hawkins, 1851. 46 ClIAP. III.] QUKSTIONS OF FACT FOR JURY. rained the questioa of bona fides, the judge must decide, as a question of law, whether the occasion of the publication was such as to rebut the inference of malice.' If, however, any doubt exist as to whether or not the defendant in some respects exceedf d the limits of his privilege, and made comments, which may be evidence of nvtual malice, the opinion of the jury must be taken upon the effect of such evidence.^ § 45. On an indictment for perjury, it is still a moot point whether the materiality of the matter in wliiuh the false swearing is proved, is a question of fact for the jury, or a question of law for the judge. According to the better opinion, it ought to be regarded in the latter light.' § 45a. All questions of mere fact are for the decision of a jury, unaided by any positive legal rules — it being the duty of the judge merely to take care that tliey are not misled by anything coming out in the evidence.* Questions of this description are as to ])er- missive occupation ; * the assent of an executor to a bequest f the unsoundness of a horse ;' the delivery of a document as an escrow, unless the question turn solely on the construction of writings ; * the infringement of a patent," where such infringement does not depend merely on the construction of the specification •,'" the novelty of a design, within the meaning of the Acts relating to copyright of design for articles of manufacture ; " the existence of a nuisance, as caused by erecting a bridge or weir in a navigable stream ;"^ the definition of the word " street," '^ excef)t in certain cases Avhere the term has been employed in an Act of I'arliament ; '* tlio seawortlii- ' C()xh(wh'. Richiirds, 1H4()(Civhs- woll, J.; Coltirmii, J.); Stiico v. Grillith, 18(i(). ' Cdokc r. Wililos, 18Jj. ' S(<i) iind compiiro 11. v, Courtney, lH.-)(i (Ir.) ; II, V. Liivoy, l.S.)(); 11, v. Dmistiin, 1H24. * I 'it lid. Aliiiij^or, in ^[iK^kiiito.sh V. Mui!*liiill, 1H4:J. ' JjOHswi of I'liiijMo V. Fahy, 1H;J2 (Ir.); Jouos I'. Boliiiid, 1810 (Ir,^; but Hoo Wliitmcre v. SymoudM, 1808. ° Miison V, Fiirnidl, 184-1, oven thoufi;h " the quostion dopcuidw ujion tho niroful und woniowhiit critical coiniiarison of tho tonus of a dood with the uthur circumMtaucu8 and facts of tho I'lisc." Pit Ahh^r.-iou. H., prouinuH'ing tlio juiljjjiiuMit of tho court. Soo, idso, i'lUiott v. Elliott, 1811 (lid. .\l)iii-iT.). ' Si'o ])i'r I'atti'soii, J,, in Haylis i\ Lawri'Ui'o, 1810. •^ Funx'ss V. iMcck. 18,-)8, II. I;. Sec auto, § 41, post, § 18;i4. " Do la Huo /'. Dicki'usou, 18J7 ; Lister V. IjcatluT, 18,')8. •0 Sood r. lliKt,'ins, 1 800, 11. L. See post, § 43. " Harrison v. Tav'.or, 18(i0. " K. u. Ilotts, 1800 ; 1{. V. lluasoU, 1827 ; 11. V. Ward. 18;i(i. " 1{. r. FuUforil, 1801. '* Kobiusou V. Local board of Bar- il 'I ; ( i:: Mi IH lU QUESTIONS FOR JURY — NECESSARIES. [PART I. r nesB of a ship ; * the construction of a policy of insurance, shown by evidence to contain a latent ambiguity;^ the materiality of facts not communicated in effecting an insurance;' the competency of a testator in a will cause, and his freedom from undue influence;* the cruelty of a husband as a ground for judicial separation ;* the condonation of a conjugal offence;^ whether there has been an acceptance of goods sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds;' whether a tender be absolute or conditional.^ The court, however, in the last-named case, should be mindful to point out that a tender is not invalid in law as being conditional, if it merely implies that the debtor admits no more to be due, but that to make it bad it must go further, and imply that the creditor, if he takes the sura offered, will admit that his entire claim is satisfied.^ The jury have also, in any question relating to the amount of interest payable on a foreign bill of exchange, to determine as facts, first, what rate of interest is usually paid at the respective places where the bill was drawn or indoi-sed or accepted, and next, whether the plaintiff has sustained any damage requiring the payment of interest at all ; but the judge will decide as a pure question of law, whether the case is to be governed lege loci confrfiefm, or ler/e loci solutionis '' § 4(5. Among other matters of fact it is for a jury to decide whether articles supplied to an infant be necessaries . but, as to this, their decision is suhjict to the control of the judges,'^ who have laid down general rules of law, as follow : first, the question whether articles are necessaries or not does not, in any degree, depend upon what allowance the infant may have received from his father, and may have misapplied ; '^ secondly, the articles must be really useful, ton, 1 882 ; Maude v. Baildon Local Board, 1883. ' Clifford V. Hunter, 1827 (Ld. Tcnterdcn). * Ilordorn v. Commercial Union, Ac, 1887. * Eiiwlings V. DesLorough, 1840 (Ld. Denmau), « Purdon V. Ld. Longford, 1877 dr.). * Tomkms v. Tomkins, 1859. * Peacock v. Peacock, 1859. ' Lillywhito v, Devereux, 1846 ; Aldovson, B., recognising Edan v. Dudfiold, 1841; Clark v. Wright, 1860 (Ir.). * Eckstein i'. Rej-nnlds, 1837 ; Marsden v. Goode, 1845. ' Bo won V. Owen, 1847 ; Bull v, Parker, 1843 ; Henwood v. Oliver, 1841. '0 Gibbs V. Fremont, 1853. See further on this subject, post, § 47. >' Harrison v. Fane, 1840 (Tiiidal, C.J.) ; Ryder v. Wombwell, 1868. » Biui'hart v. Hall, 1839; Peters V. Fleming, 1840. But see Barnes v. Toye, 1884, whore it was held that, on a qiiO'*tinn of necessaries, an in- fant might prove that at the duto of the salo ho was suflRciently supplied with other similar goods. 48 m CHAP. III.] INFANT — NECESSAi;iKS. and therefore merely ornamental jewellery/ or luxiirious confec- tionery,^ cannot be uece&saries ; and, thirdly, articles, even if useful, must be such as would be necessary and suitable to the degree and station in life of the infant/* The judge determines whether the articles are capable of being necessaries, regard being had to the position of the defendant ; and if he decide this in the alPrraative, the jury say whether, under the circumptances, they actually were necessaries or not.* Funeral expenses incurred on her husband's death by an infant widow ;* legal expenses incurred by an infant bride on marriage,^ and a gold watch and chain for an undergraduate,' are all capable of being " necessaries." But a pair of jewelled solitaires and a silver-gilt goblet cannot be '" neces- saries."' And in a case where the jury, in opposition to tho opinion of the judge, found that the hiring of horses and gigs were " necessaries " for an Oxford undergraduate, who was the younger son of a man of fortune, but kept a horse of his own, the court set aside the verdict as perverse, and granted a new trial;"* the same course was jjursued, where an Irissli jury had found that a hunter was *' necessary " for a mere boy." § 47. Questions as to the meaning of particular expressions have already been seen to be in all criminal cases — and this even when they are in writing — entirely for the jury.'" Speaking generally, it may be said that the meaning of expressions is in most cases to be determined by a jury. The power of a jury to interpret expressions is not confined merely to such as are employed in con- tracts, or have a peculiar commercial meaning. It extends to all phrases, capable of being used in a technical sense, which do not require any knowledge of the law to explain them. Accordingly, the courts have more than once refused to entertain the question, whether an excavation is or is not a mine," and as such not rate- ' Rydor u. Woiubwell, 18GS, supra. » Ihoiikor V. Scott, 1843 ; Wharton r. Mackenzie, 1844, and Cripps v. Hills, 1814. s Peters v. Flem.ng, 1840. ♦ See Skrine v. Gordon (Ir.^ i7jra, and Cripps v. Hills ' ',44, supra. '' Chappie V. Cooper, 1844, • Helps V. Clayton, 1864. ' l^'tor8 V. I'loming, 1840, " Harrison v. Fane, 1840. T. — vni,. I. 49 • Skrino v, Gordon, 1875 (Ir.); so in Wharton v, Mackenzie, 1844, and Cripps V. Hills, 1844, whore juries decided that wine parties and suppers were necessaries for undergraduatoa. '" Ante, 9 42. " Any question as to whether a mine is a mine within the meaning of the Mining Acts "shall be referred to a Secretary of State, whose deci- sion thereon shall be final." 50 & 51 ' j i i , 1 I ' 1 ' ^♦ili MEANING OF TECHNICAL PHRASES. fPAUT r. able to tho relief of the poor, and have left the Sessions to apply to the question, as one of fact, the information they possess, and their knowledge of the English language,' declining to lay down any legal principle, except that the method of working is to be con- sidered, and not the chemical or geological character of the produce.* It also is exclusively for a jury to say whether what is proved to have taken place is or is not " a representation " of a dramatic work, so as to subject the person representing it to penalties under the A<tt of 3 & 4 W. 4, 0. 15 (" The Dramatic Copyright Act, 1833 ").» If, however, a word of doul.tful import be used in an Act of Par- liament, its general meaning ought to be explained to the jury by the judge ; and accordingly where, on the trial of an issue whet!-jer a railway was passing through " a town," within the meaning of the Railway CI '.uses Consolidation Act, the jtidge merely told the jury that the word "town" was to be understood in its ordinary and popular sense, the omission to give them any further instrui- tion was held to constitute a misdirection, and a new trial Viis granted.* But the inspection of a record is a matter within the peculiar province of the court; and a jury will not be allowed to examine a record, for the purpose of giving their opinion as to what word has been written above an erasure.* § 48. Questions as to whether a/orriffn law, &c. exists or not p.ivv as we have already seen,'' entirely matters to be found an facts by a jury. Foreign' laws, usages and customo cannot be judicially noticed, but must be proved as facts in each particular case,* find found by the jury. In such cases, the abstract mcaniiig as well as the euMcncc of the law must, in general, be determined by tue jury v. 0. .58, § 71 ; and 35 & 3G V. c. 77, ' li. V. Sodgoley, 1831 ; R. v. Bret- tull. 1832; 11. V. Duiisford, 183j. " Till' Court of Quarter Sessions are judj^es of law and fact. The appeal to tho Queen's Henuh is confined to questions of law. The distinction, therefore, hi'tweeu tho respective pro- vinces of tho two courts ia so far analojfous to the distinction under discussion as lo justify the drawing of illustrations from cases of appeal." - See Darvill v. Koper, 1855 ; Bell V. Wilson, 1866 ; Dow. Ducli. of Clnvelmd ?i. Meyrick, 1868 (Malins, \'.-( '.). ijut see Jones r. Cwiriorthen Slate Co., 1879. Sec, also, iNJdl. lly. Co. V. Haunchwood Briok and Tile Co., 1882. » Planche v. Braham, 1837. * Elliott V. South Devon Ry. Co., 1848. » R. V. Ilucks, 1816 (Ld. Ellen- borough). * Ante, § 5. ' As to colonial laws, see ante, § 9. * Although a point of foreign law may have been proved and acted upon in one court, another court will not rely upon the report of such a case, but will require fresh proof of the law,. as a matter of fact, on each particular occasion : M'Cormick v. Garuott, 1854 (Knight- Bruce, L.J.). 50 CHAP. III.] FOREIGN LAWS. on the testimony of the skilled witnesses.' It is, however, the duty of the court to decide, first, as to the competent knowledge of the witnesses ca'.i,'d;'* next, as to the admissibility of the documents by which they seek to refresh their memory ; and lastly,' as to the speoial applicability of the law, when proved, to the particular matter in controversy.* Even where the admissibility or inadmissi- bility of certain evidence depends on its exiistence or interj)rctation, proof of a foreign law should exclusively be addressed to the court, just as in other cases where a question respecting the admissibility of evidence rests upon disputed facts.* Perhaps, indeed, as the object of the proof of foreign aw is to enable the court to instruct the jury respecting its bearing on the case in hand, it will always bo advisable for the judge to assist the jury in ascertaining what the law really is.* § 49. Before leaving the subject of foreign law, it must be pointed out that the rules of evidence adopted in one country, — whether established by the practice of its courts, or enacted by its legisla- ture, — will not regulate the proceedings of courts in another country, when transactions in the first-named country become the subject of investigation in the latter.' The lew- fori governs every court upon all questions of evidence. Such questions as whether a witness is competent or not ; whether a certain matter requires tc be proved by writing or not ; whether certain evidence proves a certain fact or not, must be determined, not lege loci contrm'tun, but by the law of the country where the question arises, where the remedy is sought to be enforced, and where the court sits to enforce it.* Thus, where (before the Evidence Amendment Act of 1851 ") the assignees of an English bankrupt sued in Calcutta, the bank- ruptcy and the assignment could not bo proved in the Calcutta court by producing copies of the proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court, purporting to bear the seal of that court, and to be signed ' E. V. Picton, 1806. * Bristow V. Sequeville, 1850. The whole of this subject will be di.8- cussed, post, §§ 1423—1425. * See Sussex Peer, case, 1844; Ld. Nelson v. I A. Bridport, 1844. * Story, Contl. (Am.), § 638. » Tiasher v. Everhurt, 1831 (Am.) ; Story, Confl. (Am.), § 638, n. 3, ante, § 23. « See Story, Confl. (Am.), § 638; Mostyu V. Tabiigas, 1774 (Ld. Mans- field) ; Disora ('. Phillips, 1863. ' Clark V. MuUick, 1840 (Ld. Brouf^ham), infra. * Bain v. Whitehaven, &c. June. iiy. Co., 1850 (Ld. Brougham) (H. L.). e 14 & 15 V. c. 99, §§ 11 and 19. '* I . ll! m 61 V.2 M 'I P w m r • 1( lU . . 'rill 1 |i 1 III n |l :\ 1 " 1 \h. i [\ *1 1 ■ ■ rOUKKJN RULES OF KVIDENCE. [PAKT I by the Clerk of Enrolniints>, for such evidence, although sufReient in English courts of justice, was not then admissible in India.' Again, although by Scotch law, all instruments prepared and witnessed according to the provisions of the Scotch Act of 1^*<1 are probative writs, and may be given in evidence in a aourt without any proof, in an English court, the mere production of such a Scotch instrument would not suffice, but it would be necessary to call one or other of the attesting witnesses.' A copy of a charter- party which has been verified in accordance with the law of the place where it was entered into, cannot on that account be received in an English court, but is inadmissible there.' Several other oases might be cited to the same effect;* and in all, the distinction is recognised between the cause of action, which must be judged of according to the law of the country where it originated, and the mode ofprocecdiiif/, including of course the rules of evidence, which must be adopted as it happens to exist in the country where the action is brought.' § 49a. English courts-martial held abroad are expressly excepted from the general rule that the lex fori governs the laws of evidence. For the Army Act, 1881,^ enacts, first, that " a court-martial under this Act shall not, as respects the conduct of its proceedings, or the reception or rejection of evidence, or as respects any other matter or thing whatsoever, be subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, or to any Act, law, or ordinance of any legislatu'-e whatsoever, other than the Parliament of the United Kingdom ;" and next, that " the rules of evidence to be adopted in proceedings before courts-martial shall be the same as those which are followed in civil courts in England ; and no person shall be required to answer any question or to produce any documents, which he could not be required to answer or produce in similar proceedings before a civil court." > Clark y. Mullick, 1840. * Yates V. Thomson, 1833 (Ld. Broufj;liain). ■> Brown v. Thornton, 1837. * Ti'imbey V. Vignier, 1834; Huber V. Steiner, 1835 ; British Linen Co. V. Druuimond, 1830; ipleton v. Ld. Braybrook, 1816; Blaik v. Bray- brook, 1816; Don y.Lippmann, 1837; Leroux v. Brown, 1852; Finlay v. Finlay, 18G2. * Mostyn v, Fabrigas, 1774. See also Story, Confl. (Am.), §■} 556 et seq. and 629—636. • 44 & 46 V. c. 58, §5 127 and 128. 63 cii-vr. III.] A.MKItlC'AN NOTIiS. 52» AMERICAN NOTES. Law and Fact. — The Hue of distinction between matter of law and matter of fact by no means follows the same lines as the divi- sion of judicial functions between the court and the jury. The action of the jury is confined to deciding such facts as are involved in the issue raised by the pleadings in the case, or by the nature of the particular investigation. These are what may be called the ultimate facts. It is to such facts alone that the evidence sub- mitted to the jury is limited. State v. Hodge, 50 N. H. 510, 522 (18G9). Various dicta, indeed, speak of a wider power on tlie part of the jury. Thus Judge Story, in denying the right of the jury to judge of the law in criminal causes, says : " 1 hold it the most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime, that the jury should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the law." U. S. V. Battiste, 2 Sumn. 240 (1835) ; Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. 151 (1828). That it is the duty of the jury, even in criminal cases, to take the law from the court, see liobbins v. State, 8 Oh. St. 131 (1857) ; Duffy v. People, 26 N. Y. 588 (1863) ; Com. V. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185 (1855) ; Battre v. State, 18 Ala. 119 (1850); I'ierce v. State, 13 N. II. 536 (1843); Hardy v. State, 7 Mo. 607 (1842); Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. 151 (1828); State v. Hodge, 50 N. H. 521 (1869). "The jury are not judges of the law in any case, civil or criminal. Neither at common law, nor under the con- stitution of Pennsylvania, is the determination of the law any part of tiieir duty or their right." Com. ;;. McManus, 143 Pa. St. 64, 86 (1891); Higginbotham v. Campbell, 85 Ga. 638 (1890). Counsel can address the jury on all questions of law within the issue. Cora. V. I'orter, 10 ]\Ietc. 263 (1845). Under these decisions all questions of domestic law are for the court ; some questions of fact are for the jury. To the contrary, see State i>. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849) ; State v. Jurche, 17 La. Ann. 71 (18()5) ; Nelson v. State, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 482 (1852); State v. Snow, 18 Me. 346 (1841); Montee v. Com., 3 J. J. Marsh. 132, 151 (1830). CoNSTRucTiox OP WRITINGS. — Though construction of writ- ten documents is in most cases merely attempting to ascertain a fact, viz., the intention set forth in it, tlie duty of construction is a function of the court. In Hamilton r. Liverpool, &c. Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 242 (1889), it is said that " the construction of the correspon- dence in writing between the parties," presents " a pure question of law." The same phrase is employed in Allen v. Frost, 62 Ga. 659 (1879). Probably the rule had its inception in the fact that in early days juries could noi read. It owes its continuance to reasons him i i I'l P! ■lilHH i; Ill §m i I':, 52« AMKUrcAN NOTKS. [PAUT I. of policy find conveiiii'iKM'. Morse v. Weymouth, 28 Vt. SUl (isrwi); Allen />. Frost, (!li Gil. (;r)'J (l.S7<)); Jl. k/Co. /•. McKcniiii, l;{ Lea, 2S() (1.SH4) ; .loii"S 0. Sweiiri,!-,'*'!!, 4'J S. C. .W, (57 (181)4) ; I.imlsiiy V. Hiunbui-g, &c. Ins. Co., 115 N. C. L'12 (1894). " Where a contract is oral, the (iiu-slion wliat tlic contract is must, it' controverted, be tried by the jury as a qiu'stion of fact; but where the terms of a contract are un<lisi)uted, its construction and effect, where the contract is oral as well as where it is written, are to be determined by the court.'' Globe Works c. Wrij.(ht, 1(M> Mass. 207 (1870). This duty of construction may, at times, princi- pally involve a (question of the meaning of words, of which the court takes judicial cognisance ; e. //., whether the term " Congrega- tional persuasion" means theological doctrine, or merely (^liurch government, so as to embrace a " Unitarian clergyman." Atty.- Gen. IK Dublin, 3S N. II. 459 (1859). The court may be aided "by experts in reading a document, e. (j., railroad orders. K. K. v. McKenna, 13 Lea, 280 (1884). It is error to submit the question of the construction of a deed to the jury " withoiit limitation or restriction, and witlumt si)ecitic instruction." but if the jury take the correct view, a new trial will not be granted. Morse v. Wey- mouth, 28 Vt. 824 (185(i). While '"the construction of a written document, where the mean- ing is to be collected from the document itself, is matter of pure law and for the court," its nu'aning, if to be determined by refer- ence to extrinsic facts or usages, must be submitted to the jury as a question of fact under approjjriate instructions, (iibbs v. Gilead, &c. Society, 38 C(;nn. 15; J871). W^hether the printed regulations of a railroad applied to a particular train is a question of construc- tion for the court, and it is error to submit it to the jury. Illinois Central II. R. Co. v. Murphy, 52 111. App. 65 (1893). " The interpretation of writings is always for the court except in two cases : First, where the writing is ambiguous and the ambiguity must be solved by extrinsic, nnconceded facts; and next, where the ■writing is merely adduced as containing evidence of certain facts, from which different inferences may be drawn, and where it is for the jury, and not the court, to draw the inferences." Enterprise Soap Works v. Sayers, 55 ^fo. A])p. 15 (1893). Whether tne written contr.act was made as the final agreement of the parties, is a question for the jury. Holm v. Coleman, 89 Wise. 233 (1895) ; Bloom v. Cox, &c. Mfg." Co., 83 Hun. 611 (1894). And the meaning of a contract in a foreign language as inter- preted by those familiar with it. Uadart v. Foulon (Mich.), 61 N. W. 536 (1894). So where there is ambiguity in the contract. Ginnath ?>. Blankenship, 28 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.), 828 (1894); Becker v. Holm, 89 Wise. 86 (1894). See to same effect, Wood- bury Granite Co. v. Millikeu, 66 Vt. 465 (1894). m CHAl'. Ml.] AMKKICAN NOTE8. W VVliure the facts attoiulin^ tlie makiiij,' of an allegod contract are in dispute, it is not error, as nil'iMTiiij,' the oonstriuition of a written instriiMU'Mt to tiie jr.vy, for tiiu court to construe tlic contract upon till! assuin[)tion that certain facts exist, and thiMi leaving it to the jury to determine whetiier tliese facts do exist, liasconi v. Smitli, nil Mass. Gl (189r>). So the interju'etation of statutes "in order to ascertain the true intent and meaninj? of tl»e legislature," /. /'., a plain matter of fact, is a (piestion for the (!ourt. Com. c. Anthcs, ~> Gray, 185, l'.)0 (IH.KJ); Edes i>. l^oardman, 58 N. II. 580, 5'Jli (187'J). The reason on which this rule apparently at present rests is in jiiirt tiin necessity of a uniform adnunistration of justice. " It is of tli(! highest importance, not only that tliere should be a true and correct interpretation of the statute, . . . but also that such opera- tion shall be equal and uniform over all those who are subject to the sami! government." Com. v. Anthes, 5 (Jray, 185, IDl (1855). The meaning of unambiguous oral language is a cpiestion for the court. Matthews *'. I'ark, 159 I'a. St. 579 (1894) ; Spragins v. Wliite, 108 X.C. 449 (1891). Nkolioknck. — It is said that when the facts are undisputed, neg- ligence is a matter of law for the court. This is an imperfect statenuMit. It is, as has been said, part of the duty of the court to enforce the rules of correct reasoning. It is but natural, therefore, that courts should find themselves forced to attempt establishing a standard of what is reasonable conduct under certain circumstances, where tl>e question is not as to the existence of facts, but as to the inferences to be deduced from them. Joslin /•. Le Baron, 44 Mich. ICO (1880) ; Woodward (;. Hancock, 7 Jones (Law), 384 (18(50) ; Mauermau i>. Siemerts, 71 Mo. 101 (1879) ; Lake Shore, &c. K. H. V. Bangs, 47 Mich. 470 (1882) ; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. i\ Righter, 42 N. J. Law, 180 (1880) ; Stackus v. N. Y. R. R., 79 N. Y. 404 (1880); Delaware, &c., R. R. v. Converse, 139 U. S. 4(59 (1891). It is also clearly of advantage on recognised grounds of public policy that certain standards of conduct should be uniformly and definitely settled, to afford serviceable guides for the future. This can, of course, best be done by removing cases which are clearly settled either on reason or by previous action of the jury as being or not being instances of negligence, from the further con- sideration of the jury and deducing froni them a rule of law. Tiiis is legal growth. Beginning with clear cases on either side of the line, courts are enabled, by this process of ruling as matter of law, gradually to restrict the range of doubtful cases, with the result of more defi- nitely establishing legal standards of conduct. Wheelock v. Boston & Albany R. Co., 105 Mass. 203 (1870). For instance, it has " become a postulate that due care requires a 'i u\hm !| I'iJ ■iJ ■wh ■ it ■ . ; it : ■ 52* AMERICAN NOTES. [part pedestrian, before crossing a railroad track, to look in either direc- tion to ascertain whether a train is approaching." Rodrian v, N. V., &c. K. K., 125 N. Y. 52G (1891) ; Fletcher v. Fitchbnrg K. R., 14i> Mass. 12'i ( .889) ; Lavarenz v. Chicago, &c. R. li., 60 la. Go9 (1881). But to the contrary, i. e., that the failure to look is a fact to be left with other faf^ts to the jury, see Texas, tS.c. E. R. v. Chapninii, 57 Tex. 75 (1832) ; Plumnier v. Eastern R. R., 73 Me. 691 (1882) ; Terre Haute R. R. v. Voelker, 129 111. 540 (1889). Doubtful cases of negligence, which have not been covered by rules of law, where "it is a matter of judgment and discretion, of sound inff ;ence, what is the deduction to be drawn from the undis- puted facts," are pure questions of fact for the jury. " It is assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life tlian does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge." Rail- road Co. V. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 (1873) ; Williams v. Grealy, 112 Mass. 79 (1873) ; Randall v. Connecticut River R. R., 132 Mass. 2G9 (1882); Teipel v. Hilsendegen, 44 Mich. 461 (1880); Stager v. Pass. Ry. Co., 119 Pa. St. 70 (1888); Kansas Pacific R. R. v. Richardson, 25 Kans. 391 (1881). " It is a matter of right in the plaintiff to have the issue of neg- ligence submitted to the jury when it depends upon conflicting evidence, or on inferences to be drawn from circumstances in regard to which there is room for a difference of opinion among intelligent men." Payne v. Troy & Boston R. R., 83 N. Y. 572 (1881) ; Jones V. East Tenn. R. R. Co., 128 U. S. 443 (1888). " Whether there was negligence or want of ordinary care in the conduct and acts of the plaintiff under all the circumstances of this case, is a question in regard to which reasonable men may honestly hold different views. This being so, it follows that we must sustain the refusal of the court below to withdraw the case from the con- sideration of the jury." Cumberland, &c. R. R. Co. v. Mangans, 51 Md. 53 (1883) ; Detroit, &c. R. R. v. Van Steinburg, 17 :\Iich. 99 (1S68). It is in this sense that it is frequently said that negligence is a question of fact. Not " that the definition of negligence is one of fact, and that the jury shall be left to their own fancies to determine what, in each case, shall be the measure to which the proof shall be applied in determining whether there is negligence, but, simply, the general rule being declared as matter of law, the jury must determine whether such facts have been proved as bring the case within that general rule." Pennsylvania Co. r. Conlan, 101 111. 93 (1881). The question of negligence, in other words, may be, and often is, a complex one involving two main questions : (1) Did the defendant do or omit to do certiiu tilings ? (2) Do these acts or omissions ( CHAP, in.] A3IERICAN NOTES. 52& constitute negligence ? The court may leave both these questions to the jury; or it may leave the first to the jury and rule, in a clear case, itself upon the second. In a doubtful case the court, not feel- ing confident of whether the reason of mankind unhesitatingly stamps the conduct as negligence, " aids its conscience by taking the opinion of the jury." Holmes, Common Law, p. 123. Due Diligence. — What is reasonable diligence in giving no- tice of dishonor to the drawer or indorser of commercial paper is, when the facts are proved or admitted, a question in many cases for the court. Walker v. Stetson, 14 Oh. St. 89 (1862) ; Bank of Upper Canada v. Smith, 4 Q. B. U. C. 483 (1847). But what is a " reasonable time " in which to cut and carry away cedar under a contract has been held to be " a (luestion for the jury to determiue upon evidence given on that subject." Jenkins v. Lykes, 19 Fla. 148 (1882). The same considerations call for this rule as affect the action of the courts in matters of negligence. The result has been reached in the same way ; l. e., by establishing rulings upon clear cases, and gradually limiting the doubtful cases in which lies the province of the jury. Prohable Cause. — So where the facts are proved or conceded, the existence of reasonable and probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution is "a question of law to be determined by the court." Taylor y. Godfrey, 36 .Me. o2S (18r)3) ; Jacks *•. Stimpson, 13 111. 701 (18r)2) ; Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189 (1858). So in an action for nuilicious prosecution, tlie supreme court of the United States say : " It is true tliat what amounts to probable cause is a question of law in a very important sense. In the cele- brated ease of Sutton v. Johnstone, 1 T. R. 493 (178G), tlie rule is thus laid down : ' Tlie question of probable cause is a mixed ques- tion of law and fact. Wliether the circumstances alleged to show it probable are true and existed, is a question of fact ; but wliether, supposing them to be true, they amount to a probable cause, is a question of law.' This is the doctrine generally adopted. M'Cor- mick ;;. Sisson, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 71.5 (1827); Besson c. Southard, 10 N. V. 23(5 (1851) ; " Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 IT. S. 187. 194 (1878). In all these cases wliere, if the facts were admitted or otherwise settled, the determination of due care, reasonable and probable cause, due diligence, &c., would be matter of law for the court, the facts themselves are in dispute, it is the <luty of the court to submit tlie (piestion of fact to the jury with alternate rulings of law appro- ])riate to the jury's action in determining tlie issue of fact. Ash v. Marlow, 20 Ohio, 119 (1851); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187 (1878). I'KKMMmAHY Fact.s. — In discharging his duty of presiding and enforcing the rules relating to the admissibility of evidence, either m ■ W i'! i! 9 Wi^ f|:i 52« AMERICAX NOTES. [part I. sua sponto or when called upon to act, many occasions arise where such admissibility dejieuds on the determination by the judge of some preliminary fact. Such decision is final, and not reviewable on exceptions. Walker V. Curtis, 116 Mass. 98 (1874). Such finding " is a finality as niuoh as the verdict of a jury upon a question of fact." State t>. Tike, 41) H. II. 301) (1875). " But his ruling as matter of law that such fact renders the evidence competent or incompetent is the subject of re- vision." Com. V. Gray, 1119 Mass. 474 (1880). Whether a dying declaration was made under a sense of impending dissolution is a question for the court, its weight being a matter for the jury. State v. Tilghman, 11 Ired. Law, 513 (1850). The competency of a witness to a codicil to a will is " in the first instance clearly a matter for the court." Wilson v. Van Leer, 11.'7 Pa. St. 371 (1889). So whether, in case of a disputed handwriting, a certain writing is so far proved to be genuine as to serve as a safe standard for comparison, is a preliminary fact to be settled by the court. Com. V. Coe, 115 Mass. 481, 603 (1874). So whether an expert is sufficiently qualified to testify is a ques- tion of fact for the court. Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H, 510 (1800) ; St;ite V. Cole, 94 X. C. 958 (1886) ; I'reeper v. Reg., 15 Sup. Ct. of Can. 401 (1888) ; Com. v. Williams, 105 Mass. 62 (1870). Whether the subject on which the evidence of the expert is offered is such that the jury might reasonably be expected to derive benefit from expert opinion, is a matter of law. Shatter v. Evans, 53 Cal. 31i (1878"); Wliite v. Ballon, 8 All. 408 (1804) ; Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. .')46 (1860). So the question whether a confession offered in evidence is " vol- untary," presents a fact for the decision of the judge. Ellis v. State, 65 Miss. 44 (1887); State r. Pike, 49 X. IL 399, 407 (1870). This question cannot be submitted in toto to the jury except by consent. "The prisoner has always the right to require of the judge a decision of the com]ietency of the evidence, and even after the judge has decided the evidence to be competent, the prisoner has the right to ask of the jury to disregard it, and to give no weight to it. because of tlie circumstances under wliich the con- fessions were obtained." Com. r. Calder, 120 Mass. 464 (1879). Where secondary evidence is offered of the contents of a written document, the question whetlier a sufficient foundation has been laid for its admission by accounting for failure to produce the original, is a preliminary question of fact for the court. Bell v. Keiidrick. 25 Fla. 778 (1889). Wlietlier a witness is (]ualified to testify, as being of sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and solemnity of an oatli, is (]uestion of fact for the court. Com. v. Lynes, 142 Mass. 577 I * ' t CHAI>. 111.] AMEinCAN NOTES. 52' (1886) ; IVterson v. State, 47 (Ja. ol'4 (1S73) ; State v. Severson, 78 la. Gi5o (1889) ; Coleman v. Com., L'6 Chutt. 8G5 (1874) ; Udy o. Sttnvart, 10 Out. Rei). 591 (l88G). Tilt! court may suspend his examination as to competency to allow the witness to be instructed as to the nature and meaning of the oatii, e. ij., 'ny a christian minister. Com. c. Lynes, 142 Mass. ;'577 (188(5). Till) finding of the court may be reviewed by an upper court upon evidi'iice duly reported. Udy i\ Stewart, 10 Out. liep. 591 (l88G). But the court will be very loath to disturb the finding of the lower court. "He has the child before him. We can only judge of its capaiiity from written evidence." Peterson r. State, 47 Ga. 524 (1873). 'riie court's inquiry in case of youth may extend to the mental capacitv of a v.itness. Simpson c. State, 31 Ind. 90 (1869) ; Com. V. Mulfins, 2 All. 295 (18G1). Tliis inquiry must be condiifted by the iudsre himself in open court and in presence of the jjarties. He cannot properly delegate the duty to some one else out of court, and decide according to the report. Simpson /■. State, 31 Iiul. 90 (1869). No case has been found that " the right to the preliminary exam- ination, when insisted on, could be denied." Seeley v. Engell, 13 N. Y. 542 (1861)). " The decision upon this particular question of the admissibility of the evidence is ordinarily conclusive, unless the judge sees tit to reserve or report the question. . . . There is no rule of law that, in order to render the testimony admissible, such prior fact must be established by a weight of evidence which will amount to a demon- stration, and shut out all doubt on the question of its existpnee. It is only necessary that tiiere should be so much evidence as to make it proper to submit the wliole evidence to the jury." Com. /•. Rob- inson, 146 Mass. 571 (1888). In pursuance of its duty to enforce ••,he exercise of correct reason- ing and decide what is reasonable in connection with legal liability, it is for the court to determine, as matter of law. whether there is any evidence on which tiie jury can. by logical rules, reasonably liiid in favour of a contested proposition of fact. School Furniture Ci). i\ Warsaw School Dist., 122 Ta. St. 494 (1888) ; State /•. Me- i!i Till", 79 N. C. 3i)3 (1887) ; Chandler r. Von Ifoeder. 24 How. 224 (18()lt) ; i'.ridger /•. Ashville. etc. R. W. Co.. 25 S. C. 24 (1H85). " If there is, that is suflRcitMit to send the ease to the jury, no matter liow strong niav be tlie proofs to tlie contrary." School i'uniiture Co. r. Warsaw Scliool Dist., 122 I'a. St. 794 (1888); and it is tlie duty of the judge to send it there, "although in his opinion its i)reponderance should be against the plaintiff." Cavnor /■. Old Colony R. R., 100 Mass. 208 (18GS); Eilert ,: Green Hay. &c. i{. H., 48 Wise. 606 (1879). 1 il^.iH \'^\[m ffii 52» AMERICAN NOTES. [PAKT 1. W ^' [h:f'^ .,..1 :;. " The court will not decide the question upon the preponderance of the evidence." Cook v. Union Railway Co., 125 Mass. 57 (1878). "Whether there is any evidence is a question for the judge; whether there is sufficient evidence is for the jury." Chandler r. Von Roeder, 24 How. 224 (1860). See, also, State v. Stephen, 45 La. Ann. Pt. 1, 702 (1893). Demurkek to Evidence. — A method of getting a ruling as matter of law from tlie court as to the sufficiency of certain facts to support a verdict, is by demurring to the evidence. It is the right of either party to ask the court to rule that upon the facts submitted by the opposite party, the latter has not sustained his contention. Trout v. Virginia R. R., 23 tiratt. 619 (1873) ; Kansas, &c., R. R. Co. V. Foster, 39 Kans. 329 (1888). For example, in an action for negligence, " a demurrer to the evidence must be sustained where iin unavoidable inference of con- tributory negligence arises out of tlie plaintiff's own evidence, or out of other evidence which stands uiulisputed in the case." Weber c. Cable Ry. Co., 100 Mo. 194 (1889). This right is not waived by putting in contradictory evidence. " Tne defendant, by putting in its evidence, took the chance of aiding the plaintiff's case ; bu^ it was not thereb\' deprived of the right to ask the court to direct a verdict on all the evidence." Weber v. Cable Ry. Co., 100 Mo. 194 (1889). Indeed, it is held that the party demurring must rest his case on demurring, and that overruling a demurrer where the party demur- ring does not rest, cannot be assigned for error. Columbia, &c. Railway r. Hawthorne, 144 U. S. 202 (1892). "The demurrer to evidence has long since gone out of use in this state, and ought not any longer to be regarded as a right upon whicli an exception can be jDredicated." Colegrove v. N. Y., &c. R. R., 20 N. Y. 492 (1859). So the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts say : " A demur- rer to evidence is rarely resorted to in our ])ractice, as the statutes furnish more simple and convenient ways of raising any questions of law." Golden i: Knowles, 120 Mass". 336 (1876).^ " Unless all inferences are admitted which a jury might have drawn, judges, instead of confining themselves within their province of deciding on questions of law, will also become triers of every matter of fact." Patrick /'. Hallett, 1 Johns. 241 (1806). Foreign Laws. — As has been stated, the existence of a rule of law is in reality a fact. Such facts are segregated from others largely because rules of domestic law are not the subjects of evi- dence, but are in a special sense within the cognisance of the court ns representing that branch of government whose duty it is to en- force the rights they prescribe and the standards of conduct they 4.SK«&' .. c;iiAr. 111.] AMERICAN NOTES. 52^> establisli. Wlierc the existence of a, rule of law other than those which the court is cliargud with tiie adniinistiMtivc duty of euforc- iii;', e. g., a foreign law, is a fact in issue or relevant to the issue, the reason for distinguishing rules of law from other facts at once ceases. " The existence or non-existence of a foreign law is a ques- tion of fact." Konnard v. Kennard, 63 N. H. 303 (188;")); Hortoir ('. Reed, 13 K, 1. 36(1 (1881); Williams v. Finlay. 40 Oh. St. ;i4L! (1S83); Chumasero v. Gilbeit, L'4 111. 293(1860); People r. Me- Quaid, 85 Mich. 123 (1891); Ins. (Jo. of N. America v. Forchcimcr, 8(; Ala. 541 (1888); Condit v. Blackwell, 19 X. J. Kq. 193 (18(;8); St. L. & S. F. Ky. Co. /;. Weaver, 35 Kans. 412. 425 (1886) ; Syni<' /•. Stewart, 17 La. Ann. 78 (1865) ; Klin.- p. I5ak'>r, 99 Mass. 253 ('l>'()S ) ; Eunis n. Smith, 14 llow. 400, 427 (1852) ; Charlotte v. Ciiouteau, 25 Mo. 1(55 (1857) ; Cox v. Morrow, 14 Ark. ()03 (1854) ; Polk /•. Butter- field, 9 Col. 325 (1886); Jackson r. dackson, 80 Md. 176 (18'.t4). Hut on an indictment for adultery in Vermont, the marriage uf the female defendant having been in New York and no proof being offered at the trial court as to the laws of New York, the supreme court say, speaking of the New York law, " It was not necessary to prove the law if it was known to the court at the trial, or if it is now known to be as decided on the trial." State r. Hood, 12 Vt. 396 ( 18411). To contrary effect and with better reasoning, see People v. Lam- bert, 5 Mich. 349 (1858). Pkook of FoKKKiX Law. — In the absence of statutory provis- ions, the accepted rule is that proof of the foreign law is a matter for expert testimony by those familiar with it. Kennard r. Ken- nard, 63 N. H. 303 (1885); Ennis r. Smith, 14 How. 400, 427 (1852); Owen /•. Boyle, 15 Me. 147 (1838); Pierce r. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546(1882); People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349 (1858). "The laws of Wisconsin are not, in fact or by theory of law, known to the courts of this state and must be proved, either by experts, coun- sel learned in the law of that state, or copies of its statute, with the decisions of its courts thereon." Condit r. Blackwell, 19 N. J. Eq. 193 (1863). Speaking of some of the Wisconsin decisions on cer- tain of their statutes, the learned Chancellor (Zabriskie) says: "T concur in (and would be bound by, if I did not) the conclusion at which the courts, with hesitation, but with sound reasoning, ar- rived." I/it(l. To the same effect, the supreme court of Kansas, speaking of a cause of action which arose in Arkansas, say that "If it had been proved in the case what view the supreme court of Arkansas has taken with respect to the common law in cases of this kind, we would follow its view ; and this we would do even if its views should differ from ours. If within its views the plaintiff has no cause of action, we would also hold that he has no cause of action." St. Louis, &c. Ry. v. Weaver, 35 Kaus. 412, 426 (1886). ' m !l w mm 1 1 jfii 5t' '. ' . i i 52W AMERICAN NOTKS. [part I. Speaking of the law of Virginia, the court of appeals of Mary- land say, " Tliat law is a fact to be proved in our courts, as other facts: if unwritten, by the testimony of experts; if statutory, by the law itself or exemplified copy." Baltimore &c. R. R. v. Glenn, 28 Md. 287 (1807) ; Charlotte r. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 465 (1857) ; State /•. Moy Looke, 7 Oreg. 54 (1879). So a Spanish lawyer Avho has practised in Cuba, can testify from the Commercial Code as to the law of partnerships in Cuba. Barrows c. Downs, 9 R. I. 446 (1890). " The law of a foreign country on a given subject may be proved by any person, who, though not a lawyer, or not having filled any public office, is or has been in a position to render it probable that he would make himself acquainted with it." American &c. Ins. Co. r. Rosenagle, 77 Pa. St. 507 (1875). Law of othkk States. — •' The existence of a law of another state is a (piestion of fact." Ingraham r. Hp,rt, 5 Ohio, 255 (1842); Miller r. MacVeagh, 40 111. App. 532 (1891) ; Hoyt r. lAIcXeil, 13 Minn. 390 (1868). A declaration which states the alleged effect of a statute of an- other state instead of setting it out is demurrable. Hoyt r, McNeil, 13 Minn. 390 (1868). " The relation of the United States to each other in regard to all matters not surrendered to the general government by the Constitu- tion, are those of foreign states in close friendship, each being sovereign and independent ; and the courts have generally held that therefore tlie laws of one state were to be proved in the courts of another oidy as other foreign laws."' liayley's Adm. v. Chubb, 16 Gratt. 284 (1862). But, as the Arkansas supreme court say : "Where two countries have the same origin, or were at one time associated, the courts of each are bound to take juflicial notice of what the law was when it was common to both," giving as an example the states of Missouri and Arkansas. Cox /■. Morrow, 14 Ark. 603 (1854). Where a statute of a sister state certified according to act of (Congress embraces several subjects, it need not contain all its sec- tions but only such as are relevant to the case in which it is offered. Whore in the certified statute anotlier act is referred to, the statute itself is admissible without including the statute referred to. Grant r. Coal Co., 80 I'a. St. 208 (1876). As to what is a sufficient compliance with the formalities of au- tlipiiticatioii required by tlie act of congress, see Rice's Succession, 24 Lii. Ann. 614 (1869). See also Grant r. Coal Co., 80 Ta. St. 208 (1876). Where the law of a sister state is an essential fact and no evi- dence is adduced .as to wliat it is. the court of the forum is obliged to assume as to the law of the sister state either, (1) That the common CHAP. lU.J AMERICAN NOTES. 52" law prevails in the s'Ate in question on that point. (L'j That tlift foreign law is the same as that of the forum. Which of these assumptions is indulged in, frequently depends on whether the sister state was originally settled by those using the common law of England. (1) It is assumed that the common law prevails in "those states which were originally colonies of England or carved out of sueli colonies." Norris r. Harris, 15 Cal. 21'6 (18(50) ; Miller /•. MacVeagh, 40 111. App. 632 (1891) ; Eureka Springs liy. i: Tinuuons, ol Ark. 459 (1888). " In the absence of any proof as to the statute law of Michigan, we must assume the existence there of the common law." Leather Co. r. Hardware &c. Co., 67 Mo. App. 297 (1894). In the case of Miller r. MacVeagh, uOi supni, the court were asked to rule that while the common law would be presumed to exist in all states of the American Union which were colonies of Great Britain, judicial cognisance should be taken of the fact that Dakota (the state whose law was involved) was formed out of the "Louisiana Purchase "' from France, and therefore the civil law should be pre- sumed to exist in that state. The court in declining so to rule say : '• Laws are for people and not for mere territory, as such. In the ])ortion of the Louisiana purchase from which Dakota was formed there existed no civilised community governed by any law at the time of the cession. When Dakota was peo[)led and an organised, community created in her territory it was by emigrants from states where the common law was in force, and by citizens who looked to that common law as their natural right and as forming the source and basis of their jurisprudence." The same ruling is made in the courts of California. Norris c. Harris, 15 Cal. 226 (1800) ; and in those of Arkansas concerning the state of Missouri. Eureka Springs Ry. v. Timmons, 51 Ark. 459(1888); and in those of Missouri. Roll r. St. Louis Smelting Co., 52 Mo. App. (iO (1892). " Hut no such presumption can apjdy to states in wliich a govern- ment already existed at the time of their accession to the country, as Florida, Louisiana, and Texas. They had already laws of their own, which remained in force until by tin; proper authority they were abrogated and now laws were pronuilgated. With them there is no more presumption of the existence of the common law than of any other law." Xorris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 22G, 25.'] (1860), ^kt Field, C. J. So he^ ■• of Texas in Brown /'. Wright. 58 Ark. 20 (I89;i). (2) Wlien the sister state was not settled by men living under the common law, and had at the time of the cession to the United States an organised jurisprudence, the assum])tion of the prevalence of the common law can no longer he indulged, and recourse must be lit ..l^.flHilH iiir!l .1 I 'ii 52" AMKUICAN NOTES. [PAKT I liail to another aHsuniptioii, viz., — that the law of the state in ques- tion is the same as that of the forum. "The hiw of the sister state of Illinois, both statutory and common, in the absence of any showing to the contrary is presumed to be the same as that of our own state." Bierhaus r. ^,\. U. Tel. Co., 8 Ind. App. L'46, 2(53 (1H93); Oak Leather Co. r. Union Bank, 9 Utah, 87 (1893); Haggin /•. Haggin, 35 Xeb. 375 (1892); Palmer r. Atchison &c. 11. E., 101 Col. 187 (1894) ; Scroggin v. :McClelland, 37 Neb. 044 (1893) ; Chapman v. Brewer, 43 Neb. 890 (1895) ; 8illi- nian i: Tliornton (Tex.), 30 S. W. 700 (1895). This rule applies also to England. AVickershan v, Johnston, 104 Cal. 407 (1894). So the rate of interest in a sister stt'te will be presumed to be the same fixed by the statutes of Nebraska. I'itz- gerahl r. Fitzgerald &c. Construction Company, 41 Neb. 374 (1<S94). Of the two assumptions, the second seems the one sustained by the weight of authority. " It is almost universally held that where there is no proof of the law of another state, nor judicial knowledge of the origin of such state whicli would raise a presumption that the common law prevails there, it will be presumed that the law of the forum in which the issue is being tried is the law of that state on the question under consideration.'" Keni;ebrew v. Southern &c. Co. (Ala.), 17 So. Eep. 545 (1895). The feeling on the ])art of the court M'hich leads to this course is well stated in an early California case. "The question then recurs as to what is to be i>resumed as to the law of Texas, in the absence of any proof on tlie subject. We can perceive only one way in which the question can be answered, and that is to presume the law of tliat state to be in accordance with our own. We are called upon to determine the matter in controversy', and are not at liberty to follow our own arbitrary notions of justice. We cannot take judicial notice of the laws of Texas, and we must therefore, as a matter of necessity, look to our own laws as furnishing the only rule of decision on which we can act; and to meet the requirement that the case is to be disposed of according to the laws of Texas, the presumption is indulged that the laws of the two states are in ac- cordance with each other." Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 22C, 253 (18(50), citing Smoot r. Russell, 1 Martin, N. S. 523 (1823); Allen V. Watson, 2 Hill (S. C), 319 (1834) ; Syme v. Stewart, 17 La. Ann. 78 (18(55) ; Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gill. 377 (1848). If the laws are in fact different, the party desiring the benefit of the difference " can only obtain the benefit of the foreign law by making it a part of the case in evidence." Cox r. Morrow, 14 Ark. 603 (1854). See also Simms v. So. Express Co., 35 Kans. 129 (1808). The same result is reached on other grounds by the New York court of appeals relating to the law of Scotland. It is held that Iff * I M jilAP. III.] A>rERICAN NOTES. 5213 ui'ima fiirie the lex fori governs, and wlioever desires tlic benefit of the law of any other jurisdiction must ])rove what that hiw is. Monroe c. Doughiss, 1 Seld. 447, 4")!^ (ISol). " With no proof before him as to the laws of Texas, the Chan- cellor could not determine the right to the Tyler hotel otherwise than according to our own laws." Brown c. Wright, ^.S Ark. 20 (IM!);]). The supreme court of Alabama in a case where no evidence was offered of the New York rate of interest on an insurance pol- icy decline to make either assumption and treat the evidence as iailing as to an essential fact. Ins. Co. of N. America v. Forcheimer, .SC) Ala. o41 (18S(S). So also in California, Cavender v. Guild, 4 Cal. L'.")() (1854). It is not perceived why such a course is not, in point «)f principle, correct. I'koof, now MADK. — If the law in question is said to be estab- lished by the decisions of the courts of the sister state, the courts of the former will examine the officially printed reports of their decisions. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in an equity case, say : " The question of what is the law of Massachusetts is a ques- tion of fact, to be determined on evidence, and on such a question we can have no better evidence than the decisions of the highest judicial court of the state." Horton r. Heed, 13 R. I. 3(i(; (1881) ; Kennard /•. Kenna,rd, 03 N. H. 303 (1885) ; Ames v. McCamber, 124 Mass. 85 (187S). But there seems force in the decision of the .supreme court of Kansas. "If it be claimed that we should take judicial notice of the common law of Arkansas, we would answer that we cannot do so. The courts of this state may take judicial notice of the common law of Kansas, and what it would be except for our own statutes or our own written law ; and for this jjurpose our courts may take judicial notice of all tlie judicial decisions of this country, and of all other countries which have adopted the common law of England. But for the purjjose that the courts of this state shall know as a fact in a particidar case what the common law of some other state is, such law nuist be proved like any other fact." St. Louis, &c. Ry. r. Weaver, 35 Kans. 412 (1886). See. to same effect, Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me. 147 (1838). Unofficial publications, e. g., Brightley's Pennsylvania Digest, if properly authenticated as reliable, will be admitted for the same purpose. People r. McQuaid, 85 ]Mich. 123 (1891), where the Digest was admitted on the statement of a Pennsylvania minister that he had consulted it and seen it used in court, and that it had continued publication for twenty years. The court add : " It was within the knowledge of the trial court that Brightley's Digest is not a fugitive publication." The use of official reports of decisions is frequently provided for :! i !■'■ ill)' m i F If' n ) ! 1 !! n '' ! ( m :ll bh»m: i ri 621* AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AUT I. by statute. Bridger r. Asheville, &c. R. R., 25 S. C. 24 (18Huj. The volume must be produced and offered in evidence; it is not suf- ficient merely to refer to it. Ihld. Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 (Jonn. 3G1 (18-47) is to the same effect. " The written foreign law may be proved by a copy of the law properly authenticated. . . . They may be verified by an oath or by an exemplification of a copy, under the great seal of a state, or by a copy proved to be a true copy by a witness who has examined and compared it with the original, or by a certificate of an officer, properly authorised by law to give the copy ; which certificate muh-t be duly proved. But such modes of proof as have been mentioned are not to be considered exclusive of others, especially of codes of laws and accepted histories of the law of a country." Eunis /•. Smith, 14 How. 400, 427 (1852) ; Charlotte r. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 4G5 (1857). The validity of a discharge in bankruptcy under the law of Canada can only be proved by a witness who produces a copy of the law authorising it. " Some copy of the law wliich the witness (;ould swear was recognised in the Province as autlioritative should have been ju-oduced." Spaulding v. "Vincent, 24 Vt. 501 (1852). See also Pub. Sts. of Mass., Chap. 169, § 73. So a printed voIuuh! of the laws of New Brunswick, j)urporting and proved to be official, has been admitted as evidence of these statutes. Owen /•. Boyle, 15 Me. 147 (1838). " In the admiralty, as in other courts, foreign law must be pleaded and proved as a fact. ... I believe it to be the true doctrine that the unwritten law of England may be proved in this court, not by experts only, but also by text-writers of authority and by the printed reports of adjudged cases; and that the unwritten law may be prove'" by the printed copies, and be construed ,with the aid of text-books as well as of experts." The Pawashick, 2 Lowell, 142 (1872). If tlie government of the court of the forum has itself promul- gated a foreign law or ordinance as authentic, that promulgation is sufficient proof of such law. Talbot r. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 38 (1801). To WHOM PuooK IS TO BE MADE. — "The rulc of the common law undoubtedly is, that the laws of other states and nations are to be proved here by documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses ; in which case the jury are the judges of the proofs, as in other questions of fact." Lockwood r. Crawford, 18 Conn. 3G1 (1847); Thra,sher r: Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234 (1831) ; Kline r. Baker, 09 Mass. 253 (18(18) : Moore /-. Gwynn, 5 Ired. 187 (1844); Ingraham r. Hart, 11 Ohio, 255 (1842); Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400,427 (1852). The qualification of these experts is a preliminary question of fact for the court. Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253 (1808) ; Hall /-. Costello, CHAP. 111.] AMEIUCAN NOTKS. ii-J. )16 48 N. H. 17G (1868). Ami \vh»ne tlui (luestioii to which the existence of the foreign law is relevant is one for tlie decision of the court, e. g., tile admission of evidence, "the evidence to enable the decision to be made must of course be addressed to the court." Vickard /•. Uailey, 2G N. 11. 152 (1852) ; Thrasher c. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234 (1831). But even this question the court can leave, if in doubt, to the jury, with alternative instructions. Thrasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234 (1831). Holman v. King, 7 Mete. 384, 388 (1844), applies this rule even to the construction of foreign statutes. Like any other finding of fact, a finding of the existence of a foreign law is usually final. Kennard /•. Kennard, 63 N. H. 303 (1885) ; Williams r. Fiiday, 40 Oliio St. 342 (1883). " When the law of another state is in disput*', it is to be determined as a question of fact by the court or jury trying the case. If the evidence was conflicting, as the plaintiff contends, we have no authority to revise the finding, although the judge has reported tlie evidence." Ames r. McCamber, 124 Mass. 85 (1887). A question much debated in Charlotte /•. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 465 (1857), was this : Whether proof of the existence of a foreign law should first be made to the court or jury. The court conclude : " The decided weight of the American authorities goes to the length of estal)lishing the doctrine not only that it is the province and duty of tlie court to instruct the jury as to the meaning and effect of a foreign law, when proved, whether the law is written or unwritten, but that the proof must be made to the court." "It is well settled that foreign laws, like foreign judgments, are to be proved as facts, and the better opinion is that the evidence should be addressed to the court and not to the jury." Pickard *•. Bailey, 26 N. H. 152, 169 (1852). On the contrary, except in cases of " a statute or judicial opinion or document," in Massachusetts, " it is a general rule, that laws of other states must be proved as facts ; and ordinarily, in a trial by jury, the question must be left to the jury to decide as a fact what the law of another state is, if it becomes material to be determined. This may in some cases prove inconvenient in practice, especially in view of the provision of our statute that the court shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact ; but such is the established rule in this commonwealth." Afford v. Spaulding, 156 i»tass. 65 (1892). " When the evidence admitted consists entirely of a written docu- ment, statute, or judicial opinion, the question of its construction and effect is for the court alone." Kline r. Baker, 99 Mass. 253 (1808); Haines r. Hanrahan, 105 :\rass. 480 (1870); Gibson v. .Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 81 (1887) ; Lycoming, etc., In- surance Co. V. Wright, 60 Vt. 515 (1888) ; Charlotte r. Chouteau, 33 Mo. 194 (1862) ; Afford v. Spaulding, 156 Mass. 65 (1892). * ! i I if i; I \- ^mi ^ I r)-ji« AMEIMCAN NOTKS. [I'AUT I. Sen also, to the effect tliat tlie court eiiii, if so disi)Ose(i, leave tlie question of eonstiuctiou of a statute to the jury, lloliuau v. King, 7 Mct(!. 3H4, .'588 (1844). l>ut tilt' suiUL'iuu judicial court of Massachusetts will not, on exceptions, consider any statute of another state which is not made part ot the bill of exceptions. Haines r. Jlannhan, 10/) Mass. 480 (1870). To same effect, Drake r. (ilover, 30 Ala. 382 (1807). " The statute being authentieated in the manner pointed out by the constitution of the United States and the act of Congress, both the fact of its existence and its proper construction is matter for the court." Moore /'. Gwynu, 5 Ired, 187 (1844); State /•. .Jactkson. 2 Dev. 508 (1830). "And if the evidence is uncontroverted and will not s>ip])ort the action, it is the duty of the court so to instruct the jury.'" Kline r. IJaker, 99 Mass. 'J63 (1868). In the North Carolina case, which actually was an instance of a written statute, the court lay down a broader rule than seems sus- tained by the current of authority. "The existence of a foreign law is a fact. The court cannot judicially know it, and therefore it must be proved ; and the proof, like all other, necessarily goes to the jury, lint when established, the meaning of the law, its con- struction and effect, is the province of the court. It is a matter of professional science." State /-. Jackson (it/ji Kiipra). Statutoky Provisions. — It has been usually provided that printed copies of th(^ statutory laws of any state of the American Union, apparently published by official authority, will be received in the courts of the forum as prhmi fiirir evidence of the existence of such statutes. People V. McQuaid, 85 Mich. 123 (1891) ; bridges /•. Asheville K. K. Co., 25 S. C. 24 (1886); Martin r. Payne, 11 Tex. 292 (1854) ; Clan- ton ('. Barnes, 50 Ala. 260 (1874). So if a pamphlet copy of laws of a single session purporting to be published by authority. Ashley v. Root, 4 All. 504 (1862). It is sufficient that the title-page of the volume ^uestion bears the words " By authority." Merrifield v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 150 (1857). So " Printed by order of the Governor " is sufficient Wilt r. Cutler, 38 Mich. 189 (1878). Under such circumstances parol evidence or an unofficial copy of a statute cannot be received. Martin v, Payne, 11 Tex. 292 (1854). ClUP. IV.] DISrOBITlON TO liLUEi' INSTINCTIVfi, CHAPTER IV. THE GROUNDS OF BKMEF. § 50.' We proceed now to a brief consideration of the Oenaral Nature and Principles of Evidence. No inquiry is here proposed into the origin of human knowledge ; it being assumed, on the authority of approved writers, that all which men know is referable, in a philosophical view, to perception and reflection. But, in fact, the knowledge acquired by an individual through his own percep- tion and reflection is but a small part of what he possesses ; much of what we are content to regard and act upon as knowledge, having been acquired through the perception of others.* It is not easy to conceive that the Supreme Being, whose wisdom is so con- spicuous in all His works, constituted man to believe only upon his own personal experience ; since, in that case, the world could neither be governed nor improved ; and society must remain in the state in which it was left by the first generation of men. On the contrary, during the period of childhood we believe implicitly almost all that is told us ; and we thus are furnished with informa- tion which we could not obtain for ourselves, but which is necessary at the time for our present protection, or as the means of future improvement. This disposition to confide in the veracity of others, and to believe what tliey say, may be termed inMinctire. At an early period, however, we begin to find that of the things told to us some are not true ; and thus our implicit reliance on the testi- mony of others is weakened ; first, in regard to particular things, in which we have been deceived ; then, in regard to persons, whose falsehoods we have detected ; and, as these instances multiply upon us, we gradually become more and more distrustful of statements made to us, and learn by experience the necessity of testing them by certain rules.' " Confidence," exclaimed Lord Chatham, on a * Gr. Ev. § 7. nearly verbatim. * Abercr. on Intell* Pow., I'art 2, p. •\2. * Id. Part 2, § 3, p. 73. 63 v\ n 111 1. ; ■ : I m m ' ' 1 . 1 i ■ i i <! I 1 i INSI'INCTIVK Ti:XUKNCY TO BKLIEF. fPART T. memoraUe occasion, " is a plant of slow growth in an aged Losom ; " and indeed, it may be generally observed, that, as our ability to obtain knowledge by other means increases, onr instinc- tive and indiscriminate reliance on testimony diminishes, by yielding to a more rational belief.' Still, in every period of life, i-.: P> • Gr. Ev. § 7, 11. vorlmtim. See also Gamb. (juido, 87; M'Kiniion, I'liil. of Ev. 40. Dr. Ri'id, in his In(]uiry into the Human Mind, c. (i, § '24, pp. 190, 197 of his collected Works, observes : — " The wise sind beneficent /viithor of Nature, who intended thut we should be social creatures, and that we should receive the jjreatest and most im])ortant part of our knowledgo by the information of others, hath, for these purposes, implanted in our nature two principles, tliat tally with e:ich othia\ The first of these prin- ciples is a propensity to speak truth, and to use the sij^ns of laiignajije, so as to convey our real sentiments. This principle has a powerful opera- tion, even in the greatest liars ; for where they lie once th(!y sjieuk truth a hundred times. Truth is always uppermost, and is the natural issue of the mind. It requires no art or traininp, no inducement or temi)ta- tion. but only that we yield to a natural impulse. Ijyinfj, on the contrary, is doing violence to our nature; an<l is never pructisi'<l, even by the worst men, without some temptation. Spesikiui:; truth is like using onr naturiil food, which we would do from appetite, altlioiigh it answered no oi'.d ; but lying is like taking physic, which is nauseous to the tiiste, and which no man takes but for some end, which he cannot other- wise! uttain. * • * * Anotlier original ])riiici))le, im])lanti'd in us by the Su])reme Bi'ing, is a disposition to contide in tlu! vin'acity of othei-s, and to Ixilieve wliat tliey ti'U us, Tiiis is the counterpart to the former : and as that may be calli'il the )irinci])lo of vtawity, we shall, for want of' a projier name, call tliis tlie iiriuciiijo of credulity. It is unlimited in <hd- dnni until they meet witli instiinces of deceit and fulsi'hodd ; iii.d it con- tains a v.'ry considerable degree of strength through life. If nature had left the mind of the speaker in eqiii- librio, withr>ut any inclination to the side of truth more than to that of falsehood, children would lie as often as they speak truth, until reason was so far ripened, as to suggest the im- prudence! of lying, or c<mscienc(!, as to suggest its immorality. And if nature had left the mind of the hearer in equilibrio, without any inclination to the side of belief more than to that of disbelief, we should take no man's word, until wo had positive evidence that bespoke truth. His testimony would, in this case, have no more authority than his dreams, which may be true or false : but no man is disposed to believe them, on this account, that they were dreamed. It is evident, that, in the matter of testimony, the balance of human judgment is by nature in- clined to the side of belief ; and turns to that side of its(>lf, when there is nothing put into the opposite scale. If it was not so, no proposition, that is uttered in discourse would be be- lieved, iintil it was examined and tried by reason: and most men would be unaiilc! to find reasons for believing the thousiindtb part of what is told them. Such distrust and incredulity would deprive! us of the! gre'atest benefits of se)ciety, anel ])lace us in a worse cejiidition than tliat eif sav- ages. Childre'ii. e)n this su])pe)sitie)n, woiilil hi- alisolute'ly ine're'eliilous, anel tlierefori! absolute'ly ine'ii])able e)f in- structicin; tliose- wlio hiid little kneiw- le'dge eif humiin life, and of the' man- ners anel cliarae'terse)f men, we)ulel be in the next ele'gre!e incre^elulous ; anel the! me)st e're-duleius me'U we)ulel be those of gi'e'iite'st expi'rience!, anel e)f the elee>|M!st Jie'ue'tratieiu ; be'e'aiisei, in miiny e'ase-s, thety woulel bi! able to find ge)e)d re'a<e)ns feir b(!lie'ving te'slimeaiy, which the> we!iik anel the igiie)rant e'oulel not elise'eiver. In a word, if cruelulity woio the effect of H CHAP. IV.] INSTINCTIVE TENDKNCY TO BELIRF. and in every state of intellectual culture, man is instinctively more prone to believe than to disbelieve the testimony of others, and this disposition towards credulity may be regarded as a fundamental princi[)le of our moral nature, implanted in us by the Almighty for the widest and most beneficent purposes. As such it constitutes the general basis upon which all evidence may be said to rest. §51.' Subordinate to this paramount and original principle, evidence rests upon our fnifh in hnmnn trutimony, as sanctioned by experience ; that is, upon the generally experienced truth of the statements on oath of men of integrity, having capacity and oppor- tunity for observation, and without apparent influence from pas-ion or interest to pervert the truth. This belief is strengtlicned by our knowledge of the narrator's reputation for veracity and intelligence, by the absence of conflicting testimony, and oy the presence of that which is corroborating and cumulative.' § 52. In the hasty progress of a trial at Nisi Prius, it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to ascertain, with anything like cer- tiiinty, what characters the witnesses respectively deserve for honesty and intelligence, and how far they are actuated by inte- rested, malignant, or other improper motives. A rigid cross- examination, skilfully applied,* will, however, often tlirow much light upon these subjects; while a careful attention to the demea- nour of the witness is always a good guide. While simplicity, minuteness, and ease are the natural accompaniments of truth, the language of witnesses coming to impose upon the jury is usually laboured, cautious, and indistinct.* We have, too, more or less \\ rciisoninp; and oxpoiienco, it must prow up mul {jatlicr ,sti'('ii,!.'th, in tho siiiiio projortinn as roasun and cx- pciicnco (.(). ]$'it if it is the gilt of nature, it will 1'M strongest in child- hood, pud liuiilt d aiul restiainod by I'xpciii'iice ; and tho most supcriicial view of human lito shows, that the last is really tho east, aiul not the first." ' (Jr. ]')v. § 10, nearly voihatiuij * Arehhishop Whately, in his jou d'esprit, " Historic ])oul)t8 relative to Najudeon lUiniuj parte," clearly states tho nuiiii tests of human Vi'rncity. lie says: "I suppose it ■will not 1)0 deiii(>d that the three following are among the nwst im- portont points to be ascertained, in deciding on tho crodihility of ■wit- nesses : first, whether they have tho means of gaining correct informa- tion; Becouilly, whether they have any interest in concealing truth, or propagating falsehood; and, thirdly, whi'ther thev agree in their testi- mony."— I'. U, (ithcd. 3 In the Tiehhorue trial of 1871, Mr. Hawkins' cross-exauu'nation of Mr. llaigeut should he cai'efully studied, as being the best modern exam])le of forensic ability in that direction. * ( 'lianning, !•>. of Christ. ;3rd vol. of Works, ;ij(l. I'll I i tin DEMEANOUJl OF WITXKSSES — TESTS OF J'RUTH. [PAKT 1. conclusive indications of insincerity or falsehood when we find a witness over-zealous on behalf of his party ; exaggerating circum- stances ; assuming an air of bluster and defiance ; ' answering without waiting to hear the question ; forgetting facts where ho would ^ . open to contradiction ; minutely remembering others, which he knows cannot be disputed ; ^ reluctant in gpiving adverse testimony ; replying evasively or flippantly ; ' pretending not to hear the question, for the purpose of gaining time to consider the effect of his answer ; affecting indifference ; or often vowing to God* and protesting his honesty.* In the testimony of witnesses of truth there is, on the other hand, a calmness and simplicity ; a naturalness of manner ; an unaffected readiness and copiousness of detail, as well in one part of the narrative as another ; and an evident disregard of either the facility or difficulty of vindication or detecticm.^ § 63. Besides these tests of truth, which are obviously of value in fixing what amount of credit is due to each individital witness, certain general rules must be borne in mind, as bearing upon the relative merits of particular classes of witnesses. It has been said that " a propensity to lying has been always, more or less, a pecu- liar feature in the character of an enslaved people, — accustomed to oppression of every kind, and to be called upon to render strict account of every trifle done, not according to the rules of justice, but as the caprice of their masters may suggest ; — it is little to be wondered at if a lie is often resorted to as a supposed refuge from punishment, and that thus an habitual disregard is engendered."^ This passage accounts in some measure for the lamentable neglect of truth evinced by most Oriental nations, by Kussians, and by some of the Irish peasantry. • ' ' Asseveration blustering in your face Makes contradiction such a hopeless case." Cowi'ER, Conversation. • "For, when we risk no contra- diction, It proni])ts the tongue to deal in fiction." Gay's Fuhles, Part I., Fahlo x. • " All persons who have been accustomed to soo witnesses in a oourt of justice know, that those who are stating falsehoods are extronuily apt to give flippant and impertinent answers." Per Mr. Brougham on the Queen's trial, 1820. • "And oven when sober truth prevails throughout, Thoy swear it, till afHrmanco breeds a doubt." CowpEH, C'jnvermlion. • 1 St. Ev. 547. • Greenl. on Tost, of Evang. § 40. ' Bj). of Tasnuiuia'e Leot. oa Christ. Catucliism, -519. 56 CHAP. IV.] TESTIMONY OF WOMEN. § 54. Again, aa exaggeration chiefly springs from an innate vain love of the marvellous,^ and is most remarkable in the softer sex,^ a prudent man will, in general, do well to weigh with some caution the testimony of female mtuesses. This is the more neces- sary, in consequence of the extensive and dangerous field of false- hood opened up by mere exaggeration ; for, as truth is made the groundwork of the picture, and fiction lends but light and shade, to detect the lurking falsehood often requires much patience and acuteness.' In short, the intermixture of truth disarms the suspicion of the candid, and sanctions the ready belief of the malevolent.* If due allowance be made for this feminine weak- ness of a proneness to exaggerate, the testimony of women is at least deserving of equal credit to that of men. Indeed, in some respects they are superior witnesses ; for first, they are, in general, closer observers than men ; next, their memories, being less loaded with matters of business, are usually more tenacious ; and lastly, they often possess umivalled powers of simple and uuaft'ected narration.* • Bp. of Tasmania's Lecture on Clirist. Cato(il!ism, 522. ' The u-vinan of Samaria, for in- stance, whin told by our Saviour that she had had five husbands, went into the city, saymg, " Come, see a man, which told me aU things that ever 1 did." 4th ch. of St. John, v. 29. " Bp. of Tasmania's Tioct. on Christ. Catechism, 522. The difficulty of detecting falsehood engrafted on truth has been noticed by Tennyson, in the " Grandmother": — " and the paraon . . . said like- wise. That a lie which is half a truth is over the blackest of lies, That a lie which is all a lie may bo met and fought with outright. But a lie which is part a truth is a harder matter to tight." Mr. Brougham, in the Queen's ti'ial, IH'JO, said : " If an individual wore to invent a story entirely, — if he wore tf) form it completely of falsehoods, the result would bo his inevitable de- tection ; but if he build a structure of falsehood on the foundation of a little truth, he may raise a tale which, with a good deal of drilling, may put an honest man's life, or an illustrious Princess' reputation, in jeopardy." 1 Ijd. Br. 8p. 147. And, again: " The most effectual way, because the safest, of laying a plot, is not to swear too hard, is not to swear too much, or to come too directly to the point ; but to lay the foundation in existing facts and real circiimstaucos, — to knit the false with tho true, — to interlace reality with fiction,— to build the fanciful fabric up(m that which exists in nature, — and toescape detection bj- taking most especial care, as they have done lu!re, never to have two witnesses to the same facts, and also to make tho facts as modi>rate, and as little oHensive, as possible." 1 Ld. Br. Sp. 215. * Bp. of Tasnuvnia'sLect. on Christ. Catechism, 522. ' Take, for instance, the Jjettors of Madame do Sevigne, or 1-ady Mary Wortley Montagu. The only letters written by men which at all eciual them are those of tho offeuiinato Ld. Orford. 57 ^iil I 1 i' i'i:i TESTIMONY OF CHILDREN. [part I, § 55. Sir William Blackstone apjiarently tliouglit,' that loss credit was due to the testimony of a vliild than to that of an adult; but reason and experience scarcely warrant this opinion. In childliood, observation and memory are usually more active than in after life, while the motives for falsehood are less numerous and powerful. The inexperience and artlessness accompanying tender years usually render a child incapable of sustaining consistent perjury, while they operate powerfully in preventing his true testimony from being shaken. A child comprehending the drift of the questions put in cross-examination has no course but to answer them according to the fact. Thus, if he speak falsely, he is almost inevitably detected ; but if he be the witness of truth, he avoids even that suspicion of dishonesty, which sometimes attaches to older witnesses, who, though substantially telling the truth, throw discredit on their testimony, by a too anxious desire to reconcile every apparent inconsistency. § 56. The testimony of foreigners and of others, who are brought from a distance to the place of trial, requires to be scrutinised with more than common caution. Such persons speak before a tribunal, which ordinarily knows no more of them than they care for it, whose threat they have no reason to fear, and whose good opinion they utterly disregard. Consequently they are obviously far less likely to be influenced by the dread of having their falsehoods exposed than witnesses living on the spot.'^ Such witnesses, even if detected of perjury, have little to fear from loss of chnraeter, and are in no real danger of punishment. A dishonest foreigner, who has attained a tolerable knowledge of our language, may, too, conceal it, and by seeking the assistance of an interpreter, obtain an opportunity of preparing with caution his answer to any incon- venient question during the time that the interpreter is furnish- ing him with a needless translation.^ § 57. The testimony against a prisoner of pnlicrme))^ cnnstnhh's, and others employed in the suppression and detection of crime, pliould usually be watt^hed with care ; not because they inten- tionally pervert the truth, but because their professional zeal and « 4 lU. Poin. 'JKi. id. p. 241. » rcrMr.liroii^'liumonthoQuoon'p .•'' Id. 1(!.S. Soo R. '. Buiko, 1869 tiJul, 1820. 1 Ld. lir. Sp. 120. Soe (Ir.), cited post, § Mil. 58 CHAP. IV.J TKSriMONY OF SKIIl.ED WITNESSES. Ii!i1)itiial contact with had men and women almnst necessarily leads tliem to ascribe nil netions to the worst motives, and to give a colouring of guilt to facts and conversations, which, in themselves, are consistent with perfect rectitude.' The creed of the police is naturally apt to be that " all men are guiltj^ till they are proved to be innocent." § •'■(S. The testimony of i^l-illrd in'fnrsKCS is perhaps that which deserves least credit with a jury. These usually speak to opinions and not to facts ; and it is often really surprising to see the facility and extent to which views can he made to coincide with wishes or interests. Skilled witnesses do not, indeed, wilfully misrepresent what they think: but their judgments have often become so warped by regarding the subject from only one point of view, that they are, in truth, not capable of forming an independent opinion even when they would conscientiously desire to do so. Being zealous partisans, their belief becomes synonymous with the Apostle's^ definition of Faith, "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." Lord Campbell once said, " Skilled witnesses come with such a bias on their minds to support the cause in which they are embarked, that hardly any weight should be given to their evidence." ' § 59. Coincidences in the testimony of independc^nt witnesses afford a t/iird ground for the credibility of evidence. Such coincidences, when numerous, and presenting themselves as un- designed, or incidental, necessarily produce a prodigious effect in enforcing belief; because, if the witnesses had concerted a plot, the coincidences would almost inevitably have been con- verted by cross-examination into contradictions ; * while, if the supposition of collusion, or that some deception has been practised on the witnesses, be excluded, then coincidences and harmony in I'l! ii ^ !|i!!i!l • Sno jiost,, § f)8. ' E|). to tliL! IFclircwa, c. xi., v. 1. ' Tracy Poer., l.S-i;j. Sot; post, § fi.S. * Mr. Broupjham said on the (iucon's ti'inl ; -•• Wliy worn tlioro iiovur t\v;) witnesses to tho siiiiu! I'lict? Bi'ciiuso it is (liiiif^erous ; ln'caiiso, when you live umldu;; ii jilot, you bUouM liavo oue wituoBb to a livct, and finothor to a confirmntion ; liiivo sonu' thiiij^'s ti'iio. wliieli iiiiini;'iMch- ahlecvidciice (Mil jirovi"; other tliiii>,'S tiiliricateil, without which tlio truo would hii of no avail, — but avoid calling two witiu'sscs to llio saiiio thiu^' at tho same time. l)r<Muse the rro-*s-examiiiatioii is (^xtrenielv likelv to make them ('(nitradict oach othor." 1 lid. Br. Sp. 'lid, 1820. 69 ■n'it ' m I ■>' Rf f . CX)INCIDENCES IN TESTIMONY. [ PART 1. ill t the evidence of several persons can be explainpcl upon no otiior hypothesis than that their individual statements aie true. Each witness taken singly may be notorious for lying ; but tlie chances against their all agreeing by accident in the same lie may be so great as to render the agreement morally impossible.' It has been remarked, that " in a number of concurrent testi- monies, where there has been no previous concert, there is a probability distinct from that which may be termed the sum of the probabilities resulting from the testimonies of the wit- nesses ; a probability which would remain, even though the witnesses were of such a character as to merit no faith at all. This probability arises purely from the concurrence itself. That such a concurrence should spring from chance, is as one to infinite ; that is, in other words, morally impossible. If, there- fore, concert be excluded, there remains no cause but the reality of the fact." * § GO. Lord Mansfield gave expression to the truth of this prin- ciple when he once observed, " It is objected that the books [Keble's and Freeman's Reports] are of no authority ; but if both the reporters were the worst that ever reported, if ■suhntnidially they report a case in the same way, it is aemonstration of the truth of what they report, or they could not agree."' Dr. Paley, in his Evidences of Christianity, says that " the usual character of human testimony is substantial truth nudor circumstantial raricti/. This is what the daily experience of courts of justice teacb^s. When accounts of a transaction come from the mouths of different wit- nesses, it is seldom that it is not possible to pick out apparent or real inconsistencies between them. These inconsistencies are studiously displayed by an adverse pleader, but oftentimes with little impression upon the minds of the judges. On the contrary, a close and minute agreement induces the suspicion of confederacy and fraud." * Theae last observations apply with almost over- > Aber. on IntoU. Pow., Part 2, § 3, p. 91. ' CumpboU's Philos. of Rhotoric, ch v., b. 1, par. 3, p. 125 ; Wbi'.toly's lihotoric, Part 1, ch. 2, § 4, pj). S'J, £9. » E. V. Genge, 1774. Tho ■word "substantially" hero used is highly important, with a view to tho ques- tion of collusion, sinco it is scarcely possible that several independent witneHses should tell precis oly the wamo tale, without any vajiatioa. * Part 3, ch. 1, p. I'oS. 60 ini CHAP. IV.] PROBAlilLITY OF liVIDEXCE. whelming force when the facts deposed to consist of conversations, or of a scries of trifling and unimportant events, and the testiiuouy is given atter the lapse of a considerable interval of time.' §61.^ Fourthh/, in receiving the knowledge of facts from the testimony of others, men are much iullueuced by their accordance with facts previoits/f/ kiio- n or hcUcvcd ; and this constitutes what is termed their probahi/ifi/. Statements, thus probable, are received upon evidence much less cogent than is requii'ed for the belief of those whicb do not accord with previous knowledge ; but while such statements are more readily received, ;uid justly relied upon, care should be taken lest all others be unduly distrusted. While unbounded credulity is the attribute of weak minds, — which quo magis nesciunt, eo magis admirantur, — indiscriminate scepticism belongs only to those who, affecting to make their own knowledge and observation the exclusive standard of probability, forget that they are liable to be misled even by their own senses.^ Such persons, therefore, if they intend to sustain a truly consistent character, shoidd act like Moliere's Docteur, in "Le Mariago Force," who, in answer to Sganarelle's statement that he had come to see him, replied, " Seigneur Sganarelle, changez, s'il vous plait, cette fafon de parler. Notre philosophie ordonne de ne point ^uoncer de proposition decisive, de parler de tout aveo incertitude, de suspendre toujours son jugement ; et par cette raison vous ne pouvez pas dire, je suis venu, raais, il me semble que je suis venu."* ]']ven sceptical philosophers, true to the nature of man, but incon- sistently with their avowed principles, receive a large portion of their knowledge upon testimony which has been derived, not from their own experience, but from that of other men ; and they will even do this about matters which are at variance with their own personal observation. Thus they receive with confidence the testi- mony of the historian in regard to the occurrences of ancient times ; that of the natur list and the traveller, in regard to the natural history and civil condition of other countries ; and that of the astronomer, respecting the heavenly bodies ; facts which, upon ' See further on this interesting subject, Greonl. on Tost, of Evang. ' Gr. Ev. § 8, in great part. • Abercr. on Intell. Pow., Pai't 2. § 3, p. 74. Channing, on E''. of llovoiiled llelig., "^rd vol. of V/orks, p. IK), obsorvos — '■ All liiy senses have aomotimes given false reports." « Scene 8. 61 J 'V !, ^ 1 II 11 i' i ACCOKDANCE VVlTli PKEViOUS KNOWLEDGE. [I'AKT f. the narrow basis of their own "firm and unalterable experience," which is so much relied upon by Hume, they ought to reject, as wholly unworthy of belief^ § 62. The sceptical philosopher is not the only person, however, who is reluctant to lend fuith to a narrative of facts, which do not strictly accord with preijonceived opinions that are mistaken for knowledge. Persons of a similar stamp of mind to his are abundant in all ranks and conditions. Thus, the king of Siam rejected the testimony of the Dutch ambassador, that, in his country, water was sometimes congealed into u solid mass ; for it was utterly repugnant to his own experience ; * the stories of the Abyssinian traveller Bruce were long considered mere fictions; and in 1825, the evidence of George Stephenson, before a parlia- mentary committee, was much impaired by his venturing an opinion, that steam-carriages might possibly travel on railroads twelve miles an hour.* With his finite knowledge, man should, in truth, on the one hand, be slow to reject a narrative as incredible, merely because it is beyond, or even contrary to, his own very limited experience. On the other hand, scientific knowledge is not confined within the narrow limits of ancertained facts, but enlarges the understanding so as to prepare it for the further reception oi truth, and sets it free from many of the prejudices which influence men, whose minds are limited by merely the narrow field of actual experience. For example, Archimedes, deeply imbued as he was with science, might well have believed an account of the invention and wonderful powers of the steam-engine, which unscientific Englishmen of the last century would have rejected as incredible and absurd.* § 63.* A Jiff h basis of evidence is* the known and experienced connexion subsisting between collateral fads or circumstances satis- factorily proved, and facts and circumstances such as those which are in controversy. This is merely the legal application of a process ' Abercr. on Intell. Pow., Tart 2, § 3, pp. 79, 80. » Id. p. 75. ' Life of George Stephenson, by Samuel Smiles, 1857, oh. 19. * Abcicr. on Intell. Pow., Part 2, § 3, pp. 75, 7(). So Voltaire shrewdly observes : — " La oi le vuliriiire rit, le philosophe admire ; et il rit oii le vulgaire ouvre de grands yeux stupides d'etonnement." Vol. 42, p. 142. » Gr. Et. § 11, verbatim, except the uotaa. 62 11 r ClIAC. I V.J ClUCUMSTANTIAL KVI UKNCK. familiar in natural philosophy, namely, that of proving the truth of an hypothesis by showing its coircidence with existing phenomena. Such connections and coincidence^, may be either phj'sical or moral ; and the knowledge of them is derived from the known laws of matter and motion, from animal instincts, and from the physical, intellectual, and moral constitution and habits of man.' Their degree of force depends on their sufficiency to exclude every other hypothesis but the one under consideration, and will be considered hereafter.'^ Meanwhile a good illustration of the legal application of the piinciple is afforded by the doctrine of law by which the possession of goods recently stolen, accompanied with personal proximity in point of time and place to them by the party charged, accompanied by inability on his part to show how he came by them, naturally, though not necessarily,* excludes every hypo- thesis but that of his guilt, although the possession of the same goods at another time and place would warrant no such conclusion, since it leaves room for the hypothesis of the goods having been lawfully purchased in the course of trade. Another illustration of the same prin(3iple is afforded by the legal rule of construction •' nosciiur a sociifi," vhich implies that the meaning of words in a written instrument is ascertained by the context. § 64.* In considering this subject, it must always be borne in mind, that in the actual occurrences of human life nothing is incon- sistent. Every event, which actually transpires, has its appropriate relation and place in the vast complication of circumstances of which the affairs of men consist ; it owes its origin to those which have preceded it ; it is intimately connected with many others which occur at the same time and place, and often with those of remote regions ; and, in its turn, it gives bii-th to a thousand others whioli succeed.* In all this system of inter-dependence perfect harmony prevails ; so that a man can hardly invent a story, which, if closely II! ' For an amusinp oxample of a fact proved by a long chain of cir- cumstantial ovidenco, see Voltaire's Zadifi;, cli. ',i. » Post, §§ (54— (59. ' For Joseph's cup was found in Benjamin's sack, Gen. c.4-4, v. 1 — 17. The story of the Hunchback, in the Arabian Nights, and that of the Baked Head, in Mr. Morior's Hajji Baba, both turn on an erroneous presumption of guilt ari.-^ing from recent possession. >*oe, too. Smollett" .s Rodnrick Random, oh. xxi. * Or. Ev. § 12, in great part. » 1 St. Ev. 560; 3 Channing'tf Works, 133, 340. 63 ■! i. 1 i|'> (:;"• ' ! ■ ' ?!. DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL KVIDKNCE. [PART I. coniparod with all the actual contemporaneous and successive occurrences, may not be shown to be false. From these causes, minds enlarged by long and matured experience, and close obser- vation of the conduct and affairs of men, me*', with a raj)idity and certainty approaching to in.aition, perceive the elements of truth or falsehood in the face itself of the narrator, without any regard to the narrative. Thus, an experienced judge may instantly dis- cover the falsehood of a witness, whose story an inexperienced jury might be inclined to believe. But though the mind, in these cases, seems lO have acquired a new power, it is properly to be referred only to experience and observation. § G5.' In trials of fact, it will generally be found that ihe/anium prohamlitm is either directly attested by those who speak from their own actual and personal knowledge of its existence, or is to be inferred from other facts, satisfactorily proved. In the former case, the proof rests upon the second, third, and fourth grounds of belief before mentioned ; that is, it depends, partly, upon faith in human testimony, as sanctioned by experience ; — which faith will be in- creased or diminished in proportion to the apparent honesty and intelligence of the witnesses, and their opportunities for observa- tion ; — partly, upon the exercise of reason on the consistency of the narratives given by different witnesses ; — and here the value of the testimony will vary, according to the number of the deponents, and the apparent absence or presence i' collusion ; — and partly upon the conformity of the testimony with experience. In the latter case, however, namely, when the fact in dispute is to be inferred from other facts satisfactorily established, the proof rests upon the grounds before mentioned, with the addition of the con- nexion shown by knowledge and experience to usually exist between collateral facts such as those which have been proved, and facts such as those which are in controversy ; which connexion has already been pointed out to constitute the fifth basis of evidence before stated. In both the two cases which have been above sup- posed, the facts proved are directly attested. In the former one, the proof applies immediately to the factum prohandum, without any intervening process, and is therefore called direct or positive ' Gr. Ev. § 13, in great part. 64 ClIAl'. IV.J DIRKCT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. testimony. In the latter case, the proof applies immediately to collateral facts, supposed to have a connexion, near or remote, with the fact in controversy, and is termed circitimtantial ; and some- times (althongh not with entire accuracy) presiinipfive. For example, if a witness testifies that he saw A. inflict a mortal wound on B., of which B. instantly died, this is a case of direct evidence. If, how- ever, a witness only testifies that a deceased person was shot with a pistol, and it is proved from other sources that the wadding was found to be part of a letter addressed to the prisoner, the residue of which was discovered in his pocket, the facts themselves are directly attested ; but the evidence which they afford is termed circuinstan- tial. From such facts, if unexplained by the prisoner, the jury may, or may not, deduce, or infer, or presume his guilt, according as they are satisfied, or not, of the natural connexion between similar facts and the guilt of the person thus connected with them. In both cases the veracity of the witness is presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary ; but in the latter case there is an addi- tional presumption or inference, founded on the known usual con- nexion between the facts proved, and the guilt of the party impli- cated. This peration of the mind, which is more complex and difficult in the latter case, has caused the evidence afforded by circumstances to be sometimes termed presumptive evidence ; though, in truth, the mental operation is similar in both cases. § 66. Much has been said and written respecting the compara- tive value of direct and circumstantial evidence ; but one argument urged in favour of circumstantial evidence is palpably erroneous. " Witnesses may lie, but circumstances cannot," ' has been more than once repeated from the bench, and is now almost received as a j udicial axiom. Yet no proposition can be more false or dangerous. If " circumstances " mean — and they can have no other meaning — those facts which lead to the inference of the fact in issue, they not only can, but constantly do lie — in the sense that the conclusion deduced from them is false. For example, when the viper fastened on St. Paul's hand at Melita, the barbarians said " No doubt this man is a murderer ;" but when they saw that no harm came to imi mm :i :>r ii ' Annesley v. Ld. Anglesea, (Ir.) 1743 (Mountenoy, B.); E. v. Bland'^, 1752 (Leggo, B.). -VOL. X. 6o ■i'l fU '.*: DIRECT AND CIUCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. [pAIiT I. ■J r him, ** they changed their minds, and said that he was a god," ' and both conclusions were alike false. Again, in Macbeth, Lenox, Macduff, and the other chieftains are described as en-oneously assuming, first, that the grooms had murdered the King, because " their bands and faces were all badged with blood, so were their daggers, which unwiped we found upon their pillows :"* and next, that " they were suborned " by the King's two sons, who had "stolen away and fled."* In truth, the only "circumstances which cannot lie " are those which necessarily lead to a certain conclusion. Who is to decide on this necessity ? Clearly those who have also to decide on the fact in issue. Throw a case of circumstantial evidence into the form of a syllogism, and it will bo found that the major premiss rests solely on the erring experience of the tribunal to whom it is presented. Besides, these very circum- stances must be proved, like direct facts, by witnesses, who are equally capable with others of deceiving* or of being deceived. In no sense therefore is it possible to say, that a conclusion drawn from circumstantial evidence can amount to absolute certainty, or, in other words, that circumstances cannot lie. § 67. It may not be without some advantage to keep in mind the dangers against which juries should especially guard, in deciding cases supported by each species of testimony. In a case sought to be established by direct evidence the witnesses are usually few, and there consequently is the more reason to apprehend conspiracy and fraud ; since it is far more easy to find ' Tho Acts, xxviii. 3 — 5. So, whon him.; Josnpli is irltlinat doubt rent in Jacob saw Joseph's coat of many piccca.' " Gen. x.vvii. 33. colours stained with kid's blood, "he '■' Act il., sc. 3. knew it, and said, 'It is my son's ' Act ii., sc. 4. coat ; au evil boast hath devoured * lago's stoiy of the handkerchief, which goaded Othello to madness, will occur to everyone : — "Iauo. Have you not sometimes seen a handkerchief, Spotted with strawberiies, in your wife's hand? Otiikli.o. I gave her such a one ; 'twas my first gift. Iago. 1 knew not that; but such a handkerchief, (I am sure it was your wife's,) did I to-day See Cassio wipe his board with. Ol'IlELLO. If it be that, — Iago. If it be that, or any that was hers. It speaks uf/ainst her, with the other proofs. Othello. Oh I that the slave had forty thousand lives — One is too poor, too weak for my revenge ! Nubu du I SCO His true.'^ Othello, Act iii., Sc. iii. bb m\ CITAP. IV.] CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. two or three persons who, from motives of interest or malignity, will combine to aggrandise thomselvos, or to ruin an opponent, than to get together a larger number. The story, too, being for the most part simple, is readily concocted and remembered, while its very simplicity renders it extremely difficult, on cross-examina- tion, to detect the imposture. The uncorroborated statements of single witnesses, especially when they testify to atrocious crimes, such as rape, &c.,* or ore known, like accomplices,- to be persons of bad character, and to have an interest in the result, are in conse- quence regarded with distrust, and, in practice, generally deemed insufficient to warrant a conviction. § 68. In cases supported by circumstantial evidence, juries should remember, that, although the number of facts drawn from apparently independent sources renders concerted perjury both highly improbable in itself, and easy of detection if attempted ; ' yet, the witnesses in such cases are more likely to make uninten- tional misstatements, than those who give direct testimony. The truth of the facts they attcut depends frequently on minute and careful observation, and experience teaches the danger of relying implicitly on the evidence of even the most conscientious Avitnessos, respecting dates, time, distances, footprints, handwriting, admis- sions, loose conversations, and questions of identity. Yet these in general are the links in the chain of circumstances, by which guilt is sought to be established. The number too of the witnesses, who must (dl speak the truth, or some link will be wanting, renders additional caution the more necessary. Besides, it must be remembered, that, in a case of circumstantial evidence, the facts are collected by degrees. Something occurs to raise a suspicion against a particular party. Constables and police officers are immediately on the alert, and, with professional zeal, ransack every place and paper, and examine into every circumstance wliiuh can tend to establish, not his innocence, but his guilt. Presuming him guilty from the first, they are apt to consider his acquittal as a tacit reflection on their discrimination or skill, and, with something like the feeling of a keen sportsman, they determine, if possible, to Hill > 1 Hale, 635. » E. V. Jones, 1809. 8 Greenl. on Test, of Evang. § 40. 67 p2 I i n US '■i ' I' i\l i 'M :i CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. [part I. bag their game. Though both sportsmen and policemen alike would be horrified at anything unfair or " unsportsmanlike," yet, as both start with this object in view, it is easy to unintentionally misinterpret innocent actions, to misunderstand innocent words, for men readily believe what they anxiously desire,^ and to be ever ready to construe the most harmless facts as confirmations of preconceived opinions " These feelings are common alike to the police, to counsel, engineers, surveyors,' medical men, antiquarians, and philosophers; iLnluod, to all persons who first assume that a fact or system is true, and then seek for arguments to support and prove its truth. § 69. But, even where the facts sworn to are satisfactorily proved, the task of the jury in cases turning on circumstantial evidence is highly lifficult. For they must decide, not whether these facts are consistent with the prisoner's guilt, but whether they are inconfiistent with any other rational conclusion ; since it is only on this last hypothesis that they can safely convict the accused.* ' A strikinj? illustration of this was the cii'<lit that was given by the ■whole civilised world to the lyiner telegram which, in October, lj<i4, auuounoed the fall of Sc^"?t ^^ol » Ante, § 57. » Waters v. Thorn, 1856 (Eomilly. M.R.). * £. V. Hodge, 1838. 68 ClIAP. v.] PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE. 1 i'l CHAPTER V. PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE. § 70.' PREsuMmvE EVIDENCE 18 Usually divided into two branches, namely, presumptions of law, and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law consist of those rules, which, in certain cases, either forbid or dispense with any ulterior inquiry. Pre- sumptions of law are sub-divided into two classes, namely, conclusive and disputable. For the general doctrines in accordance with which presumptions are made are not peculiar to municipal law, but are common to all departments of science. For instance, the presumption of a malicious intent to kill from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon, and the presumption of aquatic habits in an animal found with webbed feet, belong to the same philosophy, difforing only in the instance, and not in the principle of its application. The one fact being proved or ascertained, the other, its uniform concomitant, is universally and safely presumed. The presumption, however, has more or less force, in proportion to the universality of the experience ; and this furnishes the reason for the distribution of presumptions of law into the two classes which we have mentioned, namely, conclusire and disputable. § 71.* Conclusire, or, as they are sometimes termed, imperative, or absolute presumptions of law, are rules determining the quantity of evidence requisite for the support of any particular averment, and forbidding such averment to bo overcome by any evidence that tlie fact is otherwise after the degree of proof which they demand has been furninlied. Conclusive presumptions exist chiefly in those cases in which the long-exporienced connexion, just alluded to, has been found so general and uniform, as to render it expedient for the common good, that such connexion should be taken to be • Or. Ev. § 14, largely. « Gr. Ev. § 13, largely. 6U ! J,: i !| i^' 1:1 CONCLUSIVE STATUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS. [PART I. ^:i insepariiLle and universal. They have been adopted by common consent, from motives of common policy, for the sake of greater certainty, and the promotion of peace and quiet in the community. Where they arise all corroborating evidence is dispensed with, and all opposing evidence is forbidden.^ § 72. Sometimes this common consent is expressly declared through the medium of the legislature in uttttutcs. Thus, under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, in the absence of fraud, the approval of the Court, testified by a certificate of the official receiver, is conclusive as to the validity of any comjjosition, or general scheme of arrangement, accepted in pursuance of the Act;' all the requisi- tions of the Public Schools Act, 18()8, in respect to any statutes made by the governing body of a school, " shall be deemed to have been duly complied with," so soon as the statutes themselves have been approved by Iler Majesty in Council;' under the Endowed Schools Act, 1869, an Order in Council approving a scheme is conclusive evidence of its validity;* under the Valuation Metro- polis Act, 1869, " the valuation list for the time being in force shall be deemed to have been duly made ;" * under the Act for the protection of bankers, it is enacted that " any draft or order drawn upon a banker paj'able to order on demand, which shall, when presented for payment, purport to be indorsed by the person to tv/tom the same shall be drawn paj/able,"^ shall be a sufficient ' Tho prpstimption in Eomnn law is dt'HiKMl to ho, "c'onjoctuni, duota alt (!(), qu(»l ut pluriininn tit. Eii con- ji'ctuni vcl a Icfic induritur, vol a jiiilice. tiiion ab ipsa lego iiiducitur, vol ita cninpanitii, ut probutiouciii coiitiaiii liiuidadiiiittat; vol ut oadoiu jxissit I'lidi. I'riiirem doctoros /irir- »iniii>tiiiiien jrias KT 1)K jritK, jmx- tivii'Vcm pni'siniijitiiuiiin jriiis, ad- pflliiiit. Ciuii' a tiinliri' iiiducitur con jcctura, jirifsnmiilio IIOMIXIS vo- cari solct ; ct s('in]iiM' ndiiiiUit pioha- tinnciii contiinii, (inunivis, si alicujua iiioiiii'nti sit. priilmndi nutTo rclovot." Jlcin. ad Paud.. Pars iv. § 124. Of till' fiirniPi', ausweriu;; to our von- clu.-iivo ]ii'('.siini])ti(iu, AriiHciivdiiH ob- BiM'vi'H, — " Super hiic jnu'Huiii])tiono Idx tii'iiiuin Hauuit jus, et eum pro vttitiitc liitbH." 1 do I'rob., Qiuust. x. 48. An oxppption to tho conchisivo- ness of this chiMS of jin siuni])tions is allowL'd by tho civil law, whon tho pri'suiiiption is luct bj- an achnission in /'iidicid. » 4(i iV 47 V. c. o2, § 18, subs. 9 ; o3 & .M V. c. 71. § .'J, subs. l.{. As to prcsunijitic HIS which, in tho absence <d' fraud iirosc under the Itankiuptcv Act of l.S(i!», SCO ;i'J & ;{3 V. c. 71, § 127. •' ;il & ;i2 V. 0. lis. § 8, subs. 4. * .•i2 iJt a;) V. c. j(), §"47. :i2 vV ;t:t V. c (i7, § 4"). Seo also " The r,ociil (Jovernnient Act, 18,SH" (.Jl \- .VJ V. c. 41). ° These woi'ds includes the pnyoo's agent, though not really authori/ed to endorse, soo Charles u. Blackwoll, 1877, C. A. 70 CHAP, v.] STATUTES OF LIMITATION. aiitliority to such banker to pay the amount of such draft or order to the bearer thereof ; and it shall not be incumbent on such banker ' to prove that such indorsement, or any subsequent indorse- ment, was made by, or under the direction of, the person to whom the said draft or order was or is made payable either by the vVr-awer or any indorser thereof ;2 and, under the Stamp Act, 1891, "a bill of exchange or promissory note purporting to be drawn or made out of the United Kingdom, is, for the purpose of this Act, to be deemed to have been so drawn or made, although it may in fact have been drawn or made within the United Kingdom."' § 73. Again : by the Statutes of Limitations,* where a simple contract debt has not been distinctly recognised within six years as a subsisting obligation, either in some writing signed by the party chargeable, or his agent, or by part payment of principal, or by payment of interest,^ such debt" is, at the end of the six years, con- clusively presumed to have been paid ; and a presumption of satis- faction arises with respect to all injuries, the remedy for which is an action on the case, other than slander, trespass to goods or land, or for detinue' or replevin, unless they have been sued for within six years after the cause of action shall have accrued ; ^ while actions for an assault or false imprisonment must be brought within four years ; * for slander, within two years;* for compensation to the families of persons killed by accident, within twelve calendar months from the death of the deceased.' Actions under the Employers* Liability Act must be commenced within six months from the date of the ' Tliis enactment does not protect any other person than a hanker who takes a eheiiuo on tlie faith of a foi'fied indorsonieut. Ogdun v, JJenas, 1.S74. ' Tliis Act is extended to drafts by the raviiiastor-(ionoral hv ',i'i & ;J(» V. c. 44. § 11. See, also. 4.) iV 4(i V. c. (>1, § ()(). And see Ilaro i<. Cop- land, 1802 (Ir.). 3 r.4 & oj \ . e. ;59, § ;?«. « 21J. 1, c. Iti ("Tlio Limitation Art, lO'j;}"); 1() & 17 V. e. IIH, § 20 (li.). 'i'he fust-named Aet is amended i)V 19 & 20 V. e. !»", § 9. ■» Tho St. of Limitat. 21 J. 1, c. 16, npjilies to nn action of deht for a ]ienalty under a hy-iaw. T(d)acco- jiijje ^takers' Co. r. Loder, IS.jl. « i» U. 4, c. 14, § 1 ; 19 & 20 V. c. 97. § l.{. ' Se(! Wilkinson v. Verity, 1871, as to when the cause of action will accrui^ in detin\ie. " 21 J. 1, c. l(i, § 3. As to when concealed fraud and non-discovt'i'y can he jileaded in rejilv to a defence under the Stat., .see (Jihhs r. U\iild, 1882, ('. A. See, also, liarbor v. Hou.tim, 1885 (Ir). » 9 & 10 V. c. 9,1, § 3, as amended by 27 & 28 V. c. 9j. '41 ill! ri ^^1 ■■!i STATUTES OF LIMITATION. [part 1. accident, or, in case of death, "within twelve months from the time of death." ^ § 73a. The PubUc Authorities Protection Act, 1893,2 enacts^" that where, after Ist January, 1894, " any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced in the United Kingdom against any person for any act done in pursuance, or execution, or in- tended execution of any Act ot Parliament, or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, dutj or authority, the follow; ^ pro- visions shall have effect: — (a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of injury or damage, within six months next after the ceasing thereof : (b) Wherever la anj' such action a judgment is obtained by the defendant it pLall carry costs to be taxed as between solicitor and client : (c) Where the proceeding is an action for damages, tender of amends before the action was commenced may, in lieu of or in addition to any other plea, be pleaded. If the action was commenced after the tender, 't is proceeded with after payment into court of any money in satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim, and the plaintiff does not recover more than the sura tendered or paid, he shall not recover any costs incurred after the tender or payment, and the defendant shall be entitled to costs, to be taxed as between solicitor and client, as from the time of the tender or payment ; but this provision shall not affect costs on any injunction in the action : (rf) If in the opinion of the court the plaintiff has not given the defendant a sufficient opportunity of tendering amends before the commencement of the proceeding, the court > 43 & 44 V. 0. 42, § 4. A notice has power to relax tho stringoticy of ihat injury has been sustained must this last rule, also be given "within six weeks," * o6 & 67 V. o. 61. though in coses of death, the judge ' § It 72 w CUAP. v.] STATUTES OF LIMITATION. I t] may award to the defendant oosts t^^ be taxed as between Bolicitor and client. " This seotion shall not affect any proceedings by any department of the Government against any local authority or officer of a local authority." By § 2 of the Act last cited so much of any public general Act is repealed a3 enacts, with reference to any proceeding, that — '• (a) The proceeding is to be commenced in any particular place; or (i) The proceeding is to be comi .need within any particular time; or (c) Notice of action is to be given ; or (rf) The defendant is to be entitled to any particular kind or amount of costs, or the plaintiff id to be deprived, of oosta in any specified event ; or {e) The defendant may plead the general issue." The section then repeals various oldtr enactments. A provision contained in an earlier Act, which was passed in 1842,' provides that actions for anything dono in pursuance of any public local and personal Act, or any local and personal Act, shall be brought within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued, or in the case of continuing damage, within one year after the damage shall have ceased.^ Any action, prosecution, or proceeding against any person for any act done in pursuance or intended execution of the Army Act, 1881, or of the Militia Act, 1882, must be commenced within six munths next after the act, neglect, or default complained of, or, in case of a continuunye of damage within six mouths next after the ceasing thereof.' Actions and proceedings against persons acting under the Seamen's Clothing Act, 18G9,'* or the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882,* must be commenced within six months after the act complained of shall have been committed.* Justices of the peace in England fall within the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act, and in Ireland every action against a justice of the peace for » 6 & 6 V. 0. 97. '§3. » 44 & 46 V. 0. 58, § 170, subs. 1, iiniomlt'd by "The Army (Anuunl) Act, 1894 " (57 V. o. 8), § 7 ; 45 & 46 V. c. 49, § 46. • 32 & Xi V. 0. 57, § 0. • 45 & 4(i V^ c. 50, § 226. • Soe uoto ', post, p. 74. 73 ■;tii ;i !' ifi^'» I ' ■ ■ I M ^^ STATUTES OF LIMITATION. [part I. anything done by him in the execution of his office must be brought within six raontlis.' On similar principles, when a judgment has been obtained against a banking copartnership, no execution can issue thereon against any former member of such copartnership, after the expiration of three years next after the person sought to be charged shall have ceased to be a member.' § 74. Presumptions that their rights have been satisfied or in Bome other way extinguished are, in like manner, sometimes raised by statute against the Crown or the Duchy of Cornwall. Thus, the right of the Sovereign,' or of the Duke of Cornwall,^ to insti- tute legal i)roceedings for the recovery of lands, rents, or minerals, is barred, under several special statutes, by uninterrupted possession for a period of sixty, or in certain cases, of one hundred years. § 74a. Length of enjoyment, too, as between subjects of the Crown raises a conclusive presumption of right. Thus, the pos- session of land, or of rent, for the length of time mentioned in the general statutes of limitation, under a claim of absolute title and ownership, constitutes a conclusive presumption of a valid grant;* ' 12 & 13 V. c. lOC'Tht) Justices IVotoctiou (Iiuluiid) Act, KS40"), § 8. Ill S(.'.)t!im(l, un(kT"The Summary I'loe. .\ct, l.S()4," the poriod is fixed at two mtinths, 27 & 28 V. c. o.'J, § Aa. » 7 G. 4. c. 4G. § i:J (" The Country lUiukers Act, 182(i"). See In ro North of iMif^l. Joint Stock liunk €o., Ex parte Oouthwaite, 1851 ; Uarkfi' V. buttress, 184.). ' !» G. ;>, c. in, amended by " The Stat. l.awKiA-. Act, 188.S "(ol V. c'X) ; 24 & 2.) V. c. ()2 ; a!» & 40 V. c. 37 (Ir.). « 7 \- 8 V. c. lO.J. S§ 73 e.t seci- 23 & 24 V. c. -)3 ; 24 & c. «2 ("Tlu' Trowii Suits Act, l.S(il "). ' This peiiod has for many years past been shortened, at successive revisions of the law, both in Kngland and llie I'liitcd States. In 1833 the Act of 3 iV 4 \V. 4, c. 27 (" The J{cal Property Limitation Act, 1833"), §2, passed, and baricd all actions to re- cover land or rent, after twenty years from the time wlieii the rif.'ht of action accrued ; unless, at sui^h timi-, the plaintitV or the party tlirouf,'h whom he claims shall liiive be(Mi uniler some disability, speeitied in the Act, in which case ho is allowed ten years fiom the ceasiu;; of the dis- abilitj' ; provided that in no case shall an action be broufrht after forty years from the time when the right first accrued, although the period of ten years shall not have expired : §§ l(i and 17. This statutory rule is extended by §§ 24 and 25 to uU claims in ('(juity for the recovery of land : Magdalen College v. Att.-Uen., 18,)7, II. L. ; it also ai)i)lio8 to a claim for de .v'er : Mai'shall r. Smith, 1805 (Stuart, V.-C.^; to a claim forcompen- salion for eiiuitable waste: D.of I eeds V, Ld. ;^ '- horst, 184(J; and to the i laim of an aiiiiuity chai-ged u])on hind by will, the twenty yi'ars in this last case lieing calculated from the deatli of the testator : James i'. Salter, 1837. The secilons just referred to do nctt, however, a|)ply to s))iritual or elee- mosynary coriMiratious .sole, who are em])owered by § 2i* to bring actions or suits to recovei' land or rent within two successive incumbencies and six years, or, in case these periods do not amount to sixty years, then witliiii sixty yeai's next after the right of action shall lirst havo accrued. See l>]cclesiaH. ( 'ommis. v. Howo, 188((, II. 1-. §§ 30-33 limit the time within which advowsons can be 74 L CHAP, v.] TITLE TO LAND. ? the payment of a modus, or the mhrne, and as of ri'^/if enjoyment of land tithe-free, for the yieriods specified in the xYct of 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 100,' conchisively bars the right of all parties, even the Queen, to recover tithes, unless such payment has been made, or enjoyment had, under an express written consent or agreement.* § 75. The principle that, by statute, rights are after a certain time to be presumed to be extinguished is further exemplified by the rule that on the completion of any contract of sale of land, the period of the commencement of title which a purchaser may roquire (or, in the language of conveyancers, the root of title) is now fixed by statute at forty years, unless tliere be some stipula- tion to the contrary in the contract, or some very special circum- stances in the case.' § 75a. Again, by the Prescription Act, 1832,* the length of time nio 1X1 ropov('rcd, whilo § 40 enacts, that ull inonoya chuifi;ud upon liiiul and lef^iu'ics shall bo doomed satisfied ot the end t)f twenty years, unless Bouio interest shall have been paid, or Koiiio writton ncknowledpuont shall have been given in the mean- while. Under § 28 no mortgagor 8hall bring a suit to redeem a mortgage but within twenty years from the time when the mortgagee took possession (see Kinsman v. House, 1^81 ), or from the last writt(>n acknowledgment of the mortgagor's title. Mortgagees also may bring actions to recover laiul at any time within twenty years next after the last payment of any part of the ])vineipal or interest secun-d by the mortgage : 7 W. 4 & 1 V. c. 28 ; Doc V. Kyre, 1>SJ1 ; Jjoo i-. Massoy, ISol ; Ford r. Ager, 1803; provided that such last jtavTuent be itself within t\v aty years from the date of the 7iioitgage : Hemming v. lUanton, iSTIi; and jirovided that the pay- ment bo madi! by the mortgagor, or by some jua'son bound to make it on Ins behalf : llarlock l: Ashberry, 1.SS2. On Ist January, 1S79, tlio " Keal l'n)ii(<rtv Jamitafion Act, 1ST4" (37 iV 3>< V. c. ,-)7), came into opi'iation, and by it these periods of limitation were rednced by six, twelve, and thirty years being Hiihstituted for the ten, twenty, and forty years mentioned in the Acts of 7fi 1833 and 1837. 6 & 7 V. c. 54, and 7 & 8 V. c. 27, extend to Ireland such of the provisions of 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, as wei'O not already in force there, and exjdain and amend that Act. The ])eriod of twenty years has been adopted in most of the United States. .See 4 Kent, Com. 188, n. a. The same period in regard to the title to real jjrojierty, or, as .?onio construe it, only to the ])rofits of the land, is adoi)te(l in the Hindoo law: 1 Macnagh. Klem, of Hindoo L. 201. See, as to the Scotch law, 37 & 38 V. c. 94, §^ 13, 34. ' See Salkold v. Johnson, 1848. See, also, Followes v. Clay, 1842, and Salkold v. Johnson, IHKi. * See Tovnibee i\ Jirown, 1849. » 37 & 38 V. c. 78 (•' The ^'ondor and Purchaser Act, 1874"), ^ 1. « 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 71,— extended to Ireland by 21 & 22 V. c. 42.— liinits the))eriod of legal memory as follows: — In cases of riirhts of common or other ])rofits er benefits 'n'ising out of lands, except tithes, rent, and services, jirirmi t'lin'f to thirty years, and conclusively to sixty years, unless it shall a])})ear that such rights were enjoyed by some consent or agreement expressly given or made by deed oi' writing ; § 1 ; in cases of ways or other easements, watercourses, or the use oi water, priino fiirif to twenty years, and conclusively to forty years, luiless it H hi t in t H ' l-i I ; ii 1 r' 1 1 1 I i I SPECIALITIES — ACTIONS FOR PENALTIES. [PART I. which constitutes the period of legal memory, or, in other words, which affords a legal title in respect of incorporeal rights,' has been definitely fixed. § 75b. Further, by the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833,' the time within whi("h actions for rent due under a lease, actions of covenant,' or debt on specialties,'' and debt or scire facias on a recognizance,'' may be brought, is expressly limited. So, likewise, by the same enactment, is the time for actions for debt or on an award, where the submission is not by specialty ; for copyhold- fines, escapes, money levied on a scire facias, or for penalties.' § 75c. Again, as regards religious trusts. Where any real or personal estate, subject to a trust for a Roman Catholic charity, has been applied upon some trusts connected with that religion for twenty years, but the original trusts cannot be ascertained by any document, a consistent usage of twenty years is, by statute, rendered conclusive evidence of the trusts on which the property has been settled." Under Lord Lyndhurst's Act for regulating suits relating shall be proved, in like miinnor, by wiitten evidence, that the sunie were enjoyed by consent of the owner: § 2 ; and in cases of lights, conclu- sively to twenty years, unless it shall be proved, in like manner, that the same were enjoyed by consent : § 3. See Bewley v. Atkinson, 1880; Tup- ling V. Jones, 1865 ; Lanfranchi v. Mackenzie, 1857 ; Aynsley v. Glover, 1875. § 4 directs, that the before- mentioned periods shall bo deemed those next before some suit or action respecting the claims, and further detiues what shall amount to an interruption. § (5 enacts, that no pre- sumi)tiou shall be made in support of any claim, upim proof of the enjoy- ment of the right for any less period than the j)('riod uientiont;d in the Act us applicable to the nature of the claim. § 7 provides for parties who are under legal disabilities. As to what evidence of user is necessary under this Act, see Lowe i;. Car- penter, 1851 ; IloUins v, Vernoy, 1884, C. A. ' A right to the passage of air and light to a garden : I'otts v. Smith, 1869 (Malins, V.-C.) ; or of air to a windmill or house, is not within the mraiiing of this Act: Webb v. Bird, IsOo ; Bryant v. Lefever, 1879, C. A.; nor is a claim of " a free fishery " in the waters of another proprietor : Shuttleworth v. Le Fleming, 18(i5 ; Smith V, Andrews, 1891. For "pre- scription pre-8upi)0808 a grant, see Smith V. Andrews, supra, and no frant of the right claimed can here e imagined. » 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27. As to spe- cialties, see § 3 of this Act. § 4, as amended by 19 & m V. c. 97, § 10, provides for parties under legal dis- abilities, and § 5 states the effect of an acknowledgment in writing or part payment. See the Irish Act of 1() & 17 V. c. 113. §§ 20—24 ; also Alliance Bk. of Simla v. Carey. 1870. * See In re Baker, Collins v. lihodes, 1882. * The tenn "specialty" inclvides all actions on statutes, as, for iii- stanco, an action against a share- holder of a company for calls : Cork & Band(m Bail. Co. v. Goode, 1853 ; Shejiherd v. Hills, 1857. * See, also, as to actions for penal- ties, 31 El. c. 5, § 5, as limited by 11 & 12 V. c. 43 ("The Summary Juris- diction Act, 1 S48 "), § 3(5, and amended by "The Stat. Law' Rev. Act, 1888" (51 V. c. 3), and Robinson v. Curry, 1881 ; overruling Dyer v. Best, 1866. * 23 & 24 V. c. 134, § 5. 76 '')l 70. kal- 11 m. CHAP, v.] SPECIALITIKS — ACTION'S FOR PliXAT/riES. to meoting-houses and other property hold for religious purposes by dissenters, fh" iis/ifja for twenty-fice i/mra imiUddiatcly preoodiug any such suit, shall be taken as oonoluaive evidence that the reli- gious doctrines, opinions, or mode of worship, v/hicL for that period have been taught or observed in these houses, may properly be taught or observed, provided the contrary is not declared by the instrument declaring the trusts of such houses, either in express terms or by reference to some other document.' §^ 7G-8. The principle that after the lapse of a certain period it must be presumed that the offender is innocent, or, at all events, must not be called upjn to defend himself, is also one which finds a place in Criminal Jurisprudence. Many statutes accordingly limit the period within which particular offenders may be prose- cuted. Some of the principal of these are mentioned in the foot- note.* Clauses of this nature will be found in a vast variety of » 7 & 8 V. c. 45 (" Tho Noncon- fonnist Chapols Act, 1844"), § 2. See Att.-Gen. v. Bunce, 1868 (Malins, V.-C.}. ' Tlio under-mentioned statutes (aiTinif^ed in alphabetical order) l)re.sci'ibe periods of limitation which are respectively as follows, viz. : — "The Army Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V. c. 58, § 161), ci-eates a limitation of three years for offences other than mutiny, desertion, or fraudulent en- listment, and by it absolute ira- mimity is confeired (except for the offence of desertion on active ser- vice) by three years' exemplary ser- vice ; " The Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1874" (as to England, 37 & 38 V. o. 88, § 46, and as to Ireland, 43 & 44 V. c. 13, § 3t!), creates a limitation of three years ; " The Clergy Disciplii i Act, 1«!)2" (55 & 56 V. 0. 32, § 5, with which compare former Acts on this ^subject, as construed in Denison v. Ditcher, 1857 ; Ditcher v, Denison, 1857 ; Bishop of Hereford v. T n, 1M53 ; and Simpson v. Flamank, 1867), creates (by § 5) a limitation of five years, or of two years after con- viction by a temporal court; "The Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887 " (50 & 51 V. c. 58, § 62), one of three months; "Tho Corrupt Practices Act, 1H83" (46 &47 V. c. 61, § 51, and Part 12 of " The Municipal Cor- porations Act, 1882," viz., 45 & 46 V. c. 50, § 78), unless against a party who has absconded, creates a limita- tion of one year from date of of- fence, or within three months after report of commissioners; offences against "Tho Customs Act, 1876" (39 & 40 V. c. 36, § 257), must be prosecuted withiii three years from commission of tho offence ; offences against "The Diseases of Animals Act, 1894" (57 & 58 V. c. 57), must be prosecuted within tho time limited by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts (which see) ; offences against ' ' The Factory and Workshops Act, 1878" (41 V. c. 16, § 9n, within two to three months (varying with the offence) from commission of act ; a false declaration, in order to procure a marriage to take place out of its proper district (3 & 4 V. c. 72, 5 4), within eighteen months from tho marriage ; high treason, or mis- prision of treason (7 W. 3, c. 3,§§ 5, 6, extended to Scotland 7 Anne, c. 11), within three years after offence ; summary proceedings under "The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 " (57 & 58 V. c. 60, § 683), on tho construction of which see Austin v. Olson, 1868, must bo usually taken six months, but in some cases within two months of the date of the alleged offence; offences against the MaiTiago Acts (the Eng- lish " Marriage Act, 1836," being 6 & 7 W. 4, c. 85, on the construc- tion of which see H. v, Ld. Duu- '!1 li !;Hi' i:>^ tl '^m H-l: 77 ; I I ■ M I'i f" 5 1 II ! m I : ■ ! STATUTi:S OF LIMITATION. [pAi:r I. statutes, to which it is considered unnecessary to make particular reference.* § 79. The principle upon which these statutes rest would appear to be simply the broad one of general expedience and justice, rather than upon that of any presumption, for " Intere&t reipuWicjB ut sit finis litium." When a party has ueen in undisputed possession of property for a considerable length of time, it is harsh to deprive him of that which, however obtained, has now acquired the character of a vested interest. No presump- tion of a former grant is. however, necessary to give validity to his title, but it rests on the fact of long uninterrupted enjoyment. When a person has foregone a claim for many years, there is, indeed, no need for presuming that he has, in reality, been satis- boyue, 1850, and the Irish Act being 7 & 8 V. c. 27, § 13), within tnroo yeiirrt, or in tho case of offoncea under tlio Irish Act, punishable on siunmarv conviciion (7 & 8 V. c. 81, §§48, 78"; also 2() & 'll V. c. 27, § 16), ■within throe months, or in tho case of false declarations to ])r()euro a niavriugo oxit of its piojier district, within the tiirio stated above, under head "False JJeclaration " ; "Tho Minos Regulation Act, 1872" (;}j & SC) V. c. 76, § (vJ, r. 1 ; and c. 77, § ,'M, r. 1, extended to Isle of Man by (34 (>c 00 V. c. 47), reiiuires ott'ences against it to bo prosecuted within three months; "Tho Municijial Corpoiations Act, 1882" (45 & 46 V. c. 5(1, § 219, subs. 1), re([uir,os proceedings for offences and fines under it to bo taken within six months from act ; proceedings und.u' tho Public Ileulth Acts (of 1875, for England, being 38 & 39 V. c. 00, § 252, and of 1878, being 41 & 42 V. c. 52, § 250. for Ireland), must bo taken within six months from when matter arose ; ])roceod- ings under "Tho Naval Discipline Act, ir>()() " (29 & 30 V. c. 109, § 54), within throo yea'-s frf)ra ctYeuce, or if offender has boon abroad, one year from his return ; proceedings under "Tho Night Poaching Act, 1841" ^beiiig 7 & 8 V. c. 'zi)), are, as to indictable offences (by 9 G. 4, c. 59, § 4, and 7 & 8 V. c. 29, as to the con- struction i)f which see R. v. Casbolt, l.S()9). to bi' within twelve calendar months; and as to offences punish- 78 able on summary conviction, to be within six calendai months, the commencement of tlu 'iroKecution being tho laying of an u. nnation, or the obtaining of a warrant : see R. V. Parker, 1864; R. v. Hull, 1860; R. V. Brooks, 181"; R. r. Killminster, 1835; and R. v. Main- waring, 1858; under "Tho Pre- vention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1894 " (57 & 58 V. c. 41), by § 18 (3), a summary con vietiim must be wittiiu si.x months of the otlence. Tho Summary Jurisdiction Acts, in ail cases whore no time is specially limited, require that complaint shuU be made, and information laid, within six calendar months. See "The Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848" (11 & 12 V. c. 43). § 11. ' Various periods of limitation are also imposed by 11 & 12 Y. c. IIH, § 3; 1 G. 1, St. 2, c. 5, § 8; 33 G. 3, c. 67, § 8; 4 G. 4, c. 76, § 21 ("The Marriage Act, 1S23"); 60 G. 3 & 1 G. 4, c. 1 (i)aitially rejjealed bv "Tho Stat. Law Rev Act, 189M " 56 & 57 V. c. 61), § 7; 6 A. c. 7. § 3 ; 23 & 24 V. c. 107, § 32 (Ir.)("The Refreshment lIouses(lr(!- land) Act, I860"); 14 iV 15 V. c. 93, § 10, r. 4 (Ir.); " The Merchandise Marks Act. 18^7 " (50 & ,.1 V. c. 28), § 15. In Scotland summary com- plaints must, in general, bo insti- tuted "within six months from the time when the matter of such com- plaint arose." 27 A 28 V. c. 53, § 24. See as to the Police Courts in Edin- burgh, 30 & 31 V. c. 58, sch. § 172. CHAP, v.] STATUTES OF LIMITATION. fied ; it is siilTicieut to say that his light to recover is lost by his own negligence. The statute of Juiiies, which has been hold not to discharge the debt, but merely to bar the remedy, is strongly confirmatory of these views.' Lord t'lunl-.et once eloquently said, " If Time destroys the evidence of title, the laws have wisely and humanely made length of possession a substitute for that which has been destroyed. He comes with his scythe in one hand to mow down the muniments of our rights ; but in his other hand the law-giver has placed an hour-glass, by which ho motes out incessantly those poiiions of duration, which render needless the evidence that he has swept away." ^ § 80.' The doctrines of irrebuttable presumptions are sometimes (as in most of the instances just cited) embodied in statutes. In other instances they are declared by judicial tribimals as being the common laic of the land. The decisions of the courts on such matters are respected, equally with the enactments of the legisla- ture, as authoritative declarations of imperative rules of law, against the operation of which no averment or evidence is received. In short, in determining the legal rights and liabilities of i)artie3, the courts conclusively presume that which in a vast number of cases must of course be contrary to the fact.* For instance, it is conclusively presumed that every sane person, above the age of fourteen, is acquainted with the criminal as well as the civil,^ the common " as well as the statute,' law of the land ; and the doctrine "ignorantia juris, quod quisque triicfur seive, nerainem excusat," is as uniformly recognised in this country, as it formerly was in ancient Home;* and, indeed, has been carried so far as to include the case of a foreigner, who was here charged with a crime, which impedit, on the trial of which Ld. Pluukot iniido iiso of tho imagery in hirt address to the jury. ^ Gr. Ev. § 17, as to first six lines. * Soo Afartiudalo v. Palkiior, 18-1(> (Maulo. J.) » Bilbio V. Luiiiloy, 1802 (Lord Ellouborough). " A mistake of tho legal effect of n document cannot be set up as a defence Powell V. Smith, 1871,' (Ld. IJomiUy). ' See Stokes v. Suloiuons, 18.j1 L'harlotta, 1814 ' Spears v. Ilartly, 1857 ; Higgins V. Scott, 1832. ' See " Statesmen of tho Time of George III.," by Ld. Brougham, 3rd Ser. p. 227, n. In Malouo V. O'Connor, 185!) (Ir.), Napier, C, tho above passage is cited as fol- lows : — "Time, with tho one hand mows down tho muniments of our titles ; with tho other, ho metos out tho portions of duration which render these muniments no longer neces- sary." iJrury's Cas. in Ch. tomp. Napier, G44. This version is pro- bably more accurate than any other, as it was furiished to tho Chancellor hy one of tta counsel in tho ,quarc (Turner, V.-C.) ; Tho Chi (Sir W. Scott; ; Middleton v. Croft, 17;j<) (Ld. Ilardwicke). » See 1 lluss. C. & M. 154 ; 1 Ilale, 42 : Ff. 22, 6, 9. r n 'W m 4 •) 1 ! ; J i 11 It '1 i 1 , CONCLUSIVE PRKSIIMPTI0N8 AT COMMON LAW. |_PAUT T. •woB no offonco in his own country.' It is again conclusively prosumed that every '» sane man of the age of discretion contem- plates the nattiral and probable coHXpqiirnrrs of his own acts. Thus an intent to kill is conclusively inferred from the deliberate violent use of a deadly weapon ; ^ on an indictment for cutting with intent to do the prosecutor some grievous bodily harm,' the prisoner is rightly convicted, though it appeared that his real intent was to wound another person ; ■• an intent to defraud a particular party will be conclusively presumed on an indictment for forgery, pro- vided the defrauding of such party would be the natural result of the prisoner's act, if successful,* and this even though it be proved that the prisoner did not entertain the intention charged ; ^ and on a charge of arson for setting fire to a mill, an intent to injure or defraud the mill-owners will be conclusively inferred from the •wilful act of firing.'' The same doctrine would, apparently, on principle, apply to all other crimes.* § 81. There are, indeed, several decisions which tend to show that where the character of statutory offences varies according to the intent with which they are perpetrateil, the real intention of the prisoner must be left to the jury. For instance, on an indict- Hitii ' R. V. Esop, 1836 (Bosanquot and Vaughan, JJ.); Barrouot's case, 1853. '* Gr. Ev. § 18, as to four following linos. » Soti 1 Ru88. C. & M. 940, 941 ; E. V. Dixon, 1814. But if death does not ensiio till a year and a day, that is, a full year, after the stroke, it ia conclusively presumed that the stroke was not tlie sole cause of the death, and it is not murder. 4 Bl. Com. 197 ; Glassf. Ev. 592. The doctrine of pr' aumptive evidence was familiar to the Mosaic Code ; even to the letter of the principle stated in the text. See Numb. xxxv. 16, 17, 18, where every instniment of iron is conclusively taken to be a deadlv weapon ; and the use of any such weapon raises a conclusive presump- tive of malice. The same presump- tion arose from lying in ambiiah, and thence destroying another. Id. v. 20. But, in other cases, the existence of malice was to be proved, as one of the facts in the case ; and in the ab- sence of express malice, the offence was reduced to the degree of man- slaughter, as at the common law. Id. w. 21, 22, 23. This very reasonable distinction seems to have been un- known to the Gentoo Code, which demands life for life, in all cases, except where the culprit is a Brah- min, " If a man deprives another of life, the magistrate snail deprive that person of life." Halhed's Gentoo Laws, b. xvi. § 1, p. 233. ' Under the repealed Act of 43 G. 3, c. 58. * R. V. Hunt, 1825; R. v. Fretwell, 1864. See, also, R. v. Smith. 1855, which was an indictment imder the repealed Act, 7 W. 4 & 1 V. c. 85, § y; and R. v. Ward, under 14 & 16 V. c. 19, § 6 (fifteen judges). » R. V. Beard. 1837 (Coleridge, J.); R. V. Hill, 1838 (Aldereon, B.); R. V. Cooke, 1838 (Patteson, J.). « R. V. Shoppard, 1806; R. v. Maza- gora, 1815 (all the judges); R. v, Geach, 1840. The prisoner may also be convicted on a count charging the real intent. R. v. Hanson, 1841 (by all the judges). ' R. V. Earrington, 1811; E. v. Philp, 1830. « See R. V. Murphy, 1875. 80 CHAT, v.] CASES WIIEUK REAL INTKNT MUST I):: I'KOVKD. mont for cutting,' where the intent laid in tlie sevoral counts wns to murder, to difiible, nnd to do grievous hodily harm, but the intent found by the jtiry was to prevent being ajtjirohended, it was lield that a conviction could mot be sustained, thougli the prisoner had inliicted a serious wound ; '^ where a party was charged with intlicting an inju'-y dangerous to life witli iiihfut to murder, it was held ^ that the ju -y must bo satisfied that *he prisoner, at the time he committed the assault, luid formed a deliberate intention of murdering his victim; on an indietraent* charging the prisoner with shooting at the prosecutor with intent to murder him, the jury were allowed to pronounce a verdict in accordance with the actual intent, which was to kill another person, and the prisoner was consequently acquitted ; * on the same principle, where the prisoner was charged ^ with causing poison to be taken by the prnseoutor with intent to murder him, and it appeared that the prisoner's real intention was to poison another party, he was acquitted." § 82. Nevertheless it is submitted that the distinction which these decisions seek to establish is founded on no sound principle, and goes far towards frittering away one of the most valuable pre- sumptions known to the criminal law. Moreover, one judge of great experience in the administration of criminal justice refused to recognise the distinction.* § 82a. It is immaterial whether the intent charged be the prin- cipal or subordinate motive which instigated the commission of the ' Under the repealed Act of 43 0. 3, c. 58. » R. V. Duflin, 1818. This case is badly reported, and perhaps the deci- sion turned upon the ground that the attempted apprehension was not lawful. > R. V. Cruse, 1838 (Patteson, J.). But the jury may infer such intent fiom the circumstance that if death had been caused it would, under the circumstances, have been murder : E. V. Jones, 1840 (Patteson, J.). * Under 9 G. 4, c. 31 ; repealed by 24 & 25 V. c. 95, and other pro- visions enacted in 24 & 25 V. c. 100 ("The Offences against the Person Act, 1861"). ' R. V. Holt, 1836 (Littledale, J.). 1. VOL. I. 81 The learned judge observed, in sum- ming up : " If this had been a case of murder, and the prisoner intend- ing to murder one jJorHoii, had, by mistake, murdered another, he would be equally liable to be found guilt}'. The question, however, may be dif- ferent on the construction of this Act of Purlianiont." « Under 7 W. 4 & I V. c. 85, § 2 ; repealed by 24 & 25 V. c. 95, and other provisions enacted in 24 & 25 v. c. 100 (" The Offences against the Person Act, 1861"), amended by 48 & 49 V. c. 69. ' R. V. Ryan, 1839 (Parke and Alderson, lib.). « R. V. licwis, 1833 (Gurney, B.); E. V. Jarvis, 1837 (id.). ^m ;i!n« ,1 ! PRESUMPTION OF INTENT AND MALICE. [PART I. crime. Therefore where the jury found that a prisoner had wounded the prosecutor with the view of preventing his lawful apprehension, and that, in order to effect that purpose, he intended to do him some ^jrievous hodily harm, the conviction on a count charging the latter offence was held right.' And the same rule has been applied where the immediate object of the criminal was to rob the party he wounded, and the wound was inflicted as the means of effecting the robbery.* § 83. The presumption that a party intends the natural conee- quences of his acts, also extt-uds to civil responsibilities. Thus, in an action for libel,' the deliberate publication of calumny, which the publisher knows to be false, or has no reason to believe to be true, is by stutute taken to raise a conclusive presumption of malice ;* if a party make a representation, which he knows to be false, and injury ensues to another, it will be inferred by law that he was actuated by a fraudulent or malicious intent;* the willul neglect of a defendant to plead within the time appointed by law, is taken conclusively against him, as a confession of the plaintiff's right of action ; * if a person wh<j is, in the language of the Bank- ruptcy Act, " unable to pay his debts as they become due from hi? own money," spontaneously muiie a transfer or pa3'ment in favour of any creditor, which necessarily has the effect of defeating or delaying liis other creditors, it will be conclusively presumed to have bten made with that intent, and the transfer or payment will be set aside as fraudulent, though all fraud in fact may be distinctly negatived if the payer or transferor is adjuilged b-uik- rupt on a petition presented within throe months from the date of the transaction.' > R. V. Oillow, IS':-). » \\. V Hctwfii, \M\ (roloridjro, J.). » S. <i & 7 V. I'. iXi ('-Thi' Lilifl Aft. IMI.T'), <j (i. * lluiiv r. Wilson. 182?) ; R. r. Shijili'v, 17H4 (Asliluiist, J.): FiN".:-" V. Cli'iiii'iit, l.s;i0 \\A. Tcntoidcn) ; IJavlis '■. Luwn'ni'f, IKU) (I'littcwm, J.)"; Hddwi'll r. OspMMl. IH'J:. (Am.). ■■' Tiipii 1'. Lee, lH(i:j; KosttT v. f'hiiili'8, 1!S;J0; Pontifox v. 1%U()1(1, IHIl, " H. S. (". 1SN;J, Onl. XXyil. r. 'i et st'<|. 'riio I'liiiciplu of thin Order boloiips to ppnovnl jurisprudonco. So ill till' UoiiiuM liiw : " Coutiiiiiiiciii oormii. (jui juh dic.iiti iion obtciii- iMTiiiit, litiH duiiiuo coci'cctur." l>if,'. lib. 4'J, t. 1 , 1. 't'A. " Si citatUH uli(|iiiM iioii coiiipiii'ijtit, hiibutiir ))ro t'on.s(>!i- tioiif." ;J Miiw. do Prob. p. 2JU, con- cl. ll.-)I). II. 2(i. 1 4() & 47 V. c. 32, § 48. and Ho & 3(i V. c. .)H, § i},\, Jr. Heo Ex jiart^ Cruvtii, 1870; In lorruvoii, Kx jwiito TcMiipcBt, 1871 ; llidwii <•. K(*iiiptoii. 1850; In n' ('h(<m((broiii{li, 1871; Smith t'. ("hiiiiuii, 1854 ; Jn n> Wood, 82 k CHAP, v.] JUDICIAL PUOCEEDIXGS. S 84. Conclusive preeumptions are, again, made in fovour of all judicial proceedings. Thus, as an undoubted rule of pleading, nothing will be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior couit but that which is so expressly alleged, so that the records of superior courts, among which are the courts of the Counties Palatine, need not state the cause of action to have arisen within the jurisdiction ; ' whenever the contrary does not plainly and expressly appear, the respective Houses of Parliament will be con- clusively presumed to have acted within their jurisdiction, and agreeably to the usages of Parliament, and the rules of law and justice. So that a warrant issued by the Speaker of the IIoush of Commons at the instance of the House for the arrest of a witness need not contain any recital of the grounds on which it was founded;- all writs issued by any Division of the High Court of Justice are presumed to bo issued duly in a case in which the court has jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears on the face of them, so that such writs of themselves, and without any further allega- tion, protect all officers and others in their aid acting under them, and this even though they appear on the face of them to be irregular, or even void in form.' The respect due to the High Court, and the credit given to it, that it will not abuse its powers, furnish alike the reason and the justificatioa for this somewhat arbitrary presumption.* § 85* The irrebuttable presumption that all judicial proceedings have been regularly conducted, has, among others, the following consequences. It is assunuHl, at least priiml facie, that the un- reversed sentence of a foreign or colonial court of competent jurisdiction is correct, since otherwise our courts v/ould be, in elfect, constituting themselves courts of appeal, without ]»ower to reverse the judgment." Judicial acts arc, ua a general rule, con M ' i m\ Si rte III, 1 ; 1872; Ex pnrt<* Hiiih'v. Tn loBarn'll, IN.VJ; ItittlcMtoncr. r<")<)k.>, 1N,)(>; IWl r. SiiMjiNon, IN.JT ; HIIIh c Smith, IH(W. St'o, nlsd, iiH to till' •.iviiiilunco lit vdltiiifiiry HottlciiK^ntu, 4(1 & 47 W. 1-. .VJ, §47;"aiiil ;J5 & M V. c. 58, § 62. Ir, ' I'cncdck t'. Bell. 10(17. rocognisod ii\ ()oHH(>t r. Howurd, IMIT. • (JoBsut V, Ilowuid, l»n. 83 * OosHct I'. TT'iwiinl, 1847, citinpf PoniitJtsHof Kiitiiiiid's cuse, ICiOi"), 1111(1 I'lirsdiis V. J/py.l, 1772. * 111. Soo the olriliiirato judpmfnt df !'!x. Cli. iii(id>.int V. Howard, liS47. ' (Jr. Kv, § 12, as t^) oiio or two * Hronan's raso, 1K47 (Tid. Den- inaii); lidhcrtHun v. Strutb, 1H43 (l'attf(M)U, J.). o2 l( HHbiII ~" ' BHUfl i^ ■ If iil;] i iii 11 i |: ■ :«iiM: V. ill' JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. [part I. clusively prosumed to have taken place at tlie earliest period of the day on which they were done, so that a jud<»ment is regular though signed several hours after the defendant had died,' — provided only thif doctrine does not work injustice in any particular case; 2 and with the further limitation that it does not apply to the issuing of a writ of summons, since, if it did, a plaintiff could not commence legal proceedings till the day after the cause of action had accnied, and the defendant in the meanwhile might escape out of the jurisdiction.^ The recordu of a court of justice, and indeed all records, must again always be presumed to have been correctly made;' so that no evidence will be admissible to <ihow that a charter granted by the Crown was made or delivered at another time than when it bears date ;* while the day specified in a record of conviction will be co) elusive proof of the commission day of the assizes at which the trial took jdace,' — though (as in the case just mentioned), the court will, where it is necessary to do so, in order to prevent justice being defeated," allow the party against whom the record is produced to show by parol evidence the actual day of trial, and will judicially notice that though by fiction of law the whole time of the assizes is only one legal day, yet that this legal day may consist of many natural days, and thus prevent justice from being defeated by a mere arbitrary rule ;" and will on production of a Nisi Prius record containing two counts, on distinct caus(>8 of action, admit parol evidence to show that on a verdict entered as awarding damages to the plaintiff generally, that the substantial damages were recovered on one count oidy.' In these two last-named cases proof of the real facts would not rontnuUd the record, but merely (\rj)i(iin if. On the principle, too, that every presumption necessary to sustain a record will be made, it will after verdict, whether in a civil or a criminal case," be presumed that those * Wi-iRht V. Millfl, 1859 ; Edwards V. R., 1MJ4. » ("lurkof. llnulliiugh. 1881. * Hft'd 1'. iliuksoii. 1801 ; Riuns- bottoui c. IhickliuiHt, 1814 (lid. Kllon- boronKli); li- "• tVrlilo, 1832 (Ld. Ttmtonlcn). " Roh judicutu pro vori- tttto um|iitiir." Dig. lib. 60, t. 17, I. 20;. * liudford V. Orotton, 1576. • Ree Thomas v. Ansloy, 1806 ; R. V, Puf^o. 1788. • Whitakt-r v. Wisbey, 1862 ; Roe V. IlfTHoy, 1771. ' ProHtou V. I'coko, 1868. • R. V. Wfttors, 1848 ; R. v. Bowen, 184H; lleymaun v. R., 1873; R. «. (loldHiuith, 1873 ; R. v. Aapinall, 1876. 84 i i l!| <,uii CHAP, v.] LEGAL PUOCEEDIXGS. facts, without proof of which the verdict could not have beea found, were proved, though they are not distinctly alleged in the record ; provided such record contains terms sufficiently general to comprehend them in reasonable intendment.' In other words, the verdict will cure any defective statement, though it will not cure the omission of any material averment.* It is, again, always a presumption of law that the notes taken by the judge at Nisi Prius are correct, and no party is allowed to raise any question respecting the rejection of evidence at the trial, unless it appears from these notes that the evidence was formally tendered.' ^ 86. A conclusive presumption in favour of an act is sometimes raised by the solemnity with which it was done, though it was not done in court. Thus, where an award professes to be made de proemissis, the presumption is that the arbitrator intended to dis- pose finally of all matters in difference, and if by any intendment it can be made so, his award will be held final ; ^ a bond, or other specialty, is, so long as it remains unimpeached,* presumed to have been made upon good consideration, and for the consideration stated on it.^ And, by an Act of the present reign,' " every bill of lading in the hands of a consignee or indorsee for valuable con- sideration, representing goods to have been sliipped on board a vessel, shall be conclusive evidence of such shipment as against the master or other person siyninij the samc,^ notwithstanding that such goods or some part thereof may not have been so shipped, unless such holder of the bill of lading shall have had actual notice at the time of receiving the same, that the goods liad not been in fact taken on board ; provided that the master or other person so sign- ing may exonerate liimself in respect of sut'h niisrojuvsentation, by showing that it was caused without any default on his part, and wholly by the fraud of the shipper, or of the holder, or uf some f f ' Jiickson V. Pi'skod, 181.'< (TiOnl l'!ll('iili()r(Hi{i;li); Spionis v. Parkor, 17H(!; Hiivisr. lUiuk. 1S41(L(1. Dou- iimii. C.J., and J'attcson, J.); Harris r. Goodwyn, 11S41; Ui)ldtliorj)o v. Ilitrdinan, IN-I.'). StHt, also, Smith v. Kciitinj;, 1H^<»; Kidfjill c. Moor. IH.JO; imil Ld. iJolaincro v. Tho Uui'oii, 18(i7. •' JJradlmiph r. H., 1H7«. C. A. • Uibbs i: I'iko, 184'J(Ld. Abinger, and Aldi'rson, B.). * Harrison r. Croswick, 1853; Jowoll r. ("hristii', lS(i7. * fiowii I). Poors, 17(i.S; Story, Itills. § 10. Hoo jKist, § IJH. " Marlon r. Hank of Now South WaloM. tN<»() (p. v.). ' 1H\- 1!» V. f. Ill ("Tlio Hills of Lading' Act. lS.),i"), § ;j. * Soo Moyor r. iJrt'ssor, 1SG4 ; Jessol I'. Bath, 1807. I| So " \.\n I. LEGAL PKOCEKDINGS. [PAUT I. I :^ person under whom the holder claims." Again, it is by statute enacted that every conveyance made under the Act for facilitating the pale and transfer of land in Ireland shall be " for all purposes conclusive evidence " that all previous proceedings leading to such conveyance have been regularly taken ; ' and that every declaration of title by the Landed Estates Court shall be as conclusive upon the rights of all parties as any such deed of conveyance.^ § 86a. Again, when (as is now often the case) the contract is made by one party delivering to the other a document, in a common form containing tlie proposed terms, if the form is accepted without objection, the acceptor is presumed to have agreed to its terms, and is bound by the contents, whether he has or not in fact read the document.' Exceptions to this rule exist, however — 1st, where from the nature of the transaction the person accepting the docu- ment may reasonably suppose that it contains no special terms ; 2nd, where the terms are printed in a mode calculated to mislead ; and 3rd, where the terms or conditions are in themselves unreason- able or irrelevant.' § 87.* Another conclusive presumption made by the law, is t.iat in favour of the due execution of anrirnf ilvcdft and inf7*i. When these intiruments aid iliirty years old, and are unblemished by any alterations, they (as it is said) prove themselves ; their bare production is sufBcient, and the subscribing witnesses are conclu- sively taken to be dead. This presumption,— so far as the jjresent rule of evidence is concerned,— is not affected by proof that the witnesses arc living,'' and, it seems, even actually in court ;^ nor, in the case of wills, by showing that the testator died within the thirty years.' But it must appear tliat the itjstrument comes from custody, which (oven though it is not in point of law ptrictly proper), affords a reasonable presunijjtiou in favour of its genuine- • 21 & 22 V. c. 72 ( " Tho Lniulod EstiitcH Cdurt (livliitKl) Act, l.sr.H"), 5 N.">, If. Sfi) I'dWrr r. H.M'VOH, IS'lt (11. L.) ; la ru Tottenhuiu'ij Eatiitu, 1807. » 21 & 22 V. p. 72. § 51, Ir. ; llillinj? V. W.'l.li. 1,S71 (Ir.). » Wiitkiiis V. l{yiiiill, 1883, and Ottsud thui'u citud. * Or. Ev. § 21, in groat part. • Doo r. ]5uiilftt, IS.'lti. ' I'd' Vuti's, J., as citi'il (Lil. Kon- yoii) iu Mni.Hh v. CoUnctt, 17!).s. ' JicHM'. Wolloy, I.S'JN. lu.JackHon V. liluiiNlmn. iKOHrAm.), th<> Suj). Ct. of Ni'W Vdik lii'ld that the tliirty yuars iiiiiHt ho wmputod iiom tho t*)8tutor'9 duutli. 8li Cn.VP. v.] ANCIENT INSTRUMENTS — ESTOPPELS. ness ; ' and tliat it is otlierwise free from just ground of suspicion.' It is not altogether clear whether, if the deed be a oouveyanoe of real estate, the party is bound first to sh )vv some acts of possession under it ; but the weight of opinion seems to be in the negative, as will hereafter be more fully explained.' It also is (questionable whether the rule applies to an instrument bearing the seal of a court or a corporation ; " because, although tlie witnesses to a private deed, or persons acquainted with a private seal, may be supposed to be dead, or not capable of being accounted for after such a lapse of time, yet the seals of courts and corporations, being of a permanent character, may be proved by persons at any dis- tance' of time from the date of the instrument to which they are affixed."*. Si 88. The presumption in their fi^'our, if they come from the proper custody, and purport to be thirty years old, is not confined to deeds and wills, bu^ extends equally to letters,'^ entries,^ receipts,'' Hrttkment certificntcH,^ and indeed to all other uritten documenta ; and in such cases the signatures and handwriting need not be proved. The rule is founded " on the great difficulty, nay, impossibility, of pioving the handwriting of the party after su'H a lapse of t; '10." 9 § 89.'" Entoppeh may be ranked among the class of irrebuttable presumptions.'' A man is estopped, when he has done or permitted some act, which the law will not allow him to gainsay. " The law of estoppel is not so unjust or absurd, as it has been too much the custom to represent." '* Its foundation rests partly on the obli- gation to speak and act in accordance with truth, by which every lionest man is bound, and jiartly on the policy of the law, which thus B>. ks to prevent the mischiefs that would inevitably result ' Dot! ('. SiiinploH, 1H;(8; liisho]) nf Mtfiith V. M. of WiiichottUT, 1H;{() ^Tindnl, (".J., rrprcMcutiiig all tho jiiilgf'M in J)(im. I'n!e.). * ]{()« i\ l{iiwliii;;s, 18lo. ' Siju Miilcolii sou ('. ()'])oa, (II. li.), oiti«(i post, §§ (Kij, ()()<(. ♦ K. V. Jtiithwiik, W,V1 (IaI. tprdon, C.J.). » Doo V. Hovnon, 1840; Horo v. W.ir.l, IH21 (DiilliiH. C.J.); uiul 1823 (L.I. TimtiTdfii, ('..!.). • I'er cur. iu Wyuuo v. Tyrwhitt, 1802 Tou- 18.TJ. ' Hortio I'. Hoiiumont, 181(J. » K. r. Uytou, i:!)2; H. v. Nothor- thou;;, 181;}. lu Uii'nc casos uo proof of tilt) I'UMtody WHS ^ivt'U iu t*viiiuuco, but tlu> court lit 1 i tliiw to Im iiumu- tttriiil. " Wvnno V. Tyrwhitt, 1821. '" (Jr. Kv. § 22, iu part. " Hy till- N. YinkCiv. Code, § 1792, estiipiu'lH iirii iil>oliHht!il, ■' I'l^r i'liuutou, J., ia iiowinaa v. Taylor, 1834. .1 ; m ' !!i,.„ 87 I'M ill! ESTOPPELS BIND PARTIES AND PHIVIES. [PAUT I. from uncertainty, confusion, and want of confidence, were men permitted to deny wliat tliey had deliberately asserted. The doc- trine of estoppel is, however, guarded with great strictness, or, as it is said, "estopjjcls are odious." The reason for this is not because the party enforcing the estoppel is presumed to be desirous of excluding the truth ; indeed, the more reasonable supposition is that that which the opposite party has already solemnly admitted to be so really is the truth ; but because the estoppel mai/ exclude the truth. It consequently is required that all estoppels must be certain to every intent ; for no one shall be prevented from setting up the truth, unless it be in plain contradiction to allegations and acts previously made in his interest.' § 90. From these last words it will be gathered that a man is estopped not only by his own allegations and acts, but also by those of all persons through whom he claims} In technical language, estoppels are usually binding upon both parties and prides} Lord Coke divides privies into three classes ; first, privies in blood, as heirs ; secondly, privies by estate, as feoffees, lessees, assignees, &c. ; and thirdly, privies in law, " as the lord by escheat, the tenant by the courtesy, the tenant in dower, the incumbent of a benefice," * husbands suing or defending in right of their wives,* executors and administrators.* Upon the principle qui sentit commoduin, sentire debet et onus, the privy stands in no better position tlvin the party through whom he derives his title ; and if the latter is not at liberty to contradict what he has formerly said or done, the former is subject to a like disability.' An exception to this rule is admitted in favour of those privies, who would themselves bo aggrieved or defrauded by the conduct of the party through whom they claim. For instance, where a man executes a deed with the fraudulent intent of defeating the statutes of mortmain, his heir- at-law is not estopped from questioning the validity of the inden- III » Bowman v. Tiiylor, 1835 (Lord Doninuu und Tuunton, J.); liiiiu- Bou V. Trcmoro, WM ; Kopn v. Wig- Rftt, 1851 (Williams, J.); Pullctn>au V. Jackson, WM (Am.); Curvor v. JuckHun, 18:i() (Am.). » u. N. P. 2aa. • Soo post, §§ 787 — 793, as to ad- missions by privies. • Co. Litt. 352 a. • Outram v. Morowood, 1814. • II. V. Uobdon, 1738. ' Taylor v. Noedliam, 1811. 88 Uli CHAP, v.] ESTOPPELS NOT BINDING UNLESS PLEADED. ture, since his claim to the lands is founded, not on the deed, hut. on his title by descent.* § 91. There are three classes of estoppels; namely, estoppels by matter of record, estoppels by deed, and estoppels in pain? Judg- ments ' are the most extensive species of records, and consequently estoppels by record will be most conveniently discussed in treating of judgments. Neither an estoppel by record nor one by deed will operate as a conclusive estoppel, unless the matter of estoppel appears on the record,* nor unless it \\a.s been cxprcsn/i/ plradvd by way of estoppel whore an opportunity of so pleading it has been afforded.* If a party, having an opportunity of pleading an estoppel, does not avail himself of it, the court will conclusively presume that he has intended to ■?"'.ive all benefit derivable from it, and allow the jury to form their own conclusions from the facts presented to them in evidence.^ If, indeed, no opportunity for pleading the matter of estoppel in bar has arisen, an estoppel by record or by deed ought, on principle, to be binding when offered in evidence ; and this has been held to be the law in some of the United States,^ though the point has not yet been expressly decided in this country.* In pleading, an estoppel can only be mot by the plead- ing which is now equiv; ^ to t'ae old demurrer. '•• § 92. As a general rule, howt ver, estoppels in puis med not bo pleaded in order to make them obligatory. For instance, if a man represent another as his ag«'nt, in order to procure a person to con- tract witli him as such> and this person so contract, the contract » Doo V. Lloyd. 1839. Soo Smyth V. Wilson, 1841 (Ir.). ^ Co. liitt. 352 u; 2 Smith, L. C. * See post, §§ 1607 ot soq. * Soo Uobiiison v. Rohiiison, 1H7J). * 2 Smith, li. C. <)7(), iui, ami (>83. Tho wholo noto, from m. (i,)() to 72(), should Ih) perused. It contiiius an eliihonito oxposition of a vory dillicult branch of tnn niw. Soo also Tro- vivan v, Lawrence, 17()4; Mugrath V. Hardy, 1838. ' ())itram v. Morowood, 1814; Voo{,'ht V. Winch, 1832; Doo v. lluddart, 18W; Doe v. Seutou, 1835 i'arko, ]{.); Nowlnn i'. Gibson, 1847 It.); Matthew r. Osborno, 1855; Doe V. Wright, 1839 ; Magruth v. Uiirdy, 1838, as to 08toi)pel8 by matt'T of ro(M)rd ; Wilson r, IJu'tlor. 1838; Hiiwinan v. Kostron, 1835 ; Voun<; v. liaincock, 1847; ("arpcntcr r. HiilJiT, 1841; I'otts c. \ixun, 1H7() (Ir.), us to osto])i)ols bj' dofxl ; anil l-'rconmn c. I'ooko, 1818 (I'arko, 11.), us to both kinds of t'stoijpol. ' Soo Howard i'. Mitchell, 1817 (Am.); Adams c. liarnos, 1S21 (Am.). • K. I'. lUakomore, 1852. See R. V. Ilaufjhton, 1853; Ld. Kovorshaui V. Emerson, 1850 ; and 11. v. Ilutchins, 1880, ro versed (on another point) ia C. A., 1881. » R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXV. rr. 1- 2; see, also, JJru'Uey v. Uookett, 1844. n till sii i.iii ^•m NO ESTOrPEL FROM SETTING UP ILLEGALITY. [PART I. binds the prinoijtiil oqiially with one made by himself, and no form of pleading can loave such o matter at large, or enable the jury to treat it as no contract ; ' and in an action by indorsee against accf>[)tor on a bill payable to drawer's order, to a plea that the drawer had no authority to indorse, j)laintiff, though he might reply the estoppel,'^ would not be forced to do so, but he might by his pleading raise the point of law., that the defence disclosed no legal answer to the action.' § 93. A party is not, however, estopped by his own deed whei*e he can make it v i ' b;' pn^ving that it was execjuted for a fraudu- lent, illegal, or i -rd : 'jrpose. In one case,* indeed, where a man, in order to ^ * hit b other a colourable qualifioation to kill game, had conveyed some -.vis to him, it was hold that the grantor's widow could not avoid this conveyance in an action of ejectment against her by the brother. But although Sir Nicholas Tindal attempted to support this decision as resting on the fact, that " the defence set up was iiiroHxisfrnf with the deed," * it can, even on this trround, scarcely be supported. Modem decisions have establishea thai in an action of ejectment by the grantee of an annuity, to rjoover premises on which it was secured, the grantor may show thai, the premises were of less value than the annuity, and that the deed, consequently, required enrolment, notwithstand- ing that he hfid expressly covenanted in the d(!ed that the premises were of greater value ;" and that where a bond has been given, or a covenant ma<le, for an illegal consideration, the obligor or cove- nantor may avoid the instrument by pleading and i)roving the ' l''r(.H'inan v. Cooko, 18JH (I'arku, 15.). ■' Sand Tsou J'. Colliimii, \H-i'>i. " Ilullitiix r. Lylt', 1M!». « Doc r. I{(il)i-i"t8, l.s:{2. Soe ulso riiilljiott.s r. l'liill|.(.ttH, IH.JL •"• I 'role c. \Vi;,'f,'iiiH. \KM. • 1 »((« c. l-'onl, IM.'!.), whom n quoH- tioit was riiisi'd wluitlmr a covdimiit, iiMiliT liny t'iinimHtiincos, is hih-Ii a <iiM'liiratiiiii as to t'sto]) a jiarty iroin altcrwaids (liM])utiiij.' t.lin fact cnvo- iianti'd toi', Imt \.\w jiDint was lol't uiiili'i'iilcil. Ill AiiKii'icaa party may, ill ^oiiu! casns, bo cNtniipt'd liy a iu>vi'iiaiit. Thus a covenant of war- ruiity L'stops tho graiitur fnjiu (jotting up (iti aftor-acqiiiroJ tltlo nj^aiiist till' jjrmti ', for it is a jicipi'timlly <ipt!iatinj;('i)vt'naiit : Ti-rrt'tt /•. Tiiylor, IHl.> (Aim.); Ja<'ks()n c. Alatsdotf, 1«I4 (Am.); Ja.ksou v. Wnj;lit. 1817 (Am.); M'Willianis i'. N'isl.y, 1810 (.\ni.) ; Somes r. Skinner, Lsil.') (Am.), lint a grantor is not esto]i|H)d by a covenant, tliat lie is seised in feo and has j^ood rijfht to convoy ; .\llen r. Sayward, IH.'M (Am.); for any seisin in fact. t)ioii<;h by wronj.', i« sntlicient to satisfy this covoiiunt, its im]M)rt lM'in(< merely tiiis, that ho has the seiHin in fact, at the time of conveyance, and thereby is ({naiitiod to traiiHt'er tho OHtuto tu the grantee. 90 1 1 ^_ CHAP, v.] ESTOPPEL BY DEED — ILLEGAL COVENANTS. illopality ;' and this too. thougli a lognl, lint untrup, eonsifleration 18 stated on thu fa< e of the doed.'^ Indeed, wlicro both parties to an indenture either know, or have the means of knowing, that it is executed for an immoral purpose, or in contravention of a statute, or of puhlif! policy, in general neither will ho estopped from proving facts which render the instrument void ah initio.' For although a party will thus, in certain cases, bo enabled to take advantage of his own wrong,^ yot (his evil is trifling in comparison with the flagrant evasion of the law, that would result from an oppo.site rule.* Neither will a party bo estopped by his deed, if he executed it while, from duress, infancy, or other cause, he was incapable of making a valid contract, or if ho was deceived by the fraudulent misrepresentations or acts of other parties.*' !i !)4. The doctrine at one time prevailed" that trustees ctir-!: for the benefit of the public could never be estopped from d'^putiuj^ the validity of their deeds, because, if they were, tho innocent parties, on whose behalf they were acting, might be seriously injured.' The doctrine now, however, only holds good in cii^es in which the trustees have, in their dealings with ano t party, violated a public statute, the contents of which are presumed to be known to sxich party. Therefore, where a bridge Act authorised commissioners to mortgage the tolls, and enacted that the mort- gagees should have no preference by reason of priority, it was held in an action of ejectment brought by a mortgagee of the tolls against the commissioners, that the defendants were estopped from setting up the fact of an earlier mortgage to defeat the legal estate of the lessor of the plaintiffs." S 95. Though an estoppel may bind a person acting in one capa- city, it does not necessarily follow that it will have a similar elfect ' Prolo V. WifTfrins, 18;}7; f'dlliim r. lUiinti'iii, ITfiT ; Uiis Li;;lit iiiul Cdk.i Co. c. Tinner, IS.'Jit; alTd. in J•;x.('h.,l^i^(); Stmtliiiilan.lMori'ti.ii l!y. Co. r. Strutton, ISIl.!; Hill i: Mauuh. Watcrw. Co , ISUl ; Ucnvou t'. Xcttlcfold, 18.j(); lloitoiic.Wub'tm. Iinpi-Dvi'. I'oinr-i., 1S.V_'. '' I'axtou f. I'opiiain, 1,S14. » Id. * Doo V. Ford, l83o (Ld. DDiMnau); Doo V. HowcUh. 18;}2. » iJt'nyon r. Xuttlffold, 18jO. Soo Mallalii'u c. Ilod^'soii, Iti.Yl; liowea ('. Foster, iHoH; Taylor c. JJowors, 1877. • Hayno v. Maltby, 178!». ' ]'"airtillo v. Oilixit. 1T,''7 ; Doe v. llaroM, 18.« (I.ittl.-dalo, J.). " Doo c. lloriit!, lH+!{; 1{. ,. Wliito, 184U ; llortnii c. \Yestra. Improve. Comrs., 18 J2. i 91 !|,lii* 'li i|rl .;? il , ,:h||l: ■ I 1 11 f i \ [■ ' m ill * iili ESTOrPKL IJY DEED — MERE DESCUIITION. [PAKT I. when ho is sustaining a totally different character.' For instance, an executor de son tort, who has verbally agreed with the landlord to deliver up demised premises, but has afterwards taken out letters of administration, is not concluded from bringing an '\ction of eject- ment against the landlord, who has actually obtained possession under the agreement.' Where, however, "an heir apparent, having only the hope of Buccession, conveys, during the life of his ancestor, an estate, which afterwards descends upon him, although nothing passes at that time, yet, when the inheritance descends upon him, he is estopped to say that he liad no interest at the time of the grant."* The distinction between these two cases is, that in the former, the party not estopped was acting for the benefit of others ; in the latter, the party estopped was sui juris, and acting on his own behalf. § 96. A deed does not estop a party from disputing the correct- ness of that wliich is not an essential averment thereon, but is mere (/cscrip/ioii — such, for instance, as the date of the deed ; the quantity of land ; its nature, whether arable or meadow ; and the like— for these statements are but incidental atid collateral, and may be supposed not to have received the deliberate attention of the parties.'* In this country, however, if a deed of conveyance distinctly states in the operative part that the consideration money has been received, and the estoppel is properly pleaded,* the fact of payment, and the amount paid, are conclusively presumed.® The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881," has expressly enacted that this (which appears to have been so long before the Act) shall be so in favour of a subsequent innocent purchaser. Under > 2 Smith, L. C. 6(57 ; Robinson's cnso, l(i(»;{; Smyth v. Wilson, 1H41 (Ir.); L.'Kp)tt r.Gt. N. lly. Co.. 1H76. Sen Ik'nnutt v. Giimffeo. 1877, C. A. ' Dot) V. Olonn, 1H:J4. Soo also Miildleton's case, 1603 ; Mi^ttors v. Jirown, 1K()2; Lyons v. Muldorry, 1H;J2 (Ir.); Kirwiln v. Gorman, 1840 (Ir.) ; Johnson v. Warwick, 1HJ(J. » Hay no v. Maltby, 1789 (Ld. Konyon). ♦ Com. Di. Estoppel, A. 2 ; Yelv, 227, by Metcalfo, n. 1 ; I)oddington'8 case, lo94; Shipworth r. Green, 1725 » Potts )•. Nixon. 1870 (Ir.). • Sludly r. Wright, 1737 ; Cossens V. Cossens, 1737; l{<).k"ntn!0 r. Ja<M)b, 18()!>, in which la>t easo tluTe wi-ro hi{^hly8U8))i(i()iisciri;timNt4inc-<!stfn(I- ing to show that the consideration money had not in fact been j)aid; liaker v. Dewcv, 1823; Iiani])on r. Corke, 1834 ; Hill r. Maiich. \Vat(aw. Co.. 1832. ,Sco Smith v. Uattams, 18 J7 ; also Gn;slty r. Mrjusloy, 1801. ' 44&45 V. c.'il.Joo. ' f| CHAP, v.] E.sTOPn:Ls — uixitals in dekds. tlie snmo Act,' tho proiluctum by a solicilDr of a »1»'(m1 with a receipt in the l)(i(ly tlicn'of or indorsed niou it lor tlio eousidfriition is Hiifficicnt autliority for the piiymont of the considoration to him, nltl)ough a receipt indorsed upon the deed will not in itself amount to an estoppel.- In America,'' though tho party is estopped from denying the conv»\vanc;e, and that it was for a valuable considera- tion, the statement in the deed is ajiparently only prirail facie evidence of the amount paid.* S 97. Lord Coke's doctrine that "a recital doth not conclude, because it is no direct affirmation,"'' luis bi en expressly overruled. The law now is^ thus: "If a distinct statement of a particular fact is made in the recital of a bond, or other instrument under seal, and a contract is made with reference to that recital, it is un(jue8tionably true, that, as between the parties to that instru- ment, and in an action upon it, it is not competent for the party bound ' to deny the recital, notwithstanding what Ijord Coke says on the matter of recital in Coke Littleton, ''i-')2 b; and a recital in instruments not under seal may be such as to be conclusive to the same extent. A strong instance as to a recital in a deed, is found in a case * where, in a bond to secure the payment of rent under a lease stated, it was recited that the lease was at a rent of 170/., and the defendant was estopped from pleading that it was 140/. oidy, and that such amount had been paid. So, where other particular facts are mentioned in a condition to a bond, as that the obligor and his wife should appear, the obligor cannot plead that he appeared himself, and deny that he is married, in an action on the bond." All the instances given 1n;H; R. r. StiimiMT, 1.S41; Hill ,k Miim^h. Wiit(>rw. ("o., Ih.'Jl ; I'lirpjtor r. Harris, 1S4,); ("liirkev. Hull, lH8i> (Ir.). SofiilHoHuyWi'.Hradloy, lW-18; Vouiig V. Kaiiicock, 1847; Horton c Wewtin. lini)r()VO. CdiiirH. , 18.52; and Hiiiipsrford v. Hoochcr, 18o.) (Ir.). Hut Hoo liimlsay v. E. of Wicklow, 1873 (Ir.). ' Kven thotigh sho bo a married womim, seniblo (Ld. J. Jamos), Joues V. Frost, In re Fiddoy, 1872. • Lainson v. Tremoro, 1834. Seo Brooke v. Hayincs, 1868. » I fioU. Abr. 873, o. 26. 1 > 44 &4.J V. c. 41, §56. ' liaiii|)oii (t. Corke, 18;J4 (Ilolrovd, J., H.'Ht, J.); Stratou v. Kastall, 1788. ' (}r. Ev. § 26, n., almost verbatim. * Tho principal cases will bo found rofcri-ed to in tho early editions of this Work. » Co. Lit. .1.')2 h. As to tho offoct of recitals in a deed which has biti-n tendered fnr execution but not exe- cuted, seo Hulk'v V. HuUey, 1875. • Per Parke, B., in Carpenter v. BuUer, 1 84 1 . As to other cases where a recital has been held conclusive, seo Bowniiaii V. Taylor, 1835; Hills v. Luming, 1854; Ijuiiison v. Tremere, •m 93 li I (J I' I i 111 WHEN RECITALS OPERATE AS ESTOPPELS. [PART U in Com. Dig., Estoppel, A. 2, under the head of ' Estoppel hy Matter of Writing ' (except one which relates to a release), are oases of estoppel in actions on the instrument in which the admissions are contained. By his contract in the instrument itself a party is assuredly hound, and must fulfil it. But there is no authority to show that a party to the instrument would be estopped, in an action by the other party, not founded on the deed, and uho/Zi/ collateral to it,' to dispute the facts so admitted, though the recitals would certainly be evidence ; for instance, in another suit, though between the same parties, where a question should arise whether the plaintiff held at a rent of 170/. in the one case, or was married in the other case, it could not be held that the recitals in the bond were conclusive evidence of these facts. Still less could it be so aeld, if the matter alleged in the instrument were wholly immaterial to the contract therein contained ; as, for instance, suppose an indenture or bond to contain an unnecessary description of one of the parties as assignee of a bankrupt, overseer of the poor, or as filling any other character, it could not be contended that such statement would be conclusive on the other party, in any other pro- ceeding between them." § 98. To make a recital operate as an estoppel, there must then be, first, a distinct statement * of some material ' particular * fact ; secondly, a contract made with reference to such statement ; * and, thirdly, either an action directly founded on the instrument con- taining the recital, or one which is brought to enforce the rights arising out of such instrument." If these requisites are satisfied, ' Soe S.-Eii8t. Ey. Co. v. Warton, 1862. '' Sec Kepp v. WijTRott, 18,>1. » In Curpcutc r. Uullor. 1X41. tho court were stmiifjly inclined to think that, in a (Iced rclatinj,' to an adit, a recital that certain nt.'ifrhhourinf? lands, throufrh which the adit did not I)asM, bolonp-'d to A. 15., was an im- material mattei', which a i)arty to tho deed was not estojiped from denying. Tho point, howovcr, was not directly decided, fts the admission was held inconclusive on other grounds. * Ah to tho distinction between generality and particularity, see Com. Dig., Esto])i)el, A. 2, and notes to Riiinsford v. Smyth, l.JGl. * In Stnmghill c. Ikick, 1830. the oouit thus stated the law :— " Wiiero a recital is intended to bo a state- ment, which all the parties to tho deed have mutually agreed to admit as true, it is an estopjiel upon all. ]Uit whtne it is intended to be the statc^ment of one party oidy, tlie estop])el is conlined to that party, and the intention is to be gaflua-ed from construing thf* instrument."' See, also. Young r. l{ainc<ick, 18-47 ; Ulackhall v. (libsoii, 1878 (Ir.). • "Wiles V. Woodward, 18-Jl ; Carter V. Carter. 18,)8 (Wood, V.-C.) ; Fru-^er V, Pondlebury, 18B2. 94 CHAP, v.] ESTOI'I'KW MIIRT HK KKCH'KOCAL. the doctrine may, in some cases, be extended to instruments not under seal. In all cases of estoppel by recital, the matter recited requires no proof ; since the recital is not offered as secontlnry, but as primary evidence, which cannot be controverted, and winch fonns a muniment of title. This rule, however, only applies to so much of a deed cs is ait nail if irvitvd ; and therefore if it liecomes necessary to rely ou a yaii of the recited deed which is not itself recited, such recited deed must be produced and proved in the regular way.' S 99. It is a rule in the general doctrine of estoppels, that every estoppel must be reciprocal ; that is, it must bind both parties, since a stranger can neither take advantage of an estoppel, nor be bound by it.* For example, where a party, holding chambers in Lincoln's Inn as tenant-at-will under the benchers, in a deed, by which he conveyed his interest to A., recited that he was seised oi them for life, and subsequently stirrendered them to the benchers, who admitted li. as tenant, it was held that B. was, as against A., not estopped from denying that the surrenderor was seised for life ; ' again, where a man took lands from the assignees of a bankrupt, by a deed describing such lands as freehold, Ik^ was held not estopped, as against the bankrupt's wife (on a claim by her of dower), from proving that the lands were in fact leaseholtl ; * in an action against an individual for using a way,* plaintiff's conviction on a previous indictment, in respect of the same way, for obstructing a public highway, though doubtless strong evidence, cannot be used as an estoppel ; while the grantee or lessee under a deed poll if he claim title under it (although not, in general, esto[)ped from gainsaying anything mentioned in the deed which is the deed of the grantor or lessor only) is thereby estopped from denying title of the grantor." Indeed, as against {hd grantor under such a deed poll an exception to the general .ulo requiring reciprocity in estoppels might perhaps be recogi.'jed, because in these instruments only one party is ever intended to be bound, and as he has executed a deed wn i the same solemnities as an indenture, there is no ' Abbott V. Oill.^tt, 1838. ' Co. Lit. 3.V2 (I. * Doo V. Errinj^ton, 1840. * Gaunt V. Waininan, 1836. » Petricf. Niittall, 1835. • Co. Lit. 363 b ; Goddard's case. 1684. m Ml Ih ! 96 1 iV si II at^f^H 1 'i f:sTorrcL3 hy dkkd — ksioi'I'Kls in pais. [I'ART I. vnlid reason why the dootrine of estoppel sliould not apply to iii III.* S 1(M(. Another rule with respeet to estojtpelH by deed is that a deed whieli can take effeot />;/ iiitrrrst pjiall not be eonstrued to take etrect by estoppel.' Therefore if a lessor has any interest in the demised preiiii.Mm, even though it be one lass than ho professes to grant, the lease siiall not work by estoppel, but shall enure to tho extent of tlio lessor's interest, and no further.' If, howi^ver, a ])erson, liaving no titl»» whatever, makes a lease by indenture, this will esto]» tli(! parties to the deinl from alleging tho h«ssor's want of title during the eontinuanco of tho lease; and if the lessor suliso- quently purchases the land, or otlierwise obtains an intere.st in it, the leaM>, wliich was originally a lease by r-u'o/ijit'/, will bo converted into a lease in iiiffrcxf, and tho heir or a.ssigneo of the lessor will he bound thereby, as well as \\w lessee and his a.ssigiu'es.* {i lOl. The third kiiul of ohtoppt-ls are estoppels by matter in piiin} Tho rnost ordinary instanee of these is the well-established ru)i>, that a tenant, during his possessicm of jiremises, shall not deny tliat a landlord, \inder whom im enlered, or from whom lie has taken a renewal of his holding," or to whom he has paid rent, liiid title at such time.' Neither in an ejeetment by the lai<dlord, ii<.' in an action by him for rent or for iise and oeenpation, oan the ter.aiit set up the superior lith' of a third person," or that the lainl- lord has no title. For instar.ee, if the plnintiif be an incumbent, the tenant cannot give evidence that his presentation was simo- iiiucal ; '' if lie be a devisee he will not be allo»ved to prove that the devisor was iMcapable of making a will'" (unlcRs, indeed, tlie party clainiiiig as d«>vi:4ee was guilty uf fraud in making tho will, and in falsely representing it to hiui as a valid one)." The only course ' '1 Smith, I-. (". (i(M* ; Hue. Abj. lit. \>A« in ikiih, hoc )Mmt. S§ 772, 7«a, N'JO ],('!»*•«, (>, tit b"'l|., Nilll t>t Htl(|. '' Doc r. Piiiton. 1N40 (I'littosou, • \hw v. \Vin>:iim, IHI.J. J.), ' Doc I'. I'l'KKc, l"N7 (1.(1. Miiim- ' III. ill iiiKiiiiiciit; Co. Lit. 4.'i(i, ililil); Dou v. Mioton, is 10. Sco 47/-; Doc (. Siiton, 1n;1.-( (I'liiko, Atl.-(icii. r. StcphciiH, Its,").). i;.); \\iil;oii I'. Wiiti rlioiiM). l(17'J. ' D<»o v. I'ckK'". '^^7 (IhI. MaiiH- ' W. Iil>.'. Austin, IM I ; SliuKcon lir,lil). V. WiiiKlicld. IS Mi. • ('<M»ko I', I.oxliy, I7ICJ. ' Ah to "jiiiiHiiil ailiiiii<f>ioiiH," hikI '" Dor I', WifiniiiK. IMJ, " Milini^xioiix ixtcil ii]ioii," wliii'h " l.il. Duiiuiitii, in 111. m uic'tiiiicH uiu t'luHMil uuiuiij; i'mUiji- flfi CHAP v.] KSTOPPKI. IN PAIS — LANDLOKP AND TI'.NANT. which a f(>iiiiii< wlio wishes (<» (lisjmte th»» litlo of tho huullonl iiiwh'r whom he •tutcriMl vaw jtursuti (siiv<* iiulccd in tho oin' cdsc uf his l)i'iii}j; abk' to show that his ailiiiission of Immii}^ tonnikt was obfaiiit'il hy a chmr fraud) is to yicM \i\) the iiri'iniscs, and then hriii}r ail uctiiiii to nn-ovor tluMH.' So strict is thia ndo, that, even if a hiiidloi'd, in {troviug his own caso, discloso tho faut that he has only an t'(iiiitahh' or a joint ostatf in the pn'inisi's, the tenant ciiimot avail himself of that eircuinstance as a defence.- Further examples of the rule are, that a lessee, who iias once acei'iiteil a lease and paid rent under it, cannot disjiute the lessor's title, though thu d(>ed itself admits upon its face som*; infirmity in that title," and that a tenant who has held jjremises under a corporation aggr»>gate, and paid rent, ennnot object to such corporation suing him fur use and occupation, on the ground that a corporation cannot demists except by deed, and that he has occupied without deed.' The rule that i> tenant cannot ileny his landlord's title is applicable in an action of trespass, as well as in one to recovitr hind;'* ami is binding, not only (m tho tenant himself, but on all who claim in any way through him," as, for instance, a party to whom a lessee has given up jiossessiou." Its principle, moreover, extends to the case of a person coming in by ]iermi.ssion as a mere lodger, a servant, or other licensee." $ Kl'J. [bit though u tenant cannot deny that the person, by whom he was let into possession, had title at the tinie when he so let him in, he nuiy show that such person had no title at some jinvious time. I''or instance, where the defendant claimed under a mnveyance from a certain company, dated in |S'J4, he was allowed 'i 1 ' I'd' < 'iili'i'iil^c, ■)., ill III. .')77 ; \>i»' >■. I.ll(lv .<lllVlllc, ISl,'). Sec \{. ,S. r. issit, (till.' will. r. •-•; A|.|i. V,. • iK.ll.y V. Ilm, IHIU, ' l>uk« V. AMlil.y, IH«J;!; Mnrtnii r. W I-., IMIW. • M.iy. ef StiilTonl v. Till, isjlt; I'i'iiii jiiiil Cli.iif Koi'licMcr c. riiTcc, ISON; I'l'rn^'liiHCil in FiHhliii(||j{clN' Co. r. lti>l>crtH(iii, \H\X Hi'C I'iii'li'H. ('(iimiiiM. V, Mcrril, IWllt; iilmi ikjmI, S l»M. ' lit'iiiiiny v. Fdx, \M1 \ (iiiiiliry- iii;: u (III turn u( I'ulluuk, t.li., nt T.— \oj.. I. , \Vul-<iiii )'. I,iiiii>, |S,')(i. Sco iilsd Willll r. Itviili, IST'i. • '...ii.l. \v N. W.M. l!v. (',,. r. Went. ISIIT. ' H.ic .'. MillH, 18.I.-. ; |)i..> V. I.iidy Siiiyliic, IHIT; 'I'livlnr c. Nccillniiii, iNim. " line c. Iliiytllp, iNlfi, wlifin u Woliiilll wllii llllil IIHki'il li'ilVe to ffOt vi p'tali|i'>4 ill fill' ^iinlcii, Mill oil- tciiii'd tlic kc\M for tliis piiiiii nc, truiiiliili'iitly ttiiik |HiHMi'HNiiiii of tho lldlimt ikiiil tried (iiiiNiic'CNMriilly, of (■((iirMc) to fi't ii|i tt title, Su«) ulso l)oe I'. Iliii liiiioi)., \KM. ESTOPPEL IN PAIS — LANDLORD AND TENANT. [I'ART I. to dispute the titlo of the company ro convey the same premises to the i)laiutifF in 1818 ; • a lessee let into possession in IH'^C) under a demise from a tenant for life, was allowed, in an action brought by the reversioner (though he would not liavo been permitttxl to show after the death of the tenant for lifo adverse title iu another at the (late of the lease), to prove that, Ixfore 1826, the legal estate was outstanding in a third party, and that, consequently, the reversioner, who claimed in common with the t«uant for life under a settlement of a much earlier date, had no legal title.* A tonaiit is also allowed to prove that, since the commencement of the tenancy, the title of his lessor has expired or V)een defeated.' For example, he may prove that his landlord was a tenant pour autre vie, and that the cesttii (pie vie is dead ; or that he was a tenant from year to year or at will, and that the superior landlord had given him a notice to quit or determined the will;* or that l\w person who let him in was a mortgagor in possession, who, not having uj* to the date of dcmiiso been treated as a trespasser, had then title to confer the legal possession, but has subsetpiently been treated as a trespasser.* In short, the tenant may rely on any fact whi(!h either amounts to an evictior by title paramount,' or shows that the title of his landlord has expired." S lOIJ. It is not always clear what constitutes a "letting into possession." Where a party was in possession of preini.ses without leavtf obtained fnmi any one, and a person came to him and said, *' Vdu have no right to the jtremises," upon which he aoquiesocd, and took a lease from ihis person, the relation of landlord and tenant was lu^d to be sulliciently created to dultar the one from « l»o<) V. Pnw.ll. 1h;m. • lion I'. Limpldli, IHJH; Drxt v. Whitl...., IH-.".'. ' 1 r. iJiiitoli. IHIO (Lil. Di'Il- iiiiiii'* ; HKjifiaft I'. Kt'VM, lN.'i;i. fSco MiiylfV I'. Hniilliy, IM«7; WiitHon c. I.iiiii', IH.'jO; l.iiii^fortl c, ScliiH'H, 1N,')7; lldWt- I'. .SiilTott. 1H,')!»; Loud. & N. Wfnt. iJv. Co. I'. W.Kt, \m't. * Dim) I'. I(a'il<iii. IMO. ' |)(Mi I'. Huitiiii, Hiiimi. A inort- (rap'i<, by Hiiii|ily );:iviii|.r iiotico tothi* toniiiit. t(i i_)ay n-tit to liiin, tlooH nut trcMit th« iiioi'tKitKor im >t tr*tH|MiMN«r : Ilii'kiniut f. Muchiu, INJ!), but it iiofin', to biivii sin'h iiu offi'ct, iinist ritliiT 1)11 roii|il)>(| with an att<irn- nicnt, or be I'ollowcil by actual |)ay- nirnt of ri'iif. to tlio niorl;;a;;i!(i. .Sen ill. ; also Wilton v. l)iinn, iNiil ; Tiirniir v. ('anu'i'on'H Coalbrook St. Coul Co., 1M,5(I; Litchliold r. Hrady, IH.'iO; Tivnt .-. Hunt. IH.VJ. • Oolllilswoltll r. Klii«lltH, isi:t. ' llowim II. Cooper, lull. ,Si>)<l)(io I-. AVatM4in, 1H17; Doo r. Scuton, IsiKi; ClaridpM'. Ma(!k)>nxii*, \M'1\ Mount- noy r. CollitT, 1H,')U; I'lmtiiy I'. Mar- n«tt, ls,')S; Ifidine^u v, MuUiua, 1875, lix. fh. 98 ;. v.] WHAT CONSTITUTES A LETTING INTO POSSESSION. disputing tlie title of the other.' But where a teuant, already in possession of premises under a demise from a termor, at the expi- ration of the termor's right entered into a parol agreement with another party to hold under liira, in ignorance of the real facts, and under the supposition that this party was entitled to tVe pre- mises, this agreement was held not to be equivalent to the first letting into possession.* Neither a parol agreement by a tenant to hold of a party, by whom he was not let into punsooiioii,'^ nor an attornment,* nor an actual payment of rent to such party, even under a distress,* will in themselves operate as estoppels ; but the tt-nant may still show that he has acted in ignorance, or under a misapprehension of the real eircumstancos," or, in the case of pay- ment of rent, that some other i)arty was entitled to receive itj i 104.*' There are also certain conchisive presumptions of law with respect to iiifautx.^ Thus, an infant under seven is conclu- sively presumed incapable of committing any felony, or, in<l<'eJ, any indictable offence,'" for want of discretion ; " a male infant under fourteen is presumed incapable, on the ground of impotency, of committing a rape as a principal in the first degree,'^ or of being • Door. Mills, 18;J5(Patt.'son, J.). Set) hIho D.ilhy v, IIoh, IN4(>. ' ('lari(l;;(i r, Muckcii/io, 18-12. "'nicni wiiH no niin poHHiwHion jjivcn liy thii <|i'fi'iiiliuit ; sho was in no way projiuliciul ; hHh coiiltl not Imvo turned tho pluintitY out of jiossch- nion ; and hi'foni their iif^rt'eincnt, if hIu' IiimI Ix'dii^ht her ejectinent, tlic i)liiintill' niirfht huvo hIiowu tliat hIio iiait no titli', and tlmt tlio titlo was in Konie one *>lHt>. It in not like tho case of a ]i('rson letting.' unother into |piissessi(in of vacant promises ; it is m fact a remaining in possession of ]ircniiseM, which had bet'ti f.)rniei'iv ncciipied Ity thotoiianl." I'erTindal, CJ. •' Id. • !).<<• r. Hrown, 18:17. • Kninl't I'. Cox, 1h;)(1. • (iri'f;ory '•, Doidpt, 1827; Orii- venor r. Woodhoiiso, 1824 ; ItotjerH r. Pitcher, 1818; Doe r. Harton, 1840; Hull r. Ilutler, I8;j(» (I'ntteson, J.). ^ ('(Mtper r. Hlandy. 18;J!); Don w. TrHntMH, 18,17 ; in which caMi* pay- luoiit of runt buiTig th j only uvidonoo of tenancy, Puttoson, J. aUowed the dofendant to show, that tho hrnxor of the plaintitY had acted us the uffont of tliird parties. Seti IIitciun}»'s c, Thompson, 18.j(), explained hy Ld. Crnnwoith, (",, in Att. -Gen. v. Htephens, 18.),). " (ir. Mv. § 2H, in part. • In all civil <|uestionH where the rifjlits of parents de]iend on tlm birth of a livin;; child, tlie Scotch law con- clusively presiiiuert that the child was not horn alive, if it was not heard to cry. I hickson, Kv. 18((. '" 12 \- »;l V. c. 4!»C' The Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1H7!»"),U0,hii1)-s. .). " 4 lU. Com. 2.1; 1 Hale, 27. If an infant under seven is ^iven into custoily on a charpi of felonj', an action for false iinprisonuieut will lie; Maish >\ Loailer, I8l>;{. " 1 IIale,(i;t(»: 1 HuHs. C.&M. 07«. This presumjition is not alTccted hy 24 & 2.') V. c. 100 ("The OJfenceg npiiinst the I'erwMi Act, 18«1 "j, § 48 ; R. >'. (IroomhridKo. I8;j(i ((l.iseiee, J., and Ii<l. .\l)inp<r) ; audit applioH to the ull'uiicu of oarniiUy abuiuiig a uu u , lii i OONCLUSIVF, PU'l'-SllMI'TIONS — INFANTS. [PAILl i- guilty, iimlor sect. 4 of the Criminal Tiaw Amtiiidniont Ant, I8.S.'),^ of tho offence of carnal knowl('<lf*o of a girl undtsr tliirtf'fni,^ thougli h« may Lo convicted of a criminal asKuult upon hor,'' or of com- niittiiig an aswiult with intent to perpetriite that orinio ; * n ft;nial(( inider thirteen is presumed incapaUo of consenting to Bexual intercourse, and to have carnal knowledge of her is a felony ; while an attempt to have such knowledge is a misde- meanour,* and to have, or attempt to have, carnal knowh'dge of a girl over thirteen and under sixteen is a misdemeanour," and the conscnit of a girl mider thirteen to an act of indecency cannot bo set up as a det'enco to a charge of assault.' An uumarrietl girl under eighteen cannot consent to be abducted in onh-r that a man may have carnal knowledge of her, and to abduct such a girl for such a purpose is a misdemeanour.* An infant of eith(>r sex under twenty-one is presumed to be so far incaiJablo of managing his own ad'aii-s as not to be able, in general," to alien land, execute a deed,'" state an account, to make any bitidiug confmet," unless for necessaries." lie is also incaj)ablo of being Hubjectc'd t^) a receiving order made under tho Bankru[.icy laws ; ' ' and since th»» first of pill under tho statiitory ago ; U. r. Jonliiii, ls;)H (Williains; J.). Hut if tlic l»>y Imvii a inincliii'VocH iliscrt*- tinii, hit iiiiiy Im) ti pi'iii('i]>iil ill tho niMdml (h'fi'rco ; 1 lliilo, (i;50. Tlio jiafii'iit iiiuy l>o convii'tcd of an un- natural crinir, tliiiu}^h tlm agent ho undir tniirtccn; U. r. Allen, 1826, ' IH iV I'l V. f. (i!l. » |{. V. Wait", 1H!»2. » It. V. WilliaiiiH. 1H!»3. ♦ U. i\ Kld.TMhaw. 1N2« (Vaughan, K); v.. I'. I'hilips, lH;{7(l'attoH<.n.J.), * Sit "Till' ( 'riniiird buw Anicnd- mcnt A.'t, IMH,-)" (4.S & mi V. <•. (ii»), $ 4 ; anil soo, also, U. c. itcale, lS(t((. • Si'o Id. § •'). ' r.'. \ H V. c. 4.', ("Thn Criniinal ], aw Amendment Act, IHNO"). § 'J; li. f. Kiiaclley, ISNO. The last -named caso in overruled l>y the ahovo unuctinent. • 4H * l!» V'. c. (W, § 7. » S.o IH & ll» V. c. 4:} ("Tho In- fants' Settlemeiitfi Ai;t, 18W"). and 'j:j * 24 V. i\ n;J (!r,), enuhling iiuilo infa.itNof t A-eiity, aiul fuoMilo infaiits (if Moventeo" to niako, with the ap- firobalion -•; ihn ('htnic^'ry l>iviMioii, liiidiiig t)uttlumuiit« on miirriagp. '» Soo Martin r. fiale, l.SIIT, hold- ing a deed hy an inlant ('liarginj.' his reveisionai'v interest to secnrH money advanced for iiecessarieM vcid- alile and nut enforceaiile. " :»7 \- :tH V. e. <i'J("Tl\e InfantM* Helief Act, 1N74"). As to how fur .in infant ■.ui act as a trustee, or exorfJHf >' "'i>r, sei. K'ing c Idllord, 18H;J; • !- ii, roArnifs Trusts, IHIW, (Ir.); li, !.• !. Angihau. IS.Sd, ('. A. '' 1 hi. ( om. 4(i.), 4(>(): Co. Lit. 7N h. As t^l what are liecesMuries, Ki'e ante, § 4'J. .\h to Ikiw fill' infant shareholders are liulile to lutions for calls, see Xewry & Mnnisk. l!y, Co, i: (Jomho, 1S49": IaiciIs & Thirsk Uy. Co. c. Kearnlcy, \HW , Cork iV: Han- doii l{v. Co. r. Ca/enove, 1S17; N. West. Hy. Co. i: McMichael, l.S.V); Hirkenhead, Ijiiiio. & Clu'sh. Juno, ily Co. ('. I'ilchnr, IHM). An infant lesseo, thongh not liahlo on tho ct'ii- tnict of tenan(^v, in answeralslc for the vont during bis occuji.ition of tho premises. HIako c. CunramiiMi, lN70 I'li.). I'.iit HOC l.emjinei-o i'. Lungo, iN7!l (Jessel. M.ll.V " Ho JonoB, Ex p. Jones, 1881, C. A. 100 CHAP, v.] CIIILD-HK.VUINO AOE -IJIOIIIMACY. January, 1H;JH, such a perBon caiino*; m' j a will, whether it pur- ports to dispose) of rt'dl or of personal estate.' S !()">. No rigid nresumption is fixed by law as to the exact period of life at which the possihility of having issue, without miraculous agency.' becomes in women extinct ; but in directing the distribution of trust funds, the courts have been in the habit of iu»Hiiniing that, in general, females, after arriving at the age of fifty-three, arc past child-bearing.' S I0(i. A conclusive presumption in favour of Inntiiiuirif exists in certain cases.* Thus, where husband and wife Imve cohabited together, and no impotciuey is proved, the issue is conclusively presumed to be legitimate, though the wife is shown to liave been, at the same time, guilty of infidelity.* Even where the parents ore living 8e[)arate, a strong pro8umj)tion of legitimatjy still arises, which can only be rebutted, either by proving a divorce a mcnsA ct thoro, or, since the lltli of January, IMAH, a judicial separatinii, or by cogent and almost irresistible jjroof of non-access in a sexual sense;" and, indeed, the fact that a married woman is living iu notorious adultery, though amounting to very strong ovidtmce, is not, in itself, sullicitnit to repel the presumptidu of the legitimacy of her oir.spring.' But where alleged parents have been divorced i i ' 7 W. J & 1 V. 0. 2«("Tho WillH Act, IHltV"), §§ 7, 34. Hclon, that iliitc, txiy.s 'of fiiurtt'on yciM'H, aiut j^irlw of twi'lvfi, luiirlit liiivn (liM|iimi'il (if ]H>rN(iiialty liy wiM. if jMovod to IlilVi' l)ft>li <)t Sltllirliillt llirtcrutioii. 1 Will, oil V.S.. II 1(1. ■' SiM' 111 u,, I'll, xvii., vv. 1.1 l!'; I'll, xviii., vv. \t ■ l.j, itiid eh. .\\i., vv. 1 7. ■' lluMH'H I'. lIiivii(>H, lN(i(i (Kin- ili'iTili'y N'.-(".), iiiiil riiMi'M citcil ill tlio lldtc. SiM' IiIno |{|> WkIiIow's TlllHtH, lN7!{MiiliiiH,V.-('.}.iii!.lli.'.MilliiiT'H i';Miit<s \H~'l, iu wliicli liiHf .•ii«i> II vs'oiiiiiii iiiiirri»'il fnr twiiity-Mi.x yuarM, liiiil /laving never liail a cliilil, wuh liriKiii;it'<| to 1m> harri'ii at the a^e of foily-iiiiif ytuii' and niiin iiiiiiiMih. Hut ill t'loxton I'. May, lN7<l, tlm Court, of .\ii|M>iil r.ffiiHiiil to rof'iii'il M Woiiiaii wli"i-i(i ii'fo wa.-i (Ifiy-foiir ainl a Uulf yuuin, tiiunioU tLa<u ) out m, utid M'lrprt ». ll('lr(>rat«, lH.-(,i; Hail- ApJH'Il- I I'Vcr having' hail a i'liild, ]iHMt cliild- bcai'iii);. Si'd i|ii , iiiid ki'o Itavidrtou V. Kuiiptoii, issi. * Sic ante, § 1(1. » ('o|M' i\ Coiie, is;{;i; Davien, llS(i(i; Wiinlit c IN.')(»; \,<']:\n^i\ 1-MiiKihdH, l.ury i'.-r.. l7-'7. II. I,. ili\, II. K. to i,e .Mar('liaiit'H(tar>liii>i' i« I'eer. : It. i\ l.iille, lN((7. A to tlii) Malionii ihiii Law oil tliJH Hiilijiut, him) AhIihiIoiiiI I'ciwlali .Vlimed c. Ilyiler Ilos-ieiii K'liaii. iNs,), ' Id.; lloNvilo I'. Attoriioy-'ien., 1HS7; .Siyeaiid.Selel'tier., l.siii, ILL.; Iliii'l^rave r. Ilar^fiave, INIIS ; liowes V, HoMHi'V, iHiiJ; Ati'hl' V c. .'^iirij,'^, 18(11. ' it. i>. Manstinld, IHII. Ill tliiH I'liH.) lid. !>nmiiaii qiieritioiiH the au- thority of ('u|ie ('. ('o|tn. lK:l;j, .Sim lluwi»;i V, llimigoi, lt»s;j ^Kuy, J.). m i|»i ill SPOLIATION OP PAPKR8 — RUNNING BLOCKADE. [PART I. or judicially separated, children bom during the separation ore prim& facie illegitimate.' § 107.* Conclusive presumptions are also known to the taw of natioits. For instance, despatches of the enemy which a nvutriil vessel is found carrj'ing between different j)arts of the enemy's dominions, nre i)resumed to bo hostile,' at least, if thoy have been fraudulently conuealed ; the Hpoliatioii o/'jiujhtk by a captured party is regarded, in all the States of Continental Europe, as giving rise to a conclucivc presumption of guilt. But, in general, in Englan<l and America, the presumption of guilt is only prima facie, and is open to explanation. English and Amoricnii law are more lenient, and do not found on the more spoliation of papers »in absohite pre- sumption of guilt. But they only stop short of that result ; for a ease that escapes with sucl) a brand upon it is saved, as it were, from the fire ; * and where the case labours under otiier circumstances of suspicion, or the surrounding circumstances establish bad faith or gross prevarication, the presumption is, even in English and American law, conilusive.* Again, a presumption all but conclu- sive is ral^> ' against any vessel which has boer. r-aptured while entering a blockailcd port ; and the ovvujt can protect the shiit frr,ns l.".>iiig condonumd as lawful prize only by establishing u justificntiim on the groiind of imperative iiecessity." It is, n>ore- over, alKO priinii facie prfsumed that the owners of a cargo foun<l on board a ship, which is condennicd for blockade-running, were privy to the intention of violating a blockade, and their only escape from this pn^sumptiim is their Iwing able to prove that, at the time wlun the shipinc! t was made, they could not have known that the blockade had been imposed.' § H^H.* In all cases of ooutrlusive presunsptlon, the rule of law mert'ly attaches wself to the cin-uinst^inueH wh.-n proved ; it is not deduced frojK Miera. It is not a rule of inlVronre from testimony, but a :'.!;•- of jTotectioa, which is held to be expedient for the ' St. (l'M.rr* ■ '^t. M ;rfr«rot, 17!)«; Ilnthi'vin;; i /U t>. iloti-t*)' ^ton, ISH". Ill Hiic'h i'rti»«)», H" :.-u" ■'!« is pro- iuiiuiil. ' (Jr. Kv, § v., in j>wt. * Tbu Atuluittu. \6iM. « The Iliiiitor, 181.^ (Sir W. Scott). » Tiio I'i/urni. IN17 (Am,); Tho liuiifi-r. iNi.-i. Sft. |Mist. J no. * l«altii/,/i r. Kyilor, 1«4H. ' 1(1. * (ir. Ev. i d'i, almoitt vtiib»tuia. 1U2 CTIAP. v.] DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS. general good. It is not, for example, assumed that all landlords liave good titles; but it is held that it will bo a public incon- venionuH to suffer tenants to disjuite them. Neither is it assimiod that all averments and recitals in deeds and records are true ; but it is held that it will be mischievous if parties are permitted to deny them. It is not ossumed that all simple contract debts, of six years' standing, are paid, nor that every man quietly ooeujiying land twenty years as his own has a valid title by grant ; but it is desmetl expedient that claims ojiposed by such evidence as the Icpso of thos" periodH affords, should not be coimtonaiiced, and that society is more benefited by a refusal to entertain such claims than by siit^'oring thuiii to be made good by proof. In fine, the law does not assimie the impoesibility ol things whijh f.'e jiossible ; but the pri'sumptitm of Itnv is for.ii led, not only cm the jwHsibility of their uxistence, but on their fjccjiusionnl occuiTonw); and it is against the miBcliiefs of fheir ocijurrence th.it it interposes its protecting prohi- bition ' S 109 — 110.' We now come to the urmmf class, into which are divided presumptions of law,' These are what arc ternujd i/i.s/)ii/- ■ihlc }itrmoiij)fioii'>, and answer to the f)y(vsiinif,t.iniv>i Jiini of the Roman law. Presumptions of this class may always be overcfuue by opiKtsing proof.* These disputable pnnjumptifmn of law are, like wiir/iiHin' f)resumpti))i)s, the result of the general experience of a connection between certain facts or things, the one b(nng iisuaUy found to be the companion, or the effect, of the other, Wlasre disputable presum)>tioiis arise, however, the connexion is not so intimate, or so imiform, that it (lan be concltisively presumed to exist in every case ; yet it is so general, that th«' law itself, with- out the aid of a jury, in the absence of all (-pposing evidence, infers the one fasi from the proved existence of the other, .In this mode f/it' fair — even in the ulwence of any (Hrrrcflpoi'.iHng allegation in (he pleading-^ — deliium the natort* and amount of tlie evidence wl'.ich is BulHcieut to eslablish a primA faei(< case, mid to throw the burthen of pr(K)f on the othei' party ; and Mxyt- thai in such casos, if no opposing evidence is offered, lh»i jury are bound to find iu favour » S«o tt Lii» M111.C. :148. .l.W, .'Wfl. » Ileit). imI Pftiid. P. iv. ( 121 » Or. Kv. § ;«;». ia gnul i^mI. » U. S, (\ 1H,n,{, Ord. XlX. » H<Mi supru, § 70. fitwl jMwt. 5 .3(>«, a. II r. 20, 11 r _ Hi ll 1 ■ 1 '.: 11 1 i ■ 1 H j; : i m M I] ! M 9B , !: ! l^ !■ ■• i s .; ; i I'Kr.Hl'Ml'TIONS OF LAW AND OF FACT. [I'AKT I. of the pre8uin|iti()n, and tlmt u contrary vordiot may bo set aHidn as being against ovidfuicu. § 111. Disputable prosumittioiis of law dilfur from more pro- sumptions of faut in thruu i!iipf)rtant particulars. In tho (irst place, the judge is bound to explain to the jury whatev(tr Ic^al presumptions arise frcra the factg proved ; ' next, the jury are bound to give full weight to the presumptions so explained ; and lastly, the court ulone, without the intervention of tho jury, nuiy draw ine proper legal inferences, whenever the retpiisite iactn are developed in the pleadings.* In practice, however, the distinotion between presumptions of law and presumptions of fact is by no means well d(>tincd, and the lino of demarcation, oven when visible at all, is oft' n overlooked.* A presumption which is regarded by some judges r.n one of law, it treated by otluus as one of !avt', nay, the same judges place the same presumption at different tinjes in dilftrent classes. Tho following remarks principally apply to disput^ible presumptions of law, but tiiey will bo ouca- eionally found to extend to cogent presumi)tions of fact. i 112. One of the most im]iortant of disputable legal jiresurnp- tions is that of iiiiwiriic: This, in legal phraseology, " gives the bont^fit of a doubt to the accused," and is so cogent, that it cannot be rep(«lled by any evidenite short of what is sullieient to estabjisli the fact of criminality with moral certainty.* In civil (Usputes, when no violation of the law is in question, and no le^^al pre- sumption operates in favour of either party, tint , )reponderari(:(T .u j)rf>babiiflv, due regard being had to tho burthen of proof, may oonstitute sullicic^nt ground for a verdict.'' To allix oi» any person the stigma ol" crime requires, however, a higher degree of assurancft ; an<l juries will not be justified in taking sui^h a siep, except <>u evitlence which excludes from their minds all reasonabli* d<)iiltl." It has sometimes been said, that the presumption in (juestion is oonfined to tho criminal ci>urts, and is adopte<i there specially in favour of life and liberty, and as a safeguard against error in ' Ante. § 2.5. • St. Ev. HI 8. 4th od. ; 1 Or. Ev. * U.mt, Ev. UH, JOS. §lMii; Ht'st. Hv. I'JO; ('..(.iter r. .Hliwla, • H.mt, Ev. 4-'». IN.'iH, II. I.. (Will.m, J,). ♦ St. Ev. H17, N(i.). Ith 0(1. ; 1 Or. • St. Ev. 617, BOJ, 4th «d.. liwt, Kv. § 13 u ; 11. V. WliiU), 18(i6 (M.irtiu, Ev. 12U. B.). 104 CHAP, v.] PRK8UMPTI0N OF INNOCKNCB. oonviotions which are not open to rovwion.' But it rosta on a broader biwis. Tho right which every iniui has to his ehiiraoter, tile value of that eharuuter to hinisitlf uidI his fiiniily, and the evil eouso(|uence8 that wouhl result to society if charges of guilt were lightly entertained, or readily established in courts of justi(!o:^ these are the real considerations which have led to the adoption of the rule that all imputations of crime nmst be strictly proved. The rule, accordingly, is recognised alike by all tribunals, whether civil or criminal, and in all proceedings, whether tho (juestion of guilt be directly or incidentally raised.^ For example, in an action against an insurance company to recover a loss by fire, and where the defence is that the plaintiff wilfully burnt down the jirciaises, the jury, before finding u verdict agiiinst the plaintiff, must be eutisfied that the act imputed to him hll-^ been proved by clear evidence, so clear as to justify a conviction f(jr arson ;' and, in gt;neral, whether the question arises in a prosecution for it, or in u civil court, forgery or bigamy nmst simihirly be citablislicd by the same s'.riot evidence.* Sll'J.* ^o strong is the jtresumptiitn of iii;iorrn<r, that even where guilt can be established only by pntving a negative, tliat ncgativ(t must, in most cases (unless indfcd a special Matufe bo applicable"), be proved, though lis a g«'iieral rule the b\ii'tlien of proof lies on the party alleging the allirmative. For instance, a lilaintiir who complained that the cinirterer of a ship had put on board un article highly inllammable aixl dangeyous, itiHiont ijiriny iiutiir of its nature to tin* master in cliaigc, was held boumi to prove this negative averment.' 8 114." tiuchtions of nicety arise where the presumption of ' MiipMM'. >rark, tsdO (lr.)(l'ij;.it, (Ml.); lic.Ht,, Kv. I'JO; 1 Ur. Kv. ji i:iu. '' It.'.st, F,v. HT. » Tliml.'ll r. Itriiimiunt, lK'j;i. * C'lmliiHTM c. Slmrkfll, \K\\ (Tiii- diil. <'.J.); Willinctt r. liiiniiiT, IS.'tO (l.il. Ut'lillliUl). Sim, uUii, N.ilfj- r. i^K'k. lN;m ('I'iiiiliil, c.J.); .Miip>o r. Murk, 1«(U» (Ir.) (Kitz- K'Tal'l, I'-.). • Ur. liv. § 3,"», Ju \Mxi. • S.M. |).>Ht. § Mi. ' WillmiiiK ,'. ]•;. Iii.l. Co., 1802. Sii of ulli'K'iti<in?> that u |>iivty hud not taki'ii th)'.Si<'iuiiii'iit : 11. c. Iliiwkiii.'i, I.SO.S; III' Iia«l tint i'i>lii|ilii'<l with tllO Art iif IJnil'orniity, iVr. : I'nwtill c. .Milliiini, 177'J; or that f;ii<>ilM wuro imt h'pilly iiii]iiirtuil : Sismins v, l*i.viiii, IN'JO ; or that li thuutru wits lint 'liily lirt'iiMiiil : Uodwtill v. Uudgu, IM.'I. Sill piiMt, § ;t71. * Ur. Ev. \ 36, iu part. 106 IJ i i I's PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. [fart I. innocence is met hy snnjo oountor iiroHumption.' For example, whoi-o a woman, lw<!lvti months aftur Ikt Imsband (ii soldier on fonngn Horvice) was last heanl of, married a second huHband, on a question uh to tlm settlement of the children by the 8«»cond husbuiid, it was held that it might be presumed that the first husband was diuid at the time of the second marriage, though the presumption of the ctmtinuance of life would have prevailed had it not been disphuicd by the stronger l(>gal i)r('sunjption of innocence;' and on a trial for bigamy of a woman who had niarrieil again only four years after separating from her first hutiband, it wbk held that the l^nr could not premmie the continuance of the first husband's life, but that it was a (juostion of fact for the jury whether he was alive or dead at the date of the second marriage;' but where a letter was jiroved to have been written by a wife from Van Uienum's Land, dated only twenty-five days prior to second marringe, it was held that it might be j)resumed that the husband had lj«>en guilty of bigamy ;'* and on an indictment for manslaugliter by driving a cab over a woman, the fact that the woman had been killed was in itself regarded as suiHcient prinu\ fncie evidence of negligcni e to rebut the presumption of innocence, and to ])lace upm tlut driver the burthen of proving that he had exercised due care.* S 11''). An excepti<m to the rule that innoctr.ce is to be presumed on jtrincijiles of jiublic policy exihts in some ciu«m of agencty, both in crituiiial ami civil cases." Thus, a contract baker may 1m) convicted of selling unwholesome bread, if it appear that he has uUowtMl his foreman to use a!um, though not in such (piantities as to render the bread unwholesrune, but that the servant luis introduced alum to a deleterious extent;' by the Pawnbrokers Act, lH7'i, "anything done or omitted by the servant, apprcntiic, • S«<i. MiililHon I'. Hiimod. 1H49; i-. Oriorunn, 1818, H. L. ; nnd thn li, V. lti<i:iisi'ii, l8tiJ. lin-uiliilliaiiii ciihu, iMili, II. L., citiil • K. i'. TwyiiiiiK, 1819. Siio H. v. jMist. § 17'.'. Joni>H, |sh:{. » H. r. i.miih'.v. I8m»; It. i-. Will- Mhini, 18H1. Sco flirt luT, U. r. JdiicH, I8li8; iiml Hf<>, its to the |)i'('HUiii])tiuii of iif.'. §5 HIS '.'OH, jMwf. « H. .. Ilinliorii.i, IHIJ,-); 1{. v. Munsfiolil, 18-11. iSiio, uIbo, LiiiwUiy » 1{. V. CavciKliKh. 1873 (If.). • S'li jMiMt, 5§ !M».^, IMMl. Seo, iilwj, ('....IMT (. .Shiili), 1857, II. L. (I.d. Wi'iiMlrydalu). ' U. r. Itixon. 18H. Hoo Att.- Oeii. f. Hidilli', 1832; und Svurle v, lUiynoldH, 1800. 106 ClIAl'. v.] Ph'KsUMrnON OF OlIILT. ,•! or npont of a juiwnbrnkor, in tlio courw) of or in roliition to the liUHJut'SH," hIiiiU Imj (it>(*niu<l to lie tlont* or omitttxl by the pawn- broker;' \]ui tlircctorH of ii giiH itonipany ore t>riminally auHweruhle for an act done by tli«ir siiporintendont and onginwr, undor II g*Mu>rul authority to niiuiago tho works, though luTHonuUy ignorant of the particular plan adojitod, and though NUch plan waa a dt'parturo from tlio original and understood mulluMl, which the dirt'i'tors had no roa»on to suppow) waH di.H('ontinu(Hl ;'' and the Halo of a libel* in a bookseller's shop by his servant in the ordinary coiirKi nf his eniph)ynient, is evidence of a ;.'uiUy publication by the master. Hut this prestimption is never roiw/usiir against tho niaster. Inde(Hl, on indictments for HIk*!, it is especially pmviiled that the niaster, under '• not guilty," may prove that the publica- tion was in fact made *' withotit his authority, concent, or know- li'tlge," and that there was "no want of care or caution on his jiart."* Himilar principles apply not only to publishers of news- jtapirs,* but to owners of alkali works." i 115a. In spite of the usual presumption of innocence, it must, too, be presumed on a jirosecution under the rrevention of Cruelty to Chihlren Act, 1S!»4, that the chihl, who is the subject of the cliarge, is of the age which it is charged as being and apparently is.' S IK).* Moreover, tho presumption of innocence may be over- thrown, and a prrsiiniptioii of ;niilt lUi raised, by the miseonducit of the party in suppressing or tl-strui/imj cridiucv^ whi<'h he ought to jiroduce, or to which the other party is cntithHl." For example, ' ;t5 & ;m V. c. 9:j, § 8. » 11. 1'. MfilUiy, 1H.J4 (1,(1. Don- iiuili), S<'(', iilmt, It. I'. Sti'itlu'iiH, ISliti; MiilliiiH 1. ColliiiH, 1H74 ; uiul \Minv, ])« Vitit-, imm {\a\. (')>oliii8- f<inl, C); iiiitl I)i<^kiiiH<in v. Fli'tclior, 1M74; Soiii.'im-t r. llillt, 1 HH» ; dig. tiii);uiHli('(l Hdjul V. Kvaii-«, \HHx. •* <ir. \',\. § ;K}, in |mrt. ♦ <l& 7 V. c. imC'Th.. LiWl Act, • '^••IJ")i§ 7. Ak t' tho law Intforo thr Htiit., WH1 1 ItiiMs. ('. * M. 'lf>\ ; K. '■. (hitch, 1H'J!»; IliiriliiiK »'. (Jnion- ia^, 1"»I7 ; 11. >■. .Vlmoii, 1770. • I UuNH. I". & M. -J.^l ; (i A 7 V. ■••. im ("Tlio Libtsl Act, lS-13"), S 7; J R. I'. Ilolbrook, 1878 ; on wcond tl-ial, 1N7H; It. I'. HuniHfV, IN84. • U A \!> V. c. ;J7 (" Thl' Alkali. &o. WorkM Uc>{iihtti(in Act. INN I "j, § 25, uir-iiildil t>v .M & M \. c. 30. .•)7 * .)N V. c. 41, § 17. • (ir. I'lv. § 37, in ;;ii'uf part. • For iiiHtani'u, foiiin'ily, by 21 J. 1, 0. 27 ^|ii'<i)iahly ('ii|iii'(l from a Hiinilar edict <if Hen. II. of i'^rancn, ('it)-(i hy Donia't), X\w ni<ith<<r of iiu illi'^itiiiiati) (')til(I wlio (•iiih'avounol Iirivatt'ly, i-itlior liy (liowiiin);, or M'crut buryiiijf, or by uny •)tlier way, to concH'ul itM deatli, wan )>r(mui)i<t(l to havu niurdurcU it, uiiIumm hLu uuuld 07 ■i i 1 t ' 1 IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) /. 1.0 I.I 1 2^ 1 2.5 1^ 12.2 1^ US t 1^ III 11.25 ■ 1.4 2.0 1.8 1.6 V] <^ /a /: V <% >^ Photographic Sciences Corporation V ^^ '^ o o^ 33 WIST MAIN STRUT WIBSTIR, N.Y. USSO (716) 872-4S03 I/. xP z \\ ;\ ' ' vm miyi C'i it 1 i SUPPRESSING OR DESTROYING EVIDENCE. [PART I. the spoliation of papers, material to show the neutral character of a vessel; furnishes, as before pointed out'), a strong presumption, in odium spo/iatoris, against the ship's neutrality f if any person on board a vessel, which is being chased by an officer of the preven- tive service, throw overboard, stave, or destroy any part of the lading, the vessel is forfeited, because such conduct raises an almost irresistible presumption that the freight so made away with was legally liable to seizure f the concealment on board a vessel of any goods liable to duly, justifies the inference that the owner intended to defraud the customs, and such goods will accordingly be for- feited;^ a presumption that they are adverse to him is raised against a party, who, having obtained possession of papers from a witness, after the service of a subpoena duces tecum upon the latter, withholds them at the trial.^ Indeed, the general rule is " ohinia pnetsioniinfur contra Kpoiintorctn"'^ whose conduct is attri- buted to a supposed consciousness that the truth would operate against him. Thus, to take a familiar example, wl.ere the finder of a jewel Avould not produce it, the jury, uuvler tlie judge's direc- tion, presumed against him that it was of the highest value of its kind.' But in an action for goods sold against a defendant who has been guilty of no fraud or improper conduct, in the absence of evidence of the quality of the goods which were delivered, the pre- sumption is that such goods were goods of the cheapest description." § 117." But the mere fabrication of evidence does not of itself furnish any presumption of lair against the innocence of the party, but is a niotter to be dealt with by the jury. Innocent jiersons, under the influence of terror, have soiujtiraes been k'd to the simula- tion of exculpatory facts, of which there are several instances in tlie prove by one witness' at the least that th(3 child was born dead. Thin bar- barous rule is now reseindod both in England and Ameriea. See, as to f resent English law, '2-i & '2') V. c. 100 'The Offences against the Person Act, 1801 "), § 00. ' Sui)ra, § 107. » The Iliinter, ISl-J; The Pizarro, lH2T(Ain.). 3 Sec »9 & 40 V. c. HO (" The Cus- toms Consolidation Act, 1M70"), § 180. * See ;19 & 40 V. c. HO, § 177. » Leeds v. Cook, 180;i. « 2 Poth. Obi. 292 ; Dalston >: Coatsworth, 1721 ; r'()W])er v. LI. Cowper, 17.'U; It. r. Arundel, 17^1; I), of Xewcastlo r. Kinderley, IHO.'J; Gray r. llaig, IH.Jo ; Annesley /•. E. of Anglesea, 174U (Ir.). See, also, Sir S. lloniilly's argument in Ld. Melville's case, IStHi; Anon., 1098. In IJaker /'. Ray, 1820. the L. C. tliougiit that this rule had in some casi's been ])res8ed a little too far. ' Armory v. ])(dainirie, 1721. Cluniies r. I'ez/ey, 1807. ' Or. Ev. § 37, as to first six liucs. 108 r. v.] FAISRICATIOX AND XON-PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE. bofiks.' ]\[oroover, the exercise by a client of liis unJoubterl riglit to prevent his sohcitor from diselusiiig coiiri(hntial coin- municatious, forms no just ground for adverse presumption against liim.^ The non-production of deeds or papers, after notice, has, in general, only the effect of admitting the other party to prove their contents by parol,* and, as against the party refusing to produce them, to raise a prima facie presumption that they have been properly stamped.'' Nevertheless, such conduct is, in the absence of excuse, calculated to produce a very prejudicial effniit in the minds of the jury against tlie pr-rson having recourse to it ; ■' and if the production of his papers would establish the guilt or innocence of a person charged with fraud or misconduct, the jury will be amply justified in presuming him guilty from the unex- plained fact of their non-production.® Indeed, jurors will always do well to regard with suspicion the conduct of a party, who, having it in his power to produce cogent evidence in support of his case, offers testimony of a weaker and less satisfactory character. ' § 118^ Though the general presumption of law is in favour of innocence, yet, as men seldom do unlawful acts with innocent intentions, the law presumes that every act, which in itself is unlawful, has been wrongfully intended, till the contrary appears.' Tims, on a charge of murder, malice is presumed from the fact of killing, unaccompanied by circumstances of extenuation ; and the burthen of disproving the malice is thrown upon the accused ; '" and if an unauthorised party, to raise money, puts the name of another person to a bill, a felonious intent will be presumed, unless the accused show reasonable grounds for believing that he was autho- 72 1; iiso:}; !•;. also, Ld. 1()98. ('. ■loine ' See 3 Inst. 232 ; Wik. Circ. Ev. 154. 2 Wontworth v. Lloyd, 1864, H. L. (Ld. (.'luslmaford]. = Cooper V. Gibbons, 1813. * Crisp V. Anderson, 1815. See § 148, post. » See Koe v. Ilarvey, 1769 (Ld. Mansfield) ; Bate v. Kinsey, 1835 (Ld. Lyndlmrst) ; Sutton v. Devon - poit, 1858 ; Edmonds v. Foster, 1N76, • Clifton r.U. S., 1846 (Am.). ' See N. Y. Civ. Code, J 1852, arts. 6 &ud 7. ' Gr. Ev. § 34, as to first seven linos. " "Whore an act, in itself in- difft-reiit, if done with a particular' intent becomes criminal, there the intont must bo proved and found ; but where the act is in itself unlaw- ful, the proof of justificaticm or ex- cuse lies on the defendant ; and in failure thereof, the law implies a criminal intont." R. v. Woodfall, 1770 (Ld. Mansfield). See also R. v. Harvey, 1827 ; R. v. Wallace, 1853 (Ir.); and R. v. Creovey, 1813. '« Fost. C. L. 26o. 109 I I t ! ! i ! !;!' ii m lit <i 1 ! 1! i I ?!■ 1 ' i- UNLAWFUL INTENT WHEN NOT PRESUMED. [PART I. rised to act as he did, and acted on that helief.^ A similar pre- sumption arises in civil actions, where the act complained of is unlawful. Thus, on the one hand, where the act was primS. facie unlawful, malice in law is presumed. For instance, in actions of slander, though it appear that the defendant was not actuated hy iU-will against the plaintiff, malice in law will usually he inferred from the fact of intentional puhlication.'^ And in other actions for damages founded on wrongs, as for a malicious arrest, a malicious prosecution, and the like, the fact that the defendant has had recourse to legal proceedings raises a prima facie inference in his favour, which the plaintiff is bound to rebut by proving the absence of all reasonable and probable cause,' and the presence of an actual malicious intent.* On the other hand, where the act was prima facie la II fill, and an action cannot be maintained in respect of it except on proof of " malice," malice in law will not be implied, but it is necessary that actual malice be proved. If, therefore. » R. V. Beard, 1837 (Coleridge, J.). ' Bromage v. Pressor, 1825, where Bayley, J., as to iinpled (or legal) malice (as distinguished from malice in fact), says : " Malice, in the common acceptation, means ill-will against a person ; but in its legal sense it moans a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. If I give a perfect stranger a blow likely to produce death, I do it of malice, because I do it inten- tionally, and without just cause or excuse. If I maim cattle, without knowing whose they are ; if I poison n fishery, withoiit knowing the owner, I do it of malice, because it is a wTongful act, and done inten- tionally. • * * If I traduce a man, whether I know him or not, and whether 1 intend to do him an injury or not, I apprehend the law considers it as done of malice, because it is wrongful and intentional . It equally works an injury, whether I mean to Eroduce an injury or not, and if I ad no legal excuse for the slander, why is he not to have a remedy agaiufit mo for the injury it pro- duces? And I apprehend the law recognises the distinction between these two desrnptions of malice, malice in fact, and malice in law, in actions of slander. In an ordinary action for words, it is sufficient to charge that the defendant spoke them falsely ; it is not necessary U) ptate that they wore spoken maliciously. This is so laid down in Sty. 392, and was adjudged upon error in Mercer i;. 8parkes, loS6. The objection there was, that the words were not charged to have been spoken maliciously, but the court answered, that the words were themselves malicious and slan- derous, and, therefore, the judgment was affirmed. But in actions for such slander as is prima facie ex- cusable on account of the cause of speaking or writing it, as in the car.o of servants' characters, confidential advice, or communications to persons who ask it, or have a right to expect it, malice in fact n.ust l)o proved liy the plaintiff, and in Kdmonson r. Stevbuson, 1705, Ld. Mansfield takes the distinction between those and ordinary actions of shinder." » Abrath v. North East Ry. Co., 188(3. II. L. See, also, Davidson v, Smvth, 1887 (Ir.). ''Mitchell V. Jenkins, 1833 ; Portor t). Weston, 1839; Johnstone r. Sutton, 178(5. The jury may, but ore not bound, to infer malice in fact from the want of probable cauee. Id. 110 it CHAP, v.] BOUNDARIES — RIPARIAN OWNERSHIP. defamatory language was used upon a privileged occasion, the plaintiff must establish actual malice,^ and in order to do thisy must, either by extrinsic or by intrinsic evidence,* prove facts which are inconsistent with bona fides.' The occasion being lawful, the prima facie legal presumption, which exists till it is displaced by actual evidence, is that the speaker was actuated by proper motives.* § 119. Some presumptions also exist with respect to the owner- ship of property. Thus, with regard to boundaries of property,"* where two counties or parishes are separated by a non-tidaP river, the mid-stream is the presumptive boundary between them ;' the owner of a several fishery is, when the terms of the grant are un- known, presumed to be the owner of the soil ;' the soil of unnavig- able rivers, usque ad medium filum aquae, together with the right of fishing, — but not the right of abridging the width, or interfer- ing with the course, of the stream,* — is presumed to belong to the owner of the adjacent land;'" and, in navigable rivers and ai-ms of the sea, the soil is prima facie vested in the Crown, and the fishery is prima facie public.'' These presumptions as to riparian owner- ship in streams, do not, however, apply to great non-tidal inland lakes, whether navigable or not.'* But somewhat similar presump- tions are recognised in respect of the sea-shore. Land there which ' Clark V. Molj-noux, 1877, C. A. ' Cooke V. Wildes, I80G. » Too-ood V. Spyring, 1834; Whit- aeld V. South East Ry. Co., I.S08; Coxhoad v. Richards, 184() ; Spill v. Maule, 18G9 ; Wright v. Woodgato, 1815 j; Taylor y. Hawkins, 1851 ; Gil- pin V. Fowler, 1854 ; Somorville v. Hawkins, 1851 ; Harris v. Thompson, 1853; R.v. Wallace, 1853 (Ir.). In an action for alleged libel contained in an answer to inquiries respecting a servant's character, the jury may find express malice from the simple fact that the answer complained of was untrue to defendant's knowledge. Fountain v. Boodle. 1842. * Note h to Hodgson v, Scarlett, 1818 ; approved of by Aldereon, B., in Gibbs v. Pike, 1842. • As to bonndarios of counties, &c.. in Ireliind, see 35 & 36 V. c. 48 ("The County Jjoiiudarios (Iro'uiid) Act, 1872"), §§ 2, 3, 4, cited post, § 1771. * Bridgwater Trust v. Bootle-cum- Linacre, 186(5. ' R. V. Landulph, 1834 (Pattoson, J.); M'Cannon v. Sinclair, 1859; R. ;•. Strand Board of Works, 1864. » D. of Somerset v. Fogwell, 1826; Holford V. Bailey, 1850 (in error) ; Marshall v. The UUoswator St. Navig. Co., 1863. But see observa- tions, contra, by Cockburn, C.J., in S. C, at pp. 747 — 74i) ; also, Bloom- tield V. Wharton, 1867 (Ir.). • Bickott V. Morris, 1866, H. L. >» Carter f. Murcot, 1768; Wishart V. Wyllie, 1853 ; Lord v. Commiss. for City of Sydney, 1859; Crossley V. Lightowler, 1867 ; Dwyer v. Rich, 1871 (Ir.). " Carter v, Murcot, 1768; comson v. O'Dea, 1862, H. L. " Bloomfield v. Wharton, Mai- 186T (Ir.); Bristow y.Cormican,1878,H.L. ill ' : .i y \ i 1 1 H 1 ■! lii i III I PRESUMPTION'S RESPECTING BOUNDARIES. [PART I. is covered by the ordinary high water, — or, to speak more accurately, by the medium high tide between the spring and the neap,- — is presumed prima facie to be the property of the Crown, tho'igh by grant or prescription it may belong to the lord of the manor, or to any other subject ; ^ while that which is overflowed only at spring tide, is presumed to be vested in the proprietor of the adjoining lands;* land between higli and low water mark, though forming part of the body of the adjoining county,'' is prima facie presumed to be extra-parochial.* Similarly, waste land on the sides, and the soil to the middle, of a highway, are, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumed to belong to the owner of the adjoining inclosed land, whether he be a freeholder, leaseholder, or copy- holder." This latter presumption is founded on a supposition that the proprietor of the adjoining land, at some former period, gave up to the public for passage all the land, between his inclosure and the middle of the road,' and is, consequently, liable to be rebutted by showing that the road has never in fact been dedicated to the public at all,* or that it was originally dedicated by some other party,' or that the lord of the manor, or even that a stranger, has exercised acts of ownership, either over the spot in dispute, or over other waste land in immediate connection with it.'" The presump- tion just mentioned as usually prevailing in the case of a public liighway, also obtains in the case of a private occupation road running between two properties. In the absence of all evidence of acts of ownership, in such a case each owner will be presumed to be *.V(e proprietor of the soil usque ad medium filum viae.'' And ' Att.-Gon. V. Chambers, I81J4. * lUiiiidoll V. Cattorall, 1821 (IIol- r<)y(l,J.,Bayley,J.); Lopez ('.Andrew, 1«2«, Calmady t'. Eowe, 1848. See post, §§130, 131. ^ Lowe I'. Govett, 1832. * Embleton v. Brown, 1860. * R, V. MusHon, 1858; Waterloo Bridge Co. v. Cull, 1859 (Ld. Camp- Lell). This presumption applies not only to the main seashore, but also to an estuary or arm of the sea : Ipswich Dock CJommrs. v. 8t. Peter, Ipswich, 18(j7 ; and to the shore of a tidal river : Bridgwater Trust v. Bootlo-oum-Linacre, 1867. * Doe V. Peareey, 1827 ; Steel v. Pwckott, 1819 (Abbott, C.J.); Cooke V. Greeu, 1823 ; Scoonos v. Morrell, 1839 ; M. of Salis^bury v. Gt. N. Ey. Co., 1858; Simpson v. Dendy, 1860; Berridge v. Ward, 1861 ; 11. v. Strand Board of Works, 1864. See Gery v. Redman, 1875. ' Doe y. Pearsey, 1827(Bayley,J.). » Leigh V. Jack, 1879, C. A. » Iloudlam v. Ueadloy, 1810 (Bay- ley, J.). "* Doe V. Kemp, 1835 ; Grose v. West, 1816; Anon., 1773; Doe v. Kemp, li!31 ; Doe v. Hampson, 1847; Beckett v. Corporation of Leeds, 1871 (L.JJ.; " Hc^jnes v. Bellingham, ]8o9. 112 CHAP, v.] lilGHT OF OWNKRS OF ADJOINING LAN'1)8. the mere fact that the owner of a field has a private ri'glit of way over a lane leading only to that field, affords no presumption that the soil of the lane is vested in him.' Indeed, as to roads set out under the first general Inolosure Act, the presumption that " tlie herhage and grass arising therefrom" belongs to the proprietors of the adjoining lands is conclusive.^ As to roads madt^ under the later Act of William the Fourth, the commissioners are directed to award " the grass and herbage growing and renewing upon " them to such persons as in their judgment are best entitled to the same.^ l?ut as both Acts are silent respecting the ownership of the .vo//, it seems that no legal presumption as to that can, under either Act, arise in favour of the proprietors of the neighbouring allotments.* § 120. Further i)resumptions of law with regard to boundaries are as follows. Where fields belonging to different owners are separated by a hedge and ditch, the hedge prima facie belongs to tlie owner of the field in which the ditch is not.^ Tlie common user of a wall separating lauds or houses which belong to different proprietors, is prima facie evidence that the wall, and the land on which it stands, belong to them in equal moieties as teiumts in common." But this presumption may be rebutted by showing that the wall in fact stands on land, parts of which were separately contributed by each proprietor.' There is* a distinotion between a bank and a wall ; the former, being made of earth taken from the adjacent soil, is presumed to belong to the party whose land iidjoins thereto ; the latter, being built of materials brought from a distance, is prima facie the property of the person who is bound to repair it. Where a tree grows on the boundary of two ficilds, so that the roots extend into the soil of each, the property in the ■i i\ % \v. \m » Smith V. Ilowdon, 1803. » 41 (>. 3, V. 10!), ^ 11 ("Tho In- cliwuro (Consolidiitidii) Art, 1801 "). M)&7 W. 4, (3. Ua, §'J}). ■• II. V. llattiold, 18;5.j (Ld. Don- niiui) ; R. ('. Edmonton, 1831 (Ld. Tontordon). •■* (luy V. Wo.st, 1808 (Bayley, J.). Whoi't' thoro ai'o two ditchos, ono on oach side of tlio hedge, no i)i'(!S(inip- tion arisea, and tho ownership of the hedge depends iipon evidence : see id. In Franco, boundary hedges and tho trees in tliom are declared to bo common property, " mitoyens," exceijt in certain cases ; Code Civ., Arts. ()T(), G73. « Cnbitt V. Porter, 1828; Wiltsln're V. Sidford, 182" ; Watson v. Grav, 1880 (Fry, J.). ' Matts )\ Hawkins. 1813; Mmly V. M'Dormott, 1838. 8 I), of Newcastle v. Clark, 1818 (Park, J.); Calhs on Sowers, p. 74, 4th ed. T. — vol,. 1. 113 mm r.i : 1 ADJOINING OWNERS — SURFACE OWNERS. [PAKT I. tree is presumed to belong to the owner of that land in which it ■was first sown or planted.^ § 121. The following disputable presumptions arise when the surface and the property lying beneath it are vested in different owners. In the case of land, if the surface and the subja' ^nt minerals are vested in different owners without any deeds * regu- lating their respective rights, the law presumes that the owner of the surface has a right to the -wpport of the minerals.' Similarly, when a building is divided into different flats, the proprietor of every upper story has a presumptive legal right, without any express grant, or enjoyment for any given time, to the support of each lower story, and the owner of each lower story is entitled to the protection afforded by the upper rooms as a rocf or covering for his dwelling.* When two adjoiviing closes, or two ancient buildings,* respectively belong to different persons, the owner of the one is presumed to have a limited right ^ to the lateral support of the other.' This presumption of a right to support does not extend to a c",se where, by the erection of modern buildings, an additional weight has been put upon the land.^ Yet even here, if the house has been built for more than twenty years, the law will presume the grant of an easement entitling the grantor to have his house supported by the soil of his neighbour's property if the « Holder v. Coates, 1827 (Littlo- dale, J.); Masters v. Pollie, 1620; contra, Waterman v. Soper, 1697 — 1698; Anon., 1623. * Where such deeds exist, see Aspden i\ Sodden, 1875 ; Davis v. Troharne, 1881, per Dom. Proc. ' Iluiiiphries v. Brogdcn, 1848 ; Smart v. Morton. 18 JJ; Harris v. Rydinj;, 1839; Haines v. Eoberts, 1857 ; Rowbothani v. Wilson, 1861 (H. L.); Caledonian llv. Co. v. Sprot, 1856 (H. L.). hee Elliot V. The N. East. Ry. Co., (H. L.); Brown v. Robins, Fletcher v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., Gt. W. Ry. Co. r. Bennett. Pountney v. Clayton. 1883 (C 1863 1859; 1859 ; 1867; A.); Jeffries v. Williams, 1850; Rogers V. Taylov, 1858 ; Eadon v. Jeff cock, 1872 ; Koxt v. Gill, 1872 ; Dugdale V. Robertson, 1857. The right of support is an ordinary right of pro- perty incidental to all land, a id not a right founded on any premimption of a grant or an easement : Back- house V. Bonomi, 1861 (II. L.). Also, Wakefield v. I), of Buccleuch, 1.S66; also. May. of Birmingham v. Allen, 1877 (C. A.); Dixon v. White, 1883 (H. li.). And every fresh subsidence of a worked- out mine gives a now cause of action : Mitchell v. Darley Main Coal Co., 1886 (II. L.). * Humphries v. Brogden, 1848; Caledonian Ry. Co. v, Sprot, 1856 (H. L.). * Leniaitre v, Davis, 1881 (Hall, V.-C). * See Smith v. Thackeray, 1866; and Siddons v. Short, 1877. " 2 Roll. Abr. 564, Trespass I., pi. 1, cited in 12 Q. B. 74;). * Murchie v. Black, 1865. » Wyatt V. Harrison, 1832; Hide w. Thornborough, 1846; Partridges. 114 criAP. v.] LATERAL SUPPORT — WASTE LANDS. easement has been enjoyed peaceably, openly, and without any attempt at deception or concealment.' Where, too, a landowner, having built two or more adjoining houses in such a way as to require mutual support, or mutual drainage, afterwards parts with them to different persons, either a grant or reservation will, in g<^neral,* be presumed, entitling each owner to have his house support'' a by,' or drained through,* the adjoining buildings. A presumption, however, of a legal right for bowsprits to project will not be made where a dock and a wharf belonging to the Fame owner, a separate sale is made of the wharf after the bowsj)rits of vessels in the dock had for some years usually projected over a part of the wharl.* § 122. With regard to manors, the following disputable pre- sumptions exist. The lord of the manor is prima facie entitled to all )raHte lands within the manor ; and it is not essentially necessary that he sliould show acts of ownership upon them.* The lord, in exercising his right as owner of the soil to take gravel, marl, loam, or subsoil, so long as he can do it without injury to the commoners, will be presumed not to have exceeded his limited powers, and if they complain the tenants must adduce some evidence that he has done so.' In the case of an " approvement " by him, however, the presumption is against the lord, apparently on the ground that, as he has made a grant over the whole waste, his right to inclose any portion of it must be conditional on his establishing that sufficient waste is left for the tenants to enjoy their rights of common.* § 122a. When a tenant encroaches upon and incloses the waste contiguous to his farm, he is presumed, in the absence of facts proving a contrary intention, to have done it for the benefit of his iHiil )l». Scott, 1838, all of which cases are cominontcd on in Iliiniphries v. Uiogden, 1848. See Hunt v. Poake, 18()0 (Am.) ; Jeffries v. Williams, 1850; Rogers z>. Taylor, ,?.J8. ' Dalton V. Angus, 1881 (H. See, also, Bell v. Love, 1884 (H. * See Mui'chie v. Black, ISiio. ' Eichards v. Rose, 1852. See Solomon v. Vintners' Co., 1859, and Kempston v. Butler, 1861 (Ir.). * Pyer v. Carter, 1856 ; Hall v. Lundi 1863. The authority of Pyer y: V. Carter has been denied by Ld. Westbury, C, in Suffield v. Brown, 1864. See Pearson v. Spencer, 1863; Wheeldon v. Burrows, 1878, C. A. ; Polden V. Bastard, 1865; Watts v. Kelson. 1870. " Suffield V. Brown, 1864. « Doe V. Williams, 1836 (Cole- ridge, J.). ' Hall V. Byron, 1876. 9 Id.; Arlettv. Ellis, 1827 (Bayley, J.); Lascellea v. Ld. Onslow, 1877 (Lush, J.), 115 i2 i^ i 1 1 i I pursirMPriox Ai;r>iN'r. fkom rosstissiox. [paut i. liinillord.' This prosiiniption will bo rt'Of>p;iii«'(l evt-n though tl'r lundd inolosod be tho property of a stranger;' ami will be much strengthoned, if the landlord of the farm be also tho lord of the waste.' S JvJ3. A presumption of oinirr-s/iip in many cases arises from pn-sNi's.sion, as men gen(>rally own the ])rf)perty they possess.* This pre8uni[)tion arises under the Factors Act ;* under the Irisli, Scotch, and English Acts relating to injuries done by dogs to sheep f under tho Pawnbrokers Act, 1872, so far as relates to the holders of pawn-tickets ;' and also under most of the statutes authorising tlu^ coiuptdsory sale of hinds for jiarticular purposes; as, for instance, in tho Lands Chiuscs (consolidation Act/ It may also be illus- trated by a great variety of eases at common law. Thus in an action on a policy of insurance on ship and cargo, plaintiff ma}' rely on the mere fact of possession,' or of having purchased the ship's stores,'" without the aid of any documentary proof or title deeds, imless such further proof be rendered necessary by some contrary evidence. In matters relating either to real or personal property, possession again gives rise to the same presumption of ownership, which in the case of real property is presumed to be ownership in fee.'^ Indeed, in actions for frcsjidss to real property, the presumption arising from the possession, as against a mere wrongdoer, amounts to couclunivr evidence.'- Therefore, in an action for an injury done to the reversion of real estate, proof of in ' m! ' Doe V. Jones, 1846; Androwes v. Ilailfs, 18j;5; Kiiififsiiiill v. Millard, l«.jj; lid. Lisbunio c. Davios, lS(i<); Doe r. Massoy, 18.il ; Doe i\ AVil- liains, 1H:{(); Doo v. MurroU, 1837 (Ld. Al)inf,'<'r); Doe v. Recs, 18;54 (Park.', J{.); Doo u. Tidbuvy, 18 J4; \Vhitiuore v. Huuiphrics, 1871; Att.- Geii. r. Toinline, 1877. Formerly this point was othorwisn : see Doe v. Mulliner, 179'> (Ld. Kenyon) ; Doe V. Davios, 179o. * ( 'ases cited in last note. » Bryan v. Winwood. 1808. ♦ Webb V. Fox, 1797 (Ld. Kenyon). • 52 & 53 V. c. 45. See Iloyman v, Flewkor, 18(33; Bainos v. Swainson, 1863; Fuentes (1. Montis, 1868 (Ex. Ch.); Vickers v. Hertz, 1871 ; Johnson r. Credit Lyonnais Co., 1877, C. A. 116 • 25 & 26 V. c. .59 ("Tho Dors (Iro- laTid) Act, 1862"). § 2. See, also, 28 & 2!» V. e. 50, § 7. Ir. ; 26 & 27 V. c. 100 ("The Dogs (Scotland) Act, 1863"), (^ 2, So. ; and 28 & 2!» V. c. 60 (" The bo<fs Act. 1865"), § 2. " 35 & 3() V. c. 93, s. 2.5. « 8 & 9 V. c. 18, § 79. » Rf,bertson v. French, 1803 ; Sut- ton r. Buck, 1810. '" Thomas 0. Foyle, 1803 (Ld. El- lenboroiif^h). " Doe V. Coulthred, 1837 (Ld. Denuian) ; Jayno v. Price, 1814 ; Doe V. Penf.dd, 1838 (Patteson, J.). See Mctters v. Brown, 1863, as to how this presumption can be re- butted. « Elliott I'. Kemp, 1840 (Pal•k^.^ B.). CilAl*. v.] I'KKSl'MITKJN AKisiNU FliOM I'OSSIXSION. the reoeipt of rent' by tho pliiiutilf will, unless tho sum anniiiilly received be so small us to raise a pre8umi>tioii tbat it is a mere (piit rent,'^ be aulfieient evidence of title to the reversion aa against all the world, ex(;ojit the real owner and persons claiming under him.' In actions ugninst wrong-doors for injuries to jiemotKi I chattels, proof of possession, when coupled with evidt^nce that the j)laintilf has some special property in such chattels, has, too, long been held to constitute a complete title.'* Therefore, an undischarged bankrupt may* sue in trover a wrong-doer wlio has taken goods out of hia custody ; cortaiidy possession of a ship under a transfer from tho riglitful owner, void under the register Acts for ufm-compHanco therewith, constitutes a sufficient title to support an action of trover against a stranger for converting a part of the ship which was wrecked ; '' even a general bailment will suffice, without being made for any special purpose, but only for the benefit of the rightful owner ; ' and a mere naked possession will (when no more is proved) entitle a party to maintain trover as against a wrong- doer,* though it will not entitle a mere bailee, who is proved to be under no liability to his bailor, to maintain an action for negligence against a third party.' *5 124. Many authorities also sli \v that the fact of his producing a document makes it ample priii i ficie evidence for a jury in support of a plaintiff's claim.'*' Tl le production of an I U signed by the defendant, thoug addressed to anyone by name, is, in general," abundant evideur. , not indeed of money lent (of which it furnishes no proof whatever), '^ but of an account stated > Seo, also, 23 & 24 V. c. l.M, § 24, Ir., wlu(:li iiiiiki's tlio r(Hi'ij)t of iL'ut, under ccitiiin circiinistiuiccs, for a coitaiu jii'i'iod, jiriiiia taiio cvidi'iico of a landlord's derivative title. ' Doe V. Johnson, 1819 (llolroyd, J., rccof^niHod in Eeynokls v. Key- uolds, 1,S4H) (Jr.). " Daintry r. Brocklohiivst, 1848. • Elliott V. Kemp, 184()(l'arko, B.). • Webl) V. Fox, 1797; Drayton v. Dale, 182;5; Fyson i>, Chanibors, 1842; those wore decisions under tho old law. « Sutton V. Buck, 1810. ' Per ( 'hanibre, J.. iO. 309. • Jeli'rieu v. Gt. West. lUiil. Co., 18d(i, which resolves a doubt raised by I'arke, B., in l''yson i\ Chambers, 1842; Fil/]iatrick r. Dunjihy, 18.)1 (Ir.). See also Armory c. Delamirie, 1721, 1722; .Sutton v. Buck, 1810 (La wren. 'o, J.). '■' ( 'larri(lfj:(; v. South Staffordshire Eail. Co., 1892. '" Fcsenmayer v. Adcoek, 1847 (Pollock, ('. lU. " But it will not furnish evidence of an account stated, if the defendant can show that, in fact, it was not given in aikiiowledf;nient of a debt due: Lemere r. Elliott, 1801. "^ l'\^seniriayer r. Adcoek, 1847, quostiuuing Douglas v. Holme, 1840, 117 .nil V\\ it i; I'll ; 1 J ' SI i 1 1 jl 1 i PRESUMPTION ARIPINO FROM POSSF.SSIOX. [part r. ( I ! I 1 - between the parties,' and if a letter bo given in evidence with the direction torn off, the jury will do well to presume, prim& facie, that it was addressed to the party who produces it.* § 125. As possession is prima facie proof of ownership in actions for the recovery of land, it is on the one hand an inflexible rule that the ]»laintiff must solely rely on the strength of his own legal title, and on the otlier hand clear that proof of a prior possession by the plaintiff, however short, will be primA facie evidence of title as against a wrong-doer.* Thus, where the plaintiff had given possession of a room to a third party, he was held entitled to recover against the defendant who had, about a year afterwards, broken into the room at niglit and taken the key ; ■* and again, whexe on the plaintiff's part, possession for twenty-three years, and making increases of rent during that period, were proved, it was held that defendant could not rebut the presumption of a seisin in fee arising from these unequivocal acts of ownership by merely showing a subsequent possession (for less than twenty years *) by himself. The presumption of ownership which arises from posses- sion will in general extend not only to the surface of the land which has been the subject of possession, but to all minerals which are under it.' Still, this presumption is not universal, since in mining districts the right to the minerals and the fee-simple of the soil are frequentlyl n different persons. Even where it arises it may be rebutted by showing either an absence of enjoyment of the minerals by the owner of the soil, or an actual user of the minerals by a stranger.' A very similar prima facie presumption is that the tenant of the surface is tenant of the subjacent strata. But this presumption also is liable to be defeated by proof that the surface and the subsoil have become separate tenements.* ' See last note; Curtis v. Eickards, 1840; Croker v. Walsh, 1852 (Ir.). See Wilson v. Wilson, 1854. •^ Curtis V. Eickaids, 1840 (Tiudal, C.J.). » Asher V. Whitolock. 1865. * Doe V. Dyeball, 1829. See Doe V. Barnard, 1849. 6 Doe V. Cooke, 1831 (Ld. Tonter- den). See, also, Brest t'. Lever, 1841. • But see "The 'IViinsfer of Land A.ct, 1862 " (25 & 26 V. c. 53), § 9, and "The Land Transfer Act, 1875" (38 & 39 V. c. 87), § 18, both of which statutts, for puri)()sos of legistration of title, recdf^nise an opposite pre- sumption, unless, in the description of the land, mines or minerals be expressly mentioned, ' Eowe V. Grenfel, 1824 (Ld. Ten- tordon); Howe v. Bronton, 1828; Ilodfykinson v. rietchor, 1781. * Keyse V. Powell, 1853; Smith v, Lloyd, 1854 (Parke, B.). 118 C:iAP. v.] LONG UNINTERRUPTED POSSESSION. § 12(5. The j)iosurapti()ii of title nrisiug from posspRsion will alwnyH bo much strtMigthoued by proof of uuinterruptud onjoyiiieut for a t'oii8i(l(>riibl« time. lu many cases, inJeod, the legislature has, as before observed,' fixed what periods of undisturbed possession will sufHce to confer an absolute title. In such cases, when the party by his pleading shows that he relies upon the statutory limi- tation, no lapse of time but that of the full period fixed by Act of Parliament will justify a i)resuraption in sui)i)ort of the claim.^ If, however, a party, instead of depending upon the statute-law, relies (as he may do) upon common-law presumption, or a lost grant, enjoyment for a less period than the statutory number of years, when coupled with other circutnatdncen, will warrant a jury in Bnding a verdict in his favour.* ^ 127. The principles of legal presumption which we have just been discussing apply, indeed, to all cases to which the statutes of limitation do not extend, though in many of them they are of necessity only capable of a vague interpretation. For instance, though (as we have just incidentally seen"*) a plaintiff seeking to recover land is bound to establish his own title, he will not be required to prove strictly every successive link in it, provided that the property has been long in his possession. Therefore, when a person claiming under a feoffment proved that he had had un- interrupted enjoyment of the premises for twenty years, the court and jury presumed, in his favour, that the necessary formalities of the old livery of seisin had been complied with.^ Presumptions of this latter nature will not, however, now be raised, where the land has been held for a less period than twelve years,*^ nor will they, where the acts of the parties, or the other facts in the case, lead to a different inference.' § 127a. Another disputable presumption of law is that arising from the possession of stolen property recently after the commission of a theft. Such possession raises a prima facie presumption that ' Ante, § 74. » See 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 71, § 6 ("The Prescription Act, 1832"); 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 100, § 8; Eldridge v. Knott, 1774; Lowe v. Curi)ontur, 1851. ^ See Wheaton v. Maple & Co., 1893; Bright v. Walker, 1834 (Parke, B.); Ld. Stamford v, Dunbar, 1845 ; Lowe V. Carpenter, 1851 (Parke, B.); Hanmer v. Chance, 1865 (Ld. West- bury). * Ante, § 125. * Eeos V. Lloyd, 1811; Doe v. Cleveland, 1829 ; Doe v. Davies, 1837 ; Doe v. Gardiner, 1852. « 37 & 38 V. c. 57 (" The Real Pro- perty Limitation Act, 1874"); and see cases in last note. ' Doe V. Gardiner, 1852. 119 It i ■ I •! I 'i i iiiiiii I • il i; 'I ■,{l. r RKCKNT POSSESSION OF STOI.l'.N rK01'i:iMY. [PAKT I. tlie possessor was either tlie thief, or tlie nicoiver, nccording to tlio other eircumstiiiiees of tlio case.^ This presumption, though rehut- tahle, is, wlum unexplaiiUMl,^ either by direct evidence, or by the eluiracter and habits of the posrrsror, or otherwise, usually rcgaTilcd by the jury as cfinclusive.''' Tlio question as to what amounts to recent possession, varies according as the stolen article is or is not calculated to pass readily from liand to hand. Thus, where two ends of woollen cloth in an unfinished state, contiisting of about twenty yards each, were found in the possession of a prismuu" two months after they had been stolen, it was held that the prisoiu^r should explain how he camo by the property.* But, on the otlier hand, where the only evidence against a i)risoner was, that certain tools had been traced to his possession three months after their loss, an acquittal was directed ; * and a similar course was pursued on an indictment for horse-stealing, where the horse was not dis- covered in the custody of the accused until after six monihs from the date of the robbery ; " and where goods, lost sixteen months before, were found in the prisoner's house, but no other evidence was adduced against him, he was not called upon for his defence.' The finding of stolen property in the /ioiixt< of the accused, provided there were other inmates capable of committing the larceny, will, moreover, bo of ihvlf insufficient to prove IiIh jiossession, however recently tho theft may have been ed'ected ; * though, if coui»led ' IL r. l/iuiRinciKl, l.S()<. « K. r. Kxiill, lS(;(i(l*oll()rk, C.B.). » 2 J'liist, V. C. <!*•)() ; 1{. ,'. , IS'20; Th.-Stiit(( r. Adams, 17.S!» - INOO (Am.). "l"'ui'tMin ])iii<suiiiitiir com- iiiisHiim all illi), ])t'iu^s ([iicm w.h luiiitii iiivciita t'uciit. adcd ut si nou doi'uciit a (|iio ii'iii liiihiiciit, justt\ «'X ilia iuvi'iitioiH', ])()t('iitr Hulijici formi'iitis." '1 Ma-^c, <1(^ I'nil). coiicl. IS.'i4 ; Muiiocli. dt! I'lWH. lib. o, juivs. 31. SiK) ante, § filt. * 11. V. I'urtridgo, 18UG (Pattoson, J.). » R. V. Adams, 182H (Park.-, J.). 8e(> 1{. V. Cockiiifi;, ISIifi, wlicm tvo ftacks worn foiiiKl in the ]tris<piii'r's I)()HHonHi()n twoiity dayn after tlicy had n'M\ missdd : ami ('(ili'ridfj;i', J., left thiMiin'niiou t<) till' jury, iibHorviii^;, Hiat "Htdlon ))i((|)erl,y usually jjasHcn throuf^li many hund.s." Sen the oh- eervutiuus oi the rupurtor ou this prcsiimption, id. » J{. ,\ (^;)<ii.(T. IH.VJ (Mawle, J.); E. V. Harris, lH(i() (Channrll, M.). ' ]{. i: , l.S'J(;(Havley, J.). * 2 St. I'lv. (in, n. ((/).' Sco Kx ])arto Han^h y, WIW, wh('r<» the haro limlinfi; of smii),'f,'led s]mits in do- fendant's hduse, diirin;;; liis alisencn from liome, was held insuilicient to HUjiport a I'onviction under 11 (i. 1, V. ;iO, § Hi (now repealed hy ;{() \- ;il V. (!. oil), foi' knowinj^ly harhoiiiinj; and concealinp;. Al)i)ott, (!.J., oh- sei'ved, "The mere naked fact of tho s])irits heinj? found in tho defendant's house durinj^ his ahsence cannot ho consid(>ri'd as conclusivo evidenci^ of knowled;>:n to HU|)j)ort ii conviction on this statuto. tIk^io is abundant fjround for suspicion, but wti cannot say that it is a clear and Hatisfa(!t.ory ground to couvict." Boo, ahjo, U. v, Hulo. 177». 120 CHAP, v.] EECKNT TOSSHSSION OF STOLKN rk)l'EUTY. with proof of other suspicious circumstances, it may fully warrant the conviction of the accused.^ § 127n. This presumption is in all cases one of fact rather than of law. It is ooeas 'ually so strong as to render unnocossary any direct proof of what is called the corjtKx (li/ivti. Tlius, to horrow an apt illustration from Maule, J., if a man were to go into tlie London Docks quite sohor, and shortly afterwards were found very drunk, stiiggoring out of one of the cdliirs, in which above a million of gallons of wine are stowed, " this wouhl he reasonable evidence that the man had stolen some of the wine* in the collar, though no proof were given that any jiarticfular vat had been broached, and that any wine liad actually been missed." * *5 127c.* The presumption under discussion is not coiifinod to cliarges of theft, but <i.'.teTuls to all >liiM'ges, however ])enal. Thus, on an indictment for arson, proof that property, which was in an house at the time it was burnt, was soon al'tcrwanls found in the possession of the prisoner, raises a probable pr('Sunii)tion that he was present nnd concerned in burning the house;'' ami under similar circumstances u like inference arises in the cases of munhir accompanied by robbery,'* of burglary," and of the possession of a quantity of counterfeit money.' § 128. The maxim, "ex diuturiiitato temporis omnia |ir;i'sumun- tur rite et solcnniiter esse acta," is also of great importance. It is a presumption of law that where there has been long continued j)ossession in assertion of a right, the right must be presumed to have liad a legal origin if such a legal origin was jiossible, and that all those acts were done and the circuiMNtiinces existed which were necessary to the creation of a valid h'gal title." It is r.lso a presumi)ti()n of law that till transactions were originally legal and honest, whihi the older they are the stronger will be the presiim|ili()n.* S\u!h presumj)tion intleed is sometimes, and under certain circum- stances, conclusive. An instance of this has already been furnished'* Ml ' «. r. Wi.tson, 1817 (Ld. Mien- Exall, IKdfJ. bdioiif^li and Abbott, J.), '' H. r. Marton, 1,H,VI. Sf.>, also, R. V. Mdckford, ISiiH. Sen, liowi'vtir, U. V, Williams, 1H71 ; scd qy. this case. Mir. Hv. § ;{4. * K. i\ l{irkman, 17Hi). » Wills. Vv. Kv. (11. • Bou 11. V. Uould, IBIO; 11. v. ' U. ('. Fuller, IHKi; 11. v. Jarvis, ih:),-). " I'liillipH r. Halliday, 1N91 (Ld. llcrsrli.'ll). * Croft V. Kirkmansworth llifjfh- wnv Hoard, 1H8H ; rostlcthwaito v. IJickniau. ISHll (U.A.) (liowou, L.J.). '» Auto, (j 87. 121 Ji: I ' f II REGULARITY PRESUMED FROM LAPSE OF TIME. [PART I. in the case of ancient documents, the due execution of which will be pre sumed on their mere production. And the American courts recog- nise other applications of the rule. Thus, after^ the lapse of twenty years, they conclusively presume, in favour of every judicial tribunal which has acted within its jurisdiction, that all persons interested in its proceedings have had due notice.^ They have also held, that where an authority is given by law to executors, guardians, and other officers, to make sales of lands upon being duly licensed by the courts, but they are required to advertise the sales in a par- ticular maimer, and to observe other formalities, the lapse of sufficient time (which in most cases is fixed at thirty years) raises a conclusive presumption that all the legal formalities were ob- served ; ^ the licence to sell, and the official character of the vendor, being provable by record or judicial registration, must in general be so proved ; and the deed must also be proved in the usual manner ; but the intermediate proceedings are presumed. Probaiis extremis prcvsiiumntur media. And in England the valid existence of a bye-law will be inferred without any direct proof of its having been passed, or of the loss of it, but the court will infer its existence from a usage of long standing.* § 129. The maxim, " ex diuturnitate temporis omnia proesu- muntur rite esse acta " has, indeed, since the passing of the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874,* become one ',i the leading rules, which are henceforth to regulate the practice of conveyancers and the rigid s of vendors and purchasers. And by tlie Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, lyHl,** it is enacted that the purchaser of any prupeity *' shall assume, unless the contrary appears, tliat the recitals contain id in the abstracted instruments of any deed, will, or other document forming part of the title [prior to tbe time prescribed by law » Liuet'ly, Gr. Ev. §§ 19 and 20. » ]$rowu V. Wood, 1«2() (Am.). * Soo l'(.'jei)scot Prop's i'. Itiuisom, 1817 (Am.); IJlossom v. Ciumoii, 1!S17 (Am.); C'lilmau v. Aiideiwdii, IHKJ (Am.); ^VllliaI'lS v. Eytoii, 18J!); (Jniy f. (iardinor, 1807 (Am.), hohiinj^ an interval of twunty-two yoars .siiHicii^nt. Stio cases coUcctod, liioom's Ldpil Maxims (Gth udit. p. 890), tit. ' 'Onmia PiiL'sumuntur, &i'. ' ; Society, &c. I'. Wheolor, 1814 (Am.). « R. V. I'owoU, 1854 ; May. ot Hull V. Horner, 1779 (Ld. Mansfield). Woo Johnson v. Barnes, 1873 (Ex. Ch.). 37 & 38 V. c. 78. Provisions ulinost identical with those in the te.xt contained in the Act of 1881 are contained in § 2, subs. 2, of the Act of 1874, and are said, in tho tabular index to statutes for that year (wliidi is of no authority how- over), to be repealed by tho Act of 1881, but tlicy aie not mentioned in the repealing portions (viz., § 7, and Sched. 11. Part 111.) of tho Act of 1881. « 44 & 45 V. c. 41, § 3, subs. 3. 122 CHAP, v.] REGULARITY PRESUMED FROM LAPSE OF TIME. for its commencementl are correct, and give all the material contents of the deed, will, or other document so recited, and that every document so recited was duly executed by all necessary pfirties, and perfected, if and as required, by fine, recovery, acknowledgment, inrolment; or otherwise." The time prescribed by law for the commencement of the title may be fixed by express stipulations, and it is always desirable to so fix it, at the same time stating the nature of the instrument wich which the title com- mences.* In the absence of stipulation,' abstracts of title in general ^ commence, as to freeholds, with a document at least forty years old ; ' as to leaseholds for years, with the lease or under- lease ; * as to the freehold interest in enfranchised copyholds or customary freeholds, with the deed of enfranchisement.* § 130. The presumption afPorded by the maxim, "ex diuturni- tate temporis omnia prajsumuntur rite esse acta," has again an important application where the rights of the Crown are con- cerned. Here," — though lapse of time does not of itself furnish a conclusive legal bar to the title of the Sovereign, — yet, if the adverse claim could have had a legal commencement, juries are instructed or advised to presume such commencement, after many years of uninterrupted possession. Accordingly, royal grants, charters, and even Acts of Parliament, have not infrequently been thus found by the jury, after long continued peaceable enjoyment, accompanied by the usual acts of ownership ; ' the long enjoyment of port duties, tolls, customary dues, fees, or the like, will, if the nature of the case admits it,* be held to warrant the presumption of any fact necessary to make them legal ; ° while if distinct * Wolstenholmo & JJrinton's Con- veyanoinj^ Act, Gth edit., ], 2. ' See Bolton v, Londou School Board, 1878. ' Vfiiidor and Purchaser Act (37 & ;« V. c. 78), § 1. ♦ Id. § 2, r. 1 ; and " The Convoy- anring and Law of Property Act, 1881" (44 &45V. c. 41), § 3, subs. 1. ' Id. 8ul)8. 2. ' Or. Ev. § 45, in part, as to nine lines. ^ Ooodmun v. Mayor of Saltash, 1S8'.>(('. A.); R. V. Brown, 1779; May. of Hull V. Ilornor, 1779; Eldridge v. KiKitt, 1774 ; Lopez v. Andrew, 1826 ; Dtlarue v. Church. 1833; O'Neill v. 12 Allen, 1859(Pigot, C.B.) (Ir.); Doo (/. Devine v. Wilson, 1850 (P. C.) ; Little V. Winstield, 1859 (Ir.) ; Boo V. Ireland, 1809 ; Ooodtitle v. Bald- win, 1809; Att.-Gen. v. Ewehiie Hospital, 1853; Matlior v. Trinity Church, 1877 (Am.). ' SeoGann I'. Ereo Fishers of Whit- stable, 18(i4 (II. L.); Free I'^ishors of Whitstablo v, Gann, and Gann v. Johnson, 18()3 (Ex. Ch.); Bryant V. Foot, 1868; Ijawronco v. Ilitch, 1808. See, also. Mills v. May. of Colchester, 18H7 ; Forman v. Vroa Fishers of Wliitstable, 1809 (II. L.). ° May. of Exeter v. WaiTeu, 18i4 (Ld. Denman). 1 : Ui !■ ' ; ! ■ * : ^m liii V'Hl \i •i TITLE I'RESUxMED FUOM LONG ]:N.J0VJI1:NT. [I'Ali'l' 1. evidence of any such payments be given as far luuk as living memory goes, tlie jury, unless evidence to the contrary be shown, will not only be quite justified in presuming, but will be direet(;d to presume, that such payments were immemorial, or at least were referable to a legal origin ; ' and a series of acts of ownership exer- cised on the seashore by an adjoining proprietor, or the production by him of a royal grant conveying the right of wreck,^ affords abundant evidence for a jury to presume that the Crown formerly granted the soil to one of his ancestors.^ On the same principle, after evidence of possession for nearly forty years of a tract of land, of a ] trior order in council for a survey and of an actual survey, a jury has, in America,* been instructed to presume that a patent was duly issued. A longer period is, however, usually required for this presumption to arise with regard to Crown or public grants than is needed in the case of a grant by a private individual.* § 1-51. Agfiin, on the same principle, the uninterrupted user of a road by tlie [lublic for forty or fifty years justifies a presumption in favour of the original animus dedicandi, although there was ground for supposing that the soil of tlie highway was vested in the Crown," and this although it is a rule that, to constitute a valid dedication to the public of a higliway, the owner of the soil must intend to dedicate.^ Even a qualified or partial dedication of a way may be presumed from continuous use. Accordingly, where, as far back as living memory goes, the j)ublic have enjoyed a riglit of way across an arable field, and the owner has plouglied up the wliole field, including the path, it is presumed that tlie original dedication of the way was subject to the liglit of ]»l()ugliing it up in due course of farming,** and therefore the public had no right of d(;viating from it, although the path mny have become tomjoraiily impassable in consequence of being so ploughed." Where, too, tli6 ' Malcoiiison v. 0'])ctt, 18(i2 (II. L.); MillH V. Miiy. of ColchcHtor, 18(i7 ; D. of Beaufort v. Hmitli, IN4<) (I'lirki!, K.); I'dlmiii v. PickerHgill, 1"87 (AshiirHt, J.); Shopliard v. I'ayiKs INO;*, (Kx. Ch,). '* IJiilo do Juni Mar. 2'), rocofjjTUHcd ill (,'aliiiadv v. Kowo, IHIH. ■' Caliiiady v. Itowii, 1818; I), of Hcaufort V. May. of Swiiiisca, 1810; LcStraiiK''''. Kow(!, lS(i,)(Kil.-.('..I.); Ilcalv r. Thoruo, 1870 (Ir.). tSuo imtiiA 11!'. * Jackson v. McCall, 18i;j (Am,). * SiM) Masnird do I'lob., p. '2',i\); coiR'l. 19!), n. 11, 12. « J{. r. ]']aHt Mark, 1848; It. v. Potiin, 18.55; Tumor v. Walsh, 1881 (!'. ('.). Sco (ii'coiivicli jioard of VVorkn r. MauilKlay, 1870; I'oworw y. J'.atliuiHt, 18^0 (l''i"y, J.). ' I'oolov. Ilusliiiisoii, 184|{. * M(!i('or V. \Vond>,'ato, 1870; Ar- uold V. Ulakor. 1871. » Arnold v. llolbrook, 1873. 124 CHAP, v.] TITLi: ITCKSU.MKD FROM LOXG ENJOYMENT. facts proved loave room for such a presumption, property which a piirisli has enjoyed for a long period niay be presumed to be vested in trustees for such parisli.* § 1^32. In cases of incorporeal hereditaments, where it is desirable to raise a presutn[)tion of lost grant, juries should' not he required to find as a fact tliat a deed of grant has been ((dmtUij executed, hut without believing any grant to have been made, they may often, imder the instruction of the court, presume its existence for the sijn[)lo purpose of qnu'tUig poHHemon} 8uch a presumption may he sometimes raised even against a rcvorsioni^r, provided it can bo either directly proved, or reasonably inferred, that he has had full knowledge of his opponent's actual enjoyment of the right in ([uostion, and has tacitly assented thereto.* But the presumption of a grant can only arise wlien the person against whom the right is claimed might have interrupted or prevented the user relied on.^ Therefore, the grant of a right to the uninterrupted passage of air to a windmill from over the soil of a neighbour, cannot be pre- sumed from an uninterrupted use of the mill for forty years.' § 133.'' Juries are also sometimes advised to presume convey- ances of ('orpni-o((l hereditaments between private individuals, in favour of the party wlio has proved a right to the beneficial owner- sliip, and whose undisturbed possession, heing consistent with the existence of the conveyance required to be presumed, affords reason- able ground for belief that the legal title has in fact been con- veyed.' Tliis presumption is made in order to prevent an apparently just title from being defeated by mere formal matter." It ought oidy to be drawn where a party has shown a right good in sub- stances, but in some way technically deficient in form. ' ILiii-ih v. Wost, 1893 (C. A.). » DiM.bli! V. Liiiohun, 18()() (Ir. Ex. Ch.), following tluulicta of lid. Miuih- tii'hl ill J'lldiidgo /'. Knott, 1774; and of Fid. Wcnslnydalc) in Bright v, Walkca-, l.s;}j; and in Magdakai C(dl. V, Att.-Gon., 18o7 ; and ovorruling a dictum of Hay ley, B., in Day v, Williams, 1832 ; Little v, Wingtiold, 18511 (Ir.). » I)i'(*l)l() V. Linehan, 18(iO(Tr. Ex. Ch.); Wiiitorbottom o. Ld. Derby, isi;:. ♦ Clias'iiinrn v, Bichards, 1869 (H. L). « Webb )'. Bird, l.S(i3 (Ex. Ch.); Brvant '■. Lofovor, 1879 (C. A.). « (Jr. Ev. § ■!(), in part. ' Doe V. C'ook(>, 18i'9(Tindal C.J.). Soo Doe V. Milk'tt, 18-18, and cases there cited. " Doe r. Cooke, 1829 (Tindal, C.J.); Doe ('. Sybouin, 179(1 (Ld. Kcnyou). In Little c. Wingfield, 18 J9 (Ir.). a passage in Doe v. Cooke (Nui)ni). in which Tindal, CJ., states in what cases this presuni])tion may be made, is called in question, as laying dowu the law too narrowly. 125 til iiii 1 t; i* . 1 \\ - < ! Pi Uli 1 . r. ff PRESUMPTION OP CONVEYANCE OF LEGAL TITLE. [PT. I. § 134. A presumption in favour of such a conveyance Laving been made will, in general, prevail whenever it was the t/wty o* trustees to convey to the beneficial owner at a specified time, as upon his attainment of the age of majority, or on the death of a cestui que vie, or after the payment of debts, legacies, portions, or the like, for in such cases it is reasonable to presume thj,t the trustees have performed their duty, and have done what a court of equity would compel them to do.' A like presumption probably arises where the duty to convey, though not expvcmi. may vomti'm- tkeUj be gatliered from the object of the trust, as, for instance, where an estate is vested in trustees for a temporary purpose, which has been attained, and no further intention is declared, or can reasonably be infeiTed, requiring the legal estate to remain outstanding.' § 135. It is said (probably rightly) that this presumption will never be made againd the owner of the inheritance, save in cases where he has attempted to defeat the solemn acts of himself, or of those through whom he claims. If, however, a mortgagor attempt to set up an outstanding fee as agt.inst a mortgagee for years, or the appointee of a devisee in fee to >""ispute the right of a former devisor to grant a lease of the promises in question, on the ground that the legal estate was, at the time of the grant, outstanding in a trustee, the jury (even if in cases the estoppel is not pleaded) may presume a conveyance. In the first case,^ the presumption will be made in favour of the honesty of the mortgagor at the time of the mortgage, though against his interest at the time of the trial ; and in the second,* it will prevail, in order to give effect to the grant of the devisor, which would otherwise be void. § 136. Questions under this head of presumptionis frequently arose in former times, when juries used often to be called upon to » England v. Sladn. 1792 ; Doe v. Syboinn, ITOO; Wilson r. Alien, 18'2() (Sir T. PluuKsr); Emory v. Grocock, 1821 (Sir J. Loach). In England v. Slado, a convoyanco from tho trustoos was prosninod, though only three years had elapsed from the time when they ought to have con- veyed. « Hillary v. Waller, 1805 (Sir W. Grant) ; Doe v. I^loyd, 180(1 (Law- rence, J.). See Sug. V. & 1'. (14th edit), .-i'JO; Math., Pres. Ev. 215— 217. 8 Per Abbott, C. J., in Doe v. Ililder, 1819; Cottrell V. Hughes, 1855. * Bartlott V. Downos, 1826 (Abbott, O.J.). 126 if CHAP, v.] OUTSTANDINO TKRMS ACT. presume the surrender of oufufanding fintisfind terms ; * but an Act,' passed in 1845, provides that every satisfied term of years, wliidi, either hy express declaration or by construction of faw,^ sliall, upon the Slst day of December, 1845, be attendant upon the inheritatice or reversion of any land, shall on that day absolutely cease and determine as to the land, upon the inheritance or reversion whereof such terra shall be attendant as aforesaid, except that every such term of years which shall be so attendant as aforesaid by express declaration, although thereby made to cease and determine, shall afford to every person the same protection against every incum- brance, charge, estate, right, action, suit, claim, and demand, as it would have afforded to him if it had continued to subsist, but had not been assigned or dealt with, after the said 31st day of December, 1845, and shall, for the purpose of such protection, be considered in every (tourt of law and of equity to be a subsisting term. It also provides * that every term of years now subsisting or hereafter to be created, becoming satisfied after the said Blst of December, 1845, and which by express declaration or construction of law, shall after that day become attendant upon the inheritance or reversion of any lands, shall, immediately upon the same becoming so attendant, absolutely cease and determine as to the land, upon the inheritance or reversion whereof such term shall become attendant as aforesaid.* § 137. Notwithstanding this Act, it is perfectly clear that no presumption can be allowed in favour of the surrender of a term whidi is still unsatisfied,^ or the continuance of which is found in a special verdict, or admitted in a special case ; ■' for, whatever individual hardship may result, it is obviouslj' absurd to permit any inference to be drawn, which is directly opposed, either to the ascertained fact, or to all reasonable belief.^ § 138. A jury may also, under certain circumstances, presume » Seo (tnrrard v. Tuck, 1849 ; Doo V, Liinpdon, 1848. » 8&9 V. c. 112. ' Seo Doe v. Prico, 1847 ; Doo v. Moulsrlalo, 1847; Doe v. Jones, 1849; Cottrull V. Hughes, ISJo; Plant v. Taylor, 18G3. M 2. • As to the construction of tliis Act, 800 § 3. • Doe V. Staple, 1788, where the lessor of tho i)liiiutift' was hoir-at- law, and only claimed the promises subioct to the charf^o. ' Goodtitle v, Jonos, 1796; Roe v. Reade, 1799. " See per Bayloy, J., in B. v. Upton Gray, 1830. 127 I It* i' ill PKlvSUMPTION OF SUIIRENDKU OF LEASE. [PAliT I. the surrender of a lease by operation of law. The production hy the lessor of a cancelled lease will not, indeed, warrant the pre- sumptinii of sui-h a surrender as will satisfy the Statute of Frauds.' Yet, when the production of the cancelled lease was coupled with proof that a new lease had been granted to another party, who, like the former lessee, was a mere trustee for the same cestuis que trust, and it further appeared, that when leases were renewed from time io time, the usage was to send in the old lease to be cancelled in the lessor's office, the jury were allowed to infer that the second lease was granted with the assent of the former tenant.- The unexplained payment of an abated rent for thirty ytars by a tenant of premise^;, which were shown to have been loased vo another party for an unexpired terra, has been treated in Ireland as evidence from which a jury might presume the surrender of the original lease, and the creation of a new tenancy from year to year, at the abated rent, in favour of the present occupier.' §§ 1 39 — 142. The principle " ex diuturnitate teraporis omnia prassumnntur rite esse acta " has also been ajiplied in a variety of matters other than tho.se mentioned iibove. Thus, where eject- ment was brought to recover a messuage, demised for a long term by a lease containing a covenant that the house f;hould not oe used as a shop without the lessor's written consent, wilh a proviso for re-eutry on breach of such covenant, it was held that, on proof of tlie uninterrujited user of the premises as a beershop for twenty years, the jury ought to be directed to presume that a licence in writiu ' hud been duly given ; * after the lapse of sixty years, the court, in the absence of any direct evidence, has pretiumed that executors, who were proved to have renounced, had also disclaimed an estate in a chattel real, which had been bequeathed to them by the testator ; * and it is a general proposition," that stale demands ought always to be regarded in courts of justice with jealous suspicion,' and that long acquiescence in any adverse claim of ' Doe V. Thomas, 1829; Roe v. Abp. of York, IHDo. '' Thomas v. Cook. 1S18. See, also, AVulker i'. Kichanlsoii, 1837. See pf)st, §§ 1009, KHO. 3 LoU-oy V. Walsh, 1851 (Ir.). See, also, Tenr.ont v. Noil, 1870 (Ir. Ex. Ch.); Ex parte fiaymond, 1874 (Ir.). * Gibson )'. Doeg, 1858. * M'Kciina v. Eager, 1875 (Ir.). ' Gr. Ev. § 47, in groat part. ' Sibhoring ;;. Ld. Balcarras, 1850. See H., falsely called C, (,-. C, 18(i2 ; T. V. D., falsely called IJ., 186(5. Thus, too, the non-user of a patent for a series of years raises a strong pro- 128 .i.i' ii CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTION OMNIA RITK ESSE ACTA. right is good ground, on which a jury may presume that the ohiim had a legnl commencement ; ' since it is contrary to general experience for one man long to continue to pay money to another, or to perform any onerous duty, or to submit to any inconvenient claim, unless in pursuance of some contract, or other legal obli- gation.^ § 143-4. In the great majority of cases to which the maxim " ex diuturnitate temporis omnia prsosumuntur rite esse acta " applies it is only available, " donee probetur in contrarium. " * The application of the presumption arising from it to acts of an official or Judicial character will oe best illustrated by referring to one or two deci- sions.* For instance, where successive decisions are inconsistent with a general order of the court, a reversal of that order ought to be presumed ; * on an indictment for perjury proof of the signa- tures of the defendant, and of the official before whom the docu- ment purports to have been sworn, is sufficient evidence that the defendant was regularly sworn to the truth of its contents, though the clerk, who proves the handwriting of the official, has no re- collection of administering the oath, and admits that the jurat was not written by himself ; ^ the fact that a town was in the military occupation of an enemy, and proclamations, purporting to be signed by the general in command, posted on its walls, is evidence whence a jury may infer that the placards had been printed and posted by the authority of the commander ; ' on an indictment for bigamy, proof of the solemnization of the first marriage in a Wesleyan chapel in the presence of the registrar, and of the entry of such marriage in his book, raises a prima facie presumption that the chapel was duly registered ; * and so also proof by a witness present at it, that a marriage was solemnized in a parish church by the curate of the parish, renders it unnecessary to prove either tho Bumptionof its practical inutility: Re Allan's Patent, 18G7, P. C; Eo Bake- well's Patent, 186'.', P. 0. ; Ee Hughes' Patent, 1879, P. 0. ' See Re Birch, 1853. ' See Castleden v. Castleden, 1861, H. L. ; Ogilvie v. Currie, 1868 (Ld. Cairns, Ch.). » See 11. I). Bjornsen, 1865. * See, also, Lee v. Johnstone, 1869. -VOL. I. • Bohun V. Delessert, 1813 (Ld. Eldon) ; Man v. Ricketts, 1845 (Ld. Lvndhurst). '« R. V. Benson, 1810 (Ld. Ellen- borough). See, also, Cheney v. Coiirtois, 1863 ; and Re Chapman, Ex parte Johnson, 1884, 0. A. ' Bruce v, Nicolopulo, 1855. * R. u. Mainwaring, 1857; Sichelr. Lambert, 1864; R. v. Cradock, 1863 (Willes, J., and Pollock, C.B.). 129 K i'l if m t 1 1) ' ■ PRESUMrilON OMNIA RITE ESSE ACTA. [PART I. repscration of the raarringe, or tl»e fact of any licence having betii granted, or of any banns having been published ; ' and the constant performance of divine service from an early period in a chapel, raises a prima facie preni hat it has been duly consecrated. - § 1 44a. An Irish decisiuu .,a.ried this presumption to its extreme limit. There a shopkeeper (prior to the passing of the Weights and Measures Act, 1878)* was prosecuted for using weights whicli were light when compared with the county standard. Proof that the county standard had been compared with the imperial standard within the last five years, although such comparison was expressly required by statute, was held unnecessary, on the ground that the prima facie presumption was that the officials in charge of the local standards had performed their duty.* § 1 15. Again, the court presumed the regularity of the proceed- ings, and that tlie writ had in due course come to the gaoler through the coroner, on a motion to discharge out of custody a party detained for debt in the sheriff's gaol, made on the ground of irregularity in the proceedings, although it did not appear that a writ of ca. sa. at the suit of the sheriff, which was in the hands of the governor of the gaol, had ever been in the coroner's hands, such writ having been set out in a return which the gaoler had made to a writ of habeas corpus previously issued, together with a certifi- cate by the coroner, that the copy of the writ was a true one.* The court has also presumed that a parish certificate purporting to he granted by A, the only churchwarden, and B, the only overseer of the parish, sixty years previously, during which the appellant parish liad submitted to such certificate, was regular, and that, by custom, there was only one churchwarden in the parish, and that two overseers had been originally appointed, but that one of them was dead, and his vacancy not filled up at the date of the certificate ; ^ in favour of the regularity of a parish indenture of apprenticeship, signed only by one churchwarden and one overseer ; ' in favoui- of ' R.r. Allison. 1806. See Limerick r, Limerick, lS();i. ■' Kuj?}? ('. Kingsmill, 18G7 ; R. v. Crfsswell, 1870. 41&42V.C.49; amended by 52 & 63 V. c. '21. ♦ Hill V. Ilennigan, 1877 (Ir.). » Bastard v. Trutch, 18;io. « R. V. Catesby, 1824. See also, E. V. Whitchurch, 1827. From R. v. Upton Gray, 18.'50, it appears that this presumption is rather one of fact than of law. ' R. v. Hinckley, 1810; R. v. Stain- forth, 1845. lau CHAP, v.] OFFICIAL AND JUDICIAL ACTS. of deeds of jmrisli appreiitice>lii|i — lliat where such a deed had been allowed by justices as requind by the then law, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be taken that notice had been duly given to the officers of the parish, where the apprentice was to serve;' that where such a deed, certified by the allowance of the justices, contained a recital of the order of binding, no evidence of such order, beyond the indenture itself, is necessar}-,* and that where an apprentice had served his time under a deed executed thirty years before, and it was proved both that such deed was lost, and that the parish in which the pauper was settled under it had relieved him for the last twelve years, it must be presumed that the deed was properly stamped, though the stamp officers proved that it did not appear in their office that any such indenture had been stamped during the last thirty-one years.' § 146. On this same principle of "omnia proosumuntur rite esse acta," every reasonable intendment will be made in support of an order of justices, provided it appear on the face of the order that the justices had jurisdiction.* But this rule does not extend to convictions, which, as combining summary power with penal con- sequences, are watched with peculiar vigilance, and construed with strictness at least as great as indictments.* Still, even with respect to convictions, if the authority of the magis-trate can be distinctly collected from the facts stated on the record, the court will not be astute in discovering irregularities in the proceedings. The safest rule on the subject is that laid down by Lord EUenborough, that the court " can intend nothing in favour of convictions, and uill intend nothing against them,"" and the conviction or order will bo construed according to the very language employed in it.' > E. V. Whiston, 1836 ; R. v. Wit- ney, 1836. '■* E. V. Stainforth, 1845. Soo also E. V. 8t. Mary Magdalen, 1803 ; E. v. lii'oadhempston, 1859. f E. V. Long Buckby, 1805. Both this case, and E. v. Catesby, 1824, cited above, partly rested on the presumption of validity arising from long acquiescence. See ante, §§ 126 — 131, 139 * E. V. Morris, 1792 (Ld. Kenyon); Onnerod v. Chadwiek, 1847 ; E. v. Preston, 1848; E. v. Stainforth, 1845. ' E. V. Morris, 1792; E. v. Baines, noO; Fletcher v. (.'althrop, 1845; E. V. Little, 1758 (Ld. Mansfield); W.v. Cordon, 1769, whore tho court ob- served that "a tight hand ought to be holden over tlieso summary con- victions :" E. V. Pain, 1826 (Abbott^ C.J.); E. V. Daman, 1819. » E. V. Hazell, 1810. See Paley on Conv. 74 — 77. ' E. V. Helling, 1715, 1716 (Pratti C.-Lj; Christie V. Unwin, 1840 (Cole, lil K l I i ■ m m ii I OFFICIAL AND JUDICIAL ACTS. [part I. § 147. Neither does the rule tliat "omnia pnpsumuntur ritA essso acta" apply, 80 as in any event to (jia' jurisdiction to authorities acting judioinlly unflcr a special statutory power; but in all such cases every circumstance lequired by the statute to give juris- diction mud appear on the face of the proceedings, either by direct averment, or by reasonable intendment.* There is no distinction, in this respect, between convictions, commitments,* inquisitions, warrants to arrest, examinations, or orders;' and whether an order under a special act be made by the Lord Chancellor or by a justice of the peace, the facts which gave the cuthority must be stated.* A presumption that an Ecclesiastical Court will exceed its juris- diction will not be made.' On the same principle the courts refuse to anticipate the decision of the master on a question of costs, as they cannot presume that he will decide erroneously.^ § 147a. The presumption under consideration is ignored in the case of highway rates. In such cases, although its recognition would have been productive of much public advantage, the pro- duction of the official book, with the rate duly entered in it and allowed, does not even furnish at least primA facie evidence of a highway rate ; and the fact that it has been duly published must still 3 proved by independent evidence.^ With regard to poor- rates, however, it has been expressly enacted, that " the production of the book purporting to contain a poor-rate, with the allowance of the rate by the justices, shall, if the rate is made in the form prescribed by law, be primS. facie evidence of the due making and publication of such rate."* § 148. The doctrine that " omnia prsesumuntur rite esse acta " ridge, J.); In re Clark, 1842 (Ld. Donman.). ' E. ('. All Saints, Southampton, 1828 (Holroyd, J. ) ; Gosset v. Howard, 1847 ; R. V. Helling, 1715, 1716 (Pratt, C. J.) ; R. v. Totness, 1849 ; R. V. Hulcott, 179fi, and note to § 147, infra. ■^ But a warrant of commitment which purports to be founded on a preceding conviction will be good, though it does not state that the evi- dence was given on oath, or in the presence of the prisoner : Ex parte Bailey, and Ex parte Collier, 1854. » Day V. King, 1836 (Williams, J.); Brook V. Jenney, 1841 (per id.); Johnson v. Reid, 1840 ; Gosset v. Howard, 1847. * Christie v. Unwin, 1840 (Cole- ridge, J.), » Chesterton v. Farlar, 1838; Hall V. Maule, 1838; Hallack v. U. of Cambridge, 1841. • Head v. Baldry, 1838. ' Bird V. Adcock, 1878. ' " The Poor Rate Assessment and Collection Act, 1869" (32 & 33 V. 0. 41), § 18. 132 CHAP, v.] SOLEMN ACTS OF PRIVATE I'EKSONS. i V. V. is, in many instances, recognised in support of the solemn acts of even private persons. For instance, if an act can only be lawful after the performance of some prior act, due performance of that prior act will be proaumed.' Again, although, in the case of contracts not under seal, a consideration must in general be averred and proved, bil/n of exchr.tuje and promissory notes are primA facie presumed to be founded on valuable consideration,* this latter presumption being made partly because it is important to preserve the negotiability of such instruments intact, and partly, because the existence of a valid consideration may reasonably be inferred from the solemnity of the instruments themselves, and the deliberate mode in which they are executed.' The following are further examples of presumptions : if secondary evidence bo tendered to prove the contents of an instrument either lost or detained by the opposite party after notice to produce it, it will be presumed that the original was duly stamped, unless some evidence to the con- trary, as, for example, that it was unstamped when last seen,* can be given ;* under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act, 1877, the execution of a lease by the lessor furnishes sufficient presumptive evidence that the counterpart has been duly executed by the lessee ; •• where lands originally leasehold have been dealt with as freehold for a long period by jjersons in possession, as between parties claiming under such jjersous, a presumption will be raised that the reversion has been got in;' in the absence of all proof as to which of two deeds of even date was first executed, the court will presume in favour of that order of priority which will best support the clear intent of the parties;* and where an act has been done by a joint stock company, to the legality of which certain formalities are requisite, and the circumstances are such ' Kinpi's County v. Neath National Bank, 1893 (Am.). » 45 & -16 V. c. 61, § 30 ; Collins v. Martin, 1 797 ; HoUiday v. Atkinson, 1826 ; Story, Bills, §§ 16, 178. See ante, § 86. 3 Story, Bills, §§ 16, 178. * Marine Investment Co. v. Havi- side, 1872, H. L. » Hart V. Hart, 1842 (Wipram, V.-C.) ; Crowthe'r v. Solomons, 1S48 ; Pooley V. Goodwin, 1836; Crisp v. Anderson, 1815 ; E. v. Long Buckby, 1805 ; Closmadeuo v. Carrel, 1866. Seo Arbon v. Fus.-ioll, 1862; Connor V. Cronin, 1838 (Ir.) ; Herbert v. Hae, 1862 (Ir.1 (Smith, M.E.); 33 & 34 V. C. 46, § 58, Ir. • 40 &41 V. c. 18, §48. ' Hqlmes v. Milward, 1878 (Fry, J.). * Taylor v. Horde, 1757. See E. V. Asiiburton, 1846 ; Gartside v, Silkstone, &c. Co., 1882. 133 ■fl, ilili 'i iiij( ! EXECUTION OF DKEDS. [part I. !i that acquiescence may be imputcJ to the shareholders, a cora- ])liance with the necessary formalities will, as against the company, bo presumed.' $i 149. On tlie same principle, where the atfontation of a deed hao been in the usual forra,'^ and the signature of the party has boon proved, the jury will ho advised to presume a duo sealing and dclivc^ry, and that, too, in cases whore the attesting witness has denied all recollection of any other form having boon gone through beyond the more signing.'' Indeed, it is not necessary, to consti- tute a valid sealing, that an impression should be made with wax or with a wafer, but an impression made in ink with a wooden blocik will sulHce ; ■* and even though no impression at all appear on the parchment or jjaper, still, if the instrument purport to be a deed, is on proper stamps, and be stated in the attestation to have been duly sealed and delivered, it will, in the absence of evidence to the contrary (especially if it be an ancient instrument),' be pre- sumed to have been sealed.^ Evidence to the contrary will, how- ever, be afforded where a bond, bearing no trace of any seal, and referring to contemplated testamentary dispositions which are to supersede it, is found among the papers of the ohliyorJ And a transfer which bears upon it a printed circle, and within such circle the words " I'lace for seal," but bears no actual seal, is not a deed merely because its attestation clause says it was " signed, senled, and delivered." * But a deed executed by a corporate body need not have the corporate seal affixed to it, but the corporation may adopt any prirate seal they ]tlease for the occasion, and the jury may presume that the use of the adojjlcd seal was a corporate • Qnidy's ruse, Rn The British T'rov. Lift' mill Kirn Ahs. Soc, IW.i; Lumo'h case, IKfiU (lid. Wi'stbury, ( '.). '•' Ah to jn'csmiiiititm in favour of a will liuviiij; a (lim uttrstatiou claiisi', 80(> jiost, § I(ir)(l. ^ l'"ass(!t r. ilrnwii, ISfJl ; Ori-Uior V. N«^ali>, 17i)() (lid. Kciiyon); Talhot V. Ilod^'Hoii. ISKi; Hall v. Wiun- brid.u:"', 11^1'''*; Biirlint; ". I'atoi'Hoii, ITJI'i (I'attcson, J.); Davidwou u. Cooper, 1,S»;J (Ld. Allin^'t•l■). Sc«n, also, Il<)() IK lii'wis, IMItO; l)o(! )'. Biu'di'tt, 1.SI3; Nowtoii ('. Uickctts, IbiUl, 11. L. ; uud Buriihuin v, liuiuiutt, V6i 1817. Tl'is ])rosiiiii])tion was for- iiii'ily ticat(Ml as oiio of law, lnit is now coiisidi'i-Dd Olio of fact, and loft to till' jury. * U. ('. St. raid's, Covcnt Oanlon, IHI,-). " Crawford and Lindsay Poer., INIS, II. L. " 111 rii Siiiidilands, 1871, citud by Ld. l)iMiiiiaii in 1{. i<. St. I'aiirs, Covont (JardiMi, 181,'». ' Hi' Smith, Oswi'll r. Shophord, 18!IL>, C. A. " Ho Btilkis Co., 1888. '^' 'I CHAP, v.] EXECUTION OF DKKDS. act, if the instrument purport to be executed by tlie head and the Huhordinnte nionibers of the corporiitiou " under their seal." ' The presunijjtion in favour of the due execution of instruments was (carried to a great Icngtli in a case'" in wliidi an action having been brought upon the assignment of certain h)tt»;rs-patent to recover the consideration nKmey named therein, one of the defen<lants ])k!U(hMl non est factum, and produced the deed, wlu(;li was signed and executed by all the jtarties to it excerpt himself, but with a seal placed for him in the usual way. And he having acted under tlie assignment, and liaving recognised it as a valid instru- ment, it was presumed that he had duly execiuted it. I5 150. In accordance, again, with the maxim, " omnia prmsu- rauntur rite esse acta," every man is, in the absoncjo of evidence to the contrary, presumed to know the contents of any deed which ho executes,^ and to be bound by it. It is, however, enacted by UJ EHz. c. o,"' that all conveyances of lands or chattels, which are not made for a valuable consideration and bona fide,'' shall be void as jigiiinst any person, including the Crown,'^ whoso (;laims on the original owner of the proj)erty shall bo thereby delayed or dis- turbtHl." Whenever, therefore, any transaction is sought to be invalidated under this Act, the purchaser must both establish the justice of his title, and show affirmatively, not only that the deed under which he claims was duly executed, but that it was made in perfect good faith, and also for a valuable, as contradistinguished from a mere good, consideration.' In determining the (juestion of boiia fides, the jury will take into considi^ration all the circum- Btances connected with the transfer. If, therefore, the ccmveyance be absolute, and passes to the V(>ndoe an in)m<Mliate right of j)os- session, the fact of the vendor being allov.'cd to continue as the apparent owner of the pro[)erty naturally raises a very strong II' ' JoncH ?'. Oiilway Town Coiiiiiiiss., 1«J7 (In). '" ('liiaiy V. lloiniii},', lH4i). ' 111 ro (.JodiHir, 1H82 (JohsoI, M.K. . ' Mado p(tr|)(4iml by '2i\ & 27 V. c. l'2'>, iind aiiiiiixicd \>\ Stiituto liaw .•Hcvisiim Act, IShN (,■)!" V, c. ;{). * S(M) In 10 iiidlor, iiidlur v, lliUlor, IbW, U. A. • Shaw V, Uraii, IHHi; Mori'wood V. "Wilk.H, WM; IVrkiim v. Ihadlry, 1H1L>. S(.(, Whitakor /'. WiHliiiy, lH,-)2. ° S(H) Frci'miui V. I'opo, 1(S7(); Crosshiy V. I'llwoithv, 1H71 ; Coniisli V. Clark, l.S7li (1-d." Uoiiiilly) ; Knit V. liil.'v. 1872 (lid. K(.iiiillv); (ic.ldcu V. (iilluiiii, 1HS2, ('. A,; \]\ ])ai'le lUis^.'ll, Hd lliittcrwditli, ib»2, C. A. ' Tw) uo'h cubo, Hi.:, 135 I i f^ ' \ ■i- r 1; PRi:suMr"'ioNS respfxting deeds of gift, [part I. presumption of fraud. ^ If, indeed, the conveyance or bill of salo is by way of mortgage, and the mortgagee is not to take possession till a default in payment of the mortgage money, then, as the nature of the transaction does not call for any change of possession, the absence of such change will not of itself furnish any evidencft of collusion.* § 160a. Bills of sale of personal chattels are, moreover, now ren- dered void under the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, unless they set forth the consideration for which they were given.' § 151. Notwithstanding the maxim, "omnia prsesumuntur rit^ esse acta," whenever any person by donation derives a benefit under a deed to the prejudice of another person,* — and the more especially so, if any confidential or fiduciary relation subsists between the parties, — the courts so far presume against the validity of the instrument as to require some proof (varying in amount according to circumstances) of the absence of anything approach- ing to imposition, over-reaching, undue influence, or unconscionable advantage.* For example, a deed of gift, or other disposition of property, except a will,^ made in favour of a solicitor by a client,' of a medical attendant by a patient,* of a parson by one of his congregation,* of a " spiritual medium " by one of his dupes,'" of a trustee by a beneficiary," of an executor by a legatee,'^ of a guardian by a ward, of a parent by a child,'^ of a Imsband by a wife, of an agent by a principal,'* or of a shrewd' man of business by an infirm ignorant old woman,'* will be regarded with jealous ' Martindalo i;. Booth, 1832; Lin- don V. Sharp, 1843 (Tindal, C.J.). 2 Martindiile v. Booth, 1832. 3 45 & 46 V. c. 43, § 8 ; 42 & 43 V. c. 50, § 8, Ir. Aa to what is a BufRcient complianco with this rule, Bee Ex parte Firth, Re Cowburn, 1882 ; Ilamlyn v. Betteley, 1880 ; Hiuuilton V, Chaine, 1881, 0. A.; Ex parte Rolfe, Re Spindler, 1881, C. A. * Cooke V. Lamotte, 1851 (Romilly, MR.). See Coutts v. Acworth, 1869. » 1 Story, Eq, Jur. §§ 308—323. See Baker v, Bradley, 1856. « I'artitt V. Lawless, 1S72. See Ash well V, Lomi, 1850. ' (irosleyv. Itloii8loy,1859; O'Brien V. liowis, 1863 ; Gardener v. Ennor, 1860; M'Phorson v. Watt, 1877, H. L. 8 Mitchell V. Ilomfray, 1881, C. A. ; Dent V. Bennett, 1858. » Nottidge V. Prince, 1860; Hu- guenin v, Baseley, 1807. »» Lyon V. Home, 18G8 (Giffard, V.-C). »» liuff V. Lord, 1864. " Gray u. Warner, 1873 (Wickons, V.-C). " Wright V. Vanderplank, 1056; Bainbrigge v. Browne, 1881 (Fry, J.) ; Hartopp v. Hartopp, 1855 ; Dimsdale V. Dimsdale, 1856; Bury w. Oppenhoim, 1859; Daviea v. Diivies, 1863 (Stuart, V.-C.) ; Potts v. Surr, 1865 ; Turner v. Collins, 1871, C. A. '* King V. Anderson, 1874 (Ir.). » Baker v. Monk, 1864 (L.JJ.); 13G » CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS IN DEALING WITH REVERSIONS. 10 suspicion, and the instrument will be set aside as conclusively void,' or the person benefited will have thrown upon him the burthen of establishing beyond all reasonable doubt the perfect fairness and honesty of the entire transaction.^ § 152. A grotesque attempt was made in Ireland to extend this doctrine to a case in which a woman had, living in adultery with a married man, assigned some of her property to secure a debt owing by her paramour, and had the hardihood to afterwards apply to the Court of Chancery to set aside the assignment on the ground of undue influence. But it was held that the doctrine in question was only applicable when some lawful relation existed between the parties.' § 153. The old Court of Chancery used to look with peculiar favour on heirs apparent and other expectant heirs, who entered into negotiations as to their expectancies.* Every person who dealt with an expectant heir for his reversion had, if the transaction were subsequently disputed, the burthen of proof upon him to establish its entire fairness.* At the instance of some prominent lawyers,* an Act passed in December, 1867, enacts, that " no purchase made bona fide, and without fraud or unfair dealing, of any reversionary interest in real or personal estate, shall hereafter be opened or set aside merely on the ground of under-value." ' It will be noted that this enactment is carefully limited to purchases " made bona fide and without fraud or unfair dealing," and it not only leaves untouched the law which governs unconscionable bargains, but allows under-value to be still regarded by the court as a material element in cases where fraud is charged.* Summers v. Griffiths, 1866; Slator v. Nolan, 1876 (Ir.). ' Tomson v. Judge, 1835. This was tlio case of a deed of gift by a client to liis solicitoi'. » 1 Story, Va\. Jur. §§ S08-323; Hunter v. Atkins, 1832 ; Nedby v. Nedby, 1852 ; Uoghton v. Iloghton, 1872; GroHvenor v. Shonatt, 1860; Savery v. King, 1856, H. L. ; Espoy V. Lake, 1852 ; Billage i'. Southoe, 1852. Son Price v. Price, 1852; Toker v. Toker, 1863; Phillips r.Mul- lingH, 1871, C. A.; King v. Anihr.son, 1874 (Ir.) See Taylor v. Johnston, 1882. 137 ' Ilargroave V. Evevard, 1856 (Ir.). • Hroniloy v. Smith. 1859; Ld. Portmore v. Taylor, 1H31 ; Davies v. I), of Marlborough, 1818; Sharp v. Leach, 18(i2 ; Croft v. Graham, 1863; Perfect v. Lane, 1861 ; Benyon v. Fitch, 1866. • See cases cited in last note. • See Webster v. Cook, 1867, C. A. (Ld. Chelmsford, C). ' 31 V. c. 4. § 1. See Miller v. Cook, 1870; Tyler v. Yates, 1871 (Ld. Hatherloy, C); JucUl v. Groon, 1876. » Ld. Aylesford v. Morris, 187.3 (Ld. Selborne, C.) ; Beynon v. Cook, t ill i tifin n i'« ijpiui fl^iii .1; ' .i.i INCUMBRANCES — CHARITABLE GRANTS. [_PAET 1. § 154. It is a presumption that a tenant for life, or other person having a partial interest in settled estates, who pays off an incum- brance upon them, intends to keep the charge alive as against the inheritance for his own benefit.^ This presumption, however (on technical rather than on substantia) grounds), is inapplicable to a case where a tenant for life pays off the bond debts of the settlor.* Neither does it extend to the ease of a charge bearing interest, where, — the rents and profits of the estate having been insufficient to meet the interest, — the tenant for life has paid the balance of it out of his own pocket, without having warned the remainderman of his intention to charge the excess of his payments on the inheritance.^ ^ lo5. Certain presumptions are also recognised as to charitable imtitidions, and in interpreting charitable grants. Thus, if the charity be founded to support a religious establishment, or to pro- mote religious education, and the intentions of the founder be not clearly expressed, the prima facie presumption is, first, that he intended to support an establishment belonging to some particular form of religion, or to promote the teaching of cerLain particular doctrine ; next, that the form of religion or doctrine contemplated was that which he himself had professed ; and lastly, if no evidence be adduced of his entertaining particular religious views, that the established religion of the country was the one meant to be sup- ported. If, however, the charity were founded for purposes of mere secular education, or if it were one of a purely eleemosynary character, the court, in the absenca of any expressed intention to the contrary, will presume that its benefits are intended to be shared by all persons, whatever their religious opinions.'* § I06. It is also now presumed (contrary to what was once considered to be the law) that an estate for life without impeach- ment of waste does not confer upon the tenant for life any legal right to commit " equitable tcaste," unless an intention to confer BUL'h right exfiressly appears in the instrument creating the estate.* 1875. C. A. SoG, also, Novill v. Sncllin-r, 1880; O'Horko v. Buliug- brokc, 1877, II. L. See, too, Uuu,, ch. XXV. vv. 29 — 34. ' Morley v. Morloy, anil Hailiind V. Morloy, 18.J3. Soo post, § i70A. '^ 1(1. Bee lloddam v. Morley, 18J7. ' Ld. Konsiiigton v. Bouvcrie, 1859, II. L. * Att.-Goii. V, Calvert, 1857 (Eoniillv, M. R.). " ;i() & ;i7 V. 0. G() ("Tlu! Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 "), § 25, subs. 3 ; 40 & 41 V. 0. 67, § 28, Hubs. 3, ^Ir.). 1^8 iMi' n o5 CHAP, v.] JOINT TENANCY — VOLUNTARY SETTLKMENT8. § 157. The presumptions, or, rather, the rules of construction recognised in equity with respect to Joint tciKtncy are " not very comprehensible." ^ If two persons jointly advance money on HWitgage, a mere tenancy in common will be created, though the [iroperty be conveyed to them as joint tenants, because the law presumes that men will not willingly speculate with money which they lend.^ But, on the other hand, if two persons jointly advance money as jmrc/tHners, and the sums paid by each be equal, a joint- tenancy will be established, because here it is supposed that men will readily gamble as to survivorship with respect to property which they buy.' If, however, two persons make a purchase, and one of them advances more of the purchase-money than the other, even tliough the deed does not contain the words " equally to be divided " there will be no survivorship.* § 158. The existence of some mistake in it will not be presumed from the absence frora a voluntary settlement of a power of revo- cation. The circumstance will, however, generally be taken into account, as entitled to weight, in deciding on the validity of the instrument.* Parties relying upon an irrevocable voluntary settle- ment ought, therefore, to be prepared to prove that the settlor was properly advised when he executed it, that he thoroughly under- stood the effect of omitting the power, and that he intended to omit it.* § 159. It is, in the absence of any express stipulation to the contrary, since the 1st of August, 1870, presumed, that " all rents, annuities," — which term includes salaries and pensions,"- " divi- dends,' and other periodical payments, in the nature of income, whether reserved or made payable under an instrument in writing or otherwise," accrue from day to day, like interest on money lent, and are apportionable in respect of time accordingly.* The statute ' See Harrison v. Barton, 1801, and the remarks there of Wood, V.-C. » Petty V. Styward, 16;}2. ' Rigdon V. Vallier, 1751, ♦ Hall V. Hall, 1873, C. A. ; Phillips V. Mullings, 1874, C. A. See, also, Welman v. Wolman, 1880. » Id. • Treacv v. Corcoran, 1874 (Ir.) ; 33 & 34 V. c. 3.j (" The Apportion- ment Act, 1870"), §3. ' See In re Griffith, Carr v. Griffith, 1879 (Jfssel, M. R.). 8 33 & 34 V. c. 35, §§ 2, 7. See, also, 4 & 5 W. 4, c. '22 ("The Ap- portionment Act, 1834"). See Jonog V. Ogle, 1873, 0. A. See, also, C'apron V. Cupron, 1874 ; Ro Cline'a Estate, 1870; Pollock i'. I'ollock, 1874 ; llae- liick I'. IVdlcy, 1875; Daly r. Att.- Geii., 1870 (Ir.); Re i'ox's Trusts, 1878 (Hall. V.-C.); Swansea lik. v. Thomus, 187U. 139 t ■'I If im- •! :!•' EXECUTION or WILLS. [rAET I. providing this extends to wills, wliich, though executed before its passing, have come into operatii)n i^iuce its date.' § 160. T/iere exint the foHoicing presutnptions with respect to the execution, alteration, and revocation of wills : * — First, on proof of the signature of the deceased, he will be presumed to have known and approved of the contents and effect of the instrument he has signed ; * such knowledge and approval being essential to the validity of the will.^ This presumption, how- ever, is liable to be rebutted by showing any suspicious circum- stances.* Therefore, if the testator, from want of education, or from bodily infirmity, was unable to read," or if his capacity at the time of executing the instrument is a matter of doubt ; ' or if the party who is materially benefited by the will has pre- pared it, or conducted its execution, or has been in a position calculated to exercise undue influence ; * or if the instrument itself is not consonant to the testator's natural affections and moral duties ; * — a more rigid investigation will take place, and probate will generally not be granted, unless the court be satisfied by evi- dence that the paper propounded really does express the true will of the deceased '° In cases of extraordinary suspicion, it will be highly expedient to prove, either that instructions were given by the deceased corresponding with the actual provisions of the will, or that the instrument was, at the time of execution, road to or by M w n)»ij » Constable V. Constable, 1879 (Fry, J.). The Act applies where a tenant for life dies after its passing, but the testator, under whose will he took, died before that date; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 1884 (Pearson, J.). * For other presumptions respecting wills made prior to Ist Jan., 1838, see the former editions of this Work, §§ 131 — 134. ^ Billinghurst v. Vickers, 1810; Fawcett V. Jones, 1810; Guardhouse 1'. Blackburn, 18G6; Wheeler v, Alderson, 1831 ; Browning v. Budd, 1848, P. C. * Hastilow V. Stobie, I860 (Wilde, J. 0., overruling a dictum of Cress- well, J. 0., in Middlehurst v. John- son, 1861 j. See Cloare v. Cleare, 1869. » Von Stentz v. Comyn, 1848 (Ir.) (Brady, C). * Barton v. Robins, 1769; In re Duane, 1862; In re Wray, 1769 (Ir.) ; but see Loiigchamp v. Fish, 1807. ' 1 Phillim. E. 193; Ingram v. Wyatt, 1«28; Dodge v. Meeuh, 1828; Dufaur v. Croft, lft40, P. C. " Mitchell V. Thomas, 1847, P. C. ; Scouler v. Plowright, 1856, P. C. ; Eaworth v. Marriott, 1833 ; Greville V. Tylee, 1851, P. C. ; Pasko y. Ollat, 1815 ; Zacharias v. Collis, 1820 ; Wheeler v. Alderson, 1831 ; Billinghurst v. Vickers, 1810; Ful- ton V. Andrews, 1875, 11. L. (Ld. Cairns, C); Durling v. Lovelund, 1839 ; Chambers v. Wood, 1848 (Ld. Cottenham); Paine v. Hall, 1812; O'Connel v. Butler, 1819 (Ir.); Gore V. Oahagan, 1819 (Ir.). • See Prinsep and E. India Co. v. Dvce Sombre, 1832, P. C. '" Browning v. Budd, 1848, P. 0.; Fulton V. Andrew, 1875, H. L. 140 m CHAP, v.] EXECUTION OF WILLS. the testator, or that he had expressed some subsequent knowleilgo and approval of its dispositions ; but this precise species of evidence is not absolutely required, and it will be sufficient if, by any means of proof, a knowledge and approval of the contents of the will can be brought home to the deceased.' § 161. Secoii(f/i/, wliere proof can be furnished that, prior to the execution of a will by a competent testator, it was either read over to him, or otherwise brought specially to his notice, the Probate Division will, in the absence of fraud, not only infer, prima facie, that he approved of the contents, but will recognise a coiiclitairo presumption to that effect. No matter what evidence may be forthcoming to establish a case of obvious error, or to show that some passage has crejjt into the instrument by a sheer mistake of the draughtsman, the judge will turn a deaf ear to all such testi- mony.'^ Where, however, the jury found as facts, both that a certain word had been introduced into the will by a blunder, and that the clauses in which it appeared had never been brought to the notice of the testator in any way, the court directed that the obnoxious expression should be struck out of the instrument wherever it occurred.' § 162. Thirdltf, in the absence of direct proof, when several sheets of paper, constituting a connected disposal of property, ara found together, the last only being duly signed and attested as a will, it will (even in spite of partial inconsistencies in some of the provisions) be presumed that each of the sheets so found ■! ^^med a part of the will at the time of its execution.* § 163. Fourthly, it is, in favour of attestations to wills, presumed that if a testator might have seen them, that he, in fact, did see, the witnesses subscribe their names.* The fact of his having been in the same room with them is prima facie evidence of their attesta- . I ' Barry v. Butlin, 1838, P. C. ; Mitchell V. Thomas, 1847, P. C. See further on this subject, 1 Will, on Ex. 97, 311, 312; and Atter v. Atkinson, 1869. ' Guardhouse v. Blackburn, 1866 (Ld. Penzance); Harter v. Harter, 1872 (Sir J. Hannen). Sed qu., for the judicial reasoning in these cases is not so logical as might fairly be expected. See In re Oswald, 1874. » Morrell v. Morrell, 1882. * Marsh v. Marsh, 1858; Gregory V. Queen's Proctor, 1846; Rees v. Eees, 1873. See, also, In re Cattrall, 1863. » Todd V. Ld. Winchelsea, 1826 (Abbott, J.); Doe V. Manifold, 1814. See post, § 1054. 141 1 J t i ■ ;; \ \ ' ALTERATIONS IN WILLS. [part I. tion in bis presence, while an attestation not made in the same room is prim& facie not made in his presence.* § 164. Fifthly, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that all alferntiom, interlineations, or erasures, which may appear on the face of a will, were made after its execu- tion,^ and even after the execution of any codicils thereto.' Con- sequently the Probate Division of the High Court will, in a case of unexplained alteration, interlineation,* or erasure, only grant probate of the will in its original form.* This presumption, how- ever, — which is contrary to that which jjrevails with respect to deeds,* resolutions, and other official documents,'— may be rebutted by slight affirmative evidence,^ such as a statdment in the attesta- tion clause that a will had been executed " with a few alterations."" And it will not apply at all to the filling up of blanks. Therefore, where a testator gave instructions that his will should be prepared with blanks for the amount of the legacies, and after his death the will was found regularly executed, with the amounts filled up in his own handwriting, it was, in the absence of all evidence on the subject, presumed that the blanks were filled up before the will was signed, since otherwise the execution would have been a mere idle ceremony.'" § 16u. Sui/i/i/, if a will, traced to the possession of the testator, ;^ 1 ,:•■ , If ■(;]' ' Noil V. Neil, 1820, 1839 (Am.). « Siinmoiids r. KmlnU, 1K,>(); ])oo r. Ciitoiiioro, 18 Jl ; Doe v. I'lilinor, 18.)1 ; In re fStone James, 16J8 ; Williuins I'. Ashton, 18(5' . » Lushiugton v. Onhlow, 1848 (Sir II. Fust). See, also, Christmas v. Whinyat'es, 18(j3. ♦ In re Wliito, 1861. But see In re Cadge, 18G8. » Gann v. Gregorj', 18o3 (Stuart, V.-C); Coojun- v. Bockett, 18(i3, P. C. ; Grcvillo r. Tylee, 18Jl, P. C. ; In re Hardy, 18()1. A curious in- stance of this occurred lately. A will was found with pieces of paper stating the amounts of certain legacies pasted over it. These were presumed to have been made since execution, and so not admitted to probate. At that time the original figur(!s, imdeiiieath the pieces so pasted on, could not be read, so they wore also not admitted to pr()i)ate. Aboiit twenty years after- wards it was found that these original figures were legible, and the probate was amended by ins(3rtii)g them ; Flinch V. Combe, 1894. See llules for Reg. of Ct. of I'rob. in Non-con- tentious Business, Nos. 8— 10. " Simmonds v. lludall, 1850 ; Doe V. Catomoro, 1851. ' Stoovous's Hospital v, Dyas, 1863 (Ir.). '* Soo Dench v. Dench, 1878 ; In re Dully, 1871 (Ir.); and In re Sykes, 1873; Moore v. Moore, 1871 fir.). The presumption, moreover, has oeen altogetiior set at nought in the case of a will made by an oHicer in actual military service : In re Farcpiharson V. Tweedalo, 187'). Sed ou. » Doherty v. Dwyer, 18"9() (Ir.). '0 Birch V. Birch, 1 848 (Sir II. Fust) ; Greville v. Tylee, 1851. 142 CHAP, v.] REVOCATION OF WILLS. and last seen in his custody, be not forthcoming on his death, a presumption is made under ordinary circumstances, and unless there he sufficient evidence to rebut it, that such will has been destroyed by the testator, animo cancellandi.* But the declarations of a testator, whether written or oral, and whether made before or at or after* the execution of the instrument, in such cases furnish cogent proof of his intentions.' Again, the finding of the will among the testator's papers, with the signature cut out, raises a presumption tliat the mutilation was efffoted intentionally by the testator himself ; and the will cannot be regarded as revived, though the signature has been again attached by gum to its original placn, and the document, when discovered, was in that condition.* In the event, moreover, of a testator having become insane after the will was made, the burthen of proving that it was destroyed by him while of sound mind lies upon the party who sets up the revo- cation.' The revocation of a will by the testator was at one time considered to raise a prima facie, though by no means a conclusive, presumption that the testator intended to revoke every codicil to it," but this presumption no longer prevails ; and now a codicil (however dependent it may be on the will) can only be revoked in one of the methods prescribed by the Wills Act.' § 166. With regard to gifts in wills, the following presump'ons arise. It is, in the absence of any distinct intimation to the con- trary, presumed that every testator considers his estate sufficient to answer the purposes to which he has by his will devoted it. Con- sequently, in the event of any deficiency arising in the assets, all annuities and legacies will, prima facie, be held to abate rateably. In all cases the onus lies upon those who claim any priority to furnish conclusive proof from the language employed, that the ■I > Supdon v.lA. St. Loonards, 1876, C.A.; Welch V. Phillips, LSJO, V. C. (Parke, B.) ; Finch v. Finch, 1807; Johnson v, Lyford, 18(58; Podniore ('. Whntton, 1861 ; Dickinson v. Stidolph, 1861 ; ]5rown v. Brown, 1858; In re Brown, 18.58; Wood v. Wood, 1867 ; ditto v. Gilbert, 1854, P. C. (Dr. Lushington). » Sugdon V. Ld. St. Leonards, 1876, overruling Quick v. Quick, 1864. ' Whiteley v. King, 1854 ; Keen v. Keen, 1873; Sugden v. Ld. St. Loonnrds, 1876. Sco also Saunders I'. Saunders, 1.S48; Williams f. Jones, 1849; Patton v. Poulton, 1858; Ecker.sley ('. Piatt, 1866. • Bell V. Fothorgill, 1870. • Spriggo V. Spriggo, 1868. • Grimwood?'. Cozens, 1860; In re Button, 1862; Medlycott v. Asshoton, 1824 ; Clogstown u. Walcot, 1847. But see In re EUice, 1864 ; Black v. Jobling. 1869. ' Be Turner, 1872 (Ld. Penzance). 143 i 1 i 1 1 1' i BliQUKST OF ANNUITY LEGACY TO EXECUTORS. [PT. I. testator intended th« bequests not to stand on an equal footing.* Again, it is prima facie presumed that property specifically be- queatlicd or devised was intended by the testator to pass to the legatee or devisee in its entirety ; and this presumption will not be rebutted by a codicil, charging certain pecuniary legacies on all the testator's estates, both real and personal.^ If, too, an annuity be bequeathed by will for an indefinite period, the law will pre- sume, in the first instance, that it was intended to be given for the life of the annuitant ; but this presumption is liable to be rebutted by proof that the testator has used words which indicate an inten- tion tliat the annuity should be granted, either in perpetuity, or for a fixed number of years.' § 167. It is likewise prima facie presumed that a legacy bequeathed to a person, who is also named in the will as an executor, was given to him in that character, and consequently if such person decline to accept the office, he must relinquish the legacy, unless he can show, from the language employed, that the bequci-t was made to him independently of his character of executor, and solely as a token of personal regard.'* When, too, under the terms of a will, the consent of executors or trustees is rendered necessary to the validity of any act, the law presumes, in the absence of any express direction on the subject, that this discretionary power should be exercised by those only who undertake the duties of the office ;* and an executor or trustee, who, even without any formal renunciation or disclaimer, declines to accept the office or to act in the trusts, thereby relieves the parties interested from the responsibility of obtaining his consent.^ It also is presumed, in the absence of evidence of intention to the contrary, when executors are appointed, and the residuary estate is undif-posed of, that the executors are trustees for the next of kin ; ' > Miller v. Huddlostone, 1851 (Ld. Truro); Brown v. Brown, 183(3; Thwaites v. Foreman, 1844 ; Dun- boyne v. Brander, 1854. * Conron v. Conron, 1858, H. L. ; Campbell v. M'Conaghey, 1870 (Ir.). ' Y.ates V. Maddan, 1851 ; Lett v. Randall, I860 ; Stokes v. Heron, 1845, H. L. ; Potter v. Baker. 1850; Blewitt V. Roberts, 1841; Hill v. Ratley, 1862 (Wood, V.-C.) ; Sul- livan V. Galbraith, 1870 (Ir.). * Stackpole v. Howell, 1807 ; In re Reeve's Trusts, 1877 (Jessel, M. R.); Harrison v, Rowley, 1798; Reed v. lJ(!vayne8, 1791 ; TJix v. Reed, 1823; Piggott V. Green, 1833; Jewis v. Lawrence, 1869 ; In re Banbury's Trusts, 1876 (Ir.); In re Reeve's Trusts. 1877 (Jessel, M. R.). » AVhite V. M'Dermott, 1872 (Ir.). • Id. Ml G. 4& 1 W. 4, 0. 40. 144 '» ,KH CHAP, v.] MEANING OF TERMS USED IN WILLS. and that if there be no next of kin (as where the testator is illegiti- mate), that they may retain the property for their own use instead of its becoming forfeited to the Crown.' The presumptions of law with rrgiird to emblements ' are somewhat capricious ; '" for it is presumed that the personal representatives of a man dying seised in foe of land are entitled to the emhlements in preftrence to the heir, but where there is a devise of the land, that the testator intended them to pass to such devisee.' This capricious presump- tion may he rebutted by a specific bequest of the growing crops, or " farming stock,"* to another party ; but the title of the devisee to tliem will not be ousted by a mere disposition of all the testator's personal estate.' § 168. There is a prima facie presumption that the following terms, when used in wills, bear the following meanings : — The word "children" is limited — as it also is when employed in the Statute of Distributions," — to such children as are legitimate according to the law of England ; and this presumption will be conclusive, unless there be something in the will itself to show clearly an intention to provide for natural children.' In this last event, such a child, though en ventre sa mere at the date of the will, is included in the term.* The word " cousins," in a will, is inter- preted to mean " first cousins " only ; — first cousins being persons who are cousins german, that is, persons having the same grandparents ; while " second cousins " prima facie means persona having the same great-grandparents." Neither " cousins " nor " second cousins " will, in the absence of an evident intention,'* include the children or grandchildren of first cousins, who are commonly called first cousins once or twice removed." Again : a testator who uses the word " family " will be presumed, primjl ' In re Knowles, 1880 (Mulins, V.-C.j. ' The old technical term "enhla- vmce de Met," for the profits of a growing crop. ''» Westv. Moore, 1807 (Ld. Ellen- borough). ' Cooper V. Woolfitt, 1857. * Evans y. Williamson, 1881, C. A. (Jesscl, M. E.). " Cooper V. Woolfitt, 1867. • 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, as amended by " Stat. Law Rev. Act, 1888" (51 V. c. 3) ; In re Goodman's Trusts, 1880. ' Dorin v. Dorin, 1875, H. L. ; Ellis V. Houstoun, 1878; Boyes v. Bodale, 1863 ; Megsou v. Ilindle, 1880, C. A. See Laker v. Hordern, 1876. 8 Crook V. Hill, 1876. ' Ee Parker, Bentham v, Wilson, 1881, C. A. '" Re Bonuor, Tucker v. Good, 1881. T. — VOL. 1. 145 ilpi I ' 1! !i li I!!' li 1 ■ i', li.. \u 'iWll! \U PRKSUMPTIONS RESPECTING DATE OF DOCUMENTS. [I'T. I. facie, to mean the cliiidren, if any, of the person whose family is spoken of, and there must be a special context to give the word a different meaning.' Further, the word " moneys " in a testamentary instrument, will, in the absence of anything in the instrument indicating a different intention,' bo confined to ready money actually in hand ; * the word " furniture " — unless under special circumstances ■* — will not include tenant's fixtures ; * the term " debentures " will not include " debenture stock " ; " and tlie term " unmarried " will, unless otherwise explained by the context, mean " without ever having been married." ' S 169. Another general prima facie presumjttion of law is, that all (locuiucnts urrc tiiddc on t/ic day they hear (lafv.^ This presump- tion obtains, whether the document be a modern or ancient deed," a bill of exchange or promissory note,'" an account," or even a letter ; ''^ and whether it be written by a party to the suit or not." The rule, however, has been only recognized with reluctance by at least some distinguished judges,'* and it is, moreover, certainly subject to two except ioiin}^ The first is, where, in order to prove a petitioning creditor's debt, an instrument is put in signed by the bankrupt, which purports to bear date before the act of bankruptcy. The effect of a proceeding in bankruptcy being retrospective,'® and to invalidate all transactions which have taken place between the act of bankruptcy and the time when the adjudication takes effect, the court feels a reasonable jealousy of a collusion between the petitioning creditor and the bankrupt, and, accordingly, requires that independent proof of the existence of the instrument, previous to the act of bankruptcy, shnuia be given in evidence." The ' rigg V. Claiko, 1876 (Jeseol, M. H.). - St'O Re Cadogan, Cudogan v. Paluj^i, 18815. •' I,angdale v. Whitfield, 1838 (■\V()()d, V.-C); Williams v. Williams, 1877 (Haggallay, L. J.). * I'atou V. Shopiiard, 18139. '• Finney i'. Grico, 1878 (Jossol, M. 1{.). " In re Lane, 1S8(). ' Dulrymplo r. Hall, 1881. " Malpas V. Clements, 18o(); Potez V. GlosHop, 1848; Morgan v. Whit- inoro, 1852. • Anderson w. Weston, 1840; Davies V. l.iivtndes, 1843; Doe r. ■•^tiUweil, 1838; Smith v. Battens, 1834. 146 '0 4o & 46 V. c. 61 (" The Bills of Exchange Aet, 1882 "). § 13 ; Ander- son I'. Weston, 1840; Smith v. Battens, 1834. " Sinclair v. Baggnley, 1838. " I'oti'z V. Glossop, 1848; Lewis?'. Simpson, 1848, and Angell c. Worslev, 1840; Hunt r. Massey, 1834 ; Good- title V. Millhurn, 1837. '•> Potez r. Glossop, 1848; Anderson V. Weston, 1840 (Hosanquet, J.). '* Potez ('. Glossop, 1848. See also Butler V. Mountgarrot, 1859, II. L. (lid. Wensleydale). '* See also Re Adamson, 1875. '« 46 & 47 V. c. 52 ("The Bank- ni])tcy Act. 18S;5"), §43. " Andeison y. Weston, 1840 (Bos- !!! ii UIIAP. v.] DATE OF D0LUMKNT8 — ACTING IN OFFICKS. s roiid except ion is, where, in petitions for dariages for ndultory,' letters are put in evidence to show the terms on which the Imshand and wife were living before the seduction. Here again, to avoid the obvious danger of collusion, some independent proof must be given that the letters were written at the time they bear date.* A thu'd exception to the rule in those oases perhaps now exists, where evidence of indorsements made by a deceased obligee on a bond, aoknov/ledging the receipt of interest, is tendered by his assignee, to defeat a plea of the Statute of lamitations, by the obligor.* *i 170. In applying the presumption that a document was written on the day on which it is dated to bills of exchange, the date of a bill, though priraA facie evidence of the day when it was drawn, is no proof that it was accepted at the same time. The most that the law will presume is that a bill was accepted within a reasonable time after it was drawn, and before its maturity ; and it makes that presumption, because in all ordinary transactions such a course of busineps would be pursued.* § 171. It is another prinri facie presumption of law that a person has been duly appointed to it if he has in fact acted in an official capacity. For it cannot be supposed that any man would venture to intrude himself into a public situation which he was not authorised to fill. The legislature itself has expressly adopted this presumption in the statutes relating to the excise ' and customs.* At common law it applies to lords of the treasury,' masters in chancery, though exercising special powers,* deputy county court judges," commissioners for taking affidavits,'" surrogates,'^ sheriffs,'* iinquet, J.) ; Sinclair v. BaggiJsy, 1838 (Lil. Abingor); Iloaro v. Cory- ton, 1812; Wright v. Lainson, 1837. These cases overrule Taylor v. Kin- lock, 181G. > See 20 & 21 V. c. 85, "The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857," § 33. '' Trelawnoy v. Coleman, 1817; (Ilolroyd, J.) ; Ilouliston v. Smyth, 1825 (lieat, C.J. ). ' Seo this question discussed, post, §§ 690-696. * Roberts v. BethoU, 1852, ques- tioning Israel v. Argent, 1834, and Blyth V. Archbold, 1835, cited in Pears. Chit. PI. 330, n. b. See 45 & 46 V. c 61 (" The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882"), § 13. » 53 & 54 V. c. 21 ("The Inland Eevenue Begulation Act, 11^90"), §24. • 39 & 40 V. 0. 30 (" The Customs Consolidation Act, 1876 "), § 261. ' K. V. Jones, 1809 (Ld. Ellen- borough), " Marshall v. Lamb, 1843. » 11. V. Roberts, 1878, by Ct. of Crim. App. '" l\.v. Howard, !832(Patteson, J.); R. V. Newton, 1844. " R. V. Verelst, 1813 (Ld. EUen- borougli). '* Buubury v. Matthews, 1844 (Parke, B.). 147 > ■■ ' I 1 ,ii 1 ; lU. 1 l!i I w ^^^^ I : i i 'I ]5.^ ■ J' M Wl \\\\l ill mi »< PRESUMPTIONS FROM ACTING IN PUBLIC OFFICES. rPT. I. under-sheriffs,' justices of the peace,' constables,' though appointed by commissioners under a local public Act,^ trustees under a turnpike Act,* churchwardens,^ overseers,' vestry-clerks," trustees empowered to raise church-rates under a local Act,' weigh-masters of market towns,'" attested soldiers engaged in the recruiting Borvice," and, indeed, to all public officers.'^ Moreover, no distinc- tion is recognised, though the appointment is one required to be either in writing,''' or under seal,'"' or though an action be brought in the name of the officer, "* or though the title be directly put in issue by the pleading," or thougli the proceedings be criminal, (as, for instance, a trial for the murder of a constable in the execution of his duty,) and in the highest degree penal.'' Nor will any exception to the rule be allowed, even where parties are indicted for offences committed by them in their character of public officers. For example, if a person employed by the Post-office be indicted for stealing or embezzling a letter,'* his formal appointment need not be proved, but it will suffice to show that he has acted in the capacity charged." § 172. On similar principles the law prim& facie presumes the > Doe V. Brawn, 1821. Soe Plumor V. Ihisi'o, 1 847 ; llobinsou v. Colling- W(H)(1, 18()0. * Berryinan v. Wise, 1792 (Bullor, JX Id. « Butlor V. Fonl, 1833. » rritchard v. Walkor, 1827. « R. V. Mitnholl, 1818 (Abbott, C.J.), citod 2 St. Ev. ;}07, n. r, ■> Doo r. Barnt's, 184(5. 8 M'Gahoy v. Alston, 1836. » J{. I'. Murphy, 1837 (Coleridge, J.). '" M'Malum v. Lennard, 1838, II. L. ; llayoH v. Doxtor, 18G1 (Ir.); M'Mahon V. Ellis, 1863 (Ir.). »' Walton V. (javin, 18o(). '» M'(iahov«. Alston, 183(5 (Parko, B.); Marshall v. I>anib, 1843 (I'at- toHon, J.); Don v. Young, 184.'). " Soo cases cited in preceding notes to this section. '« I)ext<>r V. Ilayos, 18G0 (Tr.) (Fit/.girald, B., exjilaining Smith V. Cart Wright, 18,')1). >• M'Oahey w. Alston, 183(5; M'Ma- hon V, Leiuiurd, I8J8, U. L. ; Doe V. Barnes, lS46,whichwasanactionof ejectment brought by l)arish odicers : Cannell v. ( "urtis, 183.'), wliere anaver- nient in a declaration that the plaintiff hud hvi'u ttfifiuiiitril and was assistant overseer was traversed hy the i)lea. But Tindal, C.J., intimated a strong opinion tliat it was only necessary for the jilaintiff to prove that ho ucti'd as assistant overseer. This ruling was cited by Parke, B., iu 2 M. & W. 209, 183(1. '» Haves V. Dexter, 1801 fir. Ex. Ch.); M'Mahon v, lieuiiard, 1858, II. L. " R. V. Gordon, 1789. " See 7 W. 4 & 1 V. 0. 36 ("The Post OHice (Offences) Act, 1837"). §§ 2,-). 2(5. '» ('lav's case, 1784 ; R. v. Reos, 1834 (I'arke, B.); R. v. Barrett, 1833 (liittledaln and Bosanquet, JJ., and BoUand, B.); R. v. Townsend, 1841 ; R. V. Goodwin, 1828. In an Irish case, some proof of actiiif^ with the Kiviction of the I'ost-ollice autho- rities was apparently lield neoessaiy. B. V. Tronwyth, 1841 (Ir.). Sod qu. P 14S CHAP, v.] piiivSUMrnoNS as to makriage, i:tc. existence of certain relations in life from parties having acted towards each other as occupying those relationships. From such conduct tliere may be inferred the relations of landlord and tenant, of partnership, and of master and servant,' or of master and api)ren- tice, even where no direct proof of the existence of any indenture has been given. ■^ A cogent legal presumption is also raised in favour of the validity of any marriage which is shown to have been celebrated de facto,' and will not be rebutted where a minor is married by licence in her father's lifetime by the mere fact that the motlier's name appears in the register as the consenting party, and no evidence is adduced as to the consent of the father ; * if persons live together as man and wife, it will, in favour of morality and decency, be presumed that they are legally married,* while this presumption has been carried in Scotland so far that even where the connexion was shown to have commenced in adultery, a sub- sequent valid marriage has been inferred from strong evidence of habit and repute." Two exceptions to this last example are, how- ever, recognised in England. Both on an indictment for bigamy,' and on a petition claiming damages against an alleged adulterer,' a valid first marriage " must be proved ; and even the proof of a ceremony, which the parties supposed to be sufficient to constitute the relation of husband and wife, is not enough, unless it be shown to be legally valid.'" These two exceptions rest on the ground, that • E. V. Fordingbridgo, 1858 (Erlo, J.). « Id. ; E. V. St. IVriirvlolxmo, 1824. » riciH ('. I'iors, 1849, II. L.; Sicliol V. liiinibcrt, 18()4 ; Sastry Vclaiilcr r. Sfinlu'ciitty, 1881. I'. I'. Sco Iliiriod V. lliirrod, 18,V1, also unt(>, § 144. • Uiurisoii V, Corp. of Soutluiinptoii, 18.);{. ' Doo »). Fluiniiig, 1827; Qoodimin V. rioodiiiiin, 18,ji); Collins r. Hisliop, 187!»(MiilinH, V.-C); Siwtry Vclaidcr V. ScmlHM'utty, 1881, P. C. Tho kuuio i)i('siini]itioii i« itw()giiint'd by tho Mii- noiiu'daii Ijaw(Hani'o Khujooi'ooiiisn, r. Miissainut llniishim Jcliau, liS7'i, P. C.) ; and by tho Ronian Dutch Law HH picvaiHiig in Coylon. Aronogary V. Sanib()nad(\ 1881, P. C. • Tlio 1 iivachiUmnc caKo, 1 W()7 , II . T,. ; ox])laininfi;. or, pciliai)?*, an sonic may think, e.r2>Uiiiiuiy uivity, Cunningham V. Cunningham, 1814; and Lapsloy V. (jriorson, 1818, II, Ij. Soo also Lyhi I'. Kliwood, 1874; Do Tlioron c. Att.-Gon., 1S7.>, H. Ii. ; and Dy^rat Poor., 1881, II. L. ' 24 & 2,) V. c. 100 (" Tho Offoncos against tho Poison Act, 18()1"), §57. S'c R, r. (Jiitlin, 187!). » 20 & 21 V. 0. 85 ("Tlio Matii- nioiiial Causes Act, 1857 "), § 'M. • Tiii^ .s('(()/»/ inai'i'iago need not be such as would bo binding in law, if it wore not bigamous; ('.7.. a widower may bo con victcd of bigamy, if, having a socond wifo living, ho has gone through tho oorcmony of nianiago with a nioco of liis first wifo. II. v, AUon, 1872 ; overruling 11. v. Fan- ning, I8()5. '" Cutliciwood V. Caslou, 1814 (Parko, 1?.); Hurt v. Hurt, ISOO. Ihit 800 Uookor i'. Uookor and Now- 149 <:■: 'ti ' m |SW if r ^ ' ■ M'^ CORPORATE BODIES — PROFESSIONAL MEN. [PART 1. iih' suoh proreediiigs, being of a penal nature, require the stricteFt proof ; and for the exception in cases of adultery, a further reason is, to prevent parties from setting up pretended, marriages for evil purposes.' § 173. It is not altogether clear, however, how far the presump- tion, derivable from acting in a particular character, raises a prima facie i)resumption that those who have done so filled the character, which they have assumed, of corporate hot/irx, or of persons suing or being sued as prq/hm'oiia I men, or as filling particular situations. On an indictment, whicli charged the accused with obtaining the goods of the company by false pretences,^ parol evidence that a limited company had acted as such was held sufficient, without strict proof of incorporation ; but in this case no allegation of ownership was necessary.* In an action against a clergyman for non-residence, the plaintiff was held not to be bound to prove the admission, institution, and induction of the defendant, but to have given sufficient prima facie evidence by showing that he had received tithes and acted as incumbent.* Plaintiff's appointment as Farrier- General under the Post-liorse Act, was, too, presumed from defen- dant's having accounted to him as such ; * and a solicitor, who sued a party for slandering him in his profession, by threatening to strike him off the rolls for misconduct, recovered damages, on proof that he had actod as a solicitor, without showing his due admission and enrolment.^ The same lax evidence has several times been allowed in actions by surgeons " and solicitors for their fees, and by parsons for their tithes.* But all these cases, perhaps, lest not so much upon the jjresumption now under discussion, as on the ground that the opposite party had, b/ his admissions, either by word or deed, rendered it unnecessary to prove the actual appoint- ton, 1S()4 (Wilde, J.O.). Soo, ulso, Piitrickson v. I'atricksoii, lK(i,) ; and cases cited onto iu two la.st nototi Huvo onu t(j § 143-4. I Morris i>. Miller, 1767 ; Birt v. liarlow, 177!»(lid. MnnsK.dd). •■* K. V. KaiiKtoii, IH77, ('. A. » Hy 24 it IT) V. c. !JG (" Tlio Lar- coiiv A('t. iHiil "). «"|{<'viiu r. Williams, 177'), 1770 (Lord Miuisficld). » iladford v. M'lutoBh, ViWi. * Hervymiin r. Wise, 1701. ' (irciiiiiiri! I'. Ii(^('l(!ik iJoisValon, 1K()!». St'(! also (.'()[M! r, llowlands, 1830. But 21 & 22 V. c. 90, § 62, has rond(3red it noccssary for a medlciil iiiiin (and 41 & 42 V. c, .'J3, § 5 (amiMidcd by 49 & 50 V. o. 48, § 20) for a Jtiitid), when suing for his chiirfjjcH, to jirovc! liis duo ri^^istratiou. " Uudfordc.M'lntoHh.l790; Borry- maii r. Wise, 1791 (Bailor, J.). See (JrtiL'U f. Jackson, lUOd. 160 I': ■ i CTI. v.] PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING PROFESSIONAL MEN. ment.' Where no such admission has been ma^le, the safer, if not the necessary, course will be to prove the a[>pointraent in the ordinary manner ; and to do so seems most consistent with modem practice and the latest decisions. § 174. As a rule, indeed, it is clear in an action for slander on him in any particular character, the plaintiff must show that he possesses that character.^ At all events, where, in an action for defaming him as a physician by using words denying that he held an M.D. degree, the plaintiff, not content with resting his case on evidence of having practised, proceeded to prove that he had received the degree of M.D. from a Scotch University (St. Andrews), the court having held that this did not entitle him to practise in England, he was not allowed to fall back upon proof of practice, on the legality of which he had himself thrown doubt. § 175. There are, moreover, three actions, brought by persons who alleged that they held particular offices, where the plaintiffs were respectively nonsuited on failing to prove appointment to the offic) claimed, although it does not appear that any evidence was offered that they had ever acted in the respective capacities alleged.' These cases, though for this reason, perhaps, not direct authorities, tend to show what the practice has been, and so lu,.- "upport the view that the rule which renders evidence of acting prima facie proof of due appointment, is confined to cases where the parties occupy a jviblie situation, or, perhaps, where the question of appointment is not direvtli/ in issue.* § 176. There are also various prim4 facie presumptions which, are founded upon the experience of human conduct in the ovdinary 1 Sco Smith V. Taylor, 180,J(Cham- bre, J.) ; alwo judgment of Ilfiith, J. * CulliiiH )'. OanifKi''. 1«^J ; l'i<'k- fonl )'. Uuti'h, 1787 (lUillor, J.) ; and Smith i;. Taylor, IHOo, wlioro possibly tlio words inipliud an admission of tho I'haractor in which the ))laintiff snod. In actions of tliis kind, if tho etatomcnt of claim allcfjod that the plaintiff holds a certain oflice, or belongs to a j)articnlar profession or traih', no evidoncti is jiow rccjnii'ed to Bujiport this statement, unless it bo distinctly deni(Ml in tlu^ statement of dofonco. 1{. S. C, 1883, Urd. xix. r. 13. » Sellers v. Till, 1825; Savago v. , 1780; Cortis v. Kent Water- works Co., 1827. * R. V. Jones, 1774, whoro, on an indictment against an a]i])ientice for fraudulent enlistment, it was held that the indenture must bo proved, is an authority on neither side of this (luostion, for that decision rested on tno ground, tliat as tho aduul. and li'Unl binding was tho fact wliich con- stituted the gist of the offeni^e, this could only bo provod by tlio best evidence. 151 •fi PRESUMPTIONS FOUNDED ON BUSINESS. [_PAIiT 1. III! 11 ifiM [j ill ftl. conne of busincHH. For instance, a mere holding over after the expiration of an old lease, even for a long period (such as ten years), raises no presumption of a new tenancy from year to year ;' but the receipt of rent raises a legal presumption of a new tenancy from year to year ; ^ though either the payer or tlie receiver of siush rent may repel the presumption, by proving that the payment was made under circumstances inconsistent with it, as, for example, under the impression that the old lease was still subsisting.' Again, if a tenancy from year to year be created, the law presumes that it was intended to be determinable by either party at the end of the first, as well as of any subsequent, year, unless the parties, when arranging tho terms of the contract, have used expressions showing that they contemplated a tenancy for two years at least.* Further, if a lessor, having mortgaged his reversion, is permitted by the mortgagee to continue in the receipt of the rent incident to that reversion, he is during such permission presumptione juris authorised, if it should become necessary, to sue for such rent, or to prevent or recover damages in respect of any trespass or wrong relative to the property, in his own name only.* Whether, under these circumstances, the mortgagor could realise the rent by distress in his own name, is not so clear, but under the old law he could distrain for it in the mortgagee's name, and as his bailiff." The same implied authority is also recognised in favour of a party, to whom the mortgagor has assigned his equity of redemption.' Again, in actions of trover, the jury will be advised, if not directed, to presume a conversion from unexplained evidence of a demand and refusal.* i5 176a. Whether paying off a mortgage will keep it alive or extiiiguisli it, depends upon the intention of the parties ; but, in the absence of any express evidence, equity will raise a presumi)tion » Cusack V. Farroll, 1887 (Ir.). * Hiahop V. Howard, 1823 ; l)oo v, Taniore, 1848 ; Ecclo.s. Commiss. v. Morral, 1869. In these last two cases the lessoi's were a corporation. 8 Doev. Crago, 1848. * Doe V, Sniari(l(j;o, 1845. See Brown V. Synions, l6(i(); Langton v. Carloton, 1873. * 36 & 37 V. c. G() (" The Siiproino Court of Judicature Act, 1873"), § 25, subs. 5 ; 40 & 41 V. o. 57, s. 28, subs. 5 (Ir.). « Trent v. Hunt, 1853 CAldorson, B.). ' SnoU V. Finch, 1863. * Caunco v, Spanton, 1844; Stan- clirt'n V. Ilardwick, 1835 ; ThonijJHon V. Trail. 1826; Thompson v. Small, 1845; Davios v. Nicholas, 1836; CIcndon v. Dinneford, 1831. See Towno V, Lewis, 1849. 162 CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIVE TERMS OF SERVICE. in favour of that intention, which, under the circumstances, would be most advantageous to the party paying. Thus, a mortgage paid off by a tenant for life will, as stated in another place, * be presumed to have been intended to be retained for his own benefit against the inheritance ; but if the owner of an estate in fee or in tail pays off a charge, a contrary presumption will be recognised, and the mortgage will prima facie be extinguished.^ § 177. It is also prima facie presumed upon a general hiring of a servant, without any stipulation as to time, that such hiring was for a year, unless, indeed, there are circumstances tending to rebut this presumption,' as, for instance, an agrf^-^ment to pay weekly or monthly wages, with no stipulation showing an intention that the service should continue for a longer period than a week or a month.'' This rule applies to domestic as well as to farm servants. There is, however, this difference between the two classes, that the service of domestic servants, unlike tliat of farm servants,* may be determined by a month's warning or on payment of a month's wages." In the case of clerks, wuroliouseinen, travellers, editors, reporters, actors, ushers, governesses, and the like, the law raises no inflexible presumption of an indefeasible yearly hiring from the mere fact of a hiring for an indefinite period. In all such cases, the jury must determine tlie question for themselves, after weighing ail the circumstances proved, and ascertaining, if possible, what usage prevails in the particular business or employment to which the hiring rcliites." § 177a. There is c presumption that there was a promise that the act should be done within a reasonable time on proof of a promise to marry,^ to discharge a cargo," and in all cases («. g., a * Ante, § 154. ' Adiuus V. Aiigoll, 1870; Mohosh Lair. MohuntHiiwan J)iis, 1883, P-*^'- » liillcy r. Elwiu, 18i;{. * 11. V. WorHolfl, 1704; R. v. St. Andrew, I'orshoro, 1828 ; R. v. Pilk- iii^jton, 1844 ; Baxter v. NurHe, 1844 (Coltnmu, J.). * Beestoni'. Collyer, 1827 (Ouaeleo, J.). " Turner v. Miisoii, 184.) (I'liiko, IJ.); lieeaton v, CoUyor, 1827 (Gase- loo, J.); Fawcott v. Cash, 1834, Aiito, § 34. ' Haxti'r V. Nurso, 1844. See IIol- ci'oft ('. Barber, 1843; Todd v. Kerrick, 18o2; l>;.rkor v, Iblmtsou, 1858; t'airnian v. Oak ford, 18()(). » Totter ( . Debons, 1816 (Ld.EUen- boroiif^h) ; Atchiiison v. Baker, 17!>7 (Ld. Kcin'on). » I'ostlolhwaite v. Troelaud, 1880, ILL. 153 m m i • \ i m :f i 11 ^ U II t , V r PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING PAYMENTS. [part I. contract to deliver goods) in which the time of completioc has been left undefined.* § 178.^ Moreover, as men are usually vigilant in guarding their property, prompt in asserting their rights, and diligent in claiming and collecting their dues, the law prima facie presumes, where a bill of exchange or an order for the payment of money or the delivery of goods is found in the hands of the drawee, or a promissory note is found in the possession of the maker, that such note has been duly paid,'" or that the goods ordered have been delivered ;' a receipt for the last year's or quarter's rent is evidence of all the rent previously accrued having been paid.'* Further, the mere delivery of money, or of a bank cheque, by one person to another, or the transfer of stock, is, if unexplained, presumptive evidence of the payment of an antecedent debt, and not of a loan ;* while payment of money of another, which the drawer admittedly had in his hands, must be presumed on its being shown that a cheque in favour the plaintiff, who has had it duly cashed, has been drawn on the account of the person who held the money, though it be not proved that the cheque was directly received by the plaintiff from the defendant, and it be urged that it might have passed through many other hands.* § 179." Several prima facie presumptions, moreover, are made from the regular course of business in a piihlic office. Thus, post- marks on letters, {irhcn capable of being deciphered,) are prima facie evidence that the letters were in the post at the time and place therein specified;^ "the oflicin^ mark of any sum on any postal packet as due to the Post-office, British, colonial, or foreign. ' iniis V. Tlioinpson, 18:58 (Al(](n-- son, B.). See roid v. Cotodwoitli, 18J0. » Gr. Ev. § 38, in part. '• Breiiibridgo i'. Oshorno, 1810. ' Gibbon V, Foiitherstonhiiugh, 1810; EjJK t'- liiirnott. l.»0(); (Jarloi'k V. Goortner, 18;U (Am.) ; AlvorJ v. Baker, bS.'Vi (Am.); Woidner v. Sohweigart, 1823 (Am.); Shepherd y. Currie. 18 10. »» 1 Gilb.Ev. 309; Brewer r.Knapp, 1823 (Am.); 23 et 24 V. o. 1.5-4, § 47. ♦ Welch )'. Soaborn, 181G; Breton V, Copo, 1701 ; Llovd v. Sandilnnd, 1818; Caryr. Gerrish, 1801 ; Aub(>rt V. Walsh, 1812; Hoswell v. Sniitli, 1H33; Graham v. Cox, 1848; I'attou V. Ash, 1821 (Am.). Mountford v. llurpor, 1847 (Al- dersoii, H.V « Gr. ]:v. § 40, in part. ' Fletcher -•. BnuMyll, 1821 ; R. v, Johnson, iNOo ; It. r.'Wutson, 1808; Archanjijolo v. Thompson, 181 1 ; li. V. Pliimer, 1814; (■"jcknn v. OoUin, 1811; Butler v. Mountgarret, 1809, U. L. 164 i' J ^ . ' i ' ■ CHAP. V.1 NOTICES, ETC. SERVED THROUGH THE POST. ii in respect of that packet, shall in every part of Her Majesty's dominions be received as evidence of the liability of such packet to the sum so marked;"^ and if a letter properly directed^ is proved to have been either put into the post-office, or delivered to the postman,' it is presumed to have reached its destination at the regular time, iind to have been received by the person to whom it was ^ddressed.^ § 180. This last presumption, indeed, though generally only prima facie,' is in certain cases rendered conclusive, either by rules of court, or by Act of Parliament. Thus, Order LXVII. r. 3 of the 11. S. 0. of 1883 provides, that " notices sent from any office of the Supreme Court may be sent by post ; and the time at which the notice so posted would be delivered in the ordinary course of post shall be considered as the time of service thereof, and the posting thereof shall be a sufficient service." Under sect. 142 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, " all notices and other documents, for the service of which no special mode is directed, may be sent by prepaid post letter to the last known address of the person to be served therewith," ^ and by the Bankruptcy Kules, as to notices of meetings of creditors,^ — "an affidavit by the trustee, official receiver, or other officer of the court, or the solicitor in the matter, or by the clerk of any such person, that the notice has been duly posted, shall be sufficient evidence of such notice having been duly sent to the person to whom the same was addressed." There are also con- tained in such rules special provisions,* as to the service of creditors' petitions, and the proof of sucli service with respect to bankruptcy notices,^ and as to serving and proving service of petitions for administering insolvent estates,'" while the rules further provide *- that, " where notice of an order or other proceeding in court may > 38 & 39 V. c. 22, § 8. ' "Wliero the address was " Mr. llaynes, Bristol," it was lield in- sutH'-'ont to raiso this presumption ; Walter V. Haynes, 1824 (Abbot, C.J.). » iSkiroeck v. Garbett, 1845. * Saundorson v. Judge, '79o; Woodcock V. Houldsworth, i84() ; I'unlop V. Higgius, 1848, II. L. ; lloiiMohold l''iro, i&c. Ins. Co. v. Grant, 1879, C. A.; Bussard y. Lever- ing, 1821 (Am.); Lindenberger v. IBeal, It.'t (Am.); Warren t^.Warren, 1834; Kufhy. Weston, 1799; Dobree V, Eastwood, 1827 ; Wall's case, 1872 (Mulins, V.-C.) ; In re Ilickey, 187j (Ir.) ; Story, Bills, § 300. * lleidpath's case, 1870 (Ld. Eo- milly. M.ll.). « 4(1 & 47 V. c. 52, « 142. ' Seen-. 1K4 and 188. * See Bankruptcy Rules, 144 — 8. » J:i. r. 123. '" Id. r. 201. " Id. r. 82. 155 , i f.i . i!ii '. 1 1 I t i,y 1 , ' ill 1 1 1 1 s I ■ 1 i i t if,- ■ ; ■ . ■ {ii ■ ■ ■"! -i,-: NOTICES, ETC. SERVED THROUGH THE POST. [PAKT r. be servod by post, it shall be sent by rcgiafcrcd letter."' Again, in Scotland, any summons or warrant of citation, whether of a party or a witness, or warrant of service or judicial intimation, may, in any civil action or proceeding in any court, be executed by posting a registered letter duly addressed.'^ And, under various Acts of Parliament, the service of notices and other documents by post (which is indeed sometimes re<][uired to be registered post) is per- mitted. Some of the principal of these Acts are enumerated in the foot-note, but reference must be made to the provisions of the particular statute to see if any given notice or document has been served in the manner required by its provisions.' ' See, however, 46 & 47 V. c. 52, §11, which relates to the service of or(ler.s stayiiif? proceedings, and is inconsistent with the above rule. * 43 & 4() V. c. 77, §§ 3 and 4. ^ Some of the principal of tlio sta- tutos liere referred to, arranged alpha- betically (no better arrangement sug- gesting itself), under which notices, &c., may be served by post, are as follow : — " The Agricultural Holdings (England)Act, 18H3"(46&47 V.c.Gl, § 28) ; "The Alkali, &c. Works Eegu- lation Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V. c. 37, amondod 55 & 56 V. c. 30, § 26) ; " The Army Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V. c. 58, § 163, subs. P.) ; The Act of 1851 as to Charitable Institutions (14 & 15 V. c. 56. § 2) ; " The Com- panies Act, 1862 " (25 & 26 V. c. 89, §§ 62, 63) ; " The Companies Clauses Act, 1845" (8 & 9 V. c. 16, § 136); " The Conveyancing and Law of Pro- perty Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V. c. 41, § 67, subs. 4); "The Copyhold Act, 1894 " (57 & 58 V. c. 46, ^ 57, subs. 1 i): "The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883" (46 & 47 V. c. 51, § 62) ; The Act of 1844 as to Covuitv Kates (7 & 8 V. c. 33, § 6); "The Dentists Act, 1878" (41 & 42 V. 0. 33, § 39) ; " The Diseases of Animals Act, 1894 " (57 & 58 V. c. 57, § 48, subs. 3); "The Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Act, 1871 " (34 & 35 V. c. 43, § 69) ; " The Elementary Edu- cation Act. 1870" (33 & 34 V. c. 75, §811; "The P^ndowed Schools Act, 1869" (32 & 33 Vict. c. 56. § 57) ; "The Employers' Liability Act" (43 & 44 V. c. 42, § 7), on the construction of which see Movie v, Jenkins, 1.^81 ; "The E.tplosives Act, 1875" (38 & 39 V. c. 17, § 85); "The Factories and Workshops Act, 1878" (41 V. c. 16, § 79) ; " The Friendly Societies Act, 1875 " (38 & 39 V. c. 60, § 30, subs. 11, as amended by 4 2 V. c. 9); "The Landed Property Improvement (Ire- land) Act, 1847'" (10 & 11 V. c. 32, §60); "The Licensing Acts, 1872" (35 & 36 V. c. 94 , ^ 70) ; ' ' The London County Council" (see 18 & 19 V. c. 120, § 22, and 51 iV: 52 V. c. 41, § 40, subs. 8); "The Lunacy Act, 1890" (53 V. c. 5, § 327) ; " Tlie Mines llegu • lation Acts, 1872" (.35 & 36 V. c. 76, § 71, and c. 77, § 40); " The Parlia- mentary A'oteis' Pegistration Act, 1843 " (6 & 7 V. c. 18); " ThoPatinits Designs and Trade-inarks Act, 1883" (46 & 47 V. e. 57, § 97) ; " The Poor Law Amendment Act, 1844 " (7 & 8 V. c. 101) ; "The J'ublic Health Acts, 1875," for England (38 & 39 V. c. 55, § 267); and for Ireland (41 & 42 V. c. 52, § 267); "The Public Works Loans Act, 1875" (38 & 39 V. c. 89, § 47); " The Pegulation of Railways Act, 1873" (36 & 37 V. c. 48, § 35); " The Telegraphs Act, 1878" (41 & 42 V. c. 76, § 12); "The Valuation (Metro])olis) Act, 1869" (32 & 33 V. c. 67, § 65); "The Parliamentary Voters' Registration Act, 1843," for England (6 & 7 V. c. 18, on construc- tion of which, see Bishop v. Helps, 1845; Hickton v. Antrobus, 1846; Bayley v. Overseers of Nantwich, 1846; Lewis V.Evans, 1874; Hornsby V. Uolton, 185() ; Ilannsford v. White- way, 1856) ; and for Ireland, 13 & 14 V. c. 69, §§ 113, 114. 156 CHAP, v.] PRlvSUMPTIONS FOIINDKD ON RUSLN'KSS. § 180a. Where by the course of business in a public dopartmpnt a thing has tak'H place which would not have been allowoi to occur without che previous performance of certain formalities, it will be presumed that those formalities have taken place. Thus, on its being sliown that the Custom-house would not liave allowed goods to be entered without an indorsement on the licence, under which the vessel in which they came was sailing, of the time of her clearance, such an indorsement will be presumed to liave been made ;' and on proof that goods, wliich cannot be exported without licence, were entered at the Custom-house for exportation, a licence to export them will be presumed.* § 181. A similar presumption to that just mentioned is some- times drawn from the usual course of men's private offices and but^iuess, where the primary evidence of the fact is wanting.^ For example, underwriters upon a foreign ship or a foreign voyage are presumed to know the usages and laws of foreign states which affect that shin or that voyage, because such knowledge is neces- sary for the due conduct of the business;'' an underwriter is often presumed, as a matter of fact, though not as one of law,* to know the contents of Lloyd's Shipping List, to which, in the ordinary course of business, be has access ;" a man who deals in a particular market will be taken to act according to the custom of that market ; a man who, if he directs another to make a contract at a particular place, will be presumed to intend that the contract should be made according to the usage of thot place;'' so that a person employing a broker on the Stock Exchange im^/'iedly authorises him to act in accordance with the rules there established, provided only that they be reasonable, or, in othar words, legal;* and this whether the principal himself be or be not acquainted > Butlor V. AUnutt, 1816. * Van Omeron v. Dowick, 1809. » Doe V. Turford, 1832 ; Ohamp- noys V. Peek, 1816 ; Pritt v. Fair- clouffh, 1812. * Young V. Turing, 1841 (Ld. Abinger) ; Noble v, Kennoway, 1780 (Ld. Mansfield). * Morrison v. The Universal Mar. Ins. Co., 1872. * Mackintosli v. Marshall, 1843. This presumption is strictly con- fined to cases where the assured has made no representation inconsistent •with the list, which is calculated to mislead the underwriter. Id. ' Bayliffe v. Butterwcrth, 1847 (Alderson, B.); Pollock ;. Stables, 184K ; Graves v, Legg, 1857 ; Buckle V. Knoop, 1867. See post, §§ 1160 et seq. » See Pearson v. Scott, 1878. 157 I ii II : i>' in; ^ ■'/ I ^ ' .;■ i > ' ! m\\\ jflii ii PRKSUMPTIONS F0Ux\D1:D ON HUSINIXS. [ifAllT I. with the rules hy which Buoh brokers are governed.' This latter doctrine, however, will not be carried toe tar ; ^ and therefore whervs goods were shipped at Liverpool, and the bill of lading was indorsed 'o parties residi.ig in New South Wales, evidence of a local usage in Liverpool, affecting the construction of the written contract, was held inadmissible as against the indorsees, in the absence of proof that they were acquainted with the usage.' Moreover, " Lloyd's " at the Royal Exchange is not a market within the rule, and the usage there prevalent among insurance brokers is not such a general usage as to bind merchants and ship- owners unacquainted with its existence.^ Indeed, it is doubtful whether the doctrine applies in its full force to cases of maritime insurance, and authorities^ are not wanting which "look the other way."*' S 182. The presumption arising from the usual course of men's private offices and business, again, gives rise, where letters or notices properly directed to a gentleman are left with his servant, to a prima facie presumption that they reached his hands ;^ while the fact of sending a letter to the po?t oiTits will in general be regarded by a jury as presumptively proved, if the letter be shown to have been handed to, or left with, the clerk, whose duty it was in the ordinary course of business to carry it to the post, and he declares that, althouf'^. he has no recollection of the particular letter, he invariably took to the post-office all letters that either were delivered to him, or were deposited in a certain place for that purpose.* But it has been held at Nisi I'rius that neither proof of ' Sutton V. Tiithiim, 18;J!) ; recog- nised ill liiivlitto V. Buttoiwortli, 1847; Pollock v. Stiiblee, 18-48; Bay- ley v. Wilkins, 1849 ; Tiiyior v. Stray, 1851 ; Ilodfikinson i\ Kelly, 18(>8 ; Coles r. Bristowo, 18()8, C. A. ; Bowring v. Shepherd, 1870 ; Grissell f. Bristowe, 18(i8; Duncan v. Hill, 1871. See Nickalls v. Merry, 1870, H. L. ' See Eohinson v. MoUott, 1875, H. L. * Kirchner v. Venus, 18.')!), P. C. But see The Steamship Co. Nordcn v. DempHey, 1876. * Sweeting v. Poarco, 18(51, Kx.Ch. ; Scott V. Irving. 18;j(); Todd /•. Ueid, 18J1 ; Gabay v. Lloyd, 18'2u. « Bartlettc. Pentland, 18;J0; Gabav V. Lloyd, 1825. • Baylitto V. Butterworth, 1847 (Ld. Wensleydale). ' Macgrcgor i: Koily, 1849. This pre.sunij)tion is sometimes conclusive, as, for iui^tanco, in the case of a notice to quit sei-vt^d at the tenant's house on one of his servants. Tanham v. Nicholson, 1872, II. L. * Skilbeck v. Garbett, 1845 ; Heth- oringtou v. Kom]), 1815; Trotter v. Maclean, 1875; Ward v. Ld. Londes- boroiigh, 1852; Spencer c. Tlioiiipson, lS,j(; (Ir.). So, in Si'oMntnl, ' wliere there is i)roof of the regular j)!;i(tii e 168 CHAP, v.] WOKKINO OF SCIENTIFIC INSTULMKNTS. the possession of a letter by a (iecoaml person for the purpose of posting, nor of an entry in a postage book made by liira in tlie ordinary course of business, is sufficient legal proof of the postage of a letter.' § 183. The working accuracy of scientific instruments is also presumed. For example, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a jury would be advised to rely on the correctness of u watcii or clock, which had been consulted to fix the time when a certain event happened ; a thermometer would be regarded as a sufficiently safe indication of the heat of any liquid in whi(;h it had been immersed ; a pedometer would aiford jjrima facie evidence of the distance between two places which had been traversed by tho wearer; and similar prima facie credit would be given to aneroids, anemometers, and other scit'iitific instruments ; and blood siains aro every day detected by means of known chemical tests. Indeed, in some instances this presumption has been recognised by the legislature.- § 184. Various presumptions are again recognized in tho law of prirfHcrship. The mere fact of participation in tlio net profits of a business was, prior to 1860, supposed,^ by an arbitrary and absolute presumption of law, to constitute a partnership. In that year the House of Lords, in the well-known case of Cox v. IJ.icikruan,* however, denied the existence of any legal presumption to this effect. Consequently, although a right to share in the profits of trade is a strong test of partnership, and, Avhen standing alone, will even justify a jury in presuming its existence, tho question whether or not several persons are partners must, nevertheless, in each case depend on the real intention and contract of the parties.* And of a house of business to despatch its letters in a particuhii- manner to tho post-olRce, it is not necessary to prove tliiit the indivitl'-al hittor in •liiostion M>as so de.sjmtdi 3(1." Dick- son, Ev. § (J, and cases cited in n. e. ' Kowland v. Do Vecchi, 1882 (Day, J.). ^ Thus, under " The Gas Works Clauses Act, 1871," and th ^ Public Health Acts of 1875 for Knj^land, and 1878 for Ireland, tho rc^^ister of u gas or water meter " shuU boi)riniri facie evidence of the quantity " of gas or water consumed. See Jil & ',io V. c. 41, ^ 20 ; US & ;«) V, c. 55, § 59 ; 41 & 42 V. c. 52, § ()!), Ir. ' Waugh V. Carver, 1793; Pott r. Eyton, 1840. ■« 18(50, 11. L. « Mollwo, March & Co. v. The Ct. of Wards, 1872, 1'.C; Kosav.rarkyns, 1875 ; Pooley if. Driver, 1876; Ex p. Teiinant, Ko Il-n.^v-rd, 1877, C. A. ; Ex p. DeP.asse, lie Mogovu,r'd, 1867, C. A. ; Tawsoy v. Armstrong, 1881. 159 ..'I'^l f ■: I'UESUMPTIONS IN LAW OF PARTNKHSHIP. [PART I. the Partnership Act, 1865 ' (commonly called Bovill's Act), enahles loans of money and contracts for remuneration to he made and anniiitios to be granted by partnerships without making the recipient a partner. And in partnership law, it is still presumed — in the absence of any contract between partners, or any dealing from which a contract may be implied, — both in England * and in America,^ following the civil law,^ that the business has been con- ducted on terms of an equal partnership ; and, consequently, that each partner has a right to insist on an equal participation in profit and loss. It has even been held at Nisi Privis, that, in the absence of all evidence on the subject, partners must be presumed to be interested in equal proportions in the partnership stovk.^ § liSo. Every member in an ordinary trading copartnership is moreover i)resumed to be intrusted with a general authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the firm for the usual purposes of the business, and, consequently, to be empowered to borrow money, and to contract or pay debts, on account of the partnership, and to make, draw, indorse, and accept negotiable securities in the firm's name." Similar powers, however, are not presumed to exist in the case of minizjg copartnerships. Accordingly one of several co- adventurers in a mine has no authority, as such, to negotiate any bill on behalf of his fellows,' or to pledge the credit of the general body for money borrowed for the purposes of the concern." Still less have the members of a firm, not established for trading pur- poses (as, for example, a firm of solicitors) any implied authority to bind each other by drawing or indorsing bills of exchange, or making promissory notes or even post-dated cheques." Nor in an V'l ! -.1 > 28 & 29 V. c. 86. » Stewart v. Forbes, 1849 (Lord Cottonham, C, recognising ruling of Lord Eld on in Peacock v. Peacock, 1809); Webster y. Bray, 1848; M'Gregorv.Bainbrigge. 1848; Robin- son V, Andeison, 1855; Collins v, Jackson, 1862; Story, Part. § 24. Bnt see contra, Peacock v. Peacock, 1809 (Ld. EUenborough) ; and Tomp- 6011 V. Williamson, 1831. » Gould V. Gould, 1830 (Am.). * Inst. lib. 3, tit. 26, § 1 ; Dig. lib. 17, tit. 2, § 29. » Farrar v. Beswick, 1836 (Lord Wonsleydale). ' Jenkins v. Morris, 1847 ; Ex p. Darlington, &c. Bank Co., Ee Riches and Marshall's Trust Deed, 1864 ; Story, Part. §§ 102, 124, 125. Bk. of Australasia v. Breillat, 1847, P. C. See Maclae v. Sutherland, 1854. ' Dickinson v. Valpj', 1829. * Ricketts v. Bennett, 1847 ; Bur- mester v. Norris, 1851. See In re German Mining Co., 1853; and post, § 1185 ad fin. » Forster v, Mackreth, 1867 ; Med- ley V, Bainbridge, 1842. 160 IJUAP. v.] rillvSUMPTIONS KKSPECTING rAItlNKUS. ordinary partiiorahip has one member of a firm power to bind the others by contracts out of the ordinary mode of the partnership dealings, merely because they are reasonable acts towards effecting the partnorfhip purposes.' Consequently, where a partner signed a guarantee in the name of the firm for the purpose of giving effect to a transaction within the scope of the partnership dealings, it was, in the absence of proof of any usage, and of any recognition by the other partners, held that the firm was not bound by the guarantee.' Had any evidence been given of the adoption of the act by the other partners, the result would, of course, have been different.' § 186. Presumptions are also made in the law of (igcncy. Thus, when a seller deals with an agent resident in this country, and acting for a foreign principal, he is presumed not to co;x...ict with the foreigner, but to simply trust the party with whom he actually makes the bargain.* This, however, is at best * a mere presumption of fact, liable to be rebutted by any evidence, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, that credit was intended to be given to the foreign principal." § 187. One or two presumptions also attach to particular trades, having been originally founded on principles of public policy.' Thus with regard to common carriers. If goods intrusted " to a common carrier be lost or damaged, the law will conclusively presume that the carrier has been guilty of negligence, unless he can show that the loss or damage was occasioned by " the act of God," or by the Queen's enemies.' Similarly the loss or damage * C. ir- re ist, ' See Bishop v. Countess of Jersey, 1854. ' Brettel v. Williftms, 18-19; over- ruling Ex p. Gardom, 1808. See also Hasloham v. Young, 1844 ; Duncan v. Lowndes, 1813. One puitner, too, has no implied autho- rity to bind another by submission to arbitration. Hatton v, Royle, 1858. ^ Sandilands v. Marsh, 1819. See Maclae v. Sutherland, 1854. • Heald V. Konworthy, 1855 (Parke, • It is put too strongly by Mr. Justice Story in Story, Agen. j 290. • Green v. Kopke, 1856; Mahoney V. Kekule, 1854. ' Best, Ev. 528-530. • The rule does not extend to a passenger's luggage placed in the same carriage with him on a railway ; and if such luggage be lost or injured the company will only be liable for the damage on proof oi the negligence of thoir servants. Bergheim v. Gt. East. Ey. Co., 1878, C. A. » Ross V. Hill, 1846 (Tindal, C.J.); Coggs V. Bernard, 1704- (Ld. Holt). See post, § 1172. The Scotch law on this subject is now embodied in § IT of 19 & 2(1 v. c. 60, which enacts, that " all carriers for hire of goods within Scotland shall be liable to T. — VOL. I. 161 iill ;i ■ N'M'' r 1.; 1 ; 1 ; Mil] uii 1 i'ImPS Ir . ^ il ' H " ir llili il PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING INNKEEPERS. [PAUT I. of luggage, while under the custody of a stage-coachman, a cab- man, or even a gratuitous bailee, raises a primft facie inferonce of want of care, which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, renders the bailee liable to an action.^ Again, with regard to innkeepers. Where chattels not exceeding in value the sum of thirty pounds,^ have been lost by a guest ' in a public inn, — which te^m seems to include an hotel, a tavern, and a cofPee-house,* — or injured there, the prima facie presumption is that the loss or injury was occasioned by the negligence, or, at least, through the defect, of the innkeeper or his servants : * but on proof that it wiis caused by the negligence of the guest, the landlord's responsibility will cease.' The salaried manager of an hotel belonging to a company, is not regarded as an " innkeeper " within this rule, chough the hotel licence may have been granted to himself personally.' § 188. A presumption of negligence sometimes may be made (if a jury think fit) from the mere happcuing of an accident, if it be one which, in the ordinary course of things, does not happen to thoso who use proper care in the management of their business, and therefore affords reasonable evidence of negligence, in the absonco i m mak- p-oo 1 to tho owner of such goodB all losi.sps arising from accidental firo, v>''»ilo such goods lire in the cuatody or posscHsrin of such carriers." ' Boss V. Hill, 1846; Ilarris v. Cos'cir, 18'J.); Cof;^'ij v. Bernard, 1704. See Gt. N.-rth. Ry. Co. v. Sheppard, 18.52. " The common hiw liability of inn- keepers has Lecn r<'strieted by 2() & 27 V. c. 41 ('The Innkeepers Lia- bility Act, IHO.'J "), and is now limited to 3l)/., save ns to Roods d(>]iosited for eafe custody, atul as to horses an<l cnrriasyes, if the inn has a copy of § 1 of the Act (exhibited in a con- s|)icuous part of its hall or t^ntrance. As to tho construction of the \vi, there is a case of Moss r. Russell, 1.SH4, 0. A. See, as to this point, 8j)ice ('. Macon, 1N77, C. A. ' The depositor nuist be a guest. See as to r.-iiat constitutes a fruost, Strauss i\ Coiuity Hotel Co., INH.'J. ♦ Thompson v. Lacy, 1H2() ; Turrill V. Crawley, 1849. § 4 of 2<i & 27 V. 0. 41 ("The Iimkoopers' Liability Act, 186.'J "), interprets the word "inn" as meaning "any hotel, iiui, tavern, public-house, or other ])laco of refreshment, the keepcn- of which is now by law responsible for tho goods and property of his guests." See Doe v. liaminar, 1H14 ; and R. i<. Rymor, 1877. A boarding house or lodging-house keeper hii- no duty imposed upon him by law to take care of his lodgers' goods. Holder V. Soulby, lH(i(); Dansey v. Richard- son, 18,')4. * Dawson I'.Chamney, 1843; Mor- gan V, Ravtiy, 1801 ; Hichmond v. Smith, 18;i0 ; Hurgess i\ Clements, 1815; Armi.steail v. Wilde, I8.-)l ; Calye's case, 158;}; Day v. Rather, 18();{. « Armistead v. Wildo, 18,)1 ; Cas- hill V. Wright, 18j(i; Morgan c. Ravey, 18(i(); Filipowski v. Merry- weather, 18()(); Oppenheim v. White Ijion Hotel Co., 1871 ; Spicoy. Bacon, 1877, C. A. ^ Dixou V. Birch, 1872. 162 k Li,... CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING ACCIDENTS. of any explanation by the defendant.' For exarajile, this has been done where the injury oom{)lained of was caused, either by a col- lision between two railway trains belonging to the same company,* by a railway carriage having, during the journey, unaccountably left the rails,' or by a barrel of flour falling on a man out of a warehouse window while he was walking in the street below.* On the other hand, where a ladder, inside a private house, from some unexplained cause fell against an upper window and broke it, and the glass in falling damaged the eye of a person passing by, the proof of these facts alone was held insufficient to fix the owner of the house with negligence.* And the mere happening of an acci- dent does not raise a presumption that an injury, which was caused to a person by his acting with rashness to avoid an imaginary danger, that he erroneously supposed had arisen owing to such accident, is attributable to the negligence which originally occasioned such accident.* Indeed, an accident will not be presumed to have been attributable to it in all cases where negligence by the defen- dant is proved. If the facts are equally consistent with its having been caused by some voluntary act of the plaintiffs, a case should only be left to the jury (1) where the circumstances make it a question of fad whether such voluntary act of the plaintiff was negligent or not ; or (2) where the circumstances are such that an inference that the defendant could, by reasonable care, liava avoided the accident would not he unreasonable.^ § 189. Various primft facie and disputable presumptions arise, again, in respect of iii/ants. Thus, infants between seven years and fourteen, are prima facie presumed to be unacquainted with guilt, and therefore cannot be convicted, unless the jury shall be satisfied from the evidence, tliat, when the offence was committed, they had a guilty knowledge that they were doing wrong." This ■ - 1 1 '' !-. { i 'l^llii IIS- r. rry- ' Cnsos cited infru, noto '. • Skiimor v. Ijond. & Brighton Ry. Co., I,S5(i. • Fliiiinoiy V, Watoii. & L. Ey. Co.. 1877 (Ir.). • Uynu! V. Hondlo, 1803 ; Scott v. Lond. Dock Cm., 18(15; Kciiriicy v. Loud. & biigh. liy. Co., 1871, Exch. Oh. • ITipffs V- ^ravniird. ISGfi; Wel- fart! r. Lond. & J$ii},'h. Hy. Co., 18G9. Suo MofYiitt V. Katcmau, 18«9. • Koaruoy v. Gt. Soiithoin & \Vo8- tcrii l{y. Co., 188(5 (Ir.). Compare JoiU'H r. Ilovcc, 181(i; Ihivio v. London & S. W. Hy. Co., 1883. ' Coylo V. Oiont North of lioload Rv. Co., 1887 (Ir.). • UuHB. C. & M. 1— A. ica m2 I ' m ' h -ii imj PRESUMPTIONS RKSPECTING INFANTS. [PART I. rule, though perliiips originally adopted in favorem vitoo with respect to capital offonops ouly,' has for many years past been ex- pressly held applicable to all felonies.^ There seems no reason, on principle, why it should not also be extended to misdemeanors, with the exception, perhaps, of those where an infant occupier of lands, charged with the repair of a br'dge or road, might be indicted for non-repair.' The test of juvenile exemption pro- pounded by Lord Hale, is whether the accused was capable of discerning " between good and evil." * These words are sufficiently indefinite, since they may apply either to legal responsibility or to moral guilt ; ' and many children of tender years, though perfectly well aware that it is wrong to take what does not belong to them (who are consequently, according to this test, fit subjects for punishment), may yet be only partially acquainted with the sinful nature of theft, and be wholly ignorant that it is a crime against the law of the land.* § 190. The law also recognises certain presumptions with respect to married women. Thus, if a wife commit a felony,' other 1 Hale, c. 3. R. V. Owon, 1830. E. V. Sutton, 1835. 1 Hale, 27. » Soe 30 Law Mag. 24, and article on M'Naughtnn's trial in Log. Obs. for May 27, 1843, as to the dangerous and unphilosophical nature of this test, ' The loose and unsatisfactory manner in which this merciful pre- sumption of infantile innocence has — ^at least in former years — been practically rebutted, cannot be more clearly exposed than by referring to a sbvtisticiil return of juvenile delin- quents, published in the present roigu. By those it appears that, out of 297 children under the age of fifteen, committed in the metropolis alone during a single year, 238 were actually convicted ; and of these no fewer than 36 wore sentenced to transportation. See Porter's Statist. Tables, Part 14, pp. 149. 151, 152, l.')3. In 1844, 1596 children, under the age of fifteen, were committed for trial in England and Wales. Porter's Progress of Nation, p. 050. ' Some doubt exists as to the erimos excepted from this presump- tion. " Thus, Ld. Hale, in one part of his Pleas of the Crown, vol. i., pp. 45, 47, assorts that the presumption is recognised in all cases excepting treason and murder; but in later passages (id. 434, 516) he excludes from its operation man- slaughter also, and cites as his autho- rity a passage from Ualton, in which manslaughter is not ini-ntionod : Dalt. c. 104, p. 207 ; new od. c. 157, p. 603. Mr. Serjt. Hawkins makes the excep- tions consist of treason, murder, and robbery (1 Hawk. c. 1, p. 4) ; while Mr. Justice IJlackstono, in the first vol. of his Conim., mentions only treason and murder (c. 15) ; and in the 4th vol., c. 2, excepts also crimes that are mala in so, aud prohibited by the law of nature, as murder and the like. • • • We would gladly see the exception extended to all capital folonios, if not to all crimes punish- able with transportation, and thus abolish a rule of law, which was originally founded on doctrines that no longer prevail, and which every naiTiod man knows is often diametri- cally ojiposod to the fact": 30 Law Mag. pp. 9, 11. 164 en, v.] PllKSUMl'TIONS Ki:sriXTlNU MAUKIED WOJ.IKN. than treason or homicide,' or, perhaps, highway robbery,'^ in com- pany with her husband, the law presumes that she acted under his coercion, and consequently without any guilty intent, unless the fact of non-coercion be distinctly proved. This presumption appears, on some occasions, to have been considered conclusive, and is still practically regarded in no very difPerent light, especially when the crime is of a flagrant character.' The better opinion, however, now seems to be that, in every case, the presumption may be rebutted by posilke proof that the woman acted as a free agent.* Indeed, in one case,* the Irish judges apparently considered that such posi- tive proof was not required, but that the question was always one to be determined by the jury on the evidence submitted to them. However, a married woman cannot, under any circumstances, be convicted as a receiver of stolen goods, when the property has been taken by her husband, and given to her by him.* But she may now be convicted of stealing her husband's goods.' § 191. It is somewhat doubtful whether this doctrine of coercion extends to any misdemeanors. But the better opinion seems to be, that, if the misdemeanor be of a serious nature, as, for instance, the uttering of base coin,* the wife will be protected in like manner as in cases of felony. The protection does not, however, extend to assaults and batteries,® or to the ofPence of keeping a brothel." Indeed, it is probable that in all inferior misdemeanors, the pre- sumption, — 'if admitted at all, — would be held liable to be defeated % 1: ' . ' : i \\\ ;hat ory tri- jaw • See R. V. Manning, 1849. » In R. .;. Stiiploton. 1828 (Ir.), the majority of tho judges thought that this piosuinptiou does not amily to highway rohlierj". It certainly does not apply to a case of felonious wounding with intent to disHguro, or to do grievous bodily harm: 11. r. Smith, 1858. But see R. v. Torpey, 1871. ' 1 Hale, 45 ; R. v. Archer, 182G. 8oeR. (,'. Torpey, 1871. * See 7 Rep. of Criin. Tiaw Com., p. 21 ; :)() I,aw Mag., pp. 0—12; R. V. Hughes, 18i;j; R. v. I'ollard, 18;{8 (Tindal, C.J., aiul Vaughan, J., in a case of arson where i\w husband WUH bedridden). See, also, H. «. Smith. 1842 (Ir.). • R. V. Stapleton, 1828 (Ir.). • R. V. Brooks, 1853. See E. v. Wardropor, 18(iO. ' See ' ' Tho Married Women's Pro- perty Act, 1882 " (45 & 4fi V. c. 76), §§ 12, IG, amended by " Tlie Manied Women's IVoperty Act, 1884 " (47 & 48 V. c. 14); R. v. Bi-itUeton, 1884 (Ct. of Trim. App.). Formerly she could not bo convicti^d, oven if she had committed adultery and Hed with her paramour, taking tho goods with her. R. v. Kenny, 1877. • R. V. Conolly, 182!) (Bavley, J.); E. V. rnce, 18;n ; Anon., 1841 (Ir.). • R. V. (.'ruse, 1838 ; R. v, Ingram, 1705. » E. V. Williams, 1710. 165 PRESUMPTIVE AGENCY OF MARRIED WOMEN. [PART I. by far less stringent evidence of the wife's active co-operation than would sufRce in cases of felony.' § 192. The following prim& facie presumptions exist with regard to a husband's liability for debts contracted by his wife ; where goods are supplied to family or wife, on the order of a man's wife, who is living with him at the time, and the articles are neither excessive in quantity, improvident in quality, nor extravagant in price, it is, in the absence of evidence to the con- trary, presumed that the wife was tb husband's agent to order Buch goods.* But this presumption muy always be rebutted by proof that the husband, while supplying his wife with an adequate allowance, has expressly forbidden her to pledge his credit even for necessaries ; and that, too, though the tradesman may have had no knowledge whatever of the husband's prohibition.* If. jdeed, the debt has been incun-ed by the wife while living separate from her husband, the doctrine of presumptive agency will depend on the cause of separation. Should the wife have been turned out of doors or deserted by the husband, or have left him because his misconduct rendered it impossible for her to remain under his roof,* she has an implied authority to pledge his credit for necessaries,* whether supplied to herself or to her infant child,^ unless by an adequate^ allowance frori her husband, or by the terms of her settlement, or perhaps by her own exertions, she be in a position to provide for her maintenance.® On the other hand, a wife who leaves her husband without his consent, and without justifiable cause, has no authority to bind him by her contracts."" Where m ill fe " '. » E. V. Cruse, 1838. * Lane v. Ironmonger, 1844 ; re- cognising FroBstone v. Butcher, 1840 (Ld. Abinger) ; Atkins v. Curwond, 1837; Johnston v. Sumner, 1MJ8; Morgan r. Clietwynd, 1H<I5 (Cock- burn, (\J.); Waithinun i>. Wiikctiuld, 1807; Manby v. Scott. KiHO. See Beneaux v. Tcakle, 1853; I'hillipson V. Ilayter. 1870 ; Moylan v. Nolan, 18(54 (Ir.); Hold i;. 'Tcakle, 1803; Kuddock V, Mainh, 1857 ; Jowsbiiiy V. Newbold, 1857 ; and post, §§ 77(», 771. See also post, § 842. » Deberiham v. Mellon, 1880, II. L. ; Jolly V. l^'os, 1804 ; Ryan v. Nohm, 1804-5 (Ir.); Jotloy v. Hill, 1884 (Pollock, B.). * Ba/.eley v. Forder, 1868 (Black- burn, J.). » Wilson )'. Ford, 1868. As to ho\r far this doetriuc applies to cases where the wife has retained a solicitor to act for her in divorce or other legal pro- ceedings against her husband, see Ottaway v. Hamilton, 1878, C. A. ; Mecredy v. Taylor, 1S73 (Ir.); Shep- herd ('. Mackoul, 1813; Brown r, Ac^krovtl. 1850; Orindoll v. God- mimd, 1830. * Ba/eley v. Forder, 1868. * Baker c. Sampson, 1803. * Jr>hu8ton V, Sumuer, 1858. » Id, 166 ii'l CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIVE AGENCY OF MAIfRIED AVOMEN. husband and wife have parted by mutual consent, aud the wife has afterwards incurred a debt for articles suitable to her degree, the creditor, to recover from the husband, must affirmatively show either an express authority from him, or at least such circumstances as will justify the jury in implying an authority ; for instance, that the wife has been left without adequate means of support, or that an allowance promised to her by the husband has not been paid.^ Under any circumstances, too, the authority of a wife to pledge her husband's credit is no greater when he is a lunatic than when he is sane.^ § lii3. Moreover, though a wife has often an implied authority from her husband to procure goods on credit, an E'^glish court would never, under the old system, presume that shr .vas his agent for the purpose of borrotving moiipy ; and this even though she were turned out of doors without any misconduct on her part, and without any means of livelihood, and notwithstanding she might have expended the whole of it in procuring the actual necessaries of life.' But a creditor who had been non- suited at common law in pursuance of this doctrine might succeed in equity before a vice- chancellor.* The rules of equity will, in future, prevail on this subject.* § 194. The rule of law as to proving impotence in matrimonial suits for nullity of marriage is somewhat fantastic. Where the marriage has not been consummated, and no visible defect is proved to exist in either party," impotence is presumed after, but not before, the expiration of three years of ineffectual cohabita- tion.' This rule, however, only applies where the impotence is not otherwise proved, but is left to be presumed from continual non- consummation ; and the court will never reiy on this rule of pre- sumption when other evidence on the subject orn be obtained.* § 195. The presumptions with respect to par; nt and c/iiM are not ' Johnston v. Sumnor, 1838; Biffin y.Bigneli, 18()2; Eustlandf. BunhoU, 1870. Soo Manby v. Scott. 1 «(>(). * Richardson v, Dubois, 18G9. Soo Drew V. Nunn. 187!», T. A. > Knox V. BushoU, 1857. * Jennor i'. Morris, 1861. Soe Bo Woo("8 Estiite, 1863. * The old law in Ireland was aa it formerly was ii.. equity in England. Johnson v. Manning, ISOO (Ir.). " Soe ])., falsely called F. v. V,, 18(54 ; B., falsely called B. v. B., 1875 (Ir.). ' M., falsely called H. v. II.. ISrj; Ticwia, falsely cillod Ilayward v, Ilavward, 1H65, 11. L. "'v., ful.soly culled D. v. 1)., 1865. 167 m I n ) m :l i.s t 'i ■mrf?;," ; ^ :! ffiiii ■d 1 H 1 f^ J ■ : i nm' I 1 iiiSiir^^ PRKSUMPTIOXS A8 TO SENIORITY. [PAUr 1 very important. If a parent and a child both bear the same Christian and surname, and this name occur in an instrument without any addition of " senior " or " junior," it will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the parent was intended.' For example, if a legacy be left, or a noto be muio payable, to John Holland, and there be two of that name, father and son, the law, prim& facie, presumes that the father is the legatee or payee. This presumption may, however, readily be rebutted, as for instance, in the case of the will, by proving that the testator did not know the father,^ or in the case of the note, by showing that the son had had it in his possession, or had indorsed it, ov had given instructions to bring an action upon it.' No pre- sumption of a promise to pay a debt contracted by the child for necessaries is made from the mere moral obligation of a parent to maintain his child.* § 196.' Various primft facie legal presumptions are founded on the continiiance, or immutability, for a longer or shorter period, of human affairs, which experience tells us usually occurs.* For instance, when the existence of a person, or pei-sonal relation, or a state of things, is once proved, the law presumes that the person, relation, or state of things continues to exist till the contrary is shown, or till a different presumption is raised, from the nature of the subject.' For example, where a jury found that a certain custom existed up to 1689, it was held, that, in the absence of all evidence of its abolition, this was in legal effect a verdict finding that the custom still subsisted in 1840 ; ^ in settlement cases, unless there be some eviaence to the contrary, it will be presumed that a son, though long since arrived at manhood, has continued uneman- cipated,' and that the ;. .ttlement of a pauper,'" or the appointment ' Steblying v. Spicer, 1849 ; Lepiot V.Browne, 1703; Sweeting i;. Fowler, 1815 ; Jarmain v. Hoopor, 1843. * Lepiot V. Browne, 1703. * Stebbing v, Spicer, 1849; Sweet- ing v. Fowler, 1815. * Shelton v. Springott, 1851 ; re- cognising Mortimore v. Wright, 1 840, and overruling Baker v. Keone. 1819; Blackburn V, Mackoy, 1823; Law w, Wilkin, 1837. See Bazoloy v. Furder, 1868. • Gr. Ev. § 41, as to first seven linos. • See argument in Blandy v. Do Burgh, 1848. ' See Price v. Price, 1847, over- ruling Mercer v. Cheese, 1842. See, also. The Gananoguo, 1862. • Scales V. Keys, 1840. ' B. V. Lilloshall, 1845, explaining R. V. Oulton, 1835. w E. V. Tanner, 1795 (Abhhuret, J.). 168 » i'>.*5 I -rij^" ifti CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOUR OF IMMUTABILITY. of a party to an oflBcial Bituation, continues in force for, at least, a reasonable time ; ' a partnership, agency, tenancy,* or other similar relation, once shown to exist, is presumed to continue, till it is proved to have been dissolved.' From the presumption of a continuance of a state of things once shown to exist, it follows that when a business is carried on by partners after the expiration of the term limited by the articles, it is primS, facie presumed, that such of the provisions of the articles as are not inconsistent with a partnership at will, continue to apply : * if a tenant hold over after the expiration of the term, he impliedly holds subject to all the covenants in the lease which are applicable to his new situa- tion ' — and this, though the rent has been advanced,' or though the original lessor has assigned his interest to a third party, or, being a clergyman, has resigned his living, and a fresh incumbeat has succeeded him ; ' and that if a man on several occasions authorise his mistress to order goods from a tradesman on his credit, he is liable for articles supplied after the termination of the connexion, unless the tradesman knew of such termination.* § 197. The continuance of a debt once shown to have existed, is presumed, in the absence of proof of payment, or some other discharge.' It is also presumed, till the contrary appears, that opinions,'" which individuals once entertained and ex[(ressed, and that a state of mind on their part once proved to exist, remain unchanged." Every man who has once been sane is presumed to be still of sound mind till the contrary is shown.*'' m » R. V. Budd, 1805 (Ld. Ellen- borough). ■' See Pickett v.Paokham, 1809, C.A. ' Clark V. Alexander, 1844, whore a partnership admitted to exist in 1816 was presumed to continue in 18.'{8. See, also, Alderson v. Clay, 1816; Blandy v. De Hur','h, 1848; and Parsons v. Hayward, 1862. So, by Ilindoo law, a family once joint is presumed to retain that status, unless evidence can bo piven to show that it has become diTidcd : Mussu- mat Cheetha v. Baboo Miheen Lall, 1867. • And this, however difficult it may be to say what provisions fall within this description : Cox v, Wil- loughby, 1880 (Fry, J.); Clark v. Leach, 1863. See VVoods v. I<amb, 1866 (Woods. V.-C). • Tonianov.Younfj, 1833; Thom.as V. Packer, l.SJT; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 154, § 5, Ir. But see Oakley v. Mouck, 1865 (Kx. Ch.). • iJiRby V. Atkinson. 1815 (Ld. Ellenborough), explained in Johnson V. St. Peter, Hereford, 1836. ' llutton V. Warren, 1836. See Thettord v. Tylo", 1845. • Ryan v. Sams, 1848. » Jackson v, Irvin, 1809 (Ld. Ellenborough). "• Gr. Ev. § 42. " For instance, all members of a Christian community are presumed to believe the common faith till their acts or declarations evidence the contrary. See The State v. Stinson, 1844 (Am.). " JJyco Sombre v, Troup, 1856 (Sir J. Dobson). In Sutton v. 8a4- 1G9 I n ill n N '! . I 1 i 'U ! ■; '1 ■ i'lhiij 1 ■ I ■ ! ^1 ii "I'll: '^:';i! f^:^ 'i - ,!J ! U I 1 , = i PRESUMPTIONS AS TO CONTINUANCE OF LIFE. [PART I. § 1 98. It is on the above principles also a presumption of law that a person shown to ^^ave ouoe been living is, by English law, in the ab- spnoeof proof that he haa not been heard of within the last seven years, presumed to be still aliv>3:' until a time considerably exceeding the ord'.nary duration of human life has elapsed. In the civil law the presumption of life ceases at the expiration of one hundred years from the date of the birth,'^ and the same rule appears to have been adopted in Scotland.' In England, however, no definite period has been fixed, at the end of which the presumption of a continu- ance of life ceases. In several old cases, however, the possibility of persons having survived the expiration of terms, periods varying from eighty to ninety-nine years, was neglected in determining the nature of remainders.* In an action of ejectment, where the plain- tiff, to prove his title, put in a settlement 130 years old, by which it appeared that the party through whom he claimed had four elder brothers, the jury were allowed to presume, not only that these persons were dead, but, in the absence of all evidence to the con- trary, that they had died unmarried and without issue.'' And ler, 1857, this presumption was held to be one of fait, which ought not to influence the jury in a case of con- flicting evidence. See, also, Ander- son V. Gill, 1858, II. L. (Ld. Wens- leydalo) ; Crowninshield v. Crownin- shield, 1854 (Am.). And, on the other hand, where any derangement or imbecility is proved or admitted to liavo existed ut any particular period, it is presumed to continue till dis- proved. See Att.-Oen. i;. Parnther, 1792; Grimani v. Draper, 1848 (Sir 11. Fust); Johnson v. lilane, 1848 (Sir II. Fust) ; Dyce Sombre v. Troup. 1856 (Sir J. Dodsou) ; Frinsep and E. I. Co. V. Dyce Sombre, 185ti, P. C. ; Nicholas and Freeman v. Binns, 1858 (Sir C. Crosswell) ; Ilassard i'. Smith, 1872 (Ir.); Hlitko v. Johnson, 1819 (Ir.); Smith f. Tobbitt, 18(57— unless, indeed, it be obviously of a partial or temporarv character. See Walcot v. AUevn, 1819 (Ir.); Legeyt v. Obrien, 18;M"(Ir.); Airoyv. Hill, 1824; White i;. Wilson, 18()(); Hall v. Wan-on, 1804. ' See, however, R. v. Lumley, 18C9, cited ante, § 114. I •' Vivere etiam usque ad centum annos quilibet prresumitur, nisi pro- mortuus." Corpus Juris Glossutum, tom. 2, p. 718, n. 5; 1 Masc. de Prob. concl. lo3, n. 5; Campegius Tract, de Test. reg. :}o(), ' Morison, Presump. xvi.. Car- stairs V. Stewart, 1734 ; Ilubb., Ev. of Sue. 168. Mr. Dickson in his Law of Evid. in Scotland, states, however, that "a precise limit to this pre- sumption nas not been fixed." 1 vol. p. 183. For other foreign laws on the same subject, see Hubb., Ev. of Sue. 758, 759. * Weale v. Jjower, 1672 (Lord Hale) ; Napi)er v. Sanders, 1628 ; lid. Derby's case, 1592. ' Doe V. Deakin, 1828; Doe v. WoUey, 1828. There Bayley, J., in stating that the jury had properly made this presumption, relied on the general rule, that things must bo presumed to remain in the same state in which thoy were proved to have once b'jen, unless there is some evi- dence of a subsoqiiont alteration. 3 C. & P. 403. It is, however, sub- mitted that the rule waa in this case strained some'nhat beyond its legiti- mate extent. If presumptions are 170 " ■ It jl ^'m}''i M CHAP, v.] PKERUMrnONS AS TO CONTINUAXCE OP LIFE. whenever it becomes necessary to prove the exhaustion of remote branches of a family, the jury may safely be advised to act on very slight evidence, such, for example, as unanswered advertisements or ineffectual inquiries.' And in two other cases a book kept by a person has been admitted in evidence, without proof that any inquiries had been made for the writer, or as to his death, in the one case after the lapse of seventy-four years,^ and in the other of fifty-four years only.' § 199. On the other hand, where a term was for sixty years, the court refused to presume the death of the termor at the expiration of that period, and recognized the possibility of his living after its expiration : * and where a person's deposition had been taken sixty years previously it was held that there was no presumption of his death, and it was refused to admit such deposition in evidence in the absence of any proof of search having been made for the depone^ i , or any account of him.' § 200. The presumption of life will, however, certainly on the one hand continue for a period exceeding half a century, unless proof be given either thut the party has not been heard of by those jiersons who would naturally have heard of him had he been alive, or, at least, that search has been ineffectually made to find him.* On the other hand, if evidence be furnished of a person's con- tinuous unexplained absence from home, and of the non-receipt of intelligence concerning him, after the lapse of seven years'' the presumption of life ceases, and the burthen of proof is devolved on « ■ fouuded, as they should be, on the experienced course of events, it was surely . ore probable that one out of four brothers should many and have children, then that they should all die unmari'ied. In Doe v. Griffin, 1812, where a similar que.-itioii arose, evidence neyativing the nuirriaf/e of the party, who was there presumed to have died without issue, was given ; and in Hichards v. liichards, 1731, whore the plaintitT claimed as heir by descent, antl proved the death of his elder brothers, the court held that he must further show that they died without issue, since in ejectment no presumption could be admitted against the person in po8iios.'«ion. See in re Webb's Estate, 1870 (Ir.); Mullaly v. Walsh, 1872 (Ir.). * Greaves v. Greenwood, 1877, 0. A. * Jones V. Waller, 1763. See also Doe V. Davies, 1847. » Doe V. Michael, 1851. * Beverley v. IJeverley, 1690; Doe i; Andrews, 18J0. ' Henson v. Olive, 1781; Manbyv. Curtis, 1815. * Doe V. Andrews, 1850. * Gr. Ev. § 41, in part. I 1 u t ilM!iH I r. ■ ' ;1 \ti-' m mm m III i^' . ,ii PRESUMPTIONS AS TO CONTINUANCE OF LIFE. [PART I. the party denying the death.* TI\U8, where a person whose life is insured has not hoen heard of for seven years, those who have effected the insurance are, at the end of that period, entitled to have it paid.' The fixing of this arbitrary period of seven years is explained by its having been inserted in thi, old statutes concerning leases for lives,' and since, by analogy, been adopted in other oases.* A period of seven years is also recognized in the various Acts relating to bigamy.* Under the last-named statutes on an indict- ment, if it appear that the prisoner and his first wifr, lived apart for seven years before the second marriage, mere proof that the first wife was alive at the latter time will not warrant a conviction, but affirmative evidence that the accused was aware of this fact must be gi'.en.* Although, however, a person who has not been heard of for seven yer.rs, is presumed to be dpa;' the law raises no presump- tion as to the time of his death; ana '* any one who seeks to establish the precise period during those seven years, at which such person died, must do so by actual evidence.^ ' Hopewell v. De Pinna, 1809; Rusty. Bukor, 1837; Loiingr.Steino- man, 184(. (Am.). In Bowden v. Hen- derson, 1854, the presumption of death after seven years' absence was held not to arise, if tlie probability of the exile sending intelligence home bo rebutted by circumstances. See also M'Muhon V. M'Klroy, 1809 (Jr.); Prudential Ass. Co. ♦;. Edmonds, 1877, II. L. ' Willyams v. Scottish Widows' Fund, 1888. » 19 Car. 2, c. 6, § 2. See also 6 A. c. 18, entitled " An Act for the more effectual discovery of the death of persons pretended to be alive, to the prejudice of those who claim estates after their death." For the construc- tion and ])ructice under which, s^e In re Pople, Ex parte Baker, 1889. * Doe u, Jesson, 1805; Doe v. Deakin,1821 ; King v. Paddock, 1820 (Am.). In Scotland the law on this subject is embodied in " The Pre- sumption of Life Jjimitation (Scot- land) Act, 1881" (44 & 45 V. c. 47). See especially § 8. In America it is not necessary that the junty be proved to be absent from the United States ; it is sufHciont if it a])pears that ho hiis been absent for seven years from the particular State of his residence, without having bt^en heard of. New- man i". JenkiiiS. 18'i0 (Am); Innis v. Campbell, 1829 (Am.); Spurr v. Trimble. 1818 (Am.); Wambough «. Shenk, 1807 (Am.); Woods v. Woods, 1802 (Am.). In the New York Civ. Code, the presumption is thus briefly exim'ssed: — "That a pers<m not heard from in seven years is dead." § 1780, art. 26. As to cases where the i)re8umi)tion of life con- flicts with that of innocence, see § 114, ante. Willvame v. Scottish Widows' Fund, 1888. » IJ. l,c.ll,§2; 90.4,0.31, §22; 24 & 25 V. c. 100 (" The Offoncbs against the Person Act, 1801 "), §57. ' R. r. C'urwengen, 1805. See R. V, Jones, 1883. ' Connor, In the goods of, 1892 (Ir.) ; Re Rhodes, Rhodes v. Rhodes, 1887; lie I'hene's Trusts, 1809, C. A.; Ro Lewes's Trusts, 1871, C. A. ; Re Corbishley's Trusts, 1880 ; Hickman v. Upsall, 1877, C. A.; Lambo v. Orton, 1800; Pennefather V. Pennefather, 1872 (Ir.); Thomas 172 CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS AS TO SURVIVORSHIP. § 201. Whore, moreover, the facts reasonably raise such an inference, a person's death may be presumed to have taken jdaoe be/ore a certain date,' and death may be presiimed after the lapse of a shorter period than seven years — as for instance, if the party, Avhen last heard of, was aged, or infirm, or ill,'^ or had since been exposed to extraordinary peril, such as a storm and probable ship- wreck.' Although the pre.sumption of the common law, indepen- dent of the finding of a jury, does not attacli to the mere lapse of time short of seven years.* § 202.* Closely connected with the subjoit of the legal presump- tion as to the continuance of life is that of presumption as to Hurvivonhip, which may become important with regard to the devo- lution of property. Common instances, affording occasions for questions of survivorship arising, occur when two persons (especially when two relatives), perish in the same calcmity, such as a wreck, a battle, or a conflagration. Direct proof can seldom be procured in these cases. In the Koman law, and in several other codes, recourse is had to artificial presumptions, whenever the particular circum- stances connected with the deaths are wholly unknown, such pre- sumptions being based on the probabilities of survivorship resulting :."'i t i m V. Thomafl, 1.S60; In re Bonham's Trusts, 18G8 (Rolt, L.J.) ; In ro Peck, 18()(;; In re Nichols, 1872; Dunn w. Hnovdon, 1803; Doe v. Nojioan, 1833. In Nepean v. Doe d. Knight, 1847 (iTx. Ch.), Ld. Donman, in the court's judgment, observes: — "It is true the doctrine will often practically limit the time for bringing the action of ejectment in such cases [viz., where the plaintiff claims as grantee in reversion of an estate] ; and cir- cumstances may l)o supposed, as of a lease for seven years, commencing on the death of A., or of a promissory note payable two months after A.'s death, and many other cases which might be put, in which it would be difficult to carry into effect certain contracts, or to have remedies for the breach of them, if the parties inte- rested, instead of making inquiries respecting the person on whose life 80 much dopendod, chose to wait for Uie legal presumption. Such incon- veniences may no doubt arise, but they do not warrant us in laying down a rule, that the party shall bo presumed to have died on the last day of the seven years, which would manifestly be contrary to the fact in almost ail instances. 2 M. & W. 913, 914. ' 8ee, for example, Sillick v. Booth, 1841 ; Ommaney v. Stillwell, 1856. * R. V. Harborne, 1835 (Ld. Den- man) ; Re Uousney's Trust, 1809. » Watson V. King. 1815 ; Patter- son V. Black, 1780. In the case of a missing ship, bound from Manilla to Ijondon, on which the underwriters had voluntarily paid the amount insured, the death of those on board was presumed by the Prerogative Coui-t, after the absence of only two years, and administration was granted accordiiigiy : In re Hutton, 1837. * See further on this subject,Hubb. Ev. of Sue. 167 et seq., 768, 769. * Gr. Ev. s. 29, in part. 173 ilill I. I 'i! ' :'il. V. i . i ' PR1':SUMFTI0NS AS TO SURVIVORSHIP. [PAKT I. from strength, age, and sex. Thus, if a father and son perish together in the same shipwreck or battle, Eoman law presumed that the son died first, if he was under the age of puberty ; but if he was above that age, that he was the survivor; the principle being, that in the former cose, the elder is generally the more robust, and in the latter, the younger.' The French code has regard to the ages, and presumes that of those under fifteen the eldest survived ; and that of those above sixty, the youngest sur- vived ; that if one of the parties were under the age of fifteen, and the other above the age of sixty, the former survived, and that if both parties were between those ages, but of different sexes, the male survived, unless he were more than a year younger than the female : but that if they were of the same sex, the survivorship of the younger must be presumed, as opening the succession in the order of nature.* The same rules were in force in the territory of Orleans, at the time of its cession to the United States, and have since been incorporated into the Code of Louisiana.' They have also, with some modifications, been adopted into the State of New York.* § 20'}. The law of England, however, in such cases recognizes* • Dig. lib. 34, tit. 5; Do rebus bubiis, lib. 9, § 1. 3; Id. i. 16, 22, 23 ; Monoch. do Prros. lib. 1 , Quoest. X. n. 8, 9. This rule, however, was subject to somo exceptions for tho benefit of roothers, patrons, and beneficiaries. « Code Civil, §§ 720, 721, 722; Duranton, Cours do Droit Frangiiis, torn. 6, pp. 32, 42, 43, 48, G7, (59 ; Eof^ron, Code Civil, Expli. 411, 412; Touiller, Droit Civil Fran^'uis, torn. 4, pp. 70, 72. 73. 2 Civ. Code of Louis, art. 930— 933; Dip. of Civ. L. of Orleans, art. fiO— f)3. • N. Y. Civ. Code. § 1780, tit. 3. • Alston, In the Goods of, 1892 ; R. V. Dr. Hay, 1767. The latter case (known as General Stanwix's case) was compromised upon the re- commendation of Ld. Mansfield, who Said he knew of no legal principle on which he could decide it. See, 1767, 2Philliui. B.268, n.; Foarne's Posth. Works, 38; Doe v. Nopoiin, 1833 Underwood v. Wing, 18J4 (llomilly, M.R.) ; aff. on appeal (Ld. Cran- worth. C, assisted by Wightman, J., and Martin, B.), 1856; Mason »-. Mason, 1816. See Diirrant v. Friend, 1857; Burnett v. Tugwell, 1862. For tho cases decided in the old Ecdes. Courts, sec Wiight v. Nether- wood, 1793; more fully repoitod under tho name of Wriplit v. Sar- muda, 1793; Taylor »'.l)iplock, 1815; Selwyn's case, 1831 ; In the Goods of Murray, 1837. In tho brief note of Colviu V. Proc. Gen., 1827, where tho husband, wife, and infant (if any), perished togblLar, the Court seems to have held that tho prima facie pre- sumption of law was that the husband survived ; but the question was not much discussed ; and in Satterthwaite V. Powell, 1838, where a husband and wife perished in the same wreck, the CO art would not presume that he survived, and consequently refused 174 m ClIAP. v.] PRESUMPTIONS AS TO SUKVIVORSniP. no presumption, either of «urvivorslup, or of contemporanoons death;* and in the total absence of all evidence respootiug the particular circumstances of the calamity, treats the matter oa one incapable of being determined.' If indeed, any circumstances connected with the death of either party be proved, the ques- tion of survivorship may be dealt with «« one of fact, and tho comparative strength, or skill, or energy, of the two sufferers taken into account.' § 2(»4. A primA facie presumption in insurance law is that, if a vessel has sailed, and no tidings of her have been received within a reasonable time, she is presumed to have funmletrd at sf-a.'* By ** tidings " are meant, not mere rumours, but some actual intelli- gence received from persons capable of giving an authentic account.* In an action on a policy from an English to a foreign port, the presumption of loss will arise, from proof that the shi{) was not heard of in this country after she sailed, without calling witnesses from the port of destination to show that she never arrived there." to grant to his repreaontative the administration of property vested in the wife, tho subject of presumed survivorship is fully treated in 4 Burgo, Com. on Col. & For. L., 11 — 29; and in Hnbb. Ev. of Sue. ISfi, et soq., and 759— 7G4. See, also, 2 Kent, Com. 435, 4:36, 4th ed.. n. b. ' By the Mahometan law of India, when relatives thus perish together, "it is to be presumed that they all died at tho sumo moment ; and tho property of each shall pass to his living heirs, without any portion of it vestina: in his companions in mis- fortune." See Baillio's Moohum- mudan Law of Inherit. 172. ' Wing V. Angiave, 18()(), H. L. » In Sillick v. Booth (1«41), Knight-Bruce, V.-C, hold that a presumption of priority of death might be raised from tho compara- tive age, strength, and skill of the parties ; and accordingly, whore two orothers perished by shipwreck, under tho circumstances wholly unknown, the one twenty-eight years of age, and the master of the ship, while the other was under age, and act(Hl as second mate, presumed that the elder, as tho stronger and more experienced sailor, survived the younger. This case must, however, bo taken not as laying down any rule of law. but as merely a finding of fud, under the particular circumstr.ncrs. * Green v. Brown, 1744; Newby ?;, Reed, 176;i ; Koster v. Roed, 1H'2«. But in order to recover on a policy, there mu.st bo some evidence that when tho ship loft the port of 'ntfit she was bound upon the voyage in- sured. Cohen v. Ilinkley, I'sOO (Ld. Ellonborough) ; Koster v, Innes 1825 (.Vbbott. C.J.). " Koster r. Reed, 1826(Bayley. J.), where the statement of a witness that a few days after tho vessel sailed he heard that she had foundered, but that tho crew were saved, was held not suflicient to rebut the presump- tion of loss which arose fiom the ship never having arrived at her port of destination, and not to oblige tho plaintiff either to call any of the crew, nor to show that he was unable to do 80. • Twemlow v. Qswin, 1809 (Sir J. Mansdeld, C.J<)> .'.'6 ^ wm ! M li! i ! I r M PRESUMPTIONS ADOPTED IN INSURANCE LAW. [PART I. ^ '' l« u Neither English law nor any general custom has fixed any drfinite period after which the assured may demand payment for his loss, in case n 3 intelligence is received respecting the vessel insured ; hut among insurers a vessel is in practice treated as lost if she be not heard of within six months after departure for any port in Europe, or within twelve months for a greater distance.* § 205. Another presumption in insurance law is thn.t if a ship, shortly after sailing, without visible or adequate cause, becomes leaky, or otherwise incapable of performing the voyage insured, she is deemed to have been unseaworthy at the commencement of the risk.' This, however, is not really a proposition of law, but simply an inference of fact which may be drawn by the intelligence of the jury,' and it ia not so binding that the court will grant a third trial, after the verdict the other way by two special juries.* § 206. Certain presumptions are again, in maritime cases, made by tho Admiralty Division of the High Court, which technically shift the burthen of proof. Thus, if two vessels come into collision, of which one was at anchor,* or " in stays " * at the time, the fact so far raises a presumption in her favour that she is so iax prcnumed to be without blc.i.ie ; and the burthen of proof rests on the opposite side to establish, either that the other vessel was to blame or had been improperly put " in stays," or that the damage was occasioned by stress of weather, or by other unavoidabla accident. Again, in the case of a collision between two ships, if the master of either ship fail to render assistance to the other, and to stay by her for that purpose, the collision shall, in the absence of proof to the con- ipiijiit ' 1 Piirk. Ins. 149. By tho ordi- nancoH of Spuin, if ii ship iii.Mucd cm goin^ to, ')r«)ining fioiii, i\w Iiidios, 18 not linird of within u yuiu° iind u hulf after h<<r di'imrturo from tho port of outKt, sho iH ,l"«'inod hwt, '2 Mittens, an ; by those of Franoo, if tho ussured rocoivoH no n^ws of his >)hip, hi^ may, at tho oxpirittioii of a your for citnimon voyoffOH, lorkoninR from tho day of the flopHrturo, and uftor two yours tor ihonn of u gioator distanco, mako his soHsiou U) tho uiulorwritors, aad demand payment, without being oblipfod to produce any cortificKte of tho loss. Ordonnanco de !a Murine, liv. n. t. (), dos Assur. Art. 58. » Wutson V. VUrk, 18i;{; Munro V, Vundum, 17!M (I,d. Konyou) ; I'urk.T V. Po.th, IHl j, U. L. ' Pickup V. Tliumos Ins. Co., 1878, C. A. • Foster V. Stoolo, 1837 (Tindal, C.J. und Park, J.; Vaughan and Coltmun, JJ., diss.). • Tho Hothnia, 18fi0. • The irioa Nymph, 1860. 176 -1^ ■ \ fi CHAP, v.] riMisiiMrrioNs adoited in maritime law. trary, be deomcd to have been causod by tlio wrongful act of the defaulter.' Moreover, the infringement of any regulation for jtrevonting tollisiuns at sea,- made under the Merchant Shipping Act,' 18m, raises a presunipticm of blame as against the infringer, unless lie can show either that circumstances "made a departure from the regulation necessary," * or that the infringement charged could not by possibility have contributed to the collision.* Again, if a salvor's vessel be injured or lost while engaged in a salvage service, the Admiralty Division presumes, primal facie, that such injury or loss was caused by the necessities of the service, and not by the salvor's default.* § 2l>7. Another presumption of maritime law, moreover, is in favour of the rights of property in the owners, whenever any ques- tion of derelict is mooted betwoon them and the salvors. There- fore, where salvors make a claim, as in a case of dereliction, it will not suffice for them to merely prove that they found the vessel at sea apparently abandoned, but they must go further and pi'ove that the master and crow, when they left the vessel, did so without any hope, expectation, or intention of being able to return, or, in tho technical language of the law, sine spe recuperandi.' § 208. Another presumption of ^faritime I^aw is that a ship- owner, — o.xcept so far as his liability is limited by tho Merchant > Tl.o Quoon. 18G0 ; .i7 & oS V. c. 60 ("Tho Morthant Shippinj? Act, 1NP4"). §422. '■' Miido iintlor Ordor in Council, gii/.pttod Utth AuKiwt, 1884. » d7 & 58 V. c. (iO, §r)03(l, 2). • 67 & .")8 V. c. m, § 410 (U. 4). Thfis(> wonlH incun * ' absolutol y iiccos- Hiny." leiiviiij^ no iimri^in for dis- crt'tinn: Htooinviiiu't, &c. i'. I'on. & Ori.'ii. St. Nav. Co., 1880, II. L. Hut § 17 dons not ui>i)ly to an in- frinp'Tiumt of tho Thitnios Uulos : The ilarton, 1884. • Tho MiiKnot, 187.); Tho English- nian. 1877; Tho Tir/ah. 1878; Kniory V. Cichoro. Ro Tho Arklow, I88:». • Tho Thotnas Hlyth, 18(W. ' In re CoHinopolitan, 1848 (Dr. Stock), and cascg thoro cited. ITio iiid)i;niont of tho court in thii4 caHO is HI accoKJanco with tho i'i:<rd artiolo of the laws of Olcroo, "if from any ship or other voss(<l have boon cast ovor- board Huvoral pnxU or iiioi'chaii(hH(<a wliich are in cliontN well locked and nnido faHt ; or bookH ho well Hociirod and so well conditioned that they may not ho daninitiod by huU water ; in sucli caflos it M to bo prcHuinod that they who did cast Huch gooda over- board do Htill retain un intention, hope, and desire of recovering the Bamo: for which reatton, such a« shall hai)pen t^o find xuch thinp^s, are oblififed to make rcHtitution thereof to him who Hhull mako a iluo inquiry after them," which haH been tho law for 7<)0 yearn and in still in full force and deserves att<<ntivo nonisal. In- dependentlv of dtuoliciion, tho Ad- miralty Idvision will never decree more than a moioty of tho value of tho article Hnvo<l for mere nilvuKe : Qon V. Hothel, 1858, 1*. 0.; The luca, 1858. T. VOL. I. 177 I* » ■ Mm I !' in Il ."i' ^ '3 j^ ) 1 ] Il Rh m PRESUMPTIONS ADOPTED IN MABITIME LAW. lP^**^ I. Shipping Act, 1894,' — is primA facie responsible for any damage occasioned by negligence in the navigation of his vessel. To bring himself within the exemption from liability conferred upon him by the Act where pilotage is compulsory,* a ship-owner must show not merely that he had a pilot on board a; the time of the accident, and that the presence of such pilot was compulsory,' but also that the damage was occasioned exclusively by the pilot's fault.* It will, however, suffice for him in the first instance if he show that the pilot's fault occasioned the damage, leaving his opponent to establish, if he can, a case of contributory negligence against the ship-owner.' § 208a. It is a further presumption of Maritime Law that the legal owner of a ship is prim& facie liable to pay for all suoh repairs and sto-es ordered by the master," as are necessary for the equipment and navigation of the ship in the voyage or trade in which she is employed, and that in the absence of all evidence to the contrary,' the master is the agent of the owner to give all hi > 67 & 58 V. c. 60. §§ 502, 503, and § 63;i, infra ; as to the conHtruction of which, see The Kajah, 1872. » § (i3;J of 57 & 58 V. c. 60 (" The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894,") enacts, that " An owner or master of a ship shall not be answerable to any person whatever for any loss or (lamago occasioned by the fault or incapacity of any qualified pilot acting in charge of such ship, within any district where the em- Cloyment of such pilot is compulsory y law." Sc(f Conseiv. of Riv.Thanios t>. Hall. 18(!S ; Piowso i'. The Kuro- pt'in & Amor. St. Shii)ping(\)., ISfiO; Th(! Clan Gordon, 1MM2. This statut- abh' law is applicable to a case where the ((lUision has dccuni'd within the limits of a foreign port : Tho Ilalloy, 1S(>H, 0. A. As t^) tlKuiicaiiingof tho word "compuls<)iv."s(M<(i(m.St.Nav. Co. r. Hiit. .V: Col'. St. Nav. Co., l.S6!». As to tho mi-aiiiiigof the term "acting in chaign," son The I'riiicfton, 1878 ; The ( iiiy Mannoring, ISHJ, < '. A. A pilot being on boiird a towed vessel will not exempt tho tug fit)ni lia- bility: Tho Mary, 1878; Tho Sin- quoai, 1880. Se«, also, Spai^^ht v. Todcastlo, 1881, II. L. 17 » The Earl of Auckland, 1861 , P. C. ; S. C. nom. Malcomson v. Baldock. 1861 ; The Hanna, 1866; The Anna- polis, 1861 ; The Lion, Owners v. The York Town, Owners, 1869. * Hammond r. Rogers, 1850. P. C; Pollock V. M'Alpin. 1851, P. C; Hates r. Don Pablo Sora, 18.»6, V. C. ; The Carrier Dove, 1863; The lonii. 18()7, P. C. ; Tho Minna. 1868; Tho Valesquoz, 1867. P. C; The Victoria, 1867 (Ir.); Tho Oeneral Do Caen, 1855; The Mobile, 1856; The Admiral RoxT, 1857; The Sihwnlb.. 1861, P. C. ; The Netherlands St. Uoat Co. V. Styles, 1854. 1'. C. ; Tho Protector, 18:}»; Tho Diana, 1840, P. C. ; Kodricpios ('. Mi'lhuish, 1854; Wooil V, Smith, lie The City of Cambridge, 1874; Clyde Navig. Co. v. Uarclay, 1876. ILL.; The Meteor, 1875 (Ir.). » Clyde Navig. Co. v. Harclav, 1876, ll. L. ; The Daioz, 1878; Tfie Maritthon, I87i>. • As to tho authority of a shijt's husband to bind tho owners, see Thomas r. Lewis, 1878. ' Mitcheson v. Oliver, 1855 ; Ilibbs V. Ilo88, 1860; Uuim v. Buborts, 1874. CHAP, v.] rRESUMPTIOXS RESPECTINO DOMICIL. needful orders, and has authority to pledge the owner's credit for goods supplied or work done in pursuance of his orders.* § 209. In private International Law, legal presumptions are sometimes made with regard to domicil. Where, for instance, a man either has no fixed place of residence, or has two homes, the scale hetween which is almost evenly balanced, the presumption is primfi facie in favour of what is called the forum originis, or domicil of origin ; by which is meant, not the place where he may chance to have been bom, but the home of his parents.' Intention to adopt a place as his domicil may be presumed from a person's merely residing or merely marrying in a country — and k fortiori from both ^ in cases where the domicil of origin is not known ; * though any presumption which would otherwise arise from the circum- stances last mentioned may be rebutted by showing that the person whose domicil is in question merely came to live in the country for a limited period, or for a special purpose, or that he had no animus manendi, or settled intention of making that country his place of permanent abode.' It wiU also be presumed, where a married man has two houses situate in different countries, in each of which he is in the habit of residing, that his home or domicil is in that house in which his lawful wife and his establishment of servants usually remain when he is at the other." In consequence of the legal presumption in favour of the domicil of origin,' slighter evidence is required to warrant the conclusion that a man has intended to abandon an acquired domicil, and to resume his domicil 'til u ■ill > FroBt V. Oliver, 1833; Boldon v. Ciuriiibi'll, IHol ; The Great Eiwtem, 18(i8 ; EdwunlH v. Ilavell, 183a. S«o Wiilluce V. Fieldon, 1851, P. C. ; Tronson v. Dent, 1853, V. C. ; Myers V. Willis, 1855 ; lirodie v, Howard, 1851!; itaikwood v. liyall, 1855; MiK'kouzie v. Pooloy, 1 85(J ; Whitwidl V, Perrin, 1858. Hee Atlantic Mut. In8. Co. V. lluth, 1880. » Munroc.Muuro, 181(),II.L.; Bell I'. Kcimi'dy, 18(}H, II. L. ; Somorvillo V. SdiiK-rvillo, 1801 ; Forbes i'. Forbes, 1851; Crookeiidon v. Fuller, 1850; Whicker v. Hume, 1851>. II. L. ; Ij<ird V. Colviu, 1859 f Kindersloy, V.-C); Iliidgsou V. De lieuuchosno, 18.)8, P. 0. • In re Eschmann, infra. • In re Eschmann, 18i)3; Bempde V. Johnstone, ITiMJ (Ed. Thurlow) ; Bruce i'. Bruce, 17!H>; The Diana, 1803; The Ocean, 1804; The Presi- dent, 18t»4 ; Guier v. O'Daiiiol, 1800 (Am.). ' Hruco V. Bruce, 1790; Bell v. Kennedy, 18(i8; Lord w. Colvin, 18()!l; Jopp V. Wood, 1805; Kinf? v. Foxwell, 187<!; Ciillis i-. Oillis, 1874 (Ir.); The IlaruKmy, 1800; Guier ». O'Diiniel, 180(i (Am.). • Forb's V. Forbes, 1854 (Wood, V.C.) ; 1'l.itt V. Att.-Gen. of New 8. Wales, 1878, P. ('. ' See Udny v. Udny, 1809, H. L. ; King V. FuxwoU, 1870. 179 N 2 ■ m ! iH K ! Nfi n' i !i i 'hi; _ ;!. ! »; iH UikL^ JAi DOMICIL — COPYHOLDS — PEKRAOES. [PART I. of origin, than is necegsary to justify the conclusion that he has determined to abandon this lust, and to acquire a new domicil.* § 210. There will, however, be a stronger presumption against the acquisition of a new doraicil in the case of a person who is alleged to have gained one in a foreign land, than against the acqui- sition of one at a place where the party would not be a foreigner.^ For instance, a Scotchman would be more readily decided to have acquired an English, or Anglo-Indian, domicil than a French one. This is because a man's acquisition of a foreign domicil is a most serious matter, since it not only renders the validity of his testamentary acts, and the disposition of his personal property, liable to be governed by foreign laws, but is calculated to involve him in a conflict of national duties, and to subject him to the embarrassments of a divided allegiance.' Further presumptions with regard to domicil are thit it is by law presumed that the domicil of a wife is ihe domicil of her husband. Although, how- ever, this presumption is, as a general rule, conclusive,* an excep- tion might possibly be recognized in the cas( of a judicial separa- tion pronounced by competent authority,* or where the husband ha<^ objured the realm, deserted his wife, and established himself permanently in a foreig:n country, or hod committed felony, and been transported.* § 211. It is a presumption of law with regard to copyhold pro- perty which is made in the absence of proof of any specific custom in the manor, first, that estates tail cannot be created, and next, that if they can, they are liable to be barred either by a common surrender, or by a surrender to the use of a will." § 212. It is a prim& facie presumption of law with regard to peerages that where the limitation of a peerage cannot be dis- covered, it descends, not to the heirs general, but to the heirs male of the body of the original grantee.* ' Lord V. C.)lvin, 1859 (Kindorsley, V.-O.); Douglas v. Douglas, 1871 (WickonB, V.-C). « Id.; Whicker v. Hume, 1858, H. L. (Tjd. Cranworth); Hodgson V. Do lleauchosne, 1858, P. 0. ; Orookondon v. Fuller, 1859. • Id. * Dolphin V. Robins, 1859, H. L. * Id. (Ijd. Cranworth, Ld. Kings- down). * Id. (lid. Cranworth). ' (lould V. White. 1854 ; Radford V. WilHon, 1754 ; Moore v. Moore, 1755. * Ulbucairn Peer., 1796, H. L. ; rt- 180 CHAP, v.] NATIONAL COMITY — PRESUMPTIONS OF FACT. § 213.' It is a presumption arising from the spirit of comity which is presumed to e^ist among nations, and a maxim of inter- national law, that when the solution of any legal question depends upon the laws of a foreign state, — as, for example, when a contract made in one co'intry is sought to be enforced in another, — courts of justice must, in the absence of any positive rule affirming or denying or restraining the operation of such foreign laws, presume that such foreign laws have been adopted by their own government, unless, indeed, they are repugnant to its policy, or prejudicial to its interest.* § 21;{a. The above appear to be some of the examples of pre- sumptions of law which are most frequently met with. § 214.' Pkesump^ins of fact, it was pointed out, at the commencement of this chapter,* are the second of the two branches into which all presumptive evidence may be divided. Such presumptions are, in truth, mere arguments, of which the major premiss is not a rule of law ; they belong equally to any and every subject-matter ; and are to be judged by the common and received tests of the truth of propositions, and the validity of arguments. They depend upon their own natural efficacy in gene- rating belief, as derived from those connexions, which are shown by experience, irrespective of any legal relations. They differ from presumptions of law in this essential respect, that while presump- tions of law are reduced to fixed rules, and constitute a branch of the system of jurisprudence, presumptions of fact are derived wliolly and directly from the circumstances of the particular case, by means of the common experience of mankind, without the aid or control of any rules of law. Such, for example, is the inference of guilt, drawn from the discovery of a broken knife in the pocket of the prisoner, the other part of the bladt* being found sticking in the window of a house, wliich, by means of such an instrument, had been burglariously entered.* '■ i ■■"P • i i ■3\ ' cognized and Ponfirm(>d in Montroso Poor., l«j;j. II. L. ; IkarioB' I'oor., IHJH, II. L. ; Dreudulbanu Poor., 1858, II. L. > Or. Kv. $ 4.1. in part. * Itk. of Augusta i: Kurlo. IHlit) (Am.); Story, CouU. ^ J>(>-38; Iluber, do Confl. Log., lib. 1, tit. 2, § '2, p. 5:j«. * Or. Kv. § 44, almost verbatim, excopt tho note, * Supra, § 70. * In Il-iiry VI., Pt. ii., Act iii., So. 2, Warwick, aftur cuutvmplating 181 PRESUMPTIONS OF FACT. [part. 1. 1, J ;;•(! § 216. These presumptions of fact remain the same under what- ever law the legal effect of the facts, when found, is to be decided.* They embrace all the relations between the fact requiring proof and the fact or facts actually proved, whether such relations be direct or indirect, and whether they be physical or moral. A single circumstance may raise the inference, as well as a long chain of circumstances. For instance, the decision of King Solomon as to which of the two harlots was the mother of the living child, rested on the general presumption * in favour of maternal affection,' while the famous judgment of Sancho Panza acquitting the herds- man charged with rape,* was founded on the ascertained fact that the prosecutrix successfully resisted the attempt to take her purse, which the accused made by order of the court. § 216.' Although it is the exclusive province of the jury to fix the due weight which ought to be given to presumptions of fact, juries are usually aided in their labours by the advice and instruc- tion of the judge, more or less strongly urged, at his discretion. Indeed, some few general propositions in regard to matters of fact, and the weight of testimony, are now universally taken for granted iu the administration of justice, and are sanctioned by the usage of the bench.' Such, for instance, is the caution usually given to juries, to regard with distrust the testimony of an accomplice, "duke Humphrey's timeless death," comments thus : — "Who finds the heifer dead, and bleeding frosh, And sees fast by a butcher with an axe, But will suspect 'twas he that made the slaughter ? " See, also, Smollett's " Adventures of Roderick Riuidom." Ch. xx. ' See :J St. Ev. });}2 ; «5 Law Mag. 370. This subj(;ct hiin boon suecoss- fully illustrattJd iu Wills, Cir. Ev. paNsim. ' Apart from this prcHumption. the socred narrutivo contiiius not imo word to show thut, iiftitr all, the judgment was really in uocordanco with the fact. ^ 1 Kings, ch. H. vv. 10-28. 3ne- toviius, in his lifu of the Einporor Claudiun, ch. 1<), states that that monarch disc^jvered a woman to be the real mother of a young man, whom she refused to acknowledge, by commanding her to marry him ; for rather than commit incest she confessed the trnth. Diodorus Sicu- lus also speaks of a King of Tliriice, who discovffred which of three claim- ants was the son of a deciiustMl king of the Cimmerians, by ordering each of thom to shoot an arrow into the dead boily. Two obeyed without hesitation, but the otlmr refused. See Hag.-tt'r's Comprehensive Bible, note H. to v. 2o of th. H of 1 Kings. * "Sinter of mine," said honest Saniho, to the diunMol, " hnd yon shown the same, or but half as much courage and resolution in defending your chastity, as yon have shown in defending your money, the strength of Hercules could not have violated you." iJou Uuixote, purt 2, book 3, ch. l.'J. ' (ir. Ev. § 43, in part. • See New York Civ. Code, $ 1852. 182 CHAP, v.] TESTIMONY OF ACCOMPLICES. unless it lie materially confirmed by other evidence, for though there is no rigid presumption of the common law against such test imoiiy, experience has shown that it is little worthy of credit : and on this experience the usage is founded.' Other cases in which, though there is no actual rule of law on the subject, similar cautions should be given, are with regard to the verbal admisiiions of a party, (this kind of evidence being subject to much imperfection and mistake^), or to the effect that little reliance can be placed on the remainder of the evidence of a witness who has been detected in telling a falsehood in one part of his testimony. ' See further as to the corrobora- 0. & P. 542, n. (Parke, J.) ; R. », tion of accomplices, post, §§ 9G7 — Simons, 1884 (Aldorson, B.); Wil- 071. liams v. Williams, 1798. See poet, * Oxford Spring Circuit, 183S, 6 §§ 861, 862. 183 ' ■( I i:l|i i. ItB fll- 1 , , ; 1 ) ! ! I i li ■Ife m I m iii is n "I m i 4 183» AMEUICAN NOTES. AMERICAN NOTES. [PAUT I. Conclusive presumptions. — Tlie tiuii" is a cuntradictioii in turius. phrase " conclusive presu'iii)- There is and, indeed, in ti.e nature of things, can be, no such thing. The expression, wliile possibly sufficient or ut least innocuous for the purposes of particular cases in which it has been used, has brought into the law of pre- sumptions an almost impenetrable mass of ambiguity. A presump- tion is an inference of the existence of one thing from proof of another. It is a creature of logic ; — a syllogism where the major ')remj",u if the known connection wliicij human experience establishes <» v,v een Lhs fact proved and the fact to be proved. A dry remark . . lit' 'ustice Chapman (Atwood v. .Scott, 99 Mass. 177 (18(58) il!- , trat-'s 'his. "Experience is not sufficiently uniform to raise a prei^umptio.: is at one who has the means of paying a debt, will actually pay it. Accordingly, it is held that the fact that a debtor has Iiad such means is not evidence tending to show that the debt has been paid." ♦ In all cases where evidence is not direct, it produces convic- tion in tiie mind of the tribunal in this way. Where ^.vidence is not directed immediately to the fact in issue but to facts which tend to render probable (or improbable) the existence of the fact in issue, i. e., when facts relevant to the issue are the subject of evidence, tiie probative force of those mediate facts consists entirely in this ; — that they " raise a presumption " of the existence of the fact in issue. Strictly speaking, therefore, all presumptions are of fact. Juris- prudence may intervene, for various reasons, and with various effects, to asHume that certain of the stronger presumptions of fact are sufficient to establisii a prima facie case, in the absence of evidence to tiie contrary. It is convenient to call Uiese latter, " presumptions of law." Itnt such a course is confusing if it leads to any obscuring of tiie fact that a " presumption " is, as has been stated, merely* the logical inference of the existence of the unknown from proof of the known. The confusion so created is increased if not only the "assumj)- tions" of jurisprudence but the rules of positive, even, at times, of stivtutory, law are classed among presumptions — " conclusive pre- Hunjptions," as the phrase is. When it is said that we " presume " a certain fact exists because we know that another fact, with which it usually co-exists, is in existence, it is of the v(?ry essence of the ex- pression that it is permissible to show that the inference is erron- eous ; — either (1) ISecause the major premise cf common expericMico, to which reference is impliedly made, is fallaciou:-i, or (2) Heeause the minor premise, that the case in hand comes within the rule, is itself untrue. If, for example, it be claimed that, as a matter of CHAP, v.] AMEKICAN XOTE8. 183a experience, men not heard from for seven years by those who would be most apt to hear from them are dead, and that since A. has not been heard from by such persons within that period he is presum- ably dead ; — we have a case of pr< mmptive reasoning. Without tak- ing into consideration any weight which judges have seen tit to give, SIS a rule of law, to the probative force of this presumption, wo have, in any case where the death of A. is in issue, or relevant totlie issue, established an inference or presumption of his death. lUit it must necessarily be open to tlie opposite interest to contend r.iul offer evi- dence to show either (1) That men not so heard from are not usually dead ; (2) that A. has been heard from ; — in other words that one or the other premise of the syllogism is false. If the instance is a fair one, it follows that all presumptions are rebuttable ; — from the meaning of words. What, then, are conclusive presumptions of law ? They will, it is thought, be found to have no direct rr'tion whatever to the law of evidence. They are almost unifoit .y . les of substantive law expressed as a rule of evidence. Likeotiier lesof jjositive law, they determine what facts may be provt in ..iiy particular issue, and as evidence is only directed to the existence of facts in issue, the rules of substantive law which n^^sqnerade us so-called "conclusive presumptions," affect the law of evidence merely by determining what issues can be raise lUit to extend tlu; law of evidence so as to embrace decisions as , what issues may be raised would obviously be to transfer a large part of the entirt? rorjms Juris into this branch of the law. What facts may be placed in issue in a given matter is a question to be settled by sid)st:intive law. Which of these facts are placed in issue in a given case is a question of pleading. What may be shown, assuming a fact to have been placed in issue, in order to prove (or disprove) its exist- ence, is ?i question of evidence. Yet judges only too frequently rule that '• evidence is not admis- sible to prove " a certain fact when wiiat tiiey really mean, or should mean, is that the fact itself is not admissible, U'cause, as a matter of positive law, or under the pleadings, the fact itself is not in issue or relevant to any fact that is in issue. In any case wliere the fact itself is admissible, very frequently the evitltMK^e offered and properly rejected wo\ild l)e entirely- competent. In much the sanie way, judges have said that a fact is ''conclu- sively presumed," to exist when, in truth, the rules of positive law forbid its existence being ])laced in issue and have therefore made it impossible to introduce any evidence on the subject. This has usually been done for two umin reasons : (1) From the confusion of expression above referred to ; (2) From a desire to conceal the fact of judicial legislation. (1) False presumptiont. Statutr ok Limitations. — It is said, ^Ml i : Ul i! ':< * m- l:r - 183» AM Kit HAN N<)TP:.S. [I'AllT T. for exaiiii)l(>, that uiilt'ss a causf of action accniPil within a certain time prior to briii^zin^' procctMlinf^s to iMiforcc it, it will bo "con- clusively presuincd," tiiat tin* <;aiis»! of action hits been paid or other- wise settled. This is spoken of as part of the law of evidence. Hut where the statute of limitations is relied on to defeat a cause of action it is perfectly clear that the issue is not one of payment ; — where the defendant supports a jilea of payment by setting up a coni'lusive presumjjtion of payment under the statute. The statute itself must be pleaded and relied on, and the only issue is whether the facts necessary to this statutory bar really exist. Did the cause of action accrue within the statutory period ? If it did not, has the statutory bar been waived or defeated ? These are the only points on which evidence is admissible, because they alone can be in issue. The fact of payment of thu cause of action is not in issue. It is ol no conserpience. The phrase that it is "conclusively presumed" to exist is merely a misleading way of saying so. With the intention of the legislature, or the grounds of public expediency on which the legislature proceeded, the law of evidence is not concerned, except in the matter of construction. loNOKAXcE OK Law. — Another instance of the fact that "con- clusive presumptions " are paraphrases of some rule of positive law is furnished by the learnerl author in § 80, siiprn. The statement is that "courts conclusively jjresume that which in a vast munber of cases must of course be contrary to the fact . . . that every sane person, above the age of fourteen, is acquainted with the criminal as well as the civil, the common as well as the statute, law of the land." It may well be doubted, we may notice, in passing, whether any authority whatever can be cited for this proposition. The English authorities seem to he opposed to such a rule. " There is no presumption in this cfmntry," says Mr. Justice Maule, "that every person knows the law; it would be contrary to common sense and reason, if it were so." Martindale /•. Falk- ner, 2 C. B. 700, 711) (l.S4(;). So Lord Mansfield, in Jones r. Randall, 1 Cowper, 37 (1774), said, speaking of the contention that all the judges knew the laws, " as to the certainty of the law mentioned ... it would be very hard upon the profession, if the law was so certain that everyl)ody knew it; the misfortune is that it is so uncertain, that it costs much money to know what it is, even in the last resort." What is meant by this conclusive presumption apparently is that, as a matter of substantive law, knowledge of the law is immaterial on the question of its observance. It is not and cannot, with safety to society, ever be a defence to a claim of legal liability that the party said to be liable did n«)t know of his liability. No issue, therefore, can be raised on the question of such knowledge. There- CHAP, v.] AMKItlCAN NOTKS. 188* fore no evidence can be submitted as to it. The equivalent plirast", " Ignorance of tlie law excuses no one," correctly states the rule as one of positive law. Such a form of statenujnt is not open to tiie objection of attempting to incorporate into the law of evidence something with v/hich evidence has no concern ; — by saying that a fact, tiie existence of which is immaterial, is "conclusively pre- sumed '' to exist. That the latter is the correct statement of the rule is amply establislied by authority. '• No system of criminal juris[)rudence can be sustained on any other principle " than that " ignorance of the law excuses no one." U. S. ('. Antony, 11 lilateh, 200 (1873); "No man can avoid a liability, as a general thing, because he is ignorant of the law. This is an essential rule of society." lilack /•. Ward, 27 Mich. lUl (1S73). '• The rule is that ignorance of the law shall not excuse a man or relieve him from the consequences of a crime, or from liability upon a contract." Martindale v. Falkner, 2 C. K. 709, 720 (1846) ; " As he is bound to know the law, he is held to the consequences of a wilful violation of it, whether he knew of its existence or not. Otherwise it would be ditticiult to punish any man for a violation of law. because it might be impossible to prove that he had knowl- edge of the law. Hence the legal presumption is that every nmn knows the law and that his violations of it tare wilful." Whitton v. •State, '47 Miss. .'t7l) (18"/.)) ; "If a man knowingly does acts which are uidawful the presumption of law is that the 7iiens rva exists ; ignorance of the law will not excuse him." R. v. Mailloux, .3 I'ugs- ley, 49.'{, .'515 (187(5) ; " It is a rule of presumption, adopted from necessity, and to avoid an evil which would otherwise eonstantly perplex the courts in the administration of the criminal law; that is, the plea of ignorance. Hence the maxim 'that ignorance of the law excuse"? no one.' The courts and the profession, however, well know that this necessary rule of presumption, as often, and periiaps oftener than otherwise, presumes against the truth." lirent v. State, 4.3 Ala. 297 (1800). That the so-called conclusive presumption of knowledge of the law is in truth not a presumption is demonstrated when knowledge of the law becomes a fact in issue or relevant thereto and wlion there- fore it is to be established by affirmative evidence. Under these cir- enmstances the .so-called "presum])tion " of knowledge is found to have no probative force whatever. For example, wiiero a question arose whethf^r a wager as to the existence of a rule of law was \\\)o\\ a rrrfdin event; held, it was not. .Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowper, 37 (1774). Where the question was whether a client knew enough law to understand when and in what courts the services charged liy an attorney were rendered, the court say, "The (juestion is, whether this bill conveys information enough to a person as igno- 't m i ft ■ I M 'a;' t r.r ; r^"" I li- '^ I HI' ■ ( * 1 r i 1 188» AMEKICAN NOTES. [PAKT I. rant of the law as he may with propriety bo. I think that the client is not to be presumed to know that the business was done in Chancery, because of the mention of warrants, interrogatories, de- crees, and the like. . . . Afterwards tliere couios a charge fctr ' periia- ing decrees and reports at the lve[iort-ottice ' wiiicli it is said tlie client must know could only bo in Chancery. I do not agree tii:it the client is to be presumed to know anything of the kind." Martin- dale 0. Falkner, 2 C. H. 7(M) (i8i<)). Wiiurc, by statute, all votes cast at a certain election for a candidate were, if the latter was known to be ineligible to election, thrown asvay ; and an election was luih' at which votes were cast for A., who was by a plain pro- vision of law ineligible to the office in question, it was decided that there was no such presumption that the voters knew the law as to prove tliat, as a matter of fact, they did know it and, by consequence, tiiat such votes would be thrown away. " It does not seem to nie consistent with either justice or common sense or common law, to say tiuit because these voters were aware of a certain (iircumstance, they were necessarily aware of the disqualification arising from that circiunistance. ... A maxim has been cited, which, it has bei-u urged, imputes to every person a knowledge of the law. The maxim is tynortiiUla li'gls neiiiinein ej-cusnt, but there is no maxim that says that, for all intents and purposes, a person must be taken to know the legal consequences of his acts." Queen /'. Mayor of Tewksbury, L. R. li Q. H. 6l't) (1SG8). In a case where a promissory note payable in Canada was made payable in " Canada currency " and this was construed to mean payment in gold, the contention was made that as tiie parties must be prt^sumed to know that, by the law of Canada, the iu)to would have been payable in gold without express stipulation, some other meaning must have been intended, the court say, ''The maxim referred to in regard to a knowledge of law is misapplied. No man can avoid a liability, as a general thing, because he is ignorant of the law. This is an essential rule of society. Hut the law is not so senseless as to make absurd presumptions of fact." Black n. Ward, 27 Mich. 11)1 (ISTiJ). Negligence is not imputable to an attorney because he followed a widely .accepted but erroneous con- struction of the law. Mash r Wliitmore, 21 Wall. 178 (1874 »; .Morrill r. Graliam, 27 Tex. 64(5 (18(>4). The real nature of this "conclusive presumption " is further shown by the limitations which have been plaeiMl on it. •• It must he confined to presuming that all j)ersons know the law exists, but not that they are presumed to know how the courts will construe it, or whether, if it be a stitute, it will, or will not, be held to be constitutional." lirent v. State, 4.*? Ala. 297 (ISO'.J); « Where tlie .act done is malum in ae, or where tlie law wliich has been infringed i"* settled and plain, the maxim in its rigour will be ajiplied ; but It'll >-'\i CHAP, v.] AMEUICAN NOTKS. 1888 where the law is not scttli'd, or is obscure, and where the fjuilty intention, being a necessary cunstitiiciit of the partieuhir offence, is dependent on a kiiowh'dge of the law, this rule, if enforced, would Iw misapplied." Cutter ada. State, y« N. J. Law, VJo (1S73). So where trustees acted in good faitli and under the advice of couiisel, but in !iu erroneous view of the law, the supreme ccnirt of < )liio say : — " Woulil it be just under sucii circumstances to hold them account- t'.ble for their iguoraiuie of this recondite, and 1 miglit even say, .loubtful principle of law ? . . . A majority of the court think not." Milh-r V. Proctor, 20 Oil. St. 442 (18710- "The familiar juaxim that JLfnorance of the law is no excuse for the breach or non- performance of any agreement, becauao any one is prosnmeil to know the haw, applies only to i,'eneral ])ublic liiws, wliich prescribe a rule of action to the entire comnuinity: ... It has no application whatever to special or private laws. . . . All tin; authorities concur, that ignorance of foreign law is deemed to be ignorance of finf ; because no one is presumed to know the foreign law . . . The laws of the other states of the Union are to be regarded as foreign laws." King v. Doolittle, 1 lle:id (Tenn.), 77 (ISoS). CoNCLUsiVK Pbksumi'TIon ok Intknt. — So the learned author, relying on 1 Ureenleaf, Evid. § 18, affirms that "a sane man of the age of discretion is conclusively jiresumed to contemjilate the nat- ural and probable consequences of his own acts." If by this is meant, as a matter of positive law, tiiat if A. has done an illegal act, he cannot set np in defence that he did not mean to do it, the statement is correct. In this view, it closely resembles the so-called "conclusive presumption that every one knows the law." But if the statement is intended to assert a rule of evidence, it is not only erroneous, but fairly open to the criticism which the supreme court of Indiana (Clem v. State, 31 Ind. 480, 484 (1869), in a well-considered opinion, make on the statement as it ay)pear8 in the learned work of Prof. Greenleaf. " It is not sustained by the authorities which the author cites in its support. It is entirely at variance with principles which have received the uni- form sanction of all the courts in this country and Great Britain. It is a great inaccuracy, and it is strange that a work whi(di has pa.ssed through so r;any editions should still contain it. A con- clusive presumpti'" » admits of no proof to rebut it; and murder is a felonious k'..nng. . . . The purport of it, tlien, is, that if the defendant killed the person named by the deliberate use of a deadly weapon, no evidence to show that the act was done in his necessary self-defence can be sufHcient to rebut the presumption, or to prove that the killing was excusable and not felonious." The courts of Kansas refuse even to allow the presumption the prima facie, force of a presumption of law. " The presumption that the accused intended the natural and probable consequences of his own \ '■ ii Mil'!: « t I r) ! ji ■;, » i i , : .-! I i* 18a' AMBKit'AN NOTES. [part I. acts is not one of law to be applied by the court, but one of fact to be weighed by the jury." Madden v. SUte, 1 Kans. 340, 36(i (l«o.H). " The intention may be inferred from the act, liut this in principle is an inference of fact to be drawn by the jury, and not an implica- tion of law to be applied by the court." I'eople v. Slokes, 53 N. V, 164 (1873). In a later New York ciise (Thomas r. IVople, (57 N. Y. L'18 (1870) the court of appeals sustain a ruling that the fivcts that the prisoner used a deadly weapon, and ainied at and struck a vital part, were presumptive evidence of an intent to kill. ''lie must be |)resumod to have intended the natural consequences of his act, just as if he had uiincd at tiie heart of th<; deceased and tired a gun. It was not charged that the evidence was conclusive, but simply that it was presumptive, and it w.i.s left to the jury to deterniin^ the fact upon the evidence under the charge as given." '■ Tlie intent may be inferred from the act, but this, in principle, is an inference of fact to be drawn by the jury, and not an iiuplication of law to Imi applied by the court." State o. Swayze, 30 La. Ann. pt. 2, 1323(1878). Mai.K'k. — The example given l)y Mr. Greenleaf of the "conclu- sive |)resuuiption " of intent is ahso atlirined by the learned author : — "Therefore the intent to kill is conclusively -nferred from the deliltcnite violent use of a tlcadly weapon." This is the so-calh'd "eonchuive presumption of iiiiilicc" Kxactly liuw it cume ali<mt that the nuist vital |>art of the guviTiiment's case in an iinlictmi-ut for murder could be established without proof has, as might l>e expfctetl, furnished sonunvhat of a niysteiy ti) the courts. Much learning has been displayed in weighing the claims of the •• presump- tion of innocence" against this so-i:alled "coui^lusive presumptioM " of mali(Mt. lu fact, neither of these so-called presumptions are presumptions at all. Tlie " presumption of innocence " merely states the burden of proof in criminal eases. The "presumption of malice " probably owes its origin to another branch of positive law. It w;is at lirst, in all probaiiility, merely a rule of juiiieial const ru •tie. !i. The jury in cases of munler rre(|ueutly found sjieciiil verdicts: stating the facts and reserving the (luestioiis of law for the court to pass upon. When, on such a verdict, the mere fai't was stilted of n '•killing," without circumstances of justili- cation or cxi-use, tlu^ courts very naturally ruled that, as a (piestion ol how to construe this language, tlu-y must understand killing to be " xoliiiilary," for the plain reason that, had cireuiiisfanees of jnstilieation or excuse existed, it was the duty of llie jury to have stated them. Their not having domt so must Im> taken to mean that in)ne such existed. Thus IMuinnu'r's (!ase (Kex e. riummer, Kelyng, 10'.> (1701), The indii'tnn'nt was lor murder. The jury returned ii special verdict that umler certain circumstances therein stated, one of a company of snmgglers "did shoot olT the fu/.eu <HAP. v.] AM£UICAN NOTES. 1888 and thereby did kill " one of the others. The court, by the (•hii'f-justice, in oonstruiiiK this ver(li(!t say : " It secuis to mo hard upon a Special Verdict to construe that the fu7.ee went otY by accident, but it must be understood to l)e voluntary ; thou^'h even in an Indictment for Manslaughter, it is reciuisite thut il sliould be averred that he discharged it voluntarily ; but in a Verdict it need not be so alleged, but the saying he did it must be understood to bo with, and not against iiis will; for where any one upon any killing of a Man is to l>e discharged by an involuntary killing, it must be so found, without whicii it will be understood to be voluntary; for a Man being a free Agent, if he be found to do any Act, it must be supposed to Ih; witii liis will, unless it bo specially, and partii'ularly fimnd to he against his will. Therefore when a Man is indicted for a voluntary killing, if lie (lid kill tin) Man by misadventure, the special Circumstances of tiu! Case must be found that it may appear to Ihtt Court to be by accident." In ()n«'by"s Case (Kcx V. Oneby, L' li.iym. 118.".. 141)4, li Strange, 700 (1727) the court say, " Altliough tiiere are many sp«'cial verdicts in indictments for murder, there nev«'r was one, wliere the jury iind iu express terms that tiie nvt was done with malice, or was not done with malice prepense, or that it was donu upon a sudden (piarrel and in transport of passion, or that tin* piassion was cooled or not coole<l ; or that the act was deliberate or not deliberate; but the collection of tliose things from the facts fouml, is loft to the judgnn-nt of the court." In reply to an objection that the honii(ud<! was on a sudden ciuarrcl ami so manslaughter, the cotirt say. " I must first take notice, that where a man is killed, the law will not ])resumi> that it was upon a sudilen (pianel, unless it is proved to be." The general reason for the rule is stated in Lord Kaymond's report of the saiiu* <ui.se at page 14'.)7. In eommenting on Legg's Ciisi' (Kelyii, -7) the court say: — "If A. kills H, and no smhlen ipiiirrel appears, it is murder; for it lies <ui the party indicted to priive the sudden (piarrel ; and therefore the jury not having found any such thing for the prisoner's benelit, it is to l)e took, there was no such." This rule of eoiistrnction is |>rol»iibly the origin of the so-callod " presum<>ti(ni of nniliee." To turn this rule of constriic- tion into a rule of evidence is |)reci«ely to reverse it. In construing the special verdict malice is |)iesunie(| because it must have been proved to the jury. As a rule! of evidence malice, it is said, need not be jiroved at all, but is ronrhiHivehj /treniiiiietl on mere proof <if the killii)'.;. The rule that malice is conclusively presumed from deliberate killing has been either, (I) repudiated in the American courts or, ('-') so explained as to render it of but little practical elTecl, (I) Among the courts which dooliiiH to reuogniHe thii4 " conclusive k I I mi III •i.'^l m ■ I s 183» AM mac AS NOTKS. [PAKT I. I»re8iiinpti()ii " are tlie following. Tlin supreme court of Indiana say: — " \Vliatev«*r tlie origin ot the nili' may be, we are convinced tiiat it is entirely arbitrary, contrary to the reaso!i and the analogies of the iaw of criminal proeediire, both at common law and under our procedure and code." Olem /•. State, .'51 Ind. 4<S0, 4S4 (IS(;">j. In Farris o. Com. 14 liush, 302 (187S), on an indiutinent for murder the trial court ruled: — "Malice is implied by the law from any cruel and uniu'cessary ;ic.t done by one person to another, and from the <leliberate and unnecessary use of a deadly weapon." It will be noted, in passing, that this ruling does not come up to the level of a ** roncliinii'e presuni|iti()n," but is stated in the language of a pr«'- sumptiou of law. Hut even this modified expression of the doctrine was held to be error. "Malice," the court hold, "is necessarily a constituent element in the crime of murder, and nuist be established by evidence to the satisfaction of the jury, as any other fact necessary to make out tlm olTence, and it is no more within t\w province of the court to determine, than the fact of death or the chanicter of the weajion used to iuHict it." In Tennessee (Corteo v. State, :i Yerger, '2M (1831,'), a ruling that, " if the fact of killing by the defendant be proved, the law implied him gnilty of murder unless the proof clearly and satisfactorily showed the offence was one of less magnitmle," was held erroneous. " There is no reiison in saying that a jury must a<*(ptit upon a doubt as to the fact of killing, and yet upon a stronger doubt as to tln^ equally imjjortant fact of malice, tiiey nuist convict." //>/</. In I'eople v. Stokes, oiS .N. V. ir»4 (1S7.'{), the court of appeals say, " Argument seems un- necessary to demonstrate the error of this charge. It was a necessary jKirt of the case of the ])ro8ecution to establish that the homicide was perpetrated with a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed. Vet rhe court, assuming to determine what the circumstajiccs of the killing were, solemidy instrui^ted the jury that, the fact of killing iM'lng conceded, the law implied malice." See also Teople V. Downs. ITA X. Y. (»7 (1890). (li) In other jurisdictions, the so-called " conclusive presumpti(Mi " <d' malice from proof of killing is treated, not as conclusive, but ns an ordinary presumption or inference of law unless and until evidence is introduceil, liy one side or the other, of justi- fication or excMise. When such evidence is ii\troduced, the pre- sumption, as sui'h, is, like any other presumption of law, as distinguished from ii prosumption of hwt, fmiHiis nffirSn. There is reason for thinking that the courts have not in all cases been care- ful to distinguish between the burden of proof (whicdi, in a crimiuid ease, never leaves the government) and the "biinlen of introducitig evidence," which, in case of murder, upon the establishment by the govennnent of a deliberate killing, without justification or excuse, obviously rests, for any justification or excuse, upon the defence; — 'f\ i' CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 183"' whctlu'r this burden of •'stahlisliiiij^ cviiUnice is, strictly sprakiii;.', sliilti'd by tlie estiiblisliiiK-iit ot a jiresuiiiptiun oi law fruiii killing' itst'H, or not. The .supri'me (;ourt of Miissacliusetts shows the tendonoy nnini- fi'stcd l)y llu' cuiirls wliicii do not rcpiKliatf the prcsuniiition, but "draw its sting." In York's Case (Com. o. York, i) Mete 'JI (ISir)), the cimrt was divided on this " presumption of nniliee." I'he majority, in an exhaiistivi; opinion by Chief thistice Shaw, adopt tlie view that when the fa(;t of killinj,' is proved, the acc-used must establish any facts of justification or excuse by a preponderance of the evidence. As they say, " It will not be suflieient to make it doubtful or (piestionable. It must preponderate." From this opinion, Mr. Justice Wilde dissented. The dissentini,' <ipinion has been, by general pr<»f«'ssional opinion, (ionsidered to contain the better law. In his view '•Tlif (piestion depends <'ntiri'l3- upon the rule of law as to the burd(Mi (d' proof. If the burden of proof, throughout the trial, was on tlui Commonwealth, the instructions to the jury were clearly incorrect; if, on the c(Uitrary, it was on the prisoner, afU'r the proof of the homii-itle as charged, he has no ground (d exce])tion. . . . The counsel for the Comnn>nwealth contends, that, tin; homi- citle having been proved as charged, the law presumes malice, and consc'piiMitly that a /niimi fudr case for tiu' government was fully |)roved, and thereupon the burden of proof shifted, and was thrown on the i»risoner, to nuike it appear that the homicide was excusable, or was committed on su(di provocation as would be Hutlieient to reduce the crime to manslaughter. This argument cannot be maintained, unless the law of hondidde as to the bunlen of proof is an ex(!eption t<i tin* well-<'stablished rule <d" law in all other oases. ... In criminal cases, tlie burden of proof m-ver shifts, so long as tin- defendant groutuls his defence on the denial of any essential allegation in the indictment. . . . And how can the |»riiiciplo vary when a /irimn furl,- cas<f is made out partly by i)resumption ? If on the whole evidence, the jury had a n'asoiiable doubt ol the prisoner's guilt as charged, they could not Ix' justiHed in convicting 1dm." .\fter examining the authorities cited by the majority, and tracing them all back to Oneby's Case (L' Ld. Ray. US.') (1727), — a case of special verdict, — I»e reaches tlie conclusicui that " Thesi- principles and authorities are wlndly irreconcilable with the pre- sumption of malice on which the counsel for the Ccunnionwealth relies. No mali(!c (fan be inferred from the mere act of killing. Sueli a j)resumption, therefore, is arbitrary and unfouinled." The results of a full examination of the entire field are sumined up by the leariu'd judge in three projiositions ; — which have frcipiently l)oen oit'd with approval, as a dear and (fonci:;e statement of the law. He holds: " (1.) That when tins facts and circumstances accompany- ing a hoiuioide ure given iu uvidenou, the q^ue^tiou whether the lii iipi ';'i i'X- til ;ii 1 if m m mi ^p"' i!MM- 183»» AMKRICAN NOTK.'.. ri'AKT I. •onmc is murder or nuiiislaufjlitcr is to !vo doeideO upou t .0 evi- dence, and not upon any prusnniption from the > i«re p*!; of kiiliii};. (2) That if tliere Ix! any siicli presumption, iL iri a pnv-i. nipt it " olfiu'l, and if the evi(U>nce leads to a veiusonable doubt wltethcr the pre- sumption be well founded, that d(mbt will avail in favour of the prisoner. (.'{) That tlie burden of proof, in every criminal ciise. is on the Commonwealth to ])rovu all the material allegations mi the indictment ; aiul if, on the whole evidence, the jury havt; a reasonable doubt whether the defendant is guilty of the crime cluuv'l, they are bouml to acMpiit him." A few years later, in Con), v. Hawkins, .'Hiray, 46.'! (lSiV»), Chief iFiisti(!e Shaw himself, interrupting counsel when proceeding to argue in favour of the dissenting opinion in Vori;'s Case {uhi sii/im), lemarked, according to the report (page KJ")), '• that the doctrine of Vork's Case was lluit where the killing is proved to have been com- mitted by the defendant, and luitli'un, furthi-r is s/imi'ii, the pre- suni[>tion of law is that it was malicious and an ac: of murder; and that this was ina[)plicable to the present case, where the circumstances attending the homiiide wt>re fully shown by the evidence," and cliarged tliat "'if the jury, upon all the circum- stances, are satisiied lieyoinl a reasonable doubt, tiia' it was done with malice, they will return -i verdict of murder . ■fllMM-wiso, they will find the defi'iidaut gniUy of manslaughter." Ti. "igh there is rea.son to doubt whether York's (Jasc wouhl s.'ll be followed even in .Massachusetts on precisely the saiiu; facts, the (pialitication on the rule laid down in (Join. /•. Hawkins ( it/ii .Hii/tni) eifectually removes the prat^ticai mischief of the rule, iis it |irobaMy can lint seldom happen tliat, in any given case, the killing and m<» otiier f.act will appear in evidemte. The Vermont courts ftdlowthe rule laid down ir. (\tiii. r. Hawkins [ii/ti mi/irii), ill holding that the hoiiiicide is presumed U) be malicious only wIk'ii notliing cx"<>i<t th(> killing is shown, and follow the learned . ''licf justice : .i.is') liy ipioting his very clear iMid ((incise ruling in tl'.^t cum'. • T; niunler charged must be proved; the burden of proof is on the (>ommoiiwealth to prove tlie caso ; all the evidence (III Itolh sides which the jury lind true is to be taken into consideration and if, the homitdde being conceded, no excuse or justifuMtioii is shown, it is either murder or manslaughter; and if the jury, upon idl the (drcumstances, are satisiied lieytmd a reiusoi- abb* doubt that it was done with malice, they will return a verdict ol' murder; otherwise they will find the defendant guilty of man- slaughter." Stiite n. l'att«'rsoii. »r» Vt. .'iOH (IHl'A). in Maine in a case where the trial court riileil that "in nil cases where the nnlawiul killing is proved and there is nothing in the circunistaiuies of the case, as proved, to explain, (lualify, or palliate tiie act, the l:iw pri^suines it to havo bouii done maliciously; and if r ClIAI'. v.] .VMKUICAN NcrrH. IH^'* tlie acciisi'd woiiM r<!(Uuie the criiiu' below the ue^reeof murder, the biMiii'ii is Kpou him to n-hut tlic int'erenue of malice which the luw niises trom the act of .illiiig, hy evidence in del'eiie.e," — the in- struction, " not having been satisfactorily shown to be erroneous." was sustained. State •'. Kniglit, 4.'J Me. 12, \',i~ (l.S.")7). In Texas, the trial court had charged tiie jury that "they should look to all the facts and circumstances attending the homicide, sis disclosed by the evidence, and if they disclosed no facts or ' -rcum- stances which reduce the offence to negligent homicide or man- slaughtt.'r, or which excuse or justify the fact, the law, in such cases, implies malice and makes sutdi killing murder." Tht? court on appeal say: — " We are unable to discover any e.ror in this instruction calcidated to injure the rights of the defendant." iJrown I'. State, 4 Tex. App. 27'> (1878). In Louisiana, the trial judge (duu-ged that " where tlic killing is proved, malice is presumed by the law from the fact of killing, and that it was incund)ent on the a(!(ui.sed to jirovo any matter of excuse or extemuiLion." Held, crr(»r. '"The < ircumstamu's which surrou.. . the act either attest or negative a criminal intent. If noiui exist, the court — as said by Mr. CJreeideaf — is justilied in (dunging that from the act of killing, iiiiincitiiijiinilid by rtmnnsfinirrs of r.rtritu- (ifimi, malice is presumed (he should have saiil ' mai/ In- iiifrrnd ') and that the burden of disproving it is then t.lirown u|ion the accused. This rule is as correct as rational, and its a]iplication would prevent an otherwise unavoidable eoiiHiet betwet-n the presumption «'stal>- lished by law in favour of the statu and of tiie iirisoncr. Tin; intent nuiy be inferred from the act ; hut this, on principle, is an inference t)f fact to be drawn by tint jury, and not an iniidication of law to be applied by the court." State /•. Sway/.e, ,'{(» La. Ann. pt. L*. IJS-.'i (1878). !n a later case in the same court, the trial judjjt: id cliargeil that the state must prove, 1. Tlu- killing; 2. That ae prisoner ilid it, and that *' when this is done, tlie law pr' :red malice." Held error. ''The jury must be instructed tt- eigh and consider all the cintumstanees arising from, or > onnocted w ;tli, the evideiue jiroving tli" homieide, and that the iiresuiuption ' iho iunocfuee of thi' a<iused must yi(dd to tin' presumption o*" . 'on delilM'rate intent, only when the evidence .s liuaeeomp; "i-. . , eir* cunistauees showing alleviation, justification, or excuse." Htiit<» e. Trivas. ;tl La. ,\nn. l(>S(i (1880). In Mississijtpi, the rule is laid ilown thus: — "We understand the settled rule to Imi this ; The law presumes the accused to be innocent of fhe crime <'liargi'd, iiiitil the contrary is nuide to ajipear; lint when it is shown that he killed the deceased with % ileadly weapon, the general presiiniittifUJ of innoet-nce yields to the speeifin priiif of such h(unii'iiIo, and the law infera that it wan malicious and thuruforu murder, iHioause, as a rule, it is unlawful to .I'll \, ij •■"0.,:*.„ H< Vi n '^m ■iif! 188»» AMKIMCAX XOTKS. [part I. kill a human bcins. iuid it is tiiiinicr it' not soniPthius vhv, .md as H|M'('ial ciiruiiistaiKM's alone can vary the lcj,'al vitnv of honiicido 8() as to rt'liiivo it Ironi tlir charaotcr ot' nmnliM', it is infcrn'd or prc- 8tnncd to he smdi Iroiii tiie la(;t of killing', unexplained; hut if the attendant (tin iinisLanees are slutwn in evidence, whether on the part of the state or the aeeused, tluf character of the killinj^ is to he (leterniined by consideriii); them, and it is then nut a nuittor for presiimpti.)n, which operates in the ahsence of explanatory evi- dene:-, hut for the determination fron) the eircunistances siiowu iu evidence." Ilawthoriu) r. State, 08 Miss. 77H (IsSl). In North Carolina, a ehar>je was sustained, • tliat a preHiimption in favoiir of innoc(!nce prevailed, until overcome l»y ((videuce of the truth of the criminal ehar^e, and this must be such as to nunove all reasoiial)le doubt from tin- mind. That when such prucd' of the homicide is presented, matters in <'xcuse or miti^'ation must ap- pear, or be shown, not beyond a reasonalile doubt, liut to tlie satis- faction of the jury. The prisoner admitting the killinj; l»v means of a shot from a jiistol, that instrument, thus used, is a deadly weajion, and the law implies malice, \inless its absence is maile to appear, and this nuisl be to the satisfaction of the jury." State r. I'otts, 100 X. ('. ir.: (ISHH). See also State /-. Smith, 77 \. C. JSS (tH77). iu (ie<ir<„'ia, the court approve a ruling' that " When tho state has shown the defendant has done the killing, such killint^ would be pre- huukmI to have been done with malice, unless the d(>fendant or the ciriMimstanees of the case show the contrary." Marshall 1; State, 7i (ia. *-''•, (ISS I). In .\labama. the supreme court indorse a rulinj? that " When life is taki 11 by tln^ direct use of a deadly weapon, the law presumes that the killiii;; was malicious and tlierefore miinier, and <'asts upon the ilcf«Midants the onus or burden td rebu(;tiut; it ; unless the evi- dence estabUshiii},' the killing; also sliows circumstances of justi- fi<!Ulion, excuse, or milij,'ation, which overturn the ju-e^timption." Thn court say: "Tljere was no error in that portion of the ehar^J•^" (}il)son If. State. Ml) Ala. I'-M (IHH(>). See also Sylvester r. State, 7'J Ala. 201 (IML'.) It will be observed that in no instance throu}(hout these rulings is the presumption (d' malice spoken of as roiir/iisirr. Mamik r\ Lini'.i,. — It is said by the learned author (§ .S.'i), following Mr. (Jreenleaf (in § |m), that the deliberate publication of f;il;nnny, which tl: * jtublisher knows t(< Ih» false, or ha« no nnwon t 1 i ;>Iievc to be true, r.'vises a conclusive presumption of malice." liike. 'ither so-called ' eonclusiv> presumptiouH " this is a rule of Hubsthutive law, having no direct ndati<ui to the law of evidenofl. ft ;ii!i M»nts to saying that, under tho law of libel, malice is immn- terlu,!. If a defamatory statement is false and made without reason- ablo an<i probable cause, tho publisher is legally (even if not m ..: i*' CHAP, v.] AMKUICAN NOTKS. 1H3» luonilly) liiiblt'. As Jiidj^t' CodIcv says (Cooley, Torts, 2ir>) : " It seuins ini.sU^udii);^, tluMt'foro, to fiiiploy tliu ttM-iii iiiiilice, uiid iiiiili- oious, in (IfHiiiiig tlit!So wrongs; niul, in a U^gal sciirfc, as usod, tlu^y can only mean that tlu; talsu and injurious publication has been made without legal excuse." So in an action for sland(>r, nroinane r. I'rosser, 4 15. & C. 1.'47, LT..") (l«25), Hayley .1., said, ".Malice in conunon acce|)tation means ill-will against a person, but in its legal sense it means a wrongful act dune intentionally, without just cause or excuse." (lertainly this is true of the law of libel, wluu-e no (piestion of privilege is involved. So in a Teunsylvania action for libel, the co\irt say, " In its conunon acceptation inalict^ means ill-will against a person; but in its legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse, and therefore every utterance or publication having the other <jualities of slander or libel, if it be wilful and unautluuised, is in law maliciou.s." Uarr /•. Moure, H7 l*a. St. .'W,"!) (lH7(S^. See also Moore v, Stevenson, '.'7 Conn. 1-4 (1S">M). " The publication of what is necessarily injurious, and done purposely and knowingly, and not fm* any good purpose or justiti- ai>le end, is legally malicious in the law of lilxd." Mclican c. Scrii)ps, r»l* .Mich. Iil4 (IS.S;?). "The court properly declined to instruct the jury . . . that if the <lefeiidant actted boun j\i\i' in the discharge (d" what he believed to be his duty, the action could not be maintained without extrin- sic proof of express mali<!e." Smart /•. Hlanchard, 42 N. 11. 137 (IHCiO). "If a pulilicatioii be libellous and not privileged, the law implies that it was malicious. I'his is not a mere presumption, which may be wholly overc<ime by proof, but it is a legal ecuiclnsion which cannot lie rebutted." Lii-k w Owen, 47 Cal. 'ITitl (1874). The siiiireme court of Wisconsin holds, excu'pt in questions of privilege, that " In all other actions for lilnd and slander, malicioiia intent constitutes no part of the issue, but is or may be considered oidy as a cirenmstaiice iu aggravation of damages." Wilson »'. Noonan, .T» Wise. .'LM, ."111) (IM7I). See also Lewis v. Chapman, 10 N. Y. Wl'l n«.".7). It is merely jmtting tlie rule in another form to say that " When the appellant proved ilie publication of tin; article, the law implie(| malice, anil appellant was entitled to recover such compensatory damages as he h;ul sustained, regardless of the intent that actuated the ai)p('llee in the pnl)lication of the libel." !!eariek r. Wilson, 81 111. 77 ( lH7t'M. '• In common parlaiier malice means ill-will against a person, but the law attaidies a dilferent meaning. In its legal sense the term implies an act wnuigfully and intentionally done, "vithdut just cause or excuse, and does not necessarily imply malevo- lence of diMposition or enmity toward any particular individual." I'ennington e. .Meuks, 4(1 Mo. -17 (1H70). See also lndiana|Hjlis I! i !> ■1. Li'i m I M 183« AMKIMCAN NOTKM. [I'AllT I. Sun. (!o, r. lloircU, ".3 Iiid "/JT (ISTC). '<Thn falsity of tlio lil»'I is siitticifiit |)i-().)f of inali(;i' to ii|)li<>l(i (•xciiiplary 'liiniiij^cH." Ititrj.;- ni.uiii ('. .Jones, l»4 N. V. ol (IHSy), "Wiu-n! tlif wonls H|»okfii or wiitU'ii air, siiowii to bo witliiii ii conliilfiitial or privilttgud coin- nimiicacioii, tlu; pn-suinittioii of nialicu no loii^t^r exists ; but tlio plainUff in Hiich :i case must sliow oxpri'ss niiilict*, und cannot rely on til*! prosuni|ition of nialico wliiuh tlit* law attucli(>H in all otlior cast's to the uttcraui'c or publication of tliu wortU Hpuken or written." Dill.ird ,: Collins, 2.'> (Jratl. .'M.'i (IST-l). Mamck IX Otiiku C'oNNKtrioNs. — III all (jasoM where tho oxist- o'lCd of malice in a inaturial fact, exce[)t in the anomalous case of hoin>ci(l<( ai)ovo referred to, it must 1m! proved lik<' any otlier fact. For exaiii]ile. on an in<lictment tor maliciously placing ubstni<;tioiiH on tho track of a railroad. State c. Ilessenkamp, 17 la. -'» (1H(J4); C'liMi. /'. niikcman, lO.*) .Mass, .'I'S ( l<S7<0- !*^o of malicious mi.s(;hicr. Com, c. Williams, 110 Mass. KH (l'"*^-)- Otiiku Co.vclusivk PuKsr.Mi'Tioxs. — The oiIht runcliisive pie- Humptioiis referred to l»y the learned author are . rpially rules (d' Hul>stantiv<> law. I'he coniilusive ell'ect of judgments, for example, is properly referable to that subji'ct, see /mst, i 1(5S'.'. The law of esto])pel is a branch of substantive law, considcrctl atifr, § 89. So the rules as to tile conidusiveMcss of a default upon liie service of process have clearly no relation to the law of eviilence. That an award binds the parties, if within the scope of the H>i!>missioii ; that a documenl uiider .st*al rc(piires no considiM'atioi ; — tlK-.';e and many others stand on the .same tooting. Most ru es td' substantive lau suein capable (d' iHMiig made an apparent Mart of the law of evidence, by simply saying that "evidence is adnissible to show, Ac.," or "avi(b>iice is not admissibh^ to show," ;!ccordiiig as tliu rubf uf |K>nirave law is in form attirmativc or negative. Amiknt I)o( I mknts. — The rule ridating to ancient documents ditfers from those above>mentionei| by being 1i>gitimate|y part if the law of evidence. There seems, however, but little reason for stating the rule in the form of a onchisive presumption, or indeed in the torm of a piesiimption at all, \ well recognised rule of evi- dence reipiircs that ll xei iitioii id' a wriltvn instrument, ixccutcd in presence of a subscribing witness, should ite proved by the siiU scribing witness, or, in case of bis death, disaliility. or justitialile alisciice, by proof id his sigiiiMiire. In cim- there i> no subscribing witness, the signature of the party must Ih> pruved, uiii<-ss admitted. See fxisf, i \H:\\). Ancient dniniincnts, — /. /■, documents .it least thirty years old, produced from the pro|ier custody and frne from oircuiiistanceH of Huspicion, form a recognised exception to tliiH rule. Their pro- duction and inspection is sulHcient ivideiiee ol execution. If there is a sul).scribing wituuss, liu need nut U cuiiud. No proof is CIIAI'. v.] AMKItMAN NOTKS. 183>« iii-(H>.ss:tt'y ol' the si^niiititrc of an unavailalilc Hiibscrihiii}; \vitn(>8H. or ot a party. It' tlio (lociniwiit is n-linaiit, it mn-n in cvidiMictt dm itH i'acf. Il is Haiil tliat tin- siiltscriMiij,' witncHhcs an* "roiichisivcly IM't'siuiK'il to Ih; ditad." It is |)frliu|is quitu as auourati* to miy that tlif ruh' applies, whctln-r they an- tlcad or ii(»t, or cvon wlictlicr they arc ill court or not. 'rhorc scfiiis to he iio iiilficiicc, pn'smiiptioii, or qmmtiuii uf proof about tlu' iiiattfi-. It is Himply a ipu'stioii of a niif. 'I'lif ruh' (lispi!iia«'s with liviiij,' cvidcii'-i' if tin' witiifssi-s all' alivi-; of proof of Hij^iiatunm, if tht-y arc dcivd. All is, a (huiu- ini'iit tiiirty years ohl proves itself. TImk, of coiir.se, is by no iiieans the same tiling' as saving that it is adiiiissii)le. To be admissible, the evidence must also bo reb-vaiit and not the Hubjeet of any rule of exclusion. For example, the Massachusetts supreme judicial court say : — ■ " It is an old and \v<dl-sci,tlcd rule of evidenci-, that re^,'isti'red deeiU which ujtpear to be thirty years old, and whiidi have been followeil by possession under them, may be given in evidence, without any proof of their exi-ciition. Afti r such a lapse of time the witnesses are presumed Ut be deatl. And it is said to \n> a peicniptory rule of law, found tu bo both safe and cunvfiiient, that, after a lapse of thirty years, a deed, unacrcoiiipanied liy any (Mrcumstances of sus- picion, may be admitted without proid Of its execution." (ii n e. Chelsea. '.'i I'ick. 71 (I«:W.I; Ileiithorne e. Doe, 1 Hlackf. I o" ( I H'Jl') ; 'riiriiston ('. .Masti'iscdi, ',» D.ina, I'l'H (jH.'HI); Carter /•. (;handr<Mi, L'l .Ma. 71', ".U (iSf)!';; Mclicynolds r. hoiiKenbcrK'er, oI Pa. Si. l.'J, ;!I (ISCS, ; Duncan c. Heard. L' Nott N: .MeC. 4(»(» (I.S'-'O): <"iii'k ••• tlweiis, IM N.V. i;U (1M.*.H); Hiirgin »'. Chenault, D Ii. Monr. l'8o (INIS); Wcitiuaii <•, Thiot. fit (ia. 11 (IH7<.)). Mo in speaking' of a iiii'iiiorial <if an ancient deed, the crourt (d' <puu'n's bench of Cpper Canada Ixdd, ''The principle of receiving in evidence documents more than thirty years old, without proof of their authenticity, is not conlined to the deeds themselves, but extends to any written documents whatever, evi'ii to letters." Dtie v, Turnbull, o l^. H. I,', C. l'.".l (ISIH). The Kiipreme I'ourt of (Jeorgia, speaking of a witnessed recei|>tover thirty yr-.-iis old, say, " It was properly adi lissible in evidence oii the ground that it was more than tliirty years (dd, and therefore its execution n I not have been prov -n at the trial. In admitliii}} written documents in evidence, when nnut« than thirty years old, the ooiirtR do not go altogether upon the presumption that the Hiibscribing witnesses are proved To be dead, but they ado|it that limit of time, iM'voiid which proof cd' the execution of written instruments will not be reipiired, ahhougli the subscribing witneHses may 1m. aliv.-." Settle e. Ali.son. Sda. 'JOl (jH.-.O). So of a wiM. ''The rea.Hon of the law, in dispensing with the attendance of witnesses to a deed of thirty yearn' standing, and where poHsession i:ii i ! >^ m m i :JI I'J'l' ,il I itjP li 183" AMKUICAN SOTKS. [I'AItT has Immmi held iiii(l(>r it, is fuuiidcd upuii tliu presumption tlint they urn dead, and tlit; impossibility of proving its uxccutiun ; and ulthuu^h tliey are, in hwt, alivo, it is not ntcussary to pi-o<lucu tliem, for the rule is ^iMUM-al in its operation. The reason of this rule applies tu the time of tiie execution of a will, and not to the death of the testator, for the same dittieulty of proof exists in the one ease aa ia the other." Juekson v. Hlanshan, o doluis. I".)!' (1K()8). " The rule on this subject is, that when instnmients are more than thirty years old, and are unblemished by any alterations, and obtained from the proper custody, they are said to prove them- selves, and the bare production is sutticient, the subscribing witnesses or all living witnesses of the transaction being presumed to be dead; and this presumption, as tar as this rule of cvi(lence is concerned, is not atTected by proof that there are witnesses living. Hut it is essential that it appear that the instrument or instruments come from such custody as to afford a reasonable presumption in favour of thttir genuineness and be otherwise free from just grounds of suspicion." Reynolds i>. Longenbtirger, 57 I'a. St. Hi, 31 (1HG8). The rule is arbitrary. A document twenty-nine years old is ex- cluded. Ghisscock V. Hughes, oo Tex, 401 (1881). Where a deed wiis executed under a power, the power, if an ancient document, proves itself etpially with the deed made under it. Hut if the iM>wer is on rcconi, neither are admissible, uidess the power or u copy of it is proiluceJ. Tolman r. Emer.son, 1 i'ick, 160 (i81'G). The supreme court of Illinois have gone further; — holding that ancient documents cannot be .^'Imitted in evidence when pur|K)rtiMg to be executed by one acting in a fiduciary character, in the absence of proof of his authority to make tlie deed. Fell e. Young, Oil 111. 100 (ISTli). Where there are circumstances of suspicion concerning a docu- ment over thirty years old, if the evidence explains or ri'futes suciii circumstances, the (Uxnimnnt is t^ntitled to the InMietit of the rule. Walton 0. (!oulson, I McLean, lliO (18.'M). To come under the rule, " it is notsutHcient . . . that the instrunu^nt merely bears date thirty years before the time of its pr<»duction. It is necessary to show that it has l)e(;n in existence for that period of time ; and that may Imj d(m(! not only by evidence of its execution, by the maker, or of its possession by the party claiming under it for that period, but by circumstances creating the presumption of such existence." Kairly r. Fairly, ."18 Miss. L'80 (IHr.O). In New York existence for tliirty years is notsutticient. " If possession has accompanied the deed, for that length of time, that is enough. If not, other circumstances may be resorted to for the purpose of raising the niices.sary pre- smnption in favour of the deed." Clark v. Owens, 18 N. Y. VM CHAP, v.] AMEllICAN NOTES. 188'» That a predecessor in title relied on such iinoicnt deed is sufficifut to admit it. Whether witliout this it would liavo l)ecii udiuissihl'-, qiKm: Uur^'in v. Clieniiult, '.) li. .Mour. I'So (iHlM). Ill MuHsacluisetts, " If u subscribing witness be alive, he shall Im« called to prove the deed, ultliougii it 1m^ more than thirty years old." Tolinan v. Einerson, 1 I'iek. 1(10 (iSIiCJ), (litiiig .Faekson r. Hlanshan, 3 Johns. 1,"J2 (1808), which, by the way, does not support it. The basis of such presumption as may exist in tlx* matter is ])rob- alily found in Duncan r. Uearil, 2 Nott & McC. 400 (18L'0) : '* After a lapse of tiiirty years it is dilHcult, and in most eases im- possible to proeurt! tlie witin'sses to the deed. Those who are parties to a deed of thirty years' standing, must bo upwards of tifty years old, and a large portion of those who are born, die before tliat jMiriod." The rule relating to proving the execution of antuent documents must not Im) confused with the .somewiiat analogous rule that ancient records from proper custody are admissible to show facts of ancient title, without furtlier attestation. For exami)le, " Ancient books pur- porting to be record (tf the Lower llousatcuiic I'roprietary " prod iced froiii the custody of the clerk, " were projierly admitted as evidence, without any further procd' of the original anil continued urgaiiisation of the proprietary. This species of eviileiuM' is that usually intro- duced in tracin;.: ancient titles, and has huig Ih'cii sanctioned by this court.'' King c. Little, I Cush. \'M\ (IKl.S). So the supreme court of \cw llampsiiire iiold that an "ancient book of records, purporting to be tlie proprietary records of Rumney, accompanied as it was b\ an admission that it came from the custody of tlie town clerk of Kuminy, the proper depositary, by statute, of le pul)lic records of that character belonging to the town, was properly admitted in evidence, without jinxd' that it con- tained the re(!ords of the original proprietors of the town. . . . The jury may well i)resume many things, wliidi it would In- imlispensablo to prove in relation to more recent documentary evidence." Little «•. h.iwmng, ,'{7 N. IL ;{">;">, ;$(•..". (1S.".«). Tl tlicr eonclusivt^ pnsumptidiis mentioned by the learned autluu- fall into the same class. They are rules of j)ositive law. Thus that a <'hild under seven cannot be guilty of felony; that a Inty undtu- fourteen cannot be guilty of rape and et.iain kindn'd crime > ; that a female child under a fixed age cannot legally consent t-o certain sexual acts, — are among the rules of criminal law, common or statutory. That an infant under a given age (iannot dispo,se of real or personal property in ccrtiiin ways; that th<- children of husband and wile lM>gotten during their cohabitation cannot be shown to be illegitimaU^ by the U'stimony of the parents, — all present no (question in the law of evidence. I ;! f.iillii''-!! / IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) k /, (./ ^ \ / 1.0 1.25 ■ti|2<S 12.5 ISO ■^~ M^S 40 12.0 lU I. I, 1.4 1^ 1.6 v] <^ 4V% O / Photographic Sdences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4303 ^^;#% ^-*^^ ^ f/u Vi iPfiitii 183'9 AMEKIOAN NOTES. [part I. (2) Fictions. — Courts have tisually been sensitive about con- fessing that they an; making hiw rather than dedaring it. A CDiuinon nietliod of concealing this lieqnent and often valuable ])r()cess has been by interpretation. Anotlier has been by the (U'eation oi fictions. Now, it is obviously essential to the value of a legal fiction that it should not be disputed. The casual loss by the l)laiiitiff and the finding by tlie defendant, in an action of trover; the promise in an liiilchitdtiis ussiim/islf, for exami»le, would have been of but little use, as fictions, if they could have been traversed and an issue raised on them. The liction was necessarily non- issuable and, as in other cases, where a fact is not issuable, it has been " conclusively presumed " to exist. A modern instance will illustrate this process of legal develop- ment. The circuit courts of the United States have acquired juris- diction over suits between corporations organised under the laws of different states, or where the other party is a citizen of a different state, by establishing the fiction that the members of any corpora- tion before them are all citizens of the state to which such corpo- ration owes its charter. This is done by conr/itsive/i/ itri'sitniin<j them to be so. " A corporation itself can be a citizen of no state in the sense in which the word 'citizen ' is used in the Constitution of the Unit'Hl States. A suit may be brought in the Federal courts by or against a corporation, but in such a case it is regarded as a suit brouglit by or against tlie stockiiolders of the corporation ; and, for the ))urposes of jurisdiction, it is conclusively presumed that all the stockholders are citizens of the state which, by its laws, created the corporation." Muller V. Dows, !)4 IJ. S. 444 (187(5). " The members of tlie corporate body must be presumed to be citizens of the state in wliich the corporation was domiciled and that both parties were estojiped from denying it." Louisville, itc. K. Ii. r. Letsoii, '2 How. 4t)7 (1844). cited in Covington Drawbriilge Co. V. She])herd, 20 How. 2L'7. L'3;UlHr)7) ; ()hio& :\Iississipi i It. R.V. AVheeler, 1 lilack, 28(;, L".)7 ( ISGl): \l. II. Co. /•. Whitton, 1.'! Wall. 'J7(» (1.S71). Tiie same rule a[)plies to a corporation created under the laws of the United States, e. ;/. a National Hank ; IVranufacturers, &c., Hank I', r.aack, 2 Abb. Circ.'ct. 232 (1871). Presumptions. — I'resumptions. strictly so called, are divided into two main classes, " I'resumptions of Fact" and " Vresumjjtions of Law." 'I'he presumi)tion of fact is, as has been said, the logical inference of the existence of one fact from proof of another. It is the only real presumption, as the " jtresnmption of law " is an assumption of jurisjjrudence that a given presumption of fact has a certain ])r()bative force, to wit: tliat it establishes a jiriina furlf case, or, in other words, that a tribunal of fact would be justified in '! 'I ! lir CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 18320 acting on it in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It is, tlioro- fore, a rule of law, concerning presnni])ti()iiH. It is a li-ramni pm- bntionis, rather tlian proof itself. It is. like an admission, or other k'Vdiiicn prolidfionla, rather a fact to be i)roved by evidence, than evidence to prove a fact. I'resuniptions of law are rules of law ; and a rule lias no probative force. The phrase " presumption " has proved a very favorite one in judicial reasoning, and it apparently embodies many different meanings. In deciding whether, in any parti(!ular case, we are dealing with a hoiia. fide presumption or a counterfeit, but one infallible test presents itself, — to weigh it in the scales of logic. If the " presumption " shows probative weight, it is a presumption. If it does not, it is sometliing else, — usually a rule of positive law, or possibly one of i)leading. A useful way of verifying this result will be to see whether the so-called "presumjition" can be exactly restated as a rule of jiositive law or pleading. A true presumption does not lend itself readily to this process; but a rule whicli has been paraphrased fioni the positive law into the language of presumption can usually be paraphrased back again. Good illustrations of this process may be found in the so-called "presumption of innocence," or the "conclusive presumption that every one knows the law." A '• presumption " (or assumption) of law, Mr. Wharton (2 Whar. Ev. § l'J.'?7) well says, '' derives its force from jurisj'rudence as dis- tinguished from logic." Perhaps it would be fully as a; cerate to say tiiat its force is derived from a definite weight, which jurisi)rudence, in certain cases, has seen fit to give to logic. The law of evidence alone does not fix rules for carrying on a line of reasoning. Hut courts, from early times have apparently felt under pressure of an obligation to the general community for the promotion of cer- tainty in the rules of law. Tliey have constantly tried to lessen the field of the uncertain and the debatable in connection with ri'^lits and liabilities; to make repeated trials of fact settle S(une- tiiing valuable generally ; to ])revent, so far as possible, the use- less expense and annoyance of trying the same question of fact over and over again. As in cases of negligence, reasonable care, due diligence, &c., the effort is to " lay down a rule about it"' which will remove some element of uncertainty as to what the legal stan- dard really is. In its dealings with tiie jury this feeling has ajipar- ently been intensified by practical dangers which a permanent tribunal, realising the value of precedent, and responsible for tlie larger consequences of litigation, would readily perceive might, arise from the uncontrolled and unaidiMl efforts of a casual tribunal. littk> giv(>n to th<^ solution of the problems which they were called upon temporarily to solve, and much more apt to be moved by tiie facts of a particular case than bj a consideration of the remoter social consequences of permitting tliemselves to follow their feel- If w 'l. i il i I' 1 ' i ' ■ 'Mil ■' — d i ■ . J '\ m i'lH i 18321 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAUT r. ings. Partly to guide the jury, ami perhaps largely to control it; partly to bring the exjjerience of the past to tlieir aid, and partly to enforce the use of correct reasoning, or retain in the court a power which it was undesirable tlie jury should exercise, — the court naturally and early adopted the practice of stating to the jury that certain plain, obvious inferences or " presumptions " of fact tliry miglit safely assume to be correct, until they were disputed by other evidence on the same point. When conflicting evidence was gone into, the "assumption" they had been asked to make would of course be gone, and it became the duty of the jury to weigli all tlie evidence, including the presumption of fact wliich they could have assumed to be correct if it had been alone. It is obvious that this action on the part of the court practically amounts to a ruling as to tlie burden of proof in the sense of the " burden of introducing evidence." This burden rests always on him against wliom the tribunal of fact would decide if no more evidence were introduced. In other words, at the opening of the case, it rests, together witli the " burden of establishing," on him who has the affirmative of the issue, but may shift during the trial whenever the i)arty on whom it has rested succeeds in establishing a prima furh; case in his own favor. Proof of a presumption of fact sufficiently strong to be assumed by the law to be correct, establishes sucli a prima facie, case. Hence it is said tliat "a presumption of law shifts the burden of proof;" which is true, if the burden of introducing evidence is meant. When the party on whoui this burden of evidence now rests introduces evidence to show that the assum[)tion of law is in- correct in the particular case, the "assuuiption " in fanrtuH officio as such, leaving the presumption of fact to have its jirobative force. It simply has ceased to be assumed to be correct. U. S. v. Wiggins, 14 Pet. 3.34, 347 (1840). There is nothing in the above practice to conflict with the rule that the probative force of a presum])tion is always a question for the jury. '' Whenever evidence is offered to the jury which is in its nature jirima facie proof, or presumptive proof, its character as s\ich ought not to be disregarded ; and no court has a right to direct the jury to disregard it, or to view it under a different aspect from that in which it is actually presented to them. Wliatever just influence it may derive from that charac- ter, the jury have a right to give it." Crane v. Lessee of Morris, 6 Peters, 698, ()2() (1831>). The facts on which the presumption or inference is claimed must be tliemselves proved by affirmative evidence. Tliey cannot be themselves presumed. A presumption on a presumption is not per- mitted. "A presumption which a jury is to make is not a circum- stance in proof; and it is not, therefore, a legitimate foundation for a presumptioi\." U. S. r. Poss, 92 U. S. 281 (1875); Douglass v. Mitchell, 35 Pa. St. 440 (l.SGD). 1 CHAP, v.] AMEUKIAN NOTES. 18:}^ LllU- fov V. Illustrations of certain of the more usual and definite presump- tions of law have been cited by the Icnniod autluir. '• I'kk.scmi'TIox UK IxNocKNC'i;."' — This is a spurious presuuiptiou, and juerely a paraphrase of the usual statement of the rule of the burdi'u of proof in criminal cases; — that the burden is on tlie gov- ernment to prove beyond a reasonable doid)t all facts material to the offence cliarged. I\Ir. Justice Stephen (Dig. Law of Evid. Art. 94) frankly abandons this so-called " presumption." It rests apparently on no probative basis of fact. Speaking of the rights of a prisoner, tlie supreme court of Ohio say : " The benefit of the presumption of innocence was fully and practically secured to him in the instruc- tion that the state must prove the material elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Morehead ik State, 34 Oh. St. 212 (1,S77); Hemingway v. State, 68 Miss. 371, 408 (1890). "'flie first uistruction prayed puts the point, whether the burthen of proof of the offences charged in the iiulictment does not rest upon the United States. Without question it does in all oases where a party stands charged with an offence, unless a different provision is made by some statute; for the general rule of our jurisprudence is that the l)arty accused need not prove his innocence ; but it is for the gov- ernment itself to prove his guilt before it is entitled to a verdict or conviction." U. S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 400, 471 (1827). Where the charge covered the rule as to burden of proof, but did not state the " presumption of innocence," held, no error. Hutto n. State, 7 Tex. A\)p. 44, 49 (1879). "A reasonable doubt must be charged in every felony case whether asked or not." Ihtd. The nature of this so-called presumption is seen when the attempt is made to use it in a probative capacity. So tested, it cannot be used as evidence of the fact of iiniocence. For exaiuple, on an indictment charging the seduction of a woman "of previously chaste character," affirmative evidence of the woman's chastity must be furnished, the presumption of innocence furnishing no evidence of it whatever. The court say that the presumption of innocence is '•always to be used in the administration of justice as a weapon of defence, not of assault. They are the shield of the accused ; not the sword of the prosecutor." W(>st r. State, 1 Wise. 209 (1803) ; People V. Itoderigas, 49 Cal. 9 (1874). So on an indictment for enticing women of " chaste life and con- versation," the judge at nisi prius ruled that it was for the govern- ment to prove their chastity, but that " in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is a presumption of law that they were of chaste life and conversation," This was held erroneous. " This instruc- tion permitted the jury to find that the burden on the government was satisfied by the legal presumption that the women were chaste, although the government had introduced no affirmative evidence of their chastity. . . . The defendant is presumed to be innocent until I . I r^i (1 /, i idi; iliii IMiH! mm ll^l 18328 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAUT every material allegation necessary to constitute the offence charged is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. To allow the proof of such an allegation to rest merely on the legal presumption that the women were chaste, would be to permit the presumption in favor of the defendant's iimocence of tiie offence charged to be overborne by another legal presunijjtion in favor of the innocence of other persons not parties to this proceeding." Com. v, Whittaker, 181 Mass. 224 (1881). To the contrary effect that in an action of seduction " the chaste character of the prosecutrix was presumed, and the burden was on the defendant to overcome the presumption," see State v. Wells, 48 la. 071 (1878). On a civil action for breach of promise of marriage, the plaintiff claimed a pretended marriage and subse(i[uent cohabitation. The ndant being already mi>,rried ; held that evidence of recognition ui. the plaintiff as his wife, &c., would not warrant a presumption of a lawful ceremony. Wright v. Skinner, 17 C. P. U. C. 317 (18G6). ])ifft!ring from other courts, the supreme court of Vermont appar- ently regards the " presumption of innocence " as having a certain probative force. See Childs v. Merrill, (3G Vt. 302 (181)4). *' The presumption is single, and the same in all cases, and in all must be overturned by evidence which excludes every other reason- able hypothesis but that of guilt." Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 72 (1889). Where proof of good character is said to raise a " presumption of innocence," a true presumption of fact is referred to, but such is not tlie usual meaning of the expression. Harrington v. State, 19 Oh. St. 264 (18G0). In many civil cases, on the analogy of the " presumption of inno- cence," is a so-called presumi)tion against fraud, illegality, &c., which amounts merely, as also in many cases the so-called pre- sumption of regularity, to a statement that tlie burden of evidence is upon him who relie3 jn proof of fraud, illegality, or irregularity. "He who alleges fraud must prove it." I'arkhurst c. McGraw, 24 Miss. 134 (18.-)2). So in an action on a promissory note it is for t]u> defendant to allege and prove illegality or fraud. Haxter v. Ellis, 57 Me. 178 (18G9). So where a corporation was prohibited from making certain con- tracts after a given date, it was held, in an action on such a con- tract, " the presumption being that there was no violation of law," it would be presumed that the contract was made wliile it was yet legal to make it. Friend v. Smith Gin Co., 59 Ark, 8(5 (18!)4). So wliere a constitutional provision prohibited towns from issuing bonds in aid of a railroad, after a certain date, held, in an action on such bonds, " Courts can presume that an act was don"? prior to ay ,' CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTKS. 183« a period after which it could not legally have been dune." St:ite V. Hannibal &c. R. R., 113 Mo. 1^)7 (18<»;i). Tkesumption of Ownkk.suii'. — The presumption of ownership from proof of possession is one of fact based on the general expe- rience of mankind, stated by the learned author at § 1 23 sirpni, that "Men generally own the property they possess." McEwen r. Port- land, 1 Oreg. 300 (18G0). The accuracy of this presumption of fact is an assumption or pre- sumption of law, and proof of possession is prima facie evidence of ownership. " The first evidence of personal property is possession. If this young man was in possession of the house; holding himself out to others as the owner ; and acting as the owner, the presum|ition of law is that he was the owner." Drummond i>. IIopi)er, 4 Har- rington, 327 (1845). "Possession is prima farir evidence of title." Viiiing V. Raker, 53 Me. 544 (1866) ; Andrews v. Reck, 23 Tex. 455 (1859). "Possession of personal property is ^^r////*^ /Wr^V evidence of ownership." Goodwin v. Garr, 8 Cal. 615 (1857). So of a promissory note. Its possession at the trial is jirima farir evi- dence of ownership and authority to sue. Hovey v. Sebring, 24 Mich. 232 (1872)] Vastine v. Wilding, 45 Mo. 80 (1860); Stod- dard V. Rurton, 41 la. 582 (1875). " It is a presumption of law, that every species of property found in a person's possession at his death belongs to his succession." Alexander's Succession, 18 La. Ann. 337 (1866). So in an action of trespass tjiiare rhnismii, the court say, "The presumption of the law is, that the person who has the title is the one in possession." Finch y. Alston, 2 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 83 (1832). So possession of land under a general claim of title is jirima. farir evidence, of a seisin in fee sinii)le. Ward r. Mcintosh, 12 Oh. St. 231 (1861). So Chief Justice Savage, in .fackson v. Waltermire, 5 Oowen, 301 (1826), speaking of actual possession of land, sa^'s : •'This is presumptive evidence of a seisin in fee, and sufficient until tlie contrary appears." •• Possession of property alone and without explanation, is evi- dence of ownership; but is the lowest si)ecies of evidence. It is merely presumptive, and liable to be overconui by any evidence slui>.ing the character of the possession, and that it is not neces- sarily as owner. If the custody and ])ossession is siiown to be equally consistent with an outstanding ownership in a third person, as with a title in the one having ])OSsession, no presumption of ownership arises solely from such possession." Rawley v, Rrown, 71 X. Y. 85 (1877). The reasoning from experience on which the presumption is based defines its scope. "The possession of an open account in favor of another has never been held to be evidence of ownership in the holder." Gregg v. Mallett, 111 N. C. 74 (1802). I ; ' . I i I 'I 4; mm M' iflli>'' F ':■ ■; ii, ;- 11. 1.^:^ 18326 AMKUK'AN NOTKS. [part I. Omnia Contua Stomatokkm. — Tho presumption that one who destroys or supprcssfs evidence does so because tlie evidence so Kupi)ressed would opeiate a,i^ain!-:t liini, seems a true in-esumptioii, /, !•., one of distinct probative effect. As in tlie case of other presiiniiitions, it is capable of being -.obutted. Thus, in prize i)ro- ceedings, where it appeared tliat during the chase resulting in the capture, a package of pajjers rehiting to the cargo was thrown over- board by the master and super-cargo, the ship i)apers being retained, the court say: — ''Concealment, or even spoliation of papers, is not of itself a sutticient ground for condemnation in a prize court. It is undoubtedly a very awakening circumstance, calculated to excite tii3 vigilance and justify the suspicions of the court. ]>ut it is a circumstance open to explanation, for it may have arisen from accident, nec(;ssity, or superior force; and if the party in the first instance fairly and frankly explains it to the satisfaction of the court, it deprives him of no right to which he is otherwise entitled. If, on the other hand, the spoliation be une/plained, or the exi)lanation appear weak and futile ; if the cause labour under heavy suspicions, or there be a vehement presumption of bad faith, or gross prevarication, it is made the ground of a denial of further proof, and condemnation ensues from defects in the evidence which the i)arty is not permitted to supply." The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227, 241 (isil). So abstracting from the court files part of a vessel's original report of a collision "throws great discredit on the claimant's side of the case." The Sam Sloan, 65 Fed. Rei). 125 (1894). So where a party attempts to suppress testimony by defacing a public record, it is held that the court was " justifi;^d in construing the testimony strongly" against him. Murray /•. Lepper, 99 Mich. 135 (1894). " The spoliation of evidence, damaging to a litigant's cause, may constitute just as much of a fraud, as the manufacture of evidence that is favourable to it." riioenix Ins. Co. v. Moog, 78 Ala. 284, 307 (1884). For similar reasons, a plaintiff who has deliberately and volun- tarily destroyed a promissory note will not be permitted, in the absence of suitable explanation, to give secondary evidence of its contents. " I believe no case is to be found, where if a party has delibei-ately destroyed the higher evidence, without explanation showing affirmatively that the act was done with pure motives, and repelling every suspicion of a fraudulent design, that he has had the benefit of it." Blade v. Nolaud, 12 Wend. 173 (1834). So it is held error to allow the plaintiif in an action for Mbel to introduce secondary evidence of the contents of an alleged libellous letter which he had voluntarily destroyed. "This we think was a violation of the cardinal principle that where it ap- pears that a party has destroyed an instrument or document, the CIIAI". v.] AMKUICAN NOTICS. \m^^ ])i'osiuniition arises that if it liad been produced it would have hccii against liis interest or in some essential particular unfavorable to Ids claims untlor it. Confnt upoiuiiorem, omnia presinuantur. . . . He must fi.ot rebut the inference of fraud which arises fron: the act of a voluntary destruction of a written paper before lie can asiv to be relieved from the consequences of his act by introducini;; pMi'ol (evidence to prove his case." Joannes /;. Jiennett, 5 All. IfiO (18G2). " It is not a matter of course to allow secondary evidence of! the contents of an instrument in suit njjon proof of its destruc- tion. If the destruction was tiie result of accident, or was without the agency or consent of the owner, such evidence is generally admissible. ]>ut if the destruction was voluntarily and deliberacely made by the (;wner, or with his assent, as in tiie present case, tiie admissibility of the evidence will depi nd upon the cause or motive of the party in effecting or assenting to the destruction," Bagley c. McMickle, *) Cal. 4;3(), 416 (IfwS). Where the destruction was done in good faith ; — for example, uniler the well intentioned though injudicious advice of a sister, the secondary evidence is receivable. Tobin v. Shaw, 45 Me. 331 (1S5S). In a lesser degree, the same presumption arises where a material witness is withheld. '"Wiiere a party has evidence in his power and within his reach, by which he may repel a claim or charge against him, and omits to produce it, this supplies a presumption of fact that the charge or claim is well-founded. This presumption attaches with more force in cases where a party, having more certain and satisfactory evidence In his power, relies upon that which is of a weaker or more inferior nature." Savannah, &c., K. R. V. Gray, 77 Ga. 440 (188G). But this rule receives a reason- able construction. No presumption can be drawn against a railroad if it does not produce a witness — one of its engineers — who has gone to another state and whose residence is unknown. I//i(L And where the witness is " subject to the call of either party," no inference can be drawn from a failure to produce him. Haynes )•. McKae, 101 Ala. 31S (1893) ; Scoville v. Baldwin, 27 Conn. 316 (isr,s). Where the question is as to the meaning of a certain written contract which the appellant refused to produce, the court say; — '• Wliere the adverse party has it in his rower to produce evidence that would settle the question at issue, although not compelled to produce it, every intendment and presumption is to be made against the party w.io might remove all doubt on the question." Benjamin v. Ellinger's Adm., 80 Ky. 472 (1882) ; Cross v. Bell, 34 N. H. 82 (1856) ; Wallace v. Harris, 32 Mich. 380, 394 (1875). So the defendant's non-production of his books on notice is "strong presumptive evidence against him." Atty-Gen. v. ''Ill iiiiijlii! m 183W AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AIIT T. Halliday, 2G Q. B. U. C. 397 (1807). " If he does not exliibit it to the court and jury for their satisfaction, they have tlie right to inftT that it contains evidence unfavourable to him in the matters in dispute between iiim atul the defendants." Lowell v. Todd, 15 C. 1'. U. C. 300 (1865) ; Merwin v. Ward, 15 Conn. 377 (1843). But see Cartier v. Troy Lumber Co., 138 111. 533 (18D1). So where the defendant did not appear to testify to matters peculiarly within his own knowledge, the court say that his course " carries with it the usual unfavourable and damaging presumptions." Con- necticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. o. Smith, 117 Mo. 2G1 (1893). The limits of the rule are well defined in a Michigan case. Wliere a female plaintiff was absent, without excuse, a ruling "that if she was absent when able to be present, the jury might consider that as evidence tending to impeach the good faith of lier claim " was held correct. An instruction that there was a pn;- sumption of law that, if s!io had testified, her testimony would have hurt her was held to liave been properly refused. Cole i>. Lake Shore, &c. E. R., 95 Mich. 77 (1893). So where parties re- fuse to obey the precept of a siibj'wna duces tecum, the court say that "it is a circumstance that the jury could have considered as a fact tending to show a i)urpose u{)OU the part of appellees to suppress evidence against them." Darby v. Iloberts, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 427 (1893). But the " mere non-production of books, upon notice, has no other effect than to admit the other party to prove their contents by parol. . . . Any presumption against him can only be on the ground that he withholds evidence and omnia confrtt, spoJiatorem. liut this rule cannot operate where all that is done is not to produce evidence whi"h can only go in by consent of the other side." Cartier v. Troy Lumber Co., 138 111. 533 (1891). " Where withholding testimony raises a violent presumption tiiat a fact not clearly proved or disproved exists, it is not error to allude to the fact of withholding as a circumstance strengthening the proof." Frick v. Barbour, <)4 Ta. St. 120 (1870); Gulf, &c., R. R. Co. V. P:ilis, 54 Fed. Rep. 481 (1893). " The non-production of evidence clearly within the power of a party creates a strong presumption that, if ])roduced, it would be against him." Miller /•. Jones, 32 Ark. .337 (1877). "In equity, as at law, the omission of a party to testify in con- trol or explanation of testimony given by others in his presence is a proper subject of consideration." McDonough v. O'Niel, 113 Mass. 92 (1873); Eckel v. Eckel, 49 K J. Eq. 587 (1892) ; Hall v. Vanderpool, 15() Pa. St. 152 (1893). "Where evidence which would properly be part of a case, is within the control of the party whose interest it would naturally be to produce it, and, without satisfactory explanation, he fails to t CHAP, v.] AMEUIC.VN NOTKS. 18;3M do so, the jury may draw an iafcroiice that it would bo unfavourablo to liiiu. It is an inlVrciuro of fact, not a presuniptioii of law." Hall ('. Vanderpool, (nfn sujirn). It is competent for the party against whom such presumption would lie to introduce evidence to meet its force. Thus, where it is claimed that the plaintiff, in an action for personal injury, was feigning weakness to esca])e medical examination into the extent of her injuries, it is comj)etent for her to show that shortly prior she had herself freely invited such examination. Durgin r. Danville, 47 Vt. 95, 105 (1874). liut it has been held that (however important as bearing on evenly balanced evidence) the mere failure to question one's own witness as to a certain fact will not relieve the other side of the necessity of proving the fact affirmatively ; — if material to his case. " To so hold would be substituting conjecture for proof." Arbuckle r. Templeton, 05 Vt. 205 (1892). But where a party offers only weak and unsatisfactory evidence, when lie clearly has ])lenary evidence in his control, such evidence as is offered should " be viewed with suspicion." Wimer v. Smith, 22 Oreg. 469 (1892). In criminal cases, the voluntary suppression of testimony is usually cogent circumstantial evidence of guilt. For example, that a defendant travelled under an >.ssumed name and destroyed, on his arrest, the notes alleged to have been forged, State /•. Chamberlain, 89 Mo. 129 (188(5) ; or offered to destroy some barrels furnishing incriminating evidence of barratry. Phoenix Ins. Co. i\ Moog, 78 Ala. 284, 307 (1884), do not differ in any essential particulars from other facts circumstanti 'ly tending to sustain the claim of criminality. The same inference or presumption obtains whev dence is fabricated in support of any contention. Indeed, have fre- quently exhibited a perhaps natural resentment anu iiu itnice in disposing of such cases and have not always, apparently, felt in- clined or constrained calmly to balance the weight of evidence in favor of one who has deliberately attempted to mislead them But even as matter of logic, an inference or presumption of lack of real merits in a claim or defence which feels forced to rely upon manufactured testimony, presses most strongly on the judgment. Thus, in an admiralty case of collision, where the defendants produced a log-book found to be false, the court say, "This conclu- sion disposes of the case ; for, in a conflict of evidence such as the case presents, the production of a fabricated log warrants the rejection of the testimony which it is brought to support." The Tillie, 7 Benedict, 382 (1874). Similarly, for a plaintiff to attempt to bribe the sheriff to select certain jurymen "is in the nature of an admission that the cause of the party resorting to bribery of witnesses or jurors is unjust, I I 1 mJ m !i-t lliiii' m^> m li i !; l»;i2» AMKKICAN NOTKS. [PAKT I. aiul thtit Ills olaiin is dislioiifst uiul unrighteous," KiiUl /•. Ward, (I own) ')!) N. W. 271) (ISU-J). So \u rt'lutiou to witui^sst's. "Evidence ol' the fact ol' an at- tempted subornation is admissible as an ailniission by (tonduot that the party's caus(( is an unrigliteous one." Fulkerson r. .Murdock, r*;} i\lo. A\>[). lol (\h02). So a party may show, if lie ean, that his opponent has attempted to prevent an adverse witness from attend- ing the trial, and to bribe a witness to testify on his own behalf. Carpenter /•. Willey, G5 Vt. IGS (1«;)L'). Kkcknt i'ossKssioN — Tho possession of stolen goods shortly after the commission of the crime is presum|)tive evidence of guilt, or of a receiving with guilty knowledge. "The rule is well established, that the recent exclusive jxjssession of the fruits of crime soon alter its commission is jiriiiKi fncir evidence of guilty jjossession.'' ilcn- derso.i /■, State, 70 Ala, L'V. (1.881), The supreme court of Illinois has sustained the following ruling: "The jury are instructed, as a matter of law, that possession of stolen property, immediately after the theft, is sufficient to warrant a conviction, unless attending circumstances or other evidence so far overcomes the presumption thus raised as to create a reasonable doubt of prisoner's guilt." Sahlinger v. People, 102 111. 241 (1882). It may well be doubted, however, whether the prima favlr weight of a presumption of law has usually been given this presumption. It seems to be essentially one of fact. " The instruction, that pos- session of stolen property immediately after the theft, if an unsatis- factory account is given, 'affords 2)resumptive evidence of guilt,' was right; and the whole matter of the degree of force the presumption ought to bear in the particular case was submitted to the jury, as a ([uestion of fact, in a manner which leaves no ground tor exception." Com. V. McGorty, 114 Mass. 299 (l«7;i). " The doctrine of the cases referred to is, that there is no presum[)tion of law arising from the possession of stolen goods. To that doctrine we readily yield our assent. It is not a presumption of law for the court, but a presump- tion of fact for the jury." State v. Raymond, 4G Conn. 345 (1878). The reasons for declining to assign this presumption the probative weight of a presumption of law are principally that the varying cir- cumstances of particular cases, as to remoteness of time, presence or absence of reasonable explanation, etc., give this presumption a very varying weight. " Tlie first practical difficulty in the way of making it a presump- tion of law is the impossibility of inventing a rule by which to determine whether the possession is recent or not. ... It is use- less to call such a presumption a presumption of law. Call it what we may, it is a presumption of fact. ... It is a presumption estal> lished by no legal rule, ascertained by no legal test, defined by no legal terms, measured by no legal standard, bounded by no legal iHAl". V.J AMKKICAN NOTKS. 1h;j3' limits. Jt liiis iioiu' of tlio cliiiructeribLics of l.iw." SUiti' /'. J lodge, oU N. II. 510 (18(5U). la Stokes v. State, 58 Miss. (177 (18H1), a ruling that the present was a presiiuiptiou of law was held erroneous. '' However strongly tln^ one fa<;t may seem to follow from the other, they (the jury) cannot be told they must infer it, or that the law infers it for them." " Ordinarily it is stronger or weaker in proportion to the jjeriod intervening between the stealing and the finding in possession of the accused; and after the lajjse of a considerable time before the possession is shown in the accused, the law does not infer his guilt, but leaves the (piestion to the jury under the consideration of all the circumstances.'' State /'. Kights, S'J N, C. 075 (ISSO). Jn lli;rnandez v. State, '.) Tex. App. 'JHH (IHSO), the court say that th'j request lor an instruction that, '" The possession of ])roperty re- cently stolen is a circumstance proper for the consideration of the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, but does not of itself constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty," should have been granted. To same effect, State v. Kim- ble, 3i La. Ann. 31)2 (1882). On the contrary, and with a confused perception of the real relations of presumptions of fact to assump- tions of law, the supreme court of Iowa hold that "the presumjjtion in question, unless overcome, will authorise conviction. It is a pre- sumption recognised by the law, and may therefore be termed a presumption of law. The term 'presumption of fact' iin]ilies that from certain facts the law will raise a presumption. Either of these terms, 'presumption of law ' or ' presumption of fact,' may be used to express the same thought, for they are identical in mean- ing." State v. Kelly, 67 la. G44 (1882). Like other presumptions of fact, i)roof of the recent possession of stolen goods amounts to circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue, " The fact of the possession of the stolen property by the accused is evidence tending to prove his guilt, but in no sense conclusive as to his guilt ; nor does his guilt follow as a presumption of law unless such possession be exjdained by the accused." Ingalls v- State, 48 Wise. 047 (1879). See also State v. liaymond, 40 Conn. 045 (1878). I'uKsi'MPTioN OF CONTINUANCE. — The inference of the existence of a fact at a particular time from proof of its existence at a time previous seems to be entirely one of logic. In other words, it is a presumption of fact. The inference naturally varies niu.^li in weight according to the nature of the fact itself and the length of time over which the continuance is sought to be presumed. The presumption has probative force so far as based on experience. The illustrations of the inference are as endless as the application of any other line of thought. {?■''' f 11 PiM • 1) • r h i> s; 1 «i^ 18331 AMERICAN NOTES. [part t. " If seizin is once proved, it will be presumed to continue until the contrary is shown." Currier /•. Gale, All. 522 (18()5) ; Cob- leigh i: Young, lo N. H. 493 (1844) ; Liud /•. Lind, 53 iMinn. 48 (1893) ; Bulch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 (1892). Plvidence being introduced of delivery of bonds to a railroad, and there being no evidence as to what was done Avith them, the court say: "The only presumption arising from these facts is that said bonds are still in the hands of the railroad company." Choisser v. People, 140 111. 21 (1892). Where A. is sliown to have owned certain personal property "the law would presume, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it continued to be his up to the time of his death, and that it belonged to the estate at the date of the commencement of this action." Hanson v. Chiatovich, 13 Nev. 396 (1878); Flanders r. Merritt, 3 i^arb. 201 (1848). But finding a piece of property at a certain place eight months before the death of the deceased is no evidence that it was in the same place at his death. Adams r. Clark, 8 Jones (N. C.) L. 56 (1860). Where one enters into possession of premises as a tenant, he will be presumed to hold under that title, and any intention to claim under a title adverse to the landlord can only be shown by "plain proof." Leport r. Todd, 32 N. J. Law, 124 (186()). This presumption has been extended over a period of ten years without evidence in the meantime. Alabama State Ld. Co. v. Kyle, 99 Ala. 474 (1892). The fact that A. was insolvent shortly before giving a certain note and mortgage raises "a legal presumption" that he was insolvent at the time issue was joined in a suit on the note. Evidence tliat he was solvent at the trial of the cause does not countervail the presumption. J')ody v. Jewson, 33 Wise. 402 (1873). When a person's residence is proved to Vie in a certain place, it will be presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. "As A.'s residence was admitted to be in the state in 1886, the law presumes that his residence continued to be in this state unless such presumyi- tion has been rebutted." Ferguson /■. Wright, 113 X. C. 537 (I8!)3). "When the residence of the defendants in New York is once established, it is presumed to continue there till tlie contrary is shown; and the burden is cast upon the defendants to show a change of residence." Uixford r. Miller. 49 Vt. 319 (1877) ; Xixon V. Palmer. 10 Barb. 175 (18.")0i; Prntiior r. I'almer, 4 Ark. 4.56 (1841) ; Wray /-. Wray. 3;5 Ala. 187 (18.-.S). The expr«>ssion last above quoted from the court in Rixford r. Miller is significant. The presumption of continuance, like many others, is often made useful by the courts in determiniTig who has the burden of evidence as to a particular fact. In determining this, f J..,: CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTKS. 18332 jurisprudence plays a part as well as logic, and the presumption of fact being ruled in the language of a presumption of law as a Ijrima facie case is jn-o hue vice, given tlie force of a presumption of law. Insanity and otiikr ^Mkntal St ;s. — A state of settled per- manent insanity once shown to exist will be presumed to continue. " The rule does not apply to cases of occasional or intermittent insanity ; but it does to all cases of habitual or apparently confirmed insanity, of whatever nature," State r. "Wilner, 40 Wise. 304 '187()) ; Lilly v. Waggoner, 27 111. 305 (18G2). "When it ai)pears in proof that a person was, at any given time, of unsound mind (unless from some temporary or transient cause), the legal presumption is, that that state of mind continues until the conti-ary is made to appear by evidence." Crouse i>. Holman, 10 Ind. 30 (1802). If a certain state of relations is shown to exist between two per- sons it will be presumed to continue. Eames v. Eames, 41 N. H. 177 (1860). So of improper sexual relations. CaujoUe r. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90 (18G1). Evidence that certain persons were partners two or three years before raises a presumption that they are still partners. Cooper V. Dedrick, 22 Barb. 51(5 (185(5). So if a course of dealing, t'.;/., taking by an insurance company of a promissory note secured by a pledge of the policy in payment of the premiums on a life insurance policy, is once shown to exist, it Avill be presumed to continue. Hastings r. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 138X. Y. 473 (1803). But where a former marriage would render a second one bigamous, it will not be presumed to continue on proof that it once existed. "That a fact continuous in its nature, will be presumed to continue after its existence is once shown, is a presumption which ought not to be allowed to overthrow another presumption of equal if not greater force, in favor of innocence.'' Klein r. Lawdman, 29 j\Io. 250 (1860). The real meaning of this apparently is that a presumption is not proof beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal ca^es. ruicsi'Mi'Tioxs AS TO LiFK, — The presumption of the continu- ance of life may be and frequently is of but slight probative force. Its logical effect apparently varies greatly not only with the inter- val of time which it is sought to cover with the presumption, but also with the probability of procuring evidence other than the pre- sumption if the fact be as claimed. While the presumption of the continuance of life certainly continues during the period of seven years from the time the person was last known to be alive, the presumption of fact may and usually does gradually grow less and i lilt if 18333 AMIiKIUAN NOTES. [PAUT less strong; — until it finally remains merely a forensic presuuij)- tiou or assumption of law ; in other words, amounts to a ruling as to the burden of proof; — that he who asserts the death of a person shown to be alive before seven years of unexplained absence has intervened must introduce evidence to show it. " The presumption of the continuance of life is merely a presumption of fact, which is subject to be controlled by facts and circumstances and other legitimate evidence. ... It is a presumption by no means of equal strength at all times and under all circumstances. If the last known of a person was tliat he was a soldier, and was about entering into a battle, and had been seen by none of his comrades after the battle, the presumption of the continuance of life would be very slight, and very slight evidence would be sufficient to con- trol it." Hyde Park v. Canton, 130 Mass. 505 (1881). " The evi- dence, therefore, that a person was living at a particular time is but one of the facts to be considered in the determination of the ques- tion whether he is living at any future given time." Ibid. So if a person be once shown to be alive, he will be presumed to continue to live, within reasonable limits, until the contrary is shown. State i: Flym, 43 Minn. 385 (1890). " Ordinarily, in the absence of jvidence to the contrary, the continuance of the life of an individual, to the common age of man, will be assumed by presumption of law. The burden of proof lies upon the party alleging the death of the person." Stevens r. McNamara, 30 Me. 176(1853). " The rule is, that the proof of the death of a person, known to be once living, is incumbent upon the party who asserts his death ; for it is jiresumed he lives until the contrary be proved." Duke of v'Jumberland /'. Graves, 9 Barb. 595 (1850). Extreme age alone is not sufficient to rebut the presuii.ption of the continuance of life. "The civil law v.-ill presume a person liv- ing at a hundred years of age, and the common law does not stop much short of this." Watson v. Tindal, 24 Ga. 494 (1858). So the fact that a person in " bad health " twenty-two years before, would now, if alive, be eighty years old, raises no presumption of death. Matter of Hall's Deposition, 1 Wall. Jr. 85 (1843). Pkksumi'Tiox of Dkatii. — This apparently is not the entire truth in the matter. As the unexplained absence grows in duration, even during the seven years, and as the inference that the person in (luestion is alive because he has been shown to be at a previous time, therefore continuously grows weaker, a presumption of fact that he is dead has been gaining probative force. As both processes are continuous, a time comes in any case when the probative weiglit of the second presumption of fact not only preponderates over that of the first, but preponderates to such an extent as to constitute a p7'{ma facie case in favour of death. The burden of introducing evi- CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 1833* of of I. ire )ii, u (lence to prove the existence of life under these circumstances lies on him who asserts it; — in other words, there is a presumption of law that the person is dead. This period the law, somewhat arbi- trarily but upon reasons historically satisfactory (see Stat. 1 Jac. 1, Ch. 11, sec. 2 ; 19 Car. 2, Ch. G), has tixed at seven years. Jolinsou V. Merithew, 80 Me. Ill (1888) ; Whiting v. NichoU, 46 111. 230 (1867); Adams v. Jones, 39 Ga. 479(1869); Winsliip r. Conner, 42 N. H. 341 (1861) ; Primm v. Stewart, 7 Tex. 178 (1851) ; Spen- cer (;. Koper, 13 Ired. 333 (1852) ; Youngs v. Heffner, 36 Oh. St. 232 (1880) ; Giles v. Morrow, 1 Out. Hep. 527 (1882) ; Osb'<:ne v. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 388 (1857) ; Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. 150 (1838) ; Learned r. Corley, 43 Miss. 687, 709 (1871) ; State v. Henke, 58 la. 457 (1882) ; Holmes v. Johnson, 42 Pa. St. 159 (1802) ; Garwood r. Hastings, 38 Cal. 216 (1869). " When a person goes abroad and has not been heard of for a long time, the presumption of the continuance of life ceases at the expi- ration of seven years from the period when he was last heard of. And the same rule holds, generally, with respect to persons away from their usual place of resort, and of whom no .account can be given." Whiting v. Xicholl, 46 111. 230 (1867). It is error to exclude evidence of persons who have heard of the alleged deceased on the ground that it is liearsay. It rebuts the presumption, which only arises wlien a jjerson is not heard from in seven years. Dowd v. AVatson, 105 N. C. 470 (1890). " The presumption of death, from any lapse of time which the evidence in the case would justify, would only apply where the indi- vidual alleged to be dead had left the place of his domicile and had not been heard from for seven years or more." Duke of Cumber- land V. Graves, 9 Barb. 595 (1850). "The statutory presumption, in certain cases, of death after seven years affords no ground for tlie converse jjroposition that, if the person has been heard from within seven years, there is a pre- sumption of law that he is still living. Neither is it true that there is any iiresumption of law one way or the other as to the continu- ance of life. It is a mere presumption of fact which is subject to be controlled by facts and circumstances, and consetiuciitly by no means of equal strength at all times, an 1 under all circumstances; or, perhaps, more correctly speaking, there is no rigid presuniptiou one way or the other." State /•. I'lym, 4.'i Minn. iiii~) (1890). If the contention that great length of absence tends rather to show that the person in question has changed his home than that he is dead, the court say, " We do not perceive any solid foundation for it." Winship v. Conner, 42 N. H. 341 (1861). But the court of Alabama very truly say that " considering the great length and breadth of this country, and the migratory character of the people, the presumption has less force here than in the country where the ■4 \ i i ! i, 18335 AMKUK^VX NOTES. [part I. l;i\v on this subject originated." Smith r. Smith, 49 Ala. 156 (1873). Where lieirs at law, while very young, moved to a western state as a place of permanent residence, evidence that for twelve years they Jiad not been heard of by the testatrix at the place of their original residence, does not raise a presumption of their death. " The absence, witliout being heard from for seven years, which will war- rant the presumption that a person is dead, means absence from that person's place of residence — his liome — with which place he would most certainly keep up some kind of communication, or to which he would return were he alive." Keller v. Stuck, 4 Kedf. 2U (1880). The death of such person at any time within the seven years is not presumed, but must be proved. Newman r. Jenkins, 10 Pick. 515 (1830) ; Whiting ». Xicholl, 4G 111. 230 (1807) ; Spencer /•. IJoper, 13 Ired. 333 (1852); Johnson v. Merithew, 80 Me. Ill (lSiS8). Such "death may be proved by showing facts from which a reasonable inference would lead to that conclusion, as by proving that a person sailed in a particular vessel for a particular voyage, and that neither vessel nor any person on board had been heard of for a length of time sufficient fo information to be received from tliat part of the globe where the vessel might be driven or the per- sons on board of her might be carried." Johnson v, Merithew (iif)i ,siij/r(i). So that "tlie person was dangerously ill, or in a weak state of health, was exposed to great perils of disease or accident, or tliat he embarked on board of a vessel wliich has not since been heard from, thougli the length of the usual voyage has long since elapsed." Eagle v. Emmet, 4 I'.radf. 117 (1850); Smith r. Knowlton, 11 N. H. 191 (1840). "Any facts or circumstances relating to the character, habits, con- dition, affec*:ions, attachments, prosperity, and objects in life wliich usually control tlie conduct of men and are the motives of tlioir actions, are competent evidence from which may be inferred the deatli of one absent and unheard from, wliatever has been tlie dura- tion of such absence." Tisdale v. Connecticut, &c.. Ins. Co., 26 la. 170 (1868). •' It may well be conceded that where a person is studious in liis habits, attentive to liis business, has a fixed and permanent resi- dence, and is surrounded by those infliuMices whicli are calculated to endear him to his liome, suddenly and unaccountably disappears, a presumption may arise which would warrant a jury in finding that he was dead." Hancock r. American, &c., Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 26 (1876). " A ju'y may find the fact of death, if the circumstances of the case (ioncur, from the lapse of a .shorter period than seven years." Puckett r. State, 1 Sneed, 355 (1853). So in a case where deceased .^1 I? CHAP, v.] AMEKICAN Nt)TES. 18335 was last seen on an overland jonrney to California, through a coun- try infested with hostile Indians, and determined to fight his way through, the court presume from the fact that neither he nor any of the party were since seen that lie died soon after he was last seen. Davie /•. Briggs, 97 U. S. GL'8 (1878). Whoever claims that death occurred at any period within the seven j-ears has the onus of proving that fact. Doe d. Ilagerman r. Stmng, 4 Q. B. U. C. olO (1848), confirmed 8 Q. B. U. C. 291 (I8r)i;; Howard v. State, 75 Ala. 27 {1883). ]S0 rUESLMl'TIOX OK DeATII WJTillX THE SeVEN YeAKS. — TllB attempt has been made to establish a presumption of law that the person died precisely at the end of the seven years, i. e., lived through that period. The better opinion seems to be that the time of death within the prescribed period of seven years is a matter entirely for evidence, and that the person to whose contention the fact of such death is essential, must prove it. " It certainly has not been expressly decided that the person must be taken to have lived throughout the period ; but that conclusion inevitably follows from the legal presumption of life, which, though prospectively rebutted at a particular period, is sufficient to sustain the allegation of exist- ence during the time it lasted." Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. 150, 171 (1838). "The legal presumption . . . establishes not only the fact of death, but also the time at which the person shall first be accounted dead." Whiting r. Nicholl, 4G 111., 230 (1867) ; Eagle r. Emmet, 4 Bradf. 117 (1^'5C) ; Whiteley r. Equitable Life, &c., Co., 72 Wise. 170 (1888). " It is no answer to .say that the probabilities are that the death did not occur at the ex])iration of the .seven years, but at some other time within that period. The time of the death, as well as the fact of death, are presumptions not of fact but of law. The law regards neither as certain. It simply declares that the party shall be jiresumed to be dead at the ex])iration of seven years, whenever his death shall come in question." Clarke r. Canfield. 15 X. J. Eq. 110 (1802); Shown /-. ^SIcMaekin. 9 Lea, 601. 607 (1882); Stevens /•. MeNamara, 36 ]\Ie. 176 (1853); Craw- ford /•. Elliott, 1 IToust. 465 (1856) ; Montgomery v. Be vans, 1 Sawy. C. Ct. 653 (1871). If a person was unmarried when last heard from, it will be pre- sumed that he died without issue. Shown r. INIcMaekin, 9 Lea, 601 (1882). Whose Ioxoraxce is Important. — Tn an Alabama ease it is very truly said that "evidence of parties having no particular interest in the ])erson whoso life or death is in issue, not being rela- tions, friends, or members of the family, — parties with whom the absent person, if alive, would not be likely to have any correspond- ence; . . . should have but little weight." The court held a single letter from the alleged deceased from Texas to one of her friends :ii! :i„ ^i: m ^!iTi S^: I ^siS « 1! Ufa 1 in 1 I- "'-|: Ul\ mm Ri t:i! 18337 AMEUICAN NOTES. [PAKT I. four years before of much greater weight than many affidavits from persons who would not naturally be expected to hear from the per- son, if alive. Smith v. Smith, 49 Ala. loG (lS7y). No presumption of death is raised by the fact that inquiries at the post-office of the party's former residence reveal the fact that he is not known there; — even if the person were in "bad liealth " twenty-two years ago ; that if now alive he would be eighty years old, and that his name is not in the directory ; — in the absence of evidence of inquiry being made among his friends, tlie kind of ill health, and the fact of change of residence. " Show me that (alleged deceased) was the subject of some quick consum- ing disease, or of any specific malady, ?,nd you will change the case. ... It is no presumption of law that tlie runners of the post-office know, so as to answer at first inquiry, the name and residence of every person in a populous city." Hall's Deposition, 1 Wall. Jr., 8o, 104 (1843). " There is no rule of law which confines such intelligence to any particular class of persons. It is not a question of pedigree." Flynn IK Coffee, 12 All. 133 (1866). So where a wife left the place where the parties had resided as husband and wife, her evidence that she had not heard of her hus- band for seven years iloes not raise the presumption of his death. The persons whose not liearing is significant of the death of per- sons not heard from are " those who are nearly related to them, or were upon terms of friendship with them, and remaiiie<i at or near the place wliere they last resided." Thomas /•. Tliomas, 16 Neb. 553(1884); Com. v. Thompson, 11 All. 23 (1865). To the same effect is Hyde Park v. Canton, 130 Mass. 505 (1881). Under simi- lar facts, and answering the question as to wiiether the former, abandoning, husband, were dead, the court say: "This is a pure question of fact; and, in the absence of any direct evidence, is to be determined by the presuniption which the law authorises. If a man leaves his home and goes into parts unknown, and remains unheard from for the pace of stiven years, the law authorises to tliose tliat remain, the presumption of fact that he is dead; but it does not authorise him to presume therefore that any one of tliose remaining in the place which he left has died." Hyde Park r. Canton {iibi siiprn). To same effect, of an absence of seventeen years under similar circumstances, see Garwood v. Hastings, .38 Cal. 216 (1889). The fact that one has been absent twenty years from a certain place raises no presumption of death, "as there is no evidence he ever established his residence there." Stinclitiejd -(;. Emerson, 52 Me. 465 (1864). It is unnecessary to say that the presumption may be rebutted. Youngs V. Heffner, 36 Oh. St. 232 (1880). "This is nierely a pn>- sumption of fact, and may be rebr.tted." Flynu v. Coffee, 12 All. ( CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 183«« 133 (18GG). The explanations of such absence may be such as to deprive the presumption of nnioh of its probative force. Where a person leaves home for some foreign place, unex- plained absence for seven years does not raise a presumption of death unless inquiry were " made at such place without fretting tidings of him." Wentworth /•. Wentworth, 71 Me. 7L; (1880) ; McCiirtee v. Camel, 1 Barb. (X. Y.) Chan. 455 (1846). It naturally follows that if tlie presumption of death from seven years' absence turns out to be erroneous, that acta done on the strength of the presumption are of no legal validity. For example, a savings bank may be required to pay to a depositor money already paid to his administrator, erroneously appointed on the presumption of his death from seven years' absence. Jockumsen v. Suffolk Savings Bk., 3 All. 87 (1861). For a New York decision, by a divided court, CO the contrary effect, see Roderigas r. East River Savings Instn., 63N. Y. 460 (1875). Bkesumptiox of Likk ix Ckiminal Cases. — The presumption of the continuance of life, being at the highest a presumption of law, regulating the burden of proof and based upon a presumption of fact of a varying probative force, which grows weaker in exact proportion as it becomes necessary to rely on it, is not considered sufficient to sustain the government's burden of proof in a crim- inal case on a material point. In other words, it is not proof be- yond a reasonable doubt. To adopt a common expression, " The presumption of life yields when in conflict with the presumption of innocence." "Though the law presumes a continuance of life, yet where this pi-esumption necessarily involves a presumption of crime, and comes in conflict with the presumption of innocence, the former, which is the weaker, yields to the latter presumption, and the party affirming that an individual is not dead will be bound to prove it." Lockhart v. White, 18 Tex. 102 (1856). For these reasons, on an indictment for bigamy, the courts have usually refused to consider the fact that the defendant's first liusband or wife was alive shortly before the second marriage as sufficient evidence that such husband or wife was actually alive at the time of the second marriage. Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 467 (1874). On an indictment for bigamy, the supreme court of Indiana de- cline to consider the fact that the first wife was alive two years before the second marriage sufficient evidence that she was alive at that time. " Inasmuch as the state was required to prove the appel- lant's guilt byond a reasonable doubt, we think the jury were not justified in coming to the conclusion, over the presumption of his innocence, that t^** first wife was living at the time of the second marriage." Squ.x-e v. State, 46 Ind. 459 (1874). The :;ame rule is applied in a civil case where the continuance of life would establish bigamy in a criminal case. Sharp v. Johnson, 22 Ark. 79 (1860); : I Ul ! ! Ii>! if;: m 'i I ■ jpi " In 18389 AMEHICAN NOTES. [PAUT r. Klein v. Laudnian, 29 Mo. 2;'50 (ISfiO) ; West r. State, 1 Wise. 209 (lcSy,3). " Thougli the law presumes a contimiauoe of life, yet where this presumption necessarily involves a presumption of crime, and comes in eonfliet with the presumption of innocence, the foriiier, which is weaker, yields to tlie latter })resumptiou, and the party affirming that an individual is not dead will be bound to prove it." Lockhart v. White, 18 Tex. 102 (185G). " Otherwise the second marriage would be held criminal, by rejison of a presumption ; which would be to establish a crime upon a bare presumption." Spears v. Hurton, 31 Miss. 547 (1856). While " it may be true that inuocen(!e is to be j)resumed, and that when the presumption of life is brought in conflict with the pre- sumption of innocence, the latter should prevail," the jury are not to presume death except at the end of seve.'i years, but are to weigh all the evidence in the case. Murray v. Murray, 6 Oreg. 17 (1S7(;). The rule, mor- or less definitely announced in the above cases, that the presumption of the continuance of life cannot be used to prove the defendant guilty of biij;amy was considered in an interest- ing Massachusetts case. Com. v. McGrath, 140 Mass. 290 (188;")). The indictment was for polygamy. For the lawful marriage tlio government relied on a marriage to one N. W. on January 24, 1880. The defendant set up tliat previously, in 187G, he had mar- ried one C. T. and cohabited with her until within a month of his going through the ceremony with the said N. W. He then asked tiie court to rule that " the jjresumption of law in the absence of evidence to the contrary '' was that C. T. was alive at tlie dale oi the ceremony relied on by the government as the legal marriage. This the judge, on the strength of tlie presumption of innocence, declined to do. Held error. " The fact that a person is alive at a certain tinu^ does afford some presumption that lie is alive a monili later, as it does that he was alive an hour or a year later. It is evi- den(!e tending to prove hat fact, whicli in ordinary cases, in the ab- sence of otlicr evidence, would be deemed conclusive. Its weight, of course, would be affected by any cinuimstances affecting the proba- bility of the continuance of life in particular cases, or rendering it probable that deatli had occurred ; and, in this case, the fact of the defendant's marriage is such a circumstance. But the question whether a person is alive at a certain time, whether a day, or a month, or a year, or any period less than seven years, after direct evidence that he was living, is for the jury, to be determined by the general presumption or probability of the continuance of life, modi- fied by the circumstances of the particular case. . . . The jury were to judge of the strength of the presumption of the innocence of the defendant, as well as of the continuance of the life of his former wife, in view of all the circumstances affecting them. The instruc- CHAP, v.] AMEltlCAN N(>Ti:s. 183«» tions of the court were not merolj tliat there was no presumption oE law, and that the fact was for tlie jury to find upon the evidenec, but were in 'fEect a lulinj; that the presumption of innocicnce destroyed the presumption of the continuance of life, so that the fact that the first wife was alive a month before the second marriage was not to be considered as evidence that she was living at the time of that marriage." In a libel for adultery on account of a second marriage, the first being denied, it was held that the general rule that marriage could be inferred from cohabitation did not apply, and an actual marriage must be proved. " We caiiuot indulge this inference without pre- suming that the defendant has been guilty of the crime of bigamy." Case V. Case, 17 Cal. C'JS (ISC^). b\)V analogous reasons, when the crime of bigamy is collaterally involved, the continuance of life will not be presumed, cf/., in an action ul" ejectment where the claim is made that certain heirs of the patentee were illegitimate because a former wife was shown to be living within five years of his marriage to their mother. Sliarp V. Johnson, 2'2 Ark. 79 (1800). Fkesumi'Tion ok Continuance Affirmed. — But this contention that where, in a civil case, the presumption of the continuance of life tends to show a subsequent marriage to be bigamous, the pre- sumption of innocence requires that probative force should be denied the presumption of continuance of life, has been vigor- ously repudiated. In a case involving a pauper settlement acquired by a second marriage and residence in the defendant town, the (hifence being that of a prior marriage to a man who had abandoned the pauper several years before and not shown to be dead, the court say: "It is said, however, in argument, that there is a presumption of innocence, which of itself is sufficient to overcome the presump- tion of continuance of life ; and that therefore the fact that the pauper married again is to be considered as some evidence that slio might lawfully do so. The presuuiption of innocence is not based upon factts, but is independent of all evidence. The presumption of continued life rests upon facts proved; and those established facts, while they raise the presumption of continued life, rebut the pre- sumjition of innocence." Hyde I'ark v. Canton, 130 Mass. 505 (1881). Under similar circumstances, the supreme court of Oregon say: " Ordinarily the death of a person would not be presumed until after an absence of seven years without being heard from. But if within the seven years, the presumption of life is to be overcome by the presumption of innocence, then the entire ease and circum- stances under which a party claims such force for this presumption of innocence ought to be carefully considered." Murray v. Murray, 6 Oreg. 17 (1876). • 1 'iii H i m I : '1: I: IB'-' Is J, * iHJCl!iH!!!il 183" amkii[<;an notkh. [part I. For siiailiir reasons, *^lif' court will not allow a statute permitting juM'sons to marry at'tor thrct! years' unexplained absence by a former liusbaud or wile without being deemed guilty of bigamy to be used as proof of actual death in a criminal case where such death is a material fact. State r. Henke, .58 la. 407 (1""' Hut in a Minnesota case, on an indictment liowe ver, there were corroborating circumstances, the lirst wife being shown to be alive witliin two years of the second marriage, the court sustain a '•uling that " when life is once shown, it is presumed to contiiuie until it is sliowu to liave ended. That presumption may be stronger or weaker according to the circumstances of any particular case. It is not a conclusive presumption, but it is a presumption which tlie jury is warranted in drawing, from the fact of life being shown, that life contiiuics until it otherwise appears." The court state tlieir opinion thus: "Taken as a whole, we find no error in this statement of the law. There is some confusion, if not conflict, of view^ in the decisions in cases of conflicting presumptions of the continuance of life and of innocence as to which shall prevail. Some hold that what is called the presumption of the continuance of life must yield to the stronger presumption of innocence ; and therefore, in prosecutions for bigamy, the fact that the former husband or wife was living at some particular date before the second marriage will not warrant a conviction ; that there nuist be some direct evidence that he or she was still living at the date of the second marriage. Reduced to its logical result, the effect of this would be that, if it was proved by the most indisputable evidence that the former hus- band or wif(^ was alive and in good health a few liours before the second marriage, the jury could not presume that death had not intervened, without some direct evidence to the contrary. The unreasonableness of this as a practical rule of evidence would seem almost self-evident." State r. Plym, 43 Minn. 385 (1890) ; Howard V. State, To Ala. 27 (1883). Probably the "confusion, if not conflict," referred to in State r. Plym, 43 Minn. 385 (1890), in part, at least, arises from a failure to distinguish presumptions of fact from assumptions or presump- tions of law. In a criminal cause, the forensic rule of the " pre- sumption of innocence" m.ay fairly be considered to be inconsistent with the establishment of a conflicting rule of presumption that there is such a probative force in the presumption of fact of a continuance of life as to satisfy the burden of establishing pre- scribed by the " presumption of innocence." But there seems no reason why the presumption of continuance should not be used as an inference of fact with such weight as the jury see fit to give it. Survivorship. — A mass of ingenious reasoning clusters about the question. What pri viumption of survivorship exists when several persons perish in a common accident ? The rugged common-sense ClIAl'. v.] AMKUICAN NOTEkS. i«a« of English law, after some sli^'lit attfuiipts to adopt tliciii, disciirds the intricate prrsiiinptions of tlie civil law, as hast'd on age, liealth, Hcx, &c., and adopts the ndc that there is no prosuniption oti the subject whatever; that he who relies on the fact of survivorsliip must establish it as best he can. Newell v. Nichols, V2 Hun, ()(i4 (1.S7S) ; Newell v. Nichols, I't N. Y. 78 (IST.S) ; Stiiidt- v. IJidg- wav, 55 How. Prac. .'JOl (1878) ; Stinde v. Goodrich. 3 Jtedf. 87 (1877). So in charging a jury, in such a ease, Mr. Justice Woods says: "There are no i)resuniptions of law in the case. If the evidence produced by the i)laintilfs establishes the fact of survivorship to the satisfaction of your minds, your verdict should be for the ])laintiff. . . . Tiie plaintii'fs have the afKrniative of the issue, the burden of proof is on them, and unless the testimony in the ease satisfies and convinces your minds you cannot return a verdi(!t in their favor; but, if you are satisfied and convinced, you can and should." Kobin- son /•. Uallier, 2 Woods, 178 (1875). It is merely reversing the statement, without affecting the mean- ing, to say, as is frequently done, that the jiarties are presumed to have perished at the same moment. What is meant is, that he who desires to establish any survivorship, has the burden of proving it. Tiiere is no jjrobative force in the *' presumption " of simultaneou.s deatii, and if that fact were material, aflirmative evidence would be refpiired to prove it. •■' When two persons, lius\)and and wife, are killed in the same accident, and there is no proof on the subject, the presumption of law is that they died co-instantaueously," Kansas Tac. R. v. Miller, 2 Col. 442 (1874). Apparently the facts that the accident was at sea; that the hus- band was in the prime of life and an expert swimmer, while the wife was in feeble health, does not authorise an inference that the husband survived. Fuller v. Linzee, 1,35 Mass. 4C8 (1883). lUit, on the contrary, in weighing the effect of positive testimony, the tribunal may properly take into consideration the ])hysical con- dition of the parties. For example, where a father was washed overboard from a wrecked vessel, a son for a time remaining, evi- dence of the health of the father may found an inference of the point of time at which the father died. "As we understand the doctrine of the connnon law, it is this, that when several individuals ])erish by a common calamity, and there is no circumstance other than that of age, sex, &c., from which it may be rationally inferred who was the longer liver, in such case, no presumption arises ni)on which a conclusion can be predicated. V>\\t that when the calamity, though common to all, consists of a series of successive events, sep- arated from each other in point of time and character, and each likely to produce death upon the several victims according to the iWIItt 'Hi i ' V, !i :iMi 183" AMERICAN NOTKS. [l AI!T I. degree of exposure to it, in such a case, the difference of age, sox and health beeonios a uiatterof *'r("(/«'«(r and may be relied upon as sucli." Smith /'. Crooni, 7 Fla. 81, 144 (1857). To the same effect is IVU V. Hall, 1 Chevfs (S. C.) lOq. D'J, 108 (1840), where the fact that the wife was heard for some time loudly calling for her husband in all parts of the vessel, without reply, was held sufficient evidence to warrant the finding of her survivorship. " Because the plaintiffs are to prove the fact of survivorship, it does not follow that they are to prove it to demonstration." KjhI. So where an elderly lady was swej)t away by a wave, while her grandchildren were se( ;i standing in the place " some ten or fifteen minutes after the grand- mother disa|)peared," it was held that " it may be that the evideniie is sufficient to justify the conclusion that the children survived their grandmother as they were last seen alive." Stiude **. Kidgway, 55 How, I'rao. oOl (1878). This decision, however, was reversed in Matter of Kidgway, 4 Redf. 22G (1880), where the surrogate says, after remarking that in such a calamity those who abandon the ve.s- .sel are the safer: "The facts of this case seem to me to indicate the instant and inevitable doom of the children, with hope of res- cue or at least some contiiniance of life on the part of the grand- mother. At all events, I am of the opinion that the parties alleg- ing survivorship have not satisfactorily proved the fact." Iln'd. Where the conditions of a common death, e.rj., that caused by a bniliiug building, can be made the subject of evidence, all the oii- cumstances of the case are relevant of the question of survivorship. "The death of the several victims resulted from a succession of causes." Will of I'^hle, .,3 Wise. 445 (1889). riiKsuMi'Tiox OF Reoulauity. — lu uiost iustauces, this so-callod presumption is rather a rule of administration than one of logic. It generally has slight probative force, and amounts in many in- stances to a statement that whoever relies on an irregularity must prove it. In other words, it states who has the burden of intro- ducing evidence on that particular subject. As the effect of tlu! courts announcing an assumption or "presumption" of law is to shift this burden of introducing evidence, the process of locating the buitlen of introducing evidence on a particular point by ruling that there is a p'-esumption of law to the contrary has proved an ca.sy one. The practical considerations wliicli have led courts to assume the regularity of proceedings (especially those of long standing) until the contrary is shown are obvious and valuable. It is fair to say of these assumptions, as Sir William Grant, in Hillary (/.Waller, lli Vesey, Jr., 239, 252 (1806), said, in presuming a lost grant of the estate, that these " Presumptions do not always proceed on a belief that the thing presumed has actually taken place. Grants are fre- ([uently presumed, as Lord Mansfield says (Eldridge v. Knott, 1 Cowp. 214 (1774), merely for the purpose, and from a principle of riiAV. v.] AMUItllAN NOTKS. 1H;J" fiuietiiig tho possession. Then' is ^is imicli occasion for preauiniiig conveyances of legal estates; as otherwise titles must forever remain imiuirfect, and in many respects unavailable, when from length of time it has become impossible to discover in whom the legal estate (if outstanding) is actually vested." This statement is cited with approval in Fletcher r. Fuller. lliO U. S. CM (1886). JuDif'iAL Puoc'KKUiNUH. — Wliocver would imi)each the accuracy of judicial proceedings must introduce evic'ence to that effect. The reason is partly given by the supreme court of Pennsylvania : — " We are not to expect too much from records of judicial i)ro- ceedings. They are memorials of the judgments and decrees of the judges, and contain a general but not a particular detail of all tliat occurs before them. . . . Much must be left to intendnirnt and presumption, for it is often less ditlicult to do things correctly than to describe them correctly." lieale r. Com., 25 l*a. St. ll (l.Sof)); State v. Lewis, 22 N. J. L. CG4 (1840); Worley Adni. r. J lineman, 6 Ind. App. 240 (1892). •'It is a principle long since settled, that in pleading the judg- ment or decree of a court having plenary jurisdiction of tlie subject, it is not necessary to set forth the proceedings preliminary to such judgment or decree. The presumption of law is conclusive, that all the r(>quisite prior proceedings were had in the case until the contrary appears." Lathrop v. Stuart, 5 McLean, 107 (LSoO). So the 'Maryland court of ap))eals, in a case involving the validity of a license iss\ied to a Pennsylvania corpor.ation by the governor of Pennsylvania under an act of the legislature of that state, hold that they are required by comity "to presume, that the license granted by the governor, purporting to be in pursuance of the law, Avas a regiUar exercise of power, and further to presume from it, that the jiatent had duly and regularly preceded it." Plank Koad Co. v. lirure, 6 .Md. A'u (1854). lUit the proceedings must be prutiii furif regular. The courts of Massachusetts, for exam])le, will not assume, in the absence of a recital in the record or evidence to luliat effect, that a California court had jurisdiction to grant a valid divorce between non-resident parties. '' A presumjjtion may exist in favor of the jurisdiction of a court of record of another state, which has assumed 'to exercise jurisdiction over a subject matter in controversy between parties residing there. But there is no such presumption in favor of the jurisdiction of such a court over parties not there residing." Com. r. Blood, 97 Mass. 538 (18G7). Omnia rite acta. — So it will be assumed, after a suitable length of time, that all facts existed necessary to the validity of an ancient title. The rule proceeds partly upon the presumption of fact that if serious flaws had in reality existed, advantage would have been taken of them in so long an interval, and partly upon consideration ii« t!! i I ii['':' ^1 1 ^" ' ■ '• ( ' ■ i : ill 1 1 !)■ '■ Hi § 11 ' \m\ \ Ir Wrm., 183^6 AMEHICAN NOTKS. [rART I. of the practical advantages of quieting titles as contrasted with tlie mischief and hardshij) of requiring the proof of trivial things in cases wherr the evidence is ])erishable, and, after an interval of time which would render the furnishing of absolute proof extremely difficult and exjjcnsive, if not indeed impossible. "There is a time when the rules of evidence must be relaxeil. We cannot summon witnesses from tlie grave, rake memory from its ashes, or give fresh- ness and vigour to the dull and torpid brain." llichards v. Elwell, 48 Pa. St. 301 (1864). So in a case in ]\Iaine, where the question turned on the validity of a tax-deed over thirty years old, it is said that " after the lapse of thirty years from a collector's sale of land for taxes, it may be i)re- sumed from facts and circumstances proved, that the tax-bills, valu- ation, warrants, notices, &c., were regular ; that the assessors and collector were duly chosen at legal meetings ; that the colletstor was sworn ; that a valuation and copy of the assessment were returned by the assessors to the town-clerk, and that everything which can be thus reasonably and fairly presumed, may have the force and effect of proof." Freeman t\ Thayer, 33 Me. 70 (1851). Where the plaintiff's title was based in part on a grant of land by a proprietors' meeting ten years before the bringing of the action, held: "It is but a just assumption as against them (and a fortiori against a stranger) that a grant asserted by their records to have been made at a legal meeting, was made by a meeting duly warned and linlden, until the contrary appears." Cobleigh v. Young, 15 N. H. 41)3 (1844). IJut in a Massachusetts case, where five persons petitioned for a proprietors' meeting under a statute authorising that number to apply to a justice of the peace for the purpose, and nine years after a writ of entry was brought on a title derived through the proceedings of tliat meeting, it was held that there was no " legal presumption " that all five were in fact i)roprietors, but that the demandant must establish that fact by competent evidence. Stevens r. Taft, 3 Gray, 487 (1855). In a later case in Maine, the point was raised in 1802 that the bond filed by an administrator who had made sale of certain real estate in 1830 did not ap[)ear of record to have been apjjroved in writing by tlie judge of probate, as required by law. The court say : " When we consider that this was a transaction which occurred more than twenty years ago ; that the law required the bond to be approved by the judge before it could be legally filed; that the bond was in fact filed ; that the record shows that all the substantial steps were taken required by law, and, so far as the administrator was con- cerned, with technical accuracy ; that the sale was a public one, and that the defendant immediately entered under his deed, and has held undisturbod possession for more than twenty years, the law would If' M CHAP, v.] AMERICAN N()Ti:s. 183« fully authorize the conclusion that all was done which was required to give the defendant a perfect title." Austin /'. Austin, 50 Me. 74 (18G2). In a case in Missouri, where executors had been directed by the probate court to give a deed, and there had been undisturbed possession for over twenty years, the court say : " It may well be presumed that the executors . . . executed . . . a deed . . . in con- formity to the order of the probate court." The court further speak of " the liberal presumptions that we would indulge in order to pre- vent irregularities or imperfections in such transactions from being held fatal." Williams *;. :Mitchell, 112 Mo. 300 (1892). A sheriff's deed, over thirty years old, recited a judgment. The court records being burned, held: "The existence of the judgment and execution recited in the sheriff's deed ought to be presumed." Giddings v. Day, 84 Tex. 605 (1892). In a North Carolina case the court, in deciding that a commis- sioner appointed to take depositions offered in evidence is pre- sumed qualiiied until the contrary is shown, use the following language : — " l*)y the general rules of evidence, certain presumptions are con- tinually made in favour of the regularity of proceedings and the validity of acts. It presumes that every man in his private and official character does his duty, until the contrary is proved ; it will presume that all things are rightly done, unless tlie circumstances of the case overturn this ])resumption. Thus it will presume that a man acting in a public office has been rightly appointed ; that entries made in public; books are rightly made by the proper officer, and like instances abound of those presumptions. Bank v. Uandridge, 12 Wheat. 04; " Gregg v. Mallett, 111 N. C. 74 (1892). Otjikk IxsTAXf i:s. — The same rule, for the same reasons, assumes the propriety of official conduct in matters not of record or in aid of ancient titles. So tlie official acts of public officers, within the general scope of tbeir jiowers, will be presumed to be by legal authority. Payne r. Troadwell, 10 Cal. 220 (1800). Tublic officers and all other ]ieople will be presumed to do their duty, — the idea being that the onus of evidence is on tlie person alleging the contrary. A county judge, for example, will be pre- sumed to have paid over insurance-money to the ccmnty treasurer as required by law. Stajdes r. lilano (U). (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. .109 (1894). So it will be presumed that a sheriff in giving a deed acted within his legal ])owers. Ivy v. Yancey (Mo. Supreme Court), 31 S. W. 937 (1895). The courts of North Carolina say that there is a presumption that men do their duty, private and official, until tlie contrary is shown ; that all things were rightly done unless tlie circumstances rebut the ])resumption ; tiiat they will presume men in public office were rightly appointed; that entries in public books i WW i 1 1' piw W^^'' Iv^ .i-iri: i I "it 1 H: r f ■ 1 ■J^b^U.: 1 183« AMERICAN :T0TES. [part T. were made by the proper officers. So it will be presumed that a commissioner appointed by the court to take depositions is qualified until the contrary is shown. Gregg [v. Mallett, 111 N. C. 74 (1892). Such a presumption, as has been said, usually amounts merely to a statement of tlie burden of evidence. Its lack of probative force is seen when it is attempted to use it probatively, i. e., to supply proof of such alleged regularity. Such a force the courts have declined *o give it. '' The presumption that public officers have done their duty, like the presumption of innocence, is undoubtedly a legal presumption ; but it does not sui)ply jiroof of a substantive fact. . . . Nowhere is the presumption held to be a substitute for proof of an independent and material fact." U. S. v. Ross, 92 U. S. 281 (187",). Lost Gkaxt. — Analogous to the presumption of regularity in acts of ancient possession is the rule that, in favor of the legality of a long continued enjoyment of corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments, a jury is authorised to infer the previous existence and subsequent loss of such documents as would legally account for the existing user. Tliis "presumption" hardly pretends to be anything more than a judicial tiotion. By employing the language of the law of evidence, the idea that judges declare law and do not create it is made to " moult no feather." At first the inference of a lost grant was said by the court to be a justifiable one; /. c, one which the jury might draw if so disposed. Then it is stated as an inference which the court advised. Finally, the rule was laid down broadly that a jury should be instructed not only that they might, but also that they were bound, to presume the existence of such a lost grant, although neither judge nor jury nor any one else had the remotest idea that any such instrument had, in fact, really existed. iNCOKiMmKAi, Hkukditamknts. — In case of incorporeal heredita- ments, tlic presumption of a lost grant has been stated as a positive rule. " Adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty years of an incorporeal hereditament affords a conclusive presump- tion of a grant or a right, as the case may be, which is to be applied as a j)resinii/)fi(> Juris c.f tie jinr, wherever by possil)ility a right can be acrpiired in any manner known to the law." Wallace r. Fletcher. SON. 11. 4.'U (18r.o). The rule has even been invoked in favor of the state's power of taxation. Certiiin Indian lands in the stati? of New .lerscy were, by convention in 1758, exempted from taxation. In lHO.3, these lands were sold to t\u' predecessors in title of the realtors, who, upon being taxed by the state under a statute of 1804, resisted the attempt to collect the tax, and by a decision of the United States supreme court (State of \ew Jersey tf. Wilson, 7 Crancli, l(i4 (1812) suc- ceeded in their contention. For some unexplained reason, the pay- CHAP, v.] AMERICAN Nt)TK.S. 183« inentof taxes was resumed in 1814 and continued until 1877. Upon their again insisting ou an immunity from taxation, it was lield by the court in giving judgment affirming the tax, tliat " the presumption will arise from the payment of the tax for so long a period, that the claim of the citizen has been discharged and extinguished." Tlie fact " raises a conclusive presumption that by some convention with the state the riglit to exem})tion was surrendered." State v. Wright, 41 N. J. L. 478 (1879). . Tlie language of the court as to "conclusive presumjjtions " sufficientljMudicates that tlie rule laid down is not one based upon logic primarily, but is a rule of jiositive law. l>ut in a well-considered case in l^ennsylvania, Carter r. Tinicum Fishing Co., 77 Pa. St. 310 (1875), user of a fishery for a long period was held to raise merely a presumption of fact, the weight of which should have been submitted to the jury. "Acts of owner- ship over incorporeal hereditaments," say the court, "corresponding to the possession of corporeal, are cli;i:;r.cd a foundation for a presumption." Coui'OHKAL IIkkkditamknts. — The presumption of a grant of corporeal hereditaments has not usually been placed higher tiian a presumption of law, while in case of incorporeal hereditaments it lias been laid down as a positive rule of law, under the disguise of a presumption of law. " In cases where the party claiming title under sucli presumption, may find it necessary to rely upon the presumption of a deed, we tliink that long continued user is evidence of a lost or non-existing grant, from some person who might, at some time, have made a valid grant to some ]iersoii capable of accejjting it." AVallace c. Fletcher, SON. H. 434,452 (ISSn) ; Proprietors of the Church in Prattle Square r. P.ullard, 2 IMetc. 3G3 (1841) ; Williams v. IMitchell, 112 Uo. 300 (1892). The rule in Massachusetts is stated thus by Chief Justice Shaw : " Sucli a question is a mixed question of fact and law, to tliis extent, that the facts being found, it is for the court to advise the jury, whether in tlieir nature and quality they are sufficient to raise tlie presumption proposed, tlie weiglit of the evidence being for the jury." Valentine r. Piper, ii2 Pick. 85, 94 (1839). This presumption of a grant "can never fairly arise where all the circumstances are perfectly consistent with the non-existence of a grant ; h fortiori, tliey cannot arise wliere the claim is of such a nature as is at variance with tin' supposition of a grant." llicard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59, 109 (1822). ItKiaTi.Aurrv in IJusimoss. — Incases involving tlie operation of an establislied course of public or j)rivat(! business wliere precision is a necessary requirenien*-, and systematic accuracy has been demon- strated by exjierience. it is evident that we liave in the so-called !i<l 183« AMKUK'AN NOTKS. PART I. ])resuinption of regularity souicthing more than a statement that the burden of introducing evidence to the contrary rests on him wiio disputes it. The presumption in such cases is one of fact, the ])nj- bative force of which is readily recognised, though it may greatly vary, for obvious n^asons. Rkcuilakity ok Mails, kt(\ — For example, letters received in regular course of business responsive to letters on the same subject, with proper letter-heads, envelopes, etc., are presumably authentic, according to their purport. Scotield v, Parlin, &c. Co., Gl Fed. liep. 804 (1894). The postmark of a letter containing a notice of protest of a promissory note " is evidence that the letter was mailed and sent, rather than that it was merely put into the post-office." New Ilavcn County ]{ank v. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 20G (1842) ; Oaks y;. Weller, !(> Vt. ()3 (1844) ; Kussell r. Buckley, 4 11. I. b'2o (1857) ; U. S. v. Bab- cock, 3 Dill. C. Ct. 571 (187(5). The presumption has been placed as high as a presumption of law. " The depositing in the post-office of a letter properly addressed, with the postage prepaid, is jiruixt, jhcie evidence that the person to whom it was addressed received it. The fact that the defendants had no additional proof that the letters were actually received by the plaintiff is immaterial. The evidence that letters were so deposited was comj)etent, and should have been submitted to the jury to be weighed by them in connection with the other evi- dence in the ease. They alone have the right to decide whether the inference that the letters were received, founded ui)on the proba- bility that the officers of the government will do their duty, and that letters will be duly delivered, is overcome l)y the other evidence." liriggs r. Ilervey, 130 Mass. 18G (1881); Folsom v. Cook, 115 Ta. St. 5;{9 (1887). Speaking of a notice of dissolution of a jjartnership, the supreme court of Illinois say : " Proof of tlu! mailing of the circular to tiiem was pi-imit fdrit; evidence tliat they received it. And no rebutting testimony was introductMl to overcome the presumption thereby created." Young v. (;lai)p, 147 111. 17G (1802). " It is well settled tliat t!ie fact of depositing, in the post-office, a l)roperly addressed, prepaid letter, raises a natural ])resumi)tion, founded in common exjjeriencie, that it reached its destination by due course of mail. In otlier words, it is /triiint. fudc evidence tliat it was received by the person to whom it was addrt!ssed ; but that prhiu' farir, proof may be rcfbuttcd by evidence showing tliat it was not receivcid. Tiie quuotion is necessarily one of fact, solely for the determination of the jury, under all the evidence." Whitmore V. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 148 Ta. St. 405 (1892). "It was error to instruct the jury that the mailing of a IcttiT addressed to the ajipellants was notice to them of its contents. It « CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 18360 was presumptive evidence, but nothing more." Eckei-ly v. Alcorn, 62 Miss. 228 (1884) ; Hastings r. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 473 (1893). So the supreme court of Pennsylvania say : " There is no jtre- sumption of law that a letter, mailed to one at the place he usually receives his letters, was received by him. A strong probability of its receipt may arise . . . and the fact of its deposit in the mail- bag in connection with other circumstances may l)e sufficient to warrant the court in referring the question of its receipt to the determination of the jury." National Bank, &c. v. McManigle, 09 I'a. St. ir)0 (1871). The requirement that the letter be sent to the sendee's permanent address is a reasonable qualification of the rule. Huntley v, Whit- ticr, 105 Mass. 391 (1870). '' Such a presumption is in accordance with and is founded upon connnon experience, and is therefore known to the law as a pre- sumption from the ordinary course of business. Farther proof of the receipt of a letter than what is derived from proof of tlie proper direction and mailing of it would be wholly unnecessary, always difficult, and often impossible." Kussell r. Buckley, 4 11. I. f)2.'> (1857). Other courts have considered the presumption purely one of fact. " The presumi)tion so arising is not a conclusive presumption of law, but a mere inference of fact, founded on the jn'obability that tin; officers of the governujcnt will do their duty, and the \isual course of business ; and when it is opposed by tsvidence that the letter was never received, must be weighed, witii all the other circumstances of tlie case, by the jury, in determining the (jucstiou wjiether tii»? letter was actually received or not; and the burden of ])roving its recei])t remains througliout upon the party who asstu-ts it." Huntley V. Wliittier, lO;"* Mass. 391 (1870), quoted with approval in Rosen- thal r. Walker, 111 U. S. 185 (1883). "Tiie mailing of a notice properly directed to the party to Ix' cliargod raises a presumption of notice in fact, for it is presumed that letters s(Mit by jjost to a party, at Ids residence, are njccived by him in due course. But it is a prr- suniption of fact and not of law, and may be repelled by proof."' Austin /•. Holland, (59 X. Y. 571, .570 (1S77); De .Jarnettc /•. McDaniel, 9;{ Ala. 215 (1890); (Jerniau Nat. Bk. r. Burns, 12 Col. 539 (1889). "There is no presumption of law that a letter directed and mailed to out! at the i)lace where he usually received his letters was received by him. . . . From its postmark, the fact that a letter was mailed may be inferred; btit by that, or other admissible evidiMKic, the mailing, when material, must be ])roved. It will not be pre- sumed from evidence that it had been written. So as to time of mailing. No presumption whatever arises from the date written m \-m 18361 AMKIIICAN NOTES. [part I. in the letter. . . . The date of a postmark upon a letter is not evi- <lence that it was forwarded on tliat day. . . . A fortiori the date of a letter is not.'' Uhhnan /'. Arnholdt, &o. liryvving Co., 53 Fed. Rep. 485 (181).'{). 'fhere is no presumption of law that a letter postmarked June IL'th was not dejjosited in the post-ottice until that day. "A letter de[)0sited on the 11th might happen not to be noticed or stamped until the ILJtii. It was sutticient, on this jjoint, to instruct the jury that t\n) 2)ostmark was one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration, with others, in deciding whether the letter was actu- ally left on the llth, or not till the llith." Shelburne Falls Nat. Bank V. Townsley, 102 Mass. 177 (18(;9). Kentucky court of appeals denies the presumption the weight of a ])resumption of law, but considers it " proper testimony to be con- sidered by the jury, together with the other evidence, in determin- ing when it [the letter mailed] was received ; and tliey should not have been instructed that a presumjjtion arose from it wiiich must prevail, unless overtiirown by other satisfactory evidence." Sulli- van V. Kuykendall, 82 Ky. 483 (1885). The presumption does not go so far as to establish the date of the receipt of the letter in the absence of evidence as to the frequency and speed of trains or the "usual course and time of mails." Boon V. State Ins. Co., 37 Minn. 426 (1887). The mailing must be itself proved. Where the secretary of an insurance company testified that he wrote and signed a certain letter, and gave it to an attendant to press-copy ; tiiat the latter brougiit it back looking as if it had been press-copied; that he folded and enclosed it in a sealed envelope, on which was a notice to return if not delivered; directed it to the insured, and put it in a basket where letters for nuiiling were usually ])laced. And the ottice-porter testified that it was his business to take the letters from the basket and mail them ; that he mailed all letters found in the basket, but had no recollection of ever seeing or handling this jiar- ticular letter, it was //cA/, tliis being the only evidence on the jwint, that whether the letter was mailed was a question for the jury, and it was not so (ionclnsive as to authorise the court to take the ease from the jury. Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 473 (18!).3). So no ])resumption of the receipt of a letter arises in the absence of evidence that it was stamped. Bless v. .Jenkins (Mo. Supreme Court), 31 S. W. 038 (18!)5). ( )n the same ground of tlu' due performance of official duty rests the presumption that a letter was received by the sendee, if the envelope containing it bore a request for its return to the sender if not delivered in a 'jcrtain time, and it has not been returned. "Evi- dence that upon the envelope was printed a request for a return of CHAP, v.] AMKHICAN NOTKS. 18852 the letter to the i)Ost-ofRce address of the phiiiitiff, if not failed for in ten days, and that tae letter was not returned to liini, was rightly admitted in connection with the evidence that the plaintiff sent the bill enclosed in this envelope by mail to the defendant. It was the dnty of the officers of the postal service to return the letter to the address upon the envelope (the postage being prepaid) if it was not delivered to the person to whom it was addressed, and there is the .same inference of fact that they would do their duty in this respect as in forwarding and delivering letters addressed to a mer- chant at his place of business." Hedden v. Roberts, 134 Mass. 38 (1882). In a recent Pennsylvania case, the court say that the fact of non-return of a letter bearing a request for return in case of non- delivery so strengthens tlie presumption of receipt from mailing " that it becomes well-nigh conclusive." Jensen v. McCorkell, 154 Pa. St. 323 (1893). liut this presumption of the regular performance of official duty may have but small weiglit in a particular instance especially outside of the routine work of an office, and it may therefore be only a ruling on the burden of evidence, t. e., a pure presumption of law. On the question whether a defendant knew he had no title to timber he had cut, an attempt was made to show that he had been notified by the United States government authorities that his entries had been cancelled. Defendant absolutely denied that he ever had been so notified. To prove notice, evidence was introduced that the (Commissioner of the Land-Office had notified the local register that tlie defendant's entries were cancelled, and directed him ^o to notify the defendant. Tlie plaintiffs then relied on tiie presumption that the Register had done as directed. The court say : "They rely upon the familiar rule that all reasonable presumptions must be made in favor of the regularity and validity of the action of public officers and tribunals. This rule is well established, but it does not appear to be applicable under the present circumstances. It is a mere presumption of law, which operates only in case of absence of evidence. It disappears entirely in the presence of positive, uncon- tradicted evidence upon the subject ; and, furthermore, it seems very doubtful whether any presumption could be indulged here that the register gave the notice in question." Befay v. Wheeler, 84 Wise. 13") (1893). Rkoclauity in TKLRfiUAMS. — Bascd on similar reasons, a pre- sumption of fact exists that a telegram properly directed and deliv- ered to the company for transmission is duly received by the person to whom it is se..;. Rut little can be added to the very cogent reasoning adopted by the New York court of appeals on tlu^ subject. Finch, ,L, in Oregon Steamship Co. v Otis, 100 N. Y. 440, 451 (1885) ; Com. V. Jeffries, 7 All. 548 (1803) ; U. S. v. Rabcock, 3 Dill. C. Ct. 571 (1870) ; White v. Flemming, 20 Nova Scotia, 335 (1888). •| i i i i ! ' ! I ,1 . \l Hf^i ■^ .t'- \ \ m ' III 1 I 'I III! ' 1^^ U- ii f ' ' si 1 allegation;:' and EVIDKXCE MUST COUliESl'OND. PART TI. EULES GOVERNING THE PRODUCTION OF TESTIMONY. CHAPTER I. CORRESPONDENCE OF EVII)KN(;E WITH ALLEOATIONS ; SUBSTANCE OF issue; variance; and amendment. § 217.* The production of evidence on a trial — whether civil oi criminal — is governed by four general rules. First, the evidence must correspond with the allegations in the pleadings,^ but the substance only of the issues raised thereby need be proved ; nccomlly, the evidence must be confined to the points in issue ; thinlly, the burthen of proving a proposition at issue lies on the party holding the substantial affirmative ; and fourthli/, the best evidence, of which the case in its nature is susceptible, must always be produced. § 218.' The first rule is that the evidence must correspond with the allegations in the pleadings. The pleadings, it may be explained, are the written allegations of the parties, terminating in proposi- tions distinctly affirmed on one side, and denied on the other, called the issues.^ If these are propositions of fact, the first rule, which it is important to remember, is, that the evidence must corre- spond with tlic (tlleii(di(>»s,l,ut that it is sufficient if the substance of thi issues be proved. Pleadings being intended* to apprise the parties of the specific questions to be tried, this object would be def6ated > Gr. Ev. § 50, slightly. * Pee generally as to the Dature of pleiidirgs, and the rules by which they are now governed, poat, § 298 et seq. ' Gr. Ev. § 51, in part, as to first six lines. * As to their objects, see further, post, § 299. 184 CHAP. I.] AMENDMENTS UNDER SUCCESSIVE STATUTES. if either party were at liberty to prove facts essentially dilTereiit from those stated on the record, as constituting tho tlaini or charge on the one hand, or the defence on the other.' Every material disagreement, between the allegation and the proof, constitutes what is called a viiriancc, which, in strictness, is as fatal to the party on wliom the proof lies as a total failure of evidence. § 219. Having regard to the recent changes in the law on this subject, it appears to be unnecessary to give detailed instances of what the old law held to be a variance. ^ § 220. A partial remedy for the injustice which in old days was done by the highly technical rules which prevailed as to " vari- ances " was provided in 1828 ; ' larger powers of amendment were granted in 1833 to the English judges,* and in 1840 to the Irish judges.* §221. In civil cases further powers of amendment were created in 1852, by the Common Law Procedure Act,* and by the Equity Procedure Act of that year ; ' the Common Law Procedure Acts of 1854 and 1860 contained clauses authorising the amendment of " all defects and errors in any proceedings under the provisions " of those Acts respectively, " if duly applied for ; " * while the Irish Common Law Procedure Act of 1853 empowered the judges in that country to amend " all defects and errors in any writ, pleading, record, or other proceeding in civil causes," " and the law relating ;Ml ' In Caton v. Caton , 1 849, Dr. Lush- inf^ton observed: "The maxim of the Eccles. Courts, and I may say of all other courts, is to decide secundum allegata et probata. There must be both charge and evidence ; the party cited is entitled to know the specific charge for the purpose of defence. * * The difficulty I feel is to avoid the error of adhering to this rule with ■pedantic strictness, and, on the other hand, not to weaken a rule which is founded on one of the great principles of justice." See Malcolmson v. Olay- ton, 1860, P. C. (Ld. Chelmsford); The Ann, 1860, P. C; Tyrer v. Heniy. 1860, P. C; Kilgour v. Alexander, 1860, P. 0. ; The Has- well, 1864; and The Amalia, 1864. * Jones V. Cowley, 1826, was de- clared by Alderson, B., to be "a great disgrace to the English law," m Hemming v. Parry, 1834. See, also, Goodtitle v. Lammiman, 1809; Brooks ('. Bhinshard, 1833. ^ I5y Geo. 4, c. 15 (repealed by 63 & o4 V. c. 33, " The S. L. E. Act, 1890"). ♦ By 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42, §§ 23, 24 (repealed as to High Court by 44 & 45 V. c. 59). » By 3 & 4 V. 0. 105 ("The Debtors (Ireland) Act, 1840"), §§48, 49. « 15 »& 16 V. c. 76, §§ 34, 35, 37, 222 (repealed by 46 & 47 V. c. 49). See corresponding sections in the Irish Actofl6&17V.c.ll3,§§ 85-91. ' 15 & 16 V. 0. 86. §§ 49, 53. « 17 & 18 V. 0. 125, §96; 23 & 24 V. c. 126, § 36. Repealed by 46 & 47 V. 0. 49. • 16 & 17 y. 0. 113, § 231, It. 185 I'ilil P"f ilH F ■ i t i ' f i i, i i UL li M '■ i IP • 1 ! ! Ml: ' ■*;•,! AMHNUMI.NT UND7JI RULES OF 1883. [PART II. to siinli amendments was in civil cases further altered bj the Rules of Court originally framed under the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 ; and in 1883 these last-named Rules were aimulled. The Rules, now regulating the amendment of proceedings in civil oases in the Supreme Court, are Orders XVI., XIX., and XXVIII. of the R. S. C, 1883.' § 222-5. Not one of the above named three Orders, however, has any effect on criminal proceedings, or on proceedings for divorce or other matrimonial causes. Orders XVI., and XIX., moreover, are inoperative in proceedings, either on the Crown side, or on the Revenue side, of the Queen's Bench Division. Order XXVIII, however, applies to all cicil proceedings on the Crown side, includ- ing mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto, and to all pro- ceedings on the Revenue side, of the same Court.* And it will be recollected that the law as to amendment of civil proceedings in many inferior courts, is still governed by the enactments earlier than the Judicature Act which are referred to in § 220. § 226. Reference must be made to a Book upon Practice for the details of the contents of the Rules just mentioned, and of the decisions upon them. Briefly, however, their effect may be sum- marized by sa^'ing that, 1st, the court or a judge may at any stage of the proceedings, " for the purpose of determining the real ques- tion or issue," ^ allow eitaer party to alter or amend his indorse- ment or pleadings ; ■• 2nd, all such amendments shall be made as ¥ h ^ 1 Ji.'i4..^: 1.. J ' Evon an indorsement can be amended, see Cornish v. Hochen, 18 J3 ; Leigh v. Baker, 185". Ais to amendments of pleadings in the Con- sistorj' Conrt of liondon, see Keg. Gen. of 1877 relating to that court, Ord. III. * Crown Office Rules, 1883, r. 299. 3 As to wliat is " the real matter in controversy," it has been said that it is a mutter, not of law, but of fact, what "the real question in contro- versy between the parties" is; next, that this matter of fact miist be de- termined, not by the jury, but by the judge on a careful consideratioii of the pleadings and the evidence; and, lastly, that " the question ir contro- versy " is, in other words, the ques- tion which both parties really in- tended to have tried, and not any question which, diuing the course of the trial, may for the Hrst time bo brought into coiitrover.sy by one of the litifjants. See Eoles v. iJavis, ISoO (judgment of Court of Common Pleas). As to amendments of names, or substituting or adding parties, see rr. 11 and 12 of Ord. XVI., under which an application caiuiot bo made ex ])arte : 'i'ildesley v. Haiper, 1876 (Hall. V.-C.) ; S. C. in C. A., 1878. * Where a plaintilY amends liis claim so as to alter the whole cause of action, the ])H)])(>r course is to apply to the couit to disallow the amendment, or to allow it only on terms: Bourne v. Coulter, 1884. See also rr. 1 and 4 of Ord. XVI., which respectively render amendments un" 18;5 CHAP. I.] AMKNDMENT OF PLKADINnS. raay be necessary for the purpose of dotormining tlie real questions in controversy ; ' 3rd, without leave, but subject to the risk of having to pay coats, the phiiutiff mny amend his statement oi claim, and the defendant may amend his counterclaim or set-off ; 4th, the application for leave to amend any pleading may be made by eitlier party to the court or a judge, or to the judge at the trial of the action ; * 5th, pleadings may be amended by striking out any scandalous or embarrassing matter ; and lastly, any of these respective amendments raay be allowed upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as may be just. § 227. The power.s of amendment conferred by these ruU-s ouglit to be exercised in a liberal spirit.' Mm necessary in cases whovo too niaity plaintiffs or defcnclants have bucn joined. See Child ». Stunning, 1877; Udoth V. Bi'iscoo, 1877. ' See n. ', ante, p. 186. ' An application to amend can only be made whei'e there lias been a bona fide mistake: Clowes v. Ililliard, 1893 (Jessel, M.R.). But such mistake may bo one of law : Duckett v. Govor, 1877 (Jos.-el, M.R.). And the court must be satisfied, where a party is proposed to bo added, that ho has assented, or that his interests have been properly i)rotected : Tiirquand V. Fearon. Ifs79. Whore, after an amendment, the opposite party fails to plead afjain, he is taken to rely on his original pleading : Boddy v. Wall, 1S77. If a party be added (see r. 11 of Old. XV'l. as to this) he must, if ho be a plaintitt', have given a written consent, and, if a defendant, bo served with a suriimons or notice. As to when a plaintiff will or will not pre- judice the fair trial of the action by asking alternative relief, see Bagot V. ivistoii, 1877, C. A. As to what is Bmbariassing, see Heap r. Marri'i, 1870; Davy v. Garrett, 1877, C. A. ; Stokes /'. Grant. 1878 ; I'hilipps r. I'hilipps, 1878, C. A. This last case shows what statements must be con- tained in an action for the recovery of land of which the plaintiil has never been in possession. A county court judge can amend a mi-*join.ler of defendants in an action remitted Irom the High Court. See llennison r. Walker, 1872. ' This was so even with regard to the power of amendment conferred before the Judicature Acts. See Parry V. Fairhurst, IfsliJ (Alderson, B.) ; Sainsbiiry v. Matthews, 1838 (Parko, B.); Ward v. Pearson. 18;i!»; Evans V. Fryer, 1839 (Williams, J.) ; Pacific St.. Xavig. Co. I'. Lewis, 1847 (Pol- lock, C.B.); Smith r. Knowelden, 1841. Lord Mansficdd long ago said (Bristow V. Wrighr, 1781): "The strong bias of my mind has always leaned to previMit the manifest justice of a cause fioni being defeated or delayed by formal slips, which arise from the inadvertence of gentlemen of the ])rofes'iion ; because it is rx- treiiic/i/ liitril mi the }i(i)ii/ tn he turned riiiiiid, (iiiit put to e.rpriise, frinn such inittu/ien (if tlit aiiiiine/ ur ultoriieij lie einji/ni/n. It iii Imril, (//so, (jii t/ic jiio- fesnif'ii." AVith reference to amend- ments under th(; Judicatxu'O Act, Bowen, ]j.J., said tliat there was no kind of error or mistake which, if not fiaudiileiit or intended to overreach, a court ought not to correct, if it can he done without injustice to the other party, for courts of justice do not exist for the snke of discipline, but for the sak(^ of (h'ciding matters in controversy, and amendments for this purjiose ought not to be regarded as matters of favour or of grace : Cropper c Smith, 1884, C. A. (Bowen, L.J.). In accordance with the spirit of this dictum, the Court of Appeal has held that an amendment on such 187 ! I: l:! :1 ! AMKNDMKNTS A [.LOWED UNDKU OLD LAW. [I'AU'I' IL § 228-0. It would, sinoo this ia not a book of Pnictico, not only !)(' irrelevant to give details of the various do('i8if)ns which have taken pliicf* as to ainendinents, hut it would also ho of no practical utility, seeing that it is extremely unlikel}' that a case in which the necessity for amondnient arises at Nisi I'rius will he identical, or nearly so, with any case which has been previously the subject of actual decision. § 2;U). At the same time, it may not be entirely without use to here jioint out a few instances which exemplify priiiripks, in accordance with which an amendment has been permitted to be made even under the old law.' t^ 2'M. Where the real questions in dispute were, first, whether land in the possession of a tenant was the plaintiff's property, and, next, whether there was a public footway across it, the plaintiff was allowed to amend tlie pleadings in such a way as to really raise these questions free from technicalities.* Whore the real question was whether cargo had been delivered in proper time, an amend- ment of the pleadings, by inserting averments that raised this question in proper foim, was allowed.* § 232. In an action for slander, whore the words charged were, " S. is to be tried at the Old Bailey, &c.," and those proved to have been really spoken were, " / /i/iv 'iranf that S. is to be tried, &c.," an amendment was allowed on pnymont of costs,* Bosanquet, J., observing that the introduction of the words " I have lieard" left the slander as actionable as before, although the amount of terms as tho ciroiinstnncos may de- Tniind ought always to l)o allowod whoro tho other party would not be seriously or irremediably damnified, but uo injmy would be caused to him which would not bo sufficiently coiiipensateil for bv costs, see Clapa- rede v. Comm. Union Assurance Co., 18!);j, C. A.; Tildesley v. Harper, 1«78, C. A. ; In re Trufort. Trailord V. IJlane, ISSo. In St. Losky v. Green, 1800, Bj'les, J., observed, " Various statutes have, from timo to time for more than oOO years, been pa<8fd, from tho 14 Ed. ',i, c. 6, down- wards, to facilitate amendments, but the strict and almost perverse con- struction which the judges put upoa them, rendered them nearly abortive- But now a totally different principle prevails. Ever' nmondment is to bo made, which is .;ei;essary for deter- mining tho rial question in con- troversy between tho parties." ' Tho'se who wish to understand tho irry old doctrine of vaiifince, and to trace its oppressive ojioration pre- viously to the passing of tho remedial statutes, will find the subject fully and ably treated in 1 St. Ev. 430 — 494. See, also, 1 I'h. Ev. 50;3 et seq. See, also, the casee cited supra, in n. ' to § 219. * May V. Footner, 1835. ' Tennyson v. O'Brien, 1855. See Savage v. Canning, 18G7 (Ir. C. I'). ^ Smith V. Xnowelden, 1841. 188 CHAP. I.] AMKNUMKNTS ALLOVVICD UNDHU OLD LAW. dftmages might be losaciiHil, and also tliiit, as tlie diimagos wore given for tlio wordu as proral, and as tlio dofondant <liil not apply to amend his pleadings or to put off tlio trial, it did not api)flar how he could have been prejudi(!tMl in his disfonoe.' In another action for slander, wliere the words alleged to have been spoken about a surgeon were, " There have been many inquests held upon persons who have died, Iwrdiigo he attended thora ; " but those proved were, "Several have died that lie (plaintilf) has attended, and inquests liave been held on them," an amendment was likewise allowed.'' Where the only variance was, that the words stated in the deolara- tion were in English, while the expressions proved were Welsh, an amendmont was also allowed.' § 233. Iti another action for defamation, on objection being taken that the plaintiff's pleadings did not (as is necessary) set out the libel, but merely stated its substance, an amendment by setting out a verbatim copy of the defendant's letter on the record was allowed.* Whore it was alleged tliat the defendant published a libel, " o.ontainod in and hoiiig an article in a certain weekly paper^ called the ^ Paul Pri/,^ " and proved that he had given a slip of printed paper, containing the libellous matter, to several persons to read ; but it was not proved that this slip had been cut from any newspaper, the record was amended by striking out the allegation marked in italics without any terms whatever being imposed.* Similarly, a statement by way of justification, that goods had been stolen by " some person unknown," was allowed to be amended by striking these three words out, and substituting the name of the party who was proved to have taken such goods.' § 23-1, Where a special contract is stated, and the pleading then contains an erroneous allegation in conformity with its supposed legal effect, such allegation (even under the old law) might either be struck out, or so altered as to express oorreocly the real meaning of the contract.' 1 2 M. & Gr. 563. * Southee v. Donny, 1847. » Jenkins v. Phillips, 1841 (Cole- ridge, J.). * Saunders v. Bates, 1857. * Foster v. Pointer, 1840 (Qurney, B.). See, also, Pater v. Baker, 1847. • Pratt V. Ilanbury, 1849. See, also, West v. Baxendale, 1850 ; and Hailes v. Marks, 1861. ' Whitwill V. Scheer, 1838. But see Bowers v. Nixon, 1847, cited post, § 2;i9. 189 iJ pvpifW'i ^f' > i !:p ; ' i 1 i »'■ fiii!ii-( i.ri' I V'r ! AMENDMENTS ALLOWED UNDER OLD LAW. [PAliT II. § 235. An amendment, too, ralght, under the old law (and sL fortiori may now) usually be made, where the contract, or tort. or custom declared upon, turns out to be either more or less com- prehemire than the one proved.' For example, the statement of a general warranty of a horse has been amended by substituting an allegation of a qualified warranty, where the defence did not depend upon the qualification introduced ; ^ and a pleading alleging that defendant promised to lay out certain money in the purchase of a government annuity, and avemng as a breach that he had not done 80, but had placed it in the bands of some private company, has been amended by substituting " security " for " annuity," where the evidence showed tliat the money had in fact been received for the purpose of investing it in some government ■•■ieeurity} % 236. Where a contract, a duty, an instrument, or other matter has been mindescribed on the record, an amendment to suit the facta proved is permissible, alike under the old law and the present Rules.^ For example, where the pleadings stated that the defendants, in consideration of plaintiffs supplying beer to a third party, promisi d to pay them the amount of the beer so supplied, and in support of plaintiff's claim a written guarantee was put in, the " variance " (between an original liability to pay, and the collateral liability arising on a guarantee) was allowed to be amended by substituting the word "guarantee" for "pay."^ In former editions of this work, numerous further cases were set out, which furnished detailed examples of amendments liaving been allowed ; but, for the reasons already given, it is thought that the insertion of any more detailed inst.'nces would be now useless. >i 2-37. Even under the old law (and a fortiori now) the court could, upon the trial of an issue of nul tiel record, — which, be it remembered, must be determined by tlie court, and not by a judge and jury," — amend, by inserting in the pleadings, the true date of the judgment alleged to have been recovered.' A defence of " Not ' See Pacific St. Niivig. Co. v. Lewis, 1847. » L'e iiiiiint? v. rariy, 18154 (Al(li>r- 8on, li.) ; Mush c Deiishaiii, 1834 (irt.) ; Roiid c. Diinsmoie, 1840. ^ Giufoid ('. Hiiyley, 1842. Sec, also, Evans v. Fryer, 1839 ; May. of Curmarthen v. Lewis, I8U4. ♦ Iluiihury v. Ella, 1834. ' I'liny c. Faiihurst, 1845. * Ante, § 47 ; and boo llithardson V, Willis, 1872. ' Niible ('. Chapman, 18J4. .See, also, Hunter i'. Eninianuel, 18J4, where the true amouut recovered was inserted in the declaration. 190 .11 rdson CnAr. I.] AMENDMENTS ALLOWED UNDER OLD LAW. guilty by statute " has been amended by inserting in the margin an Act which had been omitted ; ' and a defence, not technical I if proved by the evidence, was amended at Nisi Prius so as to raise the substantial question, without the imposition of any costs.^ A judge has been held^ justified in amending a claim at the trial so as to increase it from 600/. to 750/. ; and in an action against the clerk of a local board of health, an amendment of the proceedings, by substituting the board as defendants instead of the clerk, has been allowed,* and vice versa amendment has been sanctioned, where the board had sued in the name of their clerk in lieu of their own name.' § 238. The cases in which amendments were refused under the old law furnish no safe guide in interpreting the more liberal language of the new rules. Indeed, it is clear that very many of such decisions are no longer law.' So far, however, as they appear to establish pn'iieiples which may be supposed to still exist, they are to the effect stated in the following paragraphs : — § 239. Some of the decisions cited in the footnotes were, it will be noticed, before the Judicature Acts and Rules, but it would appear that the principles they establish are sound, and ought still to be acted upon. It would thus, on principle, appear that there exist two great limitations on the exercise of the power of amendment. First. An amendment ought never to be made for the mere pur- pose of conferring jurisdiction.' Secondly. An amendment ought never to be made where it would be impossible if this were done to replace tlie opposite party in the position in which he formerly stood, and irremediable hard- ship would consequently be inflicted upon him by permitting the amendment.* In accordance with this principle, where more than six months after action brought, defendants snuglit to amend by the first time setting up a defence that tlie liability for the act complained of rested with a tliird person against whom all remedy had been lost because he was only liable if sued within six months ' Edwnrds v. Ilndpos, 1835. ' IJvK'kliind I'. JohiiHon, 18i)4. ^ KnowlmHii c. jUiictt, 18";J. See AVutkiuts I'. Morgan, 18.'J4. * ]jj. Boliubroko v. Towiisond, 1873. • Mills V. Scott, 1873. • Sco, also. Wilkin v. Rocd, 1854 ; Lucivs r. Taii.;t()U, 18J8; lloloH v. JJiivis. 1.SJ9. ' llojippr V. Wiirl)urton, 1863. * Stowurd r. North Metropolitan Tram. Co., 1886, C. A. m m li i AIM \ ,r I I 'I rn If 191 I) Iwi OTT I i ■^ I i i f'' I 1 n . AMENDMENTS REl'USED UNDER OLD J:AW. [PART II. of the act, leave to mnke the amendment was refused.' On this principle, although the mere impropriety or liarshness of an action ought to have no etfect in influencing the decision of the judge,^ an amendment has been refused where the matter sought to be expunged has been purposely and improperly introduced, with the view of creating a prejudice against the other side ; as, for instance, where a complaint contains averments and innuendoes unfairly connecting the plaintiff with parts of an alleged libel, which, in fact, related to other persons.' Moreover, as the rules for allowing amendments at Nisi Prius are intended to meet varinnces arising from mere slips or accidents, the judge will be very reluctant to allow an amendment, where the party has intcntionaUt/ framed his pleading in such a manner as to give rise to the objection.* When it turns out at the trial that the plaintiff, having misconceived his remedy, seeks to convert the proceedings into an action of a different character, an amendment will usually be refused — certainly at Nisi Prius — and never granted on other than strict terms.* § 240. On this latter principle, the court has, to prevent in- justice, refused to amend a variance, where it appeared likely that such variance has prevented the defendant from pleading a good bar to the action," or where the amendment proposed would in all probability have caused the defendant either to raise a question of law,^ or to plead different defences from those on tho pleadings,* or would introduce an entirely new contract and new breach,' or, perhaps even, any entirely new matter.'" ' Steward v. North Metropolitan Tram. Co., 1880, C. A. » Doe V. Pidwiirds, 1834 (Parke, B.); Doe v. Leach, 1841. See Bren- iian V, Howard, 1856. ' Prudhoiume v. Frasor, 1834 (Ld. Deninan). • Bowers v. Nixon, 1847 (Maule, J.); Clowes 1^ Uilliard, 1876 ( Jossol, M.B.). But see Whitwill v. Scheor, 1838, cited ante, § 234. • See Jacobs v. Seward, 1 872, H. L. ; Newby v. Sharpo, 1877, C. A. ; Clark V, York. 1882 ; Hipgrave v. Case, 1885, C. A. ; Clark v. Wray, 1885. See, however, Laird v. Briggs, 1881, C. A. ; Cargill v. Bower. 1878. • Ivoy V, Ycung, 1836 (Aldorson, B.). ' Evans v, Powis, ISV ; Bury v. Blogg, 1848; Martyn v. Williams, 1857. * Perry v. Watts, 1842, explained in Gurford v, Baylcy, 1842; Frankum V. Ld. Falmouth, 1835. • Brashior V. Jackson, 1840; Bou- cher V. Murray, 1844 ; Richards v, Bluck, 1848 ; Moncrieff v. lleado, 1848. '» David V, Preece, 1843. Se« Gull V. Lindsay, 1849; luid Addington v. Magan, 1851. For examples, see Perry v. Watts, 1842, explained by Maule, J., in Gurford i". Bayley, 1842; Frankum v. lA. Falmoutn, 1835. 192 %j CHAP. I.] ADDING PLKAS AT TRIAL. all of Gull see d by yi'7' nuth, § 241. Independently of actual decisions, there is very little doubt that the judge may allow a paragraph raising a new defence to be added at the trial, whenever it is necessary for the purpose of placing on the record the real question in dispute.' It often happens, as was once observed by Maule, J., that in consequence either of imperfect instructions given to the pleader, or of ignorance, or of oversight, the substantial point intended by the parties to be tried is not raised by the pleadings ; * and when this occurs it would he obviously unjust to refuse an amendment.* It was, however, said (before the Judicature Acts) that a direction that all amendments necessary for determining the real question in controversy " n/iallhe made," does not make it mprrative on the court to allow a plea to be substituted after issue joined, even though the application be made prior to the trial, and though it be supported by an affidavit that the real question in controversy between the parties can only bo raised on the record by the introduction of the proposed plea.* § 241a. All disputed questions of amendment depend upon the discretion of the judge ; the Court of Appeal ^ will, therefore, always be very unwilling to interfere with that discretion, save in a case where it is obvious that some serious mischief would result from non-interference.* § 242. It remains to notice a few piacfiml points respecting the exercise of | i wers of amendment, which, though decided under earlier statutes, probably would, in general, be acted upon even with regard to the powers of amendment conferred by the Judicature Acts ; First, an amendment at Nisi Prius must be made, if at all, during the trial and before the verdict ; ' unless, indeed, the opposite party waives his right to enforce this amount of strictness, in which case it would suffice if the amendment were made within the time allowed for moving, provided it were ultimately in agreement with the judge's note." Secondly, the amendment must be allowed by the ])residing judge, who, it seems, may be the sheriff or his officer.' Thirdly, ' MituhoU V. Crnsswoller, 1853. » "Wilkin V. Rood, 18,j4. * Soo supra, note ' to § 227, and infra, § 2o'i\, as to the spirit in which appliciitions for amondmonts ought to DO ontoitiiinod. * Kitchio V. Van Goldor, 1H.)4. » Soo K. S. C. 1883, Ord. LVllI. r. 4, citod p(>^t, § 1883. • Golchng V. Wharton Salt Works Co., 187(i, (". A. ' Unishior v, Jackson, 1840; Doe V. Loiif?, 1841 (Coloridgo, J.). " Joni's r. Hutchinson, 1851. / » Hill '•. Suit, 1834. Compare Co» V. Hill, 1892. T. vol,. I. 193 o 1 iilit it m I fiMj COSTS OF AMENDMENTS. [part II. ' : M I! ' v^: !' wlien, in consequence of an amendment being allowed in a state- ment of claim, some alteration becomes necessary in the defence, the court will direct this also to be made, should the counsel for the defendant decline to interfere or to amend the pleadings himself.' Fourthly, a divisional court ^ will not control the discretion of the judge either in refusing '^ or allowing * an amendment to be made, unless upon clear proof that he was wrong, or, at least, unless it be Bhown, by affidavit, that the defendant has been prejudiced by the amendment. In all these cases, if both parties consent, a larger power may be exercised, either by the judge at Nisi Prius, by the person substituted in his stead, or by the court above.^ § 243. It is difficult to lay down any distinct rule as to the terms with regard to costs, and otherwise, upon which an amendment will be permitted. Each case must, in a great degree, depend upon its own particular circumstances. As a general proposition it may be said that the court will not allow any additional expense to be thrown upon the opposite party by reason of any amendment." Thus, if the defendant has put a defence on the record, the proof of which will be rendered unnecessary by the plaintiff's amendment, or has summoned witnesses, whom it will thereby become needless to call, or has otherwise been at any bona fide expense in preparing to disprove the original allegations, the plaintiff will only be per- mitted to amend on payment of the costs occasioned by his error. If the defendant, in consequence of plaintiff's amendment, will require to alter his statement of defence, or to summon other witnesses, the trial will at least be postponed, and the plaintiff obliged to pay the costs of the postponement. In cases where a variance cannot have misled the opposite party, an amendment will be allowed without the payment of any costs.' § 244. Although the judge at Nisi Prius has a discretionary ' Porry v. Fisher, 1846 (Ld. Den- inan). ^ So, too, tlio C. A., see supra, §24U. 3 ]JoG V. Errington, 18;J4; Jenkins V. Phillips, 1841 (Coloridgo. J.); Whitwill V. Scheer, 18o8 (Patteson, J.); llolden v. Iklliintyno, 18G0. See Lucas V. Uealo, Uoward, IBJG. 1861 : Brenuau v. ♦ Fuinsbury i'. Matthews, 1838 (Ld. Abinger). ° I'any v, Fairhurst, IS'.io, noticed by Patteson, J., in Guest v. Elwes, 18;J(i; Koborts v. Snell, 1840; Brawhier V. Jackson, 1840. * Smith IK Brandrara, 1841 (Tiudal, C.J.). ' tit. Losky V. Greou, 1860. 194 CIIA.P. I.] APPLICATION OF RULES AS TO AMENDMENTS. power of awarding or refusing costs in the event of an amendment, the court will take care that no injustice is done by his accidentally omitting to give directions on the subject. Therefore, when an order had been obtained by the plaintiff, enabling him to withdraw the record and amend his pleadings, but no mention was made as to costs, the court held that, as the variance had been corrected for the benefit of the plaintiff, he was bound to liquidate the defendant's costs of the day.' § 245. As already stated,'^ the present Rr. S. C, which have been referred to as to amendments, " apply to all civil proceedings on the Crown side of the Queen's Bench Division, including man- damus and prohibition, and also to quo warranto, and to all pro- ceedings on the Revenue side of the said Division." * Such Rules further apply to the High Court exercising jurisdiction in Bank- ruptcy, which now forms part of the Supreme Court,* to Admiralty actions, and to Probate actions, and to such of the County Courts as have Bankruptcy jurisdiction.' But they do not affect the procedure or practice, either in criminal proceedings, or in pro- ceedings for Divorce or other Matrimonial Causes.^ In the Divorce Court the only material rule respecting the amendment of pleadings was promulgated in 1875, and is thus expressed : — " Either of the parties before the court desiring to alter or amend a pleading may apply by summons to one of the registrars for an order for that purpose." ' § 246. Large powers of amendment are also possessed by the County Courts, when errors have been committed with respect to the names, descriptions, numbers, or representative characters of the plaintiffs and defendants ; * and, in addition to these powers, it is provided" that a County Court judge "may at all times amend all defects and errors in any proceeding- in the court, whether there is anything in writing to amend by or not, and whether the defect or error be that of the party aj)plying to amend or not ; and all ' Skiiinor v. Lond. & Bright. liy. Co., 1850. » Ante, § 221. » Old. LXVIII. r. 2. ♦ 46 & 47 V. c. 52 (" Tho Bauk- ruptcy Act, 1883"), §93. * Ibid., § 100. « Ord. LXVIII. r. 1. ' Eiiles in Div. and Mat. Causes, r. 187. Soe also it. 35 — 37. 8 Soe Cy. (Jt. llules, 1889, Ord. XIV. See Mills v. Scott, 1878, cited ante, § 237. » By § 87 of "The County Courts Act, 1888" (51 &52 V. c. 43). 195 o2 ! I I rii mv: Wii! ■lii ! i i ■ )! AMEXDMKNTS IN CIVIL BILL COURTS. [PART II. Buoh amendments may be made with or without costs, and upon snch terms an the judge may think just ; and all such amendments as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real ques- tion in controversy between the parties shall be so made, if duly applied for." Still, if the particulars of the plaintiff's claim do not disclose a case within the jurisdiction of the County Court, the judge has no power to amend them, so as to turn the complaint into one over which he has cognisance.' § 247. The Civil Bill Courts in Ireland possess'^ powers of amend- ment ; for, by § 2 of the Act regulating their practice,^ " it shall and may be lawful for the several assistant barristers, and judges on appeal, and they are hereby respectively empowered, in all cases, to amend all variances between the statement of the cause of action in any civil bill, or other process or proceeding in their respective civil bill courts, and the evidence in support of such cause of action, and also to amend all va iances, omissions, and misdescriptions in the descriptions, additions, and resid- ice of the parties, or any of them, or otherwise howsoever, of or . any such process, or between the original and any copy or copies thereof, provided such last- mentioned variances, omissions, or misdescriptions shall not, in the opinion of the assistant barrister, be calculated to mislead the defen- dant or defendants therein ; and in e ery case of any misjoinder of parties or oauses of action, it shall and may be lawful for every assistant barrister to strike out of the process the name or names of any one or m )re plaintiffs or defendants, or any count or counts in such process, by reason of whom or which such misjoinder shall arise, and thereupon to proceed therein as to justice shall appci tain." * , § 247a. We have now indicated in a general way, and so far as they appear to be relevant to a work on Evidence, the principles which regulate amendments in civil cases. The subject of amend- ments in criminal cases remains for consideration. §§ 248 — 61. We have seen that in 1828 * some po>ver8 of amend- ment of variances in criminal cases were given,* these powers were ' Hopper t'. Warburton, 1862 (Mel- to the "judge of assize on appeal," - ■ ~ - ■ by 27 & 28 V. c. 99, § 48, Jr. lor, J., in B. Ct.). « By 14 & 16 V. c. 57 ("The Civil Bill Courts (Ireland) Act, 1851"), § 106. ■' Further powers of nincndniont are given to the Civil Bill Cts., and 196 * By 9 G. 4, c. 15. See ante, §220. » See E. V. Cooke, 1836 ; R. v. Howins, 1841 ; E. v. Christian, 1842. CHAP. I.] LORD Campbell's criminal act of 1851. exceedingly limited. Accordingly, in 1848, and the following year, the limited provisions of the Act of 1828 were greatly extended, and made applicable to all offences whatever.' In 1851, at the instance of Lord Campbell, an Act was passed,'' which has placed criminal proceedings on nearly the same footing with civil actions, in respect to the amendment of variances between the record and the proof.' I 1 .! » By 11 & 12 V. c. 46, § 4, as to assize courts; and 12 & 13 V. c. 45 ("The Quarter Sessions Act, 1849"), as to sessions, the provisions of which Act are extended to Irish quarter sessions by 27 & 28 V. c. 99, § 49, Ir. The inferior courts in Scotland have now, under " The Summary Pro- cedure Act, 1864 " (27 & 28 V. c. 53), § 5, large powers of amending com- plaints before them with respect to variances and other defects. » 14 & 15 V. c. 100 (" The Criminal Law Procedure Act, 1831 "). * The principal provisions of this Act are as folio iv-s : § 1, " Whenever, on the trial of any indictment for any felony or misdemeanor, there shall appear to be any variance between the statement in such indictment and the evidence offered in proof thereof, in the name of any county, riding, division, city, borough, town corpo- rate, parish, township, or place men- tioned or described in any such in- dictment, — or in the name or descrip- tion of any person or persons, or body politic or corporate, therein stated or alleged to be the owner or owners of any property, real or personal, which shall fonn the sub- ject of any offonco charged therein, — or in the name or description of any person or persons, body politic or corporate, therein stated or alleged to bo mjured or damaged or intended to be injured or damngcd by the commission of such offence, — or in the Christian name or snrnamo, or both Christian name ai. . surname, or other description whatsoever, of any person or ])ersons whomsoever therem named or described, — or in the name or description of any imiittr or thing whatsoever therein named or described, — or in the ownership of any property named or described therein, — it shall and may bo lawful for the court before which the trial shall be had, if it shall consider such variance not material to the merits of the case, and that the defendant can- not he prejudiced thereby in his defimce on such merits, to order such indict- ment to be amended, according to the proof, by some officer of the court or other person, both in that part of the indictment whore such variance occurs, and in ever}' other i)art of the indictment which it niuy btjcoma necessary to amend, on such terms as to postponing the trial to be bad before the same or another jury, as such court shall think reasonal)le ; and alter any such amendment the trial shall proceed, whenever the same shall be proceeded with, in the same manner in all respects, and with the same consequences, both with respect to the liability of wit- nesses to be indicted for perjury and otherwise, as if no such variance had occurred ; and in case such trial hihall be had at Nisi Prius, the order for the amendment shall be indorsed on the postea, and returned together with the re(;()rd, and thereupon such papers, rolls, or other records of the couit from which such record issued, as it may be necessarv to amend, shall be amended accordingly by the proper otlicer ; and in uU other cases the order for the amcndme t shall either bo indorsed on the indictment, or shall be engrossed on parchment, and filed, together with the indict- ment, among che records of the court. Provided always that, in all such cases where the trial shall be so postponed a^ aforesaid, iu shall be lawful for sach court to respite the recognisances of the proseci'.lor and witnesses, ai.d of the defendant, and his surety or surbties, if any, acorrd* IN 197 If?! 'n: AMENDMENTS IN CUIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. [PAUT II. § 252. Under the provisions of the Act just referred to, an indictment charging the defendant with liaving obstructed a foot- way may be amended, when one of the termini of the way has been misdescribed, provided the variance be not calculated to prejudice the defence ; ' — an amendment may be made when the ownership ol stolon property,* or the stolen property itself,* is wrongly described ; — the misnomer of a party injured may be rectified ; * — the misde- scription of any persons described iu the indictment may be set right;" — an erroneous date ascribed to the passing of a statute may be struck out ; " — an indictment for perjury alleging that the crime was committed on a trial for burning a barn, may (to meet the facts) be amended by alleging its commission on a charge of firing a Htiiek.'' It, moreover, is not too late to apply for an amend- ment, even though the counsel for the prisoner may have addressed the jury.' § 252a. In general, however, the court will not amend an indict- ment after plea, if, in its amended form, it would be open to a demurrer." Neither can an amendment be made after verdict.'" inply ; in which caso the prosecutor and witnesses shall bo bound to attend to ]iios(!cuto and give evidence re- spectively, and the defendant ehiiU b 3 bound to attend to be tried, at the time and placu to which such trial shall be jiostponed, without enter- inj; into any fresh recognisances for that purpose, in such and the same inaunor as if they were originally bound by their recognisances to ai)])c'ar and prosecute or give evi- dence at the time and place to which such trial shall have been so post- poned ; " and a further proviso directs, " that, whore any such trial shall bo to be had before another jury, the Oown and the defendant shall res])ectively be entitled to the saTue challenges, as they were respec- tively entitled to before the first ,iury was sworn." By § 2, "Every verdict and judgment, which shall do given after the making of any amendment under the provitioiis of this Act, shall bo of the same force and effect in all respects, as if the indictment had originally been in the same form in which it was after such aTuend- mont was made." By § U, "if it shall become necessary at anj' time for any purpose whatsoever to draw np a formal record, in any case where any amendment shall have been made under the provisions of this Act, such record shall bo drawn up in the form in which the indictment was after such aTuendmont was made, without taking any notice of the fact of such amendment having boon made." See further as to amendment of formal defects in indictment, § '25 of the Act, post, § 281), n. '. * R. V. Sturge, 1854. * R. i\ Vincent, 1852 ; R. v. Ful- larton, 1853. » R. V. Gumblo, 1872. * R. y. Welt(m, 1862. » R. V. Western, 1868. « R. V. Westley, 1859. ' R. V. Neville, 1852 (Williams, J.); R. V. Tymms, 1870 (Lush, J.). « R. (\ FuUarton, 185;j(Ir.)(Lefroy, C.J„ and M()nahan,CJ.); overruling R. V. Ryiner, 185U (Williams, J.). ' R. V. Laliement, 1853. Sod (ju. The case, as reported, is not satis- i'actorj'. '" R. V. Larkin, 1854 ; R. v. Frost, 1855. 198 I'!'' ' CHAP, I.] AMENDING INDICTMENTS. Nor will the court amend an amendment, or restore an indiotniont, once amended, to its original foriA.' Where a prisoner was indicted for a statutable forgery, but the evidence only sustained a forgery at common law, an amendment on the indictment by striking out the word " feloniously " (thus converting a charge of felony into one of misdemeanour), has been refused.^ § 253. The Acts which authorise amendments in criminal pro- ceedings are founded on the policy tliat substantial justice is of more real importance than technical precision, and they accordingly seek to render punishment more certain, by neutralising the eifect of trivial variances, which have constantly protected the wrong- doer. So long as the least rational doubt exists respecting hia guilt, juries should weigh with jealousy the evidence against a prisoner; and judges should see most clearly that the act, with which he is charged, is an offence against the law. But when courts of justice go further than this, and permit the law to be defeat ""d by technical errors, which cannot by possibility mislead a defendant, and which have nothing to do with the substantial merits of the case, they take the most effectual means of rendering the administration cl the criminal law a fitting subject for con- tempt and ridicule. In civil causes, the Rules authorising amend- ments receive a liberal construction.' Why should an unduly strict construction be applied in criminal courts? The statutes tliem- selves warrant no such distinction, and to introduce into the interpretation of them the old doctrine *' strictissimi juris," is to misunderstand and misap})ly the meaning of that doctrine. § 254. Having drawn attention to the Rules and the Acts now authorising amendments, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, and the leading decisions upon their construction, some three or four general rules, which regulate the law of iriiiance, may, with utility, be noticed ; for although a discrepancy between the allega- tion and the proof is not (as formerly) fatal, if immaterial to the substantial merits, yet it may still entail considerable expense and responsibility as to costs on the party, who is driven by a " vari- ance " to apply for an amendment. It is in view of this that the ' R. V. Barnos, 186<); R. v. Prit- chard, 18G7 ; R. v. W('l)st«>r, ISO I. » fi. V. Wright, 1860 (Uill, J.). ' Sdo as to tho spirit in wliit'h thoy should bij rogiirded, supra, § 227, and note ^ thoroto. 199 II ii^fij IjM I vl Ik- K mm I SURPLUSAGE NEED NOT BE PROVED. [PART II. subject is still discussed in this work, and in applying the strict lilies which exist as to variances, the ample power of amondment now possessed by the courts must not be forgotten. Subject to this observation, the rules wi'h regard to va? ance may be stated to he/our in number, and are as follow : — (1) Surplusage need not be proved; (2) Cumnlativp alley ntiom, or such as merely operate in aggruvafion, are immaterial ; (3) Mere formal allegations need not he proved ; (4) But allegations of matter of essential description must be proved as laid. Having stated these four important rules, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to discussing them in detail — § 255.' The first rule as to " variances " is, that siirplusage need not be proved, and that the proof, even if offered, should he rejected. " Surplusage " comprehends whatever may be stricken from the record without destroying the right of action, or the charge, on the one hand, or the defence on the other. This, it is true, is a loose, and therefore unsatisfactory, definition ; but it is difficult, if nv?t impossible, to find one more distinct and practical. Each case must, in a great measure, depend on its own paiticular circum- stances. The best general idea of what will, or will not, amount to surplusage, is to be gained from one or two decisions on the point. Thus, where the pleading in an action for breach of a warranty that some claret wao in a certain state alleged that it was not, and that the defendant well knew it was not in that state, but at the trial no evidence was given of the defendant's knowledge, after a verdict for the plaintiff, a motion having been made for a new trial, on the ground that the scienter, having been alleged, ought to have been proved, the court were unanimously of opinion that the alle- gation of the scienter was wholly unnecessary and immaterial, and therefore required no proof.^ Said Lord EUonborough : " If the whole averment respecting the defendant's knowledge of the unfit- ness of the wine for exportation were struck out, the declaration would still be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover upon the breach of the warranty proved. For, if one man lull another into security as to the goodness of a commodity, by giving him a war- » Gr. Ev. § 61, in part. ' Williamson v. Allison, 1802; pitod by Ld. Abinger in Cornfoot v. Fowke, 1840. 200 i CHAP. I.J INSTANCES OF SUKPLUSAOE. ranty of it, it is the same thing whether or not the seller knew it at the time to bo unfit for sale ; the warranty is the thing whidi deceives the buyer, who relies on it, and is thereby put off his guard. Then, if the warranty be the material averment, it is BufReient to prove that broken to establish the deceit." Said Lawrence, J. : "I take the rule to be, that if the whole of an averment may be struck out without destroying the plaintiff's right of action, it is not v sessary to prove it ; but otherwise, if the whole cannot be struck out without getting rid of a part essential to the cause of action ; for then, although the averment be more particular than it need have beevi, the whole must be proved, or the plaintiff cannot recover." ' § 256 — 7."^ On the same principle, in an action for removing earth from the defendant's land, whereby the foundation of the plain- tiff's house was injured, the allegation of bad intent in the defen- dant need not be proved, for the cause of action is perfect, independent of the intention ;' in an action for impounding cattle in an unfit pound, an averment that the pound was " at all times unfit, as the defendant well knew," may be rejected as immaterial, and consequently it requires no proof;* if plaintiff's pleadings dis- close a state of facts upon wLrh an action may be maintained, althougb it may also (needlessly) allege malice or fraud, the plaintiff is not bound to prove either, and may recover upon the liability which the facts disclose, and this even if both fraud and malice be actually disproved ; * in an action against a common carrier for the loss of property intrusted to him, negligence, though averred, need not he proved ;° in trespass, for driving against the plaintiff's curt, an averment that he was in the cart is immaterial ; ' an aver- ment that the defendant wrongfully cut in plaintiff's close, used as a private road, a certain large sewer, and thereby diverted the water from a pond, was held clearly immaterial, so far as regarded » In Williamson v. Allison, 1802. See, also, Jackson v. AUaway, X^AA; Att.-Gen. v. Clerc, 1844; Tempest v. Kilner, 1845; Anderson v. Thorn- ton, 1853; Thorn v. Bigland, 1853; Southall V. Rigg, and Forman v. Wright, 1851. ' Or. Ev. § 64, as to first four lines. » Panton v. Holland, 1819 (Am.) ; Twiss V. Baldwin, 1832 (Am.). • Bignell v. Clarke, 1860. • Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford, 1860. • Eichards v. Lond. & South Coast Ey. Co., 1849. See ante, § 187. ' Howard v. Peete, 1817. 201 U! W- fti i! nli; :. 1 ■ ; P i ■' • f • i ( 1 i'lii BURPLU. AGE IN CUIMINAL PROCEKDINCSS. [PART II. the words marked in italics, and the plaintiff entitled to recover damages, though it appeared that the sewer was (!ut jireviously to the construction of the road. " For," said Tindal, C. J., " what has it to do with the wrongful act of the defendant, or the measure of damages which the plaintiff is entitled to claim, whether the defendant used his close as a road, an orchard, or a garden P " ' §§ 258 — 262. In the former editions of this work many further examples of averments in pleading in civil cases which were " surplusage," and consequently " immaterial," were given, but having regard to the present liberal state of the law with regard to amendments, it is not thought advisable to weary the reader with any further examples of the application of the rule in civil cases.'" § 263. The law rejecting surplusage applies equally in criminal as in civil proceedings. The api)lication of the rule that immaterial averments (or " surplusage ") need not be proved in criminal cases may, moreover, be usefully exemplified. For instance, if a party be indicted for robbery in f/ic dwel ling -house of A. B} or for arson in the night time^ the allegations marked in italics may be rejected as surplusage, and, consequently, need not be proved ; ^ and where one section of a statute' (now repealed) said that a certificate given hiowinghj and wilfully, with intent to deceive, should be a misdemeanour, and a separate clause made it a distinct offence to give such a certificate without having visited the patient,^ it was held that a conviction on an indictment, blending two distinct offences in one charge, and stating that defendant knoiring/j/, find with intention to deceive, signed the certificate tcithout having visited the patient, was, after a verdict in which the jury ' Dukos V. Qostling, 1835. '^ Exiimplos of the appliciition of the old hiw are containecl in Powell V. liradbury, 1849 (soo, however, Lush V. Russell, 1850, whore this case is denied to be law) ; Smith v. Lovoll, 1850; Horton v. M'Murtrv, 1800; Keller v. ]31ood, 1861 (Ir.); R. v. M'Kenna, 1842 (Ir.); R. v. Duroro, 1784; and E. v, Upton-on-Severn, 1833. ^ R. V. Pye, 1790 ; R. v. Johnstone, 17!)3 (by all the judges) ; see, also, R. V. Wardle, 1800. 3 R. V. Minton, 1786. * For other instances, see R. ", Phillips, 1818; R. v. Oxford, 1819; R. V. Summers, 1705; R. v. Hick- man, 1784; R. V. Radley, 1849; R. v. Otway, 1849 (Ir.); R. v. Williams 1850; R. V. Kcaley, 1851; R. v. Healey, 1824. » 9 a. 4, c. 41, §§ 9, 29, and 30. 202 I CHAP. I.] CUMULATIVE ALLEfiATIOX.S IMMATERIAL. negatived any intent to deceive, hut found the defendant guiUy, held to have been rightly recorded, nince, on the charge under the latter clause of the statute (viz., that of having certified without visiting), the averment of intention was mere surplusage." § 264. On the same principle, too, where an indictment charged the defendants with conspiring to indict the prosecutor, A/ Av///, with intent to extort money, they were held to be rightly convicted, though the jury, in finding them guilty of conspiring to indict with the intent alleged, expressly negatived any conspiracy to make a false charge ; for the court observed that a conspiracy to prefer an indictment for purposes of extortion was doubtless a misdemeanour, whether the charge were true or false.'* Again, where a parish was indicted for non-repair of a highway, an alle- gation that the road in question was an immemorial highway has been rejected as surplusage ;''^ on an indictment ior jointly receiving stolen property, persons guilty of separately receiving any part of such property may by statute be convicted;* and on an indictment charging a common law offence as having been committed " against the form of the statute," tin allegation in question may bo rejected as surplusage.* § 265. Tlie second rule" respecting variances is, that ciimidntive allegations, or such as mcreli/ operate in aggravation, are iminaferial^ provided that sufficient is ])roved to establish some right, offence, or JuHtification, included in the claim, charge, or defence specijied on the record.'' For example, where a defendant was charged in an in- formation with composing, printing, and publishing a libel, but no evidence having been given to show that he was the author, his counsel having claimed an acquittal, Lord Elleuborough* observed^ " It is enough to prove publication. If an indictment charges that the defendant did and caused to be done* a particular act, it is enough to prove either. The distinction runs through the whole criminal law ; and it is invariably enough to prove so much of the indict- ' R. V. Jones, 1831. * R. V. HoUingbony, 1825. * R. V. Turwoston, 1830. * 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny Act, 1861"), §91. * R. V. Mathews, 1793. See, also, 14 & 15 V. 0. 100 ("The Criminal Procedure Act, 1851"), § 24, cited post, § 280, n. '. * Supra, § 254. ' R. V. Macphorson, 1869. « See R. V. Uunt, 1811; S. P. in R. V. Williams, 1811 (Lawrence, J.). » S. P. (Ld. Mansfield) in E. v. Middlehurst, 1757. :li| f 20-S ¥ CUMULATIVE ALLEGATIONS IMMATERIAL. [PART II. ment as shows that tbie delendant has committed a suhstantive crime therein specified." § 266. Accordingly at, common law, on an indictment for mnrder the prisoner maj' bo convicted of manslaughter, for the averment of malice aforeth'jught is merely matter of aggravation;' on an indictment for treason or conspiracy charging several overt acts, it is sufficient o prove one ; * and on an indictment for obtaining property by several false pretences, it is not necessary to prove them all, unless they are so connected as to be incapable of separation,^ but it will suffice to prove the one or more, by which the property was in fact obtained.* § 207. Moreover, if a compound intent, or several intents, be laid in the indictment, and if one part of the compound intent, or each of the several inte» fs, when coupled with the act done, constitute an offence, it will li^t be necessary to prove the whole as laid. For example, an indictment for killing a sheep, with intent to steal the whole carcase, will be supported by proof of an intent to steal part of the carcase ; ' if a prisoner be charged with obtaining an order for a certain sum from the prosecutor with intent to defraud him of the sdinfi, he may be legally convicted, though it appears that his real intention was to client the prosecutor out of a small portion only of the procee'?° r>" the order;' under the old law a man accused of assault: rg a girl with intent to abuse her and carnally know her, might be found g. alty of an assault with intent to abuse simply ; ' and a party 'udicted for publishing a libel with intent to defame certain magistrates, and also to bring the administration of justice into contempt, may be found guilty, if the libel was pub- lished with eit/irr of those intents.* § 268. But the intent proved must either correspond with, or be included in, the intent alleged. Thus, it will be a fatal variance if an indictment for burglary charge an intent to steal, and it be ' Co. Lit. 2H2a. Fost. 1!I4. K. r. Witkham, 1839. R. V. Hill. IHll. 11. V. WilliamH, 1825. The same EDint 80OII13 to havo boon riilod by rosswoll, J., in R. v. Marloy, 1842. The principle in both cases was ' ' that tho offonce of intending tn steal a part was part of the offence of in- tending to steal tho whole, and that tho statute meant to make it ini- matniial whether the intent applied to the whole, or only to part." « R. V. Leonard, 184S. ' R. I'. Dawson, 1821 (llolroyd, J.). • R. V. Evans, 1821 (Bailey, J.). 204 11 CHAP. I.] now FAR INTENT MUST BE PROVED AS LAID. shown that the real intent wus to commit rape or murder ; ' and a prisoner charged with hurglary and stealing will he acquitted, if no property was taken, though it appear that the house was entered with an intent to steal ; and though, had larceny actually been committed, he would have been convicted without any allegation in the indictment of a felonious intent.^ §§ 269 — 70a. The rule that matters merely of aggravation are material, provided enough be proved to establish some substantial right, offence or defence included in the proceeding upon the record has been adopted by statute on several occasions. For example, by statute, on an indictment for burglary and stealing, if the prosecutor establish his case with the exception of proving that the breaking was by night, the prisoner may be convicted of housebreaking ; * if no breaking be proved, but the property stolen be laid in tlie indictment, and be proved by the evidence, to be of the value of five pounds, the verdict may be guilty of stealing in a dwelling-house to that amount,* the prisoner may be found guilty of larceny, if the evidence be not sufficient to prove the commission of the more aggravated crime ; ^ if no satisfactory evidence be offered to show, either that t^e house laid in an indictment as such was a dwelling-house, or some building communicating therewith ; or that it was the dwelling-house of the party named in the indict- ment ; or that it was locally situated as therein alleged ; or that stolen property, laid as of that value, was of the value of five pounds, provided it appear that any goods were stolen by the prisoner, he may be convicted of simple larceny ; * and the same law applies on a charge of stealing in a dwelling-house with menaces,' or of stealing from the person, with or without violence," or of stealing as a servant,* while an indictment under the statute for horso-stealing, though bad for not describing the animal by any term used in the Act, will support a conviction for larceny ; '" a M > 2 Eiist, P. C. 614. » R. V. Furnival, 1821 ; B. v. Van- dorcomb, 1796. 3 Under 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny Act, IHOl "), § 50. * Ibid., §60; see R. v. Compton, 182H (Gasoloo. J.). » 2 little, 302 ; 2 EaHt, P. C. 784. • 11. V. Bullock, 1825 ; B. r. Brookes, 1847 (Pnttoson, J.); E. v. Jackson, 1842 (C'rcsswoll, J.). ' See 24 & 23 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny Act, lH(il"), §61. » Ibid., §§ 40, 43. • R. V. Jonninffs, 1858; 24 ft 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny Act, 1801"), §67. '" R. V. Beauey, 1820. it 205 :i II HOW FAR INTENT MUST BE PROVED AS LAID. fPART II. m woman charged with the murder of her infant may be convicted of endeavouring to conceal its birth ; * a person indicted for felony in administering poison so as to endanger life, or to inflict grievous bodily harm, may be convicted of the misdemeanour of adminis- tering poison with intent to injure, aggrieve, or annoy some one; * on the trial of an indictment for simple or aggravated robbery, the jury may convict of a simple or aggravated assault with Intent to rob, if the evidence shall prove such an ofPence to have been committed ; ^ upon a count for maliciously wounding, or for maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, against the statute, a prisoner may be convicted of a common assault, even though the term " assault " be not found in the indictment ; * and it is pro- vided^ that, "if, on the trial of any person charged with any felony or misdemeanour,' it shall appear to the jury upon the evidence that the defendant did not complete the offence charged, but that he was guilty only of an attempt to commit the same, such person shall not by reason thereof be entitled to be acquitted, but the jury shall be at liberty to return as their verdict, that the defendant is not guilty of the felony or misdemeanour charged, but is guilty of an attempt to commit the same, and thereupon such person shall be liable to be punished in the same manner as if he had been convicted upon an indictment for attempting to commit the particular felony or misdemeanour charged in the said indict- ment ; and no person, so tried as herein lastly mentioned, shall be liable to be afterwards prosecuted for an attempt to commit the felony or misdemeanour for which he was so tried." ' ' 24 & 25 V. c. 100 (" Tho Offences against tho I'urson Act, 18(51"), § CO. » Ibid., §25. 3 24 & 25 V.c. 96 ("Tho Laicpny Act, 180i"), § 41; H. v. Mitthulf, 1852. Sco K. )•. Woodhull, 1872 (Dciiunan, J.). ♦ R. V. Tavhjr, 18(J8; R. v. Can- well, 18(i{>; R. V. Oliver, 1860; R. v. Yeadon, I8()l. Seo, also, R. v. Outhiio, 1870. » 14 & 15 V. c 100 f" Tho Criminal Proccduro Act, 1851"), §0, replacing 7 W. 4 & 1 V. c. 85, § 11 (which was worded differently, and la repealed by 14 & 15 V. 0. 100, $ 10) ; as to tho conntruction of which, see R. v. Bird, 1851. y<'0 R. r. M'l'herson, 1857. « See R. V. Ryland, 1868; R. v. ITa](g()od and Wyatt, 1870. ' Tho Articles of AVar for the government of tho Navy establish rules similar to thoao rocogniacd by canon and statute law. "Tho Naval Discipline Act, 1866" (29 & IJO V. 0. 100), expressly enacts, indeed, in § 48, that " whoro any prisoner shall be charged with murder, a court- martial nuiy find him guilty of man- slaughttir, or of a common assault; where ho shall bo charged with sodomy, a oourt-martial may find 206 CHAP. I.] CUMULATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN CIVIL MATTERS. ir.l. V. § 271 — 7. The rule that mere " cumulate allegotiom" or " aver- ments in aggravation," need not be proved not only prevails in criminal cases, but equally obtains in civil actions. For instance, in an action for defamation, if the plaintiff allege special damage, he need not prove it, provided the words be actionable per se ; ' in an •.otion on a policy of insurance, the material allegation is the loss ; but whether total or partial, is a mere question of degree ; and if the former be alleged, proof of the latter is sufficient.* In all cases, indeed, a party may in his statement of claim sue for a less right than he is able to prove, provided that the lesser right claimed does not differ in kind from, but is included in, the greater right proved.' § 278 — 9. The third rule* with regard to variances is that mere formal allcgatiom need not be proved. " Formal allegations " comprise, — among other matters, — all those averments of place, time, number, value, quality, and the like, which may be inserted in the pleadings, without being either essentially descriptive of the subject of the claim or charge, or otherwise rendered material by special circumstances, and also a multitude of other idle statements, which, in former times, English lawyers loved to introduce into him guilty of an indocont assault ; where he shall be charged with theft, a court-martial may find him guilty of an attempt to thieve, or of em- bezzlement, or of wrongful appro- priation of property belonging to another ; and, generally, whore any prison -• 8hall bo charged with any oft'enci' iiuler this Act, he iiT^y, upon failure of proof of the commission of tho greater offence, be found guilty of another offence of the sumo chi.ss involving a less degiTo of puuish- mont, but not of any olfonco involv- ing a gri'utor degree of punixhnu'nt." "The Army Act. 1881" (44 & 45 V. 0. 58), in § 5G thereof, also con- tains provisions to the same effect, and enacting that any prisoner charged before a court-martinl with steiiling may be found guilty of em- bezzlomont, or of fraudulently mis- applying money or property ; and if ho be charged with emb(!zzlement may be convicted of stealing, or of fraudulent misa^jplicatiou ; and if ho be charged with desertion may be found guilty of attempting to desert, or of being abroad without leave; and if he be charged with attempt- ing to desert may bo found guilty of desertion or of illegal absence. Tho section then concludes with a general, but not very happily expressed, en- actment, that ' ' a prisoner charged before a court-martial with any other offence under this Act may, on failure of proof of an offence being com- mitted under circumstances mvolv- ing a higher degree of punishment, bo found guilty of the savie offence as being committed under circumstances involving a less degree of punish- ment." ' Smith V. Thomas, 1835 (Tindal, C.J.). ' Gardner v. Croasdale, 1700 ; Uenson v. Chapman, 1848, H. L. ; King V. Walker, 18()3. ' Dimcan v. Lourh, 1845; Hailey V. Appleyard, 1838 (Coleridge, J.). * Supra, § 264. :;' t \-¥m liiiii 207 1^ ;i 1 i w 'i 1 1 1 1 t r" iJi II ^i: {;: iHi FORMAL ALLEaATIONS NEKD NOT BE PROVED. [PART II. every legal document. Since the modern amendments in the law, the rule in question has fortunately become a matter more of his- torical curiosity than of present practical interest. § 280. Indeed, so far as civil actions are concerned, this rule ha? passed into a dead letter ; and Lord Campbell's Act of 1851,' renders it of little importance even in criminal cases. With regard to averments of phce, it is ixow sufficient in all cases, excepting where local description is required, to state in the margin of the indictment the county, city, or ■.iiher jurisdiction, as the 3nuo for all the facts averred in the body of the indictment.* > 14 & 15 V. c. 100 r"The Criminal Procedure Act, 1851 ), §23, enact- ing, that "it shall not bo necessary to state any ve7nie in the body of any indictment, but the county, city or other jurisdiction named in the margin thereof shall be taken to be the venue for all the facts stated in the b,dy of such indictment; pro- vided tliat in cases whoro local de- scription is or hereafter shall be re- quired, such local description shall be given in the body of the indictment ; and provided also, that where an in- dictment for an offence committed in the county of any city or town corpo- rate shall be preferred at the assizes of the adjoining county, such county of the city or town shall be deemed the venue, and may either be stated in the margin of the indictment, with or without the name of the county in which the offender is to be tried, or be stated in the body of the indictment by way of venue. § 24 enacts, that " no indictment for any offence shall be held insufficient for want of the averment of any matter unnecessary to be proved, nor for the omission of the words ' as appears by the record,' or of the words ' with force and arms,' or of the words 'against the peace,' nor for the insertion of the words ' against the form of the statute,' instead of ' against the form of the statutes,' orvicevors4, nor for that any person mentioned in the indictment is designated by a name of offlco, or other descriptive appella- tion instead of his proper name, nor for omitting to state the time at which the offence was committed in any case where time is not of the essence of the offence, nor for stating the time imperfectly, nor for stating the offence to have been committed on a day subsequent to the finding of the indictment, or on an impossible day, or on a day that never happened, nor for want of a proper or perfect venue, nor for want of a proper or formal conclusion, nor for want of or imperfection in the addition of any defendant, nor for want of the state- ment of the value or price of any matter or thing, or the amount of damage, injury, or spoil, in any case where thf value or price, or the amount of damage, injury, or spoil, is not of the essence of the offence." § 25 enacts, that " every objection to any indictment for any form'il defect apparent on the fiu e thereof shall be taken, by demurrer or motion to quash such indictment, before the jury shall be sworn, and not after- wards ; and every court, before which any such objection shall be taken for the formal defect, may, if it be thought necessary, cause the indictment to be forthwith amended in such particular by some officer of the court or other person, and there- upon the trial shall proceed as if no such defect had appeared." ' As to the former law, see R. v. Hollond. 1794; R. v. Haynes, 1815; R. V. Foargus O'Connor, 1843; 7 G. 4, c. 64 ("The Criminal Law Act, 1826 "), § 20. Even before the Act it was no objection in the case of a transitory felony that there was 208 no V. 15; ; 7 aw the Mise cn.vr. r.] averments of place — local offences. § 281. In indiotments, however, for those offences which the law regards as bearing a local character, the pro'-f respecting the place must still correspond with the allegation ; though probably in many cases of variance on this point the courts would sanction an amendment of the record.' The distinction between local and tran- sitory offences is not very clearly drawn, but among local offences are— among others— burglary,' but not highway robbery ; ' house- breaking; * stealing in a dwelling-house ; * sacrilege ; ' riotously de- molishing cLnrches, houses, machinery, &c. ; ^ maliciously firing a dwelling-house, perhaps an out-house, but not a stack ; * forcible entry ; ' poaching ; '" iiuisances to h.j,hways ; " and malicious in- juries to sea-banks, mill-dams, or other local property. In most of these cases it is sufficient to allege and prove the parish, town- ship, or other local district, less than a county, in which the offence was committed ; '^ but in some, a more accurate description is necessary. § 282. For example, an indictment for not repairing a highway must specify the situation of the road within the parish, and any substantial variance between the description and the evidence will be material ; " on an indictment for night poaching, it has been held, by a majority of the judges, that the locus in quo must be described either by name, ownership, occupation, or abuttals, and that it is not sufficient to allege that the prisoner was found " in a certain close in the parish of A ; " " but on a charge of taking or ii no such parish in the county as that in whifh the offence was stated to have been committed : R. v. Wood- ward, 1831 ; R. V. Dowling, 1826. > 14 & 15 V. c. 100 ("The Criminal Procedure Act, 1851"), § 1, cited ante, § 249. » 1 Russ. 0. & M. 82G; R. v. St. John, 1839. » R. V. Dowling, 182G. • R. V. Bullock, 1825. • R. V. Nappor, 1824; R. v, Jarrald, 1863. ' Arch. Cr. PI. 67, and p. 457 oJ 2lBtcdit. (1893). ' R. V. Richards, 1SS2. » R. V. Woodward, 1831. • 2 Leon. 186. "> R. V. Ridley, 1823. » R. V. Steventon, 1843 » See R. V. Napper, 1824. T. VOL. 1. » R. V. Great Caafield, 1810; B. V. Upton-on-Severn, 1833; R. v. Steventon, 1843. See R. v. March. Dow. of Downshire, 1835 ; R. v. Waverton, 1851. If a earriago-r.'ay is described as a bridle-way, the variance is material: R. v. St. Weonard's, 1834. See, also, R, w. Lyon, 1824. " R. V. Ridley, 1823, under tne repealed Act of 57 G. 3, c. 90, § I , R. V. Crick, 1832 (VauRhan, B.";. imdcr 9 G. 4, c. 69 ("The Nighi Poaching Act, 1828"), § 9. In R. v. Owen, 182(>. whore the close was described by name and occupation, but the name proved was different from that allegctl, the judges held that the variance nas fatal. See R. V. Andrews, 1837 ( Jurney, B.), »ad £. V. Eaten, 1851. 30» r I i 'i' ft! AVERMENTS OF PLACE. [part II. destroying fish in water adjoining a dwelling-house, if the boundary of any parish, township, or vill, happen to be in or by the side of Buch water, it is by statute sufficient to prove that the offence was committed either in the parish, township, or vill, named in the indictment, or in any such local district adjoining the water ; * and if the charge be that of stealing oysters, or oyster brood, the bed, laying, or fishery may also by statute be described by name or otherwise, without stating it to be in any particular parish, town- ship, or vill.* Moreover, an indictment for an affray cannot be sustained, unless it contain an averment that the offence was com- mitted in a public street or highway, and unless that averment be supported by corresponding proof.' § 283. Why a burglar should be entitled to more accurate infor- mation respecting the house he is charged with having enterecl, than the highway robber can claim as to the spot where his ofPence is stated to have been committed, it is impossible to say ; either full information should be given in all cases or in none. § 284. Excepting in the very few cases where time, is of the essence of the offence, an indictment,* too, need not contain any allegation respecting time.* § 285. Allegations of number and value are, also, in general immaterial in indictments. Thus, if a party be charged with steal- ing five horses, he may be convicted of stealing one ; and if he be indicted for larceny or robbery, and the property be laid as of the value of twenty shillings, the offence will be complete, though it » 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (" The Larceny Act, 1861 "), § 24. » Id. § 26. « R. V. O'Noill, 1871 (Ir.). ♦ So as to coioniTS inquisitions ; SCO " Tho Coroners Act. 1H87 " (30 & 61 V. c. 71), § 20; and see, also, R. V. Ingham, 1804. » 14 & ioV. c. 100 ("Tho Criminal rrocodure Act, 18.Jl"), § 24. citod ante, § 280, n. \ on p. 208. Tlio()hl rule roquiied a day to be specified, but did not rc(iuiro that day to be proved. Ihit tho lof^ishiture has now adopted my Uncle Tol»y's reply to Corporal 'I'rini's argument in tolling his unfortunate story of tho King of Hoheinia. " ' Thoro was a certain King of Bohemia, but in what year of our Lord,' — ' I would UjD give a lialfpenny to know,' said my Uncle Toby. ' Onh/, an' please yiiur Honour, it mnkes a story look the liftti-r ' the face,' ' Lcdve out the date entirely. Trim;' said my Uncle, 'a stori/ jiu^ses rcri/ inell without these niceties, unless one. is pretty sure of 'en!'" Even before the statute, whiTO a court had no jurisdiction to try a criminal, except for an offence committed after a certain day, no objection could bo taken to the in- dictment in arrest of judgment, for alleging that the act was done before that day. when the jury had ox- j)reKsly fotind tliat this was not correct. !Seo, a\m, R. v. Troharne, 1831; and 11. v. Levy, 1819. 210 m CHAP. I.] ALLEGATIONS OF NUMBER AND VALUE. appear that the article stolen was of less value than any coin of the realm, provided that it was of .so/we value to the owner.' § 28G. In certain cases, however, value is essential to constitute the offence ; as where a bankrupt is indicted for fraudulently con- cealing or removing property to the value of ten pounds,^ or for absconding with property to the amount of twenty pounds,' or a person is indicted for maliciously injuring property to an amount exceeding iive pounds,* or a tenant is indicted for stealing a chattel or fixture let to him with his house or lodging, and exceeding the value of five pounds,* or a party is charged with stealing in a dwelling-house chattels, &c., to that amount,' or with stealing, or with destroying or damaging, either maliciously or with intent to steal, any trees in a park, pleasure-ground, garden, or orchard, above the value of one pound, or any trees elsewhere above the value of five pounds.' In such cases as these, the evidence must so far correspond with the allegation as to show that the statutable offence has been committed : that is, the property fraudulently or maliciously dealt with, stolen, or destroyed, must be proved, as well as alleged, to be of the requisite value ; though if this be done, the exact amount specified in the indictment need not be proved. Where * a bankrupt was charged with concealing his property, and the indictment, — after specifying many articles without stating the separate value of each, — added tliese words, " and also one hundred i; f i !! .Ul "/ > R. V. Morris, 1840 (Parke, B.) ; R. V. Bingloy, 183:1 (Gurney, B.) ; R. V. Clark, 1810. The fact of the article being in the possession of the prosecutor is, in general, evideuco that it was of value to him. Id. » 32 & 33 V. o. 62 ("The Debtors Act, 18G9"), § 11, Bxibs. 4, 5; as amended by 40 & 47 V. c. 52 ("The Hunkruptcy Act, 1883"), § 103, and ■13 & 54 V. c. 71 ("The Bankruptcy Act, 1890"), § 20; 35 & 30 V. c. 57, 511, subs. 4, 5, Ir. » 32 & 33 V. 0. 62, § 12; as amended by 46 & 47 V. c. 52, § 103; 35 & 30 V. c. 57. § 12, Ir. * 24 & 25 V. 0. 97 ("The Miilicious Damage Act, 180r'), § 61. The damage must be done at one time : R. V. Williams, 1862 (Ir.). The vahio of each article injured uojd not be 211 stated, but it will be sufficient to allege that the amount of the aggre- gate damage exceeded 0/. : R. v. Thoman, 1871. » 24 & 25 V. 0. 96 ("The Larceny Act, 1861 "), § 74. If the value of the property stolen do not exceed 51., tlio jirisoner is not liable to penal servitude. Id. « 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny Act, 1801 "), § 60. ' 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larcen" Act. 1801"), § 32; 24 & 25 V. c. 97 ("The Malicious Damage Act, 1801''), §§ 20, 21. Where several tr(!e8 have been stolon or dumagwl at the 8a.me time, their collective value will watisiy the Act: R. v, Shoidierd, IHOS. * R. V. Forsyth, 18H (all the Judgoa). p2 1IH fpn ! 1- ' i pi ■ i ■ i III- ■ 1 i'!^ ; ALLEUATIONS OF NUMIJEIt AND VALUC. [I'ART II. other aiticles of furniture and a certain debt due from J. T. to tlie prisoner, to the value of twenty pounds and upwards ;" ' the indict- ment was held bad, as all the property concealed was not specified, and no distinct value was put upon the aiticles enumerated. It, therefore, would seem that where value, being material, is ascribed to several articles collectively, the offence must be made out as to each of those articles. § 287. Descriptions of the subject-matter of the offence are also, in many cases, unnecessary. Thus in an indictment for embezzle- ment against a clerk or servant, or against a person employed either in her Majesty's public service, or in the police, if the offence relate to any money or valuable security, it is sufficient to allege that money was embezzled, without specifying any particular coin or valuable security; and such allegation may be supported by equally loose evidence ; ' and it seems, even by proof of a general deficiency of money that ought to be forthcoming, without showing from what persons the money was received, or of what coins it con- sisted, or that any particular sum was»received, and not accounted for by the prisoner.' So, also, " in any indictment in which it shall be necessary to make any averment as to any money,* or any note of the Bank of England, or any other bank, it shall be sufficient to describe such money or bank-note simply as money, without speci- fying any particular coin or bank-note ; and such allegation, so far as regards the description of the property, shall be sustained by proof of any amount of coin or of any bank-note, although the particular species of coin of which such amount was composed, or the particular nature of the bank-note, shall not be proved ; and in cases of embezzlement and obtaining money or bank-notes by false pretences, by proof that the offender embezzled or obtained any piece of coin or any bank-note, or any portion of the value thereof, although such piece of coin or bank-note may have been delivered to him in order that some part of the value thereof should be returned to the party delivering the same, or to any other perstni, and such part shall have been returned accordingly." * ' This case was .Iccided under the repealed Act of 5 G. 2, c. 30, § 1. » 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (" The Larceny Act, 1861 "), § 71. • B. V. Grove, 1833 (eight judges 212 including the three chiefs against seven). « See R. V. Gumble, 1872. • 14 & 15 V. 0. 100 ("The Criminal Procedure Act, 1851 \ J 18. CHAP. I.J ALLEGATIONiS OF QUALITY. § 288. Allegations of quality (or, in other words, those allegations which describe the mode in which certain acts have been done) may often be omitted from an indictment, and it b seldom necessary to prove them with precision. For example, in an indictment' for murder or manslaughter, it is unnecessary to set forth the manner in which, or the means by which, the death of the deceased was caused ; but it is sufficient to charge that the defendant did felo- niously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought kill and murder the deceased, or, in an indictment for manslaughter, that he did feloniously kill and slay him.* Moreover, should an indictment for homicide unnecessarily allege the means of death, it would be quite sufficient for the proof to agree with the allegation in its general character, without precise conformity in every particular. Similarly, on a charge of felonious assault, if it be alleged that it was committed with a staff, and the proof be that it was done with a stone ; or if a wound, alleged to have been given with a sword, be proved to have been inflicted by an axe ; or if a pistol be stated to have been loaded with a bullet, and it turns out to have been loaded with some other destructive material,* the charge is substantially proved, and no variance occurs.* § 289. The fourth general and remaining rule * as to variances is that allegations of matter of essential description must be proved a» laid. The only practical mode of understanding this rule is to examine some of the leading decisions on the subject, and then to apply the reasoning or ruling contained therein to other analogous cases, always bearing in mind that the judges now have large powers of granting amendments both in civil and in criminal pro- ceedings.* And first, with respect to the criminal law, it is now clearly established, that tie name or nature of the property stolen or damaged is matter of essential description. For example, the variance is fatal if, ou a charge of firing a stack of hay, it turns out to * This term includes inquisitions taken before coroners ; B. v. (ngham, 18(54. » 24 & 25 V. c. 100 (" The Offences against the Person Act, 18(51 "), § (i. 3 H. r. Oxford, 1840. See II. v. Hughes, 1832, the marginal note of which is misleading. * 1 East, P. 0. 341 ; K. v. Martin, 1832 (Parke, B.). See, further, aa to the law prior to the passing of Ld. Canipliell's Act in 1851, R. v. M'Conkey, 1841(Ir.)(Toiron8, J.), B. V. Waters, 1832; R. v. Culkin, 1832; R. V. Thompson, 182(5; R. v. Kelly, 1825; R. V. Mosley, 1825; R. v. Tomlinson, 1834 (Pattcson, J,); E. V. Turner, 1830 (Parke, B.); B. v. Warman, 1846. * Supra, § 254. • See ante, §§ 220—226, ?49. 213 '^ I I 8 ' ' ' 1 m ' 1 ■ 1 ^ ! l! Il-l *Fiiii MATTEll OF KS.SKNTIAL DKSCRirTION. [PAIiT II. have been a stack of wheat ; or if a man be accused of stealing a drake, and it is proved to have been a goose, or even a duck, unless, ii'.deed, an amendment be permitted.' An instance of the application of this rule, before amendments were as liberally allowed as now, occurred some years ago at assizes. \ man, charged with stealing " a slop," the theft of which was clearly proved, when called upon for his defence, exclaimed, " Why, my lord, it ain't no slop." " You hear what he says," observed the judge to the jury. " Is it a slop, gentlfmon ? " " No, my lord, it's a smock," said they. " Then you must acquit the prisoner." He was acquitted ; but the grand juiy not being discharged, a second indictment was preferred and found, charging him with stealing " a smock." Nothing daunted, the prisoner now pleaded autrefois acquit, and called several witnesses to prove that the article he had stolen was in fact a slop, and this ques ^n was sub- mitted to a second jury with much gravity by the learneu judge.* § 290. AVhere the stealing of specified animals is made a sta- tutable offence, it seems sufTioient to use the generic term which includes the whole species, even though the language of the Act should be more specific. Thus, on an indictment for sheep stealing, framed under an Act ' making it penal to steal any '* ram, ewe, sheep, or lamb," charging a man with killing a sheep, with intent to steal the carcase, it having been proved that a sheep was killed, but the sex could not be disccn^ered, a great majority of the judges held that *' sheep " was a geneiio term, which included equally rams, ewes, and wethers, and confirmed the conviction ; * an in- dictment for stealing a sheep will now be supported by evidence of killing a lamb ; * but whether a charge of stealing a horse would Bi5 ; l^l' \i' « Under § I of 14 & 15 V. c. 100 ("Tho Crimiiml I'locudui-e Act, 18 jl "), cited unto, § 249. » 29 Law Mii<<. 12, U. ' 7 & « O. 4, c. 29, § 25 (now repealed). Tlie samo words are now contained in 24 & 25 V. c. 90 ("The Larceny Act, ISiil"), § 10. « K. V. Ml'iiUev, lS:iS; K. v. Bannnin, 1.S.'59 (Ir.). Tlieso cii.ses overrule R. v. Puddif<jot, 1829. • R. ". tSpicer, 1IS45, overruling R. V. Loom, 1827. Tho decision in R. V, Loom was under the repeulod Act of Id a. 2, c. 34, which, like the Act of 7 & 8 O. 4, 0. 29, § 25, specified Iambs ac well as slieop. In an old Act of 25 II. 8, c. 13. §§ 2, 13, which is now re])('al(Hl by 19 & 20 V. c. 64. f.n<l which ])rohibited persons from havinfj above 2,000 sheep, it was expressly enacted, that " 'ambs nnder tho age of one wliolo 5'ear shall not bo adjudged for sheep prohibited by the statute." The special insertion of such a clause leads rather to an inference, that, without it, the men- tion of tho grown aumial would have included the young. See next note. 214 CHAP. !•] SUBSTANCE OF OFFENCE. be sustained by proof of stealing a gelding, a mare, a colt, or a filly,' is by no meane» clear. § 291. When forgery was a capital offence, on prosecutions for that offence great nicety was required in describing the instrument forged. The law, however, is now happily amended, and the punishment for forgery has become less severe but more certain. For tlie Act of 1861, row governing the law on this subjent,* by § 42, enacts that, " in any indictment for forging, altering, offering, uttering, disposing of, or putting off, any instrument, it shall be sufficient to describe such instrument by any name or designation by which the same may be usually known, or by the purport thereof, without setting out any copy or fac- simile thereof, or otherwise describing the same or the value thereof." A similar lasity of description is permitted, whenever any person is indicted for engraving or making '* any instrument, matter, or thing," or for using or unlawfully possessing any plate, material, or paper on which any instrument, matter, or thing shall have been engraved, made, or printed.' § 292. Moreover in indictments, too, for offences under the Debtors Act, 1869,* or the Bankruptcy Act, 1883,* it is sufficient to " set forth the substance of the offence charged, in the words of the Act specifying the offence, or as near thereto as circumstances admit, without alleging or setting forth any debt, act of bank- ruptcy, trading, adjudication, or any proceeding in, or order, warrant or document of, any court acting under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883." » § 293. Generally speaking, the name of the person injured,'^ and, indeed, the name of every person necessarily mentioned in the I K . ! li' ' Probably it would be good; " horse, mare, gelding, colt or lilly " are the words used m 24 & 25 V. c. 9(5 ("The Larceny Act, 18G1"), § 10. Under an old Act, which only Tnontioned "horses, goldiiigs, and mares," proof of stealing a Jillji was held to support an indictment for stealing a mare : R. v. Welland, 1822. » 24 & 25 V. c. 98 (" The Forgery Act, 1861"), §42. » Ibid. § 43. * 32 & 33 V. 0. 62, § 19; amended by 46 & 47 V. o. 52, § 149, subs. 2. » 46 & 47 V. 0. 52, §§ 31, 163-167. "The Irish Debtors Act, 1872," contains a similar provision. 35 & 36 V. c. 67, § 19, Ir. ' See, as to the old law on this subject, 11. V, Biss, 1838; R, v. Eobinson, 1817; R. v. Campbell, 1843; R. V. Waters, 1848; R. v. Willis, 1845; R. v. Stroud, 1842; E. V. Sweeny, 1841 (Ir.); R. v. Smith, 1833; R'. v. Evans, 1839; E. v. Sheen, 1837 ; R. v. Hogg, 1841. 215 1 iJ wi;.: '^1 11^ NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS IN INDICTMENTS. [PART II. indictment,' is matter of essential description, and formerly it must have been proved with precision. There is, however, little room for doubt that the court would now, in every case of meio misnomer f^ direct an amendment to be made almost as a matter of course." Still a question may ©ccasionally arise as to what the nature of the amendment ought to be, and as to this, the following rules, therefore, may furnish some guide : — Ist. If the name of the injured party cannot be proved, it will suffice to describe him as a person " whose name is to the jurors unknown." * 2nd. It is not necessary to describe a party by what is, in strictness, his right name ; but it will be sufficient to state any name he has assumed,* or by which he is generally known, and the omission of a second christian name has been frequently held to be immaterial.* 3rd. An illegitimate child is not entitled to the surname either of the mother or of the putative father, but can only acquire a surname by reputation.^ 4th. The proper mode of describing a peer is by his christian name and rank in the peerage ; but the christian name may be omitted ; * and it seems that under the degree of a duke, a nobleman may be designated by the simple title of " lord."* 6th. Foreigners of rank may be described by their christian names and foreign titles, provided they be generally known by those appellations ; •" or it will suffice, as it seems, to describe them by ' See, as to the old law on this subject, E. V, Dumnurry, 1841 (Ir.); E. V. Walker, 1811; E. v. Jiush, 1818. » See E. V. Welton, 1862. » Under § 1 of 14 & 15 V. c. 100 (" The Criminal Procedure Act, 1851 "), cited ante, § 249. * See E. 1'. Welton, 1862. » E. V. Norton, 1823. See E. v. Williams. 1836. In E. v. Toole, 1857, where the only proof of the prose- cutor's christian name was the state- ment of a witness, who said that he had see»i the prosecutor sign the charge against the prisoner, and the deposition before the magistrates, and that the signatures of those documents, which the witness iden- tified, corresponded with the name laid in the indictment, the court held that the evidence was suSicient. • Att.-Gen. v. Hawkes, 1830 ; R. v. Berriman, 1833; E. v. , 1834; Williams v. Bryant, 1839. But see E. V. M'Anoruey, 1841 (Ir.) (Cramp- ton, J.). ' E. V. Waters, 1835; E. v. Clark, 1818. 8 E. V. Frost, 1855. » E. V. Pitts, 1839, whore the pro- secutor was described as " George Talbot Eice, Lord Dynevor," instead of "George Talbot, Baron Dynevor; " P.. V. Elliott, 1839, where the words were, " The Right Honourable Wil- liam Fitzhai dinge, Lf)rd Segravo," he being an earl. It seems that "Edward, Bishop of Ilereforu, ' is not a right description : E. v, Pitts, eupia. >" R. V. Gregory, 1846, where the prosecutor was held sufficiently de- scribed as " Charles Frederick Au- gustus William, Duke of Brunswick and Luneberg," his name being Ch. Fr. Aug. Wm. D'Este, and he having ceased to be the reigning Duke : £. v. 2lri CII. I.] I,'AME OF INJURED PARTY NEED NOT HE PROVliD. tlieir chnfitinn and Burnames, with the addition of the word esquire, that being the title which English ('oiirtosy confers on foreign noblemen." 6th. If a parent and (rlrild bear the same name, it will Buffice in an indictment to describe the latter by that name without the addition of "junior."' And lastly, where joint-stock com- panies, trustees, oi; other joint owners have been injured, several Acts of Parliament have been passed, which render it sufficiont in Buch cases to describe in the indictment one person only by name, and to state that the offence has been committed against that person, and another or others, as the case may be.' The same de- Bcription * is allowed, under certain circumstances, in informations or complaints before justices of the peace. § 294. In some few instances it has been expressly provided by statute that, to justify a conviction, the name of the injured party need neither be alleged nor proved. For instance, on an indict- ment against a person for any offence against the Act of 1861 relating to malicious injuries to property, it will suffice to allege and prove that the prisoner did the act charged with intent to injure or defraud, and no allegation or proof is necessary that the prisoner intended to injure or defraud any particular person ; • the law is the same in prosecutions " for forging, altering, uttering, offering, disposing of, or putting off, any instrument,"* or for obtaining, or attempting to obtain, any chattel, money, or valuable security by false pretences ; ' — and, in this last case, the indictment will be good,' " without alleging any ownership of the chattel, money, or valuable security." Similarly, in indictments for stealing, or fraudulently destroying, or concealing wills," or for stealing, or fraudulently taking, or maliciously destroying, records Sulls, 1800, where, in an indictment for larceny, the goods stolen were hold to bo properly laid as the property of Victory, liaroness Turkhoim, the pro- eecutrix being an Alsatian lady, whose real name was Selina Victoire. In both these cases the parties were well known by the names used. > R. V. Graham, 1791. » R. V. Peace, 1820; E. v. Hodg- son, 1831 (Parke, B.) ; R. v. Bland, 1832 (Bolland, B.); Sweeting v. Fowler, 1815; B. v. Bayley, 1835. See ante, § 195. » 7 G. 4, c. 64 ("The Criminal Law Act, 1820"), § 14. See, also, 7 G. 4, 0. 40 ("The Countiy ]3anker8 Act, 1826"), §9. • 11 & 12 V. c. 43 ("The Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848"), § 4. » 24 & 25 V. c. 97 ("1110 Malicious Damage Act, 1861 "), § 60. See E. V. Newboult, 1872 (C. C. R.). • 24 & 25 V. c. 98 ("The Forgery Act, 1861 "), § 44. ' 24 & 26 V. c. 96 {" The Larceny Act, 1861 "), § 88. • Id. S 29. 217 1 p 1 1 i ' 1 ■■ 1 1 It -4 \ f i *!! fii'li h^: 1 DESCUIPTIVE ALLEGATIONS IN ACTIONS. [PART II. or legal documents,' or for stealing fixtures attached to any square, street, or place dedicated to public use or ornament,'^ it is not neces- sary to allege that " the article in respect of which the offence is committed is the property of any person." § 295. The prisoner's name is not a matter of essential descrip- tion, because on this subject the prosecutor may have no means of obtaining correct information. Therefore, if it, or his addition, be wrongly described, or the addition omitted, the court may correct the error, and call upon the prisoner to plead to the amended indictment.' § 290. The rule that proof must be given of descriptive allega- tions, which are essential, need not be illustrated with regard to civil actions, because that subject has already been discussed, while examining the cases that have been decided on the Rules authorising amendments.* hi > 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (" The Larceny Act, 1861 "), § 30. « Id. § 31. » 7 G. 4, c. 64 ("The Criminal Law Act, 1826"), § 19. See R. v. Orchard, 1838, where a woman charged with the murder of her hushand, being describtd as " A., the lui/e of B. C," the record was nmonded by inserting the word "widow" instead of "wife (Ld. Abinger). * Ante, S 227 et seq. 218 m \ CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 218> AMERICAN NOTES. Relation of Pleading to Evidence The rules of pleading exert in certain directions a controlling intiuence upon the admissibility of evidence. They determine also which party has the onus of convin- cing the tribunal, to a i)redetermined extent, of the truth of facts in issue. As the only admissible evidence is that bearing on facts iu the issue or relevant to the issue, the issue is an absolute limitation upon the facts provable in any given case. As sui!h, a very natural habit may be noticed on the part of the court to rule that evidence offered to prove facts other than those in issue or relevant tlu-reto, is not admissible to prove such facts; — as if such an exclusion were under some rule of evidence. The truth, however, fretiuently is that, in such a case, the evi- dence offered is excluded not by the rules of evidence, but i)y those of pleading. Very possibly the evidence offered to prove the fact is perfectly (lompetent by the rules of evidence to i)rove it if the fact itself were competent. It is not, and therefore evidence to prove it is not admissible. The pleadings have not made tlie fact as to which evidence is offered relevant, — a circumstance which the rules of evidence themselves have no power to control. Frr rontra, a ruling is f recpiently made that evidence is admissible to prove a certain fact when no possible question has been or eoidd be raised that the evidence is competent to prove the fact in any case where the fact itself would be admissible, and all that such ruling in reality amounts to is a statement tliac und»'r the pleadings tiie fact itself can be proved, Tlio object and function of the pleadings being to l)ring tiic par- ties to an issue of fact upon some one or more material fact (ir facts atfinned on the one side and denied on the other, it is of importance in any given c;tse to determine what facts are material, for it is only on these tliat issue can be taken. To iiscertiiin tiiis, namely, what are the material allegations of fact in any case, resort must lie had neither totl'fl law of evidence (whicii decides iiow a fact in issue may 1)1! proved) nor to the law of pleading (which determines wliat material facts are placed in issue, and how ir should i)ro|)erly be iloiie) Init to the rules of the branch of the substantive law involveil in tiie casi'. In other words, what allegiitinns are material in any given matter is a ([uestion of positive law ; which of these material allegations is placed in issue, is a question of pleading ; how such allegation, when placed in issue is to be proved or disproved is; a<pu'stioii of evidence. Tliere seems, as lias been saiil, an unfortunate tendency to turn many of the riiles of positive law or pleading into rules of evidence sinijily by saying that evidence is not admissible to prove a certain fact, or that the opposite of it is "conclusively |)re8umed *' when I M i ■ i '.' ! ■ HUB r ■ fih 1 ■' ■ ■ i ' ' 1 w \i:ir 1!*: . h •!.' ifjiil m. ill) 2182 AMERICAN NOTES. [part II. what is meant is that, as a matter of i^eading, the fact is not in issue or perliaps, as a matter of positive law, is not material. Or, on tlie other hand, to rule, as if on a point in the law of evidence, that evidence is admissible to prove a certain fact when what is meant is that, as matter of jiositive law, the fact is material and that, as a matter of pleading, it has been placed in issue. That the evidence offered must tend to prove some fact placed in issue by the pleadings, is abundantly sustained by authority. " It is a settled principle, that no evidence can be admissible, which does not tend to prove or disi)rove the issue joined." Hudson V. State, 3 Cold. HCtii (180G). " The prinoiph; is, that all the evidence admitted must be pertinent to the point in issue." Com. v. Choate, 305 Mass. 4")! (1870). " Evidence was introdu(!ed .... tending to show that the defend- ant held possession of the property under some other right than under the contract. In so holding the Court erred, for the reason that there was no such issue." J'^oline Plow Co. i: Braden, 71 la. 141 (1S87). " The fact that, &c did not tend to prove or disprove the issni! joined." Hawkins t\ James, 09 Miss. 274 (1H91). "The end and jiurpose of testimony in legal proceedings is to arrive at the truth of the issues between the parties." Turnbull v. Itichardson, 69 .Mich. 400 (1888). "Collateral facts are not admis- sible. The evidence must be relevant to the issue, that is, to tiie facts jmt in controversy by the jjleadings." Nickerson v. Gould, 8L' Me. 'tVJ (18!>0); Grand Trunk II. 11. Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454, 4()9 (I87r»). Where the issue is not defined, "and whereof course, at the time, it is often impossible to anticipate what (piestions may arise in the course of the trial, the rule in such cases is, that the testimony slionld be received, if it is competent evidence in any view of the case wiiicli may be thereafter taken," Harris r. Holmes, .'iO pt 302 (1808) jM-r Ked'fi.'ld, ('. J, KviiiKNcK .\i>MiTTKi> i>K HKNK. — As a party can prove but one fact at a time; and as a strictly logical order of proof, especially wlien offered by different witnesses, is not ahv.nys i)Ossible, except at great practical inconvenience, courts frecjnently receive evidence condi- tionally upon its being (lonnected later; i.e. made relevant and otherwise admissible, " Wc agree," say the supreme court of (lon- nectieut, " with tiie defendants' counsel that, as a general rule, no evidence should Im' admitted till the court can see that it is admis- sible, Wht're Ijowever the admissibility of eviihiuce depends up(m several facts, to some extent independent of each other, and where eaith fact must be jiroved to (tomplete the chain of evidence, the exer- cise of a sound judicial discretion does not require the court, uiii- formiy, to interfere in the order of the testimony. A beginning CHAP, v.] AMERICAN NOTES. 218- must be made somewliere ; and when, as in the present case, the eouit is satisfied that tlie party is actini,' in good faith, and intends fairly to supply each particular link till tiie chain of testimony is j)erfect, the evidence, as offered, may come in, subject to objection, to be stricken out and j,'o for nothing if the necessary connecting ])ortion be not supjdied." Moppin v. .Etna Axle, &c. Co., 41 Conn. L'7 (1874). Such a ruling, being as to the order in which the evidence may be introduced, is matter of judicial discretion, and therefore not a mat- ter to which an exception may be taken. Com. e-. Dam, 107 Mass. 210 (1871). If the condition is not complied with, ami the other side does not ask to have it stricken out or disregarded, there is no error on the ])art of the court in not itself taking action in regard to the matter. Reeve >'. Dennett, U.T Mass. 2.'} (18S7). Kelkvaxcv. — Whether a fact tends to establish the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue is a question of logic. As the views of particular judges naturally differ as to the logical effect of facts, it is not surprising to have the supreme court of Maine say, that " the relevancy of evidetu-e of other facts, as bearing upon the proba- bility or non-probability of the main fact in issue, has been one of the most troublesome <pu'stions for the courts to decide.*' Nickers'Mi r.G(mld, 82 Me. .'31 2 (181»0). Tiie recognition of a logically probative effect on the issue lieing a fact preliminary to the receipt of evidence, it is one to be decided by the court. In exercising this discretion, it has been held that where the fact offered in evidence seems to the court to be of but slight j)ro- bative force, either because too remote in point of time or for other reasons, it is permissible within reasonable limits, for the court to reject it. tlones r. State, 2G Miss. 247 (18.");>) ; Morrissey v. Ingham, 111 Mass. ().'i (1872). This discretion may be reviewed on exceptions and reversed wiiere it appears to have been unreasonably exercised. Tims where a defendant, endeavoring to show that he did not consent to his wife'.s using lier own liouse, in which he also resided, for an illegal imrpose, was tronfined to his acts during the time covered by the iiidictuient, an exception to this ruling was sustained. " \Vlieii tlie questiou is of the state of mind of a person at or during a jtartic- ular time, which can only be shown by acts or speech, evideiu'e of what he said or did for a rea.sonable time before, if it tends to sliow a permanent or settled state of mind on the subject, has always been admitted."' Com. r. Hill. 14.') Mass. .'{()"> (1887). ICvidence that during ten days innuediat(dy i)rior to the date alleged certain premises were used for the illegal purpose charged in the indictunuit is eom]»etent. Com. r. Ferry, 1 1(5 Mass, 20;{ (1888). The issue being whether u party was insane at a certain i iU m 218* AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AllT II. i^-- ■• time, the court refused to uchnit evidence of such party's mental statt! eight months after. " We cannot say that the judge who tried tlie cause exercised tlie discretion confided to him erroneously." Wright r. Wright, 139 Mass. 177 (1885). It is not necessary that evidence offered should be sufficient to prove any fact in issue. "If such were its tendency — if it were 'a link in the chain of proof,' it was within the sphere of competency, while its effect was for the consideration of the jury." Schuchardt V. Aliens, 1 Wall. 359 (18G3). "Distinct matters, forming separate links in a connected chain of title, often cannot convenientl}- he given in evidence together. It is no answer to evidence, that it does not prove the plaintiff's whole case ; if it is a link in the chain of tlie evidence afterwards to be given, it is admissible." Haughcv V. Strickler, 2 W. & S. 411 (1841) ; Tarns v. Bullitt, 35 l»a. St. 3o's (18G(»); Tucker v. J'easlee, .'50 X. H. ](»7 (1.S5S) ; Com. r. Kenno, 134 Moss. L'17 (1.S8;!); Sanders v. Stokes, 'M Ala. 432 (1857); Co- lumbus Omnibus Co. r. Semmes, 27 Ga. 283 (1859); Willougliby r. Dewey, 54 111. 2()(; (1870); Farwell r. Tylir, 5 la. 535 (1857); Comstock /'. Smith, 20 Mich. 338 (1870). " Although, of itself, it may have been weak and inconclusive, yet being derived from a legal source, and pertinent to the issiu', the jury was the proper tribunal to pass upon it." liichardson v. Mil- burn, 17 Md. ()7 (18<;0). Au.xiLiAKY F.MTs. — If a fact bc admissible, all preliminary and introductory facts necessary to explain it are efjually admissible. As Mr. .,'ustice Stejiaen (Dig. Law. Kvid. pt. 1, chap. 2, Art. 8) says, " Facts necessary to be known to explain or introduce a fact in issue or a relevant fact, or which support or rebit an inference suggested by the fact in issue or relevant fact, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for these purposes respec tivcly." Thus the question being whetiier a lease was verbally surrendered, evidence is (loiupe- tent as to certain dealings between the landlord and tenant as to the (juality of certain ale, comphiiut as to whi(!h was the cause and occa- sion (>r tlie alleged surrender. Wallace r. Keiinelly, 47 X. .1. L. 242 (1S85). in contests not held under the rules of tlie eomnion law, and where, therefore, there are, strictly speaking, no j. leadings, the facts in issue are deteriiiined by the nature of the investigation, and the burden of producing conviction in the tribunal lies on him who asks the iiiterveiiiion of the c<iiirt in his favor. (Questions involving the power of the court in the allowance of auuuidments and relating to th»^ suHiinency of allegations, etc., are, it would seem, too closely related to the statutory procedure of the several states to admit of profitable discussion. CHAP. II.] EVIDENCE CONFINED TO POINTS IN ISSUE. CHAPTER II. CONFINING EVIDENCE TO POINTS IN ISSUE. ill § 298. We may now pass to the consideration of the second of the four general rules which have been pointed out ' as governing the production of evidence. This second general rule is, that the evidence must be confined to the points '■ issue. These points having been selected by the parties in their pleadings, as those on which they are respectively willing to rest the fate of the cause,'' any evidence, in support oi other facts, would be obviously improper. Accordingly, in an action of defamation, where the issues raised by the pleas of justification were whether the plaintiff's scholars were "ill-fed, badly lodged, and covered with vermin," defendant's counsel was not permitted to put any questions to show t'lat the bf . a were also badly educated.^ In another action of the same kind, where the defendant had only pleaded the general issue, Jjord EUenborough would not allow the plaintiff to prove that the asser- tions contained in the libel were false, observing : " There io no plea of justification on the record, and, therefore, I can no more hear a falsification on the one side than a justification on the other."* Where to an action in contract {not founded, be it obser^o'' '^n any allegation of fraud) the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations, to which there was a replication that lie did promise within six years, and the plaintiff did not reply fraud to this plea, but siraidy denied the fact by taking issue on the plea, the plaintiff was not allowed to prove that the action was grounded on a fraudulent -eceipt of moncif by the defendant, and that the fraud teas first diseorered nithin six years from the commencement of the suit ; ' where the breach of covenant for which the action was * Soo supra, § 217. » Stqih. i'l. lir». • lioldrou V. Widdows, 1824. ♦ Stuart V. Lovoll, 1817; Cornwall V. KichanlHon, \H2d, ' Clark V. lloughum, 1823. 219 r ■ ■»-■ 'Am I i liiilil !;' ;iii iii= ii (ii lii I w NEW RULES OF PLE.VDING — THEIR OBJECTS. [PART II. brought was that defonflant had not used tlie piniutiff's farm in a husbandlike manner, but had committed waste, evidence of bad husbandry not fii/iounfitig to mistc was rejected.' § 299. The cases just cited were decisions under the old rules of pleading. The new rules (Order XIX. of 11. S. C, 1883), are intended to effect three material objects : first, to make each party- acquainted with the intended case of his opponent, and thus to prevent either side from being taken by surprise at the trial; secondly, to save the expense of collecting unnecessary evidence ; and thirdly, to bring legal defences more prominently forward on the face of the record.* § 300. Accordingly, it is provided, in general terms, that all pleadings shall henceforth consist, first, of a statement of claim, and of the relief or remedy sought ; ' next, of a defence, set-off, or counter-claim ; * thirdly, of a reply,* if any ; and lastly, of a joinder of issue on the one side or the other.* It is further provided that ** such statements shall be as brief as the nature of the case will admit," ' and that " every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved." * For example, if an agreement be alleged in any plead- ing, it is not sufficient to aver generally its existence, and to state its effect, but the party relying on it should state whether it be in ■writing, or by parol, or the result of a series of documents.* The phrase *' material facts " will include any facts which the party pleading is entitled to prove at the trial.'" Thus, in an action for breach of promise of marriage, the plaintiff may allege in her Btateraent of claim her consequent seduction or infection, these matters being important by way of aggravation." § 301. Twelve other pleading rules have a material bearing on the Law of Evidence. Rule 13 of Order XIX. provides that > Ha^•i^' . Mantle, 1789. • Soo Isaac c: Farror, ISUfl (Ld. Abingor) ; Barnett v. Glossop, 1835 (Park ami Hoaanuuet, JJ.); Outsole V. Mathers, 1830 (Ld. Abinger). » Ord. XIX. r. 2. *Id. •Id. • Ord. XIX. r. 18. See post, § 304, also § 829, and Ord. XXVII. r. 13, thoro citod. ' H. 2. • II. 4. flee Heap v. Marris, 1876; Philipps V. Philipps, 1878, 0. A. • lurquand v. f'earon, 1879, 0. A. '* Miilington v. Loring, 1880, 0. A. 220 CHAP. II.J FACTS NOT DENIED IN PLEADING — ADMITTED. ** every allogation of fact in any pleading, not being a petition or summons, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the opposite party, shall be talru to he admitted,^ except as against an infant, lunatic, or person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition." 13y Rule 14, " any condition precedent, the performance or occurrence of which is intended to be contested, shall be distinctly specified iu his plc-ding by the plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be ; and, subject thereto, an averment of the performance or occurrence of all conditions precedent necessary for the case of the plaintiff or defendant shall be implied in his pleading." Kule 10 provides, that " the defendant or plaintiff, as the case may be, must raise by his pleading all matters which show the action or counter-claim not to bo maintainable, or that the transaction is either void or voidable in point of law,* and all such grounds of defence or reply, as the case may be, as if not raised would be likely to take the opposite party by suiiirise, or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleadings, as, for instance, fraud,' the Statute of Limitations, release, payment, performance, facts showing ille- gality either by statute or common law, or Statute of Frauds.** By Rule Ifi, "No pL /j, not being a petition or summnns, shall, — except by way of aiiieiidmoif,* — raise any new ground of claim, or contain any allegation of fact inconsistent with the previous pleadings of the party pleading the same." § 302. By Rule 17, ** it shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his staiement of defence to deny (jcnerdlh/ the grounds alleged by the statement of claim,* or for a plaintiff in his reply to deny geucmllif the grounds alleged in a defence by way of counter-claim, ' Sen Tildesley v. Ilarpor, 1S78, 0. A. ; Ilunis v. Guuiblo, 1S78 (Fry, J.); Kultm-r. Tn-Kt'iit, 1H79. 'All cxcpption to this proposition is coutiiiiR'd i" Onl. XXI. r. 21, which provides, thut " no dufi'iiditiit in an notion for tho rocovcry of himl, who in in j)osscssion hy himself or his tenant, wvA i)loiid his till<\ utdoss bin dcfi'nci' di'ponds o:. iin ('(luitiihlo ostato or rifi;ht, or he chiinis relief U]ion liny e(|iiita))le ^roiiml apiinst any right or titUi a-inerted liy tho plaintiff." As to tluD role, aee Dan- ford r. M'Aniiltv, 1883, ILL. " Soo l)ost, <^ .''.iMi. * See, also, Ord. XXTTI. r. fi, which provide-), that " )io ?/«''• ii-^Hii/niifiit shall lie necessary or nsed." Itut ovfrvtiiinj; which was formerly al- le<;ed l>y way of now assiffnment may liereal'ter be introdnced by aineiid- uiont of t)»e statement of eluiin, or l)y way of reply. .See j'iarp i\ Hender- son, 18"(i, as explained by Hull v. Jive. lH7(i. » Sen Harris v. Gamble, 1878 (Fry, J.); liuttor V. Tregout, 187tf. '>?1 w IIIN- lU %'-r f 'l f W ;ii! GENERAL ISSUE PRACTICALLY ABOLISHED. [rAUT II. but eaob party must deal sppcificalhj with each allogation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages." llule 18 provides that, " subject to the last preceding rule, the plaintiff by his reply may join issue upon the defence, and each party in his pleading, if any, subsequent to rejtly, may join issue upon the jirevious jjleading.' Such joinder of issue shall operate as a denial of every material allegation of facsts in the pleading upon which issue is joined, but it may except any facts which the party may be willing to admit, and shall then operate as a denial of the facts not so admitted. § 303. The g ' ef*>ot of these rules — especially of the two which are Inst citt -is t j 'o away in the .sfafrnitiii of (fr/rnrc witji ■what used to be termed by i }x-.:al Pleaders " the General Issue." Under the old forms of pleading, on an action, which was in form one " ex contractu " (or founded on contract), being brought, when- ever the defendant could show that no (/rht in fact existed before action brought, he was allowed to do it under the plea of " never indebted." Foi- examiile, in an ordinary action for yoo(f.i sold and deliirred, the defenJant might, under the useful j)lea of " never indebted," show either that they were paid for by ready money ;^ that they were sold on credit, which was unexpired when the action was commenced;' that tliey were bought through an agent, to whom, before the expiration of the credit, the defendant had remitted the price ;* that thoy were sold under a condition, that if they did not answer their purpose nothing should be paid for them, and that in fact they did not answer their purpose;^ that they were sold under any special agreement, wliich had not been per- formed;' that they were delivered under a contract of barter;' that the goods delivered did not answer the description of the articles which tlie vendor professed to sell;* or that they turned out to be utterly uselcfs." ' As to tho fffcct of not (li'livi'iiiij a n'lilj', or itiiy KubMiMiuciit i»li.'iiiliu}j ■within tlio i)n)]i('r jM'i'iod, mio Old. XXVII. r. 13, cito.l post, § K2!). » 15u.>(H(!y V. liunictt, 1H42. But Bee Littlochild v. liiiiikH, 1845. ' lirooiiificld I'. iSiiiitli, 1h;{(), ovor- ruliii}? Edmonds r. ll'iirriH, IH.'H. * yinyth V. Andi'i'soii, IHI!). * UrouuttuU V. Lumb, lHHi. See I auiond )•. Tliivall, 1S47. " Hroomficid c. yiiutli, 1.S3G (Ld. Abiiif^ci) ; (iaioy r. I'yko, hSIJi); HiivHfldon I', Stuff, 18;j(i; Mo.^-uly v. M'MiilI.'ii, lSJ(i (Ir.V ' Jliinisou I. Luke, lh4); Smith f. Winter, 1852; UrucegiiJlo y.ilinka, 185 ». " (lompi'itz I'. HartHt, 1853. * L'uubiiut V. i'uddou, 1835, recog- 222 il: ii CHAP. II.] REPLIES — EVASIVE PLEADINGS. § ']03a. a similar multi[)lit'ity of defences was open under the plea of " never indebted " in an action for use and ocoupation. No useful jjurpose is to be served by mentioning thenx in detail. § ;U>;Ji«. Now, however, the grounds of defence are in all cases (in the two above specified, as well as in others), recpiired to be djxrifirdl/i/ set out in the statement of defence. § aO'Ac. While in an action founded on contract a great variety of defences was thus permitted to be raised (without any previous notice to the plaintiff as to which of such possible defences the defendant intended to set up), under the " general issue " (or plea of " never indebted "), in an action founded upon tort a similar variety and choice of defences was allowed under a " plea of the general issiie," taking the form of " not guilty." The efect of such a plea is learnedly discussed in BuUeu on Pleading.' B' 'he Pleading llules of 1803 the operation of such a plea was co'isider . 'y restricted. But even after the passing of these rules the pleu 'ji " not guilty " had still, in some cases, a wide operation ; for instance, in actions for fraud, its operation was to deny that the defend<.iit made the representation charged, that it was false, that he . 'de it either knowing it to be false, or even without a belief in its truth, that he made it with the intent to induce the plaintiff to act upon it, that the plaintiff did act upon it, and also that the plaintiff sustained damage in consequence of so doing.'' Again, in respect of slander for words not actionable in themselves, but which are so only hy reason of special damage caused by them, a plea of " not guilty " denied the speaking of the words, the speaking of them maliciously, their use in the defamatory sense imputed, and the alleged special damage.* § 304. The general issue is, by the rules at present in force under the Judicature Act, forbidden to be raised by a statement of defence. But it will be observed that, by Rule 18 of Order XIX. it is still allowed to be contained in the plaintiff's reply, the rule saying that the plaintiff " by his reply nifii/ join issue upon the defence."* The nis(>(l by Ld. D'»ninnn in IlayspUlnn V. Staff, IHm; IJiiillio v. Koll, 1W8; Obapol V. Uirka, 1833; Allou v. rumoron, 1833. 'nioso cases over- rule Roffoy V, Smith, 1834. * 3rd edit. pp. (iO" ot so*!. ' Htilluii oil i'loading, ubi supra, p. 701. » Wilby V. Elston, 1849. * Soo auto, § 3U2. 4 223 I!! ^i I' \t\M Mi riiMi ,:r '11: II. I ,1, -.1 B! H. -i ri ' ^M ISSUES TO !!!•: DKl'IXlTi: AM) Dl.SllNrT. [I'AUT II. nile in quostion does not mean tliat the jilaintilT iiiiiHf tuko {lint. course, llo may — except in a case where, under the ohl system <<t oommon law pleading, a new assignment would have been neces- sary,' — either amend hin claim under Order XXVIil., or traverse the allegations in the defence generally or specially, or ounfosB and Avoid them, or unite in one reply those several answers.' § 305. Thus the whole object of the present system of plea<ling is to narrow the parties to definite and distinct issues, and thereby to diminish expense and delay, especially as regards the amount of oral testimony required on either side at the trial.' § 30fl. This object is further sought to be attained by the help of various rules besides those which have already been cited. Thus Order XIX., r. 20, provides, that " when a contract, promise, or agreement is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of the same by the opposite party shall be construed only as a denial in fact of the express contract, promise, or agreement alleged, or of the matters of fact from which the same may be implied by law, and not as a denial of the Icyalitij or sufficiency in law, of such contract, promise, or agreement, whether with reference to the Statute of Fraui/n or otherwise." Tiie effect of this rule is, that, whenever a party in- tends to rely on the illegality or insufficiency in law of any con- tract, whether with reference to the Statute of Frauds, or other- wise, he must specialli/ plead such illegality or insufficiency, and it will not be sufficient to traverse allegations made by his opponent in anticipation of objections to the contract upon such grounds.'' Neither can a defendant avail himself of the Statute of Frauds by simply raising in general terms by his pleading a point of law' (the substitute for the old general demurrers" ), nor will it suffice for hira to state generally that he relies on a statute, but the facts which make the statute applicable must distinctly appear on the plead- ings.' § 307. Again, Rule 5 of Order XXI., provides, that " if either party wishes to deny the right of any other party to claim as » See ante. p. 221, n. «. « Hall V. Eve. 187«. C. A. • Thorp y.IIoldsworth, 187()(Jessol, M.R.); Byrd i-. Nunn, 1877, (I A. ; Tildesloy v. IIiirptT, 1878, C. A.; Collctto V. Goodo, 1877 (Fry, J.). J.) * Clarke v. Callow, 1870. 0. A. » Futcher v. Futchor, 1881 (Fry, • Ord. XXV. rr. 1, 2. ' PuUeu V. Snelus, 1879. 224 kk. \ !| nitAF. II.] WANT OF STAMP — OF JUUISDICTION. executor, or as trustee, whether in bankruptcy or otherwise, or in any representative or other alleged capacity, or the alleged consti- tution of any partnership firm, ho shall deny the same speci- fieally." § 308. Sometimes it will be difficult to reconcile this last rule, and also Rule 13 of Order XIX.,' with certain e.xpross enactments. For example, if in an action on a doc^tor's bill the statement of claim allege that plaintiff is a " legally qualifio(l medical prao- titionej'," ^ an omission to specifically deny this statement amounts to an admission of the fact. But the Medical Act of IHOH' expressly enacts that " no person shall be entitled to recover any charge in any court of law for any medical or surgical advice, attendance, or for the performance of any operation, or for any medicine which he shall have both prescribed and su])plit'd, unltsss he shall prove upon the trial that ho is registered under the Ai;t." Yet it cannot be that a qtiiick doctor, who must inevitably bo nonsuited in any county court, would have a fair chance of recovering his charges, if he sues in the High Court. § 309. Again, it would appear to follow that the objection that an instrument is not stamped, or is insufllciently stiiinpod, cannot be taken at the trial by a party who has nut relied on that point in his pleading.* But when the document is offered in evidence, these pleading rules do not affect the steps which must be taken either by the presiding judge, or by the ministerial officer of the court, to protect the interests of the Revenue. § 310. Moreover, the question how far a defendant can avail himself of want of jurisdiction in tlie court witliout raising that defence by means of a si)eoial plea, does not seem to have been set at rest by tlie rules of pleading under the Judicature Act, aud is m an unsatisfactory state.* , I > Oitoilante. §;{01. » Soo 21 & 22 V. c. flO, § 34. » I<1. § 32. * Sooi us to tho old liiw. Field v. Woods, ln:)7; 1 »aWHon r. Macdoiiiild, 18:J«; M'DowuU i'. lij-stor, 183(5. Seo. ulso, ))()8t, § 397. » Scfi Spoonor V. Juddow, ISJS-flO, P. C. , whuro tho I'rivy Council decided , thatwhon tho facts ouHtiug thojuiis- T. \0t. I. diotiiiu urn lnonjjht liy tho plniiiliff hiiiiHi'lf to tho iiotico ot' tho court, the niero oiiiisMion of th(! dofonduiit to plead 8])ccially will not givo tho court jurisdiction over tho suit, hut it will ho lM)und, whatever ho tho nature (»f the issues raised, either to nonsuit tht! plaintiff, or to din.-ct a verdict for tho defendant, but do- cliui'd to state what would be tba 225 J I i; i*!i PLEA OF NOT GUII/IY BY STATUTE. [PAUT II. § 311. Tho numerous niiaos in whioh a defendant is exi)ros.sly empowered to picttd ^' Nut (Jiiiltii In/ stutntc,''^ and to give speeiiil mutter in ovi<lence under suoli pleii, are nf)t affected hy the preeont pleading rules further than tluH, that the party who intends so to I)leftd cannot " plead any other dofeuoe to the same cause of acition without tho leave of the court or a judge ; " ' and raust " insert in tho margin of his pleading the words ' By Statute,' together with the year of the r«Mgn in whicjh the Act of Parliament on which he relies was passed, and also tho chapter and section of such A(!t, and ppecify whether such Act is public or otherwise ; otherwise such defence shall be taken not to liave been pleaded by virtue of any Act of l'arliam(>nt." * S -'J 12. Under this form of general issue a defendant may some- times give special matter in evidence so as to be entitled to lely upon the want of notice of action, or a tender of amends, or on some other special protection given by a particular Act of Parlia- mont. lUit when such a privilege as this is claimed by virtue of liaving (ictvd in cm office, or under a statute, it is extremely difficult to lay down, as an abstract prop()8iti(m of law, what amounts to such an acting in piirttiifince of the xtatntc, or in the execution of the office, as to entitle tho defendant to the protection of the statute.' This much, however, may safely be stated, that if a party believes, bona fide, in the existence of a state of facts* which, if they had existed, would have afforded a defence to tho action,' he is, —with- out reference to the reasonableness of such belief," — entitled to pro- m ■ m Iiiw, if tho i)liiiiitifT wcifl to close liis case without hetriiyiuf.j tho want of jmisilictiou. and the; (Icfeiidaiit wore tlion, without any Hjiooial plea raisin;? th(! jioiut, to oi, T evittoiico of facts with a view of showing? that the cause of action was ultiu vires. ' Old. A' IX. r. 12. » Old. XXL r. 19. ' Si!o Anicdd c. Ilainol, 18.54 ; and .Kirliy '■. Simpson, IS.VJ, where a i;iairistrati', actin;? in (^vci'ution of his ollico malii'iintsly and without roa-iiiuablu and i)robal)h) cause, was hohl outitlcd hy 11 & 12 V. c. 44 ("Tlio Justices' Proti'ction Act, 1S4S "), § i» (nowrt'pcak'd hy 57 & 08 V. 0. 50), to notice of uctiou, 226 * If there are no facts on wliich a hoiiii fide hidiof can rcasonahly ho founded, tho jirotcnrtion will not apply: A;;no\v c. Johson, 1H78. * Ilcrnuuin c. Siuicsclial, lH(i2 ; Heath V. Ur ..cr, 1H(>4; Mid. Ky. Co. V. Within^rton Local Hoard, 188;}, 0. A. ; Itolxats /•. Orchard, 18();j. .Sfo l)owninj; c. Capol, 18(57; Sclnics c. Judp", 1871. * CliainJM'rlain ''. Kinp, 1871. Prior to this decision, it was tliou;;ht by many tliat the beliof, to be availubhi, must liavo rested " on some coloiii' of rtsason." See (.'auii v. Clipperlon, 18:J!»; Cook V. Leonard, 1827, as qualitied in Jones r. Uooday, 1842. 8oe, also, Kiuo v. Jivorshod, 1847; n'M CHAP. II.] PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BY STATUTE. ttMjtioii, although lio iiiiiy havo proeeedod ilh'f^ully or exoeotk-J his jurisdiction.' Stiitutos of this kind are inti^uded for tlio pro- teetiou of honest jMjrsons, wlm bontl fido mean to discharge tlieir duty ; ' and the court will, consetiuontly, so interpret theii' provi- fiioiiH, H8 to save harmless all persons who act illfgully under tho reiisoiiiihle belief that they are authorised in wliut they do by Act of rurliament ; and this, too, whether tho error complained of has been comn;illed In respect of fitiic, pfarr, or rirciiiihs/diicr.^ §313. Under a plea of "iVW Giii/fi/ hj/ .stntufr" a defendant may, too, clearly set up any defence that could he specially ph-aded, whether it he founded wholly or partly on the statute, or be merely KUJ-tainable at common law.* For example, in an action for an excessive distress, such a plea puts in issue not only the matter of justification, hut the tenancy and the ownership of the goods.* This being the ca.se, the courts will not, in general, allow a defendant to plead "not guilty by statute," together with any other defence; but if a reasonable doubt exists as to whether the defendant, in regard to tho particular act complained of, is entitled to such a plea, the rule will, in favour of substantial justice, be some- times relaxed." § 314. It may be added in connection with this subject that' so nuich of any clause or provision in any Act commonly called Public local and persoiud, or Local and personal, or in any Act of a local and personal nature," whereby any party was entitled, Tippto V, Hurt, 18(iS ; Spoonor v. Jiiddow, lHJ,S-.j(), P. U. (Lil. (.'iiiiii)- l)ull); Booth V. Clive, l.S.Jl ; \\vm\ r. Coker, lHo',i; Arnold r. llanicl, I,Sj4 ; lii'i'iiiaiui r. Si'iR'si'hal, IN(i;{. ' IIiizoldiiKi r. Orovo, IM'2; Spooncr V. Jiiddow. 1848-(iO, 1*. ('. ; Jont^s c. (ioodav, IM2 (Piiik(» u/id AldtMsoii, ]U{.);"Thi'olmld r. Ciulmiorc, IHKS (lid. Elleiilior()ii{,'h, luid liMvlcy. J.), i^t'c, further, Kliot v. Allen, IHl.) ; [Slmtwoll r. lliiU, 1842; Hopkins r. ( "rowo, 18;}( Lidstor y. Uorrow, l8;{i»; JIuhIi v. Urn ; 18;}"; Smith r, Slmw, 182!»; Davis ?•. ('urlinf;, 181"); Voxv. l{eid, 1849; Thomas v. Stei>h»)n8on, iS.iU; Nowt^mc. iillis, ISoJ; i'oiil&um V. Thirst, 18(i7. ' Por Purko, B., in Jonos v. Oooday, 1842. » lIii;,'ho8 c. Buckland, 184(> (Pol- loek, C.B.); Horn c Thorn borou};h, l.S4i», * Ho89 V. Clifton, 1811 ; Mannd i>. Monmouth Can. Co., 1812 (CretJH- well, J., Htatin;,' tlio ^^cneral opinion of t'lc ju(l;;cs); ]""isher i'. Thames Jii c. l{y, Co., 18;17; Hainti i\ i)avev, 1 .td; Kaj.'Ieton v. Outtoridgo, 184;{ ^Parke, U.). ^ Williams I'. Jones, 184 1. I'ornn'rly it also onalili'd a dciVnilant to disputo tile eliaracter in wiiieh jjlaintiiV sued: Tharpe r. Stalhvood. 184:1 (Cress- well, J,). But see, now, Ord. XXI. r. i), set out at § ;i()7. « I.anf,'fonl r. Woods, 1844. ' By o & () V. e. !)7, § .'J. * As to the meai\ing of this phrase, isnnraso, SCO Biehards c. Eustu, 1846; Cuck v. It m m^ W ii.-i i; I ''•:"' IJ :li|i PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BY STATUTE. [PART II. before tlio 10th of August, 1842, to givo Hpocial matter in ovidem-u under the general issue, is rejx^aled. The Irish Coniniou Law Proceduro Act of 18o-"{,' also repeals, by S <){>, " so mueh of any Act of Parliament as entitles or permits any person to plead the general isstie oidy, and to give special matter in evidence without ])h'a(ling the same." lTnfortunat(»ly a similar clause is not to be found in either of the English {-'(inunon Law Procedure Acts; and the pleader is consecpiently still left to discover, as best ho may. iu what cases the defendant may or may not avail himself of this indefinite and comprehensive form of pleailing. S -'{i 5. It will be recollected that a general pr()t(!otion to public authorities is, in lieu of the plea of " Not (hiilty," now afforded by the provisions of the I'ublie Authorities Protection Act, IHJ).'},' within which is included every Junfice of the peace, siicd for anything done by hini in the vxrcnfiim of hix offur} There are, however, still in existence various statutes empowering delendiints to plead the general issue, and to tender or jtay into court amends for the injury complained of. In many of these* (but not in all of theiii*) it is expressly enacted that tender of aoiends or payment into court shall b(» specially pleaded.* § 81oA. The general ruh* of law, as staleil above,' which limits priHif to the matters put in iasue by the pleadings, has been supple- mci.t.^d by express cMUUitment, as regards actions for infringement of patents, by the Pat«'nts, Designs, and Trade-marks Act, ISH^.J (ifiit, INCJ; Kanictt v. fox, 1M7 ; I'llkin^'tnii r. Itili.y, \MV \ Mi='il'". 1 V. Slllll|), lN.')ti. ' l(i\- 17 V. e. il;i, Ir. » .'ili iV :>', V. c. (il. ante. § 7:». » S..e .'j(l * .'.7 V. c. (il ("Til) ViiMic AutliorilicM I'ldlei'tiiin A<'t, iKIIlt "), iiiiti', H 7;iA : iinij 1(11 till' i(ni- Mtnictiiiii of li n'|ii'iili'il .'\rt (II \' \'l V. «'. -I-I, M. it), Stic Kirliy r. Siiii|miiri, 18>H, uittnl unto, nnti's to § 'A\'i. * Si'd, r,(/,, " Till' SeiiiMun'MClotlnnj; Act, IHfiH" (;»J iS: ;j;i V. <•. ■•.7), ^ tl; nnd, iilHi.. li O, '.>, «•. lit cTlii' His- tiT-iH fur K.-nt Art, 17:17 "), §§ '.'(i, •.'! ; iinii'niiiiil l>v " Tliii S. I,. l{t!V. Alt, IHKS" (,-,1 V, r, :»). ■• Sim. •(,•) iV •Id V. c. .'lO ("Tl.n Uuni<n]itil (.'or|Miriiti<ins .Vut, lh8'J"), 22H § •J'Jf!, HIlllH, 2. " \\X {% 'MS rt Mi'.|, ' Ifi.V 17 V. .'. .-.7. § •-•() of thin .\pt |)roviiir.s UH I'lilJuwH : "(1.) In an iictinn I'nr infiinp'- n)<>nt III It ]iiiti>nt tlm ]iliiintilV niiiHt ili'liviT with liis Htati'MH'nt of ciiiiiii, or liy iinliT nf llif roiiii or the jmlp', ut anv -"111 |ui'hf tinn-, iiiitirul.irN of till' hri'iirhi's ('oni|iiaini'il of, "(2.) The ili'fi'mii.nt niiist ileiiviT with his Htati'iiii'iit of ili'tVuco, or. hy oriliT of th lilt or a jinlui', at uii) HiiliH<'(|iii'iit tiiiii', |iiii'tirularH of liny oliji'itiims on wliith ho i-i'IIhh in Hii]>|Hirt thiTi'iif, ",;!.] If tint ili'fi'iiilant ilispiiti'i .1 vuliility of thu )iutoiit, thu jiiu- 1 1 CHAP. II.] EVIDKNCE OF COLLATERAL FACTS EXCLUDKI). § 316. The rule nonBuing evidence to the points in issue not only prechidtw tlu) litigant parties from proving any facts not dis- tinctly controvertod by the ploailings, bnt it limits the mo(ie of proving even the issues themsolvos. Thus,' it excluders all evidence of collatrntl fdih, which are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption as to the principal matters in dispute. The reason is, that su.h evidence tends needlessly to consume the public time, to draw away the minds of the jurors from the points in ife&ue, and to excite prejudice and misleail ; while tlio adverse party, having had no notice of such evidence, is not prepared to rebut it. The duo application of this rule will occasionally tax to the utmost the firmness and discrimination of the judge; so that while he shall reject, as too remote, every fact which merely furnishes a fanciful analogy or conjectural inference, he may admit as rele- vant the evidence of all those matters wliich shed a real, though l)erhap8 an indirect and feeble, light on the question in issue. The circuniHtancos of the parties to the suit, and the position in which they stood' when the matter in controversy occurrcid, are generally proper subjects of evidence ; and, indeed, the cliango in the law enabling parties to give testimony for thems<>]ves, has rendered this proof of *' xurroinufiiuj ciiriimataiircH " still more important than it was in former times.* Accordingly, in an action for m«)noy lent, the poverty of the alleged lender is a very relevant fact, evidence of whic^h is admissible for the purpose of disproving tlio loan.* !i ;U7. Tlio most important facts which are excluded on the ground of ivrehvuncy, are the acts and declarations, either of tii'iiliii'H (li'livorod by him iiiiiwt Htato nil whiit ^|-<lllll(lH ho <liMi)iit('M it, iiiiil, if oiiit of thoMit ^I'diiiKlH ix wiiiit of ii(iv<'lty, iniiHt Htiito tho tiiiuninil iiliicit of till' orcviniiH ])ubli('ution or imiir hIIi'ki'iI tiy liiiii, "(I.) At tht« hearing no oviih-nco t»huli, oxropt hy U'avn of tho conit or H jii(l(^>, Im< aihiiiltt'il ill ]ii'iiiif of uiiy ullt'K>><l iiifriiigi'iiK-iit oi oliji'ction, of which piirticiihii'H urn not. ho ilclivurcil. " (5.) riirtiiulurM delivered may ho from timo t ) time amcndod, hy h'livo of tliii court or a jiidfi:<<. "(li.) On taxation of contM, rojjunl ■hbll bo hud to the purtiiulurs du- livcrnd hy tlio phiintifT and by the di't'cndaiit.H ; and thi'y rcHpcciivcly hIiuII not bii allowed any rostH in ri>H|Hict of any |iartii'uliii' delivered by tlieni, iinlesH the Hiinie in cerlilii'd by the court or a ,jud^e to have been proven, or to have been rcanoimblo and proper, witliout repird to the general coMt« of the cuMe." ' dr. J'lv. §.')'-•, in part forHix liiiei, • S»M( Woodward f. liiichuiiun, INTO. » Dowling V. Dowling, 18(10 (Ir.) (I'igot. CM.). ♦ Dowling V. Dowling, IbOO (Ir.). 1 : i if'! ■ 1 ,1 I 1 229 !ii' \ f ii Ml' ■ I ',!!■ Willi RES INTER ALIOS ACI.E EXCLUDED. [r.VIir IL Btrnngers, or of one of the pnrtios to the action in liis (leuliii;,'s with strangers. Tliose, in technical language, are dcnonuiiutcd " ITS inter alioH nrtcr." § 318. A good example of matters being oxeludod for irre- levancy, and as " res inter nlion nrfir," is that in an a<'tion to recover goods by his assignees against a bankrupt's creditor, proof of the commission of acts of bankruptcy, by showing that ot/icr goods which, about the same time, had been delivered to other creditors before the goods in dispute came into defendant's hands, had been got back from them, was rejected. It wa.- suggested that tho con- duct of such other creditors bor(> upon the case which was being tried, a« it showed the conviction of the other crcditoi-s that they had received the goods under tircuniHtances which did not entitle then) to keep possession. Hut as their opinions, expressed after the liat, could not have bi>en receivetl as evidence, so also evidence of their acts, adduced for the purpose of raising an inference respecting the ])revious intentions, either of themselves or of the bankrupt, was iiiadiuiKsible.' To return, proof of llic usage of u particular estatis however extensive it nmy be, is inadmissilile for the purpose of importing into tlie lease of a farm on that estate some B]iocial stipulalioiiH relative to the mode of cultivation ;* on a (pies- tion between laudh.rd and tenant, win ther rent be payable <|uar- terly or half-yearly, cvidenee of the mode in which other tt'nants of the same huidlurd pay their rent is rejected;^ and where if was necessary for a brewer to prove that he had supplied a puldieau with good beer, other piiblicans were not allowed to show tliat, during the same ])eriod as thecb-aling in ({uestion, hehad furnished them with beer of an excellent ipiality, for a man may deal well with some of his customers, though not with others.* !i UUJ. Again, where the issue* is whether the jilaintifT's seholars have been ill-fed, although eviilence is admissible to show tlie gitirriil treatment <tf boys at schools, a witnens may not be asked as to the comparative (pmlity of the provisions supplied by the plaint ilF with those cr)nsimiod in a /w;7/n//rtr school ;•'* in an action > Huckhinuut r. JmieH, |S;«>. KlleiilxiriiU);))). H<>fl, ,^\m^, \\\\\\'\\\\t- • WdiiKTHlcv r. Dully, IH.)7. liuni ., II. ml, \hM\\ Hew <•. lliit.liiiiH, > Cuitor V. I'lyke, itsil \\.i\. Ken- iHiil ; li.iw.uil r. Shewunl, IHIMI. yoii\ * lleMion I'. WiililoWH, 1«24 (Al>- ♦ Holcdiabo I', llewieii. IS1«(I,.|, l.ott, (".J.). 230 1 1 ClfAP. II.J CUSTOMS OF MANORS WIIKN AnMISSIULE. ngainst a niarrieil woiiinn, wli^ro tltoro is nn issue wlu^tlior slio had represented herself to the i)laintiff as a feme sole, and he had dealt with her as such, evidenoo of the defendant's dealings with other trad(>sinen is only admissihle, if at all, on the ground that she had held herself out to others as a single woman in such a nmnncir us to reach plaintiff's oars ; ' in an action by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill, where the defence is that tho acceptance is a f()rgery, evidence that a collection of bills, on which the defendant's acceptance was forged, had b(*en in plaintiif's possession, and that some of them had been circulated by him, was rejected, as no dis- tinct proof was given that the bill in (juestion had wrr Jhnmd part of t/itif vnllrifioii} 13ut in an actiim fur ii nuisance to a highway by jilacing a heap near it, evidence that ollnr horses (as well as plaintiff's) had shied at it goes to prove that that piirtittular heap is a nuisance, and such evidence is acctu'dingly admit'sible.' S ;Vj(). The two cases last (iited point us to an cjrviptioii to the rulo under discussion, which is, that tn-idence of facts which, though col- lateral, are proved to be couiirrtidhy W)n\*i gen(?ral link with tho matter in issue, is admissible. There are numemus other instaniM** of the recognition of this exc«'ption. Thus, although the ntxfuniH of one iiKiiKir usually cannot be given in evidenct! to prove the customs of another,^ yet such customs beconie evidence the moment that a foundation has been laid for tlieir admission, by clear proof of a sutHcient c(»nnection between tho two nwinors. Tlu' mere fact that two nuinors lie within the same parish and leet, nor even that th(* one was a subinfeudation of the other, will not be sullli i«>nt ; at least, unless it b(* clearly shown that they weie separatrd after the time of legal memory, since otherwise* they may have had dif- ferent immemorial customs.* If, however, it can bo satisl'actorily ' 'Hunli'H I', Kf'vcili.'rf?. IS.'l". Poo Siirli (•viilnici' wmilil Ih' ili'inly inud- Siiiitl; I'. WilkiiiH, lH,'t;{, win re, tlio iiiiH-ilili' in an iiiilicttiii'nt Inr t'orp'iy i|ii<>r<tiiiii lii'in); whi'tlii'i' I'l'i'iiit wuh (1,(1. I>*'nin:ui\ );ivi>ii t4) lii'fcniiaiit'N wile ni' to )ii>r fiitliiT, cviilrnci- that otlxT truili'mncn liJiil Kivrn cnKlit tt> the f'ltlii'r was rt'j.'itctl l)y Tinilal, CJ. Alxn Uolu- lantlii I'. |',aii«. INIO. ' OrillitH r. I'ayiif, IMMO; ThdUj))- sim r. MtiHily, lh;t;i(l,(l. I,vnil)iuii*f); Vincy V. llarHH, 17H') ( Ltl. Kt nvoii) ; ]»al..'lU V. Hfiuni, 17!i'.' (Miilli'l, J.). ' Hiowii ct iix I'. KaKtorn Coiiiitit'ii Uy.. l.sHK, (". A. * M. of Aiij^l'^'V r. I-<1, IlatlxT- foii, IHVI (I,ti. Aliiiipii) ; Kuriii'aiix ''. llutcliiiiH, 177H; l>oe v. SInmou, * M of AukI'si'J' v. Lil. Ilutln.'ituu, 1H12. 'il COLLATKRAL FACTS [PAHT II. ■Ill j (I ^/roved 'lial I'^e cn8t(»iiis in the two manors are identical, ' ihai the cue was derived frc/m tlie otlier after tlie time of llichard tho First, then the customs of each will respectively become cnidence.' More- over, whenever the custom in question is as to a particular incident of a general tenure proved to be common to the two manors, evidence may be given of what the custom of the one is as to that tenure for the purjioso of showing what is the custom of the other as to the same.' For instance, prove in a particular manor that borough English or gavelkind prevails, and then you may see from other manors what are the peculiarities of those tenures.' S 321. Similarly, in the manors on the border between Scotland and England,^ a particular species of tenure, called tenant-right, and in the manors in the mining districts of Derbyshire and Cornwall, partiotdur customs, as to the rights of the minors and the rights to the nunerals, prevail. If in one of those no example can bo rtddtioed of what is tho custom in any particular case, in order tc; exjilain tho nature of the tenuri) or right in question, evidiMice is adniissibh* to show what is the general usage with respect to that tenure or right.* S ii'22. Accordingly, too, \i\wx\ a question wliether the Crown, ir right of the Dueh}' of Ijancastor, had the exclusive privilege, imder an original chart<'r, of appointing a coroner within tho honour of I'ontefraet, ovidenee of api>ointnients of coroners, and of flioir ail- ing, in other parts of thepame duchy, was admitted.' On tho pume princij*!", tho mode of conducting a particidar branch of trade in one place may be proved by showing the "immer in which tlu? same trade is carried on in a.xthor place.' .\;.ii) whore there is a dispute as to tho exact lino of boundary b(ftwK ,. manors, evidence that the alleged boundary is a uatnral one, and bounds ono of tho manors from certain other manors (not the subjects of controversy) is admissible, because the boundary being a natural ono, equally ' M. of Aiifjh'Hoy r. lid. Iliithorton, ISI'J ( .\l(l.Ts(,n, H.). " 1(1. : Staul.iy 1'. Whito, 1811 (1,(1. Elk-nbonniKh) ; II. v. KIIIh, 1H1;{ fid.) ; 1). of SoincrHct v. 1''iiiim'(?, I72( : rhinniiiiin »•. AtkinMon, 1(i72 ; oxi)]aiii('(l(HoUc, IDinM.ofAii^jloHflv V. I A. Ilafhcrton, \K\'l. * M. cf Augluouy V, Ld. liuthuitou, INI'.' (Rolfo, II.). ♦ Howo V. I'liikor, 1792 {lA. Kon- yoii). * M. of An(?losoy »•. T,d. Ilatherton, ISI'J (1,(1. A!.int?.T); liowo v. \S\vn- toii. 1N2N. • iliwinoti it. DyRon, IH42. Son FIdft -. Mnrlon, 1871. ' Noblo V, Kouuoway, I7b0, 232 CHAP. II.] CONNECTED WITH FACT !>: ISSUE. suitable ia botli onsc», it is higl-.ly unlikely to have beea varied.' S 32'i. Where, too, the question is wlictlior a slip of waste land, lying between the highway and the enclosed lands of the plaintiff, belong.s to him, or to the lord of the manor, — the loid may give evidence of acts of ownership on othor jmrts of the waste land between the v^w;^ road and the enclosures of othor persons, although at the distance of two miles from tlio spot in dispute, and although the continuity of the waste be interrupted.' Again, where, in trespass, the plaintiff's object is to prove himself owner of the entire bed of a river flowing between his laiul and that of the defendant, and thus rebut the presumption that each party is entitled ad medium filum aquoc,' ho may give evidence of acts of ownership exercised by himself upon the bed and banks of tht; river lower down the stream on the defendant's side, where the same river flows between the plaintilf's lan<l and the farm of a third ])arty, or of repairs done, beyond the limits of the defendant's land, to a fon(H* dividing defendant's and other land from the river, which runs for a considerable distance along the side of the strcMim, till at last it comes actually opposite to the extremity of the plain- tiff's property on the other side.* ! t I ' Urisoo I'. TiCmnx, 18;5ft. • Doo I'. KiMiip, IS.U, ri'corf'iiy.od (Paiko, H.) in JcncH r. Williams, IN.IT; ]lrvuii V. Winwooil, i«08; J>('ii(ly ('. Si;ii])s()n, \H')(\. ' Auto, § Hit. « In. lon.'sr. Williams, 18;n.P;irke, H., ohservfs : — "I think thcovidonco (ilTi'i'c'd of acts in annthi'r ]iart of one rnntinuons Ikm'.jji". ami in tlic wliolo boil lit tlin river, iidjoininj; tin' |ilain- tin's lanil, was admissibli- in iivi- (li-nui, on till' j,'ioiinil that tlwy aro ciich acts as mi;;lit rrasoiialilv Icatl to till' infuiTiici' that till' rntirc In'dpi anil bcil of tho river, ami, ronMo- qni'iitly. tilt' part in ilisjaiti'. hiilonjjji'il to till' iiliiintilY. OwniT-iliip may hn jirovod hy j)roof of poHsi'ssion, .ind that can ho shown hy acts of onjoy- mcnt r,f tlio lanil itself; hut it is iui- ])Os-ihlo, in 'ho nature of things, t« conllno tho oviili'iini to tho vory pio- cisi' s])i'l on whii'h tho allo)fi'(l trcn- pUHii niuy havtt Liwu uuuunittcd ; eri- dencf may }if i/ivrn n/artx iloiifim aflier jxiriit. jiriiriilid tliirr in mifh a couimou I nntitir of luraliti; 'ittifrni tlmsr /mrt/i tiiiit till- Hfiut III <iiiiKti<iii, us traiilil riii»f a reasoiKihU iujimice i'« tht miiiili <>/ tilt jury, ihut the plnrr in ilin/iittf hihiiKjrd to thr fil'iiiiUff if tht iilhi r i-'irl.t fliil. In ordinary ra-M's, to jirnv!' his title to a closi', tho claimant may <^\vi' in cvidi n'l' acts of owin-r- hhip in any part of tho same on- cloiuiro ; for tho owiii'imIh of one part cansi's a roasonahli' infori'iico that till' other hrlon^s to the ^amc })i'rson ; thoii;,'h it hy no means fol- iiws as a necessary ciin-'i'i|iience, for dilVerent persons may huve halks of land in the same enclosure ; l>ut this is II fact to he Huhmitteil to the jury. Ho, I anprehend, tin ^llme rule is iipplicahlo to a wnuil which is not enclosed hy any fence: if you prove the eultiiifj of timber in one part, I lake that to he ovideliee to jro to H jiuy to pt'uve a right iu thu whole 1 illili COLLATKRAL FACTS [I'AUT il. § 324. Tho same principle applies to the case of mines. There- fore, on a chiim founded upon a demise of all mines and minerals under a large contiguous area, evidence of working under one part of the surface is evidence of possession of the entire subject of demise.' S ti'25. In oases, as those above referred to, it is for the judge to decide,* whether such an unity of character exists between the spot in dispute and tho parcel of land over whi'-h acis of ownership have been exercised, as to lead to the fair inf<>rence tiiiit bo^h iiro subject to the same rights, and constitute in fact but parts of an entire ]troperty. If no stieh inference can be raised, evidence of acts done beyond tlie limits of the locus in quo will be inadmissible. YuT example, whcire it was attempted to connec^t parcels of wiislo land with each other, by merely showing that they all lay within the same manor, and between enclosures and public roiul.s, ovidt^nce of acts of ownership over some of these lands was held inadmissible to prove title to the others.^ wood, altlidiipli tliuro Iw no fonro, or (listiiict l«...uiluiy sundiiiiiliii^r tho whdli' (', till' CllMtl of Stuuli'v I'. Whito, iNll, I coiiciiv"'. is to t)o (•xj)l!<iiii'(l on tliin iniiiciplt' : tluro WHS 11 (•(''.I'iiiiioiiM Ih'U ot trt'i'H, iinil nets of owiu'i's'iiii on (iiic jmi't wcif held til hif iidii.ir^-iblf to prove that tho idain'ilf w;is Mil' owner olunipthcr part, on whitli the tl•l•s|m^^wllH iniii- niitted. So I »hoiild uiiply tlie i-aino reasoiiiii); to a I'oiitihuoiiM ii< iltr*! ; thoiij^li no duuht th.i ilelemlant niijilil relmt the ii!f'>Hn<'c that tho whole helollpd to tliv silne Jiclhon. I)y Hhiiv. iiij.' aeti ol ownersliij) on his Iiait ali>?ip Uii siniie I'eOie. It li.»rt )eeii Miiii 111 the eniUKe of !h(> argu- ment, that the i/(/i uliinl Inn! im iii- frrid (ii i/ii>iiiili' 'Ai loY.i (i/ tiiiiiirKliift not iiiijiiiitUi' h< ■ iiirii liihil ; hill 'lif yroinnl im triii'/i inch nrtn iirf <iil- mittibli it hOt the le ■luiiniiiirr of am/ jHirly : ''n'l art tutn.) AiUr <•/ L m- nrlvm iir.irri" i''<:--ri , _/'«•■ thtii tun! to provf :li,ii he ahu dtn'n fJunt i* the iiwiirr of ihr i»>U ; ,' .md/A •/ thri/ iire iliiur ill tlir iiI'Miii; <;/' ill! ■■' rmiiiH in- ttrcntid I'l diK/iIlt' /Aria, </i( ■, 'Iff i[l"tv»3 irriiiht," See, ul'o, H. r, Unj^htfido, liiorluw, 184U; I'laidon v. Uiidcrliili. 234 1S,')(); Ponejiiill r. Temi.lemoro, IS.VS (Ir.) (Christian,. 1. 1; ind In ro J^elfa^t bi'ik Ait, lS(;(i-7 (Ir.). ' Tiiylor V. I'any, IMO (Timhil, C.J.I ' hi :•. Kemp, 1S31 (iJoHiiniinut, J.); ante, § '-M. •' Hoe /. Kemp, 1K;J."). I,d. Ken- man, in irivin;; jiiilj^nient, oliseiieH, "It till' liii'ii has a litrlit to one |ii(ri) of wiisti' hmd, it aD'Mids no inlei- onee, even tile moht remote, that Ik- luis a I'ifrht to another, in th<> Maino matior, altlioii;:h liitli may he simi- larly sitimtid with ii^pect to the hii:ii«iiy ; assiimin).' that nil were originally the jiio|ierty of flie hhihk ]teisoii, as the litrd of lh ' manor, 'A h'l h is all that the fait of tliiir bi ill); in 'he same maimi' prii\ .'s, no preMuni)ition liriscs fmni liis retain- iii); one part in his hunds that he refaineil iinother; nor, if in one part, of the manor the lord has dedirate.l a Jiortion of the waste to the use of tlie plihlie, iilid ^'Milted out the ad- j'linin^ land to private individuals, does it hy any means follow, iiiir dix'H it raise any prohahilily, that in aimther part heiiiaynot have^ranled tho whole out to private iudividuuU CHAP. II.j WHEN EXCIADKU IN CKIMIVAL CASKS. S I{2(). Tho rule that ovitlcnco must be strictly confined to the points in iusuo (as liniitod in the nmnner above stated), a]>{)lieg with oven greater force to n-iininul than to civil proceedings. An indictment should afford distinct information to the prisoner of the specific charge about to bo brought against him. There- fore, the admission of any evidence of facts unconnected with that charge, and relating to acts alleged to have been doms at a different time or jjlace, would be clearly open to the sori'>u8 objection of taking the jirisoner by surprise. No man should be bound, at the peril of life or liberty, fortune or reputation, to answer at once and unprepared for every action of his life. Few even of the best of men would choose to submit to such an ordeal.' Consccpi'jntly, if <m an indictment for burglariously entering a house on a certain day and stealing gooils therein, the prosecutor fail in ])roving that any larceny was committed on that occasion, he cannot abandon the charge of burglary, and then proceed to show that the prisoner stole some of the articles mentioned in the indictment on a prcrious occasion ; because, though time is not usually a material allegation, yet the prisoner, having been led to suppose that he was to meet a charge of burgliirv, ciinnot be expected to come prepared to prove his innocejice with ropect to a distinct offence, saitl to have been committed at a totally di'?irent time.' Accordingly, too, an admission by a prisctner that he has, at (inof/iir liinc, committed an offence similar to that with which he is charged, and has a tendency to jierpetrate su< h crimes, cannot bo received.' Thus, on a charge of firtinoii, no overt act amounting to a distinct independent charge, though falling under the same head of treason, can be given in evidence, unless it be either itscH expres>ly alli gctl in tin- indictment, or bo direct proof of some or one of tho overt acts which are there luid.* and they iifterwuniM hiivo deilicuteil (Huxley, J.). itiirt iiM 11 ]iu)>li<' iniid. Itiit the ciise ' l'"ii!st,, ( '. I,. 'J4fi. Vote the (\i»~ !■< vei V dinVl'ilit willl ie-*|ieit to tho-e tilictinn lietweeu Nllrll cilMeM iiiul jiaiteis, wliiih liiiiii Iheii lucal >itiiii- tlm^'e where a eliiiip" neiertsiirily tioll limy he deemed |):Mts of one iHi-flirM some i.fhei' di-tiiict oU'eiiO'? waste or comiiKm ; m-ts of ownership to liave heeii roiiimitted nt liif miint ill oiii) |mrt. of tho same field, are t/'/n'- »fii/ /i/i/rc, us to whicth, Heu ante, I'videllCO of title to the wliole ; and ^§ '.'(i.i ('< Xf'i. the like may he said of similar acts ' It. c. \ andercninh, I'UO. on Jiart of one lal^e waste or com- ' ]{. r. Colo, INIO (Ity nil flie moil," See, also, Tyrwhitt c. Wynne, judf,'esV 1«1» ; lloUia V. "Uoldliich, 182;J « 7 W. 3, o. 3 ("The Trsuson A. t. 2lio m WHAT COLLATERAL FACTS ADMISSIBLE. [PART H. § 327. When, however, aovcral/i'/oiiirs are so connooted togellior as to form part of one eutira tranFaction, an exception to the gciH'rul rule tliut oollatcral facts must he exchidod arises, similar to that which prevails in civil cases,' and evidence of one felony may be given to show the character of the other.' Thus, on nn indictment for litealing (Is. from a till, evidence was received that on one occasion, when the till contained marked silver and other money, amounting in all to 12.s. G<i., the prisoner went to it, and it was afterwr.ids found to contain lis. 6<i. only, and that on Buhsequent exar.iinations of the till the money was perceived to have gradually diminished, and that, on the prisoner being searched, Ss. of the marked money was found on his" person ; for thougli each unking was a separate felony, they were all so connected together as mutually to illustrate and prove each other.* So whore the lessee of a coal-mine had run lev(>ls from his own shaft into liis neighbours' mines, and had, during a period of four years, been constantly extracting coal belonging to thirty different proprietors, an indictment charging him in one and the same count with etealing the coal of each of these proprietors was held valid ; and the judge refused to make the prosecutor elect on which casa he would rely, but allowed him to give evidence in support of all the charges, as at least furnishing proof of a felonious intent. ' !5 ''}2H. Again, whc^re four indi(!tments against a woman respectively charged her with poisoning her husband and two of hor sons, and with ati«^raj)ting to poison a third son, on the trial of the first indict- ment evidence was admitted that arsenic must have been taken by the three sons a few months after their father's death ; that all the four parties, when taken ill, exhibited the same symptoms; and ll\d.') "), § 8, as oxpliiinid in Fost., 0. li. 24.> ; citiiif; Ainlnoso Hookwond's cast!, KiJIO; J-owick'n oiiso, HiOfi ; Liiynr's cuso, 17'J2; Di'acon's chho, 17'iii ; and WrMldirbuino's cawj, 1710. AwMJi'din^fly, <iii an indic^tinont for ndlii'iinff to lh<i Kin^'n (tncniioH on till' liifjh sea, wlioro tho ovni-t act laid ■wuH tlu) nrimmdrVi cniiHin^ on tho Kin^'u MinjcctH in a voHwd calli'<l tho lioyal Cloncarty, dvidinco, without unytliiiiK to ronni'ct it with tho overt h<(m for whicl) 111' Wii-* J)"in«^' trii'd, tliut hu hud buuiu tiniu butoiu cut away the cUHtom-houKO barjyn, and goni! a cruising in hiT, was ii'ji-ctod: Vaujrhan'H caHo, l(}!)(i. ' Ah to which, 800 Bupru, §§ .'120 — 325. » ]{. I'. FlliH. 1824 (BayJoy, J.); RouiH'll r. IlawH, 1H03, K. v. lloar- don, \m\ (WilloH, J.). » n. V. Ellis, 1H26. * H. V. lUcuMdalo, 1848 ■&!«. J). Son R. r. I'iith, I8<i», wieni the piiHoniT was indicti'd for Btealin); gao: IL. V. Iluuwoud, IblO, 236 I |l"!i cirAr. II. J IJOCI'UINK OF KLKCTION. thnt tho woinaij, wlioliiid lived in tho saino hnuso witli lior huHbiind aud oliiidrt'ij, Imd Itocn in tho lialiit of propaiiug thoir nioals, sneh evidence going to prove, first, that tho husband (tlio Huhjfct of the indictment tliat was then being tried) died of arsenic, and next, that his (h'ath liad not been uccidental.' Where, too, a man committed throe burghiri«'s in one niglit, and left at one of the Ijouses property taken from another, the three felonies were con- sidered 80 connected that tho court could hear tluj history of nil ;* and similar evidence was received wljore a prisoner was charged on three indictmojits witli firing throe slacks belonging to separate j)arties, within sight of each other, which had all been sot on fire at about the same time.' ^ '62\). In connection with tho principle that rriiniiittl eases are governed by tho general rule that evidence d collateral facts cannot bo given txccpt where it is shown to bo immediately con- nected in some way with tho transaction which is tho immetliato subject of the inquiry, wo may usefully, with this first oxcei)ti()U to such general rule,^ consider tho special rules of law, called tho doctrine of cliclion, by which tho application of this exception is limited. ^ \V-l\)\. Now, in point of law, no objection can be raised, either on demurrer or in arrest of judgment, though tho defendant or defendants be charged in different counts of an indictment with dlll'erent oU'ences of the same kiml.' In<li'ed, on the face of the record, every count jturports to bo for a separate olfenne,' and in mlMlemeanors it is tlu; daily practice to receive evidi iice of several libels, several assaults, several acts of fraud, and the like, upon the same indictment.' In cases of felony, however, this lulo f > n. M. r..!.Tinv', tHi!» (r..ii.«k. O.ll., iiltnv coiisiilliii}; Alili'isdh, U., and 'i'iilfmoil. J.) ; 15. i'. I''l:iii:i;,'ua, 18S'.' (Ilivtt, J.); It. V. (iiirniT, lN(i» (WiUcs,.!.. iinil I'oll.M'k. (M».); K. .'. I'oU.m. lS7a (Archilmlil. .1., iiiiil I'ollwk. U.); 11. I'. It.iii.Mi, I.STJ (LuHh,.!.): 1^- *'• HtM'soiii, IHT.siil.). Soo inmt, §;1UI. Hut Hfi- U. V. Wins- low, lN(i(l"'Mai1in iind Wild.'. lUJ.), ■^ <'ilid l)v Ld. i;ilinl'iiii>ii;.'li ill 1{. r. Wvli. , IMU; U. c. SlnnstT. lNi;{ fWij,'litiniin, .I.), See, ulsd, Ali-^iin, Cr. L. ;J13, ;ilJ, uud WilU, ('ir. Lv. I'lH (!(t, for icniMikiilili' rases <f a similar natitiu wliicli (icciiired iu Snilland. ^ 1!. i: Lonj,', l.s;t;i ildurni'v, 15.); 11. r. C.iImI.'Ii. I.S()'.' (Mraniw.'ll', M.). ' A>* til iitluT cxi'initiouH, M(!o iiifni, §§ .'(;{.■) nt soq. » K. V. Kin;,'ston, IHOO; It. v. Jones, INOII 1^1,(1. KII.'nl.oroM(.'li). Ah t.(i clfr-Uon ill civil uuhuh, si'o llowiini I'. Newton, IsiiJ. • VoiioK '■• It.. 17N0(Hul!.T, J.). ' It. i: .I..n..H, lmi!» (!,d. Kileii- l)orouj,'ii) ; U. V, l.ovy, lt>ll». Sitw, 237 DOCTHINE OF KMXTION. [I'AKT II. ;- 3r hn9, from motives of Imniiuiity, bwii coiiHidcniMy nioiliflcd. As an iiulictnu'iit containing M'Vcral distinct cliargtm is calculatcMl to cmliarrass a jirisoncr in \m dcfcnco, the judges am accuhtonicd to (liiasli indictnu'ntH ko framed, when it apiicars, heforn tho iiri.soncr luiH pleaded and the jui} are chargod, that tlie incjuiry \n to inchido Boparat*! erinioH. When, however, thifi cirounistttnco is di«oovore(l (hiring a trial, the jiroHccutor i» nsually called upon to elcc^t ono felony, and to confine hiniself to that,' unless the oU'eiieeH, though in law (li>tinct, seem to constitute in fact hut parts of ono con- tinudus transaction, in which latter event an "election" will not be e n forced. '•' S 'V-U). l''<ir instance, in general if a prisoner he charged with knowingly receiving several stoh-n articles, and it he proved that they were received at separate times, the prosecutor may ho put to his election. Hut if it bo possible that all the goods nuiy have been received at on(> tin»e, ho lannot V)e compelled to abandon any part of the accusation.' The court, too, refused to put the pio.seeutor to an election, hut heard the whole story, in a oaso where several prisoners were ehargeil in difb rent eounts of tlio same indictnu>nt with successive rapes upon the prosecutrix, and with aiding each other in turn.' A similar course has been followed where an in<]ii'tment contained live counts for wtting tire to tivo houses belonging to diiferent owners, and it appears that the hoiises wci'c in a row, ami that one fire burnt them all;* so, also, it was where an in<ii('lment, in the i-ame count, chargetl four prisoners with assaulting and roi»bing two persons, who w(<re walking tog«>ther at the time wlion they were attacked ;' and also in a case where the defendant was charged in a single count with uttering several forged rec<-iptK (even as many as twenty-two) purporting to be signed by diilerent persons, with intt»nt to defraud, nlse. Jl. »'. Kiiiacuni', 1h:i;1; It. r. CelliiT, ls:;i, Hut sen U. c. liunv, isii,-) Miiitiii. H.). ' 1{. f. Wunl. lH(il (Hyl.H. .).). That WMH an iinlit'tiiicut with tlirco coiintM for sniiliii;^' thicK tliriiitiiiiii;; letters. ll<'|il. tliiit |il'<meriitiir must vluct t() procuixl uii oau cue lit. 238 • YemiK' r. It.. i:H!)(null.T, J.); II. r. I.evv, INIK; It. ,.. ItinUeye, 1N;10. See, uInm, .\ii(i|1., ISU (Ir.). ' It. r. Ihiiiii, iN^Mt; ]{. V. lliiiley, lN|:{{.Mallle, .1.). • n. r. I'nlkeH, IHII'J ; U. v. Gray, iK.t,.; It. .'. I'anv, Is.lT. ^ U. r. Trileiiia'ii, IS.lll. • It. r. (ii.ldiiiH, iNI2(Tiii.lul,C.J.). i. ', i C!I.\P. II.] LIMITATION OF DOCTIMNK or F.I.KCTION. it lit'ing allogotl fhiit all wero uttiTotl ut ono atul tho same time, ami tli<' proof (jornwpoiiiling with this alI('}>;iition.' S <{•{!. It is (>xpn'SHly proviihxl by HtatiitH that in tho onso of cmlH'z/.lt'tiu'iit hy clfi-ks, wrvantrt, aiul pirsons otiiploy<'(l in (ho j'ulilic service, or in llu» polieo, distiiu't aets, not excet-ding threw, ma}' he (rhargetl in one iiulictnienf, if coniinittod against the same master, and within nix calendar months from tho first to the lust of Hiieh acts.' Still, if a proseontor (not taking advantage of tlio htatiife) in<li(!t his servant for a hiiigle act of oinhez/lement, lie nnist ciiidin(( his evidence to that alone, and, if it appear that tho jirisdiicr received dilfcrcnt simis on dilfereiit days, ami made a false account respecting each sum separately, ho must oleot one sum and one day nii which to prot d.' {i 'V-V-i. In tho cjwo of hircony, again, it is by statute provid(>d that several ((ounts may be inserted in tho same indictment for distinct acts of stealing, nf)t exceeding three, which may have been committed by ♦ho prisoner ogainst tho same person within tho space of six calendar months. ^ If, moroovcr, upon tho trial of any indi(!tnient for larc«!ny, the ])ri']H'rty alh'gcd to have Itcen stolen at ono time shall turn out to have* l)een taken at different times, the prosecutor shall not bo put to his oh'ction, iinless it shall appear that (here wore more than throe takings, or tluit more than th(» space of six calendar months elapsed between the first and tlut last of such takings.' In oitlier of these last events tho ]a'osecutitr shall be recpiircd 1 elect to proceed for .such number of takings, not oxc« eding three, tin havo occurnid within six months of eai'h other.* 5i ;{■'{•'{. In tlio coso, too, of receivors of stolen goods, it is also by statute provided" that if tho incpiiry relate to a single criminal not, one or more counts for feloniously stealing property may be joined in (ho same indidiuent with one or more counts charging the I'eliinious receipt of the hamo property by the prisoner, he well knowing it to have Imcd stolon.' ' U. V. 'rii..muM, isno. • 24 & '2:, V. <•. IMi (•Tim Liirccny Act, IHOI"), S 71. Sie U. V. Dulls, 1H71. • U. V. WillwiuH, IHM. 239 • 24 .1- '2r, V. c. m ("Tho Lurcony Act, isdl ••).$«. • bl. §(i. • 1.1. § !»•_>. ' It. r. \\,.,'Um, 1840. Soo B. ». ^. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 tii 12 ,„„■ 2.0 I.I 1.25 l*^ i 1 1'-^ IIIU 1.6 % "TT' ■'/ 0} ¥/ Photographic Sciences Corporation m ,\ :\ \ V « o^ 23 WIST MAIN STRieT WHSTH.N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 1 J COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN AUMlSiSIlSLE. [PART IT. § 334, The time for putting the prosecutor to his election is, when it shall appear by the cddeneo that the two or more 8U£)posed occurrences took place at different periods. It is not sufficient for this purpose that the ootxusel for the Crown, in his opening address, states that the fact is so, because the witnesses, on being oxamimjd, may put the matter in a different light.' § 335. It is now time to return to the consideration of the excep- tions to the general rule that evidence of collateral facts is not usually receivable. The first exception to this general rule, which we were considering when we entered upon a digression as to the law of election is, it will be remembered, the exception embodietl in the rule that evidence of collateral facts is received when such facts are connected with the transaction which is the subject of inquiry. A second exception to the general rule, which laj's down that evidence of collateral facts i:annot be received, arises where the question is a matter of .science, and where the facts proved, though not directly in issue, tend to illustrate the opinions of scientific witnesses. For example, where the point in dispute was, whether a sea-wall had caused the choking up of a harbour, and engineers were called to give their opinions as to the effect of the wall, proof that other harbours on the same coast, where there were no embankments, had begun to be choked about the same time as the harbour in question, was admitted, as such evidence served to elucidate the reasoning of the skilled witnesses.^ If the point in dispute be whether a defen- dant was or was not in his right mind on a certain occasion, it is clear that, after proof by a medical man, or (in a civil case) an admission by counsel, that madness is often of an hereditary character, evidence tending to show that none of the defendant's ancestors or near relations had been insane, would be admissible in support of the negative proposition , and on a question of disjiutod paternity, once prove as a matter of science that children are apt to inherit the features or general appearance of their pai'cnts, and tlien, as a matter of course, evidence will be received of personal resem- blance between the party in question and his alleged fatlier.^ § 336. Yet a third exception to the general rule which, in » R. V. Smart, 1811 (Ir.) (Bushe, O.J.). » Folkos)'. Ch!ul(l,l'82; MTaddcn V. Munlock, 1807 (Ir.). » Biigot V. liagot, 1878 (Ir.). 240 ■n !*■ * * f- *i CHAP. II.] COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLTi:. criminal cases, excludes evidence of collateral facts, is that in sucIj cases evidence of such collateral facts is not excluded, when it can raise a fair inference respecting the matter in issue by either tending to show a prisoner's identity or to corroborate the testimony of a witness in some material particular. For example, on an informa- tion for a libel, where the printer swore that he had received the manuscript from the defendant, and had returned it to him, and notice to produce it had been given to the defendant, other libels written by him concerning the same subject were received to corro- borate the statement of the printer ; ' where a prisoner was charfl:ed with robbing the prosecutor of a coat by threatening to accuse him of an unnatural crime, evidence of a similar, but ineffectual, attempt on the following evening, when the in-isoner brought a duplicate pawn-ticket for the coat, which was found on him at the time of his apprehension, was held admissible, as con- firmatory of tlie truth of the prosecutor's evidence respecting what occurred on the former day ; ^ on a charge of highway robbery, the prosecutor was allowed to rebut an alibi, by proving that, shorily before the attack upon him, and near the same spot, the prison, r hr^d robbed another person;-' and even had no such defence been set up, similar evidence would, it seems, have been admissible, as showing at least that the prisoner was in the neigh- bourhood at the time when the crime was committed.^ § 3-37. The exception just stated also prevails in civil causes. For instance, where a party was sued on a bill of exchange, accej)ted in las name by another person, and evidenc^o had been given that this person had a general authority from the dcfciuliuit to accept bills in his name, an admission by the del'ondiiut of his liability on another bill so accepted was held reeolvablo in ovldence to conlirm the witness who had spoken to the general authority.* § 338. It may, in connexion with the rule that evidence of col- lateral facts is usually inadmissible, bo noted that, where the 1;iiohIc(I(jc, iiiicnf, or yooit fait/i, of a party is material, ovidouce may be admitted to prove facts which hapiieued before or after ' R. V. Pcarco, 1791 (Ld. Kciiyon). ' 11. V. Kjji'rtou, INK), citu("l by Ilolioyd, J., Ill K. V. Ellis, 1820. ' 11. V. Br\i^i;H, 18;{» (Ald.Tson, B.). * 11. V. liuouuy, 1B30 (Littlodiilo, J.). Soo, aUn, R, v. Fiirsoy, 18U3 (I'lirko and (jriisoloo, JJ.). ' LlinvuUyu v, Winckworth, 184j. Soo lloUiii^'hum v. lload, 18J8 ; Morris v. iJothell, 18G9. , v. t , I ti T. VOL. I. 241 ! ! W\i w:^m ,hi n COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART II. the principal transaction, even when they have no direct or apparent connexion with such transaction. At first sight the admission of such evidence may appear to constitute another exception to the general rule. But the knowledge or good faith, or inti-nt of the party heing a material fact, the evidence, though ajiparently collateral, and foreign to the main subject, really has a direct bearing on an issue in the case. Therefore, the admission of such evidence, instead of being an exception to the rule, falls strictly within it. An example of this principle is that where tlie question is, whefher the acceptor of a bill of exchange eitlicr knew that tlie name of the payee was fictitious, or at any rate had given the drawer a general authority to draw bills on him payable to fictitious persons, evidence may be admitted to show that he had accepted other bills, drawn in like manner, before it was possible to have transmitted them from the place at which they bore date.' Again, in an action for an assault and consequent injury, evidence that she bad ascribed her injury to a previous accident having been given for the defence, the plaintiff was allowed to show that in fact no such accident had ever occurred.- So, too, in any trial, evidence will be admissible to prove or dis- prove any attempt at subornation of witnesses.'^ § 3»'39. Further, in an action for fraudulently representing that a trader was trustworthy, whereby the plaintiff was induced to trust him, the defendant was permitted to call fellow- to wu'^mon of the trader to state that, at tlie time when tbe representation was made, the man was, according to their belief, in good credit; ^ in ar. action for the price of fixing railings to certain houses belonging to defendant, the defence to which was that plaintiff had given credit to a builder by whom the houses were built under a contract, such builder was, to show the bona fides of the defence, allowed to state that the ordfT was given by him on his own account, and not as agent for the defendant, and that the defendant had actually paid him for the building of the houses, including tlie charge for the railings; ' and where a person seeks to set aside a contract on the ground of his having been insane when it was made, it must be shown that the defendant was at the time aware of the insanity,^ • Oibson i'. IlniifiT, ITSM. » MMlliuish !'. ("oilier, ISoO. ' iSlii'ou V. Buinsteiid, 18U3. 242 * Gorish V. rimrtier, 184,5. » Impoiiul Loau Co. v. Stone, 1892 (C. A.). u CHAP. II.] COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. and, upon this question, evidence of the plaintifT's oondiict, at diih'i'ent times, both b -fore and after the date of the contract, is admissible to show tliat the madness was of such a character as must have been apparent to anyone who had had opportunities of observation like those afforded to the defendant.^ § '-'AO. On the same principle, in an action against a company to recover money paid to thorn in consequence of a fraud alleged to have been committed by their agent, with their knowledge and for their benefit, evidence of similar frauds jierpetrated on otlier persous by tlie same agent, with the knowledge and for the benotit of the defendants, is admissible in proof of fraudulent complicity in the case before the court ; ^ in actions for false representation, where the questions turn q\\ fraudulent iiifcuf, other mis-statements besides those laid in the statement of claim will be admissible in evidence, for the purpose of showing that the defendant was actuated by dishonest motives ; * in the Divorce Division, in a suit for dissolution of marriage, evidence of acts of adultery, subsequent to the date of the latest act charged in the petition, will be admissible for the purpose of showing the character of previous acts of improper familiarity ;■• in actions for malicious arrest, the jury are always at liberty to draw an inference of malice ex autecedcntibus et consequentibus ; ''' and in actions for defamation, other words written or spoken by the defendant, either before," or after, those declared upon, or even after issue joined,' are admis- sible as evidence of actual inalico or of driihorate jmhiication ; * i'i ' Beavan v. M'Donnoll, 1854. ' lUiiko V. Albion Life Ass. Co., 187S. Sco ante, § 328. ^ lluntinpford v. Massoy, 1859 (Ci'oinptoii, J.). ^ I'.dddy v. lioddy, 18G0. ' SponuLT V. Thompson, 1855 (Tr.), 'Long V. BaiTOtt (Ii'.), 1845; 15iiriett I'. Long, 1850 H. L. Libels wiittt'n as niiicli as six years bcforo that sued npon ai'o achuissiblo. The jury eliould, however, be cautioned not to give damages respecting tliem ; Ibid. But tlu! omission to give sucli caution will not amount to misdirec- ti(m : T^arby v. Oiiseley, 185(i. Such other libels are also admissible upon u (juestiou us to tho 'cvndrut^lwn of the alleged libel : Bolton v. O'Brien, 18S5 (Ir.). ' I'earson v. TiO Muitro, 1843. A letter written siibse(iiioiitly to the commencement ot tht^ action, and fourteen months alter the libel com- l)laini'd of, is admissible : Ibid, See, also, Macleod r. Wakk'y, 1828, where a paragraph published only two days before the trial was admitted bv Ld. Tenterden ; and I'huik.'tt /•. ( 'olibett, 1N(I4, when^ proof that a cojiy of the paper containing the libel was sold after action brought was admitted by Ld. ICUenborough as evidence of do- liberate publication. " I'eaison r. LeAfaitre, 1843; Bar- well V, Adkias, 1840 ; i'erkins v. \\\ 243 k:.^ i'l i' I M i ;|r,! <',\ i 11 :! i %r,J^\ . COLLATERAL FACTS WHEW ADMISSIBLE. [PART H. and this whether the hmguage on which the action is founded be equivocal or clear,' — wliether the colLiteral words tendered iu evidence be addressed to the same party, to whom the slander is lileged iu the statement of claiu to liave been spoken, or to a stranger,- — or whether those words be themselves actionable or not.* § 341. Again, in an action for false imprisonment, in which the defendant pleaded, first, not guilty, and secondly, a plea (which was abandoned and a[)ologised for at the trial) setting up a justifi- cation, and alleging tliat plaintiff had committed a felony, it was held that, iu estimating the damages under the first issue, the jury might take into account the fact of a justification having been pleaded, because the placing such a f)lea on the record was a persisting in the charge, which, under the circumstances, was strong evidence of malice.'* And if, ou the trial of an action for slander, to whicli the general issue and a justification are pleaded, the plaintiff express his willingness to acce^jt an apology and nominal damages on the plea of justification being withdrawn, but the defendant refuses to abandon such plea, though he offers no evidence in support of its trutli, the jury may consider the defendant's conduct, not only with reference to the question of damages, but as furnishing evidence of e.\press malice, and thus M A^ ¥ , i .] 1 1: 1 i 41 ^ .^. . Vaughan, 1842 ; Ilemmings v. Gas- son, 18o8 ; Rustt'll V. Mcicquister, 1809 (Ld. IJlIouboroTifrli) ; Cliarltor r. liiu'ict, 17yi>(Ld. Kfuyt)n) ; Lee v, llii.son, ITStl (id.) ; Scott v. Ld. Ox- ford. 1808 (Lawronco. J.); L!Jl(■,^'al V. lliRhlpy, 18;i7 (Tiudal, C.J.); Jackson v. Adams, l8t}J. ' See n. ^, below. " Pearson v. liOinaitro, 1843; Mead V, Daubi^'uy, 1792 (Ld. Kenyon). ^ I'eaison v. Louiaitio, 1843, ques- tioning iVavce V. Ornsby, 183o, and Syimnons v. ]$lak,i, 183o. Tiudal, C.J., iu pronouncing tlie judgment of the court, states the correct rule to bo, " that eith(;r j)arty may witli a view to damages, give evidence to prove or di.s])rovo the existence of a malicious motive in the miad of tho publi.sher of defamatory matter ; but that, if the evidence given for that Tiurpose ostabli.shes anotlier cause of action, the jury shall bo cautioned against giving any damages in resjioot of it ; and if such (evidence is ottered merely for the jjurjjose of obtaining damau'cs for sucli subsfciuent injury, it will be ])ro])erly rejected. And perliaps tho cases of I'carce v. Ornsby and SynuKons v. lilake wont no farther thiiu this. * * Upon principle, we Hiink that the fsnirit (iml iittvntidii of the ])arty puhlisliing a libel are tit to bo considered by a jury, in esti- mating the iujiu'y done to tho plain- tiff, and that evidence L'uding to prove them cannot bo excluded, simply because it may disclose another and dilferent cause of ac- tion." .See, also, Rustell v. Maccpiister, 1809, where Ld. lOUenborough re- marked, that tho distinction between words actionable and not actionable ■was not founded on any principle ; and Camfield v. Bird, Tsj'i (Jervis, C.J.). * 'Warwick v, Foulkos, 1844. 244 CHAP. II.3 COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. rendering the words proved actionable, though they were prima facie privileged commnnioations.' § 342. If, however, in an action for a libel, the defendant set up the dofonces of a privileged communication and justification, which are openly abandoned at the trial, tlie jury ought not to take into considera- tion the circumstance that the justification was once pleaded.* And where it clearly appears that other libels are offered in evidence, merely with the view of unfairly recovering damages for the injury sustdiTied by their publication, they will properly be rejected ; ' — indeed, no libels subsequent to that which is the subject of the action ought to be admitted, unless they directly refer to the defamatory language set out in the statement of claim, or at least relate co the same subject-matter.* § 343. Not only is other defamatory matter sometimes admissible for the purpose of showing the animus of the defendant, but the mode in which such matter was published may also be highly material ; as, for instance, if printed placards were sent to the plaintiff's house, or paraded before his door.* § 344. On the other hand, on the principle that evidence of collateral facts is admissible to show intent, malice, ur good or bad faith, a defendant has been allowed, in mitigation of damages, to give evidence palliating, though not justifying, his act of publishing a libel. For instance, he may show that he copied it from another newspaper," or that he had been provoked to act as he had done by the conduct of the plaintiff, who had previously published libels of him respecting the same subject-matter, which had only recently come to the knowledge of the defendant ; ' for !i :^, ''\ ' Simpson v. Robinson, 1848. A jury should, howov.ir, always consider quo 071 imo a justification which, fails was pleaded, and whether it was put forward bond fide as a defence, or only to onibrace the opportunity of reiterating the charge. The mere failure to prove a justification is not alone and in itself evidence of malice: Upton v. nume(Am.), 1893. * Wilson V. Eobinson, 1845. ' See cases cited, ante, in notes *, ', and"* to § ;J40; Stuart v. Lovell, 1817; Defries v. Davis, 1835. ♦ Finnerty v. Tipper, 1809 (Sir J. Mansfield). ^ Bond V.Douglas, 1836 (Ld. Abinger). ° Uptun V. Hume (Am.), 1893; Saun- ders V. Mills, 1829, cited by Tindal, C.J., in Pearson v. Le Maitre, 1843. InTal- butt V. Clark, 1840, Ld. Donnian would not permit the editor of a newsjiaper to show, in mitigation of damages, that the libel was published on the communica- tion of a correspondent; and referring to a case, which was probably Saunders V. Mills, his Lordship observed, that ' ' that decision had lieen very much questioned." However, by the I'ecogni- tion of Saunders v. Mills in Pearson v. Le Maitre, Talbut v, Clark would seem to be indirectly overruled. See, also, East V. Chapman, 1827 ; Charlton v. Watson, 1834 (Patteson, J.); Creevy v, Carr, 1835. ' Watts V. Eraser, 1837 ; Tarpley v. Blabey, 1836; May v. Brown, 1824; i I 245 1 I Ii!i m COLLATEUAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART 1[. evidence of provocation by libels on the defendant is admissible, not on the ground of any right to set off one libel against another,' but f/om an indulgent consideration of the weakness, which sometimes leads an anj>Ty man to say " that ho should be sorry for." But it is now directed that in actions for libel or slander, in which .,he defendant does not by his defence assert the truth of the statement complained of, the defendant shall not be entitled on the trial to give evidence in chief, with a view to mitigation of damages, as to the circumstances under which the libel or slander was published, or as to the character of the plaint itf, without the leave of the judge, unless seven days at least before the trial he furnishes particulars to the plaintiff of the matters as to which he intends to give evidence.^ § 345. Evidence as to animm or intent is, moreover, frequently admis- sible in criminal proceedings. For instance, on an indictment for know- iogly uttering a forged document, or a counterfeit bank note, or counter- feit coin, proof of tlie possession, or (by statute) of the prior or subsequent' utterance, either to the prosecutor himself or to other persons, of otlier false documents or notes, or bad money, though the latter be of a dif- ferent description,^ or themselves the subjects of separate indictments,'^ is admissible as material to the question of guilti/ knoiilodye or intoit!' In these cases, however, it is essential to prove distinctly that the instru- ilii: A\ "Wakley v. Johnson, 1826; Finnorty v. Tipper, lSOi>. Seo Uichiirds v. Richards, 1844. In America the defendant is allowed to jrive evidence, not only in miti'^ation of damages in a civil suit, but of ])uiiishm<'nt in criminal proceedings, that tliii plaintilf has libelled him pre- viously to the publication by tlio defen- dant of the libel complained of. See Decamp v. Arc^liibald (Am ), l.Sit.'J. ■ Watts )'. Fra^^er, l.s;i.5 (lid. Denman). In Judge f'.l'icrkeley, 182J,Burrough, J., allowed the defendant, in an action of assault, to prove, in mitigation of dama- ges, a series of libellous article's ])ub- Eshed respecting him by the plaintilf, one of which appeared on the day of the assault- 2 R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXXVI. r. 37. ^ R. V, Forster, 1855. This case dis- poses of a doubt raised in R. v. Taverner, 1809, and in R. v. Smith, 1831, as to ■whether evidence of subsequent utterings Wv uld bo admissible, if the notes or coin we»o of a ili'lfcreni 'escription. * R. V. Harris. 183(3 (by all the judges); R. I'. Forster, lt>J5. Doubts had benn entertained on this subject by some of the judges in R. v. Millard, 1813, but the evidence was admitted in Sunder- land's, Hodgson's. Kirkwood's, and Martin's cases (1830). The same evi- dence is admissible in Scotland : Alison, Cr. L. 420. ^ R. V. Hough, 1806; R. r. Weeks, 1861 ; Kirkwood's case, IS.'iO (I.ittledalo, J.); Martin's case, 1814 (id.); I'.c. Aston, 1838 (Alderson, B.); R. v. Lewis, 1840 (Ld. Denman). Contra, B. v. Smith, 1827 (Vauffhan, B.). « R. V. Wylie, 1804 ; R. v. Ball. 1807; R, 0. Harrison, 1834 (Taunton, J., and Alderson, B.) ; R. v. Green, 1852 (Oross- well, J.); R. w. Nisbott. 1853 (Williams, J.); R. V. Salt, 1862 (Waiiams, J.); E. V, Colclough, 1882 (Ir.), 246 CHAP. "•] COLLATF.RAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. meiits offered in evidence of guilty knowledge were Iheraselvos forged.' Moreover, though the prosecutor may prove the uttering of other forged notes by the prisoner, and his conduct at the time of uttering them, it seems that he cannot show what the prisoner said or did at another time, with respect to such uttering ; for theso collateral facts are too remote for any reasonable presumption of guilt to be founded upon them, and such as the prisoner cannot by any possibility be prepared to contradict.^ § 346. Evidence of this description has long been admissible on charges of uttering, and of one or two offences of a cognate character.* It has now been expressly rendered by the Legislature also admis- sible against receivers of stolen goods ; the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871, enacting^ that, "where proceedings are taken against any person for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his possession stolen property, evidence may be given at any stage of the proceedings that there was found ^ in tlie possession of such person other property stolen within the preceding period of twelve months," and such evidence may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that such person knew the property to be stolen which forms the subject of the proceedings taken against him" § ;H7. Nevertheless, in ordinary criminal trials, judges may, if they so please, still decline to recognise the doctrine under discus- sion.' Yet not only has such doctrine been acted upon in the cases previously mentioned, but on a charge of sending a threatening > R. V. Millavd, 1H1;5. ^ R. V. I'hillips, 1829 (Bavlov, J.); R. V. Cooko, 18:58 (Pattcsoir, J.). Contra, R. v. Forbes, 18.i3 (Colo- riilge, J.). See R. v. Brown, l.'-fil. ^ J''.'j., tlio obtaining; money by falsely pretondinp: to a pawnbroker that a spurious chain was silver : R. V. Rocbnek, \Ho,i ; R. v. Fvanuis, 1874. The (loetrine, however, does not extend to ordinary indictments for false pretences : R. c Holt, 1800. Still, it lia" been applied to cases of arson with intent to defraud insur- ance companies : R. v. Gray, 18()6 (Willes, J., and Martin, B.), scd qu. * 34&35 V. c. 112, § 19. ' It is not sufficient under theso words to prove that the prisoner had very recently <lnt/t n-itk other stolea propertv: R. v. Drage, l87o (Bram- w.'ll. f,. J.); R. V. Carter, 1884: (C. C. R.)- " This . vidence will be admissible, though the property so founil may be the subject of another indictment ai^ainst the ju-isoncr at the samo assises : R. v. J(mes, 1877. ' See and compare R. v. Fairie, 1SJ7; R. r. Winsh)W, 18G0 ; R. v. Geerinj?, 1819, cited ante, § 328, followed R. V. Flannagan, 1882 ; R. r. Oddv, 18ol; R. v. Sirrell, ISoO; R. V. Dunn, 1826; E. v. Ni^holls, 1838. 2i; ^•il COr.LATKRAL FACT.S WIIKN ADMISSIBLE. [PART II. l(!tter, other Ictlors written by the prisoner, both before and after the one in question, have been admitted to exphiin its meaning ; • on an indictment for malicious shooting, if it be doubtful whether the shot was fired by accident or design, proof may be given that the prisoner at another time intentionally shot at the same person ; ' and on indictments for murder, evidence of former menaces or quarrels will have an important tendency towards supporting the legal inference of malice,' while proof of expressions of kindness or of friendly acts towards the deceased will be entitled to equal weight as raising a counter presumption.* ^ 348. On an indictment for a robbery, where the prisoners formed part of a mob who went into the prosecutor's house, one of which mob had civilly advised prosecutor to give it something to pre- vent mischief, evidence that the same mob, in the presence of some of the prisoners, had demanded money at other houses on the same day, was admitted, as tending to prove that the advice was not given bona fide, but was in reality a polite mode of committing a robbery.^ On this last case the acts given in evidence were not committed by the prisoners themselves, but only by some of the mob with whom they were connected. But the principle is the same, the law being, that where several evil-doers conspire together to effect some unlawful purpose, acts done by any one of the party in furtherance of the common design shall be considered as done by all.« § 349. On this rule, that collateral facts are admissible to show (inimm or iufciif, rests the admissibility of evidence as to the (jcneral chardctei' of individuals. Such evidence is tendered for the purpose of eitb 3r raising a presumption of innocence or guilt, or of affecting the amount of damages, or of impeaching or supporting the veraciti/ of a witness ; ' the first object being chiefly confined to criminal ,iii ' > R. V. Eobinson, 1796. » E. V. Voko, 1823. For other examples, see R. v. Mogg, 1830 ; R. V. Dossott, 1846 (Maule, J.) ; R. v. Richardson, 18G0 ; R. v. Horris, 1864. See, also, ante, §§ 327, 328. ' See R. V. Hagan, 1873. * 1 Ph. Ev. 470, 476. » R. V. Winkworth, 1830 (Parke, J., with the conci'rrence of Ld. Ten- terden, Aldeison, J., and Vaughan. 13.). This doctrine forms an incident in Mr. Baring Gould's Novel ' ' Cheap Jack Zita." s R. V. Watson, 1817 ; R. v. Hardy, 1794 ; R. V. Salter, 1804 ; R. v. Hunt, 1820. ' 2 St. Ev. 303. 248 il CHAP. II.] EVIDENCE OF GENERAL CHAUACTEK. prosecutions, and the second to civil causes, while tlio third is equally applicable to both forma of procedure. § U60. The terra " character," as here used, is not — as some able judges have considered it to be ' — synonymous with " disposition," but it simply means " reputation," or the general credit which a man has obtained in public opinion.^ The position of a witness who is called to speak to character is exactly the opposite of that of a master who is asked for the character of his servant. The master must give his servant the character which his own personal experience has told him that the servant deserves. But a witness to character cannot give the result of his own personal experience and observation, or express his own opinion, but must, in strict law, confine himself to evidence of mere general repute.' This rule rests rather on authority than on reason, and would probably have been long ago discarded but for two causes. First, the rule, in practice, is seldom strictly enforced ; and next, as " the best character is generally that which is the least talked about," * the judges have modified it, to a certain extent, by permitting witnesses to give negative evidence on the subject, and state that "they never heard anything agaimt the character of the person on whose behalf they have been called." ' § 351. V hen the point at issue is whether the accused has committed a pn ' 'oular criminal act, evidence of his general good character v msly entitled to little weight, unless some reason- able doubt \i s to his guilt ; and, therefore, in this latter event alone will the jury be advised to act upon such evidence.* The inquiry, too, must be confined, — except where the intention forms a material ingredient in the offence,' — to the general character of the prisoner, and must not condescend to particular facts.* For • R. V. Rowton, 1865 (Erie, C.J., and Willes, J.). » Id. ' Id. See post, § 1470. ♦ Ter Erie, C.J., 1865. Some judges, indeed, have asserted that evidence in this nej^ative form is the most cogent proof of a man's good reputation : Id. » PerCockburn, C.J., 1865. ' In R. V. Turner, 1664, Hyde, C.J., observed to the juiy: — "The witnesses called in point of reputa- tion I must leave to you. Few men that come to be questioned but shall have some come and say, 'he is a very honest man ; I never knew any hurt by him ; ' but is this anything against the evidence of the fact ? " ' Ante, § 345. * J 'Anson v. Stuart, 1796 (BuUer, J.). In former times the practice was less strict. See B. v. Turner 1664. 249 ! Iliiiliilj lit EVIDENCE OF OKXERAL CHARACTER. [t.WIT II. although tho common reputation, in whicli a person is licM in society, may bo uiuleservod, and tho ovidonco in 8up[)oit of it must, from its very nature, bo indofiiiito, yet Homo inference, varying in degree according to circumstances, may fairly be drawn from it ; since it is not probable that a man, who has uniformly sustained a characfer for honesty or humanity, will forfeit that character by the commission of a dishonest or a cruel act. The mere proof of isolated facts can, however, afford no such presumption. " None are all evil," and the most consummate villain may bo able to prove that on nome occasions he has acted with hunuinity, fairness, or honour. In all cases, too, when evidence is admitted touching tho general character of the party, it ought niiinifestly to bear reference to the nature of the charge against him ; ' as, for instance, if ho be accused of theft, that he has been reputed an honest man ; — if of treason, a man of loyalty. It should also relate to the samo period as tho supposed oironco ; for, as Lord Holt once rotnarkod, " A man is not born a knave ; there must be time to make him so ; nor is ho presently discovered after he becomes one."^ Subject to these observations, evidence of the defendant's general good character is admissible in all prosecutions whether for felony or misdemeanor.' § 352. Although a defendant is, from motives of humanity, allowed this reasonable indulgence, the prosecutor cannot, in the first instance, have recourse to similar loose testimony for the pur- pose of establishing the guilt of the accused.* If, however, with the view of raising a presumption of innocence, witnesses to cha- racter are called for the defence, counsel for the Crown may then not only cross-examine such witnesses to rebut this presumption, either as to particular facts,'^ or, if it be deemed essential, as to the groimds of their belief," but evidence of general bad character will also .1 I !if;i; ■ > Douglass V. Toiisey, 1829 (Am.). * R. V. iSwpiiil.scn, 1702. 3 2 Russ. ( '. \- M. 784. * R. V. TulM'itluld, ls(i4. In that caso tho question was put, not to provi' tho Ljuilt of tlio prisoner, but to sliow tliat tlio witness, a jjoliee- man, had had probable cause for arresting him. Held, nevertheless, that tho answer was not evidence. « R. V. llodgkiss 18:50. In R. v. Wood, 181,0, Parke, B., allowed a witness to (character to bo aski'd, in cross-examination, whotlicr ho had not hoard that the pi'isoiior was suspected of having committed a robberv some years before. 8ee, also, R. V. Turner, 1(504. • 2 St. Ev. 304. 25f) CHAP. 11.] EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS COXVICTiON be admissible,' — tliough tho right of counyol for tlio Crown in this respect is in practice seldom resortcul to.* Moreover, in most trials for felony, and in some for raisdetneanor, if defendant endeavour to establish a good character, either by calling witnesses himself, or by cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution,' tho pro- secution have a right — which is usually exercised — to, in answer, prove tho specific fact that tho prisoner has actually been convicted j)reviously. The statutes authorizing this, however, do not extend to any capital felonies, and apply only partially to misdemeanors.* § 35f3. Moreover, the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871,* in addi- tion to the j)rovisions which have been already" set out, provides^ that " where proceedings are taken against any person for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his possession stolen property, and evidence has been given that the stolen property has been found in his possession, then if such person has within five years immediately preceding been convicted of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty, evidence of such previous conviction may be given at any stage of tho proceedings, and may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that the person accused knew the property which was proved to be in his possession to have been stolen ; provided that not leps than seven days' notice in writing shall have been given to the person accused that proof is intended to be given of such previous conviction ; and it shall not be necessary for the purposes of this section to charge in the indictment the previous conviction of the person so accused." * § '6'A. The admission of evidence of general character is only > R. V. Rowton, 1805, by nil the ju(l<;t.'s, overruling R. v. Burt, iSJl. 2 •> St. Ev. 3(M. ' It. V. Shrinipton, 1851 ; R. v. Ga.lLury, IK.'iS (I'urko, B.). ^ !See, us allowiiifi; this, (i & 7 W. 4, c. Ill, as to (tny feliiiii/ imt iii'iiishalile with ileath after conviction for felony; as to oft'encos punishiiblo under that Act, 24 & 25 V. c. 9(5 ("Tho Larceny Act, ISOl"), § IKi; seo also, us to offences Uirainst the coin, 24 & 25 V. c. 99 ("Tho Coiniige Offences Act, 1861"), § 37; R. u. Martin, 18(59; and as to any felony, or the oilence of uttering false or counterfeit coin, or of iios.soshing countcifeit gold or silver coin, or tho oilence of obtain- ing goods or money by false ])ro- teiicf^s, or the offotico of conspiracy to defraud, or any nii.sdenieanor under 24 & 25 V. c. 9() ("The Larceny Act, I8()l"), § 58. Sec, also, "The Prevention of ("rimes Act, 1671" (34 & ;J5 V. c. 112), §§ 9, 20. 6 ;m & 35 V. c. 112. « Ante, § 345. ' In § 19. • * E. V. Davis, 1870. 251 m ■ il| S , 1 1 ^ ' 1 ; P^ ill EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART II. allowed in criminal proceedings, where it was originally received, Bome two centuries ago,' in favorem vita?. So strict is this rule, that even upon an information for penalties filed in the Revenue side of the Queen's Beach Division by the Attorney- General, such evidence will he rejected, because proceedings of this kind, though brought in the name of the Sovereign, are considered as civil suits.^ Evidence of general good character or competency is not admissible either in an action of ejectment by an heir-at-law against a devisee, where defendant was charged with having imposed a fictitious will on the testator in extremis ; ' in an action for slander — even where, by pleading the truth of words charging the plaintiff with stealing money, the latter had put the char."''ter of the former directly in jeopardy;* in an action for malicious prosecution,' in support of probable cause ; in an action of trespass for false imprisonment on a criminal charge, in which the defendant must not even cross- examine, either as to the plaintiff's bad character, or as to previouo charges made against him ; " nor in an action for a libel charging a professional man with want of skill in some particular work — and this even though the evidence be offered with a view of showing that the defendant, in making the charge, was actuated by malice.' § 355. A distinction, however, exists between cases where par- ticular acts of misconduct are imputed to a party, and those where his general conduct is put in issue. For general evidence of cha- ' So early as 1664, the practice of calling "witncases in point of repu- tation " was well establiMliod. See Hyde, C.J., in R. v. Tinner, 1664. Accordingly, in 1680, such evidence was received even by Scroggs, C.J., with Jeff eries as jjrosecuting counsel : R. V. Harris, 1680. > Att.-Gen. v. Bowman, 1791 (Eyre, C.B.). IliH lordship observed, that ' ' the true lino of distinction is this ; in a direct jiroseciition for a crime, HUch (evidence is admissible ; bnt where the ])rosecution is not directly for t'u) crim<! but for the penulty, as in this information, it is not." See Att.-Gen. v. RmUoff, 1854 (Martin, 11.). ^ Doe V. Hicks (Buller, J.), cited by Gibbs, arguendo, in Doe v. Walker, 1801. * Cornwall v, Richardson, 1825 (Abbott, C.J.). ° Nowsaoi V. Carr, 1817 (Wood, B.); Gregory v. Thomas, 1811; contra, Rodriquez v, Tadmire, 1799 (Lord Kenyon). In America, this kind of evidence has been also re- jected in actions of assault and bat- tery : Givens r. Bradley, 18i;{ (Am.) ; and in assumpsit, Nash r. Gilkoson, 1819; and is inadmissible whenever the general character is involved by th<! j)loa only, and not by the nature of the action : Anderson v. Long, 1823 (Am.); Totter v. Webb, 1829 (Am.). St!e Or. Ev. § 55. ' I)owning v. Butcher, 1841; Jones V. Stevens, 1822. 252 ' Brine v. Bazalgette, 1849. ■ii.i 1825 CH, II.] KVIULNCi: OF CHARACTER TO ATrECT DAMAGES. ratter, thougli rejected in the former, is ailinittod in the latter class of cases.' Thus, in an action for a libel, where the languugo com- plained of stated that the defendant parted with the plaintiff " on account of her incompetency, and her not being ladylike or good tempered," general evidence of her competency, good temper, and manners was given by her personal friends ; ^ and where, in a similar action, the words charged the plaintiff generally with dishonesty and misconduct while in service, a witness, with whom she had formerly lived, was allowed to testify to her antecedent general good conduct.' These cases are, however, in truth no exception to the rule of exclusion.^ § 356. General evidence of character is (subject to compliance with the rule as to previous notice in actions for libel or slander, which has been set out while considering the subject of evidence of libellous attacks upon a defendant being received in mitigation of damages') admissible, not only upon questions of mnlic^, intent, and so on, but also for the purpose of increasing or diminishing damrigcs. For example, evidence impeaching the previous general character as to chastity of the seduced wife or daughter is admissible on a petition claiming damages on the ground of adultery," or in an action for seduction.'' For in these proceedings the plaintiff in reality (though in aeti(ms for seduction it is not the ostensible ground of claim •*) seeks compensation for the pain caused him, by the dis- grace of his family, and the ruin of his domestic happiness ; and the damages should bo commensurate with the pain, and vary according as the character of the seduced wife or daughter was Jones ' Doo V. Hicks, undiitod (I5nllor, J.), as citoil by (iil)hs, arguL'iulo, iu Doo I'. Wiilkor, Ism. ' Fouutiiiii !•. lioodio, 184'2. Soo Brini! r. l{iiziilfj;,'t.to, 184!). ■' Kin- I'. Waniij;, 18l);{ (Lil. Al- viinloy). * For just as in (.'Uinulative of- foncos, sucli as trca.'-on, or a con- s|)irra'y to carry on tlio Ijiisincss of common cheats, many acts arc giv(>n in evidence, liecau.se such ctimes can ho ])roved in no other wnv : l\. v, Kobevts, 1S()8 (I,d. I'lneiil'iorou^'h), so wlicro tlio {i;eiiiM'Ml hehiivioiir of a party is impeached, it is only by {reneral evi(h>nco that such charge can b,! rebutted. " Sen Ord. XXVI. r. ;57, auto, § 314 ; see. also, § ;i4i». « 2(1 iS: 21 V. c. 8,-. (" Tlio ^fatri- monial Causes Act, IS.jT"), § 'M. ' 15. X. P. 27, 2!t(i; Elsani v. Faucett, ITOT (IjiI. Kenyon). " S,u> Dodd r. Xorri's, 1,S14 (Ld. Ellenboroujiih) : Anditnvs r. Askcy, 18;(7, (Tindal, C.J.). Seo, also, cases cited in n. n, to S. C. ; GrinnoU u. W(dls, 1.S14 ; Thomiison v. iioss, 1M,-|H ; l,on^' i\ K'ei-htlev. 1877 (Tr.) ; Ri.st r. I'"aux, l.S(i:i; Terry r. llutch- iusou, 1808 ; lludyes y. Tagg, 1872. 253 :'V7 U i \l:r -^m EVIDENCE or CHARACTER TO AFFECT DAMAGES. [PT. II. previously unblemiabed or profligate. Therefore, in such cases, not only is evidence of general bad cbaracter admissible in mitiga- tion of damages, but even particular acts of immorality or indecorum may be proved.' § 357. Both evidence of acts of this description, as well as proof of general bad character, must, however, be confined to occurrences previously to the defendant's misconduct, because this very miscon- duct may, by weakening the principles of the woman, have been the indirect cause of subsequent immorality, and may have itself occasioned a general want of reputation.^ In an action of seduction, where plaintiff's daughter is called as a witness, the defendant can probably in strict law (but if such a course were adopted in practice it would be made matter of strong observation) prove specific acts of immorality, without first cross-examining the woman ; since, on principle, such evidence may be tendered, not so much to impeach the veracity of the party seduced, but to show that, as her previous conduct had been disgraceful, the father's feelings could not have been wounded by the misconduct of the defendant.^ However, where the daughter, in her examination in chief, states that the defendant seduced her, and that she has borne a child in consequence, and the defence is that she has declared another person to be the father, it is clear that witnesses cannot be called to prove her declarations, unless she be first cross-examined as to the fact of her having made them ; because, though language of this kind, if lightly uttered, would tend to degrade her character, yet, if used in earnest, it would directly contradict the testimony she had given, and would be evidence not in mitigation of damages, but in bar of the action.* § 358. On a claim of damages from an alleged adulterer," the co-respondent may prove, in mitigation of damages, that the petitioner has bcju guilty of notorious infidelity ; has turned his wife out of doors ; has refused to nuiintaiu her ; or has other- wise been guilty of dissolute condiKft ; " for, in such cases, a man can scarcely complain of the loss of that society upon which he has 1 Vorry v. Watkins, 1830 (Al'lor- son, I!.). Sco, iiIhd, Siuipsoii v. Gray- son, 1892 (Am.). » Klsam V. Fiiucctt;, 1707. » ('ari)ontiT r. Wall, ISIO. * Id. ; AuilrowB v. Askoy, 1837 (Tindal, C.J.). » Woo '20 & 21 V. 0. 85 ("The Matrimonial Causoa Act, 18o7 "), « B. N. P. 27 ; Broniloy v. Wallace, i8oa. 254 en, II.] EVIDENCE OF CHARACTEK TO AFFECT DAMAGES. himself placed so little value. In an action for seduction, it would on principle appear that evidence in mitigation of damages may be given (since plaintiff conduced to the result by allowing his daughter to consort with such a person) to show that the defendant is notori- ously a man of profligate habits. In actions for breach of promise, the defendant is entitled to prove, in mitigation of damages, that the plaintiff is a person, either of bad character,' or of coarse and brutal manners,^ though acts of misconduct committed after the promise, or even before that event irithout the Imnicledge of the defendant,' can, where sufficiently glaring to constitute a bar to the action,* only be proved under a special defence.* § 359. It has been much discussed, and is not now clear, whether, in an action for defamation, evidence impeaching the plaintiff's previous general character, and showing that, at the time of the publication, he laboured under a general suspicion of having been guilty of the charge imputed to him by the defendant, is admissible as affecting the question of damages.* § 3G0. Assuming, however, such evidence to be admissible, a defendant in libel or slander, who has not pleaded truth as a justi- fication, is now precluded, by a Rule of Court already set out, from attempting to mitigate damages by giving evidence reflecting on the plaintiff's character, unless he has complied with such Rule.' ' Foulkes V. Scllway, 1800 (Ld. Kcnvon). Soo, aliso, Johnson v. Caulkins, 1799 (Am.) ; Boynton v. KuUogg, 1807 (Am.). ' Leeds V. Cook, 1803 (Ld. EUon- borouph). ^ Iiviitp; V, Greenwood, 1824 (Ab- bott, C.J.). * Leeds V. Cook, 1803; Baddoloy V. Mortlock, 1810. Ante, § 301. Seo Young v. Murjiliy, 18:JG; and Pujolas v, Hol- land, 1841 (Jr.). " ;';'^ 'n support of the admissi- bility of the evidence, Kichards v. Eichards, 1814; v. Moor, 1813; Ld. Leicester ;;. Walter, ls()9; liell r. Parke, ( Ir. ) 18(i0 ( I'ifrot. C. B. ); "Wil- liams V. ('alleiider, 1810; l']amer v. Merle, 180'J-i) (Ld. Lllenborou^rli); Kiiobell y. Fuller, 1797 (Lyre, C.J.); Newsam v, Carr, 1817 (Wood. B.); Ellorshaw v. Bobinson, 181(>-'_'8 fllolroyd, J.) ; Moore i'. Oastler, 1836 (Ld. Dopjjiau, after consultiuy I'arko, B.); Mawby v. Barber, 1820 (Ld. Tentorden) ; Hardy v. Alexander, 1837 (Coltmau, J.). These last four cases are cited in 2 St. Ev. 041, 042, n.f, ; . I cr. Kirkmiin ('. Oxley, 1811-16 (Heath, J.). iSee contra, Scott v. Saiiii)son, 1882 (Mathew and t.'avo, JJ.); Jones r. Stevens, 1822; Waithman v. Weaver, 1822 (Abbott, C.J.); Connvall I'. I^iehardson, 1825 (Abbott. C.J.); Siiowdon v. Smith, 1811 (Chambre, J.). In Seotland the evid(Ui('e is admissihlr : Dickson, Ev. (Sc.)§24, and cases xV.nv cited in n. ('/). I'^or the Amciiean autho- ritie.-,, seo Boot )'. King, 1827 (Am.); Bailey ''. Hyde, 1820 (Aiu.); Ben- nett r. Tfyde", 182.') (Am.); DoUfjlasB V. Tousev. 1829 (.\m.); Inniiin \k Foster, 18;52 (Aju.); Walcott r. Hall, 1810 (Am.); Boss c. Lai)hani, 1817 (Am ); Foot v. Tracy, 1800 (Am.). ' B.S.C. 1883. Onf. XXXVLr.37, cited unto, § 344, ad liu. '•1 'i 200 \\> m EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER TO AFFECT DAMAGES. [PT. 11. § 361. In the above cases, as well as in other actions for libel, and other actions where witnesses to character are admitted, the evidence impeaching the plaintiff's previous general character must (if admissible) be confined to the particular trait in it which is attacked in the alleged libel. Such evidence must, moreover, be confined to the general reputation as to plaintiff's character on this point, and it must not relate to particular acta of bad conduct.^ Evidence of any rumours calculated L- com- promise the plaintiff's character must, too, be strictly confined to rumours which were prevalent before the publication of the slander of the defendant ; otherwise a man might slander another, and then call neighbours to say that they had heard of the impu- tations which he had himself originated.^ § 362. A plaintiff cannot give evidence of general good character in (aggravation of damages, unless counter-proof has been first offered by the defendant ; for, until the contrary appear, the presumption of law is already in his favour. Therefore, in an action of slander for imputing theft, plaintiff will not be allowed to prove his cha- racter for honesty, even though the defendant has placed on the record pleas of justification.* Indeed, in an action for seduction, where evidence was jjroduced for the defence, to jirove that the girl had previously had a child by another man, she was not allowed to be asked respecting her general good character for chastity, but plaintiff was restricted to proof that the specific charge made by the defendant was false ; * on another occasion similar evidence was rejected where the daughter had been cross-examined, with a view of showing that she had been guilty of gross levity and indelicacy ; * and in a case for criminal conversation, in which the defendant had endeavoured, by cross-examining the plaintiff's wit- nesses, to impeach plaintiff's character, but had failed, plaintiff was not permitted to call witnesses to his general good conduct.* It is true that in these cases the characters attacked remained, in strict- ness, uuimpeached, because the facts insinuated had, or might have, ' See cases citud in last note but (Abbott, C.J.). one, uiid t'urthor, Androws v. Van- * Hamfiold v. Massoy, 1808 (Ld. duzcr, 1814 (Am.); Sawyor v. Eit'ert, EUonboiough). 1820 (Am.). " Dodd f. >forri8, 1814 (Ld. Ellon- ' Tnompson v, Nye, 1850 ; Bell v, borough). Parko, 18(j0 (Ir.). « Kmg v. Francis, 1800 (Ld. Ken- * Cornwall v, Bichaidson, 1825 yon). 256 |jf;i li CHAP. II.] EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER OF PROSECUTRIX. been denied. But, the very circumstance of the questions being asked was calculated to excite a suspicion in the minds of the jury, wliich, it may be said, the plaintiff should be given an oppor- tunity of removing.^ A contrary rule has prevailed in a later English case,^ subsequently followed in Ireland.^ § 363. The law as to the admission of general evidence of cha- racter to impeach the verncity of a witness will be discussed hereafter.'' Such evidence is, however, sometimes receivable, not so much to shake the credit of the witness, as to show directly that the act in question has not been committed. Thus, on indictments for rape, or attempts to commit that crime, not only is evidence of general bad character admissible to show that the prosecutrix ought not to be believed upon her oath, but so also is proof that she is a reputed prostitute, for it goes far towards raising an inference that she yielded willingly. In such cases general evidence of this kind will on this ground be received, though the woman be not called as a witness, and though, if called, she be not asked, on cross-examination, any questions tending to impeach her character for chastity.'^ Counsel for the defence cannot, however, prove upvcific immoral acts with the prisoner, unless he has first given the prosecutri.v on opportunity of denying or explaining them." Moreover, the prosecutrix, if cross-examined as to particular acts of immorality with other men, may decline to answer such questions, while, if she answers them in the negative, witnesses cannot be called to contradict her.' ^m » 1 C. & p. 100, n. a ; 2 St. Ev. 30(i, 307. ■' Bate V. Hill, 182:5 (Park, J.); Mui'f^atroyd v. Murgatroj'd, 1K28 (Baylcy, J.). Soc, also, 11. v. Clarke, 1817. " In Brown v, Goodwin (Ir.), 1841 (Torrcns, J.), an action for sodnction, in which phiintitt"8 danj^htor having been asked questions to inipcacli her reputation, plaintiff was ulhjwed to call witnesses to her general good character. * Post, ^§ 1470—1473. » 11. V. Clark(\ 1817 (llolroyd, J.) ; E. v. Cluro(lr.), 1841 (Cranipton, J.). « R. V, Cockcroft, 1870. 8eo R. v. Martin, 1834 ; 11. v. Robins, 1843 ; E. V. Aspinall, 1827 (llullock, B.). On one occasion the prisoner's counsel was allowed to ask tho piosecutrix, with tho viem of cdiitrwiictiii;/ her, .whether sue had not, on a day si)ico the alleged rajie, been walking in a certain street with a cor "on prosti- tute, looking out for hicn : R. v. Barker, 182!) (Park, J., alter considt- iiig I'arke, J.); see, also, Ycrry v. \V:itkins, 18JB; Andrews v, Askey, l.s.)7 ; and R. r. Dean, I8j2. ' R. V. Cockcroft, 1870 (Willes, J., and Martin, B.); R. v. Ilolmes and l''urness, 1871 (C. C. R.); overrulin;j R. r. Robins, 1843 ; R. v. Hodgson, 1812 ; secus, as to acts with prisoner himself, post, § 1441. VOL. I. 257 Mil p^^ iff 1 ! \ f IV' ' 1.; - ' 1 i1 ' "II Ii! , fit' ■ ^■i' ■■', i'li i- ■ 4. ill'''', "•¥ ■ i' riiiil '(■:■ ■ I *Hii Ijiii "» 257' AMKUICAN NOTES. PAKT II. Res inter alios actee — It may be doubted whether many of the facts excluded undei- the rule hinted at in the phrase res inter alios iiefcE are excluded because they are irrelevant. It is one of the few errors in Mr. Justice Stephen's admirable Digest of Evidence that all questions of admissibility are dec'ded by him on the single test of relevancy. Such does not seem to ba the case. Relevancy indeed is essential to admissibility. But it is not sufficient, in all in- stances, to secure it. It might almos^t be said to be the essential characteristic of the English common iaw of evidence that much evidence, perfectly relevant, is not received; — because practical dangers and difficulties in receiving it are thought or have been thought to outweigh the advantages which could be derived from its use. Probably the historical reason of much of this is to be found in a persistent influence of the feeling that a jury was liable to be con- fused, or misled by the consideration of certain .matters that would not att'ect better disciplined minds to the same extent. Tliat it was better, on the whole, to lose the benefit of the evidence, rather than run the risk. The fact that many kinds of evidence are admitted, either directly or as exceptions to the rules of exclusion, which seem quite as dangerous as those which are ruled out, count's for but little. The law of evidence is neither the growth of one mind or of several mi. ids at one time. It was not even the work of a single age. Its synn-ietry therefore lays little claim to admiration. And all that can be said is that certain great rules for excluding other- wise competent evidence became established. That they are prin- cipally four; — Res inter alios aetfe, matters of hearsay, character, and opinion. That certain exceptions in the operation of each of tliese general rules have also become established. It is perhaps not a scientific statement. But it is ajiparently correct as a general .statement, and gives the present condition of a branch of law wliicli, considering the conditions of its growth, is greatly to the credit of those men who have helped to mould it; — in that it has served its jmrjiose, on the whole, fairly well. The rule of res inter alios excludes evidence otherwise relevant. There is little need of a special rule excluding irrelevant evidence. It excludes itself, furnishing slight apparent necessity for classify- ing the reasons why it is irrelevant. As a rule of exclusion, the rule forbids the attemi)t to prove that A. did or omitted to do a certain act by means of evidence that he did or omitted to do the same or a substiuitially similar act at anotlier time. On the question wln^thei' tlie driver of a horse-car stopped his car with undue suddenness, it is erroneous to iulmit evidence of his sud- den stopi)ing on })revious occasions. ^laguire v. Middlesex Rail- CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. J.) ( ' way, 115 Mass. 239 (1874). In a case involving responsibility for a maritime collision, it is error to permit tlie captain of one of tlie vessels to be asked as to "accidents which had happened while lie was pilot or captain of the propeller." Mailler v. Express Propeller Co., 01 N. Y. 312 (1874). The question whether a railroad company gave danger signals at a certain crossing " is a question of fact that cannot be affected one way or another by showing the conduct of subordinate officers or servants in charge of some other train or trains" in giving the signals at this crossing. Eskridge v. Cincin- nati, &c. R. 11., 89 Ky. 3(57 (1889). So in a case in ]Massacliusetts, the issue being whether the bell was rung and the whistle sounded at a certain crossing, the court say, " It was not competent for tiie defendant to prove that its servants usually rang the bell at this crossing, and to ask the jury to infer therefrom that it was rung at the time of the accident ; neither was it competent for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's servants often or usually omitted to ring the bell at this crossing, and to ask the jury to infer therefrom that the bell was not rung at the time of the accident." Tuttle v. Fitchburg K. E. 152 ^lass. 42 (1890). On an issue as to the terms of a contract for the service of a stallion, evidence is incompetent as to contracts with others for tiie same service. Evans v. Koons, 10 Ind. App. 603 (1894). Of course the rule does not apply where the second contract refers to the first. Gardner r. Crenshaw, 122 Mo. 79 (1894). See also Roberts r. Dixon, 50 Ivans. 43G (181)3). On an issue of (levisavlt vel non the claim was made by the remonstrants that the will was forged by the propounder. Held : the propounder could not be asked whether he had not been guilty of other forgeries. " The fact of forgery of a particular pajjcr can- not be shown by proof of other crimes of the same kind." Frank- lin V. Franklin, 90 Tenn. 44 (1890). Similarly, it has been held tliat where the payee is claimed to have forged one of the endorse- ments on the note, evidence of his previous conviction of forgery is immaterial. Benedict v. Rose, 24 S. C. 297 (1885). Or that the party liad the " capacity, skill, and ajipliances which would enable him to forge the note in suit." The court say : — " In cases where a person is accused of a crime, it is not competent to show, as evi- dence of the corpus di'Iictl, that he has committed similar offences, or that he is of bad cliaracter, or that lie has the capacity and the moans of committing the crime. The argument in favor of admit- ting such evidence is plausible. It might aid the jury if they could know tlie character of the defendant, — whether he is a man morally anil jihysically able and likely to commit the offence; but the law excludes such evidence upon grounds of public rolicy, to ])revent the multiplication of issues in a case, and to protect a party from tlie injustice of being called upon, without notice, to explain the l| tfCi, ; . I ji.t IN; 2573 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AliT 11. acts of liis life not shown to be ooiinoctiHl with tho offciico witli which he is charged." Costeh) y. Crowell, 1;5<J Mass. aHS (18Sr)). Wliere the question was whether the phiintiff made a certain (ion. tract with the defendant, it is not competent for liiin to sliow that he made siinihir contracts with other people. '' Tlie maxim that a transaction between two 2)ei'sons ought not to operate to the disad- vantage of a third, tliough somewhat obscure in its application, because it does not show how unconnected transactions should be supposed to be relevant to each other, and though failing in its literal sense, because it is not true that a man cannot be affected by a transaction to which he is not a party, is U' vertheless one of the most inii)ortant and pr'u-tically useful maxims of the law of evi- dence. It means . . . that you are not to draw inferences I'rom one transaction to another that is not specitically connected with it merely because the two resemble each other ; that they must be linked together by the chain of cause and effect in some assignable way before you can draw your inference." Aiken v. ICennison, 08 Yt. (U)") (188(>). On the question what arrangements a firm of book publishers made with one of their canvassers, evidence is incompe- tent, of their contracts with other canvassers, in the absence of evi- dence that the jiai'ticular canvasser knew of such other contracts or of some usage in the business. Newhall /•. .\i)pleton, 101} N. Y. lo.'J (1880). " It would seem also that custom or the habitual conduct of the defendant is not admhssible to show the existence or absence of negligence in a given case." Oulf, &c. iiy. Co. c. Kowland, 82 Tex. IGG (18!)1). In New Hampshire, howevei', "a different rule prevails, and has become established in cases where the evidence is conflicting; and it is here held to be competent to show that the party charged with negligence had performed or omitted the same act in the same way before, as tending to show tliat he did or omitted the act at the time in (piestion, on the ground that a jjcrson is more likely to do a thing in a jiarticular way, as he is in the habit of doing "r not doing it." Tarkinson 0. N; sl'iua, .'vc. U. R., (it X. H. 41G (is'si). In Massachusetts, the rule prevails that on an issue of the value of laiul evidence is admissible of the price at which other lots, simi- larly situated, sold about the same time. Roberts v. I'oston, 149 Mass. 31() (188!)). The preliminary (piestion as to whether the lots are so far similar and the time snthciently ne ir to render evidence of sales competent is for the court. "It is net competent to put in the opinion or judgment of witnesses as to the value of other land in the vicinity." Thomjison r. Boston, 148 Mass. .'587 (1889). On a question whether a certain brick-kiln was a nuisance to the ]ilaintiff, evidence is inadmissible that a certai;i otlun* brick-kiln ■was not a nuisance to the witness. Kirchgraber v. Lloyd, 59 Mo. App. o9 n894\ I 1 " 1 , :rt-' i :■! 1 Ik^'L i:\ CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN XOTKS. 2.->l* Of couvso the doing of acts at another time may be inadmissible on tlie ground of irrelevancy. For example, on an indictment lor arson, it is fatal error to allow evideinte tiiat the defendant had stolen a V'uggy i)revioiisly. Sehaser /•. State, oG Wise. 41".) (1874). So on an issue of the value of a son's services in his father's store, evidence of what the father jiaid another son is immaterial. Cohen r. Cohen, 2 Maiikey, 227 (18iS3). So in an action to recover against an estate for horse hire, evidence that the plaintiff did not charge certain other persons for the use of the same horse is immaterial. Harris r. Howard, 5G Vt. G95 (1884). In Criminal C.vses. — The rule excluding proof of similar acts at another time as evidence on the question of the doing of a particular act, has naturally been enforced with especial strictness in criminal cases. The increased probative force of proof of a prior illegal act and the seriousness in consequences to the prisoner have per- mitted but comparatively little relaxation in criminal as compared with civil cases. To permit this evidence, would substantially amount to proof of character by evidence of particular acts of mis- conduct. This cannot be done directly, and this rule forbids its being done indirectly. " The rule is a familiar one in criminal pro- cedure, that a party cannot be proved guilty of one offence by evi- dence that at a different time and place he was guilty of committing a similar crime." Com. r. Campbell, 7 All. ,')41 (1863), Thus on an indictment for advising a slave to escape, it is error to allow the government to show that the defendant previously advised another slave to escape. Cole v. Com., 5 Graft. 09(5 (1848). On an indictment for infanticide, ar admission, by silence, that the prisoner '• had a child this way before, and put it away," is inadmis- sible. State i: Shuford, 69 N. C. 486 (1873). So on an indictment for murder it was held to be error to permit the government to connect the prisoner with other offences. " The only effect of testimony of this character was io distract the atten- tion of the jury from the real issues in the case and to fill their minds with prejudice against the accused. All independent mat- ters and all independent crimes which are disconnected from the crime then under investigation, which shed no light upon the alleged criminal transaction, are to be rigorously excluded for the reasons already given." State v. Parker, 96 Mo. .382 (1888). " As a general rule, it is not admissible to adduce evidence that a defendant committed an offence, in order to prove that he com- mitted another." State v. Alston, 94 X. C. 930 (1886). On an indictment for murder, preceded by an attempt at robbery, it is error to permit evidence of prior robberies by the defendants. " Proof of them only tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw tlieir minds away from the real issue, and to produce the impression that they were wretches whose lives were of no value to the community." Boyd v. U. S. 142 U. S. 450 (1892). I ' m 'i ; 1 • '1 \ li' "m : l\ lilliif niit. mi I :!f| 257° AMKHICAN NOTKS. [taut II. On an issup of burglary cviilonco is inconipctiMit of a prior bur- 1,'lary of the iioiisa of tiio proiioontor and tiic jirisoncr's fonnuctiou with it, Jii^'btfoot r. People, IG Micili. 507 (IHlIN). The {^overiiiiK'nt in a eriniinal ease, however, is not prevented from proviii" the offence charged because such proof incidentally shows tl i ' jfendant has been guilty of another crime. Com. /■. tlohn- so.,, ...w i\[ass. o4 (hSS!)). The rule has no api)lieation where the ])rior act was the cause of the act in question. Under these circumstances "the two embrace but one continuing transaction, ami, occurring at the sanui time and place, together constitute but the rrs tjcsta; of a single principal fact." Trior v. State, 77 Ala. r»G (1884). Kklaxation of the Kllk. — In two important particulars the bene- fits to be derived from tht; use of this species of evidence have been considered to more than compensate for the danger of admitting it. The controlling consideration apparently has been that two impor- tant sets of facts can frequently be proved in no other way. These are, (1), mental states, and, (2), in seeking a responsible cause among several possible causes. (1) JMkntal Statks. — To prove purpose, intent, motive, knowl- edge, or other nu'iital state is a task of difficulty. To the niedi;eval mind, indeed, the task was insui)erable. To ascertain the seovt thoughts of th(i human lieart seenuMl to our ancestors a task beyond mere mortal j)ower. A direct appeal to the judgnn'ut of Heaven, by ordeal, wager of battle, &e., was needed to aid consciously feeble resources for the discovery of truth, when locked up in a human breast. 15ut this is a mystery which modern jurisprudence by the use of reason undertakes to unravel. It demands, however, from the nature of the problem, a certain relaxation of the usual rides of evidence. Unless tlie jjerson whose mental state is involved ad- mits its existence, the fact of such mental state can be establislied only by proof of its natural manifestations, either in langunge or conduct. It folh.ws therefore that in cases where a mental state is a fact in issue or relevant to the issue, the usual expressions of such state are competent. The exclamation of pain, hatred, or malice; the tiireat of revenge ; tiie timid exjiression of fear by a mind unduly inHueneed to do wliat its sense of justic(i repudiates; — these, and many others are admissible in any case where smdi a mental state is in issue or relevant, not as Jiearsay evidence of the facts stated, but as original cinnimstantial evidence of the existence of the state of mind of which they are the usual expression. In hke manner, the existence of such a mental state may be proved by evidence of eomluct which is the usual expression of such state. It naturally follows tliat sucOi jiroof will frecpiently be found in the doing of an act at anotlun- time similar to the one as to winch the issue is raised in the case on trial. That such proof would CllAP. VI.] AMKItI(;.\N N(»TKS. t.V)78 cjoiiio within the scopo of tlin riilo .a!,':un.st fiilinittinj; rns infer iilii>s dctd', (loi'S not iift'oct tlio Viilidity ol' the reasoning nndcr wiiich it. is I't'ceiviul. Intknt. — Porhiips the most Ireqncnt mental state to be iitliruiiu tivoly shown, especially in criminal cases, is the existence ol' a spcciiic intent. In an indictment for assault with intent to commit murder, " previous attacks . . . during the same evening, which showed a continuous and persevering determination, by rei^ated assaults, accompanied by threats to kill (the ])rosecutor) or otherwise injure him" were admitted. Koss ik State, (L' Ala. U24 (1S78). So on an indictment for murder previous threats or attempts ti) kill are competent. '•This evidence did not of itself establish the fact that the defendant intended to kill his wife at the time he tired tiie fatal shot; but it was to be weighed by the jury in connection with all the facts surrounding the homicide for the purpose of deter- mining the motive and intent of the defendant at the time.'' I'eoplo /'. .lones, IM) N. Y. (167 (iHcSr.). So in an indictment for rape a prior unsuccessful attempt to com- mit the same crime upon the prosecutrix is competent. People v. O'Sullivan, 104 N. Y. 481 (1887); State ;>. Walter.s, 45 ia. .'!8'.> (1877). So in a libel for divorce on the ground of adultery prior acts of adultery are admissible "for the purpose of proving an adulterous disposition in the persons implicated, which itself tends to provi; the particular act charged, as a continuation of the same immoral proclivity." Hicks v. State, 80 Ala. .'{!) (1888). So on an indic^t- ment for adulter}', subsequent acts of adultery are competent, but the effect of the evidence must be properly limited, and it is error not to do so. Funderburg v. State, 'So Tex. App. 3*.»2 (1887) ; State /'. Way, 5 Neb. 28.'} (1877). [n an indictment for adultery, one of the government witnesses testified to seeing the alleged guilty parties undress for the pur- pose of occupying the same bed for the night and go to bed together. The defence introduced evidence of the witness's character for truth. It was- held that prim- acts of undue familiarity were admissible. " The circumstances thus ])rovcd wi^re such as naturally excite in the mind a belief that a woman who would so conduct herself, would be more likely to commit the fact alleged against her, than if her deportment had been modest and discreet." ()om. r. Merriam, II I'ick. 018 (18;W). In an action for malicious and wilful mischief the court permit evidence of other similar offences against the prosecutor by the defendant. "Inasmuch as the case was one where the motive or intent with which the act was committed was the gist of the offence, it was permissible to go into and show other criminal transactions ':i| 'i; 1' MM ■ i 1 I IPiPM Ifc b 1 ' i 1 I 1 ¥"'• ' 1 1! 1 If: tf ij r ' ■ 1 ! ( I' { 11 * 1 "■■ I' i mi '■\ 257" AMKIMCAN NOTKS. [I'AKT tl. »»f ii siiuiliir rharaotcr, as oviileuco of tho iiitont or inotivo." Street *•■ Mtatt", 7 Tex. Apj). ") (1.S7U). So ill a case ot larcii-ii y, •• as a general rule, evidence that the ilefeiuhiiit lias coniniitted offences other than tiiose charged in tho iiidictiiu'iit. though of a similar nature, is prima facue inadiiiissihlc. The general rule lias its limitations and exceptions. Wiu-n it is material to show the intent with which the act charged was com- mitted, to illustrate its criminality, or to identify the accused as the person who committed the act laid in the indictment, such evidence is admissihle." Curtis v. State, 78 Ala. 12 (1884). In an action of libel the publication of which is claimed to be malicious, subsequent publications by the defendant are admissible '• for tlie purpose of showing the personal malice and ill-will of the defendant towards the plaintiff." Grace v. McArthur, 7G Wise. r»41 (1S90). In an indictment for manslaughter, evidence of cruel and abusive treatment of the deceased is admissible on the (juestion of malice. Knrnett r. State, 14 Lea, iVJ (1884) ; Eldridge v. State, L'7 Fla. 102 (I8i)l). So where the replication of express malice was made to a defence of privileged communication in an action of slander, the plaintiff is entitled to give evidence of a previous statement to a similar effect, under eireumstances not privileged. Hamel v. Amyot, 14 Quebec, m (1S87). Where an innkeeper, in an action by a guest to recover for loss of j)ro{)erty by lire, relied on ii statutory exemption that the fire was incendiary, evidence was offered that on the same evening an attempt was made to fire a neighbouring building by similar means. The evi- dence was rejected, and such rejection was ruled to be error. The court, jii'r Andrews, J., while conceding that the evidence offered would be incompetent against the prisoner on an indictment for arson, con- tinue : — " But in investigating in a civil suit a question depending solely upon circumstantial evidence, it would, I think, be holding too strict a rule to refuse evidence such as was offered in this case, which is connected with the principal fact by circumstances which naturally tend to establish it. There is no fixed and definite rule, by whi(;h it can be determined whether a collateral fact is so 'remote as to be inadmissible to support the princii)al fact sought to be established. The question must, to a considerable extent, be de- cided in each case, on its own circumstances." Faucett r. Nichols, (!4 N. Y. 377 (187C). On an indictment for arson, a prior attempt four weeks before by the defendant to fire the same buildings, is competent. " Evidence of previous unsuccessful attempts to com- mit the same crime for which a respondent is on trial, is admis- sible." State V. Ward, fil Vt. 158, 181 (1888). Where the issue was whether the jdaintiif was dealing with the cashier of the defendant bank as an individual or as an officer of the 1/ ! < ; j.{Jj) i CIIAT. VI.] AMKUICAN NOTKS. I'il* (lofeiidaiit, l);iiik, ovidonco is compt'tcut of foniior triuiaactions of a similar natnie between the parties. L'JIerbette /•• I'ittslielcl National Banlt, UVJ Mass. U57 (l.S'.)4). Acts admitted lor tlie purjujse of sliowing intent may really amonnt to what would popularly be, termed circumstantial evidence of guilt, though in truth all evidence of the existentc of oni' thing by proof of the existence of another is, in a sense, circumstantial. Thus on an indictment for stealing a hog, evidence is admissible that the defendant after the taking altered the brand on the hog, though this would be a distinct offence, '• to show the intent with which the act charged was done . . . inasmuch as thf' altering of the previous mark of an animal tends to show the intent of convert- ing it to one's own use." State v. Thomas, .'}() La. Ann. Pt. 1, GOO (1878). Ou an indictment for using instruments on a certain woman to procure a miscarriage, evidence of treatment by electricity of the same woman on the same occasion and of similar acts on other occa- sions, is competent. " Whether it was of acts which formed part of the principal transaction, or of acts of the defendant at other times, it tended to prove attemj)ts of the defendant to procure the identi- cal result the intent to ])rocure which constituted the gist of the offence charged, — that is, to prove the intent which was charged in the indictment." Com. v. Corkin, 13G Mass. 429 (1884). Where the defendant, an insurance agent, was indicted for fraudulently transferring to a certain insurance company from another company, for the purpose of shielding the latter, after he knew that the vessel called the " Wade " and her cargo insured had been lost, a certain share of the risk, evidence is admissible that he did the same thing as to other risks about the same time. " it was necessary for the People to show the evil motive and fraudulent intent of the defendant in changing the insurance upon the cargo of the Wade, after knowledge of the loss, from the Conti- nental to the Thames and Mersey; and for the purpose of showing the motive and intent, it was competent for the People to show that the defendant had done similar acts, although it might thus be shown that he was guilty of other crimes." People v. Dimick, 107 X. V. 13, ;;2 (1887). Malick. — Acts of the person wiiose malice at a particular time is important, whether made before or after the time in question, may be shown if such acts tend to establish the existence of malice fit the time alleged. On an indictment of a husband for the murder of his wife evidence of threats and acts of violence for a period of eight years prior to tlie death is competent. " It tended to show a settled ill-will and malice on the part of the defendant towards his wife, and therefore l)ore directly on the question whether there was any motive for him to commit the crime." Com. v. Holmes, 157 Mass. 233 (1892). M ■^, ifli •■IM I iii . i li i 2579 AMERICAN KOTES. [taut II. So in an action for malicious prosecntion, the court say : " Malico may also lie inferred, of course, from the circumstances surrounding and attending upon the prosecution, the conduct and declarations of the prosecutor, his activity in and about the case, his efforts therein to secure some personal end. Indeed, the existence of malice being a fact which, in the nature of things, is incapable of positive, direct proof, it must of necessity be rested on inferences and deductions from facts which can be laid before the jury; and hence it is that a wide range is permitted in adducing attendant circumstances which tend to throw any light on the subject." Lunsford c. Dietrich, 93 Ala. ofio (1890). KxowM;u(iK. — That a particular fact was known to a person is difficult of proof in the absence of an admission or other affirmative proof. When, as fre<]uently happens in criminal cases, it becomes necessary to establish such a mental state, the usual, and apparently the necessary, method of doing so is by proving facts which tend to render such knowledge probable. Usually a single fact of this nature so easily admits of explanation in the way of accident or mistake us to furnish but a slight degree of probative force. But it will be seen that the number of such as facts is multiplied, hypotliescs which satisfactorily explain them all grow rapidly fewer and more diffi- cult of belief. The necessity of the case and the valuable results to be obtained from the process have warranted a frequent use of facts which would otherwise be objectionable as res hitcr alios Kctcc. The question being whether A. fraudulently induced 1?. to loan him money on the security of false certificates of stock, evidence ol' the possession and use by A. of other altered and false certifioates about the same time, whether before or afterwards, is "competent, to show that his possession of those, for the use of which lie was indicted, was not casual and accidental. . . . They were admitti'd and allowed to be used only to show guilty knowledge." (Join. v. Coe, 11") Mass. 481 (1874). On indictments for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen, evidence of stealing from the same persons of similar goods and tlieir purchase by the accused, is competent. "The rule is recognized as well established, that in eases like the jireseiit, where guilty knowledge is an ingredient of the offence charged, tlie same may be proved as other facts are proved, by circumstantiiil evideiKic, and tliat other acts of a like cliaracter, altliough involviii'^' substantive criincs, may be given in evidence to ])i'ove tlie sriniffr. The i)riiici|ial limitation of the rule is, that the criminal act wliicli is souglit to b" given in evidence, must be necessarily connected witli that wliicli is tlie subject of the prosecution, either from some con- nection of time and place, or as furnishing a clue to tli(! motive on the part of the accused." Coleman v. People, 08 N. Y. fiHS (1874). CHAP. VI.] AMKUICAN NOTES. •2.3710 It is not essential to this rule that the gooils should have been stolen, in the second instances, from the same party. " Upon the trial on an indictment for receiving certain stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, evidence that other goods, known to have been stolen, were previously received by the defendant from the same thief, is admissible for the purpose of showing guilty knowl- edge on tlie part of the accused that the goods, for receiving wliioh he is charged, were stolen." Schriedley tu State, 23 Ohio St., 130 (1872); Devoto t'. Com., 3 .Mete. (Ky.) 417 (1861). On an indictment for forging and uttering certain receipted bills for hides, " on the question of the defendant's knowledge that the bills in issue were not genuine, his possession and use of other sim- ilar false bills, about the same time, whether before or afterwards, in a continuous series of transactions with the same persons under the same contract, was comjietent to sliow that his use of the former was not innocent." Com. v. White, 145 :\[ass. 392 (1888). It is immaterial that the transactions extend some months later than the latest forgery mentioned in the indictment. Ibid. To prove defendant's knowledge of the falsity of tlie false pre- tence used in obtaining a certain amount of money by means of a cheque, evidence of prior frauds on other parties, shortly before, is admissible. Tarbox v. State, 38 Oh. St. 581 (188.3). In an action against a stage line for damages sustained by tlie overturning of a stage-coach, as bearing on the bad nature of the roads and the defendant's knowledge of the necessity of providing a careful driver in consequence, the frequent occurrence of other similar accidents may be sliown. IJut such evidence is not admissible " for the pur- pose of showing negligence on the part of the driver at tlie time." Higley v. Gilmer, 3 .Mont. 90 (1878). So in an action of negligently setting fires by sparks escaping from a locomotive engine, prior instances of similar tires are admis- sible as bearing on " wliether, in view of their previous occurrence, the comjmny was, at tlio time of the fire in question, in the exer- cise of reasonable care." Smith v. Old Colony, &c. li. R., 10 R. I. 22 (1871). JUit no evidence of past fires is admissible for tliat purpose. [/>!(/. So on ail issui' of negligence, it is competent to show other occurrences showing knowledge of defects on the part of the defend- ant. Thus, in an action for ])ersonal injuries caused by the cars of a freight train running off the track, evidence is competent that freiglit trains under tlie same e()n<hietor liad run off tlie track seven or eight times within the preceding month, ^lobile, &c. R. J!, r. Ashcraft, 48 Ala. 15 (1872). So on an indictment for passing counterfeit money a witness tes- tified " that tlie defendant's wife sold to him a twenty dollar coun- terfeit bill belonging to the defendant, in liis absence; but that tlie defendant subsequently was advised of the transaction and sane- i m It jl 257" AMERICAN NOTES. PART II. tioned it." This was not the bill for the passing of which the defendant was indicted. Held, " the evidence was admissible as tending to show knowledge on the part of the defendant that the bill passed by himself was counterfeit, as, the transactions were about the same time." Bersch v. State, 13 Ind, 434 (1859). On an indictment for uttering and passing counterfeit money, evidence that the prisoner " had been employed in the business of printing parts of genuine bank bills was pertinent for the purpose of showing his knowledge in respect to bills. It tended to show guilty knowledge that the bills he passed were counterfeit." Com. V. Hall, 4 All. 305 (1862). So on an indictment for uttering a forged cheque, it is competent to show the uttering of other forged cheques upon other occasions. " Such proof is not received for the purpose of showing other crimes than that charged in the indictment, but for the purpose of show- ing the guilty knowledge and intent which are elements of the crime charged." People v. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 591 (1887). MoTivK. — It is obvious that where the doing of an act, especially one of serious consequence, is to be established by circumstantial evidence, one of the most essential objects of judicial inquiry is as to the existence of motive. Crimes of magnitude and other acts of grave import are not usually done without a motive, of some kind, which, for the time at least, probably appeared adequate. To establish such a motive, resort frequently must be had, as in proving other mental feelings, to proof of acts which are its. usual expression or otherwise point to it. " Indeed, it would be difficult to detect criminals and bring them to punishment, by any other means than by following the thread of impelling motives." Com. v. Ferri- gan, 44 Pa. St. 386 (1863). Instances of the use of this kind of evidence are extremely frequent. For example, in a case where a father was indicted for murder of a daughter, May, it was the theory of the government that the defend- ant desired to be rid of a wife and two children, Irene and May, in order to marry another woman, "There was evidence tending strongly to support this theory, and to show that the death of each one of the victims was but a part of a system in which the lives of all were involved, and in the working out of which to the accom-. plishment of defendant's ulterior purpose, the life of each was, in substantially the same manner, ruthlessly sacrificcnl. Under these circumstances, all evidence going in any way to connect the defend- ant with the murder of his wife, or of his daughter Irene, was rele- vant to tlie issues involved on his trial for the murder of May, and was properly admitted." Ilawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 67 (1889). Similarly, where the object of the government was to show that the murder was committed to enable the prisoner to marry the wife of the victim, evidence of adulterous intercourse between these parties m ■ f ?i f i 5?' t? ciiAi'. vr.] AMERICAN NOTKS. 25712 was admitted. " He is a poor judge of huiiian motives and impulses, who cannot see in such a rehitiou .as proposed to be proved liere, between the deceased's wife and the prisoner, that it might lead to the perpetration of the crime cliarged, or who would deny that it would probably shed light on the motive for the act. History is full of such examples." Com. /•. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. St. 3SC (1863). So evidence is competent, in a similar case, "that during four of the eleven niglits intervening between the killing and the finding of the body of the deceased, the accused and Polly, the wife of the deceased, slept in the same bed, and together, at witness's house. Clearly this was a pregnant circumstance, taken with the other proofs tending to show a motive for the crime on the part of the accused." Miller v. State, 68 Miss. 221 (1890). " Evidence of one crime may be given to sliew a motive for com- mitting another, as in the case of Ilex v. Clewes (4 C. & P. 221), and ^"here several felonies are all parts of the same transaction, evidence of all is admissible upon the trial of an indictment for any of them." P. V. Chasson, 16 New Bruns. 546, 582 (1876). So where the motive claimed for a murder was revenge fcr procuring prisoner's dismissal from employment, evidence is admissible that the prisoner had stated that he so believed and had threatened to " fix " deceased for it. " Upon an indictment for murder, evidence of former grudges and antecedent threats is received, because it tends to show malice in the defendant against the deceased. Such evidence is admissible because it supplies a motive for the act." State V. Palmer, 65 N. H. 218 (1889). On an action against certain judges of (dection for refusing to allow the plaintiff to vote, it was the plaintiff's contention that the motive of tlie defendants, who were all members of one political party, was the partisan one of preventing members of the oi)posite political party (of which the plaintiff was a member) from voting. Held : that evidence was competent that the defendants on the same day had rejected others of tlieir political opponents for the same trivial reasons. " Wliere the inipiiry turns upon intention and motive, and in cases where fraud, corru|)ti()n and the like constitute the gist of tlie action, acts and declarations of a similar cliaraeter, at or about tlie same time, to or towards third parties, are admissible to sliow the quo (I II lino of tlie particular transaction." Friend v. Haiiiill, 34 Md. 298, 306 (1870). In an indictment for tlic niurder of one Prince Arthur Freeman by poison, the motive of tlie defendant, as claimed by the govern- ment, was as follows. That Freeman, a married man with a wife and two children, had insured liis life for $2000 in favor of his wife, Aiiiiio Freeman. Tliat the defendant, a sister of his wife, was bur- dened with and pressed for tiie payment of debts which she had no means of paying. That thereupon, tiie defendant formed the plan iiili If 1 i 1.1 'iH Mf : ■.r M' W: III 25713 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAKT II. and intention of procuring to herself this insurance money, for the payment of these pressing debts, by lirst killing her sister; then inducing Freeman to make his life insurance payable to herself and, finally, killing him. The wife died February 26th, 1885 ; on May 13th, 1885, the defendant was appointed by Freeman beneficiary under his insurance certificate ; on June 27th, 1885, Freeman died ; the defendant's bills were paid from the insurance money which was duly received on September 23rd, 1885. The court ruled that upon a trial of a defendant for the commission of a crime, evidence that at another time he committed a similar crime could not be received or considered as tending to show that he committed the crime for Avhich he was on trial ; that therefore evidence tending to show that the defendant killed her sister Annie Freeman was not to be considered as indicating that she would be likely to kill Prince Arthur Freeman, and that all the evidence in relation to the death of Annie Freeman was only to be considered so far as it bore upon tlie question whether the defendant, at the time of the alleged mur- der of l*rince Arthur Freeman, was actuated by the motive which Avas imputed to her by the (Jonimon wealth, to obtain for her own use the life insurance money payable on his death. Held: "the ruling at the trial was correct." Com. v. Ilobinson, 1-40 Mass. 571 In a Pennsylvania case involving a series of murders by poison, where the apparent motive in each case wns different, the court insist that the existence of a common motive is ;i,n absolute essen- tial to admitting evidence of other crimes. In other words, the crimes must be means to a common end foreseen from the begin- ning, as in the Itobinson case, to admit the evidence of other crimes. "To make one criminal act evidence of another, a connection between them must have existed in uhe mind of the actor, linking them together for some purpose he intended to accomplish ; or it must be necessary to identify the person of the actor, by a connec- tion which shows that he who committed the one must have done the other." Shaffner i>. Com. 72 Pa. .St. GO (1872). Where tlie supposed motive for the murder of a wife to whom the prisoner had been .sccrelly iiKirried was the fact that the announce- ment of such marriage, wliich could be delayed but a sliort time longer, would interrupt his relations witli a prostitute n,nd prevent marriag" with another woman ^.viiig in Indiana, to whom he was then under engagement of marriage, letters of the prisoner to the deceased and such other women were held competent. "All of them . . . showed the existence of a relation between the accused and these two women which might be broken off or interfered with by his marriage to the deceased becoming pu1)lic. They exhibited a motive why he should desire to rid liiinself of his wife and their unborn offspring." O'lJrien v. Com., 81) Ky. 354 (l.SSD). ' I ^^ CHAP. VI.] AMIiRICAN NOTES. 2571* Where the claim was that the insured had swindled an insurance company by insuring his life for lars^e amounts in favour of his cred- itors and otlier friends, then killini,' himself, a witness was allowed to testify that a few months before tlic process of insurance began he went at request of insured to raisr money for him from his (insured's) friends ; that he failed to accomplish the purpose and so informed the insured. "It indicated an existing motive for the fraud in the want of money and the failure to obtain it.'' Smith v. X. B. Society, 123 X. Y. 85 (1890). So where a prisoner had mur- dered his father and step-mother, the government was permitted on an indictment for the murder of the father to show ill-will on tlie part of the prisoner against the step-mother. " Tiie motive whieh induced the defendant to kill any one of the family might very well be held to have induced him to kill the others." AVoolfolk r. State, 85 Cia. 01), 105 (1890). So in a murder case, tlie court rule tliat, "It is permissible to prove previous altercations or cond)ats between the accuced and the deceased as tending to show malice, ill-will, or a motive for the killing. The object of such evidence is the fact of the jn-evious difficulty, and collateral inquiries into the jjarticulars, details of merits, are not allowable" Garrett c. State, 76 Ala. 18 (1884). On an indictment for murder in an attempt to rape, evidence of the defendant's conduct about the time of the homicide toward vari- ous women in tlie neighbourhood showing an apparent desire to commit the crime of rape is admissible. But the government can- not show that the defendant committed a rape several years before on a woman other than the deceased. " The law in regard to proof of intent, is, I ajipreliend, in no particular different from the law in regard to the proof of other facts, unless it may be in the general principle that a person is ordinarily presumed to intenil the natural conseiiuences of his actions. Hut always the evidence will be sub- ject to the condition that it legally and logically tends to prove the facts in issue, whether it be th(^ intent or any other fact.'' State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245, 290 (187(5) ; State r. Walters, 45 la. 389 In an indictment for rape, evidence of solicitations six months previous is competent. " The evidence was admissible as tending to show the existence of a motive or passion tliat would render the commission of the act charged more probable." State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148 (1803). To sliow tliat a defendant had negotiated the nrce in suit at a larf,'e discount because of his impecunious condition, evidence is admissible that he negotiated other notes at large discounts at about the same time. Turner r. Luning, 105 Cal. 124 (1894). Where the doing of a prior act possesses a jirobative force apart from its resembkuice to the act in question, such fact is, in general, ' I I m i i':.:>, -ii! illHiil i:!i' \ - nili 2571s AMKIUCAN NOTES. [PAKT II. admissible, in the absence of special danger to be apprehended from its use. Purpose. — So where criminal acts form part of a common imr- pose or organised plan of operations. " There is a distinct and significant in-obative effect, resulting from the continuance of the same plan or s(!heme, and from the doing of other acts in pursuance thereof. It is somewhat of the nature of threats or declarations of intention, but more especially of preparatioi.'s for the commission of the crime wliicli is the subject of the indictment." Com. v. Robinson, 146 :\rass. 571 (1888). On an indictment for stealing a horse it may be shown that the defendant on the same night stole a wagon from another person. " The taking a wagon to use with the stolen horse, if they were used together, was evidence of a corroborating circumstance to the main charge, and could be used as evidence for that purpose, notwith- standing it was proof of another felony also, not charged in the indictment." Phillips r. People, 57 Barb. 353 (1869). On an issue of larceny of a horse evidence of the larceny of a saddle and blanket at the same time was competent. State v. Folwell, 14 Kans. 105 (1874). So a larceny of a whittletree about the same time, useful in enabling the prisoner to escape. Und. On the contrary, the supreme court of Arkansas granted a new trial in a case where, on an indictment for larceny of two horses, evidence was admitted that the defendants had shortly afterwards stolen bridles and saddles with which to equip the horses for the journey. " It was not competent for the State to p^'ove these sepa- rate and distinct offences, by the admissions of appellant, or other- wise, on his trial upon the cliarge of stealing the horse and mare. " Endaily v. State, 39 Ark. 278 (1882). In tliis latter case, however, the evidence of stealing the horse was plenary the defendants leav- ing confessed. The evidence of the further larcenies seems to have served no useful purpose. It is necessary to establish a connecting link between the trans- action sought to be shown and the transaction in question ; — as that they are part of a single plan or scheme. In a well-considered Massachusetts case, of alleged false pretences in the sale of a horse, similar false pretences in sales to other persons shortly before were held inadmissible. " It is not in general competent to show a dis. tinct crime committed by the defendant for the purpose of proving that he is guilty of the crime charged. . . . But as in all crimes, except a few statutory offences, a criminal intent is necessary to be proved, evidence which legitimately bears upon this may be put in, even if it be derived from circumstances which also show the com- mission of another offence. . . . The evidence here admitted as to the three other distinct fraudulent sales does not appear to come within any of the exceptions to the general rule th.at limits the trial CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 2571'' to the immediate act for ■vvhicli the defendant is indicted. . . . The transactions foi mod no part of a single scheme or plan, any more than the various robberies of a thief." Per Devens, J., in Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16 (1882). Where, on the trial of one charged with the forgery of a promis- sory note, it appears that the crime in question is one oi a system of like crimes committed by the defendant in pursuance of a con- spiracy, other notes forged by him during the pendency of tlie conspiracy and purporting to be executed by different ])ersous, are admissible in evidence against liim. " The reason foi- the rule in this and similar cases is that when once system is proved, eacli par- ticular part of the system may be explained by tlie other parts which go to make up the whole." Card v. State, lO'J Ind. 415, 420 (188C). In a case in New Hampshire which the court evidently feel is <a close one, the evidence having been admitted on the wrong ground at the trial, the court "after some hesitancy " decide that on an indictment for placing obstructions on a railroad track, evidence was admissible that shortly before and shoicly after the obstruc- tions in question were struck the defendants j^ilaced other obstruc- tions on the track, in the immediate vicinity. "These aets would show that the defendants were near the place whore the offence was committed, about the time it was committed, an-l that tlu^y were consequently in a situation to place tlie obstruotit.ns on the track, and had the strength and ability to put them tliere." State o. Weiitworth, 37 N. H. 19G (1858). A similar reasoning is adopted in a Massachusetts case. " Where unlawful acts of the same general cliaracter are continuous in their nature, and appear to be parts of a general scheme or plan, participation in them at an earlier stage is the usual evidence that one who was afterward present was a particii)ator then." Tyson v. Booth, 100 j\Iass. 258 (ISOS). Fraud. — Xowhere is a wider lat-rude given into tlie range ot res Inter alios activ. than in cases of fraud. To show fraudulent intent, evidence is admitted of other frauds of a similar nature, especially where such evidence tends to estab- lish tlie existence of an organized scheme, of which separate frauds constitute part. For example, where it was claimed that the plaintiff was patentee of an invention for baling cotton, and that tlie defendants, an English company, making a similar device, fraudulently iiretended to be about to purchase this invention, not actually intending to do so, but with the real object of keeping the market for their own process during the pendency of protracted negotiations, evidence that the defendants, during the same period, entered into negotia- tions with other American inventors, patentees of competing inven- r 'ii^i ii!li| i r I ( jii! pf rr^ ^ i ' ■ !' 1:. ' 1 !! i' if. •m ri,. ill''-' ■ Is; ' I:: iiijil! 257" AMKUICAN NOTKii. [taut II. tions, in the same way and with the same object, is competent. " It was an important iiupiiry in the case, what was the pnrpose or animus of the defendants in their negotiations with the phiintiff ? ... If a motive exist prompting to a particular line of conduct, and it he shown that in pursuing that line a defendant has deceived <aud defraniled one person, it may justly be inferred that similar conduct towards another, at about tlie same time, and in relation to a like subject, was actuated by the same spirit." Hutler v. Wat- kins, I'o Wall. 450, 4()4 (1871). On an issue whether the defend- ants fraudulently sohl the plaintiff's goods to a person of no financial staiuling, it may be shown that they sold the goods of others to such persons with similar false representations. "Actions of this de- scription, . . . where fraud is of the essence of the charge, neces- sarily give rise to a wide range of investigation, for the reason that the inttuit of the defendant is, more or less, involved in the issue. E.xperience shows that positive proof of fraudulent acts is not gen- erally to be expected, and for that reason, among others, the law allows a resort to circumstances, as the means of ascertaining the truth." Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172. 187 (1859). So on an issue of a fraudulent entry of goods at the custom-house, evidence of similar previous fraudulent entries has been received. " Wherever ttie intent or guilty knowledge of a party is a material ingredient in the issue of a case, these collateral facts, tending to establish such intent or knowledge, are proper evidence." liottomley r. U. S. 1 Story, 135, 144 (1840). Where it was claimed that the defendant procured an extension of time upon a certain indebtedness by fraud- ulent representations as to his ability to pay, evidence is admissible that at the same time the defendant was making like false repre- sentations to others. "The plaintiff relied upon showing, that the defendant had been engaged in a sclieme, to defraud those upon whose credulity he could impose; and the entire history of the defendant's dealings with him, in regard to this money loaned, would tend, in some degree, though perhaps remotely, to show that it was witli a continued intent to defraud, that he made the rep- resentations " in question. French r. White, 5 Duer, 254 (1856). On the issue whether a certain conveyance to the plaintilf was in fraud of A.'s creditors, evidence is admissible of other conveyances from A. to the plaintiff and collusive suits between A. and the plaintiff about the same time which were also in fraud of A.'s cred- itors. " It is usually the only nu)de of proving such matters. Purpose and intention, especially when tliere is an obvious motive for disguise, is only to be reached by inference, and safe inference can almost never be made from a single transaction, especially wlien tht! form of the act is in itself indifferent and of hourly occurrence." Pierce /•. Hoffman, 24 Yt. 525 (1852) ; Baldwin r. Short, 125 N. Y. 553 (1891). " It is not essential to the competency of such evidence CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 257« tliat it slioiild relate to transactions contemporaneous with the one investigated. If thoy are so closely related in time that the intent that governed in the one may fairly and reasonably be inferred to be the intent that controlled the other, then the one sheds light upon the other and is therefore a relevant subject of investigation." Bernlieini r. Dibrell, OG :\Iiss. 199 (188S). 80 evidence that the alleged fraudulent grantee assisted the grantors in devising means to prevent their creditors from availing themselves of their legal remedies, c. (/., by leaving the State and remaining away until alter a certain session of the trial court, is competent. Adams /•. Keniuy, 59 N. H. ].".3 (1879). It is not, /)('!• contra, sufficient to show that two frauds are contem- poraneous to succeed in establishing a probative relation between them. Tiiis would only tend to show that the defendant was likely to do tlie act complained of because he had done it before, — whieli is precisely what the rule of tlie n-.t inter aUus seeks to prevent. Such a line of i)roof substantially .anunints to proof of eliaractfr by specific acts of conduct. Evidence of pvior frauds is admitted only wlien done with a persistent motive, or as part of a systematic plan. In a case where the plaintiffs, who were wholesale merchants, claimed that the defendant had procured a sale to liimself of certain goods by fraud and with intent not to pay for the same, it was held error to admit evidence of similar fraudulent representations to other merchants about the same time, unless the transactions should be connected in some particular manner. *• The admission of such evidence would introduce a multiplicity of collateral issues, calculated to withdraw the attention of the jury from the real issue in the csase ; and it would operate unjustly to the uefendant, as it requires him to explain his transactions with others, without any notice or oppor- tunity for preparation." Jordan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457 (1872). After reviewing the authorities, the court in that case (Jordan v. Osgood) say : "We think the true rule to be deduced from them is, that another act of fraud is admissible to prove the fraud charged only where there is evidence that the two are parts of one scheme or plan of fraud, committed in pursuance of a common purpose." Ihkl. Edwards r. "Warner, 35 Conn. 517 (18G9) ; Moline-^Iilburn Co. V. Franklin, 37 :\linn. 137 (1887). Where, in an action on a life insurance policy, the defence was that the policy was procured by one Hunter on the life of Arm- strong for the fraudulent purpose of feloniously killing Armstrong and securing the money from the policy, the benefit of whicli had previously been assigned to him, it was lield that "evidence that he effected insurances upon the life of Armstrong in other com[>anies at or about the same time, for a like fraudulent purpose, was admis- sible. A repetition of acts of the same character naturally indicates the same purpose in all of them; and' if when considered together Ihlu^ wK' Y 1 [ ' .■ ' Wm m V|,.:;i^i^^i.| ; illl ! mm 257 10 AMERICAN NOTES. [PART JI. they cannot be reasonably expln.inod without ascribing a particiihxr motive to the perpetrator, sucli motive will be considered as prompting each act." New York Mutual, &c., Ins. ('o. v. Arm- strong, 117 U. S. 591 (1885). In a Virginia case, on an action to cancel a contract for the sale of land alleged to have been procured by the fraudulent misrepresentation of an agent, evidence that tlie agent made similar representations to others is admissible, not as showing wliat took place on the particular occasion, but as being " very persuasive of the bent " of the agent's mind. Wilson t>. Carpenter's Adm'r, 21 S. E. 243 (1895). So in an action in ^1 ichigan, where the issue 'vas whether the sale of a certificate of stock was induced by certain fraudulent represen- tations of a promoter, similar representations to others by the same promoter may be shown. Frencii v. liyan, G2 N. W. 1016 (1895). On a bill in equity to rescind the purchase of a silver mine on the ground of fraud perpetrated by "salting" the specimens of ore taken by the complainant for assay, evidence is competent that the defendant also " salted " samples used in prior negotiations with other persons for the sale of the same mine. ^Mudsill Mining Co. V. Watrous, 61 Fed. Rep. 163 (1894). To prove that the ''salting" was not accidental, evidence is competent that no native silver was found in the samples assayed, but that each one of thirty samples contained ])owdered silver. Ibid. To establish fraud in the impor- tation of certain merchandise, evidence of twenty-nine other invoices imported by the claimant into the same port is admissible " for the puri)oseof showing the fraudulent intention of the claimant in tliese importations as well af- the ])resent." The supreme court of the United States, speaking by Story, J., say : "Indeed, in no other way would it be practicable, in many ca-jO's, to establish such intent or motive, for the single act taken by itself may not be decisive either way; but wlien taken in connection with others of the like character and nature, the intent and motive may be demonstrated almost with a conclusive certainty." AVood v. U. S. 16 Peters, 342, 360 (1842). "Experience shows that positive proof of fraudulent acts is not generally to be expected, and for tliat reason, among others, the law allows a resort to circumstances, as the means of ascertaining tlie truth." Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172 (1859). In cases of fraud, subseipient acts may be sliown to establish a prior fraudulent intent. " The subsequent acts are illustrative of the intent and character of the first." Butler i\ Collins, 12 Cal. 457 (1859). Skill. — So in the proof of any other mental state, e. g., the skill needed to do the act alleged to have been done, evidence of acts done at another time may be received. On an indictment for arson, the government, after showing that the fire was set by the use of a peculiarly constructed box, well * I I: < CHAP, VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 2oT*'> adapted to that purpose and to no other, was permitted to show that a box found a month before, iinder circumstancos showing its use for incendiary purposes, was made at the defendant's shop *' to sliow tliat lie possessed the requisite skill, materials, tools, and opportunity to have made " the box used in the fire in question, and that this was the sole legitimate iniriiose of the evidence, " unless the jury should find, in the one, such marks as show that one hand must have made both." Com. r. Choate, 105 Mass. 451 (1870). It is immaterial that the proof of a mental state in this way inci- dentally results in showing the commission of other crimes. Street /•. State, 7 Tex. App. 5 (1879) ; Com. v. Kobinson, 146 Mass. 571 (1888); State v. Palmer, 65 N. H. 216 (1889); R. v. Chasson, 16 New. Bruns. 546 (1876) ; Phillips i\ People, 57 Barb. 353 (1869). If evidence " tends to prove the crime alleged, it is not to be re- jected, though it also tends to prove the commission of other crimes, or to establish collateral facts." Com. v. Choate, 105 ^lass. 451 (1870); Com. v. Scott, 123 Mass. 222 (1877) ; Com. v. Corkin, 136 ^Fass. 429 (1884). The rule is well stated by the supreme court of Missouri in State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585 (1888). "Evidence of another crime is never admissible unless so connected with the one then being investigated as to show that the commission of the for- mer had something to do with the perpetration of the latter. Un- less the apparently collateral crime be brought into a common system, a system of mutually dependent crimes, or unless it be so linked to the crime under trial as to show that the former, though apparently an extraneous offence, is not so in reality, such evidence is not admissible." (2) TkACiN(j A Constant Causk. — A frequent and indeed the usual ground on which facts objectionable as res inter alios acfce are admitted to prove intent, knowledge, motive or other mental state is that a constant effect under various circumstances in which one cause alone (the mental state sought to be proved) remains constant strongly tends to show that the mental state is the impelling cause in the case under consideration. This naturally results from the fact that other hypotheses, perhaps at first equally tenable, are being con- stantly eliminated from the problem. If the case under considera- tion were alone subinitted to examination, it would be difficult (if not imjjossible) to establish to the required extent the proposition that one among the several possible causes disclosed by the evidence, was the one actually operative. Various other hypotheses would, in all probability, seem equally tenable upon the facts in evidence. Ijut as these facts are varied in other instances and as these instances are multiplied, if the same effect follows it will naturally be found that as instance after instance is added to the scope of the inquiry, one permissible hypothesis after another is being excluded ; — until only the mental state alleged remains as a constant cause. This HMiHJ ill •1; ■ "■. i' iiMli inil! B 'f^iili^ l\ 25721 AMKIMCAN NO'I-KS. [' •AUT II. line of reasoning is in frequent use in other fic-lds of incjuiry, and it is doiibtful vvliether tlie search for trutli on many issues involviiij,' the existence of a mental state can l)e profitably prosccMitcid in any other way. The same statement will be found to apply to many cases other than those involving the existence of a mental state. Where the effort is made to fix liability for a certain result uiuin one among several possible (iauses the same thing is true. Upon the evidence ill the case itself, the effort must fail, where other exculpating theo- ries are deducible from the facts. Among them the cause to whicdi liability is assigned may not stand out with sufficient prominence to sustain tlie onus of establishing the case. JtJx iificcfti^itatu ni, the pleader must proceed to show that in other instances, where different facts existed, the same result followed the presence of the cause for which liability is claimed. Any exculpatory hypothesis must now apply to all the cases, and these will be found to be few and faint ; — if, indeed, they exist at all. The process, sufficientjy continued, leads to mental certainty. For example, it is claimed that the plaintiff's horse, when opposite a pile of lumber, which the defendant town permitted to remain near the highway, shied violently, hy which damage occurred. The plaintiff''s claim is that the pile of lumber frightened the horse, and that permitting such a ])ile to remain was a defect in the highway, it may be claimed, in defence, tliat ot]u>r causes than those inherent in the aj)pearance of the pile of lumber, are responsible for the acci- dent. The time of day, the condition of the weather, the care and skill of the driver, the unsafe character of the horse; — these or other more or less possible causes of the accident may be so left upon the evidence of the particular occurrence as to render it doubt- ful to which of such causes the injury is fairly to be attributed. If. however, the plaintiff can go forward and show that at all times of the day, in many various conditions of the weather, with many drive' f>f varying degrees of skill and care, other horses, old and youu',-, kind and vicious, were affected in a substantially similar manner when brought in contact with the same pile of lumber, it is evident that new facts are being shown ; — of probative force great in pro])ortion as they exclude the oj)eration of causes other than the nature of the pile of lumber itself. It may fairly be alleged against this method of proof that it tends to a inultiiilicity of issues. liut this objection is purely a matter for the court, on a fair consideration of what may reasonably be expected to be gained by pursuing such inquiries. As the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts say : '• So far as the introduction of collateral issues goes, that objection is a purely practical one, a concession to the shortness of life. When the fact sought to be proved is very unlikrly to hiivc any otlier ('xjilaiiation tlnin the fact in issue, and if; i: m 1: I.HAI'. VI.] AMKUICAN NOTES. 25T2» may bo proved ot disproved without uii reasonably protracting tlio trial, there is no objection to going into it."' Keeve c. Dennett, 146 Mass. 23 (1887). Keeve v. Dennett (/<W supra) is im instance of the application of this rule. The issue was fraud in the sale of shares in a eoni- 2)any intended to encourage the use in dentistry of a compound dis- covered by the defendants called " Naboli." The plaintiff's claim was that this compound was worthless. In reply to this evidence, "the defendant put on a number of liis patients, who testified that the defendant's operations upon their teeth, using his invention, were practically painless, whereas similar operations before had been very painful." Held that this was competent: " If a dozen patients should testify that, when the defendant used his luiboli, he lilled tlieir teeth without hurting them, aiul that he hurt them a good deal when he did not use it ... it woidd go far towards proving that naboli had some tendency to deaden pain. Indeed, the same thing is true in a less degree, if the painful operations were by another hand. Filling teeth, however skilfully d()n(>, is generally unpleas- ant. If it is found to be wholly painless when a certain compound is used, as the witnesses testified, probably the compound is at least in ])art the cause." Ihitf. Where a horse was alleged to have been frightened by steam escaping from the defendant's mill, situated on the margin of the public highway, "witnesses for the jdaintiff were i»erniitted to tes- tify that, when travelling by the mill with horses wtdl broken and ordinarily safe, their horses were frightened by the escaping steam. This evidence was limited to a short tinu' before and after tlu; plaintiff's injury, wiicn tlic mill \v;is in the same condition as when she wa.; injured ; and was admitted for the sole purpose of showing the cai)acity of the escaping steam to frighten ordinary horses." Held, no error. '• We tliink tlie competency of the evi- dence rests upon tlie same principle; as evidence, in actions against railroad corporations for damage by fire, alleged to have been set by coals or sparks from a passing hjcomotive, that the same locomo- tive, or others similarly constructed and used, have emitted sparks and coals, and set tire at other places and on other occasions. It tends to show the capacity of the inanimate thing to do the mischief comidained of." Crocker i\ Mc(Jregor, 7(1 Me. 282 (1884). So in an a(!tion to re(!over for injuries caused by a defect in a liigh- way where the defence is that the plaintitT was driving at a very higli rate of speed, the capacity of the horse foi' going at that rate of speed may be shown by evidence of recent trials of his speed on a race-track. Whitney r. Leominster, 13() Mass. 25 (1883). , So in an action against a town for an injury caused by an alleged ' defect in the highway consisting of a i)ile of lumber by the side of the road likely to frighten horses, where the defence was that the iM 1 1 li 1 n , t mU '' 'B 1 ^ ^H ' ^^B |H|h| 1 25723 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'ART II. plaintiff's horse was vicious and unsafe, evidence is admissible that another horse on driving past this pile of lumber was also fright- ened by it. Darling f. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401 (1872). "In this case two primary questions arose, whether the lumber was likely to frighten horses, and whether it did frighten the plaintiff's horse. Was it of such a character, quality and condition, that it <jould, and probably or manifestly would, be an object of terror to horses in general, or horses of ordinary gentleness or of average skittishness ? That was one question. Was the plaintiff's horse frightened by it ? That was another and very different question. . . . No one doubts that the fright of the plaintiff's horse was compe- tent evidence on that question (whether the lumber was likely to frighten horses) ; and, ordinarily, where evidence of one experiment is admissible to show the character of i.:"r'"iate matter, evidence of two experiments of the same kind is not inadmissible. . . . What rule of law considers the fright of Mr. Darling's horse as impor- tant, and disregards the fright of Mr. Fletcher's horse as of no consecpience at all ? " Ibid. Jiailrmid C<(ses. — The nature of the questions raised by certain injuries caused by the operation of railroads makes a resort to the evidence of other occasions necessary, while the general regularity of operation and similarity of construction in machinery, &c., which may be presumed to exist under a common and highly systematized management make a resort to such evidence frequently productive of a highly j)robative effect. Thus with regard to fires alleged to be communicated by sparks from locomotive engines. In an action to recover damages to the plaintiff's mill from fire alleged to have been communicated by one of two locomotive en- gines of the defendant company, on June 7th, 1870, "the plaintiffs were allowed to prove . . . that at various times during the same summer before the fire occurred, some of the defendant's locomo- tives scattered fire when going past the mill and bridge, without showing that either of those which the plaintiffs claimed communi- cated the fire was among the number, and without sliowing that the locomotives were similar in their make, tlicir state of repair or management, to those claimed to liave caused the lire complained of." Held, no error. "Tlie question has often bi.'en considered by the courts in this country and in England ; and such evidence has, we think, been generally held admissible, as tending to prove the possibility, and a consequent probability, that some locomotive caused the fire, and as tending to sliow a negligent habit of the officers and agents of the railroad company." Grand Trunk R. R. V. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454 (1875); Koontz r. (). R, & X. Co., 20 Oreg. 3 (IH'.)O); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Stranahan, 79 Ta. St. 405 (1S75) ; Field lu N. V. Cen. R. R. .32 N. Y. 339 (1805) ; Cleavcliuid V. (}rand Trunk R. R. 42 Vt. 449 (1869). CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 2r)T-* So a ])l;iintiiT ran show that at intervals during a jjcriod of lour years {trior to tlie scttiui^ of tlie tire in (lucstion, coals dropped from the defemlant's locomotives had caused tires in the same [)lape and that such locomotives hademitted sparks of suthcient six.e to set iire to the plaintiff's property'. Longabaugh v. Virginia City. vS:e. Iv. Ji. 9 Nov. 271 (IS7-I). So the fact "that fires frequently occurred along the line of rail- way after the passing of the defendant's trains " is admissible. Ivobinson r. New JJrunswick 11. R. 2.'> New Uruns. 02;! (1S,S,'>). So evidence is competent, in a similar case, that trains frccpiently set fire to fences and grass at other places in the vicinity of plaintiff's prenuses during the same autumn. Kentucky Cen. R. R. i\ Barrow, 8i) Ky. (538 (181)0). So that within a week bei'ore the lire in question the engines of the defendant, in passing, had scat- tered large sparks which were capable of setting fires to combustible articles along the road, and that frequent fires, occasioned by such sparks, had been put out within that time. Annapolis, &c. R. R. r. Gantt, 3'J Md. lla (1873). " It is competent for the plaintiff to show the emission of sparks or ignited matter from other engines of the defendant, passing the spot upon otlier occasions, eitlier before or after the damage occurred for which the action is brought, without showing that they were under the charge of the same driver, or were of the same con- struction as the one occasioning the damage." The actual inquiries were limited to within a month of the fire. Diamond /•. Northern &c. R. R. () Mont. 580, o8G (1887) ; Hrighthope R. R. v. Rogers, 7G Va. 443 (1881). For similar reasons evidence is admissible "that engines had prior to the fire passed over the road under like conditions of wind, weather, iScc, irit/ioiit causing fires '" on an issue whether there was negligence in causing the fire in question. Atchison, &c. R. R. r. Stanford, 12 Ivans. 354 (1H74). In a Rhode Island case, evidence of both antecedent and subse- quent fires from sparks was held admissible under certain restric- tions. " We think there are two purposes for wliich su(di testimony may be admissible. Tlie fact that otlier fires have been communi- cated before, and especially if recently before, the occurrence of the fire in question, is a fact which should put the company on their guard and stimulate them to increased watchfulness, and therefore testimony relating to such fire might properly piiss to the jury, to enable the jury to judge whether, in view of their jirevious occur- rence, the com])any was, at the time of the tire in (juestion, in the exerc'^ie of reasonable care. For this pur|)ose, however, no testi- mony should pass to the jur}-^ relating to fires subsequent to the fire in question, for obviously no such fire could have ])ut the eomj)any on their guard against the fire in question. A second purjwse for If 25725 AMKKICAN NOTKS. [I'AItT i:. It which suoli testimony might be iulmissible is this, namely : to show the possibility of eommuiiicating lire by sparks from a locomotive, if any question were made npon that point, and, for this purpose, it would be immaterial whether the testimony related to fires of an earlier or later date than the tire in question. If, however, the pos- sibility were not questioned, and, especially, if it were admitted that the fire so originated, testimony relating to fires of a later date should be carefully excluded as being irrelevant, and as having a tendency to excite prejudice against the company." Smith u. Old Colony, &c. K. K. 10 R. I. 22 (1871). Where " the fatal fire has been set out from a designated engine, it is admissible to introduce evidence of other fires previously set out by the same engine but not by any other engine of the defen- dant company." Jacksonville, &c. II. 11. v. Peninsular Land, &c. Co., 27 Fla. 1, 104 (1891). "Former fires by the same engine arc admissible as evidence tending to prove its defective condition or construction, or improper management, and those put out by other engines are excluded because they are matters collateral to the issue and not evidence of the imperfect condition or bad manage- ment of the particular locomotive." Hud.- Ireland v. Cincinnati, &c. K. II. 79 Mich. 16;} (1890). So where the evidence placed responsibility for the fires on one of two' designated engines, fires set by other engines were excluded. "The evidence in this case was circumstantial, and it should not be extended to circumstances which could not have any logical bearing upon the issue. Tlie .syllogism that because other locomotives on this road caused other fires at other times in the vicinity, therefore these two locomotives, or one of them, which ])assed the place at this time, caused this particular fire, would be ;io more logical than that locomotives on some railway in another state, a thousand miles distant, caused fires in the vicinity of the railway, on account of insufficient manufacture or repair, or other negligence." Gibbons r. Wisconsin, &e. II. II. .-)8 Wise. ?,",5 (18.s;!). "The testimony tending to show that other fires were set about the same time by the same engine was competent." Haseltine c. Concord II. 11. ()4 X. H. 545 (1888) ; Stertz /■. Stewart, 74 Wise. KiO (1889). So of fires on the same day and trip. Lanning c. Chi(!ago, &c. R. R. 68 la. 502 (188(1); Slossen >-. R. It. (JO la. 215 (1882). Wliere the fire was (daimed to have been set by a designated engine, evidence that about the same time other engines had set fires along tlie defendant's road was excluded as collateral although it wiis in evidence that all the locomotives on the road used the .same kind of s]iark arresters, and that the designated engine "was a good, safe engine which was su])])lied with the most ii,])proved Hpark arrester." Coale v. Hannibal, &c. R. R. CO Mo. 227 (1875). i, 1 ■B 'u \\m^ ,! CHA1\ VI.] AMKinCAN NOTES. ■2r^T» The only autliority cited by the court in support of this proposi- tion is IJaltiniore, &e. K. R. t>. Woodruif, 4 Md. 242 (1853), whicli may be considered as overruled. It has been held that where the emitting of sparks must, accord- ing to the testimony, be due to a want of repair in the spark arresters or similar contrivances, it is the duty of the court, before admitting evidence of subsequent fires, to ascertain that the str;.te of repair of the engine is approximately the same on the two occa- sions. Collins c. N. Y. Central, &c. K. K. 109 X. Y. 243 (1888). So in New Ilampsliire, the qualification is made on the admissi- bility of evidence of other locomotive fires or sparks tliat the other engines were of the same construction, used in the same manner, and in the same state of repair. Boyce t'. Cheshire K. R. 43 X. H. G27 (18G2). Such evidence of other occasions is only admissible where it is necessary to rely on it for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff to prove his case. Where the issue is a simple question of fact to be settled by direct evidence, it is not admissible. Thus on an issue whether the defendant company had set fire to the plaintiff's wharf and lumber-yard by sparks emitted from the smokestack of a steamer, the screens being negligently left open, " evidence of the screens being open and the escape of sparks therefrom on other occasions and at other places than at the time and place iu question was inadmissible." Edwards v. Ottawa River Navigation Co., 39 Q. B. U. C. 264 (187G). So where the facts are capable of being shown to the jury such evidence will not be received. Thus where the question was whether the defendant railroad had left the highway to the plain- tiff's tavern in suitable condition evidence that " one or more per- sons had l)een upset in driving over the road in question," is not admissible. "The width of the road, the smootlniess of its surface, its elevations and depressions, the obstructions remaining thereon and their si/e and position, are all susceptible of exact admeasure- ment, and from these facts as disclosed with more or less of accuracy, it will be for the jury to determine how far and to what extent the condition of the road may have been the cause of injury to the party complaining." Hubbard r. And. &c. R. R. 39 Me. 50G (1855). CiiAUA('Ti:u EviDKVcK. — Au exclusionary rule characteristic of the English law of evidenc^e is that whi(!li, on the (piestion whether a person did or did not do a certain act, Avithholds from the consid- eration of the jury the fact that the i)erson alleged to have done or refrained from doing the act in (question was of a character such aa to make it probable that he did it or refrained from doing it. ISattlea ('. Laudenslager, 84 I'a. St. 44(> (1H77) ; Lander r-. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859); Sonic t^. Bruce, 07 iMe. 584 (1877); McCarty v. Leary, 118 Mass. 009 (1875); Jacobs v. Duke, 1 E. I). Smith, 271 (1851). I i . ■iJ.!'!. m- I S i i M I' 2o7 2- amp:i:icax notes. [l>AUT ir. Tims, in an action of assumpsit by a pliysician for services, wliere the (lel'endant offered evidence of the plaintiff's poor character as a physician, the evidence was held to have been properly excluded. '•Character was not put in issue by the nature of this action. . . . The plaintiff is entitled to compensation for his skill and labour whatever they might be." Jeffries v. Harris, 3 Hawkes, lO;") (1S24). In a civil action for assault and battery evidence of plaintiff's bad character and loose morals is not competent even on the question of damages. Bruce r. Priest, 5 All. 100 (18GL'). This evidence is not, as a rule, excluded because irrelevant. On the contrary, it is frequently probative in a high degree. Character evidence may, on the other hand, be properly rejected because irrele- vant. For example, where a witness had admitted on cross-examina- tion various acts of drunkenness, evidence of a general reputation for sobriety is irrelevant as " it would not have removed the imputa- tion which resulted from his testimony on the stand." I^IcCarty i: Leary, 118 Mass. 509 (ISTi)). So where a specific act of negligence is proved, " the (juestion whether it is actionable negligence is to be decided by the character of that act or omission, and not by the char- acter for care and caution that the defendant may sustain," and evi- dence of defendant's character as a careful man, is immaterial and irrelevant. Teuney r. Tuttle, 1 All. 185 (IHOI). All that is meant is that the ground for excluding evidence of character is not, primarily, that it is irrelevant. The reason for the rule is probably to be sought, in ])art, at least, in that rigor of the early Euglish criminal law code which naturally led to unusual and, perhaps, undue leniency in its administration. Ctvii. Cases. — In a civil action the rule is well settled that neither party is allowed to introduce evidence of good character. Even though the facts savor of criminality, the party affected does not have the option (as in criminal cases) to introduce evidence of his good character. Boardman r. Woodman, 47 X. IT. lliO (IHGO) ; "On principle, as well as authority, evidence of good reputation is not competent to show that one is not guilty of a dishonorable or unlawful act which is not punishable as a crime." Lamagdelaine V. Tremblay, 1G2 ^lass. 3.39 (1894). So in an action on a policy of insurance, where the defence is fraud, the plaintiff cannot set up evidence of good character. Fowler r. vEtna Fire Ins. Co., G Cowen, G73 (1827); "If such evidence is proi)er, then a person may screen himself from the punishment due to fraudulent conduct, till his character becomes bad. Such a rule of evidence would be extremely dangerous. Every man must be answerable for every improper act ; and the character of every trans- action must be ascertained by its own circumstances, and not by the character of the parties." Ibkl, Schmidt v. N. Y. &c. Ins. Co., 1 Grav. 529 (1854). But see Spears r. International Ins. Co.,1 Baxter, 370"(1H72). Imi I OlIAl'. VI.] AMEUICAN N()t;:s. 25728 So ill an action of debt, tlie plea of fraud does not put in issue tlie cliaracter of tlie plaintiff. No eviden(!e is admissible regai'din<,' it. Anderson /•. Long, 10 8. & II. ~}~> (IS'Jo) ; Dudley v. jNIcCluer, art ,Mo. L'4i (1S77). Even if tlie facts in an action of trespass amount to an einbozzlement, evidence of good cliaracter is incompetent. Wright V. McKee, 37 Vt. lOl {\HM). So on an action for bastardy, cliaracter evidence is inadmissible. Low V. ]Mitchell, 18 Mc. 371.' (1841). In a civil action for assault with a knife, the defendant offered evidence of his good character as a peaceable and orderly person. In attirming the rejection of the evidence the court say, after a full ex- amination of the authorities, that these authorities " assert two principles. (1) Tliat in civil suits evidence of the (diaracter of the parties, except where the character is directly in issue, is not admis- sible. (-) That putting character in issue is a technical expression, which does not mean simply that the character may be affected by the result, but that it is of particular importance in the suit itself, as the character of the plaintiff in an action of slander, or that of a woman in an action on the case for seduction. The remark of Professor Greenleaf, in his Treatise on Evidence, Vol. 1st, sect. o4, that 'gen- erally in actions of tort, wherever the defendant is charged with fraud from mere circumstances, evidence of his general good character is admissible to rejiel it,' is not sustained liy any authority which I can find, save Kuan ''. I'eiry, 3 Caines (120), and this is expressly over- ruled in IG Wend. (()4G) above referred to." Porter r. Seller, 23 Pa. St. 424 (lSr)4). Speaking of Ruau v. Perry (i(h! stipnC) the court of appeals say '• Tiiat case was long since overruled." Pratt r. An- drews, 4 y. Y. 493 (I80I). This view is concurred in by the court in Gregory *•. Chambers, 78 Mo. 2'.)4, 300 (1883), and Amer. Fire Ins. Co. i\ Hazen, 110 Pa. St. 530 (188.")). Put see Scott v. Fletcher, 1 Overton, 488 (1812), which follows I'uan v. Perry. Evidence of character is incompetent for tlie plaintiffs in an ju'tion on an insur- ance policy wliere tlie defenct^ set uji is that tlie plaintiffs burned their own mill. Amer. Fire Ins. Co. r. llazen, llo I'a. St. r)3(> (1880). So an action of tort for maliciously Imriiing the pliiinliff's barn does not jiut the defendant's character in issue, or enalile liim to in- troduce evidence of good character. Thayer v. l>oyle, 30 ]Me. 475 (1840). In an action for slander not imputing a crime, a defence of truth does not entitle the ]daintiif in rebuttal to put in evidence of his general good character. ^lattJKMvs r. Huntley, X. If. 14G (1838); IToughtaling v. Kilderhmise, 1 X. Y. 030 (1S48). The courts of Vermont admit such evidence in these cases of in- direct incrimination on the ground that the incriniinating evidence impeaches the character of the [daiiitiff as a witness ft)r veracity. n 'v\ ! ,1 ■nf'f .■ ■; HmHB^:!'il>il' B^Wf^!!"! ^Hiffii^ '!>''< ^^■■■Hh^ I'.cni if 5 :^ ill:;|i| H p. ■' t.,;' 1 1 i J 1 /■ j - ! ■ ■ V 1 it is P'l 1 iS L ^mU: ! »(!>! '•':•'■!: ■ 'iliir ' fi-i I'V ' :■ ,'i ■ Jn [^ll 2;') 729 AMKltlCAN NOTES. [PAKT ri. '• 'I'liat testimony tending to show that he liad sworn falsely upon a material matter then in issue and on trial, would have that tendency cannot be doubted." Mosley v. Vermont, &c. Ins. Co., 55 Vt. 14'2 (1SS2). In Alabama, the rule is laid down that unless character is in issue in a civil case evidence of reputation is incompetent ; but that if evidence of bad character is introduced tlie jiarty assailed may intro- duce evidence of good character. Goldsmith 0. l*icard, 27 Ala. 142 (1855). Ckiminal Casks. — In criminal cases, the defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of his good character, if he desires. Unless and until he avails himself of this option, the government can introduce no evidence that the prisoner's character is bad. Felsenthal v. State, 30 Tex. App. G75 (1892) ; State /•. ]\[errill, 2 Devereux, 2G9 (1829). When the prisoner opens the subject, the government is not only at . liberty to meet the defendant's evidence but to prove attlrmatively that the defendant has a bad character in relation to the trait in- volved in the inquiry. People v. White, 14 Wend. Ill (1835); People V. Fair, 43 Cal. 137 (1872) ; Com. v. Hardy, 2 Mass. 303 (1807). This disproof of the defendant's evidence of good character must follow the same limitations as the proof itself. Even when the accused has opened the issue of character, and the government attempts to rebut the evidence offered by tlie prisoner, " ordinarily such rebutting testimony must be confined to general reputation, and cannot be extended to particular acts." Ilolsey v. State, 24 Tex. App. .35 (1887). So after accused offers evidence of good character as a peaceable and quiet person, the government cannot show that he has been indicted for an assault. Com. *'. O'J^rien, 119 Mass. 342 (1875). Or has drawn his revolver on a cer- tain occasion. Olive v. State, 11 Xeb. 1, 27 (1881). By reason of th" fact that the legitimate [)robative effect of char- acter evidence lit-s in throwing a suspicion upon facts tending to show that a person of excellent moral character should have been guilty of the offence charged, courts have been led to rule that it was of comparatively little value in the case of serious offences. "There are cases of circumstantial evidence, where the testimony .adduced for and against a prisoner is nearly balanced, in which a good char- acter may be very important to a man's defenc(>. . . . I'ut where it is a question of great and atrocious criminality, the commission of the act is so unusual, so out of the ordinary course of things and beyond oominon ex[)erience; it is so manifest that the cffenee, if perpetrated, must have been influenced by motives not frequently operating ui)on the human mind • that evidence of character, and of a man's habitual conduct imder common circumstances, must be considered far inferior to wliat it is in the instance of accusations V I CHAP. VI.] AMEKICAN NOTES. ■Zoi 3) of a lower grade. Against facts strongly proved, good character cannot avail. . . . But still, even with regard to the higher crimes, testimony of good character, though of less avail, is competent evidence to the jury, and a species of evidence which the accused has a right to offer." Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 324 (ISoO). Following the same line uf thought, it has been ruled that " evi- dence of good character in relation to the particular crime charged, seems to be only admissible in cases where the guilt of the party accused is doubtful." MoDaniel v. State, 8 Sm. & M. 401 (1847); Bennett v. State, 8 Humph. 118 (1847) ; State v. Ford, o Strob. 517 n. (1849) ; Schaller v. State, 14 Mo. 502 (1851). Such, however, is not the prevailing rule in the United States. The ruling in Com. i<. AVebster {iibi siipni) has frecpienfly been repudiated as unsound, l^'or example, in Harrington v. State, 19 Ohio St. 204 (1809), a charge based on Com. v. Webster was held erroneous. The court say, " The weight that ought to be given to proof of good character does not depend upon the grade of the crime, but rather upon the cogency and force of the evidence tending to prove the charge, and the motives shown to exist for the commission of the crime by the accused. . . . The reasonable effect of proof of good character is to raise a presumption that the accused was not likely to have committed the crime 'ivith which he is charged. The force of this presumption depends upon the strength of the opposing evidence to produce conviction of the truth of the charge. If the evidence establishing the charge is of such a nature as not, upon principles of reason and good sense, to be overcome by the fact of good character, the latter will, of course, be unavailing and imma- terial. But the same will be true of any other fact or circumstance in evidence, which, after receiving its due weight, does not alter the conclusion to be drawn from the other evidence in the case. Good character is certainly no excuse for crime ; but it is a circumstance bearing indirectly on the question of the guilt of the accused, which the jury are to consider in ascertaining the truth of the charge." A ruling that evidence of character is adnussible only in a doubt- ful case, was held erroneous. '"In the laws of all civilized countries, under various aspects of the question, good character is recognized .as an element, ^ very potent element of defensive proof, going directly to tlie credibility of the accusing witness, to the intrinsic value of the inculpating testimony, to tlie probabilities of mistaking niemorv. of mistaken identity, of innocent motives in actions appar- ently (!ulpable and in many instances anu)unting in and of itself to a complete defe ice." U. S. v. Guniiell, 5 .Mackey, 100 (18S0). "Good ciiaracter is always to be considered. It will of itself sometimes create a doubt '•. iiere none could exist without it." People v. jNIo.'tt, 23 Ilun, 00 ( 1880). '• Evidence of good character is substantive and M Mil m'- II, ,ii .;! !f,: I 2o731 AMKKK'AN NOTKS. [I'AUT II. iiiiist 1)0 trciitetl as such; that it is not a iiiero makeweight ti) lie thrown in to determine the bahince in a doubtful ease, but that it may, ot itself, by the creation of a reasonable doubt, produee an acquittal." llanney v. Com. 11(> I'a. St. o2- (J8.S7). ''If upon the whole of the evidence iutroiluced, including that of the good char- actor of the defendant, the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he should be acqiutted." State v. Douglass, 44 Kans. G18 (18<)0). In Vermont, a ruling that evidence of the defendant's good char- acter "was received " as a kind of makeweight in his favor, if there is a pinch in the case," was held to erroneously impress the jury with the idea that the evidence was of no value except where the respon- dent was entitled to an acquittal without it. " Such evidence is not only useful in cases of doubt, but it is equally so, for the purpose of creating, geutu-ating doubts." State v. Daley, 53 Vt. 442, 440 (1881). " A long and honorable life must be worth something to a man when accused of a crime in cases other than those where the evidence, in- dei)endent of his good character, is doubtful or obscure." State v. I^orthrup, 48 la. 5S.'J (1878) ; Long v. State, 11 Fla. 295 (18(5(5). Of course, " If the evidence in this case had been so clear, and con- clusive as to satisfy the minds of the jury, and leave no doabc as to the guilt of the party, then character, however excellent, could not be considered." Ifjiif. In Alabama, where evidence of good general character for twenty years was introduced in favor of a person accused of murder, a ruling that '"'proof of good character, then, is not permitted to go to the jury for the purpose of shielding the defendants from the consequencies of their conduct, but simply as a circumstance to be considered l)y the jury, along with the other evidence in the case," and that if u])()U all the evidence the jury found the defendants guilty they were to say so "as firmly against a man of good character as of bad,'" was approved. Armor /;. State, (33 Ala. 173 (187!)). "In all criminal prosecutions, whether of felony or misdemeanor, the accused may prove his good character not only when a doubt exists on the other proof, but even to generate a doubt of his guilt. ... It does not shield from the consequences of a criminal act, proved to the satis- faction of the jury ; though it may raise a reasonable doubt of the act having been done with a ci'iminal intent." J//!i/. It abundantly appears from the foregoing eases that the theory on which evidence of good character is admitted in criminal cases on behalf of the accused is, that it renders improl)able the evidence tending to show that a man of good character has been guilty of an act involving moral turpitude. It necessarily follows that evidence of the accused's good reputation is of no importance where it can have no such effect. If the criminal act in question is the viola- tion of a municipal ordinance, town by-law, &c., where the act has CHAP. VI.] AMKKICA>: NOTES. no moral (quality, the reasons for ailniittiny cliaracter eviileno(! coa.'io to apply. So in an indictment for sellin<^ liqnor to a minor, evitlenet* of the defendant's good reputation for observing the conditions of liis license was held properly rejected. " This rule has little or no application to penal acts which have no moral ([uality, but aro merely mn/it jini/n'/nf<i. That one is of good reputation as an honest, [x-aee- able citizen has little tendency to show that he has not violated a statute or ordinance forbidding him to catch trout out of season, or to drive certain vehicles faster than a walk, o" requiring him to keep tlie sidewalks abutting on his premises free from snow and ice. Tiio sale of intoxicating lic^uor to minors is strictly forbidden by the statute, but it does not necessarily involve any moral turpitude." Com. V. Nagle, lo7 ^Fass. r>iH (18<).3). Failure to offer evidence of ehar.acter in a crimin; 1 case is a fact which nuiy be brought to the attention of the jury. State v. McAl- lister, 24 Me. 139 (1844). Hut this view lias been strenuously opposed as destructive of the defendant's privilege not to open the issue of cluiracter unless ho sees ht. Where the government attorney was allowed to comment on the fact tiiat the prisoner had oiferetl no evidence of character, the supreme court of Michigan held tliat it was " error of the gravest cliaracter. Xo presumption of guilt arises from the fact that a i)er- son, when on trial for a crime, fails to call witnesses in support of his good character. This is a privilege which the accused may avail himself of if he chooses. . . . No legal inference can arise from such omission tluit he is guilty of the offence charged, or that h.is char- acter is bad." J'eople v. Evans, 72 Mich. :Hu. .'ISL' (ISSS). Tiie same case holds that the error of permitting such an argument is not cured by an instruction to disregard it ; (piotiiig I'rom (^)uinn r. Peo- jile, 12,3 111. tf.Vi, the remarks of the court on the futility of a similar attempt on the part of the trial judge, ■• As well might one attemjjt to brush off with the hand a stain of ink from a piece of white linen. One, in the very nature of thinj:!, is just as impossible as the other." Tlie character of a defendant is to be established by repiitation before the difficulty iirose. He is not to be exposed to the injustiee of having the arising of the ditheulty assist in proving its truth. Wroe V. State, 20 Oh. St. iCA) (1S70). Evidence of character subseijuent to th(> doing of the act in ques- tion is rejected as ''irrelevant and inunaterial." Graham v. State, 20 Tex. App. 31 (1890); Carter v. Com. 2 Va. (Jases, 109 (1819). A different ride would expose tlie defendant to tlu; great danger of having his character ruined or badly damaged by the arts of a po])- ular or artful prosecutor stimulated to activity by the hope rif thus making his prosccutit)n successful." State v. Johnson, 1 Winsteil, (X. C.) lol (1803). I i iH?lt| 1 i m wm ri'l ' ' I lj ;, ■ hBB - ' - .. C^^B li ' 25733 AMKKICAN XOTKS. [r.VllT 11. (.JiiAKAf'TKK IN Tssi'E. Civii. Casks. — 'Plio vule by no iiioiiiis absolutely cxcludos ovitli'iiee of clianuttcr. It exoluilcs such evideuce merely UM evide'-.tiary that a person did 11 certain act because he was of a certain character. In many eases the existence of a pariicular "haractor is part of the substance of the issue. To such cases the rule has no applii'ation. There are many instances of the a])plication of this principle. For exain[)le. in instituting an action for the brcacih of a promise of marriage a female plaintiff places in issue her character for chastitj'. McCarty /•. CofHn, 157 Mass. 478 (1H'.)2); Van Storch v. Grithn, 77 Pa. St. ri04 (1S7;')). To the extent that damages are claimed for injury to reputation, any flaw in the reputation may be shown in mitigation of damages. Tiie witnesses of such a plaintiff may be asked on cross-examination "respecting tiie plainiiff's general badness of character" in mitiga- tion of damages. :\[cGregor r. :srcArthur, 5 C. P. U. C. 4').3 (18.")(;). So' the action for indecent assault puts in issue the plaintiff's character for chastity. IJinghain v. Pernard, ^6 Minn. 114 (188(5). In like manner, an action for seduction, being based on the previous existence of chastity in the woman, places such portion of cliaracter in issue. People t\ Knapp, 42 Mich. 207 (1879) ; M'Creary u. (Jrundy, 39 Q. P. U. C. 310 (1870). For the same reason, in a civil action for damages caused by a rape, the character for chastity of the plaintiff is in i?sue, and may be impeached by particular acts of misconduct. Voung r. Johnson, 123 X. Y. 226 (1890.) The fui- ther ruling in this case that good reputation for chastity is part of the plaintiff's original case, seems somewhat more doubtful, as a matter of princii)le. Evidence of plaintiff's bad character in these actions involving offences against chastity is admissible in mitigation of damages. M'Xutt r. Voung, 8 Leigh, 542 (1837). "Among the elements of damages is the injury to feelings and the injury to reputation. lUit both these injuries would be less in the case of a woman of bad rcjuita- tion tliiin in one of good." IWirnett r. Simi)kins, 24 111. 2()4 (1800). On tiie contrary, the Court (jf (^)ueen's lieneh of Upper Canada liave ruled that such evidence is inadmissible. Myers 0. Carrie, 22 Q. n. U. C. 470 (1803). On an action for libel or slander the character of the plaintiff is in issue. Peterson r. Morgan. 11(5 Mass. 350 (1874); Ilolley /•. Purgess. 9 .Via. 728 (1S4()) ; Cami)bell r. I'.annister. 79 Ky. 205 (1880); Podwell /•. Swan, 3 Pick. 370 (1825) ; Leonard v. Allen," 11 Cash. 211 (185;!); Sawyer r. Eifert, 2 Nott cS: McC. 511 (1820); Powers /•. Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227, 241 (1859); Paddock /•. Salisbury, 2 Cowen. 811 (1824). It is not necessary that the plaintiff shouhl rest content in relying on the presumption that his re[)utation was good at the time of the Ita Li. ! CIIAl'. VI.] AMKKIC'AN NOTICS. :2oT*» re I villi;' (iT tilt' alleged defaiiiation. TIo can introdupe aftirmative evidi'uco to that effect. Adams r. Linvsoii, 17 (iratt. 'Ji>0 (IHO?); Sliroyer /•. Miller, li \V. Va. lAH (ISC)*.)). So of a plaintiff in a civil action for rape as to her character lor chastity. Y'oung r. ilohnson, 123 N. V. -'L'6 (1S90). The plaintiff in an action of slander can certainly prove a good reputation when it is attacked, llolley r. lUirgess, 9 Ala. 72S (1S4()). For example, by evidence of rumors that the alleged slanderous statements were true. Inman /•. Foster, 8 Wend. 00- (\^32). But see Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn. 32o (1820), contra. Ill an action for malicious prosecution, evidence of the plaintiff's general bad character as a horse racter and gambler is admissible. '• It would certainly require less stringent proof to make out probable cause for prosecuting such a character for larceny, than one who maintained a good character, and followed an occupation for a liveli- iiood altogether lawful.'' ]\Iartin v. Hardesty, 27 Ala. 458 (185")); :\rark r. :Mer/, 53 111. App. 458 ''1893); ^Miller r. Brown, 3 -Mo. 94 (18;!2); Barron v. ^lason, 31 Yt. 1<S9(1858); Gregory v. Thomas, 2 Bibb, 286(1811). The plaintiff, on the other hand, may prove his good reputation as tending to establish his claim that there was no probable cause for the [irosecution. "To prove that the attack was originally nuuh; without probable cause, we think he should be permitted to show his good reimtation known to the defendant when the prosecution was commenced." ^Melntire r. Levering, 148 Mass. 540 (1889) ; Bostick r. liutherford, 4 Hawks, 83 (1825); Blizzard v. Hayes, 40 Ind. 1(!0 (J874); Woodworth r. .Mills, 01 Wis. 44 (1884); Israel i\ Jirooks, 2;', 111. 575 (1800) ; ]\Iiller r. Brown, 3 Mo. 94 (18.'i2) ; Rosenkrans r. Barker, 115 111. 331 (1885). Evidence of plaintitt"'s bad reputatior. is admissible in malicious prosecution in reduction of damages. O'lirien r. Frasier, 47 X.J. L. 349 (1885); Bacon r. Towne, 4 Ciisli. 217 (1849); Fitzgibbon r. Brown, 43 .Me. 109 (1857); Gregory /•. Chambers, 78 ]\Io. 294 (1883), which cites with disapproval the statement in 1 Greenleaf Evidence, § 55, to the effect that character evidence "is not permissible 'in trespass on the case for malicious prosecution.' The single authority cited by him in support of the text is Gregory v. Thomas, 2 I'dbb, 280. With great respect I sub- mit that the case is no sujiport for the text. . . . The trial court had, under the special jdea, admitted evidence of other jiarticular charges of thefts, &c. imputed to the ])laintiff. That was held to be error. But the court expressly say : ' We think the court ought not to have permitted the inquiry to have extended further than to the ]>hiintift''s general character.' It is, therefore, an express authority lor impeaching the general character." (Jregory v. Chambers, 78 :\Io. 294 (1883) ; Ilosenkrans /•. Barker, 115 111. 331 (1885). A defendant has been permitted to show, in mitigation of damages, that the defendant's char-icter was bpjl after the prosecution, ff the ;H! M ( f * 2.')!^ AMKUIOAN NOTKS. [l'.\i;r I!. prosecution itself oiuised the bad re])utntion, (l:iiiKHj:es should Iji' enliauoed. IJostick /•. Ivutherford, 4 IlawUs, S.'J (l.SL'r>). Ill iiii action ai,'aiiist a master for kccpiiig an iiiconipetent servant, traits of eliaracter sliowiiij^ inuoiii])eteiioy are in issue. East (.inr, \c. 11. U. /•. Seott, OS Tex. ()'.)4 (ISST) ; Krazicr i\ I'eiinsylvaiiia K. I!., 3« Pa. St. 104 (KSCO). So in an aetion for false imprisonment, evidence as to the plaintiffs (diaraeter lias been admitted, and evidence of specific acts of iiiis- condiict rejected. Wolf v. J'errynuiii, H2 Tex. Ill' (18'.)1). Where the issue involves the existence of due care on the part of the ])laintiff, evidence of his general character in the particular involved is not admissible. The ([iiestion is to be "decided by the character of the act nr omission, and not liy the character for care tliat the defendant nuiy sustain.'' McDonald v. Savoy, 110 3Iass. 41) (1872). Such evidence of reputation for due care is not admissible; — cer- tainlv where the facts have been observed by eye-witnesses. So. Kaus. H. K. Co. v. Kobbins, 4;? Kans. 14;") (IHDO)." Ill a civil case, wliat portion of a party's entire character may be made the subject of evidence is determined by the pleadings or the nature of the investigation. So in an action for slander in alleging that the plaintiff set lire to a schoolliouse, tlu^ defendant in reduction of damages was permitted to introduce evidence of tlui plaintiffs bad reputation either for integrity and moral worth or in regard to condu(!t similar to that charged in the slander. Leonard /•. Allen, 11 Cash. 1>41 (1853). Ckimixal Cases. — The rule excluding character evidence in criminal cases until the defendant opens the issue applies only to the character of the defendant, it may be of the substance of the issue for the government to establish the character of some person other than the accused ; a-iC ;t may be equally open to the defendant to disprove smdi a character or make its existence doubtful. For exain})le. on an indictment for carnal knowledge of a girl under sixteen " theri'tnl'ore chaste.'' the girl's character for chastity is in issue, and evidence is coinpetent to prove it. People r. Mills, 94 Mich. ().'J'.) (18!).'!). So on an indictuient for rape, evidence is admissil)le of the eliaracter of the jirosecutrix for chastity. "The witness must b(> able to state what is generally said of the ])ers()n by tliose among whom he dwcdls, or with whom he is chiefly con- versant, for it is this only that constitutes general rejmtation or character." Conkey r. People, 1 Abb. (Jt. of App. Dec. 418 (1860) ; O'Blenis r. State, 47 N. J. Law, 279 (1885). So in an indictment for indecent assault, the accused may show that the reputation of the woman for chastity is bad. Com. r. Ken- dall, 113 ]\rass. 210 (1873). So on an indictment of an attempt to commit rape. Camp v. State, 1 1"-' ' ( IIAl". VI. J AMKKICAN NOTKS. 'J")-*' .'! Kelly, 417 (1H47). On uii iiulicttment for rapo the cliiiractcr for cliastitv of tlu! prospoiitiiig witness is in issue. Kvidenco of partic- iihir acts of niiscondiict, suttioiently nuniorous to bo kaldtttiiU lias Ir'cu aduiittud. Tims in a Mow \\n\\ case;, nunu'rous witnesses wore allowed to testify that tlic woman had been "in the habit of reoeiv- iiiL;- men tiiere lor the purpose of promise.uous intercourse." it seems jirohable that tlie evidence was really received as cireumstantially establishing the fact that the woman was a prostitute — " proof more satisfactory than that of a bad general reputation for chastity." Woods c. People, bo 'S. Y. 515 (1874). Especially as bearing on the probability of consent, single acts of sexual misconduct have been admitted, in indictments for rape. In Vermont, on such an indictment, a single prior act of illicit sexual intercourse with a person other than the prisoner was admitted, on cross-examination of the woman. As compared with general reputiv- tion for chastity, the court say, that " The testimony here offered has piacti(rally the same tendency, thoutrh inferior in force and conclu- siveness." Stati! /•. Keed, 39 Vt. 4i.i ^1807). So that the complain- ant had been delivered of a bastard child. State /•. Murray, G3 X. C. ;!1 (1808); State r. Jefferson, (> I red. Eq. 305 (1840). In Illinois the right to i)rove character by specified acts of incontinence as distinguished from evidence of general reputation for chastity has been denied, though such evidence was admitted for another pur- pose. Shirwiu v. People, 09 111. 55 (187.")). So on an indictment for adultery, the evidence of the complainant may be met by evidence of prior acts of undue intimacy with other men. U. S. v. JJredemeyer, () rtah, 143 (1889). So on an indictment for murder, to aid a plea of self-defence the prisoner may ])rove that the general character of the deceased in the neighborhood where lie lived " was that of a turbulent, bloodthirsty, and violent man." Williams r. State, 74 Ala. 18 (1883) ; Thomas v. Peoide, G7 N. Y. 218 (1870). WiTNKss. — The character of a witness for truth and veracity may be said always to be in issue. It may be impeached by evidence directed to that point. Evansich r. It. K., 01 Tex. 24 (1884). The rule applies to the attesting witness to a will. Chamberlain v. Torrance, 14 Grant's Chan. Kep. 181 (1808). And to the defendant when offering himself as a witness. McDonald r. Com., 80 Ky. 10 (1887). Such evidence is confined to character for truth and veracity. Moreland v. Lawrence, 23 ]\Iinn. 84 (1870) ; Shaw r. Emery, 42 Me. 59 (1850). A party cannot, in the first instance, sustain himself or other witnesses by proving their good character for truth and veracity until these qualities are directly impeached. A mere conflict of evidence is not sufficient, although of such a nature as to raine a \ f 1 ' ' 1'l. ' i 1 25737 A.MKIMCAN N(»Ti:s. [I'AKT il. strong presumption that one side or the other is testifying falsely. Morgan /•. State, 88 Ala. L'L*3 ( 1889). As is said in People v. liusli, (>5 Cal. 1U9 (1884), "Where witnesses contradiet each other, tiic character of tlie one is as much impeached as that of the other." Prnitt I'. Cox, 21 Ind. 15 (18().'5); Vance /•. Vance, li Mete. (Ky.) o8i (1869); Saussy v. R. H., 1.'2 Fla. 327 (188()); Tedens v. .Sehumers, 112 111. 2(53 (1884) ; Sweet r. Sherman, 21 Vt. 23 (1848) ; Stamper /■. Griffin, 12 Ga. 450 (1853). A similar rule obtains where the contradiction is not between different witnesses, but where evidence is introduced of contradic- tory statements of the same witness. By the weight of authority, it is not competent for the party offering the witness thus discredited to sustain him by proof of his good general character. Frost r. Ma- Cargar, 29 Barb. G17 (1859); Chapman /•. Cooley, 12 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 054 (1860); State <: Archer, 73 Iowa, 320 (18S7) ; lirowu v. Mooers, G Gray, 451 (1856) ; Stamper v. Griffin, 12 Ga. 450 (1853). Many of the earlier cases, relying largely upon 1 Greenl. Ev, § Hi'.}, which " is not sustained by the case the author cites of Hex /•. Clarke, 2 Stark, li. 241, and is not law " [Brown r. !Mooers, 6 Gray, 451 (1850)], have adopted the opposite view, /, i'., that under such circumstances, sustaining evidence of good general character is competent. Burrell /-.State, 18 Tex. 713 (1857); Sweet v. Sher- man, 21 Vt. 2.". (1848) ; Hadjo /•. (iooden, 13 Ala. 718 (1848); Hairis r. State, 30 liid. 1.31 (1808). And see also Cluunberlaiii i<. Torrence, 14 Grant's Ch. Kep. ISl (1808), where it is said tiiat as soon as any doubt is thrown on the execution of a dcM'd, the person offering it may give evidence of the good character of the subscribing witness. 1'ko(»k ok C!ii.\K.V("ri:u (Jknkram-v. — The proof of character is by [)ro()f of gener;il reputation in the community where tlie jjcrsdii resi(h)s. As the Suprtfuie Court of Alabama say. it '• is the (;nly mode in which chara(!ter can be exhibited to us." Jones v. State. 70 Ala. 8 (1884); Bodwell r. Swan, '5 Tick. 370 (1S25). '• It is not competent to show \^'hat two or three ])ersons only may think or say concerning the witness, but the intjiiiry must be coniined to the general estimation in which he is held by his neighbors and acquaintances." .Matthewsoii c. Burr. 6 Xeb. 312 (1877). "It is a gtMieral rale that j)articidar acts are not a<lmissible to sustain an attack u|i(in cliaracter." McCarthy r. Collin, 157 Mass. 47s (1S92). So in an action for a breach of jiromisi' of marriage "an intimacy with several dill'eifnt men " cannot be jtroved. //'/(/. In an action for slandering the plaintiff by accusing her of unchastity. evidvncc is incomiictcnt that others maih' similar remarks. " Neither can the character of plaintiff for chastity be assailed by this class of testimony. Nothing but general reputation is allowable for such a purjiose. It cannot be attacked by proof of particular acts or CHAP. VI.] .\MKRICA\ NOTKS. :>5T-» particular suspicion.s." Troctor v. llouglitaliiig, .">7 Mich. -II (liSTT); Jones V. State, 76 Ala. 8 (18.S4). " Particular facts are not admissible to prove the reputation of a party or witness to be either good or bad, for the reasons that they do not necessarily tend to establish a general character ; that tliey con- fuse the jury by raising collateral issues, and especially that a party is presumed to be ready to defend his own general reputation or tliat of his witnesses, but not to meet specific charges against either without notice." Nixon v. McKinney, 105 M. C. 23 (1890) ; People if. Wliite, 14 Wend. Ill (1835); Campbell r. liannister, 79 Ky. 20r> (1880) ; Kearney v. State, 08 Miss. 233 (1890). Though a defendant in an action of slander may show that t]w |)laintitt"s character was bad as to the offence charged at tlie tinui of tlie alleged speaking of the words, he cannot show it by rumors current in the community. Such evidence is objectionable as a surprise on tlie plaintiff, " and besides proof of false rumors alono must of necessity be by hearsay evidence in its most objectionable form." reter.son v. ^Morgan, 116 Mass. 350 (1874); Holloy ,•■ iiurgess, 9 Ala. 728 (1846). In an action for malicious prosecution, the defendant can introduce evidence of plaintiff's bad reputation in reduction of danuiges, or as affording probable cause for the prosecution, but he cannot prove individiuil acts of misconduct. So ])articular rumors are to be rejected. Towers v. Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227. 241 (1859). And what a iii'uiiiritji of his neighbors say is not competent, though precisely why not, if tlie evidence is offered in mitigation of damages, is not appiirent. IhUI. It is not jjermitted in sucli a case to show tiiat tlie jilaintiff was seen on tlu; street in bad com])any, at all liours of the niglit, swearing louder tiian otlierboys. 'Mifiieral reputation, when thus placed in issue may be supported by the party thus attacked by calling witnesses to prove tlie contrar}' of the stateiiKMits of witnesses by which his reputation is attacked. It would be (juite ditlicult to see what proof could liave been made to reliiit the impression created in the minds of tlie jury by tlii.s testimony." Dorscy r. Clapp. 22 Neb. 564 (1887). Evidence tend- i':g to show disiionesty has, however, been admitted, tiiough not apparently against objection, as bearing on the (piestion of reason- al)le cause for suing out a searcli warratit. In siicli case tiie party sought to be impcaclied may give rvidrnce of his general character. Mark /•. Merz, 5.3 111. App. 45S (1893). The fact that no reputation exists on the jiarticiilar aspect of cliar- acter is competent evidence. " Such evidence is often of i\w strongest description, as when' a character for truth is in issue, that among those acquainttul witli tiie party, it has never been iHicstioned, and so, as to character for peace and (piietness. that among those with whom the party associates, no instance has been 2.37=i9 AMKinCAN NOTKS. [I'AKT JI. known or lieard of. in which lio has been engaged in a quarrel."' Cianilolfo r. State, 11 Oh. St. 114 (18G0J ; Freneh r. Sale, (>3 Miss. ;!SG (1.S85) ; 15oon i\ Weathered's Adm. 23 Tex. 075 (1859) ; Uinghani /•. Bernard, 3G Minn. 114 (188()) ; Davis /•. Franke, 33 Gratt. 413 (ISSO). The evidence as to the defendant's character in a criminal case nuist be relevant to the offence with which he is charged, /.*•., directed to the particular mental or moral attributes involved in tlie accusation, otnerwise the evidence is witliout logical forf'e. On an indictment for felonious assault, evidence of reputation as a law-abiding citizen is inadmissible. "The law limits the inquiry in sueii eases to liis general character as to the trait in issue." State r. King, 78 Mo. oof) (1883). On the other hand, by a paritj' of reasoning, on an indictment for assault with intent to kill, evidence of character for truth and veracity is incompetent. Morgan r. State, 88 Ala. 223 (188!)). On an indictment for murder of a man by his mistress, no evidence of the prisoner's bad reputation for chastity is admissible, " inas- mucli as it involves a trait of character not in the slightest degree involved in the alleged commission of tiie crime with which she stood charged.' People (;. Fair, 43 Cal. 137 (1872). But it has been held that on an indictment for rape, the defendant may offer evidence tending to show that he is of a good moral character. State i\ Knapp, 4") X. ][. 148 (18()3). On an indictment for larceny evidence of general moral character is incompetent. " General character is shown by general reputation, and not by tlie particular facts of one's life; but the general reputa- tion may well be confined to the particular traits of character that are supjiosed to render, to some extent, the commission of the crime charged improbable." State v. Bloom, 08 Ind. ~}4 (1870). Si'KCIFir A< TS. — AVllKX Al>MISSIIJI,K. — CUOSS-KXAMIXATION. — Tlie exceptions to tlie rule thatcliaracter must be jiroved by evidence of general reputation are neitlier numerous nor iinporta 1^. In attempting to weaken the force of evidence of tiie defendant s good character in a criminal case, the witnesses in his favor may be asked in cross-examination as to specific instances of misconduct involving tlif existence of the trait of character in (piestion. " Ft has been thought useful and favorable to the elucidation of truth in such cases to allow on cross-examination an inquiry as to particulars in the charges and also in reference to the jiersons who made them, or gave their opinion as to the character of tlie individual impeached." Leonard r. Allen. II Cush. 241 (ISo.S); Sawver r. Frbert, 2 Xott & McC. oil (1820) ; H(dnies r. State, 88 Ala. 2{\ (188!)). Wliere on an iiidietment for rape witnesses for the defendimt testified to his good character for morality, as wtdl as ch.astity. "on cross-examination, the State was properly allowed to test their accu- CHAl'. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 2o7'»" rucy by inquiries as to liis reputation for selling liquor in violation of the law ; for the court surely cannot say tliat such acts are not immoral." State r. Kuapp, 45 N. ]J. 148, 157 (18(53). So on an indictment for murder, where a government witness had testitied that the reputation of the deceased as a peaceable man was good, the defendant is entitled to inquire, upon cross-examination, whether he had not heard of certain enumerated acts of violence done by the deceased. De Arman r. State, 71 Ala. 351 (1882). As the defence was that the killing was in self-defence, the evidence offered was probably admissible on other grounds. A witness to good character of a deceased person may state in cross-examination "that he did not think tliat he jKissessed that higli character the latter part of his life." Nixon c. McKinney, 105 N. C. -'3 (1890). Evidence of hearsay of specific acts has been admitted in cross- examination of a witness to the defendant's character. For example, on an indictment for murder, a witness testifying to the defendant's character may state that he " had heard for the last few years that defendant had frequent difficulties with, and struck liis wife." Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 71 (1889). Rkputation is Cuauactkk. — It may well be doubted whether in selecting reputation in the community as the sole permissible proof of character the law uses the only rational means of proof, or even the best. Th^ effort is to prove the existence or non-existence of a mental attribute by circumstiintial evidence. The probative success of such an effort rests on a presumption of fact that when a man has a trait of character his neighbors know of it, and suffi- ciently discuss it to establish a reputaticm as to its existence. Experi- ence liardly seems sufficiently uniform to lend much weight to such a ])resumption. Ability to conceal real diaracter is an essential element in the commission of many offences, and dissinudation is sufficiently common to make good standing in a community by no moans a reliable, nnudi le:is a necessary test, of actual character and disposition. On the other liand, suspicion, gossip, unpopularity; — tlu'se and other misfortunes may place a really fair character at great disadvantage when tested by its reputation. A partial explanation of the limitation is found in the historical origin of this species of evidence. Historically considered, it is a final remnant of compurga- tion, a fact which naturally explains the test of reputation in the community. Starkie, Evid. (*7()) n. h. While, under any circumstances, the existence of a certain repu- tation or the absence of any reimtation concerning a particular trait of character is a (iircumstance of probiitive value, other (at present jjrohibited) methods of proving the existence of such traits seem at least of ecjual value. Character is a mental or jjsychical condition, The usual proof of I i: it'll U|. HH \ t i ' ! 1 1 I I'l m I'l',' ' 'i' m\ m\\ 257" AMEIUCAN NOTKS. [I'AIiT I!. sucli conditions is by proof of acts or statpinents whicli juc tiicii- natural expression. That a multiplicity of issues might be tlnis raised has not sufficed to offset the admitted benefit of receiving tliis class of evidence in otlier cases requiring proof of a mental state. The difficulties do not seem greater in the case of evidence of character. As a genera) rule, such evidence of sjiecific acts is not admissible. Thus on an action for furnishing a careless conductor, the supreme court of Pennsylvania say: "Character for care, skill, and trutli of witnesses, parties or otliers, must all alike be proved by evidence (>f general reputat'nn, and not of special acts. . . • Ciiaracter grows out of special a. i, but is not proved by them. Indeed, special acts do very oftev indicate frailties or vices that are altogether contrary to the ciiaracter actually established. And sometimes the very frail- ties that may be proved against a man, may have been regarded by him in so serious a light, as to have produced great improvement of character. IJesides this, ordinary care implies occasional acts of carelessness, for all men are f; ible in tiiis respect, and the lav\" demands only the ordinary.'' Frazier v. Pennsylvania K. II. .'iS I'a. St. 104 (1800) ; Nixon r. ^FcKenney, 105 N. (J. 33 (IS'.K)). So in an action against an employer for furnishing an incompetent foreman, specific acts of carelessness are incompetent. Ilatt v. Nay, 144 ]\lass. 186 (1887). In several cases, however, such evidence has been i-eceived, appar- ently without objection. On an indictment for murder a witness to the defendant's ciiar- acter was allowed to testify " He is the most {piiet, peaceable bov I ' .'er saw or liad. ... If I spoke roughly to him, it would bring tears to his eyes, Imt no retort. ... I never knew him to give an uncivil word to any of them." (randolfo v. State, 11 Oh. St. 114 (ISOD). "Those acquainted with tlie party, — with tlie ordinary course and conduct of his life, would know how far and U> what extent he had exhibited or failed to exiiibit the (piality or trait."' r/>!,/. In an action against a town for a defect in a highway tlie defonce was that the driver, the i)laiiitifl"s husband, was fast and careless. Plaintiif was then allowed to testify to his careful driving on several other oc(!asi<)ns. "The evidence was relevant to tlie (|ucstion of tiie husband's character for driving safely or otherwise."' I'lummer /•. Ossii)ee, 51) N. H. 55 (1S79). In th(! case of lower animals, ciiaracter, when material, may be ])rovcd by s]»ccilii'. acts of conduct embodying the trait in question. ( Ml an issue whether a certain liorse was gentle, evidence of both prior and subsequent conduct on the part of the animal is competent. Turnpike Co. v. Ilearn. 87 Tcnn. L'iM ^888), citing with approval Todd /•. Kowley, S All. 51 (18G4), where, tiie character of a horse f- CHA]'. VI.] AMERICAN NOTKS. 2o7« being in issue, under similar circunistiincL'S, the court say: "The liabit of an animal is in its nature a eontiuuous fact, to be sliown by proOi. of successive acts of a similar kind."' To the same effect, also in a highway accident case, see Chamberlain /•. Entield, 4.'5 X. II. ooC) (18G1). So in an action against the proprietors of a stage line in providing vicious horses, causing injury to the plaintiff. " The vicious habits of a horse can only be proved by instances. . . . That he had this habit might be proved by instances before and after the accident in question." Kennon v. Gilmer, 5 ]\lont. 257 (1885) ; Lynch <•. Moore, 154 IVIass. 3o5 (1891). Traits of character even of inferior animals, f. y. a horse, may, it has been said, also be jjroved by general reputation, .^'ormsdorf /•. Detroit &c. Railway, 75 Mich. 472 (1889). On the contrary, the supreme court of New Hampshire, in allow- ing the character of a horse to be shown by specific acts, state that they are not ''aware of any ; ithority that would allow evidence of general reputation. The ^<ise does not stand like the character of a person for truth, for then it may well be presumed that it cannot be bad without being known to the public, but it may be otherwise in respect to the vicious propensities of the horse." "Whit- tier r. Franklin, 4G X. H. 23 (1805). AVhere the question relates to the existence of a hahlt, it would seem that, on |)rinciple, repeated acts calculated to show its exist- ence ".re comi)etent. The range of these acts is largely discretionary with the court. They may be "so remote in time or so insignificant in character, as to turinsh no aid in deciding the fact to be found." Com. /•. liyan, i;54 Mass. 22.'5 (18S3) ; Com. v. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472 (1881). Again, n]ion principle, a further method of proving character would bt tiuit those accpiainted with the person a particular aspect of whose character is involved, should testify what, in their opinion, was the character of the person, based on their observation. Such evidence is received as to the existence, on a particular occasion, of anger, fright, insanity, v.:A other mental states. It is difficult to assign a satisfactory reison why, for exanijile, a character of prone- ness to the exhibition o'.' these same mental (jualities should not be proved in the same or a s'luilar way. Such evidence of chavacter by the opinion of the witness has occasionally been ro('eiv(i\ (^n an indictment for rape a witness was allowed to state that •. /lis opinion the chu.acter for chastity of the i)rosecuting witness was good. Conkey v. I'eople, 1 Abb. Ct. of A))p. Dee. 41 8' (1 800). But tlie rule is well est.iblished that the only proper proof of charactei is by evidence of reputation. Til Mississippi, on an in'U;!tment for murder, counsel for the l)risoner wen; not allowed to ask for the prisoner's general ohar- ' li I '■ m 'I'l: \W 'II ,1^1' 1 ; 4m ' i 1 257*3 AMEUICAN NOTES. [part II. iicter ''for peace or violence" as a preliminary for asking whether from the witness's knowledge of that character he " regarded him as a man of violent or i)eaceful character." The court thought the second question was correct, but required the counsel to first inquire as to the '• general character of the accused." McDauiel v. State, 8 S. «fc M. 401 (1847). On an indictment for murder in procuring an abortion, a physician cannot be asked, in reference to certain testimony, "if, on that testi- mony, you would lose faith in the character of any person whose character had heretofore been high in your estimation." Beasley i-. People, 89 111. 571 (1878). So, on an indictment for murder, where a witness was asked, con- cerning the defendant, " What is his character for -peace and quiet- ness. . . . By character I mean what the man is, not what people say about liim," the question was held rightly excluded. " If the question ' What the man is ? ' was intended to . . . require from the witness his opinion farmed from sources not common to those acquainted with the party, and having no reference to the general character as shown by his ordinary course and conduct, we do not think that the rule has ever been carried so far." Gandolfo v. State, 11 Oh. St. 114 (1860). In a suit for damages caused by an incom- petent engineer, to show incompetence, the opinion of an expert engineer who had had no previous acquaintance with the engineer as to whose competence he was testifying was offered. The evidence was held properly rejected. " Incompetency cannot be thus estab- lished." East Line &c. K. R. v. Scott, 68 Tex. 694 (1887). Such opinion as to tiie existence of traits of character cannot be said to be excluded because such evidence would not be relevant. The reason assigned is that the rule is otherwise. Of course, in certain cases where the mode of use of an inarimate object is involved, such evidence of opinion would be simply irrelevant. For example, the character of a house in which a ceitaiii assault was committed is not a matter for evidence of opinion. People v. Lock Wing, 61 Cal. 380 (1882). But the character of a house as being a '•lewd house" must be proved by its reputatifjn. Hogan v. State, 76 Ga. 8L' (1885). Community Dkfixed. — The question has naturally arisen in cases where the person whose eharacter is in issue has ^ accessively resided in several communities, which community was entitled to speak on the subject of his character. Is it the community where he last resided, where he longest resided, or where ho now resides ? The question has received a very sensible answer. Inquiry may be directed to reputation in anj' community where the party in question has resided for a sufficient length of time to .acquire a reputation for the ]>articular trait involved ; provided, the time is surticiently near to the time wliei. the fact is important, to have an CHAl*. VI.] AMKIMCAN NOTKS. 257^* appreciable probative effect. The question of remoteness is a pre- liminary matter of fact for determination in the discretion of the court. In the absence of sui'prise, the exercise of this discretion will not be reviewed '• unless the circumstances of the case show a gross abuse of this discretion." Snow i'. Grace, 29 Ark. 131, 141 (1874). In this discretion, evidence of rci)utation seven or eight years prior to the trial has been received. Graham v. Chrystal, 2 Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. 263 (ISG.j). In Holsey v. State 24 Tex. App. 35 (1887) it was held that the reputation of a witness can be proved either '• in the community of his residence or where he is best known." " The general reputation of a witness among his neighbors is the only legitimate subject of inquiry. . . . Neighbors are those who dwell near each other ; and he who would testify as to the general reputation of a witness must be able to state what is generally said of the person by those among whom he dwells, or with whom he is chiefly conversant." Wadding- ham V. Hulett, 92 ]\Io. 528 (1887). So evidence offered of the reputation of the ap2)ellant as a witness for truth and veracity in the county of Johnson, where he had lived until four years before, was admitted. " The law does not presume that a person of mature age, whose reputation has been notoriously bad to within a period such as intervened between the time the appellant i-esided in Johnson County and the time when the witness testified, has so reformed as to have acquired a different rei)uta- tion. The evidence offered may not have been entitled to so much weight as if it had related to his reputation in the community in which he lived at the time the testimony was given . . . and was subject to be rebutted by evidence showing a different reputation at the time of the trial in the (iomniunity in which he resided." Mynatt r. Hudson, GO Tex. 00 (1886). The character of a witness may be impeached by persons in whose neighborhood he had lived until four years prior to the trial, though he had then removed to iinother place fourteen miles from that neighborhood, where he had since resided, and tlio witnesses did not know the character which he bore at tin; hitter i)lace. " There is a strong probability that one, wiiose general character was bail four years siiu-e, is still of doubtful or disparaged fame. So macii, at least, may be asserted, witliout evincing the feeling of a misanthropist or any unseemly lack of charity." Sleeper r. Van .""idilles worth, 4 Denio, 431 (1817). So it has been held that reputation in a jilace where a witness had lived two years before was admissible for ])ur])oses of impeachment. Kelly V. State, 01 Ala. 19 (1878) ; Louisvilh> \-e. K. I{. v. Itichardson, 00 Tnd. 4.". (1879). So the inmates of a jjrison can testify to the repu- tation of a deceased person as quarrelsome and vindictive in the community when* they became acquainted with it, i.e., in the prison Itself. Thomas r. People, 07 X. Y. 218 ( 1870). So where a witness MM •!! i 11 mi li<m- ! inn, I,''' [m ''I 2bV^ 45 AMKiaCAN NOTES. [PAKT II. a few months i)i'ior to the trial liad removed to a now place of residenee, where he had not lived long enough to aetjuire a reputation, evidence of reputation at his former residence was admitted. Tape /•. Wright, 11(5 Ind. aOL' (1888) ; Coates v. Suhui, 4G Kan. 341 (18'J1). So evidence of the rei)Utation of a witness two years prior at another place is competent. Lawson r. State, ',i'2 Ark. 1.'20 (1877). "General reputation at a former ])eriod and in another neighborhood may or nuiy not tend to prove tliat issue, according to the remoteness of the time and place, and other circum- stances. Ordinarily these will affect the weight, but not the compe- tency of the matter." IJrown v. Luehr.s, 1 HI. App. 74 (1877). Two or tiiree years are not too remote. State v. Lanier, 79 N. C. G22 (1878). On the contrary, where a witness had resi;1ed for the last five years in his present residence "and there was abundant evidence as to his reputation," it was held incompetent to inquire as to his character for truth and veracity at the place of former residence. State r. I'otts, 78 la. ().")() (188!)). So the chara(!ter for truth of a witness at a distant place where he has resided but three months on a temporary visit is not competent. "A man's character is to be judged bj" the general tenor and current of his life, and not by a mere episode in it." Waddingham v. Hulett, 92 ^Fo. 528 (1887). ' Tiie rei)utation of a person among a iiiitwrif// of his neighbors is not competent. Powers r. I'resgroves, .*]8 .Miss. 227, 241 (ISoO). But it is not necessary that the witness should know that the repu- tation he states is the opinion of the majority, llobinson /•. State, IG Fla. 8.-}o (1878 . The existence of a certain reputation may be circumstantial evi- dence entirely apart from any effect in proving cliaracter. In sucli cases tlie rules under consideration have, of course, no application. For example, on the question whether the vendor of a chattel intended to reserve the title in himself, evideiu^e of the ])oor reputation of the vtndee for tinaneial stability is competent. liuswell Trinnner Co. )•. Case, 144 Mass. 3."»(> (1887). So in an action against an emjiluyer for negligence in hiring a fellow servant jthysically too infirm to safely do his duty, evidence is competent tiiat he " was generally reputed to be iidirm in tlie senses of sight and hearing and in piiysical strengtii " . . . " for the ])urp()se of jiroving tliat iiis infirmitij'S in tlies(! respects were well known in tlie coniniunity," and that there- fore tlie employer either knew of his condition (>r with reasonable diligence might have learned. Monahan /•. Worcester, l')0 Mass. 4.'W(18nO). TuooF OF CirAKAcTKU. WiiXKss. — The law is now entirely settled that, as to a witness, the only proper object of inquiry is as to rejjutation for trutii and veracity. H: '■ CIIAl'. V I] A.MEUK'AN NoTKS. :i.)T*'» Ct'rtaiii of the earlic' cases, indeed, suiij,'lit to establisli the rule tliat the f^ciieral moral character of the witness is tlie preliminary subject of inquiry. It lias ue(',onlin,!,'ly been hehl that to impeacli a witness the ^jroper nietliod '"is by askin<,', iirst, the (pu'stion * what is the witness's gen- eral cliaracter?' If tliis is answered tliat it is bad, then it is fol- lowed by the (juestion, ' from his j,'eneral clianieter would you believe him on Ids oath in a court of justice'.'"" Anon. 1 Hill, Law (S. C.) LT)!, L'r»S (is;};;; ; state r. Uoswell, L' Dcv. Law (X. C), I'O!) (18l.'<»; ; Stokes r. State, 18 Ga. 17, o7 (l.S*>5) ; Hume v. Scott, '.) A. K. Marsh. L'GO (1821); State /'. Stallings, 2 Haywood (X. C), 3()(» (1804); Cun- ningham 0. State, Go Ind. 377 (187'J); Gilliam r. State, 1 Head, ;>8 (18-18). ' In support of this form of interrogation, it has been urged, that if the in([uiry be limited to reputation for truth alone, a witness of immorality so notorious that tlie mere matter of veracity has escaped remark, would stand unim])ea(died. [n reply, it has been said that " a man who is notoriously im- moral, who is believed to be dishonest, •; 1 who is addicted to mis- vei)resentation, can never have a good cliaracter for truth."' U. S. /•. Vansickle, 2 McLean, C. Ct. 219 (1840). The position taken in U. S. f. Vansickle (iihl supra) has been gen- erally approved. The prevailing rule, therefore, is that the deposing witness must first be asked wiiether he knows the general reputation for truth of the witness sought to be imjjeached instead of asking for liis "general character." '• What is wanted is the common o\n\i- ion, that in which there is general concurrence, in other words, gen- eral reputation or character attributed. That is presumed to be indicative of actual character, and hence it is regarded as of impor- tance when the credibility of a witness is in question." Knode r. "Williamson, 17 Wall. 'M (187;}); Craig w. State, 5 Ohio St. 005 (18,-.4); Davis v. Franke. 3;! Gratt. 4L3, 425 (1880); U. S. /•. Van- sickle, 2 McLean, 210 (1840) ; Smith >: State, 58 Miss. 807 (1881) ; Teese /•. Huntingdon, 2;5 How. 2 (18.")0). Wliere a witness was impeacdied by evi(h'nce of bad general char- acter for honesty, the form of in([uii'y was held to be error. l>orn /•. Wi'athered's .\dm. 'l'.\ Te.x. &ir> (18.-)0) ; Craig r. State, o Oh. St. OOo (18."i4). A party who takes the stand has the same jmsition as any other M'itness, and the impiiries arc limiti'd to character for veracity and do not extend to general character. State '•. Heal, ((8 Ind. 34o (1879); Mershon /•. State, 51 Ind. 14 (ls75): State /•. Rugan, 5 Mo. Ai)p. 592 (1878). It is eipially W(dl settled that spocitic instances of untruth or im- morality ar(» incompetent to prove the character of the witness for truth and veracity. ■'», 'i r. 1 1: |||i ; Mk L 2o7^' am;:i;i('An notks. [PAllT H. The vi'iacihy of a male witness cannot be imppached by sliowin;,' tliat ho is liiil)itually intoxicatctl. Thayer it. lioyU^, 30 ^Me. 47") (1841)). Or lias indulged in unhuvt'ul sexual intercourse. Cunniiii,'- liani V. State, G5 Ind. 377 (lS7i)). Wiieru eviden<!e on beliait' of tlie accused as to his good character for truth and veracity was met by the governnu-nt by evidenct! of particuhir acts oi immoral conduct, tending to sliow low and im- moral associations, the court held that " This . . . was clearly ille- gal evidence." As, however, the evidence as to truth and veracity was itself improperly admit^^^ed, the court decline to reverse the judg- ment. Morgan i>. State, 8-^ Ala. 223 (1889). "A witness cannot be impeached by evidence o'' particular wrongful acts, nor is it proper to (piestion the witness witli reference to such matters." Jones /•. Duchow, 87 Cal. 109 (1890) ; U. S. v. Vansickle, 2 McLean, C. Ct. 219 (1840). The ciiaracter for veracity of a female witness cannot be im- peached by showing lack of chastity. People r. Mills, 94 Mich. G30 (1893); Cai-i) i>. State, 3 Kelly, 417 (1847); Johnson v. State, Gl Ga. 305 (187h, Jackson /'. Lewis, 13 Johns. 504 (1816); Spears v. Forrest, 15 Vt. 4^ ■ (1843) ; Cora. v. Churchill, 11 Mete. 538 (184G); overruling Com. o. Murphy, 14 Mass. 387 (1817) ; Dimick v. Downs, 82 111. 570 (1870). But see U. S. v. Ikedemeyer, G Utah, 143 (1889) where the court apparently decided that on an indictment for adultery, the character of the woman as a witness may be impeached by proof of improper relations with other men. The evidence was admissil>le, howtiver, on other grounds. The rule forbidding proof of character by particular instances of conduct, does not interfere with the rigiit, on cross-examination of a sustaining witness to character, to inquire as to such particular in- stances. Jones IK State, 7G Ala. 8 (18S4) ; llohnes i'. State, 88 Ala. 2G (1S8<»); Leonard /•. Allen, 11 Cush. 241 (18.");{); Steeples v. New- ton, 7 Oreg. 110 (1879). An impeaching witness may be asked, on cross-examination, to state the names of all persons whom he lias heard speak against the reputation of tlie witness impeached. iJates i>. Barber, 4 Cnsh. 107 (1849). As tlie court say in State r. Perkins, 6G N. C. 12G (1872), " It is settled that a witness who swears to tiie general bad ciiaracter of another witness on the other side, may, upon cross-examination, be asked to name the individuals whom he heard sjieak disparagingly of the witness, and what was said. This is everyday practice." Where the att nipt is made, on cross-examination, to limit the bad reputation to a particular set of facts, r. ;/., promises to pay debts, the impeaching party can extend the scope of the bad repu- tation to the extent of making it general. Pierce v. Newton, 13 Gray, 528(1859). CHAP, vr.] AMEUICAX XOTKS. '2r,7« So the opinion of one witness as to the truthful character ot an- other is not competent. On the matter of tlie veracity of a witness, an impeacliiny witness ctMinot be asked " From what you Itnow of his reputation, and ivlutt i/oii know of him, wouUl you believe him under oath in a nuitter in which he is interested ? " The court say " so far as it autliorizcd the witness under examination to base belief on his personal knowl- edge — as distinguished from general reputation — the question was improper." People v. Methvin, 53 Cal. 08 (187H) ; llolsey o. State, 24 Tex. App. 35 (1887) ; Sti'te v. King, 78 Mo. 655 (1883). The preliminary question is whether or not he knows the general reputation for truth and veracity in the neighborhood in which he resides. If he says no, his examination should stop. If he says yes, he should be asked whether that general reputation is gooil or bad, and whether, from such general reputation, he would believe the person under oath ; and the sources and extent of his information may be tested on cross-examination. French v. Sale, 03 Miss. .'{86 (1885). He must answer, as a matter of conscience, if a sufficient number of neighbors have expressed themselves. If>i(/. Hamilton V. People, 29 Mich. 173, 189 (1874) ; Wilson v. State, 3 Wisi;. 798 (1854). If the witnesses to char.acter understand the phrase in a general sense, it is not error to omit the word ''general " in in([uir- ing for the reputation of the witness. Coates v. Sulau, 40 Kans. 341 (1891). This preliminary (juestion as to whether the second witness knows the reputation of the first, is for the jury and not for the court. Bates V. Barber, 4 Cush. 107 (1849). " It is not like the case of experts, who are called to give opinions, and whose qualifications to give such opinions must be first ex- amined and decided upon by the court. Wliat is the reputation of a witness for truth and veracity, is a simple question of fact; and there is no more roason for the court to make a preliminary exami- nation as to tlie knowledge of witnesses called to testify to tliis fact, than tiiere is for making such examination as to tlie knowledge of witnesses called to testify to any other fact. All witnesses, com- petent to testify to any fact in the case, are competent to testify to the fact of reputation for truth; and the in(iuiry as to the aniftnut and means of this knowledge is for tlie jury, in order to enable tiiem to satisfy themselves as to the weiglit and importance of the testi- mony." r.ates /•. IJarber, 4 Cush. 107 (1849). "Ex«iLisu IviTLK." — Assuming that the impeaching (or sustain- ing) witness has answered that he knows the reputation for truth and veracity of the witvicss sought to be impeached, and has next been asked whether it is good or bad, the point in dispute on the cases is whether the in(iuiry siiould stop here or whether tiie witness should be further asked, *■ From what you know of this reputation, ,,1, im 257*0 AMKIMCAN NOTKS. [I'AKT II. ^V()lll(l voii bt'licvc liiiii iiiidcr outli ".' " This latter (luostioii, if iiskt'tl, is said to 1)C! acconliii,!,' to tliu so-called •• Eiii,disli rule." It is Indieved that tlu,' j,'r('iit [)r('i)(jii(U'raiu:t' of authority is in fiivor of this socallod '' Eiii,'lish '" form of iiiti-rrof^ation. Thu gri'at iii- llui'uct! of Professor (Jrcciilcaf is probably ri'spoijsible for such con- flict as exists. It is saiil in Hamilton v. JVople, lit) Mich. 173 (I.S7I;, " Until ]\Ir. (Jrccnlcaf allowed a statement to creej) into his work on evidence to the effect tiiat the American authorities disfavored the Eni,'lish rule, it was never very seriously (luostioned. ... It is a little remarkable that of the eases referred to to sustain this idea, not one contained a decision upon the question, and only one con- tained more than a passing dictum not in any way called for." The reasons in favor of the form of (piestion calliu},' for tlio opinion of the witness as to the effect on his own mind of the re[)u- tation of the impeached witness, are <,Mven in this well considered case of Hamilton v. People, 2D Mich. 173 (1874). " Unless tin; iuj- peaching witness is held to showing tln^ e.vtent to which an evil reputation has alfected a person's credit, the jury cannot accurately tell what the witness means to express by stating that such repu- tation is good or bad, and can have no guide in weighing his testi- mony. ... It has also been commonly observed that impeaching questions as to character are often misunderstood, and witnesses, in spite of caution, base their answer on bad character generally, whiiili may or may not be of such a nature as to impair confidence in tes- timony. . . . The objection alleged to such an answer by a witness is, that it enables the witness to substitute his opinion for that of the jury. l>ut this is a fallacious objection. The jury, if they do not act from personal knowledge, cannot understand the matter at all without knowing the witness' opinion, and the ground on which it IS based."' ///id. The following authorities, among others, follow th(! English rule. T.-ople r. Davis, 21 Wend. 3(l!> (isy'.l) ; Titus r. Ash, 24 N. H. 311) (IS.")!) : L.vmaii r. I'hiladelphia, oO I'a. St. IS8 (lS(i7); Knight/'. House, 2'» -Mil. l'.)4 ( ISCS) ; Hason r. Chaimian, 21 111. 33 (iM.'iS); Wilson c. State. 3 Wis. 7'.IS (18r>4); Stokes/-. State. IS (Ja. 17 (IS.*.,")); .M'Cnteiien r. M'Cutchen. '.). Porter (Ala.), <;."■)() (is;!!)); United States /•. Vansickle. 2 .MttUean, C. Ct. 21'.t (1S4<>) ; .Mol)ley /■. Hamit. 1 A. K. .Marsh, .V.H (18I<.») : Ford r. Ford, 7 Humpii. '.12 (iMlti); Robinson v. State, 10 Fla. 83r) (1878) ; Snow e. (irae.e, 21) Afk. 131 ( 1874). In a New ^'ork case a witness called to sustain a prior witness whose vci'aeity luul been attacked, testilied that he did not know " from the speech of the ])eo]de " what the prior witness's character for veracity was. ]?ut that he had known liim for ten years, knew liis character, and liad heard it (piestiomnl. He was then asked, " From the spee(!h of the ])eople as to his character, would you be- lieve him under oath ?" Held t') be a jjroper (piestion. Adams c. (ireenwich Ins. Co.. 70 X. V. ICG (IH77). "I ■ i CHAV. VI.] AMKHKJAN NoTKH. •J.. 7 .*)() To the Siuno offcnt is tlio reasoning,' in Kord r. Knnl. 7 IIiim|ilin'y CriMiii.). '••- (ISKJ : •• W.' think it is inuiicr tiial tlit- wit'ii'ss should tt.'slil'y as to his own oiiiuioii. J5ut tliis opinion must bi- thi- result of his knowledge ot tlie general reputation oT the principal witness; not of itartieular facts, nor of his estinuite of the character of the, l)arty. foundeil upon his knowledge of many facts. . . . Humors may e.\ist. and may ae(piire a general einnilation in a neighhoriioml, and yet their origin may be so vague, or the sources from wliieii they s|iring so unworthy of credit, as that tlie ju-ople of the neighijorhood may tfutirely disregard them, and retain the ntmost coididencc in the party to whom they relate. . . . The party has no such general reputation as tiiat which these rumors, if btdievod, wovdd give, (ieneral rei)ntation is the estimate one's neighbors place upon ids character." J/ni/. Wike r. Lightner, II S. & 15. IDS (1,S1.'4). •• We all know that there are persons so given to aiiocryjihal statements in their common conversation and inten^ourse with their friends and neighbors, that no one places any conHdenci.' in their statt;- meiits, and this want of truthfulness bo(!oines a subject of common remark among all who know them, still, from their dai^y walk and conversation in other resi)ects, none would donbt their truthfulness when .solemnly called to testify in a court of justice." Eason c. Chapman, LM 111. 3.') iSoH). The same rules ajiply to a i)arty when he takes the stand as a witness. State r, IJeal, (18 Ind. o-lu (i87i»). Where a party is a wittiess the form of the question may be modi- fied as follows. After in(iuiring as to the general reputation for truth and veracity in the community when? he resides, the impeach- ing witness may be asked, '• Whether, from that reputation, he, the witness, would believe him on oath, in a matter in which he was interested." Knight v. House, 211 .Md. I'.M (1S(5S). Should the sustaining witness, wlien inquired of as to the reputa- tion for truth and veracity of the first witness, state that he has iiev(ir heard it <iuestioned, he is entitled, if otherwise competent, to state that he would btdieve him on his oath. •' If such a question was not iH'rmitted, tlie most respectable man in the community might fail in being sujiported if his character foi' trutli should hajipen to be attacked." People c. Davis, L'l Wend. ;!0;> (18;5!»). But where the second witness said, " I never heard his reputation sjioken of. I have heanl ])eople say he lias lied," it was held that he did not ))ossess the re([nisitc knowledgi^ of tlie reputation for truth to entitle him to state his own btdief in the value of the first witness's oath. " A witness must state his own knowledge of another's general good reputation before he will be permitted to say he would b(di(!ve him on oath, otherwise he has no legitimate foundation for his be- lief. In some of the states tlie secondary (piestion a.v to belief is not permitted at all." Lyman r. I'hiladelphia, oG I'a. St. 488 (1H('.7). ;i '.il.i 'iii' 1:' i ■i 'P i 'H . • ' W' :■;!■ :i;i!i ti w 'V' 'ii m Piii'l'l N 257°i AMEIilCAN NOTES. [I'AKT II. Cfi'tiiin Amoriean authorities, followinj^ the authority of ProlVssor Grotudoaf, hohl that the only i)r()[)er iniiiuries are whether the wit- ness kuows the general rei)Utation of the impeaelied witness for truth and veraeity, and if so, what it is. I'romineut auiong these states is .Massacliusetts. In tliat state the usual question is, " What is his general reputa- tion for trutli and veraiiity ? " It is discretionary with tiie eourt to direct tht; examining party to first impure whetiier the witness knows the reputation. "The prac^tice upon this subject differs in different courts, in tins state, no jjractiee is established as a rule of law. but it is witiiin tiie discretion of tiie presiding judge to re- quire the j)relin:inarv ipiestion above stated to be asked of each witness if he shall deem tiiat the interests of justice require it. The same principle is ai)])licable to tiie examination of witnesses upon other subjects. It often occurs, in the trial of cases, tliat tlie judge is called upoti to inquire of a witness whether he has knowl- edge of the matter of which he is called to testify. If it appears to be doubtful whether the witness umh'rstands and appreciates ids duty to testify only to what he knows of his own knowledge, or if, fo" any reason, there is danger tliat he may testify to hearsay, it is the right, and may be the duty, of tiie presiding judge to inquire of liim if he has knowledge of the matter as to which lie is asked to testify; and the party calling the witness would not !);• thereby •aggrieved, and no exca'ptions would lie." Wetiierbee r. Xorris, lo;{ Mass. ~ti')~t (1S7()); tiuii'sigamond liank n. IIol'l)s, II (Jray, L'oO (18r..S). Tlie rule is the same in New Jersey. It is not sufficient that the impeaching witness should state that from what he kuows of his reputation he would not Ixdieve him under ojith. ''The only testi- mony allowed in siwh ease is as to the general reputatittn of thi' witness impenclied, in the neighborhood, fur trntli and veracity, ami that sucli rei)utation is generally bad ; saying that tin- witness, from what he knew id' his reputation, would not believe him under o itli, is not suUi ient." King /•. Ifneltman, 'JO N. .1. Kq. .'ilC) (IHC.K). ,\nd (!alif(U'nia, " 'I'he (picstion of veracity is one of fact for tlie jury, and it e;innot be artirmed, as a legal proposition, that a witness is not successfully impeaelied, unl"ss tlie impeaching witnesses testify that, from tlie general reputation of such witness, tiiey woiilil not believe him or her under oath." I'eople r. Tyler, X> Cal. In Texas, the impeac hing witness, after stating knowledge as to the first witness's reputation for truth and veraeity, 'may then juoperly be asked whether tliat general reputation is such as to en- title the witness to creilit on oath." but not whether he wouhl be- lieve liim on oath. Miirshiiil r. Stiite, .", Tex. App. LT.'J. l.".U (IS7S). Tlie reasons lor excluding the linal question as to the witness's ft I CHAP. VI.] AMEltlCAK NcrrKS. 25762 bi'lief is thus stated in Boon *•. Weathered, 23 Tex. 075 (IS.")*.)), titod with approval in Marshall '•. State {ii/ii siipni). "Where tiie impeaching witness is asked ' whether or not he could believe the other under oath,' lie is more likely to give an an wer suggested by his personal knowledge, or pronijjted by his personal feelings, or his inilividual opinion, than when he is asked, whether or not he is ac- (puiinted with the general reputation of the impeached witness, for truth, and whether it is good or bad." In Ohio a somewhat similar rule is adopted. The court suggest the following as the proper form of <|uestion : " Have you the means of knowing the general reputation of A K, the witness, for truth '.' Or, this preliminary question may be thus : Are you aeciuainted with \ B, and do you know what is his general reputation for truth? So, any other form of words may be adopted, by which to ascertain whether the witness has sufficient knowledge of the public estima- tion for truth, iu which the witness i)roposed to be impeached is held." Craig u. State, 5 Ohio St. (505 (1854). Kkpctation antk LifKM MoTAM. — The reputation as to veracity is reputation at the time of trial. As bearing on this question, reputation subsetiuent to the bringing of the suit is competent, tiiough if it arises out of the suit itself its force is naturally much weakened. "A foundation for such evidence must first be laid by showing that the witness has a reputation, that there is a (lommon report as to his veracity ; and to determine this, it is proj)er to show its e.xtent, how it originated, and what originated it, whether in the transaction out of which the controversy arose, or independent of it. It' from the controversy itself, and sintte it commenced, its force and weight would be nuiterially lessened." .\niidon r. Hosley, 54 Vt. 25 (1HS2) ; Fisher r. Conway, 21 Kans. 18 (187S). In New .Fersey tht^ (courts have gone further, and Jiold that the reputation of a witness for veracity arising since the controversy, is incomitetent. " No rule is bettca- settled, or founded on clearer principles, tiian that which excludes all testinu>ny toucliiiig reputa- tion fo\nide(i on opinions expressed /tost llfini niottnii. Not only sliould evideiu^e as to tiic cliaracter of the witness be founded on reputation, previously existing, but a stranger si'iit by a party to tlie neighborhood of the witness to learn his character, will not be permitted to testify as to tiio result of his iiupiiries." Reid *'. Keid, 17 N. d. K(i. 101 (IS(54). Where evidence of liad rejuitation of a witness for veracity is re- ceived, evidence is competent that prior to a certain event, e. g. his failure in busiiu'ss, it was good, tjuinsiganiond Hank r. Ilobbs. 11 Cray, 2."»(> (1S5H). So where an impeaching witness has stated, in reply to the usual cpu^stions, that he co»dd not believe the fust wit- lu'ss \Mider oath, lie may state further that, laying aside impressions which he received at a certain trial at which the impeached witness I ii'T :• ji; W- ¥ ! » '!! ft: III! I , i 1 ' ' i.'oT'^ AMKHICAN NOTES. [I'AUT 11. testified, he would believe Lim under otitli. Titus /•. .Vsli, 24 N. II. 319 (I8r.l). Who MAY TKSTiKY. — In Morgan f. State, 88 .Via. L'2;{ (188!)), a party testified to his (nvn reputation for trutli and veracity. The evidence was held incompetent, but not apparently on account ot any disability of the witne; -, to testify. Wiiere the impeaching witness liad had no dealings with the principal witness for five years, it was held discretionary with the court to refuse to admit the question. Teese r. Huntingdon, 'Jo How. 2 (185!)). It is not necessary tliat the second witness should be a member of the community in wliicli the reputation e.xists. It is sutticient if he knows what it is. Iladjo r. Gooden, 13 Ala. 718 (1848). If an impeaching (or sustaining) witness knows the reputation of tlie first witness wliere he resides hu need not himself be one of his neighbors. That is a circumstance going merely to tiie weight of his evidence. Wallace /-.White, .")8 Wis. •>(> (_188;?). Hut "ordi- narily, tlie witness ought to eonni himself from tlie neighborhood of the person whose (diaracter is in (juestion." I'owers /•. I'resgroves, 38 Miss. 227,241 i!8.V.)); Louisville, &c. R. Ii. r. Kiciiard.son, (li; Ind. 4.") (1871)). It is for the jury to judge as to the (pialifications of the second witiu'ss. If lie says lie knows the reputation of the first witness he can testify, even if the court tiiinks dirt'erently. liates r. I'.aiber. 4 (hisli. 107 (l.S4!»). I'.ut if the witness (hies not, claim knowledge, his evidence may be excluded. Com. r. hawler, 12 All. r>H~) (18(>()) ; State /•. Perkins, GO X. (!. 12(5 (1872). In the case of Com. r, Lawh'r, 12 .\11. TiS.") (IS(iO), tlie governiiieiit relied oil the evidence of one \. "In order to impeach liim, the defendant called a witness, and asked him, • Wliat is tlie general reputation of Connell for truth and veracity '.' " The defendant tlien asked the several (piestions following; but all were excluded by the judge. 'Have you heard his character for truth and veracity called in (piestion? If you hav(! heard his character for truth and veracity called in (luestimi, state; what the common speecdi of people is as to his character for truth and veracity. What is the general reputation of Connell for truth ami veracity, among tho.se who speak of it at all ? ' The juilge nileil that the defendant might ask the witness what was the common speech of people as to (.'oiiiieirs character for truth and veracity, but that the (piestions in the form put by the defendant were inadmissible." This ruling was sus- tained on exceptions, the Supreme ,Iiidici;il (;()urt (Migelow (!. d.) saying, — "The defendant has no valid ground of exception to the ruling of the court, lie was permitted to jiut to the witness the proper iiupiiry as to the general reputation for truth of tin; person whose character for veracity he sought to impeach. The (piestions whicli were ruled out were calculated to eli(at testimony to the CHAl*. VI.] AMERICAN N()TH;l. '2'u'^ piejuilioo of the witness offered by the govpninieiit, from ;i person who had no luitmil knowledge of liis general reputation for trutli. If answered, they might have led to tiie introduction of evidenee of particular instances of prevarication by the government witness, or of doubt as to his truthfulness on some special occasion, without touching his general character for veracity. The rule is perfectly well settled that the evidence must be contii\ed to the general repu- tation of the witness, and the court did nothing more than hold the party to a strict observance of it, by requiring his questions to be restricted to that form of inquiry solely." Com. /•. Lawler, 12 All. .-)85 (ISGO). The inimber of impeaching and sustaining witnesses to credibility may be limited by the sound discretion of the court, to be exer- cised according as the issue of credibility is important in the case. " It would be absurd to hold, that, upon iin cncpiiry of that sor"-, de- pending, in a great measure, upon the opinion of witnesser,, a party has the right to examint; as many as he pleases, and that the court and jury are bound to sit and hear them, without any power to inter- fere." liunnell i\ Jiutler, L'.'} Conn. 05 (lHo4). In this case the court limited the number tu six on each side t " 'h In-ill iiij-ii Ni:' w RULES UE.SPECTINU THE BUBTIIEN OF PROOF. [PART II. CHAPTER m. BURTHEN OF PROOF. 5 364.' The third of the rules^ governing the production of evi- dence is, that the hui-then of proof lien on the party who fmbstantiat/i/ aHHerta the ajfirmative of the issue. This rule is in the Roman law thus expressed, Ei ineuinhit probatio, qui dicit, nan qui negnt? It has been adopted in practice, not bec.use it is impossible to prove a negative, but because the negative does not admit of the direct and sjraple proof of which the affirmative is capable ; * and also since it is but reasonable and just that the suitor who relies upon the existence of a fact should prove his own case. In its applica- tion, regard must b had to the substance and effect of the issue, and not to its grammatical form ; for in many oases a party, by making a slight alteration in his pleadings, can give 1 'p issue a negative or affirmative form at his pleasure.' ;i 'MS'k The best tests for ascertaining on whom the burthen of proof lies are, to consider first which party would succeed if no evidence were given on either side ; " and, secondly, what would be the effect of striking out of the record the allegation t(f be proved. The onus lies on wliichever party would fail, if either of these steps were pursued.' Instances in which, on these grounds, aver- ments negative in form must be, nevertheless, proved by the . .irty who as-sorts such negative, arise in an action for non-compliance with tlio covenants in a lease, where the brer.ch assigned is tliat ill! Bt I- ' Or. Ev. § 'A in part. * Son unto, ^217. » Di}?. liil). 122, tit. 3, 1, 2; Maac. do Trol). Coiicl. 70. tot. ; Concl. 1128, n l(t. Soc Tiiit. Kv. 1. • Dniiuiuot r. i'rudhomine, 1831 (Am.). " Soward v. liOgujatt, 1830 (Ld. Abiuger). AinoH »'. IIuglK>.s, 183.'* (Aldt'i- ion, 1!.); Btdchor v. M'liitowh, 1S3« id.) ; I)()o V. RowlandH, INH) (Colc^- son, 1! (. ridgo, J.) ; Osl)()rn v. Thomijsou, 183!) (KiAinr, J.) ; llidgwav v. Kw- baiik. lS3i){Aldor8on, 1».); Uoach c. Inptll. LSI,-) (id.). ' Mills V. I B.). Jarbor, 1836 (Aldcrson. 258 CHAP. III.] KXAMPLES RESPECTING BURTHEN OF PKOOK. the premises wore not kept in rei)air, for this allegation must, if traversed, be provcMl by plaintiff ;' and in an action where a plaintiff, lainiing on a life policy, avers that the insurance was efPected on an assertion, made by the insurer, that tlio insured was not subjt'c t to habits or to attacks of illness tending to shorten life, and was in good health, which was true ; but the defence is that such state- ment was false in these respects, namely, that the insured was f-ubject to habits and to attacks tending to shorten life, that is, to habits of intemperance and to attacks of erysipelas, and was ill at tiie time when the assertion was made, in which case the burthen of proof here again lies upon tlje plaintiff — since, to entitle him to a verdict, somb evidence must be given that the life was insurable at the time when the policy was effected.* § 366. Similarly, the burthen of proof lies upon the plaintiff in an action for not executing a contract in a workmanlike manner, to which it is pleaded that the work was properly done ;' in an action on a warranty of a horse, where plaintiff alleges that the horse was not sound as warranted, and the defendant denies the unsoundness;* in an action against a solicitor for not using due d'ligence ;* against a merchant '^r not loading a sufficient cargo on board a ship, pur- suant to a charter party ;° against an architect for not building houses according to a specification ; ' and, indeed, in ever}' case in whioh plaintiff grounds his right of action upon a negative allega- tion, and the establishment of this negative is consequently an (essential element in support of his claim." The practice in Admi- ralty is also in accordance with these principles. In a duinugo suit there, if a defendant, making no charge of negligence against plaintiff, ilvnicH /lis (iirrnifnf.s, and pleads inevitable accident, ■ilH ' Soward v. Lcprfratt, 18!U); Doo »•. Howliintls, ISIO ,('i)lori(lj;(', .),); Mi'lchor V. M'luto.sli, lH;iy (Alih-r- soii, !{.). ' lluckinan v. Firnie, 1838; Ashby »'. I?utf8, SJ() ; 0(!«ch 1'. liif^iill, 1S4.); Rawlins v. D(mb()rnn{»h, IHIH Lil. Doniium); Craig n. Finn. 1841 xd.); I'olo V. llogorn, 1840 (Tiudal, L\J,). ' Amos V, Hughos, 18;J5. ♦ ()st)orn V. Thompson, 18:19 (Rrs- kino, J.) ; Cox v. Waltor, umJati-il HA. Donman); S. P. (Tindal, C.J.). Ill Fisli.T r. Joyo', ls;t!», Colo- ridge, J., allowed dofniidant to bogiu, hut in Doo c. Rowlands, 1840, loii- fcsscMl this wrong. ' Shili'ockc. PasHman, 18;if)(Aldor- 8on, 15.). ' Ridgway v. Ewbank, 18;ii) (Alder- son, M.;. ' Hniith t'. Davios, 1836 (Aldorson, H.). " l)o() i«. Johnson, 1844 (Tiudal, (5. J.). 209 82 ili*i! 1 m (HH 'IJU:-. ii: ;! |i! M EFFECT OF DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS OF LAW. [PT. II. plaintiff must begin at tlie trial.' But if, on the adoiitfed farh, the onus of proving that there was «o negligence by him is upon the defendant, hi^ begins.^ § 367. There are certain exceptions to this general rule that the burthen of proof rests on the party whose assertion, though in form negative, is in substance atHrmative. These must now be noticed. The first exception to such rule is that the party who asserts the negative must begin whenever there is a dixputohle prrsum/)fion of fate in favour of an affirmative allegation.' The presumption, till displaced by direct evidence, servos the party, in whose favour it arises, as well as if he had given express proof. Thus, for instanoe, where a 8hi[)per was charged in a civil action with having shipped dangerously combustible goods without giving notice of their nature, whereby the ship was burnt, as the omission to give notice would have been criminal on the part of the defendant, the law was held to ])re.sume that notice had been given, and to thus throw upon the plaintiff the burthen of proving tlie negative;* in an action by a landlord against a tenant for forfeiture by breach of a covenant to insure, it was held that the law presumed, in favour of the party in possession, that he had satisfied the covenant, and that the non-insurance must therefore be proved by the plaintiff,' and that the landlord could, to relieve himself from the burtlien of giving this negative proof, have inserted an express clause to that effect in the lease;" in an action on an insurance on a Ehip, if the underwriter plead that certain material facts, known to llie assured, had been concealed from him, the burtlien of proving tlie non-communication of tliese facts will, on a reply traversing tliis the whole statement of defence, be on the defendant ; for the presump- tion of law prima facie is that the assured discliarged his duty of communicating all material facts to the underwriter — though tli<' ' Tho Benmoiv. 187:1 ; The Ottor, 1874. ' Tho Merchant I'rinco, 1892. ^ It is only witli ruforonco to dis- piitiiblo prosunij)tii)ns of law thiit this rule ii])plii's, for if tho iir(muin])tion be ('oaclusivo. no nvidonce at all can bo given to rebut it ; if it bo merely ono of fact, tho promiinption itself doen not ariao till mode oj a jury. Soo ante. §§ 71, 109. 211 -•-'I'i. ♦ Wdiianis v. E. India Co., 1802. ' Sen Toltiinun v. I'ortbury, 1809 (Ex. ("h.). • Doo V. Whitehead, 18;W, whore refusal to produce the policy or any receipt for premium was held n(.t sufficient proof oi an omission to insure. 260 CHAP. III.I IJTFECT OF PKliSUMPTIOXS IN SHItTING ONUS. amount of evidence required to show the contrary will vary accord- ing to circuiUritunces. Indeed, nottHtimrx very slender evidence will be sufficient, to that, for instance, proof that a ship was known by the assured to have been burnt at the time when the assurance was effected would in itself be reasonable evidence to show that it had not been communicated, because no underwriter, had he been aware of such a circumstance, would have executed the policy.' § 368. A common example of the principle that a person who asserts that which is contrary to a prima facie presumption of law must prove it, is afforded by actions upon bills of exchange, for in these the plaintiff need neither allege nor prove that the bill sued upon was given for good consideration, as, in the absence of evi- dence to the contrary, the law presumes that fact.^ But in an action by indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, on a defence that the bill was accepted for the accommodation of the drawer, and was indorsed to the plaintiff without value," and when it wa3 overdue,* and a reply traversing tlie latter of these allega- tions, the burthen of proving tliat no .ralue was given for the bill, or that it was overdue at the time of indorsement, devolves on the defendant, because the defence does not contain an allegation " any fraud which would counteract the presumption arising from the possession of such an instrument.* § 3G9. Where, however, the defendant " taints the bill" (as it ia called), that is, shows fraud or illegality in the orif/iunl transaction, — as, for instance, after stating that the bill was originally obtained by fraud or duress, or had been given for gambling purposes,* oi had been lost or stolen, he avers that the plaintiff held it without value, and this last fact is traversed, — the plaintiff is required to prove that he gave value, because the presumption of illegality arising from an admitted fraud in the inception of the bill is pre- ' Elkin »'. Janson, 1845 (Piirko and Alderson, BH.). » See 4o & 46 V. c. (il (" Tho Bills of Exchanpo Act. 1882 "). § M). See, aUo, li. S. C. 188U, Ord. XIX. r. 25. •Mills V. Barber, 1836; Whit- taker V. Eduuuds, 1 834 (Pattetion, J.) ; Fitch V. Jones, 1855. * Seo (Alderson, B.) Elkin v, Jan- Bon, 1845. ' Tiowis V. Parkor, 1836 ; Jacob v. IluiiKiito, 1834 (I'arke, B.) ; Brown V. I'hilpot, 1N4() (lid. Deuiuau). Seo, also, Siiiitii ('. Martin, 1K4I. • Tho fact that a note was given for a wager on duty subject to fluctuation, dooa not render tho in- strument illegal within this rule, fur such a wagHf was only a promise which tho law would not «u(orc« : Eitc'h V. Jones, 1855. 201 Ml I ', • 'I m^'. ji! \\ EFFECT OF PRESUMPTIONS IN SHIFTING ONUS. [PART II. fimiiod to attach to every subHpquent lioWer, and to render liiin in- cnpahle of recovering on such a hill in the absence of evitU-ncH fliowing under wljat circumstances lie heeame possessed of it.' Similarly, if in such a case, whether the actirm he upon a bill- or upon a note,^ the plaintiff, in answer to such a dofonce, merel}' reply a general denial,* and defendant gives evidence of the fraud, as soon as the illegality is proved, the onus of showing that ho gave value is cast upon the plaintiff without notice of any fraud. § 370. On the same principle, too, that a person who asserts the negative of a legal presumption must begin and prove his denial, if a plaintiff avers that a certain party was, at a specified time, of sound mind, and this averment is traversed by the defendant, the latter is bound to prove the negative allegation of incompetency, for the law presumes every man to be sane till the contrary is shown.* If, however, on the trial of such an issue, the defendant ' Soo cases cited in last four pro- cedinp: notes. Also 45 & 46 V. c. 61 (" TJie Hills of Exchange Act, 1882"), § 30, subs. 2 ; and lSinf;haui v. IStun- loy, 1841, overruling Ld. Denman's decision at Nisi Prius as reported in 9 C. & P. 374. See, also, Elkin v. Janson, 1845 (Aldcrson, B.). Soo also, however, Masters v. mrrots, 1849. - Harvey v. Towers, 1851 ; Smith V. Hraiu, 1851 ; Ilofjp v. Skeen, 1865 ; Horry v. Aldennun, 1853; Fit(;h V. Jones, 18o5 ; Mather v. lid. Maidstone, 1856 • Hall v. Feather- stone, 1858. ' Huiley V. Bidwcll, 1853, ovor- riilin>r Paterson r. Ifiirducre, 1811. * Which is now the proper plead- ing . see K. S. r. 1N83, Ord. XIX. r. 18; ant(>. §§302. 304. ' See Sutton v. Sadler, 1857 ; Dyco Sombre '•. Troup, iHjCi. The pro- position stilted in the text, that every man is jiresumed to bo sane till the contrary is proved, is doubth-ss true in criminal cases. It may even be, too, that it is also true in civil cases. Hut, so far ns jnohate issues are con- c(-Tn<>d, tlie cases are corflicting. See a learned note on the whole matter in (Ireeidoaf on Evidence, 15th edit. (18921, p. 124. The passage in the text has been allowed in stand, n<< it appoarii to oxpreus the deliberutily 262 formed opinion of the Author. Aa to Probate issues, however, many other text books state the law some- what differently to the proposition in the text above, and in the above citf^d note to (Jreenleaf on Evidence (a work upon which the j)re8ent treatise was, originally, to a large extent founded) it is said that, on a (jues- tion of j)r()bate, the b»u-th(!n of prov- ing that the testator was of soiuid mind " is, by the luitter rases, held to rest upon the party ))rop(>unding the will.' The present Editor, while h(^ does not fed justifii'd in altering Mr. Pitt Taylor's text, nevertheless personallj' agrees in the views ex- pressed in the alK)ve cited note to Oreenleaf, since, in his opinion, the maxim that "every man is presumed to 1)0 sane till the contrary ai)pears" does not arise at nil, until it has been shown that the individual, whose act is under investigation, was like other men, and, possibly, ai)plies only in criminal cases, while the ca.se oi Sutton i: Sadler itself shows that a direction to the effect suggested in the text is a misdirection tf) a jury. As to wills, a contrary rule prevails in Massachusetts. Crowninshield v. (Vowniiishield, 18,34 (Am.); and sec Andcrsmi r. Gill. 18.)8, II. L. (Ld. Wensleydale) ; Smee v. Smoe, 1879. lior in ol u in ry. Cir. I'l.] I'.riMIIF.N OF PUOOF IX CKIMIXAL IMMK'F.KIUXGS. puts in evidence an inquisition finding the imrty lunntic from a date prior to the transaction in (juesfion, this evidence, tliougli only prima fa' ie and not conclusive, shifts tlie burthen of proof on the plaintiff, who asserts the party's sanity.' Thu . if it he shown that a testator was insane, or even subject to delus'cj 's,- at any time prior to the date of an alleged will, or within a few yfars after that date, the burthen of establishing his testamentary capacity will certainly be shifted on to the party propounding the will.^ § 371. On the ground that a prosecutor must p^ive every fact necessary to substantiate his charge against a prisoner, (jr, in other words, that the law always presumes innocence in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, in criminal cases the burthen of proof, unless sb'^'^ed by legislative interference, always falls on the prosecuting p. riy. -and this though, in order to convict, he must necessarily liave i. course to negative evidence. Thus, if a statute, in the direct description of an offence, and not by way of proviso, contain r"gative matter, the indictment or information must both contain an allegation negativing such matter, and the allegation its ' nuist also be supported by prinui facie evidence.* A better illustration of this principle cannot be given than to point out that the old (and now repealed) statutes nuido it au offeuco to either course deer in inclosed grounds without the con- sent of the owner,* or to cut trees without such consent ;° and that the law, having uuxde the absence of consent a material element in such offences, on indictments for them it was necessary both to allege and to prove that the act was done without such consent. § 372 — 374. The liOgislatiu-e has now, however, in many in- stances got rid of the necessity for proving negative matter either » Ilassiird V. Smith, 1872. • R. r. .Mlm, 1S20 ; 42 O. 3, c. 107, » Since V. Sniec, '.S7i) (Sir J. ITan- § 1. ivjHiiliil liy 7 & S (}. 1, c. 27. (IIIkt ])iiivisiniis, oinitti)!^ nil iihmi- fioii 111' ciinsfut. arc n<i\v Mili-tiliiti'd l)v 21 \- 2."> V. V. !i(i (••'111.! Luiviiiy Art, iMil "V § i:t. '' It. /•. n'ii/y. is2(>: (i (t. :j, c. ;j(i, ri'iMiilia lii>t'i.v 7 & H <i. 4, c. 27, anil, wiundly, i»y ;») & M V. c. o!>. (ttliiT ]ii()Vi>i(pns, oniittinf.' nil iiifii- lion lit' constiit. arc nuw swli-titiiti'd l.v 21 \' 2.") V. r. !»: (•• Tlic Mali, iuviu Jianiajju Act, I6GI "), §i 20, 21. 203 ncn ■" Waring v. Waring', iSIS ([,,|. l?i<iii}:liani) ; Fowli.s v. J laviil.-.m, IMS (,Sir II. rust';; (iiiniani /■. l)rak.T, IHIS (id.); I'linsij) v. l»vio yoinl>iv, lS,-)(i(l'. C); antf. § n»7'. * I{. r. Jai'vis, \~M; Tayli>r v. Ilnnipliiifs, 18()J; I'avis c. .■^I'laiu, l.S<i!l; Mor^ran r. li.'(|.;.,T, 1870; C.iiilcy '■. Duit.in, lh70. i! mi -' )i; I :' t I r^' , 5 Jl , mm lUrRTHKN OF VllOOV SIIIITKn UY STATL'Ti:. [I'Airi' 11. by oniiL'tim'uts creating the offonco afroslj, iiiid (.niitliiig all nidutioii of tho nogiitivo inatfcr,' but more generally by ex- pressly enacting that the hurt hen nf proriiuj itnlhoriti/y coiisnif, htirful rrriixt', and the like, shall lie on the (liffiuldiif. Thus, tho accused is, by llu' statuti's relating to the offences, bound to protect himself by showing alfinnatively tlio oxistence of some lawful authority or excuse where he is charged with sundry statut- able offences.' ' Sic, for instance, tho two pro- CCmHiii^ Ilotrs. - Aiii(iii;,'sts>ich()ffun('esar(': bcitif; f( ■,ui(l l>y iii;;lit ill jjossi'ssioii of any j>icklock ki'v. crow, jin'k, liit. or otluT iMi|>l<'iiii'iit of lioiisi'liriMkiii;; ('JJ A: •!■) V. c. !i()(" Til." I-iincny Act, IMdl"), § .jH) ; or Iniyiii;; or sdlinj; coin lit an iimlerviiliic, or i'X|iortin;;or iniportin^, countci I'cit coin (21 i^i 'I't V. c. !»!) (•• 'I'lif ( 'oinii^jc < MlVni cs Act, isiil "),§§(!. 7, H, 14, VJ); or luakirit,', incndin;;, or havinj; jMisHcssion of, coininj; tools, r>r cnnvcyin;,' such tools, or iiiiv I'oiii or hiiUioii, out of the Mint (24 A: •-'.» V. c. !!!»(•• I ho ("oiiiii^'cOIV.Micc.sAct, 1.SI)1"),!;:J14.'.'4, 'i:>\ sec It. ,'. llavvcy. 1S71 (('.('. ]{.); or havin;; ])o«scssioii of )p:i)M'r. (ilittcs, or (lies used in connection with tin; Htmiii) duties (:t:{ vt :t» V. c. its, §§ IS, 22; .">» \- .V) V. c. ;18 ("Tiie Stiini|) Duties Maniiy:enii'nt Act, 1N!»! "), § I')); or (hein;,' licensed to sell staniiis) huviii;; iio>sessioii of any for;red stamps (see j I iV o.j V. c. .'tS, § 1H\ or any instrmneutsor materials for iiiakinjr eithiT letter stanijis ,)1 »V: A.'» V.(!. ;i.S,^l;{, siiiis. 1): ore.\cise|ia|.i'r (2 W. 4, c. Hi ("The K.vcise I'ermit Act. is.t2"l §:{; 11 * 12 V. (•. 121, § 1S\ or jiaper us<'d for niakin;; e.\- che.|uer hills (24 vt 2.-) V. c. r., ;: l.S; '21 \- 2') V. c. ''s (" The l'or;.'erv .V<'t, ISfil "), § !)\ hank notes (24 \-'2.i V. r. !».S ("The I'oru'ery Act, ISCl "\ 5 !l\ the notes of private li:inkers (Id. § IM), or foreij,'!! notes (Id. § 1!»): or for nianiifacf HI in;r paper siiiiilai' to that u-.cd for staiij|i'< hy or niider tliei 'oniniissionersof Inland liiveniie (.»l v'; .■).) V. c. ;tS, § 11 ; see. also. 21 6 2.-I V. c. ,). § IS;" 21 A: 2.> V. c !»S ("The For-eiy Act, isill "1. 5 10'; or havinir |i>>^e^sion of sinh paper bcluro it \i\xa hueii r)tuini)ud und iBsued 264 for USB (54 & int V. o. ;iS, U5 ; 24 & 2.-. V.c.!tS("Tho I''orf,'eiy.Vct, 18)51 "). 511: 24 vV 2.') V. c. ,■). 5 1!»') ; or on>,'rav- in^' hank notes or any ])art thereof (24 iV 2.) V. c. <IS ("The I'"or^'eiy Act, iMll "), ;;;i Ki, 17). the notesof private hankers j^ld. § IS), or forei(;n notes (Id. § \\)]\ or liavin;; po^sission of countei'feit dies for niakin;; p)ld and silver wares, or in^lrunients for niakinj; siicii dies, or any wares of pdd, silver, or haso metal, liavin;,' thereon for;;ed dies (7 iV: S V. c. 22 ("The (ioM and Silver AVares Act. 1SI4"), §^ 2. ;t) ; or hiivin;; jiossessioi of hackney-coach and sta;,'e plates, or drivers" or watormen's tickets ((> \- 7 V. c. SCf"'!'!^; London Hackney Carria^'es Act, IS i;{ "'), § 2U ; and see also ;{(» i\i ;(1 V. c. 1;J4 (amonded hy 4S V. c. is), 5 17); and certain othi-r coi;nate otTences (sei) U. c. Kilnililid- .son, ls,'(<»). Tho law i.s tho same whiMi, on a jiarfy heinf; char;;od with apphin;; any marks ujipropriatcd to ller" MajcslV's stores (.'{S ,t .TJ V. c. 2.". ("Tho I'uhlic Stores Act, 1S75"), !j 4\ or with converting; or liavin^ in iiis jpossession any such stores, when the same ar<! rcasonahly siis|iected of heinj; stolen or unlaw- fully ohtaiiied (§ 7 ; see, also, §§ 8 and '.I). piiMif is fi'^'cn, or an inferonco raiscil, tliat he has acted (It. /'. Wil- mi'tt. ISIS ("oltman,.!.); II. /•. Cohen, |S,-,s \Vats.in. M.. an.l Hill. .1.); It. c. Sle.p. isilj) " knowin;;ly ; " so, the lilllthen of proof also rests (It. r. Maiiks, 17!M I.il. Keiiyon)) upon the accused in a prosecution uiiil< . fhi« direction of the ( 'oinniissioners of I'u-toiiis. in re-pi'ct of ;,'oods .seized for non-payment of duties, or any other cause of fill leiture, or for re- coverin;,' any innalty unih'r any .\ct rtlatiu^ tu tiiu cuuLuuis; uu un in- PKAP. III. J nUKTlIKN OK PROOF SiniTKF) RY STATITR. (lictiiu'iit for inakiii(7 a si<rtml to ii Hiitisfactory in'count of how ho ciiinc HiiniH;t;liii;; vt'sscl itf s<>ii, tlu' ili-t'i'ii- iii(-<-c-si'il of tln' aitiflt! Iniiiiil (•_•■! iS limit ,;i!>»V: 10 V.c. ;((>(•' TlK-CuNfoiiiH 'J.* \. c. !«i ("Th.' Iiiicfiiy Act. Consoliiliif ion Act, lisTfi"), §'_'.')!)) must l.Sdl "\ § ;(.»). rcrsoiis fminil in prove tli;it till- si;^niil \v:is not nmih' ])o>si-*-ioh of, or olVninj; for i«ah<, for tilt' imriioso of ^'iviii'; ill('",',il slii|)\vi('(k''il frooiN, iirc iMiimd ir nolico (1(1. § III] ) ; anil ^fomls foiinil show that they have imt transj,'rcsst'il or M'i/iil iinilcr tin- ci^toiiis laws the law in lakinj,' thciii Jil. §§(>."), (i(i\ will he ileemeil to lie mil p)oiU, In jiidceeiliii;rs a^rain^t any peisori nnh'fs the owner can prove the edii- for ha\inf.' or keeiiiii;.' an niilireiisiMl trary (Iil. § I'lS). The hnrthen of theatre, or for actiii;,' nir hire there- jiiMtifyinj; his coiiiliict (.'i'J & ;{;i V. in, if it he jiroveil that the theatre i»- c. ,")T. §5 ■'• •"') ''!'*" I'l'^ts n|ion the do- umil for the ]nihlic |i 'iforniance ,if fenilant in ])roceeiliiij;.< uinh Sejiiieii K 11 nil er Clotl 'I'h Tlie Mta;;o jilays. the Imrthen of pr .ini,' So. that it is iliilv lieenseil or aiit'.ioii/iMl imil; Act. iNtiil. l'"oreii'ii I'lnlistnieiit lies on th Act, ISTd," wliero tho hr.'iich of neutrality ('harj^eil relates to the ilo- 1i\ t a s hi|> t< .f tl le States ruseil Mi vV 7 V. c. (IS '••The Theatres Act, lS»;t"), § 17). In an action tor a jienaltv iimler "The Puhlic Health Act. Is7.'»." for (;i:{ (V ;tl V. c !H», § li) at war. So, improperly (f'tinj; as a meinher of a uniler •• The Merchant Shippin;^.\ct, local Ixmnl, thii hiirthen of proof is 1K!H. it siiiiilarlv rests when in fjreat moasiire shifteil en to the jierson is char;,'eil with seinlin^. or ilefetulant (ItH & ;{!( \' . c. .V). Scli attempting; to send, or fake a ship to rule 1. snh-rnle 7(0- I" any dispute sea in an unseaworthy state so as to in the hosiery trade hetween tho eiidaiif;er lite (:»!) iV: H) V. c. HO, § J); manufacturer and the workmen ro- und in such cases tho indictment spectin;.' the alle;;ed imperfect exe- need neither aver that the accused cution of any woik. which has hren knew tho ship was unseaworthy. delivered to the mannfaiturer or his nor ne^'ative tiie use of reasonahlo av:ent. the work, if not ]iroiIi;ced in metins to insuro her f;"'"rf ^" ''^'''^ order to adjudication, will he deemed in a seaworthv .state : H. 1' to) lavc h( •n p rlv executed H it man. 1.S7.') (Ir.). In any jirosecution !> V. c. 77. § :{ : H iV !l V. c. 12.S. § ;t). under the Act for jireventin^ acci- So, on ii comiilaint that a jw'rson dents hy threshini; machii m employed in a factory or workshop roof that the machiiio was not duly without a siir}.'ical cortilicite. is unile ■need while workinj;. the person to th" prescrihed aire, if the court lie of whom it heloiie-s. or for whom it has that opinion, the emjdover shall ho h used. st •' satisfy the court liahl e to penaltii liul ess no can that he took all reason. ihlc jirecaii- ])rcivi'tliat the pai'tyumiiloyed isof tlv tions to ensure the ohservance of the ap' riMiuired '11 V. c 10 ("The I-'ac- Acf"(ll a il V.c. I'J (•• The Thresh- tory andWorkshop Act. 1H7H").^ !>•_'). in;,' Machines .\ct, 1N7X"). § 1). So. Tho ])roof of the ajj^e of the employed the hnrthen of proof that he actc i also rests upon the defi'iidant in any innocently lios upon any ]» ;.-<on jirosecution of a chimney sweeper for charjred under •• The Army Act. illi"_Mlly emjiloyinvr a climliin^.' hoy Issl." with illo^'ally jmicliasin^ (21 iS: '2H \'. c. ;{7. $ 10). and in any from soldiers re;;imental necessaries, ]iroceediii;r ae;ainsl any peisoii for e(|uipmeiit. or stores, or with illepilly em]i|oyin^ a child in a dani^eroiis hein^' in possession of any such nerformanco (I'J .V III \'. c ,'ll, § l), artiides (14 & -i'i V. c. .Vs. § I.IO, Similarlv. the ]>ronf of the (lo;r's a^o Kuh-ss. 1 and •J). A^'ain. a man sum- lies on the defendant on the hearinf? nioned for hein;; unlawfully in ]iosses- of an information for a jnnalty for sion of venison, must satisfy the keepinj; a do;; without a lie i;ristrate that he came lawfully l>y wlcie it is said that tl animal is it !'JI & '_'■) v. c. !Mi ("Til.' Larceny a mere puppy ( II V.c. l.VThei'us- Act, lH(n "). § H); and one who tomsand Inland Ijev.nue Act, I.S7S"). kiiowin;,'lv and unlawfully has on 5 "*)• -^ i>awiiliroker char^'cd with his premiseH any tree, shrul). post, certain olfeiices a;rainst " The I 'awii- julo, rail, or tho like, um^'t givo a hrokorsAct, KST^/'inrttquirodtopiuvo 205 f I' FACIS I'l.CUMAKI.V IN KNOWLl.ln;!: OF I'AUTY. [pAKl 11. § ''i7C>. Moronvor, as to all ciifos fiilliiij^ williiii tho Siiniiniiry Juiisdittiou Act, 187!),' it im gciicniUy juovidtMl,-' that "any oxtcji- tion, ('X('iiii>fi(iii, |ir()viwi», nxciisc, or <iualifiiatioii, wliotlier it floes or does not af'(()iii|iatiy, in tin- haiiut section, the ilosoriiition of tlie offt'ncc in tho Act, onlrr, liyo-law, regulation, or other docu- ment creating the oU'eiice, may be proved by the Jefendunt, hut need not he sjiecitied or negatived in the information or com- plaint, and, if so upecified or negatived, no proof in relation tc tho matters so specified or negatived shall be recjuircd on the part of tho informant or complainant.' § 376. The first exception to the general rule that the burflien of proof rests with the party who asserts the substantial alHrmative is, then, that it does not apply where there is a prirail facie pre- sumption of law one way or tho other; and it is suflicieutly esta- blished by the exatnplos which have been cited. ^ tJTGA. The second exception to the above-named general rule is that where the subject-matter of tho allegation //(>« peciiiiar/^ wit/iin the knoickdyc of one of tho j[)arties, that party must prove it, whetlier it bo of an atlirmativo or a negative charactcM-, and t!Ven though there be a presumi)ti(jn of law in his favour.* lAjr instance, Romo lawful or rousonablo excuse for his eoiuluct (;<o & ;«) V. c. »;{, § 23, r. 4, anil § :tl). In most jji'owccu- tioiiH for olVciici'H a^aiii!st tlm baiik- ru])t luw, tlio lu.'ciisod limy bo con- vifti'il oil tlic t^ole jimof of liis liavitif; ('oiiiiiiitt)'(l tho net cliiirfrod, "unless tho jury is siitisiiod tiuit ho liutl /lo inti'iit to ilcfiiiiul," or, "to fonccal tlic static of hisalTairs," or, "to defeat file luw," as the case may be {',V1 &. .'Jli Y. c. (>2, §§ 11, 12; as amended bv 4(i & 47 V. c. i)-l, § Ifi.J; bi. & J4 V. c. 71, § 2«; .'ij & ;)<> V. c. :r,. §§ ii, 12, Ir.'. Tho bnrtlien of sliowiii^if "uny lawful authority or excuse" for his eondwct rests u|ioii a jieison charp'd witli liavin.i,' coiniiiilted an olVelK'i! against "The I diseases of Animals Aet, 1H!»4 " (.n A: .JH V. c. <'>7), §§ b'l, b\\. Sec IIue:^'ins r. AVard, l.'SS2. On a eliaij;e against a consumer of fiaiululently ab-lniet- in^? f;as, "the existence of iirtilicial means" for altering; the index to any meter, or for ]ire\eiitintr any meter from duly ref^isteiin^', or for ab- stracting, consuming, or usin;; t?^s when s\ich meter is under the eim- Humer's control, in jiriiiia facie evi- dence that such alteration, |ireveii- tion, abstraction, or consnniiition has been fraudulently, knowinjrly, and wilfully caused by the consumer ',.'i4 iV: ;{.) v. v.. 41 ("Thn (laswoiks ( 'lanses Act, 18" 1 "), § 'M). In cliaincH iipiinst consumers for fraudulently ubstractinf; it, or water sn|i])lied bv meter (;i.S & ;iy V. c. o.>, § (lU; 41 vS; 12 V. c. o2, § 7(1, Ir.), the burthen of proof also rests with the accused. As to casi's under tho iVdlurH Act, Bco infra, § 'M'). ' 42 A 4,1 V. c. 4!». » ^ ;i!), subs. 2 ; " The Pedlars Act, 1.S7 1"" (;M & :i.j V.c. !)(i), § 20, sub-s. .{; 41 it 42 V. c. bi, § 200, Ir., contains a similar ]irovision. ^ See, on the construction of thii-. lloberts I'. Iliimjihruys, 1S82 (ib cided on a very similar clause in the Liceiis- infj Acts). * llickson V, Evuns, 1794 (.\sh- hnrst, J.) ; 1{. v. Turner, INK! (I'.ay- ley, J.), jhit see the obm-rvalions of AlderbUD, li., in Elkin v, Junsuu, 236 CHAP. 111.] FACTS ri:cl.'LFAI{I,Y IN KNOWIJ'.pnR OF PAUTY. under tlie old law, in nn lUition for penaltit's against a ihthoii for practising as nn apothocary without n ciiHilioate,' aw tlio dct'cndant was peculiarly oogni/ant of tho fact whctlitT or not In* Imd obtained a certifioato, and, if lie had done so, could have no dilliculty ahout ju'oduoing it, tho law conipoUud him to do so (although, had it not been for the principle in question, the jilaiutill' would have been bound to prove the negative for two reasons ; first, as essential to his case, and secondly, to rebut the presumption of innocence), and in aeoordanco with tho i)rineiplo under consideration it is for him to do so, auJ not for the plaintiif to prove it non- existent.^ S '677. This second exception also prevails in all civil or eriniinal j)roceeding8 instituted against parties for doing acts which they are not pennitted to do unless duly qualified. It holds good, and compels tho defendant to produce tho necessary liceiu-e or autho- rity (as the case may bo), in proc(>(>dings for selling li(juors, oll'ences against the game laws,'' improperly exercising a trade oi' profession, and tho like;' in actitms for penalties against the proprietor of a theatre, for performing dramatic pieces without the written eon.sent of the author;^ in proceedings for misprision of treason — where, if the treason be proved, and the knowledge of it be traced to the prisoner, he is, in strictness, bound to negative tho aveiniont of concealment by offering proof of a discovery on liis part.'' It also ])revail8 in the Ecclesiastical Courts, so that, in proceedings against a clergyman for non-residence without licence or exenii»tion, the prosecution need neither aUcge nor jirove that the defcmlant had not a licence, or that he was not resi(b'nt on another benefice; but if defendant have a licence ho must produce it.' 181.'), siijr^rostinf; that tlm riili' only Ji-lTiics, IS'JI ; Tliitison's ciiso, 18J1 ; reins to fli.' ir,i<i!,l. of th(^ cvidciic.-. Sh.-liloii r. Cliirk, IHOd (Am V V. .*^. hut thiit tliore shouhl hn soiim' fvi- r. I|:iv\v:0(l, IHl,) ( Am.) ; diiiiii'; c. (h'lico to stiirt tho pri'smii)itioii utiil Tho Stuto, iS'i'J (Am.). Sec, iilso, cast tho onus; on till' otliiT siilo, I loo r. W liitcho!nl, ISoS, oitoil auto, ' I'liiloc ,V) (r. ;{, c. 11)1 ("Tho § ;i(lT, wIu'H' thi;< i iilo was hchl in- AlMithniirios .\ct, ISl,')"). SfO, now. :i|)|ilic;ili|c' 2\ \- -JJ V. v.. !l(l. § -10. » Ajiolh. ("o. V. IJontlov, (Al)hott, C.J.). I82» .Sfo 1 & 2 W, 32 ("Tho Oamo Act, 18;il"V ^ 42. * li. V. Tmucr, 1810; Smith v. ' I'n.lor ;{ \: 4 W. 4, c. ITi ( ' The I)niniiilic Copyn-rht Act, Ks;i;{ "V § 2 ; Morton »■. ('o|iclanil, IS,"),') (,\m.). » 1!. )\ Thistli.wood, l.S'JO (Al)lmtt. C.J.. in rhiir;;(' to frrand jtirv''. ' liluck I'. IJuLkmun, 1640 (P. C). 207 I : M-* I RULK.S RKSPHCTINO THK UIOIIT TO HKGIN. [I'ART II. § »}7M. Tin* lliinl rult) jifovcriiinj^ the iJiotliictioii of I'VuliMR-e, nariif'ly, tliiit thn Imu'iIicii of jiroof g.-iitTiilly lit's uiiou tlio iiurty who siilisfaiitially iisscrtrt tlu* iifliniiiitivo, 1ms now licon in itsi'lf hiiflicinitly cuiisidcn'tl. I?ut in connt'c'lii.n with this rulo (nicstions friMpuMitly ariso with rt^siict't to tlu' //<//</ (u liryiii. Thoroforc, it will ho well to I'oiicludf this ohft|tt»T with a thscussion upon this ini|Mirtant suhjt'ft. TIuh is, iuiliM'tl, strictly s|niikin<;;, jM-rhiips a «ligr»'hsion from tht> suhjcct of the chaiilcr, uaini'ly, the oonsidora- lion of the rulo as t.) tln' J'urthcn of I'roof. Yi-t it is so iiiti- niaftly coinuutf'd with tlm suhject, soohviously luust bo tlctorniiiiid with u (hi)' regard to tho [irinciplos contained in this third rule, and so important, that its coiisiih'ration will ocrtaiidy not ho irrclovant. Tho " riijlil to hti/iii," — in other words, thu privih-go of opening tlio euso to the jury — is oft'-n oi.o of consideruhln udvaiita/(> hefore any trihunal,' hut in particular at Nisi I'rius. it not only enahles a jiarty to create ai! impression in his favour, which it may be ditliiult suhsetpiently to erase, but also secures him the last word, iu tho evi'ut of wilnessos being called by his opponent. Still, cases Hometimea oceur where u defendant goes to trial relying simply on tho weakness of tho plaint ill's case, and where, if called upon to begin, he will instantly be defeateil.- The duty of beginning is, conscipiently, sehlom u mutlor of iu- dill'crenee, but is generally regarded as an (tbject wliieh it is important either to attain or to avoiil, according to the circuni- htanees. The principles which govern the (pjcstion as to who has tho privilege or duty (as tlm case may b«*) of tho " n>;/tf to hn/iii" arc dillicult of application, and are, moreover, not very distinctly understood, and the decisions as to such right arealike numerous and eonllicting. A detailed examination of them r.ll W(»uld hi' out of place here, but a few general rules may, perhaps, bo of practical value. S .'i7l>. The first general rulo as to tho right to begin is, that ' (>i\ till' lu'iiriinr of u|i|mmiIm in siiliitaiu'i') wuh wiuit of riiic<ii|<'rii- <M|iiity till' .i|i|M'llii!it iilwiiVH UM'il to lion; tli>' |il:iiiitill' liuviii;; i'.'|ilii'il, iM W^tMi : Willi. iiiiH I'. Willi. iiiiN, iNilll. to |iait iif till' Kiiiii cluiiiii'il, tliiit. Iiii ^ IIi'kI •' < h, li'iijlit III Hiiiiii," 'Jtl , '2H, k"^'' I'DM-iiliiiiliiiii, iitiil as til till' He«», (•.</., l''.ihvaiiN i'. JmifM, IN.'JT ; ri''<ii|ii'', iinlli' iirnwuiii, AIiIi'I-noii, 11., whi'l'o, ill an arti'Ui mi a noti' liy lidil tlcil iji'li'iiiliint iiiii*! lii'Kiii.aiiilus lUiioiMMi iigiiiiiiit iiiaki'i', till' |i|i'a jii In- rniilil nut, |ilaintiil' hud li vuiilii't. •JliH CHAP. III.J KIIM:S RKSPKCTING Till-: RlfJIIT TO hVMlS. the pot'tif on irhoin tin' onus prohiiiii/l //(■>■,' ^^s• t/rrr/nprr/ int fho rccnrif. inii'Sf hrtfiii} It soinctimos is wiiid that tlic lij^lit of h'^nnning l)i'l()iigs ti) th<> jmrty on whom tlu* afflrnmtive ol' the issue lies ; btif lliis assertion, if literally uuilerstootl, is hv no means accurate, since (iis we have seen) it iloes not iipply eitlier where the affinuative alli'tr ition is siipporteil by a lejjal pn'suinption, or the truth of the nejrative averment is peculiarly within the knowleil^c of the party who relies on it.* And the rule as to the liiijhf to tinjln is, in what- ever form it may bo stated, subject to some civ/itions. I'irst, in sojiii' eases, if iif t/ir trinl \\w defeiidaut will admit the irholc prima faeie ease of the plaintiff, he will b(> entitled to betjin, jiroviiled he was not bf)und to have* made this a<lmission by his plradinp;' at an earlier period. For instance, this is so in a claim by a person as heirat-law of the person last in possession against a devisee under such person's will, if tlie defenilant admits not only that plaintiff is heir, but tluit the anoestor, throiijrh whom he claims, died seised.* *i :!Si>. The exc(>ption will, however, be strictly confined to easas when! the del'eudant admits the nliolr title of the plaintiff. There- fore, if defendant, in an action to recover lan<l, admit at thi^ trial a will under whicli the ])laintiff claims, and rely on a subserjuent devise or codicil, he will not be entitled to begin. For so far from admitting the iihole title of the plaintiff, be would expressly deny a rao.st material \r,\r\ of it, sinct* by setting up a second will or codicil, he would in effect assert that bis opponent was not dtivisee at the time of the testator's decease.' Again, a defendant whose title rests upt)n a conveyance from the ancestor," or in part undt3r the ancostor'ii marriage sottlemeut,' cannot, by ' .\4 to thfi Im'nI tests i>f tlic niiiis I'littcHDH, J.), tlcfi'iidiiit was allowed ]ll'iili:lllili, sen iilltc, 5 .'tll.'i. tci liejriii, tlluM;;li |iluilltilY. lis In part ' 'riiiis, where II liiisliaiiil |ii'titionH of the |iri'iiii.si'pi, wa'- |il'e|iaiei| to prove for II ie-«titiitiuu of I'oii jiiy:iil ri^rhls, ii that hi' was iissi^rnre of an hiiIsIiiimI- rii|i(ini|i'iii wlio aiiMWei.s liy |ili'ailiiijf iii;r tctiii. See, now, It.S. ('. ISh.'l, riihlty is eiilitleil to he^'i'ii : Cli.ny I >iil. .\ .\ I. r. I'l, cileil ante, ; :i(il. ii. ' r. I'lienv. 1 ■'*'>'<• •' i».'st,' " On lii'iht tn lUfiiH," 'i!*. Sen ante, 5§ ;t<>T, •I'li. * (liHiiititle >'. Itrahiiiii, ITD'J ; ]>oe f. Ihavne, IS IN; l»iie v. Ilailief*, iH.tl l,.l. liriiiimii). Ill l*oe c, .Smart, IH.'iii ^(Juiiiey, U., aflur uoiitiultiitg ° I loe r. llniyiii'. IM.S; (ivcnuliiif^ jliif r. ('(iiiii'ft, |sl;i, ami an iiieiiiy- iiiiiiis i'li.sM ciii'il liy 1,(1. Id'uiiiaii in Ki.e r. MaVlie-*, ISIU. "• Hoe r. 'I'lick. r, lH;to JIoIIiukI, li). ^ l>iKi t;, liHWlH, iHtli (Miiulu, J,). '-iti'J J '■ 1. m i:; PLAINTIFF SHKKIXG UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGKS. [I'AliT 11. pimply atlmitting his oppoiiPiit's hcirsliip and bis own possession, (U'jirive tlie fuinior of liis li^'lit to lirj^iji, Ik-cuiisc muIi ini adniissinn will not ooviT tlio ontirn title of the jilaintill'. Where, too, eaili party claims as l»eir-at-law, and the defendunt is clearly the heir, if /njifitiiatc, his admission of a conditional title in the plaintiiV, // the defendant was ille^^itimate, is insnilicient to give him the right to hegiji, because the plaint i If, in order to recover, nnist prove bis own title ; for althoiigl: in this particular castt the tith' may d(>pend on (h'fendant's legitimaty, the legitimacy does not constitute the direct issue. S ;{S1 — 2. A second rjrccpiion to the general nde that the party on whom lies the onus probandi, as developed on the record, must begin, is that the jdaintilf begins in all actions where ]ui seeks Hubntdutial and unliqiiidiilid (liinitdjix, tlioiiijh (hr (i//inii(i/if<' lie ujkih the ili/rmliiut. This doctrine rests upon the broad ]irinciples of public convenience and justice, and was promulgated by a majority of the judges many years back, as applic.'d)h> to acti(jns for ////(/. Kiaiif/cr, and iiijiirira to tlir jurxdii, and extended (in 1M40) by a consideretl judgment of the Court of (iueen's iWnch.- Its ojteration was subsequently extended to actions of covenant and assumpsit, and indeed, as it wouhl seem, to a// (ivfioiix, when; the jilaintilf is seeking to recover actual danniges of an iiii'iK<rrftiiiii(l amount.'* ^ -JSU. This second exception, however, does not extend to cases wliere the jilaintilf seeks to recover a debt, or a liquidated demaml in money;' since in such actions, unless a specific denial of the claim be placed on the record, the plaintiff is not nqiiired to give any evitlence as to its amount. Neither does such exception apjilv where the damages sought to be recovered, though technically tinli<piiilated, are obviously nominal i'* nor where they are admitted ' I><.ci'. Hmv. IH'.'H (Vaa^flmii, IJ.). ' III M.mi.t")'. Wliiill. |si.), ail iic- tioii liy a Milii itiii'sili'ik lur \vniii);liil (lisiiiiHsiil, wliii'h (li'I'c'iiilaiit jiiNtilii'il liv ])l<'ailiii^ iiiisi'iiiiiliii't (III Ills pait, plallltllT Wa^ hi III I'litllli'il til li(>i;iii, S'ti jiulniiH'iit llii'ii'iii (li'livcicil liy lid. Di'iiiiian. (I'lirkc, II., novxr us- Miiitcil tn tliis i!Xi'i')itiiiii, liiit waM III' 1)11 wlmm tlio liiiitiii'ii iiT ni'iiiit i.iy mij;lit til lir;:iii "), Sfn, aUo, ('uitii V. .Iiuiirt, lH,i;(. " S. 11 Fill. V c. TmImii-, IS'il. ♦ WiMiilpilf r. |',.||M, iHIT (I'lllkii, II.) ; FdwIit c. CdsIit, IsjN J,il. Ti'ii- tcidi'ii) ; lliiiifii'lil r. .Siiiiili, |,m;|; U. S ('. ISS.J. Kill. X.WII. r. '.'. • IIimIkcs c. lli.l.lir, lNl.l(llavl"y, ulwu)(t of ii|iiiiiiia timt " iu all cu^ "< J.); Jauknou i;. iinHkoth, islit ^iil.) CHAP. III.] WHEN PLAINTIFF MUST BEGIN. liy the tlefondant, so fur as amount is concornod;' nor whoro tlioy can be asoertaiiioil l»y nion^ (iomputatiou, as, for instance, wliero tlie notion is lu'oii<»}it on a bill of oxchiingc or a jtroniissory note; '■' nor where the pLiiiitilF will not say whotlior or not he intends to proceed for t)ul)stantial damages.' i^ ''384. A second general ridt> as to the right to begin is, that if Hie record contaiiiH srvoral ismifn, mid the hitrfhon of prnriiKj nmj one ■if thfin /irs on thp plaintiff, he is rnfif/rd to hcgin prodded he rill undertake to (jive evidence upon it.* This ride will equally prevail, though it clearly appears, as matter of calculation, that i" thw ilt'fendunt should eventually suecseed on a certain one of the issues, the proof of wljich lies upon him, the plaintiff will recover nothing on the issue which lies upon him.' lUit the proviso at the (tnd (tf the rule constitutes a material part of it; and, therefore, if a mere :'laim in general terms for an unlicpiidated money diMnand has been adde<l to some special claim for li(iui<lat('d damages, and the defendant, while confessing and avoiding the special claim for the li(]ui(bitcd amount, specifically denies that made in general terms for the unliquidatcil amount, such a denial will not entitle the (tlaintiff to begin, unless in fact he intends to rely on the claim which has thus been made in general terms for an unliquidated amount, and to udtluce evidence in support of it." The effect of the proviso is, in short, this: that it must be the object of an opt^ning to e.xplain to th"? jury the facts which th(> witnesses are going to prove. kj .'IS'). Sometimesthoburthenof proof of someone or more issues lies upon the plaintiff, while that of proving others lies upon the defendant. Under such (iircurastanccs the plaintiff may (at his own option) either go into the whole cose in the first instance, or else elect to only give evidence with regard to those issues which ' Tiiiiliill r. IJiiskott, IHdl (Krlo, niHng Iloinan i-. Tlioiniison, l.s.'H; C.J.). Kaitii v. Mliityio, iN.l.); Ouko- ' Oiuiniim V. I''iinnftr, 1849; R.S.C. loy "• <'(>ilili»'ii, l^lil (Kyliw, .I.\ Sno 1S8;», Old. X.X.XVl. r. .•):. Ki1k« r. Hilliiiy. IH.VJ." whom't.. nn ' t'liupiiiiiii 1. lUwHon, IN^.V action for i^doiIs sold, ilifiticjatit * KawliiiH ii. J)onl)()ro\if^li, 1810 plcadid, i«xri|it un to l.ill/., thu (l.d. DciiiiianV p'lui'al JHsiiit, and ufl lo that, huui a * Ciipim c. Widls, lH»;jrilolfo, 11.); (i|).cial jilfu. Thu plaintitT'h jiar- rcropiisi'd in Month r. MillnM, 181(1. ticiilars limited his doniaiid to l.>0/., * Smart v. Huviht, 18;M (I'arkn, and it wa-. Imld (Ld. CainidMill) tlutt U.); Miila v. Uddy, 1834 (id.); oTor- dufundunt Hhould l)«>giu. •JTl i '• F;,ii>7;y'^K in kkim-v. [PMir 11. W^^- IT^ he is him?=r1f l)oui)d in ];vovp, reiprving flio right of ruhuttiiig liis ailvorsiiry's luool's, 1m ths-^ «% .'lit if tho hitter cstalilishiiig a priniii facie case in sujuiort uf tlic i^savs wiiii-h lie u\nm him.' Tim hist- naniPil course \», in practice, most usually adopted ; and if it is followed, the defendant may have a special reply on the plainfifr's fresh evidence, while the plaintil'' will he entitled to the general reply or the whole case. If, however, the plaint itf at the outset thinks fit to call any ovidenot to repel the defendant's ease, ho will not ho permitted to give i'urther evidence hy way of reply ; in other words, he "cannot sjdit his case ;" since if such a privi- lege were allowed to a plaintiiF. tlio defendant, in common justi('(», might claim the same, and the proceedings wouM run the risk of being extended to a very inconvenient length." S '•W\. Accordingly, in an action hy the indorsee of a hill against the acceptor, where the only issue was on ii defence denying the indorsement, the plaintiff was not allowed to re.st his case at first on testimony given to identify the intlorser's handwriting, and after evidence for the def 'ni '• had heen given to ahow that plaiiitill liimsflf was too poor to hrc e discounted the hill, and that he liud disclaimed all kn<n 'edgt> ol. it, to call hy way of mjily evidence to show that, in point ( i lact, plnintiff actually had dise()unt<'d the instrument.'' A fiir'lnr illustration of the same principle will he found on a later pagc,^ S MS7. The ijuesti(. respecting the right to hegin or to rejily is a matter of practice and regulation upon which the presiding jutlge must exercise his discretion. Acconlingly, the court will not Interfere with his decision, unless i', he clearly j)rovod, not only that the ruling on this point was nuniifiKflii inoin/, hut that it has occasioned suhstantial injustice.* It will not grant a now trial, 1+^ ' l-'iirnioily, when oitlu-r \>y plead- a different courHe was, indeed, pcr- iiig or iKitii't', tile (it-fi'iirt! waM known, niifti'd ; N«>d (|y. if it l)e ullowi'd now. thu uluiiililT wuH bound to o|K>n lim '' Ji'cohN c. 'J'aiU'lt>n. ININ. Sue, whole caste; Keo.s i'. Sniilii. 'HU5; uIho, N/iii^lit c. Wilcox, 16J0. but tuis jimctice having JMiri found ♦ Infiu, § JlH". inconveiiiont, hiw b«M>ii abandoned: ' Mi-uHilfoKJ r. l''r<H'inun, 18.V); browiio I'. Miiriiiy, IH'JJ (Abbott, Kdwaitls r. MutthewH, INl". See, C.J.); Hliaw v. Keck, 1N.)3. See also, lliirrell r. .NidioUon. lN;i;i (Id. Penn e. Jack, INUU. Doninaii); Jiird i: lii).:giui«ou, Ibill " Urowno v. Murray, 1H25 (Ab- Hucknniu i'. l-'ernie, l«;tM; Dai v, bott, C.J.); Syivifter v. Hall. \H-id lUaMie, ISiH; Itooth t<. AlilliiM, IHlli; (id.\ In WilliuMw I'. l>aMe-. \h:]A. < i!i| m.iu c Euidua, l«ll (_roleiidg«\ 272 CHAP. III. J IM'Li: liKSI'EL-TINO THK K'PIHT SO It!'.! 1.*'. merely Wause the jml^f iiuc I'itluT uiliniucl fv!'.. n : in ;•«;.!_/ w' 'oh shruld in stridiiesH luive boeii prfxhutMl in '11)1,111 oi th«i jilaiiitiff's origiiiivl case,' or has prevented the p'-iiii iff l?'."n (nulling witnesses in anticipation of the defendan'/s (<!;»•, prjvid'.'d ,mw]\ \vitne8.ses ho suhserjuently examined in reply .^ § ;W7*. The right to begin, however, usually diaws after it, hotli in civil and criminal proceedings, whenever the ativersriry od<luw)» evidence to the jury in support of his ease, Home right of reply.' The right of reply thus conferred may be either (a) a right to make a further speecli in nsjdy to the a Iversary'b case, or (b) u right to r/i/l priilfitrr in reply to such case. $i 'M<7\. With these prefatory remarks, civil and criminal easeft must be scjiarately considered. S tiHTu. In civil cast-s a right even to nuike a speech in reply is not conferred by the mere commenting o: i cash-book, whirli luw been used to refn^sh the memory of one of the a<lverso witnes-ses, or even by a reference to parts of this book, not looked at by such witness,* nor by the produt-lion of a pajjcr, which the judge has called for in onh^r to satisfy his consctiencie.* Neither will tho I)laiiitiff be entitled to a siM-ech in reply, because, in the course of the trial, it has become noces-sary for the defendant to cal! witnesses to inform llic Jtidijc up<Hi a question respecting tl •' admissibility of ' evidence." S ;}H7c. In criminal oases where e; vral jtrison.^r?, are jointly in- dicted, and one of them calls witnesaoe, t'. '■ oum' , i f' I'tho prosecutor has a htrict right to reply generally, \l '^ cluirf; 1 be a joint ohe, and the evidence affects the prisoners gtaii Tsy. If, however, tli(! charges be separate (as for stealinL; and rec'iv 'ngy, or the d'"enc(> ))e a separate one (as an alibi), counsel *" ihe jir )secution has not a general, but only ■>■ sjwciul, repl; ai ! • uist iu his reply confine his remarks to the ease of the party for whom witnesses have a[>penn!d.' J.); !)<»« V. Kowlaiuls, IHIO ^iil.); Mi'icnr f. Wluill. isi,); (.io;ich v. ]iiK"ll. lNl.i(rollock, (• B.). ' Williiiiiis I DttvioH, ls;J3; Doo V. lt(iw«'r. Ik.jI. » .'^iiiilh -■. Miirrable, XHA'l. ' lU-Ht ■Oh Thi- lliuld to llnjin," 83, anil chmoh thom collccU'd. ♦ I'ullun V. White. 1.SJ8 (Ik'st, T, \OI.. I. 273 CI.). ' DowliiiK V. riuifjun, 1824 (Iivst, O.J.V • liurvov '•. Mifclii'II. ISIl (I'arkp. 11.}: iN.voV »'. MiM'stii'T. IKIH {lA. Kilf!tli<in)iit;h). Suo unto, § L'.'i. ' li ■. lliiycH. l«;wa'iiike, 11., anil <'<)ltiiian, J.I; U. c. lUuikburn, IHiA ('ialfoiinl iwA Williumij, •IJ.); U. v. I Si'' f|W j\ " 1 IB 1 ill ^Ri ^wi : m i PRACriCK A8 TO CALLING EVIDKNCE IN UKPLY. [iT. II. Again, " if tlio only oviilcnoo called on the part of a prisoner is ovidt^ncc? to cluiractcr, although the counsel for the prosecution is entitleil to the reply, it will ho a matter for his iliscretion whether he will use it or not. Cases may occur in which it may be fit and proj)er to do so." ' S MS7i). It has not boon clearly dot^ided whether the counsel for the plaintiff or the prosecution will be entitled to reply, if tho defendant, without fl^/f/»r7H// rnV/rwr/*, opens new facts ; hut tho better opinion is that no such right can be r/tiimcd, thotigh tho judge may, in a flagrant case, permit its exercise.* i5 Uf^S. As to the nattiro of tho t'vi(lnnr which may be called in reply, tlie remarks made on a previous page to the effoot that the party beginning is "not allowed to split his ease,"' must in tho first place be borne in mind, llegard also must be had to tho oiroiinstaneos of the individual case, and considerable latitude will necessarily be granted to tho judge in the exercise of his discretion.* Thus, where a plaintiff in ejectment made out a primA facie case as heir-at-law, which was met by a will being proved for the dt>fendant, he was permitted, in reply, to put in a subsequent will whereby the estates claimed were devised to himself; for although this will proved him to bo entitled to the premises as devisee, and thus set up a title dilfcreiit from that on which ho originally relied, it operated also as a revocMition of the former will, and thus deniolislied the defendant's case.* Indeed, in one ease^ where tho plaintiff in an accident case originally offered evidence to show that (he defendant was at Layton at a given time, and the defen- dant had called witnesses to show that lie was th«»n at Richmond, the judge refused to exclude further witnesses, tenderetl in reply by the plaintilf to ])rovo tliat tl»e defendant was not at Uichniond, hut at Layton, at tho time in cpiestion." On thedflier hand, where the .Tnidim. lS:iit (Williiims, J.'; \\. v. Trevflli, 1HS2 (Hawkins, J.); U. v, Kiiiii, ISH.'J iStc|)lH'ii, J.). ' KeHoliillDii of tlio jddf^cH, 1>*;J7, r(>|>iirtei| "('.&!'. ()T(). ' Creriir r. Soil.., 1NJ7 (I,<!. Ton- fenli'iO. See, in fiiviiur of tlie riirht, 11. r, llotnt), 1777; U. v. Hi>fiii>l(l, 1NJ4 (Abliott. r.J.); 11. I', t'liililii, IH.'M (Vark. J.); lte«t " n„ Thf Itiijht til Itnfin," 02 1*4 ; iipiiiist it, Ho8t, id. 94— »»; Fiiith v. M Intyro, lH3o 274 (I'lnko. \\.)\ Ste|.ll(>lis V. Wel.h, 1S;(,^; H. r. ;\liili^'(l"ll, I7!l-I (I.il. K'eiivnii); Niiinh i\ Ilni\vii,IHUi(I'ollock,('.U.). ' Siiiuii, § .'IN. « Wiiy:lit /•. Wil.nx, IH.V). • i)oe ('. linsli'V (I<il. I)einil!m). Sell (|;i. iiM to tile jneMeiit Jinictice. See W.S.C. iH.s:i,()i-.|. \XI. r.'Jl.MMi! Oiil. Will. r. (i. cited iinte. ^ :;n|. ' HritrjTH r. Ayimwoitli, l«.iH([,ii. I)«>niiiiiiri. This cuNe (Mirttiinly cui lien the jirivilej^o of uddiieiiig ovitloiico LH. III.] PllACTICK AS TO CALLING KVIDKXCK IN HKPLY. issue Wiis as to the souihIiicss of a liorsc, which was oxhil)itt!d to the jury during tlic tlcfciHiiint's caw, the phiititiff wiia not iillowcd to recall his veterinary witnesses, who had possessed an ojipf)rtunity of inspecting the horse before llu! plaintiff's case had been dosed, but had only seen him on the view in (luestion, to give tlieir opinion respecting his soundness.' S ;{8!), In civil cases in which evidenc(> is taken by adidavit umler R 8. C. 188;}, Order XXXVIII., it is expr.'ssly provided by R. 27, — in accordance with the jiractico described in the jtreceding section, — that the plaintiff's aflidavits in reply " shall bo confined to matters strict />/ in rc/i/i/."'^ § 39t). With regard to the nature of the evidence which may be 'jailed in roply in criminal cases, sufficient guide will for the most part bo obtained from what has already been .said as to the pnictiee in civil cases. But in criminal co-ses it is further a rule that on the trial of public proKcciitioiifi, whether for felony or misdemeanor, (lirvitlij instituted ttij the C'rcwii, and conducted personally by the law oilicers of the Crown, but not on prose(;utions merely directed by them,'' such law of!ic(«rs are in htrictness entitled to reply, even if no evidence be adduced on the part of tlie defendant.* As, liowever, ill roply t" itH extrtiiit' limit; for (dtliiMi^fli the iiliiiiititY WIIS lit lilierty to ilis|)i-(ivt' tlie ulilii Ity sliowiiij; ti.'it the (lefflidallt wiih not lit Iticliiiioiiil, yot wIk'u the witnes.sc.t went on to jirovii ttiiit lie wiiH lit I.aytoii. they tliey not only pive ('\ iili'ncK wliiili on^fht to have lii'cii siiliniitti'ii to tiie jury ill tlie livst instainc, hut con- iiniu'il that which was actually niveii in chief, and wiiidi. consiMiiinitly, slioulil liave lieoil tili-ll exllillistod (sei- note (t to y. < '. Ji]). HH), 1 70.) ' OhImii-u v. Thoinitsoii, IM.)!* (Kr- skiiii', .1.). • Hut this rultuiiniemsto have been disrepiidi'd ill rcacock i'. llaiper, IHTH. Scd qu. ■' My II leHolutioii of the jndf^cB coiiii- to ill issT, anil iciiortiMJ in 6 St. Tr. N. S. ]). ;M, it wiik rcMilvcd: " Thiit in thoNc Crown ciini'm in whicii the .\tt.-(!in. and Soi.-(!en. is ]icr- Hoiiiiily enpif^i'd, ii re|ily. when- no witiic.NNcs 111'' ciiIIihI for the ilffeiicc, is to bo allowed, us it lij^lit. to tlii' eounst'l for the down, and in no otheiH." It had before this, in H. r. Cliristie, IN,-)8, been held that tho privilejre does not extend to the .\tt.- <!en. of tlie County I'lilatine, uud that wliere HUch ])roseciition was not (Minducted by a law ollicer in jieison, it did not extend to a |iro.secutioii iliicrled bvthe I'onr L;iw Itiiai'd ; U. v. Meck«ithjs.-),s |l\|es. .1.'; hut thiitit did llpltly to i'ost-Ullice ri'o.HeciitioiiH, and that it extended to the,Sol.-(ien., us well as to the Att.-tiell. : U. V, Toiikley. ISIili (Mellor, J.); K. V. Harrow, lH(>(i. With respect to tho Att.-dnll. of the I'rince of Wales, seo Att.-(»t'n. of r. of Wales r. Cross- iniiii, |N(ili. The uullmrities us tu the Alt. -(fen. 's lijrht of v jily uro collected '.' SI. Tr. N. S. Itllit. • Hoolntioii of the juilp'- 111 l.S;n, re|.orted 7 < '. \ 1'. fi7<i: It. <. Home, 1777 n.d. Miiiisliel.n; It. r. Maisthn, lN-'!t(l,(l. TeMteid.ll). The sniiie un- ju-t rule |lleMlll« III till- lievt line sidll ol the (iUi I II .-> ]', III li I )i\ . in all cases ''4 27'. t2 mi fc rj ^H • t ii H l| 1 1 -'ii iHll ^ I BH^ ' i i ATTORNEY-OKNKRAL KXTITLKD TO RKPLY. [PAUT H. this is a privilege, or ratlior u jirtTogiitive, opposed to tliu ordinuiy practici' of the courts, and is, (>nipluiticully, " more honoured in the breach than the obsorvunco," it should bo watched with jetilouHy. Mr. Home, in 1777 observed, that the Attorney-Goiu>ral would be gi'ievously embarrassed to produce a single argument of reason or justice on behalf of his claim.' As the rule which precludes tlie counsel for the prosecution from addressing the jury in reply, when the defendant has culled no witnesses, has been long thought to afford the best 8(>ourity against unfairness in ordinary trials, a natural suspicion anses that a contrary rule may have been adopted, and may sti/l be followcnl, in 8lut»( prowHaitions, for a less legitimate purpose. It is to be hoped that, ere long, the Legislature will int«'rfere, and intnxluce one uniform practice in thj trial of political and ordinary offenders.* wht*ru th<' I'lowii ih coiicorntH M. of fonniition nisjMictinfrthoHuhjocts dis- (.'hundori (', ComrH. of inl. ll«v., 1851. euHfWHl in thiH chuptor urn i-itt'orrtMl t<> ' 1777, !2(( How. Ht. Tr. ti«;J. to Mr. UohI'm vf'>ik "(M Tht Itiyht to ' ThuH« who wiitb fur fmlher iu- lityiii." 276 CHAr. III.] AMKKICAN NOTK8. 2761 AMKKICAN NUTKS. Burden of Proof. — In tho law of uvideiuM^ tliia phrase me., j ono of two (li.stiiict tilings. " I'roof " means oitlmr (I) •• provinjj," t»r (2) evicloiKU' to prove. In otlu^r words, cither tlie result of evidene*', in producing atlirniative belief, or the means u.sed in |uroUucing that result. Therefore, it means either a mental statu or thu meauH of producing one. When incorporate*! into the phrase " burden of proof," and the latter applied to the trial of causes, where an issue has b<^en raised as to thu oxiutene** of u particular fai;t or facts, the phrase necessarily mwins (1) The duty of creating by a certain pre- [xuideranee an attirmative Indiuf on thu part of the tribunal in the existeiuic of the fact or facts in issue, or (2) Thu duty of introduc- ing the evidence necessary to establish facts which produce or pre- vent such athrniative belief. That these two bu^lens are distinct from e;i(!h other; that they may and often do rest at particular times oil ditt'erent parti<>8 to the litigatitm, is {>erhaps obvious. It is, however, rather the rule than thu extu^ption that they are suitably distinguished in pnictice. It seems lulvisable, therefore, to consider their respective differences. (1) ItritDKN' OK F..H'rAiiMsiirN'u. — With the placing of this «»»« the rules of evidence have nothing whatever to do. It has la-en determined iM'fore the time comes for thu use of evidence by the issue as raised by the pleadings. Under tiie established rules of pleading, the parties litigant have formed an issue of fact: — un allegation of fact a.sserted by one party and denied by the other. Onu party has, tlierefore, assumed, by asserting the truth of a eon- tested fact, tlie athrmativo of tiie issue. Hy so (h)ing, hu has, as a matter of sul)stantivu law (not under a ruluof evidence), undertaken the responsibility of resting tim result of the entire case upon his ability to produce in the minds of the tribunal, by a certain rtupiired preponderance of evnJence, an atlirniative belief in the existence of tho fact or facts whiuli hu has a.sserted and his o|)ponent has denied. In (itlier words, lie mint jirove his case. He lias assiinietl the bur- den of eshibli.shing it. riicre is no such burden on tin* other siih'. If that interest can mi.rely prevent the neces.sary attirmative belief by the party having this burtlen of establishing, it succeeds. All this has nothing to do with the rules of evidence. As a matter of pleading or siibHtiiiitive law, whoever substintially luus the attirma- tive of the issue :is determined by the pleadings, has whe burden of establishing his case. " Hu who attirins must prove." lUanchard r. V'oung, 11 Cush. ;W1, .'Wo (IH.'Wt); McClure i: I'ursell, ♦i Ind. 'XM) (IH.Vi); Seavy e. DearlM.rn. lU N. II. Aol (1S41)); Southworth ,: Hoag. 12 III. 44(1 (IMiT); Ciizler o. WiUel, H2 111. 322 (1M7(3) ; UakuH v. Ittu-rison, 24 I 2Ht^ AMKKK AN N(>Tr-H. Ll'AIlT II. la. irn (18(57); Hoyal Ins. Cu. r. SrliwiiiK, S7 Ky. .nO(lSHS\; S.M.tt i: W.ioil, Hi C;il. ;bs (l«S!»)i Mt'in.'iu;imi r. Mciinl, «»:,' N. V. M/S, 4.M (l«7ri); Clark r. Hills, (17 'h-x. Ill (1S.S(5); Kast Tfiiiu'ss.-.MSic. Ji. It. r. Sli'wart, I,*} I.t-a, VSJ (ISHI) ; Kstato (»! Kiilf. 7:\ Wis. l\\ 4.'iH (ISSU); lUu'.lw v. Krascr, 7 Low. Can. liep, 472 ( I«">«) ; I^'linian I'. McQucfii. <•.". Ala. r»70 (IHS(I); McQuofn /•. IV-oplc's Hank. Ill N. C. r.o«) (IHUL'); Krnt c. Wliitf, L'7 ln«l. .'!'.•(» (ISCWJ) ; .MotlVt f. MotTft, IM) la. 4IL' (IM'.U); MrK.Mi/.ic v. Strolcii. 4.S 111. App. 410 {IH'.rj) ; Vdun r. Lainont, TiC. .Minn. L'KJ (1S<M). So wlu'iv the tlofcnci) to a pnmussory note is payment, tlio biinlfn of cstalilishinK i.s on tin; dcfnidant. Kondall v. Mrowiison, 17 X. II. 186 (18<)0). So whore the defence is the existence of fraud known to tiio phiintiff. Iteevo v. Liverpool, &c. Ins. Co., .'{*.) Wis. AL'O (187(5). The saint! rules as to tiie effect of the pleadinf^s to deter- mine the burden of establishing obtain in ei|uity, as at law. I'usey r. Wright, ;{l I'a. St. .'587 (1H58). " In both, the jiarty maintaining the atlirmative of the issiie has it cast tijion him." ////«/. " It is an establishe<l rule of evidence in equity, that '.vher(! an answer whieh is put in issue, admits a fact, and inuists upon a distinct fact by way of avoidance, the faet admitted is established, but the fact insisted upon must be proved ; otherwise the admission stands as it the fact in avoidance had not Ix'en averred."' CliMnents r. Moore, (1 Wall. 290, ;iir» (18(57) ; MeChee Irrigation Ditch Co. *-. Hudson, Ho Tex. r>87 (18'.>;{) In what particular instances the burden of establishing is on the ])laintitT or on the defeiulant is not a cpiestion in the law of evidence. '1 II. <illirmative of the issue may, as a matter of pleading, rest upon the defendant when equally satisfactory a /irlnrl reasoning would ])lace it upon the defendant. As is said in Starratt c. .Mullen, 1 18 MuflH. ri7(> (1H,S'.>) : " I'ndoubtedly nuiny matters whieh, if true, would show that the plaintiff never had a caus<< of action, or even that he never had a valid contract, must Im' plcailcd and proved by the defendant; for instance, infancy, coverture, or, probaldy, illegality." See also Sparks e. Sparks, ol Kans. l',»."> ( !8<.t;{). Hut with all this the law ol cvidem-e is not dirciMly concerned. Kvi- dence takes uj» the proceihiro of the trial where pleading leaves it. Iiiderd Henthain says with great truth (Works, Vol, \'I. p. I'l I) : '•This topic . . . iiinis pri.hiiiidl . . . seems to licloiig rather to I'ruce- dure than to Kvi<lence." Kvidenee is limited t.i facts from which a judicial tribunal may infer the existence of a fiuit in issue. The detinition, therefore, exchidcs m"re argument. Yet the burden of establishing, fixed and unshifting, lies upon the party who has the affirmativo of the issue, during the stage of argument, after the eviilencc is all in, and throughout much legal reasoning, whether relating to rules of law or issue of fact. Thcref'ire while biinlen of jiroof (uuicerns the law of evidence, it concerns it merely because evidence is part of the law of procedure. it niAP. III. I AMKItlCAN NOTKH. 27<l« Whi'r«' 11 |i:irty has ussiiiiit'd without (»l)jiM'tioii tho Ixinlon nl fs- tiililisliiiiK' ill tilt' trial court, hi; will nut hv pcnuitttMl to coiiti'inl iit t\w u|i|iiT rourt tliat 111' w TiiUKtully assuiiiud that hurdon. I'i'iijaiiiiii t: Slu-a, h:\ la. 'MJ (IS'.M). Tho burden uf ostahlisliiii^j may iiivolvu proof of ni'f,'ativo aver- iiiciits or liicis. " Whilst till* party haviui; the atiiriiiutivc ol' tlm issui- IioIiIh th« burdi'ii of proof, an a K*'»('ral ruh* it is not nooessary that the issue siioiild always bi* pri-senced iu an aniniiativi* I'oriii. If this were rfipiisiti', a iiwre ehauK'i' iu the lorni of tho issue woulil change tho burden ot proof, without regard to thu substance and etVeet of tho issue Chirk I'. Hills. (57 Tex. Ml (IS.SO). So III an action for nialiciotis pnisecution, tho jilaintitT must show that the prnceediiigs were iiistitiiled ii'if/iniit probable cause. King i: C'ulvin. II K. !. ns'2 (1H77); Amus ». Snider, ()'.) 111. ;t7l5 (1M7.*{); Smith e. ZcmI, ."•'.> Ind. :UV2 (1S77). In an action for negligence the plaintiff may b« rorpiirod to show that cortaiii warnings were intt given. (Jroany v. Long Island H. K., HU N. V. Ill) (ISSC). On a complaint against the keeper of a liilliard table for allowing a minor to |ilay billiards at his tablo irltliniit the consent of his parent or giiantian, the burden of proving that the parent or guardian did not consent is on the State. (!onyer.s e. State, ,'i() (la. IH.'J (1H7.'{). .So in an action ag.iinst a surety on a note, where the surety has given notice of his intention ni>t to (fon- tinuo liable, the burden of proof is on the |ilaintitT to show that tho money could imt have been collected if suit had been brought when notice was given. .Strickler m. Ibirkholder, 17 I'a. St. I7<» (18(51). In like minnor, on a bill in equity to eanoel a deed, on the ground that it was nev. r executed, it is incumbent on the complainant to prove the negative allegation. Kerr /•. Frei'man, .'{.'{ .Miss. L".»2 ( 1H-.7). So in an indietmcnt for selling liipior to a sl.ive without an order was from his owner, it i.-- the diitv of the State to prove that no order given. Hate /•. Kvans, o .loiies, I'.ld (|H."iS), In an indictment for selling guilds //»>^ of the growth, prodiiee, or iimnufactiire of the state, tin* burden is on tlw government to prove this negative averment. Stati' i\ llirsch, I." .Mo. IL'IJ ( 1S70). So on an indictment for selling goods //<»■' tho produce I ir inanufacturo of the riiited States. Com. c. Samiii'l, L' I'iek. III.'! (18'.',. So when' a utitiite gave a civil remedy for cutting logs iritlnmt the owner's consent, the plaintilT must show aMirmativelv the absence of such eon.sent. Little v, Thniiipson, L' (ireeiil. L'L'.S ( iSL'.'t). Hut see to the ( ntrary elTect, Welsh c. State. II Tex. .'tll.S (Is.",}). Hut while the onus of establishing may include proof of negative averments, it does not folluw that the same cogency of proof is re- i|iiired as in proving pnsitivc allegations. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) /. .^^ 4^ :/ U.x it 1.0 1.25 ■ 50 ""^B* mh^s 1.8 M. 1116 -•> Hiotographic Sciraices Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. 14580 (716) 872-4503 V <F \\ •% V* ^^ ^7# O >* ;\ '^f^ wS A V.A V, ) o X"^^ PI, I'' ;i!f I r m\^ U ! ll,* 'ivi ■Itili 276* AMERICAN NOTES. [part II. On a bill in equity for the cancellation of an agreement in writinj^ on the ground that certain representations were false and fraudulent, and the plaintiff's burden of establishing involved proof of certain negative averments, viz. : that one Lea had not invented a new and improved process for making iron and steel ; had not taken out a caveat on the same, and had not transferred the same to a certain companj', the court say : " The degree of proof of a negative allega- tion is seldom measured by that required of an affirmative allegation. In some cases a negative may be positively and conclusively proved, . . . but in many cases this is impossible, and hence the amount of proof required to support the negative jn-oposition and to shift the burden will vary according to the circumstances of the case ; and very slight evidence will often be sufficient to shift the burden to the party having the greatest opportunities of knowledge concerning the fact to be inquired into." Kelley v, Owens (Cal.), 30 Pac. Kep. 696 (1892). Where the burden of establishing involved proof of a negative alle- gation, viz., that no alluvion existed at a certain time susceptible of private ownership, the court hold : " Inasmuch as this involves the proof of a negative and is an exception to the general rule that the party holding the affirmative must prove it, demonstrative evidence is not required, and the burden of proof may be shifted when suffi- cient facts are established to raise a strong presumption in favor of the negative." Succession of Delachaise v. Maginnis, 44 La. Ann. 1043 (1892). This extract, by the way, is an excellent instance of the common confusing of the " burden of establishing " and the "burden of evidence." The first reference is apparently to the bur- den of establishing ; the second to the burden of evidence. " Full and conclusive proof, however, where a party has the burden of proving a negative, is not required, but even vague proof, or such as renders the existence of the negative jirobable, is, in souk! cases, sufficient to change the burden to the other party." l>eardstown r. Virginia, 70 111. ."4 (1875) ; cited with approval in Vigus v. O'Ban- iion, 118 111. 334 (1886). "Where the negative does not admit of direct proof, or the facts lie more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant," the party within wliose knowledge the proof is, is required to produce evi- dence of the affirmative. U. S. v. Hay ward, 2 Gall. 485, 498 (1815). So in an action for a penalty in neglecting, without excuse from the judge of probate, to probate a will, it was held that the onus was on the plaintiff to establish the negative averment of lack of excuse. Smith v. Moore, 6 Greenl. 274 (1830). Probably the onus of the party having the burden of establishing is reliev«-(i of the proof of these facts because of the presumption that sujjpressed evidence is unfavorable to the one who declines to produce it; a feeling embodied in the \\\&x\m, omnia contra spoVuX' it: III CHAP. III.] AMERICAN NOTES. 2766 torem. Lovell v. Payne, 30 La. Ann., Pt I., 511 (1878) ; Great Western R. K. v. Bacon, 30 111. 347 (1863). " Where it is as easy for the plaintiff to prove the negative as it is for the defendant to disprove it, then the burthen of proof must rest upon lain, as that the place where the animal was killed was not in a town or village, or was not more than five miles from a settlement ; but where the means of proving the negative are not within the power of the plaintiff, but all the prftof on the subject is within the control of the defendant, who, if the negative is not true, can disprove it at once, there the law presumes the truth of the negative averment, from the fact that the defendant withholds or does not produce the proof, which is in his hands if it exists, that the negative is not true. In other words, the burthen of proof is thrown upon the defendant to prove the aifirmative against the negative averment." Great Western R. R. /•. Bacon, 30 111. 347 (18G3). Facts well knowx to other Party. — The rule requiring proof of essential negative facts by him who has the burden of establishing is especially modified where such proof includes facts difficult of proof and peculiarly within the knowledge of the other party. Thus where the defendant is charged with the commission of an act without a license or other authority of law, as the fact of such license or authority being one peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, he may be called upon to prove it. State v. Morrison, 3 Dev. 299 (1831) ; Haskill v. Com. 3 B. Mon. 342 (1843) ; State v, Crowell, 25 Me. 171 (1845) ; Shearer v. State, 7 Blackf. 99 t IU\) ; Schmidt v. State, 14 Mo. 137 (1851) ; Wheat v. State, 6 Mo. 455 (1840). On an indictment for selling intoxicating liquor, not being an agent appointed for the sale of the same, it is not incumbent upon the government to prove the negative averment ; but if the necessary facts exist, the onus is on the defendant to introduce evidence to prove them. State v. Shaw, 35 N. H. 217 (1857). On an indict- ment for keeping a ferry without a license, the same rule is applied. Wheat V. State, C Mo. 455 (1840). So on an indictment against a physician for practising without a license. Williams v. People, 121 111. 84 (1887). So in an action against a railroad company, under a statute, for killing stock, the burden of establishing is not on the plaintiff to prove the averment that there was no contract between the company and the owner of the land that the owner should fence. Great Western R. R. v. Bacon, 30 111. 347 (18G3). "When a fact is peculiarly within the knowledge of a party, the burden is on him to prove such fact whether the proposition be affirmative or negative." Robinson r. Robinson, 51 111. App. 317 (1893) ; Clapp /-. Ellington, 87 Hun, 542 (1895). Where the plaintiff is the party to whose case the existejice of a I I 270« A.NiEHICAN NOTKS. [I'AHT II. I'.- ■•! license is essential, he nuist prove it. For example, in a civil action for liquors sold. lUiss v. lirainard, 41 N. H. 250 (18G0) ; Solomon V. Dreschler, 4 Minn. 278 (^ISfJO). To the contrary effect, see Wilson v. ]\Ielvin, 13 Gray, 73 (ISiTJ). " There is no legal presumption that tlie sale is unlawful, and there should hardly l)e, in favor of a defendant who has himself joined in the contract. As against tlie Commonwealth, the legislature have required that the defendant in a criminal prosecution shall prove the authority under which he acts, when charged with a violation of the statutes prohibiting the unlicensed sale of intoxicating liquors ; but they have imposed no such obligation upon parties who seek the enforcement of contracts." Ilmh So where the defendant sets up the illegality of such a contract, it is for him to establish it, even if so doing includes the proof of negative averments. Craig v. Proctor, G R. I. 547 (18G0). The same result is reached by statute in Massachusetts. Pub. Stats. Ch. 214, Sect. 12. Under this section it has been held, speak- ing of the licensee, " If he be invested witli tliat authority only in case certain circumstances exist, it is for the party relying on the license to prove the existence of the circumstances." Com. r. Towle, 138 Mass. 490 (1885). Therefore, in case of a sale on Sunday, it is necessary to show that the persons sold to were guests of tlie licensee's hotel, such sales only being authorized by the license. Burden of Establishing in Criminal Casks. — The pleadings in a criminal case place the burden of establishing upon the govern- ment as to all the essential ingredients of the crime charged. State r. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873). Shaier r. State, 7 Tex. App. 239 (1879) ; Com. /•. ]\rcKie, 1 Gray, 61 (1854) : " The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove all that is necessary to constitute the crime of murder." Com. r. Eddy, 7 Gray, 583 (1856); People c. Garbutt, 17 ^lich. 9 (1808). So of insanity in a criminal case. As the court say on a trial for murder, " The prosecution takes upon itself the burden of establish- ing not only the killing, but also the malicious intent in every case. There is no such thing in the law as a separation of the ingredients of the offence, so as to leave a part to be established by the prosecu- tion, while as to the rest the defendant takes upon himself the burden of proving a negative. The idea that tlie burden of proof shifts in these cases is unphilosophical, and at war with fundamental principles of criminal law." People v. Garbutt, 17 IMich. 9, 21 (1868) ; State /•. Crawford, 11 Ivans. 32 (1873); Fife v. Com., 29 Pa. St. 429 (1857). In a criminal case, where the defence of nh'bi was relied on, the court say that if they are to construe a ruling of the trial judge, that by evoking this defence, " the prisoner changed the burthen of proof under his plea of not guilty, and waived his right under that CHAP, in.] AMERICAX NOTES. 27<i'' c. plea, to demand from the Commonwealtli full proof of his guilt, w(; should be bound to say tliat it was a cruel and monstrous misai)pre- hensiou of the law. . . . But it is very clear that a resort to that kind of evidence neither changes the burthen of proof on the other questions in the cause, nor in any manner entitles the Common- wealth to a verdict against the prisoner without proof of liis guilt beyond reasonable doubt." Fife v. Com. 29 Pa. St. 429 (1857). In a Massachusetts case for arson where the defence of (ilihi was also relied upon, the court sustain a ruling which, indeed, is correct, though using the phrase " burden of proof" indiscriminately as des- ignating the burden of introducing evidence to support the claim of (ilifil (which clearly rested on the defendant as soon as the gov- einment had made out a 2)>'l»ut farl-i case), and the burden of establishing that the defendant was guilty (which at no time left tiie government). ''The proposition was, in substance, that if the defendant sought to establish the fact that he was at a particular place at a particular time, the burden of proof was upon him. But he (the trial judge) modified this statement in respect to its bearing upon the burden of proof which was upon the government to establish the alleged fact that the defendant was present at tiie lire. The substance of the whole ruling was, that if the evidcntie of the defendant which tended to prove an (dUil was such tliat, taken together with the other evidence, the jury were left in reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was present at the alleged fire, they should acquit him. We cannot see that he has any ground to object to this ruling, for it left the evidence whicii tended to prove the (d!'>l, even if it failed to establisli it, to have its full effect in bringing into doubt the evidence tending to prove the defendant's ju'esence at the fire." Com. v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451 (1870). To the same effect see Briceland ik Com., 74 Pa. St. 4(5.3 (1S78). " There is no shifting of tlie burden of proof. It remains upon the State throughout the trial. The evidence may shift from one side to the other. The state may establisli such facts as must result in a con- viction, unless tlie ])resumpti()n they raise be met by evidence, l)ut still the burden of proof is on the State to establisli the guilt of tlie accused beyond a reasonable doubt." State /•. Wingo, Gi> ^[o. ISl (1877). To the contrary effect, that when the defendant in a criminal case relies on the justification of self-defence, he must prove the same by a fair preponderance of the evidence, see Peo[)le r. Schryver, 4ii N.Y.I (1870). Pkoceedinos wrTHOUT Pi.KADiNiis. — Where the legal investiga- tion is of such a niiture that there are no pleadings, the analogy of pleading is so far followed that the burden of establishing lies upon him who asserts the affirmative of the issue as determined by the nature of the investigation. !■'• :!i M ■ i ■ilii rn 2768 AMERICAN NOTES. [part II. As the party offering a will for probate impliedly affirins that the will " was executed with the requisite formalities by one of full age and sound mind, he m\ist prove it." The onus of establishing is therefore on him throughout. Tiiis burden is not shifted by evi- dence of sanity by the subscribing witnesses. Crowninshield v. €rowninsliield, 2 Gray, 524 (18o4) ; Comstock r. Hadlyme Ecclesi- asti(!al Society, 8 Conn. 254 (1830); Ware v. Ware, 8 Greenl. 42 <18yi). TiiK BuKDKN OK EsTAUMSHiNu DOES NOT Shift. — It is hardly necessary to say that this burden of establishing a case does not shift, it cannot shift, sinii)ly because the issue has been fixed once for all by the pleadings, and the rules of jileading do not permit it to be altered during the progress of a trial on those pleadings. Wright V. Wright, 189 Mass. 177 (1885). " AVe understand the doc- trint! to be well settled in this Commonwealth, that the burden of proof nev ■- shifts ; and we think, that in the case we are discussing, and in case at bar, the burden to sliow negligence was upon the plaintiffs from the beginning, and remained on them throughout the trial." Willett v. Rich, 142 .Mass. 350 (1886); Aulls v. Young, !)8 Mich. 231 (1893). In this sense, it is true that "a jiriiiKi facie case does not change the burden of proof." Blanchard v. Young, 11 Cush. 341, 345 (1853). In an action of contract on the warranty of the endorsement on a promissory note, the defendant set np that he was acting as a broker in the negotiation of the note, and that the plaintiff knew the fact. The plaintiff asked for a ruling that the burden of proof was on the <lefendant to satisfy the jury of these facts. Held: that such an instruction was rightly refused. " Although it was incumbent upon the defendant to establish the truth of any fact relied upon by him to overcome the prima facie case which the plaintiff had made out, yet there was no change in the burden of proof in a legal sense. This defence was not a confession and avoidance. It was indeed an assertion of new and distinct facts ; but it tended to establish the negative of the very proposition r.pon which alone the plaintiff could recover ; namely, that his contract was with the defendant in the suit." Wilder v. Cowles, 100 Mass. 487 (1808). It is thought that a certain amount of ambiguity in the use of the phrase "burden of proof," lies in the fact that under the statute laws of many of the states of the American Union, there are no such things as pleadings, — in the scientific sense. The defendant is allowed to set up some kind oi a general issue and introduce, under that traverse, a number of affirmative defences on which, in a more scientific system of pleading, the burden would be on him. For f^xample, under a general issue to a declaration charging negligence, th(^ defendant, it has been held, is entitled to give evidence of contributory negligence. Indianapolis &c. II. R. v. Horst, 93 U. S. CHAP. III.] AMERICAN NOTES. 276« 291 (187C). Under these ciroumstanocs, the burden of proof is said to be upon the defendant to establish tiie defence relied upon l)y a fair preponderance of the evidence. In other words, he has the burden of establishing that issue. As a matter of conmion-law pleading, the defence of contributory negligence is set up by an afiirniative plea. Stone r. Hunt, 94 Mo. 475 (1SS7). It may plausibly be said that in cases like Indianapolis &c. R. R. V. Horst (iibi supra), the burden of estaV.ishing changes, or, as it is said, shifts. Color is given to this suggestion by the fact that while, on the record, the affirmative of the issue seems to be upon the plaintiff, after the afHrmative defence of contributory negligence is set up, the burden of establishing it, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, is upon the defendant. This seeming exception to the rule that the burden of establishing does not change, exists in appearance only. The fact seems to be that the parties are not really at issue on the allegations of the record, and only become so when the defendant states his real defence in the evidence. In other words, the defendant is allowed to raise the issue by his evi- dence, instead of in his pleading. The real issue in Indianapolis &c. II. R. ('. Ilorst was one of contributory negligence, and on this defence the affirmative was on the defendant. Under a scientific system of pleading, this issue would have been revealed before the close of the pleadings, and the burden of establishing definitely ])laoed upon the defendant. Under the system of pleading in use in Indianapolis &c. R. R. r. Horst {iihi siqini), the defendant was accorded the privilege of delaying the time at which he should set np his real affirmative defence until the record pleadings had closed and the trial begun. Another instance may be found in MoCloskey V. Davis, 8 Ind. App. 190 (1893), where the court say: "When a !j;eneral denial is pleaded, all defences may be proved under the issues thus formed, except a set-off or counter claim." (2) BuKDEN OF EviDEvcK. — The duty of introducing evidence to prove or prevent proof of facts in issue is not, like the burden of establishing, a resultant of the pleadings. lis position, as between the parties, is determined, not by the state of the pleadings, but by the logical state of the case. The issue being fixed, the logical interest of one party is to produce an affirmative conviction on the ])art of the tribunal. It is the object of tlie other party to prevent it. Such a state of the evidence as would, if undisputed, produce such affirmative conviction, constitutes a prima ftin'r case. It merely repeats the statement, therefore, in another form, to say that the interest of one party is to establish such a prima facie case, and of the other party to destroy it, either by establishing a prima facie case of his own, or by reducing the probative force of tlie opposing case belo.v the required standard. Should this effort succeed, the neces- sav ■ consequence is that the burden or necessity rests on the first ii! T! :! 27610 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AUT J I. pleader to introduce additional evidence with a view to strengthening' liis former proof into a jirimn fucir case, either by disproving the facts alh'ged against it, or by jjroving additional facts. If, when tiie evidence on both sides is all in, the pleader wlio lias the afhrnia- tive of the issue remains witli what tiie tribunal considers tlic equivalent of a pr'unn facie caso, lie succeeds ; otlierwise, not. Tlie necessity for having the final tip of the scale in his favor lias not clianged since the pleadings placed it on him, however many times the probative scales may have changed in tlieir balance. " Wiieii upon all the facts the case is left in equipoise, the party atHrming must fail." Oaks v. Harrison, 24 la. 17'J (18GS). The BiMiDKN of Evn»r':\('E Shifts. — It follows from what has been said that this burden of introducing evidence to prove or dis- prove a prima facie case may, and frequently does, change from one side to the other. A fair test of where it rests at any particular stage of the case is to answer the question : Against whom would the tribunal decide if no further evidence were introduced ? Applying this test, it is obvious that at the opening of the case the burden of establishing and the burden of evidence rest on the same person. Vriets v. Hagge, 8 Ta. 103, 11)2 (1859). Upon the establishment by him of -A priina facie case, while the burden of establisliing remains, tlie burden of evidence is obviously shifted. Powers v. Kussell, 13 Pick, m, 77 (1832) ; Tolson v. Inland, &c. Coasting Co., G Mackey, 39 (1887) ; Penitentiary Co. v. Gordon, 85 Ga. 159 (1890) ; Ketchum V. Amer. «fec. Exp. Co., 52 Mo. 390 (1873). ' The two burdens are distiiict things. One may shift back and fcrth with the ebb and flow of the testimony. The other remains with the i^arty upon whom it is cast by the pleadings, — that is to say, with the party who lias the affirmative of the issue." Scott v. Wood, 81 Cal. 398 (1889.) " During the progress of a trial it often happens that a party gives evidence tending to establish his allegation, sufficient it may be to establish it prima facie, and it is sometimes said that the burden of proof is then shifted. All that is meant by this is, that there is a necessity of evidence to answer the prima facie case, or it will prevail, but the burden of maintaining the affirmative of the issue involved in the action is upon the party alleging the fact which consti';utes the issue, and this burden remains throughout the trial." Heinemann v. Heard, 02 N. Y. 448, 455 (1875). The su- preme C'jurt of Texas, after saying that the fact that the negative form of the issue does not determine the burden of proving, add, " Much less does the fact that a defendant is forced to maintain the affirmative of some fad, in disproving the plaintiff's ^ase, shift upon him the burden of proof." Clark v. H.'.lls, 67 Tex. 141 (1886) ; Small V. Clewley, 62 Me. 155 ri873) ; Jones v. Simpson, IIG U. S. G09 (1885); Harris v. Harris, 154 Pa. St. 501 (1893). CHAP. III.] AMERICAN NOTES. '27(5" WIhm'p a (It'od prima furle correct was ])nt in evidence by tl)e plaintiffs in aid of their title, the burden of introducinj,' evideneo to show a forgery is on the defendant. "The appellees having made a j'fivKf facie case of the genuineness of the instrument the burden »)f proof was cast v.jion the intervenor to rebut this." Smith v. (iilluui, SO Tex. 120 (ISOI). In an action for negligently over- driving a horse the court say : " A prima facie case was made by the introduction of evidence tending to prove that the horse, at the time of the delivery to the defendant, was apparently in good con- dition. If the evidence had closed at this point, the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover, provided the jurors were satisfied from its evidence that the horse was in a healthy condition at th'3 time of its delivery to defendant. Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, the burden of evidence was cast on the defendant to show by some substantial' evidence chat he exercif sd ordinary care in the use of the animal. When this burden was met, then the final question for the jury was whether the whole evidence preponderated in favor of the plaintiff as to the constitutive facts of its cause of action, i. e., that the defendant was negligent in the use of the horse, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of its death. The burden of proving these issues by a preponderance of evidence was imposed on the plaintiff by the pleadings, and we can conceive of no principle, recognized in our code of civil procedure, that would re- lieve the plaintiff of this onus." Marshall Livery Co. v. McKelvy, o5 Mo. App. 240 (1893). " In every case in which there is prima facie evidence of any right existing in any person, the burden of proof is always on the ])erson or party calling such right in question." Walker v. Detroit, &c. R. R., 47 Mich. 338, 351 (1882). Sc where a plaintiff claims an easement by prescription, the onus of proving the easement claimed is on him. When the necessary facts are shown, the prima facie case is established. If the defendant's position be that he was under a disability at the time of the user claimed to be adverse, the onus of introducing evi- dence to prove such disability is on the defendant. Davidson v. Nicholson, 59 Ind. 411 (1877). So far as proof of ])artioular facts goes, it is undoubtedly true that the party whose case reuuires proof of any particular fact is under the onus of introducing evidence to prove it. Lehman Bros. n. McQueen, G5 Ala. 570 (1880); Clements v. Moore, 6 Wall, 299, 315 (18G7); Freeh i>. Philadelphia, &c. R. R., 39 Md. o74 (1873). If such particular fact, however, is involved in the proof of the aiKrmativc of the issue in the case, it is saflicient for the party not having the burden of establishing, to create an equipoise or reasonable doubt, according as the case may be civil or criminal. As an instance of the ambiguity arising from the use of the term, I ' 1 i- !■ 276" AMEItK'AN NOTKS. [PAIJT II. "burden of proof," to indicate the burden of introducing evidence to prove particular facts, see Burton /'. Blin, 23 Vt. lol (ISril), where the learned judge (Chief Justice Kedtiekl) says : " As a general rule, it is fair to say, that the burden of i)roof rests upon both parties, to make out their own part oi the case." Pkksumptionh ok Law. — It is said that " presumptions of law shift the burden of proof.'' This is not true of the burden of estab- lishing. It may be quite correct as to the burden of evidence, if the presumption in question covers a fact in evidence. As to such fact, there is a levunifn probiithni'iK in I'avor of the party having the onus. A presumption of law is a fact to be proved, rather than evidence to prove a fact. As lias been said, the burden of evidence is, at first, on the party who has the burden of establishing, and afterwards on the party who has to meet an amount of adverse evidence equivalent to a prima facie case. A jiresumption of law as to fact covered by it estab- lishes a prima facie case. That is its precise object and effect. It follows that the party who is able to prove the existence of a pre- sumption of law in his favor has, in so doing, made out a prima facie ca.«'e as to the fact covered. The burden of disproving it is cast on the opposing interest. In other words, the burden of evidence is shifted. When conflicting evidence on the point covered by the presumption of law is gone into on the initiative of the opposing interest, the presum]ttion of law is fumfiis offlrio, as such. The presumption of fact on which it is founded loses its prima facie value as a levamen j>ro/»<ifioiiis, but retains any probativo force. So in an action on a promissory note, where the defence is lack of consideration, the court charged that the burden of proof was on the defendant to prove such lack of consideration. Held, that this was erroneous. " In one sense, a burden of proof would be upon tlie de- fendant a particular burden, to rebut the prima facie case maile by the production of a genuine note, but the general burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show a consideration for the notes, and that burden does not shift. . . . Here the plaintiff declares, in his writ, that the notes were given for value. If not so given, they were not the contracts upon which the defendant could ye legally held. The plaintiff is required to prove this essential allegation. He can rely on the presumption which arises from the note itself. But there being other evidence on both sides, which has a beariuji upon the question of consideration, the burden remains upon the plaintiff upon all the evidence produced, including the note itself and the presumption that arises from it, to establish what he, in the declaration in his writ, has necessarily alleged." Small /•. Clewley, 62 Me. 155 (1873; Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R. I. 76 (1868) ; Manistee Bank v. Seymour, 64 Mich. 59 (1887) ; Wilcox v. Henderson, 64 Ala. 5;55 (1879) ; Coffin v. Grand Rapids, &e. Co. 136 N. Y. 653 CHAP. III.] AMERICAN NOTK."*. 27fJI» (189.^); Kitner /•. Whitlock, 88 111. r,l;{ (IS7S); Temple Street Cable R. K. v. Hellinan, 10.'3 Cal. <)o4 (181)4). A fair instance of the effect of a presumption of "law in shifting the burden of evidcMice may be seen in the deftMu^e of insanity in criminal causes. According to tlie better opinion the bunion is on tlui ifovernment to prove sanity — beyond a reasomihle doubt. State r. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 400 (1871) ; People c. (}arbutt, 17 Mich. <) (18G8); State v. Crawford, 11 Kaus. 32» (1873) ; (Jom. r. Kddy, 7 Gray, .'583 (185(5). At the opening of the trial the burden of proving the defendant guilty rests on the government. The burden of introducing evi- dence of the facts necessary to sustain that burden of proving, in other words the establishment of a prima facie case, is also on the government. Kut to make out such a prima facie case, so far as sanity is con- cerned, the government is not required to produce affirmative evi- dence as part of its original case. It is a presumption of law that all men are sane. If the accused rests his defence on the claim that he is insane, and there is no other evidence in the case, the burden" of evidence is on him to introduce evidence to that effect. If he is silent, the pre- sumption of law prevails. It thus has shifti. ' the burden "of evi- dence from the government to the accused. But the burden of establishing the defendant guilty has not shifted. If the accused weakens the government's prima facie case by raising a reasona- ble doubt as to his sanity, the burden of introducing evidence to strengthen the government's (piantum of proof to the ecjuivul'Mit of a prima facie case now rests on the government, — who may ntro- duce affirmative evidence of sanity. In so doing, while the j>riivi facie effect of the presumption of law as a hvoiiien prohntlo' > gone, the government is entitled to the full probative effect ? presumption of fact that the accused is sane, because men general i^v are. When all the evidence is in on the issue of sanity, the burden of establishing still contiiuiingto rest on the government, if the accused has succeeded in preventing the government from establishing the equivalent of a prima facie case, by raising a reasonal)le doubt as to liis sanity, he must be acquitted. State r. Jones, oO X. II. 3G9, 40O (1871); People v. (Jarbutt, 17 Mich. 9 (18()8) ; State v. Crawford, II Kans. 32 (187.']). Presumptions of law may be established by the legislature pre- scribing that certain facts shall establish a prima facie case. liike other presumptions of law, the presumptions so created do not operate to alter the burden of establishing, but transfer to the opposite party the onus of introducing evidence to meet the prima facie case they establish. While the party having the burden of I ! ! ! 1 ! 270'^ AMKItlCAN NOTKS. [I'AIIT II. pstal)lis]iiiif; is pxcusod from goiuR forward in the first iiistaiioo wiicii t.luM'c is a i)rt'siiiiiption of law in his favor, lift is hy no iiieuits tliert'- hy t'xcusod from tiic necessity of establishing that fact if dispnted. Com. ('. Heath, 11 Gray, .m'i^lSoH). Thns, when an auditor's report is made prima facie evidence by statute for the party in whose favor it is. "The auditor's report, it is true, is only jjrima facie evidence, and does not change the hiirdeu of proof, but the plaintiff may in the first instance rest his case upon it, anil, if it is attempted to control or impeach it by other evidence offered by the defendants, may be permitted to put in evidence in reply, in support of his own case." JJrewer v. Ilousatonic K. K. Co., 104 Mass. oDS (1870); Shepardson v. Perkins, CO N. II. 7G (1880); lilodgett V. Cummings, GO N. H. llo (1880). So of the assessment of value by api)raisers appointed under a statute. Kailroad v. Crider, 91 Tenn. 480 (1802). Such prima facie effect may be given to certain evidence, by stat- ute, not only in civil but in criminal cases. Th\is the law may provide that the act of a physician in prescrib- ing whiskey is prima facie a violation of the "local option" law. Com. V. Minor, SSKy. 41.'2 (1880). ItioiiT TO Opkn and Ci.osk. — This right is rather a rule of practice and jirocedure than one involved in the burden of proof. As a rule, however, the party having the burden of establishing has the right to open and close. Seavy v. Dearborn, 19 N. H. 3/)l (1849) ; Koyal Ins. Co. /•. Schwing, 87 Ky. 410 (1888) ; Ware v. Ware, 8 Greenleaf, 42 (18:11) ; Gaul v. Fleming, 10 Ind. 253 (18r)8) ; Norris V. Ins. Co., 3 Yeates, 84 (1800). But while this is so, the right is largely discretionary with the court, and on a probate of a will where the party not under the burden of establishing was given tli< open and close, the court refused a new trial. Comstock v. Hadlynie Ecclesiastical Society, 8 Conn. 254 (1830). In Massachusetts, on the contrary, the plaintiff opens and closes, regardless of who has t\"i burden of establishing a case under tlic pleadings. Tage i: Osgood, 2 Gray, 2fi0 (1854) ; Hurley v. O'Sulli- van, 137 Mass. 80 (1884). The rule is the same in equity cases. Dorr V. Tremont Hank, 128 Mass. 349 (1880). In probate trials, in Massachusetts, the executor propounding the •will opens and closes without regard to the burden of proof. Dorr f. Tremont {uhl sti/jrti) ; Crowninshield v. Crowninshield, 2 Gray, 524 (1854). The rule is essentially one of procedure. For a short period the right to open and close could be acquired by the defend- ant under a rule of court. Spaulding ». Hood, 8 Cush. 602 (1851) ; Emmons v. Hay ward, 11 Cush. 48 (1853). ir''! ' ClUP. IV.] UEST EVIDENCE MUST BE PRODUCED. Hit ' M CHAPTER IV. BEST EVIDENCE. § 391.' The fourth of the rules which have been laid down * as governing the production of evidence is, that the best evidence, of which the I'ase in its nntitre is susceptible, should alwaj's be presented to the jury. This rule does not demand that the greatest amount of evidence which can possibly be given of any fact should be offered ; it is designed to prevent the introduction of such evidence as, from the nature of the case, allows room for supposing that better evidence is in the possession of the party, and to prevent fraud. For when better evidence than that which is offered is withheld, it is only fair to presume, that the party has some sinister motive for not producing it, which would be frustrated if it were offered.' The rule is thus essential to the pure administrati(m of justice. In requiring the production of the best evidence applicable to each particular fact, it is meant that no evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original evidence is attainable.* For instance, depositions are in general admissible only after proof that the parties who made them cannot themselves be produced ; * and a preliminary agreement, which has been followed up by the execution of a deed of conveyance, cannot be admitted as evidence to show what parcels were subsequcnitly conveyed.* For the contents of every deed must be proved by the production of the deed itself, if such deed be within the control of > Gr. Ev. § 82, in part. » Ante, § 217. 3 See Strother v. Barr, 1828 (Best, C.J.); Brewster v. Sewell, 1H20 (Hol- rovcl, J.) ; Twyman v. Knowles, 1853 (Jervis, C.J.); Clifton v. U. S., 18-16 (Am.) (Nelson, J.). * 1 Phil. Ev. 418; 1 St. Ev. -500; Ghssf. Ev. 2«()- -278; Tiiyloe r. Riggs, 1828 (Am.); U. S. v. lieyburn. 18;}2 (Am.); Minor ?;.Tiliotson, 183;i(Am.). » B. N. P. 239. * Williams v, Morgan, 1850, 277 ill BKST EVIDENCE MUST BE PRODUCED. [PAIJT IT. '' ! the party. For every deed is tlie best evidence of its own contents, and its non-production raises a presumption that it contains some matter of defeasance. On the same principle, if there be duplicate originals of a deed, all must be accounted for, before secondary evidence can be given of any one.* § 392. Similarly, an instrument, requiring attestation to its validity,^ must in general be proved by calling a subscribing witness;' and if there be two such witnesses, it will not be sufficient 80 long as one of them is alive, sane, free from permanent sickness, within the jurisdiction of the court, and capable of being found by diligent inquiry, to prove the signature of the other who is dead ; for such evidence would merely raise a presumption that the deceased had witnessed all which the law requires for the due execution of the instrument ; whereas the surviving witness would have been able to yirc direct proof. Such direct testimony is evidence of a better and higher nature than mere presumption arising from the proof of the witness's handwriting.* § 393. The rule under discussion only excludes evidence which itsc/f indicates the existence of more oriyinal sources of information. Therefore, when there is no substitution of inferior evidence, but only a selection of weaker, instead of stronger, proofs, or an omission to supply all the proofs capable of being produced, the rule is not infrhiged.' For instance, in proof or disproof of hand- writing, or in proof of the contents of a letter whicli cannot ho produced, it is not necessary to call the supposed writer ; " whore it is necessary to prove negatively that an act was done without the consent, or against the will, of another, the person whose will or consimt is denied, need not be himself called,^ and where an instrument is required to be attested by two witnesses, it is only neeessni'y,-— exce])ting in the case of wills relating to real estate, — to call one of them, though the other may be at hand.* Even the ' Alivon V. Furnivnl, 18.'}4 (Purko, - As to provin;:; oxociition of Jocu- inontrt not ro(inirin<7 attostatii-u, eoe 28 & 'Ji) V. c. IH, § 7. •' Uowiiian V. Hodgson, 18G7. • Wright V. Doe d. Tathum, 1834 (Timlal. C.J.). • 1 Ph. Ev. 418. Sue Alfonso v. U. S., 18415 (Am.). • R. V. lluiloy, 1843 ; Ilughns' caso, 1802; M'Giiiro'H ciiso, 1801 ; U. V. Bonson, 1810; Liobmau v. Poolcy, ISKJ; bank ProHocutio.is, 1819. ' 1!, v. Hazy, 1820; 11. v. Allon, 182(>; R. V. lliirloy, 1843. « Andrew)'. Motley, 1862; Belbin V. Skeats, 1857; Eo'reter y, Forstor, 278 oolcy, CHAP. IV.] PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. previous deposition of a deceased subscribing witness, if admissible on other grounds, may supersede the necessity of calling the survivor.' § 394.* The nile that in each case the best r linable evidence is required to be given naturally suggests that all evidence is divided into PRIMARY and seoionuary. Primary evidence is the best or highest evidence, or, in other words, that kind of proof which, in the ey > of the law, affords the greetest certainty of the fact in question. Until it is sliown that the production of this evidence is out of the party's power, no other proof of the fact is in general admitted. All evidence falling short of this in its degree, and suggesting on the face of it that other and better evidence is attainable, is termed liccondary. The question whether evidence is primary or secondary has reference to the natuio of the case in the abstract, and not to the peculiar circumstances under whicli the party, in the particular cause on trial, may be placed. It is a dis- tinction of law, and not of fact ; referring only to the quality, and not to the strcnyth of the proof. Evidence, which carries on its face no indication that better remains behind, is not secondary, but primary. § 395.' But though all information must, if possible, be traced to its fountain head, yet if there be several distinct sources of information of the same fact, it is not in general necessary to show that they have all been exhausted, before recourse can bo had to secondary evidence with respect to one of thera.^ For instance, if it be requisite to prove that a collector has received certain sums of money, primary evidence of that fact is the evidence of the col- lector himself if he be clive, or else the evidence of the parties who paid him, while (if the collector be dead) secondary evidence — such as entries in his book acknowledging the receipt, or if the book itself be in the hands of the opjjuiite party, who, after notice, refuses to produce it, even secondary evidence of its contents — is also admissible.* 1863; Anstoyv. Dowsing, 1745, 1746; Or. Kv. 1-20, V12, 123. ' Wright t'. Doo </. Tatham, 1834. » Or. Kv. § 84, in part. • Or. Ev. § 84 , as t« first four linos. « Cutbush V. Uilbert, 1818 (Am.) ; U. S. V. Oibert, 1834 (Am.). » Middlotou V. A.olton, 1820 (Bav- loy and I'urko, JJ.); Harry v. Ikib- bii\gton, 1792. The diHtiiiction Iw- twccn this case and that of tho two subscribing witucssos to an instru- 279 ' 1 ■ I ■ 1 ' ■ ■ ' ( ; ! I Wh h'\l I i 'SI DOCUMENTS NOT PROVABLE BY PAROL. [PART 11. § 396.' The cases which most frequently call for the application of the rule that the best evidence of which the ease is susceptible must always be produced, are those which relate to the siihstitidion of oral for written evidence. The effect of the rule on these cases is to render it necessary that the contents of a written instrument, which is capable of being produced, be proved by the instrument itself, and not by parol evidence? Lord ' Tenterden said : " I have always acted most strictly on the rule, that what is in writing shall only be proved by the writing itself. My experience has taught me the extreme danger of relying on the recollection of witnesses, however honest, as to the contents of written instruments ; they may be so easily mistaken, that I think the purposes of justice require the strict enforcement of the rule."* Lord Wynford observed: "I seldom pass a day in a Nisi Prius Court without wishing that there had been some written statement evidentiary of the matters in dispute. More ar+ions have arisen, perhaps, from want of attention and observation at the time of a transaction, from the imperfection of human memory, and from witnesses being too ignorant, and too much under the influence of prejudice, to give a true account of it, than from any other cause. There is often a great difficulty in getting at the truth by means of parol testimony. Our ancestors were v,ise in making it a rule, that in all cases the best evidence that could be had should be produced ; and great writers on the law of evidence say, if the best evidence be kept back, it raises a suspicion that, if produced, it would falsify the secondary evidence ,on which the party has rested his case. The first case those writers refer to as being governed by this rule is, that where there is a contract in writing, no parol testimony can be received of its contents, unless the instrument be proved to have been lost." * An additional but important reason for the application of the rule ment, where, as we have soen (ante, § ;{92) proof must be given that both the witnesses are uniiblo to be called, before evidence of the handwriting of one of them can bo received, — seems to be, that the iittesting wit- nossiis are either rendered necessary by statute, or at least have \wv.n 8c)loiiii\ly (ihoson by the j);irti('«. us the persons on whoso united tebti- mony they wish to roly, and, conse- quently, so long as one of them can DO callt!d, secondary evidence respect- ing the other cannot be admitted. ' (ir. Ev. § 85, as to first three lines, ' The Queen's case, 1820, H. L. ' Or. Kv. §88, in part. « Vincent c. (We, 1828. 6 Htrother v. iJarr, 1828. 280 liit L. CII. IV.] WANT OF PROPER STAMP, HOW CURED AT TRIAL. in the manner pointed out is, that the court may acquire a know- ledge of the whole contents of the instrument, which may have a very different effect from the statement of a part.' § 397. Tlie rule requiring every written document to he proved by production of the docu;uent itself in civil courts ^ often indi- rectly inflicts grave injustice* in consequence of the stamp laws. For, as a general rule, a document which is inadmissible for want of a stamp* to prove the fact it prima f.acie shows is also inad- missible for any purpose whatever,* even a collateral purpose — so that, for example, an insufficiently stamped promissory note cannot be used as evidence of the receipt of money by tlie maker of such note.' An exception to this rule indeed prevails when it is only sought to use a document to refresh the memory." And, moreover, the judges, some years ago, promulgated a rule (which is, perhaps, of questionable expediency), that, unless the want or insufficiency of a stamp be pointed out at the earliest possible period, that is, as soon as the document is tendered in evidence, an objection on that ground will not bo entertained." And a further attempt has been made to, as the Common Law Commissioners express it,** "reconcile the claims of justice with the interests of the revenue," hy enabling all such instruments as may be stamped after execution to be received in evidence, though unstamped, or insufficiently stamped, if the party who tenders them is prepared at the trial to pay to the officer of the court the proper duty," the penalty, and a further sum of 1/.'^ > The (iueon's case, 1820, H. L. ' In criminal courts a stamj) ob- jcutioii dous not u])])!}' at ail. " Tlio Stamp Act, 1891" (o4 & 55 V. c. 3'J), § 11, subs. 4. ^ Sl'o i)or Ld. Tcntordon, in lloid v. 15atto, 182!>. Tlio law us to stamps is now contained for tbo most part in •'The Stamp Act, 18i»l " {oi & 55 V. c. ;j!t). * Intoiloaf Publisliing Co. v. Phil- lips, 188.'). 5 Asbling V. IJoon, 1891. • Soi' post, § 1411. ' llobuisou V. Jid. Vurnon, 1859. Si^e ante, § ;)()9. " 2n(l Itcp. p. 2(). ' AdocnnuMittobo "dulystainiiMl" must bo stamped "in ac'cordaiut! with tht» law in force at the time wh(^ii it •..'as hrst o.xucuted." tj4 & o5 V. c. 39, § 14, gnbs. 4; Clarke v. Eoche, 1877. '» 54 & 55 V. c. 39 (" The Stamp Act, 1891"), § 14, snbss. 1 and 2, enacts, tliat " upon tlie production of an instruin(!nt cliarj^cable witli anv duty as evidinco in anyc^ourt of civil judicature in any part of the United Jvinj,'dom, or belcvo any arbitrator or refert'O, notice siiai" bo taken by tho jiidf^e. arbitrator, or rii'. : . of any omission or iiisulficiency of tlie stamp th(!reon ; and if the iiistiunient is ono wliich may h'j^ally bo stamped after the execution tliereof, it may, on l)aynient to tlie olllcer of tlie court whose duty it is to read the instru- ment, or to tlu! arbitrator or refeico, of the amount of the unpaicl duty, and the piMialty payable on staiii]iiii{? the sauiu us aforesaid, und of a f urtlior 28 L 1 1 ! lilts <l <»UI««B! -mi: -Li • ■ . i. 1 ^ ' 282 ORAL TESTIMONY, WHEN WRITING REQUIRED. [PART II. Further, it is provided that instruments executeJ abroad may be stamped within thirty days of their being received in the United Kingdom.' And this provision applies to a charterparty tcholly executed abrofid.' By R. S. C, 1883, Ord. XXXIX., r. 8, it is also provided that " a new trial shall not be granted by reason of the ruling of any judge that the stamp upon any document is sufficient, or that the document does not require a stamp." This provision impliedly restrains a judge at Nisi Prius from reserving for the court any question respecting the sufficiency of a stamp on a document admitted by him at the trial,' and makes the ruling of the jndge final where a case is tried by him without a jury.*. In the criminal courts, no objection can now be taken to the admis- sibility of any document in evidence for want of a sufficient stamp. § 398. The cases under the rule requiring the contents of a document to be proved by the document itself, if its production be possible,6 may be arranged in three classes : the fr.st class contain- ing those instruments which the law . tHjuires to be in writing ; the second, those contracts which the parties have put in writing ; and the third, all other writings material to the issue, the existence or contents of which are disputed.' § 399." The Jird class of cases in which oral evidence cannot be substituted for the writing are those in which there exists any instrument w/iich the law requires to be in writing. The law having required that the evidence of the transaction should be in writing, no other proof oan be substituted for that so long as the Bum of one pound, be received in evidence, saving all just exceptions on other grounds. The officer or arbitrator or referee rccoiving the duty and penalty shall give a receipt for the same, and make an entry in a book kept for that purpose of the payment and of the amount thereof, and shall communicate to the com- missioners the name or title of the proceeding in which, and of the party from whom, he received the said duty and ])onalty, and the date and de- scription of the instrument, and shall pay over to such person as the com- misf^io'iers may appoint, the money received by him for the said duty and penalty." ' See now 34 & 5f> V. c. 39 ("The Stamp Act, 1891 "), § 15, subs. (3). » The lielfort, 1884. ^ Siordet v. Kuczinski, 1835; Tat- tersnll v, Fearnley, 1836 ; Cory v, Davis, I8G3. ♦ Ulewitt V. Tritton, 1892 (C. A.). » 34 & 33 V. c. 39 (>' The Stamp Act, 1891 "), § 14, snbs. (4). * Gr. Ev. § 83, in part. ' The iiuestion how far witnesses maj- bo cross-examined as to written statements made by them without producing the writings, will be dis- cussed hereafter. See post, §§ 1446, et soq. " Gr. Ev. § 86, as to first six lines. 282 CHAP. IV.j ORAL TESTIMONY, WHEN INADMISSIBLE. •writing exists, and is in the power of the party. Accordinglj, parol evidence is inadmissible to prove records, public and judicial documents, official informations' or examinations, deeds of con- veyance of lands, wills, other than nuncupative, acknowledgments under Lord Tenterden's Act, promises to pay the debt of another person, and other writings mentioned in the Statute of Frauds ; or to show at what sittings or assizes a trial at Nisi Prius came on,* or even that it took place at all, the only proper evidence of this being the record, or at least the record with a minute of the verdict indorsed on it,' nor to prove the date of a party's appre- hension for a particular offence, as the warrant for apprehension or committal is superior evidence ; * as it also is to prove the testimony of a witness when it is required by law that it should be reduced into writing, — as, for instance, when it is taken by depositions, either before an Examiner of the Court, or before a magistrate on an indictable charge, — since the writing is in all subsequent pro- ceedings, whether civil or criminal, the best evidence of what the witness has stated ; * and so it also is as to the statement of a prisoner before the magistrate upon an examination reduced into writing, and subscribed, and returned by the justice,* in conformity with the Indictable Offences Act, 1848,' in England, or the cor- responding Act in Ireland. § 400. Parol evidence of what was said by a prisoner before a magistrate is however admissible if the written examination be excluded for informality,^ — other than for having been a confession taken on oath, and therefore not voluntary,' — or if it be clearly ill •'i, '' > E. V. Dillon, 1877. » Thomas v. Ansloy, 1807 (Lcl. Ellenborough) ; 11. v. Page, 1807 (Ld. Konyon); as explained inWhit- aker v. Wisbey, 1852, cited ante, §85. * Olive V. Gwin, 1058 ; E. v. Browne, 1829. ♦ E. V. Phillips, 1818. • Leach v, yiinpson, 1839, post, § 416. But in E. v. Coll, 1889 (Ir.), the judge at the trial, having rejected a deposition which ho ouglit to have received, appears to have afterwards set the matter right by the reception of oral evidence from a witness of what he said he had also sworn on the same day, and the majority of the Irish Court of Criminal Appeal sanctioned his action. The refine- ment by which it was supported was that for all that appeared th(3 witness was s})eakiiig of a separate sworn in- formati(jn wliich had not been re- duced into writing. « E. V. Foiirshiro, 1779; E. v. Jacobs, 1784. See post, § 893 et soq. ' 11 & 12 V. c. 42; 14 & 15 V. e. 93, Ir. 8 E. V. Eoed, 1829 (Tindnl, C.J.); E. ('. Cliristopher, 1849, post, § 410. » E. V. Wlieeley, 1838 (Alderson, 15.); E. V. Eiveis, 1835 (Park, J.). 283 ORAL TFSTIMONY, WHEN CONTRACT IN WRI'iTNG. [PT. II. provt I' that the statement was not reduced into writing. So it may also, if the prisoner was examined on two occasions, or with reference to two offences, and the examination, signed by the magistrates, relat(*s only to what occurred on one occasion,* or with respect to one offence,' as to statements made by the prisoner in that part of the inquiry not included in the written examination. In like manner, if a witness, having given a written deposition in a cause, has afterwards testified orally in court, parol evidence may, in the event of his death, be given of his viva voce testimony, notwithstanding the existence of the deposition ; * for, in this last case, as two independent sources of information exist, the party who relies on the evidence may, at his discretion, have recourse to either. In all these cases the parol evidence is offered, not in substitution for that of ihe official document, since no such docu- ment exists, but as the best evidence which the circumstances admit of. § 401.' The second class of cases " falling within the rule requiring the contents of a document to be proved by the document itself if its production be possible consists of those in which the parties have of themselves chosen to put their contract into uriting. Here also oral proof cannot be substituted for the written evidence. The written instrument may indeed be regarded, in some measure, as the ultimate fact to be proved, especially in the case of negotiable securities ; and has tacitly been treated by the parties themselves as the only repository and the appropriate evidence of their agree- ment. The written contract is not collateral, but is of the very essence of the transaction ; ' and consequently, in all proceedings, * But in Parsons v. Brown, 1^52, Jervis, C.J., held that the Court could not, in the absence of positive evidence, let in parol evidence by pnanming that ejiainiiic.tions before justices on a charge of felony were not taken down in writing ; but see E. V. Coll (Ir.), cited ante. § 399, n. ». » E. V. Wilkinson, 1838 f Parke, B., and Littlediile, J.) ; E. v. Christopher, 1849. See also E. v. Coll (Ir.), supra. 3 E. V. Harris, 1S32. * Tod V, E. of Winchelsea, 1828 (Tid. Tenterden). * Gr. Ev. § 87, in part. • See supra, § 398. ' See E. V. Castle Morton, 1820 (Abbott, C. J.). Doiiiat thus explains the principles on which a document is deemed part of the essence of any transaction, and consequently the best or primary proof of it: — •'The force of written proof consists in this : men agree to preserve by writing the remembrance of past events, of which they wish to create a memorial, either with a view of laying down a rule for their own guidance, or in order to have, in the instrument, a lasting proof of the 284 CirAP. IV.] ORAL TESTIMONY, WHEN LEASE EXISTS. civil or criminal, in wliioh tlie issue depends in any degree upon the terms of a contract, the party whose witnesses show that it was reduced to writing, must either produce the instrument, or give some good reason for not doing so. Thus, for example, if in an action to recover land against a tenant holding over, or in an action for the use and occupation of real estate, it should appear, either on the direct or cross-examination of the plaintilf's witnesses, that a written contract of tenancy has heen signed, plaintiff must either produce it, or account for its absence ; ' and in an action by landlord against tenant for rent and non-repair, if it should ap[)ear that the parties had agreed by parol that the tenant sliould hold the premises on the terms contained in a former lease between the landlord and a stranger, a nonsuit would be directed, imless this lease could be produced.' § 402. The same strictness prevails where the question at issue is simply what amount of rent was reser"ed by the landlord,' or who was the actual party to whom a demise had been made,'' or under whom the tenant came into possession.* It has also several times been held that, in an action for extra work done beyond the contract, if it appeared that the work was commenced under an agreement in writing, in the absence of positive proof that the work in question was entirely separate from that included in the agreement, and was in fact done under a distinct order, the plaintifP is bound to produce tl\e original document, since it may trutn of what is written. Thus con- tracts uro written, in order to pres(n'vo the moniorial of what the contracting parties have presoiihed for (jach other to do, and to make for thonisolves a fixed and immntublo law, as to what has been agreed on. So, testaments are written, in order to i)rc.sorvo the I'omenibrance of what tlie jiarty, who has a right to dispose of liis property, has ordained concerning it, and thereby to lay down a rnle for the guidance of "liis heir and legatees. On the same principle uro reihiccd into writing all sentences, , iidgnients, edicts, ordinances and other niattoi's, which either confer title, or V /e the force of law. The writing p jservcs unchanged the matters intrusted to it, and expresses the inteutiou of the parties by their own testimony. Tho ti'Uth of written acts is established by tho acts themselves, that is, by the inspi'ction of tho originals " : Domat's Civ. Law, Liv. li, tit. 6, § 2. ' Brewer v. Pabner, ISOO (Ld. Eldon); Fenn v. (jritlith, l,s;i() ; Ileuiy c. M. of Westmeath, 1S4;5 (Ir.) (RichiU'ds, B.); Thunder y. Warren, 184.} (Ir.); Itudge y. M-Carthy, 1841 (Ir.).' ^ » Turner v. Power, 1828. ' B. ('. Merthyr Tidvil, 1830; Au- gusticn n. Challis, 1847, where Aldnr- son, B., observes, "you may jn-ove by parol the relation of liimllord and tenant, but without tho lease you cannot tell whether anvront wusduo." * B. I'. Bawden. 18L>8. Doe c. llarvoy, 1832. f 15 II m ORAL TESTIMONY IN CLAIM FOR KXTRA WORK. [I'T. II. furr.iHh cvidonoo, not only that the items sought to be recovered ^ve^e not inelu(h>d (herein, but nlso of the rate of remuneration upon whieh the parties liad agreed." On like principles, where an auctioneer delivered to a bidder, to whom lands were let by auction, a written ])aper xiijiml hij hhmelf, containing the terms of the lease, in an action for use and occupation, the landlord was lield bound to produce Ihis paper duly stampi^d as a memorandum of an ngroement.^ § 403. Similarly, where ' the plaintiff had been employed as secretary to the committee of a charitable society, pursuant to a resolution entered in the book of the committee, of which, having ncco})ted the situation and entered upon its du^ie^, the plaintiff during his service Jind the care, and on the society being afterwards dissolved sued some of the members of the committee of the society for his salary, it was he.d that he was boimd to produce the book under which he was engaged. It is doubtful whether, in an action for an injury done to the plaintiff's reversion, his interest as reversioner may be proved by the parol testimony of the tenant, when it appears that !:he premises are occupied under a written agreement.* § 404. On principle, in cases of this kind, the fact that the writing is in the possession of the adverse j>arty does not change its I liaracter ; it is still the primary evidence of the contract ; and its absence must be accounted for by notice to the other party to produce it, or in some other legal mode, before secondary evidence of its contents can be received. But in all such cases, if the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, without betraying the existence of a wiitten contract relating to the subject-matter of the action, he will not be precluded from recovering by the defen- dant subsequently giving evidence that the agreement was reduced > Vincent r. Cole, 1828 (L<1. Ten- terden) ; Buxton v. Cornish. 1844; Jones r. Howell, 18;?5; ll<)ll);ird v. Stephens, 1841 (Williams, J.); ruiton V. Cole, 1842 (Pntteson, J.). Seo Eeid c. Batte. 1829. cited post, § 40j ; and Ixlie v. Kingst'ord, 18')4. 2 BamsliDttom v. Morth'v. 1814. See Eamsliottom c. Tiiiiliri(lL''i'. i.S14, cited post, § 406. See, uIbo, Hawkins V. Warre, 1825, -where Abbott, C.J., draws the rlistinction between papers signed by the jiarties or their agents, and those whieh are unsif?nod. 3 Whitford t. Tutin, 1834. « Cottevill /;. Hobby, 1825, holding that the af;;reeinent must be produced (wliich soeiiis correct), and in Strother V. Bmm-, 1S2S, whore the judges were equally divided. .'80 CHAP. IV.] ORAL TESTIMONY, WHEN ADMI.SSIBLE, into writing; but tlio dofondnnt, if he mofins to rely on a writton contriuit, must })r()cbice it uh ])iirt of his evidence,' and in the event of its turning out to h" unstainpod, or insufHtdently stamped, ho nmst pay the duty and penalty'' — and tliis even thougli a notice to ])ro(hioe the (hxjument lias been served on the phiiiitiff.^ It lias even been held in an action of ejectment that the ]tlaintiff cannot bo forced to jiroduce a written agrofment merely because one of his witnesses proved, on cross-examination, that an agreement, v/nich he only knew related in noine way to the land in (/iiention, was seen on that morning in the hands or the ])laintifl''s solicitor, and was produced at a former trial between the same parties, since, to exclude i)arol evidence of the tenancy, it should appear (wliich it did not) that the agreement was between the same parties, and was binding at the time of the second trial/ § 405.* Mo) eover, a written communication or agreement between the parties which is collateral to the question in issue, need not be produced. For example, plaintiff can recover without pro- ducing the original written agreement if during an employment under a written contract a verbal order is given for separate work, if he can show distinctly that the items, for which he seeks remu- neration, were not included therein ; as, for instance, that wliilst certain work was in progress in the inside of a house under a written agreement, a verbal order was given to execute some alterations or improvements on the outside.^ So, also, the fact of the existence of a particular relationship may be shown by parol evidence, though the terms which govern such relationship appear to be in writing.' Thus, if the fact of the occupation of land is alone in issue, without respect to the terms of the tenancy, this fact may be proved by any competent parol evidence, such as pay- ment of rent, or the testimony of a witness, who has seen the tenant occupy, notwithstanding it appears that the occui ancy was » Magnay v. Knight, 1840; Ste- phens V. Pinnoy, 1818 ; Miirston v. j)ean, 1836; Try v. Chapman, 1836; 11. V. Padstow, 1832; Ecod v. Deere, 1827. » Ante, § 397. See cases cit(;d in n. ', supra. * Doe V. Morris, 1810. « Or. Ev. § 89, in part. • Roid V. Batte, 1829 (T,d. Tenter- den); commented on by I'utteHon, J., in I'arton v. Cole, 1842. See Vincent V. Cole, 182b, and cases cited ante, § 402, n. >. ' See dictum of Ahlerson, B., and other cases cited in next note. 287 ■'" , ■ i ; ij J 1 ^ ]\\ ^ ^""^ COLLATERAL WRITINGS NEED NOT BE PRODUCED. [PT. 11. under an agreement in writing ;' where a tenant luilils lands under written rules, but the length ot' his term has been agreed orally, these rules ncod not be produeed in an action of trespass where the defendant denies the tenant's possession, because it is only necessnr}' to prove the extent of the tenant's term, whi ig been agreed to by pai'ol, does not depend upon the written inirid ;•' the fact of partnership may be proved by ])!irol evidence of the acts of the parties, without producing the deed;' and the fact that a i)arty has agreed to sell goods on commission may be established by oral testimony, though the terms respecting the payment of the com- mission have been reduced into writing.* § 406. Parol evidence will be admissible when the writing only amounted either to mere unaccepted proposals, or to minutes capable of conveying no definite information to the court or jury, and could not, by any sensible rule of interpretafion, be construed as memoranda, which the parties themselves intended to operate as fit evidence of their several agreements. Thus, it has been admitted where, at the time of letting premises to the defendant, the plaintiff had read the terms from pencil miautes, and the defendant hud acquiesced in these terms, but had not signed the minutes ; " where, upon a like occasion, a memorandum of agreement had been drawn up by the landlord's bailiff, the terms of which were read over, and assented to, by the tenant, who agreed to bring a surety and sign the agreement on a future day, but omitted to do so ; ^ where, in order to avoid mistakes, the terms upon which a house was let were, at the time of letting, reduced to writing by the lessor's agent, and in his absence signed by the lessee's wife, in order to bind him, and the lessee himself afterwards entered upon and occupied the premises but did not otherwise appear to have constituted the wife » E. V. Holy Trinity, Hull, 1827; Doe )'. Ilarvoy, 1832 ; Spiers v. Willi- Boii, 1808 fAiii.) ; Dennett v. Crocker, 18;}'2 (Am.) See, however, the obser- vations of Best, C.J., on E. v. Holy Trinity, in Strother v. Barr, 1828 ; Bee, also, Twynam v. Knowlos, 1853; Augustien v. Challis, 1847 (Aldei'son, B.), cited ante, § 402. * Hey V. Moorh.iiise, 1839. ^ Alderson v. Clay, 1816 T.d. Ellenborough). * "Whitfield «. Brand, 1847. 6 Trewhitt v. Lambert, 1839. See Drant v. Brown, 1825 ; and Bethell V. Blencowe, 1841, where it was held that written proposals, made pond- ing a negotiation for a tenancy, might be admitted without a stamp, as proving one step in the evidence of the contract. « Doe V. Cnrtwright, 1820. See Hawkins v, "Waire, 1825. 288 CHAP. IV.] WIll^N PAROL EVIDENCE NOT EXCLUDED. as his agent, or to have recognized her act ; ' where lands were let by auction, and a written paper was delivered to the bidder by the auctioneer, containing the terms of the letting, but was never signed either by the auctioneer or by the parties ; ^ and where, on the occasion of hiring a servant, the master and servant went to the chief constable's clerk, who in their presence, and by their direction, took down in writing the terms of the hiring, but neither party signed the paper, nor did it appear to have been read to them.' § 407. Where, too, an action is not directly upon an agreement and for non- performance of its terms, but is in tort, for the conversion, or detention, or negligent loss of the writing containing such agreement, plaintiff may give parol evidence, descriptive of its identity, without giving notice to the defendant to produce the document itself.* Moreover, even though the defendant be willing to produce such document without notice, the plaintiff is not bound to put it in, but may leave his adversary to do so, if he think fit, as part of his own case.' For, as has been observed, for the purpose of identification, no distinction can be drawn between written instruments and other articles ; between trover for a promissory note, and trover for a waggon and horses." § 408. A similar rule prevails in criminal cases. For example, if a person be indicted for stealing a bill or other written instrument, its identity may be proved by parol evidence, though no notice to produce it has been served on the prisoner or his agent.' On an indictment for forgery, however, if the forged instrument be in the hands of the prisoner, the prosecutor must serve him or his solicitor with a notice to produce it, before he can offer secondary evidence of its contents.* See * E. V, St. Martin's, Leicester, 1834. * Kamstottom v, Tunbridge, 1814. See Eamsbottom v. Mortley, 1814, cited ante, § 402. ' R. V. Wrangle, 1835. See, for other instances, Ingram v. Lea, 1810; Dalison v. Stark, 1803 ; Wilson v, Bowie, 1823. * Scott V. Jones, 1813 ; How v. Hall, 1811; Biicher v. Jarratt, 1802; Eead v. Gamble, 1839; Eoss v. Bruce, 1803 (Am.) ; The People v. Uolbrook, 1816 (Am.); M'Loan v. Hertzog, 1820 (Am.). These cases overrule Cowan V, Abrahams, 1793. « Whitehead v. Scott, 1830 (Ld. Tenterden). « JoUoy V. Taylor, 1807 (Sir J. Mansfield). ' E. V. Aickles, 1784. " E. V. Haworth, 1830 (Parke, J.); E. V. Fitzsimons, 1869 (Ir.). Several grounds for this difference between larceny and forgery may be suggested. One is, that under the old law (see T. VOL. I. 289 i I i I I WllKN PAROL KVIUKXCK KXCLUDKD BY WUlTIXaS [P. II. § 400.' The third class of cases* falling witliin the rule that a written document can only be proved by the instrument itself, embraces every trriting not falling within the two classes already discussed, as to the exintence or contents of tc/iieh there i« a (/impute, and which is material to the iHstie between the parties, and which is not a mere memorandum of some other fact. Thus, to take some common examples, newspapers and account-books are the best evidence of their own contents, and therefore a witness cannot be asked whether certain resolutions were published in the newspapers;' neither can he be questioned as to the contents of his account-books.' The primary proof of the publication of an opera is the product'on of the printed music, and consequently the fact of publication cannot be proved in the first instance by a witness who has merely Been the oper.~ in print, or heard parts of it played in society.* The fact of a person being rated to the relief of the poor can only be legally proved by the rate-book itself," or at least a certified or examined copy fro.ii it,' and it therefore cannot be shown by the collector stating that such person's name was on the rate ;' neither can a plaintiff be asked on cross-examination whether his name is written in a certain book described by the questioner, iinless a satisfactory reason be first given for the non-production of the book mx now 24 *!t 25 V. c. 98 (" The Forgery Act, 1861 "), § 42, cited ante, § 291), it was always sufficient, on charges of laicony, to both in the indict- ment and the proof describe a stulen instrument in very general terms, whereas, in the case of /orrery, the prosecutor was often required to enter into a minuto description of the document allcgod to have been forged (Butcher v. Jarratt, 1802 (Cham- bre, J.)). A second is, that a per- son charged with stc i-ling an instru- ment must know, from the very nature of the accusation, that lio will be called upon to produce it, while an indictment for forgery furnishes no such intimation ; and it will be presently seen, when the rules which regulate the sei-ving of notices to produce are discxissed (post, § 452), that this is a material distinction. A thiid (and very substantial) one is that, where the charge is oae of larceny, it is highly improbable that anything material will turn either upon the contents of, or a minute description of, the instrument itself, whereas on a charge of forgery the exact oppo.site is the ease, and an examination of the instrument itself may very probably prove of the highest importance. ' Gr. Ev. § 88, in part. * See 8U])ra, § 398. » R. V. OTonnell, 1843-4 (Ir.). * See post, § 4()2. " lioosey V. Davidson, 1849. liufc see Geralopulo v, Wieler, 1851 (Jervis, C.J.). * K. V. CoppuU, 1801, recognised (Patteson, J.) in E. v. Staple Fitz- paine (1842). See " The Poor Rate Assessment and Collection Act, 1 869, " 32 & 33 V. 0. 41, § 18, cited ante, § 147a. 1 Justice V. Elstob, 1858. 29' C. IV.] PAROL ADMISSIOyS SUBSTITUTED FOR WRITINOS. itself.' Having regard to llu»so priii«i|ilos, it is voiy doubtful whether the contents of handbills written or di(!tated ut a meeting of conspirators can he proved by oral testimony.* § 410 — 11. When it is stated that oral testimony cannot be sub- stituted for any writing included in either of the throe classes above mentioned, a tacit exception must, perhaps, be made in favour of the parol ailmissiona of a party, and of his acts arioitntiiig to admis- dions, A party's admimons, and acts amounting to admissions, are primary proof against himself and those claiming under him, even where they relate to the contents of a deed or other instrument, which are directly in issue in the cause.' It is said that the reason why such statements or acts are admissible, without notice to produce, or accounting for the absence of the written instrument, is, that they are not open to the same objection which belongs to parol evidence from other sources, where the written evidenoo might have been produced ; for such evidence is excluded from the presumption of its untruth, arising from tlie very nature of the case, where better evidence is withheld ; whereas, what a party himself admits to be true, may reasonably be presumed to be so.* ' Darby v, Ouseley, 18ofi. « B. V. Thistlewood, 1820. See post, § 417. 3 Eiirle V. Picken, 183.3 (Parko, B.); Newhull V. Holt, 1840 (id.) ; Slatterie V. Pooluy, 1840 ; BethoU v. Bloncowo, 1841 ; lioward )'. Smith, 1841 ; K. v. Welch, 1840; Kin{? ?;. Colo, 1848; 11. V. Basiiif^stoko, 1851; Boulter v. Peplow, 18J0. These cases overrule Lord Tenterdon's decision in Bloxam V. Elsie, 1825. See Fox v. Waters, 1814. * Slatterio v. Pooley, 1840 (Parke, B.). Althouffh tho admission of a party may fairly bo presumed to bo true, tho jmrol evidenoo by which that admission is pioved need by no means bo so ; and, indeed, such testimony is open to even greater objection than applies to the ordinary case, where secondary evidence is produced, and the best evidence is withheld. When the admission is made in Court, it may very reason- ably be allowed to render needless the production of the written instru- ment to which it refers, because the simple (piestion in such case will be, is the admission true ? and tho rational iiresumption is, that a man will not tell a falsehood, which is against his own interest. But wlien a witness is called to say that he has heard tho opposite party make .-i certain statement with respect to tho contents of a writti'ii instrument, tho further (juestion ari.ses, was this statement really made ? and to ])cr- mit such parol evidence to be equally admissible, in jjroof of the contents of the instrument, with tlie pro- duction of the iustnunent it.self, is to ojjeu a vast field for misapjirehension, perjury, and fraud, which would bo wholly closed, if tho salutary rule of law, recjuiring tliat what is in writ- ing should be proved by the writing itself, were here, as in other cases, to prevail. Lord Tenterden and Mr. Justice Maule have emphatically ex- pressed opinions in support of the view here suggested (see Bloxnm v. Elsie, 1825; Boulter v. Peplow, ! 291 u 2 '1 m M m i I m^m\ I PAROL ADMISSIONS COXFKSSIO JURIS. [PART II. § 412. Since some observations in the last footnote dealing with the above reasons were written, the judges in Ireland ' have declared their disapproval o! the principles which such reasons embody. " The doctrine that parol admissions can prove the contents of written documents is," said Pennefather, C. J., " a most dangerous propo- sition ; by it a man might be deprived of an estate of 10,000/. per annum derived from his ancestors through regular family deeds and conveyances, by producing a witness, or by one or two con- spirators, who might be got to swear that they heard the defendant say he had conveyed away his interest therein by deed, or had mortgaged, or had otherwise encumbered it; and thus, by the facility so given, the widest door would be opened to fraud, and a man might be stripped of his estate through this invitation to fraud and dishonesty." § 413. In any case it is doubtful whether (even assuming it to be established) the doctrine allowing admissions by parol to sufficiently prove a written document extends to records, as well as to deeds and ordinary writings, and whether it would embrace the case of a confcssio j'liriH, as well as that of a confcssio facti. On the one hand, the admission of a party that he had been discharged under the Insolvent Debtors Act, was held insufficient evidence of a valid diseharge, because the judicial document, on being pro- duced, might be found, irregular and void, and the party might be 18.50); while Parke, B., liitnsolf has declared that the parol eviilonce of admissions may, in sojno cases, he quite iinsatist'actory to a jury (Slat- terio V. I'ooloy, 1810), ami that too grout wi'ijjht ouj^'ht never to ho attached ti) such evidence, since it fro([iiontlv happens that the witness not only has niisnnderstood what the party has said, hut, hy unintention- ally altering; a few of the expressions really used, has given to the stato- mout aiv effect completely at variance with what was intended. See note to Earle v. Picken, 18^3. Moreover, as the reporter observes in tlio re- port of Bonlton V. Peplow (IHiiO). 9 C. H. .")()1, n. c, "according to 81at- terio V. Pooley, wliat A. states as to what B., a party, has said re- Bpoctinp; the contents of a docniment which B. has seen, is admissible, whilst what A. states, respecting a document which he himself has seen, is not admissible, — although in tlie latter case, the chance of error is single, in tho former, double." ' Lawless c. Queale, 1845 (Ir.). The case which called forth tho remarks cited above was an action for use and occupation. At the trial, one of the ))laintiff's witm'sses, after proving the occupation of tlie jiro- misos by the detendant, ackuow- hnlged in cross-examination the existence of a written agreement ; and the Court held, that this agree- ment must bo produced, tliough tlie defendant had admitted that he was tenant at a jiarticular rent. See, also, Ld. Oost'ord v, Robb, ISl.'); Parsons r. I'urcell, 184!); and Hen- man V. Lester, 18G2 (Bylos, J.). CHAP. IV.1 ORAL EVIDENCE, WHEN ADMFSSini.E. Tlie liu'ka use oua altor j.io- uow- the lent ; thn WilS Soo, SI,-, ; mistaken.' On the other hand, on an indictment for bigamy, the prisoner's deliberate declaration, that lie had been married in a foreign countrj' was held to render it unnecessary to prove that the marriage had been celebrated according to the laws of that coimtry ; * and in an action for wages, an admission by plaintiff that his claim had been referred to an arbitrator, who had made an award against him, was held admissible evidence on behalf of the defendant.' § 414. A material difference, at all events, exists between proving by an admission the execution of an instrument requiriug attestation, which is produced, and proving the party's admission, that by such and such instrument, which is not produced, a certain act was done. It will hereafter be shown,* that when an instrument, which requires attestation to give it validity,' is in court, and its execution is to be proved against a hostile party, an admission on his part of due execution, unless made with, a view to the trial of that cause, is generally" not sufficient. § 415.' Where a writing does not fall within either of the three classes already described, no reason exists why it should exclude oral evidence. For instance, if a written communication be acconi' panied by a verbal one to the same effect, the latter may be received as independent evidence, though not to prove the contents of the writing, nor as a substitute for it ; ' the payment of money may be proved by oral testimony, though a receipt be taken ; ' a verbal demand of goods may be shown, though a demand in writing was made at the same time ; '" the admission of a debt is provable by oral testimony, though a written promise to pay was simultaneously given ;" and the determination of an interest in land, whether free- hold or copyhold, may be proved without producing, or accounting for the non-production of, the title-deeds or court rolls, but merely ' Scott V. Clare, 1812 (Ld. Ellon- horoujjh). See, also, Suiuinersctt v. Adainson, 1822; Joiiiut v. JoULflo, IMO (Am.); Wclldnd Cimiil Co. v. lliitliiiway, 18;52 (Am.). 2 11. V. Nowtoii, 1843 (Wi^'bttnan nnd Cresswt'U, JJ.). Hut see 11, v, I'liilicrtv, 1847; and R. v. Savage, 1870 (Lush, J.). " Murray v. Orepory, 1830. « See post, §§ 1843, 1849. » See 28 & 29 V. c. 18, § 7. • See, however, Nagle v. Shea, 1870. ' Gr. Ev. § 90, in part. « See unto, § 4()(). • Kiiiribert v. Cohen, 1803; Jacob V, Liiidsav, 1801. '" Smith i\ Young, 1808 (Ld. Ellon- borougli). " Singleton v. Barrett, 1832. ■ ill! 293 i I I m-4 ih|i «i«''i' .^i-': l!) ' ! :l| 'I i! "'■ i ORAL EVIDENCE, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [i'AIJT I.'. showing that a deceased occupier had, while in possession, declareiJ that his interest in the premises would expire at his death," since,— as will presently be seen,'* — all statements by a person, while iu possession of property, are, after his death, in themselves primary evidence, if they tend to out down his interest therein.' § 416. In the same way, oral evidence of what then passed will be equally as admissible as the clerk's note, where, on a prelimi- nary hearing of a charge, the magistrate's clerk takes down what the witness says, but neither the witness nor the magistrate signs the writing, and it does not constitute part of the depositions returned :* or if, on the hearing of an information for a trespass in pursuit of game," the clerk takes a note of the charge ; because this is not one of those cases where the magistrate is bound to take down what the witnesses say ; ° or if in support of an indictment for perjury committed in a County Court, without production of the judge's note, the perjury be proved by any witness who was then present, if the case was one in which the law does not require the judge to take any note.' Similarly, too, what passed at a meeting where the proceedings of directors, commissioners, public trustees, and the like, are voluntarily entered in books, may be proved by parol, because the fact that such books are rendered by statute admissible in evidence, does not exclude verbal proof of what has taken place.* On like grounds, it is not necessary to produce a certificate of registration ia order to prove that a joint stock company has been completely legistertJ." The fact of birth, baptism, marriage,'" death or burial, may, for the same reason, be proved by parol testimony, for though the law requires a narrative or memorandum of these events to be entered in registers, the existence or contents of these registers form no part of the fact to > Doo I'. Lanjjfield, 1847. » Post, § GS4 nt 80(1. » Doo ('. Liiii{,'field, 1847 (Parke, B.). * Joiins V. Whcedon, 184.'J (Cress- well, J.); R. V. Christopher, 1849; ante, § 400. » Under 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 32 ("The Oiimo Act, 1831 "), § 30. « Hobiiisou V. Vaughtou, 1838 (Aldorson, B.). ' R. V. iforgan. 1852 (Martin, B.); Hariner v. Bi-im, 18J3 (Piirko, 13,). ' Miles i\ Bouph, 1842 ; Infjlis v. Gt. North. Ry. Co., 18.)2, H. L. ' Agricultural Cattle Ins, Co. v. Fitzgerald, l8ol, decided under the repealed Act, 7 & 8 V. c. 110, §§ 7. 25. See, now, 2.5 & 26 V. c. Hit, § 18. See, also, R. r. linngton, 187(). '" Lady Limerick V. liOrdLiineriok, 1862. 294 CHAP. IV.] OKAL EVIDENCE, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. be proved, and the entry is no more than a collateral or subsequent memorial of that fact, which may be used to furuish a satisfactory and convenient mode of proof, but cannot exclude other evidence,' while the non-production of a minute book or register at most does no more than afford grounds for scrutinising such evidence with more than usual care. The fact that a picture is an infringement of the copyright in another picture may, too, be proved in an action for infringement of copyright without producing the original picture.' It is also every-day practice for the fact that writing is very like that of a named person to be proved without producing any of that person's writing. § 417.^ The principle under consideration, though hitherto only illustrated by examples drawn from civil cases, tilso applies in criminal ones. Accordingly, on prosecutions foi political offences, such as treason, conspiracy, and sedition, the imcriptionn on flags and banners paraded in public, and the contents of resolutions read at a public meeting, may be proved, as being of the nature of speeches, by oral testimony.* Where, too, a party was indicted for ad- ministering an unlawful oath, a witness was permitted to give parol evidence of the words used, though he stated his belief that the accused read the words from a paper, which he held in his hand when he administered the oath, and no notice to produce this paper had been served on the prisoner.' § 418. The rule of law that the best evidence which the nature of each case permits must always be produced, has thus far been discussed as to its effect in forbidding oral evidence being substi- tuted for written evidence. But the same rile of law sometimes excludes wrifinrp which the law considers as entitled to less weight than those which might be forthcoming. The original of a document must always (with a few exceptions that will be presently mentioned") be produced, and a mere copy, however ' Evans v. Morgan, 1832; R. v, Allison, 1806; Iliirrison v, Corp. of Southivmpton, 1803 ; R. v. Miiin- waring, 18 J6; Rood v. Passer, 1794; St. Devoreux v. Much Dow Church, 1761-2; Morris v. Miller, 1766-7; Hirt V. Barlow, 1779; Com. v. Nor- cross, 1813 (Am.); Ellis y. Ellis, 1814 (Am.); Owings V. Wyaut, 17yi5(Am.). » Lucas V. Williams, 1892, C. A. « (Jr. Ev. §90, in part. * R. t;. Hunt, 1820; Sheridan's and Kirwan's case, 1811; R. v, O'Connoll, 1843-4 (Jr.). See ante, § 40tf, and cases cited in notes. » R. V. Moors, 1801. ■> Post, § 428. ::'l lih 29-^ BEST DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRODUCED. [PART II. accurate, will not be, in the first instance, admipsible.' For instance, on an indictment for feloniously setting fire to a house, with intent to defraud the insurers, the policy itself, being the best evidence of the fact of insurance, must be produced by the prosecutor ; and recourse cannot be had either to parol evidence that the premises were insured, or to the books of the insurance office, unless notice to produce the policy itself has been duly served upon the defendant, as this ought to be, and usually is, in his possession.' If, too, it be necessary to show the contents of a manuscript which is in the possession of the opposite party, a paper, purporting to be a printed copy, cannot be received in evidence, without a notice to produce the manuscript.' The ques- tion as to what is or is not an original is sometimes raised. On this point it is settled that, on the one hand, a duplicate writing, taken from an autograph at one impression by means of a copying machine cannot be regarded as an original, but the autograph itself must be produced, or its non-production be accounted for as in ordinary cases.* On the other hand, all printed copies struck off in one common impression, though they constitute merely secondary evidence of the contents of the paper from which they are taken, are primary evidence of each other's contents.' § 419. The memorial of a registered conveyance is primary evi- dence ° to prove the contents of a deed against the party by whom the deed is registered, and those who claim under him, being con- sidered in the light of an admission,' and is at the very least, as against such persons, good secondary * evidence. As against third persons, however, it is certainly inadmissible as primary evidence.' ■ B. N. P. 293, 294. » R. V. Doran, 1791 (Ld. Kenyon); E. V. Kitaon, 1832; 11. v. Gilson, 1807 ; R. V. EUicombe, 1833 (Little- dalo, J.). 3 R. V.Watson, 1817. * Xodin V. Murray, 1812 (Ld. Elloiibovough). In India, " an im- pression of a document made by a copyitif? machino Rhnll be taken •without further proof to be a correct copy." Act 11 of 1835, § 35. " R. V. Watson, 1S17, where the question was, whether a priaonor was acquiiintod with the contents of certain placards, some copies of which were traced to his possession, and a copy remaining with the i)rinter was allowed to be road in evidence for the prosecution, though no notice had boen served upon the prisoner to produce the copies which had been delivered to him. * Boulter v, Peplow, 1850 (Maulo, J.). See Brown v, Ai-mstrong, 1873 (Ir.). ' WoUaston v. Hakewill, 1841. 8 Uoe V. CHfford, 1847 (Alderson, B.) ; D. of Devonshire v. Noill, 187(i-7 (Ir.). » Molton V. Harris, 1797 (Ld. Kenyon). 396 '.•niv! !«"• „ III CHAP. IV.] MEMORIAL OF REGISTERED DEED. On one or two occasions, indeed, such memorial, or oven an examined copy of the registry, has, under special circumstances, been received as secondary evidence of the contents of an inden- ture, not only as against parties to the deed, who have had no part in registering it, but also as against third persons.' The enrolment of a lease granted by the Crown is primary evidence, because the possessions of the Crown cannot be alienated but by matter of record ; and so also are memorials of leases granted by the Duke of Cornwall, on account of the identity of interest which subsists between his Royal Highness and the Crown,* § 420. Occasionally it is a question of some nicety to determine what instrument constitutes the primary evidence of a transaction. For instance, it has been discussed what is the primar}' evidence of the transaction where goods have been sold througli the medium of a broker. Some have said that the broker^ s hook, if signed by the broker, is the primary evidence of the transaction, and conse- quently, in the first instance, the only admissible proof of the con- tract.' On the other hand, it has, after much consideration, and after consulting merchants, been held that the bought and sold notes, provided they agree, and are signed so as to satisfy the Statute of Frauds,* constitute the contract, and, as such, must be produced in the first instance." It is at least quite clear, that if no not6s have been transmitted to the principals, recourse may be had to the signed entry in the book kept by the broker,^ or, indeed, to any other memorandum made by him as agent for both parties, which ..■il I (Ld. > See Sadlier v. Biffgs, 1853, II. L. ; Biggs V. Sadlier, 1847 (Ir.); IVyton V. M'Donnott, 1837 (Ir.)- >^oo, also, Collins I'. Maiile, 1838; Doe v. Kiluor, 182(). In all these cases, however, either the paities liad been acting for a long period in obedience to the pro- visions of the supposed instrument, or the deed has been recited or re- ferred to in other documents admis- sible in the cause * Bowe V. Brenton, 1828. For other instances, see post, §§ IGJO et seq. ' Sievewright v, Archibald, IS'il g'attoson, J., and Ld. < 'iuui'bcU) ; evuuin f. Neulc, 18(I!» {lA. Ellen- borough) ; Grant v. Fletcher, 1826 ; HendiH'son r. Barnewall, 1827. * Uurrell I'. Evans, 1801. See Far- ton V. Crofts, 18G4 ; and Thompson V. Gardiner, 187(). In those lust two cases the jjroduction of the sold note only was held sulticient to satisfy the statute. s doom i: Afhilo, 182() ; Thornton V. K(unpst(U', 1814 ; Thornton v. Meux. 1827 (Abbott, C.J.) ; Cum- niing V. Boebuek, 1816; Ilawos v, Forster, 18.'54 (Ld. Dennian) ; Town- end r. Drukefonl, 1843 (id,). » Townond v. Draki'ford, 1843; Pitts v. Beckett, 184.> (I'arke, B.); Tiiouipson V. Gardiner, 1&76. I i 1 297 1 I broker's books — BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES. [^PART II. lis; ii--i'- ■ ■ ■■ ■ 'M is sufficient to satisfy the statute.' But if even a single note, actually signed by one party, has been delivered to the other party, this note has been held to itself constitute the contract, even though it differed materially from the note which was sent to the party signing that originally produced by the plaintiff.'* Wliere the bought and sold notes are signed by the broker, and it is affirma- tively shown that these substantially differ from each other, no binding contract is usually effected, even although the purchaser, on objection raised by the vendor to a particular word inserted in the sold note, strikes out that word, and evidences his consent to the erasure by affixing his initials thereto.* § 421. Whether the broker's book may be resorted to if there be a material disagreement between the bought and sold notes is a very difficult question. Two eminent judges, on three different occasions, held that it could not.^ But a third, Avho was no mean lawyer, thought that it could,* and it is submitted that his opinion will ultimately prevail. § 422. In general, it will be sufficient if a party seeking to en- force a contract made through a broker produces the note in his possession, and shows that the broker was employed in the trans- action by his adversary without producing the original broker's book. His adversary, if he rely on any variance between the bought and sold notes, must produce, as his evidence, the one that has been handed to himself.' § 423. As already indicated,* any substantial variance between the bought note and the sold note may prevent there ever having been any contract at all. But the amount of variance that will have this effect cannot be expressly defined. In one case, where 1 Eichey v. Garvey, 1847 (Ir.). There the inemovaiuhim had Ih^cu drawn up two or three diiys utter tlie sale ; but the Court helil this fact to bo immaterial, the broker's authority as agent for the parties not having been revoked. '• Howe V. Osborne, 1815. » Cowie V. Remfry, 184(i, P. 0. But sen Rowe v. Osborne, 1815 (Ld. EUeuborough), recognized in (.'owio V. llemfry, P. 0., supra; and see. also, Moore v, Campbell, 18,54 ; Iley- worth (', Knight, 18(54 (Willes, J.).' \ Thornton v. Charlos, 18;i(> (Ld. Abiiigor) ; Towneiid v. Dnikijlord, 184;i (Ld. Denman) ; and Gregson v, Euck, 184;^ (Ld. Denman). * Lord AV'ensleydalo in Thornton V. Charles, 18;J(j. " llawes V, Forster, 1834 (Ld. Donniitn). « Cowio V. Remfry, 184G, P. 0., supra, § 420. 298 CH. I V.J VARIANCE BETWEEN BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES. 299 the bought note spoke c a brokerage of one per cent., and a deposit of fifteen per cent., and the l old note stated that the brokerage was ten shillings per cent., and omitted all mention of the deposit, it was ruled that the discrepancy was fatal, though with respect to the brokerage one of the jury interpreted the notes as meaning that the broker should be paid by the buyer one per cent., and by the seller a half per cent, ; * and a similar conclusion was come to in another case, where Scotch iron was named in the bought note, and Dunlop's iron, which is Scotch iron, but not the only kind of Scotch iron, was specified in the sold note ; * and in yet a third, in which the sole difference between the bought and the sold notes was, that the one purported to deal with " Riga," and the other with " Petersburg," hemp.' But a mere clerical error, or even a mistake in a name, if productive of no loss, will not invalidate the Bale.* § 424. In applying the general rule that the original document, and not a mere copy of it, must be produced as evidence, to notarial instruments, it is always considered a duplicate made out at any time from the original or protocol in the notarial book, is equiva- lent to an original drawn up at the time of the entry in the book.' § 425. Primary proof of the title of a person as executor or administrator may, as to grants since the 11th of January, 1858,^ be proved either by producing the probate or letters, or by an exemplification thereof granted by a registrar or district registrar of the Probate Division of the High Court.' § 426. The rule as to whether any or which of the copies of deeds executed in duplicate may be regarded as an original, and as to any or which of them are to be regarded as copies, is this : — When two or more parts are sealed and delivered by each party, — ' M ' Townend v. Drakoford, 1843 (Ld. Denman). See Kempson v. Boyle, 1805, where parol evidence was ad- mitted to explain away an ap^ arent variance between the notes. ^ Sievcwright v. Archibald, 1831. ^ Thornton v. Kempster, 1""4. * Mitchell V. Lapage, 1810. See Bold V. Eayner, 1830. * Geralopulo v. Wielor, 1851 (Manle, J.). « When the Act of 20 & 21 V. o. 77 f " The Court of Probate Act, 1857 ") (as now amended by "The Statute Law llevisi(m Act, 1892," 55 &. 50 V. 0. 19), came into operation. See Gazette of Friday, Doc. 4, 1857. ' See forms of cxomplitications appended to the Eules, &c. of 1802, for the Registrars of the Court of I'robate in respect of non-contentious business, Nos. 10 and 1 1 ; and similar forms appended to Rules, &c. for the District Registrars, Nob. 11 and 12. Mi r\ •1 ■* i ■ ,1, if .:il!. Sf.,: •!■ Hi «■ ' DUPLICATE OUIGINALS — COUNTKRPAUTS. [PAUT II. a practice which of late years has frequently prevailed, — they are denominated duplicate or triplicate originals,^ and each copy is considered primary evidi'nce.^ When, however, each pai't is exe- cuted by one party only (as often occurs in the case of leases), the two instruments are called counterparts, and each is alternately the best evidence as against the party sealing it, and those in privity with such party,' and secondary evidence of the contents of the other part.* Thus, if a landlord briKgs an action for rent, he produces the counterpart executed by the tenant as original evidence,' or, in the event of its loss, he may have recourse, either to the part sealed by himself, or to any other species of secondary proof of such counterpart : ^ if, however, the tenant is the person aggrieved, he must rely on the part delivered by the landlord, and that executed by himself will only be considered as secondary evidence. For stamp purposes the counterpart sealed by the lessor is usually deemed the original ; but that which is sealed by the lessee may be described in pleading as the " indenture," though stamped as a counterpart, provided the action bo brought against the lessee.' Where any discrepancy is found to exist between a lease and its counterpart, the law will presume that the lease is correct, unless it be clear that the mistake is in that instrument.^ § 427. On one or two occasions, where it was necessary to show that the plaintiff's ancestor had exercised acts of ownership over the property in question, counterparts of leases older than the period of living memory, and found in the ancestor's muniment room, have * Note by reporter, 2 M. & Gr. 618 6, 1841. 2 See Colling v. Trewoek, 1827 (Baylov, J.) ; Brown v. Woodman, 1834 (Parke, J.). 3 Eoo V. Diivis, 1806; May. of Carlisle r. Blamive, 1807; Paul v. Meek, 1828; Pfarce v. Morrico, 1832 ; Burleigli v. Stibbs, 1793; Houghton V, Kcrnig, 1856. * Munn V. Godbold, 1823. As secondary evidence it will bo admis- sible, though unstamped : id. See 64 & 55 V. c. 39 ("The Stamp Act, 1891 "), § 72 ; and ante, § U8. * The law in Ireland is now regu- lated by § 23 of the Act 23 & 24 V. o. 154, which enacts, that " iu all actions, suits, and proceedings, proof by or on behalf of any landlord of the perfection of the counterpart of an J' lease shall be equivalent to proof of the perfection of the original lease ; and in case it shall appear that no counterpart existed, or that the counterpart has been lost, destroyed, or mislaid, proof of a copy of the original lease or counterpait, as tlie case may be, shall bo sufficient evi- dence of the contents of the lease, as against the lessee, or any jjorson claiming from or under him." « Doe V. EoPS, 1840; Hall v. Ball, 1841. ' Pearce v. Morrice, 1832. » Burchell v. Clark, 1876. 300 CHAP. IV.] COUNTERPARTS OF OLD LEASES. been admitted in evidence even against strangers, though executed by no one but the persons named as lessees, who were not shown to have actually held under them, and though no excuse was given for not producing the original leases sealed by the ancestor.' It is difficult to reconcile these decisions with strict principle, since the counterparts amounted, in fact, to no more than admissions by third parties that the ancestor was seised ; but the rule was apparently relaxed in consequence of the acknowledged difficulty of tracing acts of ownership after the lapse of many years. § 428. The rule which requires the production of the best attainable evidence has now been discussed, and an attempt has been made to illustrate the distinction between primary and secondary modes of proof. It remains, before concluding this chapter, to be seen upon what occasions secondary eckleiice will be received. § 428a. The first general rule is, that srcondnn/ ciidcncc is inadmissible , until it is shown that the production ofpriinari/ evidence is out of the prirtf/s power. The second is, that secondare/ eridence as to previous oral testimonij can onlij he given in a prescribed naij and subject to certain restrictions. The remaining general rule as to secondary evidence is that there, are no degrees of secondarij evidence. § 428b. The first of these general rules, namely, the rule that secondary evidence is inadmissible until it be shown that the production of primary evidence is out of the ])arty^s power, and the exceptions to it, will be most conveniently discussod with regard to, first, documentary evidence, and, next, to oral testimony. § 428(;. With respect to documents, proof of their contents may be established by secondary evidence, first, when the original writing is destroyed or lost ; secondly, when its production is phyhically impossible, or at least highly inconvenieut ; thirdly, when the document is in the possession of the adverse party, who refuses, after notice, or in some cases without notice, to produce it ; fourthly, when it is in the hands of a tliird party, who is not com- :',^^'i » Doe V. Pulinan, 1S42; D. of Bedford v. Lopus, 1m;}8, decided by Ld. Donmau; Biistow v. Cor- iiiican, 1878 (Ld. lUiickburn), in II. L. ; Gov. of Magdalen Hospital V. Knott, 1877, 0. A.; Clarkson V. Woodliouso, 178-. In tliifl last case the distinction between couuter- piii'ts and leases does not appear to have been much discussed, if taken at all. 301 llM (IF'' m Wm mu I i it ;lii|||j^»i§l|i| WHEN INSTRUMENT IS DESTROYED OR LOST. [PART II. Reliable by law to produce it, and who, being called as a witness ■with a subpcona duces tecum, relies upon his right to withhold it ; fifthly, when the law raises a strong presumption in favour of the existence of the document : sixthly, when the papers are voluminous, and it is only necessary to prove their general results ; and lastly, •when the question arises upon the examination of a witness on the voire dire. § 429.' First, if an instrument be destroyed or lost, a party who seeks to give seeonrlary evidence of its contents must, to begin ■with, give some evidence that the original once existed," and then either prove positively, or at least presumptively (as by showing that it has heen thrown aside as useless^), that such instrument has heen destroyed, or he must show that it has been lost by proof that a search has been unsuccessfully made for it, in the place or places ■where it was most likely to be found. What degree of diligence ig necessary in a search for a lost instrument cannot easily be defined, as each case must depend much on its own peculiar circumstances.^ The party seeking to be allowed to give secondary evidence, on the ground that an instrument is lost, is, however, generally expected to chow that he has, in good faith, exhausted m a reasonable degree all the sources of information and means of discovery which the nature of the case ■would naturally suggest, and which wore accessible to him.' The object of the proof is merely to establish a reasonable prf umption of the loss of the instrument, and this is a preliminary inquiry addressed to the discretion of the judge.^ The party offering secondary evidence, therefore, need not on ordinary occasions have made a search for the original document, as for stolen goods, nor be in a position to negative every possibility of its having been kept back.' If the document be important, and such as the owner may have an interest in keeping, or if any reason exist for suspecting that it has been fraudulently withheld, a very 'l. » Gr. Ev. § 5o8. in part. * Dog v. Wittcomb, 1851 (Ld. Campbell) ; in H. L., 1853 (Alderson, B.]. » E. V. Johnson, 1805. * Brc^rster v. Sowoll, 1820 (Best, J.); Gully V. Bp of Exeter, 1827. Soo i'aidoo V. i'lice, 1844 ; K. v. Gordon, 1855. « E. V. Saffron Hill, 1852. Seo Moriartj' v. Grey, 18(J0 (Ir.). « Ante, § 23. "< M'Galiey v. Alston, 1836 (Aider- son, B.); recofjnized (Wigram, V.-C.) in Hart v. Hart, 1841. 302 CHAP. IV.] SEARCH FOR LOST INSTRUMENT. etrict examination will be required ; but only a comparatively slight degree of diligence will be demanded on a search for a paper supposed to be of little or no value.' § 430. When a document belongs to the personal custody of a pnrtieidar individual, or is proved, or may be presumed, to be in his possession, he must in general be served with a subpoena duces tecxim, and be sworn to account for it ; " since, so long as he is capable of being called as a witness, his declarations respecting it will in strictness be inadmissible,^ and even after his death this species of evidence, though admissible as tending to prove the diligence and extent of the search, must be received with great caution.* However, this species of evidence being only required for the purpose of satisf}'ing the conscience of tlie judge on a preliminary inquiry, a looser rule is allowed to prevail than would have been applicable to proof of material issues ; indeed it even has » Gathercole v. Miall, 1846 (Pol- lock, C.B., and Aldorson, B.); Brew- ster ■". Sewell, 1820 ; Kensington v. Inplis, 1807; R. v. East I'airley, 1825 (Bayley, J.); Freeman v. Arkell, 1824. * See E. V. Saffron HUl, 1852. 8 R. V. Denio, 1827 ; R. v. Castle- ton, 1795 ; Williams v. Young- husband, 1815; Walker v. Lady Beauchamp, 1834 (Alderson, B.), * R. V. Rawden, 1834 (Ld. Den- man). On one occasion, where an apprentice, shortly before his death, had stated that his indenture had been given up to him after the expi- ration of the apprenticeship, and that he had burnt it, secondaiy evi- dence of its contents was received without any search having been made for it, as proof was given that the deed had not been executed in duplicate, that the master was dead, and that his executrix had declared that she knew nothing about the in- strument (R. V. Morton, 1815). This decision appears to have proceeded on the somewhat dubioiis ground, that if the statement of the appren- tice was inadmissible, the indenture was not traced into his hands, and as the term of service had expired, no particular reason could be assigned why it should be in hia custody, while, if the statement was receiv- able to show a possession of the deed by him, it further showed that search for it was unnecessary (per Ld. Ellen borough, in 4 M. & Sel. 50, 1815; explained by Bayley, J., in R. V. Denio, 1827. See Eichai'ds v, Lewis, 1852). The second branch of this dilemma is unanswerable, but the first is open to much doubt ; for even if the fact of the deed not being traced into the hands of the appren- tice could preclude the necessity of searching in that quarter (as to which see post, § 434, n. *), it could not discharge the parties of laches, in having neither called the personal representative of the master, nor even examined his papers. Perhaps, how- ever, the case may best be supported on the grounds stated in the text a few words further on. In City of Bristol V. AVait, 1834, too. Aider- son, B., held that, in order to let in secondaiy evidence of the appointment of one of the defen- dants as overseer, it was sufficient to show that one of the witnesses had asked him for his appointment, and that ho had said he had lost it, whei'e- upon no search was made. See, also, R. V. Eordingbridgo, 1858. 303 i : '1' j ' i 1 ' 1 •,!* ;l^i!'l '!i '111 11 ;ii' Itl'll! ii iirt SKAUCri FOR LOST INSTRUMKNT. [I'ART II. boen held' that, in order to show tliiit so.irch 1ms lucii niiido for ii document, so us to let in sccHindary proof of its t'onlout.s, hearsay evidenoe of the anxwcn-N given by persons who wero likely to have it in their custody ought to he received.* § 431. If an instrument oiiglit to have been deposited in a pullio office, or other particular place, it will generally be deemed sufHeient to liave soanilied that [)lace, without calling the party whoso duty it was to have put it there, or any other person who may have had access to it. For example, wliere a parish indenture of apprentice- ship was proved to have been given to a person since dead to take to the overseers, and a fruitless search had been made for it in the parish chest, which was the proper repository for such instruments, secondary evidence was admitted without more ; ' where it was the duty of a paying clerk of a parish to deposit a certain cancelled cheque in a room of the workhouse, an application to the successor of this clerk for an inspection of the cheques iu the room, and an ineffectual examination of several biindles, which were handed to the party searching by the successor, was deemed a sufficient search to let in secondary evidence, though no notice to produce had been served on the first clerk, he being the defendant in the cause, and though the person who succeeded him in the office was not called ; ' and on proof by the high constable, who levied under it, that he had deposited it in hit, office, and had sought for it there in vain, secondary evidence of the contents of a warrant issued by the defendant has been received, and this though the constable added that the town-clerk had access to the office, and it was objected that the defendant should have been served with a notice to produce the warrant, and the town-clerk with a subpoena duces ft., um.* » E. V. Kenilworth, 1845 (Colo- ridge, J.). * E. V. Braintree, 1859; E. v Kenilworth, IS'15 ; Smith v. Smith, 1876 (Ir.). 3 E. V. Stourbridge, 1828. See Minshall v. Lloyd, 1837. * M-Gahey v. Alston, 1836. * Fernley v. Worthiiigton, 1840. Where, however, it appeared that a solicitor, who had prepared an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, had sent it after execu- tion to the defendant by his clerk, and tiiis clerk was not called (having quitted the service of the solicitor a long time back), but the defendant's clerk stated that he had searched for the deed in his counting-house, whore tlio transactions to which it referred were all carried (mi, and where books containing entries re- lating to those transactions were kept; the case, on this state of facts, and without the expression of any opinion as to the effect of the absence of the solicitor's clerk, was referred back to a master, in order that a further search might be made at defendant's private residence, since 304 C. IV.] SK.VRCII rOK LOST WUITINGS — PROPER CUSTODY. § 43"2. It is oftoii (liirieult to nsccrfain wliat is tho propor rmtodif of an insfrunicnt,' and it will then iihviiys bo I'xpL'dii'nt, and somu- times nofiossmy, to soarcli novcral places. For oxainplo, whore a Tiiarriagn settlement, after providing a portion for younger eliildron, and vesting a Irgal term in trustees to secure it, reserved an ultimate remainder to (he settlor's heir, a search among the papers of the surviving younger child was hold insufficient to let in secondary evidence of its contents, as the papers of the surviving trustees, and of tho heir, should also have been examined ; ' an expired indenture of apprenticeship remains sometimes with tho master, sometimes with the apprentice, but, since the apprentice has the greatest interest in its preservation,' stricter inquiry should be made of him than of the master, and in the absence of positive proof respecting the possession, caution would suggest what strict law might not require* — a search among the papers of both. Search for an expired lease should be made among the papers of both lessor and lessee,' whether a term has come to an end by efflux of time or by forfeiture, since the lessee will have a right to keep the deed, for a time at least, to use in an action of covenant against the lessor, but it will frequently, after a considerable interval, be found in the landlord's possession, as constituting one of the muniments of his title.6 § 433. A deed of compromise which comes from the office of the solicitor to one of the parties to it comes from the proper custody.' The legal custody of a document appointing an overseer is in that it did not appear that his clerk, who hud been actively concerned in the transactions in question, had ever Been the deed at tho counting-house : Hart V. Hart, 1841. And m Bligh V. Wellesley, 1826, a witness stated that he had in vain searched for some Eapers in a box, in which he thought e had put them, but that he still fancied they were somewhere in his possession, though he had not looked elsewhere for them ; this was insuffi- cient (Best, C.J.). ' As to this, see post, §§ 659 — 664. ' Cruise v. Clancy, 1844 (Ir.) (Sugden, C); Richards v, Lewis, 1852. » See HaU v. BaU, 1841. * R. V. Hinckley, 1863. » Brewster v. Sewell, 1820; Hall V. BaU, 1841 (Erskine, J.). 8 Hall V. Ball, 1841 ; Tlaxton v. Dare, 1829 ; Klworihy v. Sandford, 1864; R. V. North Redburu, 1784 (Buller, J.) ; Doe v. Keeling, 1848. It has, however, never been ex- pressly decided that a search among the muniments of the lessor alone would not let in secondary evidence ; and Bayley, J., on one occasion, seems to have thought that an examination of the lessee's papers would not be absolutely necessary. See cases just cited. ' Miller v. Wheatley, 1890. 305 ' I SH '! SEARCH FOR LOST WRITINGS. [rART II. officer, lie being the person most interest'- 1 in it, and requiring its production as a sanetion for those acts which lie may he railed upon to do under its authority; therefore, in the ahsenco of proof that the other parish officers have the actual custody of such an instrument, it will not suffice to give them notice to produce it, but before secondary evidence can be received it will be necessary to call the overseer himself.' § 4"54. If the party entitled to the ciistody of a document be dead, inquiries should generally be made of his personal represen- tatives, and if the document relate to real estate, of the heii'-at-law also. But these steps will not be necessary should it appear that another party is in possession of the papers of the deceased. There- fore, where the master of an apprentice, being possessed of the indenture, failed, and an attorney took the custody of his papers, a search among these papers by tliv? attorney, after the master's death, was held sufficient to let in secondary evidence of the deed of apprenticeship, though no inquiries had been made of the master's widow.' § 435. The law does not, moreover, require that the search should have been rrcrnf, or made for the piirposon of the cause. Therefore, a search made amongst the proper papers three years before the trial, was held sufficient, though it would have been more satis- factory hod the papers been again examined.' If an instrument were executed in duplicate, or triplicate, &c., the loss of all the parts must he proved, in order to let in secondary evidence of the contents ; * and, in every case, before such evidence will be admis- sible, the original instrument must be shown to have been didy executed, and to have been otherwise genuine.* If the instrument were of such a nature as to have required attestation," the attesting witness must, if known, be called, or in the event of his death, his handwriting must be proved, precisely in the same manner as if the deed itself had been produced ; though, if it cannot be discovered who the attesting witness was, this strictness of proof will, from > R. V. Stoko Oolriing. 1817. • R. V. Piddlohinton, 18U2. » Fitz V. Rabbits, 1H;}7. • R. f. CiiHtleton, 17!).); Alivon v. luniiviil, 1834. Soo iiiitd, § ;i91. • Uoodior v. Lake, 17117 ; R. v. Culpoppor, IGOO; T)oo v. Whitcfoot, 1838 ; JiK'kson r. Krittr, l.sii) (.\m.) : Kinibiill r. MoiTcU, 18L>() (Am.). • St'c, hownvor, us to doiMimi'iits hot ii'(|\iiiiiig attosUitiou, 28 & 29 V. c. 18, § 7. 306 CHAP. IV.] PROBATE OF LOST WILL. necessity, be waived. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that a lost instrument was duly stamped,' § 436. In the Court of Probate where a will itself has, after the death of the testator, been irretrievably lost or destroyed, if its subatdHce can be distinctly ascertained (either by the original instructions, by a copy of the will, or even by the recollection of witnesses who have heard it read) probate may be granted of a copy embodying such substance.* On one remarkable occasion the contents, or rather a large portion of the contents, of a lost will, were allowed to be proved by the testimony of a single interested witness, whose veracity and competency were unimpeached ; and probate granted to the extent of the proof.' In all cases, however, of this nature, the jurisdiction of the court must be exercised with the greatest possible caution; and a judge will scarcely feel justified in acting on the evidence, unless it be of the most cogent and irrefragable character, not oidy free from suspicion in its sources, but exact and certain in its conclusions.* S 437. Notwithstanding the rule, which in general enables parties to prove, by secondary evidence, the contents of documents which have been lost or destroyed, in certain cases prior to the year 1804, no action could be maintained either upon certain written instruments themselves or even upon the consideration on which they were founded, without the production of such written instruments them- selves. Thus, no action could at law be sustained on a /o.s7 bill of ('.rcli(ii)(ir, promissory note, or cheque, or on their respet^tive con- siderations, provided the instrument had been originally drawn payable tu order, or bearer, and provided the fact of the loss had been specially pleaded.'^ The payee of a lost instrument of the description indicated was, to recover payment, formerly comiielled ' .\nto. § 148. « Wharriiiii v. WTinrrnm, 1S03; rodmin'o V. Wliiittoii, l.S(U ; Mooro V. Wliitohousc, liStH ; In lo Uody, l.S(i4; In ro Ikibor, IHfJO; WoodV. "Wood, 1H()(); Finch V. Finch, 1K(}7 ; Utiils I'. Burls. 18»)H ; In ro Calliin, 1«74 (Ir.); Miihood c Muhood, 1874 (Ir.). Soo post, § 550. ^ Siigden V. Ld. Hi. Leonardo, 1876. * Piisps in liist note hut onn. ' Kiiniu/ /•. Ciowc, 1847 ; Crowe t>. (May, IS.VI ; lliinsard r. Kohinson, l.Sl>7; riorson c. Iliitcliinisoii, ISO!); iMiiyor i). Johnson, I8i;{ ; Diivia v. J)odd, 1812; ('liatnjiion v. Ti'rry, 1822; IWau v. Hill. 810; Wood- ford ?-. Whitcloy, 18;iO. Sec .\lo.\- nndor ?•. Stronp, 1842; T.ulihock r. Tribe, 18;i8 ; ]5Iai-ki<> c. I'idding, 1848; and Charuley v. Gruudy, 1634. ^io; SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF MURAL MONUMENTS. [PT. II, Bf;!!;; >l;; lr-1 '• :;! : -!?■' \ Ulr' \ lii. ■ ■mi ■ ■iilivr::: ^^X'- ,■ ^uy .:. s to resort to a court of equity.' But the law on tliis subject was altered in 1854 by the Common Law Procedure Act of that year (which appears to be still in force) and the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, repeats very similar provisions.* § 438. Tiie second case^ in which the contents of a written document may be proved by secondary evidence, is when its produc- tion is either phijHknlly imposnble, or highly inconvenient. Thus,^ inscriptions on nails and fixed tables, mural monuments, gravestones, surveyors^ marks on boundary trees, notices affixed on boards to warn trespassers, and the like, may be proved by secondary evidence, since they cannot conveniently, if at all, be produced in court.* For instance, on one occasion a man was convicted of ;MTjKi V i ■■ >.! m: > Warmsley v. Child, 1749 ; Toul- min V. Price, 1800; Ex parte Green- way, 1802 ; Macartney v. Graham, 1828; Davies v. Dodd, 1817 ; Mossop V. Eadon, 1810. ' § 87 of " The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 " (17 & 18 V. c. 12j), is as follows: — "In case of any action founded upon a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument," which words will in- clude a bank note (M'Donnell v. Muri'ay, 18j()), or a lost half of a bank note (see liyles on Bills, 1891 edit., p. 394)— "it shall be lawful for tlio court or a judge to order that the loss of such instrument sliall not be sot up, ])r<)vidcd an indemnity is given, to the satisfaction of the court or judge, or a master, against tlio cliiinis of any other porson upon such lu'gotiabli! instrument " (see Aran- guerin r. ScholHeld, ISiJO; King v. Zimmermann, 1871). If the payee of a lost note can show that the in- strument was never negotiable, as having been originally made payable to himself alone, he cannot, as it would seem, be called ujjon to give an indemnity under this clause, but the action will be sustainable, either on the instrument itself, or on tho consideration ; because, in such case, tho defendant cannot be rendered liable to pay the amount a second time (Wain ?'. Bailey, 18.'{9 ; recog- nized in llamuz r. Crowe, 1847 ; day V, Crowe, 1853. As to what is the effect of the bill being destroyed, see § 322 of the 1st edit, of this work, and Wi'ight v. Ld. Maidstone, 1855 (Wood, V.-C). See, too, Conflans Quarry Co. v. Parker, 1867 ; where circular notes having been lost, the party losing them was held not en- titled to sue the bankers for money had and received). §§ 69 and 70 of "The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882" (45 & 46 V. 0. 61) are as follow : — § 69. " Where a bill has been lost before it is overdue, the person who was the holder of it may apply to the drawer to give him another bill of the 81.' me tenour, giving security to tho drawer, if required, to indem- nify him against all persons what- ever in case the bill alleged to have been lost shall be found again. "If the dr.i wor, on request as afore- said, refuses to give such dupliciito bill, he may bo compelled to io so." § 70. " In any action or proceeding upon a bill, tho court or a judge may onler that the loss of the in- strutnont shall not be set up, pro- vided an indemnity bo given to the satisfaction of the court or judge against the claims of any other person upon tho instrument in question." ^ See supra, § 42Mn. ♦ Gr. Ev. § 94, in ])art. » Mortimer i'. M'Callan. 1840 (Ld. Abingor and Aldersou, B.); R. v. Eursi'y. 1833; Doe v. C(de, 1834 (Patteson, J.) ; Bartholomew v. 308 CH. IV.] FOliKIGN DOCUMENTS — llECORDS — REGISTEitS. writing a libel on the wall of the Liverpool gaol, on mere proof of his handwriting.^ In order, however, to let in this description of secondary evidence, it must clearly appear that the document or writing is affixed to the freehold, and cannot easily be removed ; and therefore, where a notice was merely suspended to the wall of an office by a nail, it was considered necessary to produce it at the trial.* If, too, a document be depositeil in a foreign country, and the laws or established usage of that country will not permit its removal, secondary evidence of the contents will be adriiittcd, because in that case, as in the case of mural inscriptions, it is not in the power of the party to produce the original.' § 439.* On a similar ground, the existence and contents of any record of a judicial court, and of entries in any other ptih/ic books or registers, may be proved by an examined copy, and in some cases by an office copy, by a certified copy, or even by a mere certificate.' This rule extends to all records and entries of a public nature in books required by law to be kept ; and is adopted, — partly, because of the serious risk of loss which the removal of such documents would occasion, — partly, because of the inconvenience which the public might experience from the removal, especially if the docu- ments were wanted in two or more places about the same time, — and partly, because of the public character of the facts recorded, and the consequent facility of detection of any fraud or error in the copy.' $i 439a. For very similar reasons, too, and on grounds of con- venience, in an action for infringement of a copyright in a picture Stephens, 18139 (id.); Bruce v. Nico- lopnlo, 1855. ' Mentioned by Ld. Abinger in Mortimer v. M'Callun, 1840. ' Jones V. Tarloton, 1842. On one occasion, indeed, the Committee for Privileges in the House of Lords recoivod in evidence, as proof in a pedigree, a copy of a plate of the arum of the Knights of the Garter, which had been put up in the Chapel lloyal at Windsor in the reign of Iloiirj' v., and which, being fastened to the buihling only by screws, was phy.sically removable; but this case soems to rest, at least partly, on the ground that the plate in question could not have been removed with- out a special warrant from tlie Queen. Semble, this evitleiico would not have been adiiiissiblo had not the question at issue related to a jivdii/ree : Berke- ley Peerage, 1858-()1, II. L. ; Shrews- bury Peerage case, 1857, II. L. =• Burnable y. Baillio, 18S9; Ali- von V. Furnival, 18;i4 ; Boyle v, AViseman, 1855 ; Quilter v. Jorss, 185;j. See 14 & 15 V. c. 99 ("The Evidence Act. 1851"), § 7; and Crispin r. Doglioni, 1802. « Gr. Ev. §91, in part. * This subject will be discussed post, §§ 15;J4 ot seq. • B. N. P. 22G. 309 PAPERS IN POSSESSION OF OPPONENT. [PAPT II. it is not necessary to produce the original picture, but the infringe- ment may be proved by persons who, on looking at the infringe- ment in court, say that it resambles it.^ § 440. The third case in which secondary evidence of a written document is admissible is when a document is in the jwssesnion of the advermry, who with/iok/s it at the trial, and a notice to produce the orif/inal has been dull/ served, where such notice is requisite,^ This rule applies equally both in civil and criminal cases. In either mode of proceeding, in order to render the notice available, it must, ho'vever, be first shown that the instrument is in the hands, or under the control, of the party required to produce it.' Very slight evidence will raise a sufficient presumption of this where the document exclusively belongs to or in the regular course of business ought to be in the custody of a party served. Therefore, where a bankruptcy certificate was proved to have been obtained for a defendant, the court presumed that it had come into his possession ; * while, if papers were last seen in the hands of a defendant, it lies upon him to trace them out of his possession,* — and for this purpose he may interpose with evidence while the plaintiff's case is proceeding, and, such evidence being submitted to the judge alone,* its admission does not give the plaintiff's counsel a right to reply to the jury.' Where a party has notice to produce a particular instrument which has been traced to his possession, he cannot, it seems, object to parol evidence of its contents being given, on the ground that, previously to the notice, he had ceased to have any control over it, unless he has stated this fact to the opposite party, and has pointed out to him the person to whom he delivered it.* Neither can he escape the effect of the notice, by afterwards volun- tarily parting witli the iii>trument, which it directs him to produce.® 1 Williums V. Luciis, 1892, C. A. » 11. V, Watson, 1788 (IJuUer, J.); Att.-Gen. v. Le Marchunt, \~''? ; Gates V. Winter, 1789. As to the presumption respecting the stamp, 880 ante, § 148. 3 Sharpe i'. Jiamb, 1840. ♦ Henry v. Leigli, 18i;J (Ld. Ellen- horoiif^h). See, also, Robb v. Star- key, 1845. » R. V. Thistlowood, 1820; E. v. IngH, 1820. » aupra, §§ 23 et seq. ' Ilaryeyv. Mitchell, 1841 (Parke, B.) ; Smith v. Sleap, 1843 (Alderson, B.). " Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1824 (Rest, C.J.). In Knight v. Martin, 1819, where secondary evidence was lield iri'.dniistiil)le, the party, who was served with notice to produce a lease, told his opponent tnat he had as- signed it. » Per Dallas, C.J., iii Knight v. Maitin, 1819. 810 CH. IV.] NOTICK TO PRODUCE — POSSESSION BY AGENT. m ■4 § 441. If an instrument be in the possession of a person in priiity with the party, such as his banker,' agent, servant, deputy, or the like, such person need not be served with a subpoena duces tecum, or even be called as a witness, but a notice given to the party himself will suffice.^ For example, the admission of secondary evidence will be justified by a notice to a shipowner to produce papers, though the captain has possession of them for his own protection,' — or by a notice to a sheriff to produce a warrant, which is shown to have been returned to the under-sheriff during the time that the sheriff remained in office ; * and a document deposited in a court of equity by a party to a suit, and scheduled in his answer, which had been ordered to be delivered to him, was held to be sufficiently within his control to let in secondary evidence after notice to produce, though it appeared that, at the time of the trial, the document was still in the hands of an officer of the court.* But the party served with the notice to produce must have such a right to the instrument which is the subject of it as would entitle him not merely to inspect it, but to retain it. Therefore, where a document is held by a stakeholder between the defendant and a stranger to the cause," or where it has been delivered to a third person, under whom the defendant has justified in an action of trespass, and by whose directions he aoted,' parol evidence of its contents must be rejected, notwithstanding that a notice to proJ'Jce has been duly served on the defendant. § 441a. a proper notice to produce is, however, in all these cases necessary before secondary evidence becomes admissible. A few remarks as to the form and service of such a lotice will, there- fore, not be out of place here. § 442. The notice must, it seems, not only be in uritiiig,^ but, so far as civil proceedings are concerned, must be in a special « Partridge v.Coates, 1824 (Abbott, C.J.) ; Burton u. Payne, 1827 (Bav- ley, J.). • Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1824 (Best, C.J.). » Baldney v. Ritchie, 1824 (Ld. EUenborough). * Taplin v. Atty, 1825 ; Suter v. ap. bII, Burrell, 1857. » Eush .;. Peacock, 1838 (Ld. Den- man). « Parry v. May, 1833 (Littledale, ' Evans v. Sweet, 1824 (Best, CJ.). * See R. S. 0. 1883, Ord. LXVL, r. 1. 311 I ;■' SERVICE OF NOTICE — CONTENTS OF NOTICE. [PART II. form.' It may be directed to the party or to his solicitor, and may be served on either.^ Indeed, it will be sufficient to leave the notice with a servant of the party at his dwelling-house, or with a clerk at the solicitor's office.' Where the solicitor has been changed, a notice served on the first solicitor before the change will suffice ; for otherwise the effect of the notice might be easily evaded by changing the legal adviser on the eve of the trial.^ A notice duly served on the party will not be rendered invalid by a subsequent bad service on the solicitor.* § 443. It is difficult to lay down any general rule as to tchat a notice to produce ought to contain, since much must depend on the particular circumstances of each case. No misstatement or in- accuracy in the notice will, however, be deemed material, if not really calculated to mislead the opponent.® Neither is it necessary, by condescending minutely to dates, contents, parties, &o., to specify the precise documents intended. Indeed, to do so may be dangerous, since if any material errors ' ere inadvertently made, the party sought to be affected by the notice might urge, with possible success, that he had been misled thereby. If enough is stated on the notice to induce the party to believe that a particular Hi. .; ^mk « Order XXXII. r. 8. The form is as follows .— No. 14. App. B. [Heading as in Form 1.] "Take notice, thau you are hereby required to produce and show to the court on the trial of this all books, papers, letters, copies of letters, and other writings and documents in your custody, possession, or ower, containing any entry, memorandum, or minute relating to the matters in question in this , and particularly Dated the day of , 18 . To the above-named / (Signed) h solicitor or agent. » Hughes V. Budd, 1840; B. v. Barker, 1858; E. v. Boucher, 1859; Houseman v. Roberts, 1832 ; Gates v. Winter, 1789. This last case was a qui tam action. See B. v. Downham, 1858. , named , of , agent for , solicitor for the above- » Evans V. Sweet, 1824 (Best, C.J.). * Doev. Martin, 1832(Tindal,C.J.). » Hughes V. Budd, 1840 (Patteson, J.). * Justice V. Elstob, 1858 ; Graham V. Oldis, 1858. 312 CHAP. 1V.1 CONTENTS OF NOTICK TO PKODUCE. instrument will be c<alled for, this will be sufRciont.^ But a notice to produce " all letters, papers, and documents, touching or con- cerning the bill of exchange mentioned in the declaration, and the debt sought to be recovered," * has been held too vague to admit secondary proof of a notice of dishonour sent by the plaintiff to the defendant. And in an action ' against four defendants, as owners of a sloop, to recover an account f'^" warehousing the rigging of the vessel, in order to prove that one defendant was a joint owner, the plaintiff called for a letter, which was stated to have been written nine years before by this defendant to the son of another defendant, and relied upon a " notice to produce letters and copies of letters, and all books relating to the cause," but the court decided that the notice was too uncertain, and no sensible man could entertain a different opinion. It is believed that many judges still act upon these old principles, though later decisions justify a greater laxity of practice.* § 444. In an old case, a notice which misdescribed the title of the cause was held invalid ; ' but an objection to a notice on the ground that it was entitled (by mistake) in a wrong court, was over- ruled, Alderson, B., saying, "One does not know where we aro to stop. Would the notice be bad if one of the names was spelt wrong? . . At the time of the decision in Harvey v. Morgan, the courts were much more strict than now as to matters of this nature."* ' See Rogers v. Custance, 1839. « France ?;. Lucy, 1825 (Best, C. J.). ' Jones !'. Edwards, 1825. * Thus, a notice to produce ' ' all li'tters written by the phiintiff to the dofondaiit, rehiting to the mutters in disjjute in the action " (Jacob r. Lee, 18.'i" (Patteson, J.); see, also, Coniiy- bear v. Farries, 18GJ)), or " all letter-! written to or received by the jjlaintifl between the years 1837 and 1841, both inclusive, by and from the defen- dants, or either of thein, or any per- son in their behalf, and also all books, papers, &c., relating to the subject- matter of this cause" (Morris v. Hauser, 1841 (Ld. Dennian)), have res])ectively been held suflicient to let in ])aioI evidence of a particular li'tter not otherwise specified. In tlii'se cases the names of thts parties by and to whom the letters were addressed appeared on the notice. This was pointed out and relied upon by Patteson, J., in Jacob v. lice, 1837. The Coiu-t of Queen's Bench, in an action for work and labour, also decided that a notice to pro- duce " all accounts relating to the matters in question in this cause," comprehended with sufficient pre- cision a particular account relating to a small jiart of the work, though it apjieared that many such accounts for dirt'ei'ent parts of the work had been rendered by the jilaintiff to the defendant : Rogers v. Custimce, 1837. ' Harvey v. Morgan, ISKi. The notice in that case was entitled "A. & B., assignees of C. & U., v. E.," instead of " A. & B., ass'gnees of C, V. E." * Lawrence v. Clark, IC.'o. I 313 > " V9 if !l m^ w. !' iikk m u ■f TIME AND PLACE OF SERVICE OF NOTICE. [PART II. § 445. As to the timr and pface of the service, no more precise rule can be laid down, than that it must be such as to enable the party, und^T the known circumstances of the case, to comply with the call.' If the person to be served, whether client or solicitor, dwell in another town than that in which the trial is had, he must generally be served before the commission day.* Service after he has left home to attend the court will usually be insufficient.' In town causes, however, and in country causes, where the solicitor lives in the assize town, a shorter notice will suffice, and if the documents be such as may reasonably be presumed to be in the solicitor's possession, service on him, or at his office, before six o'clock* in the afternoon of the day preceding the trial, will generally be sufficient ; * though, if the documents would probably be in the client's custody, — as, for instance, if they were a trades- man's books," or if they were letters or papers not obviously connected with the cause, — such service would be too late.' And a notice during the trial of a town cause lasting twelve days, given on one day during the trial for the next, is not sufficient.* If a party be served with notice sufficiently early to enable him to produce the document, it makes no difference that at the time of the service the cause is part heard.' § 4 1^. If the party served with a notice to produce can prove that his papers are in a foirign country, or at such a distance from the place of trial as to render it impossible for him to produce them under an ordinary notice, such a notice will be inoperative. The > R. V. Hankins, 1849 ; E. v. Kit- Bon. 1853. * Tiist V. Johnson, 18,33 (rark, J. E. V. Ellicombe, 1833 (Inttledale, J. Lessee of Leader v. Dut^gan, 1841 (Ir.); Iluniiihrey v. St. Li'gor, 1841 (Ir.); M'MastcrandBoyle'scase, 1843 (Ir.). Boe Howard t^. Williams, 18r2. ^ George f. Thompson, 1836; llar- gestr. Fothergill, 1832 (Taunton, J.). * fcjee post, § lo8()A, citing Ord. LXIV., r. 11, of E. S. C. 1883. " Atkins V. Meredith, 183G ; Leaf v. Butt, 1842 (Alderson, B.); Moyrick V. Woods, 1842 (id.); Firkin r. Ed- wards, 1H40 (Williams, J.); Gibbons V. Powell, 184(» ((runipy, B.): E. v. llamp, 18o2 (Ld. Campbell); Holt f. Miers, 1839; LaT/rence v. Clark, 1845. If the trial is to take place on the Mon- day, a service on the Sunday, or even on Saturday alter 2 p.m. (spo rule oited iu last note), will not do ; and perliai)s a service on a Sunday would in any event be bad. See Ilughes v. Budd, 1840 (Patteson, J.); and 29 Car. 2, c. 7, §()(" The Sunday Observ- ance Act, 1077"). • Atkins V. Meredith, 1830. ' Bryno v. Harvey, 1838 (Ld. Pen- man) ; Vice v. Lady Anson, 1827 (Ld. Tenterden) ; Atlalo v. Eourdrinier, 1829 (Tindal, C.J.). s Sugg V. Bray. 18S5. ' Sturm V. JelYroe, 1847 (Pollock, C.B.). 314 1 CHAP. IV.3 TIME OF SERVING NOTICE TO PRODUCE. courts, however, incline to favour thj sufficiency of tlie notice, whenever the circumstances will warrant it. For example, where a party had gone ahroad, leaving the cause in the hands of his solicitor, it was presumed that he had left with him all papers material to the cause, and, consequently, a notice served on the solicitor the evening next but one before the trial, was held to be sufficient ; ' a four days' notice, given to the defendant to produce letters written by him to his partner in New South Wales, was considered good, where long litigation on the subject of them made it presumable that they had been remitted to this country ; ^ and even a similar notice to a foreign defendant was sufficient where the action had commenced only seven months before the trial, though the letters required had been addressed to him eighteen years before at his residence abroad, Abbott, C. J., observing that it would lead to great inconvenience and delay if trials were allowed to be postponed upon such an objection.^ § 447. However, a party who seeks the production of papers must not put his adversary to needless trouble and expense. A solicitor who, having been served in Essex with notice to produce certain deeds, fetched them from London, and on the commission day was served with a fresh notice to produce another deed, which he on being served stated was also in town, but then said that it should be forthcoming at the trial if the other side would pay the expenses of a messenger, after this offer had been declined, was held justified, in the absence of payment of such expenses, in not com- plying with the notice, and it also was held that secondary evidence was not rendered admissible by such second notice.* If a party, on being served with a notice to produce a document, states that it is not in existence, parol proof of its contents will be received, and no objection can be taken to the lateness of the service.' A notice to produce certain documents " upon the trial of the cause," applies not merely to the trial which it immediately precedes, but to every subsequent trial of the same cause which may take place.^ > Eryan v. Wagstaff, 1825 (Abbott, C.J.). * Sturgo V, liuchanan, 1839. » Drabble v. Donner, liS24. But BOO Eliioiw|)orgon v. Anderson, 1848. * Doc V. Spitty, 1832. Purbaps the secoud notice, having been nerved on the commission day, would have been too late, indepondout of the special ciroumstauces. * Foster v. Pointer, 1841 (Gr;u'ney. B.). * Jlope V. Buadou, 1851. 315 Pillil|l|i l# NOTICE TO PKOEUCE WHEN UNNECESSAUY. [PART II. § 448. By R. S. C, 188-3, Order XXXII. r. 8, "An affidavit of the solicitor, or his clerk, of the service of any notice to produce, and of the tiroe when it was served, with a copy of the notice to produce, shall in all cases be sufficient evidence of the service of the notice, and of the time when it as served." § 449. In .spi'cn cases notice to produce is not necessary, viz. : (1) where a duplicate original or a counterpart is at hand ; (2) where the document required is itself a notice ; (3) if the form of the proceedings tells the party that he will be charged with the possession ( f the instrument and called on to produce it ; (4) in odium spoliatoris ; (5) in the case of agreements by sailors with masters of ships ; (6) where the document required is admittcul_y lost ; and (7) where it is actually in court. § 449a. Each of these seven cases requires a feAv separate words of notice. § 449u. The first of such seven cases is, where the instrument in the possession of the adversary, and that tendered in evidence, are either duplicate originals,^ or are counterparts, and the part offered in evidence has been executed by the adversary, or by some person through whom he claims. The instrument produced is, as before stated, considered primary evidence, not secondary.'* § 4o0. The second of the seven cases just indicated arises where the instrument to be proved is itself a notice. This exception appears to have been originally adopted in '-^gard to notices to produce, for the obvious reason, that, if a notice to produce such a document were necessary, the series of notices would become infinite.^ The exception has subsequently been extended to other • Colling v.Trowoek, 1827(Bayley, J.); Philipson v. Chase, 1809 (Ld. EUonborough). 2 Ante. § 42G. » 3 St. Ev. 731) ; Philipson v. Chasn, 1809. But see ante, § 448. This has arisen, partly, perhaps, from a misapprehension of the ground on ■which the doctrine rests (iu Philip- bon I'. Chasi:, 1809, Ld. EUonborough observes: " xV'ilson, J., said that if a duplicate of the notice to quit was not of itself sufHcient, no rnoro onght a duplicate of the notice to produce, and thus notices niiglit bo required in infinitum"). The foregoing reasoning is fallacious. See 3 St. Ev. 3rd edit. (1842) 730. The real reasons for the rule are, partly, the experienced in- convenience attendant on a strict ob- servance of the rule requiring notice (2 Ph. Ev. '22'), n. 5); partly, because the secondary evidence that is usually offered of a notice is a copy of the paper sent, which partakes in great measure of the character of a dupli- cate original (Kine v. Beaumont, 1822) ; and, chiefly, because it con- stantly happens that the opposite partj' is well aware, from the nature of the action, that he will be chiirged with the jjossession of the original document (Colling v, Treweek, 1827 (Bay ley, J.); llobinson v. Brown, 1845 (Maule, J.). See post, § 4^2). 316 CHAP. IV.] NOTICE TC TRODUCE A NOTICE UNNECESSARY. notices, and now lets in proof by copies, if not by any species of secondary evidence, of a notice to quit ; ' of a notice of dis- honour,* provided the action be brought upon the bill, but not otherwise ; ' of all such notices of action, or written demands, as are necessary to entitle the plaintiff to recover ; ■* and of bills of costs of solicitors, and parliamentary agents, delivered pursuant to statute.' § 451. An exception to the troneral principle, that no notice to produce a notice is usually required, appears to exist in all cases in which the notice required to be produced has been served on a third person.^ Accordingly, where two parties had become sureties, by a joint and several bond, for the payment, within one month after notice should have been given to them, of such sum as should be d^ 9 from their principal, it has been held that the service of notice upon one of the parties cannot be proved in an action brought against the other, by producing the duplicate of the notice, but that the first party should have been subpcsnaed to produce the original, or to account for its ncn-production.^ § 452. The third of the seven cases in wliioh a notice to produce is unnecessary, is wliei j from the nature of the action, or indictment, or from the form of the pleadings, the defendant mn-it l;iioic that he will be charged with the possession of an instrument, aud be called upon to produce it.* For instance, in an action of trover for oon- ' Doe V. Somerton, lS4o; Jnry v. Orchard, 17T9 (Ld. Eldon) ; Colling V. Trswoek, 1827 (Bayloy, J.). Soe R. V. Mortlock, 18J5. ''■ Swiiin V, Lewis, 18155 ; Kine v. Seaumont, 1822 ; Ackland v. i'earce, 1811 (Le Blanc, J.) ; Eoborts i\ Brad- shaw, 1815; Colling v, Trowcok, 1827 (Bayley, J.). The first two of these cases wore decided after con- ferring with the judges of the other courts, and put the question beyond dispute, overruling Langdon v. Hulls, 1804, and Shaw v. Markham, 1791. ' Lanauzo v. Palmer, 1827 (Abbott, C.J.). * Jory V. Orchard, 1799. * Colling V. Treweek, 1827, decided on § 23 of the repealed Act (2 G. 2, c. 23), but equally applicable to § 37 of 6 & 7 V. 0. 73 (•• Tho Solicitors Act, 1843"'). In an action against a surety, on a bond conditioned to pay the pluintilf tho principal within six months after notice. Lord Ellen- borough, however, held a notice to produce this notice to be necessary, on tho ground that it was not a mere notice, but in tho nature of a state- ment of account b(>tweiu tho plain- tift' and the principal (Grove v. \Vare, 1817). "Whether this case would now be considered a binding authority may well be questioned, since, in principle, it i; ditlicult to distinguish it from sever il of the cases cited above, in which notice to produce has been deemed unnecessary. • Robinson v. Brown, 1846. ' Id. « Colling V. Treweek, 1827 (Bayley, J.). See ante, §§ 407, 408. 317 WIIKN NOTICE TO PRODUCE UNNECESSARY. [PART II. verting a bond, a bill of excliange, or otlior writing,' or in a prosnoution for stealing any document,^ the counsel for the plaintiff or the Crown may at once i)roduoe secondary evidence of its contents, even though the defendant offer to produce the document itself.' A like rule prevails in an action on contract against a carrier for the non-delivery of written instruments/ as also in indictments for conducting a traitorous correspondence.' It is, however, inniiplicable on a charge of forging a deed ; ' or on an indictment for arson, with intent to defraud an insurance ofRco." Similarly, it is the necessary (though reverse) consequence of this rule that a [tlaintiff may object to a defendant, who is the maker of a note or cheque, or the acceptor of a bill, the making or acceptance of which is not denied by the latter's pleadings, and is therefore admitted on the record," giving secondary evidence of its contents, for the purpose oven of identification, unless a notice to produce has been duly served," or unless the instrument is shown to be in court.'" § 453. The fourth case, in which a notice to produce is not necessary, is where possession of the paper, the production of which is required, has been obtained by the adverse party, fraudulently or forcibly, as where, after action brought, he has received it from a witness, in fraud of a subpoena duces tecum." In such cases "in odium spoliatoris" a notice to produce is not required to be given to him before admitting secondary evidence of the contents of the document of which he has improperly obtained possession. § 454. The fifth case in which notice to produce is not needed, is, that by statute every seaman may bring forward evidence to prove ;<; . fli III- iij ' Scotb V. Jones, 1813; How v. Iliill, 1811; Bucheri;. Jairatt, 1802. 'Tht'KO cases overrule Cowau v. Abra- liiuiis, 1793. =* E. V. Aieklos, 1781 ; E. v. Bren- naii. 18-i;i (Ir.) (renin, J.). ^ Wliiteliead v. Scott, 18150 (Ld. Tentcrden). * Jollev V. Taylor, 1807 (Sir J. Miiiislicld, P.J.). ° E. r. ])e la Alotte, 1781 ; Layer's case. 17122. « E. V. Ilaworth, 1830 (Paiko. J.). See Sin'afrjje's case (no date given ; decided by Buller, J.), citiMl by Ijd. Klleiilioiough, Ihll ; also 11. V, El- woithy, 1807, 0. C. li. ' E. V. Ellicombe, 1834 (Littledale, J.) ; E. V. Kitson, 1852. See E. v. Humphries, 1829; E. v. Mortlock, 1845. * The plaintiff, however, cannot recover interest on the bill from the date of its maturity without pro- ducing it: Hutton v. Ward, 1850; Cha])lin v. Levy, 1854 (Parke, 13.). ' Goodered v. Armour, 1842 ; ex- plaining Eoad V. Gamble, 1830; Law- rence?'. Clark, 1845. See, also, Chap- lin V. Levy, 1854 (Parke, B.). "• Dwyer v. Collins, 1852. » Ticeds V. Cook, 1803 (Ld. Ellen- borough); Doe V. Eies, 1831. 318 CHAP. IV.] WIIKN NOTICK TO PUODUCE UNNECESSARY. the contonts of his agrooment with the rnastpr of tlie ship, or othprwise to support his case, without produuing, or giving notice to produce, the agreement itself or any copy of it.' The reason for this indulgence is the proverbial inexperience and recklessness of seafaring men. § 4')0. Tlie sixth instance in which notice to produce is dispensed with is where either the adverse party or his solicitor has admitted tluit a document is lost — for in such case the notice would bo nugatory,'^ — or where, as it seems, the party in possession of the writing might himself give secondary evidence of its contents without producing it, as, for instance, if it be an inscription or notice attached to the freehold.' Under this exception, however, a party cannot call witnesses to prove the destruction of a document that has been traced into the hands of his opponent, and then show its contents by secondary proof, unless he has first served a notice to produce, since (notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary) the document may still be in existence, or, at any rate, the opponent may dispute the fact of its having been destroyed.* li 456. In the seventh, and last, place, notice to produce is unnecessary if it be proved that tlie adverse party, or his solicitor, has the original instrument in court. For the object of the notice is not, — as was formerly thovight,' — to give the opposite party an opportunity of providing the proper testimony to support or impeach the document, but merely to enable him to produce it, if he likes, at the trial, and thus to secure the best evidence of its contents.' If a solicitor, on being called by his client's opponent to state whether he has a particular document in court, asserts that he does not know whether he has it with him or not, and that he does not intend to ascertain that fact, unless compelled to do so by the judge, it is undecided whether or not he will then be ordered to search among his papers ; probably he will. 1 57 & 58 V. c. 60 (" The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894^'), § I'J.'i. See Bowman v. Manzelman, 1809. 2 K. V. Haworth, IHIJO (I'arkc, J.J; Foster v. Pointer, 1841 (Gurnoj-, B.); Howv. Hall, 1811 (L(l. Ellenborough); Doe V. 8pitty, 1832. ' Bavtholomow v. Stephens, 1839 (Patteson, J.). * Doe I'. Morris, 1835. " Bate r. Kinsoy, 1834 ; Cook v. Hearn, 1832 (Pattoson, J.); Doe V. Grey, 1816 (Ld. Ellenborough); Exall V. Partridge (no date given), cited (by Scarlett, urfi. Doe v. Grey) as having been ruled by Ld. Kenyou. * Dwyer v. Collius, 1852. 319 if^ ■iik Tf, m 'inf. m t! mm SECONDARY EVIDENCE WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PAHT II. § 456a. The RR. S. C. jirovide that " if a notice to produce coinprises documents which are not necessary, the costs occasioned thereby shall be borne by the party giving such notice." ' § 457. The fourth - cla<s of cases in which secondary evidenne as to documents is admissible, is when a document is in the hands of a stranger, who is either noi rompoUahlc by law to produce it, and who justifiably refuses to do i eitlier when summoned as a witness with a subpoena duces tecum,'^ or, when having been sworn as a witness without a subpoena, ue admits that he has the document in court.* The mere disohedienee of a person served with a subpoena duces tecum will not render admissible secondary evidence of the contents of the document which he is called upon to produce.' To do tliis the witness must heJiiHtifird in refusing the production, for otherwise the party will I 've no remedy, except as against ////h." The rule is only recognized at all for the same reason as that which allows of parol proof, when an adversary, after notice, refuses to produce a deed in his possession, — namely, because tlie party offering secondary evidence has done all in his power to obtain the original document.' If, therefore, a solicitor refuses to jtroduce a deed as claiming a lien upon it, secondary evidence of its contents cannot bo received, where the party tendering sueli evidence is the person liable to pay the solicitor's charges.* A.nd if a solicitor, who is not acting under special instructionL' f'-oii, his client, declines to produce an instrument on the ground of privilege, it is very questionable whether the client must not Vr subpoenaed, in order to ascertain whether he relies on a right to withhold thb deed ; ^ and it will at least be prudent to do this, inasmuch as the privilege is, in strictness, not that of the solicitor, but that of the client. If, however, the solicitor swear that his client has instructed him not to produce tlie instrument, it will not be necessary to subpoena the client ; for in ..Iil F,i, I i( j > R. S. G. Ord. XXXII. r. 9. ' Soo § 42H, su))rii, a« to tho throo cliisHCH which iircccdod imd us to the others which follow the ])i('si'ut cliiHa, ' Miiistoii V. DowiK's, 1S:M ; 1 )oo r. Iloss, 1840; Mills v. Oddv, 1«;M (I'uike, n.); ])oo V. Owen (1837) cau no loiip^or bo supportod. « Door. Clillord, 1H47 (Aldorson, 13.); Nowtou V. Chaplin, 18a0. • Josus Coll. V. OibbM, 1834. • II. V. Llanfi.cthly, 1853. ' DOO V. KONS, 184(1. » Att.-Oon. V. Aslio, 1s,-)0 (Tr.). iSoo, however, aa to u claim of Lien, iufin, § 4.)8. . " Doo V. Boss, 1840; Nowton v. riiajilin, 1850; In ro Caniorou'a Coalbi'uok, &c. Kail. Co., 1858. !{1>0 i|!i CII. IV.] WITNKSS NOT BOUND TO PRODUCE DOCUMENT. sucli a case it would be assumed that the client, if called, would continue of the same mind.' § 408. Judges always refuse to compel either a witness or a party to a cause - to produce either his title-deeds,' or any document the production of which may tend to criminate him,* or any docu- ment which he holds as mortgagee * or pledgee.^ But a witness will not be allowed to resist a subpoena duces tecum on the ground of an}' lien ' he may have on the document called for as evidence,* unless the party requiring the production be himself the person against whom the claim of lien is made." If the witness bo a solicitor, though he will be permitted, he will certainly not be force(l,^° — e.\cept in some cases for the purpose of identification,'* — to produce any instrument which he holds confidentially for his client, and which the client has a right to keep back ; ''^ but, as just noticed, it by no means necessarily follows that, in the event of the client himself not being summoned, secondary evidence will be admissible." .i It! ' Phelps V. Prew, 1854. ' The nile, so far as it relates to parties, appears to be this ; a plain- tiff will not b') compelled to produce iiuiiiiincnts of title which he swears (Ij not, to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, contain any- thing impeaching his case, or sup- porting or material to the case of the dofeniiant: Minet r, Morgan, 1873. ' rickering I'. Noyes, IH'IS; Harris V. Hill, 1K1>2 (Abbott, C.J.) ; It. v. Upper Boddington, IS'itJ; Doe v. Clitl'ord, IH47 ; Egromont Burial 15()urd f. Egremont Iron Ore Co., KSNO (Miilins, V.-C). * See Whitaker i: Izod. 1809. ' Doe r. l^).ss, 1840; e.xpliiined by Turner, L.J., in II<)j)e r. Liddell, 18Jo; Chichester r. Marq. of Done- gall, 187(t (GilVard. L.J.) ; Costa Bica, Bejmblit: of r. Eilanger, 1875. • See Ex i)arte Shaw, 1821. ' In the Courts of Bankruptcy, " no person shall, as against the official receiver or trustee, bo en- titled to withhold i)ossession of the books of account Uelonging to the debtor, or to set nj) any lien there- on": Bankruptcy Bules, 188.'$, r. 'JoO. » Hunter t'. Leiithloy, 1830, ro- ooguized (i'urke, li.) in Ley v. Bar- low, 1848; Thompson v. Mosely, 1833 (Ld. Lyndhurst) ; Brassington 1'. Brassington, 1823 (Leach, V.-C); Pratt V. Pratt, 1882 (Bacon, V.-C); Eurlong v. Howard, 1804 (Ir.) (Ld. lledesdale); In re Cameron's Coal- brook, &c. Rail. Co., 1858; Hope v. Liddell, 1855. overruling Gritlith r. Itickotts, 1849. See, also, Ijockett r. Cary, 1804 (Roniilly, M.H.); Ex parte Paine and Layton, 1809, C A. ; Be Toleman, Ex j)arte Bramble, 1S80. " Kemp V. King, 1842 (Ld. Den- man), recognized in Hope v. Lid- dell, 1855. See In re Capital Eire Ins. Assoc, 1883, and cases tlicre cited. ALso, In re Cameron's Coal- brook, &c. Boil. Co., 1858 (Bouiillv, M.B.); Vale v. Oppert, 1875, C A. But see Eowler r. Fowler, 1881 (Kay, J.), et (ju. ; Bo Martin, 1883 (Ir.). '» Ilibberd r. Knight, 1848, ex- plaining Maist<m I'. Downos, 1834. " Phelps ,:. Prew, 1854. " Harris .'. Hill, 1822; Volant v. Soyer, 1S53; Doe r. James, 1837 (Ld. Denman); Ditcher v. Kenrick, 1824. See Doe r. Langdon, 1848. " This sentence was cited and ap- proved (Esher, M.B.), in Burtwll v. Tanner, 1886, C. A. 321 |l,. ^M WHEN WITNESS BOUND TO PRODUCE DOCUMENT. [PT. IT. § 459. The nile exempting witnesses from producing title-deeds extends to a will, under which the witness claims as devisee, though such will extend to personalty as well as to realty, and, therefore, ought to have heen deposited in the Ecclesiastical Court, where the public might have had access to it.' But the rule will not prevail unless it appears that the title of the person possessing the document will in some way be affected by its production.* For instance, in an action of ejectment, where plaintiff's title was disputed, the solicitor of a gentleman, who had been in treaty (which ultimately went off) for the purchase of the property, was allowed to produce on behalf of the defendant the abstract delivered to his client, as furnishing secondary evidence of the contents of the deeds relating to the property, which had, after notice, not been produced.' *? 4G0. However, the mere circumstance that the pi'oduclion of the document may render the witness liable to a riri/ action, does not entitle him to withhold it as being within the protection of the rule. For instance, in an action of ejectment, where a plaintiff claimed under a devise in remainder, and defendant held under an invalid lease by a late tenant for life, a witness, who was an executor and legatee of the late tenant for life, was compelled to produce his testator's rent-book to enable the plaintiff to identify the lauds in question with the lands originally devised, notwith- standing that the witness was, as executor, bound (imder a covenant contained in the lease granted by the late tenant for life) to indonmify the defendant from all loss lie might sustain from an adverse verdict ; * and where a witness, who was steward of a borough, and attorney for the lord, declined to produce certain old precepts, books of presentment, and a case, relative to his office, on which the opinion of counsel had been taken by a former steward, Bayi'-ig that he Iield them as attorney for the lord, and that tlioir production would prejudice his client's interest, it was held that as the precepts and presentments were public documents he was bound to produce all of them, except the case and opinion.* > Doe V. James, 1837 (Ld. Donman). * Doo v. Date, 1842. » Loe V. Merest, 187t). • K. v. Woodley, 1834 (Ld. Den- * Due V. Langdon, 1848. man). 822 ili; CH. IV.] WITNESS NOT BOUND TO PRODUCE DOCUMENT. § 4G1.* The fifth* cmss of cases in which secondary evidence to prove the contents of a document is admissible, in the first phice consists of those cases in which the law raises a strong presumption of the existence of such a document. For instance, the original written ajjpoiuimcnt to a public office need not in general be produced, in conseqr'^iice of the strong presumption of the validity thereof which arises from its undisturbed exercise, but it will be sufficient to show that any such officer has acted in an official capacity.' § 462.* The sixth ^ relaxation of the rule demanding primary proof to be given of a document before any secondary evidence of it is received, occurs where the evidence required is the result of roltnninoiiH facta, or of the inspection of many hookn rind papem, tho examination of which could not conveniently take place in court.* For instance, if bills of exchange have been drawn between particular parties in one invariable mode, this may be proved by the testimony of a witness conversant with their liabits of business, who speaks generally of the fact without production of all the bills ; ^ a witness who has inspected the accounts of the parties, though he may not give evidence of their particular contents, will be allowed to speak to the general balance without producing the accounts ; ' and where the question is as to the solvency of a party at a particular time, the general result of an examination of his books and securities may be stated in like manner.** But the exception under consideration will not enable a witness to state the general contents of a number o^ letters received by him from one of the parties in the cause, though such letters have since been ' Or. Kv. § 92, in groat part. * Soo supra, § 42H, as to what the othors are, ^ Si'o auto, § 171. Soo, also, llrew- stor V. Sowoll, 1820 (Ifolroyil, J.). * (Jr. Ev. § OH, in groat part. " ll'h. Kv. 4;W. lu ])loa(liug, too, a gonoral ullogation is froiiuoiitly allowod, " whon tho luattors to bo ])loa(lo<l tond to iufiuitoiioss auil uiul- tijjlit'ity, whoroby tho rolls shall bo incumborcd with tho length there- of": Mints V. IMhil, KiOl. See E. 8. C. 1883, Ord. XIX. r. 2; Ord. LXV. r. 27, subs. 20. The courts admit the same excoption. and act on similar prinoiplos, if tho ])urtios to actions are numerous : Urd. XVI. r. 9. « Snoncor v. Hilling, 1812 (Ld. Ellonnorough). If tho modo of deal- ing has not Im'ou uniform, tho <'aso (loos not fall within this exco{)ti()n, but is govornod by tho rule requiring tho production of tho writinjjs. ' Hoborts V. Doxon, 1791 (Ld. Konyon). Hut soo Johnson v. Ker- shaw, 1847, wlioro tliis course was not allowod by Knight Bruce, V.-O. ' Meyer r. Softon, 1817 (IIolix)yd, a23 SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF ORAL TESTIMONY. |_PART II. destroyed, if the object of the examination be to elicit from the witness not a fact but merely an opinion or impression ; for instance, the impression which the destroyed Utters prodtioed on his mind with reference to the degree of friendship subsisting between the writer and a third party.' In the other cases mentioned the fact in question is one which simply depends on the honesty of the witness, whereas he might, from the perusal of the documents, conscientiously draw a very different opinion or inference from that which would be drawn by a jury. § 463. The seventh and last clasb of cases in which seconr y evidence of documents is admissible is in the examinatif^n of a witness on the voire dire, and in preliminary inquiries of the same nature. Owing to the modern improvements in the law as to the competency of witnesses, this rule has become practically inoperative; further discussion of it is therefore unnecessary.* § 464. We have now fully considered the general circumstances under which secondary evidence as to documents is admissible.' We may therefor** pass on ^x) consider the circumstances under which secondary evidence of oral testimony will be received. The broad proposition as to this is, it will be recollected, that such proof is only admissible where the production of primary evidence is out of the party's power. Subject to this it may be stated, as a general rule, that where a witness has given oral testimo y under oath in a judicial proceeding, in which the adverse litigant had the power to cross-examine, the testimony so given will, if the witness himself be incapable of being called, be admitted in any subsequent suit botween the same parties, or those claiming under them, if such suit relate to tlie same subject, or substantially involve the same material questions.* § 465. This rule is now recognized by all courts of justice.' ' Topham r. M'Gropor, 1844 (Rolfo, B.). Suo Taylor v. Carpenter, 184(5 (Am.). ' Soo Ist adit, of this work, § 342 ; and casop cited in this edit., post, { i;i!);j. last note. * Soo auto, § 428. « IJ. N. P. 239—243; Mayor of Poncastor v. Pay, 1810; Strutt v. Uovingdon, 1803 (Ld. Ellonborongh); li. V. JoUitTe, 1791 (Ld. Kouyon); Pvko J'. Croiich, 1()90 ; Wripfht v. Do.x/.Tatham, 1834; Glass v. Ik-ach, 1833 (Am.); Lightnor v. Wiko, 181H (Am.). ' See Lawronco v. Maiile, 18,)9 (Kindorsloy, V.-C). The rule has boon cxttuuiod to affidavits: Duiiuo V. Enfj;lisli, 1874. Soe, also, Parker V. MlCenua, 1874, and Moyrick v. James, 1877. 324 CHAP. IV.] SECONDAKY EVIDENCE OF ORAL TESTIMONY. However, to render secondary evidence of the testimony of a witness adniissibk, it must be proved that the witness was dulif sworn in some judicial proceeding', to the authority of which the party, against whom his testimony is offered, was legally bound to submit, and in which he might have exercised the ritjlit o/'cross- examiniition. If this were not the rule, the preposterous consequence would follow, that secondary evidence of testimony might be received under circumstances that would exclude the testimony itself. Therefore, sliould it appear that depositions were taken, either by parties Lot legally authorised to take them,' or without the sanction of an oath or affirmation, or in the absence of the party against whom they are ofPered,^ when, as in most criminal investigations,^ his presence was requisite, they cannot be received.* § 465. But although it is necessary that the party, against whom depositions are offered in evidence, should have had in opportunity of being present at the examination, and of cross-examining the witness,' yet it is by no means requisite that he should have exercised that power. If, for example, notice has been given to him of the time and place of an examination on commission, and he ne'ther intimates a wish to cross-examine, nor a^-^lies to the court to enlarge the time for that purpose, it will be presumed that he has acted advisedly, and the depositions will be received." § 467.' The admissibility of this secondary proof of oral testi- mony seems to turn rarher on the right to cross-examine than upon the jirecise identity, either (if the opponent be substantially the same) of the parties or of the points in issue, in the two ' 12 Vin. Ab. Ev. A. b. 31 ; B. N. r. 241. ■■' Tho admissibilify of depositions tiiken bi't'oro a coi'iiiior, in tho iib- 8t;n(o of tlio uccuwhI, will bo dis- cussed hereiilter. Hec post, § 494. ^ See post, § 479. « In li. V. Eiiswoll, 1790 (Ld. Kenvon). " Att.-Oon. V. Davison, 1825. If, theri'foro, a coiniuission bo exocnted withont liny notieo, or ■without a sullieiunt notice (Fitzgerald i'. Jfitz- geruld, 18(i;{), binng given to the opposite party, to i-nablo him, if lie pleases, to j)ut cross-interrogatories, tlio depositions will be rejected • Stoinkellor v. Newton, 1S40. ' In Cazenovo v. Vaughun, 1813, the examinations taken under the order were held to be admissible in evidence, although thi' detendant had received no notice ot the time and place of taking them: McCombio v, Anton, I84;i, where a defendant, after joining ])laintilf in obtaining a commission to examine witnesses npon interrogi'toiies, gave notice that lie declined to proceed with the exa- miiuition, npon which jilaintiff sent him word that he should .q>l)ly for a commissioii ex jiarte, and tiid done BO, and obtained one. ' Or. Ev. § 104, in part. 325 t i TESTIMONY IN FOKMEK JUDICIAL PROCEEDING. [PT. II. prooeed:ng8.' Cdnaequently, the evidence taken on the first trirtl is admissible on a second trial if, although, the two trials be not between the same parties, the second trial is between those who represent the former parties, and claim through them by some title acquired subsequently to the first tritd ; ^ if in a dispute respecting lands any fact comes directly in issue, the testimony given to that fact is admissible to prove the same point in another action between the same parties or their privies, though the last suit relate to other lands ; ' and, in criminal cases, a deposition taken on a charge either of assault and robbery, or of stabbing, or of doing grievous bodily harm, can, after the death of the witness, be read upon a trial for murder, where the two charges relate to the same transac- tion ; * for, if this were not the law, the deposition? of the deceased would, in many cases of homicide, be most improperly excluded.* Thus, where a prisoner, who had been summarily convicted of an assault, was, in consequence of the death of the party struck, subsequently indicted for murder, the convicting magistrate was permitted to state what the deceased had sworn in the prisoner's presence, the examination not having been reduced into writing ; * on another indictment for murder, a deposition of the deceased taken on a prior charge of larceny against the accused was read.^ § 468. If, however, the point in issue, though very similar, was so far different in the two proceedings, that the witness, who was called to prove or disprove the issue in the former, need not have been, /'«//// cross-examined in regard to the matters in controversy in the latter, his deposition, if tendered on the second trial, will be excluded. On this ground a deposition taken on a charge of > WriRht V. Doe d. Tatham, 1834, whfire the evidence of a witness who had testified in a suit, wherein A. and several others wei'o plaintiffs and B. detVi\(liiiit, was, after his death, held adniissilile in a suhse([uout action re- lating to the same matter, brought by B. against A. alone. ' Com. Dig. Ev. A. 5, explained by Littledale, J., in Doe v. Derby, 18m ; Doe v. Powell, 1852. * Doe ('. Foster, \K\\ (Aldorson, B.); Llanover i;. llorafray. 1880. * R. V. Smith. 1817; R. v. Lea, 1864 (Pollock, C.B.); R. v. Dilmore, 1852 (Wightman. J.); R. v. Beeston, 1855; R. r. "'illiams, 1871. » 2 Stark, ii. 212 (1817), note by the reporter. • R. V. Edmunds, 1833 (Tindal, C.J.). The learned judge appears, however, to have received the evi- dence, not as proving the facts stated, but as producing an answer from the prisoner. • R. V. Buckley, 1873 (Lush, J.). This, however, was allowed not as any evidence of the facts deposed, but simply as affording a motive for r»y«Dg« ou the part of the prisoner. 326 ii CHAP. IV.] SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF ORAL TESTIMONY. assault was afterward? rejected on an indictment for wounding ; ' again,* in America, where the issue in one action had been upon a common or free fishery, and that in another action was upon a several fishery, evidence of what a witness, since deceased, had sworn upon the former trial, has been held inadmissible.^ § 469. In stating that this rule mainly depends on the oppor- tunity given for cross-examination, it must however be carefully noted that though a party may have had the right of cross- examining a witness, he will be liable to have the statement of that witness adduced against him in a subsequent action, only in the event of his opponent being Hubatantially the same in both suits.* For, unless this be the case, the adversary in the second suit has had no power to offer evidence in his own favour.' § 470. In a civil case, R. S. C, 1883, Ord. XXXVII. r. 25, provides " all evidence taken at the hearing or trial of any causo or matter may be used in any subsequent proceedings in the same cause or matter." §471. Subject to the above rule, secondary evidence of oral testimony cannot (as has already been stated) be received. An attempt made some years ago in equity to engraft an exception on this rule — and to say that whenever depositions have been taken not strictly in the same matter, but against a party in one suit, who is also a party to a second suit, wherein substantially the same questions arise, such depositions are as against him admissible in the se lond suit without any proof that the witnesses are dead, or for other good reasons incapable of being examined •■ — entirely failed.' §§ 472-8. The common law (apart from the rule above cited) • R. V. Ledbotter, 1850, com- mented ui)on, however, in R. v, Beeston, 1865. » Or. Ev. § 164. 3 Melvin v. Whiting, 1828 (Am.); Jackson v. Winchester, 1800 (Am,). • Morgan v. NichoU, 1866, • Doe V. Derby, 1834. • As to what constitutes this, see next section, ' Blagravo v. Blagrave, 1847. The cases of Novil v. Johnson, 1703 ; Barton v. Palmes, 1704 (in both vhich cases it is not clear that the witnesses were alive) ; Bjrno v. Frere, 1828 (where the wituusst'S wore clearly dead) ; and City of London v. I'erkiiis, 1734 (where the decision of the House of Lords does not touch this point), and which were relied on for that purpose, do not, when carefully and critically exa- mined, afford any authority for the contrary. See, also, Carringtou v. Cornock, 1829; see, and compare, 3 Br, P, C. and 24 Lords' Journ. 248 (28th January, 17G4). 327 !l Hi" !l il WHEN WITNESS INCAPABLE OF BEING CALLED. [PT. II. ref^ards a witness as incapable of being calUJ.' — 1, "Wlien ho is dead ; ^ 2, When he is out of the jurisdiction of the court, or possibly, when he cannot be found after diligent inquiry ; ^ ' In wliich case only is his evi- donco on oath in a prior suit botwoon the siinie parties admissible, supra, § -iM. ■' Tyke v. Crouch, 1696. The court, however, — unless some ac- count of the death of a witness be given, or at least some evidence be furnished showing that proper inquiries have been made, and that no tidings can be heard of him, — will not presume his death, so as to admit his deposition, though taken as much as fifty years before : I5en- 8on V. Olive, 1732. See ante, § 297. ' This is clear where it is proved that the witness is actually residing in some i)lace beyond the jurisdidion of the court : Fry v. Wood, 1731. But questions sometimes arise re- Bpecting the amount and nature of the proof required to establish this fact. Thus, if a witness has been examined on interrogatories by con- sent, on account of expected absence, it is rot absolutely necessary that he should be on his voyage when the trial comes on. If the ship has sailed, though it has put back, or if the witness has gone on board, and was i-eady to sail, though pre- vented by contrary winds, that is BuHicient : Fonsick v. Agar, 1807 (Sir James Mansfield). But see Carruthers v. Graham, 1841, cited post, § 517. For instance, secondary evidence was admitted where the wit- ness had sailed for Spain, had been driven back by stress of weather, and six days before the trial was at Fal- mouth, exjiecting to sail again imme- diately : Ward V. Wells, 1809. See Varicas v. French, 1849. But where it was only sworn that the witness was a seafaring man, and some six months before the trial had belonged to a ship lying in the Thames, this evidence was rejected as too vague, though possibly admissible, if it could be further shown that any efforts had been recently made to find him : Falconer u. Hanson, 1808 (Ld. EUen- boroi igh). This case suggests the pro- j)riety of noticing au old decision of the time of James the First (Godb. 386), in wliich it was expressly laid down that, if a party cannot find a witness, then ho is, as it were, dead to him ; and his depositions in a cause betwixt the same parties may be road, ])rovided the i)iirty make oath that he endeavoured to find him, but could neither see him nor hear of him. In no modern case has pre- cisely the same point been ruled; but as it has frequently been hold that proof of inability to find an attesting witness will let in evidence of his handwriting (Kay i;. Brookman, 1828; Cunliffe v. Sefton, 1802; Crosby v. Percy, 1808; Ld. Falmouth v. Roberts, 1842 ; Parker v. Hoskins, 1810 ; Burt v. Walker, 1821 ; Spooner V. Payne, 1847), these analogous de- cisions would sei^m in some degree to support the correctness of the old authority, at least so far as relates to civil causes. A similar latitude is not allow- able in criminal proceedings, and the deposition of a witness, whether taken before a magistrate or a coro- ner, will not be rendered admissible, on mere proof that the witness him- self cannot be found after diligent search : Ld. Morley's case, 1666 (all the Judges); R. v, Scaife. l.Sjl. Neither will it be received, though satisfactory proof be given that the witness was not absent from any intention to defeat justice, but that, being a foreigner, he liad, since the prisoner was committed for trial, returned to his own country, and was at the time of the trial resident abroad: R. v. Atisten, 1856; R. v. Ilagan, 1837. These cases overrule the law as laid down in B. N. P. 242. This kind of evidence has also been r.ijected in America, both where the witness could not be found within the jurisdiction, but was n^ported to have gone to an adjoining state (Wilbur V. Selden, 1826 (Am.)), and where he was proved to have left the state, after being summoned to attend at the trial : Finn's case, 1827 (Am.). 328 CH. IV.] WHEN WITNESS INCAPABLE OF BEING CALLED. 3, When he is either insane, or seriously sick ; ' and 4, When it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that he is . 3 How far ansmcrs to inqnirus tQ- Bpc^ctinp; the witness iiro adinissiblo to piovu that lu) cannot bu found, is not vtiiy clearly dufiiiod. That such answers will be rejected as hearsay, if tendered in proof of the fact that the witness is abroad, is beyond all doubt (Kobinson v. Markis, 1841 (Ld. Abinger); Doe c Powell, 18:}()J ; but whore the question is simply wnother a diligeuL and unsuccessful search has been made for the witness, it would seem, both on principle and authority, that the answois should bo received as forming a prominent part of the very point to bo ascertained: Wyatt v. Batoman, 1836 (ColeriJge, J.); Burt V. Walker, 1821 ; Austin v. Ilumsey, 1849 (Erie, J.). In order to show that inquiries have been duly made at the house of the witness, his decla- rations as to where he lived cannot be received (Doe v. Powell, 1832) ; neither will his statement in the deposition itself, that he is about to go abroad, render it unnecessary to prove that he lias put his purpose in execution : Proctor v. Lainson, 1836 (Ld. Abinger). ' If ho bo proved at the trial to be insane, the witness's deposition will be admissible (as to dei)osi- tions taken by committing justices, see post, § 47!>a), in like manner as if he were dead (R. v. Eriswell, 1790 (Ashhurst, J., and Ld. Ken- yon)); and the same rule is stated to prevail, tlumgh the insanity be only of a tomjxirary cliaiacter : R. V. Marshall, 1841 (Ludlow, S., after consulting Coltman. J.). This, how- ever, appears to bo carrying the doctrine beyond its legitimate ex- tent; for since the casual illness of a witness will not — as shown below — warrant the reading of his former testimony, at least in a civil suit, but will only furnish good ground for moving to postj)one the trial, tlio same rule should surely prevail in the event of a witness being afflicted with toinporury madness. No sen- sible distinction can be drawn be- tween the two cases. Wheio deposi- tions are tendered on the ground of the witness being insane, it may sometimes bo advisable to stiow that his intellect was sound at the time of his jn'ovious examination ; and if such examination wore had but a short time before thotrial this courses niav even bo necessary : R. v. Wall, 1830 (Park, J.). It is somewhat difficult to discover from the authorities what dvrjrre of ■illness must bo ])rovod in order to let in dej)ositions : 11. r. Bull, 1871. See R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXXVll. r. 18, cited post, § 506. In an old case, where a witness on his journey to the place of trial was taken so ill as to be unable to proceed, his deposition was allowed to be read (Luttrell v. Reynell, 1677); but too much weight must not be given to this decision, since, if the course tliero adopted were ordinarily allowed, there would be very sudden indispositions and recoveries : Harrison v. Blades, 1813 (Ld. Ellenb(nougli) ; Jones v. Brewer, 1811 (Heath, J.). The rule laid down by Lord EUenborough, that where a witness is taken ill, the party requiiing his testimony should move to pot off the trial, is certainlj' less open to objection and abuse : Harri- son V. Blades, 1813. In the criminal courts this practice has long pre- vailed, and it has there been ex- presslj- decided, that the deiiositions of a womiin who was so near her confinement as to be unable to attend a trial could not be received : R. V. Savage, 1831 fPatteson, J.); see po.st, § 481. If, liowever. from the nature of tiie illm-ss or other infir- mity no reasonable ho])e remains that the witness will be able to aj)- pear in court on any future occasion, his depesition is certaiiilv admissible in criminal (11 & 12 V. e. 42 ("The Indictable UiYer-es Act, 1848"), § 17, cited ])()St, § 479; 11. v. Hogg, 1833 (OnrMcv. B.) ; R. v. Edmunds, 1833 (Tindai. C.J.) ; R. v. Wilshaw. 1841 ; R. V. Cockburn, 18.)7}, as it is in civil, i)i'ocee(liiigM (Jones v, Jones, 178j; Aiidii'ws '•. Palmer, 1812; I'lv V. Wood, 1731; Corbett r. Corbett, 1813), The case of loo v. Evans, 29 i| I I i iiHi DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BEFORE JUSTICES. [PART TI. kept out of the way by the contrivance of the opposite party.* ii 479. The Legislature has moreover also expressly provided that, in certain cases, certain depositions should, under particular circurastancep, be received in evidence.' § 479a. Depositions taken in criminal cases in pursuance of " The Indictable Offences Act, 1848," ' are made secondary evidence if the witness be (1) dead, (2) so ill as to be unable to travel. The Act in question provides, " That in all cases, where any person shall appear or be brought before any justice or justices of the peace charged with any indictable offence, whether com- mitted in England or Wales, or upon the high sea, or on land beyond the sea, or whether such person appear voluntarily, upon summons, or have been apprehended, with or without warrant, or bo in custody for the same or any other offence, such jusi.""*) or justices, before he or they shall commit such accused person i prison for trial, or before he or they shall admit him to bail, shall, in the presence of such accused person, who shall be at liberty to put i8'27, where Vaughan, J., is said to have rejected the depositions of a wit- ness, who was bedridden, and nearly a century old, and (luite unable to attend the trial, is obviously not law. Where, upon an '.ssue beiiip directed out of the old C ourt of Chancery, it appeared that a witness, who had been examined in the cause as to the handwriting of certain documents, had since become blind, the court made an order that his depositions should be read at the trial : Lynn v. Robertson, 1823. ' The projiosition that, if a witness be kept out of the vni/ by the adver- sary, his former statcnicuts on oath will be admissible, rests partly on the authority of sevcrul decisions l)oth in the civil and criminal courts (Ld. Morley's case, 1G()6 (all the Judges) ; II. v. Uarrisou, 1092 (Ld. Holt); Green v, Gutewick, 1673; R. t . Scaife, 1851 ; R. v. Guttridge, 1840. See, also, Egun v. Larkin, 1842 (Ir.) (Brady, CB.)); partly on the analogii^s furnished by one or two statutes (see M) O. 3, c. 102, § o (Ir.); aii G. 3, c. 87, § 3 (Ir.), noticed post, § 497) ; but chiefly on the broad principle of justice, which will lint permit a party to take advantage of his own wrong. In a case whore three prisoners wore indicted for felony, and a witness lor the prosecution was proved to be ab- seit throng)) the procurement of one of tiiom, the coiut held that his de- position might be read in evidence as against the man who had kept out of the way, but that it could not be received against the other two men: R. v. Scaife, 18ol. ■■^ See, as to depositions in criminal cases, supra, § 479a ; as to deposi- tions iu bankrujitcy cases, infra, § 49() ; and as to certain ppecial cases, infra, § 497 (as to Ireland), and § 490 (as to India and the Colonies); and as to those in ordinary civil cases taken on conimissiim, infra, § oOJ; and as to those tiled in answer to interrogatories, §§ 521 et seq. For another and special instance, see "The Fugitive Oflenders Act, 1881" (44 & 45 V. 0. 69), § 29, cited post, § 1562. 3 11 & 12 V. 0. 42, § 17. 330 ^^ i CHAP. IV.] DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BEFORE JUSTICES. questions to any witness produced against hirr-., take the statement' on oath or affirmation of those who shall know the facts and circumstances of the case, and shall put the same into writing, and such depositions shall he irad oirr to and siyurd respectively hy the tritncHKcs who shall have been so examined, and shall be sif/ticd also by the J mt ice or justices taking the same; and the justice or justices, before whom any such witness shall appear to be examined as aforesaid, shall, before such witness is examined, administer to such witness the usual oath or affirmation, which such justice or justices shall have full power and authority to do ; and if, upon the trial of the person so accused as first aforesaid, it shall be proved, by the oath or affirmation of any credible witness, that any person whose depositions shall have been taken as aforesaid, is dead, or so ill as not to be able to travel, and if also it be proved that Buch deposition was taken in the presence of the person so accused, and that he or his counsel or attorney had a full opportunity * of cross-examining the witness, then, if such deposition purport to be signed by the justice by or before whom the same purports to have been taken, it shall be lawful to read such deposition as evidence in such prosecution, without further proof thereof, unless it shall be proved that such deposition was not in fact signed by the justice purporting to sign the same." § 480. Although the above enactment only renders his deposition admissible if the witness be " dead, or so ill as not to be able to travel," the maxim, "expreisio unius est exclusio alterius," has ' The form given in Sched. M to the Act is as follows :— Depositions of Witneaset, "To Wit,— The examination of C. 1)., of [Farmer], and E. P., of {^Labourer'], taken on \oiith'] this day of , in the year of our Lord at , in the [cmiutu'] aforesaid, before the iindersij^nod, [one'] of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the suid [count ji], in the presence and hearing of A. B. ; who is charged this day before [me], for that he the said A. B. on at [&c., flexcribiufi the offence as in a irarrunt of coinniitment]. This deponent C. 1). on his [oath] saith as follows [&c., stating the liepositioii of the witness us nearli/ as -possible in the words he uses. When his deposition is complete, let him sign it]. And this deponent E. F. upon his oath saith as follows [&c.]. The above depositions of C. D. and E. F. were taken and [sworn^ before me at on the day and year first above mentioned. T. 8." ' This fact may be negatived by proof that the accused was insane when the deposition was taken, or was otherwise incapacitated b}' ill- ness from cross-examining the depo- nent : R. V. Peacock, 1870 (Brett and Mellor, JJ.). .S.31 1 1 t ' i i 1 i \ ^ 1 1^ );:, I ir ; \i i,- i\ ffii Ml DErOSITIOXS TAKEN IJEFORK JUSTICES. fPAUT H. no appl'cntion, and it does not abrogate the common-law rule,' that if a witness he fraudulently or forcibly kept out of the way by the prisoner himself, his deposition ought to he received.^ Whether the courts will go one t-tep fmther, and admit the deposition of a witness, who, although not too ill to travel,^ may he proved to bo permanently insane,^ remains to he seen ; but such a decision pcems naturally to follow from the former ruling. § 481. Some judges consider (though this is not clear) that the statute does aholish, however, the old conmion-law rule' that a prosecutor ought to apply for a postponement of the trial, where a material witness is only suffering under a temporary indisposition. Accordingly, such judges have, under the statute, admitted the deposition of a woman who, when the trial took place, had just been confined." But other judges think that a confinement (which after all is but a natural state) is not "illness" within the meaning of that word or the statute.' § 48'.?. The statute, too, apparently authorises the reading of the deposition on its being merely proved that the witness is dead, or too ill to travel ; that he was examined in the presence of the accused, who had a full opportunity of cross-examining him ; and that the document purports to be signed, either by the committing ju> -ce, or, at least, by the justice " by or before whom the sunie purports to have taken place."* Possibly, however, it is also » Ante, nolo » to §§ 472-8. » K. V. Siuifc, 18JI. ' When a witmss is able to travel without I'ii^k. lujv olil age and nervous- ness anil inability to (stand a cross- examination will not justify the reading of her deposition : E. v. Fanell, 1.S74; 1{. v. Thompson, 1876 (Lush, J.). « Antt', note ' to §§ 472-8. In E. V. Cockburn, lSo7, the deposition of a witno>s was received, on his doctor provinjj; that, thouf,di ho might liavo Deen brought tc the court without danger to life, ho was sutfeiing from paralysis, which disabled him alto- gether from giving evidence. See, also, R. c. Wilson, ISOl. » Ante, note ' to (J'^ 472-8. • Thus in R. v. Stephenson, 1802, and R. v. llan-ey, iNoO, the court admitted the dei)osition of a woman, who was daily expecting her confine- ment, and was "otherwise poorly." See, too, E. v. Croucher, 1862; E. v. Wilson, 1874; E. v. Ileosom, 1878 (Lush, J.); and E. v. Goodfellow, 1879 (Bowen, J.); E. v. Wellings, 1878. In these last three cases the woman was daily expecting her con- finement. ' E. V. Wilt<jn. 1858 (WiUes, J.); E. V, Walker, 18j9 (id. with concur- rence of Crowder, J.); E. v. I'arker and Ashworth, York Summer Assixes, 1 862 ( Mellor, J. , say ing that the gene- ral opinion of the bench was with him); E. V. Omant, 18J4. And at all events from E. V. Tait, 1861 (L'romjjton. J.), and other cases in this note, it ajjpears that the juilge, notwithstanding the Act, has a discretionary powta- of postponing the trial (which some judges habitually exercise), instead of allowing the deposition to be read. 8 In E. V. Vidil, 1861, Blackburn, J., held the deposition of a sick wit- ness admissible, though it had been 332 C. IV.] DI-TOSITIONS TAKEN HY JUSTICES, HOW PROVED. necessary for the prosecutor to further prove all or some of tlie following facts, viz., that the deposition was taken before tlio accused was committed or bailed ; tliat it was taken on oatli or affirmation ; that it was read over to the witness, and tliat it was signed by him. For it may bo contended that the section set out ttbovo enumerates all those circumstances as apparently necessary ingredients in a valid deposition ; and then, in thn jjaragraph rela- tive to the proof, speaks, first, of " the person, whose deposition shall have been taken as aforrnaid" being dead, &.c., and next, of ^^siwli^ deposition" purporting to be signed by the justi(;e, while in the form of deposition provided the justice merely states that the witness was examined on oath, and in the jtresence of the accused, and such form is wholly silent as to whether or not the examination was read over to the witness, or was signed by him. § 483. It is submitted that while " omnia i)ru3sumuntur rite esse acta," a deposition will be rendered inadmissible if the prisoner can show affirmatively that the signature, purporting to be that of the justice, is a forgery, or even that the deposition was not taken upon oath, or that it was not read over to tlio witness, or that the signa- ture purporting to be that of the witness was not made by him, or that the witness had refused or omitted to sign thn statement. § 484. A few words as to the piopev coume of tahintj dcjio-sifions under the Act, so as to render them admissible in evidence, will probably prove useful here. To render depositions admissible, it is apparently necessary that the accused should, when they were taken, have been charged wth some indictable offence ; that the statement of each witness should have been made under the sanc- tion of an oath or affirmation, administered by the magistrate before whom the charge is preferred ; ^ that such oath or affirma- tion should have been administered in the presence of the accused ; that the statement should have been made entirely in liis presence,' taken boforo two magistrates who noted only on that occusion, and the prisoner had been charged before and committed by another magis- ti'ute. Sed qu. * As to the meaning of the word *' such," SCO Ld. Brougham in Case- ment V. Fulton, 18-45, P. C. * See R. I'. Vidil, 1801, cited ante, § 482, n. s. * The same doctrine provailijd at common law. See 1{. v, Erriugton, 18;J8; K. V. Wooilcock, ITS'); K. v. Dingier, 1701; U. i: I'aino, 109,5; cited with approbation (Ld. Konyon) in E. V. Eriswell, 17U0. IM 333 I:, 1 Si : 1 f ■ ; I t MODE OF TAKING DEPOSITIONS BY JUSTICES. [PART II. and that he should have had full opportunity for cross-examina- tion ; that the whole of the statement elicited either by examina- tion or by crofs-examination, and not merely so much of the evidence as the justice might consider tnatrrial^ should have been reduced to writing in the first person, and in the very words of the wituf'ss ; * that the deposition, when completed, should have been read over to the witness, and signed by him, as a token of his assenting to its correctness ; ' that the whole body of the deposi- tions, if not each deposition,* should also be signed by the justice; and that they should have been transmitted by him, — together with the written information, the statement of the accused, and the recognizance of bail, if any such documents should exist, — to the proper officer ci the court in which the trial is to be had, before or at the opening of such court.* *5 485. The Legislature, in directing the magistrate to take down the statements of the witnesses as nearly as possible in their own words, and not merely " so much thereof as shall bo material," of course did not intend the depositions to be loaded with every idle word let fall by the persons under examination, and with expres- sions obviously having no reference to the charge against the accused. But it certainly meant to fetter the discretion of the justices, who, under the old la.v, were apt to reject as immaterial much valuable information. For facts which on a preliminary inquiry appear to be of trifling importance, turn out often to bo extremely relevant ; and where all the evidence is not given, the court, the prosecutor, and the prisoner, are alike kept in the dark, and much time may be wasted in endeavours to tlirow discredit upon the testimony oi witnesses, by lowing that they have made statements at tho trial which are not to be found in the depositions returned." If a person of weak intellect, or a child, be examined before the justice, it is also dosirablo that the questions and If ' This wiiM tlio old law. Sco 7 0. 4, u. <)4, §§ "J iiiul \i (" Tlu) riiiniiml l.uw Act, iNl'fi "). ■' Sw Schcd. M. cited auto, §470a, n. '. » See 11. V. riummor, 1844 ; R. v. Flommiiig, 1799. » See § 487, pout. » Hue §§ 17 and 20 of 11 & V> V. c. 42 (" Tho ludictable Ott'encos Act, 184H''). • R. V. Potter. 1829 ; 11. v. Thoman, 1837; K. V. Oriidv, WM\; 11. v. Smith, 1845 ; R. i». WoUer, 1848. 334 It I ii, CHAP. IV.] DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BEFORE JUSTICES. answers touching his capacity to take an ooth, should appear on the face of the deposition.' S 486. Whether a deposition originally written down in the ahsence of the prisoner could be received in evidence under the Act, on proof being given that it had afterwards been read over in his prp^t'uce to the witness, who had then assented on oath to its contents, is very problematical. Although depositions, thus laxly taken, have more than once been admitted under the old law,'^ this course of proceeding has frequently been condemned by judges as higlily unjust;' and, indeed, it is obvious that it aifords no fair opportunity to the accused of cross-examining the deponent. On one occasion, Piatt, B., rejected a deposition expressly upon this grojmd, remarking that a prisoner could not have '* a full oppor- tunity of cross-examining the witness," within the meaning of the statute, unless the deposition was taken down in his presence, and in the presence of the magistrate, and unless he was warned by the magistrate at the close of the examination that he might put any questions he liked to the witness, with reference to the statoniout which had been made.* It also is extremely doubtful whether a deposition can be read in a case where the prisoner has abstained from asking any questions in consequence of the witness being too ill to bear further cxamiuatitm.* § 487. As to the mode in which depositions should be entitled, one caption at the head of the whole body of do{)ositions will suffice,* if, indeed, it be necessary, in strict law,' to have a cai)tion at all ; * and no objection can be sustained on the ground that the title does not state with sufficient precision the charge against the accused." Although each witness must sign his own dejmsition, it will be sufficient for the magistrate to attach his signature, once for all, at the end of the whole body of deposititms, provided that all » H. V, Faintor. 184fi (Wildo. C.J.). * U. V. Smith. 1M7; 11. v. ("iilvi<rt, 1H4.S; H. !•. WuIhIi. 1850. Hoo U. v. ChiiHtophnr, 1«41). » U. r. JohnHon, I8«fl (IMiitt, 11.); H. »). roilKW, 1814 (('haml)r«. J.); U. V. Kiildy. 18JJ; U. r. Ciilvort. ITNii (Uolfo, IJ.); H. V. WiiIhU, lS.)(t; H. V. Hpi'Hton, 18;)4 fAldt'M.u, 13.). 8t>u, al8o, U. V. t'ruwtuor, 1780. • U. f. Duv. 18V2. Soo n. V. Bates, 18(i(); U. V. Wutts. 18(14. ' U. I-. liy.l.', 1848. • U. V. JdhiiMon, 1817 (AMorson R). ' S(>o, liowoviT, U. f. Xcwton, 18.Mt; uikI U. v. Oiilvin, 18(1.) (Ir.). whnro till- point iiliiioHt «K|uully dividi'tl tint Iri^li jiid^oH, • It. v. Langluidgn, 1849. • Id. \ ' ^M 335 |H I' CAPTION OF DEPOSITION.S — SKiXATURlvS. [f'AK'T II. of thera be written either on one sheet < f papci-,' or on difFiTi nt sheets connected with each other.^ Still, if the dfjiositioiis bo copied on separate sheets, and no proof bo given of their liaving been pinned, or otherwise fastoiiod together, at or before the time when the last was signed,''' those bearing no signature will Ijo rejected.* The signature of the justice must seemingly appear on the face of the deposition to be that of the magistrate " by, or before, whom the same puri^orts to have been taken," and no parol evidence can supply ony omission ou this head.* Depositions, when admissible under the Act, may be read iu evidence before the grand jury as well as at the actual trial. ^ § 488. It is no longer necessary (as formerly) to verify the signature of the magistrate taking the deposition, but proof must be adduced "that the deposition was ta'en in the presence of the accused, and that he, or his counsel or attorney, had a full opportunity of cross-examining the witness." Either the justice, clerk, or at least some person who was present during the whole inquiry,' must be forthcoming, to show that the requirements of the law have been duly complied with. When a deposition is sought to bo read on the ground of the sickness of the witness, it must, of course, be further proved that ho is at the actual time of the trial too ill to travel. The judges require this fact to be strictly established.* Mere proof that the witness was confined to his bed some days before will not suflice ; " and, as a general rule, it will be prudent,'" though it is not absolutely necessary," to liave the testimony of a medical man. $i 489. As already mentioned,'^ a deposition will be admissible under the Act, though taken upon a charge technically dillereut ' I?. »'. Youiip, 18jO; II. V. Oslxiino, 1837 (,Col(ii(i','o, J., iiiul Ij(1. Abin- gor). ' II. V. Parker, 1870; ovornilinH; E. i: IJichariU, lK(i(i. See, ulso, It. 1'. Carrol, l!S(i!> (lluiinen, J.). ' Seo 1{. V. lieo, 18(Jl (Pollock, (\H.). * K. V. l''nm(!o, IHUi) (AlilorNou nnd Piuke, 151?. V » R. V. Miller. lH,-.() (Mimlo, J.). * ii, V, Oluuitiiito, lUJl. ' Se(! P. »'. Wilshiiw, ISIl ; R. v. Wilson, 1S74. * See P. r. Hiirris, l.s,-)(); R. v. Ulner, l^.•.0; P. r. Pil.y, 18,)1. See, also, P. r. Hiiv, 1HJ1>. » P.r. Pil.v, isjl; P. I. Williams. W)u (l'i^'(>tt,"l5.). '" P. r. Pilev, l.S.')l ; P. V. Weltoli, ISd'J (livleH. "J.); P. t^. Williams, l8(l.-» {\'i'ti»n, IV;. " P. V. SteplirliM.il, ISdJ; R. V. Cloudier, IHli'.' (IJrumwoll, li,). " Ante, § 407. 336 1^:: (•II. IV.J DEPOSITIONS TAKEN ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED. from tliat in respect of which the accused is afterwards indicted, provided that on the former incjuiry a full opportunity of cross- examination had been afforded to him. For instance, the deposition of a deceased person, taken on a charge against the prisoner of having stabbivl him, or done him some grievous bodil}' harm, can ho read on a subseijuent trial for his murder or manslaughter.' § 4U0. In addition to the regulations considered above,* an Act of 1867' contains two important enactments on this subject. The first* provides in substance that every person, who is charged before a justice with an indictable offence, s'.iall be asked whether he desires to call any witnesses ; and, if he does so, the justice in liis presence shall examine such witnesses on oath, and reduce their statements to writing. The depositions thus taken shall then be road over to the witnesses and signed by them, and shall also be countersigned by the justice, and " transmitted in due course of law ; " and, afterwards, upon the trial, all the laws relating to the depositions of witnesses for the prosecution shall apply to these depositions. S 4!il. The other enactment,* after reciting the provisions of the Indictable OfEences Act, 1848, which have been already set out, further recites that it is permitted under certain circum- stances to read in evidence on the trial of an accused person tlie deposition, taken in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, of a witness. " It may happen that a person dangerously ill, and unable to travel, may be able to give material and important information relating to an indictable offence, or to a person accused thereof," and " it may not be practicable or permissible to take, iu accordance with the provisions of the said Act, the examination or deposition of the person so being ill, so as to make the same available as evidence in the event of his or her death before the trial of the accused person, and it is desirable in the interests of truth and justice that means should be provided for perjiotuating such testimony, and for rendering the same available in the event • R. V. Booston, 1854 ; R. v. Dil- moro, I8.VJ(\Vij;htinan, J.); H. r.Loe, IWi-l (Pollock, C.n.) ; H. V. Williume, 1871. iSoo U. V. Cltuke, IKoft. • Under § 17 of 11 & 12 V. c. 42 ("The Indictiiblo Offencos Act, 1848 % ' M) & ;n V. c. 33. ♦ § a of :H» & ■'«! V. c. .35. » ao & 31 V. c. 35, § B. 3;i7 .,l,j!.»'il iii;>. ' r r ^ '4m a hi' li.: I*' m I: Hi' : !^ 'PI -I i !)]■: 'I;; DEPOSITIONS TAKEN TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY. [PT. II. of the death of the person giving the same : therefore, whenever it shall he made to appear to the satisfaction of any justice of the peaco that any person dangerously ill, and in the opinion of some registered medical practitioner not likely to recover fiom such illness, is able and willing to give material iufomiatiou n-lating to any indictable offence, or relating to any person accused of any such offence, and it shall not be practicable for any justice or justices of the peace to take an examination or deposition in accordance with the provisions of the said Act of the person so being ill, it shall be lawful for the said justice to take in writing the statement on oath or aflirniation of such person so being ill, and such justice shall thereupon subscribe the same, and shall add thereto by way of caption a statement of his reason for taking the same, and of the day and place when and where the same was taken, and of the names of the persons (if any) present at the taking thereof, and, if the same shall relate to ;_iny indictablo offence for which any accused person is already committed or bailed to appear for trial, shall transmit the same with the said addition to the projter officer of the court for trial at which sutl; accused person shall have boon so committed or bailed ; and in nil other cases V'l shall trar mi.t the same to the clerk of the peace of the county, division, city, or borough in wliioh he bliull have taken the same, who is hereby required to preserve tha same, and file it of record ; and if afterwards, upon (ho trial of an_,' olfender or (»lft'n<'(' to which the same may relate, the jierson who made the saint> statement shall be proved to bo dead, or if it shall bo proved that there is no reasonable probability that such j)erson will ever b« able to travel or to give evidence, it shall be lawful to read such statement in evidence, either for or against the accused, without further proof thereof, if the same purports to be s-gncd by tiic justice by or before whom it purports to be tnkcM, and provided it be proved to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable notice' of the intention to take such statement has been served upon the person (whether prost^cutor or accused) against whom it is proposed to be read in evidence, and that such person, or his counsc'l or attorney, had or might have had, if he had chosen to be present, * Tbia ntuat be in writing : R. v. Shurmer, 1880 (C. 0. B.). am CHAP. I V.J DEPOSITIONS TAKKN BP^FOKE CORONEKS. full opportunity of cross-examining the deceased person who made the same.'*' ' § 492, The depositions of witnesses examined ^^fore the coroner as to a murder ^r manslaughter are probably admissible as secondary evidence* if certified and subscribed by such coroner with the recognizances, if they and also the inquisition taken before him, are delivered to the proper officer of the court in which the trial is to be, before or at the opening of the court. § 493. Assuming that the above provisions as to coroners* depositions are still in force,' they differ materially from thoso which regulate the mode of taking depositions before justices, and of proving them when taken. In the first place, the coroner is only required to put in writing " so much of the evidence as shall be material;" secondly, the narrative may ■•■) drawn up in the third person ; thirdly, the witness is not required to sign the docu- ment, though he usually doe? so for the purpo.se of identifying it;* fourthly, the deposition must, it would seem, be proved, either by calling the coroner who subscribed it, or by j)roving his signa- ture thereto, and showing by his clerk, or by some i)ers()n who was present at the inquiry, that the requirements of the law wer~ duly complied '*h.* § 494. it was at one time said that a striking distinction existed between depositions returned by justices and those takcti by coroners, inasmuch as while (as we have seen) depositions taken before justices, to be admissible as secondary evidence against the prisotjer, must have been taken in his presence, depositions taken before coroners might be received, though taken in a prisoner's absence. Tlrs doctrine, however, has not only been questioned by » 1' 1 I ''H sM ' A cross-oxiiininiitiou 8t(t])])(>(l in M)nH<H]uon('ii of till) witiK^sM's illnoss will nittsiitlico: U. <•. Mitchell. Isill'. § 7 I'liiicts, tlmt " wlii'iii'viT a iirincmiT ill iii'tiiiil custody sliiill have servdil, or hIiuU liiivii rcccivtid. iioticii of iiii intention to tiikc such ntiil»'in»'nt. ns hcrciiilitiforo niciitioncil, tlin jmlffe or jiiKtico of tlio jioiico hy whom tho priHoncr wuh eoniniitttMl, or tlic visit- ing justiccH of tho ]>riHon in wliich ho \H contimnl, may, hy an order in vritiug, direct the gaoiur having the custody of tho jirisonor to convoy him to the pliiii' mentioned in tin) Hiiid notice for the purpose of In'iiiff pri'sent at the tiikiny; of the state- iiieiit ; and such pidler shall coiiv»'y thi' prisoner iiccoriliii;;lv • • •" ' Itv 7 (!. », e. ,V», § I, oxtendoil to Ireland hy !M». ■». c, ijl, §4. ' i'ossildv thev are rejiealed hv C .11 of 11 & 12 V". c. r2, as to which, however, SCO U. r, Clearv, I'^fi'J. ♦ S(H. U. .-. FleinminK." 179». • Mm B. v. Wikhaw, 1841. r I i 'I ' DEPOSITIONS IN BANKIU.'ITCY. [part II. W fiuoh modern text writers of eminence as Starkio,' Pliillipps," and KusspU;' but Montague Smith, J.,'* has decflined to act upon it, and the doctrine will probably be discredited by all the jutlgos whenever it formally comes before the Court of Criminal Appeal.* S 405. Two other statutes make depositions taken either under the English Bankru[)tcy Act, 1883," or the Irish Bankrupt and Insolvent Act, 18o7,' admissible in evidence. The English Act provides' that, "in case of the dcath^ of the debtor or his wife, or of a witness whose evidence has been' received by any court in any proceeding under this Act, the deposition of tlie person so deceased, purporting to be sealed with the seal of the court, or a copy thereof purporting to be so sealed, shall be admitted as evidence of the matters therein deposed to." The Irish Act provides'" that, in the event of the death of any witness deposing to the petitioning creditor's debt, trading, or act of bankruptcy, under any bankruptcy heretofore or hereafter, or imder any petition for arrangement, his deposition, purporting to be sealed with the seal of the Court of Bankruptcy, or a vojii/ thereof pur- porting to be so sealed, shall in all cases be received as evidence of the matters therein respectively contained. §!l 406 — 4!)8. In Ireland," if any person, after giving information or examination upon oath against any person for any offence, shall, before the trial, be murdered or violently put to death, or so maimed, or forcibly carried away and secreted, as not to be able to give evidence on the trial, his information or examination shall be admitted in all courts of justice in Ireland as evidence on the trial ; ft > 2 St. Ev. 381—386. » '1 I'h. Kv. 71, -.-.. » 2 Huss. <". & M. 892, 803. « In U. >'. HiKt,', 18()(i. » S.M. l{. V. Wall, 1830. Tho doc- trine that dcpositioiiH tiikon bi'foro a (^(iroiiiT in u niiin'M uhst^nco iiro ovi- (lonf<< iipiinst liim i]i]iun'ntly rests on t\vi> or tliriM' ileciHions U'lnp. f'hiirlos II. (Lil. Morloy'H fuse, l(>(iti (all theJud^fesin II. L.): Hioniwich's oiiso, KitKi; Tliiitchnr I'. Wiillcr, KiT.j; K. V. lIiirriHon, H)'.>2), wlioii flienilos «»f evidence wuro only piirtially iindctr- ntood, and appear to Ixi eapiiliie of a fur moro limited iutorpretation ; —on dicta thrown out hy Ld. Ivenyon and Bullor, J., in U. I'.'Kriswell.lTJMt; — on a note of a (tam Baid to have lu'on derided by llothain, H. (K. c. ''iini- foy, 1704);— and on a ruliiif? l>y Coloridp'. J.. SilJH c llrowu, 1840. • 4i) & 47 V. c. b'L ' 20 & 21 V. c. ()(», Jr. " 4(i & 47 V. c. .VJ, § 13(). • Tho answerH of a liankrupt aro not- at least, diiriii'.^ liis life— made oviden(;e in procoediii'^.s in tho bauk- ruj)t('y a^'ainst per-<ons otlier than himself: IWunner, In le, ls.s7. '» 20 & 21 V. c. (it), § 3iij, Ir. " By 50 O. 3, 0. 102, § 5. 340 CHAP. IV. ("OMMis>i(»\ TO i:x\MiM': \vnxi;ssi;.s. provi»l»Ml' tliat tlio iufoiniation nr oxaiiiinution of a witness secreted shall not be evidence, unless it shall be found on a eoUateial issue, to be put to the ,;«>•// trying the prisoner, that ho was secreted by the person on trial, or by some person acting for him, or in his favour. By a subsequent Irish statute' informations, or examina- tions, under similar circumstances, are rendered, after similar proof, receivable in evidence before the grand jury. § 499. The original common law rule which required that, to constitute them evidence, the examinations of witnesses should be taken rivd voce in the presence of both a jury, and of, in a criminal case, the accused, and in a civil case both parties, has in modern times been much broken in upon by sundry Acts of Parliament and rules made by slatuiory authority. § 500. Evidence may be given about matters which have taken place in India or the English Colonies, or elsewhere, and have become the subject of criminal or civil proceedings in England, if such evidence be taken in accordance with certain statutory pro- visions which are mentioned in the footnote. * ' This is a remarkable proviso, since it differs ironj the ordinary rule of law on the subject, which is stated ante, § 23. » .J6 O. ;j, 0. 87, § 3. ' The principal of such provisions is " The East India Company's Act, 1772 " (13 a. 3, c. 63, amended by " Tlio .Statute Law IJovision Act, bSNS," of ol V. c. 3, and further aini'iidod by " Tlio Statute liaw llv- visi.in Act, 18!>-J." of oo & Mi V. c. 1!*). made applicable (see Wilson r. Wilson. 188.i, ('. A.) to the In- diii lli-'h ( 'ourts by 24 & 26 V. c. 104 ("The Indian Ili«h Courts Act, 1861"), §§ 10, 11. § 40 of the orifrinal Act relates to criminal pro- ci'cdings in the (luecn's IScnch for ollVnces committed in India, and j;ives power to the Ciucen's llench to issue warrants to the liuiiau (.'ourts in such i)roccedin}j:H in the Queen's licnch ; and if under this section the Attorney-General move for a rule to order the hulian Courts to take evi- dence, his statement tl.at this is ne- cc ssary will be sullicient without any alli<lavit. See K. v. Doufflus, 1824 ; uud also B. V. Douglas, 1U46. The provisions of this section were re- enacted by 24 G. 3, c. 26 (" The East India Company's Act, 1781 "). § 78, •I in 26 G. 3, c. 57 (" The East India Company's Act, 1786"), § 28. 5§ 42 and 4.) of the same Act relate to pioceedinps in Parliament touch- inj^ offences comnulted in India, and giv(! the Lord Chaiicellor or Speaker (as the case may be) powei" to i>sue warrants to the Jndum Courts to take the necessary evidence. § 44 of tlie Act relates to actions in the Ilif^h Court in En;,'land for causes of action which arose in India, and gives such High Court in I-lngland l)ower to issue warrants to the hidiiiu Courts to take the n(!cessaiy evidence. As to the ('(uistiuctioii of the Act geiuMiiily, and in particular of the expression "cause of action," see Francisco c. Gilmore, 1797 ; Savage V. llinnev, 1834 ; and Kelsall v. Mar- shall, lsV>6. The (iueen's Bench ])ivision in Enj-land is authorized to try any jHjrson employed in the public ser- vice abroad, who, in tiie exercise or under colour of such employment, shall have committed uny ollence, 341 Cini MISSION TO EXAMINK WITNESSES. [part II. !!,■■ ii K § r)0('.\. It will be noticed that none of the statutes above ri'- ferred to require the party to prove that the witnesses who>c depositions he seeks to use are beyond the jurisdiction of the coui i at the time of the trial. Perhaps, however, principle requires thiil some slight evidence of this kind shall be given, and this view derives confinnation from Ord. XXXVII. r. 18.* $5 '001. In rrintiiuii proceedings a resort to the provi-sions of the Acts mentioned in the footnote to ^ 500 may even now become sometimes necessary. § 501a. In civil c "s, however, the statutes mentioned in the footnote have been i .ed nractieally obsolete by the provisions contained in R. S. C. ( X.J VII.'" |5 502. The examinatiu.i of w. cv ^^es taken (/i- hoir chhi' on com- mission may also be contained in depositions which may be read at the trial if such depositions were taken under an order for that purpose, which may generally be obtained where a witness is over seventy years of age,'- or is dangerously ill, or is about to g(j abroad,' and the inability of the witness to attend the trial is proved.* $i 503. The 1 ligh Court, moreover, has a general power * to order the examination of witnesses in any cause or matter to be taken by depositions on commission wherever it " shall ai)pcar necessary for the purpocos of justice." by 42 G. ;j, c. 8,j. Tlio tniilfnco on Biich trial may (by § 'A of tho above stiitutc, and also by § 81 of 24 G. 3, c. 2.)) be taken iijiou foniini!<sion. S('t>, as to j)ost])(iiu'iiiont of a trial uiiiltT till! oiMitiiiciit abovo uien- tioiii'il, H. r. Joiics. 1S()(!. Till! ]»riivisi( lis of § 40 of " Tho East India ('o.iii]iany'8 Act, 177:^" ^siipra), aro I'xti'ndril to tlio trials in till! (iuwii'n Ki'iii'h Division of olVt'iioos against " Tho Slavo Trado Acts" by <i & 7 V. c. !)H, § 4 (" Tho Slavo Trade Act. 1 S i;t '). Tlu-ir pro- visions us to takiii}; i-vidi'iici! by commission uro also cxtondnl to all C'olonii!S, and to nil ai'tions (not boin^ actions at thu suit of the Crown: see K. v. Wood, 1841) in ■whatovor country the cause of action may have arisen, by 1 W. 4, c. 22. The High Court of Justice ii Ire- land is pivcn powers similar to tlmse posBi'sst'd by the llij?h Court of Jus- tice ill 10ii;,'Ianil, by .'{ \- 4 V. c. 22 (••The Debtors (Ireland) Act, 184(1.") As to the powi'i's of the Scotch Courts, see 2(» iV ;{0 V. c. 112. ' Si'i! post, § .■)(f4. '• IVist. § .>()4. ' This rule, however, does not en- title the i)arty to an order for the examination of a very lar<;e number of witnesses: IJidder c. llridp's, 1884, C. A., which consult generally as to examiimtion of old witnesses de bene ease. » Uellamy v. Jones, 1802. « I'ost, § 504 ; Ord. XXXVII. r. 18. • Under Ord. XXXVII. r. 6, set out in full, post, § 504. 342 )H CHAP. IV.] CJOMMLSSION TO EXAMINE WITNESSES. § 504. Under whichever of tlio powers niontioned above evidence by depositions may have been taken, (piestions as to the admissi- bility of such depositions may arise in connection with the law of evidence; therefore, although it would be quite foreign to this work to give any detailed instructions as to the practice ' to bo followed in obtaining an order to take evidence on commission, it may be useful to set out a large portion of R. S. C. of 188^}, Ord. XXXVII., which practically collects in a code the powers of the High Court upon this subject. Tlie material parts of such Order appear to be as follow : — " Ord. XXXVII. Examination of witnesses. 5. The court or a judge may, in any cause or matter where it shall appear necessary for the purposes of justice, make any order* for tlie examination upon bath before the court or judge or any officer of the court, or ani/ other pri'fion and at aiii/ place, of any witness or person,* and mny empower any party to any such cause or matter to give such deposition in evidence therein on men terms* if any, as the court or a judge may direct.* 6a. If in any ease the court or a judge shnll so order, th j shall be issued a request to examine witnesses in lieu of a commis- sion. See R. S. C. Ord. XXXVII. r. 6a (R. S. C, October, 1884, r. 6).' The Appendix to the Rules of 1884 contains (in forms 1 and 2) the forms of such order and request, which may be cited as forms !i7A and ;i7n in Appendix. 8. Any person wilfully disobeying any order requiring his attendance for the purpose of being examined or producing any ' This will 1)0 found in any pood book on I'rai'tico, «.,'/., thn Amuiiil I'riictico for 189j, at pp. 727 et sicj. ' Tlio fonns of " Ordor for Kxii- niination of Witnesses bi-foro Trial " ttn» given in 11. S. C l.SM.J, Aj)p. K. Xou. M] and .'$7. An order under this rule may be made ex parte, but only at the peril of the applicant : Itidder v. IJridgeH, Hupra. ^ See also r. 1 of same Order, cited post, § i;J!).). * See r. \H, post, § 504. ' An order under this rule can only bo made whore it is sought to examine witnesses. Under it the English Court hus no jurisdiction to order tho production rf documents. Capo Copper Co. v, Coinptoir d'Hs- conipte, ISOO, C. A. Hut (luiero wlii'tlier It'tters of re(inest, or any matter witliin the jurisdiction may not be added to the commission. See Mason and Barry >'. Coiuptoir d'Kseompto, 1890, ^loreovor, whoa no action is pending against him, and it is not necessary for the carry- ing out of an order already iiiailo, there is no jurisdiction under thia rule to make an order against a person not a party to any ponding action. See Elder v. Carter, 1890, C. A. a 13 WITNKSSKS KXAMINKD UNDER COMMISSION. [PART II. i; i 1!^ 'Isjir^ll;; 1 W " document sliull bo (loomed guilty of contempt of court, and nmy be dealt with accordingly. !». Any person rerpiired to attend for the purpose of being oxarained or of producing any document, shall be entitled to tlio like conduct money and payment for expenses and loss of time as upon attendance at a trial in court. 10. Where any witness or jjerson is ordered to bo examined before any officer of the court, or before any person appointed for the purpose, the person taking the examination shall bo furnished by the party on whose application the order was made with a copy cf the writ and pleadings, if any, or with a copy of the documents necessary to inform the person taking the examination of the ques- tions at issue between the parties. 11. The examination shall take placfi in the presence of the parties, their counsel, solicitors, or agents,' and the witnesses shall be subject to cross-examination and re-examination. 12. The depositions taken before an officer of the court, or before any other person appointed to take the examination, sliall be taken down in writing by or in the presence of the examiner, not ordinarily by question and answer, but so as to represent as nearly as may be the statement of the witness, and when completed shall be road over to the witness and signed by him in the prgsence of the parties, or such of them an may think Jit to attend. If the witness shall refuse to sign the depositions, the examiner shall sign the same. The examiner may put down any particular question or answer if there should appear any special reason for doing so, and may put any question to the witness as to the moaning of any answer, or as to any matter arising in the course of the examination. Any questions which may be objected to shall be taken down by the examiner in the depositions, and he shall state his opinion thereon to the counsel, solicitors, or i)arties, and shall reft-r to su.'h statement in the depositions, but he shall not have power to decide upon the materiality or relevancy of any question. • • • • • 16. When the examination of any witness before any examiner shall have been concluded, the original depositions, authenticated > How if thoy do not thiuk fit to attend P See r. 12. ;i44 VU\l\ IV.J WITXHSSKS KXAMINKD IJNUKIt COMMISSION. "liy tilt! Mf^niifuro of tho cxatiiiniT, sliiill bo truusiulttod by Iiim to tho Coiitnil Olfioo, and tiiore filtHl. 17. Tho jicrsoii taking tho cxiimination of a witness undor tlieae Riiloa may, and if need be shall, nuiko a sporial report to tho court touching such examination and tho conduct or absence of any witness or other person thereon,' and the court or a judge may direct such proceedings and make such order as upon tho report they or ho may think just.' 18. Except where by this Order otherwise provided, or directed by the court or d judge, no deposition si; ill bo given in evidence at the hearing or trial of the cause or matter witliont llic coimcnt of tho party against whom the same may be offered, iiitlcHx tho court or judge is satisfied that the deponent is (Uud^ or heyoiut tlie juris- diction of tho court, or unab/e from siclnuxs or other infirmity to attend tho hearing or trial, in any of which cases the depositions certified under tho hand of the person taking the examination shall be admissible in evidence, saving all just exceptions, without proof of the signature to such certificate. • • * • • 20. Any * * • • party or witness, having made an affidavit to be used or which shall be used on any procetding in tho cause or matter, sliall be bound, on being served with such subpcena, to attend before such officer or person for cross-examination. 21. Evidence taken subsequently to tho hearing or trial of any cause or matter shall be taken as nearly as may be in the same manner as evidence taken at or with a view to a trial. 22. Tho practice with reference to the exiiniiiuition, cross- examination, and re-examination of witnesses at a trial, shall extend and bo applicable to evidence taken in any cause or matter at any stage. 23. The practice of tho court with respect to evidence at a trial, when applied to evidence to be taken before an officer of the court or other person in any cause or matter after the hearing or trial, ' Soo r. 5, niito. It scims that tho ritor of ono of tho pin ties; In ro oxamiiKT iiiiiy order any \vitni'.-« to AVcst of Canada Oil T/uids and Works hu uxiiininod apart from tho itthcrs, Co., 1877 (JomkoI, M.U.), even tliough lio bo tho aj^cnt or soli- 345 m !tt^ U EXAMINKRS OF SUrilKMK COUIIT. [PART 11, " shall be subject to any special directions wliieli may bo given in any cnso. 24. No affidavit or deposition filed or made hr/orr ifisKi' Joiiin/ in any cause or matter shall, without special leave of the court or u judge, be received at the hearing or trial thereof, unless witliinone month after issue joined, or within such longer time as may bo allowed by special leave of the court or a judge, notice in writing shall have been given by the party intending to use the same to tiie opposite party of his intention in that behalf. 2>'). All evidence taken at the hearing or trial of any cause or matter may bo used in any subsequent proceedings iu the same cause or matter." S*^ 500 — (). It is incumbent on the judges to exercise extreme caution befoie making any order of an unusual character umler either rule, i.nless such order be obviously necessary for the pur- poses of justice.' An arbitration under the Companies Acts is a " cause or matter " falling within them.^ §*i 507 — 10. The " officers of the court " mentioned in Rule 5 ar(> barristers of at least three years' standing,' a2)pointed by the Lord Chancellor for five years, and removable by him.* They are called *' Examiners of the Supremo Court." All the examinations ordered in the Chancery Division imixf be referred to them in rotation, unless the court or a judge otherwise directs* ; and they iiiai/ tiikc the examinations in any cause or matter depending either in the Queen's Bench or in the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Divi- sions, if the court or a judge so directs." The examinations, unless the court or a judge entrusts the inquiry to one particular ex- aminer,' are distributed by tho princii)al clerk to the registrars of the Chancery Division among tho whole body, " according to regidar and just rotation, and in such ninnner as to keep secret from all persons tho rota or succession." ** They are to give appointments in writing, specifying the place and time, not more ' r(>ntrai Xew.s Co. v. East. Nows Tel. Co., 1SH4, C. A. 2 In ro MvHort), &p. Co., 1889. 3 K. S. (■'. iimdo 4 Fob. 1884, Oril. XXXVII. r. 40. 39. « Id. » Id. r. • Id. ' Id. r. 49. • Id. rr. 41, 42. 346 CIIAr. IV.J KXAMJNATIONS TAKKN UNDKIi COMMISSIONS. than seven days in advance, " at wliicli, Bubjoot to any apiilii'ution of tlie parties, the examination hIiiiII be taken ; "' tln-y are to re- gard the convenience of the witnesses, and all the circinnstaMces of the case;- and, snhject to such adjonrinnent a;i they sliall think reasonable or just, they are to proceed de die in diein ;■' they may, with like consent, examine persons not namt'd in the order.'* § ijll. The Form^ g'wvn by the 11. S. (J. l^H'i for a commission to oxamiiie wif nefises coritKins a clause rerpiiring the commissioners to be sworn. Decided cases" show that (.'ominissions may be granted to examine witnesses resident in countries bc^yoiid the dominion of the IJritish Crown. A commission (.'nntaining such u clause, but appointing a single commissioner, should also authorize him to ailministcr the oath to himself.' S 5l!2. To render the depositions taken under a commission avail- able, the evidence must be such, in substance, as would be received according to the English law. If at the trial it api)ears, either on the face of the depositions, or by extrinsic proof, that the oonmiis- sionera have, after due objection taken,* admitted illegal, or rejected legal, evidence, the judge will in his discretion suppress the deposi- tions either wholly or in part." The examiner's certificate must be taken up. If it be not, its effect may not bo stated to the court.'" § 513. The commissioners must, moreover, have substantially followed the instructions given by the instrument appointing them. The court, however, will not look out critically for objections to their conduct, but will rather in their favour presume that they have discharged their duty." Thus, though a conmiission that after the examinations had been taken, f/ir same should be trans- mitted to this country, is not satisfied by sending mere copies of them;''^ where oommissioners were directed to reduce the examina- ' Id. r. 44. » Id. r. 4j. 3 Id. ♦ Id. r. 40. • Sun V. 13, par. ■«, App. J. • Fischer v. Sztutjy, IbJS ; Duc- kett V. Williuins, IHJl. ' Wilson c. 1)0 C(iul..n, 1883. * liobinsou v. Davioa, 1875). • LuT ..'v r. (ho, 1K,J4. w < ..ait r. Jta'lkis ("u., 1883. » AtkiiiH r. I'aUncr, 1821 (Al.bott, C.J.): (iruvillo r. Stulz, 1N17 (Ld. Iloiiiiiaiil ; liitcliiii-t c. Ilitchiiis, 18()|>; (irill 0. (icii. Iron Scrow Colliir Co., 18()(); llodgus v. Cobb, ISIiT. '• Clay V. Stfphunuon, 1837. 347 DKPusmoNs, wiiKN admiksmjm:. fPAi: r II. tion8 info writing in tlu.' English limgiiHgt', and to fiwcar nn intn- pri'ttT to tiiinslat» tho oath, intcnogatorios, and dfpositions", the commission was hold to bn well t'xt'cuted by tht* return of dopoKi- tions, wliicli had originally been taken down in the foreign lan- guage, and translat< (I by tlio interpreter into English »i.\ wecU afterwards;' and when a commisHion contained a (lirection that tho witnesses should be examinetl apart from each other, tho court presumed that the eommissioners had eomi)lied with this order, allliough tneir return was silent ou tho subject.' I'o.xsiltly, however, tho court would not feel justified in presuming that coni- misaioners had taken the oaths prescribed to them before acting.* When documents have been produced in ovidonco before tho com- missioners, it will now HulRco to transmit with the deposit ion.s either tho origimils or ccrtilied cojties ur e.\tra»ts; and attention is drawn to this rule, because a moru btringeut uuo used to jirevail.* § 514. Wlion a commission to take evifb-n^o has been directed to a court, it is of Cv/ursu desirable that the court should liavo been rightly iiamed ; but a slight cjTor iti the docriptiftn, jirovidcd it bo rwit of stjch a nature as to render it really doubtful what tribunal was intended to havo been addressed, will not invalidato a commission.'' {S8 tOl'i — '»l(t. With regard to reading at the trial depositions vhich luivo Im'cu taken under any of tlie various jirovisions men- tioned above, reference must be made to the terms of Uide IS of Order XXW'Il.. which has been alreaily set out in full." TheiflVct of this ride is, that depositions taken under tlu> above rides are in genend admifsible oidy in one or other of four events. Eirsl, if tlte opjiosite jiarty ro/M7H/,v; secondly, if the witness Im< pr(»ved to be ilvtn! ; thiully, if he be shown to be hiijuuil i/ir Jiin'mlir/ioii of tho court ;" and, lastly, if it apiiear that, from m/iiicHH or infirmity, — > Atkins V, I'lilni.T, IS'Jt ; U. DonKliis. IHKi. ' Siiii;iis r. IIiiiiliTNoii, 1HI8. * ]lrvilp's I'. Ilriuitill, IMl. * If.'.-. Dnll^lil--, lN|.->. • Wilson i\ Wiloii, inh;j. • Su|tiii, § .'lOi, lit \i. ;ii.v t, iiiiilcr n ciiinniiNhiitn iiiuy )•<' H'iiiI witliiiul )ii<)\ in;,' lit llm tiiiil IIimI hit in then nliM'iit ; tlin ihiuh of hliiiw- iii;^' tli;it 111' in williiii tin- jiiriNilictiiiii resls nil till' iiliji'rtintx |iuity: ><utli>u V. .Viimlii', IS.VJ. 'I'lix HiiniiMlm II iiio w.is iidiipti'il liy Sir ( '. ( 'ii'^-.uill ia '' Ity .^rotrli liiw. tin' ili'|><mitinn of tin' Miiti innini.i! ('unit: I'nll.ii k c, A wituub* rttidiiiy uliiimd t'Xuiiiiiicii riillauk,l>S<Jl; mill MilUr, Mills, IHUl. MS ClLVr. IV.] DKrOSITIONS, WIIHN ADMI.SSIHLE. wliich terms do not nocossarily moim an iiiniruft/r niahidy, Ijut will bo satiHfiod by any jyravo illnoss,' — ho cannot atton<l tho trial. By liiilo /i,' indeed, none of those conditions are absolntrly l)indiii<jf, for the judge has power to order deposit ions to bo given in ovi- denoo in any ease. Still, that power must be guidtfil by a judicial disoretion.' Tho admissibility in evidence of depositions will still, in tho absence of connnit, depend (as it formerly did) upon whether tho witness at the trial* is or is not able. Indeed, in the ease of ajf! Ittvitu, it is expressly provided '' tliat " wluTe it appears to tho ',,'ourt or judge that tho other party bona tiiln desinn the jirodiietion of a witness for (iross-examination, ami ///'// such irifnrsx cmi III' ]>ri)ilttiril, an order shall not be made authori/ing the evidence of such witness to bo given by allidavit."" S '^»17. The (piestion remains, how the incapacity of the witness to attend tho trial is to be ])roved. The evidence as to such inca- pacity being exclusively oddress(>d to tho judge, ii/fii/nrits an» probably admissible upon the point as well as ordinary vivi voce testimony.' The K. S. C. IHS.'J, nuike no reference to tlie matter, wliile the (mly two forms which allude to it do so in language inconsistent and obscunt. The Form of Order for a commission to examine witnesses contains a clause that the (b'positinns may bit given in «'viilcnee, " without any other proof of the <ih.\iiiir front thin coittifri/ of the witness or witnesses therein named, than an allidavit of the solicitor or agent of the said as to his belief of the ." This, so far as it goes, is dear, but it deals simply with tho ease of tin* witness being out of the jurisdi( tioii of the court. Tho form given for an onb-r for examining witiie-M-H 1ii>|'ore an examiner, contains a direction that the depositions of ' I), of lli'iiufdit I'. Cruwsliiiv, '' (it^'il unto, § AIM. '' S.... WjiiimTc. .M..s«.'h(('. .\.\ tNSO {.liKHfj. M. !{.); Ui.l.l.T .. lliiilp.^, issl. ♦ S... lliiK.it I. Hit^'ot (lr.\ ISTS. " llv l{. S. V. Hi.l. XXXVll. r. 1. The )i<iiiit was iiKuiii r lisnl unci Idt, Uliijri'iihil ill till- riiHi- nf |||i< j I, iif iti'ilillort »'. ( 'tM\\.<||iiy, iMili. I'licid, W'llJi'N, il,, wliii xi'i nii'il iiiriiiiiij to Ki||i|»irt tlie lllliliif of flin Cliii'f It.ioiii. ri<ri'nvi| to it. r. );>!•', Isil, lilll tllllt )'ll-<'. nil I'Mli'llll I'XulliitiU- tiiiti, will lie liillllil tit tlll'iiW II llliist tlTUrlli'l'iillH ll^'llt nil thii Hlllijiti t, ii<4 • See N'llilill I'. llllsHi'lt, |NH;|, (^. A. it rchlteM fii It llii'leex |miti' |iIim(><i|. ' On one ncnisinn I'olliick, (Ml., ill;?. Si'i', also, ( 'iirriilhi'rs 1. < Intliiiiii, ri'ri'ivml the illlliUvit of ii mulnnl ls|| (|,i|, I Ii'MIIIiiii ! ; ItoliiliMon I'. >/i'Oi, iiM Nnllii'ii'iit proof of thi' ■•irk- .Murkis, |.s|| [\A. Ahingit); iiinl iHHs (if It ilelionellt to li't ill Ills (|i'|io- linle, jjj 17.1, i'tO, bitliill : Juilgllt V. ('itlll|iliiill, IHIN. COMMISSIONS. »'9'' ■''!{•.'' ' • Suft i ■t-i'i:f>.i:i iii III [I'ART II any witness may ho given in ovidtmco on tho trial of tlie cause, *• witliont any further jtroof of the uliacnrc of tho said witncws tliau tho affidavit of the solicitor or agcut of the as to his helief." llorc the term " ahscnco " has a nioro indefinite signifiia- tion than in the former form, and it is sufrgesteil tluit it may he interpreted as including an ahsence from the court in co:i8e(|ueii(0 of death or illness, as well as an absence from the country. ti olH. All the provisions of the sjM>cial Acts cited in a footnote on a previous page' relating to the examination of \vitness(>s under commissions and orders have been extended to all suits and pro- ceedings on the Itevenue side (»f the (iueens U(>noh Division, and also inado aj)plicahle to the Probate and liivorce Division in Knglnnd.'- and to the corresponding courts in Ireland.' ?i oli». The Court of J?ankruptcy is emj)o\vered ^ to " order that any person, who in Kngland would be liable to be brought before it," with the view of di.seo\ering the debtor's proj)prty, "shall he examined in Scotland or Ireland, or in any other pluce out of ICpgland " ; and it is also provide<l* that " subject to geiuTal ruli's, tin* ccmrt may in any matter take the whole or any part of tho evidence either viva voce, or by int.-rrogatories, or upon ailidavit, or by voiti mission (thioaiiy Wy (leneral Rule (id, tho court may empower any party to any matter, " where it shall appear nece.tsary for the purposes of justiev," to give depositions in ovidonco on such terms as tho court nuiy direct ; and by r. (ill, " an order for a commission to examine witnesses, an<l the writ of connnissir)n shall follow the formn for the tinse being in use in the High Coin't, with such variations as circumstances may rcfpiirc" (5 oVJO. 'J'he County Court ml* s on the sidiji'ct (d' taking evidence by deposition will bo found in Ord. XVIII. of the Uules of i^SIt, rr. 11 — ^J!^, which ar(» substantially itlentical with tho provisions of U. S. C., Ord. XXX NIL rr. 0— •,''), which have been already set out." It is also provided' that "aflidavits and depositions shall be rcaii as the ovidenco of the person h;/ iiIkhh tiny air iwf/." Itiil.'M of IH(1,'» fc.r the Ct. of Div. iiii.l Mat. ("uilNe.x, IT. rj'.l l;J7, I'eini •-'•>. • lly Ki iV j; V. c. .•iL>("'nir lliiiik- niittry .\.l. iss.l"), 5 i'7, sulw. j. • III. ;; lo.'(, hiil.c .'». • Sii|ira. 5 .'((ll. ' C. I', old. Will. r. la. ' See footnote to § .V)0, sllpril. • See Itiijes ill 1 liv. ami Mat. Cim-M. rr. V.Vl LIT, ll'S. ' See, iiIho, oil flli* milijert, Ilrowii V. r.towii, lS(t<(; tlie ItllleNof Matrll, \H'\. lor the Ct, (.f I'loli. ill lllij.'., rr. ll(i- Vl'A, aiel I'dtiii \\\ \ uud tlie ;5(j CHAP. IV.] INTKUKOCiATORIES UXDF.K RULES OF 1883. § 521. It has boon aln-iuly inoidiMitally niPiitioiKMl that evitlonco other than oral (in oIIut words secondary) is somotinios ohtuiiicd by moans of intcrrofraton 's, and tlie depositions in answer totlicin. Betwetm tlio yoars lHr>l and 1870 many rules were framed either by Iho Legislature or the judges, with the view of enabling litigants, bt^fore the actual trial took place, to scrape the con- sciences of their opponents by means of interrogatories.' Tiio law on the subject is now embodied in H. S. C, 188;{, Ord. XXXI. S tj'22. Any discusrion as to u/ini interrogatories may be administered, or as to the practice with regard to them, would appear to be out of place here. Mf)re()ver, full iuform»ti(m ou the subject will be found in any book upon " Praciiic." In this edition of the present work * it will therefore not bo further discussed. S 'VJ'{. The question whetlier any and what use can bo made at the trial of the answers to interrogatories which have been given by the other side may i)roperly be considered a branch of the Law of Evidence. As to this, the MR. S. C, 188;{, provide, by Ord. XXXI. r. 24, as follows: — "Any party may, at the trial of aii action or cau«e, nuitter, or issiie, use in evidence any one or more of the answ»>r8, or any part of an answer, of the (»|)posite party to interrogatories without putting in the others, or the whole of such answer: Provided always, that i>i such case the jiulge may look at the whole of the answers, and if he shall be of opinion that tiny others r)f them are so co^lnct•ted with those put in tiiut the last- mentioned answers ought not to be usetl without them, ho may direct them to be put in." SS 'V24 — /i42. It has been renuirkeil, *' Under the new rules the ])laintiiT can read oiu> passage without referring to the whole, even of the same paragraph, and I think no judge would allow a defendant, where he had ma<le an admission, to read with it a jiassago whi.h was not connected in sense or substance with that » 17 * IH V. 0. I'-'o, ^ li\-:n; laltv. wliethnr for Knulmi.l ( 24 ■M & :w V. <•. 77, Onl. XX.XI. For At '2o V. c. 10. $ 17, n-pfiii.d l.y 44 <4)i'ii'*^|iiiii(liii^ |iii)vihiiiiiM rciutivii to & 4.) V. c. .'iKj, or for Iri'luiui ; son liviaii.l.m'o nt iVJoV.c. l(i:'. §5 •»«- ao & 111 Virt. i . 114. §41. Ir. Ml loiiKl'-' : 40 \- 41 V. f. 77(lr.j iiml ' Tim .i^rlitli r.liti.iii iss.',) ..f tliis iiiili'f'. i^iiiiiliir |iii\v('rs wi'ie uUo work liiHt'ii^-scii tlin t.iibjuut ut jjri'ut cxtoMilud to tliu old Cuuii ol' Atiiiii- I'ligtli. !' APTIONS Foil PKUPIVrUATIXO TKSTIMONY. [VaIJT \'. ndmisaion, even i ' }io had put in ii statonifnt sulimiltiii}^ t]i;ii Im wnf fii'itlml to do mo, iind i'laimiii;^ to do so. Of cmirsi', wIhmi ;\n u'inni-Mnn jm read, ovorvtiiiii"; oii;^dit to Im read which is fairly coii- iiettod with tlnit admisHioii, hut I tliink it woidd ho wrong for dm d'^fcudant, and ho wouhl not bo nUowcd, to try to hring iu nnittfr wliii'h WHS not in any way conncctctl wiHi the inatti-r u(hnitt<'d." ' ii -'tVi. lU'foro ctiurts of hiw woro unipoworfil In issuo roniMiis- sions for thotnsplvos, it was ofti'u nocoasary to instituic proceedings in Chan<'ory as auxiliary to an action at law; ami in such cases, rocourso was had to what was called "an action for pcrpotuating testimony." S ")44. To extend tho benefits derivable from this mode of pro- ceeding, two Acts were passecl. The lir.st of these was pa'^scd in IHl'J,- and is now repealed, lis provisions aie, however, sub- stantially end)odied in tho U. S. C, iHH'-i, Ord. XXXVIl. r. Ho,' whi(;h provides, that *' any person who wouh', nidor tho eircum- stanees alleged by him to exist, become entitled, upon the happen- ing of any future event, to ajiy honour, tith*. dignity, or oJKce, or to any e.stato'' or interest in any jiroprrty, rca' or pi-rsiual, the rij:lit or claim to which cannot by him be brought to trial before tlie hajijiening of such event, nuiy commenc^e an a(;tion to porpetuato any testimony which nuiy bo nuiterial for establishing such right or claim." By tho Ijogitimaey ])cclarati()n Aot, IS'^y,* which is th(f second of tho A<ts just referred to (and is still in foroo), tho Divorce l)ivisi(m of tho High Court, on tho petition of eortain jiersons specially interested, may make di'cree^ declaratory of the lcgitiina<'y or illegitimacy id' n* y such petifi •■h- a. <;• nf the validity or invaliili*y of tho marriage of ojs parents, vv ':'-.ndparents, or of liis own niarriagu, or of hia right to bo doemeil u natin'al-borti Hubject. 8 ;"j45. An action to porpotuato testimony must have " been com- menced for tho purpose," or no witness will 1h( allowed to \w ('xamiued." The court may, on motion in such an action, if the • Cotton.L.J.,inLyellt'. Konnctly, bell c K. of Dalliousic, INti'.i, II, I,. 1NS4 ; iiimI see Itowcii. I„J. * Sen Kc Stner, \HS\, ('. A. ' .-. & (i V. c. («», i.'iii.al.d l.y 10 & » '.M ,*i '22 V. •■ ".HI. §§ :, 'J; ox- 47 V. ,.. .|». tciul. il to Irclaiut hy ill & H'i V. ^ riiMiMiliiu^t uuilcr tliii* iMiiti c. *J0, If. ■').■• -hi UijouloUHly wut<;licd: Cuinii- • (.)nl. XXXVIL r. ,17. Cn.M*. iV.j VIVA VOCK TKSTIMONY, HOW PROVKD. (Icft'iidimt mnkcs (lofault ii> <l(»livnriii;r adofdiioo, ninko an order for the (Kitiou to j»roc(!(Ml iu due couno, uii!! that (when' *'us in advisuhh') a witness bo at oiicn examined, as if tho j»le,idiii;»s were elosed.* The witnosses will b» examined orally before one of tlio ('xatniners of tliH eotirt nmlor Ord. XXXN'll. r. •').' The depositions will then 1)0 taken down, signed, aiithentioated, and transmitted to the Central Office, as in other cases. ^ No relief boinj^ ])rayeil, the action must not bo set down for trial.* In general, the depositions will not be received at a subsequent trial as ovidenco,' except in support of an action, nor then, unless it Ik proved that the wit- nes.ses are dea<l, or otherwise iiienpablo of attending to be examined.' The practice of the ecclesiastical courts was similar.' § -OK). If a witness, besides being o.\amin<Ml on interrogatories, should testify at the subsecpunit trial of a cause, either party, on any further trial respecting the same subject, may, if the witn< as bo then incapable of attending, rely, at his option, either on tho deposition, or on the previous vivA voce testimony.'* What such witness" orally te.stified may bo proved, <»ither by any person, who will swear from his own memory,'" or by notes taken at tlu» time by any person, who will swear to their accuracy," or po.ssibly from tho necessity of the case, by the judge's notes." This last mode of proof, however, is open to very grave, if not insuperable, objec- tions, as such notes form no part of tho record, nor ia it the <luty of the judge to take them, nor have they tli ■ sanction of his oath to their accuracy or completonoss.'* ll(»w far it may bo necessary to prove tho prcvine iconin spoken, does not clearly appear. Jt ia ' ^[un|lH'H«of Huto I', Juines, 188(1; mill Hi'i> rlllico i;. |{iiii|i<'ll, Isfi.'l. ■■' Miti'i|UeHH of I'.utti r. JiiinoM, Hiipru. Soe, iiImo, J.itliiit I', .Miii'|iliy, 1K7N (Ir.), (Ii'i'idinl on IIm' fiiiri'Hj«mil- iiiK liiMh (MiliT. (tnl. XXX VI. r. «. » ()r.l. XXXVII, IT. r.', 1(J. • Old. XXXVII. r. ;W. • Whno the ( "lowii hiiH iin iiitt'n st, if tint .Ut.-Ui'ii. Ill' iiiiiile (iofi'iiiiiint, tlii>li no ohjiM-tiuii I'liu )h) takt'li to tbli ll(t|MIHitl<>IIH (III tl.O f;(roUU<l lliut Kav. IHI.J ' \v.'i|ii.ii,i r, \Vf(|iic.iiii. ih;)!>. " To.i r, ]•;, of Win.li.NtMi, IS28 {\A. Tiiitfiilfii), uiit<', S liMK • (if. Kv. 5 KKl, ill tiiirt. '» Sliutt !•. Hoviiiploii, lso;t (I,.l. Mllftilioioii^fh) ; \li\\. of l>oiii'UM».'r V. Day. IHKI; U. v. JollifTu. ITUl {IA. ivi'iiyoii). " Mav.'of l)oii(-niit^r i>. Day, 1810. '» l.:.\.SirJ. M.iiiHti..l(l). '» C( (inuii f. Connuli, lNfl«(\Vilde, ••■ I'"' • rt -...-- , • ^ ....^1,., tho Crown wuM not u jiarty to tho J.O.); Mih'H i'. o'llurii, 1811 (Am.); ai lion : (»i.l. XXXVII. i, Ud. l''(mt<.r r. Shuw, Wi'. (Ain.); Esparto • 1 MiiiiJh'HCh. I'r. 7(ll>; Morrimm LourinouUi, 18'.'l. V. Atmiil, mi, tinfi Att.-Uuu 'dtj'i ii: VIVA VOCE TK8TIM0NY, HOW PUOVKD. [part II II '■' I -i: «tti(l that in ono caso the evidence of a witness wiis roje«;te(l " ns he could not undertake to give the words, hut nien-ly to swear to tho effect of them."' The sanio precision has, on Beveral occa- sions, been deemed requisite in America.'' On the other hiind, it has been forcibly urgtsd' tliat to insist upon strict accuracy, in cHect exchides this sort of evidence altogether, while oxtrotno jwiiticu- larity and minuteness in a witness's narrative, and an undertaking by him to repeat with exactness every word of the d<*ceased's testi- mony, ought to excite just doubts of tho witness's honesty, and tlic truth of his evidence.* 8 <i47. It has been, on tho one hand, decided tliat a dying depo- sition is not admissible unless tlio very words of tho deceased were taken down, both question and answer having been taken ilowii where (juestions were put.'' On tin* other hand, on indictments lor perjury, it is not neces.sary to state tlie entire examination, but it will hutlice to narrate, with ai'ciiraey, the whole of that portion of the evid('nce whirh relates to tho point on which tho perjury is assi|^ned, ju'ovlilcd the witness can further swear that he heard the whole examination, and that nothing was subseipumtly said to qualify theur!;.^iiial statement." Unless he can do this, his evidence cannot be received;' and as the same rule ought to apply to th(> proof of tho !<•!•< imony of a deceased witness, it .uid follow that the pernon who heard .t deceased witness give his evidence must ut all events be able to positively state what was said f)n the examination in chief, and must also bo able to give th»* substiinee of his answn-s in cross-exan)inatioh, or to positively swear that nothing escaped tho wiln<»ss, which (sould vary or qualify tli«> tirst statement.'* S .048. When lb positi'ius are tendi icd in evidence as hccondary proof of oral teittiiaony, they are, of course, ojien to all the objec- tions which nii^lit liiive \wn raised hail tlic witness himself been jiersonally prc(vnt uf ir.r liial. 1 reading and other illegal (pu'stions are therefore conslantly suppressed, togetli»»r with the answers to ' Mciitiontv't f \ '.onl '.( >>)on in 11. V. J.illitVo, i;i»i. » U. S. I. "• .nii, :•;*!« ; im.); FoMter I'. Hhiiw, i.»2t (Am.' Wi l>ur V. Hcld.iii, 1K2(J (Am.), C»w. ••. lli.Juuils, lH;»«(Am.). » dr. Kv. § 10.V * Boo (".im.'ll >■, Uroon. >HJ;l(Am.) . MilcH V. (Vll.im. 1811 (Am.); t'utoii r. Lenox, ISJ7 (Am.); JuckMoii r. Hiiilcv, IHOti ^Am). • li. V. Mitchull, iMil',', • H. I'. Uowloy, iN-'i; Ii. v. Uow liu. 57!»'.'. ' U. I', Jones, 179i. • W.ilf r. Wyoth, 1824 (Am.). .Md4 CHAP. IV. ] DEPOSITIONS OPEN TO WHAT OIUECTIONS. them ; and this, too, whether the tefetirunny liiis hoeii taken vivft voce or by written interrogatories.' But a party eannot repudiate an answer which has been given to an illegal question put on his own side ; ^ and in all cases where objections are taken to interrogatorie.i on the ground of their being couched in a leading form, the judge is vested with a wide discretion as to how much, if any, of the dei»osition8 returned he will in consequence strike out.'' Whore a witness, on being examined upon interrogatories in a foreign country, stated in one of his answers the contents of a letter which was nut produced, f/iat part oi the deposition was supprcj^sed at the trial, though it was urged, that as the witness was beyond the jurisdic- tion of rho court, no means existed for compelling the production of tlie letter.* Said Cliiof Justice Tiudal,'' " We have no power to compel the witness to give any evidence at all : but if he doe.s give an answer, that answer must be taken in relation to the rules of our law on the subject of evidence." 5i '')l'i. In another case, under similar circuras>tance8, where a witness described the contents of a letter and of the reply to it» but produced neither, on this dejiosition being tendered the vnurt at the trial rejected the answers which stated what the letters nm- taiiu'd, but admitted so nuich of the deposition as stated that the witness had written a letter to the party in question; for had the witness been himself present in court he might have been e.xamined thus far, in order to prove that the defendants through him hnd used some exertion to procure the party's answer." Again, de|.i>- siiions have been admitted, though the witness on his examiuiitiiin had refreshed his memory with some jwipers, which he alleged were partly in his handwriting and partly not, but which ho refused to allow the commissiimers to see upon the ground tliat they were j»rivate memoranda ; for, as it was a matter for tlu; discretion of the commifsi(.iners wlnther they would permit the witness to reft-r to ' IlutchiuHon v. lioinard, 1830. Htiiincs. thiit litli.r the letter must * Id, be |iiiiiliict'(l, nr the ir/iolf iiitcr- * Siniill I'. Nairno, 1819. i()f,'iitt>ry libanddiicd. IJut this cii.su * StciiiUfllor t'. Ni'wton, 18158 {Tin- is ch'iirly imt law. S(>o pur lid. dill, C.J.). Ill Whisj-liT 1'. Alkiim, l)i>iiiiiun, in Sinnll v. Niiirno, 184U. 180.'), lA. ElIonb<ii()ii(j;h iw rciioitiHl ■* In Stoinkolh r c. Newton, 1838. to huvo held, uudur uiiuiUr circiuu- * Tuttuu v. Whituiuiu, 181U, 855 iii S( f !i t' i]"\ NO DKCKEKS IN SKCOXDAKY KVIDKNCE. [ I'AUT FI. papers during liis examiniilion, the learned judge, at the irial, prosunu'd tlmt tljcy had exoroiHcd thfir discretion with jjroprioty.' § 54!^. Tlie rules gf)vprning the jiroduotion of depositions us evidence hiivo now been fully dinciissed. § 550. It romainr. to consider a third lioad of the subject of secondary evidence, viz., the general principle that the law recognises no (Ihji'cch in the various kinds of secondary evidence.' This rule applies whether the original evidence be itself oral or documen.avy. For instance, if a deed be lost, or in the hands of the adversary, who after due notice refuses to produce it, secondary evidence of its contents may at once be given by parol testimony, avjn though the party offering such evidence may be proved to have in his posrossion a counterpart, a copy, or an abstract of the document ; ■> and the former testimony of a deceased witness may bo proved by any person who heard hira examined, even where a clerk or a shorthai d writcT took down his evidence word for word.^ S 5ol. At the same time, the rule that there are no degrees of seeon<lary evidence simply applies to the (tilmimbilitif of secondary evidence, and not to the degree of uritj/if to which different sorts of secondary evidence are enti'.led ; it does not mean that the mere memory of a witness, who has ren<l a deed, is entitled to (Mjual weight with an authenticated copy of the same instrument. In many cases a jury would properly regard evidence with distrust if it apj)eared that more satisfactory proof was intentionally wilhhdd, and under some circumstances this distrust might even amount to absolute inci lidity. § 5;"i2. Cases in wliich the law has expressly substituted some partitMdar species of Hfcojidary evidence, in the ])lace of primary proof, are, however, rn/iaM from the opcmtion n/thr viilr that tliere are no degrees of secondary evidence. For instance, examined copies, and, in some cusci, oflico or certified copies of public records > Stoinkellorr.Nowton, 1838 (Tin- dul, r.j.). = I)(»> I'. Ross. IS 10; H.ill V. Hull, 1N41 ; Urowii i'. Wooilimin, 1N:J4 (I'arko, 1$.); Jcuns v. Whowloii, 184:J (rri'SHWcll, J.). ' CnHns in last iu)t»i ; also, S\ip;ilon V. Tid. St. Lodiuinh. INTO; Hmwn v. UruwD, 1«J8 ; lu ro lirowu, 18J« ; 356 and In ro Onnlnor, IHSS, in whuli discs oral oviiii'Mco of tlw conti'iits of a lost will was iidniittcil. .*'<•<• Johnson I'. Lvford, 1«(>H; also, ant*?. « Joans I'. Wlmodon, 1843 (Or w.'ll, J.). 8t)o li. V. ChriHtoplw 1N4». CHAP. IV.] coriKS of vvuuc documknts. and (locunients iiro, on grounds of gonorul convt-nienco, considered iidniissiblts' and, tliotjgh in slrictiifss Hecondiiry evidonco, partake HO much of the character of primary proof, that so h)ng as it is possihle to produce thcni, otlier inferior degrees of secondary evidence cannot be reooived.* Parol testimony, in sucli cases, can only be admitted on proof, first, that tlio piiblio record or 'locunient lias itself been lost or destroyed (for otherwise a copy might be obtained), and, secondly, that any copy whitfh nmy liave been taken, is no hmger under the control of the i)arty relying upon less satisfactory evidence.' In like manner, if ii witness has been examined before a magistrate or coroner under such circumstances, that these otfic(»r8 respectively have, in pur- suance of their duty, taken down his statement in writiiifr, i)arol evidence of his examination cannot be given in the event t' his (loath, so long as the deposition itself (uin be jinMluced, since the law, having constituted the deposition as the authentic medium of juoof, will not permit the admission of any inferior speci(!s of evidence. The mere statement of a witness who wiut pn^sent at the ••xamiuation will bo admissible if — and only if — it can be shown that the deposition is lost or destroyed, or is in the possesHion of the opj)08ito party, who after notice revises to produce it.* S SOU. The princiide, too, which includes every species of secon- dary proof in one legal category, by no nu>ans, hf»w(»vci', opens a iloor to any sort of evidence, however lot)8e, which a j^arty chooses to tender.' For example, the contents of a written iiistninient which is lost cannot be proved by means of a copy, until it be shown that such copy is accurate. If, as frequently hapjteuH, a party to flio huit has himself made a copy of a letter which he has sent t(i his iidverhary, this copy, should the adversary, after notice to do so, refuse to produce the original letter, cannot bo read in evidence, unless tlm party who made it can swear to its accuracy, or some (itlicr witness can be called who has compared it with the original." Neither can a document, — excepting in a \{>ry lew cases by ' '1 ' Auto, § 130, oml post, §§ 15:H, Wvlde, 1n;h. I."i4.), l.")!)8 et HO(j. » Kvcriiifflmin v. l{()mi(lill, 1H,)8 ' l><)(i r. HoHH, 1840 (Lfl. AMnpor). (Alili tmoii, U.). ' TliiiiHton 1. SliitfonM'OO; Muc- • FiNlicr i. Samiiilu. IHdS (I,d. iluiipil I'. Vomif;, IN'Jd. KIU'iiImuouj^Ii). Hut Hi'o Waldy v. • S.M, 2 Uusa. C. & M. 893; 11. v. (hay, 1N7.^ (Hacou, V.-O.). 357 i: H, \>- ■J': t ' ' ■ ^! ■ ■'' ' i |i COPIES OK C0PIK8 INAI)MI88IHIiK. [I'AIM' II. Btatutory authority, — bo provo<l by tlio i)ro(luction of tlio cojiy of a copy.' Suoh ovidonce is rejoi-tod on tho broad ground wliii li rendunt honrxay ovidonce inadnuHHiblo, for asHuniing tho scM-und copy to corrt'Hpond exiictly with tho firnt, tho iirHt muHt b« pmduci'il and proved to have been eonjparod with tho original, or ofhtTwisn thoro would bo notbing to hIiow that tho sucond copy and tlio original wcro identical. Such eviduuco would iu faut bo but tho bIuuIiiw of a hIuuIo. S /ioiJA. Wo have now diwjUHsod iu full tho four great riilon governing the jjroduction of testimony, which are : (i.) that the evidence muHt correspond with the issue — a nde which has necessi- tiitcd as iucidciutal to it tho consideration of " variances" and of "ann iidiiients ;" — (ii.) that tho evidence must bo confined to flio point in issue; (iii.) that tho burden of ])roof always lies u|hmi the ]mrty who substantially asflcrts tho allirniativo — a rule as suli- sidiary to which the subjects of tho "Right to Ucgin," and " lJi>,'ht to Ikcply " have been necessarily considered — ; and (iv.) that tlie best evidenco must always bo produced — tho subjects of "Secon- dary Evidence" beijig rendered adiuissibh^ (1) as to ilociiniciits, by means of "Notices to Produce," i^c., and (J) as to oral evi- dence by depositions, «&o., having been tieatud of us arising out of, and in connection with, this fourth rule. S .OO'Jii. The general rules governing tht* production of testimony having been thus explained fully, we may now usefully pass on to the next jiart of our 8ubjt!ct, which will bo to uonsider tho parti- cular kinds of ovidenco. ' liicbiuuu V. i'ooloy, IHlU (lA. KUunburoiigli) ; Kvoringhtiiu v, IluuudoU, 18U8. 358 It CHAl*. IV.J AMKUK'AN NOTKS. AM Kill CAN NoTKS. 3r»H' Best Evidence. — Tt is oxtri'iut'Iv ilduhtl'iil wliftlior any nilo so |tliil(»s(»|iliiral ami ^jcrnTal exists in tin- Kii;^'lisii law of i'\ iilincf as tliiit "the Ix'St ovidcMicc, oT wliidi tlio case in its nature is siiseep- tilile, slidiilil always 1>.' [irvseiileil ti> tlie jury," if liy this is meant tliat. (itliiT evidence is ex»;liideil. Tliat it would I le \V( 11 as rule of imlulpMiee tliat evidenee hIiouI)! he admitted in all cases it' it is tint best tlial tin* nature of the actual situation |icniiils. |i>r example, lieaisay statements of a deceased |ieisoii, is a |iosilioii in favor of wliicli iiimdi mi;,'lit he urf^ed. Hut neitlier as a rule of reiiuireiiieiit or of imhilj,'etiee, doe.s the rule exist that the lust eviileiiee (d' which the case is capalde is to he j,'iven. It is (piite |iossiiili' to trace in the devcdopment of the law (d eviden<'e lioth the feidini,', oii the part of jud!,'es, that tho hest evideiiou must lie j^ivcM and tliat evidence should he received, il', »./• nnrssltnfr n i , it is the hest that can hu olTered, Uut luithei" jiulioy has hecomo cHtahlished into a rule. Diiriii!,' the (dose (d' the sixteenth and for the major jmrf of the seventeenth ci'iituiy, a formative peri<id in the law (d evidence, the elTort was persistently made to determine all exclusions and admissions hy this stain ilard. The earlier American cases, as niij,dit he expected, follow these Hta;.{es id' devtdiipment (d' the "hest evKiciice" rule in I'.iij,dami hy insistint; on the rule in its wider scope. So held that conviction <d' larceny could not he shown hy pand to impeach a witness tveii if the court records had lieen lU Iroycd hy the hurninj,' (d the court house, since it was the iluty of t lu- ll istrict attorney i.i send a certifii-ate "f the conviction to the Court of Kxcheipier, and that certificate wa-- ■higher and hetter procd." Ililts I'. Colvin, II .{(diiis. IH'J {1S17). So where an exenipliticd cojiy of tlie jud.i,'nient can he ohtaiiicd, "neither the records them- selves, nor minutes, should ever he rccnved, 'vheii copies can he ohtained, unless there is some stronj; reason for ilispensint,' with the usual and appropriate evidence." Lowry c. ("ady, I \'l. otU ( IS.'!!'). Sii«di "stroiij,' reason" w.is coiisidcied to exist where i he pid'^Mueiit was in l7S.'t "in a new and frontier County Court at the close (d' the revolutionary war, at a time and in ii place where we may lu'csume the reciu'ds were made and kept in a slovenly manner." Walker c. <trienlee, 'A Hawk .'HI (1,S1>.|). The l.iilii of ceased cannot ht! proved hy witnesses while the rei,'ister of the hirth is not accoinited for. M.irti^'an v. Iideinatioiial. \'c., Society, S L. Can. Jiir. l'(i;; (I.SC.;!). It will he; ohserved that many (d tiiese eases hear <iii tin? Vfjrnfa i/uiiesflo of de;.,'rei s in secondary evideiiee. So the {ionllary of tho "hest eyidonco " rule — that the hest IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) /. A^ 1.0 I.I 11.25 |5C ja2 U il.6 V] <^ % n ^>. HiotograpAiic Science ion S m. ^ V \ :\ •^ ^ 23 WiST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. 14580 (716) R/i^soa \ o % .% i/.. ^ S %^ \ :\ c;$(^ \$ f;i-: ;'! nil iilt^^- it':' <l ■• >' :' 3582 AMERICAN NOTES. [part in. hr i evidence "^vhich it is possible to olTer will be received — has been laid down in broad terms, Tims the court of appeals of New York: "It is a universal rule, founded in necessity, that the host evidence of which the nature of the case admits is always receiv- able." McKinnon v. Bliss, 21 N. Y. 200 (1800). It is not surprising that survivals are found, even in recent times. On an indictment for larceny of a hog the son of the owner was not allowed to testify that his father had not consented to the taking. "The best evidence of non-consent was that of the owner himself; and before secondary evidence as to that fact was admis- sible a reason should have been shown satisfactorily accounting for the non-production of the best evidence." Smith v. State, l.T Tex. App. 507 (1883). But the later development of the law has rejected the "Best Evidence" rule in its sweeping form, both as a rule of indulgence and as one of requirement. The strict rules of evidence are relaxed on the ground of impos- sibility of other proof than that excluded only in specified instances. For example, " The rule excluding hearsay evidence applies with full force notwithstanding no better evidence is to be found, and though it be certain, if the account is rejected, that no other can possibly be obtained." Reeves v. State, 7 Tex. App. 27() (1879). Certainly there is at present no rule which requires, except in certain specified cases, that weaker evidence cannot be received where stronger is available. If a party, for any reason, presents a case of inherent weakness, either on account of the nature of the proof presented or because an unfavorable inference arises from the apparent suppression of better evidence, probably no rule of law is broken. The official character of an individual may be shown by his openly acting in that capacity as well as by jjroduction of a com- mission or ap])ointment. U. 8. v. Keyburn, I'eters, 352, 307 (1832); Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 04, 70 (1827). A promissory note may be used to prove a fact, though it is c(m- tradicted by a recital in a deed. Magee v. Burcli, i08 ]\Io. 3.")() (1891). Any person may state what the op|)osite party said on a ])revious occasion in court, though, the evidence has been taken down by a stenographer, and no attempt is made to account for failure to produce his notes. Briee v. Miller, 35 S. C. 537 (1891). The defence that cortain machines sold do not comjdy witli a warranty mny be established by the results of certain tests made by the vendor; though the defendants have themselves made no attemi)ts to ]mt the machines into actual use. "It is obvious that tlie well-known rule of law to which the learned judge who tried the case called the attention of the jury has no just ai)plication to the case on trial. Its purpose is to recpiire parties to deal ^ CHAP. IV.] AMEUK'AN NOTKS. 358^ irankly with court and juries, to produce the best evidence in thfir possession or control at the time of the trial, and it' it apjiears (hu- iu" the trial that the party has in his possession, or under liis control, evidence which is better in quality than that wliicii is pro- duced, it is tlie duty of the court to direct tlie jury, in effect, to dis- regard the evidence produced, and to take into consideration tlie attempted fraud." Baker, D. J., in U. S. Sugar llehnery r. E. P. AUis Co. oG Fed. Rep. TSG (1893). '-The testimony of the chemist who has analyzed blood, and that of the observer wlio has merely recognized it, belong to the same legal grade of evidence; and though tlie one may be entitled to much greater weight than the other with the jury, the exclusion of either would be illegal." People V. Gonzalez, 35 N. Y. 49 (ISGG). ISo a witness can testify even if better witnesses could have been produced. " One who can testify under any circumstances upon the facts on wliich he is examined, may do so as well wliere h^s superiors are to be found as where he knows as much as any other." KUiott V. Van Pureii, 33 Mich. 40 (1875). In the same way, on an indictment for selling intoxicating liquor to a minor, the minor was allowed to testify to his minority, though better evidence, in tlie persons of his father and mother, was available, and an instruction to the effect that such evidence was not "the best evi- dence of which the case will admit " was held correctly refused. "It is perhaps true that the evidence of the minor may not be so satisfactory, as to the fact, as the evidence of tlie failn-r or mother, or some other person ])resent at his birth — ■ still, his statement on oath as to his age, should be received and permitted to go to the jury as evidence, to have such weight as it is entitled to have, under the circumstances. ... It is true, it is a rule of evidence, that, the best evidence of which the case, in its nature, is suscep- tilile, sliouhl be required. Put still, when there is no substitution of evidence, but only a selection of the weaker instead of the stronger proofs, or ai» omission to supply all the i)roofs ca[)able of being ])roduced, the rule is not infringed." State /•. Cain, ',) W. Va. 559, 5G9 (187G). Where a document from the comptroller's office was ])roduce(l, in the absence of the comptroller, by a witness to whom he had left the keys of his office, it was objected that the comptroller himself was the best evidence, and so tliat offered was iiia(lmissil)le. Held: — unsound. "The rule that the best evidence ill the jiarty's power or possession shall be produced, does not apply in this case, for that rule only applies to grades of evidence. Oral evidence shall not be received when tliere is written, a copy when the origimil can be hail." (Jovernor v. Koberts, 2 Hawks, L'G (1S22). The dithculties of applying the "best evidence" rule to the ex- tent contended for are thus set out. " If the rule was, that the most full and satisfactory evidence should l)e produccil, it would il'- . ri;- ;- IhTii r .■ M 358* AMEUICAN NOTKS. [I'AKT III. follow that where it appeared there were others present, they siiould also bo produced, or where a person from his situation had a better view of the transaction; one who liad a less favoural)le position should not be received, or where it appears that anotlier could give a more detailed account of the affair, one who could not give so full a one should be excluded , although there may be no doubt as to his knowledge of the facts to which he deposes." Ibhl. To prove the incarceration of a prisoner the sheriff who took him there is a competent witness, though the warden, keeping a record of the terms, &c., of prisoners, would be a better one. "If the marriage or birth of the prisoners had been wanted as introductory to evidence of the crime charged, it would scarcely be argued that a witness, who was present at the birth or marriage, was incompe- tent to prove it, because a registry existed. In questions of iden- tity, records and registries are not the best evidence, for after the entries in them are received it is necessary to individuate the per- sons mentioned, and this must be done by evidence dehors the doc- ument." liowser V. Com. 51 Pa. St. 332 (1805). Evidence is admissible that a tumbler contained intoxicating liquor without producing the liquor or accounting for its absence. Com. v. Welch, 142 Mass. 473 (1886). The condition of clothes may be described though no reason is given for not producing them. To hold other- wise would require real evidence in all cases where it would be possible. Com. v. Pope, 103 Mass. 440 (1809). And yet it has been held that testimony was admissible that certain parts of a broken machine fitted each other, though the machine was present in court and could have been examined by the jury. Congtlon v. Howe Scale Co., CC Vt. 255 (1894). In proving what was done in buying and selling oil through agents at distant points under telegraphic orders, the principal is a competent witness, though better evidence could very probably be given by the agents who effected the transactions. " In requiring the production of the best evidence applicable to each particular fact, it is meant thnt no evidence shall be received whicli is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original evidence can be had. The rule excludes only that evidence which itself indicates tlie existence of more original sources of informa- tion ; but where there is no substitution of evidence, but only a selection of weaker instead of stronger proofs, or an omission to supjdy all the i)roofs capable of being produced, the rule is not impinged." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa. St. 442 (1889); Richardson v. Milburn, 17 Md. G7 (18G0). "It may bo weaker than other evidence which might be attained, teiuling to prove the same fact; but the niere selection of weaker, nstead of stronger proofs, will not justify the exclusion of the weaker. m iil i'M €HAP. IV.] AMEKICAN NOTES. 358» liiM^ when it is, in its nature, primary and riilevant." McCreary r. Turk, 29 Ala. 244 (185(5). To prove percolation, the jjlaintiff is not called upon to go to the expense of an uncertain experiment of ditching. Crozer v. New Chester Water Co., 148 Pa. St. 130 (1892). Where the making of certain statements is in issue as the basis of conduct, one who heard them may testify to them, although the party who made them might himself have been called as a witness. Jiadger v. Story, 16 N. H. 1G8 (1844); Featherman v. Miller, 45 I'a. St. 96 (1863). Or tlie statements are in writing. State r. Seymore (la.), 63 N. W. G61 (1895). The age of a person may be shown by witnesses, though there is a record of the birth in a family Bible. State r. Woods, 49 Kans. 237 (1892). To the contrary effect, i.e., that a witness with inferior know- ledge cannot be called, while a better witness is available, see Parliman v. Young, 2 Dak. 175 (1879). SuiiSTiTUTioxAKY Evn>?:xoE. — There seems no doubt, however, that merely substitutionary evidence will be rejected, or, if received, will be so counterbalanced by the inference of fraud caused by the suppression of the superior evidence as to possess little, if any, resultant of probative force. This proceeds upon the line of thought embodied in the maxim, " Omnia contra spoUatorem" and has been considered in that connection. See ante, p. 183'-*. There seems but slight practical advantage in formulating the " best evidence " rule to cover the same ground already covered by this presumption. In Holmes v. Coryell, 58 Tex. 680 (1883) the court cite with approval an extract from 1 Greenl. Evid. 82. " This rule does not demand the greatest amount of evidence which can possibly be given of any fact; bat its design is to prevent the inti eduction of any which, from the nature of the case, supposes that better evi- dence is in the possession of the party. ... In requiring the best evidence applicable to each particular fact, it is meant that no evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original evidence can be had. The rule only excludes that evidence which itself indicates the existence of more original sources of information." On the principle of ouiiiia contra spoJiatorcm, the unfavorable inference wliich arises from failure to produce witnesses who know the entire facts, while putting forward those who know less, is both logically and legally obvious. As the court say on an indictment for keeping a gaming house, where several persons present at the time of the raid were in attendance at the trial and not called as witnesses, " Had there been any reply to be made to the inculpa- tory evidence produced by the state, it was clearly in the power of the accused to answer that evidence ; and his failure to do so, 11* 358« AMERICAN NOTES. [part III. notwithstanding liis ample opportunity, could well be considered by the jury as adding strength and force to the prima facln ease niadt; out by the state. He introduced other witnesses who did not know the material facts, but carefully avoided introducing those who did know them. ' Where a party being apprised of the evidence to he adduced against him has the means of explanation or refutation in his power if the charge or claim against him be unfounded, and does not explain or refute that evidence, the strongest presumption arises that the charge is true or the claim well-founded, it would be contrary to all experience of human nature and conduct to come to any other conclusion.' 1 Stark Evid. 545." Stevenson v. State, 83 Ga. 575 (18S9). " The jury may draw unfavorable inferences from a party's failure to call witnesses who have knowledge of material facts." Wimer r. Smith, 22 Oreg. 400 (1892). " Any failure to do this could hardly happen without some motive, and in the absence of any other being shown, the almost irresistible conclusion would be that he feared at least the witness would not support his other testimony, and thus have the effect to create more or less doubt and discredit of such party's case." Seward i\ Garlin, 33 Vt. 584 (18G1) ; Whitney c. I'.ayley, 4 All. 173 (1SG2); Baldwin v. Whitcomb, 71 Mo. 651 (1880). The modern objection to substitution lies in the bad faith to the tribunal implied in suppressing better evidence Avhile offering an inferior quality, presumably less injurious to him who declines to produce the more conclusive. " For if it appear from the very nature of the transaction, that there is better evidence of tlie facts proposed to be proved, which is withheld, a presumption arises that the party has some secret and sinister moti\e for not producing the best and most satisfactory evidence, and is conscious that if the best were to be afforded, his object would be frustrated." Hart n. Yunt, 1 Watts, 253 (1832). Facts showing that the evidence is not substitutionary but that some good excuse exists for not producing the better evidence, are admissible, witi; the effect of admitting the evidence otlierwise excluded. Smith c. State, 13 Tex. App. 507 (1883) ; INlark v. Hast- ings (Ala.), 13 So. Rei). 297 (1893) ; Crozer v. New Chester Water Co. 148 Pa. St. 130 (1892). What evidence is substitutionary depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. It by no means follows because more con- clusive evidence is possible that a party is withholding and suppress- ing it because, if ))roduced, it would injure his case. A reasonable construction of the situation is adopted. " The rules of evidence are adopted for practical purposes in the administration of justice ; and although it is laid down in the books as a general rule, that the best evidence the nature of the case will -f ■ I CHAP. IV.] AMERICAN N0TP:S. 3r)8" admit of, must be given ; yet it is not understood that this rule requires the strongest possible assurance of the matter in question.'' Minor v. Tillotson, 7 Teters, 99 (1833). The existence of a judg- ment cannot be shown by the parol statement of the creditor. It " implies that there is better evidence of its existence than mere testimony can be." McNeill r. Donohue, 44 111. App. 42 (lfS91). Wkittkx Instki'MKNTs. — The rule excluding substitutionary evidence has its most rigid and invariable application where tlie substitution attempted ',is that of secondary or inferior evidence of tlio contents of a written instrument for the primary evidence of the instrument itself. J'robably the rule (and it was a most natural beginning of the entire " best evidence " rule) concerned itself at first with sealed instruments, and was connected withtlie rules regu- lating /ii-'ifcrf, wliich required the actual production of the very in- strument set up in tlie pleadings. The reasons requiringyy/v;/r// and the nature of the acceptable excuses are forcibly and (piaintly set forth by Lord Coke. " And therefore it appears, that it is (huigerous to suffer any who by the law in pleading ouglit to shew the deed itself to the court, upon the general issue to prove in eviilenee to a jury by witnesses that tliere was such a deed, which they liave lieard and read ; or to prove it by a copy ; for the viciousness, rasures, or interlineations, or other imperfections in these cases, will not ap[)ear totliecourt; or peradventure the deed may be ui)on condition, limi- tation, with power of revocation, and by this v/ay truth and justice, and the true reason of the common law would be subverted. But yet in great and notorious extremities, as by casualty of lire, that all his evidences were burned in his house, tliere if that should apjiear to the Judges, they may, in favour of him who has so great a loss by fire, suffer him upon the general issue to i>rove the deed in evidence to the jury by witnesses, tiuit affliction be not added to aitiiction ; and if the jury find it, altliough it be not sltewed fortli in evidence, it shall be good enough." Doctor Leyfield's Case, 10 Co. Kep. 88, 92 (KilO). Tlie transition from tlie production of the document as a matter of procedure to its use as evidence and the broadening of the rule from sealed to written instruments probably ])roved easy. Still, as late as 1797 tlie common hiw rule obtained in New Jersey that jealed instruments went with the jury to their consultation room as of right, while otlier written documents went only by con- sent or order of court. State r. Kaymond, ,W X. J. 200 (1891). IMoDKKN " Bkst Evidexc'k " RvLK. — At jiresent tlie rule re(piir- ing the best evidence is practically limited in scope to requiring proof of the contents of a written instrument by the primary evidence of the instrument itself until a sufficient excuse has been shown for allowing secondary evidence. " The term ' best evidence ' is confined to cases where the law has M I 1(1 3588 AAIKIirCAN NOTES. [part III. divided testimony into primary and secondary. And there are no degrees of evidence except where some document or other instrii- inont exists, the contents of which sliould be proved by an original ratlier tlian by otiier testimony which is open to danger of inaccu- racy." Elliott r. Van Buren, :V,i Midi. 49 (1875). Even a cortiiied copy of a deeu is not admissible until the party offering shows that the original is not in his possession or control. Plienix, &c. Ins. Co. v. Merchants, &c. Assoc, 51 111. App. 471) (18!)3). When it appears that the party offering evidence of an inferior grade is not suppressing evidence, but is offering the best he has, such proof is received. So where the minutes of a parish meeting were never extended on the records of the parish, they may be proved by parol. AVallace v. Townsend, 109 j\Iass. 2G3 (1872). The preliminary inquiry when secondary evidence is offered of the contents of a written document is Avhether the party ottering it is suppressing the primary evidence. Has he the original document in his possession or control, and, if not, could he by reasonable care and diligence have procured it ? " liefore, therefore, testimony of an inferior grade is iiermitted to be adduced, the court to whoin the preliminary enquiry is addressed, will require satisfactory pkoof, that better evidence is ifot voluntarily withheld." ]\Iordecai v. Beal, 8 Porter, 529 (1839); Morrison y. Jackson, 35 S. C. 311 (1891). The rule excludes even press copies. The originals must first be accounted for. State v. Halstead, 73 la. 376 (1887) ; Marsh v. Hand, Ho Ud. 123 (1871). " A letterpress cojjy is not an original. It in no wise differs from anj' other accurate copy than in the mode in which it is made ; ann it can be used in the place of the original in no case Avhere a proved copy, made in another manner, would not' be equally admissible." King r. Worthington, 73 111. 161 (1874); Foot v. Bentley, 44 X. Y. 166 (1870); Wackins v. Paine, 57 Ga. 50 (1876). The contention that such copies are always admissible is queried in Gilbert r. Moline Plow Co., 119 U. S. 491 (1880). Press copies, however, are admissible upon proof that the original letters were duly sent by course of mail, and that the sendee has made diligent and fruitless search for tiiem. Powell v. Wallace, 44 Kans. 650 (1890). Tiie onus is on the party offering secondary evidence to establish a satisfactory excuse. This he may do in one of three ways, according as the original is ((() presumably in his own ])ossession, (f>) presumably in that of tlio adverse party, ('•) presum- ably in the hands of a third party. DiLKiicxT Skaucii — (ft) Owii Posst'ssion. If the document, when last seen, was in his own possession or control, a party offering CIIAI'. IV.] AMKHICAX N'>TP:S. 858» sooondary evidence of the same must show diligent search in all places where the document might fairly be expected to be, and that suoli a search, pursued for a reasonable period, has been fruit- less. J'hilliiis r. Trowbridge Furniture Co., 8(5 Ga. G<.»!» (1S;)(»); Wing '•• Abbott, 28 Me. 3G7 (1848); I'errin r. State, 81 Wis. 135 {IS'.tL') ; Sebree v. Dorr, 9 Wheat. 558 (1824) ; Hart /•. Yunt, 1 Watts, 2.".3 (1832) ; Susquehanna &c. Ins. Co. v. Mardorf, 152 Pa. St. 22 (181)2); Roberts v. Dixon, 50 Kans. 430 (1893); Putnam v. Goodall, 31 N. H. 419 (1855); Danforth v. Tennessee, &c. K. K. 09 Ala. 331 (1S92). Where court papers were taken from the files, and traced through several successive attorneys for the plaintiff to one who said that he had never seen them, he/d that a sufficient basis had been laid for the introduction by the plaintiff of secondary evidence. Carr v. Jliner, 42 111. 179 (18C6). lieasonable diligence in search is the test applied. Where an ancient deed was sought among the other similar papers of the owner of the Ian. 1,' without effect and no other place of search ap- peared, secondary evidence was admitted. " If any suspicion hangs over the instrument, or that it is designedly withheld ; a more rigid inquiry should be made into the reasons for its non-produetion. l^ut when there is no such suspicion, all that ought to be required is reasonable diligence to obtain the original." Minor v. Tillotson, 7 Peters, 99 (1833). Where the written resolution of a board of directors was not found, on due search, in the office of the recorder of deeds, nor in that of the receiver or of the attorney for the assignee, who had received the assets prior to the receiver, but neither the secretary, president, or assignee of the conipany were produced or their depositions taken, held, that no sufficient foun- dation had been laid for the admission of secondary evidence. Mullanphy Savings Bank v. Schott, 135 111. 655 (1891). "It must be proven — that a diligent, unsuccessful search has been made for it in all places where it is likely to be." Bascom v. Toner, 5 Ind. App. 229 (1892) ; Darrow v. Pie'-ce, 91 Mich. 03 (1892) ; Smith /•. Allen, 112 N. C. 223 (1893). " We agree that the rule of law which requires the best evidence within the power or control of the ])arty to be produced should not be relaxed, and that the court should be satisfisd th.at the better evidence has not been wilfully destnyad nor voluntarily withheld. Put the rule on the subject does not exact that the loss or destruction of the document of evi- dence should be proved beyond all possibility of a mistake. It only demands that a moral certainty shoidd exist that the court has had every opportunity for examining and deciding the cause upon the best evidence within the power or ability of the litigant." U. S. /'. Sutter, 21 How. 170, 175 (1858); Pullman v. Parr, 54 Kans. G43 (1895); Mark v. Hastings, 13 So. (Ala.) 297 (1893); Brooke v. I ' il .i! il i I tli 35810 AMKIUCAN NOTICS. [I'AIIT 111. Jordan, l4 Mont. .37;") (1894). It is not sufRcient tliiit a present court stenographor could not find the notes of a former stenoyruplier. Siisquelianiia Ins. ("o. i: Mardorf, \r>2 Pa. St. '22 (18!)2). Amount ok 1'kook. — " Tlio amount of ovideiKte required to prove tlie loss of a written instrunuuit, for the jjiirpose of admittin-^' secondary evidence of its contents, depends, in a great measure upon the nature of the instrument and tlie cinuimstanees of tlie case. . . . Thus, it is obvious, tiiat the same evidence ought not to be required, to prove the loss of a promissory note, after the deiit had been paid, and tlie note taken up by the maker, as would be requisite to establisii the loss of a deed, uiuler winch a party claimed title. For, it is not usual to preserve instruments of the fornu'r character, after the debts which they represent iiave been jjaid ; while title deeds are generally kept with care." Waller c. Klevenih School District, 22 Conn. 320 (1853); Wiseman r. Northern I'ac. n. H., 20 Oreg. 425 (18<»1). Slight search will be sufficient for a subscription paper which had become of no value, because the amount on which the obligation was conditional had not been raised. " It ndght then be treated as mere waste paper." AValler v. Eleventh School District, 22 Conn. .'32(5 (1853). AV'here the record of a judgment of a deceased justice of the peace was lost, secondary evidence of its contents was not admissible in the absence of evidence of inquiry among the family of the deceased. Wing ;•. Abbott, 28 Me. 3G7 (1848). " To entitle a party to give parol evidence of the contents of a paper alleged to be lost, it is incumbent upon him to show that a diligent and careful search was made at the proper places and by the proper persons, and that it could not be fouiul. It is not enough to give sonu^ evi- dence of it.j loss, but he must give such evidence as will satisfy the court that the proper foundation for the admission of secondary evidence has been laid. Where a 2)aper which the law requires to be filed and kept by a i)ublic officer as part of the records or papers of his office, is alleged to be lost, the court has a right to require, before recfeiving parol evidence of its contents, that careful and dili- gent search was made in the office, and by o\.a so fully acquainted with the offi(!e, records and papers as to make it probable that if the paper was in the office he would find it.'' Howe v. Fleming, 123 lud. 262 (1889). A search at the Dead Letter Office will not be recuired in case of a missing letter, in the absence of evidence that such a search would lirobably be successful. Williams r. Grey, 23 C. V. U. C. 501 (1874). There must be proof '"that there has been diligent search and inquiry made of the proper person and in the proper place for the lost deed; that the loss must be proved, if possible, by the person in whose custody it was at the time of the loss, if such person be iiltl CHAP. .v.] AMKiaCAN NOTKH. 3')8>» living; and if dead, application should hu made to his representatives and search made ainoiij^ the documents of deceased.'' Trimble r. Kdsvards, 84 Tex. 4<J7 (1892); Tibbals v. ItHaml, 10 Wasli. t.-)! (istir.). If siudi search is not made among tiie effects of the deceased possessor of the document, secondary evidence is inadmissible. Adkins ('. (Jalbraith (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. L".)l (ISOo). If such search is made, evidence of contents of a deed is adniissi- ble, "even in the absence of certificates showing tlie projjer execution of tlie original." Van (Junden /•. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., oli Fell. Rep. 838 (189-). " Tlio courts have never attempted to detint; the precise degree of diligence essential to be shown in the effort to ])roduce a written instrument in order to render admissible parol evidence of its contents. But it would seem to be sutfi(!ient if the party offering such proof has in good faith exhausted all the sources and means of discovery which the nature of the case would suggest, and which are accessible to him." Baldwin v. i'>urt, 43 Neb. 'Ji~} (1895). (Jooi) Faith fob tiik Coi-ht. — The degree of proof of good faith in the searcli for tlie primary evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. " What shall constitute this satisfac<"nry proof, to authorize the introduction of secondary evidence, cannot easily be reduced to any lixed rule; it is addressed to the discretion of the court, to be governed by the circumstances of the case." Mordecai v. Boal, 8 I'orter, 029 (1839); ^Morrison r. Jackson, 35 S. C. 311 (1891); (iorgas V. Hertz, loO Pa. St. 538 (1892) ; Bain v. Walsh. 85 Me. 108 (1892); Williams v. Grey, 23 C. P. U. C. 5G1 (1874); Stratton r. Hawks, 43 Kans. 53S (i.S90); Elwell w. Mersick, Tx Conn. 272 (1882); Kleinmann /•. (Jieselmann, 114 Mo. 437 (1893) .tin r. Bowie, 37 S. C. 102 (1892); Brooke *•. Jordan, 14 Mon : 1894). "The finding of the presiding judge upon preliminar\ ^U' ais of fact material to the competency of evidence at the trial are not open to revision in this court." Stevens r. Miles, 142 Mass. 571 (188G). The discretion of the trial court is final, unless it has been abused. Howe /•. Fleming, 123 Ind. 202 (1889). "His determination of the fact cannot be reviewed here, unless the ])roof of loss was so clear and conclusive that it was error of law to find against it." Kearney r. .Mayor &c. of New York, 92 N. Y. 017 (1883). There seems to be an abiise in exercising this discretion when secondary evidence is admitted of an instrument alleged to be lost where the witness, in whose custody it has been, testifies that, after an hour's search, he is unable to find it. but thinks it must be among his papers, and that, by further search, lie might possibly find it. Wilburn v. State, 60 Ark, 141 (1895). "Whether there was sufficient evidence of the loss of the assigu- \b\ ill' iii^ :5r)8i2 AMKinCAN NOTES. [I'AKT III. luent of which secondary evidoiico was admitted, was a question nl' fact for the presidiDj; jiidf,'e. Unless his finding was based updn an error of hiw, or upon evidence wliiidi, us matter of hiw, was iusnlli- eient to sustain tiie Hndin;,', it would not hero be open to revision." Snutii i: lirown, lol Mass. IVJS (l.S!)(»). Unt while the preliminary iiKpiiry necessary to the introduetioii of secondary evidence is addressed to the discretion of tiu; couit, yet all the evidencie admitted is for the consideration of tlii; jin v. "The adnnssibility of the evidence was a question for the court, but its weight aiul effect, when taken in connection with other facts in the case, was a question for the jury, and should be left to tlieir consideration and judgment." Graham v. Campbell, o() Ga. LTiS (l.S7(i). What IxsTurMKN-rs auk [ncmioko. — Where the regidations of a railroad company are printed in a book, which is not produced or accounted for, parol evidence is not adnii.ssibh>. riouisville, ^r. It. It. /'. Orr, 1)4 Ala. OOU (18U1) ; Trice v. Uichuu)nd, &c. 11. 11. oS S. (,'. lUl) (lS!t2). The rule applies to books of original entry, orders, drafts, &(^ McCrady i-. .Jones, JJG S. C. 1;5(! (181H). To books of account, liiu Mfg. Co. /•. Townsend, oO ill. Api). o.j.S (18'.);)). To tinu' books, Dillon V. Howe, 1)8 Mich. I(i8 ( LSIKI). To the books of a bank, Itodcii /•. Hrown (Ala.), lo So. liep. 5SJ8 (1894). To an ordinary messa-e, if contained in a written note. Combs r. Com. (Ky.), -o .So. West. 590 (1894). The fact of a complaint to the assessors of taxes can only lie shown by their record and not by the testimony of one of tlu'ir number. State >\ Central, &c. R. 11. 17 Nev. 259 (188;}). Where dying declarations are reduced to writing they (lonie under the application of the rule. Bouldeu r. State, 102 Ala. 78 (I89.'i). The rule under consideration applies to ancient documents e(iually with others. McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 I'a. St. l.'J (1808). So as to docu'uents refreshing memory. Dillon r. Howe, 98 Mich. 108 (181);}). So to the heading of a hotel register. Grauloy n. Jermyn, 10;i I'a. St. .501 (1894). And to proof of a foreign law. Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400,420 (1852). So of entries in corporation books and papers. Mandel v. Swan Land Co., l.")4 HI. 177 (1895). If the authority to draw a bill of excliango is itself in writing, it must be produced. Tensley i>. Penniman, 83 Tex. 54 (1892). A certified copy of a registered deed is not admissible until notice has been given the grantee to ])roduce tlic original. Com. v. Emery, 2 Gray, 80 (1854). But a plaintiff who has never had the original deeds in her possession may introduce such a copy. Be Assignment of Ilea, 82 la. 231 (1891). CIIAI'. IV.] AMKUICAN NOTKS. r,r.si:« Wliftlicr t.lit' oriyiiiiil is in tiin possession or control of the party oIL'rin;^ i', copy is iupiestioii fur the court, iiell v, Kendrick, 1'.') Khi. 77.S (1^8!)). JJi;(jiii:i:s i.\ Skconoauy Eviok-vck. — The rule re(piirinj,' prodl' of ii written instrument liy tiie production of tlie instrnnieiit ilsell', ))r;u!tie;dly the solitary survival of ii once swei-piii,!,' '* hest evidence" rule, retains in many jurisdictions much of tlie old-time strictness of tht^ oriifinal. It is required tiiat i!ven when secrondary eviih'uee is admissil)le an inferior deyree or grade of secondary cividenci; sliail not he re(!eived while it is in th(! power of the party to present ;i hi;^dier jj;i'ad(! of tins secondar}' proof. Suidi is tlie recpiiremeiit in the (iourts of the United States. Where th(! ori,!,dnal record of a jud,^meut and .i certilied eojjy of tiie same hail hotii been destroyed by lire, a certilied copy (d' tins iirst co|)y was lield udnussible. ''Tlie principle established by this court as to siH'.ondary evidence in cases like tins is, tliat it must be the best the l)arty has it in his power to produce. The rule is to be so applied as to promote the ends of justice and guard against fraud, surprise aiul imposition. . . . This court has not yet gone the length of the ICnglish adjudications, which hold, without qualification, that there are no degrees in secondary evidence." Cornett i>. Williams, L'O Wall. 220, 240 (lS7a). 15ut in llenner i\ IJank, 9 Wheat. oSl (1S24) it was held that in i)roving a lost note a notarial copy was not nuiuired, — "it not being neces- sary that a promissory note should be protested." [h'ul.\ Stebbins /•. Duncan, 1(KS U. S. 32, 43 (1882). Apparently the courts of Crcorgia adopt a similar view. Where, a blank form of a bill of sale of furniture on the instalment plan was offered with evidence that the contract between the parties was made by tilling out a similar blank, the evidence was rejec^ted. "The {iroper foundation was not laiil for the introduction of this paper. One of the originals which had been executed should have been introduced, if obtainable. If none could be obtained from the original parties, or a certified copy of the same from the record, in case they had been recorded, then, perliai)s, the paper presented might have been admissible." Phillips i\ 1^'owbridge Furniture Co., H6 Ga. GO:) (1890). So in Louisiana, where re(u)rd of a copy of a marriage contract was admitted although neither the absence of the original was accounted for or any evidence offered that a copy of the original could not be procured, the judgment was reversed. " The objection embodied an elementary principle found in every work on evidence, and so completely consecrated by established jurisprudence as to dispense with any citation of authorities to support it." Mercier i\ Harnan, 39 La. Ann. 94 (1887). So in Arkansas, Steward v. Scott, 57 Ark. lo3 (1893) ; and Cali- fornia, Ford V. Cunningham, 87 Cal. 209 (1890). :5.")S>« AMEIJIOAN' XOTKS. [PAItT III. A modified insistance on degrees in secondary proof prevails in Alabama. '• While the doetrine, that there are no degrees in secoiid- ar}- evidence has 'lot prevailed to its fullest extent, in this State, we are not prepared to adopt a stringent extension of the rule, which excludes all seconilary. until the absence of the primary evidence is ju'CouDted for, to secondary evidence. Where the secondary evi- dence offered, »*j^ nnfnnt rei, supposes a higher degree of secondary evidence, the liest should be produced. ' But, where there is no ground ff>r legal presumption that better secondary evideniie exists, any proof is received, which is not inadmissible by other rules of law, unless the objecting party can show that better evidence was previously known to the othei-, and might have been produced; thus subjecting him, by positive pioof, to the same imputation of fraud. which the law itself presumes when primary evidence is withheld.' When a certified or examined copy of a paper reruired to be recorded, or a letter-press copy of a writing, is shown to be in existence, it is better evidence than the memoriter statements of a witness, and its pio<luction should be demanded." Jaques v. Horton, 70 Ala. l.';J8 (!Sh4). •• We confess that the American rule appears to us more reason- able than the English ; and we see great propriety, if there was an examined copy of an instrument in the possession of a party, in refusing to allow him to prove it by the uncertain memory of wit- nesses. A copy of a letter, taken by a copying press would unques- tionably be lietter evidence of the original than the recollection of its contents by a witness; and the same reasons which would require the production of the original, if in the control of the party, would openite in favor of the production of the fac-simile, or of tlie examined copy. But, in all these cases, the strength, of the proposi- tion consists in the fact, that there is secondary evidence, in its nature and character better than that which the party offers, and that it is in his power to produce it. He certainly must be allowed to .show, that what a[>pears to be secondary evidence of a higher degree is not so in fact. In other words, he would be allowed to show that the paper, wliii-h ])urported to bo a copy, was not in fact a-.. 1 in truth one." Harvey i'. Thorp. 2S Ala. '2r,0 (ISaG). 'J"h.- courts of Georgia insist upon the existence of degrees in secondary evidene.-. '• There are degrees in secondary evidence, and the best' .should always be produced. ... A sworn copy sliould always be reeeiveil in preference to verbal testimony, to jirove the contents of a written contract." Williams r. Waters, oG (la. i'ti (lsn7L Tiie rule is the same in Tllinois. It appearing i.robable tliat tliere is in existence a copy of a lost will, parol evidence of contents is not admi-ssible until the non-production of the copy is account-nl for. liliuois. &c. Co. r. I'.onner, 75 111. 31") (1H74). CHAP. IV.] M AMERICAN NOTES. 35815 The rule is the same in Peunsylvania. Parol evidence of the contents of a letter is not admissible while a facsimile (in a letter- jiress copying book) is not produced or accounted for. Stevenson c. ]I(.y, 43ra. St. 191 (1802). The courts of Minnesota do not ap{)ly iie rule that there are degrees in secondary evidence to cases where "tlie nature of the case does not of itself disclose the existence of such better evi- dence." Minneapolis Times Co. v. Nimocks, 53 Minn. 381 (1893). On the contrary, it is held in many states that, when the sources of original evidence are exhausted, the contents of the instrument in question may be proved by any competent evidence. Among these states is Massachusetts. "When the source of original evidence is exhausted, and resort is properly liad to second- ary proof, the contents of private writings may be proved like any other fact, by indirect evidence. The admissibility of evidence offered for this purpose must depend upon its legitimate tendency to prove the facts sought to be proved, and not u\)on the compara- tive weight or value of one or another form of proof." Goodrich *•. Weston, lOU Mass. 3(52 (18()9). " If there are several sources of information of the same fact, it is not ordinarily necessary to show that all have been exhausted before secondary evidence can be resorted to." Smith v. Brown, lol Mass. 338 (1890). Maine fol- lows the same rule. Xason c. Jordan, 02 Me. 481) (1873). The rule in Indiana is the same. " There are no degrees, as a general rule, in secondary evidence." Carpenter ;•. Dame, 10 Ind. 125 (1858). Ami New York. A copy of a letterpress copy is admissible after notice to the other side, in whose possession it is, to produce the original letter. Robertson r. Lynch, 18 Johns. 451 (1821). In New Jersey. Ketcham i\ Brooks, 27 N. J. E(i. .147 (1870). In Connecticut. " The rule that a copy of a copy is not evidence, properly applies to cases where the original is still in existence and capable of being compared with it; or where it is the copy of a copy of a record, the record being still in existence, and being by law as high evidence as the original. TIu; reason of the ruh' is the same in both cases, the copy offered is two removes from the original. But it is quite a different (piestion where the original is lost, and the record is not deemed in law ;i» liif^h as the original." Cameron r. Pet'.k, 37 Conn. 555 (1871). TKLKditAMs. — Skcon'dakv Evidk.vck. — The single point of difference, so far as relates to primary and secondary proof of con- tents, between telegrams and other written instruments, lies in the fact that there are frequently two written instruments in each trans- mission of intelligence; — viz., the document delivered to the transmitting oftice and that delivered to the sendee by tlie receiving ottice. Which of these two instruments is the on'i/iiKil document 35816 AMERICAN NOTES. [part in. !l it . it 'illlli within the meaning of the rule under consideration is, under tlie weight of authority, determined by the rules governing the law of agency. " When the sender of a telegraphic message takes the initiative, the message, as delivered, may, as between him and the person to wiiom it is sent, be treated as the original, in the absence of evi- dence to show mistake in the transmission of it." Nickerson v, Spindell, 164 Mass. 25 (1895); Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431 (187(5); Durkee v. Vermont Central K. R., 29 Vt. 127 (185G) ; Mor- gan i\ People, 59 111. 58 (1871) ; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Asso- ciation r. Hutmacher, 127 111. 652 (1889) ; Western Union Telegraph Co. V. Shotter, 71 Ga. 760 (1883) ; Wilson v. Minneapolis, &c. R. R. 31 Minn. 481 (1884) ; Morgan v. People, 59 111. 58 (1871) ; Magie v. Herman, 50 Minn. 424 (1892). To the contrary effect, that the original in all cases is the message delivered at the transmitting office, see Matteson i: Noyes, 25 111. 591 (1861) ; Williams v. Brickell, 37 Miss. 682 (1859). It is necessary in some way to show that "the alleged sender did actually send or authorize to be sent the dispatches in question." Oregon Steamship Co. v. Otis, 100 N. Y. 446 (1885). This evidence may frequently be found in the telegram, signed by the party himself or his agent, i. p., the copy delivered to tlie com- pany. Ihld. Smith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138 (1880). For the rule to apply at all, it is essential to show that the tele- grams were in writing instead of being delivered ortiUy, many telegrams being communicated to the transmitting office in that way. Terre Haute, &c. R. R. i-. Stockwell, 118 Ind. 98 (1888). "In proving a contract entered into in such a manner, it would, I appre- hend, be necessary to produce the original communication^ with the proper signatures of the parties, and tho tranoinission over the wires migiit then be admitted as the means of informing them of the proposition on one side and the acceptance on the other." Kiiig- horne v. Montreal Telegraph Co., 18 Q. B. U. C. 60, 71 (1859). Where the person who afterwards becomes the sendee of a tele- gram, requests an answer by telegraph, the telegra])h company becomes the agent of the sendee, and the original is the message as delivered to the telegraph company at the transmitting office. " But where the party to whom the communication is made is to take the risk of transmission, tlie message delivered to the operator is the original, and that is to be produced, or the nearest approach to it by way of copy or otherwise." Durkee v. Vermont Central R. R. 29 Vt.' 127 (1856) : Smith /•. Easton, 54 Md. 138 (1880). The rules governing the admission of secondary evidence in the case of telegrams are the same as obtain in connection with other written instruments. Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431 (1876); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Collins, 45 Kan. 88 (1890); (18[ iff CHAP. IV.] AMERICAN NOTK8. 3.')817 Prather /•. Wilkens, C8 Tex. 187 (1887) ; Howley r. Whipple, 48 K. IT. 487 (1869) ; State v. Hopkins, 50 Vt. 316 (1877) ; Lindauer r. ?*Ieyber-,', 27 Mo. App. 181 (1887) ; Western Union Telegraph Co. V. Cline, 8 Iiul. App. 364 (1893). , There is no question that a telephone message may be proved by the oral evidence of the sendee. Wilson v. Minneapolis, &c. li. K. 31 Minn. 481 (1884). Wlien parol evidence is admissible as to the contents of a written instrument it is naturally confined to such portions of the instru- ment as would be relevant if the instrument itself were produced. It is no objection to the competency of a witness that he cannot state the immaterial portion of a letter. McGibbon v. Burpee, 25 New Bruns. 81 (1885). Admissions as Pkoof of Contexts. — Whether an admission by a party otherwise entitled to insist upon primary proof of con- tents by production of the original, regarding the contents of a written instrument is such a levamen j)robationls as to dispense with the proof of such contents is in dispute. That an admission does have that effect, see Wolf v. Lachman (Tex. Civ. App.), 20 S. West. 867 (1892); Loomis v. Wadhams, 8 Gray, 557 (1857) ; Hoefling v. Hambleton, 84 Tex. 517 (1892) ; IVIorey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542 (1893). So of the contents of a telegram, as admitted by the sender. Williams v. Brickell, 37 Miss. 682 (1859). To the contrary, see Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480 (1832). " The admissions of a party are competent evidence against himself only in cases where parol evidence would be admissible to establish the same facts, or in other words, where there is not, in the judgment of the law, higher and better evidence in existence to be produced." Jbicl. Production of written receipts is not excused by the fact that a third party has made a memorandum of them to the accuracy of which the party demanding primary proof has assented. Hart v. Yunt, 1 Watts, 253 (1832). In New Jersey the rule prevails that while an ordinary admission does not have the effect of relieving tln' adverse party from the necessity of proving the contents of a written instrument, a " formal and solemn" admission has been "ever regarded as intrinsically possessing all the force of primary evidence." C'v:.berland, &c. Ins. Co. ('. Giltinan, 48 X. J. Law, 4i)5 (1886). The rule requiring primary evidence of contents is not dispensed with in favor of a holder in a suit against tlie maker on a promissory note by the fact that under a statute the defendant is not entitled to dispute his signature, having filed no aflidavit to that effect. Seebree V. Dorr, 9 Wheat. 558 (1824). (i) Papers in Adverse Possession. — If the original document I ' ; i 1 f Stat I'. ^1 ' <4 ' I It 358^8 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AUT HI. is in the possession of the adverse party, liis failure to produce it, upon being seasonably requested so to do, will be regarded as sufK- cient proof that the party is not suppressing evidence to let in secondary evidence of contents. Steed r. Knowles, 97 Ala. aT.'J (1891.'); Roberts v. Dixon, 50 Kans. 436 (1893); Coftman (-.Niagara &c. Ins. Co., 57 Mo. Ap. 647 (1S94) ; Morse v. Woodworth, la"* Mass. L'3;?, L'4.S (1892). Or to his attorney. Den v. M'Allister, 7 N. J. Law, 46, r)3 (1823). This is sntticient even where there was no evidence that tlie original had never been in the hands of the defendant, but was traced into the liands of his attorney through his connection with another case. Ib!(/. " Hut such notice may be dispensed with upon proof that such party has said that such writing has been lost or destroyed. . . . The law nowhere requires the doing of an obviously nugatory and unavailing act." Barniby v. riunimer, 29 Neb. (14 (1890) ; U. S. tf. T.ritton, 2 Mason, 464 (1822). So win-re from the nature of the action the diifentlant has notice that the plaintiff intends to cliarge him with the possession of a written instrument, e. g., a notice in writing, formal notice to pro- duce is not required. Railway Co. v. Cronin, .38 Oh. St. 122 (1882) ; Ho\\ell r. Ilnyck, 2 Abb. App. Cases, 423 (1867). In a criminal case, where an oii_;inal instrument is in the posses- sion of the accused, apparently notice to produce is excused. The court will not compel him to furnish evidence against himself. State V. Gnrnee, 14 Kans. Ill (1874). See also Dunbar n. U. S., 156 U. S. 185 (1894). An admission by the defendant that he wrote a letter which he refuses to produce on notice is sufficient to admit secondary evi- dence of its contents. Dunbar v. U. S., 156 U. S. 185 (1894). Wiiere tlie defendant puts in part of a letter wliich he has received from the plaintiff, but which the plaintiff claims is muti- lated, the plaintiff can give parol evidence of the mutilated portion without ii, notice to produce given to the defendant. Robinson v. Cutter, 163 Mass. 377 (1895). A seasonable notice must be given. A notice given on the same day as the copy was received in evidence, the opposite attorneys dis- claiming any knowledge of the original, has been held insufficient. Pitt V. Emmons, 92 Mich. 542 (1892). So a notice to attorneys to produce papers which are in a distant state must be sufficiently extended to permit the originals to be found and produced if secondary evidence is to be received. Dade V. .Etna Ins. Co., 54 Minn. 336"(1893). Less extended notice may be sufficient where the party in whose possession they are, in view of their relation to the case or their use in former hearings, has reason to expect that the originals will be called for. Battaglia r. Thomas, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 563 (1893). If tlui instrument is within the control of a party it is tlie same in CHAP. IV.] AMERICAN NOTKS. SoS'" thing as if in his possession. '• If a party has the legal right to the possession of a document, iu a legal sense it is witliiu liis control, though he may have left it with an agent or other person, from whom he has a right to receive it by demanding its possession." Wilson V. Wright, 8 Utah, 215 (1892). W^iere the defendant, on being requested to produce certain written receipts, excuses their non-production by claiming that a third party refuses to surrender them, he cannot afterwards intro- duce parol evidence of their contents if the judge finds that, in point of fact, the defendant has attempted to suppress the written receipts. " A party who has suppressed a written document, and refused to produce it upon notice, and so compelled the adverse party to resort to secondary evidence thereof, is not afterwards entitled to offer proof of its contents." Gage v. Campbell, 131 Mass. 566 (1881). Mere failure to produce a written document on notice, where a reasonable excuse exists, will not prevent the party on whom the demand was made from proving its contents by secondary evidence. Spears v. Lawrence, 10 Wash. 308 (1894). (c) Possession in a Strangkk. — I: the document itself is pre- sumably in the possession of a tliird party, reasonable efforts to procure his attendance as a witness, with the document, will be required in order to admit secondary evidence of contents. Greer V. Richardson Drug Co., 1 Tex. Civ. App. 034 (1892). Where the document is in the hands of a tliird person outside the reach of the process of the court, production is excused. Cabot i\ Given, 45 Me. 144 (1858): Mordecai v. Beal, 8 Porter. 529, 536 (1839); Pensecola K. R. v. Schaffer, 70 Ala. 233 (1884) ; Beattie o. Milliard, 55 X. H. 428 (1875); Missouri, &c. E. R. v. Gernan, 84 Tex. 141 (1892); Burton v. Driggs, 20 W^all. 125 (1873); Gordon v. Searing, 8 Cal. 49 (1857); Zellerbach v. Allenberg, 99 Cal. 57 (1893); Brown ?,'. Wood, 19 IV^o. 475(1854); Shepard r. Giddings, 22 Conn. 282 (1853) ; Ralph v. Brown, 3 W. & S. 395 (1842). When the residence of the holders of an instrument is beyond the jurisdic- tion of the court, the instrument is presumably out of the jurisdiction. Manning v. Maroney, 87 Ala. 563 (1888). But see Mullanphy Savings Bank i\ Schott, 135 III. 055 (1891). where, upon the original paper being traced into the probable possession of persons outside the jurisdiction, the court suggest that "Although all three were either non-residents or out of the state at the time of the hearing, yet no reason is perceived why tlieir testi- mony could not have been taken." " It has repeatedly been held that the person last known to have been in possession of the pa[)er must be examined as a witness, to prove its loss, and that even if he is out of the State, his deposition must be procured if practicable, or some good excuse given for not doing so." Kearney v. Mayor, &c., ^^ \"' \u 1' I IhHBI I ' ■ 1 1 'i 1 ! 1 jL till 35820 AMERICAN NOTES. [part III, 92 N. Y. 617 (1883). "The law provides an easy and simple method of taking the deposition of a witness residing out of the state, and his deposition should have been taken, or some proper effort made to obtain it. Tlie fact that the person to whose posses- sion the paper was traced resided out of the state, did not excuse defendant from a diligent effort to procure it." Wiseman v. North- ern Pacific K. R., 20 Oreg. 425 (1891); Wood v. Oullen, 13 Minn. 394 (1868) i McGregor v. Montgomery, 4 Pa. St. 237 (1846) ; Porter V. Hale, 23 Can. Sup. 265 (1894). But if the party having the custody of the original is out of the state, and on being asked to give a deposition refuses in the interest of the opposite party to surrender the original, secondary evidence is competent. Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer, 52 Minn. 174 (1893). If an original deed is in a foreign court, which declines to permit its removal, a copy is admissible. Owers v. Olathe Co. (Colo.), 39 Pac. Rep. 980 (1895). The suggestion that parol evidence is substitutionary and offered in bad faith instead of written evidence, and to avoid its effect, pre- sents itself in a most incisive form when it appears that the ^jriginal has been voluntarily and intentionally destroyed by the party offer- ing the parol evidence. Under such circumstances the party is not allowed to offer secondary evidence. ]»agley ■«. Mc^Mickle, 9 Cal. 430 (1858) ; Count Joannes v. Bennett, 5 All. 169 (18o2) j Rudolph V. Lane, 57 Ind. 115 (1877). So where original documents are destroyed by the plaintiff after the commencement of the suit. Baldwin v. Threlkeld, 8 Ind. App. 312 (1893). Where the destruction is by accident or in good faith, parol evidence of concents is competent. Pollock v. Willcox, 68 N. C. 46 (1873) ; Steele v. Lord, 70 N. Y. 280 (1877). But the party destroy- ing must repel every inference of a fraudulent design in its destruc- tion. Blake v. Fasii. 44 111. 302 (1867). Mere negligence ir not fatal to the right to introduce secondary evidence. Rodgers v. Crook, 97 Ala. 722 (1892). The rule requiring the contents of a written instrument to be proved by tlie production of the instrument itself, does not apply when the only fact to be proved is tliat of the execution of the instrument. " Here the suit was not on the paper : its contents had nothing to do with the case." Shocnberger v. Hackman, 37 Pa. St. 87 (1860). "The rule that excludes secondary evidence in aeon- test with primary, does not mean that everything is secondary which is not of the highest grade of proof, but only that which discloses the existence of other evidence, .the non-production of which may be supposed to be on the ground that if jiroduced would work against tlie party offering it." Ibid. So wherever tlie effort is to CHAP. IV.] AMERICAN N(^TES. 85821 prove the existence of a fact which may be shown by a writiiifr, parol evidence of the same fact is not rejected. For example, " If a person acts notorionsly as cashier of a bank, and is recognised by the directors, or by the corporation, as an existing officer, a regular appointment will be presumed : and his acts, as cashier, will bind the corporation, although no written proof is or can be adduced of his appointment." Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. G4, 70 (1827). So where it is sought to prove, not the conteiits of ceitaiu depusi*'.io'.is, but sim])ly the fact that they were ])roperly taken and used in a previous suit between the same parties toucliing the same subject-matter, this may be done by parol. Ayers v. Ohisum, 3 New jMex. 52 (1884). In a case involving the foreclosure of a mortgage by notices posted, objection was made to evidence of the posting of these notices on the ground that they were in writing and should have been produced. Held otherwise. "The rule requiring the produc- tion of the writing itself as the best evidence does not extend to mere notices or to matters collateral." McMillan v. Baxley, 112 N. C. 578 (1893). So tlie substantive fact that proofs of loss had been made and delivered under an insurance policy may be proved by parol. "The thing to be proved, tlierefore, was not what was contained in the written proofs of loss but tlie fact that such written proofs of loss had been furnished to the company within the pre- scribed time." Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Sun Fire Office, 36 S. C. 213 (1891). A witness may state that he had a mortgage, began a suit to foreclose it, and took a deed of the same j)roperty, although the record could also be used to prove them. File v. Springel, 132 Lid. 312 (1892). A witness may testify that he received orders from the Post Office Department to demand certain things of a defaulter, though these orders were in writing. " The question did not call for the contents of the orders." Alexander i\ U. S., 57 Fed. Rep. 82S (1893). So evidence is admissible that a defendant applied in writing for a government liquor license, though the application is not produced. State v. McGill, 65 Vt. 604 (1893). In an action against a railroad company for failure to carry a theatrical company to their destination on time, the plaintiff may testify that he was to receive 75 per cent, of the box receipts, tliougli the agreement estab- lishing this share was in writing. Foster v. Cleveland, &c. R. R., 56 Fed. Rep. 434 (1893). On an action for failure to deliver a telegraph message, parol evi- dence of the contents of the message as delivered and received is admissible. " That a certain message was delivered for transmission was a substantive fact necessary to be proved, and the rule is, that when parol evidence is as near the fact testified to as the written, then each is primar; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Cliue, 8 Ind. App. 364 (1893). In refusing to apply the best evidence rule so as to exclude parol f 35823 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAllT HI. m evidence that A was not mentioned in a certain will not directly involved in tlie case itself, the Supreme Court of Alabama say: " The question was not owe directly raised by the issue in the cause, but came up incidentally. In such case, the rule requiring the highest and best evidence the nature of the question admits of does not apply." Bulger v. lloss, 98 Ala. 207 (1891-0. A party may testify to the payment of money though a receipt was taken at the same time. Davis v. Htate, d2 Tenn. 034 (1893). In an action on an account for rent or use and occupation, the plaintiff can recover on proof of an admission that the account is correct and due notwithstanding the defendant has taken a written lease of the premises from the plaintiff, and this lease is neither produced nor any attempt made to account for it. Burch v. Harrell, 93 Ga. 719 (1894)., Parol proof of the identity and character of an instrument not produced will be admitted. The " best evidence " rule applies only to proof of ""ontents. Morrison v, Jackson, 35 S. C. 311 (1891). On a complaint brought under the laws regulating the sale of intoxi- cating liquor, evidence is competent as to what was written on labels attached to jugs and decanters in the defendant's shop, with- out producing them, or accounting for their not being produced. "The labelr on the jugs do not come within any class of written instruments, the contents of which cannot be proved without pro- ducing the original paper or document, or accounting for its loss or unavoidable absence," Com. v. Blood, 11 Gray, 74 (1858). ScoPK OF KuLE. — The rule requiring production of the primary evidence of the contents of a written instrument applifj; ouly when the instrument in question is admissible itself because relevant to the issue. It does not extend to the use of written instruments in incidental or collateral matters. " This rule has never been unuor- stood to extend to matters aside from the issue and merely inci- dental to the trial. Thus, the interest of a witness, and similar concerns, could alw^tys be shown without the production of the document by force -of which such interest had been acquired."' Cumberland, &c. Ins. Co. v. Giltinan, 48 X. J. Lav., 495 (1880). "The general rule has no application where the written instrument is merely collateral to the issue ; as where the parol evidence relates to matters distinct from the instrument of writing, although the same fact could be proved or disproved by the writing," Coonrod v. IMadden, 120 Ind. 197 (1890) ; Schoenbergcr v. Hackman, 37 Pa. St. 87 (1800), But it has been held that a witness cannot be questioned about a copy of a statement until the non-production of the original is accounted for. Glen Brick Co, v. Shackell, 14 Low. Can. Jur. 238 (1870). Or allowed to refresli his memory by a copy of a deed until the original has beea accounted for. Jones v. Jones, 94 N, C. Ill (1880). CHAP. IV.] AMERICAN NOTES. 358 » Parol evidence of contents cannot be given until proof is offered tliat the original, if itself produced, would be competent. The con- tents of a letter suppf^"ed to have h'H'.n written by the prosecuting witness in a bastardy complaint cannot be proved until some evi- dence is adduced that she wrote the letter itself. Stevens v. State, ."»() Kaus. 712 (1893). A lease cannot be proved by parol until the subscribing witness is produced. Hughes r. Southern Warehouse Co., 94 Ala. 613 (1891). In case of i)arol proof of the contents of a lost will ; " Unless che whole can be proved, his intention will not be effectuated, and therefore no part of the will can be established." Davis v. Sigour- ney, 8 Aletc. 487 (1844). But that a certain instrument is a copy of a will and that the will was properlv executed may be ])roved by parol. Keagle v. Pessell, 91 :\[ich. Gil (1892). The rule above stated does not extend so far as to forbid other evidence of the fuct which the written instrument would establish. Consaul w. Sheldon, 35 Neb. 247 (1892). So where a certain sum of money was paid and a receipt taken therefor, the evidence of a witness who saw the sum of money paid is competent, even if the same witness would not be allowed, until a suitable foundation was laid, to state the contents of the receipt. " The difference between the two principles consists in this : Tue payment of the money was a fact testified to independent of the receipt, and was capable of parol proof. But when the witness went further and stated that he saw a receipt for the money signed, he undertook to give the con- tt-Mits of the receipt, and the receipt itself was the better evidence." Steed V. Knowles, 97 Ala. 573 (1892) ; Hyde v. Shank, 03 ]Mic]i. 535 (1892). ^nvnership in a vessel may be shown by acts of ownership ecjually well as by the ship's register. Stearns v. Doe, 12 Gray, 482 (185'J). A horse-car conductor may testify to the number of his passengers on a particular trip though his slip is not produced. Wynu r. City, &c. R. II. 91 Ga. 344 (1893). But see also Coder r. Stotts, 51 Ivans. 382 (1893). '1 he rule does not apply wliere a written document is used to '■test the temper and credibility of the witness." Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 4;5.'5, 4.".9, 4G4 (1873). A j)hGtographic copy will not excuse faihun; to produce the original. Maclean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214 (1853). Dui'LicATKS. — The rule also does not apply to the case of dupli- cate originals. In sucli case, each of the duplicates is admissible, not as a copy but as an original. Crurdner r. Eberliart, 82 111. 31G (1S7G). There is no obligation to account for the absence of the other- (lu])licates or any of them. Cleveland, ccc. R. R. r. Perkins, 17' Mich. 29G (18G8). Where two letters are written at the same time, one being retained i I I I' iii m ar)8'-^ AMKinCAN NOTKS. [PAIST III. and till! other sent, tiu-, one rotained is not a cojiy but a dii])lie!itt' origind, and is adniissiljlo without notit^u to ])roduce the otlicr ori,u;inal. JTubhai'd r. Hussell, 'J I Harb. 4(»4 (1857). When a paper is made out in duplicate and one of the originals is lost and the other in the hands of the pers . -d of a criminal offence, a copy is admissible, as the court cai.w. . jnipel the prisoner to put in the other original against himself. State r. (iurniK', 14 Kans. Ill (1S74). So wiiere a bill of lading was executed in duplicate, the plaintiff. to prove the contents by secondary evideiu;e, must satisfactorily account for the non-production of both originals. When the jilain- tiff introduces parol proof of contents, the defendant may n'l)ut the jiroof by (evidence of a similar luiture. Dyer v. Fredericks, (j.') Me. 17.'5, m'2 (1874). I'uooK OK (joNTKXTs. — The parol evidence of contents must be confined to an attempt to state th(! language contained in the written instrument. Evidence is not competent of the previous conversation of the parties in relation to what they ])rop()sed to agree in the writing to be drawn ujx llichardson v. Ifobbins, IL'4 ]Mass. 10") (1878)^. The language itself is to be given and not evidence as to what the witnesses understood were the propositions made and accepted in the written instrument. Elwell r. Walker, 62 la. 2i")G (1H7!)) ; Burr r. Kase, 108 Va. St. 81 (1895). A photograi)iiic reproduction of the original is admissible as secondary evidence. It is merely a cojty and whether a facsimile or not is a (question of fact for the jury. Eborn r. Zimpelman, 47 Tex. 503 (1877). Depositions. — The law relating to depositions is so largely statutory and so varying in the different states that it appears hardly to admit of profitable attempts at classification. lilll LI .! if f* PART III. PAETICULAR KINDS OF EVIDENCE. CHAPTER I. EVIDENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SENSES. § 554. The first degree of evidence, and that which, though open to error and misconception, is obviously most satisfactory to the mind, is afPorded by our own senses.' " Believe half what you yourself see, and a twentieth part of what you hear from others," is a maxim, founded in the main upon the experience of life, marking the vast distinction that obtains between a knowledge of facts derived from actual perception, and the belief of the existence of facts resting on information. In judicial proceedings, the judge or jury can seldom act entirely upon evidence of this description.* In a vast number of instances, however, especially where the fact in dispute is sought to be proved by circumstantial evidence, the verdict will rest materially upon matter submitted to the ocular inspection of the jury. § 555. Indeed, in all cases in which the guilt or innocence of a ' " Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem, Qiiam quai .sunt oculis subjecta lidelibns, et qtiae Ipse sibi tradit spectator." — Uok. Ars I'oct 1. ISO. So, also, in Shakespeare's " Eape of Lucroce," we read, — "To see sad sights moves more than hear them told, For then the eye interprets to the oar." * Though, when pregnancy is pleaded, a jury of matrons is em- powered to decide the issue upon examination of the jjerson of the prieioner: Bayiiton's Ciise, 1702; 'X, V. Wycherley, 1838. But even here it appears, from the last of the cases just cited, that the matrons may, in addition to their personal inspection, hear the evidence of a surgeon ; but in that event he must bo examined as a witness in open court. See, also. Lady Essex's case, 1013. 359 PRODUCTION OF ARTICLES FOR IDENTIFICATION. [p. HI. prisoner depends upon the identity of two articles found in difforent places, it is highly expedient that a direct appeal he made to the senses of the jury, and that the actual articles to be compared should he produced in court. Thus, on an indictment for stealing corn, where the prisoner's possession of wheat, apparently resembling a quantity from which a portion has been recently taken, is relied upon by the prosecution, a comparison by the jury of the wheat found upon the prisoner with a sample of that belonging to the prosecutor, will evidently be more satisfactory than for its identity to be sworn to by a witness, who has examined the two lots out of court. It is true that the jury may come to an erroneous conclusion in such a case ; for either the witnesses, who state that the two parcels of wheat produced were respectively taken from the prisoner and the prosecutor, may intentionally or accidentally assert what is not t''ue. or the jurors themselves may be mistaken in assuming the identity or non-identity of the grain. Still, in the event of a witness being called to state the result of his previous examination of the two samples, these sources of error will both equally exist, while, in the latter case, there is also the further possibility that the witness may tell a fabricated story with little danger, since examination as> io me'^ matters of opinion is almost necessarily inconclusive. Similar considerations arise where it is necessary to compare two articles found in different places ; as, for example, the wadding of a pistol with portions of a torn letter found on the person of the accused ; the fractured bone of a sheep with mutton found in his house ; or fragments of dress with his rent garment ; or to compare damaged property with the instrument by which the damage is supposed to have been effected. § 555a. However, the rule which demands the production of the best evidence does not expressly require that the course sug- gested should always be adopted, but permits a witness to testify as to his having made the comparison, without first proving that the articles cannot be produced at the trial. Nevertheless the non- production of articles which could be produced, when unexplained, often generates a suspicion of unfairness, and will always furnish an occasion for serious comment.^ A well-known instance of the 1 See ante, § 117. 360 CHAP. I.] SKILLED WITNESSES AIDING THE JURY. application of this principle occurred where a boy having found a diamond, took it to a jeweller, who refused to return it to him, or to produce it at the trial, on which the jury were directed to pre- sume that this diamond was one of the fino5.t water.' Another inHtance of the principle was f urniched by a case ^ in which, the poiut at issue being whether " llunning Rein," a Derby-winner of 1844, had been foaled by " Mab " in 1841, the plaintiff, being unable to comply with an order of the court to produce " llunning Rein," submitted to a nonsuit. § 556. In auch cases as these, however, where the personal ex- amination of the articles by the jury themselves is very valuable, they ought, in certain instances, to be assisted by persons conversant with the particular articles produced. For instance, on a question whether two samples of wine be drawn from the same bin, or two pieces of cloth be the produce of the same loom, or two coins be struck in the same die, a wine-merchant, a clothier, or an officer of the Mint,' should respectively be called. Still, even here the articles should be produced, that the jury may test the accuracy of the opinions expressed by the witnesses, and may perceive that the reasons, upon which those opinions are founded, correspond with the actual state and condition of the articles themselves. These observations are especially applicable in compariscms of dis- puted handwriting — the mere fact that an expert ■sfij/.s that two specimens of handwriting are similar or dissimilar is of little value, but becomes of great weight if he can point out to the jury peculiar features of similarity or dissimilarity in them. § 557. Though evidence addressed to the senses, if judiciously I'mploycd, is obviously entitled to the greatest weight, care must be taken not to push it beyond its legitimate extent. The minds of jurymen, especially in the remote provinces, are grievously open to prejudices, and the production of a bloody knife, a bludgeon, or a burnt piece of rag, may sometimes, by exciting the passions, or enlisting the sympathies of the jury, lead tlieni to overlook the ' Armory v. Delamirie, 1721. « Wood V. Poel, 1844, cor. Alder- son, B., MS. ' By 24 & 25 V. c. 99 (" The Coin- age Offences Act, 1861"), § 29, in order to prove coin to be counterfeit, it is not necessary to call any moneyer or other officer of the Mint, but is sufficient to prove that fact by the evidence of any other credible wit- ness. 361 \> ABUSE OF EVIDENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SENSES, [p. III. necessity of proving in what manner these articles are connected with the cr minal or the crime ; and they consequently run no slight risk of arriving at conclusions, which, for want of some link in the evideuce, are by no means warranted by the facts proved- The ab-ose of this kind of evidence has been a fruitful theme for the satirist.^ ^ 558. In causes relating to disputed rights of way, light, or water, or otherwise, involving some question which depends on the relative position of places, it is often desirable that the jury should have an opportunity of viewing the spot in controversy ;' since the knowledge derived by these means is far more satisfactory than any obtainable by the mere examination of maps or plans, which are often inaccurate and obscure, and may perhaps have been pre- pared with an express view to mislead. A clause providing machinery to direct a view of the place in question, " where proper, after writ issued by order of the court or a judge," is con- tained in the Jury Act of 1825.' § 559. The Act just cited extends to criminal cases depending in the superior court.* In civil actions it, however, extended only to such as those for trespass, quare clausum f regit, ejectment, or ' For instance, Shakespeare makes Jack Cade's nobility rest on this foun- dation : for Jack Cade having asserted that the eldettt son of Edmund Mor- timer. Earl of March, "was by a be{rgar wnman stolen away," "be- came a bricklayer when he came to age." and was his fathi-r; one of the rioters wmKniis the story, by say- ing, '• Sir. he made a chimney in my father's house, ai.d the bricks are alive at this day to te>tity it : there- fore, dc'uy it not." — Second Part of Hen. 6. act 4. scene 2, Whately makf« use of the above anecdote in his diverting " llisti>nc Doubts rela- tive to NaiKiIeon Buonaparte," p. 28, 6th edit., and adds, " Tmly this evi- dence is such as country people give one for a story of apparitions ; if you disc«iver any signs oi incredulity, they triumphantly show the very house which the ghost haunted, the identioil dark corner where it used to vanish, and perhaps even the tomb- stone of the person whoso death it foretold." So. m the interesting story of "The Amber Witch" ("Amber Witch," translated by Lady Duff Gordon, pp. 78—80), the poor girl charged with witchcraft. — after com- plaining that she was the victim of the sheriff, who wished to do "wanton- ness with her," — added, that he had come to her dungeon the night be- fore for that purpose, and had struggled with her, " wh(>rouj)on she hud screamed aloud, and had scratched him across the nose, as might vet be seen, whereupon he had left her." To this the Dhoriff replied, " that it was his little lap-dog, called Below, which had scratched him, while he ])layed with it that very morning," ami having produced the, d' ;/, the Court were satisfied with the truth of his ex- planation. * For an early in'-tance of this being ordered, see Monsani v. Ivy, 1(W4. 3 6 0. 4, c. 50, §§ 23, 24 ("The Juries Act, 1825 "). * See Id. 362 n '''^^■\m M CUAP. I.J OliUEli TO INSFI'XT PKOl'liRTY IN DISPUTB. waste.' The cumbrous machinery it provided having been first iraprovei],^ the narrow construction placed upon this Act led' to its being practically superseded, so far as regards civil causes, by § 58 of the C. L. P. Act, 1654.'' § 560. The last-named is itself now repealed,* and the law ou the subject, so far as concerns civil cases, is governed by the R. S. C, 1883, Ord. L. Rule 3 of this Order, in general terms, gives the court or a judge power, upon the application of any party to a cause or matter, and upon such terms as may be just, to make any order for the detention, preservation, or inxprction of any property or thing, being the subject of such cause or matter, or as to which any question may arise therein, and for all or any of the purposes aforesaid to authorise any persons to enter upon or into any land or building in the possession of any party to such cause or matter, and for all or any of the purposes aforesaid to authorise any samples to be taken, or any observation to be made or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence. Rule 4 of the same Order gives power to any judge, by whom any cause or matter may be heard or tried with or without a jury, or before whom any cause or matter may be brought by way of appeal, to inspect any property or thing concerning which any question may arise therein. Rule 5 extends the provisions of Rule 3 to inspection by a jury, and gives the court or a judge power in such a case to make all such orders upon the sheriff or other person as may be necessary to procure the atteudance of a special or common jury at such time and place, and in such manner as they or he may thiuk fit. Finally, Rule 6 pro- vides that an application for an order under Rule 3 may be made to the court or a judge by any party. " If the application be by the plaintiff, it may be made after notice to the defendant at any time after the issue of the writ of summons, and if it be by any other party, then on notice to the plaintiff, and at any time after appearance by the party making the application." ' Sco Stones i'. Monhora, 1848. » By IJ & IG V. c. 70, § IH. ' Ou the recoinmondatioii of the 0. L. Cuinmibsiuuers coutuiued in their 2nd Report, at p. 37. « 17 oc 18 V. c. 125. » By 4G & 47 V. o. 49. 363 1 1 Hi i ( ; n II ffil 1 ' mm i.u > (. ■ : i : V.--1H hi III: III Hi- POWER TO ORDER A VIEW. [part III. § 661. Very similar (though not identical) provisions are in force in Ireland.* § 562. Powers of directing a view are also possessed by the court in which such actions are pending, in actions under the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883 ; ^ by the Admiralty Court ; ^ and a Referee and his assessors (if any) to whom an action pending in the High Court, or any cause or matter, or any question in any cause or matter, has been referred, also possess powers of ordering an inspection or a view.* §§ 563 — 5. All these powers to order views of places or inspection of property, whether granted by statute or rule, give to the courts and judges, by implication, authority to order all things ancillary to the view or inspection required. Where, therefore, a wall had recently been erected in a mine, so as to obstruct a complete inspection of the workings, the court, on a question of encroach- ment, ordered the removal of such obstruction.* § 566. County Courts,^ Barmote Courts' and Courts-martial,* also possess power of ordering a view or an inspection. But with these important exceptions the power of ordering a view appears to exist only, and so far as regards the RR. S. C. of 1883" are expressly confined to, the High Court and its judges. It is suggested that the most extensive powtx of directing a view ought to be extended to every court of reconl and also to all criminal proceedings, the practice in which respecting viev. :• still rests on the inadequate provisions of the Acts of 1825 and 1852.'" In short, the presiding judge at any trial ought to be expressly empowered to order a view. » See 16 & 17 V. c. 113. » 46 & 47 v. V. o7, § 30. » Under 24 & 2o V. c. 10 ("The Admiralty Court Act, 1861"), § 18. See 30 & 31 V. c. 1 14, § 66, Ir. See, also, The Gei mania, 1868. « Ord. XXXVI. r. 48. » Bennett v. Griffiths, 1861. • Cy. Ct. Kulos, 1889, Ord, XII. r. 3. ' See 14 & 15 V. c. 94, 1 Sch., §S 22—28, and 2 Sch. Form. 8 44 & 45 V. c. 68 (" The Army Act, ISai "), § 63, subs. 7. • R. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXVIII. r. 1. '« 6 O. 4, c. 50. §§ 23 and 24 (" The Juries Aft. 1H25"); 15 & 16 V. c. TO, § 114, both cited ante, § 558. As to tliH existing practice in criminal cases which have been removed into the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, see Sliort & Mol- lor's Crown Office Practice, pp. 215 et seq. An order for a view is drawn up as of course. See Crown Office Eules, r. 252. 864 CHAP. I.] POWER TO ORDER A VIEW. even after the evidence may have been heard^ if in his opinion such a step is necessary for the purposes of justice. » In E. V. Martin, 1872 (0. 0. E.). the Court of Crim. Appeal held that the deputy assistant judge for the Middlesex Sessions, on the trial of a misdemeanour, was empowered to allow the jury to haye a view of the premises in question, after he had summed up the evidence to them. Here, however, no argument was heard, and the attention of the judges was not directed to any of the sta- tutes on the subject. 365 36r)» AMERICAN NOTES. [part III. 1" i iUjR riksL ^:M AMERICAN NOTES. . ;i Til I ■;.l i ' Jl -i Hi Real Evidence. — As is implied by its derivation from the latin res, the phrase under consideration indicates the evidence furnished by things, as distinguished from persons. This is Bentham's idea. " By real evidence, I understand all evidence of which any object belonging to the class of things is the source ; persons also in- cluded, in respect of such properties as belong to them in common with things." o Rationale Jud. Ev. p. 26. Bentham, indeed, divides the genus into two species. (1) The evidence furnished by things, which is brought to the tribunal by witnesses. (2) The evidence which things (and persons considered as things) furnish to the tribunal itself. "Physical real evidence (whether issuing from a real or from a personal source) requires to be distinguished into immediate and reported. I call it immediate, in the case where the thing which is the source of the evidence is made present to the senses of the judge himself. I call it reported, in the case where it is. not made present to the senses of the judge himself — but the state of it in respect of the evidence, the evidentiary facts afforded by it, is presented to the judge no otherwise than by the report of it made by a person, by whom (in the character of a percipient witness) the state and condition of it in respect of the evidentiary facts in question is reputed hy him to have have been observed." 3 Ibid. p. 33 (1802—1812). A usKLESS DISTINCTION. — It sccms an unnecessary and useless refinement to distinguish in the oral testimony of witnesses between facts which these witnesses have derived from persons and those which tliey have derived from observation of tilings. With the exception of oral statements, most circumstantial evidence is real in this sense. But real evidence, in the sense of immediate real evidence — the information which the court or jury receives from seeing things themselves, actually produced in court, is (luite a different matter. The phrase then represents a class of evidence which it is well worth distinguishing. The court sees for itself; — res ipsa loquitur. It is always difficult and frequently impossible so accurately to describe a thing as to communicate tlie impression formed in tlie mind of the witness to the mind of the tribunal. Producing the thing itself for inspection answers the purposes of evidence per- fectly. To tliis inherent advantage of real evidence is added an- other : — namely, that the diances for error on the part of the tri- bunal are largely decreased. In all cases where witnesses testify, even directly, lurks a double danger (1) that the witnesses may not observe correctly or may not draw correct inferences from what they CHAP. I.] AMERICAN NOTES. 3652 see, and (2) that their evidence may be lu ..understood. Where the court itself stands in the position of the observing witness, the second opportunity for error from human fallibility is removed. MiXKD KEAL KviDENCK. — Mucii real evidence comes to the ti-i- bunal of fact involved and blended with personal evidence. It had been said that persons, considered as things, may furnish real evidence. Instances of tliis have been found in cases involv- ing an inspection of a witness or other perso.i present in court as to age, color, race, or resemblaiics to other persons, said to stand in certain relations to the person in question. To a certain extent every witness is under inspection while on the stand or in court and furnisliing thereby real evidence. What he says is of course personal evidence, under Hentham's classification. But while testifying as a witness and indeed at all times, at the option of the tribunal while in its sight, every witness is creating an im})ression, favorable or otherwise, as to his bias, veracity and general reliability. That this is done by means so subtle and in ways so numerous as to elude statement, and sometimes conscious recog- nition does not detract in the least from the force of this kind of evidence. It ia this which largely assists to create the "atmo- sphere" of a trial, — frequently impressiv'e, though intangible; which enables a jury to decide on conflicting testimony and makes the court of appeal which has merely the statements of the wit- nesses without these tests and earmarks of truth, loath to disturb the verdict of a tribunal which has had the benefit of them. The same statements are true, to a lesser degree, in case of a document. Its contents are an instance of personal evidence. I>ut the paper, or other substance forming it, may on inspection furnish much evidence to the tribunal. It is probably principally for this reason, as applied to erasures and other blemishes, that tlie early laws of pleading required jn'ofert of sealed instruments. Tlius on an issue involving the validity of a will, the attention of the court and jury may be called to evidence tliat tlie sigi\ature is a simulated and counterfeited hand, Withee v. Rowe, 4;") Me. o71 (1S.58). As to evidence, in connection with an examination of the will itself, that the signature is "entirely uidike and could not have been written by the same hand" as certain genuine documents. Demerritti'. Ranilall, 116 Mass. 3.'U (1874). So in an action ona[)rom- issory note wiiere the defence of forgery is relied on, tliat the body of the note, wliich was written in blue ink, had been written after signature by the maker, which was written in black ink, because certain parts of the blue ink passed on and overlipped the black ink ; that there was an erasure in the note ; that the erasure was made at a certain time relative to the writing of the body of the note ; whether eitiier of the edges of tiie note were cut edges, or the ordinary foolscap edge; — "are all facts apparent and obvi- 9I«' f I t i; 3658 AMERICAN NOTES. [part III. OU3 upon an inspection of the note." Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355 (1864). Ill a siiuilar way, the jury may compare a disputed handwriting with a speciiiuMi admitted to be genuine. Wilson v. Beaucliainp, 50 Miss. 24 (1874) ; Calkins v. State, 14 Oh. St. 222 (18G3) ; Vinton o. Peck, 14 Mich. 287 (18GG). Experts may point out to tlie court the facts visible on inspection of a document. " It is very true that the jury may examine the paper for themselves and that opinions are not usually admissible where the jury can form their own conclusions unaided. But we do not think it would be safe in this country to adopt a rule which assumes such a degree of knowledge and skill among jurors" as to dispense with assistance in recognizing the facts visible on inspec- tion of a document. Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287 (1866) ; Dubois V. Baker, 30 X. Y. 355 (1864); Wilson v. Beauchamp, 50 Miss. 24 (1874) ; Calkins r. State, 14 Oh. St. 222 (1863); Withee v. Rowe, 45 Me. 571 (1858) ; Demerritt v. Randall, 116 Mass. 331 (1874). Constant and apparently increasing use is made of the aid which actual inspection can give the court. On an indictment for homicide in killing a person by the use of improper building materials, especially inferior mortar, used in the construction of a tenement house, specimens of the mortar used by the defendant and of mortar properly prepared were received in connection with the testimony of an expert witness as to the differ- ences. People V. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487 (1886). In a highway accident case, the shoes of the horse who was injured may be exhibited to the jury in connection with the evi- dence of a blacksmith that the corks were not appropriate for the season of the year in which he was being driven. Evarts v. Middle- bury, 53 Vt. 626 (1881). Where samples of paving stones used in paving a street in front of the defendant's residence were offered in evidence it was held not necessary to produce any of the identical stones used in the construction. Philadelphia n. Rule, 93 Pa. St. 15 (1880). In an action to recover for injuries from the fall of a derrick caused by the breaking of an iron hook, which the plaintiff claimed was insufficient, a jwrtion of the broken hook may be exhibited to tlie jury, together with evidence as to its weakness and the causes of it. " King i>. New York Central &c. R. R. 72 N. Y. 607 (1878). Rkskmhlan'ce. — On questions of the relationships between per- sons "where the parties are before the jury, and the latter can make the comparison for themselves, whatever resemblance is dis- covered may be a circumstance in connection with others, to be considered." Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144 (1876); Stumm v. Hum- mel, .39 la. 478 (1874). So in a bastardy case, the bastard may be exhibited to the jury, CHAP. I.] AMERICAN NOTES. 365* and any reseinblau to the putative father commented upon. " Why shouhl not the j ry be permitted (when they ha\ f the op[»ortuiiityj to see for themselves and draw their own conclusions from their observation, as well as to hear witnesses depose as to their observation made in the same way?" State v. Woodruff, 67 N. C. 81) (1.S72) ; Gaunt v. State, 50 N. J. 490 (1888) ; Gilmaiiton V. Ham, 38 jSJ. H. 108 (1859); Finnegan v. Dugan, 14 All. 197 (1867). In Iowa, the exhibition to the jury of a child two years old in a bastardy proceeding has been held permissible. "It is a well- known fact that resemblances often exist between persons who are not related, and are wanting between persons who are. Still, what is called family resemblance is sometimes so marked as scarcely to admit of a mistake. We are of opinion, therefore, that a child of the proper age may be exhibited to a jury as evidence of alleged paternity." State v. Smith, 64 la. 104 (1880). Exhibi- tion of a child three months old has, on the contrary, in the same state, been refused. State v. Danforth, 48 la. 43 (1878). In com- menting on this, the court in State v. Smith {ubi supra) say, " A child which is only three months old has that peculiar immaturity of features which characterizes an infant during the time tliat it is called a babe. A child two years old or more has, to a large extent, put off that peculiar immaturity." On an indictment for seduction under promise of marriage, the child, resulting from the unlawful intercourse, can be exhibited to the jury to enable them to trace a resemblance to the defendant as bearing on the fact of sexual intercourse. State v. Horton, 100 N. C. 443 (1888). On the contrary, it has been held error, in a bastardy complaint, to allow a child six months old to be exhibited to the jury for the purpose of basing an argument on the supposed resemblance. " In a case like this, where the child was a mere infant, such evidence is too vague, uncertain and fanciful, and if allowed would estab- lish not only an unwise, but dangerous and uncertain rule of evi- dence." Clark V. Bradstreet, 80 Me. 454 (1888). The reasons for this ruling are partly pointed out in People v. Carney, 29 Hun, 47 (1883), a bastardy case, where it was held error to allow the mother, when on the witness-stand, to be asked to examine the infant, and tell the jury the color of its eyes, and thereby enable them to compare the color with that of tlie defend- ant's eyes. "Common observation reminds us that in families of children, different colors of hair and eyes are common, and that it would be dangerous r" >ctrine to permit a child's paternity to be questioned or proved by the comparings of the color of its hair or eyes with that of the alleged parent." Ibid. Evidence of paternity from comparison, with a very young infant should therefore "be very sparingly resorted to. It could scarcely H m fr Si li.i! i' jiti \ fr - 3656 AMEKICAN NOTES. [PAUT III. be said that a want of resemblance between the defendant and tlie child could be treated as a strong circumstance against the alleged paternity." Udy v. Stewart, 10 Ont. Hep. 591 (1886). In certain jurisdictions, the evidence of inspection as proof of paternity in bastardy cases is not permitted, whatever the age of the cliild. So in Indiana. Iteitz v. State, 33 Ind, 187 (1870); Risk V. State, 19 Ind. 152 (1S62). In Wisconsin, Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84 (1885). And in New York, People v. Carney, 29 Hun, 47 (1883). Because inspection would be permitted on tlie question of resem- blance it does not follow tliat evidence on the same point will be received. One claiming to be the son of A. cannot introduce the evidence of witnesses as to tlie resemblance between himself and A. " We all know that nothing is more notional in the great majority of cases. What is taken as a resemblance by one is not perceived by another, with e(iual knowledge of the parties between whom the resemblance is proved to exist." Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144 (1876). " The effect of the substitution of testimony for inspection is to put the subject-matter of investigation one further remove from its responsible judges, and thus to add to the intirmities inherent in proof of this class the additional danger of bias and imposi- tion." Gaunt V. State, 50 N. J. Law, 490 (1888). The same case speaks of "the almost utter worthlessness of the testimony of witnesses adduced in the question of the resemblance of a bastard to an alleged parent." In bastardy process, a complainant is not entitled to introduce the evidence of witnesses of a resemblance between the bastard and the putative father. Eddy v. Gray, 4 All. 435 (1862). It "is matter of opinion." Keniston v. Howe, 16 Me. 38 (1839); U. S. V. Collins, 1 Cranch. C. Ct. 592 (1809). On the contrary, in North Carolina, where the defence to a bas- tardy complaint involved evidence that the complainant at a time when the child oould have been begotten was habitually liaving intercourse with a man otlier tlian the defendant, evidence that the child resembled the other man is admissible. State v. Britt, 78 N. C. 430 (1878). In Massachusetts, it lias been held that the complainant in such a case cannot meet the defendant's evidence of intercourse with another by showing a dissimilarity in personal appearance between the child and the person claimed by the defendant to be the fatlier. Young /'. Miikepeace, 103 Mass. 50, 54 (1869). "Points of dis- similaritv, not implying a difference of race, do not tend to disprove paternity." H>i<l. Rack, Color, ktc. — Alany of the infirmative suggestions which pertain to evidence of reseir.blance from inspection, do not as sug- CHAP. I.] AMEKICAN NOTKS. 3G5« 'IS s. i ■ i - gested in Young v. Makepeace, *v/^j?(f, weaken the force of the more deejjly graven facts of raue or color. Tliat one person, especially at a very early age, resembles another is often a matter of fancy. Whether a person is white or colored, whether he has a set of features usually found in the African or European races, can fre- quently be established with small chance of error. A child of white parents, claimed to be illegitimate, may be exhibited to the jury with a view to demonstrating that she is of colored parentage at least on one side. "On general principles it would seem that when the question is whether a certain object is black or white, the best evidence of the color would be the exhibition of the object to the jury. The eyes of the members of the jury must be i)re. sumed to be as good as those of medical men. Why should a jury be contined to hearing what other men think they have seen and not be allowed to see for themselves." VVarlick v. White, 76 N. C. 175 (1877). Perso.val Injuries. — A plaintiff injured by a defect in machinery may exhibit his wounded hand to the jury. Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181, 199 (1884). So of an arm injured by the negligence of the driver of a street railway company, Mulhado v. Brooklyn City, R. R., 30 N. Y. 370 (1864); Hatfield v. St. Paul, &c. R. R., 33 Minn. 130 (188;")). So the plaintiff has been allowed to exhibit her injured feet to the jury. Louisville, &c., R. R. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544 (1887); Edwards v. Common Council, 96 Mich. 62.5 (1893). In an action for ])ersonal injury to the plaintiff's shoulder requiring amputation, the plaintiff' may exhibit to the jury the naked remnant of the arm. "The plaintiff had a right to prove the hurt, and that it had entailed lasting injury by causing the amputation and loss of his arm. He could prove that by oral evidence. He could himself stand before the jury for ocular demonstration of the fact; and why may he not intensify and make more certain the fact by inspection of the naked shoulder itself? It is only more and more conclusive evidence upon a fact, which he was entitled to prove, and, being relevant, we cannot exclude it, because there may have been danger of inspiring sympathy in the jury and increasing damagps." Carrico v. West Virginia, &c., R. R., 39 W. Va. 86 (1894). So in an action for personal injuries through mill machinery claimed to be unsafe, the plaintiff's clothes as torn by the machinery are admissible. "We think the admis- sion of such evidence rests in the sound discretion of the court. If the manner in which the plaintiff was injured, or the nature or character of the injury, could be better ox])laiiied by the produc- tion of the torn clothing which the plaintiff' was wearing at the time the injury was received, we perceive no reason why such evi- dence may not be resorted to." Tudor Iron Works v. Weber, 129 111. 535 (1889). V in t >' IS t-:'! t i> I! I' I ll' 3657 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAUT HI. In an action against a city for personal injuries through a defect in the sidewalk the plaintiff may not only exhibit his injured limb to the jury, but may have it examined by a medical expert iu presence of the jury. Lanark r. Dougherty, 153 111. 1G3 (181(4). In a similar case in Missouri, where the plaintiff, while on the stand, was permitted to exhibit his injured leg to the jury, it is error not to permit the defendant to call experts to examine the limb in presence of the jury with a view to stating, as the result of such examination, their opinion of the condition of the injuries as compared with their condition at a formei trial. Haynes v. Trenton, 12.3 Mo. .326 (180i). "When a party in open court vol. untarily submits his person to inspection for his own benefit, he confers upon the opposing party a right to the further inspection precisely the same as a party who becomes a witness must submit to cross-examination." Cole v. Fall Brook Coal Co., 87 Hun, .584 (1895). "The rule is well recognized by substantially all the courts of the country that the injured party may exhibit his wounds to the jury, in order to show their nature or extent, and that rule has been followed in this state." Graves v. Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 26(5 (1893). So in an Indiana case. " The evidence in the cause tended to prove that an incurable disease of the hip joint and curvature of the spine followed as a result of the injuries inflicted by the appel- lant's servant upon the appellee. During the progress of the trial, a physician was permitted to exhibit to the jury the appellee in his then condition and to place him in different attitudes in order to enable them to determine the extent of his disability." Tliis was lieh' correct. Citizens' Street It. R. v. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 563 (189.3). The exhibition must be conducted under such circumstances as not to mislead the jury. Therefore, in an action for injuries caused by a dog bite it is error to permit the plaintiff to exhibit the then condition of liis limb — tliree years and four months after the bite — without any testimony tending to show absence of change for the worse. French r. Wilkinson, 93 Mich. 322 (1892). Compulsory Examixatiov. — A conflict of authority exists on the question as to whether a defendant can be compelled by the court to submit liis j)crson to an examination of the extent of his injuries. The opinion that such a power does not exist in the court at common law is strongly contended for by ^Ir. Justice Horace Gray, speaking for tlie majority of the United States supreme court in Union Pacific R. R. o. Rotsford, 141 U. S. 250 (1890). (.)n an action by a female passenger for injuries to tlie back of her head, rujituring the membranes of the brain and spinal cord, the defendant moved the United States circuit court "for an order CHAP. 1.] AMERICAN NOTK8. 8« );," agiiinst the plaintiff, requiring her to suhuiit to a surgical examin- atiou, in the presence of her own surgeon and attorneys, if she desired their presence; it being proposed by the defendant tliat such examination should be made in manner not to expose the* person of the plaintiff in any indelicate manner; the defendant at the same time informing the court that sucli examination was necessary to enable a correct diagnosis of the case, and that with- out such examination the defendant wouUl be without any wit- nesses as to her condition." The court overruled the motion on the ground that they had no authority to make or enforce such an order. This was sustained on writ of error. The court say, "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the i-ight of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interfer- ence of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. . . , The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the toucli of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indig- nity, an assault and a trespass; and no order or i)rocess, commancl- ing such an exposure or submission was ever known to the common law in the administration of justice between individuals, except in a very small number of cases, based upon special reasons, and upon ancient practice, coming down from ruder ages, now mostly obsolete in England, and never, so far as we are aware, introduced into this country." Ibid. Tlie supreme court of Indiana say, "so far as we know, the courts of this state have never attempted to exercise such a power, and we are of the opinion that no such power is inherent in the courts." Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 401 (18!)1); Kern v. Bridwell, 119 Ind. 226 (1889). Until modified by statute, the rule was the same in New York. "The exercise by the court of the power now invoked, as has been shown, is not sanctioned by any usage in the courts of England or of this state. Its existence is not indispensa,ble to the due administration of justice. Its exercise depending on the discretion of the judge, would be subject to great abuse. We think the assumption by the court of tl'.is jurisdiction, in the absence of statute authority, would be :ui arbi- trary extension of its powers. It is a jus'; inference that an alleged power which has lain dormant during the whole period of Englisli jurisprudence, and never attempted to be exercised in America until within a very recent period, never in fact iiad any exis- tence." McQuigan v. Delaware, &c., E. R., 129 N. Y. oO (1891). The party may submit, if so disposed, to any examination not indecent. Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 401 (1891). Should a party refuse to acquiesce in a reasonable request to !1 II- i ;}059 AMERICAN N0TE8. [part m. svibinit his person to examination, it gives rise to the same pre- stimptiou as refusing to produce any other evidence in his i)ower. "Should a litigant willingly submit, there could be no legal oh- jw'tion to such an examination, and sho\ild he refuse to submit to a reasonalde examination his conduct mig)it possibly be proper matter for comment, but tliis is quite a different matter from com- pidliiig him, against his will, to submit his ])erson to the examina- tion of strangers." Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 401 (isyi). "If he unreasonably refuses to show his injuries, when asked to do so, that fact nmy be considered by the jury, as bearing on his good faith, as in any other case of a party declining to produce the best evidence in his power." Union Pacific It. U. v, liotsford, 141 U. S. 250 (1890). "It is unknown to our practice and to the law." Loyd v. Hannibal, &c. R. R., 53 Mo. 509 (1S73). "Tlie court had no power to make or enforce sucii an order." Parker v. Enslow, 102 111. 272 (1882). "This court is committed to that doctrine. We do not think injustice is likely to result to a defendant by a refusal to make such an order, especially when given the full benefit of the fact that the plaintiff has refused to submit voluntarily thereto, as was done in this case." Peoria, &c., R. R. v. Rice", 144 III. 227 (1893). "If a party is entitled to the compulsory exhibition of the body of his opponent, it would seem to follow that he might have such examination made before the jury. And the court might require the plaintiff, on the trial and before the jury, to submit to the same examination as is recjuired by this order. . . . We know of no right which this court has to compel a party to submit to any bodily examination." Roberts v. Ogdcnsburg, &c., R. R. 29 Hun, 154 (1883); Cole v. Fall Hrook Coal Co. , 87 Hun, 584 (1895). The rule has been changed by statute in New York, and such a law has been held not to infringe any of the express or Implied restraints upon the legislative power to be found in the federal or state constitution. Lyon v. Mnnhattan R. R., 142 '' Y. 298 (1894). A very sagacious ruling was laid down in the rase last mentioned. "The power conferred by the amendment should never be used in such a way as to leave any doubt as to the fairness and good faith of the proceeding, otherwise it may prove to be a sword instead of a shield. It should be a fair and open inquiry after truth, in ■which both sides are or may be actors. If it is used only for the ]mrpose of enabling the defendant to prepare expert witnesses to give testimony at the trial it will be hardly possible to keep the fact from the jury, and it is easy enough to see how such an ele- ment in the case might be used to excite sympathy, stimulate ■|)rejudices, and in some cases possibly to enhance damages." Iliid. CoMPULsoKY ExAMixATiON Orderkd. — The considerations wliich have induced certain courts in the southern and western states of . .I', i I i CIIAl'. I.] A.MKltlCAN NOTKS. 8(i:)10 AiiH'i'icM, iiiidi'V tho lead of Iowa in 1S77. to make orders comiPidliiig cxamiiiatioiis of the person oi the phiiulilf in cases cd' idaiiiis for personal injuries, are jiaitly stated in tlie l)ree/y dissenting ojiinion of the justiees lirewer and JJrown in Union I'acilic IJ, |{. /•. liotsfoni, 111 i;. S. L'r>0 (IS<)0). "It seems strange tliat a jdain- tiff may, in the presence of a jury, be permitted to roll n[) his sleeve and disclose on his arm a wound of which hetestilies; l)ut wlien he testilies iis to the existence of su(!h a wound, the court, though persuaded that he is perjuring iiiniscdf , cannot riMpiire him to roll U[) his sleeve, and thus make manifest the truth, nor re(iuire him in the like interest of truth, to step into an adjoining room and lay bare his arm to the inspection of surgeons. It is said that there is a sanctity of the person which may not be outraged. We believe that truth aiul justice are more sacred than any jx'r- sonal considerations; and if in other cases in the interests of jus- tice, or from considerations of mercy, the courts may, as they often do, re(juire such personal examination, why should they not exer- cise the same power in cases like this, to prevent wrong and injustice?" Ibid. The leading case to this effect, above referred to, is Schroeder ?•. Chicago, &c., 11. It., 47 la. 37o (1877). The plaintiff was injured, by the alleged negligence of the defendant's employees, in his back and hips. He claimed that these injuries were pcnnanent, had impaired the nervons system to the extent of partial paralysis, especially of the bowels. The aiiplication for an examination was refused in the lower court on the gronnd that the defendant was not entitled, as of right, to the order sought. This was held to be error. The grounds of this ruling in nuiin are: (1) Every party litigant l)as a right to exact justice, which involves obtaining the entire truth on all nuitters in issue. (2) A proper examination by skilled physicians would be more apt to do full justice to both jpartics than any other way. (3) The i)laintiff has testimony under his control which reveals the truth more clearly than any other. •'The cause of truth, the right administration of the law, demand that he should have produced it." (4) The jdaintitt' is jjractically being cross-examined, as he has ottered himself as a witness, (o) 'I'liere is no indignity; as parties assured, pensioners, men enlisting in the army and navy submit to rigid examinations of their bodies. (Ci) A plaintiff can exhibit, in a case of this kind, his wounds or limbs. (7) The divorce courts have ordered exam- inations in eases of alleged imi)otency. In Nebraska, while the court will order an examination in a suit for personal injuries, the examinaticm must be before the trial and hy experts agreed on by the ])arties or appointed by the court. Stuart V. Havens, 17 Neb. 211 (l.SSr>). It cannot be regarded as definitely settled that the courts of i 1 365" AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AUT iir. urn ■'■''■a i u r ;■.!:: i" Nebraska will compel such an examination at all. But it is at least definitely settled that " if such an application is proper under any circumstances, it must be made before trial." Cliadroii v. Glover, 43 Neb. 7.52 (1895). A precisely reversed ruling has been made in Wisconsin. In that state, an examination may be ordered during the trial and in the presence of the experts of the adverse party. White i'. ^lil- waukee City R, R., 61 Wis. o.'J6 (1884). So also in Kansas, Atchison, &c. R. R. u. Thul, 29 Kans. 460 (1883). In Schroedor V. Chicago, &c. R. R., 47 la. 375 (1877) the application was made at the trial and before evidence was gone into, and the motion was for a board of physicians appointed by both parties. In Ohio, " in an action to recover for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant, the court has power to require the plaintiif to submit his person to an examination by physicians and surgeons, when necessary to ascertain the nature and extent of the injury." Miami Turnpike Co. v. Baily, 37 Oh. St. 104 (1881). In Texas the court ordered an examination out of court, but upon the plain- tiff objecting to one of the defendant's doctors on personal grounds, and the other declining to go on alone, refused to stop the case or compel the plaintii¥ to be examined by tlie two doctors suggested by the defendant. Missouri, &c., R. R. v. Johnson, 72 Tex. 95 (I8S8). "If this power should be exercised at all, it slwmld be by the apix)intment by tlie court of one or more disinterested exjjerts, either of its own selection or such as may be agreed upon by both parties." lf>!'/. The question of the court's power was regarded as an open one in (Julf, &c., R. R. r. Nelson, 5 Tex. Civ. .\|ip. .387 (180.3). The power to con\pel an examination is asserted in (Jeorgia. Richmond, &c., R. R. c. Childress, 82 (Ja. 719 (1SS9). And in Alabama. Alabama, &c., R. R. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71 (189(1). The rule is the same in Nebraska. Stuart c. Havens, 17 Neh. 211 (18.S.5). -Vnd in Mieliigan it has been ludd error to refuse to request a female plaintiff to remove her glove from an injured hand. "The decisions are not uniform upon this cpiestion, l)ut the very great weight of authority is in favor of tlie exercise of such power by the court, under proper restrictiims; the rule recog- nizing, however, that a wide discretion is vested in the trial ornirt, which justifies a refusal to require the examination wiiere the necessities of the case are not such as to call lor it, or where the sense of delicacy of the plaintiff may be offended by the exliibi tion, or whert' the testimony would be merely cumulative, or where, in the judgment of the trial e(nirt, it would not materially aid the jury." Graves /•. Rattle Creek, 95 Mich. 266 (1893). But on an action for breach of warranty on the sale of a horse the court lias no jx)wer to order that the <lefendant have the privilege of sending a vet<erinary surgeon into plaintiff's stable to examine the horse. CHAP. I.] AMEUICAN NOTES. 36oi'^ " The court had no power to compel the i)laintiif to submit to such an invasion of his premises." Martin v. Elliot (Mich.), G3 N. W. y.)<S (181)5). The courts of Missouri after at first deciding that such an order could not be made (Loyd v. Hannibal, &c., R. K., u.'i Mo. jIOO (1873),) subsequently reversed their position, and now hold that they will order the submission. Shepard v. Missouri, &c., R. K., 85 Mo. 629 (1885); Sidekum i\ Wabash, &c., K. K., 93 Mo. 400 (1887); Owens v. Kansas City, &c., K. K., 95 Mo. 169 (1888). In Arkansas, the rule is laid down as follows : — " Where the plaintiif in an action for personal injuries alleges that they are of a permanent nature, the defendant is entitled as a matter of right, to have the opinion of a surgeon upon his condition — an opinion based upon personal examination." Where the evidence of experts is abundant, the court niay, however, refuse an order. Sibley i\ Hmitli, 46 Ark. 275 (1885). But where the defendant requested that the plaintiff should be examined by experts in open court, the judge at nisi pruts overruled the motion, but required him to sub- mit to an examination at his own home before certain physicians representing both sides and passed upon by the court. This was held correct. " It is within the sound discretion of the circuit court to order such an examination, or not, and to direct whether it should be made in court or not; and the court will not control the exercise of that discretion, unless its exercise is abused." St. Louis, &c., R. K. /'. Dobbins, 60 Ark. 481 (1895). Ordkk is Discrktionaky. — The order is discretionary with the court. White c. Milwaukee, &c., Ky., 61 Wis. 5.'5(i (1884); Miami, &c., Turnpike Co. v. Baily, 37 Oh. St. 104 (1881). Where an application was not made until the close of the phiintitf's case, the application can be refused on that ground. I/iid. " It is evi- dent from the very nature of things that the propriety t)f such an order must usually rest largely in the discretion of the trial court, and it could only be in case of a plain abuse of such discretion tliat we would interfere." Hatfield v. St. Paul, &c., R. R., 33 Minn. 1.30 (1885). "And we are by no means prc])ar(!d to say tliat there may not be circumstances where tlie defendant would not have the right to such an order." lf>i</. "We decide simply that the power exists, and that in each case it is to be exercised or not, according to the sound discretion of the jjresiding judge." Richmond, &c. , R. R. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719 (188!)); Southern r.cll Telejihone Co. v. Lynch. 95 (in. 529 (1804). " It is a matter in which the court has a discretion which will not be intert'ored with unless manifestly abused." Shepard v. Mis.t,ouri, &c., R. R., 85 i\Io. 629 (1885)', where the i)laintiff offered to sid)mit her jierson to the examination of one physician, but not of three. The court can refuse an apidicatiou "for the time being," reserving to >: I H: 8()a 13 AMERICAN NOTES. [part ITI. the defendant the right to ap]ily later. Unless this is done the ])rior application may be treated as waived. Sidekum v. Wabash, &c. II. R., 9.3 Mo. 400 (1887). Possibly the action of the court was affected in that case by the fact that the defendant asked that the ,)laintiff, a lady, submit her injuries, largely displacement of the A. jiiib, to the examination of four surgeons, and was taken in view of the action of the court in Shepard v. Missouri, &c., K. R. (lib! siijtrd). "Tlie real question liere is, wliether there has been an abuse of the discretion lodged in the trial court." Owens V. Kansas City, &c. K. R., 95 Mo. 169 (1888). Where the phaintiff had exhibited an injured arm to the jury, and three physicians had testified with regard to it, it was held no error for the court to overrule the defendant's motion for an order compelling the plain- tiff to submit his arm to four physicians selected by the <lefendant. Stuart V. Havens, 17 Neb. 211 (1885). Tlie supreme court of Georgia suggest as reasonable jirelini- inaries to the exercise of this power that the plaintiff should first be asked to submit voluntarily, and his refusal proved in case of an application for an order; as well as the probability of results important to the cause of justice being elicited; the experts sliould be selected by the court rather than the party or parties. " It is likewise obvious that all the expenses should be borne by th.e party at whose instance tlie examination is made." Richmond, &c., R. R. V. Childress, 82 Ga. 719 (1889). This was substantially followed in Alabama, &c., R. R. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71 (1890). The effect of the autliorities on the matter of dii:cretion is thus summed up by the supreme court of Alabama. "It is apparent from the adjudged cases, that the statement of the rule as to the revision of tlie trial court's action on a motion of tliis sort, to the effect that such action will not be interfered with unless it involves a manifest abuse of discretion, is inapt and misleading. What is reallv meant — the rule fairly deducible from the o])inions — is, that if a jiroper case for granting the motion is clearly made, and is refused, the appellate court, having before it al' tlie facts involved in the determination of the matter in the lower court, will reverse the judgment thus infected with error." Alabama, &c., R. II. *•. Hili, 90 .\la. 71 (1890). The court then proceed to ask, " Was it essential to the ends of justice tliat ))h!intiff sliouhl submit to this examination. We think it was, and grant a new trial for the failure of the trial court to order the examination. I()iil. The rule in Arkansas is similar. " In refusing to order tlie examination, as it may do when tlie evidence of experts is already abundant, the circuit court must exercise a sound discretion; and its action is subject to review in case of abuse. Tliere could not be a more flagrant instance of tlie evils resulting from such a refusal than the present case atfords." Sibley v. Smitli, 40 Ark. 275 (1885). ciiAr. 1.] AMKHK.'AN NOTES. 30, V* The .supreme court of Kaiisiis, however, speak of the order coiii- pelling inspection in iuttioiis for permanent personal injuries as a ]iiatter of rij^ht, thougli j^ivinfj; the court a discretion to reject it if cumulative evidence only would be secured therel)y, or the evidence would be otherwise objectio'.iable on s,'euerul principles. The court is also given a discretion in prescribing details, &c. '' We would think that the defendant in a case lik(! tlie present would be entitled as a matter of right, upon a proper a])plication and u])on a proper showing, to have an ortler made by the court compelling tlie plaintiff to submit himself to a personal examination, for the ])urpose of ascertaining the nature, character, extent and perma- nence of his injuries; but of course the court sliould exercise a sound judicial discretion in making such an order. The right to the order, being founded upon necessity, would not of course extend beyond the necessities of the case." Atchison, &.C., R. K. ('. Thul, 2d Ivans. 4G6 (18.S.S). So the supreme court of Iowa assert that the defendant has a right to demand an examination. Schroeder v. Cliicago, &c., K. 11., 47 la. 375 (1877). But the conditions of the examination as to time, examiners, &c., is in the discretion of the court. Ibid. How KNFOKCKu. — The method of enforcing an order for an examination of personal injuries of a permanent nature is some- what differently suggested by those who assert the power of tlie court to issue such an order. The dissenting justices in Union Pacilic K. 11. r. liotsford, 141 U. S. L'50 (l.SOO), one of whom (Brewer) was a iii'inber of the court which decided Atchison, &c., li. li. v. Thul, 29 Kans. 400 (188.*?), say that refusal to try the order is not a •ontempt, and suggest tluit "such an order may be enforced by sta} .ug the trial or dismissing tlie case." In Schroeder ('. Ciiioago, &c., R. R. 47 la. 37o (1877), the court say that the ])ower of the court "was amply suHuuent to coerce obedience." Tiie witness being in contempt, he would be treated as a recusant witness. If the recusancy were persisted in, " the court could have stricken from the pleadings all the allegations as to permanent injury, and withdrawn from the jury that part of the case. The plaintitf by voluntarily withdrawing iiis claim for such injury would liav(> been relieved from the necessity of submitting to the examiniition, and ])roceedings as for contemijt would have been sus- jiended." This language is cited with a))proval in Atchison, &c., R. R. r. Thul, 2!) Ivans. 40(5 (1883). "On the refusal of the plain, tiff to comply with such onler, when pro[)erly made, the court may dismiss the action, or refuse to allow the plaintiif to give evidence to establish the injury. . . , Authority to exclude the evidence arises out o;" the inherent power of the court over the subject under investigation," Miami, «&c., Turnpike Co. v, Baily, 37 Oh. St. 104 (1881). 3(;-V6 AMERICAN NOTKS. [I'AUT m. tli '•Certainly, if tho court can make the order, it will liave no (lifHcnilty in enforcing it. Not that it can compel the party to sub- mit to a personal examination, but it may dismiss a plaintilf'.s suit for a persistent refusal to do so; or, in case of either defenchmt or jdaintiff, treat it as a suppression of testimony, and so present the matter to the jury as to make the refusal equivalent to proof of the fact, which the party asking sucli perscmal examination would make it probable, by affidavit or otherwise, the examination would disidose. Shepard v. Missouri, &c.. It. K. .S5 Mo. OL'!) (1.S85). Power to enfoi'ce such an order is frequently conferred by statute. Richmond, &c., K. R. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719 (188.')). Exi'iciiiMKNTS IN CouKT. — A peculiarly cogcut method of prov- ing a fact is to test its existence by an experiujent in open court. The evidence so furnished is frequently real evidence, properly so called. For example, in a Massachusetts case, in an action to recover the price of a suit of clothes wiiich it was claimed did not fit, "while the defendant was testifying, the plaintiff produced the clothes in court, and requested the defeiulant to try them on in the jiresence of the jury. The defendant assented, and, having put tlieni on, wore them in the presence of the court and jury. The pluintilf then called several tailors as experts, who testified that the clotiies needed some alterations before they could be called a good lit, but that such alterations could be easily made without injury to them." Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 1.36 (1873). When^ the evidence was unoontroverted, in an action for personal injuries, that the female plaintiff limped, the court declined to compel her to walk across the court-room in ])resence of the jury at the defendant's request. Hatfield i\ St. Taul, &c., R. R., 33 Minn. 130 (188;-)). The genernl right of the court to order such an exhibition is, however, insisted on. "As the object of all judicial investigations is, if possible, to do exact justice and obtain the truth in its entire fulness, we have no doubt of the power of tlie court, in a prober case, to require the party to perform i physical act before the jury that will illustrate or demonstrate tlie extent and character of his injuries. Tliis is in accordance with analogous cases in otlier l)ran(^hes of the law. Wlien a view of real estate will aid the jury in ri^aching a conclu- sion, it is witliin the discetion of the court to permit it. When an inspection of an article of personal property will aid tliem. it is not infrequent to cause the article to be brouglit into ccurt for the same purpose. The practice in patent and in certain e(iuity cases, of allowing tests to be ajiplied liefore the court, is somewhat analo- gous in principle. So is the practice of divorce courts, of ordering an examination of the ])erson of the party in certain cases." H>!d. The American courts have shown themselves unwilling to con- sent to the use of experiments in court where the circumstances til n 1' '■ i .f- I CHAP. I.] AMEKICAN KOTES. 365i« were such as to lead to a suspicion that evidence was being fabri- cated by this means. Thus where a colored defendant on an indict- ment for larceny in a corn-tield was claimed to have a peculiar foot, with which a government witness connected certain foot- prints found in the cornfield on the occasion of the larceny, tlie court permitted the defendant to exhibit his feet to the jury and walk barefooted on the sawdust floor of the court room, but declined to aUow him to walk on tlie open ground in jn-esence of tlie jury or to have soil similar to that of tlie corn-iield brought into the court room for the same purpose. Though the defendant objected to the refusal, it was ludd to he " at the option of the court to per- mit or not the same experiment to be made on mellow earth, either in or out of the courthouse, within view of tlie jury, for their information. ... In the present case, it could not be very mate- rial that the defendant should be permitted to make tracks for exhibition to the jury; for the jieculiarity of his ordinary tracks might be caused by some habitual trick of motion in lus gait, which he would take pains on such an occasion to avoid." Campbell v. State, 55 Ala. 80 (187G). In a case where certain masked liurglars broke and entered a dwelling house for the purpose of extorting from the cashier of a bank the combination of the lock in the bank vault, the cashier testified that he identified the defendant as one of the gang by means of his voice — •which was peculiar. On cross-examination, he was asked to state the peculiarity. Heing umible to do so, the deiondant's lawyer asked the defendant to stand up and repeat something, which he did. Whereupon the witness said that the defendant was suppressing liis voice. On the defendant being asked "to s|)eak it right out," the judge interposed the suggestion that this was not competent. The counsel for the defendant con- tended that he had a right to have the jieculiarities of the defend- ant's voice pointed out by the witness, and that for that jmrpcse the voice itself was competent to be intrcx'uced. The judge ruled otherwise, and was sustained. "His manner of speaking being in question, there was no way of determining whether he would use his voice in the court room in his natural or in a constrained and simulated manner, tli(> genuineness of the voice used not being supiiorted by his oath." Com. i<. Hcott, 12.'] Mass. 222 (1S77). A distinction is to be drawn between experiments made in court, the results of which, to act as evidence, should bi' obtained during the stages of the trial at which evidence is admissible, and U!us- f rations which may be used merely to enforce an argument. Thus in an action against a railroad company for land damages, counsel may illustrate his argument that it is an injury to a mill power to lessen the "head" of water, by demonstrating "by appliances pro- vided for the pui'pose and not previously exhibited in evidence . . . SbT) amkri(;ax N(rrKs, [I'AIiT III. I ■ that of two ooluinns of water of the same diameter but of different heights, the liigher would discharge more quickly and with greater power than the lower." Hoffman v. liloomsburg, &c., 11. li., U;5 Pa. St. 503 (1891). Exi'KuiMKNTS OUT OF CouRT. — The rulc relating to experiments in court has nothing to do with a somewhat similar rule that the court may i)ermit witnesses to state the result of experiments made out of court, the results of which are rele\rant to the issue. Thus on an indictment for a rape committed upon a woman said to be of weak physical condition, to prove the comparative strength of the prisoner, the government was allowed to show "that he had taken a barrel of flour up in his hands before him and carried it several rods, and then down several stairs or steps into a cellar; also, that he had within a few years carried a barrel of sugar some ten rods on his shoulder and then set it down on a platform," and that he "seemed to carry them easily." State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148 (1863). Other witnesses were allowed to testify ill the same case as to similar experiments testing their own strength, and the results of " scuffles " between them and the prisoner. Ibid. ViKW. — It is discretionary with t' court to permit the jury to visit any locality involved in the ca^j. Facts so learned are real evidence. People v. Buddensieck, 103 X. Y. 487 (1880). Though the granting of a view is in the discretion of the court, which will not ordinarily be reviewed on appeal, error in law may be committed by the court in instructing the jury as to the effect they may give to the facts learned .n that way. Boardman v. Westchester, &c.. Ins. Co., 54 Wis. 364 (1882). For example, where the jury were informed that the opinions of witnesses in a land damage case as to the value of the land were not to control their own opinion gained by a view of the premises, the court held it to be error. Hoffman v. Bloomsburg, &c., R. R., 143 Pa. St. 503 (1801). In that case, the court cite with approval, and adopt the language of a previous ruling (Flower v. Baltimore, &c., R. R., 132 Pa. St. 524 (1800)), that an instruction to the jury that "You are only permitted to view the land, that you may better under- stand the testimony. The value of the land you are to ascertain from the witnesses " is a correct statement of the law. "The jurors were sworn," the court say in Flower v. Baltimore, &c., R. R., "to render a true verdict according to the evidence. It was never intended that the view of the jury should be substituted for the evidence, and that they should make up their verdict from the view in disregard thereof. The object of the view is, as was correctly said by the learned judge, to enable them the better to understand the testimony; to weigh conflicting testimony, and, thus aided, to arrive at a sound and just conclusion." Ibid. Probably, CHAP. I.] AMERICAN NOTES. 365»8 however, this is not a complete statement of the law. In Massa- chusetts, in an action for personal injuries, where it was contended for the plaintiff, that the court could not grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence where the jury had had a view, the court say : " In many cases, ami per- haps in most, except those for the assessment of damages, a view is allowed for the purpose of enabling the jury better to understand and apply the evidence which is given in court; but it is not lu'ces- sarily limited to this; and, .n most cases of a view, a jury must of necessity acquire a certain amount of infoimation, which they may properly treat as evidence in the case." Tully v. I'itchburg, li. R., 134 Mass. 499 (1883). So in a criminal case, State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148 (1863), where the view was granted of the locus in which tlie offence was said to have been committed, the jury were sent "to view the premises, in charge of the high sheriff, accompanied by one agent on each side, such as each party chose to select, under proper direc- tions from the court, to the officer, the jury, and the agents, as to how the view should be conducted. One of the counsel on both sides went as agents with the jury." So also in Com. v. Webster, Para. (Bemis Ed.), 31, 32, 4G (1850). The court may decline to order a view, especially if satisfied of the accuracy of the photograph taken at the time of an accident. People V. Buddensieck, 10.3 X. Y. 487 (1886). The view, if granted, must be under conditions prescribed by the court or by law. Accordingly, where certain jurors in a cai)ital case after the close of the evidence, while walking out for exercise by leave of court and in charge of an officer, visited and examined the place where tlie homicide occurred, and in regard to wliich the |witnesses had testified, it was held to be a sufficient reason for granting a new trial. " It is a well settled rule that if a jury, after a case is submitted to them, receive any kind of evidence which can have the most remote bearing upon the case, it will be fatal to their verdict." Eastwood v. People, 3 Parker, Or. R. 25, 52 (1855). The accused is entitled in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses .against him, and this rule applies to the evidence furnished by a view. On an indictment for burglary the judge directed the jurj', in the absence of the defendant, to inspect the premises where the alleged burglary was committed. Hp directed a witness for the state to accompany them and jioint out the places marked on a certain diagram of the premises. Held error. " Wliy sucli proceedings were permitted, we are not infoimed, and caiinot imagine." State v. Bertin, 24 La. Ann. 46 (1872). In Cuimival Casks. — Tliere is no necessity of proving to che jury what they can see for themselves. Where a uefendaiit was !l 'I \ 365i» AMliUICAN NOTES. [part m. «li!soi'ibetl ill aii indictment as a "colored person," this allegation is sutfificntly i)roved hy 2>rofert, if tlie jury are satisfied of the fact on inspection. "It would not be necessary to prove by other testimony than ]>rofci't of the party that he was *a jjcrson,' or a 'man,' if so described in the indictment. Under certain circum- stances jurors may use their eyes as well as their ears." Garvin V. State, oU ^liss. 207 (1876). So the court and jury can judge from inspection whether a prisoner is over fourteen. State v. Arnold, 13 Ired. 184 (1851); Com. v. Kmmons, 98 Mass. 6 (1867). On a complaint for knowunjh/ suffering a female under the age of twenty -one years to resort to the defendant's jiremises for pur- poses of prostitution, the jury may judge from inspection of the girl as to the defendant's knowledge. "If the subject of tlie scienter in this case had been tliat liertha was a f/!vl, as well as under the age of twenty-one years, and the question had been whetlier the defendant knew her to be a girl, her appearance alone would be satisfactory, without question. The evidence in this case, in a degree, is very much of the same character." Hermann V. State, 7;^ Wis. 248 (1888). So on a trial for murder the government was permitted to exhibit to the jury the backbone of the deceased, — though the dramatic effect of such an exhibition might naturally be apprehended by tlie accused. " It served to show to the jury the attitudes and relative positions of the parties when the shot was fired. It was not an unnecessary parade of the bones of the dead man to excite preju- dice against his slayer, but was legitimate and proper evidence, ami a party cannot, upon the ground that it may harrow up feel- ings of indignation against him in the breasts of the jury, have competent evidence excluded from their consideration." State v. Weiners, 66 Mo. 13 (1877). So where the admission of a section of the ribs and vertebrae were given in evidence and excepted to "on the ground that it was calculated to inspire the jury with such horror as to influence their verdict," the court say, "It was intro- duced for the purpose of showing the direction and lodgment of the ball, and was clearly admissible." Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. r)47 (1890). Bo of a pistfd by means of which a homicide was caused. "We can see no objection to the pistol being exhibited to the jury and inspected by thein, with testimony as to its appearance, how it was fired, the indentations or marks upon the cartridges indicating wlicther any, or how many barrels had boon snapped, and every- thiiig about it as it was when the difficulty closed." Wynne v. State. 06 Ga. 113 (1876). So where the case turned on the identity of a deceased person who had lived under different names at different places, various letters, hotel registers, and other documents showing a similarity ;hap. I.] AMKIIICAN NOTKS. 365a" in liiuidwrit.ing of the two men (supposed to be the deceased under an alius) may l)e examined by the jury in tlieir consultation room. Udderzook v. Com., 70 Pa. St. 340 (ls;4;. The bloody clothes in Avhich homicide is alleged to have beei committed may be exhibited to the jury. Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 41o (18«o) ; People v. Gonzalez, .'J5 N. Y. 49 (1.S66); and the clothing worn by the deceased at the time of a fatal aifray may be "produced in evidence before the jury." Levy v. State, 28 Tex. App. 203 (1889); Gardiner v. People, 6 Park(!r, C. K. 155 (1860). "In criminal cases a jury may form their opinion as to the gen- uineness of a document, alleged to be forged, by a comi)arison of it with other writings admitted or proved to be genuine." Garvin v. State, 52 Miss. 207 (1876). And may be aided in so doing, by the use of magnifying glasses. Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181, 200 (1884). Exhibition to the jury of clothes, weapons, &c., belonging to tlie prisoner, is not objectionable as compelling a person accused of crime to furnish evidence against himself. Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 413 (1885). Where it was claimed by a prisoner that the deceased came to her death by the clothes accidentally catching fire, and that she (the prisoner) had burned her own hand in a vain attempt to save deceased, the court compelled her, against objection, to remove the bandages on the hand alleged to be injured. It proved entirely free from any indication of a burn. This was held, no error. State v. Garrett, 71 N. C. 85 (1874). It has been held that in a criminal case, to establish the iden- tity of the prisoner, he may be compelled by the court to bare his arm to the jury and exhibit certain tattoo marks which were tes- tified to a witness, and that such a course is not compelling the prisoner "to be a witness against himself." State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79 (1879). Circumstantial EvinExcE. — Frequently in criminal cases re- quiring the use of circumstantial evidence, many of the links in the chain of proof or evidence bearing on them can be produced for the inspection of the jury. Where a clerk was killed by burglars while resisting arrest, a rocket-drill found in the i)ris- oner's possession and fitting the bits with which entrance to the store was effected, may be exhibited to the jury. Ruloff v. I'eople, 45 N. Y. 213, 224 (1871). In Com. V. Webster, 5 Gush. 295 (1850), where the body of the deceased had been, it was claimed, mutilated and partly burned by the prisoner, artificial teeth found in the privy vault of the I)risoner, and alleget^ to have been those of the deceased, were pro- duced in court aiid fitted to the plaster cast made for the mouth of the deceased; a letter obviously written in a peculiar style and by the use of an unusual instrument was compared in court with a ill J >i ■' 36521 AMKUIOAN NOTES. [I'AKT 111. small stick tipped with cotton found in the prisoner's possession. Beniis Hei)ort, pp., 80, 81, 204, 205, 208, 210. On an iiidi(!tuient for the murder of one Mulock by blows on his head, inflicted with a niusk(!t, tlie court held that no error had Ix'cu committed in permitting " le district atton.ey to produce in fMJUvt and show to witnesses, in the presence of the jury, the hat and .^un found near Mulock's dead body, or a watch it was claiuied Miiloiik had on his person tlie morning he disappeared, or any otlier article found on or near his dead body, or in permitting the district attorney to produce Mulock's skull in court. ... It was also proper ... to allow Dr. Wey to examine the skull of Mulock in court, with the broken gun that was found beside Mulock's dead body, and explain the fractures in the skull and the marks on it to the jury, and to show them liow nicely parts of the guii-iock [ivA sight on the gun fitted the indentations or fractures in the skull." Gardiner i>. People, 6 Tarker's G. R. 155, 201 (18CG). The decision that on a prosecution for selling liquor to a minor, the jury are not entitled to judge of the minor's age by his appear- ance seems hardly in accordance with the current of the decisions. Ihinger v. State, 53 Ind. 251 (187G). Admission khkqukxtly Dis(;ketioxary. — The admissibility of real evidence is frecpiently in the discretion of the court. The court may exclude such evidence when, in its opinion, it is too remote or trivial to be of sufficient advantage to the decision of the case. On an action for the price of a large consignment of Swiss cheeses, the quality of which was in dispute, the court refused to permit any of the cheese to be exhibited to the jury because of the difficulty of agreeing on samples which the deterioration in the interval and the bulk of the whole consignment presented. Hood V. IMoch, 29 W. Va. 244, 255 (1886). Such evidence may be ex- cluded where the decency, morals, or sensibilities of the community would be shocked by the exhibition offered. Probably a ])regnant woman would not be allowed to prove that fact by exposing herself to the jury. Warlick /;. Wliite, 70 N. C. 175 (1877). The defendant in an action for personal injuries to a young woman by alleged breaking of her ribs "offered in evidence a sec- tion of a human body which he claimed would show the character and relative position of the bone and cartilage constituting the human ribs, and the manner in which tlie bone and cartilage are joined together, and joined to the breast-bone; which the surgeon testified tiiat he had cut from the body of a woman about the size and age of the plaintiff." Tlie court rejected the evidence. "The exhibit being of doubtful utility and offensive in its nature, we think the court might well exercise its discretion." Knowles v. Crampton, 55 Conn. 33G (1887). The court probably cannot reject evidence simply because it is ("MAI*. l.J AMEIMCAN NOTICS. 30522 oft'ciisive, either to the siglit or tlie intellij^ence. But if other evi- (leiiee is available, the court has a discretion to exchuhi — whicli it is usually not slow to exercise. Knowles /'. Cnuiijiton, o.") Conn. .'WG (ISiST). " In matters of discretion the action of tiie trial court is not subject to review." Knowles v. Crampton, 55 Conn. H'AG (1,SS7). By "discretion," in this connection, can hardly be meant that the admission of real evidence is de])endent u])on the whim of a particular judge. That tliis class of evidence can be rejected when irrelevant, remote, mislead-'ng, or, indeed, objectionable upon any ground wliich gives the court a right to reject personal evidence is clear. But that relevant evidence, not excluded by some general rule, can legally be excluded because its source is real when the same evidence, if given by witnesses, would be admitted, has not been decided. " It is not true, as a rule of law, that evidence is incompetent merely because it is inconclusive. It is oi-dinarily admissible, if the fact sought to be proved is itself relevant to the issue, and if the proposed proof legitimately tends to establish it." Teople v. Gonzalez, 35 "NT. Y. 49, 62 (1806). It is not perceived that the rule differs in this respect between real and personal evidence. Cannot bk kepoutkd. — The fact that real evidence cannot in many, perhajis in most, instances be reported to the appellate court is a characteristic feature of this class of evidence. Appellate courts have felt inclined to regard this circumstance in various ways. It has frequently been held that as the appel- late court cannot have the benelit of certain real evidence — for example, the appearance of the witnesses — it should be cautious in upsetting findings made upon conflicting testimony. ]?ut in a case where, the jury having had a view, the contention was made that as the facts obtained through a view are evidence which the court did not have, no new trial could be granted, the rule was laid down that, even under the circumstances stated, the court could still grant a new trial if the judge decides that "he is so far in possession of all the material evidence as to act intelli- gently." Tully V. Fitchburg, R R., 1.34 :\rass. 49!) (1883). Other courts have insisted that they have the right to review findings of fact and, by consequence, a finding based upon real evi- dence may deprive a party of his rights upon appeal. Stephenson V. State, 28 Ind. 272 (1867); Ihinger v. State, 53 Ind. 251 (1876). ;ll|: n ^t ■ i- I!!": i' EXPLANATION OF HEARSAY. [PART lU, CHAPTER II. HEARSAY. § 567.' As evidence afforded by our own senses is seldom at- tainable in judicial trials, the law is satisfied with requiring the next best evidence, namely, the testimony of those who can speak from their own personal knowledge. It is not, indeed, requisite that the witness should have personal knowledge of the main fact in controversy ; for this may not be provable by direct testimony, but only by inference from other facts shown to exist. But it is in general necessary that a witness should only be permitted to speak to such facts only as are within his own knowledge, whether they be things said or done, and that he should not testify from information given by others, liowever worthy of credit they may be. It is, too, indispensable to the proper administration of justice, — first, that every witness should give his testimony under the sanction of an oath, or its equivalent, a solemn affirmation, — and secondly, that he should be subject to the ordeal of a croys- examination by the party against whom he is called, so that it may appear, if necessary, what were his powers of perception, his opportunities for observation, his attentiveness in observing, the strength of his recollection, and his disposition to sp^j.^ Vac truth. And testimony from the relation of third persons cannot, even where the informant is known, be subjected to either of these tests. It has been well observed that, " If the first speech were without oath, another oath that there was such speech makes it no more than a mere speaking, and so of no value in a court of justice."^ Besides, it is often impossible to ascertain through whom, or how many persons, the original narrative has been transmitted. Evidence of this sort constitutes that sort of second- 1 Gr. Ev. § 98, in great part. » B. N. P. 294, b. 366 fev 'Bl''':' if < Mm ii' CHAP. II.] HEARSAY INADMISSIBLE. hand evidence which is termed hearsay ; a species of proof which, with a few exceptions that will be presently noticed, cannot be received in judicial investigations.' § 568. The rule excluding such evidence has been recognised in England as a fundamental principle ever since the time of Charles the Second.* It even applies in cases where no other evidence can possibly be obtained. For example, a statement not on oath, even by a dead man who was the only eye-witness of a transaction, is inad- missible;' and on indictments for ravishing children, too young to be admissible witnesses, statements made by the children to their mothers shortly after the offence was committed cannot be received in evidence.* Where a servant was indicted for perjury, in saying that her deceased mistress had never had a child, declara- tions of the mistress were rejected as evidence for the Crown.' * The rule excluding hearsay evi- dence, or rather the mode in which that rule is f retjuently misunderstood in courts of justice, is amusingly caricatured by Dickens : — " ' I believe you are in the service of Mr. Pickwick, the defendant in this case. Speak up if you please, Mr. Weller.' "'I mean to Foeak up, sir,' re- plied Sam. ' I am in the service o' that 'ere gen'l'man, an wery good service it is.' " ' Little to do, and plenty to get, I suppose?' said Serjeant Buzfuz, with jocularity. " ' Oh, quite enough to got, sir, as the soldier said ven they ordered him three hundred and fifty lashes,' replied Sam. " ' You must not tell us what the soldier, or any other man, gam, sir, interposed the judge, ' if a not evi- dence.'' "'Wery good, my lord,' replied Sam." See the account of Bardell V, Pickwick in the Pickwick Papers, at p. 367. "^ One of the earliest cases in which the rule was acted upon is Sampson V. Yavdley, 1667. 3 1 Ph. Ev. 209. In Scotland the rule is othei-wise ; evidence on the re- lation of others being admitted, where the relator is since dead, and would, if living, have been a competent wit- ness : 1 Dick.son, Ev. Sc. 66, 67 ; Dysart Peer. (II. L.), 1881, where tlio extent of, and exceptions to the rule are disnussed at some length. It seems that even where the relation has been handed down to the witness at second hand, and through several successive relators, each only stating what he received from the inter- mediate relator, it will still be ad- missible, if the original and inter- mediate relators are all dead, and would have been competent witnesses if living: Tait, Ev. 430, 431; but see 1 Dickson, Ev. 70. The reason for receiving hearsay evidence in cases where, as is often the case in Scotland, the judges determine upon the facts in dispute, as well as uj)on the law, is stated and vindicated by Sir J. Mansfield, in the Berkeley Peer., 1811. Even in English courts, hearsay evidence is often admitted and acted upon in affidavits, which are submitted to the judges only. * R. V. Brasier, 1779; R. v. Nicho- las, 1846 (Pollock, C.B.). The fact that the witness made a complaint is admissible. See post, § o80. And the late Willes, J., used to admit the further question whether, in making the complaint, any name was men- tioned, but this appears incorrect. See R. V. Wink, 1834, post, note to §681. ^ Heath's case, 1744. In an action 367 mmw li'i "!-i fi'4 '^^4- ^t*(' <S| 'Jlj 4 'i' IS ■' '' I'l '. J: ;!: mi GROUNDS FOE EXCLUDING HEARSAY. [PART III. Moreover, a declaration, though made on oath, and in the course of a judicial proceeding, cannot be received, if the litigating parties a-e .lot the mvie ; because, in such case, the party against whom the evidence is offered, has had no opportunity of cross-examining the declarant.* § 569. The rule excluding hearsay evidence will even shut out proof of dec/a rationr in disparagement of his own signature made bg a deceased subscribing witness to a deed or will. S 570.' The terLT. hearsay is used in law with reference to what is done or written, as well as to what is spoken. In its legal sense " hearsay " evidence is all evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit given to the witness himself, but which rests also, in part, on the veracity and competence of some other person.* Such evidence is rejected not only because it is not given upon oath, because it co -not be tested by cross-examination, and because it supposes soma better testimony, which might be adduced in the particular case, but also because of its tendency to protract legal investigations to an embarrassing and dangerous length, its intrinsic weakness,* its incompetency to satisfy the mind as to the existence of the fact, and because of the frauds which might be practised with impunity under its cover.* § 571. Nevertheless, the rule excluding hearsay evidence (though in general admu^iblj calculated for trials before popular tribunals) may in particular inittanc ^s work considerable injustice. For example, on a question respecting Wv> competency of a testator, the conduct of his family or relations taking the same precautions in his absence as if he were a lunatic, or his election in his absence to of ejectment, where the same ques- tiou was in issue, and the words charged a« perjury were uttcrwl, such evid'-nce was admitted, as relating to a matter of pedigree : see Annosley v, 1). of Anplesea. 174:1 (Ir.). • R. r. Nunfham Courtney, 1801 ; Ferrj- Frystone, 1801 ; R. v. Hepburn, 1813 (.\m.). * See Stobiirt v. Dryden, 18.'56, where the mutter was much dis- cussed ; and it was pointed out by the Court that the ])iuty adversely affected had nut hud any opportunity of cross-exuniinution. » Or. Ev. § \)\), in groat part. * 1 I'h. Ev. 185. R. t Abergwilly, 1807 ; Mima Queen v, • " Pluris «»t oculatus testis unuB, qunm auriti deoom ; Qui audiuDt, audita dicuut, qui vidont, plane eciunt." I'LAUT. Trucu. Act 2, bo. 6, 1. 8, 9. • Per Marshall, C.J., in Mima Davis v. Wood, 1816 (Am.); E. v. Queen o. llepbum, 1813 (Am.) ; Eriswoll, 179G. 368 CHAP. II.J EXCLUSION OF HEARSAY SOMETIMES UNWISE. some high and responsible oIUcp, or the conduct of a ])hysi(iiin who permitted him to execute a will, are facts which, tliough affording cogent tnoral evidence, are inadmissible as evidence in a court of law, because when considered with ret'crence to tlio matter in issue, they appear to be mere statements expressed in the language of conduct instead of the language of words, and consequently, in fact, only " hearsay." ' Again, on a question of soiiworthiness, the fact that a deceased captain, after examining every part of the vessel, embarked in it with his family, is (for similar reasons) not legal evidence on a question as to the vessel's scavvortliiuess ; * neither, in an action to recover for the loss of insured proi»erty, is the fact that other underwriters have paid on the same policy ,2 nor, on a question of when an act of bankruptcy was committed, and the title to goods arose, is evidence that after the issuing of a fiat, certain creditors of the bankrupt returned to his assignees goods which they had received from tbe bankrujjt previously to the date when he delivered other goods to the delViulant.^ § 572. In the instances given above, as illustrating the occasional inconvenience of the rule, the evidence rejected amounted to some- thing more than the mere dec/arafioiiH of parties not examined on oath, nor subjected to cross-examination ; for these declarations were accompanied bi/ acta done in confirmation of their sincerity, and, as smth, the evidence was, morally speaking, entitltMl to great weight. They were the more entitled to consideration, because if an act done be relevant to the issue, and therefore evidence per se, any declarations accompanying tliat act are — as we shall presently see* — admissible for the purpose of illustrating, qualifying, or completing it. Where, however (as in tliese instances), tlie act is in its own nature irrelevant to the issue, if the declaration be per se inadmissible, the union of the two canjiot reniler them evidence.* S 573. This question was much discussed in a case " whicli was tried four times, where the title to jiroperty depended ujjou the ■lii^ t i ;(! « Post, ^§ :>m «t 80(1. " "^ A. vV' K. ;it;i ; 1 liiiif,'. N. C. 498. ' Wrijjht V. Doo (/. Tiithum, 1837 (Piirko, li,, Vini^liiin, J.). ' 7 A. & K. ;(8T. ;W8. Si'o (Jioliaiu Hotel I'o. c Muiniiii),', ' Hiii'klioiiMo i\ J011C8, 183i). Soo, lsi)7, Ir. hIso, ( ircsliam llotol Uo. v, Muuninfj. " Doo (/. Tiitluiiii v. Wright. 183". ISO 7, Ir. u Si;! !■;! I: !• r'l t DOE d. TATHAM V. WRIGHT. [part III. oompetency of a testator to make a will. The House of Lords (agreeing with the opinion of the majority of the judges, who were divided as mentioned post, in note ^ at end of this section) finally decided, that letters addressed to a person, whose sanity is tlie fact in question, are inadmissible to show that he was sane, though the writers were since dead, and the party was addressed as an intelligent man, unless such letters can be connected by evidence with some act done by such deceased in relation thereto. A great majority of the learned judges also thought that the more fact of finding such letters, many years after they were written, with the seals broken, in company with other papers which bore indorse- ments in the testator's handwriting, in a cupboard under his bookcase in his private room, was insutRciont to i-aise an inference that they had been read, understood, or acted upon by him, because although letters, found in such a situation, would un- doubtedly be evidence against a party crinunallj' a(!eused or civilly charged — since it is a prima facie presumption of law that every man is of sound mind, and it would therefore be assumed tliat the deceased had appreciated the letters ' — yet that to act ujion this presumption in a case where the capacity of the party is the very matter in controversy, would bo to argue in a circle. It would, in fact, be to argue thus : — because the testator had suflicient ability to transact business, the inference arises that he read and under- stood tlie letters ; and because he read and luiderstood the lf'tt(*rs, therefore the inference arises that he had sufficient ability to transact business.'- § 574. If, indeed, the testator, in the case just mentioned, had himself indorsed these letters, or if any direct and positive evidence > Seo 7 A. & E. 3(i» (Onrnoy, B.); id. ;{"») (HosaiKiiict, J.); 4 Bing. N. 0. o:n (Althnson. H.)- ^ Si'o 7 A. & K. :ini (Piirko, B.); 4 Bin^r. X. C. r.4 J (id.) ; id. oM (Alder- son. B.); id. oO'J, .•)()4 (ColoridKO.J.); id. .')2J, iVJCi (l'attfs..ii, J.). Tho letters rejected in this ease were three. Is't. A letter of gratitude to the testator from iv eleigyinan to whom he had formerly given pro- forment; 2nd. A letter of friendship from a relative, with whom tho testator was proved to havo corro- apondod three years afterwards ; 3rd. A letter advising tho testator to direet his attorney to take steps in a transaction with a certain parish. This letter was indorsed by the attor- ney, who was long since deceased. Throe of tlio judges considered that all the letters were admissible, six thought that tho last was. The remaining judges, including Tiords Brougham, T/yndhurst, ami Cotten- ham. held thiit all the letters were alike inadmissible. 370 Hi CHAP. II.] HEARSAY AND ORIGINAL EVIDENCE. had he(ii\ given to show that he had, wliether by act, speech, or writing, manifested a knowledge of their contents, tlie letters could not have been rejected, or in any way withdrawn from the consideration of the jury ; for although they would then have been admitted solely on the technical ground that they explained and il'istrated his conduct, no rule of law could have prevented them from operating with full effect upon the minds of the jury, as showing the unbiassed opinions of the writers, and in what manner the testator had been treated by them.' S 575. The Probate Division is now bound by statute to recog- nise the rules of evidence observed in the other Divisions of the High Court,'^ and would therefore appear to bo bound to follow the decision in the case just mentioned.* § 57 G.^ It does not follow that, because the writings or words in question are those of a third person not iinder oath, they are therefore to be considered as " /icarsft;/." On the contrary, it often happens that the very fact in controversy is, whether certain things were written, or spoken, and not whether they were tn(p ; and at other times the oral or written statements tendered in evidence may be the natural or inseparable concomitants of the principal fact in controversy.* In either of these cases it is obvious that the writings or words are not within the meaning of hearsay, but are original and independent facts, admissible in proof of the issue. Thus, if the question be whether a party has acted prudently, wisely, or in good faith, the iiifornudion on which he acted, wh<<1ier true or false, is original and material evidence. Illustration of this" often u'>cur in actions for malicious prosecu- !l » 7 A. & E. 323 (Ld. Doiiinan); 4 Uiiifj. N. C. 500 (ColcridKo, J.); id. oM) (Aldi'i-soii, \\.)\ iil. olO (Williiiins, J ); i<l. .J()7 (Tindiil, C.J.). ' "Tlie Sii])r. Ct. of Jud. Aci, 1873 " (:JG & 37 V. c. G(i), ^ 1« ; "The Supr. ( 't. of Jud. Act, 187 J " (38 & 39 V. c. 77), § 18. ' Whon tho cci'loHinsticiil trihuniils woro courts of probiito, they iidi)|itud II diffiiront rule from thiit cHtiibliwhod liy tho ciiso of Doe d. Ttithani v. Wright ; and in (juoHtioiiH rcspocting the Qiuutul capacity uf a testator, they ailinitto<l, as cvidcnco of Iridtinint, IcttorH writt(!ii to liim hy liis fricinl.s, without i)roof of any recognition on hiw putt (Moigiin v. JJoys, l,S3(i (Sir li. Jcnncr) ; llundh^y v. Jones, \K,i(>; WittiTH r. Jlowlott, 1S31 (Sir J. Nicholl) )■ — and, as cvidcnco of a/ii- in'iiii, letters written by his rehitivea even to otlier piirtics : AVheelur v, Alderson, 1.S31 (Sir J. Nicholl). * (Ir. Mv. § 1(10, in great j)art. » IJartlctt ('. Dolprat, lH{)H (Am.)} Du Bost ('. Herosford, 1810. • Or. Ev. § 101, in part. 371 H REPLIES AND GENERAL REPUTE. [I'AKl III. tion,^ or libel ; * and in cases of agency, and of trusts. Thus, in an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff— to show that the magistrate's Ipniency in admitting him to bail was occasioned, not by the intercession of the defendant, but by a letter said to have come from a great personage — may give such letter in evidence, without proof that it was written by that personage's autlioiity.^ A defendant in such a case may state that he acted on the advice of a magistrate in what he did.* An affidavit by a clerk of prosecutor's soliciH)r, used on an applicatio for bail stating that means had been taken on the part of the ^j. isecutor to prevent a person from becoming bail for the plaintiff, is likewise admissible in such an action as original evidence, without the clerk's being called- to prove by whose instructions he had made it.^ And the replies given to inquiries made at the residence, either of an absent witness, or of a bankrupt, denying that he v/as at home, are original evidence, without examining the persons to whom they ^^ere addressed, inasmuch as to establish the denial (wlii(;h is the only material fact) the testimony of the parties inquiring is sufTicient.® S 577.' This doctrine not only applies whenever the fact that a certain communication was made, and not its truth or falsehood, is the point in controversy ; * but it also extends to those ca^es, where the truth of the fact in dispute will be inferred from the exintcnee of another fact which is under investigation. Thus the exMnicn of general reputation, reputed ou'iirrs/iip, public rumour, tjeneral charaeter, general notoriety, and the like, is prim& facie evidence of its truth. In other words, the fact that the rumour which is in fact com- posed of the speech of third persons not under oath exists, is original evidence and not hearsay ; rumour showing the con- currence of many voices as to the immediate subject of inquiry ' Eavcnga v. Mackintosh, 1824. * Coloman v. Southwick, 1812 (Am.). =• 'hiyXoT V. Williams, 1837. * Mctnnghan v. Cox, 1892 (Am.). • Taylor v. Williame, 18;J7. • Crosby V. Percy, 1808 ; Koy v. Shaw, 1HH2 ; Morgan v. Morgan, 1h;}2; Suninor v. Williama, 1809 (Am.); I'ollotreau v. Jackson, I8.t.'l (Am.); Phelps v. Foot, 1816 (Am.). VVlioro it is necessary to show, not only that diligent search has been mane for a witness, bnt that he is actually absent, such evidence is not admissible. 8oe ante, §§ 475, 617. ' nr. VjV. § 101, in part. « Wl.it.'lic-ii(l c. .Scott, 1830; Shott V. St:v,illirl,l, 1830. ^72 'W CHAP. II.] NOTORIKTY WHEN ORIGINAL EVIDENCE. raises a presumption that the fact ia which they concur is true.^ li 57(S. For example, f/rnrral ^epi'tation is usually admissible to establish the fact of parties being married."^ In many of the reported oases on this subject the marriage has been proved by evidence of certain specific facts, such as the parties being received into society as man and wife, being visited by respectable families in the neighbourhood, attending church and public places together, and otherwise demeaning themselves in public, and addressing each other, as persons actually married.* liut mere general evidence of reputation in tue neighbomuond, even wlien un- supported by facts, or when partially contradicted by evidence of a contrary repute,* will be receivable in ptoof of marriage. Indeed, the uncorroborated statement of a single witness, who did not appear to be related to the parties, or to live near them, or to know them intimately, but who asserted thnt he had heard they were married, has been after verdict held sutficiont prima facie to warrant the jury in finding marriage, the adverse pr.rty not having cross- examined the witness, nor controverted the fact by proof.'^ And a fact, as, e. </., a marringe, may be even established by reputation, though one of the parties to it denies it." § 579. Upon somewhat similar grounds, on a prosecution for conspiring to procure large meetings to assemble for the purpose of inspiring terror in the comnnmity, a witness may be called to prove that several persons not examined at the trial had cornjiliiined to him thai, they were alarmed at these meetings, and had re- quested him to send for military assislance;" and on a question whether a libellous painting represents a certain individual, the » Foulkosv. Sollwiiy, 1800; Jonoa »'. I'oiTV, 17!l(i; Olivor v. Baitluft, 1H1!»; (JiiiT *'. liuttou, INK). - Kxci'])t in jM'titioii.s for (liiiiuifrfis for utlultcry und prosecutions for liifjamy, wlicro, as wi^ have soor (unto. § \''l), t^trict iiroof is roqiiirod. * Kay V. 1 )ut'lK's.so (1(1 Vi('r.:i", 1811; Ili^rvoy V. Ilcrvov, 1"".'5 ; I'irt v, Harlow, 1770; Head r. Passer, 1704; licader )'. I'.airy, 170.'); I)oe c. I'Mi iti- iiifj, 1827; (JoodiiiMii c. (Jooiliiian, I8j8 ; biuitli i'. JSiuith, 1811; liaiii- (Ilall, 1878 .•57 miok I'. Bronson, 1S12 ; In r(> Taylor, 181'J. Tliese iniu'lit possil)ly be jmi; iijHUi tli(! f^roiiiid tliat tliey aiiioiiiit to (iilm<8sioiii> by the parties thom- solvos. * I.yle i: Ellv.ood, 1S74 V.-('.j; Collins r. Bisliop, (Malins, V.-('.). * I'lvans c. >lorfi;iin, 1S;{2. « I'lllidtt r. Totnes l.i.ion, l.SO.'J. ' R. r. N'iiiouiit, 1840 , Uedl'ord v. Birley, 1822. ■ F.XI'RlvSSIONS OF BODILY OR MENTAL FEELINGS. [PT. III. declarations of spectators while looking at the picture in the exhibition are admissible.* § 580.^ Whenever the hodily or mental /pcliiiffs of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelings, made at the time in question, are also original evidence. If they were the natui-al language of the affection, whether of body or mind, they furnish satisfactory evidence, and often the only proof, of its existence. And the question whether they were real, or feigned, is for the jury to determine. Thus, the representations by a sick person of the nature and effects of the mahdi/ under which he is labouring are receivable as original evidence, whether they be made to the medical attendant, or to any other person, though the former are naturally entitled to greater weight than the latter, inasnmch as a physician is far more capable than a man unacquainted willi the symptoms of diseases, of forming a correct judgment respecting the accuracy of the statements.' ^ (JSl. Accordingly, on a trial for murder by poisoning, state- ments made by the deceased in conversation shortly before he took the poison, have been received in evidence for the purpose of proving the slate of his health at that time.* In actions or in- dictments for assault, what a man has said about himself to his surgeon is evidence to show what he suffered by reason of the asirault;* on an indictment for highway robbery, the fact that tlie I Du Bost r. Berosford, 1810 (Ld. Ellonboroujjh). » Gr. Ev. § 102, in part. ' Avosou V. lid. Kiiiniiird, 1805 ; E. V. Bliimly, 17.>2 ; Chvy v. Younj!;, 1823 (Am.) ; Gilchrist v. Bale, 1839 (Am.). To such tin extent has this doctrine been carried that whore, in an action by a husband uiMin a policy of insurance on the lite of his wife, the question was ns to the state of the wife's health at the time when the policy was etVected, a wit- ness for the defendants was aUowed to state the result (jf a conversation with the deceased, which took ]ilaco shortly after the surf,'eon who was consulted in olYecting the insurance had given a certificate of her heiiltli. in the course of wiiieh tlii^ decea>ed had expressed an ajipreheusiou that she should only live u lew dujs, and had added that she had not been well from a time preceding her being ex- amined by the surgeon. The con- versation being held admissible, al^'hough at that time it was a general rule that the declaration of a wife against her husband must be ex- cluded Cseo, now, 10 & 17 V. c. 83), as the argeon liad been first called by the plaintiff, and had admitted that ho had formed his opinion respecting her health, j)rincipally from the satisfactory answers which she then gave to his inquiries : Avcsoa V. Ld. Kinnaird, lcS{»,j. In Witt v. Witt and Xlin.lworth, 1862, Sir 0. Cresswell rejected Idtura written by a patient to a medical man describing his symptojns. Sed ipi. * K. ('. Johnson, 1.S47 (Alderson, B.); B. V. JUandy. 17.)2. " Avesou V. Ld. Kiunaiid. 1803 3r4 '( !*' CH. II.] EXPRESSIONS OF BODILY OR MENTAL FEELINGS. prosecutor, a few hours after the attack made upon him, com- plained to a constable that he had been robbed, will perhaps be admissible.* In prosecutions for rape, proof that the woman shortly after the injury complained that a dreadful outrage had been perpetrated upon her, would seem to be receivable as inde- pendent evidence ; "^ and if the prosecutrix were called as a witness, such complaints would a fortiori be admissible as tending to confirm her credit.* In no case, however, can the pm'tkuJnrH of the com- plaint be disclosed by witnesses for tlie Crown, either as original, or as confirmatory evidence, but the details of the statement can only be elicited by the prisoner's counsel on cross-examination.* § 582. In consequence, too, of the general rule * that the menial feelings of individuals may be shown by proof of what they naturally expressed at the time, in petitions for damages on the ground of adultery ,*• if it be material, with the view to damages, to ascertain upon what terms tlie husband and wife lived together before the seduction, their language and deportment towards each other, their correspondence together, and their conversations and correspondence with third persons, are original evidence.' But here, to guard against abuse, it is required to be proved by some evidence, independent of the date appearing on the face of the letters,^ that they were written by the wife to the husband prior to J I (Lawrence, J.) ; R. v, Guttiidgo, 1840 (I'arko, B.). ' R. V. Wink, 18;54 ; commented ipon (Cresswcll, J.) in R. v. Osborne, .842. The witness, however, cannot be further asked whether on making the complaint, prosecutor mentioned anyone's name : Id, » R. V. Megson, 1840 (Holfe, 1?.); R. V. Osborne, 184U (Cresswell, J.); R. V. Lunny, 18,j4 (Monahan, C.J.). In R. c. Uuttridge, 1840, whcsre a proseciitiix for a rape was absent from the trial, J'arke, 15., rejected proof of her complaint, ai)i)arently on the ground that it was only confir- matory evidence. " R. V. ^leg8(m, 1840; R. >■. Clarke, 1817; R. V. Wood, 1877 (liramwell, L. J.). ♦ R. V. Walker, 18;J9 (Parke. B.); R. V. Osborne, 1842 ; R. v. (iuigley, 1842 (Torreus, J.), J.r. But see R. a: V. Wood, 1877 (Bramwell, L.J.). It is ditlicult to see u])on what jirinciple this rule is fouiuled, wliia'e the com- plaint is olfcred as conHrmatory (evi- dence ; because, if witnessi's were ])ermitted to ndate all that the pro- secutrix had said in nuiking her original comi>laint, such evidcnco would furnish the best test of the acciuacy of iier recollection, when she was sworn to describe tli(! same circumstances at the trial : see R. v. Walker, 18;}!». ' Su])ra, § .)80. « See 20 & 21 V. c. 8o ("The Matri- monial Causes Act, bS,J7 "), § 'M. ' Trelawney v. Coleman, 1817; Willis r. Bernard. l.S.'{2; Winter »•. Wroot, 1n;{4 (Ld. livndhurst) ; Uil- clirist r. Bale, l8;j!) (Am.). " Ti'elawney r. Coleman, 1817 (Ilolrovd, J.); Ilouliston v. Smyth, 182j (Best, C.J.)' 5 ii'fj If % it 'i i' ! DOCTKINK OP liKS OESTiE. [I'T. Ill any suspicion of misconduct on lier part, and, consequently, at a time when it cannot be supposed that there was any reason for collusion.' It is not, however, necessary, in the absence of other suspicious circumstances, to explain why the husband and wife were living apart at the time when the letters were written,^ though of course it is expedient that such explanation should, if possible, be given. § 583.' Another rule is that decorations and arts which form what is called part of the res gestoe are not regarded as hearsay, but admitted as original evidence. It is not easy to exj)lain of what the res gestae consists. The best explanation of the prin- ciple which admits evidence of res gesta) is this. The affairs of men consist of a complication of circumstances, so intimately interwoven as to be hardly separable from each other. Each owes its birth to some preceding circumstance, and each in tvirn becomes the prolific parent of others : each, during its existence, has its inseparable attributes, and its kindred facts, materially affecting its character, and essential to be known, in order to a right understanding of its nature. Consequently, these surrounding circumstances may always be shown to the jury along with the principal fact, as it constitutes part of the res gestce, in other words of the transaction if looked at in its entirety and as a whole. It is impossible to say in each case how the individual jiidge will exercise his discretion. For there are no fixed principles for dealing with this question ; * the application of the doctrine of res gestae is consequently hard to understand. Lord Blackburne once sarcastically remarked to another counsel in the editor's hearing, that if one tenders inadmis- sible evidence, he should, if it is in chief, say that " it is part of the res gestae," and, if it is in re-examination, that " it arises out of the cross-examination." Perhaps the best general idea of what is meant by res gestae, is that this expression includes everything that may be fairly considered " an incident of the event under conside- ration." The following examples may serve as illustrations of » Edwards v. Crock, 1801 (Ld. Kenyon) ; Trelawney v. Colouian, 1817 ; Wilton v. Wob.ster, 1835 (Cole- ridf»o, J.). Soe Wyiidham's Divorce Bill, l«oa, H. L. ' Trelawuoy v. Coleman, 1817. ' Gr. Ev. § 108, in groat part. * Per Parke, J., in Eawson v. Haigh, 1824; Kidloy v. Oydo, 1832; Poolw. Bridfres, 182') (Am.); Allen r. Duncan, 1831 (Am.). 376 '1 CHAP. II.] DOCTRINE OF RES OEST^. rulings upon the point, and would doubtless be followed if ever a similar, or nearly similar, state of matters arose. Thus, on the trial of Lord George Gordon for treason, the cry of the mob, who accompanied the prisoner, was received in evidoniie, as forming part of the res gestoo, and showing the character of the principal fact.^ What the driver of a train said directly after a child has been knocked down by his train is also evidence.^ On an indict- ment for manslaughter, a statement as to liow the accident happened, made by the deceased immediately after he was knocked down, has been held admissible.^ Even evidence as to what the wife said immediately after the occurrence, was received in an action by husband and wife for wounding the wife.* Directions given by an alleged owner of goods to a person to whom lie hus given actual possession of such goods, to the efPect that the goods are to be treated as a certain person, who has since become bankrupt, should direct on calling, are evidence on a question of title arising between the alleged owner of such goods and the bankrupt's assignees.* § 584. Generally where a person enters upon laud to take advantage of a forfeiture, to foreclose a mortgage, to defeat a dis- Ecisin," or the like ; or changes his actual residence, or doniicil,' or is upon a journey, or leaves his home, or returns thither, or remains abroad, or secretes himself; or, in fine, does, or suffers, any other act material to be understood ; * his declarations made at the time of the transaction, and expressive of its character, motive, or object, are regarded as " verbal acts, indicating a present purpose and intention," and are therefore admitted in proof, like any other material facts.^ Thus, in a suit for enticing away a servant, his ' E. V. Ld. George Gordon, 1781- * Ilcruies V. Chicago Ry. Co., 18i». (Am.): International Hy. Co. V. Andor- 8011, 1891 (Am.). Compare, po.st, note ' to § 584. ' R. V. Foster, 1834 (Parke and Patteson, JJ., and Gurney, B.), queHtioned by Cockburu, C.J., in K. . Bedingtield, 1879, and in a Hubseqiient pamphlet, but supported by the author in a letter to the Cliief Justice in reply, published l)v Messrs. Maxwell in 1880. * Thompson v. Trevanion, 1694 (Ld, Holt). ' Sharp I'. Newsholme, 1839. ' Co. Lit. 49 b, 245 b ; Bobidou v. Swott, 1825 (Am.). ' Brodic v. liiodie, 18(il. * I'arrott v. Watts, 1877; Mutual Life, &c. V. Ilillman, 1892 (Am.). » IJateman u. Bailey, 1794, anil the observations of Mr. Evans upim it, in 2 I'otli. Obi. App. No. xvi. § 11; Rawson v. llaigh, 1824; Yacher v. Cocks, 1829 (Ld. Tenter- den); Smith V. Cramer, 1835; Doe V. Arkwright, IHM (I'arko, B.); Lord V. Colvin, 1857 ; Gorham v. Canton, lb28 (Am.); Thorndiko v. City of Boston, l,S4U(Am.); Lund v. Tvngsborough, 1851 (Am.). In R. v. Edwards, 1S72, Ciuain. J., on a trial of wile miuder, allowed a witness to 'h 877 i DOCTKINK OF RES GESTiE. [ VMIT HI. fitatement at tlie time of leaving his master will be received, as tending to show the mot ire of his departure.' Similarly, upon an inquiry as to the state of mind, sentiments, intentions, or opinions ^ of a person at any particular period, his contemporaneous declara- tions are admissible as parts of the res gestoo, though evidence of this nature is seldom entitled to much weight.'' *i 585. The operation of the doctrine that statements may be admissible in some cases as part of the res gestie is so extensive tha*. it may sometimes even override the general provision of law, whi A\ precludes a party's declarations from being evidence for himself. For example, in an action for falsely representing the solvency of a stranger, whereby the plaintiffs were induced to trust him with goods, statements by them at the time when the goods were supplied, that they trusted him in consequence of the representation, were received as evidence on their behalf ; * and in au ^tion against a bailee for loss by negligence, his declarations, contemporaneous with the loss, are, in America, admissible in his favour, as tending to show the nature of the loss.^ But witnesses called to speak to what defendant said at a meeting held on a certain date, though they may be cross-examined as to the whole conversation at that meeting, cannot be asked (with a view to explaining his intentions or conduct) what defendant said on other occasions." § 5Kt). In the practical application of the doctrine as to the admission of evidence as part of the res gestoe, two points deserve especial attention. The first is, tnat declarations, — though adniis- pible as evidence of the declarant's kiwnledyc or bi'licf of the facts to which they relate, and of his intentions respecting them, — are no atatc whiit the wifo had siiiil about hor hiisbiiiul a wook boforo lior dxiith, oi! biin},'iii}^ to tho oottugo of tlio wit- nc^ss an iixo anil carving knit'o to bo takoii euro of. ^I'd tin. as to this caso. ' Iladlcy L'. Carter, IK.'JJ. p't-o, however, K. V. "SVainwright, 1H76 (("ockburn, C.J.), and il. v. Took, 1.HT1 (Hovill.O.J,), etqu. InBosccxi's Niwi Trills (Kith odit. Vol. 1. p. (Jl!»). it is stated that tho declarations of a coachdrivor as to tho loss of a parcel sent hy coach aro evidenco aj^ainst )iis iiiiistc, and Mayhew c. Nelson, 1S:<:{. is cited for this. But tho jiro- jiosition is too broadly stated , decla- rations by a servant aro only evidenco 37 if maile at the time. See ante, § .js:j. * Bartholomy v. The People, &c., 184'2 (Am.). ^ lio(l<j:son V. Do Beauehosno, 1858 (Dr. Lii.shington), cited with appro- bation (Jessel, M.Il.) in Doiicet v, Geoghc^an, 1878; Ilaldano v. Iv'k- ford, 18(i!> (James, L.J.) ; and Dou- cet V. Geoghegan, 187K 'id.). ■» Fellowes v. Williamson. 1829 (Ld. Tenterden). See, also, Miluo v, Leislor, 18(i2. i- Story, Bail. ^ 'M9 ; citing Tom- kins )'. Saltniarsh, 182(j. See, also, Beardsleo r. Kichanlsou, 183U(Am.). « Soe 21 ilow. St. Tr. 542, 54 J (1781). 8 C. II.] WHAT DECLARATIONS FORM PART OF RKS GK.ST.15. proof whatever of the facts themselves. If it he necessary to sliow tlie existence of such facts, proof aliunde must be laid before the jury. Indeed, it seems that, in strict practice, this proof should bo given in the first instance, before the court bo called ui)on to receive evidence of the declarations. For instance, the fact of insolvency must be established before statements of the insolvent to show that he wajs aware of his embarrassed circumstances will be admitted.' § 587. The second point to be observed with regard to the admission of hearsay evidence is, that, although acts, by whom- soever done, are res gestro when they are relevant to tlie matter in issue,* yet if they be irrelevant, both the acts themselves and the declarations qualifying or explaining tliem will be rejected. For instance, in an action against a town for injuries sustained through a defect in a highway, the declarations of a surgeon, since de- ceased, made at the time of his examining the plaintiff's wounds, have been rejected as evidence of the nature and extent of the injuiies, since the fact of the surgical examination would itself have been immaterial, and the declarations were no more than the mere hearsay expression of a professional opinion.* To non-atten- tion to this principle was due one of the main fallacies in support of the contention that letters written to a person are evidence (which we have seen that they are not) * in support of his sanity. For such a letter, if admissible at all, must be so, either because the act done in writing and seeding it is evidence in itself, or because the opinion which is inferentially expressed by it being donw is evidence. But the act done (that of writing and sending the letter) is ' Thomas V. Conncll, 18;J8; Craven V. IliiUiloy (no date), (Parko, B.); Vachor v. Cocks, 1829. Souiotinies, indi'od, nndor the law relating to bankrupts, the truth of the facts need not bo i>r()ved. Again, if an act roliod on as an act of bankruptcy be an absenting witli intent to delay creditors, a declaration by the baiik- ruj)t that he left home to avoid a writ will be admissible, though no evidence bo given that any writ was actually out against him, because, in order to coiistituto this act of bank- ruptcy, neitlier writ nor pressure is in fact uecessaiy (Jlouch v. Gt. West. 3 Ey. Co., 1841 ; Newn)an r. Stretch, 182i» (I'arke, J.); K.\ i)artc Miiniford, 1809; iJobson r. Eolls, l,s;i;i); but the d(!parture from home, wliich is the siibstantivo net, must bi' ))roved by evidence indcpciidcnt of the do- cbiratiou ; and being an iict in its(>li enuivttcal, the stati'umnt c>l thf liank- rujit, niiidt' (lui'iiig its cciuiiiiuitnce, is adniis>ibl(' to show tl>e iiitriitinii with which it was done. « Wright i\ Doe (/. Tatlinm, I8:J7 (Parke, li.). ' Lund V. Tyngoborough, 1815 (Am.). * Supra, § 572. 9 m '! i!(iJ3l I: I ■■ fl j ■1.1 WHAT DECLARATIONS FORM PART OF RKS (ilvST-E. [l>. KI (like tlie medical exiiminatiou iu tlio case just cited) obviouMlv immatorial to the strict issue (that of sanity or insanity) ; and ' where the declaration jier se cannot he received, no ease has yet establislied that tlie union of the two things (the irrelevant act and the accompanying declaration) will rcndijr them admissihle.* § 5H8. In all these cases the principal points for consideration are, whotlier the circiinnifdiircs and (frc/drafioii.s offered in i)roof were 80 coniipctcd iritli the main fart under ccmsideration as to illustrate its charactir, to further its object, or to form, in conjunction with it, one continuous transaction. It was at one time thoUght neces- sary that they should bo coitfritiporrniroiis with it ; * but it seems now to be deinded, that, although concurrence of time must always bo considered as material evidence to show the connection, it is by no means essential.^ For example, what a bankrupt said imme- diately on his return home, as to the place where he had been, and his motive in going, is admissible ; * where a disputed act of bank- ruptcy is whether a transfer was fraudulent or not, a declaration by the bankrupt, iu which he gave a false account of the matter, made nearly a month after it had taken i)laee, to a creditor, who had pressed for payment of his debt immediately before the transfer, and had been promised security for the following day ; when, instead of keeping his word, the bauknijit had transferred his property to a relative, and had absconded, was held to be receivable in evidence." And where a trader had absented himself from home during the latter half of February and the commence- ment of March, two letters written by him on the IGth of Januar}-, in which he had asked for time on some bills of exchange payable iu February, were admitted in evidence, as tending to throw light * As before obspr%'e(l. § 572. « So2 per CultiiiHii, J., in Wright V. Dot! (/. Tiitliiuii, 18;J7, ante. § 52. ' This Ki'ouis still to bo the law in Aiiu'ricu. In Enos v. Tattle, IK'-'O (Am.), Ilosmer, f'.J., observed, that (It'ilaiiitioiiH, to become pnit of the res jjesliv, "must have been made (it fill- tiiiif ii/lhf (irl (!iiiii\ which they are suiijjo^ed to (•hara(t((ii/o. and have been well calcnlati'd to unfold tlie natui'ti and ij[uality of the facts tlu'V were intended to explain, and so to harmonize with tlu-ni. as obviously to constitute one transaction.'' * Kouch V. Cit. West. Ky. Co., 1841. ' Iktemnn V. I3ailey, 1794; recop:- ni/.ed by the court in Kouch v. (.It. West. K'v. Co., 1841. « IJidrey V. Gyde, 18:52; disson- ticnto Gasoleo, J., but reeopnized and cnnfirmed in IJouch v. Gt. West, liy. Co., 1841. yso H j; ! 0«;- i' ■1'^ te> : niAP. 11.] NARRVTIVES OF PAST EVENTS INADMISSIMLE. mi tilt) cause of his absonco.' Indeed, tlipse cases oxoinplify the ivinarks of Mr. Justioo Park,^ namely, " that it is iniiiossiiilo to tie down to time the rule as to the doitlarations," and that, if eon- iK'ctinjT circumstances exist, a declaration may, oven at a month's interval, form part of the whole res gestoo. S 589.' Still, an ar". cannot bo varied, qnalifird, or explained, either by a declarati(»n which amounts to no more than a mere iiiirrafiiv of a past occurrcnrr, or by an inolafi'd conversation hold, or an isolated act done, at a later period.* Accordingly, the schedule of an insolvent, delivered four months after his execution of a deed of assignment, has been rejected, when tendered by the assignees as evidence that the indenture was executed with intent to peti- tion ; * and where a creditor called upon a bankrupt in the morning, and being told that he was out, paid a second visit in the evening of the same day, when the bankrupt made a statement respecting his absence in the morning, this statement was held inadmissible for the purpose of showing that the bankrupt had intentionally denied himself to his creditors, it being, he considered, too remote in point of time from the absence which it purposed to explain,* But declarations made, or letters written, during absence from home, explanatory of the motive of departure, are nevertheless admissible as original evidence, the departure and absence being regarded as one continuing aot.' § 590.* Similar principles to those just mentioned, namely, that the acts and the declarations must be connected together as regards time and otherwise, apply to the reception of evidence of the acts and declarations of one of several individuals in a company of conspirators as evidence against his fellows. Here, a foundation should first be laid by proof, sufficient, in the opinion of the judge, to establish primrv facie the fact of conspiracy between the parties, or, at least, proper to be laid before the jury, as tending to establish such fact. The connexion of the individuals in the unlawful enterprise being ' Smith V, Cramer, 1835. * In Eawson v. Haigh, 1824. Gr. Ev. § 110, slightly. Hyde v. Palmer, 1862. Peacock v. Harris, 1836. Lees V. Marton, 1832 (Parke, B.). It is, however, hardly possible to reconcile this case with Bateman v. Bailoy, 1794, cited ante, § 588, n. *, and it possibly would now ' be con- sidered as applying the principle stated in the tcixt too strictly. ' Eouch I'. Gt. West. Ey. Co., 1841 ; Eawson r. Ilaigh, 1.S24. " Gr. Ev. § 111, in groat part. 381 I ) ACTS AND DECLARATIONS OF CONSPIRATORS. [PART II F. thus shown, every act and declaration of each member of the con- fed»Ta<-y, in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and with reference to the common object, is, in contomj)lation of law, tho act and declaration of them all; and is, therefore, original evidence against each of them.' § 591. Sometimes, for the sake of convenience, the acts or declarations of one are udtuitted in evidence before proof of the conspiracy has been given ; the prosecutor undertaking to furnish such pnx)f in a subsequent stage of the cause. ]3ut this mode of prof-eeding rests in the discretion of the judge, and in seditious or other general conspiracies is seldom permitted, except under par- ticular and urgent circumstances. If it were, the jury might be misled to inter the fact of the conspiracy itself from the declarations of strangers. Still, as a conspiracy need not be established by proof which actually brings the parties together, but may be shown, like any other fact, by circumstantial evidence, the detached acts of the different persons accused, including their written correspond- ence, entries made by them, and other documents in their possession relative to the main design, will sometimes from necessity bo ad- mitttnl, as steps to establish the conspiracy itself. On this subject it is difficult to establish a general inflexible rule, an 1 each case must, in some measure, be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.' ^ .0!»2.' It mokes no dilference at what fime the party accuse;! is proved to have entered into the conspiracy or combination ; because every one, who agrees with others to effect a common illegal pur- l^me, is generally considered in law as a party to every act, which either had Wfore been done, or may afterwards bo done, by the confederates, in furtherance of the common design.* One or two m ' h. r. Stone, 17fM>; .Vmoriciin Kui Co. r. U. S.. 1H2!» (.\m.); rrownin- ^hieMfj caw.-. lM;m (A;u.); U. S. i;. licMMliiiff. ISJT .Vm.); »'nm. r. I'ImtIo, 1817 (Aiii.;. In H. r. MKcnnii, \nri (Ir.). I'enm-fathw, I'. J., niiiil:— " It Ih noco«*ary to provf tho existonoe of a conspinirv, and to connw^t the priiiuner with it in tho fiiHt inHtunee, whor»» you HO«'k to ^ivo in eviiltuico a^minr't him tho docliimtion of » co- rf>nf«pirat<»r ; and hiivinj? donn bo, jou ai-e tht-n at lilx'ity to give iu oviili'uco apiiimt tho priHonor acts ilono l)y liny i-f tho parfios, whom you liavo coinu'iti'd with tho con- miinicy ; but wlion a piirtyV own dcclitnitionH ant to bo giv(«n in ovi- donco, Miich pn.'liniinary jiroof is not riMiuinito, and yo.i niiiy, iis in any othrr otYonco, jirovo tho whohi cam) apiinst him by hiH own aihiiiMHions." ■' Soo R. t'. iJhiko, 18M; Ford v. Elliot, 1840. » Or. Ev. 5 111, in part. * H. V. Watson, 1817 (Uayloy, J.), 382 CnAP. II.] ACTS AND DECLARATIONS OF COX.SnUATOUS. individuals may have concocted the scheme, but all who afterwards join in carrying it out are equally guilty with the originators ; ' ut least, if any evidence be forthcoming from which their adoption of the previous acts of the association can reasonably be inferred.' Neither does it matter whether the acts were done, or the declara- tion made, in the prcnencc or in the nhscnrr of the accusfMl, but everything said or done by any one of the consi)irator8 or accom- plices in furtherance of the common object is evidence against each and all of the parties concerned, whetlior they were present or absent, and whether or not they were individually aware of what was taking place.* For example, it is on this principle that (as wo liave seen'*) the cries of a mob, with whoso proceedings the prisoner is connected, though made in his absence, are admissible against him, as explanatory of the objects which he, in common with the multitude, had in view;* proof of expressions used by jtcrsons going to a meeting convened by the defendant is admissible,' and papers supporting a defendant's views, publicly sold at meetings convened by him, may be received in evidence, though no proof be given connecting the defendants with the persons selling the papers.' § 69;}. Care, however, must be taken to distinguish betwcsen declarations, which are either acts in themselves purporting to advance the objects of the criminal enterprise, or which accompany and explain such acts, and those statements (not amounting, of (■i)urse, to admissions by the accused himself), whether written or oral, which, although made during the continuance of the jilot, are in fact a mere uirmtitr of the measures that have already been taken. These last statements are, as before explained," inadmissible. Kor t'xampl's a letter, written by a co-conspirator to a private friend, who was nnconnovited with the plot, giving an account of the j)ro- ceedings of a society to which the writer and the defendant wero proved to have belong(Ml, and enclosing several ."^editions songs htated to have been coniposc^l by the writer, and sung by him at a meeting of the society, has been rejected, on the ground that such ' R.r. Murphy, lH;J7(<'()li>ri(lK0, J.). » K. V. O'Oonn.'ll, lH4;{-4 (Ir.) (roiiuofuthor, C.J.). ' H. V. HnnKhoth, 1H17. « U. V. 1,(1 Gi!o. ndriloii. 1781, Bupi-a, { dtt3 ; citod by buller, J., iu R. r. Hanly, 17!»». Soo R. v. IVtiho- riiii, IN.V). » R. V. Hunt, 1820; R...lf.,nl .;. Uiil..v, 1H'J2. « R. r. O'Comioll, 1S43-4 (Ir.). ^ Autu, § oStf. 888 ^1 li I i I ; ■! :"! mi NARRATIVP:S, descriptions, etc. inadmissible, [p. III. letter was not a transaction in support of the conspiracj', Imt merely a relation of the part wliioh the writer had taken in the plot, and, us such, only admissible against himself.^ On the other hand, a letter written by a co-conspirator to a delegate in the country, describing the events that had occurred in London, and encourtigiiuj him tlivtrhii to prorred in the cruniiial l)Hfiiiirii.s in n-hich he was emjafjed, being considered by the court as an act done in furtherance of the plot, has been received against the defendant, though no evidence was given to show that it had over reached the person for whoso perusal it was intended.* § 504. In a similar way entries in books made in furfh.orance of a conspiracy are admissible,' but memoranda of payments made after the fraud by one conspirator to another are not.* Neither is evidence of a conversation overheard between men apparently rcfnniing from a meeting, lield .Ithin an hour before, about half a mile off, though it be offered as evidence, not only of the general nature of the meeting, but of the eftect that was likely to bo produced by the language there employed.* In a word, the declarations of a conspirator or accomplice are receivable against his fellows only when they are in themselves acts, or when they accompany and explain acts, for which the others are responsible ; but not when they are in the nature of narrative % descriptions, or subsequent confessions. S 590. On a somewhat similar principle, if, after his appre- liension, papers be found on the person or at the lodgings of a co-conspirator, they will be admissible or not against either an alleged conspirator according as there is or Ib not evidence that they existed previously to the arrest of the prisoner who is on his trial. If there bo no such evidence, they will be rejected, as ' a prisoner cannot be responsible for acts or writings, which possibly may not have existed until after the ' R. V. Hardy, 1794 rEyro, C.J., Macdonald, C.U., and llofham, H. ; HuUor and Oroso, JJ., diss.). In U. t'. Watson, IHl", Ld. Kllonborotiuh oliscrvi'd that thcio was a ^Mvat \vi'i;rlit in tho argumcuta of Uullor and UroHO, J J. • B. V. Hardy, supra (^racd'inald, G.1I., Ildthuin, li., Itulltn- and CJruoo, JJ. ; Kyio, (".J., dtibit.). ' It. r. Hlako, 18-14. « Id. » 11. V. OTmmAl lS4.'J-4 fir.). S('i>, iilsd, P.. r. Mui'idiy, W,i' ; U. v. \V.itM.)n, IM7. 3f>4 CHAP. II.] PAPERS FOUND UNPUBLISHED WRITINOS. common enterprise was, so far as he was concerned, at an end ; ' but if their previous existence be established, either by direct jiroof, or by strong presumptive evidence, no objection to their iiilmissibility can prevail.* § 596. On an indictment for conspiracy, unpublished irritiHgs upon nbsfmct subjects are certainly admissible in evidence if it be proved that they were intended to be used in furtherance of the (omraon design.' Possibly, too, such writings, although no proof that they were connected with the common design was given, would be in strictness admissible if they appeared to be closvhj cniinected with the nature and object of the alleged crime ; but unpublished writings upon abstract subjects of a kindred nature with the crime charged, but having no direct relation to it, are ceitdinly inadmissible.'* Where conrersafions of co-conspirators or !ici'omi)lice8 are proved, the effect of the evidence will of course depend upon the surrounding circumstances, such as the fact iitid degree of the prisoner's attention to what was said, and his approval or disapproval thereof.* $i 597. The declaralions of co-trespassers in civil actions are governed by rules similar to those in cases of conspiracy which we have just been considering; that is, if several are jointly sued, the (It'darations of each, which constitute parts of the res gosta?, are iiiliuissible against all ; " while those which amount to more admissions, or narratives of past events, can only be received against the party making them.' Where no common object or • R. V. Hardy, 1794. « U. V. WiitsDii, 1S17. Soo R. V. M<'utt'oit.V, lH(i()-7 (Ir.). Thurc, acts (if iiisuiTi'ction coiuiiiifteil at'tt'i" tho iiirc.st of tho priHoiiur, hut in cou- w(|\i('i\<'() of iiistructionH jrivon hv hull hi^foro lio was mtprflicndtMl, wi'i'ii huld to be adniiw.tihhi in ovi- di'iico on n. charge of consiiiracy to laist' I'tihuiUoii, •• U. I'. Watson, 1817. * In Alpffinon Sidney's case, KiH.'J, (iliMcivi'd ujicin (.Xhhdtt. J.) in U. '•. Watson, 1S17, a tieatiMo eontain- iir_' ^J)eculutive rejmhlican doi triiicH, V liii h not oidy was un|)u)diHh<-ii and iil'imii'iitly unconnected with the tieuiiunablo pructiuub uf which ho was accused, hut liiid heen composed Kovcral ycavH liefoicthf trial, was, in- deed, aihnitted in evich'iict' (Jt^tlVrics, J.). Hut suhsequi'nt times have re- garded this trial as a judicial murder. » K, r. Uardv. ITlij (Kvre. C.I.). • Sc.^ J{. V, llardwi(k,'lM(i<» (I.d. Kllenliorough); I'owdl r. Ilodgctts, l.S'.M) ;(Jarro\v, 1'..); North c. .Miles, l.S()8 (i,d. Kllenhorough) ; Bowshur V. C'allcv, l.Sd.S (id.). ' ]>anicls V. {'(ittcr, IHMO (Tindal, O.J.). The case of Wiicht c. Court, IN'J.V -wheiK ui an action for falso imiirisoiinient, (iarrow, 15., admitted tlie declarations of a co-didendant, showing jiersonal malice, as evidence HI against tho uthur dufundantd, though ii85 ;l<' '■ I U ■ 1 ' ! Nit DECLARATIONS OF PARTNERS. [PART III. motive is imputed, as in actions for negligence, the declaration of each defendant is admissible against himself alone.* § 598.' The principles just discussed also apply to cases of partnership. Whenever any number of persons are associated together in the joint prosecution of a common enterprise or design (as in commercial partnerships, and similar cases), the act or declaration of each member, in furtherance of the common object of the association, is the act or declaration of all. By the very act of association each partner is constituted the agent of the others, for all purposes within the scope of the partnership concern;' unless, under the special circumstances of the case, an intention can be inferred by the jury, that a particular act should not be binding without the direct concurrence of each individual partner.* While the firm thus created exists, it speaks and acts only by the several members; but when that existence ceases by dissolution, the subsequent acts of the individual members are binding on themselves alone,' except so far as otherwise agroed upon by the articles of association or dissolution,^ or as the acts relate to the previous business of the firm.' An instance of this last exce|)t:on arises where one partner in a finn which has been dissolved has admittfcu, subsequently to the dissolution, the payment of a debt due to the firm.* § 599. In cases such as that just instanced, the party making tlie admission must, however, be, at the vime, jointly interested with the parties against whom his statement was tendered in evidence." Where, therefore, a bill was filed to set aside a bond given to a made in their absence, and several weeks after the act complained of — probably would not now De regarded aH a safe proeodout. ' Daniels v. Potter, 18130 (Tindal, C.J.)- ' Or. Ev. § 112, in part. « Saudilandrt v. Marsh. 1819 ; R. v. Hard wick, ISOU; l''ox v. Clifton, ISUO; NichoUs w. Dowdin}?, 181 j; Ilodon- pyl V. VinRorhoed, 1818 ; Van Roims- dyk V. Kane, 1813 (Am.); Coit v. Tracy, 1830 (Am.). Ante, § 185. ♦ Latch V. Wudlake, 1840. » W(M)d V. Ikaddick, 1808 (Sir J. Mausileld); I'etheriok v. Turner, 1802; Kilgourn. Finlyson, 1781). • Burton v. Issitt, 1821 ; Boll v. Morrison, 1828 (Am.). ' Wood V. Bradilick, 1808. See Parker v. ?Iorrell, 1848. » Pritcliard v. Drapw, IH.'JO— 31 (Ld. Brougham). Loomis and Ju(^k- son V. Loomis, 1854 f/.m.), expressly supports the general proposition in the text. • See, and compare, the observa- tions of Ld. Cottenhinn in I'arkor v. MorroU, 1848 ; of the Reporter in S. 0. 4(i4, n. b. ; and of Crcsswoll, J., in S. C. on issue tried at Niai Priui. '686 CHAP. II.] ACKNOWLEDaMENT OF DKIiP HY IWirrNKU. banking firm on the ground of fraud, and before tho connnonoe- ment of the suit, the partner, who originally managed tho trans- action, had retired from the firm, and ceased lO have any longer an interest in the bond, this man's answer was held not to be rei oiv- able in evidence against the continuing partners.' § 600. Moreover, as against other members of a firm, neither a partner's written acknowledgment of a partnership debt, nor written promise to pay it, nor even actual payment by him of the interest, or part payment of the principal due, whether made diu-ing the partnership, or after the dissolution,- will take a case out of the Statute of Limitations.' § 601. It has, indeed, been contended* that a signature by one of several partners, minff the name of the Jinn, will take the ease out of the statute as to all the partners, in a transaction in which all are interested, because a partnership name is tho name of each and every member of the firr^ and the enactment just referred to speaks merely of joint contractors, and does not in terms mention partners, but the contention does not appear to bo tenable.* § 602.^ The declarations of agents are admissible against their principals on grounds very similar to those which gove .i tho de- clarati -\^ of co-partners. The principal constitutes the agent as his representative in the transaction of certain business. Wliat- ever, therefore, the agent does in the lairful prosecution of that business, is tho act of the principal. As Mr. Justice Story observes, " where the acts of the agent will bind tho principal, thoro his representations, declarations, and admissions, resi)outing the subject-matter, will also bind him, if made at the same time, and constitutirg part of the res gestoa." ' They are original evidence and not heu,i>ay ; and, being regarded as verbal acts, they are receivable in evidence without calling tho agont himself to prove them." Still, the admission or declaration of an agent binds liis principal only when made during tho contiiiuanoo of the agency, ' Piirkor V. Morroll, IS'IS. « Bmtow V. Millor, 1848 (Ir.) ; Watson V. Woodmau, IHTo. ^ Teiitordon's Act of » O. 4, o. 14, § 1, umoiulud bv 1» & 20 V. c. !»7, 8. 14 [•'Miiriuiiitilo Law y\im;iidiMfiit Act, IbJO"); JouoBV. liydor, l»a»; Hop- kins V. Lnpui, IS.iO (I'arko, U.). ISuo, also, post, §§ 744, 74j. « Clark c. Alexander, 1SI4. » So.) IJiiHtow V. Milhii', 1848 (Ir.).. • Or. Kv. § li;i, ill jiart. ' Mtoiy, Ag(ai. § i;VJ. " Doo V. lluwkms, 1841. M a.s7 1= In ( ' !1 ' . DECLARATIONS OF AGENTS, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PT. III. in regard to a transaction then depending, et dum fervet opua} When the agent's right to interfere in the pa/tioular matter has ceased, the jjrincipal is no longer affected by his declarations, any more than by his acts, but they will be rejected in such case as mere liearsay.^ § G03. Accordingly, when a horse-dealer, or livery-stable keeper, employs a servant to sell a horse, any statement made by him respecting the horse at the time of sale, even though it amount to a warranty of soundness,' which the servant has been really ordered not to give, will bind the master.* But the servant's declarations or acknowledgments at any other time, whether made to the purchaser or to a stranger, will not be received.* Again, if a letter written by an agent form the whole or part of an agreement, which by the course of his business he was authorized to make, it will be admissible against the principal, but if it be offered as proof of the contents of a pre-existing contract, or if it contain an account of transactions already performed, it will probably be rejected, though addressed to the principal himself ; ^ unless the principal has replied to it, or has otherwise adopted or acted upon it, in which case the agent's letter will be received as explanatory of the principal's conduct.' On the same principle a letter, written diu-ing the voyage, by the master of a ship to the owners, while admissible against the latter as to the facts it states, is not so as evidence of the master's opinion.* The rules are the same as to an engineer's log-book kept during the voyage." '( 'm ' Seo KirkstiiU Brewery Co. v. Fiir- ni'ss llv. Co., 1874 ; lie Devala Prov. Gold Mill. Co., \m?i. •i Fiiirho V. Ilustiups, 1804 (Sir W. Grant); Garth v. Howard, 18:12; Laiighorn v. AUnutt, 1812 (Oibbs, J.); llt'thain t-. lionson, 1818 (Dallas, C.J.); Mortimer v. M'Callan. 1840; 11. V. Hall. 1S;J8 (Littlodule, J.) ; The MociiauicH' hV if Alexandria v. Hk. of Columbia, l^:iO(Am.); llannayr. Stewart, 1837 (Am.); Stockton v. Deinuth, 18:18 (Am.); Stewartson v. Watts, 18;i9(Am.); Uarinf; v. Clark, 18:i7 (Am.); Hk. of Monroe v. Field, 1812 (Am.) ; Story, A^pii §§ IJM. HH. ^ Hrady V. Tod, 1801 (Kilo, C.J.). But thti utii'vaut of a private owuor. intrusted to sell a horse, not at a fair or public mart, but on some one partitnilur oceusion, has no imiilied authority to bind his master by a warranty : Id. 223. See Miller v. Lawton, 1804. « Howard >'. Sheward, 1866. ' Allen V. Densttmo, 18;i9(Kr8kine, J.) ; Helyear v. llawko, 1803 (Ld. KUenborou^h). See, also, Peto v. Hapua, 1804 (Ld. Kllenborough) ; Gt. West. Ry. Co. v. Willis, 18(i5. • Fairlie v. Ilastiiipfs, 1804; Lang- horn V. AUnutt, 1812; Kahl v, Jan- 8en, 1812 ; Reynor v, I'oaraon, 1812 ' Coates )'. I'laiiibridge, 1828. • The Solwav, 188.V • The Earl of Duuiliios, 1886. 888 CH. II,] DKCI.AKATIONS OF AGKNTS, WHEN ADMIS.SinLE. § 604. Sir AVilliam Grant has well exi)lained the law uiion this suhject as follows : ' " As a general proposition," said he, " what one man says, not upon oath, cannot bo evidence against another man. The exception must arise out of some peculiarity of situation, coupled with the declarations made by one. An agent may undoubtedly, within the fcope of liis authority, bind his principal by his agreement, and in many cases by his acts. "What the agent has snid may be what constitutes the agrtn^ment of the principal ; <^v the representations or statements made may be the foundation of, or the inducement to, the agreement. Thertjfore, if writing is not necessary by law, evidence must be admitted to l)roTe that the agent did make the statement or representation. So, with regard to acts done, the words with which those acts are accompanied frequently tend to determine thair quality. The party, therefore, to be bound by the act, must be affected by the words. But, except in one or the other of t'lose ways, I do not know how what is said by an agent can be evidence against his principal. The mere assertion of a fact cannot amount to proof of it ; though it may have some relation to the business, in which the person making that assertion was employed as agent. * * * The admission of an agent cannc. assimilated to the admission of the principal. A party is bound by his own admission ; and is not permitted to contradict it. But it is impossible to say that a man is precluded from questioning or contradicting anything any person has asserted as to him, respecting his conduct or his agreement, merely because that person has been an agent of his. If any fact, material to the interest of either party, rests in the knowledge of an agent, it is to be proved by his testimony, not by his mere assertion." § 605. As the rule admitting the declarations of the agent is founded upon his legal identity with the principal, such declarations only bind the principal so far as the agent had legal power to make them.* For example, the declarations and acts of an agent cannot bind an infant, because an infant cannot appoint an agent ; so that, if an infant, even by letter of attorney, appoints a person to make I r.l * lu Fuii'lie v. Iluatiugs, 1804. ' Soe FauHBott v. FauRSott, 1849 ; Hogg V. OaiTott, 1849 (Ir.). in DKCr.ARATIONS OF AGENTS, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART III. a lea«e, he will not be bound thereby, neither will his ratification bind bini ; but such lease, to be good, must be the infant's own personal act.* Questions of much nicety often occur, where power to make an admission is sought to be inferred by implication from an authority to do a certain act. Thus, whore a wife is authorised, in her husband's absence, to carry on the business of his shop, her admissions, made on application to pay for goods previously delivered at the shop, will be evidence against the husband.* But proof of her acknowledgiuent^ of an antecedent coutraci for the hire of the shop, . of Her agreament to make a new contract for the future occuj^^ ' o* ft, will be rejected, as it cannot be necessary that the % i sh .>a 1 have this extensive power of binding her hudband, for the mere pa ) vse of conducting the business of the shop.^ The declarations of a bank manager made behind the bank's counter as to the usual course of business at a bank are evidence against the bankers.'* The declarations of a pawnbroker's shopman made behind the shop counter that his master had received goodB said to hove been deposited with him in the ordinary course of his business, v/ould probably be admissible against the master, because it migh^- well be assumed that the shopman was authorised to answer any inquiries respecting the goods, made by persons interested in them. But if, in the case last suggested, the admission related to a transaction unconnected with the immediate business of the shop, — as, for instance, if it refeiTed to the loai- of several hundred pounds on a single pledge at five per cent, interest, — it would not be received.' So again, although the solicitor of a judgment creditor may fairly be assumed to have acted as his client's agent in directing the issue of a fi. fa., because the taking such a step might be essentially nocessary for the benefit of the client, yet special instructions to seize particular goods cannot be considered within the scope of any implied authority.^ § 606.' To sum up : there are fhrrr rianscs of dcclnratiom, which though treated under the head of hearsay, are, in truth, original k::\ '' 1 ife*;.. \ ^^ ■ ^ ■ 1 l^s '^^ V '■ ;■ ■ A ET . '.: bl kk M > Doe V. Roberts, 1847 (Parke, B.). See Hargmve v, Hargravo, 1850. » ClitYdrd V. Burton, 182.'}. * Meroditli v. Foutuor, 1843. * Siimmovs v. London Joint Stock Bunk, l>Si»(l. » Oiirth r. riowunl, 1832. « Smith V. Koal. 1882. C. A. ' Gr. liv. § 123, iu great part. 390 CHAP. II.] THREE CLASSES OF DECLARATIONS EVIDENCE. evidence. The first class consists of cases where the fact that the declaration was made, and not its truth or falsity, is the point in question ; the second includes expressions of bodily or mental feelings, where the existence or nature of such feeli^igs is the subject of inquiry ; and the third class embraces all other cases, in which the declaration offered in evidence may be regarded as part of the res gostoe. These classes are all involved in the principle of the last, and have been separately treated merely for the sake of greater distinotness. :'! 391 4 ,\ 1 . )l ??J« 391 » AMi:i:i('AN NOTKS. AMKHICAX NOTES. [I'AH'r- III. Declarations part of the Res Oestae. — Among the statements of persons not witnesses to wliioli tlie rule excluding hears;iy does not apply are statements admitted "as part of the res gestie." In this phrase both the term "part" and the term "res gestii" are the subject of contli(!ting interpretation and no small amount uf ambiguity. Jiis (itstfe. — It would probably be ditttcult, if not impossible, to give a wholly satisfactory definition of the phrase res gesUe. As is said by the supreme court of Georgia, "The dittieidty of formulat- ing a description of the res gestie which will serve for all ciiscs seems insurmountable. To make the attempt is something like try- ing to execute a portrait which sliall enable tlie possessor to recog- nize every member of a very numerous family." Cox r. State. (!l Ga. .'574, 410 (1879). The Latin expression imi)lies the idea of action, of something done ; yet, as emi)loyed in the law of evidence, facts as well as acts are among the res gesta;. Thus, on an indii't- ment for murder, the bullet taken from deceased's body of the same kind as that carried by a pistol habitually carried by the prisoner, and burglar's nippers identified as prisoner's and found near .scents of homicide, were lield to be admissible " as part of the res gestie." Williams i>. Com.. Sr> Va. 007 (ISSO). Very possibly, tiiis con- venient ambiguity constitutes no small part of the attractiveness of the phrase. The res gestae of any case ai)parently embraces all such facts as unite to constitute the state of affairs for which legal <'oii- se(p;enoes are claimed. Under such a definition, many facts may be entirely relevant to the issue, and consequently admissible, without assisting to constitute the res gestie. Legal liability in any ease is predicated upon the existence of some particular "transaction" or stute of affairs. It is this group of facts or events which make up its res gcstie. Obviously the degree of remotenes« which excludes a relevant fact from being considered part of the res gestie will be largely a matter of judicial discretion, and one in which considerable diversity of opinion may be fairly expected. Courts have experienced considerable difficulty in fixing the point of time over which the res gestie extends. Where the (piestion is as to whether the intercourse between a man and woman living together as husband and wife is matrimonial or meritricious, the res gesta* covers the entire period of their living together, and includes the declarations as well as the acts of the parties tending to characterize their intercourse. In n- Taylor, 1) I'aige, on (1842). On an indictment for assaidt with intent to miirder, the acts of persons present and apparently co-operating with the prisoner in \ 7'; CHAP. II.] AMKKK'AN NOTKS. 3<>12 his attempt to intercept the prosecutor, on the ocoasion of th(^ as- sault, are jiart of the res gestie. Uoss r. State, (VJ Alii. L'L'4 (IHT.S). Niiiiierous illustrations of this tlilHoulty will appear in tlic fiirllier consideration of the topic;. I)i:ci,Ai!ArioNs MAv coNSTiTi'TE THE Rks ( Jkst.k. — Tilt' entire res gescu! of a particular ease may (jonsist of vcrhal or writfi-n decla- rations. Where a contract or other obligation is said to result Ironi a conversation between the parties, tlieir statements are juoved as tlu^ facts which constitute the transaction. With s\ieh proof the rule against hearsay has nt) concern. The verb:il facts are proved because from their existence the contract or other obligation arises, (jiiick r. Siiison, 1);") Mich. 4lL' (iHiKJ) ; State /•. (Jregory, i'.VJ Ind. ."587 (181)1') ; Holds /•. Woods, <) Ind. .Vpp. (\r,7 (IS'j:!). Where a contract is ptM'feeted after repeated interviews, all repre- sentations made at the previous interviews ;ire included in the res gestu!. Aheru c. Gooilspeed, 7'J N. V. lOS (I87.S) ; I'orter r. Waltz, GO Mo. 4(> (18S()). Where there is an agrt'cment to arm and light, "the res gestie of the transaction comprehend ;dl pertinent acts and declarations of the parties (either or both) which take place in the interval between the agreement to fight and the consummation of the homicide such interval being very brief." Cox r. State, (»4 (Ja. .'J74, -110 (1879). On the other hand, so long as anything in the usual course of business remains to be ilone to complete a transac- tion, — e. g., giving a receipt, — wiiile the parties remain together, whatever is said until the tran.saction is thus ended assists to con- stitute the res gestae. Fificdd /•. Iliidiardson, .'il Vt. 410 (iSdl). Dklakatioxs Facts i.\ thk Mks (Id.st.k. — Verbal and written declar.'itions may not only constitute tlie res gest;e in a given case, such a declaration may itself be an independent fact in the res gestae. Where a declaration, oral or in writing, of a person not a witness, is in and of itself i)art of the rep gestie, it is ailmissible upon onli- nary principles. X verbal fact docs not differ in its proof from any other fact, e.jually relevant. Of this nature are declarations show- ing a particular intention in doing an act. Here the intention is an independent fact legitimately part of tlie res gesta', and llie declara- tion is admitted because it shows it. Sucli a <leclaration may at;- company an act, — it most frerpu'utly does so; but the declaration is not dependent for its ailmissibilitv on being part of the act. As was said by the suprenn! court of South ('arolina, '• Where the iiKpi.iry is as to a certain transaction not only what was done, but also what was .said by those present during the transaction, is ad- missildc for the jiurpose of explaining its character." State *'. Helcher, 13 S. C. 4r>'.) (ISSO). On an indictment for murder, a threat by the defendant to kill shortly before the murder is competent as part of the res gestae. 8918 A.MKIUCAN NOTKS. I ,1 '\'i [I'AKT Ml. thniiijli no Olio in i)articuliir is nninod. Stiito r. Kiiif», 9 Mont. n."i (IHi)O). (Ml tlic (loiitrary, stiitt'iiiuiits Ix'twi't-ii tlie parties on tlic fortMiooii of tlic day of an assault are not part of tho res gt'sta- of tlic assault itself. HoscnWaiiiii r. State, 'Mi Ala. .'{.51 (l.S;V.)). " If an act proved is relevant and material, declarations accoinpanyiii}^ the act aiid strictly explanatory of it are adniissiiilc as part of the res gestic. Tucker r. I'easlee, ,•)(; N. H. 1(57 (lSr»H). So whore the «piestioii was whether A, took part in a mutual affray, the fact that he took part may he shown by his shoutinj,' to one about to interfere, to let him alone. The verbal act is itself one of the res gestu! facts. Castner r. Sliker, ,'W X. J. liaw, '.)'> (I.S(IH). So, on an in- dictment for burglary, the fact that a certain person stated in jnes- ence ot tlie (ieteiulant that slie recognized liim. " i he truth or falsity thereof is not tho (juestion, and the testimony is only apiili- cable to inn i/tH<(iii, as a contempoiMiieous fact forming part of the res gesta , and as such is admissible, just as any other oontemporaneous physical ociinrrcnce could be proven." State v I Torton, .'!.'{ Fia. Ann. 281' (I.SSl). So, on a probate appeal, where the (piestion w;is as to the intention with which a certain instrument was torn, verl)al or written declarations W(!re reganleil as verbal facts assisting to I'on- stitute the res gestie. C'ollagaii v. Hums, 57 Me. 44!) (lcS(»7). Where the defendant was the ringleader of the mob that killed tlm deceased, evidence of their exclamations, declarations, etc., are facts in the res gestae, so far as they tend to show the intent with whi(;h the mob were acting. "They are regarded as verbal facts, indicating a present i)urpose and intention, and therefore admitted in proof like any other materird facts." C/.ivv r. State, 4:5 Ark. •.)'.» (IS.S4). On an action for assault and battery, the abusive remarks made by the defendant when the plaintilt first came up which might bo considered to reflect upon the ])laintitf are ])art of the res gestie. Hlake *;. Damon, KKJ Mass. 199 (ISO'.*). In a (triminal action for assault and battery, the language of the jiarties uttered at the time of the assault are part of the res gestic (^ohpiitt /•. State, .'{4 Tex. TmO (1871). In Insurance Co. r. .Mosley. S Wall. .'^7 (1S(;9). more fully stated later, so far a* declarations by the deceased as to his then present pains ami injuries, made after tiie ottciirrence of «'-me obvitmsly great change in physical condition, were admitted by the court "as verbal acts, ... as competent as any other testimony, when relevant to the issue," the action of the supreme court of the United States seems justified by the rule under consideration. It is when the court go further and admit the sufferer's statement as to the cause of his injury that the ruling is open to exception. The distinction obviously is between a declaration which is com- petent as an independent fact in the res gesta? atid a declaration which is admissible not because it is of itself part of the res f- I <iiAr. II.] AMKKH'AN NOTKS. 801* j,'cstii', but because it is part of some fiu-t wliieh assists to consti- t.\itf till- ri's gt'stii'. How easily such a iliHtiiiction uia^ he lost sij,'lit of uiay perhaps Ixf illustrated by a case iu the supreme jutlieial court of Massa(rliusftts. Wrsson /'. Washburn Iron Co., 13 All. 0.') (l.S(5(>), was ati action for injury to the ijlaintiif's inn from a nuisance erected on the (h'fend- ant's premises. Statements of guests on leaving the inn aljruptly .soon alter arrival as to tlie reason of their leaving were held incom- petent. be(!ause '• merely declarations of a previously existing tact or state of things which operated on the minds of the persons who \ittered theni, and induced them to leave the house ; but they had no tendeiKiy whatever to show that this act, of itself (ilcar ami mi- ecpiivocal, should have any different sign i filiation or elTect than that which shouhl be given to it if proved as an independent fact, irre- spectively of the statements which acfccmpanied it." Wesson r. Washburn Co., l;{ All, Uo (18(J(J). While these declarations <'er- tuinly did not characterize the act of leaving, the mental state of the guests was apparently itself a res gesta- fact, best provcid by their declarations as to its existence. Tn the same way, where the infrnf with which an entry is made on certain premises is material to the issue and part of the res gestae declarations of the party entering as to his intent in so doing is a verl)al facit which may be proved by his declarations. The mere fact that the de(!laration i.s contemporaneous with the entry and tends to characterize it does not nuike the admissibility of the decla- ration dependent upon the admissibility of the fact of the entry. Dougherty r. McManus, [Hi la. (JoT (lH7."{i. Or for what purpose a i)aMk deposit was made. Medley r. IVople, 41) III. App. L'lS (1h<.)l'). So, on a (piestion whether an ea.sement of a way had been ac(piired by adverse user, the declarations of a former owner of the land, while ])loughing across the alleged right of way, that no right of way existed there, and that the user had been permissive, are com- petent, not as proof of the facts asserted, but as evidence ijun mihno tlie ploughing was done. Sears r. Ilayt, .'57 Conn. 400 (ISTd)- So, wliether a holding is under a claim of right. Smith r. I'utuam. tlli N. 11. IWs) (1881i). On a ipiestion of the settlement of a pauiier. the intention with whi(!h lu? left a town being rnevant to the issue, his declarations on the subject at the time of ' .iving are a fact in the res gestu'. Ktna c. ]'>r<nver, 7S Me. .'{"" .iS.Sti). Where the (pies- tion is as to the power of the husband as an agent to bind the wife !is a grantor, he declarations to him as to the terms on which he was to deliver u ire part of the res gestie. Harper r. Dail, '.)- N. ('. ',V.)\ (18S.'>). Statements of the intention with wiiieh .\. removed a certain fence, made :it the time of the removal, ari' competent in any case where this intention is material. Spencer r. New York, \c. 11. K., CiL' Conn. L'4L' (18!)!.'). So, what a grantee's agents said immediately K- • . •» ii I! \r> m 391» AMKHK'AN NOTES. [I'AKT III. o:i learning of the making and dclivt'iy of tlip di-cd conoernini,' tin' a«'ci'i>tancf thereof is proper evidmce to show his assent tlicrtli). Fiseher Leaf Co. r. Wiiipple, ol Mo. App. Xh\ (ISirj). On im in. dietnieiit for murder, evideiiee tliat tlie aeiniseii iinniediatelv altir tlie hoiiiieidal aet start;d olT ; that a hystaiith'r cried out. "Call iln; police:"; that thereupon the accused siiai>ped his ritic at. 'icr, l.iit did not tire, — is couipetent. as these facts assist to constitutr the K8 gi'stic. .lohnson r. State, SS (ia. L'o;; (IS'.M ). On an aciMu brought Ity a water company a^'ainst a town, the defendant daiini'd to .show iu-ts of the plaintiff te>tin;^'and ahandoning dilferent soun'cs of water .supply as admissions by tiui phiintiff that the ipiantity of water furidshed was insutHident. /AA/, that the plaint ilT c.iuld sliow, in H'ply, l»y the re(;ord of corporate votes under whic'i tlii'su te.sts wen? maiie, tiiat tlieir object was to improvt- the cpiality of tho water, "'riie de(daration ctf the purposi' is a part of the doings of the eorjH)ration, by the authority of wld(di tht* acts were done. It dcM'S ni«t ap|>ear tliat at the time lhe.se votes were p.isscd the present controversy hail arisen. Apparently it i.s the eomm.m case of (h-clara- tions .'u-conipanying acts which teinl t(» explain or ipialify t\w niean- ing<d" the .acts, and which are considered .is a pari ol the res gestie.'' Wiley /•. Atliol, ir»(» .Mas.s. 4'_'() (INIUM, — whi(di is appan-ntly another instance nt tiu* .sanie confusion of thought th.at appe;iis in the curliei- decision of Wesson r. Washburn Iron (/'onipaiiy, I.'! .Ml. '.).">( I .slid). The deehirations were not competent l)ecausc they accompanied a relevant fact, imt because they were themselves relevant facts, and part of the res g»'stie. In the same way, as illustrating /iiir/msf on an action to restniin ).rjf lay-out of a highway across the plaint ill's laml, the fact that T.hile tin* plaintitT's preilecessor was having the land surveyed lie said he was not going to have a ro.id on the west side of the land ho Wiwi surveying was competi'Ut. Tait r. Hall, 71 Cal. 14'.) (iHSl'i). (hi :;>< ;;"tion of trover for a plougli, the defendant's intent ion in Iwirrowing Jie same may be shown liy his deidarations at the lime. Frome r. 2)eiinis. !.'• N. .1. L. 'Art (IHH.'J). Un :in i>sue •>( the making id' a contract to do a certain thing, a deelaMtioii to the defendant a few hours previous that he intended t«i do tliat {Kirtieiilar thing is competent. "This declaration, it is elaimed. was made a few hours lud'orc the alleged contrait betwciMi plaiiititl .and defendant was consummated. It was admissible as a part of tlnr res gestii* lor the pinpost* of illustrating the snbseipieiit agn-euieiit. It would not prove tiiat a contract li.nl been made, but was a circumstance fnnu which the jury might reasonably infer that the defendant had .sought the plaintiff for that purpose. So, too, would any decl.iration be admissilile as a part of the res gcKtii- made by the ilefendant on his way to meet the phiintilf, that he was seeking him for a particular purpose. Such evnlenuu would tciiil {•IlAl'. II.] AMKUICAN NOTKS. 391« only lo show tho object and purposf of tlin meeting; not tlmt it hud 1mm II iioconiplislicd. It was a ciniuiiistaiuM! whicii the jury liad a 1 i,'iit to consider in connection with tiu; evidence of the settlement."' (ianison i: (Joodale, 23 Oregoji, .'H)7 (1X92). A statement hy the lender made during the making of a loan that lie is lending some one else's money is part of tiic res gestje. Carter r. I!. Ills, 44 N. II. 40S (lH(V2). The ohjiMitions of a wife, made before ami at the time of giving lii^r acknowledgment, though at an inter- val of several hours, are part of the res gesta;. Louden *•. Hlylhe, Hi I'a. St. o.'ii (1Hr>l). So the declarations of a l»arty on receiving initiiey tliit he does not accept it in full payment. Dillard /•. Scruggs, .'{(■» Ala. ()7(( (IS(IO). Where the intention with which a iiregiiiint wiiiiian visited a doctor's ottice is nuiterial, her declarations »)n that joint when leaving home are part of the res geste. State; r. Howard, ."2 \"t. 3.S(t, 404 (I8.")l)). In an action for alienating a wife's aiTec- tio.is. her declarations on leaving houie, and on arriving at her iatiiir's liou.se "explanatory of her troubled mental condition and of luT reasons fiu' going to her father's house " are competent " as parts (.1 the res gesta'." Glass e. Hennett, HJ) Tenn. 478 (iM'.IO). Where tlie question is as to the fairness of the presiding othi'er of an elec- tinii when votes were challenged as illegal, his declarations and conversations made at that time are part of the res gestae Little r. State, 7.". Tex. ('>\i\ (1S<)(t). Where it is imp(utant to show that a city had notice of the dan- gerous condition id' a certain shade tree within the limits of the lii,'liway. the declarations of persons as to its dangerous character, while looking at its decayed roots at a time when they wi're exposed, are iaets in the res gesta>. ''The acts of persons in lociking at the roots were an important part of the evidence, From this it might lie inferred that tlu-y noticed the decayed condition of the roots, anil so that knowledge of the defect became general. Mut that evidence iiii','ht judju'rly be strengthened by introducing as a part ol the res \ir^\;v the declarations whi"h aeeomp.inied the acts, and whii'li eliar- aeteri/eil them as acts that comniunieated intelligi'iice of the condition ol the tri'c to those who looked. The remarks maile at the time nndeied it certain that the view of the roots gave notice of the ilefect to those who then saw them. If the fact that these |iersons looked at the decayed roots was <'ompetent as tending to show the notoriety of the defect, then clearly the accompanying declarations whieli teiuled to show the nature of the aet of looking were also •■oiM|.etent." Chase r. Lowell, l.'.I .Mass. 421.' (J.SIKI). The remark with w'.iich one of the participants in a mutual assault si'l out to clinch his antagonist is admissible as part (d' a res gesta' lai-t. llaker r. (Jausin, 7(1 Ind. .'117 (ISMI). Such statement on an issue of self-defence would probably be admissible an itself a fact in the res gestu) as indicating Intention to injure. Ihld. The declara- m^ »• H 3917 AMKHICAX Nf)TKS. [PAliT 111. tion of a bystandor, calonlatod to affect the action of the (lofciidaiit if made at the time of tlic affray, is equally a fact in the res (^estie, for the same reasons. Uni/. Where a man, chiiminfj to have hern robbed, ran calling for the police, the facts Mial lie met a |M>lici'maii ; told liini his story; that they went bjick aitd loiind the defendant counting certain money by the aid of street lamp, •• wen; a<lmis.sihl(« as part of the res gesta\ The whole was praetirally one i-oiiliiiiicil and brief transaction, and all that took place was of some conse- cpienco in construing the conduct of both |)arties." Driseoll r. I'eoplc, 47 Mich. 4ia (ISSli). So the declaration of a party that ho considered a boiuidary line settled may be competent evidence as bearing on his purpose in having a re-s\irvey. Arrher /•. Helm, 70 Miss. .S7J (IS'.t.'i). On an indictment for rape, where the identity (d' the prisoner with the assailant is involved, tht^ fact that certain witnesses of the assault recogiiizeii the accused next day as the person in (pie.stion is compe- tent; and the exclamation of one of these witnesses to the other, " There goes the man,'' and the reply of the other, '• Ves, then- he goes," are competent as part of the res gestu-. " It is not (pie.stiniii'd that it was perfectly competent to show that the witnesses saw and readily recognized the accused, near the s(!en« of the tran.sacticm, on th<i following day, as testifieii to by theii!, ami it must be admitted the spontaneous exclamation, ' Thert! goes the man,' with tlie re- sponse, ' Ves, there he goes,' is highly characteristic of tin- fact of their recognition. The true test, in all ca.ses, by whi<'h the admissi- bility of such testimony is determined, is, the act, declaiatinn or exclamation must be so iiitiuiately interwoven orconiu'cted with the prini'ipal fact ur event wliich it characterizes, as to iw rcgardeij a part of the transaction itself, and also to dearly negative any pre- meditation or |)urpose to nianulactuie testimony, and we are of opinion the circumstances of this case (dearly bring it within the rule." I/inder r. The I'cople. KH [11. UlM (]HS'J). l)i:( i.MtATioNs I'Aiti OK A Kf.s (Jkst.i; kact. — Declarations \vhi(di constitute the res gesta* and those whose existence forms in- depeiidi'Ut. facts in the res gesta' are admitted in evidence as verlial facts and upon orilinaiy principles. Kveii where the declaration is that of a person not called as a witness, the ride excduding hearsay does not apply. 'I'he fact of a statement having been madi' (as dis- tinguished from the truth of what is stated) differs in no essential |)articular of proof from any other fact e(pially competent. The liearsay rule, however, does exeluile the statennuit of persons not witnesses as proid' id' the facts therein stated, excejit in certain speci- fied instances. The statements excluded by the hearsay rule wiiiidi, on an exi!e))ti()ti to the operation of that rule, are admitted as part of the res gesla- are those whitdi are not themselves fact: in the res gestu;, but are part of some fact which is itself part of the res gesta-. i ClIAl'. II.] AMEIMCAN NOTKS. a!>18 It is probaMy with this in iiiiiid tliat tlic court in Mitclnun r. State, 11 (iii. rd") ( iHoli) sivy "The ideu of tlio res gesta- presniipnses ii iiiiiin fact." To make a dechiration in a person's own favor adniissihh' as part of tlie res gesta; "it is essential tliat the a(!t whidi siicli dechnatidM cliaracterizes or exphiiiis sliouhl itself be adniissible. ... if such act is not adniissihlo in evidence, its actual admission, without ohjcc- tiou, does not render the accoini)anying declaration cohipetcnt." Piiiney v. Jouph, G4 Conn. 54;") (181)4). "The credit wliich the act or fact gives to the accompanying dec- larations, as a part of the transaction, and the tendency of the con- temporary declarations, as a part of tlie transaction, to explain tiie particular fact, distinguish this class of declaration from mere hear- say. . . . There must be a main or i)riiu'ipal fact or transaction, and oidy such declarations are admissible as grow out of the principal transaction, illustrate its character, are contemporary with it, and derive some degree of credit from it." Lund r. Tyngsborough, '.) Cusli. .'{('• (lsr»l). The acts of a testator in collecting, flrying, and pasting t(»gcther the parts of a torn will being part of the res gestiP, liis de(!larations while engaged on this work tiiat "the old woman had got in one of her tantrums, and liad torn it, but that he could tix it together again " art! competent. Collagan c. Munis, .'"t" Me. 44'.) (1S()7). " Declarations are jjcrtiuent if they are uttered contem- poraneously with pertinent acts, and serve to account for, 'pialify.or explain them, and are apparently natural aiiu pontaneous." Cox r. State, (»4 (Ja. .'574, 410 (1871))." .\ declaration to be " part " of such res gestie fact must (1 ) accom- pany it ('_') explain or characteri/.e it. liotli tiies(« elements are essential. They represent the guarantees of relial)ility on whicii the operation of the rule excluding hearsay has been suspended. (1) .MtsT III: (iiNTKMroltANKoi s. — 'I'o admit evidence of a deel.i- ration, otherwise excluded, on the ground that it is |iart of a relivant act i»r other fad in the res gesta'. it is necessary that liie (ieeliir;itinn should accom|rany the act. The dillicidty at once presents itself tliat to limit the rule to a pn cise coineiilenee in time would Ih- to alun- gate it for all practical purposes. \ certain amount of leeway is thercfcM'c ni'cessary and tlie (piestion largely becmiies one oi degree. "To bring such declar.it ions within this principle generally, they milKt Im' e.uitemporaneous with the main fact to which they relate." insurance ( .- r. Mosley. H Wall. W7 ( ISC,'.)). ■• Wln'ii tlu- act is one material anil relevant, and proper for the consideration id the jury, tho declaratioiiH of the actor accompany ing and explanatory of the acts done, are uniformly admissible as part of the res gestie. Collagan e. Hurns, r.7 Me. 4 i'.) (18(;7). So the supremo court tif Iowa, in admitting the doclaration of a paasenger as to tho extent of hiH injury "at the time of the over- am'* AMEUICAN NOTKS. [PAi:- iui I' M m till nil)},' " of ti oojKili. " According to the autlioritif.s, •. riucli a «l!'.:liivatinii was iiuule at tlie time tlit; act was douo, and is oak;nl;i;,u to «'x plain tlic character, nature or (luality of tlit; facts constitntini,' the act and its tdfccts, so as to unfold and liarnioni7,c tlicni as parLs of the same transaction, then such a dttclaration naist be rcj^anlcd as a part of the res gestie, and may always be shown to thi! jury nhtw^ with the principal facts." Frink & Co. c.Coe, 4 (Jrei-ne, "(."i i IS.'di, On an action against a refiner of petroleum fur selling inipmper oil, l)y means of which the plaintiff's husband w^ts killed, vhat the latter said when enveloped in the Hanies or immediatfly after as to the <'ause of the accident " was ch-arly (M)mpetent evideiice as ;i. [larl of the res gostie." Klkins /•. McKean. 7!) I'a. St. 4'.».'{ 187")). Wiiertf a witness, l)eing alarmed in tht! night, ran from her mom, lier ex(!lamati()n " that she saw some one at tin; win(h)w in her room " is compeLciit as part of the res gustw. Dismukes r. State, S'A .Via. 287 (t«K7). '• Declarations whidi accompany the a(!t (iharat^terizo it; but to do HO the declarations must \>v by the pei'sons engaged in llu; act,, con- temporaneous with it, if not precisely concurrent in point of time, and proved as other facts by witnesses. 'I'o make ilcidarations a part of the res gestu' they must ne (•ontemporaneous with the main fact, not, however, preci.sely <!oiicurrent in point of time. If they .spring out of tin; transactio'i. elucidate it. and are made at a time so near to it a;' reasonably to lu'cclude the idea of deliberate des.gn. they are then to be regarded as contempiu-aneous." State c. Hehlur l;> S, C. 4r)'.> (ISMil) ; Mitchum r. State, 11 Ga. (M") ('l,S.-)2). The ex claniation of tin; juisoner immediattdy after tiie killing, •' 1 would not have done it for the world!" is competent as part of the res gestie. l/i!i/. "The transaction ujhju which this a<!tion is fiiund< i is the alleged cntioing of the plaintiff's daughter from her home by tiie defcmiants. That i.-i the res gestie, am by the aittors in that transai!tion contnv tends to illustrate its chi. -.cter. are pat be proved on tht? trial by eithiT party.'" 4«',7 (1.S77). .\\ Kxti;m>i:i) I)i:vi:i.oi'mi:nt. — .\s (Munparcd with the Knglish decisions, the rides regulating the admission (d ileclaratimis as jiart of a res gestu' fact have received an extended development in the United States. It bi'ing conceihvl not to be strictly necessary that tl'.e dcidaration absolutely acc<Hni)any tiie act of which it is part, it Jias proveil dillieiilt in many cases accurately to distingiii^^h between mere narrative of a com|deted transactitm (whiidi is excluded) ami a declaration rapiilly su ding an act, — ciunpelled and as it were instinctividy forced out iiy the act itself, in the altsence ui a more ilefinite test in point, of time, many tribunals have practically sid>- Htitutei' another test, - that of sjntnhni)-!/;/. They receive "as part dl that was said or done —iry with it, and whiidi h ■reof, and as smli may r It c. Amidon, l.'i Wis. ', l( \i'. II.) AMKIMCAN NMTKS. J';'l-» )f the res <]j<'stiii " tho story of oveuts rcci Jitly past, ]iii)viilii(l that it -iinii'it'iiUy appears tliat there is ji-itluT time •r iiiotiv.' tor iiiis- represciitatiiMi or invention. Most of tln'se ai.dioi'ities rest uiti iiiately uiion a .\lassai;liu,setts case, — (!uiii. r. .M'I'ike, .'{ C-'ii?' ISI'.I). fi.M. /• M'I'iKK. — Tiiis leadiiif,' ease can liardlv be said to In !S1 ivo Ipceii apparently one of nmeli eonsiileration l»y tiie court, and pos- siiiiy. lint lor its adoption by tlie niajnriiy n| die supreme court of llm I'liited States in Insurance <'o. r. Mosley as the liasis of tlieir de- rision, mi^ht not liave been heard from a,t,'ain. The court wiucli rendered the deeisiun a few yi'ars hiter ainiouneed a mueh sounder Iriral principh" in Com. r. Haekett. 'J All. l.'JC. (ISOl). As a matter i){ reasoninj,', it is ditlieult to follow the court in Com. /'. .M'I'ike in seeing,' of wiuit res gestic fact the dc(daration a<'tually atlmitled was claimed to lie part; uidess the principle lie announced that the men- tal «ir physical slate (if a dcidarant, resul! ini^' from the res ;,'i'stic. then past, be it.self a fact in the res },'est;c, and. lurther. that declarations iif the i)erson in (piestion account in;^ for tlic cxistencf of such siite slmrtly after its creation are part of smdi state, (diaractcri/.in<j and explaining it. For siudi a general principle thert^ is no basis of au- limrity, except as furnished by these decisions themselves. The casi' was oiu* of indictment foi' manslaut^hter. Tlie deceased, a woman, between twidve and oiu' o'clock in the inornin:,' of July ."ith, IHIS, ran from her sleeping-room, when' the injury was intlicted, In the room of a witness on tin- stoi'V above and kuncked on the door, er\ Ml'' .Muni er Tl lis (iiitcrv attracted tic attention of a second witnes.s, who at once got up fmm bed, to 140 iip-stairs to her ndief, but. being dissnadi'd by the iirst witness, then comiic^ linw n-slairs ill search of a priest and physician, wi'iit I'nr a watrlmi m iii-.ti'ad. itu returning, the si-cond witness went immediately up i'> tic iiMim above where the dcceaseil then Was. Alter certain reipic^t-i, the de- ceased then told the witness that she had bci'M stabli band, the accused. This was Indd cdinpeti'iit by tin bill OWIIC. aic'iiage r bv IcT iius- >>irt in the le witness descrilM-s the sllualmii in which he found the party, her appearam-c, and her rcipiest bir assistance, and, in cdnnection Ihen'with. her decdanitiim of the ciiise (if the in- jury. Tiie peridd of time, at which these acts and statements took place was so n-cent aft"r the n'ceiving itf the injury, as to justify the admissnin o f th eviilei ice as a part of the re-; j,'esta' In tl 10 admission <d' testimony nf this idiaraetcr. much must, be hd't tn tli»! exercise of the sduml discretion of the pn-siding judge M'I'ike, ;{ Ciisli. IMI (ISUh. Com. Insi'kanck Co. v. .Mosi.kv, The rile in Cm. M'I'ike (///.J "/(»•") was followed in Insiinince C,>>. r, Mosley, M Wall. ."«W7 ( ISCj'.O, hiidi is hen> sniumarized siibsl.antiallv in the language used in a w iiidst hii Ipful series of articles upon thi S SItl lijcct ill l."» Am. Law 391" AMERICAN NOTES. Li'AKT 111. Rev. 8G ot seq. Iiisiirancc Co. /'. Mosley was an action of a.ssuiii|i- sit on a policy of insiiranou issued by the [jlaintiff in orror to tin' liefcndant upon the life of her husband. The case came up by writ of error to one of the circuit courts of the United States. Tiie (pie.s- tion was as to the .soundness (jf two rulings in tlie court below uimjm points of evidence. The policy insured against deatii resulting from jjersonal injury, "caused by some outward and visible means;" it was expressly ])rovided that the policy should not extend to any injury •• eaustid by or arising from natural disea.se." Tiie declara- tion alleged that the deticased died from injuries that resulted from falling down a pair of stiiirs. The defendants (btdow pleaded the general issue. The (pjestion was whether the cause of the deceased's death was aicident or disease. He was " in his usual hcMiltli "' until a certain night when, after having gone to bed, he got up and went down stairs ; he returned ill, and complained of having had a fall, describing his symptoms, and he continued ill for three or fmir d;iys until hedietl. Tlu^ testimony whieh was ol)jected to was: (1) Tlmt of Mrs. Mosley giving the declaration of her husband. She tesli- lied that he got up between twelve and one o'rlock at niglit. and went down-sta'rs to the privy; .she did not know how long lie was goiie ; wlun he came back he said he had fallen tlown the ba(!k stairs, hiid hit an. I hurt the back of his liead. ;ind almost killed himsel.'- his voicie trembled so as to attrairt her atttMition at once; ho (tom;>!ained, and apjieared to be :n pain, and was sick, and she was up wiih him all night, Oix the next morning he said lie •• fidt bad," .uid fainted. ("J) The testimony of the son of the deceiised, giving I ; rtaiii declarations of his fiithei, was also objeeteii to, l»ut received. II. testified that he slept in the lower part of the build- ing; tiiat at about twelve o'ehxik of the night in <piestion he s;iw iiis lather lying with his heiid on the (!ount» r, iuid asked him wliut was the matter; he replied that he had fallen down liie back stairs and hurt liiuiself vi-ry !>ailly. That on the day after the tail his father said he f 1*^ very badly, and that if he atti-mpted to walk across the room I'.is h»*ad becunie diz/y ; on the following day he said he was .i little worse, if anything. Nobody testified to seeing the deceased fall. Tlu! majority (»f the court, Swayne, .1. giving the o[)iniou, str^e the cpu'stions to be whether the (lourt i rred in admitting til" <leelarations of the deceased (1) as ta his Imdily in- juries an' pains, and ('-') to jtrove that he had fallen dowii-stairs. The t'vf^^ dass < ' ■'■•elarations they n.itdily eoneliide to be admissiiile, lis beiti^ih'' usual e.tnressioiis of such fetdings, and as relating wholly to wl.M ■^^as ji;<'se<ii. The other (piestion is answered in the same way, on the gron <l ti>. t the dcidarations were mad(> immediately or very soon after the rent, — soni" of thr>m before the deceased returned tw !\iH roinn jutd the others upon reaidiing it. Moth declarations are conceived to oe " a part of the res gestie." " In 1 til CHAP. II.] AMKlilCAN NOTKS. 3!)1 '2 tlio (!()iintlcxity of huiniui affairs," say tlu' court, " wliat is done* and what is said am often so irlated that iicitlit-r v.iin \n' tU-- tacht'd without leaviii}; thc! residue; fraf,'iiieiitary and distorted. . . . Here tlie priiieipal faet is the hodily injury. The res gestse are tlie statements of tlie eause niadt; by tlie assured almost eontoniporaneously with its ocourrenoe. and those reiating to tlie eonsetiuences made whih; tin; latter subsisted and were; in progress. Where sickness or affection is the subject of in<|uiry, the sicknesij or affection is the principal fact. The res gestie are tlie declarations tending to show the reality of its existence, and its extent and char- acter." Seven cases are relied upon, including Aveson r. Kinnaird) (!oni. »•. M'l'ikp, Thompson c. Trevanion, and K. v. Foster. .Mr. .Justice ClilTord (with whom Nelson,.!., concurred), dissented in an o[)inion which is (h-voted to a consideration of the (h'darations as evidence to prove the falling down-stairs. It is insisted that the declarations wore not contemporaneous with that fact. Tlie oa.se of Com. /". M'I'ike is condemned, as inconsistent with all other Massa- chusetts cases; Thompson v. Trevanion and H. r. Foster as very slightly reported, as (li8ai)proved by Uoscoe in " his valuable trea- tise on tiie Law of Kvidence," and as inconsistent with all the tests laid ilown in Taylor. It seems dillieult to support this naae upon the facts as reported, in so far a.s it admits tlie dcchirations as to the fact of falling down- stairs. There is nothing whatever to show how long the interval was lietweeii the going ilown of the deceased and his ri'turn, and nothing deKnite to show tlie interval iR'twecn his going down and tin; interview with the sou. There is no evidence tli;it lither the son or the wife, <ir anybo<ly, heard the fall; and tlu; wife s;iys expressly that "she didn't know how huig hi' was gime." The interval may have lieen live niinuti's, or tirteen, or thirty. It seems impossible to say that such a dctdaration is shown to be c(tntempo. raneous with the cause of the injury, — so near it that it may fairly btM-alled a jiart of it; yet the court make the dec]:ir;ition admis- sible, as being connei'ted with the "iiodily injury," and as stating the cause of it almost conteniiioraiieonsly with its occurrence. It oertiiinly is extremely dilHeult to see of what res gesta- fact the declaration admitted e;in fairly be said to !»■ a part. The decisions in (!;ilifnrnia apparently follow the rule laid down in (!oni. r. .M'I'ike and Insurance Co. c. .Mosley. Where a witness heard a shot and ••about ha!!' a minute ;ind not exceeding three (juarters (d' a niimiti' from the time witness heanl the first shot" met deceased walking rapitlly away from tin- ju-is- (iiii'r's house and w;is informed of the cireuiastances of the shooting, held; these declarations were admissible. "Dcchirations to be a part of the n^s gestie, are not required to be jirecisely concurrent in pint of time with the principal fact, if they spring out of the jv.tl'" AMICIJK'AN NOTKS. [|'Ai:t III. 1 s f I, 3l. 1 lirincipiil tmnsactioii, if tlit-y it-iul to cxiiliiin it, arc voliiiil.ifv iiinl s]i(iiitant'()u,s, and arr luatlc at ,i tiino so iirar it as ti> |in'clii(l(' iln- iilfii of (IflilM'ratc ilcsii^ii, tlii-ii tlu'y aro to Ih' rci^anlcil as conti'in- poraiu'oiis, ami an' admissihlc" I'l-oplo r. Vcriioii, ."!;") Cul. |;i (ISdS). Siicli a niliiij,' liibovs uiidiT Mic dilliculty stated ahovi". It is hard to sen of wliat r<'s j^'csta* fact tlic dccliirations in (iiicstioii arc jiart. ("crtaiiily tlicv were not part of tlic I'lU'li of sliootiiij,'; as to tills liny are mere ii ii'rativc. Sm in \'iri,qnia. 'I'lie statement of a prisontT to a witness on liis own btdialf made a few minutes after llie fatal shot, on the scene iif the res j,'csta', in ailmissihlc. " It was very (dosely connected, lioth in time and pliii-.>, with the homicide, which was the subject «if the prosecution, and mi),'ht well have ti-ndcd to elucidate that fact as part, of the res ;,'esta'. It was said when the deceased was lyin;^ idosc hy, in a dyinjjj state, from the cdlVct of the wounds he had received, and in the presence, and it seems the hcariiii,', of ('I'lumlins anil (iilhert Little, the former of whom had a pist(d in ea(di liiind an I tho latter a (^un in his hand, and also in th(> presence ami hearin;^ of Oscar F/ittle, who was also wounded. It is not pmliahle that the prisiuier iiad cither time or motive to fabricate a statcnuMJt under such ciii^umstances." Little's (la.sc, L'o (iratt. \)'J\ (1^71). Where :i party murderously assaulted ran to the door caiiinji '• niunlcr," walked arouinl the house .some eij,dity feet to fi iiei,'lib(u's house; roused the latter who was asleep and, on hciii}^ admitted said "I am shot; William Kirby has shot, me;" it was held that the dcidarations were ciuupctcut. " Men', the de/ l.uMtiniis 111 (piest.ioii were n'>i. only maiie recently, but probably uilhiu two minutes, after the td'.ot was liied. And this, taken in iMiineetinn with the dccdarant.'s ('(indil inii, mental ami physical, produced iiy liie nnexp Tted, iiuproVdUed, and, as he supposed, fatal shot thioii'^'h tho hcji'!, repels the idea that his dc«darations were falu-icaled. In- deed, under the eiriMimstances disclnsed iiy the recdrd. it is hardly reasomil)lc to supposi; that ttiey could have been fabric:it<'d, as imth the time ami capacity for rctlccticm were wautinj^." Kirby r. Ci.m., 77 Va. OS I. C.SK (ISsii). And Texas. Where deceased, imiucdiati'ly upon beiii'.^ shot stam^crcil into the house, asked his wife to examine his wound, and when she told him tlie ball had passed throni^h liis liody, exclaimed "I am :i dead man, but, thank (10(1, I die inn ut ; " and, in ri-ply to her (piestion. ''who did it, I!ob'.'" replied • Mur^'. Mitlnturf (the defendant* and them," the dcdarjitioiiH were held admissible as part of the res j,'csta'. Midntnrf r. State, ?• T>'x. App. .'{;i."», .'J.'m (ISSO) ; Drake r. State, L",» T-x. App. L'f.;; JHWi. In a Texas divorct! (iasc a witnoHH was allowod to tcHtify "that the plaintiff oannf to her house crying', and said defendant had ('MM'. II. A.MKKICAN N(rn;s. ;»!'* jdst Hlilpl' licr mill imIIi'iI Iici- :i liildi. •n ir witiit'ss riirlli stiiti'd, dial aiiprllcc's lace was iimI tui one siili', aiiil tlial slir liail just (rt)iiic troiii lidiiu' lo vvitiii'ss' Ikuisc, alioiit, .'!(•(» yauls away. I'mU'r tlic (nn'iiiiisl.aiin'.s, \\n'. st.at.ciiii'iil. inailr liy a|i|M'lltr was ITS j,'»'sla'." Ilatiiia r. Ilaiiiia, .'! 'I'rx. Civ. \\t\>. .'i| (l.s'.i;;). Tiiis iili'a llial. wlifff a stati-iiu'iil. is nnl, t.aiiiLfd witli lialnlity t(» fabrirulidii it is adiiiissililc as |iai't nt I In- res p-sla> altiinii>;|i tint, pari. I't' any paiti<Miiar res tcfsla- lacl. lias iii'cn addptcil in lf},'islali(iii. (iror^ia I'tiilt', § .'»7.'!.'!. " l>i'claral.i()iis afCdiiipaiiyiii^; an art, or s(» iii-ai'ly coiiiiiTlcd tlinrwitli in liiiit! as In !)<■ Irci! t'roni all siispiriuii <i|' device or ai'l.erUiiin<'iit, are adniissiiile in •\ Klenee part n-s •sla-." (Niniinciitin^; on this pntvisinn. I lie nmrl, in '{'r.-iveliers In Slieppard, .S."i (la. 7."il, TT'i (IS'.IO) say r le II I. ('iinleniplal.es llial all llie res ^'esta*, ini'liidiii;.; dcelaralions rniniin^ part. llieie(d. ninsl, Ininspire witliiii t.lie present tin I' tlie tiaiisae- timi. r>iil l.lial. time, while it eaniint he Irss, may he more rxlcnded tliaii till' present (if the jiriiieipal i'aet, in some insl.aiiees a hilie, in tilers very mneh mure, l/'siially if they eaii others niiieii, and in <• ail he ascertained, some of the res ii;esta' w ill he ruiind simiiitaneoii.s with, iinii some anterior and others posterior to the priiiei|ial fact. Thus, siip|)ose an electric disehar>,'e during; a snmnier shower to hn the principal tact, the rormation oi' the idoiid, the lallin^' of tlio rain, the thunder and its reverheratinii would all, lor some piirjioses, he within the res ;.;esta! of the event, liion.i;h the piineipal iaet was lint a Hash of li^ditiiiii^. This example may .serve as a tl'^iire to characteri/.e the instances in which deidaralinns Mihsecpienl to the fact .1 re rei;ei\'al)lc in evidence. Let thnnder lepieseiit mmtal im- pressions prodiiced hy the event. 'I'lieii re\ eiiii'iat ion will represent admissihie deelaral ions repinlinj; these impressions, it will reprt;- seiit them liy a close anahij;y in two respecrts, first, in ln'in^' speedy, secoiiil in heiii;,; spontaneous. That they shall he or appear to Ik; spontaiM'ons is iniiispeiisahlc, and it is for this reason alone that they are icfpiired to lie speedy. There nrisl he no lair oppoitnnity till' Ihi' will -if the speaker to mould or mniiify Iheiti. His will must lia\'e liecume and remained dormant, so far as any ihlilr-ration in eoneoi'l in^; matter for speech or seleetini; words is eoneerned. Mnlcover, his S|ieecli, he.sides lieill;.,' ill the pl'i'MliI tllin- of I hi' lialis- •lion, must he in liie plisenee of it ill respect to .spac III inns III' on or near I he scene of action or of some maleiial part i>f the action. His deelaratiiiiis must he the ntteiai of human cat lire, the I'cniis homo, rallier than of tl iiiili\ niii i In! V an oa th can guarantee individual veracity, lint spoiitaneini^ impnl.M' niay he a siillicieiit sanction for the s|ieeeh of man as such, man as dis- tinguished from this or that |iarticiilar man. True, the verhai deliverance in eaidi instance is that of an imlividnal person. !'«nt if till! iitate of his mind he such that his iiidividnalily is for the tiiiiu ! %^'': I''!- i! i :;!tl'" AMKIUCAN XOTKS. [pa It r III. hi'iiij^ siipiJiTsscil iiinl silnieotl, so tliiit he utters tlip vtiici* nl' Ini- iniiiiity rallicr tli.iii of liiiiisclf, wliut lu; siivs is rryurdcd liy tlic l;iw iis ill sniiii' (l('|,Mt'<' tnistwortliy.'' TravelliTs liis. Co. v. Slu'pp.ini. «."»(5;i. 7.'.!, 77.'. (IHllO). 'I'lic fiiso of Ooiii. /•. .M'Pikc (iil)i supni) has t'vcii Im'cii rclini ini to siistiiiii :i niliii;.; that, on an iiKlictiaciit for iiiunhT tlic (h-ft'iiilaiil can ]m)vv as part of tin' res }»''''ta! what ho tohl Ills iiKttlicr on liis n'ttini honii', lih't'din^j, weak, and naus(!ati'(l, hctwt't'ii tt-n and thirty iniiiuti's al'tfr tlic! fatal stahltiny, ('lai-,' v. State, .'!0 Te.\. App. (Jl'.l (IH'.)l'). 'Must wliL'ii a faet or statement is or is not a [lart of tiie ros fjestiu is one of tho most ilitfienlt (jiiestions to solve known to the writer. The old rule was, that to be part of the res f,'esta' the riici or statement should he eontt'iiiporaneons with the traiisacttioii, and this rule is approved by many courts oi un: nrsc auiiity. nn iiu' otlur hand, the rule has been construed so as to admit acts and dec- larations (KM'iirrin^' not contemporaneously with the transact.on, but which precede iw follow it. . . . The rule wt> may understand, but in its application the dillicnlties arise." //</(/, On the other iiaiid, in a Virj^inia c.ise very similar to (Iraij; c. State in its facts, where A. claimed to havu been robbed by the defendants, his declarations to a witness ten minutes afti-r, some distaiKio from the scene of the res j,'csta', are iiirompetcnt. The court adopt with approval a saj;e statement from Mr. Wiiarton ((!rim. I'.vid. '.» I'd. I )■■>•. I'll). '• .\s soon iis we pass the line wliidi (iistiii.i,'uislies lietweeii the transaction talkin.LCof itself, and talUiiii,' as modilyin;,' the transaction, — in other W(M'ds, as soon as we p.iss the line between the time of the trans- iU'tion and the time that follows it, we hat. no limits that can lie imposed. If we are tn n-ci-ive declarations made ten minutes after a transaction, we nnist receive declarations made ten years alter- w.irds. The impulses of aic^'cr, or it may be cd' uiiK'niunded sus- picion, may, in many minds, operate even more elTectively and passionately, ten r.iinutcs after an in|uiy, than they would after ten years had idapsed." doiies r. Com., SO \'a. "U* ( tS'.ld). NKiil.MJKNCK ('asks. — l''ollowiii}i out tiie line of thouj,'lit exempli- lied in Com. r. M'I'ike, Insurance (lo. /•. .Moslcy and similar I'ases. that a spontaneous deidaratioii by a party not a witness, made .soon after an occurrence, is admissible even if it is only a story about the occurrence itself, many (niscs, more particularly actions of ne;,'li- geiice a^jainst a corpiu-ation, apjiareiitly ;idmit any statement made |>rior to the peri«; I of invention ; /. i: <d' the time when a plaintilT iiegins to think of his ri','hts or a defendant to consider how to evade liability. So lonj; as tho mind of tho declarant may fairly be assumed, in the discretion of the court, to be so lilled with and controlled by the recent transaction as to make his statement an instinctive outcoiiic of the event its. If rather than the result of thonyht, in whit h tliu ("MA 1,1' I riiAP. ll-l AMKIMCAN NOTKS. 301 w aiiticij>ation of consoquftnoos may Iw exix-cted to cxprt an iiiHiifiioo, till! stiitt'ineiits arc, it in said, to b<' taken as part of tlif rns |,'»'stn'. Tliiis whtTc a f'roiylit train liad injiin-d ci-rtain lioisi-s on tlic track, a Hl.itt'int'nt liy tliu enf^incfr to the conductor as to when lie first saw the liorscs, *' made iniinediatidy alter tlio accident, hy one person then cn^'ai^'ed in the (h-fendant's Imsiness to anotiier siinilarlv em- ployed, in nd'ereiiee to wiiat iiad just (x^'un'MJ, and what iMey were then lib in consetiuenee of Hindi occurrence, tiiere not appearinj; anv caust! other than sik li orrmience to produce or inlhieiiee the dechira- tion, was connecte<l with, and ^,'rew directly out <d', the main I'act -^ the accident — so as to bo a jiart of tlie same transaction " was htdd admissiltle. O'Connor r. (!hica>,'o, &c. I{. 1{.. 21 Minn. Hill ilSSOi. What a 1)1 ikcman, ne^digcntly injured liy derecti >• macliinery ainl liackiuK the defendant's locomotive, said within two niiniites of tlii> injury, while in presence of the train and the derectjve niaidiiiiery is ]iart of the res ^'esta-. '• Declarations which were the natural i-iiiana- tions or out,i,'rowths of the act or occurrence in liti^'ation, allhoip^di not precistdy concurrent in point of time, if they arc yet voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to i)e in the j)resence id' the iransactioii whi(di they illustrate and explain, and were iiiadt! under such circumstances as necessarily to exclmle the idea of (lesii,'n or ihdiheration, nnist, upon the clearest iM-iiiciples of justicre, be admissihle as jiart of the ad or tiansaciion itself." hnuis- ville, \-c. |{. I{. *'. I'.uck, in; Iiid. rA',r, (IHSS); 'I'exa.s, &c. K. I.', r. |{(d)crtsoii. SI' Tex. ('m7 (IS'.)I). in ;i case ai,'aiiist a railroad for the acts of a brakenian in knocking,' the plaintilf from a movin.,' train, tlio statements of the injured per.son to the person who first reaidied him seven minutes after the acciileiit as to tin' cin'uiiistaiices accom- panying' and precedinj^ his injury are competent. '• The licclaratioiis \inder consiilcration were made at the place of the accident and within a v«'ry few minutes after it occurred, anil while the plaintilT was still writhini,' under the pain inllicted by it." International, itc. |{. 1{. i\ Andi'rson. SI.' Tex. ."itC. ( IS'.M ). I'he court in this cise. after expressing,' an apparent ref,'ret at the extension of the res jjesta- rule state the rule aMthorizini: the reeeplimi of this idass of evideiiei' as follows; — "Another ruii', applied in niany of the .American courts at least, is to admit i~: parts of the res ;,'esta' not only siudi deidara- tions as ai'coniiiany liie transaction, but also sucli as are niaile uinter d)l( such circumstaiiccs as will raise a reasoi able presuni|>ti(in that they arc the spontaneous utteraii d tlioiij,dit.s created by or sprin^infj out of the transaction itself, ami so soon therealtcras toexcdude the presumption that they are the result <d' |U'emedilatioii (U- desi.i,'n." lf}li/. On similar .u'i'ounds, the declarations of the conductor (I'ish) of a train just wrecked as to the runnin^r time he supposed he hail is admissible in an action aj,'ainst the cninpany by a jiassen^'cr injured dlision. "The declarations ol Fish were made within a few in tl le ci IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) fe // :a 1.0 I.I lit. vu 1^ IM 1^ 112.2 1^ lis IIIIIM |i-25 i 1.4 1.8 1.6 V] ^^ ^a w ^ •> '/ '\ Phokjgraphic Sciences Corporation ^ 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. 14580 (716) 873-4503 iV r<N^ \\ [V o ;\ ^J^ o ^ :\ \ 1 ■ I ■A 1 '•■: ' I'll 891'' AMKUICAN NOTES. [I'AltT III. seconds after the casualty, in view of the wrecked train, and amidst the search for persons whose fate was then unknown, and while Ciinther (tlie plaintiff's intestate), who lived but thirty minutes, was dying from the injuries he had received, lie had no time to contrive or devise a falsehood by which to exonerate himself h\nn blame. "" McLeod /'. Ginther's Adm. SO Ky. ,'}<J9 (ISSl*). In the case of Han- over 11. 11. u. Coyle, oo Pa. St. 3%, 402 (1S07), where a jjcddler's •wagon was struck and the peddler injured by the negligence of the engineer, the hitter's declaration, made after the infliction of the injury, was admitted as a part of the transaction itself, tiie court saying ; — " We cannot say that the declaration of the engineer was no part of the res gestaj. It was made at the time of the accident, in view of goods strewn along the road by the breaking up of the, boxes ; and it seems to have grown directly out of, and immediately after, the happening of the fact." In an action against a railroad company for negligence in running over one Leverett, a brakeman, his exi)lanation of the cause and manner of the injury, while still under the car which ran over him is competent as part of the res gestie. "The statement of Leverett was made immediately after he was run over, and while the wrong complained of was incom- plete, he being still under the car, and was a part of the res gestae, and fairly goes to explain the cause of the condition in which he was at the time it was made. It wi^s an emanation of the act in ques- tion, and so connected with the cause of his injuries as to pre(dude any idea that it was the product of calculated i)olicy. Aside from any credit due Leverett for veracit}', the circumstances immediately preceding and connected with his statement, impress the mind with confidence in its truth. It was competent evidence." Little Rock Ky. Co. V. Leverett, 4S Ark. 'AP>3 (LSSO). Where a passenger was ejected by a brakeman from the ladies' car, the conversation be- tween tl'e ])laintiff and the offending brakeman " almost immedi- ately after" the plaintiff's ex[)ulsion from the car is competent as ])a.rt of th."! res gestie. Hass v. Chicago, &c. K. li., 42 Wis. G.j4, ()71 (1S77). Where a pa.-.ienger was injured by being thrown from a car, what was said by him "immediately after the train ])assed, and while he lay on the platform where he fell. It was, under the authorities, a part of the res gestae. It differs from the declaration which was reported in Ogden r. E. K., (44 Leg. Ind. I.'].") as that was mad(! after the removal of the injured party from the ])lace where he was found; in this case, it was made while the party was lying where he fell and an instant after his fall.'' Pennsylvania 1{. 11. V. Lyons, 120 I'a. St. 113 (1889). On an action of negligence against a firm of tin roofers for negli- gently burning plaintiff's building by the escape of sparks, what the (lefendant's servants said as to the ciuise of the Hro, made during its progress, is competent. Shafer c. Lacock, IGS I'a. St. 407 (1805). bei me tli; sui ein (pii a \' the a \< con wl wa;- Stat CHAP. II.] AMPUUCAX XOTES. 39P'» A stricter rule, and one more defensible in point of principle, has been laid down in Mississippi, tliat " it is not enoii<,di that the state- ment will throw light upon the transaetion under investigation, nor that it was made so soon after the occurrence as to exchuk' tlie pre- sumption that it has been fabricated, nor that it was made under such circuuistances as to compel the conviction of its trutli; the true in- ipiir}', according to all the authorities, is whether the dechiration is a verbal act, illustrating, explaining, or interpreting other parts of tiie transaction of which it is itself a ])art, or is merely a history or a part of a liistory of a completed past affair. In the one ease it is competent." IMayes v. State, 04 ]\liss. ;i29 (ISSC). In tliat ease, wliere tiie deceased, who had tied after receiving th(^ fatal injury, was approached by a witness about live minutes after being cut, his statement as to the defendant's having done tlie injury is iuc^omijc- tent. " We flunk . . . the statements of the injured party were not of the res gi'sta'; that they found no sui)i)ort or credence by reason of anything being done, but owe their whole force to the credit of tlie declarant, and therefore should liave been excluded by the court." The supreme court of the United States by a divided court has also declined to follow tins modern extension. Vicksburg R. R, r. O'Brien, 110 U. S. y.) (18S()), is a leading case in tliis connection. Tlie action was against a railroad for negligence, causing injury to the original plaintiff's wife by ovi-rturning the car in which she was riding. Plaintiff offered tlie evidence of a witness that he had a conversa- tion with the engineer in charge of the train about the rate of speed at which the train was going. The evidence was admitted over defendant's objection. Witness said that between ten and thirty minutes after the accident he had a talk with the engineer, and the latter told him that the train at the time of the accident was going eighteen miles an hour. Held, error. Harlan, .1., for the court says: "It (the declaration) did not accompany the act from which the injuries in question arose?. It was, in its essence, the mere nar- ration of a past occurrence, not a part of the res gesta — simply an assertion or representation, in the eours(> of conversation, as to a mutter not then ])endiiig, and in respect to which liis authority as engineer liad been fully exerted. It is not to be deemed [lart of the res gestie, simply l)ecause of the brief [H'riod intervening between the accident and the making of tlie declaration. The fact remains that the occurrence had ended when the declaration in (pu'stion was iiiiule, and the engineer was not in tlie act of doing anything that could i)ossibly affect it." Four judges dissent in an o])iniou liy Fiidd, -T., and conclude, tliat iu view of the short time which had elajised, and from the fact that the statement was made in view of the wrecked train and when the engineer was surrounded by excited passengers, that it was adniis- 39119 AMEHICAN N'OTP:s. [I'AKT III. sible as part of tlie res gestip. The modem doctrine as to tlie res gestae, the ininority say, has rehixed the ancient rule. " It now allows evidence of them, when they appear to have been made under the immediate influence of the principal transaction, and are so con- nected with it as to (diaracterize or exphiin it." Vicksburg, &c. K. K. V. O'lirien, 119 U. S. 9!) (ISSG). TiiK SouNDKK DocTKixi:. — The doctrine that a narrative, even if recent or even instinctive, can be so far jjart of the fact which tlie dechiration describes as to be admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule admitting declarations as part of the res gestae seems not to have been universally approved. It is doubtful whether Com. i\ ^I'lMke would be followed in iMassachusetts. The sounder doctrine, that a declaration to be admissible as part of the res gestse, must constitute part of some fact in the res gestae, is ailirmed in a later Massachusetts case, — Com. v. Hackett, 2 All. 1.36(1861),— which, although somewhat similar in its facts to Com. v. MM'ike, falls on the other side of the line and apparently enunciates the cor- rect rule. The case was murder by stabbing. A witness was allowed to testify that on the street, in the night, he heard the de- (icased cry out, " I 'm stabbed ; " that he at once went to him and reached him in twenty seconds, and that the deceased said : "I'm stal)l)pd — I 'm gone — Dan Hackett [the defendant] has stabbed me.'' The evidence was tliat the defendant had suddenly come upon the deceased, had stabbed him twice, and had run away. This case was elaborately considered; the court gave it "the most anxious and ciireful consideration, not only on account of [its importance], bi;t because the exception is urged with great earnestness and apparent confidence." The court (Bigelow, C. J.) say that the rule in regard to decdarations part of the I'es gestse has been often loosely admin- istered, but that " the tendency of recent decisions has been to restrict within the most narrow limits this species of testimony.'" " The objection to the admission in evidence of the declarations of the deceased, made immediately after the infliction of the alleged mortal blows, is put on the ground that it was a mere narration of a jiast event, uttered in the absence of the defendant, and therefore in its nature essentially hearsay testimony. If we regarded oidy the form of words in which the declaration was made, this objection would be well founded. Tl<e language used by the deceased apparently referred to an event which had passed. Hut this is by no means a decisive consideration. The argument would have been equally strong, in case the words had been uttered as soon as the knife had been with- drawn from the body of tli3 deceased, if it had appeared tliat, from any cause, the defendant could not then have heard them. But it is necessary, in order to determine the question of the competency of this evidence, to regard not only the language used, but also the circumstiuHV's umlcr which it, was uttered. T£ it was a narrative (MAP. 11.] AMERICAN NOTKS. 891'^0 stiiteinent, wholly unconnected with any transaction or- principal liict, it would be clearly inadmissible. JJut such was not its charac- ter. It was uttered innnediately after the alleged homicidal act, in the hearing of a person wlio was present when the mortal stroke was given, who heard the first words uttered by the deceased, and wlio went to him after so brief an interval of time that the declaration or exclamation of the deceased may fairly be deemed a part of the same sentence as that which followed instantly after the stab with tin; knife was inflicted. It was not therefore an abstract or narra- tive statement of a past occurrence, depending for its force and effect solely on the credit of the deceased, unsupported by any prin- cipal fact, and receiving no credit or significance from the accom- panying circumstances. But it was an exclamation or statement contemporaneous with the main transaction, forming a natural and material part of it, and competent as being original evidence in the nature of res gesta>. The true test of the competency of the evidence is not, as was urged b^'- the counsel for the defendant, that it was made after the act was done, and in the absence of the defendant. These are important circumstances, entitled to great weight, ami, if they stood alone, quite decisive. But they are outweighed by the other facts in proof, from wliicli it appears that they were uttered after the lapse of so brief an interval, and in such connection with the principal transaction, as to form a legitimate part of it, and to receive credit and support as one of the circumstances which accom- panied and illustrated the main fact, which was the subject of iiKjuiry before the jury." Ihld. ()f what res gestas fact is the declaration in Hackett's case part ? Tlie declaration was clearly not of itself a fact in the res gestie. If ailniissible, it must be as forming part of such a fa :t, accompanying, ilhistrating, necessary to its being understood. Apparently tiie fact (if stabbing is such a fact. In Hackett's case the declaration did iKit accompanj', as in M'l'ike's case, the mere description or exist- ence of a condition produced by the res gesta-, then over ; it illus- trated, and from its proximity and nature formed in a legitimate sense part of the fact of stabbing. The first exclamation clearly was of tliat nature. The second declaration, if nnuli' whik! tlie assailant was withdrawing the knife from the body of the deceased, anil prepared to renew the assault, would clearly have been part of the stabbing. If made wliile the deceas(^d was himself withdraw- ing tlu! knife from the wound it would hav(! been part of the res gesta' fact of stabbing. If so, the length of the interval between tin; two declarations and the nature of the exclamation, an apjiarent continu- ance of the first outcry, still leave the second declaration a legitimate part of the act of stabbing. Xice (inestions of degree nmy arise, hut it would seem as if the test wo\ild always be : Is tin; declaration offered itself a res gesta; fact or a legitimate part of a fact in the res g(>stie. !• '. I V' 31»1-' AMKIilCAN NOTKS. [I'.MIT 111. It will be nottnl that in many particulars tlio f;aso of Com. r. Hackctt (ul)i suin'a) is not inilikt' that of R. /,». I'x'ilingfiokl, 11 Cdx Cr. C. .'!41 (187!)). Under the ruling in that case, the cxclainatidn in Com r. Ilackett (ubi supra) would proljably iiavt' been ri'ji'i'U'd. As dc'liuL'd by Lord Chii'f Justice Cockburn i.i a pamplijct ('ouccrning the case, "tiu^ term 'res gcstiu,' as ap|)lied to a criminal c isc,"' is; " Wiiati'ver act, or scries of acts, constitute, or in point of time im- mediately accom[),vny and terminate in, tiie principal act cliargcd as an offence against the accused, from its iuci'ption to its consum- mation or iiual com[)icti()n, or its prevention or ai)andoumei)t. — wiictlicr on the part of tiie agent or wrong-doer, in order to its per- formance, or on that of tlu; patient or party wronged, in order to its prevention, — and whatever nuiy be said by either of tlie parties during tiie (jontinuance of the transaction, with referenda to it, in- cluiling herein what may be said by the suffering party, tliough in the absence of the accused, during the continuance of the action of the latter, actual or constructive, — as, e. g.,in tiie case of fliglit or ajiiiliitations for assistance, — form part of the principal transac- tion, and may be given in evidence as part of the res gestse, or par- ticulars of it; while, on the other hand, statements made by the comiilaining party, after all action on the j)art of the wrong-doer, actual or (H)nstructive, has ceaseil, through the completion of the princijial ai^t or other determination of it by its prevention or its abandonment by the wrong-doer, — such as, e. g., statements made with a view to the apprehension of the offender, — do not form part of the res gesta;, and should be excluded." Bedingtield's Case, 14 Amer. Law Kev. 822 (1880). If this is the law of England, which may be doubted, it certainly lays down a stricter rule than has been adopted by any American jurisdiction. Unless there be something implied in the " construc- tive "' action of the wrongdoer, his actual absence from tiie scene of the res gestic (even thougli unknown to the declarant) cannot be adopted as the decisive test of the admissibility of such a declara- tion. If we have a relevant fact, admissible as part of tiie res gesta>, and, accompanying it, such a declaration as to be in a just sense part of it. the declaration is admissible, though an appreciable interval of time lias elaiised. In Equitable &c. Association ?•. IMcCluskey, a case similar in its facts to Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397 (18G9) the plaintiff was not permitted to state declarations of the deceased made at the moment of his being drawn out of the mine in which he was said to have been injured. After referring to the dangers of hearsay evidence, the court proceed : — " The most dangerous exception ingrafted upon the rule is that which admits the declarations of a party, or an agent, uttered at the time of the principal transaction, and therefore taken to be a part of it, because it is supposed to be illustrativ- and evi- llf •• rirAP, II.] AMEUICAX NOTES. 3i)122 (Icuoe of the principal fact which is the subject of the iiKiuiry. Tt pniliahly had its origin' in the troubh; soiiictiuies experienced in criminal cases to identify tlie perpetrator of a crime. Tlie desire of till' courts to prevent wiiat would be an evidcMit miscarriage of justice ,i,'radually led to the extension of tlie rule to civil controversies ; and it is possibly as well settled as any of tlie rules of evidence, that the diuihiration of a party mach; at the time of an act which may be given ill evidence, if it be calculated to exi)laiii, qualify or characterize tlu! act itself, and is so connected witli it that it may be taken as a part of one and the same transaction, and is in no sense a narrative of something which has passed, may be proven ;is a part of the res gt'st;e. Courts have gone a long distanct; in the application of the rule to particular facts, but, for the purpose of this opinion, it is wholly unnecessary to call in (piestion or criticise the extriMiie cases, or to attempt the statement of any g(!neral principle, or limit its application. It is enough to hold, which is as far as this opinion goers, or is intended to go, that the declarations offered in evidence were not under any of the well considered cases a part of the res gesta>." Equitable, &c. Ass. r. McCluskey, 1 Col. Aiip. 47.'! (1892). The statements of a woman suffering from arsenical poisoning are not competent. " Any statement made by ]Mrs. r)ariial)y at the time of taking the fatal dose, or so soon thereafter as to make the decla- rations a part of the transaction and *>xplaiiatory of that act, was admissible. But with a single exception the statements are not of this character, and consequently the evidence should not liave been allowed as part of the res gestie. It is not only hearsay, but hearsay evidence of the most objectionable kind. Under claim that it was part of the res gestB, witnesses were permitted to detail statements maiie by Mrs. l^arnaby that would not have been receivable in evi- dence, if she had recovered and appeared as a witness upon the stand, against the defendant upon a charge for a lesser offence." Graves r. I'cople, 18 Col. 170, 177 (ISO,".). While it is necessary that the declaration be practically coiitem- ])oraneous with the act of wliicdi it is part, it is not required that it lii> contemporaneous with tlie |)rincipal act in the case. "The fact that the acts given in evidence occurred i)revious to the time when the murder was committed, can make no difference as to the rule. If till! a(!ts of the accused done before the commission of the crime! with which she is chargiMl are competent evidence tending to show that she committed such crime, then what was said at the time tlie act was done is also admissible, as explanatory of the same, and as indicative of the intent or object of the act." Mack v. State, 48 Wis. 1.'71 (1879). The exclamation of the deceased at the moment of receiving the fatal injury, "Banks has shot me," is competent. State v. Banks, 10 Mo. App. Ill (1881). w ' t . ! •'J rm 39123 A.-MEUICAN NOTES. [I'ART iir. J^ABKATivK ExcLiDKi). — As a mere narrative of past transac- tions cannot accompany and assist in constituting some fact in the res gestjB, it is excluded as siniplt; liearsay. Koss v. White, 00 \'t. o58 (1888) ; Doles c. State, 97 Ind. ^Sa (18S4) ; Waldel r. New Yoik &c. li. K., 95 N. Y. 274 (1884) ; Petrie v. Columbia &c. R. E., 27 S. C. 63 (1887); Lund v. Tyngsborougli, 9 Cush. 36 ,1851) ; McKinnou i>. Norcross, 148 Mass. 533 (1889). ^lere nearness of time does not affect the rule. The first statements of a person after being shot through a window as to who sliot him, made about live minutes after the shooting, are neither themselves part of the res gestae nor admis- sible as part of any res gestie fact. They are mere narrative. " They in no manner served to illustrate the main fact, the shooting. The chief purpose of them was to show, not that the deceased had been shot, or tlio manner in wliich, or the circumstances under which, but the person by whom, it had been done. . . . They were the simple statements of the deceased, narrative of what had already tran- spired." Jones V. State, 71 Ind. 66 (1880). " The length of the interval of time between the main fact and the statements cannot be important, if such time elapsed as to make tlie statements, liaving regard to their form and substa!ice, mere narration." Ibid. Tliat only a minute elapsed does not alter the rule. King v. State, Go Miss. 576 (1888). So what the defendant's engineer said just after the accident is not competent. '• -Vny statement the engineer might have nnide would have been concerning a past and completed transaction, and lieT.ce, would have been incompetent evidence against the railway company to prove the manner and cause ul the decedent's death. The fact that the statement was made in fi-> minutes after the acci- dent would not render the evidence admissiLle, if the con ersation referred to a past occurrence, and not connected with the res gestie." Tennis v. Rapid Transit Ky. Co., 45 Kansas, 503, 509 (1891). So of statements by an injured man made soon after being struck. ''The res gestit, speaking generally, was the accident. These declarations were no part of that — were not made at the same time, or so nearly contemporaneous with it as to characterize it, or throw any light U[)on it. They are purely narrative, giving an account of a transac- tion not partly past, but wholly past and completed. They depend for their truth wholly upon the accuracy and reliability of the de- ceased, and the veracity of the witness who testified to them. Nothing was then transpiring or evident to any witness which could confirm the declarations." Waddele v. N. Y. &c. E. E., 95 N. Y. 274 (1884). In an action for damages caused by the collision of two teams, the statements of the driver of one team to third parties "shortly after the injury " are not part of the res gestae. " If contemporaneous with the main fact under consideration, they would be admissible, CHAP, ir,] AMEIUCAX NOTICS. .•;!)1« but if made after the injury was done, and after the transaction liad terminated, tiiey would not be." Mabley v. Kittleber!,'('r, 37 Micb. .'J60 (1877). The statement of a passenger compelled to jump Irom a moving train, as to the circumstances of liis injury, made half an hour after their occurrence, to one attracted by his cries is not part of the res gestte, but mere narrative. Savannah, &c. R. R. v. IloHaiid, SU Ga. 257 (1888). So where a boy, after being pushed from a street car, got up, walked to the sidewalk and sat down, his statement rs to the cause of his injury made during or just after the sitting down is mere narrative and no part of the res gestte. " Tlic true inquiry, according to all the authorities, is whether the declaration is a verbal act, illustrating, explaining or interpreting othiir parts of the trans- action of which it is itself a part, or is merely a history or part of a liistory of a completed past affair. In the one case it is competent, in the other it is not." Chicago, &c. R. R. v. liecker, 128 111. 545 (1889). Wliat the plaintiff said to his doctor, who had driven a dozen miles to treat him at his house, as to the cause of his injury is hearsay. Fordyce v. McCants, 51 Ark. 509 (1889). Where a child was killed by the negligence of the railroad company, the n;other's declarations immediately after tiie accident are mere hearsay. Norfolk, &c. R. R. v. Groseclose, 88 Va. 267 (1891). The statement of the engineer in charge of the train causing the injuries complained of as to the speed of tlie train made from ten to thirty minutes after the accident is not competent as part of the res gestae. "His declaration, after the accident had become a com- jjleted fact, and wlien he was not performing the duties of engiuoer, that the train, at the moment the plaintiff was injured, was being run at the rate of eighteen miles an hour, was not explanatory of anything in which he was then engaged. It did not accompany the act from which the injuries in question arose. It was, in its essence, the mere narration of a past occurrence, not a part of the res gcstsr, — simply an assertion or representation, in the course of conversa- tion, as to a matL'^r not then pending, and in respect to which his authority as engineer ha<l been fully exerted. It is not to be deemed part of the res ^•estiP, simpl}' because of tlie brief period intervening between the accident and the nmking of the declaration. The fact remains that the occurrence had ended when the declar.vtion in ques- tion was made, and the engineer was not in the act of doing anytliing that could possibly affect it. If his declaration had been made the next day after ths accident, it would scarcely be claimed tliat it was admissible evidence against the company. And yet the circumstance that it was made between ten and thirty minutes — an appreciable period of time — after the accident, cannot, upon principle, make this case an exception to the general rule." Vicksburg, &c. R. R. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99 (1880). ^i ■ !V I'J.'I'' . * m li! > ; ' iB 3!)1" A.MKKICAN NOTES. [I'Airr HI. Shitcmonts by an. injurcil ])orson to liis physician doscrihiiig tlio :i('ci(lt'iit, a siitiiciunt time having ehipsed to carry tlu! injured man liouic and to summon tlie doctor, are not admissible as part of the res },'i'Sti>'. Alerkhi v. IJennington, 58 Mich. 150 (1885). Am account by an injured man to liis wife, fifteen or twenty minutes after the aceicUnit, is not admissible. "'They were no part of the transaction that was being tried." Estell v. State, 51 N. ,1. I., 18L' (1S8',)). So of a narrative by a husband to his wife maih! from thirty to sixty minutes after the occurrence in question. Armil /•. Ciiiciigo.&c. il'y Co., 70 la. I'M (18.S()). "The res gestae or transac- tion was the accident, and how it occurred. It is not essential that the declaration sought to be introduced in evidence was uttered at tlie identical time the accitlent occurred, but, if made soon after- wards, and explanatory tliereof, it is admissible." Armil, Adm'x, /'. Chicago, &c. Il'y Co., 70 la. I'M (1880). Mere nearness in point of time has not sutKced to admit state- ments as part of a res gest.i? fact, even in courts which favor a liberal interpretation of the rule, whore the utterance does not seem to have been instinctive. Thus, in an indictment of assault with intent to murder, the remarks of the assailant while lying woumlijd on the ground shortly after the termination of the assault, are not compe- tent in his own favor. " Were the statements of defendant to HaselHeld spontaneous, instinctive, generated by excited feeling ? We think not. When asked to tell about the matter he does not do it, seems to be thinking more about catching his horse than anything else, and only agrees or promises to tell witness if he will first catch his horse and fetch it to him ; and he does not tell .him until he has done so, and tliat, too, after the lajjse of about three minutes. This looks very much like a 'break or let down' in the ccmtinuity of the transaction. In his .apparently cool condition and freedom from ex- citement, the three minutes' time might have afforded defendant ample opportunity to concoct the stat-ement which was afterwards made to the witness. We are of opinion the court did not err in holding that the declarations were self serving, and eonsefpiently inadmissible." I radl)erry v. State, 22 Texas Apj). 27;> (1880). Where the conductor of a horse-car said to a passenger immedi- ately upon the happening of the accident that it was his fault, the fact is not competent as \yivt of the res gestie. The court adopt the language of an earlier decision (Lane v. l^ryant, 9 (xray, 245) : " Tiie declaration of the defendant's servant was incompetent, and should liave been rejected. It was made after the accident ocjurred, and the injury to the plaintiff's carriage had been done. It did not accompany the principal act, . . . or tend in any way to elucidate it. It was only the expression of an opinion about a past occurrence, and not part of the res gesta?. It is no more competent because made immediately after the accident than if made a week or a month ClIM'. 11.] AMKKICAN NOTKS. 3!tt2« al'ttTwarcls." Williamson r. (.'aiubridge U. ]{., 141 Mass. 1 I«(1SS7); Tyli'i- '•• Old Colony II. 11., 157 Mass. .'JoO (I.S'.IIJ). What liio plaiiitit't' in an action t'ur injuries from lalling or hcing puslit'il into a ditch by the dei'endant's iiegligcniU' said n\n)\\ being [lulled out of the diteh is mere hearsay. " Altiiougli occurring ini- mediately after tlie accident, it was no part of the res gesta', but a narration of a past transaction, and therefore iiu-rc hearsay evi- dence.'' Cleveland, &c. Iv. K. /'. Mara, '2('> Uh. St. l.S") (187")). "^ (L') In Hoover v. Cary, 8G la. 4<J4 (l8'.)L'), declarations were re- jected as part of the res gestiu because nut made at such a time ■•as to reasonably' exclude the idea of deliberate design." Mist (;iiAUA(;Ti:iuzK riii': riM\<ii'.\i, Fact. — .\s has l)een abun- dantly seen in the foregoing cases, it is essential in order to be in any just sense part of a res gestae fact that the declaration in (pies- tion should so limit, explain, or characterize siuih res gesta- fact as to be necessary in order to its full undtu'standing. "In the complexity of human affairs, ndiat is done and what is said are often so related that neither can be detached without leav- ing the residue fragmentary and distorted. There may Ije fraud and falsehood as to both ; but there is no ground of objection to one that does not exist equally as to the other. To reject the verbal fact would not Infrequently have the same (dfect as to strike out the con- trolling member from a sentence, or the controlling se.itence from its context." Insurance Comi)any r. jNIosley, 8 Wall. 3'.)7 (fS(5!)). '■ It becomes a part of the act itself, is explanatory of it, and gives it, to a great extent, its character." Mack o. State, 48 Wis. 271, L'8() (1879). In a Connecticut ise the court say that declarations part of a res gestie fact '-must mf have been mere narratives of past occur- rences, but must have been at the time of the act done which they are supposed to ohai ', and have been well calculated to unfold the nature and qua.iu the acts they were intended to ex- l)lain, and to so harmonize with lliem as to constitute a single trans- action." Rockwell I'. Taylor, 41 Conn, iio (1874). "Tin! limita- tions upon that ruh^ are easily stated, but often ilillicult in their application. The declarations iniist be made at the time of the act done which they are sui)i)osed to cluiracterize ; tiiey must be calcu- lated to unfold the nature and qualily of the facts wliidi tliey are intended to explain, and they must so harmonize witli these facts as to form one transaction." Suiith r. X. ]>. Society. JL'o X. V. 8.j (1890). "The difficulty of formulating any exact rule by which the admissibility of such declarations as a part of the res gestie shall be determined has been a source of frequent perplexity to the (tourts, and a cause of common lamentation to the judges and tlie text- writers. The inherent difficulty of the subject, and the necessity of referring each case to its own particular eireumstanoes, are univer- sally recognized. The declarations in question must not be mere -' ■■( 1 1 1 .. jMM^,_ 1 ^^^^^Hhuv J. iMi 891!*' A.MKKICAN NOTKH. [I'AUT 111. iiiiinitivcs of a past oecurronce, but must have been made at tlm time of tlie act done whicli they are supposed to characterize ; ami tlu'y must be well calculated to unfold the nature and quality of tho facts wliich they are offered to explain, and must so harmonize with tiiem as obviously to constitute one transaction. Hut, while sut'li declarations must be made at the time of tiie act done, that rule is not pressed to the extent that they must be precisely concurrent in point of time. If tlie declarations spring out of tlie transaction, if they elucidate it, if they are voluntary and spontaneous, and if tliey are made at tlie time or so near to it as reasonably to preclude the idea of deliberate design, and they be not a narrative of a past occurrence, they are then to be regarded as contemporaneous." Archer v. Helm, 70 Miss. 874, 8!K) (J 81)3). Jn an action against a carrier for assaulting the plaintilf, whose ticket did not permit him to use the part of the boat wiiere he was found, the plaintiff is entitled to put in evidence tiie declarations of the defen(huit's servants while engaged in violently removing liim. " We are of opinion that these declarations constituted a part of the res gestu'. Tlicy were made by one servant of the defendant wiiile assisting anotlier servant in enforcing its regulation as to deck pas- sengers. Thijy v/ere made when the watcliman iind tlie mate, accord- ing to the evidence of the plaintiff, were botli in tlie very act of violently ' pushing liiin,' while in a hel[)less condition, to that part of the boat assigned to deck passengers. IMainly, therefore, they iiad some relation to the impiiry, wlietiier the enforcement of that regulation was attended witli unnecessary or cruel severity. They accompanied and explained the acts of the defendant's servants out of which directly iirose the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff." Steamboat Co. t>. Crockett, IL'I U. S. 637, 649 (188C)). DrscRRTioN. — Fre(pient statements appear in the foregoing deci- sions to the etfect that the admissibility of declarations as part of the res gestie depends upon the discretion of the court. .Many such expressions appear unduly sweeping. The discretion of the court ill admitting sucli declarations is no greater than in other cases wliere relevant testimony is offered. Whether the evidence is of sutticient probative force to warrant its admission ; whether it is too remote to be of value; whether it is dangerous, as tending to mis- lead the jury, — these and similar (piestions are determined by the sound discretion of the court, subject to control by tiie upper court in case of abuse. Hut the presiding justice has no discretion to modify the rules of evidence in the case of declarations part of the res gestae in a different sense than in other cases where nice ques- tions of degree arise. " It is not a matter of discretion with the l)residing judge, to determine whether or not the declarations are admissible. That is determinable by well settled principles of law, which must be applied to each case as it arises ; the restriction being Ins. CHAP. II.] A.MKUICAN NOTICS. gov;8 IS C('\- t of ucli OUl't ises of too iiiis- tlio OUl't )U to the are law, if . tliat the declaration must be contemporary witli tlic iiriiici[)al trans- action, anil derive some degree of credit from it." Kciiiitalilc, tic Ass. /•. McCIuskey, 1 Col. .Vpp. -iln (iH'.rj). Statkmknts iiY A(JKNrs, C(M (iNsi'iK.\r()K> &(\ — Willi all dun deference to I'rofessor Greenli-af, who is followed by the hMnied author, tlie attempt to introduce the dcidaratioiis of agents, fcUow- consi)irators, &c.,as instaiuies of the res gestie nile, merely brings an (dement of further ambiguity into the consideration of a subject wiiich is at best considerably bidbgged. L'lider certain circumstances, fixed by positive law, the acts and deidaratioiis of l'>. are considered as being those of A. This lias nothing to do with the law of evidence. It is part of the law of agency, privity, conspiracy, HiC. When it is ascertaiiKul by the rules of these branches of the substanti'^e law, that the proper circumstances exist to enable 15. to act or speak for A., the law of evidence applies precisely the same ruh; in receiving the declarations of 15. that it would have ap|died to those of A. Clearly, therefore, the question is not one of evidence. The con- venient obscurity of the phrase "res gestie" operat(!s at this point. The substantive law decides that B., as a partner or other agent, can bind A. by his acts or declarations, when he is engaged on the /hisI- ni'Ks of his principal. B., as a conspirator, can, by the rules of posi- tive law, bind his fellow-conspirator, A., by his acts or omissions only when engaged in furthering the i«,s'/«^',v.s' agreed on by the conspiracy. This word "business," by being turned into the ])hrase " res gesta'," may readily become confused with the same phrase ''res gestu) " where it means the facts in issue and certain relevant facts in a particular case. So far as the law of evidence is conceriu'd, the use of the phrase in any other than the latter sense is greatly to be deplored. The extent to which the confusing of these two possible mean- ings of the phrase " res gestae" is carried is shown in a late case in the supreme court of Texas, where the statements of physicians made while attending a sick man and diagnosing his case were held admissible as part of the res gesta*. "Tlie opinions ex[)ressed at the time with reference to the subject of consideration by one or the other in the course of their examination were, in our opinion, in the nature of res gestip, and so admissible. The decdaratioiis were made in the course of their business and while engaged in a professional duty. They were coincident busiii(!ss declarations." ]\Iut. Life Ins. Co. V. Tillman, 84 Tex. 31 (1892). Hearsay. — The rule excluding the reported statements of parties not called as witnesses is unquestionably an essential cliaracteristic of the English law of evidence. Like many other characteristic features of this law, its original reason for existence is probably to be sought in fear lest that juries might be induced to give -i I ' li '' I ' <i it ;Ji)i29 AMKHICAN NOTES. [I'AHT III. ii'])()rte(l statement undue probative force. As a matter of logii', tliat a person not present in court has stated a certain fact to he true is probably of but slight iirobative force as proof of the fact. A tribunal of intellectual poise might, however, safoh^ be jx-rmittcd to receive sucdi a statement, giving it proper weight. Instances fre(piently occur where tlie operation of the hearsay rule is to remove from the consideration of court and jury evidence winch would be helpful to a correct conclusion. Hut practical considera- tions have tirmly established the rule that the e.xistenee of fads must be proved by tiie statements of persons called as witnesses or by documents properly verilied to the tribunal. Fougue r. l'.urges.s, 71 Mo. ;!81) (18S0); Slierwood v. Houston, il Miss. r»'.) (ISdC)); For- rester r. State, 4G Md. ir)4 (1S7G); Spencer i-. Fortescue. Ill' N. (,'. 2(;s (IS!).".) ; Atchison, &c. R. K. v. I'arker, o C. C. A. L'l'O (1HI>;;) ; Marks r. Suilivan, 9 Utah, IL' (189.']) ; Myers v. Knabe, ol Kans. Tl'O (ISIK!) ; Salem Gravel Road Co. i<. rennington. 02 Ind. 17o (1S7S) ; Anderson i'. Fetzer, 75 Wise. m2 (1890);' SeaU's i\ Desha. 1C> Ala. 308 (1849) ; Fage v. Farker, 40 N. U. 47 (18()0) ; Kent v. Mason, 79 HI. r)40 (187")) ; Hornheimer (.-, lialdwin, 4'2 Cal. 27 (1871) ; Shaw v. Susquehanna liooni Co., 125 Fa. St. .'524 (1889) ; Village of Fonca v. Crawford, 1>^ Xel).551 (ISSC.) ; Refay r. Wheeler, 84 Wis. FW (189.",); Little r. (\)ok, 55 Minn. 2G5 (189">) ; Brown v. l»rude, 97 Ala. O.'.'J (189;}); Illinois Central K. II. v. Langdon, 71 Miss. 14G (189."); Downtain n. Connellee, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 95 (18',>;{) ; Faker v. ({old- smith, 91 Ga. 17.'} (1892). What a witness " understood from some source" is properly rejected as hearsay. Scales v. Desha, IG Ala. 308 (1849); "That it was a matter of common report and i)ulilic notoriety that intoxicating li(piors were sold at " a certain drug store is hearsay and inadmissible. Cobleigh i: .McHride, 45 la. IKi (187(')). The error of admitting hears.ay is not cured by an instruc^tion to dis- regard it. Denu)ney r. Walker, 1 N. J. liaw, 3.'{ (1790). Its admission is none the less subject to objection and excep- tion where the ([lu^stions bringing it out are asked by tlic judge. Hornheimer r. Haldwin, 42 Cal. 27(1871). The fai't that the rei'ioiied statement is that of an expert's opinion does not aU'eet the applica- tion of the rule. Village of Fonca v. Crawford, 18 Xcb. 551 (18.SG). AMU)ng the objections to hearsay must be included the infirmity which arises from the fact that the person on whose credit the jtro- bative stiitement really rests cannot be subjected to the tests of cross examination. " .V person who relates a hearsay is not oblig(>d to enter into any j)artienlars, to answer any (pu'stions. to solve any ditticulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to exjjlain any obscurities, to renu)ve any ambiguities ; lie intrenches hiniself in the simple assertion that he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely njion his dead or absent author." Coloinan v. Southwiok, 9 Johns. 45 (1812). ('ii.vr. II.] AMEUICAN NOTES. ;;<)l3o h», The rule applies equally where prohative statement of the iieisoii not called as a witness is in writing, as, for exanqile, a letter, lirooks r. Aeton, 117 Mass. l.'l)4 (1875) ; Anderson /•. Fctzer, 75 Wis. 5(iL' (^KS'JO); 1' rsun /•. Darrington, ol' Ala. L'1'7. L'5(> (lS,")f<). (.)r is con- Uiined in deposition. I'age r. Tarker, -K) N. II. 47, <>(! (ISdO). The United States supreme cinirt in an early ease apparently re- ceived hearsay as evidence of death seemingly on the ground o( a ilitliculty in getting better evidence. Lessee of Scott /•. Katliffe, 5 IVters, 81, SG (IN.'Jl); Jackson y. Honeham, 15 Johns. l.'l.'(; (1818). Tlie (piestion has been raised wlietliei a witness in stating liisown ag" is testifying to hearsay. That he is not, see CiieevcM' r. C'ongdon, ;U Mieii. 2\k> (187()); Morrell v. Morgan. ()5 Cal. 575 (1884) ; State r. Cain. W. \'a. 55'J (187(>); State /-. -McClain, 4',) Kans. 7;}0 (18i)2) Kogers r. De Hardeleben Coal &c. Co., '.)7 Ala. 154 (181»L'). " It is quite clear that one may testily from his own knowledge of himself wliether ho was twenty-one or sixteen years of age ataeertain time " — to be given sm;h weight as the jury jdease. Hill r. Elridge, 126 Mass. L'.')4 (1879) " The witness knows the age of her sister from the declarations of her mother, who is de(!eased. Now. that this species of evidenci! must W' adniitted has always been held, for otherwise a person could not prove his own age; for where no family record is made, he can only show it from the declaration of his parents or others cognisant of the fact. Such testimony has always been re- ceived, unless there was better evidence in tiie power of the party. Tiie general rule undoubtedly is, that the best evidence whiidi the nature of the case admits must be ])roduced. Ihitthisrule is ndaxed in cases of jiedigree." Watson /•. llrewster. 1 I'a. St. .'i8l (1845). ihit the declarations of a testator are not admissible as to his age. It is " a fact of whicli \nr could not have any personal knowledge." Doe n. Ford, .'i Q. B. U. C. 35L' (1847). So a young girl may testify as to her i)arentage. " It is certainly competent for one wiu), from his earliest recollection, has been a member of lUie's family, given his name, and reared in the btdief, and in all ways given to undi rstand tiiat he is a son in tlu' household to ti'stify of his parentage ... to so rear a child is in tiie nature id' an admission of pari'ntage. ai'd should be so regarded." C(Unstock /•. State, 14 Neb, 205 (I88;i). On tiie otlier hand, a person cannot testify as to an injury suffered at the age of four. (irangtM's' Ins. Co. /•. Hrown, 57 Miss. ,'{(I8 (187'.t). .\ i>res('nt impression ])ro(luced by information from others is still iieaisay. Lamar r. i'earre, <)() Ga. .".77 (18i)2). A man cannot nd'rcsh his memory from nuMiioranda made from tin* reports of seivants. Tingley r. Kairhaven Land Co., 1) I'tah, .34 (1801). Or testify as to what he has learned from a record m.ade by another person. Cleveland, &i'. K. R. Co. v. 15rown, 5.'? 111. Api). 2'27 «'.)"')• t ■Ik W 'ill ., '4 . ■il'-i: 'Ij.; in 39131 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AltT III. P.KST Evidence Rule. — An attempt has been made to regard the rnle a,i,Minst liearsay as an application of the best evidence rtUc and permit its reception " when no evidence can be supposed to exist." Gould V. Sniitli, 35 Me. T)!,') (1S53). "The cases in whicli hearsay, declarations of parties, and reputation, have been allowed in evidence, are where no better evidence can be supposed to exist." Crouch v. Eveleth, 15 Mass. .304 (1818) ; Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch, 290 (1813) ; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1883). " Hearsay is uni- formly iiolden incompetent to establish any specific fact which is in its nature susceptible of being proved by witnesses who can sjieak from their own knowledge." Page v. Parker, 40 X. H. 47, 60 (1860). "Such testimony is excluded whenever it appears that a higher degree of evidence of that fact can be obtained by the production of the per.s(o\ from whom tlie evidence offered was derived ; but wliPii- ever Ihv testimony of sucli person is of no higher degree in establish- ing the f;ict CO be shown than the evidence offered, either is original and primary evidence of that fact." Smith v. Whittier, 95 Cal. 279, 293 (1892). It is certainly to be modified to the extent stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch. 290 (1813); — "That this species of testimony supposes some better testimony which might be adduced in the particular case, is iiottlie sole ground of its exclusion. Its intrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy the mind of the existence of the fac^t, and the frauds which might be practiced under its cover, combine to support the rule that liearsay evidence is totally inadmissible." I/juf. It is probably upon the principle of its being the best evidence available tluit tiie recognized exception to tlie hearsay rule obtains "tliat declarations, wrif'-'u or oral, made by a testator after the exc- cutinn of his will, are, in the event of its loss, admissil)le, not only to prove that it has not been cancelled, but also as secondary evidence of its contents." Matter of Page, 118 111. 576 (I88(n. P)Ut it is furtlun' true tliat where no better evidence can possibly be secured hearsay is not competent. For example, the statements of a deceased person, not part of the res gestie, and not made as a witness on a former trial, are not admissible to prove an account. Salem Grav.d Road Co. v. Pennington. 62 Tnd. 175 (1878). So the fact that a witness is dead or has left the country is no rea.son for admitting his declarations, either written or spoken. Peansou c. Harrington, 32 Ala. 227, 250 (1858). Heahsav to thi;Coi:kt. — The nature of the danger appreliended to the administration of justice from the use of hearsay in mislead- ing the jury is emphasized by the fact that, where the question is one of faet preliminary to tlie admission, and therefore to l)e decided by the court, the rule excfluding hearsay does not apply. For ex- ample, the court in deciding whether proper search hn- the original CHAP, n.] AMERICAN NOTES. 39132 document has taken place sufficient to let in secondary evidence of contents, may rely upon hearsay. Bridges v. Hyatt, 2 Abb. Trac. 449 (18r)6). UooKs OF Standakd Authokity. — A statement is none the less hearsay because it is contained as a scientitic statement in a standard work on medicine, lirowu r. Sheppard, 13 Q. ]^. U. C. 178 (ISilG) ; Fox v. Peninsular, &c. AVorks, 84 Mich. 070, 081 (1891); r.loomington v. Shrock, 110 111. 21!) (1884); Tucker r. Donald, 60 Miss. 4G0 (1882) ; Com. /-. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68 (1889) ; Gallagher v. Market Ht. R. K.. 07 Cal. 13 (188.5); Kreuziger v. Chicago, &c. IJ. K, 73 Wis. 158(1888); Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122 (1875). The rule cannot be evaded by reading from the book to an expert medical witness, and asking him wliether it is the truth. jNlarshall v. Brown, 50 Mich. 148 (1883) ; Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15 (187.3). The rule refusing to admit works of standard authority is not modified by the fact that counsel declined to examine an expert further entirely on the expectation that he could offer tlie book itself later, nor that the expert had read passages on his cross-ex- amination. State r. O'Brien, 7 R. I, 330 (1802). So of the United States ]\Iedical Dispensary'. Boehringer v. Richards Medicine Co. (Tex.), 29 S. W. .508 (1894). Such statements cannot be shown even for the jjurpose of cor- roborating an expert by showing that he is sustiiin(ul by nu'dical authority. Fox r. Peninsular, &.v. Works, 84 ]\Iicli. 070 (1891) ; Huffman r. Click, 77 N. C. 55 (1877). But where an adverse expert witness bases his opinion upon the authority of a particular author, that work nuiy be read in evidence to contradict him. " Where a witness says a tiling or a tlic ry is so because a book says so, and the book, on being produced, is discov- ered to say directly to the contrary, there is a direct contradiction which anybody can understand, lint where a witness simply gives his opinion as to the proper treatment of a given disease or injury, and a bof)k is produced recomnu-nding a different treatni'Mit, at most the repugnance is not of fact, but of theory ; and any number of additional books expressing different theories, would obviously be quite as lompetent as the first. IJut since the boDks arc not ad- missible as (M'iginal evidence in such cases, it must follow that tliey are not admissible on cross-examination, where their introduction is not for the direct contradiction of sometliing asserted by the witness, butsimjilv to prove a contrary theorv." lUoomington /•. Schrock, 110 111.219 (1S84). It would seem that, upon iiriiieiplc, a statement in a book of stand- ard authority should be competent where tbe fact to be ])roved is not the truth of tlie statenuMit, but the existenee of tlie statement. In a case like lirown r. I'iper, where originality was claimed for a li' •! «n Ml ( 1 30133 AMEiaCAN NOTES. [PAUT HI. cortain invention, it would seem to be competent to show that tlie essential principle of the alleged invention was described in the American EncyclopaMlia. Brown r. Piper, 91 U. S. 37 (1875). The error in admitting the statements of medical works may ho cured by the otherside going into the same kind of evidence without objection. Kreuziger v. Chicago, t&c. K. li., 73 Wis. 158 (188S). MoitT.ALiTV Tablks. — Ou the other hand, mortality tables uf recognized authority are admissible to assist the jury in estimating decreased earning capacity, «fcc., caused by a personal injury. " I.» order to assist the jury in making such an estimate, standard lil'e and annuity tables, showing at any age the probable duration of life, and the present value of a life annuity, are competent evidence. But it has never been held that the rules to be derived from such tables or computations must be- the absolute guides of tlie judgment and the conscience of the jury." Vicksburg, &c. R. It. v. I'utnani, 118 U. S. 545 (1880). "The expectancy of life is ascertained by the average mortality of large numbers, and for convenience tlicse averages are gathered into tables. There are several such tables, English and American, and any of them shown to be used by reputable insurance companies, with such other proof as the parties may offer, either as to the condition of the individual or tlie general mortality of the community, would be admissible.'' Mississippi, »&c. R. 11. v, Ayres, 10 Lea, 725 (1880); j\[cKeigiie V. Janes'.'ille, G8 Wis. 50 (1887). But the mortality or annuity tables must be shown to be correct; and it is error to intro- duce in evidence the table of the expectation of the years of life contained in a book entitled " A Million of Facts ; Conkling's Handy Manual of Useful Information and Atlas of the World ; all for Twenty-five Cents," without more evidence, or that it was of any " higiier character than any cheap book sold on railways." Galves- ton, &c. K. 11. V. Arispe, 81 Tex. 517 (181)1). Scoi'K OK THE lluLK. — The rule as stated above is not equivalent to saying that the statements of persons not called as witnesses are not admissible. They are not admissible as evidence of the exis- tence of the facts which they purport to state. But the fact that a certain statement has been made may itself be relevant, whether it states the truth or not. In fact the truth of the statement is not what is relevant. It is the .statement itself. Tlie hearsay rule ac^cordiiigly does not apply to jiroof of an oral contract by a bystander. " It was not hearsay, but legal proof of a contract of which there was no other or better evidence. It was evidence of a fact, and not of a mere conversation or declaration." Blaiichard v. Child, 7 Gray 155 (185G). A by-stander can testify to such a conversation, even if carried on through an interpreter, though he only understands one language, and relies on the interpreter for the other. Com. v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393 (1892). CHAP. II.] AMERICAN NOTES. 3913* • for 111 the same way the fact that a certain statement has been made out of court may be admissible to fix a date or identify an interview. Hill V. North, 3i Vt. G04 (1801). Or to fix the time at whicli a witness' attention was called to a fact. Barrow v. State, 80 (la. 191 (18S7). A declaration maybe used as a fact to identify an interview. 'I'lie hearsay rule has no application to such a use. " Any circumstance or act occurring at that transaction and remembered by both witnesses would show that they were testifying to the same occasion, and would be clearly competent. So we are of opinion that tiie conversation of the parties or any declarations made at the time are to be regarded as in the nature of verbal acts, and admissible for the purpose of identifying the occasion of which the witnesses speak. Statements used for this limited purpose are admitted without regard to the truth of the fact stated." Earle r. Earle, 11 All. 1 (18G5). Giving notice may be " considered an act, which he might prove in any case in which it became material." Kilburn v. IJenuett, 3 Mete. 19!) (1841). Exclamations of paix, &c. — Where the existence of any bodily or mental state is a fact in issue or relevant to the issue the usual verbal expressions attending the existence of such state are competent original evidence of the fact of its existence. Such statements are not an exception to the hearsay rule. It is the existence of the statement rather than its purport which is con- sidered relevant. "Whenever the bodily or mental feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelings are original and competent evidence." Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397 (1869) ; Texas, &c. R. R. v. Rarron, 78 Tex. 421 (1890) ; McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50 (1887); Phillips v. Kelly, 29 Ala. 628 (1857) ; Sanders *•. Reister, 1 Dak. 151 (1875) ; Frink v. Coe. 4 Greene (la.) 555 (1854); Hagenlocher r. Coney Island, &c. R. R., 99 X. Y. 136 (1885) ; Western Union Tel, Co. r. Henderson, 89 Ala. 510 (1889) ; Helton r. Alabama &e. R. R., 97 Ala. 275 (189;?); Reople r. Meservey, 76 INIich. 22.'? (1889) ; Lush r. McDaniel, 13 Ired. L. 485 (1852) ; riummer r. Ossiiiee, 59 N. II. r>r> (1879); Texas, &c. 11. R. v. Harron, 78 Tex. 421 (1890); (Jray /•. Mc- Laughlin, 26 la. 279 (1868); Commissioners v. Leggett, 115 Ind. 544 (1888). " It is evident tliat tlie reason for tli rule is a sound one, since it is clear that as many of the organs of the body cannot be seen, latent injuries can only be discovered and known through the declarations of the injured person." Exclamations of pain are evidence of a then present condition when made to a physician wlio is not attending tlie declarant jiro- fessionally, in the same way and to the same extent that they would be competent if made to a non-professional witness. Drew I ' i\ 1 .'■ : *ii i^/ 39185 AMERICAN X01J1«. [PAKT III. v 1 r. Sutton, ;") \'t. 580 (1882). Apparently in Newman v. Dodson, ()1 Tex. 91 (1884) it is ivgai-ded as i:ii material whether the physi- rian is employed or not. Siioh exclamntions ^v^hiie under examina- tion by a physician who is preparing himself to be a witness in the case are not competent. '• It has all the evih of manufactured testimony, without any p()ssil)le means of detecting the falsity of it." Jones v. I'ortland, 88 Mich. 598 (1891) ; Stewart v. Everts, 7G Wis. 35 (1890). The name of the party iuHictin^- the injury is to be excluded from such a statement. Denton v. State, 1 Swcn, 27C (1851). Thus in an action for i)ersonal injuries exclamations of pain littered by deceased at the time of the injury and from that tinu; down to her death are admissible. McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50 (1887). The declarations of a sick person made from time to time con- cerning present sufferings and sensations are admissible to prove tlie fact of such sufferings and sensations. Elliott i\ Van Buren, 3.3 Mich. 49 (1875) ; Hall v. American Masonic &c. Ass'n., 80 Wis. 518 (1893). ••' Evidence of exclamations which are natural concomitants and manifestations of pain and suffering are still admissible, because regarded as involuntary and natural expressions which a witness may describe for the same reason that he may the appearance of the party." Kenuv dy v. R. C. & B. K. Co., 130 N. Y. 054 (1891) ; Thomas V. Ilerrall, .8 Oreg. 540 (1S90). On an action for a nuisance by the noxious smells from the de- fendant's out buildings, the plaintiff can give in evidence com- plaints by his wife since deceased. " It is difficult to perceive why the complaint of a person suffering from a nuisance, may not be received as an expression of bodily or mental feeling, and as origi- nal evidence, as well as in any other case of annoyance or injury." Kearney v. Farrell, 28 Conn. 317 (1859). In an action against a town for injuries caused by a defect in the highway the presiding judge ruled that " groans or exclamations of pain, made by the plaintiff, at anytime, were admissible in evidence, although they referred either by word or gesture to the kxiality of the pain ; as if a man should ))ut his hand upon his side and groan, or should say, ' Oh ! my head ! ' or utter similar complaints, being an expression of present pain or agony ; but that any statement of liis condition or feelings, made in answer to a question, or as a narrative, or with a view to communicate information, was not admissible." This ruling was sustained by the supreme judicial court, as follows : — " The rule of law is now well settled, and it forms an exception to the general rules of evidence, that where the bodily or mental feelings of a party are to be proved, the usual and natural expressions of such feelings, made at the time, are consid- il' CHAP. 11.] AMUHIUAN NOTES. 39136 ored competent and original evidence in his favor. And the rule is founded upon the consideration, that such expressions are tlie natural and necessary language of emotion, of tlie existence of which, from tlie very nature of the case, there can be no other evidence. Tliere are ills and pains of the body, which are proper subjects of proof in courts of justice, which can be shown in no other way. Such evidence, however, is not to be extended beyond the necessity on wliich tlie rule is founded. Anything in the nature of narration or statement is to be carefully excluded, and tlie testimony is to be confined strictly to such complaints, exclamations and expressions as usually and naturally accompany, and furnish evidence of, a present existing pain or malady. Of course, it will always be for the jury to judge whether such expressions are real or feigned, which can be readily ascertained b; the manner of them, and the cireumstanees under which they are proved to have been made." Bacon v. Inhabitants of Charlton, 7 Cush. HSl (1851). Statemexts to Physician. — Analogous to statements of pain, &c., are the communications made to a doctor as t\w basis of med- ical treatment. State v. lielcher, 13 S. C. 459 (1880) ; Collins v. Waters, 54 111. 485 (1870) ; State v. Gedicke, 43 N. J. L. 86 (1881); Rogers v. Crain, 30 Tex. 284 (1867); Barber v. Merriam. 11 All. 3L'2 (1865) ; Fay v. Harlan, 128 Mass. 244 (1880) ; I\Iatteson v. New York Central R. R., 62 Barb. 3G4 (18G2) ; Towle v. Blako, 48 N. H. 92 (18G8); Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1873) ; Wilson v. Granby. 47 Conn. 59 (1879) ; Lakeshore, &c. R. R. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Ra. St. 519 (1886) ; Perkins v. Concord R. R., 44 N. H. 223 (1862). Such a statement cannot be so extended as to include a statement tliat a particular person caused the injury. Morrissey v. Ingham, HI Mass. 63 (1872). Or symptoms at a previous period or the existence of disease at such earlier time. Lush v. McDaniel, 13 Ired. Law, 485 (1852). Nor can a physician testify as to what the patient says is the cause of the injury. " W^hile a witness, not an expert, can testify only to such exclamations and complaints as indicate present existing pain and suffering, a physician may testify to a statement or narrative given by his patient in relation to his condition, symptoms, sensations, and feelings, both past and present. In both cases these declarations are admitted from necessity, be- cause in this way only can the bodily condition of the party, who is the subject of the injury, and who seeks to obtain damages, be ascertained. But the necessity does not extend to declarations by the party as to the cause of the injury, which is the principal sub- ject matter of inquiry, and which may be proved by other evidence." Roosa V. Boston Loan Co., 132 Mass. 439 (1882); Illinois &c. R. ;:. V. Sutton, 42 111. 438 (1867). So a patient's declarations as to the instrument with which an ''I ^1 I 11 m f"' : ~''iJ||9^ilffi .5H| ? '. ;;': ^rr~;. f.:. 39137 AMEHICAN NOTES. [PAUT III. injury is inflicted is incompetent. Collins v. Waters, 51 111. 18.") (1870). A mere narrative to a doctor cannot be used as evidence oi' the fact stated any more than the same story wlien told to some one else. " It was a statement of a fact, and was used as evidence oi that fact. It was therefore wrongly admitted." Chapiu v. .Marl- borough, 9 Gray, 244 (1857). Probably the statement would have been competent as cross-examination of the doctor if made the basis of his opinion. " Everything in the nature of a narrative of what is already past is to be carefully excluded, and the testimony conHied to such ex- pressions as furnish evidence of the jjresent condition of the patient." Taylor v. K. E., 48 N. H. 304 (18C9). If the statements, on the other hand, ire not narrative of some- thing that is past but " a description of his symptoms at the time it was made ... it may be fairly inferred that vc was made for the purpose of medical advice and treatment " and such statements are admissible if made a day or two before or even during the trial. Fleming v. Springfield, 154 Mass. 5L'0 (1891). Such declarations are limited to proof of the bodily or mental state. The declarant cannot go further and manufacture self-s(!rv- ing evidence by declaring the cause of the injury. "The rule of law is now well settled, and it forms an exception to the general rules of evidence, that where the bodily or mental feelings of a party are to be proved, the usual and naturiJ expressions of such feelings, made at the time, are considered competent and original evidence in his favor. A"d the lu.e is founded upon the considera- tion, that such expressions are the natural and necessary langua'^e of emotion, of the existence of which, from the ver}' nature of the case, there can be no other evidence. There are ills and pains of the body, which are pvojjer subjects of proof in courts of justice, which can be shown in no other way. Such evidence, however, is not to be extended beyond the necessity on which the rule is founded. Anything in the nature of narration or statement is to be carefully excluded, and the testimony is to be confined strictly to such complaints, exclamations and expressions as usually and naturally accompany, and furnish evidence of, a present existing pain or malady. Of course, it will always be for the jury to judg(! whether such expressions are real or feigned, which can Ik; readily ascertained by the manner of them, and the circum itances under which they are proved to have been made." Bacon v. Inhabitants of Charlton, 7 Gush. .581 (1851). This was approved in Chapin v. Marlborough, 9 Gray, 244 (1857). Compared with Rks Gkst.t:. — A very natural tendency, how- ever, exists, wherever proof of the physical and mental state in ■i I niiAP. II.] AMEIUCAN NOTKS. 39138 244 ([ucstioi; is contemporaneous with some relevant act to treat the [iioot' ;is admitted as a dechiration part of the res gestae. Fur example, the intention with which an alleged bankrupt left his liome being expressed in his declarations, proof of the statements lias hiHMi treated as part of the res gestte act of leaving. Intention is really a fact itself in the res gestip, and its proof is admissible on ordinary principles, llawson /■. Haigh, 2 Hing. 99, 104 (1824); Kidley r. Gyde, 9 JJing. .'549 (18;}2). So, in an aggravated assault by a school-teacher on a pupil, the plaintiff cannot show that the scholar said to his father two or three nights after the assault that his hips pained him so he could not sleep. Tlie reason assigned is that " the statements were made too loni.' after the infliction of the injury," and the rule is stated in the laii!,'..age jf the res gestiti rule that the declarations must be instinc- tive. Dowlen v. State, 14 Tex. App. 01 (1883). It is thought that the correct rule is that announced by the su- preme court of Iowa in a case of injury from a defective highway. " A witness was asked to state what complaint of pain or disease plaintiif made about a week after the accident. It is now insisted that, as plaintiff's complaints 'were no part of the res gestie, they were not admissible. They were not admitted on that ground, but for the reason that his complaints of pain or disease were competent to show the condition of his health, which was in issue under his claim that he was siwerely and permanently injured." Blair v. Madison Co., 81 la. .'n.3 (1890). Any attempt to assign a cause for the injury, and any narrative of -'how it hapy)ened " are incompetent. Commisbicners v. Leggett, ll.'ilud. 544 (1888). Sanity. — Where the issue involves the fact of sanity, many declarations, oral or written, of the jiarty whose mental state is in- volved may be given in evidence, not for tlie purpose of proving the truth of the declarations (which would be objectionable as hearsay), hut as circumstantial evidence of the existence of a state of mind of which they are indicia or natural expression. Thus, on an issue of the sanity of a testatrix, of her declarations showing a belief in spiritual communications, in her power to heal the sick, and "various other imaginations, delusions in one way and another." " The rule allowing the introduction of the declarations of a testator to show the condition of his mind is very general, and admits much that would be excluded if offered as testimony to prove facts. The rule allows great liberality to both parties as to the kind of evidence, and as to the length of time over which it extends- Much is n>icessarily left to the discretion of the presiding judge, and it is impossible to lay down any general rules which would cover all cases. To enable the jury to determine the real state of mind, the action of that miad, as shown best by conversations, declarations, JBBIv -J 39189 AMKHICAN NOTES. [I'AUT rir. claims, and acts, is the most satisfactory evidence. Hut, in oidor to fairly judye, the examination must not be confined to a single decla- ration or conversation, but must embrace sometimes many years and many different acts and declarations, and sometimes, perliajjs, tiie evidence n^!1'^ at first view, be remote, and far from a demonstra- tion." .. V. Adams, 613 Me. 369, 413 (1870). Letter^ \, ..uten by a testatrix are admissible on the question of her mental capacity. Hulger r. lloss, 98 Ala. 207 (189.'}). Fbaud or Uxduk Influe.vck. — So, where the question is as to •whether a testiitrix was induced to execute a will by fraud, a fixed intention, both before and after its execution, to make a different dis- position of her property is relevant, and such intention may be sliown by the declarations of the testatrix, within certain limits fixed by the discretion of the court. " The declarations of the testator accom- panying the act must always be resorted to as the most satisfactory evidence to sustain or defend the will whenever this issue is pre- sented. So it is uniformly held that the previous declarations of the testator, offered to prove the mental facts involved, are competent. Intention, purpose, mental peculiarity and condition, are mainly ascertainable through the medium aiforded by the power of language. Statements and declarations, when the state of the mind is tlie fact to be shown, are therefore received as mental acts or conduct. Tlie truth or falsity of the statement is of no consequence. As a narra- tion, it is not received as evidence of the fact stated. It is only to be used as showing what manner of man he is who makes it. If therefore the statement or declaration offered has a tendency to prove a condition not in its nature temporary and transient, then, by the aid of the recognized rule that what is once proved to exist must be presumed to continue till the contrary be shown, the declaration, though prior in time to the act the validity of which is questioned, is admissible. Its weight will depend upon its signifi- cance and proximity. It may be so remote in point of time, or so altered in its import by subsequent changes in the circumstances of the maker as to be wholly immaterial, and wisely to be rejected by the judge. Upon the question of capacity to make a will, evidence of this description is constantly received; and when tlie issue is one of fraud and undue influence it is equally material. "The requisite mental qualification to make a will might exist, and be entirely consistent with such a degree of weakness, or such peculiarity, as would make the party the easy victim of fraud and improper influ- ence." Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112, 120 (18G8) ; Thompson V. Ish, 99 Mo. 160 (1891) ; Gardner v. Frieze, 16 11. I. 640 (1891) ; Linch V. Linch, 1 Lea, 526 (1878). Declarations of intention to benefit certain persons do not, alone, furnish evidence which, as a matter of law, Avould justify a jury in setting aside a will on the CHAP. II.] AMERICAN NOT KM. 5!»1*'' i,'roun(l of testamentary incapacity. Cawthorn r. llaynes, L'4 Mn. 2;5G (1857). " Siieli declarations, alone, are not competent evidence to jjiovm! acts of others amounting to undue influence, although when the acts are proven, the declarations of the testator may be given in evidcnco to show the operation they had upon his mind." Cudney v. Ciidncy, 6.SN. Y. 148 (1877). The admissibility of these declarations is not confined to those made prior to or at the time of the execution of the will. It extends to subse- (juent declarations. As the court say in Shailer v. Humstead, '.)!) Mass. 1 12, 120 (1868), " This evidence was not competent as a declaration or narrative to show the fact of fraud or undue influence at a previous ])eriod. But it was admissible not only to show retention or loss of memory, tenacity or vacillation of purpose existing at the date of the will, but also in proof of long cherished purposes, settled con- I victions, deeply rooted feelings, opinions, affections or prejudices, or >. other intrinsic or enduring peculiarities of mind, inconsistent with ; the dispositions made in tlie instrument attempted to be set up as . the formal and deliberate expression of the testatrix's will; as well as ' to rebut any inference arising from the non-revocation of the instru- ment. They were not rejected as too remote in point of time, or us having no tendency in their character to sustain the fact claimed to • exist." If)i<l. ; Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N. Y. 157 (1854) ; Mooney . V. Olsen, 22 Kan. 09 (1879). So the declarations of a testatrix subsequent to the execution of the will are admissible to show imbecility of mind. MeTaggart v. Thompson, 14 Pa. St. 149 (1850). Or, on the other hand, declara- tions of a testator to show his mental capacity for transacting busi- ness are competent. Pinney's Will, 27 Minn. 280 (1880). " Parol evidence of the declarations of a testator expressing dis- satisfaction with his will, and made shortly after its execution, such as ' I have done something I ought not to have done ; I have made my will, and did not make it as I wanted to ; I know I did wrong, but I could not help it. Lord God Almighty, who ever heard of ' such a will, but I can't change it,' is admissiljle, not to prove the . fact that fraud was practiced upon him, or that undue influence was actually exercised, but as tending to show the state of testator's mind, and that he was in a condition to be easily influenced." Den- nis V. Weekes, 51 Ga. 24 (1874) ; Ilerster v. Herster, IIG Pa. St. 612 (1887). On the other hand, the view has been entertained that the declara- tions of a testator tending to show undue influence were admitted as part of the res gestae, and therefore must be made contemporaneously with the execution of the will itself. Comstock v. Hadlyme, 8 Conn. 254 (1830). This has been established as the rule in New York in cases ■v,mi^, w ;v.)H' AMKlilCAN NOTKH. [PAUT III. " wlicrc tlie validity of ii will is disputed on the ground of fnuid, duress, Miistakf!, or some similar cause, aside from tlie nu'ntal wciik- iii'ss of tlic testator." Waterman /'. Whitney, 11 X. V. InJ (IMJ). A ruliiii,' to the elfeiit that siudi deelarations must be competent us part of the res gestic was reversed in Linch v. Linch, 1 Lea, oL'd (1H7.S). OniEii Mkntal Statks. — So where the qiu'stion is as to the un- friendliness of one woman to another, her declarations to third parties on the snl)je('t are competent. " Whenever the mental feelings of un individual are to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelin;_,'s are orii,'inal evidence, and often tlie only jjroof of them whieli can he had."' Jacobs v. Whitcomb, 10 Cush. L'oo (l8r>2) ; Casat r. State, 40 Ark. /ill (IHH.S); State ». llarf,'rave, 97 X. C. 457 (lM87). " A man's words show his mental condition. It is common to j)rove insanity by the party's sayings as well as by his acts. One's likes and dis- likes, fears and friendsliips, hopes and intentions, are shown by his utterances. So that it is generally true that whenever a party's state of mind is a subject of inquiry, his declarations are admissil)le us evidence thereof. In other words, a declaration which is sought as mere evidence of an external fact, and whose force depends upon its credit for truth, is always mere hearsay if not made upon oath, but a declaration which is sought as evidence of what the declarant thought or felt, or of his mental capacity, is of the best kind of evi- dence." Alooney r. Olsen, 22 Kansas, 09, 77 (1879). So the affection of a husband for his wife may be shown by his letters to third per- sons. Gaines v. Keif, 12 How. 472 (1851). " Intention, purpose, mental peculiarity and condition, are mainly ascertainable through the nu^dium afforded by the power of language. Statements and declarations, when the state of mind is the fact to be shown, are therefore received as mental acts or conduct." Shailer u. Kumstead, i)9 Mass. 112 (18(58). So where the (pu'stion of inti'titlon is involved, declarations stating the intention, either oral or in writing, are competent. So lield where letters declaring an intention to leave a certain ydace were admitted as evidence of the existence of the intention. The letters being oifered as entries in the course of business were iirst re- jected, the court very carefully taking the distinction, frequently overlooked, between the letters as evidence of intention and as part of the res gestue. " A man's state of mind or feeling can only be nianifesced to otliers by countenance, attitude or gesture, or by sound or words, spoken or written. The nature of the fact to be proved is the same, and evidence of its proper tokens is equally competent to prove it, whether expressed by aspect or conduct, by voice or pen. When the intention to be proved is important only as qualifying an act, its connection with that act must be shown, in order to warrant the admission of declarations of the intention. But whenever the i;t,A. i>v ( IIAP. U.J AMKUICAN NnTHS. ;;iti<^ III t-ciit ion is of itself a distiiict ami luiitcrial fact, in u el mill (I fcii' cinii- were "ttcrs re- ^ntly part ly be )unil ed is it to pen. gan ■rant the .-tanci's, it may be proved by conti'iiijioraiicoiis oral or wnticii dccla- ratioiis of tlic party. The existence oi' a paitieiilar inlciitioii in a certain person at a eertain time lieing a iiiatciial l;u't lo l,c proved, evidence tliat be expressed tliat intention at that time is as (brci't eviileiie.e (d tlie fact, as bis own testimony tliat lie then bad that intention would be." Miit. Life Ins. Co. c. llilhiion, 1 l.'. l'. S. L'H") (ISDI) ; Iliint-r /•. State, -l(» N. ,J. Law, I'jr, (ISTM), These deela- latioiis should be made, to be admissible, at a time when then- was lotive to misrejiresent. Miit. Mle Ins. Co./-. I lillmoii, 1 li"» L'.S. no n I'S.') (1«!)1) ; Hunter r. State, 4(» N. •). Law, 4'Jo (1H7«). So where the ([uestion is as to a servant's reason for abandoning an employment, his deidarations as to the reason are eonipelent. "The testimony is admitted on the prt'sumption. arising' iroia expe- rience, that when a man does an act, his eotemporary de(daralioii accords with bis real intention, unless there be some n asoii br mis- representing such intention.'' Hadley /•. Carter, H N. 11. 10 ( Ih;;,")) ; Lliiier /'. Fessenden, 1;')! Mass. .'!;')',) (IH'.IO). "We cannot follow the ruling at nisi jjfiiis in Tilk /•. Tarsoiis, L' (,'. A 1*. HOl, that the testi- mony of the persons concerntid is the only evidence to jirove their motives. We rather agree with .Mr. Starkie that sucdi declarations, made with no ajiparent motive for misstatement, may be better evi- dence of the maker's state of mind at the time than the sul)se(pient testimony of the same persons." Stark. Ev. (lOth Am. ed.) Xi), As a rule such declarations are not evidence of the past facts which they may recite. The eases in which they have been admitted to jirove the cause of a wound or injury, when the declarations were made at the time, or inunediatidy after the event, if not exceptions to the general rule, at least mark the limit of admissiliility. Com. r. Ilackett, 2 All. 130, 140. Com. v. M'I'ike, ;>> Cnsh. I.sl,'lS4. In- surance Co. i\ Mosley, 8 Wall. o'J7. The excluded t ■stiiiioiiy was not competent to prove that the defendatit did tell the workmen the stor}-. As to that, it was mere hearsay, and was not within the scope of the special reasons wdueli led to the detdsions last citrii." Elmer r. Fessenden, 1;')! jNLiss. oi)'.) (181)0). A eonversatiiui showing a present intention to ]mrchase certain premises is com])etent evidence that the jdaiiitiff's ett'oits were not the cause of tiie trade. Folks v. r.urnett, 47 Mo. App. 004 (1891). So the intention of taking a train on the part of a man inju.°d by alocomotive may be shown bj- his declarations. Theeourt app.nently rely upon an unnecessary reference to the rule as to declarations part of the res gestijc. Ilaihvay Co. w. Herrick, 49 Oh. St. LT) (1802). So an intention of making a permanent or temporary change of resi- dence may be shown by the declarations of the person himself. Ciorham v. Canton, 5 Greenl. 260 (1828) ; Kilburn v. liennett, 3 ^letc. 199 (1841). So on an action for negotiating a sale of property, H J,- FPti ;■ I I 391*3 AMERICAN NOTES. [part hi. prior declarations by a purchaser showing a previously formod inten- tion of buying the property are competent. Folks v. Burnett, 47 Mo. App. 564 (1891). The purpose for which a man is walking being important, his statement that he is going " to look for it" is compe- tent. U. 8. V. Nardello, 4 Mack. 503 (1HH6). When it is said that such statements are admissible as part of the res gestiP, what is (or should be) meant is that the intention is a fact in the res gestae of that particular case. As most of these decla- rations of intention are contemporaneous with some relevant act, the tendency to confuse the rule of proving a mental state by its usual verbal expression and the rule admitting declarations as part of the res gestae has proved a strong one. See Gorham c. Canton, 5 Green- leaf, 26G (1828) ; Kilburn ». Hennett, 3 Mete. 199 (1841). Knowlkdgk. — Where the relevant mental state is that of knowl- edge of certain facts, a statement showing knowledge of these facts is admissible, not as evidence that the facts are true, biif as evidence of tlie existence of the knowledge. Rodriguez i\ Espinosa, 25 S. W. 609 (1894) ; Cadden i\ American Stoel Barge Co., 88 Wis. 409 (1894) ; Chattanooga K. R. Co. (;. Clowdis, 90 Ga. l'.")8 (1892). In a suit for infringement of a patent, on a question of when the plaintiff made his invention, liis declarations to third parties at a certain time describing his invention are competent evidence. "In many cases of inventions, it is hardly possible in any other maimer to ascertain the precise time and exact origin of the particuhir in- vention. Tiie invention itself is an intellectual process or opera- tion ; and, like all other expressions of thought, can in many cases scarcely bo made known, except by speech." I'hiladelphia, &e. R. R. V. Stin^pson, 14 Teters, 448, 462 ('l840). So on the question of admitting dying declarations, statements by third parties to declarant are adniissibh^ as evidence of his knowledge of his condition. Com. r. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296 (1871). Where it is claimed that negligence arises from t'aihire to meet cer- tain known requirements, notice of these requirements is a material fact and if conveyed in an oral statement, such statement may be proved either by admission of the party or by any one who heard it given. This is not under the hearsay rule. " If the fact soiight to be established, is that certain words were spoken, without reference to the truth or falsity of the words, as, for instance, that a certain statenuMit was made as a party to the action is an admission of a fact, or was made to him as a notice, or under such circumstances as to require action or rejdy from him, the testimony of any person who heard the statement is original evidence, and not hearsay." Smitli V. Whittier, 95 Cal. 279, 293 (1892). Where the question is as to whether an assured knew that he had a certain disease at the time of his application, evidence of his state- ("HAP. II.] AMKUICAN NOTKS. S<>1« iiients to third parties about tliat time is competent. Swift a. Massa- cliusetts, &e. Co., 63 N. Y. 18(5 (l87r)). On a defence of insanity to an inilictment for murder, the defend- ant is entitled to show that his wife made certain statements to liim shortly before the killing to the effect that deceased had ravished her and stolen from the defendant, for the purpose of showing his mental state at the time of the killing. I'eople ik Wood, 126 X. Y. 24i) (1H!)1). Where the issue raised involves knowledge by a testatrix of the contents of her will, her declarations showing such knowledge or lack of it are competent. Maxwell v. Hill, H'J Tenn. 584 (1890). In an accident caused by a blind message by the train despatcher of a railroad to the conductor of a train, his nmlerstanding of the mean- ing of the despatch may be shown by his <h!clarations made at the time of the collision. McLeod v. Ginther, 80 Ky. 3!)'J (1882). Acts of memory may be shown where the fact of being able to remember is a relevant fact. Donnelly r. State, 26 X. J. L. 40.'$ (lHr>7). lle])utation that a railroad track is in bad condition is admissible on tlie question of notice. Missouri, &c. R.R. v. Johnson, 72 Tex. 1)5 (1888). As Hkaking on Motive, &c. — Where the question arises as to what was the thought in a person's mind at the time he acted the relevant statements brought home to his consciousness are comix'tcnt. This is not under the application of the hearsay rule. It is the fact of the statement whicli is admissible, regardless of its trut'a or falsity. In other words, the statement is not admitted as evidence of wliat is stated, but as evidence that such a statement was made. If it was the basis of conduct, whether it should have been is generally imma- terial. So the existence of a rumor may be good circumstantial evidence. State V. Jones, oO X. II. .'569 (1S71). On an indictment for manslaughter, where the defence is that the killing was in necessary .self-defence, threats by tlie deceased directed against tlie prisoners can be shown in evidence. Sparks r. Com., 89 Ky. 644 (1890). So where an injured person, subsequently deeease<l, uccuseil during his last illness A. of tlie fatal shooting, tiie fact tiiat deceased knew or believed that A. had threatened to kill him is admissible as show- ing a reason why tiie deceased might have inferred it was ,\. instead of actually seeing him. Jones v. State, 71 I ml. (j(i (1880). Threats of a deceased jjerson not shown to have been communicated to the defendant are admissilde on an indictment for murder to cor- roborate evidence of previous threats jireviously admitted, and alho on the (piestion who began the assault. Levy «. State, 28 Tex. A pp. 203 (1889); Cox v. State, 64 Ua. 374 (1879). Where a statement explains the cause of relevant conduct, it is competent. People v. Kodgdon, 55 Cal. 72 (1880). !'• -m': 301^5 AMERICAN NOTKS. [PAIJT III. On an indictment for felonions assault, the defence was that the cutting was done in self-defence. In support of this plea the defend- ant " sought to prove various facts, among them, tiiat during the rencounter some one in the crowd was heard to say of the defendant : ' Kill liim ! kill him ! don't let that nigger get back to the bottom. Kill him ! ' The Court rejected tiie evidence as incompetent because the witness was not able to state who used uie language. This ruling was erroneous. The rejected evidence was clearly compet(Mit as a part of the res gestie, and as tending to show great hostility toward the defendant and the danger to which he was exposed." Morton /-. State, 91 Tenn. 437 (18i)L^). Under certain circumstances, the existence of a rumor may be good circumstantial evidence. State v. Jones, 50 N. II. 3Gt) (1871). Wliere a person claims to have acted on certain statements, one wiio heard them may testify as to them. Badger v. Story, 1(5 X. H. 1C8 (1844). Wliere the question was as to the motive with which an alleged libel was published, the statements relating to the subject-matter made to the defendant are admissible as original evidence. " It hap])ens in many cases that the very fact in controversy is, whether the words of a third person, n-^t under oath, were written or spoken, and not wliether they were true, and in other cases, such language or statements, whether written or spoken, may be the natural or in- separable concomitants of the principal fact in controversy. In siich cases ... it is obvious the words or writings arc not within the meaning of hearsay, but are original and independent facts, adniis- sibl(! in proof of tlie issue." Jones v. Townsend, 21 Fla. 4.')1, 448 (188")). So where a vendor was sued for fraud in the sale of lands wliich he had never seen, evidence is competent of declarations to him by his grantor to the same effect. Merwin /'. Arbuckle, 81 111. 601 (187(5). So on a question with what motive A. purchased a ])istol. the fact that A.'s sister informed him of certain facts which would make such a purchase reasonable, is competent, wliether the information were true or false. People v. Shea, 8 Cal. 538 (18.')7). So wliere the defence of provocation by the speaking of words is relied ui)on as a defence in an action for assault and battery, the making of the statement is a fact which may be testified to by one who heard it, and if the party who heard it has forgotten, but testi- fies he reported it correctly, the ])arty to whom it was reported can testify to it. (Jreen v. Cawthorn, 4 Dev. L. 40<.) (1834). In general, where tlie motive of a party in doing an act is involved, it is competent to show that he was induced to do the act by what he had learned from third persons. Carter v. Heale, 44 N. H. 408 (18(;-2). And, in general, when a party claims to have acted on certain I" m CIIAI'. JI.J AMEKICAX XOTKS. 391 <« )r(Is is T, tlio ly "110 tcsti- (1 ('Ml iicrnl, it is lat lio . 408 u'taiu staUMueiits any one who heard may testif v to them. Badger c. Story, 1() X. II. 1G8 (1S44). When the question was why the female plaintiif in a suit for breach of promise of marriage burned a certain hotter, a witness may testify that slie advised her doing so. Tobin c. Sliaw, 45 Me. '3'Al (LSoH), On an action for malicious prosecution, statements made to tlie defendant before instituting proceedings and incriminating tlu^ plain- tiif are competent. Bacon u. Towne, 4 Ciish. 217, 240 (1841)), On tlie question of defendanfs negligence in crossing certain railroad tracks, the statements of bystanders tliat the train (which actually struck him because it was on time) was late, is competent. Kail way Company r. Ilerrick, 4!) Oh. St. 25 (18'J2). Otiiicu Instances. — Tlie fact that a statement has been made in the presence of a party and his action in connection with the state- ment are not objectionable as hearsay. Tlie statement is not ad- mitted as evidence of the truth of wliat is said, '•but simply to show what it is that callc for a reply, and the action of the defendant himself under the circumstances, as indicating an acquiescence in, or reimdiation of, the truth of the statement." People v. ]\IcCrea, o'2 Cal. 98 (18G7) ; Green r. Bedell, 48 N. II. 540 (1869). It is on this principle that to discri'dit a witness he may be asked whether he has not stated differently tlian at the trial at another time, and if such prior statement is denied, and is on a material ])nint, it may be proved. The prior statement is not offered as evi- dence of tlie truth of what it says, but because the existence of such a ])vwv statement, true or false, discredits the witness. State v. Blake, 25 Me. 350 (1845). Wliere it is claimed that evidence is given under the influence of bias, interest or other improper motive, evidence is competent of prior consistent statements of the witness made before the bias, in- terest, or other imjtroper motive could have operated. It is the fact that such a statement was made which alone is admitted. Oil a question of pauper settlement, the place whicli the pauper regard('<l as home may be proved by his declarations. New ^lilford r. Siierman, 21 Conn. 101 (18.51). Where conversations by tliird i)arties witli a witness is what called his attention to a fact or impressed it upon his mcuKiry, such conversations are conipoteiit, '• Wlictlier the stateuu'iit of the third person was true or false was jierfectly immaterial. Tiie fact that the communication was made to the witness, and not its truth or falsitj', was the only material ])oint. The conversations were not hearsay, witliin the proper meaning of that term, l)ut were original and imbqiendent facets, and therefore admissible in evidence." State ('. Fox, 25 X. J. Law, 5(;() (1850). Kkksii C'oMrLAiNT, &c. — III certain witnesses, tlie making of a certain statement may be a fact tending to corroborate a witness. 391« AMEUICAN NOTES. [part iir. The rule that in cases of rape, attempts at rape, and assault with intent to eoniuiit rape, the fact of coniphiint by the injured feiiude is iidiiiissiblo seems to be more easily explained as that it is the fact of the statement, or circumstantial evidence in favor of the eoni- j)lainant, rather than the trutli of it which is admitted. Thus, in case of rape, McMurrin v. Rigby, 80 la. 322 (1890) ; liurt i\ State, 23 Oh. St. 394, 401 (1872) ; State v. Warner, 74 Mo. 83 (1881) ; State V. Niles, 47 Vt. 82 (1874). ; Griffin v. State, 7C Ala. 29 (1884) ; State v. Knapp, 45 X. H. 148 (1863) ; Brown d. People, 30 Mich. 203 (1877). The rule is the same in a civil action by a parent to recover dam- ages for an indecent assanlt npon his minor daughter. Gardner t'. Kellogg, 23 Minn. 403 (1877). So of an attempt to commit rape. Perfelling /'. State, 40 Tex. 480 (1874). In Ohio, " the well settled law " is " that tlie declarations of the prosecuting witness, made immediately or soon after the commis- sion of the alleged rape, may be received in evidence. They are to be received, not as evidence of their own truth, not as evidence of the guilt of the defendant, but merely in 'corroboration' of the prosecuting witness, in the sense that they remove from her testi- mony a cloud of suspicion which might otherwise rest npon it."' lUirt ('. State, 23 Oh. St. 394 (1872). The rule also extends to tlie admission of the particulars of the assault. Dunn v. State, 45 Oh. St. 249 (1887). "The complaint constitutes no part of tlie res gestir ; it is only a fact corroborative of the testimony of the com- plainant; and, where she is not a witness in the ease, it is wliolly inadmissible." State r. Clark, 09 la. 294 (18S(i). "They are merely hearsay, and are not competent as evidence in chief to prove the eommission of the offense." Dunn >\ State, 4") Oh. St. 249 (1887). The [larticulars of the complaint cannot be jjroved by the govern- ment. The only competent fact is the circumstantial evidence fur- nished by the existence of a fresh complaint. AlcMurrin /•. Kigby, 80 la. 322 (1890) ; State v.Niles, 47 Vt. 82 (1874) ; Lacy r. State, 45 Ala. 80 (1871 ) ; State v. Jones, 01 :\Io. 232 (1875) ; Pefferling v. State, 40 Tex. 480 (1874). Not even where the particulars are set forth in a letter can they be shown to corroborate the j)rosecntrix. State r. Clark, 09 Ta. 294 (1880). To the contrary, see Dunn r. State, 45 Oh. St. 249 (1887), Where the attempt is made to impeach the complainant, evidence is admissible of the particulars of her former complaints to show that they correspond with the evidence on the trial. Griffin r. State, 7() Ala. 29 (1884); Pelferling v. State, 40 Tex. 480 (1874); State /•. Kinney, 44 Conn. 153 (1870); State v. Freeman, 100 N. C. 429 (1888). (;hap. II.] AMERICAN NOTES. 3[)1*« The . ct that the complaint related to the defendant can be given in evidence. Burt v. State, 23 Oh. St. 394 (1872). To tlie contrary, see State v. Niles, 47 Vt. 82 (1874) ; Griffin /.'. State, 7()Ala. 29 (1884). Time is not the sole test of what constitutes a fresh complaint. The entire surrounding facts must be taken into consideration, and a reasonable excuse may exist for even protracited silence. That comj lainant did not confide to her mother, with whom she resided, knowledge of an alleged assault by her stepfatlier for two months, and only revealed the facts upon an absence from home, and in response to the questions of a person hostile to tlie accused is not a sufficient objection to receiving the evidence. State v. ^S'iles, 47 Vt. 82 (1874). In Oliio, tlie particulars of the complaint are admitted, and the rule is assimilated more strongly to those regulating tlie res gestse. "They are presumed to be the natural outburst of outraged feelings, and, if made at all, would naturally be made at the first opportunity, while the injury is yet fresh and aggravating.'' Dunn i\ State, 45 Oh. St. 249 (1887). "If such complaints are not made soon, or within a reasonable time after the injury, or witliout any inconsistent deh) . 1^ is a strong, though not conclusive, presumption against the trutli of the charge." State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148 (18(;3). A delay of eleven months, unexplained, will prevent tlie .admis- sion of tlie complaint in evidence. "The outrage in such a case upon a virtuous female is so great that there is a natural presumption that at the first suitable opportunity slie would make disclosure of it ; and she would be so far discredited if she did not make the dis- closure, for the purpose of confirming her evidence where she is a witness, such disclosure may be received. But where the disclosure is not recent, as soon as suitable opjiortunity is furnished, tlie reason for receiving it in evidence does not exist, and tlie jjriiiciple justify- ing its reception does not apply." I'eople r. O'Sullivaii, 104 X. Y. 481 (1857). Tlie defendant may bring out the particulars of the complaint upon cross-examination. Griffin v. State, 70 Ala. 29 (1881). Wliere the comidaint is practiciiUy (Hintempfiraneous with the injury, the particulars of the complaint have brni admitted as jiart of the res gestir. Griffin c. State, 7() Ala. 29 (1S84); McMath t». State, 55 (Ja. 303 (1875). Thus where a witness, the complainant's sister, saw the defend- ant holding the .'omiilainant, who was crying, on his lap. holding her hands, and urging lier "never to da.-e to mention it" the court regard the particulars of the comiilaint as "admissible as part of the res gestir. It was made but a lew moments after the alleged ravishment had been accomplished, and while declanvnt was under •I il.il 391^3 AM Kit IC AN NOTES. [I'AItT i;i. the influence of the mental excitement which it proiluced. It was made within such time after the act to which it referred, and under such circumstanc'es, as to prechuU! the element of premeditation."' McMurriu v. Kigby, (SO la. 322 (ISDO). If the i)arty assaulted is an infant of tender years, it is not neces- sary in all cases that she should testify to have her contemporane- ous declarations admitted as part of the res gesta;. McjMath /;. State, 55 Ga. r,03 (1S75). In like manner, on a bastardy comjdaiut, it being in evidence that the comidainant accused the defendant at the time of her travail as being the father of her child, the fact was elicited, on cross-examina- tion, that her mother told her she must do so. To meet the defence that the mother was the instigator of the charge, evidence of a prior disclosure to the mother is competent. " Her statement, therefore, if she mo,de any, was in itself a fact; and its occurrence nught be proved by any competent evidence. For upon tliis question the inquiry was not whether her accusation was true, but whether the advice and instruction which the mother gave to her daughter was in consequence of information previously received from her." Mango L'. Holmes, 7 All. K^6 (1863). Ki'UTTATiox. — In like manner, reputation, though frequently hearsa}', or even hearsay distilled, as it were, can be proved where the existence of the reputation, rather than the truth of its purport, is a relevant fact. Where the question is, whether A. had reasonable cause to believe that 15. was insolvent at the time of a certain conveyance, it is '• clearly competent'' to show that he was "reputed to be insolvent." Lea V. Kilburn, 3 Gray, 594 (1(S54). " Or was in good pecuniary cr':'dit in his neighborhood." Wiiitcher c. Shattuck, 3 All. 319 (iSG'2). In the same way, where it is claimed that the defendant was negligent in hiiiug a servant infirm in sight, hearing, and ])hysical strength, the plaintiff may show, " for the purpose of proving that the defend- ant either knew of these inlirmities, or by the exercise of reasonable care would have known of them," may show that he was generally so reputed. Monahan v. Worcester, 150 Mass. 439 (1890). So the credit of a person in a community frequently is derived from hearsav, but may be testified to as a matter of opinion. Hard V. Brown, 18 Vt. 87 (1840) ; 15ank v. Rutland, 33 Vt. 414 (1800). The fact that an alleged lender had no money to lend cannot be show^n by evidence of his financial reputation. " In none of these cases was any attempt made to introduce evidence of the financial re))utation of the lender ; and we have found no case where such evidence has been admitted on the i.ssue of the making of a loan. ' Uepntation,' as said by Le Blanc, J., in Higham v. Bidgway, 10 East, 109, 120 (1808), 'is no other than the hearsay of those who may be supposed to have been acquainted with the fact, handed CHAP. 11.] AMEllU'AN NOTKS. y91^> down from one to another.' The general rule is that hearsay evi- dence is to be excluded. To this rule there are certani well-detined exceptions; but the case at bar docs not fall witlnu any of thcni. Tliere is a class of cases relied ui)()n by tlie defendant, wlicre evidence of reputation has been admitted, naniely, wliere a convey- ance is sought to be set aside as a frauiiulent preference, and the ([uestion is whether the grantee had reasonable cause to believe that tlie "rantor was solvent or insolvent at the time of the makin<' of the conveyance. Here the inquiry is as to the state of mind or be- lief of the grantee, and it is said that any evidence is competent whicli tends to show the existence of sutdi facts or circnmstani'cs as would naturally influence the mind of an honest and reasonable UKin in forming a eonelnsion in relation to the subject matter in- volved in the issue." Bliss i<. Johnson, IGL' Mass. 3'S6 (ISD-l). "General reputation is not competent evidence to prove tin? ex- istence of a fact. After a fact lias been estdtlished by competent proof, general reputation is admissible to show that the i)arty sought to be cliarged on account of the fact, had knowledge of its existence." Schlatf v. Louisville, &c. K. Iv. Co., 1(10 Ala. .'577, 088 (IHlK!). Reputation for sobriety, &c., cannot be used as proof of the fact. If the reputation is offered as evidence of knowledge, tlio offer should be limited, and a general offer is properly rejected. Stevens /'. R. R., 100 Cal. .554 (1893). The character of a liouse as a bawdy house cannot be proved by its reputation. Uarker r. Com., 1)0 Va. 820 (1894); McGregor v. Hudson (Tex.), .'50 S. \V. 48'.) (IS!);-)). So of a ])erson's pecuniary condition generally. "Where par- ticular knowledge of a fact is sought to be brouglit home to a l>arty, evidence of the general rejiutation and belief of tlie existence of that fact among his neighbors is admissible to the jury as tending to show that he also had knowledge as well as they." Renoist r. Darby, 12 Mo. 196 (1848). '• General knowledge of a fact in a community may be proved, as evidence tending to trace notice of h cii fact, its exis- tence being otherwise shown." Hodges v. Coh'man. 70 Ala. 10,'} (1884) ; Louisville, &e. R. R. v. Hall', 87 Ala. 708 (ISSS); Kuglar /•. Garner, 74 Ga. 76;"» (188.")). In like manner, the fact that the in- tcmjierate habits of the person to wliom liquor was sold were notori- ous in tlie neighborhood in wliieli tlie defendant lived is profjcr evidence for the consideration of the jury in determining whether his habits were known to the defendant. " The principle upon which these decisions rest is, that if the existence of a fa"t is shown, and it is .also proved that a jiarty was in a situation and had o]q)or- tnnities to know of it, this is evidence tending to prove that lie ilid know of it." Stallings r. State, .3.3 Ala. 425 (18.19) ; Adams v. State, 25 Oh. St. 584 (1874). On the other hand, in .an action for gelding plaintiff's horse, knowing that it w.as kept as a stallion, evidence that the fact of plaintiff's horse was " generally known" to be kept lik 'i . i!: :i;( l':li j 391^1 AMEIUCAN NOTES. [PAIIT III. Tucker /•. Constable, IG Oreg. for that purpose is not competent. 407 (1S88). Certain cases have gone further, and held that reputation is evi- dence of the fact it alleges. It is doubtful whether such holding is not a plain infringement of the rule against hearsay. Thus, in a question whether a slave was bought with the intention of taking him beyond the state, " his general character as a negro trader is relevant." Taylor v. Horsey, 5 Harr. 131 (1849). That one was a deputy of the sheriff may be proved by reputation. Holt v. Jarvis, Draper (K. B., U. C), 190 (1830;. Reputation has also been ad- mitted, together with long-continued absence, to prove the fact of death. Primm lu Stewart, 7 Tex. 181 (1851). The character of a house as disorderly may, it has been held, be established by proof of its reputation. Stone v. State, 22 Tex. App. 185 (1886). To tlie contrary effect, see Handy v. State, 03 Miss. 207 (1885) ; Wooster v. State, 55 Ala. 217 (1876) ; Smith »•. Com., G 15. Monr. 21 (1845) ; U. S. v. Jourdine, 4 Cranch, C. Ct. 338 (1833). It may be contended that the hearsay rule proceeds in part upon the theory that the fact that A., not a witness, makes a statement is slight circumstantial evidence of the truth of wliul; he asserts, and that this objection of lack of probative force hardly applies to instances of a general consensus in a community. Tlie rule that admits general reputation as proof of character might constitute an example of acquiescence in this line of reasoning were it not for the fact that proof of character by proof of reputation has been modi- fied b}' the ancient rules of compurgation. Markkt Valuk. — Analogous to the rules allowing the proof of reputation is the rule that market value may be shown as a fact, though only embodied hearsay. The relevant fact is the existence of tlie market value, and proof of its existence establishes the fact it states. International, &c. 11. R. v. Pasture Co., 5 Tex. Civ. App. 180 (1893) ; Missouri, &c. R. R. u. Cocreham (Tex.), 30 S. W. lllS (1895). So a Parisian price-current delivered by the dealer to the purchaser will be received as evidence of the market value of certain wines. " We think that the price current is not liable to the objec- tion that it was hearsay. It was prepared and used by the party who furnished it in the ordinary course of his business." Cliquofs Champagne, 3 Wall. 114 (18G5). A witness is competent to testify to the market price of peas in New York, though he has never resided there, if he is in the pro- duce business and obtained his knowledge of ]irices from his corre- spondents. " As a general rule, the market value of any particular arti(de, at a given time, is determined by the dealings of many differ- ent individuals in such articles, and a knowledge thereof can only be obtained by information from others." Laurent v. Vaughn, 30 Vt. 90 (1858). In the same way, merchandise brokers doing busi- (HAP. 11.] AMKKICAN NOTKS. :59P2 iioss in Boston and New York, and conversant with the market value of sales of gunny bags during the time covered by a certain (•(intrac't " from daily price-current lists and returns of sales fur- iiislu'd them in Huston from New York may testify as to the market value of gunny bags in tlie New York market at said time." Whit- ney t\ Thacher. 117 Mass. 52.'} (1875). " It is not necessary, in order to (lualify one to give an opinion as to values, that his information should be of such a direct character as would make it competent in itself as primary evidence. It is the experience which he acquires in the ordinary conduct of affairs, and from means of infornuition such as are usually relied on by men engaged in business, for the conduct of that business, that (jualifies him to testify." llihl. A witness may testify as to the market value of logs, tliough he is without actual personal knowledge of sales. " Value in a business sense consists largely of the opinions of persons familiar with the market, and these opinions are largely made \\\) of wliat is said and reported by others. Hence, if a person shows that his business is such that, by commercial re[)orts or other means of like nature, he is familiar with the current market prices of an article, he is compe- tent to testify on the subject, although he may not have actual per- sonal knowledge of any particular sales." Hoxsie v. Empire Lumber Co., 41 .Minn. o48 (1889). But it has been held in New York that a mere price current in a newspaper is not competent evidence of market value, " without some proof showing liow and in what manner it was made up ; where the information it contained was obtained, or whether the quotations of prices made were derived from actual sales, or other- wise. . . . The credit to be given to such testinionj must be gov- erned by extrinsic evidence, and cannot be determined by the ne\vspaj)er itself without some proof of knowledge of the mode in which the list was made out." VVhelan *'. Lynch, 60 N. Y. 469 (189.-,). Local newspaper quotations as to the price of merchandise at the point of consignment have, however, been held admissible when value is a material fact. I'eter n. Thickstun, 51 Mich. 589 (188.'i). "If, however, there be no market ])rice at such place, by reason of the want of dealers or the want of the commotlity, then the actual value at such place can be ascertained by proof of market value in other markets, . . . such other nuirkets to be at the nearest points where goods of the quality and (piantity can be bought or sold." McDonald v. Unaka Timber Co., 88 Tenn. 38 (1889). The estimated cost value placed on certain lands by the ncigldjor- hood generally is incompetent. Powell «. Governor, 9 Ala. 36 (1846). II SIX EXCEPTIONS TO KULE KE.JIXTING IIEAK.SAY. [l T. III. liifM CHAPTER in. MATTERS OF PUBLIC AND GENERAL INTEREST. § 607.' Having illustrated the nature of hearsay evidence, Bhown the reasons on which it is generally excluded, and explained the distinction between such evidence and that which is original, it will next be convenient to consider f/ie vascx in u-/iich the rii/c rejecting hearmi/ lim been relaxed. These may be con\eniently divided into six classes : first, those relating to matters of public and general interest ; secondly, fho?e relating to pedigree ; thirdly, those relating to ancient posso.-sion ; fourthly, declarations against interest; fifthly, declarations in the course of office or business ; and lastly, dying declarations. It will be observed, that these exceptions, which are allowed only on the ground of the assumed absence of better evidence, and, as it were, from necessity, meet most of the inconveniences that would result from a stern and universal application of the rule, and thus remove the principal objections which have been urged against it. These six exceptions will now be discussed in their order. § 608. And first, the admissibility of hearsay evider.ce respecting matters of public and general interest, rests mainly on tho following grounds : — that the origin of the rights claimed is usually so ancient, and the rights themselves are of so undefined and general a character, that direct proof of their existence and nature can seldom be obtained, and ought not to be required ; that in matters, in which the community are interested, all persons must be deemed conversant ; that as common rights are naturally talked of in public, and as the nature of such rights much lessens the pro- bability, if it does not exclude the possibility, of individual bias, what is dropped in conversation respecting them may be presumed 1 Gr. Ev. § 127, in part. 392 CII. III.] MATTERS OF PUBLIC AND GENERAL INTEREST. to he true ; that tho general interest which belongs to the suhjeot would lead to immediate contradiction from others, if tlie state- ments advanced were false ; that reputation can hardly exist without the concurrence of many parties unconnected with each other, who are all more or less interested in investigating the subject; that such concurrence furnishes strong presumptive evidence of truth ; and that it is this prevailing current of assertion which is resorted to as evidence, for to this every member of the community is supposed to be privy, and to contribute his share.' § 609.^* In speaking of matters of public and general interest, the terms " public " and " general " are sometimes used as synonyms, meaning merely what concerns a multitude of persons.' But, in regard to the admissibility oi hearsay testimony, a dis- tinction has been taken between them ; the term public being strictly applied to that which' concerns ereri/ turnihrr of the state; and the term grneml being confined to a lesser, though still a considerable, portion of the community. This distinction should be carefully attended to, because in matters strictly public, such, for example, as a claim of highway or a right of ferry, reputation from anij oiip appears to be receivable. Declarations would, indeed, be practically worthless, unlesb made by persons who, by living in the neighbourhood, or by frequently using the road or ferry, or the like, are shown to have had some means of knowledge. Yet the want of proof of the connexion of the declarants with I;he subject in question seems to affect the value only, and not the admissibility, of the evidence. If, however, the right in dispute be simply general, that is, if those only who live in a particular district, or adventure in a particular enterprise, aru interested in it, hearsay from persons wholly unconnected with the place or business would be probably altogether inadmissible.* Competent ' Wright V. Doe d. Tatham, 1837 (Coltman, J.); S. C. (Alderson, B.); Morewood v. Wood, 1792 (Ld. Ken- yon) ; Weeks v. Sparke, 1813 (Ld. Ellenboiough ) ; Berkeley Peer. ,1811 (Sir J. Mansfield) ; R. v. Bedford- shire, 1855 (Ld. Campbell), adopting ahnost the language above employed. » Gr. Ev. § 128, in part. » rim V. Curell, ISJO. * LVease v. Barrett, 1835 (Parke, B.). By Roman law, reputation, or common fame, spcms to have been admissible in evidence in all cases ; but it was not generally deemed suf- ficient proof, and, in some cases, not even stmiphnn prabatio, unless corro- borated ; niai aliia udmiuiculia ad- 393 \vimii IiP :* Hi!' Is ■ I ■■'' " ■^^':l i;v MATTERS OF PLIJUC AND GENERAL INTEREST. [PT. III. knowledge in the declarant is an essential pre-requisite to the admission of his testimony ; and although all the Queen's subjects are presumed to have that knowledge, in some degree, whore the matter is of public concernment, yet in other matters, whioli are not strictly public, though they are interesting to many persons, Bome particular evidence of such knowledge is generally required.' S 610. For example, in a dispute as to the existence of a local custom, in which all the tenants of a manor were interested, evidence of reputation would be admissible, not only from any deceased tenant, but from any deceased resident within the manor ; for it might fairly be presumed that the residents, being persons con- versant with the neighbourhood, would be acquainted with the local customs.' Therefore*" on a question whether Nottingham Castle was within the hundred of Broxtowe, certain ancient orders, made by the Justices at the Quarter Sessions for the county, desoiibing the castle as being within that hundred, were held admissible evidence of reputation ; the justices, though not proved to have been residents within the county or hundred, being presumed, from the natiu-e and character of theii- offices alone, to have been acquainted with the subject in dispute.* juvetur. 1 Muse, do Prob., Concl. 17' n. 1; Concl. ISU, n. 2; Concl. 64/, n. 19. It was hold sufficient, jiliiKi praliiitio, wherovt)!', from the nature of tho case, Li'ttor evidence was not attainable ; nbid commitinter accidentibiis, prohttio (lijflcilis eft, /ama }ilenam, solet prabattoiiem fiicere ; ut ill prohutione filiationes. ButMas- cardus deems it not sufficient, in cases of pedifii*.., A'ithin the memory of man, whic'u lie limits to fifty-six years, unless aided by other evidence — tunc ntmpf non aufficeret puhlici vox et /ama, aed una cum ipm deheret tractutus et vomimitio prabari, vel alia adminicula urijcntiaadhiberi. 1 Masc. do Prob., Concl. 411, n. 1, 2, 6, 7. ' See infra, §§ 616 et seq. * Ld. Dunraven v. Llewellyn, 1850 (Parke, B.). SeoWan-ick v. Queen's Coll., Oxford, 1871 (Ld. Hatherley, C). The actual discussion of tho BUDJect in the neighbourhood, was a fact also relied on, in the E«man law, in cases of proof by common fame. " Quando testis vult probaro aliquem sci.'i.Hse, non videtur sufficere, quod dicat illo scivit quia crut vicinus; sed debet addcrc, in vicinia hoc crut cognitum per famain, vel alio iiiodo ; et ideo iste. qui erat vicinus, potuit id scire." 2 Menoeh. do Prajs. lib. 6, Pr.TS. 24, n. 17, j). 772, See, also, 1 Masc. de Prob. ;iS9. 390, Concl. 395, n. 1, 2, 19, 9, whero the law is thus laid down: — "Confines pio- bantur per testes, Verum ,scias velim, testes in hac materia, qui vicini, et circum ibi habitant, e.s,se magis idoneos quam alios. Si testes non sentiant commodum vol incommodum immediatum, possint pro sua com- munitato deponere. Licet hu jus- modi testes sint de universitate, et deponant super confinibus suce uni- versitatis, probant, dummodum priB- cipuum ipsi commodum non sentiant licet inferant commodum in univer- 8um." »» Gr. Ev. § 129, in part. ' D. of Newcastle v. Broxtowe, 1832. 394 C. III.] DECLARANT MU8T HAVE COMPETENT KNOWMDdE. § 611. Again, on a question as to the cuHtom of niiiiiii<; in u particular district, persons, under whose estates the minerals liiv, with respect to wliich the custom was said to exist, wore held sufficiently connected with the subject to make their declarations evidence, as they were more likely than otliers living at a distance to become adventurers, and consequently to bo subjocted to the operation of the custom.' But where the question was, whether the city of Chester anciently formed part of the County Palatine, an old document, purporting to be a decree of certain law oiHuers and dignitaries of the Crown, not having authority as a court, was held inadmissible as evidence of reputation, because it was not shown that the persons making it had any peculiar knowledge of ' the subject, excepting what they derived in the course of that one ' unauthorised proceeding.* ' § 612. If, however, the quality of the hearsay itself raises a natural inference that the persons from whom it was derived must have been specially acquainted with the locality, the courts will not require independent proof of that fact. The case just ' mentioned as to whether Nottingham Castle was within Broxtowe Hundred is an instance of this. Other examples are that on a question turning on a manorial custom, depositions, purporting to have been made by copyholders in an ancient suit between a former lord and a person claiming admission to a copyhold, were admitted in evidence without proof that the persons making them were either copyholders, or were otherwise acquainted with the customs of the manor, since it must be assumed that such persons would not have been brought forward as witnesses, had they i been ignorant of the subject ; ' and where an ancient unsigned customary of a manor, purported to be ex anHenm omfuam tcnentium, had been handed down with the court rolls from steward to steward, it was received as evidence to prove the course of descent within the manor.* Where, however, to prove the boundaries of a manor, an ancient survey which purported to have * Crease v. Barrett, 1835. * Rogers v. Wood, 1831 ; recog- nized by the Ct. of Ex. in Crease v. Barrett, 1835. See, also, Evans v. Taylor, 1838. Sut see Freeman v. Bead, 1863. '•' Freeman v. Phillipps, 1816. * Denn v. Spray, 1786. See Chap- man V. Cowlaa, 1810. 895 1*1' t5 EXAMPLES OF MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST. [rx. III. been made in the time of Queen Elizabeth by a deputy surveyor npjioiuted by the Crown, and to have been founded on the? presentments of certain tenants of the manor, whose names were appended to it, was produced from the proper custody, the court rejected it on the ground that no proof had been given that tlie deputy surveyor had any authority to institute the inquiry ; and, stripped of this authority, he not only had no right to make auy kind of return, but the presumption that he did make one fell to the ground. The paper might, it was said, have been written by any clerk idling in the office where it was found, from his own imagination, or compiled, possibly, by some interested person in furtherance of a sinister object of his own.^ !^ Gl-'i. It may be expedient to here enumerate a few of the principal questions which have been deemed to involve matters of public or general interest, so that evidence of rvputdtion (in other words, "hearsay") may be admitted, and then by way of contrast to enumerate a few of the cases which wore considered of a private nature, so that this sort of evidence is inadmissible. On the one hand, the following will be regarded as questions of public or general interest : questions relating to a right of common exist- ing by immemorial custom,- a feeding per cause de vicinage resting on a similar foundation,^ a parochial'* or other district modus,'' a manorial custom," a custom of mining in a particular district," a custom of a corporation to exclude foreigners from trading within a town," the limits of a town," the extent of a parish,'" the boundary between counties, parishes, hamlets, or manors," or even between a rvpiitcd manor (that is, an estate which from some intervening defect has ceased to bo an actual manor) and the freehold of a ' EviiiiH V. Taylor, 18:58. Seo, also, 1). of Hfiiufort v. Smith, \M\)\ iJmiicl V. Wilkin, IHJ'J. lUit suo Fn'oiiian v. Eoiid, 184!) ; Smith v. L(l. Ihownlow, 18GS); ]). of Dovon- filiire u. Neill, 1870-7 (I'alk'S, C.B.), (Ir.). ■^ Weeks V. Sparke, 18i;<, exphiinod in L(i. Duiiravon c LU'wellyii, 18,")(). •' Trifhanl v. I'owoll, l84d, ex- f)laiii('(l in Ld. Dumavuu v. Llewol- yn, 18.)(t. « Mosfloy V, Davies, 1822 ; White V. Lislo, 1819; Short v. Luo, 1821. » Kiidd V. Wright. l.s;52. • J><)0 u. Sinson, 1810. ' Cmisd ('. Barrett, l^;i4. • Davios V. Morpm, 18;U. » IroLuid V. I'owcll, 1802, citod (Chaml)i'o, J.) and ri'cognizod (Wil- liams, J.) in U. V. Bliss, 18H7. '" 1{. i\ Mytt(m, l.s()(). " NichoUs I'. I'arkuv, 1811 ; Briseo I'. TiOiiiiix, l.s;(8; I'jvansi'. Roes, ISUi) riaxton (', Dare, 182!); Thomas v. Jenkins, 1837< 896 'N^-.L en. III.] EXAMPLES OF MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEKKST, ; 1 |iiivate individual,^ or between old and ncir land in a manor,* a claim of tolls on a public rnad,^ the faot whether a mad was ]iublio or private/ a prescriptive liability lo repair sea-walls,'' or bridges,'' a claim of higliway,^ a right of ferry,* tlie fact whctlier land on a river was a public landing-place or not,^ the existence and rights of a parochial chapehy,'" the jurisdiction of a court, and the fact whether it was a court of record or not," the exislonce of a manor,'^ a ])rescriptive riglit of toll on all malt brought by the west cjountry barges to London, ^^ a right by immemorial custom, claimed by the deiiuty day meters of London, to measure, shovel, unload and deliver all oysters brought by boat for side within the liTuits of the port of London,'* a claim by the lord of a manor to all coals lying under a certain district of the manor,'^ a claim of lieriot custom in respect of freehold tenements within a manor lield in fee-simple,"' a custom of electing churchwardens by a select com- mittee,'' and a prescriptive right to free warren as appurtenant to an entire manor.'* § 614. On the other hand, it has been considered that evidence of rcpiifdtion as to ihoni nnint he rrjcrfti/, and that the following were mere private rights ; namely, questions as to what usage had ol.tained in electing a schoolmaster to a grammar school,'" whether the sheriff of the county of Chester, or the corporation of the city of Chester, was bound to execute criminals,-" whether certain tenants of a manor had prescriptive riglits of common for cattle levant and couchant,^' what were the boundaries of a waste over which many ' I)i>o V. Slccman, IS-JR. ' Hiiinos I'. M;i«s()U. IS in. '■ H.Ht y. Bealos, 182!) \\a\. Ton- tunli'u). * li. V. Bli-s, 1837 (Williinns, J.). « H. v. l-eif,'h, 1840. Tho iiioro fiiCt thiit oiicli lioiitii>;er hiis iihviiv.s irpiiii'cd tho sea wall in iioiit of his liiiid is not, ill itself, siidicioiit e\i- ilciuo of a ])iescii])fivo liability to iii:iiiitiiiii tho wall: Hudson i'. Tabor, IfsTT, C. A. « U. V. Sutton. 1838. ^ t'lvanH (/. liavrott, 18.34 (Parko, 1!.); lieed /'. Jiickson, 1881. " Pun V. Cuiell, 1840. • lhiid;wiitv!r v. Porter, 1835 (L'okiidyo, J.). w C-M-v V. Mostvii. 18,-i0. " (i()(.dtitl(! i: i»ew, 1M)'2. '= Steel (-. Pricke t. l^li) (Abbott, C.J.) ; Cwi/on V, Lonia.s., L>()3 (Ld. ICllcllbolollull). '3 Citv oi London v. Clerko, 1G90 ; D. of Beiuifoit V. Smith, ISIO. '* Liiyl>i)iini I', ("li-p, IS.'IS. '5 liii'iiiesc. Mawsoii. 1813. In that C'is(> cvidi'iice WMs jjivcii of an uni- t'onii exi'icisi' of the li^rlit. '» Danii'ivll V. I'roth.'Kie, 1847. " Heny r. Paiiner, {"-WJ. '" Ld. Carnarvon ii. Villebois, 1844. '» Withnell v Uarlhuni, 1705 (Ld. Keinon). ■•"'|{. c. Antrobut*, 1S3,-). " Suo Ld. Duuravou v. LlowoUyn, 397 i ,. va Sif ,1 I: I' :'f n V ii' " MATTERS NOT OF PUBLIC INTEREST. [PART III. of the tenants of a manor claimed a right of common appendaiit,' whether the lord of a manor had a prescriptive right to all wreck within his manorial houndaries,* whether the plaintiff was ex- clusive owner of the soil, or had a right of common only,* whether certain land in dispute had been purchased by a former occupier, or was part of an entailed estate of which he had been tenant for life,* what patron formerly had the right of presentation to a living,' whether a farm modus existed, and what was its nature,^ whether a party had a private right of way over a particular field,' whether the tenants of a particular manor had the right of cutting and selling wood,* and what were the boundaries between two private estates.® Where, however, it was shown by direct testi- mony, the admission of which was unopposed, that the boundaries of a certain farm were identical with those of a hamlet, evidence of reputation as to the hamlet boundaries was let in for the purpijso of proving those of the farm.'" For though it was objected that evidence should not be thus indirectly admitted in a dispute between private individuals, Coleridge, J., observed that " he never heard that a fact was not to be proved in the same manner, when subsidiary, as when it was the very matter in issue." § 615. Evidence of reputation would on principle appear not to be admissible to prove or disprove a pricate prcm'ij/fivc r'njht or liability. Yet whether it is or not is perhaps doubtful." Never- theless, where a prescriptive right of digging stones on a lord'h waste was claimed by the defendant, as annexed to his estate, and Wright V. Rudd, 1832 (Ld. Lyiid- liuist). See, however, Webb v. Pottis, (undated); Donuitioii v. Elsley, 1824 ; and cases cited 1 Ph. Ev. '.Ml, n. 2. ' Semble (Dami)ii'r, J.), in Weeks V. Sjiaike, 1813; aii<l [\A. Ivonyoii), iu Heed v. Jackson, 1800. » Bhiekott V. Lowes, 1814 (Ld. EUenborough). « Clothier v. Clmpinan, IKOo. liy the lloinan law, evidence of repu- tation seems to have been deeiiiecl admissible, even iu matters of pri- vate boundary. See 1 Masc. de Prob. 391, Concl. 396. i» Thomas v. Jenkins, 1826. See, also, Urisco v, Lomax, 1838. '* See Prichard v. I'owell, 1845. 18d(), overruling Weeks v. Sparke, 1813; Williams v. Morgan, 18o0. See, also, and compare Warrick v. Queen's Coll., Oxford, 1871 (Ld. Hathorloy, C). ' Ld. Duuraven v. Llewellyn, 18dO. '■i Talbot V. Lewis, 1834. As to what constitutes "wreek" distin- guished from "flotsam," see Stack- poolo I'. The Queen, 1873. 3 Richards I'. Bassett, 1830, semble (Littledale, J.). Sed qu. * Doe V. Thomas, 181 1. « Per Ld. Kenyon iri R. v. Eris- well, 1790, questioning Bp. of Meath V. Ld. Belfield, 1748. • Wells V. Jesus College, 1830 (Aldersou, B.); White v. Lisle, 1819 ; 398 I f CHAP. III.] PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS. u 'i the lord offered evidence of reputation to prove that no suoh right existed, the court was equally divided on its admissibility.' On the trial, however, of an indictment against the inhabitants of a county for the non-repair of a public bridge, to which the defendant pleaded that certain persons named were liable to repair the bridge ratione tenuroe, evidence of reputation was admissible to support the plea,^ it being considered that the fixing an in- dividual with, or the relieving him from, such a liability as the one in question, had a necessary tendency to abridge or increase the liability of the whole neighbourhood,'' — and, moreover, that the admissibility of evidence of reputation, when tendered to dinproce a public liability or right, cannot be governed by a diiTereiit prin- ciple from that which prevails, when such evidence is offered to edahliiih the liability or right.* ^ (UG.^ The reason generally assigned for rejecting evidpnce of reputation or common fame, in mattors of mere priaifc riijJit is the probiible want of competent knowled(jc in the declarant. " Evidence of reputation upon general points is receivable," said Lord Kenyon, " because, all mankind being interested therein, it is natural to suppose that they may be conversant with the subjects, and tliat they should discourse together about them, hr.viug all the samo moans of information. But how can this apply to private titlc.«, either with regard to particular customs, or private proscri[)tion8 '( IIow is it possible for strangers to know anything of what con- cerns only private titles?'''" It may not indeed on all occasions be an easy matter to distinguish between public aud private rights, and some few of the cases cited above may possibly be considered to rest on somewhat doubtful reasoning. Still, the general rule of 4 ' !Morowoo(l )'. Wood, 1792. Since it is (lillicult to neo how tho public uoiilil liavo boon intorostod in tho matter, luih^ss it had boon shown Jwhioh it was not) that tho rijrhts of the commoners woro infringed by tho (IctVnilant's cluim, such evidenco would probably at th" present day hi; rejected. See, also, §§ (110, 611. ' R. V. Bcdiordshiro, ISiJo; over- ruling R, V, Wavertroo, 1841, an<l ' Dutirming li. v. Cottuu, 1813. 8 S(Hi Fricluird v. Powell. 1845 (Patteson, J.). * Soo Itriukwiiter v. Porter, 18^55 (CohTi(l,u;(!. J.) ; and post, § (L'O. The two cases are proliably explicable on tho strict ground that, in tho one first cited, tho ])ublic were not interestc'd in tho dispute, while in tho luat named they wore, ' (ir. Ev. § l.'J", in part. • Morewood v. Wood, 1702. 3d9 REPUTATION AS TO PARTICULAR FACTS. [PART III. law cannot be disputed ; namely, that if the matter in question bo of a public or general nature, — that is, if it be interesting to the community at large, or even to a comparatively small portion of the community, such, for example, as the inhabitants of a parish, a town, or a manor, — it falls within the exception by which evidence of reputation is admitted; whereas, if it have no con- nexion with the exercise of any public right, or the discharge of any public duty, or with any other subject of general interest, it falls within the ordinary rule by which hearsay evidence is excluded. § 617.' The necessity for competent knowledge in the declarant may serve to explain and reconcile what is said in the books re- specting the inadmissibility of reputation in regard to pnrticukr facts. Upon general points, as we have seen, such evidence is receivable, because of the general interest which the community have in them. But particular facts, not being equally notorious, may be misrepresented, or misunderstood, and may have been connected with other facts, by which, if known, their effect might be limited or explained, and, therefore, evidence of reputation as to the existence of such particular facts is rejected. For in- stance, if the question be whether a road be publlo or private, declarations by old persons since dead, that they hate seen repairs Hone upon it, will not be admissible;* neither can evidence be received that a deceased person planted a tree near the road, and stated at the time of planting it that his object was to show where the boundary of the road was when he was a boy ; ' nor can proof of old jersons having been heard to say that a stone was erected, or boys whipped, or cakes distributed, at a particular place, be received as evidence of boundary.* And where the question was whether a turnpike stood within the limits of a town, declarations by old people, since dead, that formerly houses stood where none any longer remained, was rejected, on the ground that these state- ments were evidence of a particular fact.* If, too, the existence » Or. Ev. § 138, in part. * Por Coleridge, J., in E. v. Bliss, » Per Puttoson, J., in E. v. Bliss, 1837. 1837. * Ireland v. Powell, 1802 (Oliam- E. V. Bliss, 1837. tre, J.), cited by Williams, J., in E. 400 Cil.VI'. HI.] STATEMENTS BY PERAMBULATOllS. S.? ^ fe ?>■ ]r autl amount of a parochial modus be in issue, hearsay evidence of the payment of a specific sura in lieu of tithes by a deceased occu- pier will be inadmissible ; though general evidence of reputation, that it has always been customary to pay that sura for all the lauds in the parish, will be received.' § 618. Sin)ilarly, on a question whether a certain place was parcel of a particular parish, an old book containing entries by a deceased churchwarden, not charging himself, but relating to the repairs of a chapel alleged to belong to the place in question, have been held inadmissible ; ^ and so have been also entries in parish books, which recorded the fact that perambulation" had taken a particular line.' Still, it has been usual to admit evidence of what old persons, since deceased, who accorapanied the perarabulators, have been heard to say upon such occasions ; * because the custom of perambulating parishes having long received high judicial sanction as a legitimate mode of recording boundaries,'' — and the fact of a perambulation having taken place being considered in itself evidence of the exercise of a right," — it follows that statementa made by perarabulators may be regarded as declarations accom- panying acts, which, on grounds already explained,'' will be admissible in evidence, provided they are not confined to particular circumstances.* § 619. It is now^ held that proof of the exercise of the right claimed within the period of living raemor}', is not an essential condition of the reception of evidence of reputation ; though, of course, the absence of such proof, in cases where the nature of the subject admits of its production, will materially atfect the value of hearsay when received.'" Neither is it necessary that the opinions V. Bliss, f V. I'lifis, 1837. On the other hand, in thu ^*^lnl(3 ciiso, evidonco of rt'i)uta- tion to show thiit tho town rxtoiided to a curtain jioint was recuivod, as the limits of tho town wore a mattT oi' p'nural public intorost. ' ILirwood ('. Sims, 1810, moro t'lillv ro))oitod and oxi)lain"d in Mn>(.lcy V. Davios, 18J2; Chatfiold v. Fivor, 1816; (iarnons v. Hariiard, ITICJ; Wolls y. J(>sus (\)lloji;o, 181(0 ; Di'aclo V. Hancock, 18'J4. !Seo, also, Cruase v. Barrutt, 1835. » Cooko V. Banks, 1826 (Abbott, C.J.\ ^ Taylor v. Dcvov, 1837. * Wreks V. Spaiko. 1.S13 (Ld. El- lonborouj;h, a. id Lu Blanc, J.). « Taylor i<. Devcy, 1837. * WccKs /'. S])ai'k(', 1813. ' Ante, §§ ■■)83 ~J88. 8 1 i'h. i;v. 248. * Per liidlcr, J., in Morowood w. Wood, 17!)2; Weeks v. Sparko, 1813 (Lo Blanco and Dampior, JJ.). "' Cruuso V. Burrott, 1835; Ld. 401 Ill I I isi ' U '! M: , I'- ,rr%\^ i;i:putation evidence against public rights, [p. hi. of deceased persons, which are tendered as evidence of common fame, should appear to rest on reputation derived from others, or should liave heen expressed in the course of a trans<iction relating to a question of reputation. Therefore, on an issue whether or not a lane in a certain hamlet was a common highway, a paper signed by several inhabitants of the hamlet, since dead, stating that the lane was not a highway, was received as slight evidence of reputa- tion, although it had been drawn iip at a public meeting, which had been convened for the sole purpose of considering the propriety of repairing the road, and although the opinions expressed in the document did not appear to have been founded on reputation received from others.' ^ 620.- Reputation is evidence as well against a ptihJic ruiht as in its favour ; and this, too, whether the evidence consist of declarations which expressly negative the right, or set up an inconsistent claim, or simply omit all mention of the right on some occasion, when a i\ 4ce of it might be reasonably expected. In accordance with this principle, where the question was, whether a landing-place was public or private property, the declarations of ancient deceased persons, that it was the private landing-place of the party and his an'^estors, have been held admissible ; ' and where, to negative the existence of a particular manorial custom, an ancient deed, made between the lord of the manor and a great many of the copyholders, in which the latter claimed, and the former admitted and confirmed, what they mutually conceived to be the immemorial customs of the manor, and in wh' h all mention of the particular custom in question was omitted, was considered evidence of reputation showing that the right claimed did not exist at that day, and that the subsequent usage relied upon in support of it was referable to usurpation, and not to right.* § 621.^ It will have been seen from several of the cases cited in this chapter, that oral declarations are not the sole medium of Dunraven v. Llewellj-n, 1850 ; R. v. Sutton, 1838 ; Curzon v. Lomax, 1803 (Ld. EUenboroiigh) ; Steel v. Piickett, 181i» (Abbott. C.J.); Roe V. Pai'kor, 17!)2 ((Jioso, J.). • liiiiiiiclo;i^li ('. Jolinson, 1838. « Gr. Ev. § HO, in part. ^ Drinkwater v. Porter, 1835 (Colo- ridge. J.). * M. of Anglesey v. Ld. Hathor- ton, 1842, iu which any actual de- ji>iion as to fact cited in the text boeaine, however, unnecessary. See D. of rcutUind r. Hill, 1866. » Gr. Ev. § 139, in part. 402 CHAP. III.] DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF REPUTATION. proving traditionary reputation in matters of public and general interest. Indeed, the principle which makes evidence of reputation admissib-e at all, applies not only to oral proof but equally to documentary evidence, and to all other kinds of proof denominated hearsay, so that deeds,' leases,'' and other private documents are admissible, as declaratory of the public matters recited in them. Even copies and abstracts of old deeds and wills ' have occasionally been used for the same purpose. But these are not in f/ipinsehes evidence of reputation, but merely admissible as secondary evidence of the original instruments. Consequently, in strictness, no such document can be received, without some proof being furnished of the former existence and present loss of the originals.* § 622. Maps, showing the boundaries of counties, towns, parishes, Of manors, which are not proved to have been prepared by persons •who were either deputed to make them by some one interested in the question, or who themselves had apparently some personal know- ledge on the subject, or who are shown to have been in some way connected with the district, cannot be received as evidence whatever their age or apparent accuracy may be.' But if proof be forth- coming that they have been either made or recognised by persons having adequate knov/ledge, they would seem, on principle, to be valid evidence of reputation. Accordingly, where upon the trial of an indictment against a parish for the non-repair of a highway, to show that the road in question was not within the parish, a map was produced which had been made some thirty years before by a surveyor, from information derived from an old parishioner, who had pointed out to him the boundaries, it was held, that, if proof could be given of the old man's death, the map would be admis- sible as evidence of reputation, though it came from the chest of the parish indicted.® A map made under the authority of the sovereign's commission, u^opted in the presentment of a jury acting Ji' '. ) i 1 > Curzon v. I,omax, 1803 (Ld. El- lenborough) ; Brett v. Boalus, 1829 (Ld. Tentordcn). * Plaxtor, V. Dure, 18'2(); Barnes V. Mawsoii, 1813; M. of Aiij^losoy v. Ld. Ilatheiton, 1842; D. of Beau- fort V. Sm th, 1849 (Parke, B.). * See Siirowsbury Peer., 18o7, H. L. ; Brayo Pcjr., lo3G-9, II. li. * See and compare Doe v. Skinner, 1818; Doey. Wittconib, 18j3, II. L.; Perth Peer., 1846-.S, H. L. ; and D, of Devonshire v. Neill, 1876-7, (Ir.) (Pallcs. C.B.). * lliiniiiiond r. Bradstreet, 1854. S(>p Pipe r. Fulchor, 18.58. P. V. Milton, 1843 (Erskine, J.). 403 mti I « M ii ^m :!! MAPS — COURT ROLLS PRESKNTMKNTS. [I'AUT III. under tliiit coinraission, and acted on for nearly sixty years, is, too, evidence of the limits of a sewer's level.' On another occasion, also, maps appear to have been received merely as public documents ;* but in an older case, where, in order to prove that the locus in quo was a highway, a copper-plate map, purporting on its face to have been taken by the direction of former churchwardens, which it was proposed to prove was generally received by the parish as authentic, was rejected with the observation, that " it would be equally improper to admit it, as to admit a plan taken by the lord of the manor, who might thereby crush and destroy the estate of his tenants."' The decision is of the less authority, however, because it does not appear from the report that the map was an ancient one, or tbat the churchwardens, by whose direction it was drawn, were dead. § 62;J. Again, copies of court rolls, and especially presentments in manor courts,'* stating the customs or boundaries of a manor, depositions of conventionary tenants of a manor, taken in an authorised inquiry, and representing the rights of the lord,'^ and other similar documents, are admissible as evidence of reputation ; " though, unless it can be satisfactorily proved, or at least reasonably inferred, that the proceedings were conducted in a legal and regular manner, it will seldom be prudent to run the risk of a new trial by tendering such evidence.' § 624. Verdicts of juries, and judgmentH, decrees, and orders of courts of competent jurisdiction, are not now^ admissible as being actual evidence of reputation.^ Nevertheless, these documents, though not reputation, are as good evidence as reputation ; *" and • New komney (Mayor) v. New Romney (Couimissioners of Sowers), 1892. ■' Alcock W.Cook, 1829 (Best, C.J.). This is ovideutly the case ou which Tindal, C J., acted in the one re- I'ened to in 2 Ph. Ev. 21(5, n. {e). 3 Pollard V. 8colt, 1790 (Ld. Iven- yon). ♦ Evans v. Eees, 1809; Roe v, Parker, 1793; ArundoU v. Ld. Fal- month, 1814 ; Daincrell v. Protheroe, 1847. * Creas^i;. Barrett, 1835; Freeman V. PhillipjJS, 181G ; Gee v. Ward, 1807. » See Evans v. Taylor, 1838, as explained in D. of Beaufort v. Smith, 1849; Daniel?;. Wilkin, 1852. ' See 11. V. Leigh, 1839. 8 Pirn V. Curell, 1840 (Alderson, B.). * Formerly they wore admissible ; the doetriiio that they wore so having, as regards verdicts, tnken its rise from tlio days when juries wore sum- moned de vicimtii. Evans (/. Roes, 1839 (Patteson and Coleridge, JJ.); Brisco V, Lomax, 1839 (Patteson, J.). "> Brisco V. Lomax, 1839 (Little- dale, J.). 404 j- ] ilij, ' . ■& CHAP. III.] VERDICTS — JUDGMENTS — DECREES. (whatever be the principle on which they are admitted) the rule has been established by too many authorities to be now questioTied/ that, in all cases, involving matters of public or general interest, wherein reputation is evidence, a verdict or a judgment upon the matter directly in issue, though pronounced in a cause litigated between strangers to the parties on the record, is also admissible ; not as tending to prove any specific fud exiding at the time, but as evidence of the most solemn kind, of an adjudication by a com- petent tribunal upon the state of facts and the question of usage at the time.* For example, where a public right of way was in question, the plaintiff was allowed to show a verdict, rendeied in his own favour against a defendant in another suit, in which the same right of way was in issue.^ It matters not as to the admis- sibility (though it may as to the Aveight) of such evidence whether the judgment has been suffered by default, or, though of a very recent date, is not supported by any proof of execution or of the poyment of damages,^ or even that the verdict, where one has been obtained, has not been followed up by any judgment or decree.* Neither is it material whether the verdict be one at Nisi Prius, or be the finding of a jury summoned under a commission from a Duchy court, or any other special commission. It must, however, be proved, or be inferred from the circumstances, that the inquiry was a lawful one.** § 625. If, when the record is produced, a direct issue appears to have been raised on the right or custom in controversy, the opponent will not be entitled to show that in lu t no evidence was given on that issue ; since the record is conclusive of the fact of such a finding, though not of its truth as between other parties.' If the record contains no direct issue on the custom, the party producing it must furnish some evidence to show that the custom was really in question ; for, otherwise, the mere verdict would prove nothing.* In an action by the lord of a manor against a > Evans v. Eeea, 1839 (Ld. Den- man). » Pim V. Curell, 1840 (Ld. Atin- ger) ; D. of Devoufihiio v. Neill, 1876-7 (Ir.) (Palles, O.H.); Ncill v. D. of Devonshiio, 1S82, H. L. (Ld. Selborne. C). ' Beedf. Jackson, 1801. SoePetrie V. Nuttall, 1856. * Ld. Cainiivvon i». Villebois, 1844. Soo Pv. r. Biifrlitsido Bicilow, 1849. ° IJrisco I. Lomax, 1838. 8 Id. ' Rood v. Jackson, 1801. " Laybourn v. Crisp, 1838 (Ld. Abinger). 405 JUnr.MKXTS, ETC. ARE EVIDENCE OF REPUTATION. [PT. III. ^ :"' -U It;- -!' .. .!+ copylioldiT for trehpas^sing on his free warren, an ancient judgment on a quo warranto ir.iormation filed by the Attorney- General against a former lord, in which the defendant pleaded, and the Attorney -General confessed, a prescriptive title to the free warren as appurtenant to the manor, was received in evidence for the plaintiff, as being the judgment of a competent court upon a matter of a public nature, which concerned the Crown and the subject, and being "admissible on the same footing as an allowance before the Justices of Eyre, an inquisition post mortem, or an inquisition issuing out of the Court of Exchequer to ascertain the extent of the Crown lands." ' § 626. Decrees and orders of all competent tribunals stand upon the same footing as verdicts.* Therefore, orders of the commis- sioners of sewers requiring landowners to repair sea-walls, will, on an issue respecting the liability of a party to make such repairs, be evidence as adjudications by a court of competent jurisdiction ; and, if they are of an ancient date, it will be presumed that they Lave been duly executed and acted upon.' To render decrees of the old Court of Charcci^ admissible, it is unnecessary to put in the depositions to which they refer ; because, in equity, the judge must have collected the questions in dispute from the bill and answer onl3^* Still, a decree, to be evidence, must be final ; and mere ■■'nterlocutonj orders, not involving any judgment upon the rights of the parties, cannot be received.* § 626a. So anxious, however, are the courts to confine this species of evidence within strict limits, that they have rejected an award in a suit inter alios, though the cause was referred by order of the judge at Nisi Prius.^ § f)26B. No mere claim to the possession of lands, not followed by judgment, will be admissible in evidence,' nor can any verdict, judgment, decree, or order, be received, if it appear that the parties pronouncing it were acting without legal authority.* ' Earl of Carnarvon v, Villebois, read by the opposite party as hia 1844 (Parke, B.). '■ See Laybourn v. Crisp, 1838 (Parke, B.). ; D. of Devonshire v. NeiU, 187(5-7 (Ir.) (Palles, C.B.). 3 R. V. Leigh, 1839 ; D. of Devon- ehiro v. Neill, 187()-7 (Ir.). * Laybourn v. Crisp, 1838. It eci'iiis that the depositions may be evidence : id. » I'iin V. Curell, 1840. « Evans r. Et'es. 1839; R.v. Cotton, 1813; Wenraan I'. Mackenzie, 1855. ' I), of Devonshire v. Neill, 1876-7 (Ir.) (Palles, C.B.). 8 Rogers v. Wood, 1831. 40(5 C'flAP. in.] MODE OF PROOF OF JUl)nMi:NTS, ETC. § 627. Judgments and decrees must in }^onenil be proved eitlier by producing the originals, or by examined, or now by offioe,' copies. Occasionally, however, a copy of a less authentic cliaracter than those named will be received, if it has been dealt with by the party against whom it is tendered, or by those through whom he claims, either as an authentic copy (in which case it will be admis- sible as secondary evidence) or as a paper containing a true state- ment of the custom or other subject-matter of reputation in dispute (in which case it will be received as primary proof). For instance,* where the question at issue turned on the existence or non-existence of a particular manorial custom, a copy of an old decree of the Court of Chancery in a suit between a copyholder and the lord, establishing the custom, was allowed to be read as secondary evidence of the decree, it being held that, inasmuch as it had been found among the papers of a former deceased lord, that fact fur- nished some evidence of its having been recognised as a true cojjy, proof having first been given of an inefPectual search for tiie original, though it was pointed out by the court that it was inadmissible as primary evidence, since the mere circumstance of its having been deposited among the papers of the deceased lord was not sucli a dealing with it as to be equivalent to an admission, upon the lord's part, that it contained a true account of the customs of the manor. A second document tendered in evidence in the same case was an office copy* of another decree, and as there was some evidence to show that this had been given to a witness by the lord as proof of the customs of the manor, the court regarded it in the light of an ad- mission, and held it admissible as primary evidence of those customs. § 628.* The doctrine that declarations of deceased persons as to matters of public interest are an exception to the general rule, that hearsay evidence is inadmissible, is subject to an important qualifi- cation, which is, that such decluvatioiiH, to be ad/nissible as evidence of reputation, must have been made before anij controrerxy arose touching the matter to which they relate ; or, as it is usually expressed, ante litem molam. The ground on which the declarations of deceased persons ai'e admitted at all, is, that they are the natural effusions « B. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXXVII. r. 4, cit(!(l post, § 15;38. » i'lico I). Woodhouse, 1849. 9 Soe post, § l.i3S. * Gr. JiiV. s 'ill. in part. 40? li ■ ! DECLARATION'S ADMISSIHLK IT MADE ANTK LITKM. [p. III. of a party wlio is prosiMiioil to know tlio real fiicts, imd to 8]iofik upon an occasion when liis mind staiuls in an even position, ■without any teinptntion to exceed or fall short of the truth.' Ihit no raan is presumed to he thus indifferent in regard to lUiitlers in actual controversy; for when the contest has begun, jMinple generally take part on the one side or the other; tlieir minds iiro in a ferment ; and, if they are disposed to siteak the truth, faits are often seen by tliem through a false medium. To avoid, therefore, the mischiefs which would otherwise residt, all ex parte declarations, even those upon oath, are rejti'ted, if they can be referred to a date subsequent to the beginning of the controversy.* As the doctrine that declarations cannot be received unless made ante litem motam, is not confined to matters of public and general interest, but eipially governs the admissibility of hearsay evidence in matters of pedigree, it will be convenient to illustrate its operation by refen'ing indis- criminately to both these classes of cases. § 629.^ This rule was familiar in the Roman law ; but the term lis niota was there applied strictly to the commencement of the action, and was not referred to any earlier period of the dispute.'' But iu our law the term Uh is taken in the classical'' and larger sense of controversy; and by lis mota is understood the commencement of the controversy, and not the commencement of the suit." It is now decided that, to render declarations inadmihsible as pod litem iiiotain at the time when they are made, " there must be, not merely facts which may lead to a dispute, but a lis mota, or suit, or controversy pre- paratory to a suit, actually commenced, or dispute arisen, and that upon the very same pedigree or subject-matter which constitutes the question in litigation."' > Per Ld. Eldon, in Whitelocke V, Buker, ISOT ; E. v. Cotton, 1S13 (Diiiiiiiicr, J.). 2 Berkcaoy Poor., 1811 (JJ. in H. L.) ; Monkton v. Att.-Gen., 1831 ; Eichaids v. Bassctt, 18:50. ' Gr. Ev. § 131, in jjurt. ♦ Lis est, lit primum in jus, vel in judicium veiitiiin est ; uiittijiiiim in judiciiuii veiiiiitnr, ciuitruirrsia est, noil lis : Cujac. Op Post. torn, o, col. 193, B. and col. 1G2, 1). Lis inchoati est oniiiiutii jur libvlliim, i-t siitistln- Juris Glossatnm, torn. 1, col. 353, ad Dij;. lib. iv. tit. (i, i. 12. Lis mota rt'iisitiir, dill nisi solus urJor vijurit : Calv. Lex., Verb. liis mota. ' " Phil()soi)lii iKtiitum in litibus conteiunt." — Cic. ; cited (Lawrence, J.) in Berkeley Peer., 1811 (J J. in IL L.). 8 Per Sir J. Mansfield, in Berke- ley Peer., 1811(JJ. iiiK.L.); Monk- ton V. Att.-Gen., 1831. ' Davies v. Lowndes, 1843 (Ld. Deniiian); Shedden v. Att.-Gen. tionem, licet lum sit lis conttsta: Corpus and Patrick, 18GI ; Berkeley Peer., 408 en. HI.] DOCTRINE OF LIS MOTA, WU.VV IT KXCI-UDKS. § (530. From tlio explanation of lis niofn given abovn, three propositions follow. Tho first proposition is, that dcflarationa will not he r-'joctod, in conso(iuence of their having heon made trifh the cj-prc-H ririr ofpiriruliixj dlxpHtrs ; and it is cxoniplified by tho judges having unanimously hold, in conformity with an earlier opinion expro<sed by Lord Mansfield,' that an entry made by a father in any book, for the express purpose of establishing the legitimacy of his son at the time of his birth, in case the same should be called in question, will be receivable in evidence, notwithstanding the professed view with which it was made,'' a doctrine which has since been sanctioned by Lords Brougham* and Cottenham in England,* and by Lord St. Leonards in Ireland,' and may there- fore now be considered as established law in both countries. Tho second proposition is, that declarations ar^. .^Jmissible, if no dispute had arisen when they were made, though they were made in direct support of the title of the claimant.^ For although a feeling of interest will often cast suspicion on declarations, it has never been held to render them inadmissible. The third proposition is, that the mere fact of the declarant having stood, or thought that he stood, in pari jure with the party relying on the declaration, will not render such declaration inadmissible. One peerage case, in- deed, appears at first sight to throw some doubt upon the subject ;' but it is highly probable that the pedigree was there rejected, not as having been made by a party while standing in the same situation as the claimant, but as having been concocted by such person in direct contemplation of himself laying claim to the dignity. § 63L Even if the peerage case just referred to be not suscep- tible of this explanation, a single isolated decision can scarcely 1811 (JJ. in H. L.) ; Slaney v. Wade, 18;j6. See Biitlcr v. Monntgarret, 18 J9, H. L. ; Frederick i;.Att. -Gen., 1874. ' Goodright v. Moss, 1777. 'Ihe commencement of the controversy was, at one time, further dettnod by Alderson, B., to be "the arising of that state of facts on which the claim is founded, without anything more" : Walker v. Boauchnmp, 1834. But this dictum, — though afterwards upheld by Ld. Cottenham (Davies V. Lowndes, 1843), — has since been overruled : Shedilen v. Att.-Oen. and Patrick, 1861 ; Eeilly v. Fitzgerald, 1843 (Ir.). 2 4 Camp. 418. 3 Monkton v. Att.-Gen. 1831. * Slanov V. Wade, 183(). » Eoilly V. Fitzgerald, 1843 (Ir.). ' Tho leading authority support- ing this proposition is Doe v. Davies, 184", whence the remark in the text is taken. ' Zouch Peer., 1807, H. L. (!i 409 I"' DOCTRINE OF LIS MOTA, WHAT IT EXCLUDES. [I'T. Ill, m ■■, It" i< controvert a rule of law, which has been sanctioned and acted uiiou by numerous judges,' and which is so founded on reason that a oontreiry doctrine would go far towards excluding all evidence of reputation. For instance, in cases of public and general interest, if the circumstance that the declarant stood, or believed he stood, in pari Jure with the person relying on the declaration were a ground for rejecting the evidence afforded by such declaration, it would be g'aringly inconsistent with the rule, which requires the statement to have been made by some person having competent knowledge of the subject.' In cases of pedigree, too, though the result of excluding declarations of persons in jjarijure would not be equally mischievous, it would frequently have the effect of drying up sources of information which would be highly valuable in the investigation of truth. The circumstances assumed in each one of the cases just supposed may indeed render it very possible that the declarant may have had some secret wish or bias, which may have induced him to make a statement either partially or totally false ; but the same observation might apply to all evidence of this nature, and its weight in each particular case must be determined by the jury. § 632.^ So much of the rule under consideration as declares that a declaration shall be rejected as having been made poxt lilvin motam only when the controversy relates to the very same subject-matter as is in question in the litigation in which the dt:laration is offered as evidence, is based on sound sense. For, the mere discussion of other to[)les, howevor similar they may be in their general nature to the real matter in dispute, does not necessarily lead to the inference tliat that matter was coutrovcrted. The reasonableness of the rule is shown by the following ilhistra- tion : — In a suit between a copyholder and his lord, where the point in issue is, whether a certain customary fine is to be assessed by the jury of the lord's court, depositions taken in an ancient suit against a former lord, whore the controversy turned on the > Mosoleyv.Uavies, 1822 (Graham, B.); llarwood V. SiiiiH, 1810; Deaclo V. llaucock, 182'1 ; Moukton v. Att.- Gen., 1831 (Ld. Brougham); Free- man V. I'hillipps, 1811) (Ld. EUon- borough), citud with approbation (Ld. Lyndhurst, C.B.) in Daviosi). Morgan, 18;U ; Nicholls v. Parker, 18()o ; Do« V. Tarver, 1824 (Abbott, C.J.). » Ant«, §§610, Oil. > Gr. Ev. § 132, iu port 410 CHAP. III.] DOCTRINE OF LIS MOTA. amount of such fine, in which depositions the fine was mentioned as assessable by the lord, are plainly admissible as evidence to negative the existence of any custom for the jury to interfere.' As one of the learned judges observed in that case, " where the point in controversy is foreign to that which was before contro- verted, there never has been a lis niota."'^ § 633. It is not, however, necessary that the former controversy should have been between the same parties, or should have related to the same property or claim, provided it appears that the matters, respecting which the declarations offered in evidence on the second trial were made, were really under discussion in the former dispute. Consequently where in a peerage case the question i before the Committee of Privileges respected the legitimacy of the ' claimant, and this turned on the fact whether his parents (who had certainly gone through the ceremony of a marriage after his birth, and had subsequently had several children) had been privately married two years before he was born ; — a deposition of the father, wherein he swore positively to the fact of the first marriage, taken some years before, in a suit instituted by the claimant and three of his brothers born before the second marriage against the other children born after that event, for the purpose of perpetuating the testimony of the legitimacy of the former, who claimed in that character to be entitled in remainder to an estate then held by the father, was rejected.* So, in anotiior pcernge case, where the claimant was recjuired to prove that his partMits were legally married, declarations contained in the will of one of the parents, affirming most solemnly the fact of marriage, as also statements to the same effect made by him in conversation, were rejected, since it appeared that some years previously to such declarations and statements being made, a suit ha<l heen instituted by the Crown to annul the marriage, and it was not shown (as in truth it could not be) that that marriage, then disjjutod, was not the very marringe relied on by the present dainmut.* > Frecnian v. rhillipjis, 1H1(5. • Id. (Hiiyloy, J.) Sc-o, aUo, Goe ». Ward, 18.)7; D. of Dovonshir© v. Neill, 1877 (Ir.) (I'alloB, C.B.). * Borkoloy I'oorago case, 1811 (J J. in II. L.). * Soo Sussex Pcorago Case, 1H4I, H. L., as reported 11 CI. aud Fin. 85, 9U-103. 411 ,i-' > I I \ hi ; 1 : 1 i DECLARATIONS MADE TOST LITEM MOTAM. [PART IH. § f)34. Declarations, made after the controversy has originated, are in all events to be excluded, even though proof be offered that the cxiiitence of the controversy was not known to the declarant.' This is justified on the ground not only that whether the declarant knew of the existence of the previous litigation, raises a coUatiMl issue, and that such prioi litigation may have been instituted fraudulently, but on the further ground that, " If an inquiry were to be instituted in each instance, whether the existence of the controversy was or was not known at the time of the decluration, much time would be wasted, and great confusion would be produced."^ > Sheddenv.Att.-Qen. and Patrick, 1861. * Berkeley Peer., 1811 (Sir J. Mansfield, in 11. L.). 412 CHAP. III.] AMEUICAN NOTES. 4121 AMERICAN NOTES. Matters of Public and General Interest. — An interesting survival of a period when jurymen were members of the eoiiinumity seh'cted for special personal knowledge of matters of notoriety in their respective localities is found in the ex(!eption to the hearsay rule which admits the reported statements of (U^cicased persons, if i)rop- erly oualilied, concerning matters of public and general interest wlien such statements are made oiita lifinn viofaiii,. Lawrence v. Tennant, G3 N. H. 5.32 (188S); McCall v. U. S. 1 Dak. .'520 (1876). Among suidi matters of public and general interest are clearly the boundaries of a state, territory or other large iniuiicipal divi- sion of territory for purposes of government. On an hidictment for murder at Deadwood, in the lUack Hills, on the (pu!st,ion of tlie locality of the homicide, evidence is co)npe- tent that Deadwood is commonly reputed to be in the tcwitory of Dakota. The court say; — "It may, tlierefore, be taken as settled that where the question is as to territorial limits, and wliere the boundary concerns the extent of a public municipal jurisdiction, (as whether lands lie, or rights are exendsable within its true limits), eitlier public reputation, or the particular dechuations of deceased persons, made tmte litem inotain, are receivable." McCall V. {]. S. 1 D.ik. ;i20 (1870). So tlie i)ositiou of a line separating two towns is a matter of jiublic interest and the statenu'nts of deceased persons are comiie- tent though their declarations concern the position of a particular hoiisi? as related to tliat line. Abingtou v. North Hridgewater, 2.3 rick. 170. 174 (18;W). The location of a public highway may be proved as a matter of public and general interest by the statements of decca^i'd persons ])r()perly qualilied. Lawrence v. Tennant, (14 N. II. 5.'>2 (1888); 15 A. 54.3 (1888). What auk not ai'im£opriate Mattkus. — The ])artieular date at which an ancient school-house w;is built is not a matter of gen- eral interest. "The fallacy on the ])art of the defendants seems to be in assuming that because a school-liouse is a piddle biulding for a ]»ublic ])nrpose, the ])reeise date of its erection must nlso be a matter of piddic or general interest to be ))roved b\' traditionary evidence; and therefore one of the defendants attempts, by repeat- ing the nnsworn statement of her decensed motlier or grandmother as to a date, to change this pid)lic matter of a s(dioid-hi)iise into her own private property. . . . The law does not dispense witii the sanction of an oath and the test of cross-ex. imiiiation as a jire- re(]uisite for tlie admission of verbal testimony, unless it discovers in the nature of the case some other sanction or test deemed equiv- alent for ascertaining the truth. I' ! 4122 AMERICAN NOTES. [part III. The matters included in the chiss under consideration are sucli that many persons are deemed cognizant of them and interested in their truth, so that there is neither the ability nor the temptation to misrepresent that exists in other cases; and the matters are pre- sumably the subject of frequent discussion and criticism, which accomplishes in a manner the purpose of a cross-examination, while the persons whose declarations are offered in evidence must have been in a situation to know the truth. After passing such an ordeal it is reasonably safe to accept the result as established fact. .l)ut if the fact to be p*'>ved is a particular date, though connected incidentally with a pu'. c matter, it is easy to see that it could not stand out as a sal'cnt tact for contemporaneous criticism and dis- cussion so as to furnish any guaranty for its correctness; so that the general rule excluding hearsay evidence applies in full force. The human memory is proverbially treacherous even in regard to very recent dates, and little reliance c"t be placed on the sworn testimony of living witnesses in such i otters, unless they avo able to associate the date given with some more striking fact." S. W. School District of Bolton v. Williams, 48 Conn. u()4 (1881). Declarations of deceased persons j.re admissible in evidence regarding a private boundary when such boundary is coincident with a public boundary. Such a case frequently arises in states once part of th juiblic domain of tlie United States, where the meridian or range and sec- tion lines, tliough the bounds of jirivate estates, are also of <,'ciieral interest to the comlfiunity because serving as the boundaries of a largo nuii.iier of similar estates. it is difficult to classify witli precision the cases in which ]iri- vate boundaries may, by their coincidence witli public boundaries, become provnlde as matters of general interest. As is said in Cur- tis V. Aaronson, 49 X. J. Law, G8 (188G). "Tt nniy not, in every instance, be readily determinable wlictlier a disputed boundary is of such public character as to permit evi- dence of reputation concerning it. In the case of lines of counties, towns, townships, liigliways, large water-courses, ami the like, there ean be no doidit. But tliere may be lines and monuments of a less marked i)ublic cliaraciter, and yet, by reason of their relation to numerous minor titles and land divisions, a local ]ni\)]u- interest may arise, and a consequent knowledge in tlie neighborhood con- cerning tliem may be readily supposed to exist. Such cases it is believed come witliin the rule." Bkivate Boundakiks. — In matters of prUmte boundaries, cor- ners, &c., the declarations of deceased persons whether made avte or post litem wofani. are in most of tiie states regarded as incompe- tent. Curtis V. Aaronson, 49 X. J. Law, 08 (1880). In this case the court, in course of a well-considered opinion, lay down the fol- CHAP. III.] AMERICAN NOTES. 4128 ].n- I'ios. 'iii- llfM- cvi- ics, iko, :s of ition ■rest ■mi- lt is oor- <nife 11 po- caso fol- lowing propositions. "In some of the American states the rule excluding hearsay testimony is, in this line of fact, to some extent tlepaited from, and traditionary evidence is received to establish private boundary. It has been permitted, under color of making proof by ancient reputation, to give the declarations of third per- sons, strangers to the title, made when not engaged in any i)rov- able act, such declarations being recitals of past acts and doings of the declarant, or expression of opinion on matters exclusively per- taining to the rights of others. The reception of such evidence is confessedly in derogation of the established rules of evidence under our system, and is justified only on the ground of an alleg^.^ necessit" It is needless to cite these cases, as they are fully referred to in the text-books in common use. "But the decided weight of authority ' . the country, and upon the solid ground of reason and principle, is against the admissi- bility of evidvjuce of this character." The position of a corner in an ancient survey cannot be proved by the declarations of a deceased cliain-carrier, though made while the lattL'v was standing at or near the corner. "It was not merely hearsay, ;)at hearsay not to matters of general reinitation, or com- mon interest among many, but to specilic facts, viz. the manner and place of ru' ing tlie boundary lines of llemey's patent. The general rule i.^, that evidence, to be admissible, should he given under the sanction of an oath, legally adniinistcred; and in a judicial proceeding, depending between tiie parties alfecLed by it, or those who stand in privity of estate, or interest with them. .So it was laid down by Lord Ken3on, in his able opinion in tlic King- V. Eriswell, 3 T. Me]). 721. Certain exceptions have, liowever, been allowed, wliicli perhaps may be as old as the rule itself. lUit these excejitions stand upon ijccnliar grounds; and as was remarked by Lord Ellenborough in Weeks c. Sparke, 1 ^L and Sclw. 086, the admission of hearsay evideiuc, niio.: all or-casions, wlietlior in matters of public or private right, is somewhat of an iinomaly. Hearsay is admitted in cases of ped.'i.'i'ce; of prei-:eri|itiv(> li^lits and customs; and of some other eases of a jmhlic or quasi public nature. In cases of pedigree, it is admitted ipon the grcmml of necessity, or the great difliculty, and sometimes the impossibility of proving remote facts of this sort by living w.hesses. lUit in these cases it is only admitted when the tradition comes from persons inti- mately connected, or in close relation with the family; or from sources of a kindred nature, which, in a general sense, may be said to import verity; thei" being no lis mofn or otlier intei .>st to affect tlie credit of tlieir statement." Ellicott v. Tearl. 10 Jet. 412, 4.'i3 (IS.'JO). This (decision was ii)iheld in Clement r. Tacker, 125 U. S. 30*.) (1887), on the solo ground that it was decided by the particular 'U 4124 AMERICAN NOTES. [part hi. n X 4i!l tt" f rule existing in Kentucky, and no disposition to approve it is shown. A decision to tlie opposite effect seems to have hem reached in Hoanhnan v. Lessees of Keed, G Pet. ',V2H, 'Ml (1(S;51.'). " Ijaiuhnarks are frcfpiently formed of perishable materials, which pass away with the generation in which they are made. V>y the iinprovenient of the country, and from other causes, they are olteii destroj-ed. It is therefore important, in many cases, that hearsny or reputation should be received to establish ancient boimdarics: but such testimony must be pertinent, and material to the issue ^between the parties." In certain states, moreover, "declarations of deceased persons who were disinterested at the time such declarations were male, in res]iect to boundary lines and corners of land, are competent to jirove their location, if such jjcrsons had opportunity to be in- formed in respect thereto." Ik'thea v. liyrd, 95 N. C. .'iO') (1S.S(;). "Jt is true that such evident is hearsay in its nature, but it has been deemed necessary to classify it with, and make it one of the excejitions to the general rule of law, that hearsay is not conijie- tent as evidence. Whether this exception comes strictly within the spirit and reason of the rule, may admit of some (piestion, l)ut however this may be, it is now, and has been for a long period, the law of this State. The reason of the exception seems to have been, and indeed, still is, the circumstances of the country, and the un- certainty, confusion, and indistinctness generallj', of boundary lines and corners of tracts of land that belong to individuals. These and like considerations have rendered the exception neces- sary. Such evidence is not of a very high type, ar.ii niiiy not ordi- narilv be very satisfactory, still, it is found tliat it subserves tlie ends"of instice." liethea v. Hyrd, 05 N. C. ;5()9 (ISSG): Scoggin V. Dalrymple. 7 Jones (N. C.) Law 46 (1859). So in I'ennsylvania. Buchanan v. INfooi^e, 10 S. & R. 2"5 (ISL'.'V); Xramer v. Goodhinder, 98 Pa. St. "(;() (1881); Clement r. Tacker, 125 U. S. 309 (1887). In Kennedy v. Lubold, 88 I'a. St. L'l(>, (1878>, tlu^ declarations of a deceased surveyor thirty-tive years befoi. the trial as to the location of certain oaks and hickories as corner bounds, made while marking them, were admitted by the trial court as being weak evidence, hardly amounting to evi(h"ice, the ruling was held to be error. "These two cases were argued together. They seem to hnve been tried upon the doctrine of leav- ing first ]>rinci]des and going on to perfection. Put old surveys •are not to be so tested. :Most perfect in the beginning they are "constantly undergoing change and decay, until by wind, fire, rot- tenness, and the nets and frnuds of men, their evidences lie only in memory and hearsay. Hence wiien the learned judge said of the acts of the surveyors, who forty >ears before went upon the ground, ran the lines, blocked the tre^s, counted the growths. CHAP. II I.J AMKKICAN NOTi::-;. 41 i'- found original marks, and pronounned tlie liickory tlie nuiiibi'iid corner of donation lot No. 12G0, it was inere liearsay, lie hardly l)(dieved it evidence, admitted it with reluct.anci', and it was weak (nidenci! in determining, he clearly misled the jury. The r(!Versc is true — the eviilence was strong, and ought to prevail unless clearly riihutted, by showing either a mistake ol' the witness relat- ing the facts, or error in the surveyors making the declaration that the hickory was the numbered corner and the white oak opposite an original corner. . . . The declarations as to the corners when found, blockeil and counted, were a part of the res gcstie, and so far from being doubtful evidence were competent and always admitted when the transaction is old and the surveyor dead." Kennedy v. Lubold, 88 I'a. St. 24(5, 'J'to (1878). So in Texas, of statements by deceased persons made to a sur- veyor pointing out to him posts upon the disputed boundary line as posts placed there by the surveyor who ran the original i)artition lines. "It is well settled by our decisions that the declaratiouf: of disinterested parties since deceased, who were in a position to know a boundary line, are admissible in a controversy about such line." Tucker v. Smith, G8 Te\. 473 (1887). A dictuui in New Hampshire is apparently to the effect that this class of evidence "is contiued to monuments and lines and bound- aries, but does not extend to acts of ownership, or possession, or to any other facts." Wendell v. Abbott, 45 N. II. 349 (18G4). la the case itself a witness was j)ermitted to testify as to what a de- ceased surveyor had told him about the corner of a private estate, but not as to the cutting of certain pine trees upon the disputed premises. The rule is the same in Virginia. "Evidence is admissible to prove declarations as to the identity of a particular corner tree or boundary, made by a person who is dead, and had peculiar means of knowing the fact; as, for instance, the surveyor or chain carrier upon the original survey, or the owner of the tract, or of iin adjoin- ing tract calling for the same boundary ; and so also tenants, proces- sioners and others, whose duty or interest would lead tl.em to diligent enquiry and accurate information as to the fact; always excluding those declarations which are liable to the suspicion of bias from interest." Harriman r. IJrown, 8 Leigh, (V.)7 (1837). This case is cited with approval in llili <'. I'roctor, 10 W. Va. 59,. 85 (1877). The courts of Virginia do not, however, evidence an inclination to extend the doctrine laid down in Harriman «. Rrown (ubi supra). They are " not disposed to extend it in the least beyond tlie very terms in which it is there expressed." Clements v. Kyles, 13 Gratt. 468 (1P5G). So where the deceased declarant lived on the premises in dispute, but was neither a chain-carrier or surveyor at I ! 4126 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAIIT 111. .i)i the time of the original survey, nor owner of the tract or any ad- joining tract calling for the same boundaries, his evidence was rejected. " That his living within the bounds of the survey gave him the op])ortunity to see trees marked as corners of some survey, found accidentally or otherwise, would surely not be sufficient un- less some duty or interest can be traced to him by which he would have been prompted to make diligent enquiry and to obtain accu- rate inforinaticjii within the meaning of the rule as propounded in Harrimau v. Brown." Clements v. Kyles, 13 Gratt. 468, 471) (1856). The rule in South Carolina is very similar. Speer v. Crate, 3 McCord, 227 (1825). "How often have we known :eputed boundaries, proved by the testimony of aged witnesses, and even by the hearsay evidence of such witnesses, established in opposition to the most jjrecise calls of an ancient patent. Such evidence has been constantly received, and dietances have been lengthened or shortened, without the slightesi regard to the calls of the patent. The reason is obvious. It is not the lines reported, but the lines actually run, by the sur- veyor, \>hich vests in the patentee a title to the area included within these lines. The survey returned, or the patent, is the evi- dence of tlie former; natural marks or reputation is in almost all cases the evidence of the latter. The mistakes committed by sur- veyors and chain carriers, more particularly in an unsettled coun- try and wilderness, have been so common, and are so generally acknowledged, as to have given rise to a principle of law, as well settled as any whitdi enters into tiie land titles of this country, which is, that, when the mistake is shown In* satisfactory proof, courts of law, as well as courts of equity, have looked beyond the i)atent to correct it. It will be readily admitted, that such evidence should be eautioush' received, if it should have a pre- jionderating influence in determining the question of boundary." Conn. r. I'enn., 1 I'et. C. Ct. 4!)0. 511 (181,S). The MAssAriirsKTTS Eule. — In Massachusetts, the rule as to declarations of deceased persons regarding private boundaries has been largely affected by what l^rofessor Greenleaf has called "the principle of the res gestae; " — a thing difficult to understand. De- clarations of a deceased owner of land as to his boundaries, cor- ners, «&c., made while in possession of such land, and in the act of pointing out his own boundaries, are admissible as evidence of these facts, provided no interest to misrepresent at the time existed. Daggett r. Shaw, 5 ISIetc. 223 (1842); Holmes v. Turner's Falls Co.' 150 Mass. 535 (1800). If the declarant was not at the time, and never had been, the owner of the premises or in possession as tenant or otherwise, his declarations are inadmissible. Bartlett v. Emerson, 7 Gray, 174 CHAP. III.] A^rERICAN NOTES. 412" (185()). If the declarant had occupied the premises in question, but had ceased to do so at the time of the declaration, it is also incompetent Whitney v. Bacon, 9 Gray, 206 (1857). If not made Avhile in the act of pointing out the boundaries of the declarant's land, the declarations are incompetent. "This is an element whicli cannot be disregarded, especially when the ques- tion is one of private boundary. The declaration derives its force as evidence from the fact that it accompanies an act which it (jual- iHes or gives character to. The declaration is tlien a part of the act. Without such accompanying act, the declaration is mere nar- rative, liable to be misunderstood or misapplied, and open to the objections which prevail against hearsay evidence." Long v. Colton, 116 Mass. 414 (1875). It is essential that the declarant should be deceased. If he is alive and could be called as a witness, the declaration cannot be received. Flagg r. Mason, 8 Gray, 556 (1857). The admissil)ilit.y is limited to the fact and location of the boun- dary; the declaration is not evidence of particular <"''cts mentioned at the same time. " Any further declaration of a i.tcc material to the issue, would have been an attempt to prove such fact by hearsay evidence, and so contrary to the rule. Had the deceased been re- quested to go and point out' the line, and he had done it without any declaration whatever, it would have been an act of the same character and admissible upon the same principle." Van iJeusen V. Turner, 12 I'ick. 532 (1832). It is not an objection to the competency of this evidence that the statements of the deceased declarant were in favor of himself. " It is undoubtedly true, as an established principle of the law of evidence, that hearsay- testimony cannot be received; and the wisdom of tlie principle is confirmed by the uniformity of the decisions in various courts and in different countries, which en- force it; but, like very many general rules, it is not without, its exceptions. One of these is traditional evidence or hearsay testi- mony of ancient witnesses respecting boundaries. In regard to this exception, many autliorities have been cited by the counsel for the demandant, to prove tliat these declarations are only to be received as admissions of a party in possession, when made against his interest. But we think the rule, as it has been practised upon in this Commonwealth, is not so restricted; and that the declara- tions of ancient persons, made while in possession of land owned by them, pointing out tlieir boundaries on the land itself, and who are deceased at tlie time of the trial, are admissible in evidence, where notliing apppars to show that they were interested to misre- present in thus i)ointing out their bounihiries; and it need not ap- pear affirmatively that the declarations were made in restriction of, or against, their own rights." Daggett r. Shaw, 5 Mete. 22.S (1842). II; 41 2« AMIiUlCAN NOTES. [I'AKT 111. Iiii.K i:K(iAKi)Ki) AS Anomalous. — The supreme judicial court of MassiiclniKctts evince no iuclinution to extend the luuniialy iuither tiiau at present carried. Tliey have accordingly decline il, on a (!ase lor the conversion of the waters of a spring, to sustain the admission of a declaration by a deceased owner, that he cajlfd a cei'tain stream a "sijri"';" and intended to carry it off the land. The reason given is this: — "Such delarations have generally been regarded as an exception to the general j'ule against hearsay, and that we cannot extend the principle further than it has been carried by authority. We are not aware that it has ever been applied to a case like this." Peck v. Clar\, 142 Mass. 43G (1886). Massachusetts Kulk For.:.o\VEu. — With various modifications the "Massachusetts rule" has been followed in other states, — for example, in the federal courts. "They (declarations of a particular fact respecting a private boundary) are, therefore, receivable only when made coincidently with pointing out the boundaries and gen- erally as part of the res gestiE." Hunnicutt v. I'eyton, 102 U. S. 333, 3G3 (1880). So in Vermont. Ci. ' v. Kingsbury, 46 Vt. 47 (1873). And in New Jersey. "Proof of declarations of persons since deceased, in respect to private boundaries, to be admissible in evi- dence, must have been made by a declarant in possession as owner at the time, and while engaged in pointing out the boundary in question, and such declarations need not be against interest or in disparagement of title; they are received when nothing appears to show an interest to deceive* or misrepresent." Curtis v. Aaronson, 49 N. J. L. 68, 77 (1886). And in Maine. Koyal v. Chandler, 83 Me. 150 (1891). "We think this rule has been recognized and acted upon in cases like this in this state. It is an exception to the general rule of evi- dence, that heaisay evidence is incompetent. Landmarks in the early surveys are usually formed of perishable materials, fre- quently destroyed in clearing and the improvement of the land, and pass away with the generation in which they were made. In such cases, when no direct proof can be made as to the location and character of the monuments, we are forced to secondary evidence; and the acts of the owner of the land when upon it, pointing out the mon'.iiaents and location of his line, and his declarations, made at the time in regard to tiieni, when no controversy exists, are competent to be submitted to the jury, after his death, as having some tendency to prove the location of the line." In New Hampshire the declarations of a deceased owner of land as to his boundaries are admissible even if not made while in the act of pointing out his bounds. " Two things are necessary in order tc make the declarations of deceased persons competent evidence as to bouiularies. 1st. It must appear that the deceased party, or CHAP. III.] AMEUICAN NOTES. 412'' decliirunt had knowledge. 2d. Ho must have no interest to mis- represent. ... It is a general presumption that owners of land know tlieir boundaries, but sometimes they do not, and wlirn they are ignorant of tiiem, of course tlieir statements in relation to them, whether made on, or off their land are of but little or no coiisecpience, but when such bcmndaries are eli'arly known, or established by those in interest, then tliey generally can communi- cate accurate knowledge, whether their statements be made at the bouiulary or at a distance from it." Smith r. Forrest, 41) ><'. 11. 2;W (1870); Lawrence o. Tennant, 04 :,'. 11. TWJL' (IS.S.S). Such declarations may of course be admissible strictly as part of a res gestiE fact. For example, where the fact that a deceased pro- prietor of land had built a fence on his land was a competent fact, the intention with which he ]daced it in a certain position, as shown by his declaration when building it, is competent. Quinn v. Eagleston , 108 111. 248 (188.3). Dkoi-akaxt must he Dkad. — Such is the original rule. Ikthea V. ]?yrd, 95 N. C. 309 (1886); Tucker v. Suiith, 08 Tex. 473 (1887). So, in case of the peculiar rule in Massachusetts above referred to, as to declarations relating to privxte boundaries, it is an insu- perable objection if the declarant is not shown to be dead. Flagg V. Mason, 8 Gray, 5r)0 (1857). Antk litkm Motam. — The declaration must be made before any controversy has arisen concerning the subject-matter of the decla- ration. Bethea v. Byrd, 95 N. C. 309 (1880). If made post litem motam, they are excUnled unless prior similar statements were made ante litem motam. Speer v. Coate, 3 McCord, 227 (1825). Mu.sT i!E Disinterested. — It has frequently been deemed necessary that the declarant should be personally disinterested. Bethea v. Byrd, 95 N. {). 309 (1880); Tucker v. Smith, 68 Tex. 473 (1887). This jihrase has been interpreted in Vermont to require that there should be no object to misrepresent. Thus, in admitting evidence of declarations of a deceased ])roprit'tor as to a jjrivate boundary, the court say: — "The case does show that these ])ersons had been interested in this boundary before they made the declara- tions, and perhaps it shows enougli so that it may fairly be claimed that they were so interested at the time tliey were shown to have stated in regard to it. But however this may be, the case does not show that they were interested to misrepresent in regard to what they said about it. It does not api^ear that any one was claiming to so locate the boundary as to restrict the land of cither, Tior that either was so situated as to desire to have it located anywhere but 412'" AMKKKAN NOTKS. [I'AItT in. il I 1'! ■1 1 11 4;!. ili 41 f in its true pliico, nnr tliat in iuiytliiii!,' »'ithor said, ht> was speaking ill .subscrviciHjy to any wish on liis part to maintain any one ]iar- tii'ular location of tiii' linn over another. There arc cases, it is trne, that would exclude such declarations as these, although tliey would admit those oi' de(;eased persons disinterested in every respect.'' Child /•. Kingsbury, 4(5 Vt. 47, 5^ (l.ST.'J). Khi'utation. — That the hearsay as to matters of jmblic and general interest has taken the form of reputation does not materi- ally atfe(!t the rule. The incorporation of a parish may be shown by reputation. " It is a well known fact that l)y two several fires in the town of I'xistdu a great pai't of the public records of the late ])rovince were burnt : and unless the existence of a corporation could he proved by repu- tation, many towns and jiarishes would lose all their corporate rights and i)rivileges. Dillingham n. Snow, o Mass. .547 (18(111). The existence of a reputation concerning ancient public boimdaries is admissible as proof of tlie location of the boundary. Ilunnicutt V. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333, 3(53 (1880). "Nor is it denied that in Virginia not only general reputation, but also hearsay evidence as to particular facts, may under certain circumstances be jiroperly received as evidence." Clements v. Kyles, 13 (iratt. 4G8, 477 (1856). The location of a county boundary may be proved by reputation, and the rule is the same in civil and in criminal cases. Cox v. State, 41 Tex. 1 (1874). So the location of a highway may be established by reputation. "I'roof of general rejmtation was admissible in this case, for the purpose of showing the existence and extent of the highway in question." Noyes v. Ward, 11) Conn. 250, 209 (1848); Jaquith v. Scott, 03 N. H. 5 (1883.) "Ancient reputation and possession in respect to the boundaries of the streets, are entitled to infinitely ■ more respect, in deciding upon the boundaries of the lots, than any ■ exj)erimental survey that can now be made. If not, the whole city, and all oth.er towns, would be thrown into the utmost con- fusion." Kalston v. :Miller, 3 Hand. (Va.) 44 (1824). "Reputation as to the exi.stence of particular facts not of a pub- lic nature, is not generally admissible, though, where the existence of the facts has been proved aliunde, reputation is sometimes received to explain them." Shutte v. Thomjison, 15 Wall. 151 (1872). Therefore a refusal to allow proof of the reputation of the neighborhood as to a pojdar corner at the then present tinie, "'un- less such reputation was traditionary in its character, having passed down from those who were acquainted with the re])utation of the tree from an early day to the present time,' or unless 'the in- formation as to sucii reputation was derived from ancient sources, CHAI'. III.] AMKltlCAN NOTIX ■n •)II 1)1" from piTSons wlio Iiad pcciiliiir means nl' knowing wliat tlie loputiition of th(» tn-c was at an early day ' " was held to he " fully stistaini'd liy authority." Ihid. 15ut the court iiorniittcd cvidciKM' that the occupants of tiie estates adjoining,' the poplar corner liad •'(daiincd the poplar as the true corner of their tracts.'' Jhul. In Te.xas, ^'cneral reputation has been allowed to jirove the loca- tion of ancient jirivate boundaries. "These boundaries were an- cient, and their locality soem.s to have been a matter of sullicient interest in the neighborhood to have been the sid)ject of observa- tion aiul conversation among the peoj)le. The witness stated the reputation to have been general, and it clearly appeared that it was formed before this controversy was begun." Clark v. Hills, (57 Tex. 141, loli (188G). See also a dictum in Connecticut. Kinuey v. Faruswortli, 17 Conn, .'i.") (184r>). "From the nature of the thing, an (dd boundary cannot, in gen- eral, be ])roved by direct and positive proof; and reputation is therefore, from necessity, admissible." Smith v. Xowells, L' Litt. (Ky.) 1")'.) (1822). " Pedigree .and boundary are the excepted cases, wherein reputation and hearsay of deceased persons are reccdvod as evidence. The statements of deceased persons relative to bounda- ries of which they spoke from actual personal knowledge, have l)een frequently received in evidence in this state." McCausland r. Fleming. 03 Pa. St. .% (18<il)). So in Florida. "There is no error in the ruling that although some portion of the evidence respecting the boundaries of tiiese grants is mere reputation or hearsay, yet such evidence, taken in connection with other evidence, is entitled to resjiect in cases of boundary when the lapse of time is so great as to render it ditli- cult, if not impossible, to prove the boundary by the exist Mice of the primitive landmarks or other evidence than that of hearsay." Daggett /'. Willey, G Fla. 482, rAO (I8r>r)). "A surveyor is an expert, and he may state the facts on wdiich he i)ases his opinion, that a line run or surveyed by himself has been correctly done. He may state that lie •' found the corner stake ' of a public survey, and 'the bearing points, and the markeil trees along a line ' of such survey. These are facts, wiiich are conijjetcnt and relevant, when the fact to be proven is the accuracy of a boun- diiry line of adjacent tracts of lands. See Nolin v. Parmer, 21 Ala. (•)(). " When the proofs tend to show that it is uncertain upon which of two parcels of land, separated by a section line, a trespass has been committed, the admissions of the adverse party to the suit, who is the owner of the lands on one side of the line, that \\w line of separation is in a certain place, may be permitted to go to the jury, 412" AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AUT III. to show the truth of the fact thus admitted. T^omidary may be proven by reputation and hearsay. It may be sliown in tliis way whether land is {)an!el or not jKircel of a certain tract of land, lioardman v. Reed's Lessees, (> Voters, 341 ; also, 1 IMiil. Kv. (C. & H. Kd. Notes) pp. 1'1«, L'l'J et seq." Shook v. Tate. ')() Ala. 91 (1873). CHAP. IV, ] HEAESAY IN QUESTIONS OF PEDIGBEBL CHAPTEB IV. MATTERS OP PEDIOREB. § 635. It has been pointed out ' that while, as a general rale, hearsay evidence is not admitted, there are hi'x exceptions to this guiifcral rule. Evidence as to matters of pedigree forms the second exception to such general rule. This exception rests on the ground of necessity. For example, in inquiries respecting relationship or descent, facts must often be proved which occurred many years before the trial, and were known but to few persons. Courts of law, have, constHjuently, so far relaxed these rules in matters of j)edigree,' as to allow parties to have recourse to traditional evidiMioe; often the sole species of proof which can be obiained. The Probate Division will even grant probate to the estate of a person whose Ohristi.an name is not known, but who is proved by admissible declarations of members of the family to have had an existenne.' It was, indeed, long doubtful wliother the declarations of servants, friends, and neighbours, might not be received. But the settled rule is that the admission of hearsay is restricted to hearsay proceeding from persons who were de Jure rvlatcd by blood or marrioyc to the family in question, and who may, consequently, be sujjposed to have had the gnMitcst interest in seeking, tliH best opportunity for obtaining, and the least reason for falsifying, information on the subject.* » Anto, § 007. * Ak to tlio biirtbon of proof in mattoi'H of po'ligroo, soo In ro I'or- tnii, roiiiHoii V. Att.-Otjn., 1885 (Chittj, J.), » l{(t Goods of ThompBon, 1S87. • Johnson i>. Lawson, 1824; (Urease »'. Harictt, 18:1.^; Vowlo* v. Young, 18UU (Ld. Ei'bkiuu); Uoodright v. AFoss, 1777 (T;(l. ManHfic'ld), as ex- pliiiiii'd l)j' I,d. Kldcm in Whitidocko r. Hiikor, 1807; Monkton v. Att.- (JtMi., 18.11 (1,(1. Itn.u^'luiin) ; Staf- f.ird r.«M-., 18J.-), II. h. ; Jow.dl V. Jhwi'II, I8i;t(.\in.); JmkNon f. Urow- nur, 18'.'(l (.Am.) ; ('Impinan v. ( 'hap- man, 1817 (Am.); Waldioa v. Tuttle, 1828 (Am.). 418 \ J" ' ' IP i ARE DECLARATIONS OF BASTARDS ADMISSIBLE. [PT. III. § 636. So far as blood relations are concerned, no limitation in the rule has ever been recognised.' And with regard to relation- ship by affinity, not only are declarations by a husband respecting his wife's family* admissible, but so also are now the wife's declarations concerning her husband's relatives.' But statements made by the wife's relatives — even, for instance, her father — are not.* Moreover, the rule does not apply at all as between iUegitiniate members of a family. Therefore, an assertion by a man that one of his natural brothers had died without issue must be rejected ; * as also must a declaration by one brother that another brother has had an illegitimate son.* § 637. Whether, under any circumstances, the declarations of a pen on deceased, asserting his own illegitimacy, can be received is doubtful. Such declarations, however, can always be received as admissions against himself and those who claim under him by some title derived subsequontly to the statements being made.' Declarations of a parent that a child is illegitimate are ' Davics V. Lowiules. 184H (Paiko, B.); Shrowsbmv IVor., 18.J7, II. L. (L(l. Woiisl.'viliii.'). » Ovoiniliii^' (lictim in Duvies v. LowiuU'tf. 1M;{ (I'aiko, B). 3 Shruw.sbuiy I'oor., 18J7, II. L. *Id. » Dot) V. Barton, 1827 (PuttcBon, J.). Soo Doo )'. iJiivies, 1847. • Crisiiiii 1'. Dojjliniii, 18()3. Soe, howovcr, contra, Cooko v. Lloyd, 1803, infra, in note '. Set", also, Ilitcluna c Kardley, 1871. ' Sou 11. <•. lUsliworth. 1812 (Wifjht- man, J.); luul I'roc.-Otn. r. Wil- lianiH, 1S()1 (Sir ('. Crossw.-ll) ; S. C. nom. Dvko c Williiun.s, 18()1 ; In ro Miirv limf^lcy, 18(>2. In Cook«< v. Llovtl, 180;] (Ln Bliiiic, J.), tho (pii'stion was wlu'thiT an nldor son, who had taken i)o.><scs.sion of tho patornal cHtati's, and eonvoyod thorn to oni' of tho litigants, was horn in w.MUock. Aftor wnch ohUir sou'b (loatli, hirt own doiliration that ho was a bastard was rocoivod in ovi- donco (Lo Blanc. J.), tli.nigh nnido mihs.'(]uontlv to ho convcyanco, "as the roprost-ntation of onn ot tho fanuly of tho degroo of rohition«hip lio horo to it." If tho cases cittid in tho toxt 1)0 law,— as thoy wonld probably bo doomed at tho pro.suiit day, — this do- ciision can scarcely rost npon tliat ground, unless tho special circum- stances of the case be praj-ed in aid ; and unle.xsit can successfully bo con- tended, that, since tho defendant's claim rested on the le^^itimacy of the vendor, ho could not object to the vendor's declaration, witliout relin- quishing tho only prop of hi.s title. Should this rotined argiiniont be deemed inconclusive, perhips tho ad- missibility of tho declaration mi^'ht bo snstained, on th«! ground that the tauso turned, not only on tho con- dition of tho father's family, but on the actual s'atus of tho cU'clarant himself ; but hero we are met by tho dillic.ulty, that tho son eouhl only liavo known the fact of his own ille- gitimacy by information received from others; and, as a bastard has in tho eye of tho law no re- latives, tho hearsay nuist havo been derived from strangers, and its ad- missibility might on that ground 1)0 questioned. Soo lurthor ro- niarks on this case, infra, in text. Moreover, in one case ovidonco was received that the father had 414 ' 3 CHAP. IV.] DECLARATIONS AFTKR WIFK's DEATH. admissible after such parent's death,' notwitht-tandiug the nilo of law, which possibly stilP precludes parents from giving testimony to bastardise issue born during wedlock.' Possibly, however, after previous proof of a valid marriage they are inadmissible.'* § 638. If a man has once been connected with a family by marriage, the death of his wife will not dissolve that connexion, so as to render inadmissible declarations subsequently made by him. Therefore where, in a case of pedigree, a witness was asked whether he had not heard a husband, since deceased, state, after his wife's death, that she was illegitimate, the answer was received.' The court presunwd that the knowledge must have been obtained by the husband whilst he was a member of the family.^ | § 639. Again, no valid objection can be taken to evidence of '. tradition as to family history, on the ground that it is heamnij upon ^ hearmi/, provided all the declarations come from different members . of the same family, or do not directly appear to have been derived from strangers.' For example, the declarations of a deceased widow respecting a statement which her husband liad made to her, • as to who his cousins were, or the declaration of a relative, ia which he asserts generally that he has heard what he states, are both receivable ; and even general rrptife in the fainily, proved by the testimony of a surviving member of it, has been considered ..a falling within the rule." Moreover, it is not necessary to show specified the time of his maniiige, hud dechired his ehlest son to hiive been horn hei'ore tluit diite, had heaped upon him op])robrioua epi- tliets implying illogitimaey, and had on liis death-bed pointed to his younger son as his heir ; and tliese deehiiaticms would seem to have been ch'arly admishibh', if not as directly proving tho bastardy of a person, who, though do faeto his son, was do jure a stranger to him, at least as showing the jiosition of the legitimate portion of his family, thro\igh whom tho plaintirt' claimed his title. Seo Ooo(h'ight I', ^[oss, 1777 (Lil. Mans- field); Murray v. Milnor, 1870 (h'ry, J.). Seo, also, In re Perton, Pearson V. Att-Oon., 188j (Ohitty, J.). ' Soo In ro Perton, Pearson v, Att.- Gen., 1884; AyloBl'ord Pour., 1883, H.L. » Seo post, § 9J0. » l\. V. «tourton. 1S3G. * Murray v. ililner, 1879, supra (Fry. J.). » Vowlea V. Young, IHOO (Ld. Erskinc); Doer. Harvey, 182J(Littlo- dale, J,). Ijut seo ob.servatidiis ia last section. • Johnson v. Luwson, 1824 (Bur- rough, J.). ' 8heddene.Att.-0t 18(il. » Doo V. Giillin, 1812; Shedden v. Att.-Gen. and Patrick, isdl. Ifthis were not so, the main objci t oi re- laxing tho ordinary rules of evidinco wi'iild be trustrati'd, since it seldiim happens that the declarations of do- eeuscul reintives embrace matters within their own personal knowlcdgo : Dog v. Randall, 182S; Monkfon v. Att.-Guu., ISai (Ld. lirougham); }en. and Patrick, 415 RELATIONSHIP OF DECLARANT MUST BE PKOVED. [p. lU. that the declarations were contemporaneous with the events to wliich they relate.' § 640. Before, however, a declaration can be admitted in evidence, the ir/afioiiHhi/) of the det-lamiit with the family must he estahliHhed by some proof other than the declaration itself.* In tracing ancient pedigrees, the court would probably be satisfied with slight evidence on this head, since the connexion of the declarant with the family might be equally difficult of proof with the very fact in controversy. But some evidence would certainly be required even here. Other- wise, a stranger, by claiming alliance with a family, and then making statements respecting it, might asj^umo to himself the power, after death, of materially altering the relative rights of its Bevere.l branches.' It seems, however, unnecessary to show the exact degree of relationship that subsists between the declarant and the person respecting whom the declarations are tendered, but it will be sufficient to prove that they were in some manner connected by blood or marriage ; * and if the question be whether any, or what, relationship subsists betweea two supposed braiu.'hes of the same family, it is only necessary to establish the connexion of the declarant with either branch.* It has, indeed, been urged, that proof must be given connecting the declarant with both branches ; but if this vere necessary the declarations would be superfluous, as merely lemUug to prove a connexion, which, by proof showing that the declarant was related to both branches, had already been established.® Slimoy I'. AVado, ISIlfi. See Rohann V. Att.-Goii., 1«4;{, II. L., iiml I)iivi(>s V. LownduH, 18-13. See poet, §5 «ij<i, ()0(). ' Monkton f. Att.-Oon., 1831 ; Loviitt l'i!i'iii2rp, 18'-'t) -o7, II. li. As L(l. liroiifihain has woU obsuivcd, such a restriction " wouhl di'feat the pur|K)80 for wliieh hear8ay in podij!;roo la hit in, by provoiitinc it from over Roinj? back beyond tlie lifi'tinio of the p<!rson whoso declaratinn is to bo adduced in evidence;" and, to use a homely illustration, — it would oven render inadmissible the Btatement of a deceased person as to the maiden nam9 of liiii own grauduiothui. ' Moiiklon V. Att.-n>n., 18;)1 ; IJiiiiburv I'.MT.. Is i», II. L. ; Ld. El.lonih H.'iki-i.'vl'.M.r.. IHll, ILL.; lieialil'.'tT..18J.S -li!l. II.I>.;StalVord I'cr.. iMVj. U. L. ; U. »•. All Samts, 182S(lSi\li!v, J.); Duvios c .Morwun, 1k:)1 (Id.); Att -d.-ii. ('. Kiihlcr, lrt()l, II. L. ; riant c. Taylor, 1861; Ihke V. Williams, 18(11 ; In re Mary Einslev, 18()2. » See iJoo V. Randall, 1828 (Best, C. J.). • See VowloB V. Younj?, ISOrt. • Moiikton w. Att.-Ocn., 18:11 (M. Ili-oujjham). See Smith v. Tebbitt, 18(17. • Monkton v. Att.-Qen.. 1831 (Ld. Brougham). 416 CHAP. IV.] DIX'LARATIONS INADMISSIBLE DURING LIFPL 55 (Ml. Thnugh the ground upon wliioh hearsay evifh>nee is n(liiiitti'(l ill cases of petligree is, technically, hecause it is presumed thai no hetter eviilence can be procured, yet such evidence will not be rejected, though living witnesses might have been called to prove thii very facts to which it relates.' For example, the ilcihiratioiis of a deceased mother, as to the time of the birth of her son, may be received, though the father he living and not called.^ Where, however, the declarant himself is alive, and (■ai)ablo of being examined, his declarations will be rejected.' < 'onsecpiently, it lies upon the party, who seeks to avail himself of this species of evidence, to prove the declarant's death. Thus, where, to establish a Scotch marriage, a relative of the supposed husband had '^en asked at the trial what she had hoard on the subject from " members of the family," the answer was rejected, tm the ground that the question had not been limited to statements made by dccruHcd relatives.* Moreover, as pointed out in the last clia])ter, even in matters of pedigree, hearsay dedaiatious made liod liU'in niofatn are not receivable.^ ^ U4:^.^ The term pcd'Kjrer embraces not only general questions (if descent and relationshi[), but ah > the particiidar facts of Inith, DKtrviafjc, and death, and tbe tiinr.s'' when, either absolutely or relatively, those events happened, provided such facts are recjuircd to be proved for some goneah)gieal purpose!.** All these facts, therefore, may, in any genealogical in([uiry, be established by hearsay derived from relatives, though, with respect to specifio iliitcs, snme doubts have been entertaiticd as to tlio extent ond iili[)lication of the rule.'-* The high authorities cited in the footnote'" ' Ph. I'.v. 'Jl'J. ' ]{. r. IHiiniiiijhani (midntofl). ■' I'.'iiilr.'ll i: i'.i,«li.-ll, 17;U. ' Biitlur I'. Mi)untgunvt, 18j9, 11. I,. ■' Aiit<\ ?§ (;'.>8-(i;M ; BiitliT V. .MnimipiiT. t. 1S,);», II. L. " (jr. Va. § lo^, lis to lir.tt four lilirs, ill J).llt. • Belly V. N'Mil, lS.>(l(Ir.). " As to this jiroviso, soe jMist, • Tiii(l:il, (^.J., rojectod tho docla- iMtiollS of llcCCllKOll |)('IS()IIM, tOllllcnHl to piuve tho ugub uf thuii' lulutiveti, on tho proiiinl tli:it, thmi^'h luliniH- Sihlc I'dl' tllr [nil |JOSi' of ^llll\villy: tho roliitioiisliip, ilii'v ciiuld not be itj- ceived its )iroot oi ]iaiticiiLir fiictH, Bach us llin u;,'es of p.irtiiw. Lord Itroii^'liMiii, liowevci', on II motion tor a new tiial, intiiiia'ed a very sfidiifjf o]iiiiion in favour of the a>luiissil)jlity of tlio evidence, and Hulisi'(|uenlly Ntated tiiat I'lii'ke and Littledaiu, JJ., eiitiielv coiiciined in this viow: Kilhley i\ ('oiUl)Ulll, lN;fl. '" ll'ellielt r. 'I'nikal, l()(i;t; re- co(^iii/i!d liy I.oid lllloiilioiDugh, in iloo V. Kiiwlin^H, IhOU ; caM 417 •t( ' BIRTHS, MARUIAQKS, ETC., PROVABLE BY HEARSAY. [PT. HI. and tho general practice of the profession, appear, however, to show that these doubts are groundless. § 643. Hearsay evidence of particular facts being inadmissible in support of public rights,' it may be urged that such evidence ought to be also inadmissible upon questions of pedigree. But, " on cases of general right, which depend upon immemorial usage, living witnesses can only speak of their own knowledge to what passed in their own time ; and to supply the deficiency, the law receives the declarations of persons who are dead. There, however, the witness is only allowed to speak to what he has heard the dead man say re- specting the reputation of the right of way, or of common, or the like. A declaration with regard to a particular fact, which would support or negative the right, is inadmissible. In matters of pedigree, it being impossible to prove by living witnesses the relationshii)s of past generations, the declarations of deceased members of the family are admitted ; but here, as the reputation must proceed on parficiilar farts, such as marriages, births, and the like, from the necessity of the thing, the hearsay of the family as to these par- ticular facts is not excluded. General riglits are naturally talked of in tho neighbourhood ; and tho family transactions among the relations of the parties. Therefore, what is thus droppcil in con- versation upon such subjects may be presumed to bo true." ^ § GI4. Still, hearsay evidence must, when given as to pedigree, bo confined to such facta as are unmediatc/i/ connected with tho question of pedigree ; and declarations as to independent facts, from which the date of a genealogical event may be iuferreil, will probably be rejected. The following examples will explain the extent and operation of this rule. In a question of h^gitimacy, turning upon the time of birth, a declaratiou by the deceased sister of the alleged bastard's mother, stating that she had suckled the child, when coupled with proof of the time when her, the witness', cited in 1 Ph. Ev. 214, from Vin. Ab. Ev. T. b. 91, IT.'U ; Vulliamy V. Huskisson, IS-JS (Ld. Abinger); Eyder i'. Mai bone, IS.U, citod 2 Uus.s. & Nfyl. 1()9, us a decision by Little- dule, J. Ld. MansHold, in Goodright V. MoH8, 177" ; Lord Hrougham, in Moukton ». Att.-Uen., Ib31 ; K. Bruce, V.-C, in Shields v. Boucher, 1847; Pollock, C.B., in Plant v. Taylor, 1861 ; 1 Ph. Ev. 213 ; Ilubb. Ev. of Sue. 649; 3 St. Ev. 841. > Ante, § 617. •Sir J Mansfield in Berkuley Peerage caae, 1811, H. L. 418 .1 1 r CII IV.] HEARSAY AS TO PEDIGKKK, WIIKN ADMISSIHLH. own child was bom, tended to fix the alleged bastard's birth at a period subsequent to its parent's marriage, but its admissibility is doubtful ;' in a case,* turning on the relative seniority of three sons, born at a birth, declarations by the father that ho had christened them Stephanus, Fortunatus, and Achaicus, according to the order of the names in St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corintiiians,' for the purpose of distinguishing their seniority, and also declara- tions by an aunt, who, at the confinement, with a similar object, had tied strings round the arms of the second and third child, were, however, admitted. In the former case, the fact of suckling the child had no direct bearing on its ago or l(>gitimaoy, but was only a species of circumstantial evidence from which these facts might be inferred; whilst in the latter, the christening and the tying strings round the arms of the children were intended from the first to afford tlie means of ascertaining their relative seniority.* § G45. Mr. I'hillipps justly observes that, " there appears to be no foundation for any distinction between cases where a matter of pedigree is the direct subject of the suit, and other cases where it occurs incidentally." ' The declarations of relatives are, neverthe- l**"*. only admissible in cases which directly or indirectly involve some question of relationship, and the fact sought to be estalilishod by hearsay is required to be proved for some (jciiru/uifirdl purpose ; • they will not necessarily be admissible when the date, place, or other facts connected with the birth, marriage or death of a party is the subject of controversy. Consequently, in an action for use and occupation by a reversioner against a tenant j)()ur autre vie, who has held over after the death of the ci'siui que vie, the hitter's death must be proved in the ordinary way, and the hearsay of relatives will be inadmissible ; ' while letters written by the deceased father of the defendant cannot be read in sui)port of a defence of infancy;* er, V, bb. ley I-.- ' Isaac I'.Gompertz, 1837. Ginm-y, li., iidmittoil this ovidonco, but Lord C()tt<'nlmin expi'o.-sod lai opinion that \w was wrong m so doing. " Vin. Ab., Ev. T. b. i*l ; probably rufoirod to a» Spadwoll v. , 1731, by Luwrenco, J., in the Berkeley I'm-., 1811, 11. L. " Ch. 10, V. n. * iSee, further, on this subject, Palmer v. i'almer, Ibtti (li.); the Lovat Pcoraj^o cjiso, IHHo, II. L. » 1 I'h. Kv. 2U\, n. o. • iSliii'lds V. JioiR'.hor, 1847 (K. IlriK'o, V.-C). Sue Smith v. Snath, 187(J(Ir.). ' \Nl»ittuck V. "Waters, 1830 (Tark, J.). * Figg V. Wodderburne, 1842 (I'at- teson, J.]. Sen, ulao, Uuiiiea r. Guthrie, 1884, 0. A. 419 HEARSAY KVini:XCi: OF LOCALITY. [PART III. CHAP. IV, \i where several sons are entitled to an estate in order of seniority, in an action of ejectment for it by a younger son, family tradition is not admissible to prove the death of an elder ; ' and in a settle- ment case,'' the declarations of a deceased father as to the place where his child was born, cannot be received as evidence of the birth settlement of the child.' § 046. The settlement case just referred to* does not, however (as has sometimes been supposed), establish that in a strict question of pedigree, hearsay evidence of locafifi/, — or, in other words, the declarations of deceased persons respecting the p/ficr.>t where their relatives were born, and where they married, resided, came from, V ent to, or died, — cannot be received.' And hearsay evidence of locality has, indeed, on several occasions been admitted to elucidate matters of strict pedigree. ?5 (547. For example, where the question was, whether A. B., an ancestor of the declarant C, was thi same person as A. B., a blacksmith, who had resided at X., a declaration by C. that his ancestor was a blacksmith, and that he resided at X., was received in evidence." If it be necessary to show that a family had relations who lived at a particular place, declarations by a deceased member of the family, that " he was going to visit his relatives at that place," will be evidence ; not, indeed, that he went there, or that any person of his name lived in that neighbourhood ; but as proving a tradition in the family, that they once had relations living in the place in question, which tradition, in the event of its being shown by other evidence that persons of the same name had resided there, might be important as a mode of identifying those > ralincr v. Palmer, 1885 (Tr.). » K. v. Eiith, l.S(17. In tliis case tho cliiM WHS a bustard, and the do- cliU'iitions i)f his ]>utiitiv." fathfv would thoreforti huvo Ix^-n inailnna<il)le even on a qui'stuni of jifdi'jrruo ; but this point was not raised. Sec ante, •' Strinnious nnsuccpssful efforts wore I'oniu'rly made to render tho dcclaiations of dcci'ascd jiorsons ad- niissibb- in jiroof of particulars ro- Bpc'Ctiiiu' tln'ir snttli'ineiits. Sco R. V. Kriswcll. 1790; 11. v. Chadderton, 1801 ; U. i: l'\'rrv Frystone, ISOl ; E. r. AbLTiiwilly,1801. ♦ R. V. Erith, 1807. » See Shields v. Boucher, 1847, where Knif.'ht Bruce, V.-C, intimated a stronjj ojjinion that such evidence was adiriis<i])lo, and ohsi^iTod that in R. V. Kiith, l.S()7, Lord F-llcid)orouph carefully lested tlie juilftTneut on tho fact that no question wliatsocver of relationship was involved in tho in- quiry. !^o that, in the opinion of the V.-("., if tho evidence tendered in that case liad bi-en re([uirod for any penealojrieal i)ur])osi>, a ditVerent con- clusion niiKht very possibly have been arrived at. « Hood V. Lady Beauchamp, 1836 (ShadweU, V Ijuay 420 CHAP. IV.] ro!:.Ms of iu-aiisay — oiiaf. di:clauation8. porsons with tlio branch of tlio fiitnily tilliulol to ; ' and evidence bus also b('{3U rooidved of a family tradition, that a particular individual diod in India, ^'or the purpDse of tounecting th.. individual with the family of tho claimant.- {5 648. The fonnH under which hearsay evidence in matters oi pedigree may be presented are very numerous. Letters written under dictation from, and in the name of, a deceased person, are regarded as declarations by such deceased person,' and all oral declarations by a deceased rclaticc are clearly admissible if made ante litem motam.* But declarations by deceased relatives, how- ever made, are rarely deserving of much weight ; * for not only are they usually sought to be established by pers(ms interested in the litigation, but they are often 3cc''ded or remembered for tho first time after the contest has aiise The court, therofore, necessarily runs considerable risk o/ being deceived by deliberate falsehood, and the more so as it is obviously diflicult, not to say impossible, to convict a witness of pi jury in narrating what he alleges that he heard in a conv "aation with a deceased person.' Even assuming that the sincorit} oi the witness cannot reasonably be doubted, men are often, without deliberately intending to falsify facts, extremely prone to believe what they wish, to confound what they believe with what they have heard, and to ascribe to memory what is merely imagination.' *5 649.* Fiiiiiili/ conduct, too — such as the tacit recognition of relationship, and the distribution and devolution of property, — is frequently received as evidence from which the opinion and belief of the family mav be inferred, and as resting ultimately on the same basis as evidence of family tradition. For example, " if ' Eishton V. Nosbitt, 1844 (Rolfo, '' Id., citiiif!: ^ronkton v. Att.-Gon., lH:n. Kni},'lit Bruco, V.-C, in a very elaboruto jutlginont in Sbii-lils I'. Houcbcr, 1847, intiniiitoil a xtiong opinion, that, inacoiitrovei'sy mornly p'lioidogieal, decliirations nmdo by a ilcwsasod person as to wlioro ho or his fiiinily cuino from, "of what place" his father was doai{»natod, and what occupation his father followed, would lio adtnissibl(>, and niiyrht be most uiutcriiil evidence for tlio purpose of idontifyiiif? and indivi(hi!ilisinj; the peison ami t'aniily nniler discussion. ^ In r ' Tur.icr, Gloiiistor v. llard- inf?, 188.). * Sec ante, § (i44 ; Lovut Peerage ease, IhS.J, 11. L.; In ro Porter, PeaisDii V. Att.-Gon., INSJ. ' ^'^'e e. (/., tho Lovat Peerage case, 188.J, II. L. • Crouch V. Hooper, 1852(Komilly, M.R.); "Webb v. Haycock, 18.J4 (id.). ' Crouch ('. Hooper, 18J2(Uomilly, M.B.). » Gr. Ev. § 106, in part. 421 '•^*fti': KVniKNCE OF FAMILY CONDUCT ADMI8.SIULK. [PAUr III. tlie father is proved to liavo brouglit up tlio party as liis Ipgitinmtn son, this amounts to a daily assertion that the son is l.-gitimufo." ' On the other hand, the concealment of the birth of a child from the luishand,''— the subsequent treatment of such child by the person who, at the time of its conception, was living in a state of adultery with tlie mother,— and the fact that the child and its descendants assumed the name of the adulterer, and had never been recognised in the family as the legitimate offspring of the husband, — are all circumstances that will go far to rebut tlio presumption of legitimacy, which the law raises in favour of the issue of a married woman.* Again, on a question whothor a person, from whom the claimant shows descent, was the son of a particular testator, the fact that all the members of the family appear to liave been mentioned in the will, but that no notice is taken of such person, is strong evidence to show, either that such person was not the son of the testator, or at least that he had died without issue before the date of tlie will.'* The production, too, of a man's will, in which no notice is taken of his family, and by which his property is bequeathed to strangers or collateral rela- tions, is cog(mt evidence of his having died childless." § 650." E'lirieH vuidc hy a parent or relation in bibles,^ prayer- books,* missals,' almanacs,'" or indeed in any other book, or in any document or paper," stating the fact and date of the birth, marriage,'* or death of a child, or other relation, are also evidence, in pedigree cases., as being written declarations of the deceased persons who respectively made them. Entries in a family bible or testament will be admissible, even without proof that they have ' Berkolov Poorngo case, 1811 (Sir J. Maiistiuld), II. L. * Iluif'iavo V. llarpravc, 1848. » Gooiliitrlit f. .<uul, noi (Ash- hurst, J.) ; Morris r. lJnvi((s, 1n;J()-7, H. L. ; Hanbiiiy Poor., 1811, II. L.; 11. V. MaiihfioM, 1841; Towii«hoiid Peer., 1843, II. L.; Atchley v. Spiigg, 18U4. « Tracy Poor., 184;i(Ld. Campbell), II. L. ; ■llobsoii V. Att.-Gon., 1843 (L(l. Cottcnhaiii), II. L. See ante, \ G20. nd fin. ^ Ilungato '■. <lasfnigno, 1840; De Boos Peer., 1804-5, U. I.. • Or. Ev. § 1(14, in jmit. ' Bork.'l.'v PoLT., 1811, II. L. • Leigh I'ciT., 1828, II. L. • Slano IVnr., 18j.), II. L. '» lloihort V. Tuckal, 16ti3. •' Ik'ikoloy Poor., 1811. II. L. See Jackf-on I', ("ooley, 1811 ^Ain.); DouglaH r. Saundcrson, 1"!H (.\ni.); Carskaddon v. I'ooiman, 1840 (Am.). '» lu the Sussex Poor., 1844, II. L., on entry made by the mother of the claimant in her prayer book, declar- ing the fact of her marriage, waa admitted in evidence. 422 CHAP. IV.] ENTRIES IN BIBLES, ETC. ADMISSIBLE. lioen made by a relative ; for as this book is the ordinary register of families, and is usually accessible to all its menibors, the presumption is that the whole family have more or loss adopted the entries contained in it, and have thereby given them authen- ticity.' This presumption, however, will not prevail in favour of an entry in any other book of however religious a character, but proof must bo given, either that the entry was made by some member of the family,* or that it has been acknowledged or treated by a relative as a correct family memorial,' or, at least, if ancient, that it was made at the time when ' it purports to have been written. In order to establish this last fact, the evidence of sliilled witnesses, conversant with manuscripts of different ages, is admissible, though, as before observed, such evidence is entitled to very little weight.* § 651.* The correspondence of deceased members of the family,* too, on proof of the handwriting,' recitals in fumily deeds (such as marriage settlements,^ and other instruments'), descriptions in vitls,^^ and the like, will bo received as evidence in pedigree cases. Moreover, recitals of descent, and descriptions of parties, in such deeds other than family instruments, will be received, provided such deeds come from the proper custody, and are proved, or may from age be presumed, to have been executed by some member of the family to which the statements refer." Wherever the state- ment is contained in a deed, the execution of the deed by a relation is, however, an indispensable requisite.'* But where the ' 'J « Beikoloy Tocr., 1811 (Lds. El- lenborou};h iind Hodosdulc), II. L. ; Monktoii i: Att.-Gon., 1K31 (Ld. Bniuslittni); lliibburd »'. Lees, IHfili. "Tiiicy I'oer.. 184.1, II. L. ; Cniw- fonl uiid Lindsay Poor., 181S, II. L. * Ilood ('. ik'iKu-liainp, ISHO. * Triicy Peer., 1S4;1, II. L. ; unte, J 50. » Gr. Ev. § 104, in part. • Iluntiii^'don Peer., 1818, II. L. ; Kidni'y r. Coiklmrn, 1831; Leigh Poor., 1828, II. L. ; Hastings Peer., 184(), II. L. Soo Ihitlor v. Mount- ganet, ISJSI, II. L. ' Miirchniont Poor., 1840, H. L. See Aiith Poer., 18;{!», II. L. • Neal r. Wilding, 1740; Do Roos Peer., 1804-o, 11. L.; C'handosPcor., 1791, XL L. ; Zouch Poor., 1807, II. L. ; JJcvon Poer.. 18;J2. II. L. ; L'IsIe IVcr., 182.3, II. L. ; liunbury Peer., 18("J, II. L. ; V'.iix IVor., 1824, 11. L. ; llnntuy Peer., 18;t8, II. L. ; Itostcommon Peer., 1824, II. L. • Smith V. Teb'.'ict, lfi<)7 ; Stafford Poi-ra^je cu.so, 182.'), H. Ij. '" Vulliamv i\ llnskisson, 1838 (Ld. Abin'roi); lio Kons Peer., 1804, II. L. ; L'Wo Peer., 1S2J, II. L. " Maiinyon Peer., 18IH, IL L. ; Hastings Poor., 1810, II. L. ; Borth- wick Peer.. 1812, II. L. ; Iliingato v. (jascoigiio, 184t); I to IJoos Peer., 1801. II. li. Sfo Stokos V. Dawes, 1820 (Am.). " Sliincv t'. Wude, 1836; Foot ». Clarko, 1626. 423 INSCUIITIONS ON TOMHSTONIW, ETC. ADMISSIULK. [p. III. doclimtion is (iontained in the draft of a will prepared hy direction of the deceased, and on information derived solely from him, such draft is adniissihle.' A. id, a forfiori, a will which was duly executed, but which has been revoked as a will, is also admissible.' In regard to recitals of pedigree in old answers in Chancery (which were sworn), those relating to facts which were not in controversy are admitted, but those referring to facts which were then in controversy are excluded as made po.st litem multim? Recitals in old bills in equity are always inadmissible, being regarded as the mere flourishes of tlie draughtsman.* The admissibility of pro- ceedings in a Sheriff Court in Scotland is governed by the same principles.* § (i J2." IiiHci'iplioHH on toinhstones,'' coflin-plates," mural monu- ments," family portraits,'" engravings on rings," hatchments,'" charts of pedigree,'* and the like, are also admissible evidence in pedigree cases. Those proved to have baen made by, or under the direction of, a deceased relative, are admitted as his declaraticms ; 8uch as are only proved to have been publicly exhibited, may be supposed to have been well known to the family, and they are also admitted on the ground of taoit and common assent.'* It is i; > Lanihoit, In ro, 18S6. » Soo D.>o V. Poinbroke, 1809. ' Soo 1 I'll. Kv. '219, 2'M, and the authorities tliore citwl. Soo, also, De Roos I'oer., 1804, II. L. ♦ Boiloau V. llutliii, 1843 (Parko, B., citing the !?iinl>ury Poor., 180!), II. L.). Those cases appear to over- rule Taylor ('. ("olo, 17!)'. » TiV.'ll /'. Koiiiiody, 188!), II. L. « Ci'i . l>v. § 10.), ill l)art. ' Moiikton V. Att.-Oon., 1831 ; Gooiliij^ht V. Moms, 17"7. » Chandos P.:i'r.. 1791. II. L. ; Hokobv Peer., W.W, II. L. ; Lovut Peer.. '1827, II. L. » SLuiov V. Wade, 183G; Do Roos Poor., 1804-.J, II. L. •" Camovs Poor., 1839, II. L. » Vowlos I'. Young, ISiKj. " Iliuigato I.'. Uascitigno, 1S46. " Mcaikton v. Att.-Uen., 1831; G(K)driL;ht V. Moss, 1777. " Monkton «. Att.-Gen., 1831 ; Davies i>. Lowndes, 184:5. Parko. B., obstii'vua, "The ground upon which the inscrijition on a tombstone or a tablet in a church is admitted , is that it is prosiuniid to have boon put there by a membor of the family cognizant of tho facts, and whose doclaratiun would bo ovidoiico ; whore a podigroe liuiig up in the family man.sioii is received, it is on tho ground of its rocogiiitioa by the mombera of the family." Doubts have boon ex- prosHod it Nisi IVius lespocting tho admissibility of an inscription on a toml'-coni! in a burial-ground for dis- sn.ters ( vVhittuck i'. Waters, 1830 (P^rk. J.)); but such doubts appoar wholly grouiidloss. since tliis »i)ccio8 of ovitli.'uco has boon admitted by tho House of Lords in peerage claims (Say and S.-le Peer., 17.S1. H. L. ; llubback's Ev. of Succ, 1811, citing Scrj. lldl's Colli'ct. in Line. Inn liibrary, vol. 2()), and it may be pointed out that in tho case cited an inscription on a tombstone in the dissontiTij' burial-ground in Bunhill Fields was admittttd by the House of 424 ■n C. IV.] MUUAL INSCKirriONS — FAMILY DOCUMENTS. prosumod, — tlioupli tliis is n presunifition wliidi Ih tlouMloss often oontmry to tho fiiet,' — that the rfilativca of a family would not permit an orroneous insoription to riMiiaiu; and that a pcn-Hon would not knowingly wear a ring whioli boro a ini«-statement upon it.' § 6i>i.'' Mural and other funereal in-scriptions are i)rovttblo, utt already shown,* by copirx, or other sot-ondary evitlence. Their value as evidence depends much on the authority under which they were set up, and on the distance of time between their erection and tlie events which they purport to commemorate.* If parol testimony of their contents be offered, on the ground that the original monu- ments are destroyed or effaced, the court will not be satisfied, unless tlie prior existence of the muntmients, and the genuineness of the inscriptions, bo established in the very 8tr()ngo>t manner that the circumstances will admit." The ease with which (evidence of this nature can bo manufactured, and the dilficuUy of fixing the witnesses with perjury, render it needful to enforce this rule with strictness. § 654. The family reengnition of the truth of a document may not only arise from its publicity, but also from other circumstances. If a document, though privately kept, be clenrly proved t4^> have been preserved in a family as an authentic memorial of pcdigroo, it will be receivable in evidence without proof of its origin.' The mere production, however, of a document from among the family archives,* and, d fortiori, its production from a museum, or other public place of deposit,' will not render it admis.'-ible, without proof that it was made or recognised by some member of the family. Lords, and that inscriptions nn/om'i/n nioiunneuts hiivo also hrcn rticcivcd in ovidoiioo: ILstiiif^s I'ooi-., 1«U), 11. L. ; IVrth ' mi:, 1HI8. II. L. ' SoniM \vv .rkiiblo niis-st itoinniits onuioiiuinv-^tsuro nieiitioiu'tl in 1 I'll. Ev. 2:^2, n. 4. The uutlior of ibis work found on ii inonuni'-iit in a London coniotory tliis utiiitlinjj iiu- nouiioomont: — "Tlio victim of u iiiotlud-'s teinpor." - Vowlua V. Young, IHOO (Ld. Ei'skiiui). * dr. Hv. § 105, in part as to first five linos. * Ante, § 438 ; and boo Tracy Peer., is:i;t-i;j, If. L. : l^oscoinmou and \.<-i'j;\i I'.cr., ISJJ, 11.1,.; Sliiioy r. W.ido, lS:iU; I'ortli I't'W., 1«48, 11. L. ' AthiMiiv l'rif.,l.s:((!, ILL.; Vuux I'.MT.. is.i i, II. L. ; Eitzwiilttsr Poor., IsJJ. II. L. « Tracy I' •., ls;l!», II. L. Soo Slii('\v.sl)iiry I'ci'r., l.s.)7, U. L. ' Vuux i'u'i-., Is.iiJ, 11. L. ; ("iinjoya I'.MT., l.s;(!». H. L. ' iM'/.Miilt.T I'.'cr., IHrj, II. L. ; Lov.it IViT., IS.'T, II. L. ; I), of Duvoii-liin^ i: Niill, 1877 (I'ulloa, C. 15.). IL !'■ ill-)- » Chaudos i'otr., 17yi, 1' L. 425 PKniOREFIS — ARMORIAL DEARINOS. [PART III. S 655—0. Tho (niostion how far a pedigree, purporting to liave been cotujn'M, oithor wholly or in part, from retiistcru mid otlmr documents which are unt shown fo linir hrpit fosf, is admissible, hii8 been nmeh tliscus8(>d. A W<'lsli p(>digreo, proved to ho in tho handwriting of one of tho ancestors of the defendant, produced from tho proper (nistody, ami tracing tho genealogy of the family from an almost fahuhms antiquity, and bringing the descent down to the immediate contemporary relatives of the writer, and con- taining at its foot a memorandum in these words : " Collected from parish registers, wills, raonuincnhil inscriptions, family records, and history. This account is now jiresented as correct, and as con- firming the traditictn handed down from one generation to another, to Thomas Ijloyd, Esq., of Cwm (iloyne, this 4th day of July, a.u. 17U3, by his loving kinsman, Wm. I<loyd," was offered in evi- dence ; anr". the Common Picas rejected the whole. But the Exchequer Chamber, after much doubt and full consideration, decided that part, if not all, of tho pedigree in question was receivahh) in evidence,' saying, " tho pedigree in question was admissible, because it was certainly acknowledged by Wni. Lliyd to bo correct." § ()57. Armorial henriixjK, whether carved on wood, painted on glass, engraved on monuments or seals, or otherwise enihlazoncd, are also ailmissible in cases of jiedigrco; not only as tending to prove that ihe person who assumed them was of the family to which th"y of right belonged, but as illustrating tho particular branch from which the descent was claimed, or as showing, by tho inipal- iugs or quarterings, the nature of tho blazonry, or the shape of the shield, what families were allied by marriage, or what members cf the family were descended from an illegitimate stock, or were maidens, widows, or heiresses.'' The value of this evidence depends nlnio>t wholly up<»n its anticpiity. Since the Revolution,' tlie hciiilils have exorcised uo authority in correcting usurpation, and, r V* 1 ' I»avii«s I'. LowikIch, ISJ.'J (Ld. » Hull. MS. 18:i(l, 0141; lI.TV.-y V. Ihivi'y, 177J ; Chundos I'licr., I7U1, II.' li. ; limitinpliiii I'for , isi.s, II. ]-. : lliiMiiips iVrr.. INU». U. L.; 81ucwi*iiury r«Mjr., UiJ7, II. L. ; Fifzwultor Poor.. 18|'.>,1M,. CiiiiHiVH IVrr., I(!()7, 11. lt.\ Huh. Kv. <iiSiu'. (»U. * Tito liiMt Ilnnild'n visitiitioii wim in IliHd, tlio lii.st ImvitiK l>>'*<ii in \bl», S.U Hull. Kv. of .Sue. >iVL CIIAI' .v.] AIJMOKIAI, HKARINnS ADMISSIRLE. tlnroforo, tlic nso of iirinorial bcariiigs HuLsccpicully to tliat date is ciitilliMl to but littlo, if any, w«^i}jlit as pvidt^ncn of goiicalorry.' When jiroof of this tiatiiro is ofr«)re(l, Homo officer of tlio llcrafds' (^(ilicpc Hliottld be in attendance, to explain the horaldio meaning of tlio evidence produced.' ' I Ph. Ev. 224 ; Hub. Ev. of Sue. aro occaflioiuilty admiBsihlo as ovi- (iO(J. denco, — not, howovor, aa tlio hnnrsay • ^ f'hanclos Poer., 1791, H. evidonco of rolutivos, but us ])uf)lio Ij. Iloni(lo8 the (lifToront Bpocios documontH, and tho law ruHpnctinp^ of OTidonoo onumon»t<?d abovo, thn thoin will bo diHr'.ieswl hcn-aftor : HoriildH' 1)ookH, ijKjuiHitions post Part V. Chan. IV. Soo De Boos inortom, puriiih l>uokH, rugitttora, &c., Poor., 1804, 11. L. 427 427^ AMEinCAV NOTES. [PAKT III. AMERICAN NOTES. \h ! Hearsay concerning Pedigree. — Wliere the facts of geiu'alo<,'v or of piMligrt'i' in ;i given t;iiuily luc the siilijci't of jiitlitMal iniiniiy, tlio ilcclaratioiis of (U'ccast'il uicmlu'rH of the faiiiil V affi'cteil are iulniittt'd as ('vidcnnf of such facts, or of parlieular iacts rch'vaiit thereto, if luacUi nufi; /ifi'in mtitniii. (Jraiifiird v. IMackhiirn. 17 Md. Do (is:.-,); Jones I'. .Jones, .'W Md. 147 (1.S7-'); llarhind v. Eastman. 1(17 ill. en •M) (iSdO); S. C. on api)eal, :\ Wall. 17."> (l,S;;,->); De llav llav.'n, 77 Ind. L'.'Sl". (ISSI); Ciiddv c. Hn.wn, 7S 111. n."> (is iiWT} (l.SS;',i; Nortiintp r. Hale. 7C. .Me. .'{()(> (ISSJ); Kowlcr /-. Siiiip- )n, 7U 'r<'x. (ill (IS'.)lj; l)a\vs(.iv v. .Mayall, la .Minn. lOS (ISDl); 8< Eisenlord /-. Cliini, 12(5 N. V. ooL' (iJSUl); Elliott i\ IVirsol, 1 I'et. MI'S. ;!;i7 (ISl'S); Eaton r. Tallniadge. L'l Wis. 1'17 (l.SGDj; Cliaui- berl liii v. Chaniherl.iin, 71 N. V. H.'.') {1S77). "It has, therefore, hefiouio a universally recognized exception to the general rule excluding hearsay, based on various so\ind consid- erations, that iis to certain fai-ts of family history, usually den<imi- nated pivligree, eoiriprising inti-r n/iu, liirth, death and marriage, togi-tiier witii their respective (hites, and. in a <iualilied .sense, legitimacy an<l illegitimacy, declarations are admissilde; (1) When it a]ipe;irs by evidencu' i/i-hirs tin- de<'Iaralions that the de(darant was lawfully related by i)lo()d or marriage to the |ierson or family whose history th(> fa(rts concern ; (L') I'liat the dcidarant was dead whi'U the ih'idarations were tendered; and (.'>) That they were made fiiitf lih III iiiutiiiii." Northrop /•. Male, 7(> M(\ .'{(X; (bSS-l). pAiiTiiii.Aii I'\\(rs. — Not merely the fact of relationship itself may b:' estai«lishe(| by such deidaratn)ns. but particular facta iiear- ing on the isaiie may be proved in that way. The fact of the existence of a marriage being involved in an issue of pedigree concerning the l.'gitiniaey (d' a claimant, declara- tions of the alleged husl)and both in iavor (d' and against tiie mar- riage are itdmissil)le after his (htatli. (Crawford c. lilackbnrn, 17 Md. •J'.) (iSCill). The point reli(>d upon, that unless the maniage were tirsl. found )o be legitimati', tlie decdarant could not be shown to i)e a meudier of the family of tlie (daimint, was not sustained. J/ili/. iU.ickburn c Criwfonls. .'t Wall. 17.". tlSC,,",). So a marriage miy be proved l>y the detdar;iti(Uis of a deceased wife. Walker i>. .Murray, o Out. (l.'JS (iSSh; ('haiid)i'rlain r. Chamlierlain, 71 N. V. IL'.'! (IS77). Colialiilation need not first lie shown to admit declarations establishing a marriage. Copes v. I'earce. 7 Cill. 217, 2(;;i (iSlS). "The term pedigree iindades not only 'leseent and ndationship, but also the facts (d' i)irth, mirriige, ah.) death, and Hie times when these events happene.l. Ihcse faets miiy be established by ClIAl'. IV.] AMKKICAN NOTES, 427» AuiL'ricMii, &(.'. Trust Co. v. llosciiaLdi', 77 Vii. St. 51)7, olG general repute in the family, i)rove(l by a surviving nioiultcr of it, in all ca.se.s wliero they occur incidentally and in relation to jiedi- grce. (lS7o). \ failure of heirs may he proved h" tlie declaration.s of deceased nuMuhcrs of the family. I'eo[)le r, Tiilton Kirc Ins. Co., L';") Wend. Ijd.l ^^1840). '■ riie ijuestion is, were the statements as to independ- ent facts, such as being a meml)er of tiic army, presence in Texas, or the time and phu'c of dcatli, admissihle under t!ie rule? It is often stated tliat declarations of di'ceased mend)crs of a family are not admissihle to prove tin; time nor jilace of hirth, residence, or death. Hut tiiis rule has l)een applied in the main to eases in which the poor-laws were being administered, and a riu'ht was being asserted based upon the residence or birth at a given place. Where the time or place of residence or death is introduced for the purpose of icU'Utifying the person in (|uestion as a member of a ])ar- liiMilar iiunily. it is admissible as being so (dosely related to, if not in fact part of, pedigree, that the same rules of law are aiiplicable. Mr. lMiillii)s, in his work on Kvidence, volume I., p. L'b". (lifth American edition) states the rule so terstdy that we cojjy it as the best statement of the jjroposition that we have been able to lind. He says: ' Locality may, however, be so involved in pedii,iee as to fall within the general rule and render hear.say evidence admis- sible on the subject; as where the object is to identify certain jier- sons nonnected with a i>articular place as belonging to a family.' This rule is W(d! suiiimrted by many autliorities, both Euglisli and American, ami as we believe by souml principles of law. We cite the following autlunities as ap])licable ami in support of this rule: IIul)b;i(d< Successions, .'51.''-'; Shndds r. I'ouclnT, 1 De (Jex & S.. j), 40; Winder r. Little. 1 Veates (I'a.). l"*!'; I'.isliop ;■. Nesiiitt. L' M. iS: 11. n.")!; Wi.se e. Wynn, .T.) Miss. ;5S1; MuUery v. Hamilton. 71 (Ja. 7L'(>; Cndiiv r. I'.n-wn, 7S III. 41.".; Morrell ik Foster. .'!.'{ Conn. .".71 ); I ns. C (osenat I'a. St. r.(»7; McNeil w. O'Conmir, 71) Texas, '2'27." Hyers i-. Wallace, S7 'I'ex. ".().•{, nil (ISih-)), The deidaratious of a tleceascd mother as to her .son's marriage are competent to show tiiat one claiming to bo his son is illegiti- nmte. r.arnum v. I'.ariuim, 4'_' :\Id. '-'.'(l. .'MU (lS7r.). On a rpu's- tion of legitimacy, tiie declarations of a deceased fatlier to the elfect that his son was illegitimate, and tliat ho had never married the boy's mother are competent. I/iiil. Hut'se<' State t'. Watters, .'! lied. CN. C^ L. 4.m (1S4.'5). A mother may testify as to her son's legitimacy. Caujollo v. Ferrio, lid Harb. 177 (18r.7). A brother may testify as to the ago of a sister from declarations of her deceaseti mother. "That this species of evidence must bo 427^ AMEKICAN NOTfcH. [part hi. ! ^ ■ «f ■SI iuliuitted has always been held, f" oti.">)-wise .i person could not prove his own age; for wh. i\- no family r- -ord i.-i made, he can only show it from the declarations of his parents." Watson v. Brewster, I Pa. St. 381 (184")). So the date of a person's birth may be testified to by himself or by members of liis family, although they kne'v the faet only by hearsay based upon [popular tradition, lloulton v. Manteuffei, al Minn. 185 (1 81)2). Marriage may be proved oy rei)iitation in ,he family. Morgan V. I'urnell, 4 Hawkes (N. C.) Do (l81,'o); IJaruum v. Uarnuni, IL' Md. 2r>l, MU (187".). "In all eases, except in actions of rrlm. cou., and [)rosecutions for l)igamy, the faet of marriage may be established by evidence of the acts and declarations of the parties, by proof of tiie general repute in tlie family, and by proof of tlie declarations of deceased persons, who were njlated to tlu'm l)y h; lod or maniage." Hen- derson c. (Jargill. 'M Miss. 'Mu , 40'.) (I8r)(»); Jackson r. Jackson, SO Md. 17(> (IS'.M). Harnum v. ISarnuni, 4'J .Md. L'ol (l87o), adds seduction to this list of exceptions. Wiiether the place of residence of a n>ember of the family may be proved in this way is sonicwlnit ir di: pute. It has been iicid that it may be. The supreme eonrt of A! i ,.sissippi say: — "Tliis rilling of tin* learned j -dge was baseil upon tiie dicta of many autliorities to tin* ert'ect, that while in (piestions of pedigree the iiearsay declarations of a deceased meml)er of a family are re(!eivable in evidence, as to all matters of birth, th'ath, age, mar- riage, ami tlie like, deidarations as to plaei; are not. The later and better considered cases, liowi-ver, nMMidiate tliis distinction i»e- tween deelarations as to place auil those touching otlier family nmtters. wIumm? the in(piiry is stri(rtiy one of pedigree, .and tlie declarations iv.\ U) place are not relied on as giving any right by reascni i.i : i' i.iace, but proof as to place is m: ile nn'rejy by way <(f identihiMti'n. of tlie person or laiiiily. Thus, in a fpiestinn of setlleiiicnt under the poor laws, where the right of settlement is depeiiileiit Upon tlie place of present or former residemic, hearsay declar.itions as to \Am\v. are inadmisHJIde; Imt where the (piestion is piiitdy one of pedigree, and the effort is to identify the particu- lar jierson or family about whom the ileclarant was speaking, declarations as to place stainl upon the ;.anic footing as any otlnu'S relative to matters of family history." Wise «. Wynn, fij) .Miss. MS (1.S.S2). Hut declarations or reputation in the family as to the residence or birth of a person in a particular place are not c(Miipetent l»y the weight of authority, unlesi they can be considered as part of the res gesta'. Londonderry c. .\iidover, L'H Vt. 4I<> (isr»(>); Union «'. IMaiiifield, .'V.) Colli'. .".(;;{ (18!).'f). Tlie same is true of a record CHAP. IV.] AVEiacAN N TKS. 4- »-i entry in a Tamily Hihlc Union v. I'laiiifioid, 31) Conn. .")(■>.'{ ( I ST.'!;; Currie v. Stair.s, ' New. Hniiis. 4 (1HS.">). The time of a birth may Itc sliown by the (leolarations of a i»' ceased member of the family thi)iit,'li tiiere is a "family registxi t* birth.s " which i.s not prodiuied. "Tiie gr.ido i.s the same." (."ii :'. ents V. Hunt. 1 .lone.s (N. C.) L. 400 (1S.")4). So the death of a person may be .shown by "information received from the family." l)u I'ont e. Davis, ;{0 WiK. 170 (INTL'); Ander- .son V. I'arker, G Cal. 1D7 (IHoli); Mason r. Fuller, 4'> Vt. L".) (1872). Or by the declarations of a deceased member of the family. Morrill c. Foster, ;{.'{ N. U. .'17!) (lSr>«;). "The phrase, ' i)edi},'r.'e,' embraces not only descent anil relationship, but also the facts of birth, marriuj^e and death, and the times when these events hap- icne( Kelly I'. .Mcduire, lo Ark. ")."», <'»()4 (IKA.")). On an action of ejectment, where tiu- lessors of the ]ilaiiitifF claimed as heirs at law of A., .\.'s declarations to the elT' -t the plairtilTs were the children of a married sister, deceased, and IiIh nearest livini; relations are competent to prove the rtdafinnsiiip, iiiarriaj^e and birth of children in we. Hock. Mollit v. Withcrspoon, 10 Ired. (N. (;.). 1.. IHf) (1S4")). A declarant may state that ,\. is her natur.il son, born bcfon' her marriaj^e. Northrop »>. Hale, 70 Me. 'MW, (ISSI). iNgriUY MrsT KKi,.\'ri'. ro I'kdkiiikk, — Where the issue is of the settlement of a |pau|ier, his Idrtliplace or residence in a particu- lar town (Munot be proved by repntalion in tlie family "i lic! l.ir.i- ti(.ns in any form by deceased members of it. I nion r. I'lai'ifie!.;, :!',> Conn, iti'tli (1S7;<); I,o'i(!ondcrry v. .\ndover. L'S \t. 110 (i.Sod); Independci re r. INnnpton, <l N. .1. Law L'O'.t (ISl • i\ '\l\i lllliL r. {{nrlin-lon, I I'ick. 17 J (ISUO). It is settled that heiirsay is not admissilih- to pi lie pivee nf a person's birth." Adams r. Swansea, IiO Ma;- ■''! (isr.l); Ciirrie r. Stairs, L'a New nruiis. 4 (l.SS.')i; I'looks /'. ( i ly. .'{ A. K. .Marsh. (Ky.) r.l.^» (IHIM): Tyler r. Flanders. 57 N. H fUM (IS7<W. Ibit in an aeti<,n of ejcifiueiit, the death of a joif ■)i; '1. i-aii lie sliown by such declarations. I Hi I'ont c. p i .' \\ i,,. 170 (I.S71»). On the settlement of a pauper, the iptestioii of lb" li'L;itiiii,icy of his father, tlirou),'h whom the settlenn-nt wa,-. clainn'il, brin^' l•s^en- tial, a witness testilied that she had seen his father ali\e ihuin>? the lifetime of S. IJ., who died the year before the fathir's parents were m; rried. To prove tlie late of the deatli of S. I'>., "The de- fendants then offered, as ovidenci' that Susanna died on th.' ll.'th of Deoomber IHO.'t, a lar^e ornamented sheet of paridinient , Iwaru-tf the inscription 'family record,' on which were entered tl.» date;< of the birth luid marriage id" Susanna Mlair's parents, the dale.i of 12< AMEKICAX NOTKS. [part hi. [ail t!|' 1 t'% i ' ^ I r^f^ till' birth 1111(1 (loath of Susanna, and of the births, niarriag(>s and death ol' two sons born subs(>(iupntly of tiic! sanu' part'nts. One of these sons, lorty-seven years old, testified that, ever since his ear- liest reeolleetion, his fatlier had kept this parehiuent franied and ban^'ing in a eonspieuous jilaee in his dweliinK-liouse, and iiad handed it (h)\vii to iiiin; that diiriag all this time tlie same entries liad been on it; and tiiat ids fatlier and mother were dead. Ami tliere was evideiiee tiiat tlie entries of the births and deaths upon the p;ireiiment were made, all at one time, by direetion of Sii- .saiina's father, more tiian forty years Ind'ore the trial; tliat tlie rec- ord of the marriages of his (diihlren had been added, from time to time, as tliey occurred; and that he and his sou kept and exliil)ited the parclimcnt as a true statement of tlie events rec(n(lcd on it. The defendants also ottered to prove that an aneient gravc^stone in the burial-ground of the I'.lair family bore the nauie Susanna, and hiid ins(!ribe(l on it December iL'th, 1S0.'{ as tln^ date of her <leath." Moth (Uudarations were held admissible. No. lirookheld ♦'. Warren, l(! (Jray. 171 (1S(;(>), A teiideucy to extend the exception to cases where facts of fam- ily liistory are relevant to in(iuiri('s other than tiiose (d' genealogy is plainly ai»[iarent. 'I'lius in an airtion iig linst a life insurance company on a pf)licy on tlie life of A., A.'s deidaratioiis as to her own age have iieen held coiiipetent as a (]uestioii of (ledigree. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. lUodgett, Tex. 'J7 S. W. L'SC. (IS'.M). Who may hk 1)i;i i.ai! ants. — .Any member of the family or the husband (.i .ife ot such member is (pialilied as a deidarant. Tile mother of a bastird is a niember of the family of her son, by statute, Hulhcieiitly to make declarations as to his ]»ai'eiitage, admissible after his decease. Northrop r. Hale, "(J Me. .'{(MJ (ISSI). 'l"lu> de(daration of a deceased husband that the fatlier and mother of ids wife were never married is (iompeteiit ou an issue of genealogy. "lie does not appear to have named the person from whom he derived his iid'ormation, nor to Inve stated that his knowh(lg(' was derived from the general understanding and reputa- ti(Ui iii his wile's family. Itut iIk^ knowledge of events of this description most generally exists in every family, and hence the declarations of <uie of its nieiiibers is admissible, although he docs not mention the source from whi(di he derived his inf.u'miition; and HUch de(darations are ecpially admissible, whether his eonneo- tioii with the family is by blood or marriage." .lew(dl r. Jewell, 17 iVtiis, LM.'J, L'l'lilHl.'l); Nairn t'. Mayes, (Tex.j 'M S. W. il'.i (IH'X,). Neighbors, though acquainted with the facts, cannot be dcdar- juits. " rallies cannot establiidi pedigree by jiroviiig what the neighbors thought or said upon the subject of the paternity of the (MAP. IV.] AMKIMCAN NoTKS. 42:'' licrsoii wliose pedigroo is in disimto. rroctf ol' ixdi^icc is ic- stricti'd to tlif tli'ciiinitious oi (Icct'iisid |h'is(iiis wiio ;ih' iclatt'd by lilo'.id or innTiiigc to tlic jicrsoii whnsc iKircntir^c is I lie sidijcct of iiivi'sti|-,';iti(iii." ])e Iliivcii r. Dc Ilavcu. 77 liid. L'.'iti (iNSlj; Nor- tlini|ir. Male, 7(> iM<'. ;!(iC. (ISSJ;; liraiicli o. Texas I.uinber Rll'g. Co.. ')(•> I-'cd. Ht'p. 707 (1S".».J). 'I'liis is true even if tin- iicarsay t:ik( s the form (d' !L';('ii('ral rpim- titii.ii. lleiidt'isoii I". Oai'dll, .'51 Mis .".(■.7. 11!) (iNod). Hue wliosc only information vniiw tn-ni "talixs with tlic iamilv" and " reports ironi liis relations,'" iieitlier tlie dat<'s (d' sneii talks and reports, the decease of tiie infornKints. imr the (h',i,n'ee of tlio ndationship ol the inlornianls to the peison whose pedii,'reo was in tniversy beinj; shown, is not ('onipetunt to tebtify. NN'allaro I'lm il<.war(l, (Tex.) .*«» S. \V. 711 (ISy")). It was .-u;^j,'ested in an early Conuectioiit ease that the rule would admit the detdarations of '• those who had lived in tlie family '' to prii\.^ relationship. Cbapnian r. Chapman, L' Conn. ."17 (1S17). .\ii(( there an- <lirfii to the same cdleet in .lacdison v. Cooley, 8 .lohns. iL'tS (iSll), I', ji., "Tile decdaratinns (d' persons, who from their situation are liktdy to know. ;ire eomiietent evidenee." And a hite e.ise in Texas lias gor.e so far as to admit amdent doeu- ments by third i)arties as lelevant en pedigree. Howard v. Itsis- .sell, 7."» I'ex. 171 (INNJ)). Hut even a trusted family servant's >tatement as to the death <d' a member of the family is not eom- pi'ti'iit. Doed. Arii(dd /•. Auhlj.i. .">(>. 15. V . C. 171 (iSlS). W'iicre tlie rejiutatiou in tlie laniily is the fact ndied on, proof ean only Ix- made by the surviving niembers of the family. Du- povster ;'. (Jagani, SI Ky. -K'.'J (1S.S(>); .Mmgan r. I'lirmdl. 4 ilawkes (N. C.) Urnl^-">)i l''aiinim v. I'.anum. 41,' ,Md. L'.">1, .'JO-l (1S7'.). In a eas'' in Mieliigan the ootirt say ; — "The impiiry ndated t r;iniily <'Piineelion and membership ard to tiie decease, and tinn • id dee<Ms<' oi' memliers, and whether they had been or wei'e niar- riiMJ; ami the answers returned, although in ]iait based on the cdursi' id' spei'idi and undrrst indiii',' in the family instead of direct personal knowledge, would seem to iiave been ] roper mi view of till' nattire of the subject." Van Sickle r. (iibson, 10 Miidi. 170 (lS7'.t). 'I'he rehitionshil> to the family timst be estalilished by evidcMieo nihniilr. Doe d. Duul.ip r. Servos. ."■. (). 1!. I'. C. L'S4 (1S-M>). '•( Ulierwise evidence to support a ease of this kind might be got »)> mi the deeli ration of the merest stranger, iirst receiving his dccda- iMlion to establish the supposed relationship, whiidi alone would 111 ike his de(daration of any widglit. and then receiving his deelar.a- tii'U as to the primdjial faet." ////»/. I.anioreaux v. .\tty. Cen. 89 .Mich. IK; (\S\)]). 427^ AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AUT III. I IM li ■] i The declarations of a sifter of an alleged wife as to her si>t'i's marriage with A. do not constitute evidence aliunde tliat tlie nt'ces- fary rehitionship exists between her sister and A. on an inijuiry of pedigree in A.'s family. IMackburn i\ Crawfords, [\ Wall. ITo (18(5")). "If it had been proved by independent testimony that Sarah Evans was related by bhiod to any braneh of tlie family of David Crawford, and her dechirations had been offered to prove the relationship of another person (daiming, or eluimed to belong also to tliat family, this case would be in point. IJut the declara- tion of Sarah Evans, offered to prove that her sister was connected by marriage with a member of that family, was neither within the principle nor the language of that authority." In pursuance of this qualilication upon the rule, it has been sug- gested that the declaration of A., a deceased person, that he liad a brother living at a particular place would not be evidence sutli- cient of itself to enable his own children to claim as heirs of the brother. Wise v. Wynn, r.<) Miss. oSS (ISSL'). Hut tliat, on the contrary, such declarations can be recived to enable the estate of the brother to claim in the propi rty of the declarant. Ibid. Cuddy c. Mrown, 7S 111. tl") (187.")). When the declaration of a deceased person as to ])edigree is offered to show that A. and H. were ndated to each other ity l)lood, it is sufKcient, to lay tiie ground for its introduction, to show that the ileelarant was connected witli the family of A.; it is not neces- sary to show by evidence <leliors tint declaration, that the de<'larant was also related to 15. (Jehr r. Kisher, M;{ I'a. St. Ml (ISDI). The rule rcfpiiring ovii'enc',- of relationship ii/!iiii(/r doi's not require that the declaration and the evidence dejiors the declara- tion sliould come to the tribunal by separate witnesses. So wliere a certain witness was relied on to sustain the whole weii,'lit of the proof, the court held it sufficient. "Here tiie witness liore tlie same name as the ancestor, lived in the neighborhood witii tlie otlier sons of his grandfather, knew the mimes of the family, and seemed ac(iuaiiited with the farms which they owned, and otlier minute facts concerning them !>esidcs the cireumstaiice of being requested as heir-at-law to join his uncle in the imn'tgage re- ferred to, "No objection was suggested at the trial that he was not a coni- pctent witness to ju'ove the declaration of his mother, grandmother and niii'les as to his heirship, f.>r want of independent evidence of his conneetion with the family." WalHiridge r. Jones, .■{.'{ V. C. Q. i\. (513 (is:;}). "This evidence is primarily addressed to the presiding justice, who, before admitting the ^Kctastions, must be satisfied that a prima facie case of tlie rfqnisite relationship has been made out. . . . And the facts shown, tlie birth, place of birth, the CUAV. IV.] A MK IMC AN NOTKS. 4278 hiiiiyiiig up iiiul tliR namo of tlio a[)))t'llant, are ample piitnft facie t'vidt'iice of n'latioiisliip to warrant tlio admission of tlii' declara- tion mentioned." Noithrop i-. llalc, 7(1 .Mc. iJOd (1.S.S4). It is only ncce.s.sary that a prima facie case of relationship to the family should he estahlishi-d hy other (jvidence than the declar tions, and slij,'ht proof will sutticc where there is identity of name ;ini- f'S. great lajise of time and other oorrohorating circumstances. I'.rown c. Lazaru.«, o Tex. Civ. App. SI (l.S<);{). FoK.M OK J)K( i.AKATio.v. —The form of the declaration and the medium through which it i.s conveyeil to the tribunal are imma- terial. A reforeneo in A.'s will to his children hy 1?. as "his natural children" by h(>r is a roui[)ctont declaration after his decease on the (piestion of the existence of a marriage to 15. or an issue of pedigree involving the existence of such marriage. lUacUl urn v. (Jrawford.s, .'> Wall. 17"> (l.SOr>). "The entry of a deceased parent, or otiier relative, made in a Hihle, family missal, or any other hook, or document, or paper, stating the fact and dale of the liiith, marriage, or deatii, of a child or relative, is regarded as the decla- ration of siudi parent or relative in a matter of pedigree. Corre- spondence of deceased memliers of the family, recitals in family deeds, descriptions in wills, and other stdcmn acts, ;nc ori^^iiial evidence, wiicre the oral declarations of the parties are admissiiile. Inscriptions on tombstoneu, anil other funeral monuments, engrav- ings on rings, ii:scriptions on family portraits, ciiarts of pcdigice, and the like, an^ also admissible, as original evidence of the same facts." Kelly i\ McCJuire, lo Ark. r>'ut. (101 (iSoo). It is not even lu'ccs.-ary that the di'clariilinn sliouhl rel'ite directly to any fact of pedigree. 'I'lius the declaration of a lather speaking of his daughter, "that unless he made a will Louisa could gel notliing by law," is competent on the (pustion of her Icgiti- ma. y. Viall r. Smith, (1 11. I. 117 (iNCd). Kccogniti(!n in a deed is sulHeient. Ilarinim /•. liarnnm. IL' Md. LTiI, l.".t(l (lS7r»); .Jackson r. Cooley, S,li)lins. I'.'S (ISll): Carter /•. Tinicum Fishing (-'o., 77 I'a. St. .'>1(» ilS7o); Stokes c. Hawcs, I Mason, L'dS (ISL'(l). Or in a will, (iaines r. New (Mhaiis, (1 Wall. M'J (18(17). .•\ recital in a deed by a motlicr is not admissible to prove that her husband had not had ac(M'ss to her. and tliat consc(|nenlly the <'hild was illegitimate. Watts >k Owens. (IL' Wis. .".I*.' (IKSo). \ statement in a letter is Hullicieiil. IJyers /•. Wallace, 87 Tex. rm (iH<>r.). A "family recford " of dates of births, deaths, marriages. &c., made by deceased uu'mbers of the fantily, is competent. North Ilrookfield v. WarriMi. Hi (Jray, 171 (18(10); Kastman r. Martin, 19 N. 11. 152 (1848)1 Whitcher c. McLaughlin, llo Mass. 1(17 (1871). 4270 AMKIilCAN NOTKS. fl'AI:!- III. <(! "Tlio oxistoimo of a family n'^'istcr does not oxcliulf iinxil (,f ili'cIaiMtioiis (ifdccciiscil iiicinh«'rs .if tlii' I'aiiiily." SwinU r. Knncli, 11 lii":i, Crciiii.) 7S (tH,s;{). A n-cdrd is (KmipcttMit if iiiinif liy a Htr.iiij;cr uiiiiiT t,lu' instnictions cil' a iiicuihci- ol tlio liimiiy. Statt* V. .locst, r»l hill. I'ST (l.STa). "A pcilii^rcc is ailiiiissiltlc, tlidiii^li not Iimii; tip or iiia<lc |Mil»lic, on proof of its having' liccii iiiadc l«y a iiiciiihcr of ilic laiuily. If luni.!^' up, it is ailinissiltlo witiiotit jti-oof of its liaving Itccii inadr hy (lii'iTlion of tlif faiiiilv, on Mir 'ground ilial it is a faniiiv acUnowl- eir'ini'iit. If tiic p('di!,'ri'i' be Iniiit,' up piddicdy in a iaiiiil .V in lusiou, it would lit' adniissililc without kuowiug who was its auth.u'." KastMiiu r. Martin, I'J \. II. I.'.L' ( IS JH). A familiar form of rntord is the family I'dldr. |)r( larations in siudi form of facts of pcdif^n-o mado hy dt'ccuscd nn-inlitTS of tht- family an* coiiipi'tt'iit fvidcncc of tip' facts thcrciu stated. (Jrccn- Icaf r. Dulm.pu'. vS;c.. 1{. U. .'tO la. .'tiM (IHTO) Southi-rn, &c., In--, (lo. r. Wilkinsiin. ."»;» (Ja. ri.'l."i (IS74); Ohandicrlaiu r, Chandicrlain, 71 X. V. VS.) (1S77). The fads that the cntrios wcro made all at ono time hy a dc- ccascil sister and not j^'enerally admitted in tho family to he accii- Mte, alTect only the wei,:,'ht of the evidence. Southern, itc, Ins. Co. r. \VilUiii.siMi,r»;{(Ja. "..Tx 1S71). The inscriptions oi' an ancient j,'ravestone are competent to show dates and other faets of pediiirec. North Hrooklitdd r. \\ iirrcn, l(i (tray, 171 (IS(lli); Marnuni r. Harnum. IL' Md. L'.*»l. .'Km; (1,s7.".); SniitI 1 r \: •rson, .M( II. \.\J (ISIS) (ISSS;; .astman .M irlin, U) N. .\ written meniorandnm onclosini,' a lock of hair is competent, r.aiinim r. i'.arninn. 1-' Md. L'.'il. ;!il| (lS7r>). ■• l''amilv iiistory is notliinj,' liiit the ilccdaration of different nu>m- bers of a family rep;'at'!il by so many persons and for such .i time ,is to lii'ciiiiit mnion repute in the family. l'])oii the saiiir sidijccts the fimily iiistory and the detdaiations of a d ased luemlier ol a family ai*'- e(piiliy admissible; the widyht to lie ^'iveii to each <lepends uiKiu tiie circimstaiices. and is a (piestinn tor the jury. not a ipu'stion of adniissibilily." ISyers r, Wallace, S7 Te.\. ;■»(•.'{ (IS!),-,). IJ.vsis Ol- Tin; Him,!' It is said bv the learneil .lutlmr ^§ fi.'sro th It "this exception rests on the (.jround of necessity." Whi i' this was undoiilitedly a maiu r«' isoii for its adoption, the same necessity lias not sulHoed to adiuit the stitement.s of deee.Tsed per.sons in other conimctions, thoii'^h no other evidence is available. /'/!/• ritiifrii, the dc(d intioiis re<,Mrdin',' pediurce are competent, thcmgh tliere is no necessity for roocdvinp them. So in a case wliere t!ie fact in dispute was the existence of .a certain marriai^e, it was obji'ct«> 1 that evidence of the statements of the deceased IIAI'. IV.] AMKIMCAN NOTKH. 4:iT'" iillr,:,'t'(l liiislciiul was iiicohi]i('t.ciit ln'(;;nis(' tlic all("^'((l wife w IS ifsciit lis ii witin'ss. his (I WJfclioii iirisi's Iroiii a iiiisa|iint'licii- »iini of tlic nilc. SiuOi ilcclaratiitiis arc not licld to he atliiiissililc ur iiiailinissililc accor.lin^' to tlic uccM'ssity ol' tlif particular case; liat tilt'}' iU'(! adiiiitti'U as priiaii v fviilcin'f mi sucii Mihjccts I v tin- I'st.ililislu'd rule ol' law, wliicli, tlioii;,'li said to have had its orii,'iii ill iit'ccssitv, is universal in its a|tplic;;tion. Nor do siicli dctdara- timis stand upon tlit; tootiii}? ot siMiondary cviilcncf, to Ijc cxcdiidcd lis will ro ii witiii'88 ctiui l«! liiid who speaks upon tin- sidiject Iroiii 1 own knowlcdj^'c. ' llcaisay cvidfiuu! is of imiuisc inadiiii^silili', if tlio person niaUiii;,' tiie deel, nation is alive, and eaii lie called. Tut tli« declarations id' ;>. deceased niotlier, as to tlic time ol tlie liiitli of her son, are luliuissilde. tlioii|^h the father is liviiij,' and not ealled.' lliihhack on the Kvideiiei" of Siii-cession, (KiO," Craufiird if. llla(dcl)iuii, 17 Md. v.) (iNflO). To the eoiitravy eli'eft, see Covert r. llcrt/.o-,', I i'.i. St. 1 l."» (ISU!), a case which holds that wliere there are living; witnessi's of eidialdtatioii, eviilence of the de(daiations of a dc'ceasod rehitivo as to thm fact of a nianiaye is not competent. //-/'/. The sujireme court of Alabama 1ms dei lined to receive re]inta- lion in A.'s family as to licr a;^e, so loii^,' as the evidiiici' of living witnesses is available, and where those who declare the reputation are themselves present in court. IJoyers r. De ISardidebeii, &c. Co. U7 Ala. l")l (l.S<.»L'). It may be comduded, however, that these deidaratioiis do not so stroiijjly contravene the line of leyal policy which has estaiilished the hearsav rule, as would be the case with many other declarationa ipf deceased persons. n nios t eases, the fact that a declaration has ipccii mi de is, in ami of itself, circumstantial evidence of the truth III the si.itcinent of a jirobative wei;.,'Iit soslii,dit as to reiiuiie that it lir withheld from the jury. Where the mere making of a state, iiiciit is to a certain extent probative of its truth; in other words, where the stateii.ent is not aci-eptcd, if at all. as rest in;,' on the creilit of a deceased jierson not exaiiiiiiod as a witness, but because the makiii!^ of it is eirciimstanlial evidence of its truth, the jucidse evils intended to be )>ri'veiited by the hearsay rule do not present themselves in nnniitii^Mted form. It will be found, it is believed, tliat this fjein il line of tliou'^dit can be tracei. more or less dis- tinctly, ill many of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, — c. ij., iiyiii^' decliratious, entries in coarse of liiisiness, liooks of account, deidaratioiis against interest, Ike. If the deelaratiim does not rest at all niioii the credit of the declarant; where the statement is ndevaiit leganiless <d' its truth or falsity, r. //., on an issue of self-defence, that an allefjcd iiiiirderer hail been tid 1 that the decea.sed was carrying a jMstol and had threatened to shoot the prisoner at sight, Stokes r. People, 63 IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // 1.0 I.I 1.25 Ui|2S ■ 50 *^™ Hf 1^ 12.0 15. m 1.4 %-V^ ^ HiolDgrapjhic Sciences Corporation 33 WfST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 <^ ^P MP € 9) 427" AMERICAN NOTES. [part IIT. ,.' 'I X. Y. 1(54 (1873) the hearsay rule has no application. Tliis rule is considereil elsewhere. Apparent!}' the statement of tlie deceased inemher of the family is admitted on the issue of genealogy, because it is, in a certain degree, circumstantial evidence of the truth of the statement. deputation in the family is competent circumstantial evidence of relationship, and of the facts of pedigree on such an issue, though usually it is only hearsay; — so mellowed by time that the individual voices are lost. Kelly r. AIcGuire, lo Ark. oo5, (505 (l-Soi")); Harland r. Eastman, 107 111. Mo (1883); Viall /•. Smith, C R. I. 417 (18G0); Doe d. Arnold r. Auldjo, 5 Q. ?,. U. C. 171 (1848) Henderson /•. CJargill, 31 Miss. 3(57, 409 (185(5); Butrick r. Tilton, 155 Mass. 4(51 (18<)2). "Traditional declarations become the best evidence sometimes, when those best actpuiinted with the fact are dead. When derived from those who are most likely to know the truth, and are under no bias to misrepresent the fact, sxwAi evidcMice aifords a reasonable presumption of the truth." Eisenlord r. Clum, l'2(i N. Y. 552, 564 (18S)1); Eaton r. Tallmadge, 24 Wis. 217 (18(59). "Common reputation in tlie family, is admissible as evidence of a marriage in that family; and it is said that tlie declarations of an individual of that family, are evidence of that common reputation. But such declarations must have been made before any contest had arisen in regard to the marriage. It is necessary that tlu'y should have been made not only without any view of benetiting the person making them, but also witlu)ut a view of benefiting any other; that they should have flowed from a desire only of s]teaking the truth, which all are presumed to liave, wlien there is no nu)tive to declare the contr.ivv. The jierson, therefore, who olfers suoli declarations, must show that they were made under sutdi circumstances; it is a prerequisite to tlieir admissibility." Brady r. Wilson, 4 Hawks (X. C.) 93 (1825). Recognition as a relative by other members of the f. inily is clearly good cireumstantial evidence on such an issue. De Haven r. De" Haven, 77 lud. 2.3(5 (1881); Viall r. Smith, (5 R. I. 417 (1800); Henderson r. Cargill. 31 Miss. .3(57. 409(185(5); (Jliamber- lain I). Chamberlain, 71 X. Y. 423 (1877); (laines /•. Green Pond Iron Mining Co. 32 X. J. Eq. SO (1880). "Tiie declarations are admitted upon the tlieory that they tend to show that the jierson to whom they refer was recognized and treated as one of a family. The statements of an ancestor or de- ceased kinsman are not to be regarded as sejiarate and distinct ce.iversations, constituting in themselves inde]iendent subjects of i.ivestigation. but tlu'y are to be taken as a connected and indivisi- ble thing indicating the treatment of the j)erson wliose i)e(ligree is in dispute. The acts and declarations of the deceased kinsman I 9 CHAP. IV.] AMEUICAN NOTES. 42712 are an entirety, and the question is, not simply what he said or did on one day, or within one week, but what was his general line of conduct." l)e Haven v. De Haven, 77 Ind. 236 (1881); White ('. Strother, 11 Ala. 720 (1847); Eaton v. Talhnadge, 24 Wis. 217 (18(;y). !So the fact that in making up "a register of my children " in the family Uible a father omitted the mime of a child by a ])avtifular woman, is circumstantial evidence id' illegitimacy. Chamberlain V. Chamberlain, 71 N. Y. 423 (1877). Declarations accompanying sucli acts of recognition would clearly be admissible as part of tlie res gest.T. It is plain, however, that in cases of pedigree the declarations to be admissible need not constitute part of the res gestic. If they do, they are admissible on tliat ground; — irrespective of any question of admissibility as being involved in a case of pedigree. Even declarations, without more, of deceased members of a family as to the existence of a r-hitionship between themselves and a particular individual i)artake somewhat, thougli to a lesser degree than in case of reputation and recognition in the family, of the same probative force. Personal and family ])ride; the general interest in accuracy; a constant discussion among members of the family and the consequent correction of mistakes; — mnke it probable tluit tlie statement would not have been made and ac- cepted unless it had been true. "It seems now to ue settled, that the principle upon which the law resorts to hearsay evidence in cases of pedigree, is ' the interest of the declarants in the person from whom the descent is made out, and their eonseciuent interest in knowing the connexions of the family.' And hence the rule of admission is restricted to the declarations of deceased persons, who were related by blood or marriage to the person, and therefore interested in the succession in question. And under this rule it is held, that general repute in the family may be jjroved by the testi- mony of a surviving member of it." Henderson i>. Cargill, 31 Miss. 3(i7, 418 (imi). Lis ^loTA. — Tliat the declaration must be nuide ante Hfcm mofatii, see Northroj) r. Hale. 7(5 Me. 300 (1884); ]M(>rg;in /•. I'ur- nell, 4 Hawkes (N. C.) 9.5 (1825); Caujcdle r. Ferrie, 20 15arb. 177 (1857). "But the declarations of a deceased member of the family are not to be admitted, unless it aiipears they have been made under such circumstances that the relation may be supi)osed to be without an interest, and without a bias. If they were to he made on a subject in dispute, after the commencement of a suit, or after a contro- versy preparatory to one, they ought not to be received in evi- dence, on accouiit of the probability that they were partially drawn from the deceased, or perhaps intended by liim to serve [■ ■ i Il1 '1 427^^ AMEllICAN NOTES. [part III. lt> w m> '!' 1' If 4 '"1 1 i ^«; V" 1 one of the contending parties." Chapman v. Chapman, 2 Conn. 347 (1817). Trobably the lis mota must concern the subject matter of the declaration or the qualiticitiou will not apply. Elliott u. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, 337 (1828). Dkci-auaxt must be Dkceasku. — Ilarlaud v. Eastman, 107 111. 535 (1883); Dupoyster v. Gagani, 84 Ky. 403 (1880); Nor- throp tK Hale, 7G Me. 3()() (1884); Mooers v. liunker, 29 N. H. 420 (1854); llobinson c. Blakely, 4 llich. (S. C.) 580 (1851); Kogers V. De Bardeleben, &o., Co. 07 Ala. 154 (1803); Smith n. Geer (Tex.) 30 S. W. 1108 (1895). While the declarant must be deceased, his statement may be proved by any one. If, however, the fact to be shown is reputation in the family, this can only be shown by a surviving member of the family; and if alive, by his evidence in court. " It is only in the instance that the declarant is dead, and was related to the person in question by blood or marriage, that his declarations as to tlie relationship, and the degree of it, of such person can be proved by third persons; and any person, whether related or not, if otherwise competent as a witness, who heard such declarations, may prove them. If, however, such relationship is attempted to be proved by the general repute in the family, and not by the declarations of its deceased members, then the proof must be confined to the surviving members of it. If the declarant is not dead, then it is not competent to prove his declarations, because he can himself testify to the fact, which is tlie best testi- mony." Dupoyster v. Gagr^ni, 84 Ken. 403, 409 (1880). So to render an entry of births and deaths in a family Bible or record admissible in evidence, the entry must have been made by a deceased parent. If it is not shown that the parent wlio made the entry is deceased, it will be inadmissible. Greenleaf v. Dubuque &c. 11. 11. 30 la. 301 (1870). " The evidence is clearly incompetent, upon two grounds. 1. The date of a birth and death of an indi- vidual, being matter of pedigree, may be proved by hearsay evi- dence and general repute in his family, and an entry of a deceased parent, made in a bible, is regarded as a declaration of the parent making the entry and therefore admissible. Krreenl. Ev. § 104; 1 rhil. Ev. (Cow. & Hill's and Edw. Notes) 249-252 and notes. "It will be observed that entries of this character, in order to be competent evidence, must have been made by a dece.i.ied parent or relative. Tiiis witness in the case before us does not prove, nor is it otherwise shown, that the father of decedent was dead. For this reason the evidence was inadmissible, 2. The evidence introduced was secondary in its character. The family record itself is not offered in evidence, but the witness gives, in his deposition, a copy ^hereof, or rather recites in his deposition the contents of the record. U !''■ ' !i CHAP. IV.] AMEUICAN NOTES. ■427 »« It is not such a record that it may be proved by an examined copy, but, us all private writings, must be produced. If its absence be properly accounted for, secondary evidence, as a coj)y or proof of its contents, is admissible. 1 Phil. Ev. (Cow. & Hill's and Edw. Notes) 250 and notes; 1 (Jreenl. Ev. S 958 and notes." Greenleaf V. Dubuque &c. R. II. Co., 30 la. 302 (1870). To the contrary effect, see Carskadden v. Poorman, 10 Watts. 82 (1840). I'l '■ '1. m K m HEAKSAY IN SUPPOBT OF ANCIENT POSSESSION. [PT. lU. CHAPTER V. ANCIENT POSSESSION. § 658. A THIRD EXCEPTION to the general rule by which hearsay evidence is rejected, exists in favour of ancient documents (by which ip Tipant documents more than thirty years old), when they are -Jered in support of ancient possession. These are often the only attainable evidence of ancient possession, and therefore, the law, yielding to necessity, allows them to be read on behalf of persons claiming under them, and against persons in no way privy to them, provided that they are not mere narratives of past events, but purport to have formed a part of the act of ownership, exercise of right, or other transaction to which they relate. This species of proof demands careful scrutiny, for, first, its efPect is to benefit those from whose custody they have been produced, and who are connected in interest with the original partiei.^ to the documents, and next, the documents are not proved, but are only presumed to have constituted part of the res gestae. Forgery and fraud are, however, matters, comparatively speaking, of rare occurrence, and a fabricated deed generally betrays, from some anachronism or other inconsistency, ii;^ornal evidence of its real character. The danger of admitting these documents is, consequently, less than might be supposed. It is more expedient to run some risk of occasional deception, than to permit injustice to be done by strict exclusion of what, in many cases, would turn out to be highly material evidence. On a balance of evils, this kind of proof has, Bubject to certain qualifications, for many years past been admitted.' § 659. But care is especially taken to ascertain the genuineness of the ancient documents produced ; and this may in general be > aco 1 I'll. Ev. 273; 1 St. Ev. 67 ; Gr. Ev. § 141 ; imd liost, Ev,. 615. 428 ■I 'I CHAP, v.] l.EO.VL MKAXIXO OF PROPER CTTSTODy. shown, prima facie, by proof that they come from the proper custody} Proof of this is, however, required not only where documents are tendered in support of ancient possession, but in most cases where deeds, papers, or writings are rendered admissible by any rule of law without strict proof of their authenticity. It, therefore, is highly important to explain, with as much precision as possible, the legal meaning of the words "proper custody."' The subject will, therefore, be illustrated in this place once for all. § 660. As to what is "proper custody," Tindal, C. J., has said,'" " Documents found in a place in which, and under the care of persons with whom, such papers might naturally and reasonably be expected to be found, are precisely in the custody which gives* authenticity to documents found within it ; for it is not iicci'ssari/ that then should he found in the bent and most proper place of deposit. If documents continued in such custody, there never would be any question as to their autherticity ; but it is when documonts are found in other than their proper place of deposit that the inves- tigation commences, whether it was reasonable and natural, under the circumstances in the particular case, to expect that they should have been in the place where they are actually found ; for it is obvious, that, while there can be only one place of deposit strictly and absolutely proper, there may be many and various, that are reasonable and probable, though differing in degree ; some being more so, some less ; and in those cases the proposition to be deter- mined is, whether the actual custody is so reasonably and probably to be accounted for, that it impresses the mind with the conviction that the instrument found in such custody must be genuine. That such is the character and description of the custody, which is held suiUciently genuine to render a document admissible, appears from all the cases." ' § 661. These principles have accordingly led, on the one hand, to the rejection of old grants to abbeys, offered as evidence of private rights, where the possession of them appears altogether ' See ante, §§ 432 et seq. ' As to what is " proper cu'^>tody," see Bishop of Moath v. Marquis of Winchester, 18;i(). See, also, Doe v. Samples, 18;W (I'attoson, J.) ; Doe v. I'hillips, 1H4,). '• In bishop of Moath v. Marqiiis of Winchester, 1836. ^ For American authorities, see Bar V. Oratz, 1819; Winn v. Patter- son, 1835; Clarke?). Couitiicy, 1831 ; Hewlett 1". Cock, 1831 ; Duiicun v. Beard, 1820; Middloton v. Mass, 1819. in: M 429 i , i MEANING OF PKOPtR OUSTODY ILLUSTRATED. [PAKT III. unconnected with the persons who liaJ any interest in the estate;' of a manuscript found in the llernlds' Office, enumerating the possessions of a dissolved monastei-y, the pnssr'ssion of whidi is unconnected with an interest in flie propinty ;''^ of a curious manuscript Ijok, entitled the "Secretum Abbutis," preserved in the Bodluian Library at Oxford, and couta ning a grant to an abbey ;^ of an old grant to a priory, brought from the Cottonian MSS. in the British Museum :* and of ancient writings, pur- porting respectively to be, the cue an endowment of a vicarage, and the other an inspexiraus of the endowment under the seal of a bishop, purchased at a sale as part of a private collection of manuscripts.* The registers of burials and baptisms (being by statute" required to be kept by the clergyman of the parish either at his own residence or in the church) have, in the alisence of all explanation on the subject, been rejected, as not coming from the proper custody, when produced from the house of the parish clerk.' Terriers found among the papers of a mere landholder in the parish must also be rejected,® because the legitimate repository for such documents would be either the registry of the bishop, the registry of the archdeacon, or the church chest.'' § 662. In further accordance wi^^h the principles above sum- marized by Tindal, C. J., it has, on the other ha,nd, been held that the poor-house of a union is not an improper repository for the documents of any parish within the union ; '" that an old chartulary of a dissolved abbey may be admitted, when found in the possession of the owner of part of the abbey lands, though uot of the principnl proprietor; " that an old book of a collector of tithes is equally well W ni. ft : I > 3 Bing. N. C. 201, 183G (Tindal, C.J.). '■* L\goii V. Strutt, 1795. 3 Micholl V. llabbetts, 1810. ♦ Swiniieitou v. M. of Stafford, iSlO. » Potts y. D'lrant, 1795. • 52 G. 3, 0. 146, §§ 1 aud 5. ' Doo V. Fowler, 1850. * Atkins V. llatton, 1794; Atkirs V. Ld. Wiiloughby Do Broke, 1794. See, also, Bidder v. Bridges, 1885 (Kay, J.). • Armstrong u. Hewett, 1817; Potts V. Dui'aut, 179U. lu llandolph v. Gordon, 1815, this doctrine was cun'ii'd to Its oxtrome limit, for the grandson of a formor rector, having produced a book purporting to be tlie book of such rectoi', it was re- i'ected, as he did not show that he lud found it among hisgriimltathor's papers, or that it hud come into his posse.ssion iu a legiiimate manner: see, also, Mi^nbv v. Cavtis, lsl5. w Slater v. Hodgson, 1846. " Bullen V. Michel, 1816. See, also, R. V. Mytton, 1860. The strictly proper custody for such a ducuiuout as this would have beeu 430 rr- CHAP, v.] MKANING OF I'UOPFJl CUSTuDY ILH;.S1I;AT1;D. See, The uh a beeu authenticated, whetlior produced from the custody of thn suf^orssor, or exeoutor, of the inoumhont, or from the hands of the successor of the col','ctor;^ and that an unproved will, more than thirty years oLl, disposing of real and personal estate, and produced from the custody of a younger son of the testator, who, in common with his brothers, derived a benefit under it, may be admitted, though it was contended that it ought to have been deposited in the ecclesiastical court of the diocese* § H(i3. Again, an expired lease produced from the custody of the lessor, and proved to have been received by him from a former occupier of the demised premises, who had for several years paid the precise rent reserved by it, and had, subsequently to the expiration of the term, procured such expired lease from two strangers who claimed no interest in it, and delivered it up to the lessor, was held to be admissible, without proof in what manner it had come into the hands of thes9 strangers.' A case stated for counsel's opinion by a derea'^ed bishop, respecting his right of presentation to a living, has been admitted against a subsequent bishop of the same see, on a question touching the same right, though the paper was not found in the public registry of the diocese, but a.mong the private family documents of the descendants of the former bishop ; * and a settlement, reserving a life estate to himself, and coming from amongst the settlor's papers, has, where more than thirty years old, been allowed, in an action of ejectment by his subsequent incumbrancers, to be put in evidence, though it was strongly urged that the trustees or their representatives were the parties entitled to its custody.* Again, a deed to which as well as to the suit, trustees and executors were parties, when produced by them comes from proper custody.^ § (i64. Thert is some doubt whether the custody of a document must be proved by a sworn witness, when it purports on its face to the Augmentation Office (BuUen v. Michel (,Lcl. lledesdule), supra); but as between the diffeieut jiroprietors of the abbey lands, :^ iright nuta- rally be supposed to have been de- posited with the largest ; and the court held, that its actual place of custody was one whoie it might reasonably be expected to be found: Bishop of Meath v. Marquia of Win- chester, 183ti (Tindal, C.J.). ■ la ; referring to Jones v. Waller, 1753. ' Doe V. Pearce, 1839 (Coleridge, J.); Andrew v. Motley, 1802. 3 Roes ('. Walters, 18;W. * Bp. of Moath V. M. of Winchester, KSMG. ° Doe V, Samples, 1838. See, also, Bertie v, Beaumont, 181fi ; Ld. Triinlestown v. Kemmis, 1843, H. L, « Miller v- Whuatley, 1890 (Ir.). »r! 431 « ., li'' mi ■■"r^^ 1 I, <■'! li OORRunOUATIVE PROOF OF ANCIKNT DOCUMENTS. ['• III. belong to the party who tenders ii, in evidence. In one or tw^ settlement coses, the respondents were permitted to produce old certiBcates, purporting to have been granted to them by the appel- lants, without giving any account respecting their custody.' But where,* on a question of boundary, plaintiff's counsel proposed to read certain manor-books without proving the custody whence they came, on the ground that they belonged to the lord, who was admitted to be the real plaintiff, the court held that they could not be read ; Coleridge, J., observing that, unless Pome witness was sworn for the purpose of proving their custody, they might have been procured from a grocer's shop. But where the witness producing the document can swear that he received it from the representative of the person originally entitled to it, as a paper which had belonged to such person, this evidence will in ordinary cases be sufficient, without calling the representative himself to explain how he became possessed of the document." § 665. The mere production of an ancient document, unless supported by some corroborative evidence of acting under it, or of modern possession, would be entitled to little, if any, weight.'' Still, there appears to be no strict rule of law, which would authorise the judge in withdrawing it altogether from the consideration of the jury : — in other words, the absence of proof of possession afEects merely the weight, and not the admissibilitij, of the instrument.* § 6ri6. For instance, where, to prove a prescriptive right of fishery as appurtenant to a manor, ancient licences to fish in the locus in quo, appearing on the court-rolls, as granted by former lords in consideration of certain rents, were tendered in evidence, it was held that they were admissible without any proof of the rents having been paid— but it was added that, to give 'hem any weight, it must be shown that in latter times payments had been made under licences of the same kind, or that the lords of the manor had exercised other acts of ownership over the fishery, which had been acquiesced in ; " " in an action brought to try the title to the bed of a river, after proof of a grant from Henry VIII., two counterparts » E. V. Eyton, 1793 ; E. v. Nether- thons, 1814. « Evans v. Eees, 1839. » Earl V. Lewis, IKOl (Heath, J.). See Doe v. Keeling, 1848. * 1 Ph. Ev. 276, 278. » Malcomson v. O'Dea, 1863, H. L. ; Biistow v, Cormican, 1878, H. L. (Ld. Blackburn). • Eogors V. Allen, 1808 (Heath, J.) ; Malcomsou v. O'Dea, 18G3, H. L. 432 CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTinxs OK .WCirXT nOClTMKNTS. of leases having been produced fioin the jtlainiifl's muniment room, comprehending the soil in question, but no proof of any payment by a tenant, nor of any modern act of ownersliip having been given, the instruments were nevortlieless admitted as coming from the right custody, the judge observing that no circumstance in the case threw suspicion upon them, and that " the absence of other kinds of proof was mere matter of observation ; " ' and in one of tlie numerous ejectments brought by Lord Egremont,' a document produced from the muciment room of the property inherited from such ancestor, which purported to be a counterpart of a lease of this land made by him but executed only by the lessee, was held admissible in evidence to show that the land in question had been part of the estate of the lessor's ancestor, though no proof was given of actual possession under it. § 667.' Subject to the observance of the above rules, ancimt documents are receivable as evidence tliat the transactions to which they relate actually occurred. And though they are usually spoken of as hearsay evidence of ancient possession, and, as such, are said to be admitted in exception to the general rule ; yet they seem rather to be parts of the res r/cstw, and therefore admissible as original evidence, on the principle already discussed.* An ancient deed, which has nothing suspicious about it, is pi umed to be genuine without express proof, the witnesses being 'osumed dead ; '' and, if found in the proper custody, and co ated by evidence of corresponding ancient or modern enjo^ a or by other equivalent or explanatory proof, it will be presumed to have constituted part of the actual transfer of property therein men- tioned ; because this is the usual course of such transactions. The residue of the transaction may be as unerringly inferred from the existence of genuine ancient documents, as the remainder of a statue may be made out from an existing torso, or a perfect skeleton from the fossil remains of a part. f. Blanshan, 1808 (Am.); Crowderv. Hopkins, 1843 f Am.J ; Jackson v. Luquere, 182.i (Am.); Jackson v. Lamb, 1827 (Am.); Barr v. Gratz, 1819 (Am.); Hewlett v. Cock, 1831 (AmO. » Gr. Ev. § 144, in great pai-t. * Ante, §§ 583 et secj. » Ante, § 87. » Duke of Bedford v. Lopes, 1838 (Ld. Denman). « Doe V. Pulman, 1842. See, fur- ther, Clarkson v. Woodhouse, 1782 (Ld. Mansfield) ; Brett v. Beales, 1829 (Ld. Tenterden); Tisdall v. Parnell, 1863 (Ir.) ; Doe v. Passing- ham, 1826 (Bmrough, J.); EanclifEe V. Parkyns, 1818 (Ld. Eldon) ; McKenire v. Eraser, 1803; Jackson ■'V Hi i'lil 433 il 4;5:|i AMEUICAX NOTKS. [I'AUT III. mill m III r)' P AMEHTCAN NOTES. Hearsay Concerning Ancient Possession. — Docuiuonts thirty yc'.ir.s old not only dispi'iise with proof of I'.xt'cution, but, .so far as tlu'y inir])i)rt to show the vxcrcisi' of acts of ownership, arc evi- dence of the existence of such acts. Harlan v. Howard, 7'.) Ky. :n:i (ISSl); I'.oston /•. Richardson, !<)"> Muss. 351 (1«7()); IJaeder t>. .Jennintj;.s, 40 Fed. Kep. 11)1) (l.SSD). On an issue of ownership of a strip of beach, licenses of tiie claimant more than sixty years old, i)ro(luced from the proper cus- tody, purportin;j; to authorize the erection of a tisli-house u|)()n the l)remises in (piestion, are evidence in sui)i)ortof the licensor's title. JJoston V. llichardson, 105 Mass. 351, 371 (1870). " The fourth rulin,^ at the trial was, that there was not sufficient evidence to autiiorize the jury to liiid that the town had since the jjassaye of tiie ordinance of 1617 gained any title to the demanded premises by disseisin. " The demandants ofTered evidence tending to show that a iish box, eight or ten feet long by four or five feet wide, with a folding lid or table, upon which fish were sold, stood upon the p'-emises as early as 1808, and thenceforward until 1824 or 18U5, when the city of Boston removed it and i)ut an engiiu'-house in the same place, l)rojecting partly over the dock, which remained until 1830. The demandants also offered the records of two orders of the selectmen of the town of IJoston ; one in 17G1, granting to ' Mr. Blake, a fish- erman,' upon his apjdication, ' liberty to set up a fish-house at the ond of Summer Street, near the Bull Tavern,' 'provided he pays one dollar per annum to the town as a consideration, for said privi- lege of a fisli market;' and tlie other in 1803, by which 'Joseph iStevens is permitted to occupy the fish stall at the bottom of Sum- mer Street, lately allowed to liobinson, who consents thereto.' and two of the selecti. en ' were desired to direct the alterations in the stall which Mr. Stevens proposes to make.' " These licenses were excluded, on the ground that no acts were proved to have been done under them. But we are of opinion that, at least when taken in connection with the evidence of the subsequent occupation of the premises for the purpose men- tioned in them, they were admissible. Otherwise, as those acts would not be matter of record, and as the testimony of witnesses to facts which happened at so distant a period could hardly be obtained, it would l)e impossible to supply the proof required." Boston /•. Richardson, 105 Mass. 351, 371 (1870). The court quote with api)roval from the opinion of Willes, J., in Malcolmson v. O'Dea, 10 H. L. Gas. 51)3, Gll-OIG (1803). "The proof of ancient possession is always attended with difficulty. Time has removed U I CIIAI'. V.J A.MKUKAN NOTi:S. A',Mi till! witiu'sst'S wlio could in'ovc acts ol' nuiH'islii|) of tl:tii' own ]mt- ti)\\ il kiiowlcdj^c, iiiul resort must iicccssaiilv lit- had to written cvKii'iicc. Tlic nili! is. that aiicii'Ut docii:at'iits, (Miuiiim out <,t' jn'opcr I'UHtndy and ])uri)orlin},' upon the iucc ol tlicin to show I'Xrn'ist' oi' owiicrshi|i, su(di as a lease or a lieeiiso, may he ^dveii in evidence wUliout prool' of possession or payment of rent under tlieni, as lieiii;^' in themsidves aetsol ownership and prool ol' jxisses- bion. This riih' is sometimes stated with the (lualilication, jiro- vided that jiossession is proved to iiavi- Idllowed similar documents, or tii.it then; is some prool ol' actual enjoyment in accordaiu^e with tiu' title to whi(di the documents relate. And certainly, in tho case ot property allowinj^' ot continuous enjoyment, without proof of actual t'xercist! of the ri^ht, any nun lier of nn-re pieces of ]iapor or parchment, purportiii.n' to he leases or licenses oui^dit to he of no avail. It may be a (luestioii, wiiether the ahseiice of proof of en- joyment consistent with siudi doeumeiits n;ors to the admissiliility or only to tlie wiij^ht of the evidence; jirohably the latter. 'We know of no case in which an amdent document, coming fioin a proper custody, and purporting to be an act of ownership, by way of lease or license over the ])roperty, in (tompany with other evi- dence showing enjoyment ponsisteiit witli sucii ownership, has been rejected iijion the ground that the eiijoyiuent could not be referred to the particular document in (luestion.'" lioston i-. Iticdiardson, 105 Mass. 3r,l, ;{71 (1S70)- "The tenants also had a right to ]iut in evidence, as a i)art of their chain of title, the various deeds of the persons wdio formerly, as they contended, were the owners of the lUdcher jiortion of the proTierty, and under whom they claimed. The partition and these deeds were evidence of acts of ownership on the part of the ten- ants' predecessors in the title, at and after the date of that parti- tion in ISnr), and before l<S;i2; and we think they were properly admitted as such. They would furnish jirima facie evidence, liable of course to be rebutted and disproved, but, in the absence of other evidence, they would raise a ])resumption of suliieient seisin in the grantors to enable them to convey, and, especially in transactions so ancient, would operate to vest the legf 1 seisin in the grantees." riovd /•. Tewksbury, 120 Mass. .'5()2 (ISSO). A lease one hnndred and eight years old may be read in evidence without proof of its execution. Hewlett v. Cock, 7 Wend. 371 (18.31). The exception has been extended so ns to include ancient i)ro- prietors' records as evidence of the facts set forth in them. "Courts have felt obliged from necessity to depart from the strict rules of evidence in tlie admission of ancient writings, documents, books and records, to prove the existence of the fucts thcv re(dte. The rule of evidence requiring tli " <•'-=• i'lmnv of the liwful custodian of 'f< '!)<*' fSi 4833 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AKT III. "" v> ^M books of record offered in evidence, that they are of the descrip- tion claimed, before they are admissible, ha^s repeatedly been relaxed in the case of ancient books of record of proprietors of land. In such instances, such books have been held to prove themselves. When ancient books, purporting to be records of such proprietary, contain obvious internal evidence of their own verity and there is no evidence of the present existence of the proprietary or of any person representing it, or any clerk or other person authorized to keep the records, they are admissible in evidence without proof of the legal organization of the proprietary, or of its subsequent meetings." Goodwin r. Jack, 62 Me. 414 (1872). pROPEit Custody. — The ancient documents must be produced from such a natural custod\^ as relieves them from suspicion. Harlan v. Howard, 79 Ky. ,373 (1881). Finding t]>e counterpart of a lease one hund;'ed and eight years old among the muniments of title of the lessor is sufficient. "An- cient writings, which are proved to have been found among deeds of evidences of land, nuiy be given in evidence, although tlie exe- cution cannot be proved, for it is hard to prove ancient things, and finding them in such a place, is a presumption that they were honestly and fairly obtained, and preserved for use, and are free from suspicion of dishonesty." Hewlett v. Cock, 7 Wend. .'571 (1831). CouROBouATiox. — It lias been widely lield that some proof of actual possession or user under them should accompany and cor- roborate the statements set forth in the ancient documents tliem- selves. That possession under the ancient document is necessary, see Clarke v. Courtney, 5 Peters, 310, 344 (1831). Subsequent occupation of the premises for the same purpose and under the same authority is a sufficient corroboration to authorize the admission of prior licenses of long standing. Richardson r. Boston, 105 Mass. 351, 371 (1870). "Possession accompanying the deed is always sufficient, without other proof, but it is not indispensable." Hewlett v. Cock, 7 Woud. 371 (1831). Other corroboration will suffice. In Hewlett v. Cock (ubi supra) the fact that the lessee and his absigns treated the land as leased was sufficient corroboration. "It has been settled by the weight of authority that ancient deeds of conveyance of real estate are admissible without first recpiiring tlie i)arty olTering them to show acts of possession over the lands embraced by them. For until the court is made ac- (luaii^.ted with the tenor of the instrument, the natural order of introducing the evidence would be reversed by requiring proof of corresi)onding possession. CHAP, v.] AMERIOAiJ NOTKS. 433* The genuineness of such instruments may be shown by otlier facts as well as that of possession. And when proof of possession camiot be had, it is within the very essence of the rule to admit the .^trumeut where no evidence justifying suspicion of its genuineness is shown, and it is found in the custody of those legally entitled to it." Harlan &c. v. Howard &c., 79 Ky. 373 (1881). i: I <«f if DECLAKATl'JXS AGAINST INTEllEST. [PART IH. CHAPTER VI. f^'iil ff iiii iLil ^ I i!;! r-i f DECLARATIONS BY DECEASED PERSONS WHICH ARE UNLIKELY TO BE FALSE. § 6G8.* The fourth of the six exceptions which we have seen' to exist to the general rule that hearsay evidence must he rejected, renders admissible declarations made hij persons since deceased tinder such circumstances that they are extremely unlihely to he false? The regard which men usually pay to their own interests is considered a suflicient bccurity against any wilful mis-statement, and affords also a reasonable inference that the declarations or entries were not made under any mistake of fact, or want of information on the part of the declarant. The danger of any fraud in the statement will be still less dreaded, if it be borne in mind, th.at the evidence is not receivable till after the death of the declarant, and that if the opponent can show that the statement was made with any sinister motive, it will at once be rejected. The ordinary tests of truth, afforded by the administration of an oath and bj cross-examination, are certainly here wanting ; but their place is in some measure supplied by the circvimstam'es of the declarant. The inconveniences that would result from the exclusion of evidence, having such guarantees for its accuracy in fact and Its freedom from fraud, are considered as, on the whole, much greater than any which are likely to be ex[)erienced from its admission.* § 069. The most common example of this species of evidence is furnished by " declarations atjainst interest." In order to render declarations against interest admissible as such, it must ap- pear, eitlier by proof or by presumption,' that the declarant is ' Gr. Ev. ? 118, in groat part. Loe, 1821 (Pliimor, M.R.). » Ante, § (iOT. * 1 I'h. Ev. '.'iU. • SiissL'x I'l'or., 1844, 11. L. • • Doo v. Michael, ISJl ; ante, Higl-am v. liidgway, 1808; Slioit v. § 198. 431 LI I A p. VI.] DECLARANT MUST BE DEAD. Jcac/} The more fact Ibat he has absconded abroad in coiiso(]ueTi('n of a criminal charge, or that lie is otherwise out of the power of lh(j party to produce as a witness, will not be sufficient,' It hiis b -en expressly decided that, as regards declarations against prnniNiri/ interest, it is " not necessary that the deceased person should have his own knowledge of the fact stated, — that, if the entry cliarged himself, the whole of it became admissible against all persons, — and that the absence of such knowledge went to the weight, and not to the admissibility, of the evidence."' As regards declara- tions against propfietanj interest, indeed, it is necessary, where the declarant had no personal knowledge, that he should have simul- taneously declared his belief in the hearsay.* M(U'eover, declara- tions against interest are admissible although such declarations were not contemporaneous with any acts.^ Such circumstances only affect the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. § G70. It is now fully determined," first, that the statement or entry must have originally been against the actual pecuniary interest at that time of ' the person making it ; * and, secondly, that the interest must be of a peatnianj or propridari/ luiture,^ which latter term will include declarations as to the statiis (as e.g., the legitimacy) of the declarant.'" Lord Chancellor liyndhurst, in » Phillips V. Colo, 1839 (Ld. T)cn- manl; Sjiarfro v. Brown, l.S2!» ; Smith V. Whittiiighiim, lfs33. See anto, §641, ami post, § "(W. ' St(^l)heii «. Owenap, 1831 (AlJcr- Bon, J.). * Soi3 Crease v. Barrett, 183j ; Peroival v. N'anson, 18')1. The con- trary was (to adojit Ld. Diiniian's exiJii'ssion in O'Connell v. Tlie (iuecn, 18-(4, 11. ]i.) "taken for granted" formerly, and in the old cases of Ilighaiu I'. l{id,i,'way, 1808 (Baylcy, J.); Marks t;. Lahop, IH.iT (Tindiil, C.J., I'ark and Vau^dian, JJ.); Barker v. Bay, 182(i (Ld. Kldon); Short V. Lee, 1S21 (riiimer, M.ll.). Indeed, in tho Sussex I'eerago case, 1844, II. L., it was so laiil down (Lds. Dennian and Brougham). * Ld. Trimlostown v. Koi 1843, II. L. » Doe V. Turford, 1832. juimis, • lu" was long a matter of doubt in our Colli ts whether tho absence of all intcl•e^t to niisrepre.sent, coupled witli peculiiir knowledge in tho de- clarant, would not render his de- tlaralions admissible alter his death. See Glynn v. Bk. of England, 1750 (Ld. llardwieke) ; Iligham v. Ridg- wa\, 1808 (Le JSlanc. J.); Oleadow r. Atkin, 1833 (Bayley, J.); B(-9 w. Bawlin;,'"^, i8()(t (Ld. KUenhorough); and Daly ,■ Wil.-on, hS4:i (Ir.). ' In 10 Tdllrniuclio, Ex parte Ed- wards, lfS,S4, C. A. 8 Berkeley Peer., 1811, II. L., cited and coutiiniod in Sussex I'eer., 1844, ILL. » Sussex Peer., 1844, II. L., ex- plained and acted upon by lid. Dep- man in Davis r. Lloyd, 1844. See, also. Smith r. Blakoy, 1807 ; MasHoy V. Allen, 187!). '" In ro I'orton, Peaiaon v. Att.- Geu., 1885. 435 ■I,- '1 PECUNIARY OR PROPRIETARY INTEREST. [PART III. the Sussex peerage case, observed, ** It is not true that the declara- tions of deceased persons are in all circumstances receivable in evidence, when in some way or other they might injuriously affect the inierest of the party making them. Nor is it true, that because, while living, a party would be excused from answering as to certain facts, his declarations as to those facts become evidence after his death. These are not correlative nor corresponding propositions." * Lord Brougham added, " To say, if a man should confess a felony for which he would be liable to prosecution, that therefore, the instant the grave closes over him, all that was said by him is to be taken as evidence in every action and prosecution against another person, is one of the most monstrous and untenable propositions that can be advanced." * § 671. A declaration by a deceased person, who would, in the event of her late husband having died intestate, be entitled to a certain amount under a settlement, that he had left a will by which he had given her a less sum, isj however, against pecuniary interest, and therefore admissible.' And, in any case, the courts will not weigh with nice scales the amcunt of the pecuniary Interest possessed by the declarant, but will admit every entry which, at the time when it was made, comph'tely charged the maker to anij extent.* An incomplete charge Avill, however, not be suflicient. Therefore, an entry in the following form, "April 4th. — A. came as a servant, to have for the half year 21." was hold to be inadmissible as a declaration against interest, it being merely a memorandum of an agreement, which must be supposed to have been made on fair terms, and was, consequently, as much in favour of the maker's interest as against it, since, if the master had to pay for the services, the servant had to perform them.' § 672. The term " declaration," both with regard to declarations against interest and declarations made in the course of duty or business," includes a mere oral statement, as well as a written memorandum.' The former may indeed be entitled to less weight • Sussex Poorago, 1844. • 1(1. Tiiis case overrulos Standon Rtimdoii, 17!»1. » Mood V. llubsoU, 1892 (Ir.). * Orrtitt V. Corsnr, 1 855 ; Richards V. GoKiU'tv, ISTCi (Ir.). « ]{. V. Worth, 184;}. • li. V. Buckley, IS?:}. ^ ii. V. liirmiughain, 1861. See 436 was CHAP. VI,] ORAL STATEMENTS — WRITTEN STATEMENTS. with the jury than the latter, but the law recognises no distinction between statements made by word of mouth, and those made in writing, except where the writing is by deed,' or is rendered necessary by some statute. § 6713. It is further clear that the term " declaration," as applied to declarations against interest, or in the ordinary course of busiuess, embraces all written statptnents, whether made at the time of the fact declared^ or on a subsequent daj/,'^ though the most frequent example of it is contained in entries in books of account. Where' these are books of collectors of taxes, stewards, bailiffs, or receivers, which are subject to the inspection of others, and in which the entries are generally of money received, charging the party making them, they are clearly admissible.* But private /joolcs, though exclusively retained within the custody of their owners, are also admissible ; for their liability to be produced in courts of law on notice or subpoena, and the chance of their contents becoming known through accident, are deemed sufficient security against fraud.^ An entry, too, is not admissible, unless it either charges the jtarty making it with the receipt of money on account of a third person, or else ochiowtedgcs the prn/ment of money due to himself, and it is only considered as sufficiently against hia interest to be brought within the exception, in the one or the other of these two events." § 674. No valid objection can be taken to the admissibility of an entry, which charges the person making it with receiving money from another, on the ground that such entry forms only a part of a general debtor and creditor account, the balance of which ia in favour of the receiver.' The reasons for this are, first, tliat if an action were brought against the receiver by his employer, that part > ! 1:1 m Stapylton v. Clougli, 1853 ; Fursdnn V. Clogg, 1842; Sussex Poer., 1844, H. L. Soo, also, post, § 708. In Smith V. Bliikoj', 18<>7, Blackburn, J., said obiter, and citing no autho- rity, that this proposition was "too broadly stated." ' Buwley v. Atkinson, 1880(Thosi- ger, li.J.). » ])oo w.Turford, 18;i?(Pavko. B.); Short 1-. Leo, 1S21 ([I'lumor, M.Il.). • Gr. Ev. § 150, iu groat part. * Barry v. Bubbington. 1792; Goss V. Watlington, 1821; "Whitna.sh v. Ooor;,'e, 1828. " llighani v. Ridgway, 1808 (Bay- lev, J.); Uoo I', liawlings, 18()() (Ld. Ellenboroiigli) ; Middloton v. Molton, 182i». 1 See l-'ostor V. M ' Mahon , 1 84 7 (Ir. ). ■" Bosve I'. Brenton, 1828; Williams V. (ieav(!s, 18;i8 (Tutteson, J.); R. (•.Worth. 18i:i(Colcridgo, J.); Clark r. Wilmot, 1841. 437 ill 1 WllKUi: ENTRY IS SOLK EVIDENCE OF CHARGE. [I'T. III. of the account which charged the receiver would be evidence against him, while the entries which showed his discharge, though not absolutely inadmissible for him, v/ould, as compared with the entries against his interest, be entitled to very little weight ; ' that in any case (and even if the law were not as just stated) the admission of the receipt of money would still be against his interest, as the balance in his favour would thereby be diminished to the extent of the sum admitted;^ that a man is little likely to charge himself for the mere purpose of getting a discharge ; ' and that, as almost all entries which are tendered in evidence as being declarations against interest are contained in accounts containing items on both sides, the objection, if allowed to prevail, would strike at the very root of the exception under consideration.* § 675. It is a question of some difficulty, and the authorities on the point are conflicting, as to whether an entry made by a party acknowledging ihe payment of money to himself, will be ad- missible as a declaration against interest, in cases where mich entry in the onlif evidence of the debt and charge of which it shows the suhscqiient liquidation. § 67(i. Some years ago such entries were twice b'^ld to be inadmissible,* but in three other eases (one of which is as recent as 1876), Lord Denman," Lord Wensleydale,' and Sir George Jessel,^ appear to have admitted such entries. The modern view will, probably, ultimately prevail ; for though while that part of an « RoG 2 Smith, L. C. 286. " ^>cc AVilliinna r. Getives (Ludlow, Sovj., aiguomlo), 1838. ^ Rowo V. Brcnton, IP'^8 (Little- dale, J.). * I'er Ld. Tenterden, in id. « Doov. Vowlcs, 18;J3 (Littlcdnle, J.) ; Doo V. Burton, 1840 (Giuney, B.). * R. V. Hondon (an undated de- cif<ion of Lord I)cnman"s), cited aif,'nond() in Doe v. Burton, 1840. ' 11. r. Ij iwer tIe^ lord. 1840, cited 2 Sin. L. C. 283. In this case Ld. Wiiisleydale, and. in that cited in the hut note, Ld. Deninan, expressly disuppvoved of Doo v, Vowies, 1833, each sayinp: that ho thon<;ht l)oe v. Vowles contrary in j>rinciple to the wull-kuowu leudiug case of Ilighum 'J. Ridgway, 1808. But Xligham v. Ridgway scarcely furnishes a safe guide ou the subject, tor there it wus proved by evidence aliunde that the service charged foi' in the acconnt had in fact been performed ; and although Ld. EUenborough first lays down the general doctrine that " the evidence was admissible upon tho broad jirin- ciple on which receivers' books have been admitted,— namely, that tho entry inaiie was in prejudice of the party making it,"— ho aiterwards, in two different parts of his judgment, adverts to the fact that the work for which tho charge wa8 made waa proved to have been done by other evidence: 10 East, 117, 119. * Taylor v. Withain, and Witham .;. Taylor, 1376. 438 CHAP. VI.] ENTRIES, EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL MATTERS. entry which is in the writer's own favour stands unconfirmed, suspicions may possibly be enlortained that the whole statement is a fiction ; ' it is highly improbable that any tradesman would first enter a false claim on one side of his book, and then admit on the other that it had been satisfied. To require corroborative proof of the claim would, too, tend to embnrrass the trial by raiciug colluteral issues, while the very impossibility of obtaining such proof is often the sole cause which renders it necessary to have recourse to the entry at all. It on the whole seems, therefore, that the admission of such entries must, alike on the grounds of justice and expediency, be regarded as a less evil than their rejection. § C77. Entiies may be received as evidence of collatvntl and indcpeixlent matters, which, though forming pnrt of a (Icclimilion against interest, are not in themselves against the interest of the declarant} For instance, in a well -known leading case,^ to prove on what day a child was born, the book of the accoucheur, who had attended the mother in her confinement, was produced, and as his charge for such attendance on a day specified was marked in the book as paid, this entry was admitted as evidence of the date of the birth, Lord EUonborough, observing, " It is idle to say that the word paid only shall be admitted in evidence without the context, which explains to what it refers : we must therefore look to the rest of the entry, to see what the demand was, which he thereby admitted to be discharged." ' Similarly in another case * the entry in a book of a deceased attorney of charges paid for a lease there stated to have been drawn on a certain day, was held to be evidence that the lease was drawn on that day. § 678.* In an action upon a joint and several promissory note for 300/., a memorandum of a partial payment made by A., indorsed by the payee upon the note in these terms, — " lieueivud of A. the sum of 1:^80/. on account of the within note, the <iOO/. having been originalhj advanced to C," — was held, in nn action by A. against B. " as a co-surety," to be, after the death of the payee, evidence not only of the payment of the money, but of the ■f > 2 Sm. L. C. 283. * Hightuu V. Kidgway, 1808. * Id. * Doe V. Robson, 1812. Soo, also. In the Goods of Tboiims, 1871. " Gr. Ev. § 152, in great pait. 439 il I H ENTRIES, EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL MATTERS, [part III. fact that C. whs the principal debtor ; leaving the efEect of such proof to be Jatermined by the jury.' § 679. In yet another oase,^ two entries were held admissible which had been made by a deceased clerk of plaintiff's attorney in the day-book of the office, by the first of which the clerk acknow- ledged the receipt of iOO/. from his employer, for the purpose of making a tender to the defendant, while the second was as follows : " Re Colnaghi, attending Mr. Lahe^ ; tendering him 100/. for each of the plates, and the etching of the Queen separately ; when he declined to let me have same, and said he had no objection to deliver up the impressions, upon payment of the expenses of making them ; " — although objection was taken to the admissibility of the second entry, on the ground that it did not charge the party making it, but "ather discharged him, as showing that he had fulfilled his duty ; that the second entry must be taken by itself, because the first did not prove the tender ; and being so taken, there was nothing to show that the clerk did not tender his own money ; in which case the entry contained nothing to charge him. And in a still earlier case' it -was held that where, to establish the existence of a customary payment, two entries in a parish book have been put in, the first of which stated the custom, and the second, which was written on the samd page, was as follows : — " Received of Ilaworth, who this year disputed this our ancient custom, but afterwards paid it, 8/.," both entries were admissible, the latter as charging the parish officers with receipt of the money, the former as immediately preceding the latter, and being referreo. to in it.* § 6«0. It must not, however, be supposed that because a docu- ment contains entries against interest, it will be admissible in proof of indcpvndeiit matters, when the entries against interest do not refer to, or require to be read, in order to explain such matters, but such matters appear as separate items unconnected with such entries.^ For instance, if an account be rendered by a steward ' Daviesv. HiTmphroys, 1840. See, alHo, Percival v. JSanson, 1851. * Marks v. Lahee, 1S;57. ' tStead )'. lleaton, ITi)-. Thiscase was said (Aldoison, 15., in Kri^lit v. Waterford, 18-10) to carry the prin- ciple on which it proceeds to the extreme verge of the law. See, also, May. of Exeter v. Warren, 1844. * See Mi'sgrave v. Emmerson, 1847. ° Per Ld. Lyndhurst, in Rudd v. ^y right, 1832. At oue time doubts 440 C. VI.] ENTRIKS NO PROOF OF INDEPENDKNT MATTERS. containing on one side items charging himself with the receipt of moneys, and on the other side items discharging him hy showing how the moneys received liad been disbursed, the discharging entries will not be admissible, unless they are necessary to explain the chaiging entries, or are expressly referred to by them.' Accord- ingly wiiere,^ to show that former lords of the manor had been liable to pay poor-rates on the tithes, the accounts of a deceased steward were tendered in evidence, and on one side of these the steward acknowledged the receipt of rent for tithes from a tenant, and on the other side had made an entry in discharge of the former item, by allowing the tenant a c 'tain sum for poor rates on the tithes, the second entry was rejected on the ground that it was not directly ooiiueoted with the first item, though made about the same time. § 68.'. .' In order that declarations against interest should be admissible, it is not necessary * that the declarant should have been competent, if living, to testify to the facts it asserts.' Neither, as regards the adnmsibility of declarations, is it material that the matters stated therein are provable by living witnesses who might have been called." Moreover, no objection can be taken to an account, in which a deceased agent charges himself with the receipt of money, on the ground that it does not appear by the account itself for whom the sums were received ; provided it can be shown alhuuR that they were in fact collected for a third person.' ?! 682. Accounts will be received in evidence, as being declara- tions of a deceased person charging himself, if they were written by him either wholly * or in part,'-* though they were not signed ; or if they were signed by him, though they were written by a I!: were unquestionably entertained on the subject. See BuUen v. Michel, 181G. ' Doe V. Beviss, 1849; "VVhaley v. Carlii'le, lK6(i (Jr.), * Knifiht V. Marquis of Waterford, 1840 (Aldorsoii. B.). The learned judge addiMl that if the amount charged had been explicitly stated to bo a sum Jess than that deducted on the other side of the account, it might pos.-^ibly have been admissible, on the authority of Stead v. Ueaton, supra. 3 Gr. Ev. § 153, in part. * Formerly it was thought other- wivse. See lligham v. liidgway, 1808 (Bay ley, J.). » Gleadow v. Atkin, 1833 ; Short V. Lee. 1821. « ]yrid,llcton V. Melton, 1829 (Parke, J.); ante, §(>41. ' Eowe V. Brenton, 1828. 8 Id. » Uoo V. Colcombe, 1841 (Cola- ridge, J.). 141 ENTRIES AUTIIOKISKD BY PAUTIC8 CHAHGED. [PART III. hU Ml l< * Mi '■ V, I 1 stranger.* So tliey will also be, though thpy were neither written nor signed by the deceased, if either direct jiroof can be furnislied that they were written by his authorised ageiit,^ or if that fact can be indirectly established, as, for instance. ^•'' ^•">wiiig that the deceased subsequently adopted the acco s his own, and delivered them in at an audit.' Nor does it signify in such a case whether the party who actually wrote the accounts bo alive or dead at the time of the trial, though, if he be alive, his non-production may be matter of observation.'* If, however, no proof can be given that the account was either written, or signed, or authorised, or adopted, by the deceased person made chargeable thereby, it cannot be received. Therefore, a rental, in which a deceased steward was debited with certain receipts, written by a party since dead, styling himself clerk to such steward, was not received as a decla- ration against the interest of the steward, no parol evidence having been given to show that he ever employed the writer to make the entries ; and it was equally inadmissible as made against the interest of the clerk, because it did not purport to charge hiin.^ After the lapse of thirty years, the handwriting o^ an account need not be proved, provided the book containing it be produced from the proper custody.^ § 683.' Where the evidence consists of entries made by persons acting for others, as agents, stewards, or receivers, some proof of mich agenc]/ is generally required, previously to their admission. Where, indeed, the office is public and must exist, the law will presume that a person who acts in it has been regularly appointed. But where it is merely private, preliminary and independent evidence must in general be adduced of its existence, and of the appointment of the particular agent or incumbent.* Even the antiquity of the book containing the entry does not, per se, afford suiticieut ground for dispensing with this preliminary proof. > Doe V. Stacey, 1833 (Tindal, C.J.). ' Bradley v. Jatner, 1S53. ' Doe V. Hawking, 1841; Doe v. Mobbs, 1841 ; May. oi Exeter v. Wairon, 1S41; Att.-Gon. v. f-Jtephens, 18,.o (Wodd. V.-C). * Doe V. Uawkins, 1841 ^Pattoson, J.). • Baron do Riitzen v. Farr, 1835. « Wynne v. Tyrwhitt, 1821 ; May. of Exeter v. Warren, 1844; Doe v. Michael, 1851; Att.-tien «. Stephena. 1855. ' Gr. Ev. § 154, in part. B iShort V. Lee, 1821 (Flumer M.II.). 442 CHAP. VI.] ENTRIES BY AGENTS — PROOF OF AGENCY. Then fnre entries have been rejected for want of it, though they wore ap|iarently made as much as fifty, seventy, and in one case, even one hundred and pixty years bnfore the trial.' Bayley, B., in rejecting an entry bearing dute 1G73, observed, " The character of the evidence must be established before the entry is read ; you cannot read it to show the position of the party making it ; that must be proved aliumle.''^ Sir Tliomas Pluraer, M.li., said, with reference to a book seventy years old, purporting to have been kept by a tithe collector named Beale, " If the writings of persona not invested with the proper characters were received, nothing could be more dangerous to property. Suppose that Boale was not the [lerson authorised to collect the tithes, but nevertheless had for some purpose made these entries ; then, if after his death the book purporting to be a collector's book was to be evidence to prove that he was collector, and his being collector was to prove the entries to be correct, the consequence would be, that the rights of the rector on the one hand, or those of the parishioners on the other, would be exposed to the greatest danger, and perhaps from the writings of a person having a contrary interest." * If, how- ever, ancient books come from the proper repository, slight proof of the official character of the writer will usually be sufficient to warrant their admission. If, too, such documents contain strong infernal evidence of their actually being what they purport to be, they may, it seems, on that ground alone, be submitted to the jury.* § 084. Declarations against pvoprietary interest include state- ments made by persons while in possession of land, explanatory of the character of their possession. Such declarations, ;/ made in disparaijemnit of (he declarant's title, are receivable, not only as original admissions against himself and all persons who claim title through him,* but also as evidence for or against strangers.' ' Manby v. Curtis, 1815; Short v. Lee, 1821; Davies v. Morsan, 1831. ' Davies v. Morfjan, 1831. » Short V. Lee, 18:^1. * Doe V. Thynne, 1808; Brnne v. Thompson, 1841 (Lrl. Denmiin) ; May. of Exeter v, Warren, 1844; Doe V. Michael, 1851; Att.-Ge . v. Stephens, 1855. See ante, § 612. * Ld. Irimlestowu «. Kemmi». 443 1843, n. L. ; Doe v. Pettett, 1821; Doe V. Austin, 1832. For American authorities, see West Cambridge v, Lexington, 1824 ; Little v. Libby, 1823; Rankin v. Teiibrook, 1837; Jackson v. Bard, 1809 ; Weidman v. Kohr, 181 S; Gibblehouse v. Strong, 1832; Davies v. Campbell, 1841; Crane V. Marshall, 1839. * Curoo V. Nicoll, 183J?; Doe ». .( ■■f !■■ :•' I ; lii I i 'y}\ h > H DECLARATIONS AGAINST PROPRIETARY INTEREST, [p. III. Whether in this latter event they are admissible in the lifetime of the declarant, or only in cases where his death can be proved, has not been distinctly decided. In most of the cases where the evidence has been receivel the declarant was dead ; ' but on two occasions, at least, the evidence was admitted, though the declarant was living.* These declarations can, it is said, only be receivable during the declarant's lifetime as being statements accompanying acts of possession, and as such constituting part of the res gestce. This argument, however, proves too much, as it would let in all declarations of the occupier, whether in disparagement or in atippnrt of his title ; an extension of the rule which (however consistent it may be with principle), is certainly not warranted by judicial decisions.' Such declarations ought to be regarded as only receivable when the declarant is dead, but as then being good primary evidence ; * and as then admissible simply on the ground that they were made against the interest of a deceased declarant.* § 685. Possession is, however, prima facie evidence of seisin in fee simple.^ Consequently, any declaration by a person in pos- sessioii that he is tenant in tail, or for life, or for years, or by sufferance, as it makes strongly against his own interest, may safely be received in evidence, on account of its probable truth,' whether such declaration be made verbally,^ or in writing,® or by deed,*" or by will (even an unproved)," or in a statement of defence '* J; Langfield, 1847 ; Doe v. Jones, 1808; Davies v. Pierce, 1787 ; Doe v. Eick- arby, 1803 ; Peaceable v. Watson, 1811; Doe v. Coulthred, 1837; Garland v. Copo, 1848 (Ir.); Mount- noy V. Collier, 1853 ; Oery v. Eed- man, 1875. ' Carne v. NicoU, 1835 ; Doe v. Jones, 1808; 7~)avie8 v. Pierce, 1787 ; Peaceable v. Watson, 1811 ; Doe v. Coulthred, 1837; Doe v. Pettett, 1821. ^ Walker v. Broadstock, 1795 (Thomson, B.); Doe v. Rickarby, 1803 (Ld. Alvanley). In Papendick V. Bridgwater, 1855, Walker v. Broadstock was denied to be law. 3 See Doe v. WainwriRht, 1838. ♦ Doe V. Langfield, 1847 (Parke, B.). » In Phillips V. Cole, 1839, Ld. Denmau, in pronouncing the judg 444 ment of the court, says : " It is clear that declarations of third peisons alive, in the absence of any com- mnnity of interest, are not to be re- ceived to affect the title or interests of other persons, mcreh/ because they are against the interests of those who make them." • Ante, § 123. ' Chambers v. Bernasconi, 1831 (lid. Lyndhurst) ; Peaceable v. Wat- son, 1811 (Sir J. Mansifield, C.J.J; Crease v. Barrett, 18 io (Parke, B.); Doe V. Langfield, 1847. * Carne v. Nicoll, 1835 ; Baron de Bode's case, 1845 ; E. v. Birming- ham, 1861 ; E. V. Exeter, 1K69. » Doov. Jones, 1808; E. v. Exeter, 1869. »" Doew. Coulthred, 1837 ; Garland V. Cope, 1848 (Ir.); Sly v. Sly, 1877. » O'SuUivan v. Burke, 1873 (Jr.). C. VI.] DKCl.ARATIONS AGAIXSI I'UOIMMr/rAKY INTKREST. to an action.' But it must relate to matters, cither within the declarant's own knowledge, or on which lie has himself formed an opinion ; and therefore a statement of defence, narrating what tho declarant has heard anothcv ponon state respecting his title, is not admissible to defeat his estate — at least if he does not add that he believes such statement to be true.* § 686, It is difficult to fix with precision how far declarations against interest are evidence of the facts contained in them. They have been received to show the name of the landlord under whom,* and the identity of the will under which,* the declarant held ; the amount of rent that was paid ; ' the fact of the payment of rent ; • the extent of the tenement that was occupied ; ' and tho fact that it was freehold and not copyhold.' Indeed, the courts seem now inclined to admit such declarations not only as proof of the interest which the declarant enjoyed in the premises, but as evidence of any fact which is not foreign to the statement against interest, and which forms substantially a part of it.° In all cases in which it is sought to give evidence of a declaration on the ground that it was a declaration against proprietary interest, it must, however, be proved that the declarant was actually in possession of the land in question ; since otherwise his declaration that he has a limited interest therein may be regarded in the. light rather of a statement in his own favour than of one against his interest.'" Still, slight evidence on this head will suffice." Therefore, where a person was seen felling timber in a wood, this act of his — though probably he was in fact a mere labourer — was held to be a sufficient assertion of ownership to raise a presumption that he was possessed of the fee, and, consequently, to let in any statement made by him as to who was the actual proprietor.'* § 687. In applying the rule that declarations against proprietari/ > !• I Id * Ld. Trimlestown v. Kemmis, 1843, H. L. ' Ld. Trimlestown v. Kemmis, 1843, H. L., by the Lds., confirming the unanimous opinion of the judges. ^ Peaceable V.Watson, 1811 ; Hol- loway V, Rakes, 1772, cited by Bullrr, J., in Davies v. Pierce, 1787 ; Doe V. Green, 1820. * Sly V. Sly, 1877. • R. V. Birmingham, 1861. • R. V. Exeter, 1869. ' Mountnoy v. Collier, 1853. • Doe V. Jones, 1808. • R. V. Birmingham, 1861. "> See Crease v. Barrett, 1835. " La Touche v. Hutton, 1875 (It.), » Doe V. Arkwright, 1833 (Parke, 445 STATI'-MKNTS IN DISP/.UAOEMRNT OF TITLE. [PAKT HI. hii'fir.sf aro n(ln)i8Hil)le, caro must bo taken to distiDgiiish botwottu Btntcineiifs made by an ocoui)ior of land in disjiunigeinent of his own titlf, ind such deolarations as niBrely go to abridge or in(!umbcr tlio property itself. Tho former arc receivable, but the latter will bo rejeeled. For instance, a Hfatemnnt by an occupier that ho is only tenant for life, will, after his death, bo admissiblo evidence against astrangpr; but an admission by him that property was intersei^tod by a j)ubIio highway, or that a neighbour had an easement over it, or that he was not entitled to common of [)asturo in respect of it, will only bind himself and those who claim under him, an<l will not be admissihlo as against his landlord or a Btranger.' The groimds for this distinction are obvious. It is Bcarcely possible to imagine any inducement which will lead a person pofsossed of premises in fee to admit that ho is only a tenant. 15ut many reasons might induce a tenant to acknowledge the existence of an easement or a highway, — espeiMally where it was either not incjonvenient, or oven absolutely beneficial to him ; ' a tenant, about to remove from one farm to another, might, for example, readily feel an interest in denying tho existence of rights attached to tho farm he was leaving, with tho view of increasing the value of those which belonged to that which he was entering.* § G81S. Entries contained in the l/ooln of dccmKcd rectors or vicars have long becm admitted as evidence hi /avo'ir of their micccumrfi.* The admi.ssihility of this class of entiios is differontly viewed. Some persons regard it as nltogelher anomalous.* Others look upon it as justified by the same princi[)lo as makes the rule which admits old leases, rent-rolls, surveys, &c., admissible." Others, again, consider that it falls within the Fame principle, viz., tho extnnie improbability of falsehood, which renders declarations against interest admissible evidence. At any rate' "it is now the settled law of the land. It in nut to be prcsiimctl, that a pcrnon, I ! • B.r.BlisM, 18,37; Scliolesi'. Oliad- vicli, lKi:i (Crenswell, J.); Ticklo V. lliowii, lH;i(i (I'litteHoii, J.); Tjijien- dick I'. Itiidgwiiter, IH.'i"). » iSi'd II. r. IJliss, 1H:57 (L(1. Don- m.in); Duniel v. North, 1809 (Lo Blanc. J ). ' I'diiumlick V. Dridgwutor, 185iJ (Erie, J.). * Sco Duly V. Wilson. 1812 (Ir.); YoiiiiK r. Clmo Il.dl. 1S,>1. ° Oiitriim V. Moiowood, 1793 (Ld. Kdiiyon). " Stotiiirt V. Drydon, WMi (I'urke, n.). ' 1 I'h. Ev. ao8, ao9. 446 Hi CHAP. VI. J ENTJtlKH IN D00K8 OF DKCKAHVA) ItKCTOKS. having a fcmporanj hifrreat onh/, ui/l innrri a fdlnchnod in his honk, from wfiich he cnii drrive no fK/nitifdt/c." ' Tlie rule i-^ixtoiids to admit, the bof)kH of occlosiusticjul corporations agf^rt'giit(»,' and, as it would seem, those also of lay imprr)priatorH in loo. With regard, however, to these last, it would certainly be open to considerable ouspioion, since a lay impropriator in fee, having a jtermanont intcrnst to advance, might possibly be induced to make evidence for his heirs.' § G8ii. Though, however, the law admits such entries by deceased persons in ecclesiastical books as evidence, juries will do well not to place implicit reliance on them. Moreover, although general observations have sometimes been made which appear to authorise the admission of any kind of statement contained in such books, they must, nevertheless, be rejected unless the entries contain receipts of money or ecclesiastical dues, or are, in other ros{)e(!ts, apparently prejudicial to the pecuniary or proprietary interests of the makers.* And further, as in other cases, jjroof will be required tliat the writer was authorised to receive the money stated, and that he is actually dead; and that the document has come from the j)roper custody.* § 600. The improbability of falsehood is again probably the principle " ujjon which the indorncmrnf by the payee of the pai/nient of interest, or of pari paijuient of tlus principal, on a bond, bill of exchange, or other negotiable security, might, under the old law, be given in evidence by bin reprenentatirrn aft(!r his death, in order to bar the Statute of Ijiinitations, or to rebut the presuinjjtion of payment that would otherwise have arisen from lapse of time. Accordingly, where such indorseni(!iit was shown to have been made before the creditor's n-nicily was inifjaired by lapse of time, it was admissible evidence of an acknowledgment;' if after that period, it was rejected.* As to how the time at whicJi the indorsement 'i\ i .', I > Short V. Loo, 1821 (Sir T. I'lum- nor, M.U.)- » 1 I'h. Kv. 470—470. » Id. 47!t, 480, and <;iihoh tliero citod. * 1 Ph. Kv. :J0:1 ; Ward v. Pomfrot, 18:{2. • Orofll. Ev. 221 ; CarrinKton v. JoQM, Ib'H; Porigul v. Nicuolsou, 1810. " IJiit lit least onn oTniiient writer upon the liiw of eviiintice tri'utH tliis cliiHH (;f ciisi'H in connection with entrieH tniide in thti (MHirms of ItiiMi- newH: 1 I'h. Kv. XiO -Xiri. ■■ Seiirlo V. Jjd. lkrrin;,'ton, 1728; UoHWoith V. Cotchett, 1H2». ' Nuwbould V. Smith, lb8y, U. L. ; 447 m' . r ir ii INDORSEMENT OF PART PAYMENT, ETC. [PART III. was made can be proved is a point upon which much contrariety of opinion has prevailed.^ § 691. Now, however, so far as notes, bills, and other writings subject to the operation of the Statute of Limitations,' are con- cerned. Lord Tenterden's Act ' enacts, that " no indorsement or memorandum of any payment written or made upon any promissory note, bill of exchange, or other writing, by or on behalf of the party to whom such payment shall be made, shall be deemed sufficient proof of such payment, so as to take the case out of the operation of the said statute." * An attempt was once made in an action by the executors of the payee of a promissory note, to extend this salutary provision beyond its legitimate limits. The plaintiffs, to defeat the Statute of Limitations, having tendered in evidence a book, in which the maker of the note had himself, by the direction of the testator, entered two payments of interest, as having been made to the testator by tlie defendant within the last six years, they were objected to, on one ground, that their receipt in evidence would violate the spirit, if not the words, of the enactment just cited. But the objection was overruled.^ § 692. With respect, moreover, to bonds and other specialties, a modern statute" has rendered nugatory the old doctrine of presump- tion of payment from lapse of time generally, by enacting that all actions of debt for rent upon an indenture of demise, all actions of covenant or debt upon any bond or other specialty, and all actions of debt or scire facias upon any recognisance, &c., shall be com- menced and sued witliin twenty years after the cause of such actions or suits ; though the Act in question contains ' a proviso, that, if any acknowledgment shall have been made, either by writing signed by the party liable by virtue of such indenture, specialty, or recognisance, or his agent, or by part payment or part satisfaction on account of any principal or interest being then due thereon,* the person entitled to such action may bring it for the Turner v. Crisp, 1728; Glynn v. Bk. of England, 1750; liriggs i. Wilson, 18o3. ' Seo cases rofcnod to, post, §§ 693 — wm. '' 21 J. 1, c. 16, ("The Limitation Act, 1623"). » » Ci. 4, 0. 14, § 3. * As to the Irish Law, see 16 & 17 V. c. 113, §§20—24. ' liradloy v. Janios, 1853. « 3&4"VV. 4, c. 42, §3. ^ In § o, as to which see post, §§ lOSIO, 1091. * In Roddam v. Morley, 1857, pav- ment of interest on a bond by the 448 C. VI.] INDORSEMENT OF PART PAYMENT ON SPECIALTIES. money remaining unpaid and so acknowledged to be due, within twenty years after such acknowledgment by writing, or part pay- ment or part satisfaction as aforesaid ; and the plaintiff may, by way of reply, state such acknowledgment, and that such action was brought within the time aforesaid in answer to a plea of the statute.* The Act contains, however, no clause corresponding with the provision in § 3 of Lord Tenterden's Act, which has just been set out. It therefore seems clear that, — provided the point be properly raised by the pleadings, — the acknowledgment of the debt afforded by the payment of interest or part payment of principal may, in the case of bonds and other specialties, be still proved in the same manner as formerly ; that is, by producing the document and showing that it bears indorsements of such payments, even though these indorsements were written or adopted bj' the creditor himself, through whom the plaintiff claims. The only difference between the old and new law is, that, whereas this evidence was formerly admissible in answer to a plea of payment, it is now received in support of a reply setting up an acknowledgment by the defendant, where the original demand has been met by a plea of the statute. § 693. It consequently may still become important to determine to. what extent and in what mannev it is necessary to adduce proof as to the time when an indorsement tendered in evidence to prove payment of interest or part payment of principal was written. Now, the whole system of admitting such indorsements in favour of parties in privity with the persons making them, is an anomaly which cannot be supported by any of the reasons whereon the admissibility of rectors' books is made to rest,^ and which, so far as regards parol instruments, has been expressly rejected by the Legislature.' And such indorsements are only admissible on tlie higlily technical ground that they were, at the time they were made, entries against I i I & 17 post, pav- y the tenant for life of certain land under the will of the obligor, was held to prevent this Htatuto from barring the action against the heirs and dovisooa in remainder, after the expiration of twenty years from the time of the bond becoming due. See Pears v. Liiing, 1871 (Hacon, V.-C). But see Coope v, Crosswoll, IHtHi ; and Dickenson v, Teasdale, 18()2. • As to Irish Law, see 16 & 17 V. c. U;i, §§2()--24. » Ante, § G88. » 9 Ooo. 4, c. 14, § 3. 449 EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF DATE OF INDORSEMENT, [p. III. 1, 1^' i::': 'n,! (he interest of the person making them, since his right was at that time unaffected by any Statute of Limitations. Under these circum- stances it is not unreasonable to contend, that the courts should require strict proof of the time when the indorsements were really made, before admitting them in evidence. In ordinary cases, the law may eafely presume that a document was written at the time it bears date. An exception to this general rule was recognized,^ under the old law of bankruptcy, in cases where a note signed by a bankrupt was put in by his assignees to support the petitioning creditor's debt, and it was required that the date of the instrument should be proved. The grounds applicable in this case would appear to apply equally to the indorse- ments under discussion,* which, if really made irithin twenty years from the date of the bond, are received (because being in such case against the interest of the obligee, they are presumed to be true) ; but, if made beyond the twenty years, are rejected (because, after the lapse of that time, it would be so obviously to the advantage of the obligee to revive, by their means, the remedy barred by the statute). It is as easy to fabricate a date as to fabricate an indorsement, of which the date forms part, and it would be a strange mode of checking such fraudulent practices to say to an obligee, " Your remedy on the bond is barred by the statute, and therefore if you now indorse upon it any admission that you have received some interest from the obligor, no credit, after your death, will be given to such admission ; but carry on your deceit one step further, and add to your indorsement a date, which will give it the semblance of having been made while your remedy was unimpaired, and then, at your death, your repre- sentatives may recover against the obligor." For these reasons it is submitted that evidence outside the instrument itself may reasonably be required. Indeed, to throw on a defendant the burthen of proving negatively that an indorsement on an instni- ment was not written on the day of the date, is in fact to shut the door upon all inquiry into the matter ; because, as the note continued in the hands of the payee or his representatives, it was ' Ante, § 169. See, also, another * See Potez exception noticed ante, §§ 169, 682. (Parke, B.). 460 V. Qlossop, 1848 -&-. CHAP. VI. 3 HOW DATE OF INDORSEMENT PROVED. scarcely possible for the maker to ascertain at what time any indorsement was written upon it. § 694, The authorities cannot be said, however, to lay down any decisive rule on the point.* A case in the House of Lords'* is usually cited' as an authority against the view above contended for. But that case is not reported, and is noticed so shortly by text writers* that the grounds of the decision cannot be ascertained. In another,* extrinsic evidence was apparently given of the time when the indorsements were made, though only one reporter (Mr. Brown) mentions it ;* and he in but a loose way. In a third case,' in addition to an indorsement signed by the obligee, a witness was called, who proved actual payment of the interest. In yet another,* the payment of interest by the obligor to a stranger -^as proved ; and many circumstances concurred to show that the in- dorsement relied upon by the plaintiffs was written on or about its alleged date, and, moreover, it signified liHle when it was written, as it was equally against the interest of the obligee at all times.* § 695. The strongest case against the view above contended for is a Nisi Prius ruling'" in which an indorsement upon a promissory note of the receipt of interest thereon (dated previously to the statute) was admitted without any extrinsic proof of the time when it was actually written ; the judge observing, that, " in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, he should assume that it was written at the time it bore date." This case has been cited with approbation by the Court of Common Pleas," and by Lord Justice Turner on a more recent occasion,'^ as supporting the general doctrine that documents are presumed to have been written at the time when they bear date. § 696. The view taken in the present work that evidence of date, 1848 ' Per Bayley, B., in Gleadow v. Atkin, 18a;i. stating the result of his own rosoai'ches. » BosT\'orth V. Cotchott, 1824, H. L. * Per Vaughan, B., in Gleadow v. Atkin, 1833. His lordship was counsel in Bosworth v, Cotchett, 1824. * 1 Ph. Ev. 333; 3 St. Ey. 824. In this last work the case is cited as Parr v. Cotchett. ' Searle v. Lord Barriugtou, 1728. • 3 Br. P. 0. 594, where the reporter says that " other circum- stantial evidence " was given to prove that the bond had not been satisfied. ' Sanders v. Movedith, 1828. • Glciidow V. Ackin, 1833. • See per Bayley, B., id. w Smith V. Battens, 1834 (Taunton, J.). " In Anderson v. Weston, 1848. » Briggs V. Wilson, 1853. IH II 451 ' ' 'I i. I ' • w. HOW DATE OF INDORSEMENT PROVED. [PART III. other than that afforded by the instrument itself, must be given, is, however, supported by the language of Lord Ellenborough,' where, in refusing to admit in evidence a certain indorsement, the date of which was not proved, but which displaced evidence already given on the other side, his lordship said, " I think you must prove that these indorsements were on the bond at or recently after the times when they bear date, before you are entitled to read them. * * * If such indorsements were receivable whensoever they may have been written, this would be allowing the obligee to manufacture evidence for himself to contradict the fact of payment. I have been at a loss to see the principle on which these receipts, in the handwriting of the creditor, have sometimes been admitted as evidence against the debtor ; and I am of opinion they cannot be properly admitted, unless they are proved to have been written at a time when the effect of them was clearly in contradiction to the writer's interest." § 696a. Perhaps the safest rule that can be laid down on this subject is, that if the indorsement appear hi/ its date to have been written within the twenty years, the question may be left to the jury, under all the circumstances of the case, whether it were really so written;* the law raising no presumption either way. In equity, however, the fact is one for the judge to determine.' » Eose V. Biyant, 1809. » See per Vaughan, B., in Glea- dow V. Atkin, 1833. * See Newbould v. Smith, 1889, luL. 452 I !/. ■ A'' CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 4521 AMERICAN NOTES. Declarations against Interest. — A well established exception to the rule excluding hearsay is that which admits as evidence of the facts therein stated, declarations of a deceased person when made in derogation of his pecuniary or proprietary interest. Entries by a deceased agent of the receipt of rent from a tenant are evidence of the occupation of the demised premises by the ten- ant. Jones i>. Howard, 3 All. '223 (18G1). A receipt given by a sheriff for money paid him by a judgment debtor to redeem land sold on execution is competent evidence of the fact, date, amount and parties to the payment, not only us an entry in the course of otHcial business, but as a declaration against interest. "The receipt was admissible on another ground. The ofttcer thereby charged himself with the money, and rendered him- self accountable for it to the creditor. It was an admission against his interest, made in respect to a matter pertaining to his official duty. Written memoranda, made under sucli circumstances, may reasonably be assumed to be truthful, and are evidence after the death of tlie party who made them, as well of the fact against his interest, as of the other incidental and collateral facts and cir- cumstances mentioned, and are admissible irrespective of the fact whether any privity exists between the person who made them and the party against whom they are offered." Livingston r. Arnoux, 66 N. Y. 507, 519 (1874). So of a sheriff's receipt for the purchase-money of a lot recited to have been sold some three years before. " Upon tlie same prin- ciple and for the same reason, tlie receipt of the sheriff for the purchase-money, although made long after the occurrence of the transaction, and after he was out of office, was admissible, and ought to have been allowed by the Court to go to the jury as evi- dence. Declarations of this cliaracter are received in consequence of the death of the party making them. They embrace not only entries in books, but all other declarations or statements of facts, whether verbal or in writing, and whether they were made at the time of the fact declared or at a subsequent day. To render them admissible, it must appear that the declarant is deceased, that he possessed competent knowledge of the facts, or that it was his duty to know them, and tlie declarations were at variance with his interests." Field v. Boynton, 33 Ga. 239 (1862). In an action betv. en third parties, to show the deposit of money in the banking establishment of Bassett & Bassett, an entry on their books in the handwriting of a deceased clerk showing the receipt of certain deposits is com])etent. Heidenheimer r. John- son, 76 Tex. 200 (1890). "In connection with the entry offered in 1 : I 1? 4522 AMElilCAN NOTES. [PAKT 111. l{ iv',,p 1' J n I ;1. this case, it was proved that the entry was in the handwriting of one Kobertson, a bookkeeper for Bassett & liassett, who was then dead; and also that Jett'erson Bassett, of tlie firm of Bassett & Bassett, was also dead. It appeared in evidence that the other ni jniber of the firm was not dead, but no objection was made to the evidence upon that ground. It did not appear that he had any knowledge of tlie transaction, and if such objection had been urged it would probably have been shown that he took no part in the management of the business of the firm and knew nothing of its details. The ett'ect of the entry was to charge the firm of Bassett & Bassett with the sum of $5200, and was clearly against their interest." On the question of the nature of a possession of certain ])rem- ises, evidence is competent that a deceased tenant charged himself, in favor of the demandant's title, with the proceeds of timber cut. "Of the same nature, and of additional force upon another ground, are the entries in his books, in which he charges himself, as in favor of those parties, with the avails of the timber cut from the land; because such a charge is, for this additional cause, against his interest, rendering him accountable for a sum of money. The admissibility of entries made against the interest of the party making them at the time, as evidence between other parties, upon the ground of their being against such interest, is established by many cases in which the principle has been discussed and ap- plied." Rand ('. Dodge, 17 N. H. 343, 360 (1845). A receipt by an attorney for money paid in settlement of a claim is evidence in a suit between third parties of the payment of the money. Sherman v. Crosby, 11 John. 70 (1814). So a guardian may put in receipts of persons to whom money has been paid by him as prima facie evidence of payment. "It cannot be expected, and never is required, that for money charged in the account of a guardian or administrator, he shall be held to the trouble and expense of charging the estate with a multitude of witnesses." Shearman v. Akins, 4 Pick. 282, 293 (1826). Declarations by a deceased owner of land to the effect that his wife had "sold all the property out of his hands," under a power of attorney given her for another purpose but that they had compro- mised the matter, are relevant as between third parties, because against the proprietary interest of the declarant. Bowen v. Chase, 98 U. S. 254 (1878). So of a declaration by a tenant that her interest is for life. Lamar v. Pearre, 90 Ga. 377 (1892). A declaration of a deceased husband that he had cancelled an antenuptial agreement with his present wife is admissible in an action between her and a third party as being against interest, I- i CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 4523 because tending to reduce the amount of property over which the declarant had disposition and control. Hosford v. Rowe, 41 Minn. 245 (1889). So a party's admission of a debt is competent evidence between third persons. " A declaration, though made by a stranger to the suit, may sometimes be used when the fact which it tends to estab- lish is relevant to the case, and the declaration is against the inter- est of the party making it, and he is dead. Men do not falsely admit debts against themselves; and it is this presumption wliieh induces the law to admit such a declaration." Bartlett c. Patton, 33 VV. Va. 71, 82 (1889). Where the plaintiff's deceased husband had entered on a cash- book the receipt of rent from the defendant, it was lield that the declaration was admissible as against interest though the effect of admitting the evidence was liighly favorable to the plaintiff. "1 think it very clear that the entries in question are prima facie entries made by Mr. Turner against his interest, and so admis- sible, whatever value they may be." Turner o. Dewan, 41 (.}. B. U. C. 361 (1877). The statement by A., an insolvent debtor, that B. is not his partner, is against A.'s pecuniary interest, as it puts the entire burden of the indebtedness upon himself. Such a declaration is therefore admissible between third parties. "It is an established rule of evidence, that while, in ordinary cases, the mere declarations of a person as to a particular fact are not evi- dence of that fact, being regarded as hearsay; yet declarations made by a person which are at variance with his pecuniary or pro- prietary interest, are admissible in evidence of their own truth, under certain circumstances. These conditions are, that the de- clarant possessed competent knowledge of the facts, and is deceased at the time his declarations are proposed to be proved. The ab- sence of any motive of a pecuniary nature, which would tempt him to falsehood, creates a strong and intrinsic probability of the truth of his declaration; and it is, therefore, admitted as secondary evi- dence, after the death of the declarant, being tlie best which the nature of the case will, under the peculiar circumstances, permit." Humes v. O'Bryan, 74 Ala. 64, 78 (1883). To prove the existence of a debt between third parties, the declaration of the alleged debtor that he owed it is competent. " The declarations were made by a man, upon the subject in con- troversy, against his interest, and when he could have no conceiv- able interest to declare that wliich was not true." Peace v. Jenkins, 10 Ired. 355 (1849); Swan v. Morgan, 88 Hun, 378 (1895). So to prove payments of money to A., the receipt of his deceased attorney acknowledging such payments are admissible, on an action between third parties, to prove the fact and dates of payment. (^ 452* AMERICAN NOTES. [part in. Wh Taylor r. Gould, 67 Pa. St. 152 (18G8). "The objection is that it was hearsay evidence. ]5iit it had been proved that the attorney was dead. If there is anything settled, it is that the rule exclud- ing hearsay evidence does not apply to oral or written declarations of deceased persons made against their interest." Lowry /■. Moss, 1 Strob. 03 (1840). To prove the purchase by B. of A.'s one-half interest in certain property, entries made by showing the receipt of the nioney and other facts relating to the transaction, are, together with policies of insurance taken out by him on the property, competent in a suit between third parties. " While the general rule is, that the declarations of a person, as to a transaction with another, being regarded as hearsay, do not bind a third person, whose rights are involved, such declarations, when contrary to the pecuniary or pro- prietary interest of the declarant, and he is deceased, are compe- tent evidence against third persons, though their rights may be aft'ected. The entries, and the representations in the policies as to the ownership, were declarations of H. C. Hart, against his pro- prietary and pecuniary interests, showing that he had sold an interest and received payment, and were relevant to the issue of adverse possession." Hart v. Kendall, 82 Ala. 144 (1886). Henekicial Declaration's against Interest. — It frequently happens that a declaration apparently clearly against the interest of the declarant, when made, is really either at the time, or later, highly beneficial. The general rule under such circumstances is, that the declara- tion is admissible if prima facie against the interest of the declar- ant, even if, in certain contii.gencies, to his advantage. Still, wL. i"e a deceased person had signed and placed among his own papers what purported to be a receipt signed by himself, acknowledging the receipt of .f 48 as interest on £300, it was held liable to the objection of manufacturing evidence in his own favor, in a suit involving the question whether this £300 was a loan or the purchase-money of an annuity. Ganton v. Size, 22 Q. B. U, C. 473 (1863). The court say: — " It contains an admission to the extent of £12 against the maker, but it contains also an admission of £300 directly in his favour, so that it is by mere pecuniary com- putation twenty-five times more in his favour than it is against him; and to say that this is an admission against interest is to read the authorities to which we have been referred backward, for nothing can be more unlike the entry of forty years' standing made by so disinterested a party as was the case in Higham v. Ridgway, or more unlike the entry of nearly thirty years so completely against the maker's interest as was the case in Gleadow v. Atkin, than this memorandum made by the person who only could be directly bene- fited by it, and made so very shortly before litigation did take CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 4526 place upon it." Ihid. To tlie same effect. Confederation Life Ass'n. of Canada v. O'Donnell, 13 Can. Supreme Ct. 218, 225 (1886). It has been found necessary to alter the rule admitting beneficial declarations prima facie against interest in at least one particular. Where the effect of endorsing the receipt of money upon a bill of exchange, promissory note, bond or other specialty would, if made at a certain time, operate to remove the bar of tlie statute of limi- tations, it has been held that the endorsement, though prima facie against the interest of the declarant, is in reality so greatly and obviously in his favor as to warrant the courts in requiring that it should be affirmatively shown by evidence dehors the endorsement itself that it was made at a time when it actually was against the interest of the declarant to make it. Roseboom v. Billington, 17 Johns. 182 (1819); I3eatty v. Clement, 12 La. Ann. 82 (1857). Where the endorsement must have been made before the run- ning of the statute, it is competent. "The endorsement was then clearly against his interest, furnishing proof that he had received part of the contents of the note. This never could have been done, if the sum endorsed had not been paid." Coffin v. Bucknam, 12 Me. 471 (1835); Beatty v. Clement, 12 La. Ann. 82 (1857); Ad- dams V. Seitzinger, 1 W. & S. 243 (1841). " With this qualification, such evidence cannot operate injuri- ously; for it is not to be supposed that a creditor could so far mis- take his interest as to sacrifice a part of his debt to save the residue, when no part of it was in danger." Addams v. Seitzinger, 1 W, & S. (Pa.) 243 (1841). The rule as to endorsements upon specialties was statutory in England, 9 Geo. IV., Ch. 14, § 3. Similar statutes have been enacted in many of the United states. The same rule has been applied to an open account. Where the account sued on would be barred by the statute of limitations, unless the bar was removed by partial payments, the courts refuse to receive entries of such payments as credits by a deceased part- ner upon the firm books as sufficient evidence of the payment. Libby V. Brown, 78 Me. 492 (1886); Hancock v. Cook, 18 Tick. 30 (1836). Declarant must be Dead. — The supreme court of Connectij- cut, in excluding declarations of a living person made against his then existing interest, say : — " These declarations are from a person, not a party, or a witness, and who might have been called as gi witness. The general rule is, that if the party whose declarations are offered, is living, and can be a witness, his declarations are not evidence." Fitch v. Chapman, 10 Conn. 8 (1833). " If these declarations were offered as the declarations of de- ceased persons, while occupying the premises, they would have ( I I : i 1 1 ft' ii- i ,1 ' ^ "Mrs! 452« AMERICAN NOTES. [PAItT m. been therefore admissible. On the other hand, if they were offered as the declarations of persons now alive, they ought to be rejected." Currier v. Gale, 14 Gray (Mass.) 504 (18G()); Lowry V. Moss, 1 Strob. 63 (1«4G); Trammell v. Hudnion, 78 Ala. 2'J2 (1HH4). Hut it has been held that where the declarant is a firm consist- ing of two persons, and the only one familiar with the business is deceased, the evidence is competent, in the absence of objection on that specific ground. Heidenheimer v. Johnson, 76 Tex. 200 (ISUO). The suggestion has been made that these declarations are re- ceived from tlie necessity of the case, the declai-ant being dead. "The declaration made by Worthington — that Hudmon had paid liim all he owed, and that nothing remained due — altliough competent as an admission against the defendant, was not binding on a third person wliose rights might be affected by it. Such declarations, although made against interest, are regarded as mere hearsay, except when it is shown that the declarant is since de- ceased, and then they are admitted only on the principle, that they constitute the best evidence of which the nature of the case will admit." Trammell v. Hudmon, 78 Ala. 222 (1884). Natiike of the Lvtekest. — The interest of the declarant must, as in England, be pecuniary or proprietary. A power to dispose of property by will is regarded as a proprie- tary interest, and declarations tending to reduce the amount are within the rule. Hosford v. Rowe, 41 Minn. 245 (1889). A mere receipt by a bailee for certain uunds wliich charges him, if at all, only for gross negligence in their custody, is not, being "contingent and improbable," a declaration against interest. Tate V. Tate, 75 Va. 522, 5;i2 (1881). But a statement by A., a person since deceased, that certain property in his possession is owned by B. is competent. Walker V. Marseilles, 70 Miss. 283 (1892). Interest other than proprietary or pecuniary is not within the scope of the rule. A statement against the social or moral inter- est of the declarant is not comi)etent. On an indictment for murder, declarations by the deceased in favor of the accused, not made in articulo mortis or admissible as dying declarations, are not admissible for the accused, as declara- tions against interest. "The record shows that this testimony was sought to be introduced as containing the dying declaration of the deceased; but this proposition is so palpably indefensible, that it is abandoned here, and its attempted introduction sought to be justified on the ground that they were declarations made against the declarant's interest, and therefore admissible here, as in civil proceedings. This doctrine has never received the sanction of any CHAP. VI.] AMERICAN NOTES. 452T it be list vil my court, 80 far as we are advised, nor does the able and acute counsel titter any support derived from reason. Wv, cannot see tiie sliglit- est analogy between declarations made against interest by a suitor in a civil proceeding and declarations by a slain man, not made in ai'tlciilo mortiH under a sense of impending dissolution, and after an abandonment of all hope by tlie declarant. How any declara- tion can be said to be against the interest of a man already passed into the other world, and beyond the reach of every earthly tri- bunal and all earthly power, is wholly incomprehensible by us." Helm V. State, G7 Miss. 502, 572 (IHUO). A statement by a person, "on his death bed," that he had killed the deceased is not admissible on behalf of the accused. " It was but hearsay." West v. State, 76 Ala. 98 (1884). A., when accused of larceny, cannot prove by a witness present that B. admitted having stolen part of the goods. "The court would not admit it — saying it was no more than hearsay. If a person other than the defendant had stolen the goods, it was un- doul)tedly competent to the defendant to prove the fact, in excul- pation of himself — but not by the mode of proof now offered." Com. V. Chabbock, 1 Mass. 143 (1804). It has, however, on the contrary, been held that a declaration by an offender that he has committed a serious criminal offence, will be admitted as evidence of that fact in an action between third parties. Coleman v. Frazier, 4 Rich. (S. C.) 14(5 (1850). " I think it is true that a declaration, made by the party who does the act, as in this case stealing the letter containing the money, is admissible. It is very true that the rule that, where an entry or declaration, made by a deceased person, is against the interest of the party making it, it is admissible as evidence, was qualiiied by Gilchrist & King V. Martin & West (Bail. Eq. 492), and waa restricted to cases where there was no interest to falsify the fact that it was made against the interest of the person making it, and that the entry or declaration was so ancient as to preclude suspicion that it was manufactured for the occasion. Under it alone, therefore, this declaration would not be admissible. But when it is remembered that this is not of a matter of business, like those spoken of in that case, but was a criminal act, of which none could be so cogni- zant as the party, I think a reason will be found for its admission arising out of the rule, as qualified in the case just alluded to. The admission of such testimony arises from necessity, and the certainty that it is true, from the want of motive to falsify. Both these are apparent here." FouM OF Declaration. — The declaration may be oral. Hos- ford V. Rowe, 41 Minn. 245 (1889) ; Humes v. O'Bryan, 74 Ala. 64 (1883). If 4528 AMEKICAN NOTKS. [PAliT III. « S-'S it ^ ml 5 ' «! »ih ,.; In Massachusetts a distiiiotioii outaius between deolarations against ptiouniary and those against proprietary interest. As to pecuniary interest, the unusual ruh? prevails that the dechiration must be in the form of writing. Thus, where a suit was brought to recover back the amount of a tax collected by the defendant, a collector of taxes, from the plaintiff, who claimed to have paid the same to the defendant's predecessor in office, evidence was rejected of oral statements by the deceased collector that he had received the amount of the plaintiff's tax. " It was argued," the couit say, "that this was within another exception to the rule respecting hearsay, viz. that the admission was made by the collector, in a matter against his interest at the time, inasmucih as it rendered liim liabh* to the town as for so much money collected. . . . lUit as we think this has been confined wholly to the case of entries made in books, or other receipts, documents, or written memo- randa, made by a person deceased, in relation to a matter contrary to his interest at the time, and which went to diarge him with some debt or duty. ... It was founded mainly on the considera- tion of tlie clearness and certainty of such written nn^moranda, made by a party, against his interest, in contradistinction to the looseness and uncertainty of verbal statements, or even of letten;." Lawrence /•. Kimball, 1 Mete. oL'i (1<S4()), relying on Franiingham Mfg. (\i. /•. Harnard. '2 Tick. r>:VJ: {\H'2A); JoiiesV. Howard, li All. L'L'.'i (1S()1). Tlie same strictness is not ajtiilied to declarations in derogati(m of proprietary interest. Such declarations may be oral. Tlius, on an issue involving the nature oi' A.'s possession, the statement of H., wliile occupying the land, that he was merely holding as a ten- ant of A., is competent. "We are of opinion, that this (juestion was admissible asa-es gestie. It is true that this was a declaration only, and consisted in words; but they were words qualifying his act of possession and in dis]iarageuu'nt of his own title, so far as that circumstance is of importance." Marcy v. Sione, 8 Gush. 4 (ISr.l). Not Admissions. — To speak of declarations against interest as "admissions '' seems unnecessarily confusing. The statement of a relevant fact by a party is itself a fact, which, under the name of an "admission," the rules of procedure, the "rules of the game," so to speak, constitute a waiver of proof. Certain rules of posi- tive law, relating to privity, agency, &c. , enable the statements of persons standing in certain definite relations to a party to be received, under jjrojier circumstances, as being equally binding \ipon him as if made by himself. An admission is not necessarily against the interest of tlie party. Its force in evidence, like that of a presumption of law, is not CHAP. VI.] AMKlllCAN NOTKS. 4r)2» V):ised on logic, but upon procedure. It is not a pnOutlo ; it is a Iciutmen jirobationis ; — not ])r()of, but a waiver of it. The declaration against interest is made by a person, not a party, or enabled by privity or agency to speak for the party. It is not, therefore, an admission in any proper sense. Its proba- tive force is due to the observed fact that men do not, as a ruh^, state what is against their interest — unless it is true. Very possibly tliis is an "admission " in the popular, colhxiuial ns(! of the word ; — but not in any sense that is of value to the law of evidence. The rule now under discussion goes beyond privity or agency; it makes the declaration evidence between tliird parties. As was said in Currier v. Gale, 14 Gray (Mass.) .'>()4 (IHGO), speaking of tlie declarations of one in possession of land that he held merely as tenant of another, "The defendant insists that it was compe- ' tent, luider the general rule of admitting the declarations of a party in possession, adverse to his own interest. Sucii decliirations have in various forms and under different (nrcMimstances been decuned admissible. Tlie principle upon whicli they are held admissible is not very clearly settled. Wlien the declaration has been accompanied witli an act pointing out some monument or existing mark of boundary, it lias been allowed. So also as evi- dence against the party making the declaration, and all persons in l»rivity with liim, or claiming under him, it is comptttent. l>\it the adjudicated eases go somewhat further, and hold tiiat his declara- tion in disparagement of his apparent title, as indicated liy liis possession, may be used as evidence that his occupation was an occupation uiuler another person, and tlius make his ])ossession to avail in favor of the person stated by him to be his landlord." A limitation upon the rule tliat only as to facts of long standing are sucli declarations comj)etent, has been attempted. Gilchrist )\ ]\Iartin, I Rich. (S. C.) K>\. W2 (IS.",]). The rule has been held, in the sanui state, to apply to criminal acts. Coleman r. Frazier, 4 Rich. (S. C.) 140 (lsr»(»). "I think it is true that a declart'ition, made by the party wlio does the act, as in this case stealing the letter containing the money, is admissible. It is very true tliat the rule that, where an entry or declaration, made by a deceased person, is against the interest of i\w party mak- ing it, it is admissible as evidence, was qualified by Gilchrist & King *'. Martin & Wtist (Hail. Kq. 4i)L'), and was restricted to cases where there was no interest to falsify the fact that it was made against the interest of the person making it, and that the entry or declanir tion was so ancient as to preclude suspicion that it was manufac- tured for the occasion. Under it alone, therefore, this declaration would not be admissible. But when it is remembered that this is il 'I 51. . 'I 45210 AMERICAN NOTES. [part III. not of a matter of business, like those spoken of in that case, but was a criminal act, of which none could be so cognizant as the party, I think a reason will be found for its admission, arising out of the rule, as qualitied in the case just alluded to. The admission of such testimory arises from necessity, and the certainty that it is true, from the ' .*nt of motive to falsify. Both these are apparent here." Coleman v. Frazier, 4 Rich. 146 (1850). Apparently no such modi- fications have been generally adopted. r, I .1 ',■' ! ■ h\ CH. VII.3 DECLARATIONS IN BUSINESS, WHY ADMISSIBLE. CHAPTER VII. DECLARATIONS IN THE COURSE OF OFFICE OR BUSINESS. § 697. The class of cases which forms the fifth exception to the general rule, that hearsay evidence must be rejected,' consists of declarations in discharge of duty in the ordinary course of business or professional employment. The rule is very commonly, but inaccurately, stated to be that all entries " made in the ordinary course of business " are admissible. But this is not so, and entries gratuitously made by a man, even in the ordinary course of business, merely for his own satisfaction, and not in the discharge of any duty, will not be admissible in evidence after his death.* The considerations which have induced the courts to recognise this exception apjKVii' to be principally these: — that, in the absence of all suspicion of sinister motives, a fair presumption arises that entries made n the ordinary routine of duty are correct, since, the process of invention implying trouble, it is easier to state what is true than what is false ; that such entries usually form a link in a chain of circumstances which mutually corroborate each other; that false entries would be likely to bring clerks into disgrace with their employers ; that as most entries made in the course of duty are usually subject to the inspection of several persons, an error would be exposed to speedy discovery ; and that as the facts to which they relate are generally known but to few persons, a relaxa- tion of the strict rules of evidence in favour of such entries may often prove convenient, if not necessary, for the due investigation of truth.8 I I (fl ' It will be recollocted that there are six such exceptions. See ante, § 607. • See Hope v. Hope, 1893, 0. A. » Poolo V. Dicas, 18;!.} fTindal, O.J.); 1 Ph. Ev. 319; 1 St. Ev. 348, 349. 153 in " I 111 r-m 'I I' ', 8' i DECLARATIONS IN COURSE OF BUSINESS [PAliT III. § 098,* One of the earliest cases,^ illustrative of this subject, was an action for beer sold and delivered. The plaintiff was a brewer, and to prove the delivery it was shown that, in the usual course of plaintiff's business, it was the duty of his draymen to come every night to the clerk of the brewhouse, and give him an account of the beer delivered during the day, which he entered in a book kept for that purpose, to which the draymen set their hands. An entry in this book, stating the delivery of the beer in question, and signed by a drayman, whose signature and death were proved, was put in, and was held to be suiRcient evidence to maintain the action. This decision has since been followed in many cases. For example, the service of a notice to quit has been held, after his death, to be sufficiently proved by the indorsement of service upon a copy of the notice, made by the attorney who served it ; it being shown to be the ordinary course of business in his office to preserve copies of such notices, and to indorse the Bervice thereon.* § 699. Similarly, it has been held that a payment of rates is sufficiently shown by an entry of the receipt of rates made in his book by a deceased clerk of a collector, who had been duly appointed ; * that the dishonour of a bill of exchange by the acceptor, and notice thereof to the indorser, is proved by entries in the books of the messenger of a bank, and of the clerk of a notarj', shown to have been made in the usual routine of business ; * and, upon like proof, proof of a letter having been sent, and (after notice to the other side to produce it) of its contents, is afforded by the letter-book of the plaintiff, a merchant, in which a deceased clerk had inserted what purported to be the copy of a letter to the defendant, and had further made a men)orandum stating that he had sent such letter.** » Or. Ev. § 116, in pnrt. » Price V. Torriiigtou, 1703 (Ld. Holt) ; 1 Sin. L. C. '211. See, also, Pitman v. Maddox, 1(598 ; Rowcroft V. Basset, 1802 (liO Blunc, J.). ^ Doo V. Turford, 18;{2 ; R. v. Copo, 18;}5 (Ld. UonmanJ ; R. v. Dukin- tield, 1848; Stapyiton v. Clough, 18o;). * R. V. St. Mary, Warwick, 1853. » Sutton t'. (Jregory, 1797 (Ld. Kenyon) ; Poole v. IJicas, 1836 ; Nichols?.. Welib, 1823 (Am.); Welch V. Barrett, 1819 (Am.); llalliduy v. Miirtinett, 1822 (Am.); Butler v. Wright, 1829 (Am.); Hart <;. Wil- liams, 1829 (Am.); Nicholls v. Gold- smith, 1831 (Am.). » Prittj'.Fuirclough. 1812; Tinge- dorn V. Rcid, 1813. See, also, Champ- neys v. Pock, 1816; Doo v. Lang- tield, 1847 ; East Union Ry. Co. v. Symonds, 1850. But see Rowlaada V. De Vecchi, 1882 (Day, J.). 4.51- CHAP. VII.] MUST BK MADE IN DISCHARGE OF DUTY. On the same principle, where a pohce-constahle had, in the couise of his duty, made a verbal report to his inspector, stating where he was going and what he was about to do. proof of such report was held to be admissible evidence for the Crown on the trial of an in- dictment charging the prisoner with the murder of the policeman.' § 700. Of late years, great (ii-siiiclination has been evinced by the courts to extending the principle of allowing entries which have been made in pursuance of duty in the ordinary course of business to be admitted as evidence further than the decisions have already carried it.^ Accordingly, it has (as already mentioned) been held that, to be admissible, an entry by a deceased person must have been made in pursuance of some duf;/.^ It has further been held necessary that the person who made such entry should not only have done so in the course of some duty, but should also have had personal knowledge of the statements contained therein.^ In accordance with this latter principle, in an action'' for the price of coals sold at the pit's mouth, an entry, made in the folluwiug manner, was rejected. In ordinary course, it was the duty of one of the workmen at the pit to give notice to the foreman of the coal sold ; and the foreman, who was not present when the coal was delivered, and who was unable to write, used to employ one Bald- win to make entries in the books from Ids dictation, and Biihlwin read them over every evening to the foreman. The ioreinan and the workman, whose duty it was to give notice to him, being both dead at the time of the trial, Baldwin was called to produce the book, to prove thereby the delivery of the coal in question. Such book was, however, held inadmissible, since the entries, although having been made under the foreman's direction tliey might be regarded as made by him, as suoli foreman had no personal knowledge of the facts stated in them, but derived his informa- ' R V. Buckley, 1873 (Lush and Mellor, JJ.). 2 See Doo v. Skinnor, 1848; Smith V. Blakov, 1807 ; The Henry Coxon, 1878 ; Massoy v. Allen, 1879. ' Hope V. Hope, 1893, C. A., where it is pointed out that the case of Rawlins v. Rickards, 1860 fin which it was held that an entry by a de- ceased solicitor in his diary, noting the fact of his having attended a client on a certain d'ly on her exe- cuting a deed of appointment was admissible in evidence), is of very doubtful authority, since it is ex- tremely hard to see in that case what (hill/ the solicitor was under to make the entry ; see also Bright n. Logertou, 18()()-1, and Kerin r. D.ivoren, 1601 (Ir.). * Ryan v. Ryan, 1£8!) (Ir.). ' Brain v. Preece, 1843. '' I 455 It'! ii h r i i- . i'' P LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF RULE. [PART III. tion at second-hand from the workman, did not possess the same guarantee for the truth of the entries as existed in the cases establishing the principle of receiving entries by a deceased person in the usual course of business, — in all of which cases the party making the entry had himself done the business, a memorandum of which he had inserted in his book. § 701. Where, to show that a Jew was of age, it was proved that Jewish children are usually circumcised on the eighth day from their birth, and that it belongs to the office of the chief llabbi to perform this rite, and to make an entry thereof in a book kept at the synagogue, and upon proof that the Rabbi was dead, this book was tendered in evidence, it was rejected, probably on the ground (none is stated in the report) that there was no legal dufi/ to make the entry ; ' while in another case,^ an entry made by a deceased employer in a book in which he had in the course of his business been in the habit when hiring farm servants of always entering the time and terms of such hiring, was -'ected. The decision in this last case was expressly (while, as we have seen, that in the case of the Rabbi was probably) on the ground that, although it might be the practice, it was not the duty, of the person who, in fact, generally did so, to make such entriep § 702. The Legislature itself has, in at least one instance, recognised and acted upon the exception under discussion.^* For the statute, which regulates the Civil Bill Courts in Ireland,' enacts that " a book or books shall be kept by every officer appointed for the service of process, in such form as el .,11 be directed or approved by the chairman or assistant barrister; in which shall be entered the names of the plaintiff and defendant by or against whom any process shall be issued, the cause of action, the day on which such process shall be received to be served, the day on which such process shall be served or execute'I, the place where, and the name or description of the person on or with whom, such process shall be served or left, and in case any such process shall not have been duly served or left, then the cause of such person in the course of his duty or business, to bo I'eceived as evidence. » 14 & 15 V. c. 57 ("The Civil ly.wmcn Bill Courts (Ireland) Act, 1851"), deceased § 10. 456 > Davis V. Lloyd, 1844. » B. V. Worth, 1843. '• -'. <"., the oxcM^ption to the general rulo afjiuiiNt admitting hearsay, which allows entries made by a C. VII.] ENTRIES AND ACTS MUST BE CONTEMPORANEOUS. service not having been efFccted shall be stated; and each and every process-officer shall attend, and produce such book or books to the chairman or assistant barrister, at each and every sessions of the peace, or shall cause such book or books to be produced to such chairman or barrister in case of the unavoidable ahueuce of such process-officer; and in case of the death y illness, or such absence as aforesaid of any such piv^jess-officer, the book or books of such process-officer, kept by him as aforesaid, verified on oath as to his handwriting by some credible person, shall be produced at the sessions, aud phall there be prima facie evidence of the truth of the several matters entered therein as aforesaid." § 703. The rules which regulate the reception of entries as made by a deceased person in the regular course of business, are, in many respects, the same as those which prevail with respect to declarations against interest. For instance, the death/ the handwriting, and the official character,^ of the person who made the entry must be proved ; and it should further appear that he had no motive to misstate. In some other particulars, however, a marked distinc- tion exists between the two classes of cases. § 704. In the first place, to render entries made in the course of office or business admissible, they must, — unlike declarations against interest, — be proved to have been made contemporaneously with the acts tihich they relate? " It is to be observed," said a learned judge, " that in the case of an entry against interest, proof of the handwriting of the party, and of his death, is enough to authorise its reception ; at whatever time it was made it is admis- sible : but in the other case [of an entry made in the course of business], it is essential to prove that it was made at the time it purports to bear date; it must be a contemporaneous entry."* The word " contemporaneous," does not mean that the entry mrst have been made at the immediate time of the occurrence ; but it will be sufficient if made within so short a time after as reasonably to be considered part of the transaction. Thus, if the business be ' See Cooper r. Marsdon, 1793 (Ld. Kenvon). See ante, § (j(J9. » i)oe«. Wittcomb. IHol. » Eyan v. llyiin, 1889 (Ir.); Doe V. Beviss, 18-18; Due v. bkiuDer, 1848 (Pdike, B,). « I'aiko, 15.. -n Doe v. Turford, 1832; approved ly Park, J., in Pjole V. Dicas, 1835. 467 ii. . f ENTRIES NO EVIDENCE OF INDEPENDENT MATTERS, [p. III. dono in the morning, and the entry be made in the nvening of the same day,' or perhaps even on the following morning,^ it will be sufficient. Where, however, several intermediate days had elapsed between the date of the transaction and the time of inserting an entry of it in the book, the evidence has been rejected ; ^ and in one American case, the interval of a single day was held to con- stitute a valid objection.* The fact that the entry was made contemporaneously may, like any other fact, be established either by direct testimony, or by proof of any circumstances sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that such was the case.' § 705. Secondly, while declarations against interest are often admissible to prove independent matters, which, though forming part of the entry, are not in themselves against the interest of the declarant," a stricter rule prevails with respect to official or business entries. For, " whatever effect may be due to an entry made in the course of office, reporting facts necessary to the performance of a duty, the statement of other circumstances, however naturally they may be thought to find a place in the narrative, is no proof of those circumstances."' Accordingly, a certificate of a deceased sheriff's officer, which had been returned by him to the office in the ordinary routine of his duty, and which specified, among other circumstances connected with the arrest, the phice where it happened, was held not to be evidence to show the particular spot where the caption took place, that circumstance being a mere incideut of the performance of the officer's duty." " This decision turned on the circumstance that the sheriff's officer was going beyond the sphere of his duty when he made an entry of the ^^/rtce of arrest, and that euch an entry therefore had no claim to be leceived as evidence of that fact." 9 § 706. Some persons, indeed, have contended that the admissi- mi. :..Ji. ' Price V. Tomngton, 1703; Eay V. Jones, 1836 ; Curien v. Crawford, 1818. * Ingrahamv. Bockins, 1823fAm.V ^ Forsythe v. Norcross, 1836 ( Am.l. « Walter v. Bollman, 1839 (Am.). Contra, in England, The Henry Coxon, 1878. " lOast Union Ey. Co. v, Symonds, 1850. « Ante, §§ 667—679. ' Chambers v. Bernasconi, 1834 See, also, I'ercival v. Nanson, 185 (Pollock, C.B.); and Polini v. Gray and Stiirla v, Freccia, 1879, C. A. 1881, 11. L. " Chambers v. Bemasconi, 1834. » Poole V. Dicas, 1835 (Park, J.). See, also, id. (Tindal, C.J.). 458 C. VII.] ADMISSIBLE, THOUGH BETTER EVIDENCE EXISTS. bility of entries made in the course of business is also subject to a third rule, which certainly does not apply to declarations against interest. Such supposed qualificatiru has been alleged to be to this effect ; — namely, that entries »nade in the course of office or business cannot be admitted, unless corrohorafed by other circum- stances which render it probable thtd the fuvtn then in recorded recdly occurred. The supposition that any such qualification exists appa- rently rests, partly, on a supposed dictum of Taunton, J, ; ' partly, on a misapprehension of the rule, adopted by Lord Wensleydale, that an entry made in the course of business is admissible " where it is one of a chain or combination of facts, and the proof of one raises a presumption that another has taken place ; " ^ and partly on the circumstance, that, in one or two of the later cases on the subject, confirmatory evidence has in fact been adduced, and its existence has been noticed by the court as tending to establish the correctness of the entry.' However, the existence of any such qualification is denied by Mr. PhilHpps, who contends that, though corroborative evidence must naturally add to the value of entries, it cannot be deemed essential to their admissibility* and this view is, it is submitted, the correct one. § 707. However this may be, the further contention that entries in the course of business will only be received when the nature of the case is such as to render better evidence unattainable, has, at all events, been expressly rejected, since "it would operate as a great hardship to require the testimony of the persons who might have been presant. The clerk who presented the bill could scarcely, at the distance of two years, point out who it was that answered his application ; and if it were necessary to call all the persons who resided at the place of presentment, the expense and incon- venience would be enormous. The rejection of the evidence which > Doe V. Turford, 1832, making his lordship pay, " A minuto in writing like the present, made at the time when the fact it records took place, by a person since de- ceaiied, in the ordinary course of his business, corroborated by other cir- cumstances which render it probable that * that fact occuiTed, is adniis- eible in evidence. Those corrobo- rating circumstances must be proved: and here many such circumstances did a])p('ai'." Mr. Pliillipps suggests that the words, ' ' the entry was made when," have probably been omitted by accident at the place marked with the star : 1 I'h. Ev. a24. ■i iJoe V. Turford, 1832. 3 Id. ; Poole v. Dicas, 1835. « 1 rh. Ev. 324. See R. v. Cope, 183a (Ld. Uenman). 459 BHOP-nOOKS OF PARTIES, HOW FAR ADMISSIBLE, [p. III. \h'\i tiin' u has been received, would be a great injury to the comraeroial classes, by casting an unnecessary difficulty on the holders of bills of exchange."* § 708. To render an entry in the course of business, then, receivable in evidence, it must have been made contemporaneously with the matter to which it relates, and in the usual routine of business, by a person whose duty it was to make the whole of it,* who was himself personally acquainted with the fact, who had no interest in stating an untruth, and who is since dead ; ^ and, provided >.ll the terms of this proposition be satisfied, it seems to be immaterial, excepting so far as regards the weight of the evidence, that more satisfactory proof might have been produced, that the declaration is uncorroborated by other circumstances, or that it consists of a mere oral statement, which has never ]»een reduced to writing.* §§ 709 — 10.' In the United States the doctrine that entries fulfilling the above requirements are admissible in evidence has been extended to entries made by the party himself in his own shop- books ; " at least, where they were evidently contemporaneous with the facts to which they refer, and formed part of the res gestae. Being the acts of the party himself, they are received with the greater caution ; but still they may be seen and weighed by the jury. This doctrine is not in accordance with the principles of the English common law, as now understoo'' ' but in the time of James I. it seems to have been regarded as sound. For in 1609 an Act was passed* "to avoid the double payment of debts," which clearly recognised a tradesman's shop-books as instruments of evidence on his behalf, since it provided that entries in them shoiild « Poole V. Dicas, 1835 (Tindal, C.J.). The same rule prevails with respect to declarations against inte- rest : ante. § 681. ' Stapylton v. Clough, 1853 ; Trotter v. Maclean, 1879 (Fry, J.). See, however. Miller v. Wheatley, 1890 (diss. O'Brien, J.) (Jr.). 3 See Doe v. Wittcomb, 1853, H. L. ; Miller v. Wheatley, supra. ♦ Ante, § 672. « Or. Ev. § 118, in part. ° For the American statutes and decisions on the above subject, see notes to § 641 of the first three edi- tions of this work ; also notes to Gr. Ev. § 118. ' Ellis V. Cowne, 1849 (Wilde, C.J.). In Smyth v. Anderson, 1849, the plaintiff's books were tendered in evidence by him to show that he had, throughout a sale effected by means of an agent, debited the de- fendant as principal, but were re- jected. • 7 J. 1, c. 12. 460 C. VII.] SHOP-BOOKS OF PARTIES, HOW FAR ADMISSIBLE. not be evidence after the lapse of more than twelve nioiith-t. This Act is no doubt, in practice, always treated by our courts of law as a dead lettei'. Yet it, in truth, is still unrepealed, and was in fact recognised and made perpetual by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1863,' which repealed a few words in it which had originally mad© it only temporary. It is therefore necessary that the original Act should be inserted in this place.^ The reason for this no doubt largely is that, while the statute is never noticed, tradesmen's books may, by the common law, be referred to to what is technically called "refresh the memory." They thus, in effect, and for practical purposes, become evidence, though not technically so called, and not being technically " evidence," the prohibition against those which are more than twelve mouths old does not attach to them.' re- ' 26 & 27 V. c. 125. * The statute of Jamos I. is ex- pressed in the curious language then current, and it is as follows : — "Whereas divers men of trades, and handicraftsmen, keeping shop- books, do demand debts of their customers u])on the; .■ shop-books long time after the same hath been due, and when, as they have supposed, the particulars and certainty of the wares delivered to be forgotten, then either they themselves, or their ser- vants, have inserted into their said shop-books divers other wares sup- posed to be delivered to the same parties, or to their use, which in truth never were delivered, and this of purpose to increase by such un- due means the said debt : (2.) And whereas divers of the said tradesmen and handicraftsmen, having received all the just debts due upon their said shop-books, do oftentimes leave the same books uncrossed, or anyway discharged, so as the debtors, their executors or administrators, are often by suits of law enforced to pay the same debts a^ain to the party that trusted the said wares, or to his exe- cutors or administrators, unless he or thejr can produce sufficient proof, by writing or witnesses, of the said payments, that may countervail the credit of the said shop-books, which few or none can do iu any long time after the said payments : (3.) Be it therefore enacted by the authority of tliis present Parliniiient, that no tradesman or handicraftsman ki.'op- ing a shop-book as is aforesaid, his or th'iir executors or administrutorB, shall be aUowed, admitted, or re- ceived, to give his shop-book in evi- dence in any action for any money duo ly^j wares hereafter to be delivered, or for woi'k hereafter to be done, above one year before the same ac- tion brought, except he or they, their executors or administrators, shall have obtained or gotten a bill of debt or obligation of the debtor for the said debt, or shall have brought or pursued against the said debtor, his executors or adminis- trators, fome action for the said debt, wares, or work done, within one year next after the same wares delivered, money due for wares delivered, or work done. II. I'rovidud always, that this Act, or anything heroin contained, shall not extend to any intercourse of tratiick, merchandiz- ing, buying, selling, or other tiadinfj or denlir.,; for wares delivered or to be delivered, money due, or work done or to be done, btitween mer- chants and merchants, merchant and tradesman, or between tradesman and tradesman, for anything directly fall- ing within the circuit or comjjasa of their mutual trades and merchan • '.', 461 m i^^ R ■JilF^ MERCIfANTS' ACCOJNT-nOOKS, WIIKN ADMISSIBLE. fP. HI. §711. Iiulopondontly of all Btntiifiihlo sanction, our courts of equity liave for yours past, to a curtiiin extent, acted upon the principle of admitting shop-books in evidence, in taking accounts in cases in wliicli the vouchors have been lost.' And now, by 11. S. C, 188;], the court or a judge may, at any stage of the proceedings in a cause or matter, direct any necessary accounts to be taken, and " may, either by the judgment or order directing the account to be taken, or by any subsequent order, give special directions witli regard to the mode in which the account is to be taken or vouched ; and in particular may direct that, in taking tht account, the books of account in wliich the accounts in question have been kept shall be taken as prima facie evidence of the truth of the matters therein contained, with liberty to the parties inte- rested to take such objections thereto as they may be advised."' § Tl^.'' In the administration of Roman law, the production of a merchant's or tradesman's book of accounts, regularly and fairly kept in the usual manner, was deemed presumptive evidence (semi- plena probatio) * of the justice c£ his claim ; and in such cases, the suppletory oath of the party (juramentura suppletivum) was admitted to make up the plena ^irobatio necessary to a decree in his favour.* Several modern systems of jurisprudence follow this fP II: ,;! dizc, but that for such thinp;8 only thoy and every of them shall be in case as if this Act had never been made ; anything herein contained to the contrary thereof notwith- standing." ' Lodge V. Prichard, 1853. See, post. § 812. » Ord. XXXIII. rr. 2. 3. See Ixidge V. Prichard, 1853; NewbeiTy r. Benson, 1854; Ewart ?'. Williams, 1855; Cookes i>. Cookes, 1863, O'Grady v. Con-. 187G (Ir.) ; Alford v. Clav. 1875 (Ir.). »'Gr. Ev. § 119, verbatim. * Tills degree of truth is thus dffinod by Mascardus: — " Non est ignorandura probationem semijjle- niim cam esse, per quam lei gcstse jhles (ili(/ua fit judici : non tamen tantaut jure debeat in pronuncianda 8ontcntia earn sequi": 1 de Prob,, Qusest. 11, n. 1, 4. ' " Juramentum (suppletivum) de- Vi'i lur ubicunque actor habet pro se — aliquas conjocturas, per quas judex inducatur ad suspicioncm vel ad opi- nandum pro parte actoris" : 3 Masc. do Prob., Ooncl. 230, n. 17. The civilians, however they may differ as to the degree of credit to be given to books of account, concur in opinion that they are entitled to considera- tion, at the discretion of the judge. They furnish at least the conjeduroi mentioned by Mascardus ; and their admission in evidence, with the sup- ])letory oath of the party, is thus defended by Paul Voet, De Statutis, § 5, cap. 2, n. 9: — " An ut credatur libris rationem, seu registrisuti loqu- untur. mercatorum ot artificum, licet probationibus testium non juventur ? Eespondeo, quamvis exemplo porni- ciosum esse videatur, quemque sibi privata testatione, sive adnotatione facere debitorem. Quia tamen hrec est mercatorum cura et opera, ut debiti et crediti rationes diligonter conficiant. Etiam in eorum lore et 462 ,i til. VII.] MF.UCIIANrs' HOOKS SHOULD BR ADMISSFULK. doctrine. Thus, by French law, the books of mcn^hMnts and tradesmen, regularly kept, and written from day to day witliout any blank, when the tradesman has the reputation of probity, constitute a semi-proof, and, with his 8up[)letory oath, are received as full proof to establish his demand.' The doctrine is also acted upon in Scotoh law, by whidi the books of merchants and others, if kept with such a reasonable degree of regularity as to be satis- factory to the court, may be received in ovidenof, the party being allowed to give his own " oath in supplement " of such imperfect proof ; though a course of dealing, or other " pregnant circum- stances," must apparently be, in general, first shown by evidence aliunde, before the proof can be regarded as amounting to that degree of semi-plena probatio, which may be rendered complete by the oath of the party.* § 713. Reference to these laws is made here because it is con- ceived that the adoption of a somewhat similar praotieo in all the English and Irish courts of justice would jirove highly beneficial ; especially in cases where actions are brought or defended by the representatives of persons deceased. tnusis, ox aequo ot bono est juciican- (ium. Insiiiior iion admisso uliquo litiuin acccknandarum romedio, com- mercioruin ordo et usus evcrtitur. Neque onim ouinos pra.'sonti pi'cuiiia inei'cc'8 sibi compuiant, nwiuo cu- jusqiio r(!i venditioni testes udhiboii, qui pretia mercium noverint, aut cxpodit, aut coiigruum est. Non iuiiiuuni vidcbitur illud statutum, quo domosticis talibus instrumcntis additur fides, mode aliiiuibus ad- miuiculis juvontur." See, also, Heitius, de Coll. Leg. § 4, n. 68; 7 8tiyk. de Sem. Piob., Di.sp. 1, cap. 4, § 5 ; Monoeh. do Prses., lib. 2, Prses. 57, n. 20, and lib. 3, Proo8. 63, n. 12. 1 Poth. Obi., Part iv. ch. 1, art. 2, § 4. By th<3 ("ode Nujxih'oii, mer- chants' books are requiriMl to bo k(!pt in a jiarticular iniiuuor therein jjre- ecribed, and none otliers are ad- mitted in evidence : Code de Com- merce, liiv. 1, tit. 2, art. 8 — I'J. * Tait, Ev. (Sc.) 273-277. This degi-ee of j)root' is thoro defined aa " not merely a 8Us])icion, — but such evidence as produces a reasonable belief, though not complete evi- dence." See, also, 2 Dickson, Ev. (Sc), §§ 1179 et seq. ; Glassf. Ev. (Sc.) 650; BeU, Dig. (Sc.) 378, 898. 463 4631 AMERICAN NOTES. [part III. AMEEICAN NOTES. f 1 Shop-Books. — Books of Account. — The proof of matters of account, frequently embracing numerous items but slightly appeal- ing to the memory, offers a Held where the regular rules of evi- dence can be ajjplied only with much hardship and exi)ense. In mercantile eomnuirities, where many accounts are carried along on books of entry, where many clerks are employed, fre- quently changed and lost from knowledge or beyond the reach of process, a natural importance attaches to the book entry itself. It is felt that the fact of tiie entry is, to a certain extent, circum- stantial evidence of its truth; that there is an inherent accuracy in an entry made, without motive to misrepresent, by a quasi- machine in the course of business, where it is both easier and better to enter the truth than anything less likely to adjust itself to other entries. A persistent feeling of this kind could hardly fail to impress itself upon courts, and tlie rules to be here briefly considered show a very important tendency to relax, in a common-sense sort of way, the rules of evidence in favor of written entries in books of account. Shoi-Hooks. — The historical development of the rule admit- ting the entries on books of account began with the "shop-book," technically so callf>d. The statute 7 Jac. 1 C. 12, 1 Kng. Kev. Stats. GDI, refers to the use oi the "shop-book" as already existing. The early use of tl'e ".«iiop-book" was largely from necessity. Parties had not as yet oetn m ide competent witnesses, and yet, except where a clerk had been kept and could testify to the ac- count, the evidence of the tfader or mechanic was absolutely essen- tial to ijroof of the claim. The ''sutil rules of evidence had there- fore to be relaxed to a certain extent in favour of trade; but to a certain extent only. A tradesman or iiandicraftsman who offered his "shop-book" in evidence, did not testify to the entry; he was not a witness to that extent. The book spoke for itself as to the entry. The tradesman merely swore to his book, that it was regularly kept as iiis original book of accounts, &c. The oath was not that of a witiu'ss. The relation of tlie witness to the book was more nearly analogous to the semijtlciia jn'ohati-) and the plena probittto of the civil law. Probably the oath was required to be administered in court. Frye i\ IJarker, 2 Tick. (;r» (1S1.'.'{). The admission of such evidence is, for the most part, rested upon tliis supposed necessity; — many nuM'chants and shojj-keejiers are not able to keep a clerk, and would not, being themselves in- ("HAP. VII.] AMKUICAN N()Ti:S. 4G82 competent as witnesses, be able to prove their accounts at all if such evidence were excluded. Cole v. Dial, 8 Tex. 347 (1S52). "liooks of original entries, verified by the truth of the party, and that the entries were made by him, have always been received in evidence in Tennsylvania, from necessity, as business is very often carried on by the principal, and many of our tradesmen do not keep clerks. ... It must be in an account of the daily transac- tions of the party, and not in the nature of a receipt-book. It must be in a course of dealing between the parties, and the entries made about the time of the transaction. . . . The law fixes no precise instant when the entry should be made. At or near the time of the transaction, they should be made. It is not to be a register of past transactions, but a memorandum of transactions as they occur." Curren v. Crawford, 4 S. & K. .3 (1818). The statement of the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, in Harwood v. Mulry, 8 Gray, 250 (1857), that "the extent to which such evidence was admissible has not been marked with entire uni- formity in the diiferent states of tlie Union, but each has ado})ted its own system," seems entirely correct. In Connecticut, it is said that the rule as to shop-books is "coeval with the government." Terrill v. Beecher, 9 Conn. 344 (1832). Tlie rule and its statutory enlargement Avere adopted by certain of the American colonists. The Massachusetts rule is thus stated in 3 Dane's Abr. Ch. 81, Art. 4, p. 318. "The rule in Massachu- setts is, and ever has been, to admit in evidence books of accounts, kept in tlie daybook or ledger form; as to the sale and delivery of goods; as to the jjayments of sums of money not exceeding .f().(>7; and as to labor jierformed; with these restrictions, tliat tlie origi- nal entries or first charges be produced to tlie court and jury. The creditor must swear,, if the charge was made by himself, that he mnde it at, or very ne.ar, the time the thing was done; and that it is true, and, if required, tliat it has not been paid. If a clerk made tlie charge, he must swear to like facts; and if the jterson who made the charge be dead, his handwriting must be jiroved; and if a clerk, &c., that he was usiiiilly intrusted by the creditor to make suidi entries in his books, and that tiie books produced in evidence are or were the ])laintiff's account-books. A book ac- count .annexed to the writ or filed in, is tlie thing to be jiroved, and by the party using this kind of evidence; and as this is evi- dence from the interested party himself, and reimgnant to the gen- eral rules of evidence, though perli.a])s of necessity, it is to bo .admitted under every guard and security the nature of the case .admits of; .and therefore it is one of the best precautions to require the jiarty, so proving his account, to file, in the case, all the items of it, as early as he must have his writ served, or his account, if 4633 AMERICAN NOTES. [part III. ilia I m m defendant, filed in, in order to give the opposite party reasonable time to prepare to meet them; and so lias been our practice arising from ancient statutes revised and included in the act of Oct. .'}(), 1784, and of Feb. 27, 1794." Under certain circumstances, the shop-book was admissible to show the delivery of goods or the performance of work for third persons. Where A. directed B. to get C. to do, on A.'s account, wliat blacksmith work B. wished to have done, and agreed to pay C. for it; and B., when called as a witness in a suit by C. against A., was unable to recollect the dates or items of the account, it was held that C.'s shop-book, with his suppletory oath, was admissible in evidence to prove his charges against A. "Tlie rule, that where there is a delivery of goods to third persons, the book can- not be admitted, is not without exceptions. In cases of small articles procured by the members of a family, and delivered to children or servants, from time to time, it would be impossible that such delivery could generally be proved. To enforce this rule, as inflexible, would therefore produce much more serious injury than the relaxation of it, under circumstances where the book itself contains the articles, as delivered, and whicli is subject to the examination of tlie debtor." Ball r. Gates, V2 Mete. 491 (1847). In New Hamj)shire, the evidence is rejected where otlier evi- dence — e. ;/., that of tlie servants to whom the articles were (h^liv- ered — is available. Kicdiardson, C. «I. says: — "As this is in trtitli the admission of a party to 1)0 a witness on his own cause, tlie jn-actice (of admitting acccmnt-books of the party supported by his oatli) is ronfiiied to cases in 'vliich it may be presumed there is no better evidence, and has many limitations. ... In tiie first place it must appear, tliat the charges are in the handwriting of the i)arty, who is sworn;" because if they are not, tlie third party making them can be sw(n-n, and there is no use of calling tlie party himself. So if the charges do not a])iieiir to he the fair record of daily transactions, free from susi)icioiis circumstances of fraud, &c., the book is not admissible. If the account has been trans- ferred to another book, it must be produced. If it ajjpears by the book itself on the examination of the party that there is better evidcnrt", the book cannot go to the jury. Kastman v. Moulton. .'{N. H. irtii (ISIT.). LiMiTKi) TO sMAi.r, .\MorNTs. — The shoji-book was limited to petty tradiug. Probably the usual limitation to forty shillings (or its equivalent in the dei)reciatt'd American currency of the differ- ent states) may be traced to the influence of another early English statute, ."{ Jac. cliap. li") (160.")), in the preamble to which it is recited that "whereas by virtue of divers acts of Common Council made within the City of London, tlie Lord Mayor and Aldermen CHAP. Vll.] AMERICAN NfJTES. 4G3* ..'I i of tlie same City, for the llelief of poor Debtors dwelUii.t:; within the said City, have accustomed monthly to assign ' Two Aldcniuii and Twelve discreet Commoners to be Commissioners, and sit in the Court of Kequests, commonly called the Court of Conseicnce, ill the Guildhall of the same city, there to hear and deteriiiine all Matters of debt not amounting to the Sum of forty Shillings, to be broug't before them,' " tlierefore the procedure is amended. The same limitation of forty shillings (see IMyinouth Colony Laws, p. 128 (ICGO)) was preserved among the colonists. As early as 1782, in Cleaves' Case, in Essex County, as cited in 3 Dane's Abr. Ch. 1 Art. 4 § 2, the supreme judicial court of Mas- sachusetts "decided that in proving money payments by book- charge and the party's suppletory oath, no one item or charge in cash must exceed 40.s. or !i)!0.t)7, that originally it was found neces- sary to limit this kind of evidence to some moderate sum; and it appeared from immemorial practice that this was the sum." In Davis V. Sanford, 9 All. 21(5 (18(54), the same court say: — "The l)rincipal charges are for cash, and the items exceed forty shillings in amount. The book is inadmissible in proof of these charges." Davis V. Sanford, 9 All. 216 (18G4); Burns v. Fay, 14 Tick. 8, 12 (183;}). "The account-books of a party are admissible, with his supjde- tory oath, to prove a charge of money to the amount of .fiG.GT." Kelton r. Hill, .W Me. 114 (187<»). "The book of the deceased, if shown to be in his own handwrit- ing, would not be evidence of the payment of such a sum as this, as was ruled by the court, nor indeed of an}' cash payment exceed- ing JSii.Oi)." ilich )'. Eldredge, 42 X. II. IT).'} (ISOO). In Ohio, charges for money loaned, there being no mutual items of acc(mut, have been rejer'cd. Hough )•. Ileiik, 8 Oh. Circ. (jt. iViA (1894). See also, to same effect, r>urns v. Fay, 14 Tick. 8 (1833); K-lton v. Hill, r>H Me. 114 (1870); IJnssett i-. Spottord, 11 N. TI. 1()7 1840). ]iut wheri^ such mutual items of account are included, the mere fact that certain of the items are for cash loaned in the usual courso of b\isiness is not sudicicnt to exclude any part of the account. Cargill /'. Atwood. (li. I.) 27 Atl. 214 (I89.'i). In North Carolina, under a statute, the shoji-book was "good evidence for small articles . . . proved to be delivered within two years." Alexander v. Smoot. l.". Ired. (X. C.) Law, 4(11 (I8ri2). The later di'velopnicnt of the riilc of sliop-books has adiiiitteil them as evidence of larger sums than forty shillings. Wilson v. Wilson, () N. J. Law 9n (1822). For example, an account of .i?lo21.84 was allowed in White v. Whitney, 82 Cal. 1(53 (188i)). So of one of .1^98.40 in Kichardson V. Emery, 23 N. H. 220 (1851). I-, .( 4636 AMERICAN NOTES. [part in. S 1 3. t H- Nature of Charge Limited. — The rule being established in favor of small tradesmen for petty amounts of goods sold, work done, &c., the innovation was limibed to the precise case covered by the rule. Other items than those usually embraced in such an account cannot be proved by the shop-book and suppletory oath of the tradesman. " A book charge for three montlis' service as one item, was inad- missible, according to all the authorities." Henshaw v. Davis, 5 Cush. 145 (1849); Karr v. Stivers, 34 la. 123 (1871). An item of "7 gold watches, $308," is not a proper subject of book charge. " This species of evii > ;ice was not the proper e\ 'ence to establish a sale of this magnitude and character." Buy. n v. liogers, 11 Cush. 346 (1853). Items for cash have been rejected. Vosburgh v. Thayer, 12 Johns. 461 (1816); Davis v. Sanford, 9 All. 216 (1864); Carman v. Dunham, 6 Halstead (N. J.) 189 (1830); Cole v. Dial, 8 Tex. 347 (1852); Wilson /-. Wilson, 6N. .J. Law, 95 (1822). "The necessity of tlie case, however, which gave birth to our practice in this par- ticular, by no means warrants that entries in day books should be considered as evidence of money lent or cash paid. In those in- stances the necessity does not exist; for the party has it in his power to take notes or receipts, in the ordinary course of dealing." Ducoign *•. Shreppel, 1 Yeate's, 347 (1794). So, under a statute in Connecticut, modifying the early law of shop-books, it is said that the rule " has not been extended so as to embrace property loaned, and not returned; nor to compensa- tion for injuries of any kind ; nor to recover money jiaid on a note, which had not been applied. . . . For similar reasons, it ought not to be extended to money or other articles, delivered in fulfil- ment of any contract." Terrill *'. lieecher, 9 Conn. 344 (1832). The consideration of a promissory note cannot be jtroved in this way. "It would be extending a rule of evidence peculiar to some of the New England states, greatly beyond any of the precedents." Rindge r. Breck, 10 Cush. 43 (1852). The evidence is not admissible to prove a charge of $19.06 for labor on a petition to enforce a mechanics' lien. "To admit them in this proceeding would be a step beyond any case yet decided. . . . Tlio party has it in his power to secure other evi- dence of the work wliirh he has performed, either by the testimony of the contractor, or of his own fellow workmen." Lynch r. Cro- nan, 6 Gray, 5.31 (1856). The books of a keeper of a billiard-table are not comnetent under this rule. Hoyd /•. Ladson, 4 M'Cord, 76 (1826); or for "billiards and drinks" and "games." Baldridge r. Penland, 68 Tex. 441 (1887). But the accorints of an attorney may be proved in this way. W \ U-' CHAP. VII.] AJUERICAN NOTES. 4t;c6 Codinan r. Caldwell, .31 Mo. mO (l.Sr>0). An attorney at law can l)rove tlio rendering of services b}' his day-book and aiijiarently also by a private trial docket. Uriggs r. (ieorgia, IT) \t.. ()1 (184.3). This has, however, been qua-riid in Pennsylvania, and, so far as re- lates to a charge for commissions on colleetion it has been held in that state that "cash is not a proper sid)jeet for book charge, neither is interest or commission as casli." ilale r. Ard, 4S Pa. St. 22 (1SG4). In Connecticut, a jiarty was not allowed to show the pay- ment of tlie hnndred dollars on a note in this way. Tlic court say ; — "It would be difficult, perhaps, to lay down any geneial prin- ciple, which would determine, in all cases, what articles may and what may not be charged on book. Put, no charge can be admitted on book, unless the right ko charge exists -t the time of delivering tlie article, and arises in consequence of such delivery." Pradley /'. Goodyear, 1 Day, ll>4 (1(S0,3). In North Carolina, by statute, the amount of charge is limited to sixty dollars. Pland c. Warren, 05 N. C. ,".72 (1871). The entry is not admissible to show 'the t.me during which a vessel was at a wharf. " This suit is neither for goods sold, nor for work done, and it lias been always understood, tliat entr'^s made by the plaintiff himself, are evidence in no other cases. It la dangerous to allow a party to make evid^^ace in his own favour. The rule must be confined, to the two cases that have been men- t'oned; we see no distinction between tlie plai itt's giving his book of original entries in evidence, to prove the use and occupa- tion of a wharf, and giving it in evidence, to ])rove the use and occupation of a house, or of anything else." Wilmer v. Israel, 1 Browne, 257 (1811). CoxFiUMATioN Aui'NDE, — Where such proof is possible, the plaintiff is at liberty, e\'en if not required to do so, to coniirm his book by evidence of its correctness, from sources other than his own supjdetory oath. For example, by the evidence of other customers, "that they had dealt and settled with tlie ]daintitt's, and tliat they kept fair anJ honest books." Linnell r. Sutherland, U Wend. "iflS (18.'I4). The delivery of certain of the items charged may also be proved, in confirmation of the account. Linnell /•. Sutherland, 11 Wend. r)()8 (18.34). In Vosburgh /•. Thayer, 12 .Johns. 401 (1815), it is said to be necessary to show tlie course of dealing, that the party has no clerk; that some of the articles l-.ave been delivered; that the books and the account-books of the parVy are fairly and honestly ke^it, .ind tliis by those who have dealt and settled with him. Another reason given is vhat the ])arty debited is shown to liave reposed confidence by dealings with and being entriisted by the other party. Vosburgh r. Thayer, 12 .Tohns. 401 (1815V "lleputation in the neighbourhood of keeping correct accounts " 463' AMERICAN NOTES. [part III. m.\ m 'ii ■■( :M has been considered a sufficient confirmation. Landis /•. Turner, 14 Cal. 57'A (1860). The defendant may ascertain, "by cross-examination, the cir- cumstances under which the entries are made." Thomson v. Porter, 3 Strob. Eq. oH (1800). The court may admit the book de bene, conditional upon corrob- oration being i'urnislied, and if corroboration is not furnished, re- ject it. " The judge couhl not know, until the end of the trial, what corroborating evidence there would be; and after the evidence was all in, it was propei- for the court to decide upon the compe- tency of the book. This is a species of evidence peculiar in its nature, of the competency of whicli, in each case, the court must decide." Henshaw r. Davis, 5 Cush. 145 (1849). 1'relimixaky Pkook to thk Couht. — As in other cases where the admissibility of evidence depends on proof of some ])rt'liminary fact, it is for the court to decide upon inspection wliether the shop books offered in evidence are fairly kept, in good faith, as a con- temporaneous record of daily transactions. For example, in Davis n. Sanford, 9 All. 21(5 (18G4), the court say: — "A few of the entries for goods sold contain the dates of the sales, and ap[)ear to be original charges made at or near the time of the transactions to be proved. But most of the entries are without any date; and on some of the pages the handwriting and ink are so much alike as to indicate that the entries wore all made at one time, tliougli they relate to separate sales which were prob- ably made on different days. The book does not, on inspection, sulticiently appear to be tlie daily minutes of the party, made at or near the time of the transactions to be ]irovpd, so as to be admissi- l)le in eviilence within the rule stated in Cogswell r. Dolliver, 2 Mass. L'LM. and I'rince /•. Smith, 4 ]\Iass. ir);"*. In Wilson v. Wilson, X. J. Law, 9;") (1S22) the court refuse to permit evidence of cash clmrges written on one of tl>e last leaves of a book, detached from tlie daily entries and at^counts by sundry intervening blank leaves and dated during the ti;ne of such on- tries and accounts. The decision, however, '-an hardly be regarded as of great authority, because of the three? judges composing tlie court, one tliouglit the entries should be rojoctcd on tlint ground; another that all entries of cash were inadmissible; and tlie third judge was in favor of admitting tlie entries. Statutoky MoniKicATiox. — The rule respecting sho])-books had received, for reasons in part stated stijira, an extended statu- tory developnu'iit in various of the United States, even jirior to the general removal of the restrictions disqualifying parties as witnesses. The general effect of these provisions was to authorize tlie reception in evidence in behalf of a party of all account-book entries which the court felt were made as a daily bona fide record CHAP. VII.] AMEKICAN NOTES. 4G38 of contemporaneous transactions. Robinson r. Dibble, 17 Fla. 4.')7 (1880); Marsh v. Case, ao Wis. TWU (1872); Patrick r. Jack, 82 111. 81 (187(5); Thomson ik Porter, 4 Strob. (S. C.) Eq. r)8 (LSaO); Woodbury n. Woodbury, 50 Vt. ir>2 (187(;); Pay l: Cook, 22 N. J. L. ."U.S, .'353 (1850); Ganahl /■. Shore, 24 Ga. 17 (1858); Williams V. Gunter, 28 Ala. 081 (185()); Neville r. Nortlicutt, 7 Cold. 294 (18G9); Morse v. Congdon, .'{ Mich. 549 (1855); Anderson v. Ames, 6 la. 480 (1858). The distinctive reason for admitting shop-books fell with the enactment of statutes permitting parties themselves to testify as witnesses. As the supreme court of Pennsylvania say: — "Ques- tions in relation to books of entry as evidence, since the Act of 18G9, making the parties witnesses, stand upon a different footing from that on which they stood before. Then, the book itself was the evidence, and the oath of, the party was merely supplementary. Now, the party himself is a competent witness, and may prove his own claim as a stranger would have done before the Act of 1809. That the facts contained in the book, either of charge or discharge, of cash or goods, or whatever else is in his personal knowledge, might be proved by a stranger, no one doubts. A clerk, for instance, could prove the account, including rash items, from his own knowledge, and might use the book to refresh his memory. The ])arty now stands by force of the act on the same plane of com- petency' as the stranger stood upon, and therefore muy make the same proof that a stranger could; he may also refer to entries made at the time of tlie transaction in corroboration of his testimony." Nichols )•. Haynes, 78 Pa. St. 174 (1S75). The person making a memorandum may u.se it to refresh his memory. Price r. Gar- land, .'} N. M. 505 (1885). An interesting illustration of the development of the law in tliis branch may be found in Wilson /•. Wilson, (! N. J. Law 95 (1S22), where the court are willing to admit entries regardless of amount, but, in the case of at least one judge, consider tbat cash payments cannot be so proved. "According to the principles of the coniinon law, a man's book of account cannot be ])roduced in evidence in liis favour; but a contrary ])ractice has jrt-evailed for sucli a great lengtli of time througliout all tlie courts of judicature m tliis state, as t' have formed a general rule quite the other way, that every man's book of account is evidence in his favour, ])rovide(l the en- tries therein made are original entrit's, and were made at tlie time the transactions took place, or as nearly at tlie time as is usual. But this general rule never obtained in such latitude as to make everything lawful evidence that a man chooses to write in his book, for then he might enter in it the testimony of an absent witness, the confession of an adversary, or the service of a notice. The general rule extends to no other entries than for goods and articles 4t)39 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAUT III. r^nj.-'ilj "! sold; work, labour, and services performed by a man, his ser- vants, and means, and materials found and provided. Beyond tliese limits, wliich take in all trades and professions, entries in a man's book never were, and never ought to be evidence in his favour." Hooks of Accoi'XT. — While this rule respecting the use of shop-books was in operation, another rule, — /. e. , that respecting entries made in course of business was shaping itself; — to the effect that, under practically the same conditions of contemporaneous- ness, bond Jide keeping in course of business, absence of motive to misrepresent, &c., any entry which a person was under a legal or professional duty to make, or which was made, in tlie course of business was admissible, after the death of the declarant, in ac- tions between third parties. When almost universal legislation made parties competent wit- nesses in most instances, and thereby removed, as above stated, the original reason for the rule regarding "shop-books," the con- venience of the use of this species of evidence was by no means lessened. Stroud c. Tilton, 4 Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. ;m (18(50). On the contrary, the growth of commercial transactions ratiier tended to increase its value. The party, now a witness, became entitled to use his original books of account, when made by him- self, in the usual course of business, and at about the time of the trai! ''action, as a memorandum to refresh his recollection, regard- less of the amount or nature of the transactions. If his recollec- tion were not refreshed, but he were enabled to state that the entry was accurate when made, the entry itself became evidence, in connection with his statement. A note to Price /•. Torrington, 1 Smith's L. C. (9 Ed.) p. 566, is cited with approval in Culver ;;. Marks, 122 Ind. .'554, 5(54 (1889) as fidlows: — " * A party's own books of account and original en- tries are now. in most, if not all, of the United States, received as evidence of a sale and delivery of goods to, or of work done for, the adverse party.' On the same subject it is iurther said: ' The reason for its introduction has never been placed, by any court, on higher ground than that of necessity. For, in view of the number and frequency of transactions of which entries are daily required to be made, the difficulty and inconvenience of making formal com- mon law proof of each item would be very great. To insist upon it, therefore, would either render a credit system impossible or leave the creditor remediless.'" It is, of course, necessary, that the account be relevant to the issue. Jones /•. Henshall, 3 Col. App. 448 (189.3). And book entries may be competent for other reasons, — i. e., as admissions. German Nat. Bank. v. Leonard, 40 Neb. G70 (1894); First Nat. Bank v. Huber, 75 Hun, 80 (1894); Looniis v. Stuart, CHAr. VII.] AMERICAN NOTES. 40310 (Tex.) 24 S. W. 1078 (189,'?). Or as part of tlie res gesto in a scheme of fraud; Fleming v. Yost, ].'?7 Ind. 95 (189.'}). Or as cironmstan- tial evidence, e. fj., where tlie effort is male to show tliat no inter- est had been ])ai(l by A. in a certain obligation l)y (evidence that A.'s a('(!Ount-b()()k showed many otiier payments of iiiti-rest. I'eck V, Pierce, (Mi Conn. 310 (189.'!). That all A.'s payments of interest are not entered on this same bonk is a matter merely of the weight of the evidence. Jhh/. But the book of deceased attorneys is not admissible of itself to prove that they did not receive a payment of money upon a judgment, in the absence of proof that this is the attorneys' only account book. Shaffer r. j\IcCraekin, 90 Ta. 578 (1S94). Tlie rapid extension o1 the rules respecting eiitries in course of business and nunnoranda to refresh recoHection, when combined with the dillieulty, expense and frecpu'iit imjiossibility of making other proof of book-accounts, could hardly fail, after parties be- came competent as witnesses, to affect the rule res])ecting "shop- books," which had so many important elements in common with the other rules. Legislative enactments and judicial legislation combined to make the extension a rapid one. The old term "shop-book" is fretpuuitly retained, but the rule, as it obtains in the most of the different jurisdictions of the United States, has dropped every limitation of amount and allows, undertho old conditions prescribed for the use of the shop-book, original entries on books of account, of merchants, tradesmen and others, made in the usual course of business, as a contemporaneous record of current transactions, by a party, or those in his employ, to be given in evidence whether in favor of or against the party who offers them. Probably the rule in Missouri is a fair examjde of the growth of this development. "Since a party may testify in his own favor, it must bo conceded that he, as well as his clerk or book-keeper may refresh his memory from entries made by him, or under his eye and then testify as to the fact with his memory thus refreshed. Now in case of an account composed of numy items, all this means nothing more than reading the book in evi- dence. This we all know fro.n daily experience in the trial Courts. It is out of all reason to say tliat a merchant or his clerks can recall each item of the account, and a fair-minded witness will generally decdine the attempt. Account-books are admitted in evi- dence from the person by whom they are kepi when the entries are made at the time, or nearly so of doing the jirincipal fact, because entries made under such circnimstances constitute a part of the res gestae. An entry tlius made is more than a mere declaration of the i)arty; it is a verbal act following the princi[)al fact in the orderly course of business. Such is certainly the custom and course of business at the present day." Hissrick /•. Mcl'herson, I '-1 463" AMEHICAN NOTKS. [I'AUT III. If '.I <, ■■ >!> ill 20 Mo. 310 (1850); Railway Co. v. Mui'iiliy, GO Ark. 'X\\\ (IKOo); Irish /'. Horn, 84 Ifim, IL'I (liS<)o). In Maryland, entries in course of business are not admissible in favoi of tlie jiorson niakinfj tlieni, though adniissibh; to refresh his recollection. Stalling.s c. (Jott- schilk, 77 Md. 429 (1893). "Tradesmen's books of original entries, made in the ordina"" course of their business, are admitted in evidence under certain restri(!tions, on account of the impracticability of making better proof of the sales and delivery of articles in the course of a busi- ness conducted from day to day between parties; in reference to which it is not usual to make or evidence contracts in the methods in which isolated transactions are ordinarily transacted or evidenced. Certain facts must be shown, however, before such books are ad- missible. 1. It must be shown that the books offered contain the daily record of tlie business of the ])erson for whom they are kept, as it transpires from d'ly to day between himself and customers, and that the entries therein are ori%'in;il entri<'s, made contempora- neously with the transaction of the business which the enti -s are intended to evidence. 2. The entries must relate to the busi. ^s carrieil on by tlie person for whom the books are kept, and not to matters in no way connected with that business. .3. The entries must be sufficient to show with reasonable certainty what thing is made t!ie basis of the charge. 4. The book must be on its face regular, and the entries free from suspicion of alteration. .5. The person offering su(!h books, if tliey be kejjt by himself, must ordinarily, if living, make oath to their correctness; and we tliink further, that he should be held to make proof tending to show his probity and fair dealirg; as that the accounts of other persons kept in the same manner are usually found correct, or so treated by custom- ers." Haldridge i-. renlimd, (>8 Tevns, 441 (1887). Hooks of OitioixAii Extuy. — As in case of the "shop-book," tlie account-book, to be admissible, must be the book of original entry. Wall r. Dovev, (JO Pa. f^t. 212 (18C)9); Huston's Estate, 1(57 Pa. St. 217 (1895); Jones v. Henshall, 3 Col. App. 448 (1893); ]\[eetli >'. Rankin Brick V.o., 48 111. App. 602 (1892); Durkheimer V. Heilner, 24 Oreg. 270 (1893); Skipworth v. l)eyell,83 Hun, 307 (1894). For couvenience, a ])roj)(;rly verified transcript of the ac- count has been admitted, the original entries bein-^ in court. Texas, &c., Coal Co. '•. Lart-son, 31 S. W. (Tex.) 843 (189,")). A "inemoranduui-book from which to enter up the charges against parties in what is called the sales book," cannot be received. Hancock r. Hintrager, 00 la. 374 (1882). Ho "cash books and other books of occasional entry" cannot be admitted under the rule. Kotwitz v. Wright, .37 Tex. 82 (1872). It is not ill itself sufficient ground for rejecting the evidence that the book of original entries is kept in ledger form. Hoover r. CHAP. VII.] AMERICAN NOTES. 4(38'^ Gehr, 62 Ta. St. 136 (1869); Swain ■::. Cheney. 41 N. H. L*.'$2 (18(;()); Wells V. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246 (1861); Faxon /•. Hollis, 13 Mass. 427 (1816). Hut a single item constituting an account, and shown only on the ledger for a lump sum embracing many separate items, is not admissible. "It was not an entry upon a merchant's book, but was, on the contrary, an independent entry, by a party to tlie suit, of evidence in his own behalf." Doty r. Smith, 68 Hun, l'.)*.) (18U3). When it appears that charges have been posted into the ledger, the latter book, however, is a necessary part of the jiroof. I>on- nell r. i\[awha, 37 X. J. L. 198 (1S74). A check-book stub, from which the checks have been rut off, is not evidence for a plaintiff of the facts stated on it. "That is no book account. It is a check-book, a mere memorandum of a merchant, of the checks he draws on his banker. He cannot be •sworn to such memorandum in his own case." Wilson v. (Joodin, Wright (Ohio Supreme Ct.) 219 (18.33). So an invoice book of an agent is not evidence of the sale and delivery of goods. "The day-book containing the original traus- actions as they occurred, proved on oatli or admitted, must l)e i)ro- duced,or i)arol evidence given of the delivery of the merchandise." Cooper ('. Morrell, 4 Yeates (Pa.) .341 (1807). • Where "the book produced was a small memorandum book, apparently carried in the pocket, consisting of ten leaves and con- taining sundry minutes, some in pencil and some in ink, of money paid out and money received," and nn account therein contained was offered with the plaintiff's "own oath " to prove sale and de- livery of forty-five cords of wood, this being tlie only cliarge of such a nature, the book was rejected. "There is no princijde on which such extremely loose papers as those offered by the plaintiff are admissible in evidence, as a book of accounts. They do not possess that intrinsic evidence of their truth, without which the admission of account books is extremely dangerous to the cause of justice. In the lirst place, the charges in the hand-writing of the party, must appear in such a state that they may be jiresumed to have been his daily minutes of his transactions and business. . . . It would be much easier to manufacture a book containing the plaintiff's statement of a single transaction, than a regular account book containing the minutes of his business from day to day. . . . Undoubtedly tlie practice has l)(>en very lax on this jwint . . . and the exidanation ... is to be found in the fact that the great cheapness and convenience of this mode of proof has insensibly introduced a laxity in tlie practice, which the courts in question found it difficult to limit to the cases for which such evidence was originally designed. We have already held that there is no par- 4(iy''' A mi: I lie AN NOTKS. [rAi'.T in. It ' ticiiliir ronii ill wliicli the iiccoiint liook of ii [KU'ty iimst lie kept; Ciiinuiiii-s r. Nichols, l.*{ N. H. llM); and wi- an! (Icsivcms of adai.t- iiii,' Lht' ink' r(',L;iiIatiiiy tlio ailiuission uf it to tlu? practical liiisinfss of life, so far as tiiiit may bu ilouc without violating' the principlo tliat a iKirty siiall not lie a witiit'ss in cliiuf in his own casu," Kii'hanison r. Kiiu-ry, Ll.'i N. 11. L'L'O (18.")1). A tiuio-liook which hail only the name of the party and marks inidcr particular dates, has been received. Afathes r. liohinsoii, 8 Mete. L'd'J O*^'-!); l>ii!k<'i> '•• Winters, IGl) I'a, St. lUd (1811,")). In Maine, marks on a shingle or notches on a stick have been received. Kendall /•. I'Meld, II Me. iH) (I8.'i0). So of an aceoiint- book where statements of weight, &c., were omitted from the items, lloojier r. Taylor, .'W Me. L'L'4 ( IS"*")). So in Massachu- setts, as to this last point. I'ratt /•. White, l.'W Mass. 477 (I881i). Original entries of charges in a diary have been re;!eived as orig- inal entries. (Jleason r. Kinney, (!5 Vt. ;")(»(» (ISD.'V). Even a letter may be. "a sort of original entry." Houghton /•. Paine, L'i) Vt. r>7 (KSaC)). ]iiit it has been held that the register of a loan agent is not a "book of account," but merely a private memorandum of the owner. U. S. Hank r. Mur.son, 90 la. li)l (181)4). If account-books offered in evidence are so kept as to be intelli- gible, there is no reason why they should not be etiually admissilile, whether kept by double or single entries, or by setting apart Tv ptage, or part of a page, for each customer and exhibiting in one w the whole account. Toomor r. (Jadsden, 4 Strobh. (S. C.) VXi (18.-»()). A party is entitled to explain any ])eculiar or unusual marks appearing on his account-book. Singer .Mfg. Co. *'. Leeds, 48 111. App. 21)7 (1 SOL'). "In the United States, a tradesman's book of original entries is in most jurisdictions received in <'vidence as prima facie proof, when supported by the tradesman's oath." White r. Whitney, 82 Cal. UMi (1889); Thomson c. Torter, li Strobh. (S. 0.) Eq. 08 (isr,0). It is a requirement that the entry should be made in the course of business. Karr r. Stivers, .'U la. 123 (1871); Thomson /•. Por- ter, 3 Strobh. (S. C.) Eq. 'tH (18r)0). The entrj' must not only be made in the course of business, but it must relate to the declarant's business. "The rule is hard enough to include merchants, shop-keepers, tradesmen, mechanics and farmers, in all that jiertains to their callings. Put it would be dangerous to open the door of admission wider than this. The inclination of the court is not to extend this kind of evidence beyond its succinct limits, and we think it has not been so far stretched as to include the casual sale of an article not in the n\Av. VI 1. 1 AMKUir.VN NdTKS. 4(;3>* fiourao of tlio ijartios' Inisincss, mid of wliicli it is uHiuil to tiiko otlier i)ro()l' or evidence of salo. ... It is mucii iM-ttcr to adlicm to tiiis practice tiiaii to overstep the aiicdeiit iiiiiits of the rule, sanctioned only throu{,'ii necessity, and tlieii run the hazard of olditeratin.!,' the only int(dli},'il)lc lint; (jf distintaion." Slioeuiaker V. Keiio;,', II I'a. St. .'MO (1841)). The entry is re<,'arded as none the less "ori,i,'inal " that the first actual record is made upon a slate, and allerwards transferred there- from into the book offered, if practical convenience and the course of business refpiirt! it. I''axon /•. Mollis, I.'l .Mass. ILT (18ir>) — a cast! of work and labor broii^dit by a blacdisniith; Uarker c. Has- kell, 9 Ciudi. L'lS (iHr.li); Landis V. Turner, II Cal. oT.'J (\m)); Hall *'. (Hidden, .'{'.) Me. ■{{:> (l.S,'.r>); PiUsbiiiy /-. Locke, ;{;5 N. H. •.)() (iMrKI); Redlich /;. l{aiierlee, <».S 111. l.'M (l.SSI). So also where the ori^'inal entries of a butcher were in the form of "chalk scores on the curt, stating' to whom the meat was sold, and the (piantity aiul price; from which scores, on the return of the cart on the same day, and before it went out a^'aiii, it was the cus- tom of the otlier partner to make entries in the book of oriijinal entries," the book was held admissible. Smith /•. Sanford, 12 rick. i;{.S (1831). So where work was done by the servants of a painter, who testi- fied that they broutj;ht home memoramla of the items of service and of the amount of jiaint furnished, and from thesi- memoranda the chartjes were made in the book, it was ludd the bocjk account was admissible. Morris /•. liri.<,'<,'s, .'? Cusli. ."»J2 (ISlit). The book ort'ered is none the less a book of ori<,MiKil entries, that it is made up from information ori},nnally furnished by loose mem- oranda. Hoover r. Gehr, i)li I'a. St. \'M\ (ISC)'.)). Or "entered each day on a slate, by those doing it, or under whose eyes it was done." And where "the book-keeper entered these charges from day to day in the books and effaced them from the slate." Stroud »;. Tiltmi, 4 Abb. (^t. of App. Dee. IVJ-i (\H{\(\); Nichols /•. Vinson, 9 Houst. L'74 (1891); or that the account is kept liy the use of simple straight marks, the maker being unable to write. Miller v. Shay, 14") Mass. 1(>2 (1887). These memoranda need not, and usually cannot, be produced, l.andis r. Turner, 14 Cal. r»73 (18(»()). But where sales were entered at the close of day U]>on a ledger from loose slips, by items which did not show the kind of goods sold, it was htdd that the ledger was not admissible as a book of original entries. Way i>. Cross (la.) (;.*{ N. W. G91 (189")). This ruling was correct ui)on other grounds. The memoranda must be transferred to the book of original entries within a rea.«onable time. Three days is not an unreasonable length of time. Landis v. Turner, 14 C'al. 57.'{ (1860). lU 8' ■!' W I 463" AMEKIUAN NOTES. ti 1:, i [part hi. Where tlip plaintiff, a rord-waiiipr doing a very small business, made his oliarges ■'iiitoii a slate until it was full, and in from two to four weeks from tlie time they were so entered, when the worit was done, he transferred them to his book," it was held "properly received." Hall r. (ilidden, .*«) Me. 44.') (IH.V)). Where the entrii's are transcribed from a pass-book "within a couple of days," when tiie plaintitt' was sick, and every evening when ho was well, it wa,; held snttleiently contenii)oraneous. Hoo- ver /•. Gt'hrf iVJ J 'a. St. I'M (ISC)')). Wiiere entries are transferred from memoranda, it was held in an early case in i'ennsylvania that tlie entries ought in each ease to be transferred "at least in tlie course of the day succeeding " the day of entry on the memorandum, reje(!ting the book where some of the entries had been transferred on tiie third day. Cook r. Ashmead, li MiL (I'a.), L'CS (IS.'iS). ExTuiKs Mi'sr Ki'.sT ON I'ldssoNAL Kxowi.KDoi:. — The entry nius be verilied by the evidence of the person who made the entry or appropriate ])roof of his handwriting. State v. Hopkins, "»(( Vt. 2r.(>, L'ivS, (l.S8;i): Coi'.ntryman r. lUmiier, 1(»1 Mich. L'lH (1S'.»4); M.'cth r. Kaidiin Hrick Co. 48 HI. App. Odli (18!»L'); V. H. Hill Co. <". SoMimer, ■)"> HI. App. 34.5(181)4); Skipworth /•. Dryell, 8.'1 Hun. .107 (18<»4). It is believed that the rule laid down in the supreme court of Mississijipi in tlie following case is too liberal, unless the person oil whose information the entry i made is also proiluced as a wit- ness. "The rule is that to authorize the introduction of books of account as evidence of the facts entered, it nnist be shown that they have beiMi fairly and hoiH.stly kept, that they are the books of a party engaged in the l»iisiiiess to wliicli tliey refer, that the I'ntries were made in tlie usual course of business, at or abcmt the time the fact;; entered transpired, that the entries are original and made by a party having knowledge of the f-vcts entered, or that information thereof was communicated to the party by wiiom the entries were niatle .ly some person engaged in the business whose duty it was to transact tiie jiarticular business and make the report tliereof for entry on the books, and such re[(ort and entry must be made at" the time of the occurrence or before the facts can be sup- jiosed to iiave passed from liis recollection." Cliicago H. Co. v. I'rovine. C.l Miss. L'S8 (188;{). "Plaintiffs' l>ooks of account will not be ex(duded on the ground tliat plaiiitilfs kept a clerk during tlie time of the dealings svliicli were the sul)ject of the action, where ]daiiitilfs testily that, iliiring such time, they <lid not keep a regular (derk, Init sometimes emphtyed jiersons to help them for a few thiys or iiioiitlis. and also emidoyed ])ersons to assist tempnni- I'ily ill posting the books, anil that the book entries by others than id lintili's were made under their siipervision. in their presence, CHAP, vn.] AMERICAN NOTES. 463>8 and at their suggestion, though they state on cross-examination that they cannot say that they were always present when the charges in the books were made, or that tliey saw or gave din'otions as to every charge." Atwood v. r.arney, L'»J X. Y. Siip't. HU) (l.S<>4). This requirement tliat the entry must have been based upon tlie personal knowledge of the declarant must necessarily he relaxed where, as frefiucntly happens, the entry is made by one jjcrson upon information furnished him, and the remainder of the trans- a(!tion is completed by another. Under these circumstances, if the party making the entry can testify that lie has accurately entered what he was told (or, in case of his decease, if his liandwriting ami, possibly, general accuracy be proved) and the truth of the informa- tion which was entered, be testified to by those on whose knowl- edge it rests, it will b« sufficient verilication of tlie account. "The decided cases have also sanctioned tlie rule that where there is more than one individual connected with the sale and delivery of the goods, and the making of the charges on tlie liook, it is proper to introduce as witnesses all those persons wlio are thus connected with the transaction, and whose testinionv is necessary to establish those facts which would be retpiiied to be proved by a single person, when such jjcrson had been the sole actor, as vendor and book-keeper.'" Harwood r. Mulry, S(iiay, 'jr>{) (18."»7); Miller i;. Shay, 14r» Muss. KL' (1.SH7) ; 1-ittlelield r.'lJn-e, 10 .Mete. 1'87 (l«l.")); Faxon v. Hollis, l.'J Mass. 41'*; (ISH',); Smitli r. Sanfonl, IL' Pick. I'.V.) (IS-'U); Morris r. Uriggs, .'{ ('u^sh. 'M'J (18r>7); Marker /•. Haskell, <> (Jush. L'18 {\Hr>'J). A foreman, h;vving general charge of the work, with two gan*;- foremen undtir him, each in charge of a separate gang, kept a time- book, in wliich was entereil the name of each man employr'd; visited the work twice a day, and checked oif on the time-iiook the time cd' each nuin as reported to him by tiie gang-foremen, recognizing .some workmen by their faces. I'lie gang-foremen did not see the entries, liut testified that they had correctly reported the time of ea(di workman to the general foreman. Held, tliat the Ixiok was admissible, in connection with the eviih-nceof the general foreman. " We are of opinion that the rule as to the admissdiility of memo- randa may i)ro]ierly Ic extended so as to endiraee the cahc before us. Tin* case is ni' an account kejit in the ordinary course of busi- ni'ss, of laluirers emidoyeil in the |iriPsecution of work, l»nseii upon daily reports of foremen who had cliar^'e of the men, and wiio, in accordaiii-e with their duty, reported the time to another sulmidi- natc of the same common master, but of a liit^dcr ^rade. who, in time, also in accordance with his duty, entered tlie time as reported. We think entries so made, with the evidence of the foremen that they made true rcjxirts, and of the person who made the entries that he correctly entered tliem, are admissible, it is substantially 463" AMERICAN NOTES. T *"1 [PART in. by this method of accounts, that business transactions in numerous cases are authenticated, and business could not be carried on and accounts kept in many cases, without great inconvenience, unless this uietliod of keei)iuy and i)r()ving accounts is sanctioned. In a business wiiere many laborers are employed, the accounts must, in most cases, of necessity, be kept by a person not personally cni^ni- zant of the facts, and from reports made iiy otliers. The iii-rson in charge of the laborers knows the fact, but he may not have tlie skill, or, for other reasons, it may he inconvenient that he should keep the account. It n>ay be assumed that a system of accounts based upon substantially the sanu; methods as the accounts in this c;ise, is in accordance with the; usages of business. l;i admitting an account veritied, as was the account here, there is little danger of mistake, and tin; admission (d' such an account as legal evidence is often necessary to jirevent a failure of justice. We are of opinion, however, that it is a projier (lualilication of the rule admitting such evideni'e, that the acount most have been made in the ordinary course of business, and that it should not be extended so as to admit a mere private nu'morandum, not made in pursuaiu-o of any duty owing by the person making it, or when made upon information derived from another who made the communication casually and voluntarily, and i\iit iinder the sanction of duty or other o!)ligation. The ease before us is within the <iualitication suggested." Mayor, etc., of N. Y. r. Sec. Ave. \l. It. Co. lU'J \. V. o7U (ISS(J). The evidence of tlie immsou having actual knowl- edge of the time employed is necessar}', even if such person is without the state. Little Uock Granite Co. v. Dallas Co. (>(! Fed. Kep. r.L'2 (ISIM.) Wiiere logs were measured as they werc^ saweil, and a memo- randum of tJKiir contents marked on them liy the party sawing, and at the end of each week the figures on the board were tran- scribed into a book by one of the measurers, who, liowever. cnuld not reeogni/.e the work of the other measurers liy tlieir lii,'ures on th(^ boards, it was Indd tli;it the liook was not evidence of the ipiantity of logs sawed without culling all the ])artics who had measurt'd the logs. Leslie v. Hanson, 1 Ilannay (New Mruiis.) 2(»;< (ISCh); Chicago Lumbering Co. v. Hewitt, 04 Fed. Kep. ."{U (IH'.M). The rule being considered h:is no application to the ease, where, though the actual entry is made by H,, its accuracy has been ascer- tained by \. who has reported the fiicts which are Mie b;isis of the entry to it. In such a ease the evidence of A. is sufHcieiit. Tims where a witness took ilown ujum a slate the (|uantity in each stick of timber drawn l»y him, added up the several i|nantities, and gave tlieir sum to his wife or daughter, who entered it in his presence upon a niemoi'.iiuluui book, and he then examinetl the P CHAP. VII.] AMERICAN NOTES. 403" entries and found that they were correct, it was held that the hook might he submitted to the jury in connection witli the testinumy of the witness as comi)etent to show the quautity drawn by him. I'illshury v. Locke, 33 N. H. % {iSm). Kntkiks mist hk Contemporaneous. — As in tlie case of the sliop-book, the entry must be made at sidjstantially tlie same time as the transaction. It is for this reason, in part, tliat tlie book of original entry is alone admissible, lientley v. Ward, IIG iMass. 333 (1H74); DaVis r. Sanford, 9 All. 21<> (1804); Martin u. [Nichols, ~}i Mo. App. ~>\H (1<S',)3); Collins I>ros. Drug Co. r. (Jraddy, .57 Mo. App. 41 (IS'.M); llailway Co. r. Murphy, 00 Ark. 333 (189.")); Skipworth v. Dryell, 83 Ilun, 3(»7 (1894). The onus of showing this, as other reipiisites of admissibility, is on the jiarty ottering the account. l>rown v. Williams (Tex.), 31 S. W. L'-.") (189")). In an action against an estate upon a book accoui.*- for "drinks," "billiards,'' etc., the c(mrt say, "It was shown that the otlier entries in the books were in tlie handwriting of the appellee, but tiiere wa:; no evidence to show that the entries made by him were cotemporaneous with the transactiim of the matters to which they relate." Haldridge v. I'eidaud, 08 Tex. 441 (1887). It is not fatal that a physician's book of cliarges contains entries in which the work of several days for the defendant is consolidated. "The charges of J^/i, in s(!veral instances, embracing services of two or three days, are neither contrary to law nor the ])ractice that jtrevails with men who keep their books of account at home, while their labor and services are rendered elsewhere." Uay v. Cook, '22 X. J. L. .34.3, 3r)3 (18r»()). Wliere a laborer works by the day for a single employer, it is sufficient if he sets down his time at the end of the week. He "ouglit not in reason to bo held to nuike daily entries in his books." Yearsley's Ajjpeal, 48 Pa. St. .')31 (hSfio). In a Massadiusetts case where the entries were made u)) from daily memoranda furnished by the servants, ".sometimes on tlie day, sometimes every two or thrtie days, and one or two at longer intervals," the entries were admitted. Morris v. liriggs, 3 Cush. 342 (1849). "In this particular, every case must be made to depend very much upon its own peculiar circumstances, having regard to the situation of the jiarties, the kind of business, thi' mode of conduct- ing it, and the time and manner of making the entries." jiarker t;."na.skell, 9 Cnsh. 218 (I8r)2). TijooK oi- Kntuv. — If the i)arty making the entry be alive, he must l)e produced. To entitle a memorandum to l)e read in evidence, it is indispens able that the witness should verify tlie handwriting as his own. (Jilchrist v. Brooklyn Grocers' Man. Assoc. 09 N. Y. 495 (1875). 468» AMERICAN NOTES. [part ra. Ml?' W'^^ti 1|,J1|S I If the clerk or writer is available as a witness, he must be pro- duced, Bartholomew v. Farwell, 41 Conn. 107 (1874). Or his absence satisfactorily accounted for. Trice v. Garland, 3 N. M. 285 (188o). A dictum in Connecticut suggests that in the case of a "book debt," the evidence of the person making the entry, even if avail- able as a witness, is not required. Bartholomew v. Farwell, 41 Conn. 107 (1874). Where the clerk is dead, his handwriting should be i)roved. Stroud V. Tilton, 4 Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. 324 (18G<)); McDonald v. Carnes, 00 Ala. 147 (1890). " Where the entries are in the liand-writing of a deceased person, it is not enough, under any of the cases, for the administrator to swear to the general conclusion that the books came to his hands as administrator as tlie books of original entry of his intestate, and that he believes the debt was unpaid." In all such cases there must be proof of the handwriting of the deceased, whether prin- cipal or clerk. Robinson /'. Dibble, 17 Flu. 457 (1880). If the party making the entry is deceased, or otl orwise incompe- tent, his handwriting should be proved. Hoover v. Gehr, (i2 I'a. St. 130 (18()!)); Union Bank v. Knapp, 3 I'ick. J)(i, 100 (1825). If the person who made tiie entry is ''dead or beyond reach, or incompetent, his testimony is dispensed with ex no'e.initat^,''' Bartholomew v. Farwell, 41 Conn. 107 (1874). And this is true, t''oi. ;h the entry was originally made upon information furnished by another person who delivered the goods, performed the work, etc., provided .such second jjerson is presented as a witiu'ss. Hoover /-. (iehr, (52 Fa St. 130 (18()'.)). It is also settled that "original entries made by i\ person in his own books, or made by his clerk, when done in the ordinary course of business, and conti'mi)orane()Usly with the transaction to which such entries relate, are generally atlniissilih^ in evidence to jirovc the correct- ness of all items within the knowledge of the person making tlieni. Before admissible, the entries must be sworn to as having been nnidc by tlie party who made thcni, and that he knew of tlieir correctness at tins tiim^ they were made, if such party is living." It has been said in an early case, that it is not sutlicient to admit proof of his handwriting that the writer is without tlie state, Douglass r. Hart. 4 .McCord. 257 (1827). But being lieyond the reach of process has gene.ally been regarded as a satisfactory reason for admitting evidence of handwriting. Where a partner named Buck, in whose handwriting certain entries were, had gone to jiarts unknown, the court in admitting evidenct! of his handwriting say, "The same necessity therefore existed for receiving the books in evidence that would have existed '-!-. . Jl CHAP, vir.] AMEUICAN NOTKS. 4t>3»» if liuck had been dead at the time of trial." Mew Haven &<;. Co. V. Goodwin, 42 Conn. 2.'J() (l.S7r)). Other excuses will be acceiited for the noii-production of the evidence of the person who made the entr) . So where a party is insane, the account is admissible as proof of his handwriting verified by the oath of the guardian. Whether the person is sufficiently insane to justify admitting the evidence is a preliminary question of fact for the i)residing justice. Holbrook V. Gay, G Cush. 215 (1850); Union Bank v. Knapp, .'{ Tick. %, 108 (181>r)). If he is dead, or insane, or beyond the jurisdiction of the court, proof of his handwriting will be sufficient. Helling v. Fannin, 97 Ala. GIS) (1893). Natukk ok Ciiarok. — Even where account-books are freely admitted, regardless of amount, certain of the old limitations upon the use of shop-books are still retained, as to the nature of tiie charge in proof of which such books art; .vdmissible. For example, in New York, account-books are not admissible in proof of items of cash. "The rule which prev;iils in this state (adopted, it is said, from tne law of Holland), that the books of a tradesman, or other person engaged in busiiu'ss, coMtaiiiing items of account, kept in the ordinary course of book-aectounts, are admissible in favor of the person keeping them, against tlie party against whom the charges an; made alter certain preliniiiiury facts are slu wn, has no application to the case of books or entries reb.t- ing tc cash items or dealings between the ])arties. ... 7 lie rule admitting aecionnt-books of a Jiarty in his ^,\\\\ favor in any case, was a departure from the ordinary rult^s of '.'vidence. it was founded upon a supposed necessity, and was intended fur eases (jf small traders who kept no clerks, and was eoniined to transactions in the ordinary course of buying and selling or the ri'iidition of services. In tliese casef, some protection against fraudulent entries is afforded in the ])ublieity whi(;h to a greater or li'ss extent attends the manual transfer of tangible articles of property, or the rendition o. services, and the knowledge whicli third [lersons may have of the transactions to whi(,'h the entries ndate. Hut tiie same necessity does not exist in respect to cash transactions." Smith V. Hentz, l.'Jl N. V. Kl'.) (1S92). "The book to be admissible, it is said, must be a registry of business actually done, and not of orders, executory contnicts and things to be done subsequiuit to the entry." Hart ( . Livingston, 29 la. L'17 (1870). It was aeeonlingly held that an entry. " I'.o't of Livingstons 25 fat hogs, 12 head delivered immediately, balance when fatteiuid, )id. .f! 15.00," was not admissible. IliUl. A United States marshal's book of fees and disbursements is competent in favor of his administration. Kinney v. U. S., 64 Fed. Hep. 313(l"9;n. I W !l 46321 AMERICAN NOTES. [part in. " Nor is it any objection . . . that the labor and services charged were performed under a special contract as to the price." Swain V. Cheney, 41 N. H. 232 (1860). If the correctness of the orij^inal entries is proved, they may be shown by secondary evidence in case of their destruction by tire. Ins. Co. r. Weide, '.) Wall. G77 (iSGt)). If tlie shop-book is otherwise competent, it is not necessarily fatal that other outside a('(M)unts are put in at the close of the shop account. White r. Whitney, 82 Cal. IG.'} (1889). Statutory Extkxsio.v. — .Much of the rapid growth of this branch of the law has resulted from statutory enactment. Hancock V. Hintrager, GO la. 374 (1882); Wall v. Dovey, GO l*a. St. 212 (18G'.)). Collateral Facts. — Whether an entry in course of business is evidence of collateral facts is in disi)Ute. Tliat A. is debited on the plaintiff's books is not "conclusive evidence that the credit was given to liim, but only a circumstance, strong it is true, to be submitted witli all the otlier evidence in the cause to the jury." Myer v. Crafflin, 31 Md. 350 (1.SG!)). Tiiat the plaintiff debited a person other than the defendant is admissible as being "in the nature of admissions." Bentley v. Ward, IIG .Mass. 333 (1874). A plaintiff's books are not evidence to prove a promise of payment by the defendant. Somers v. Wriglit, 114 Mass. 171 (1873). A charge on a plaintiff's books is not conclusive as to the ptirson to whom credit was given, (lilbert v. Porter, 2 Kerr (Xev Bruns.)31)0 (1844). A bo(»k account is said not to be "evidence in reference to the amount of the claim due to the other ])arty, and of the true state of t!ie account between the parties." Alexander v. Smoot, 1.3 Ired. L. (X. C.)4G1 (1852). ('oXKiRMATio>f Aliunde. — "The rule requires, in addition, the suppletory oath of the party, and that it must be ])roved aliunde, that lie was in the habit of keeping correct and j>ist accounts." IJurleson v. Goodman, .32 Tex. 229 (18()9). "In order to entitle books of acccmnt to reception as evidence, it must a])pear tliat tlie party keeping and j)roduciug them is usually precise and jjunetilious respecting tlie entries therein, and that they are designed at least to embrace all the items of tlie account which are proper sutijcts of entry." Countryman »'. Hunker, 101 Mich. 218(1894). In a (leorgia ease, in reversing judgment for the plaintiff, the court say : "To say notiiing of the character and condition of the books themselves, not a witness swears that he kept correct l)ook8 from his own knowledge of his dealings; nor does any one depose that he knew of any dealings between Cheever and lirowu. To CHAP. VII.] AMEKICAX NOTES. 4(ur^ allow a thousand dollars to l)e recovered upon sikjIi proof, world perhaps be going too lur." Clieever v. l>r<iwn. ,'!() (ia. <.)04 (LSOO). It is immaterial thut the witnesses who testily to the general correctness of the i)liuntirt''s books settled tiieir own aeconiits by the ledger or did not verify the original entries. .Stroud /•. 'lilton, 4 Al)b. Ct. of App. Dec. 324 (l.SG()). It ia sulficient confirmation if the plaintiff call as' witnesses several persons who have kept tlie books oftered in evidence, "and who testitii'd that tiie books were correctly and accurately kept, and on tliese Dooks were daily entered the items. ... It is no longer necescary to call as witnesses others who have settled by the books." tieventli Day &c. Association r. l'"isher, '.io Mich. 274 Tlie testimony of a book-keeper to the accuracy of his accounts has been regarded as a suHicient verification. Cleland r. Ajjplegate, 8 Ind. .\pp. 4'J'.) (189;'.). Testimony of witnesses that they had dealt with jdaintitTs, and had settled from plaintiffs' books of account, which they found to be correct, is sufficient evidence that the books were fairly and honestly kept to authorize their admission in evidence." Atwood V. IJarney, 2*) N. Y. Supp. 810 (18'.)4). "The j»resnmption, prima facie, is, that the book of a decedent was regularly kept as a record of his daily transactiims. If testi- mony is subsequently introduced whieli raises any question ujion the 8iibje(!t it is for tlie jury to determine, under projier instruc- tions from the court." Hoove, . . Cehr, (i2 l*a. St. l.'U! (^ISGi)). I'ltKMMi.vAKY IxQi'iuiKs KoK TUK CiMitT. — As with otlicr mat- ters of fact, incidental to tlie receiiit of evidence, the pndiminary inipiiries relating to tliis class of evidence must be decided by the court. "Such ])rivate entries of a party himself, made in the reguhir routine of iiis business, are considered, especially in modern times, as legal testimony, however weak it may be regarded, if upon inspection of tlie l)ooks by the court trying a cause, they appear to have been houestly kept, and tlu' entries, witho\it erasures or interlineations, regularly and chronologically made." ]{u:les(m V. (loodnnui, 32 Te.\. 22!» (ISC'I). "It is for the ccmrt to decide upon the admissibility of the book offered, although the weight to be given to it afterwards must be largely a (piestiou for the jury, in connection with lis ippearance, the manner in whieli it is kept, and the other evidence in the ease. It must ajipear to have been honestly kept, and not iiitentionally erased or altered, and to have been the record of the daily business of tin- party, made for tlie purpose of estaldishing a charge against another. Necessarily, regard is to be had to the education of tlie Jiarty, his methods and knowledge of business, etc., in deciding this (piestion. Cogswell I'. Doliiver, 2 Mass. 217; I'rince v. Smith, 4 Mass. 454. sir 46323 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AKT III. The decision of the court to admit the book is final and conclu- sive, unless from its character, or troni that which was soiijjht to he proved by it, it couhl not have been admitted even it it met tliose tests." I'ratt v. White, 1.32 Mass. 477 (1882). In Florida the rule is stated thus: "Originally book accounts wtM'C' not adniissildc! in evidentse in this state. Higgs i\ Shehee, 4 Kla. .'{82. Subscfiuently to this decrision the Legislature passed an act that shop books of account of either party, in which cliarges and entries shall have been origiiuilly made shall be admissible in evidence in favor of such party, and the credibility of sucli evi- dence shall be judged of by tlie Jury in cases at law, and by the court in cases of t |. ity. ( haptsr 0(52, Acts of 1854, Hevised Statutes sec. 1120. d' i this statute, as construed by our decisions, before the h s c; ii be admitted in evidence they must be submitted to the i.. -jectio;' f the judge, accompanied with proof tliat tlie entries therein wo .. originally made, that is, made by the party contemporaneous witli the transactions tiu-rein recorded, in due course of his business, and if they exhibit a fair register of the daily business of the party, and appear to have been honestly and regularly kept, they are admissible as evidence to be judged of by the jury." Lewis v. ^leginniss, 30 Fla. 419, 428 (1802). The party againsv whom such entries are offered may call the attention of the couri, to inaccuracies and circumstances of suspicion in the entries of the book, even as to .iccounts other than tlie one otTered in the case. If the liook is admitted to go to the jury, the party can introduce intrinsic or extrinsic evidence as to tlie accuracy and goo<l faitli of tlie book as to tlie account in litigation or any other, open cr closed. "Wlien a book of original entries is offered in evidence, sun)K)rted by tlie oath of the party, the court examines it to see if it appears, prima facie, to be what it purports to be. If there are erasures and interlineations, and false or impossible dates, touching ])oints that are material, or if for any reason it clearly ajtpears not to be a legal book of entries, the court may reject it .as incompetent: (Churchman *'. Smith, (» Whart. 14r>; Cnrren i\ (;iawford, 4 S. & It. .'{. If this does not clearly appe:ir, it is to be submitted to tlie jury to judge of, and then it is competent for the adverse i)arty to show its general character by jiointing to charges and entries att'ect- iiig other parties, and by calling witnesses to jirove such entries false and fr.iudulent. That this investigation may not run into excessive departure from the issue on trial, the court should limit it to the time, or near the time, covered by the .account in suit, and should suffer no more examination of collateral ca.ses than would bear directly on the general character of the book. If a shop-book exiiibit, in respect to customers generally, illegal dates. CHAP. VII.] AMEUICAN NOTES. 463»* as on Suiulay, or impossible dates, as .'list of June or 30th Febru- ary, or altered dates, or earlier dates after those that are later, or any other su(di (foudenuiiug features, they are evidence for the jury upon the general character of the book. The jury may form simu' opinion from such examination, how far it is entitled u> weight in the scales which they are holding. Whilst they should mal<e all due allowances for mistakes, for ignorance and unskilfulness in book-keeping, and for peculiarities in the plaintiff's business, they should insist on the general honesty and accuracy of the book, made in secret by one party against the other, and now ottered as a guide to the conscience of the jury." Funk v. Ely, 4;") Vn. St. 44-4 (18G3). Wkioiit kou tiik Juky. — Once admitted, the evidence of account-books is entitled to such weight as the jury see tit to give it. "Of these attributes and pre-recpiisites of the book accounts of parties, the judge who tries the cause and has the opportunitj* to inspect them, is better qualified to form an opinion than this coi' , unless the books themselves are brought under review here. W !' n they are admitted before the jury, as testimony, the jury alone are to be the judges of the weight to be given to them." I'urles'.. v. Goodman, 32 Tex. 229 (18G9); Dicken i;. Winters, 109 F.i. St. 126 (1895). ;<i \!n 4G326 AMERICAN NOTES. i^ -'-m [I'AIIT III. Entries in Course of Business. — I'roniiiient among exceptions to the hearsay rule is that whicii admits oral declarations or written entries made by a deceased person in the usual course of i)rot'es- sional or otticial business, or in discharge ot some duty. " We think it a sale principle, fliat memorandums made by a per- son in the ordinary course of his business, of acts or nuitters wliich liis duty in sucli business reipiires liim to do for others, in case ot his deatli, are admissible evidence of the acts and matters so done." Niidiolls i>. \V.d)b, S Wiieat. ,'iliG, :y^7 (IH'SA). On an a(!tion by indorsee of a promissory note against an indorser demand and notice may be proved by an entry of a notary's chuk since de- ceased. " It has been recently settled, that the memorandums made at the time by a person in the ordinary course of his business, of ai'ts and matters which his duty in such businees rec^uired lum to do for otliers, are admissible evidence of the acts and matters so done after his death." Farmers' IJank v. Whitehill, IG S. & U. 89 (iSliT). In a similar case, a protest of a note found among the jjapers of a deceased notary pul)lic is good evidence of the dennind and notice. " Notaries are iisually employed for that purpose by holders of notes, and are trustworthy persons conversant with such business, and tlierefore suitable and proper agents to 1);* so employed; and tiieir written memoratula, after their decease, tliougli not competent evidence in chief, yet from necessity are good secondary evidence, becinse it is the usual course of tlieir duty and business to keep such memoranda. Porter /•, .Indson, 1 (}ray 17") (1S54). See also Sliove o. Wiley, l.S Pick. .loH (1S;U')), wliere no attention is apparently paid by the court to the fact that the writer was alive. Entries in the private book of a deceased town treasurer made in the usual course of his official duty, are competent. Rindge v. Walker, 01 N. H. 58 (1881). Kntries in tiie account book of a deceased physician of cliarges for services as a surgeon in setting a fractured leg, made in course of business are C()mp(!tent evidence, in a pauper settlement ca.se, though not against the interest of the declarant. Augusta w. Windsor, 19 Me. 'M7 (1S41). Entries by a deceased jeweller as to the repairs, number, make, «&c., of a certain watcli, made .according to the course of Iiis busi- ness, are competent evidence of the facts set forth. State v. rhair, 48 Vt. .'JfiG (ISTo). "The entry by an attorney in liis register of the making of an order or decree in a jjroceeding conducted by him, is admissible within this rule. The order or decree is the act of the court, but it is procured upon the apjdirntion of the attorney, and tlie fact of obtaining it is a part of the history of the proceeding, which prop- i\f'-: ■'! CHAP. VII.] AMEKICAN NOTKS. 4«;a26 erly and usually is insortetl in tlio rc-^ister. Tlioro is no absolute duty rostiuK upon an attorney to make such an I'utry, but this is not essential, it is suliicient it' the entry was tlu* natural conconiitant of the transaction to whieli it relates, and usually accompanies it.'" Fisher ;•. Mayor, 07 N. V. 7.'!, 77 (lS7(j) So an entry of demand «)f payment of a certain note made in a book kept, as recpiircd \ty the by-laws of tlu. hank by a deecascd messenger, is competent evidence of demand. Welsh v. iJarrctt ICMass. ;i71) (hsiy;. The record of a station agent as to the movement of freight cars at his station, made in the course of his duties as agent of the company, is competent. K. 11. Co. v. Henderson, rij Ark. 402 (1«9;{). It is not necessary that the duty should be one which is pre- scribed by law. The entry of a baptism, contemporaneously made by a Roman Catholic jiriest, in th(! discharge of his ecclesiastical duty, in his church record of baptisms, is eomiu'tent evidencu', after his death of the date of the baptism, if the book is jiroduced from the pro)ier custody; althongh he is not a sworn oflifer, and the record is not required by law to be kept. Kennedy v. Doyle, 10 All. 1(51 ( ISGy). '• In the ca.=i before us, the book was kej't liy the deceased l)riest in the usual cours<' of his ofliee, and was j)rod)iced from the custody of his successor; the entry is in his own handwriting, and appears to have been nuule contemporaneously with the perform- ance of the rite, long before any controversy had arisen, with no inducement to misstate, and no interest except to perform his official duty. The addition of a memorandum that he had been paid a fee for the ceremony could not have added anything to the competency, the credibility, or the weight, of tin? record as evidence of the fact. An entry made in the perfonnance of a religious duty is certainly of no less value than one made by a clerk, messenger or notarv, an attorney or solicitor, or a iihysician, in the course of his secular occupation." See also Wliitcher v. McLaughlin, 115 Mass. 107 (1S74). So the ofticial registers ke]»t by ])ublic officers for entry of official transactions to discharge the duties of their offices iirc ailniissible, though no statute rcfpiires the books to be kept. r>ell r. Ilcndrick, LT) Fla,. 778 (ISSO). "Official records, or books kept by persons in ])ublic oliice, in which they are required to write down the i)roceiMlings of some public body or corporation, are generally admissible in evidence, although their authenticity be not confirni<'(l by an oath, or the power of (^ross-examining the persons on whose authority their truth and correctness depend." Little u. Downing, ."7 N. H. 355 (1858). 403" AMKIMCAN NOTKS. [I'AliT III. 1 Hut it is requisite tli.it tlH>r(' shmilil be ii duty of soiik! kind. A Holf-iiiiposed, optional task does tiot nonic within the rule. 'I'Iiuh th(? snpienic jiidiciiil court of .VraHSiiclmsetts lias refused to admit entries made by a deceased person of payments of money enlere<l in a diary in wliicli he made daily entries. (Jostelo w. Cruwcdl, l;{!> Mass. r.SS aSHo). 'I'lie hook must have a "connection with the busines.s of the plaintiff."' Avery r. Avery, 4<.) Ala. l!*.'{ (l«7;j;. So a lawyer cannot fix a date by proof of an entry in his diary, th(ni(,'h such entry mi},'ht be used to refresh his recollection. Whitaker i*. White, <;•> Hun, 'S>H (1S'.«). Where the owner of a business, suspectinjj that an employee was not aocoiintinj,' to him for sales, had another employee make a list of sales on a slip of paper, it was h(dd that this was not an entry in course of business. I'eck r. Valentine, 1)4 N. Y. iiUy (1H,S4). FiViiiKMK ( K Com. ATr.it A I. Facts. — The declaration is not only evidence of t!ie jirecise fact which it was the duty or custom of the declarant to enter, but of collateral facts stated at the same time. So the entry on the baptismal register of a iJoman Catholic priest "IS.'iT, December 17th. ISaptized .loanna, born iL'th," is evidence not only of the date and fact of baptism, but of the date of Itirth, thoui^h it was no part of the priest's duty to record the date of birth. Kennedy v. Doyle, 1(1 All. 1(51 (iSOfi). Kntries on the books of a deceased jeweller, showing the charges tor repairs made on a (M-rtain watch, are competent evidence of its number, maker, style, itc. in any suit svhere such facts are material. State V. l'hair,"4S Vt. 'MW (IS?".). On the contrary, it has been held in Pennsylvania, that tlie record of a Lutlicran minister showing the burial record of certain persons was iMcompetent to show the names of their parents, their l)irthplaces, and the dates of birth, though this "was the usual way of keeping the record." The court say: "This burial list was com[)etent to show the death .'iiid burial of these ladies, but what the pastor \n\t down in the i)ook as t«) their ])arentage, and the time and jtlace of their buth, was incompetent, for the plain reason that it was no part of his duty to make such entries. Stiea registers arc not, in general, eviileuce of any fact not required to be recorded in them, and which did not occur in the presence of the registering oiKcer." Sitlcr v. Cehr, 105 I'enn. St. .'".77, (UlO (1SS4>. "Apart from any statute reiiuiring it, the baptismal register of a church, in which entries of baptism are made in tiie ordinary covirse of the clergyman's business, is ;idmissible to jirove the fact ami date of baptism, but not to prove other facts, as, ex. gr., that the child was baptized as the lawful child of the parents, and hence to infer a marriage between them." IJlackburn t'. Cr.awfords, 3 Wall. 17.-. (1S(m).' CMAI'. VII.] AMKHHAN NOTES. 408!" So it liivs been held in Michigan tli.it "tlie reoonl of .a laptisni, when iulinissihle in evidenoe, is evidence of the diite of Itaptism, but not of birth, although .stated therein.'' Durfec; r. Alibott, (51 Mieh. 471 (l.SSi;). And, in the same court, tliat :i book entry cannot be u.sed as evidence not only of a certain jiaynu'Ut, but ahso that it was "in full.'" "It is well settled lh;it such an entry cannot jirove anythiu},' more ';han the ohar^je of such an amount, if it proves that. Any further ei-try can have no \v('it,'lit to jirovc sucli a set- tlenu'iit as is relied on iiere. I'look-entries, when receivaliie, are not allowed beyond t!ie purpose for which the exception in tlieir favor is made m the usual cour.se of business." Kstate of Ward, 73 Mich. '-"-'0 (\SS\)). And it lias l)ccn hehl that a stranger cannot be a declarant of a man's age, — e. tj., the secMctary of a lodge cannot make his state- ment of the age of an aiiplicant upon the lodge books evidence of su(di age. (Connecticut, &c., Ins. (.'o. i'. Schwenk, '.(4 l'. S. TiO.'l (iSTCi). Similarly, on an indictment for cohabitation with a female under eighteen years of age. the annual reports of tiie clerk of the school district where the girl went to sciiocd — which stated the age of the pupils — were rejected, as the clerk "was not re(|uired to include in his report the names of the children or the a(;tual age of any child." State ,•. Woods, 4'.l Kan. l.'.'!7 (1S'.»L'). Mist hk Contkmi'ouaxkois. — If the declaration takes the form of a written entry, such entry must be ma(h' at sid).staiitial]y the same time as the occurrence of the fact wliicli it imrports to state. ChafTee r. V. S., IS Wall. olCi. ".41 (IST.'i); Kennedy r. Doyle, ]() All. IC.l (ISC.r.); I{. K. Co. r. Henderson, r.7 Ark. 4(lL' (1S<.).'"{). Tliis must be shown by other evidence than the mere production of a survey(M''s minutes. "The jirojiosed evidence falls under the class of hearsay testimony, as to which the general r\de is that it is inadmissible, to which nile, however, there are several excep- tions, of which the present with certain (lualitications is one. liusiness entries of deceased persons, when made in the line of their duty are admissible in evidence. This is the rule, but it is fiubject to the ijualitication that sucli entries to be admissible must b<', first, original; and second, contemporaneous with the facts they record; and these refjuisites must be established by evidence other than what may be flerived from the entr'.'s themselves. The tield notes (d' a surveyor sinct' deceased, nr le in the disidiarge of his official duties ami contemiiomncoiis .rli tlie survey, are admissible because siich eiitries an- made under a sense <d' business responsi- bility, and b m otiicer liaving no interest to make untrue entries. It li.as been held that where an entry has been m.ade against interest, proof of the hand-writing of the j.arty and his death is enough to auth.nize its reception at whatever time it is m.-de; but in the case of entries in the course of business, they must be 1 'I. f 4i;!P AMKKICAN NOTK8. [I'AKT III. (ionU'iiiporaneous with tlio tniusjKitioii, and if tlici-f is any doubt wli('tii«'r til*' iMitries were made at the time of tht^ transaction, tliey ari' aduiissihlf." Kay /•. Castle, 71) N'o. C. TiSO (1,S7S). Tlic evi- «lence tliat an entry was eunteniitoraneous cannot Im- proved l»v a presumption arisiny Irom the contents of tlie entry itself. 15arton r. Dnn.iaH, L'l Q. H. V . 0. 1'7.S (1.S(m). " Wiien a witness is sliown to he dt^ad, or beyond tlie jurisdiction of tl»>(!ourt, written entries and memorials of a transaction, cnti-red in tlu' usual course of business, and wiiidi are shown to be in tlie handwriting; of the absent or deceased witness, and purport or are shown to have b 'cn made at or about the time of such alh'i^ed transaction, arc admissil)le evidence, in any issue involvinj; the transaction to which they relate." Elliott v. Dycke, 7N Ala. loO, iru (isHi). ICntries. if made by one i)arty to a transaotion after the transac- tion had l)een completed, are inadmissilde. '"Tiu' rights of tiie defendant could not be varied by entries thus made, because tiicy were not contemporaneims entries, made in the due c<PMse of the business, as a part of tlie res gesta', but wcrt; made by one of the parties after the riglits of tlie otlier p'.ity had become iixed. Hurley V. (icrman-.\iii. Mank, 111 U. S. L'KJ (1SS;{). This reipiircme it of contemporaneousness is the jjrobable basis for saying that such declarations are admissibh* as part of the res gesta". It may well be doulitcd. however, wiiether such a chissili- oat' n be riot rather mi-^h-ading than otiierwise. To be part of some princijial n-s gcstiu f.ict, a ilcclaratiou must also, it is tru:-, he contemporaneous with such principal fact. Ihit here its re- sembl ,u.. " to a (h'cdaration in course of business neases. The mere fact tiiat an entry has been made contemporaneously with the ::'ansaction it Nets fortii, is not in itself (dr.Mimstantial evidence of tlie trut'> of the statement concerning the transaction. The declarant must be di'ad; it must be made in the course (d duty or l)usinc;^s — i'.i;ie of which ri'ipiircments a:e made as to a ilcdara- tion |ta t of the re.' gesta) or part of a res gest;e fact. An interesting ease in New llaiiipshire decides that an entry in a book of accounts, niadi' in the usiiil course of business liy a jier- son si;ice deceased, is admissible in a suit liehveeii third p.irtii'S, there being evii' nee d/lum/r that he had means of knowledge, even if the ei''ry l>e in bis fa^or. On an action against a railroad company ""-ir a collision td' a crossing, by which the plaintiiT's wagon .vas injured, it liecanm important for the plaintilT to show the character and extent <d' the injury to one of the hind wheels. « Mie W Iword, a wlieelwright, who repaired the woodwork (d' the wheel, died liefcrc the trial. The plaintilf called his administrator, who testilied that he had \Voodw<ird's account book, kept by Wood- word ill liis lifetime, on which appeared a cliargo "June Stli, 1887. CHAP. VII.] AMKUK'AN NOTICS. 4(18a» luittci bot WPCl To sixteen spokes, twenty eents iijiiece, .f.'J.L'O," Tlii.s \v;is jul- )ver objeetion, aiul lield, eoirfctly . " Tlicre is ;i (list inction entries made in the ii.inal and rc^'ular conrse of bnsincss. and a private meniorandnni. The latter is men? Iiearsay, and inad- missible in evidence after tlie deatli of tlie person wlm made it. Kntries made in the rej,Milar and iisnal conise of hnsiness stand differently. When shojj-books are ki'pt and the entries are miid(« contemporaneously with the delivery of piods or the perforiiianeo of labor by a ptison whose dnty it was tn make them, they aro admissible, nnless tin? natnre of the subject is such as to rend«'r iMjttcr "videnee attainable. Mr. (Jreenleaf says the remark tiiat this evidenee is admitted contrary tn the rules of the common law is incorrect; that' in >,'eneral its admission will be found iu perfect harmony with those rules, the entry benif,' admitted only when it was evidently contemporaneous with the fact aud pait v( the res gcsta!.' " Lassone v. Kailroad, (id N. II. .'Mo. .'laS (IS'.Mi). l)K<;i,AiiANT MIST UK Dkao. — F,e\vis *•. Kramer, .'{ Md. L'(!5 (ISoli); State i;. Hopkins, 5(5 Vt. '.'50 0«s;{); Smith v. Lane, lli S. & K. NO (I.SIM). Where it appeared that certain entries of sales upon the book.n of a stock e,\chanf,'e ottered in evidence in a .suit lu'twceii third parties, were written by a seenhiry who was alive and iu the city of trial, the evidence was rejected. Terry /•. llirmiugham .National IJank, •.).'{ Ala. .'i'.M) (IHUO). Disahii.itv ornKit than Dkatm. — The strict requirement that the declarant must be dead in order to n'lider his declaration admissible has been f,'reatly relaxed in the United Slates. It is sutlicient if the declarant is insane. (!haffee r. V . S. IK "Wall. r.in. n\i (is?;?). Or " beyond the rejieh of the process or commission of the court," Chaffee v. V. S.. 18 Wall. .'".IC. .Til (1S7;{); .lames r. Wliarton, .'» McLean, 4'.»L' (ISJl); Vinal c. (iilman, 'JI W. Va. .'{nl (iS.siJj. Or has absconded to p.irts unknown stances we think it is cl I niicr these ctrcnni- ear that, by tlie l.iw (d" this state, tho books should have been r-'ceived in cviilencc without the Icslimony «if lbi(d( in re^'ard to them, lie had i;oiie to parts iii, known, and could not be produced as a witness. The same necessity tiiero- fore existed for receiving tin? books in e\idciicc that would liave existed if l?\U'k had been dead at tlie time of trial. If si {•!■ had been the case they would nndonbti'illy have been evidence." New Haven Co. »• (Joodwiu. I'J Conn. L'.'io (1S7.".); North liaiik r. Ablmt, \'.i Pick. inr. (1H.T5). Such entries have been held admissible even if the declarant is iilive and present in court. Chalfee c. I'. S., IS Wall. rilCt. 5I1 (187.'i). Apparently, such is tho effect of the decision by the suprcmu 408'" AMKItUAN NOTES. [I'AKT III. m^ I: judicial court of Massaclmsctts in Shove v. Wiley, IS Tick, ry^f^ (18;{(1) wht-re tin* cntrit's of a bank lut'sscnf^cr sliowing the giving of notice to an indorsiT, were held adniissiltle on being identified by tlie iiicHsenger as in iiis iiandwriting and undoulttedly eorrect when made; thougli tlie messenger had no independent recollection of tlie oecurrenee. The court seem at times (hiring their opinion inclined to treat the entry as a memorandum tu refresh recollection, and the decision seems soumler when rested ii|)on that ground. It is said that it will be presumed that a deceased clerk, who madi' the entry on a merchant's liooks. delivered the goods. Clarke r. Ma:,'nider, L' Mar. it .Fohns. 77 (]S(»7). I'kiisovai. Knowi-ki»i:k llKgiinKh. — It is essential that the declaration sliould be iiy one who has personal knowledge of the existence of th(! fact which lu^ declares. Accordiugiy, -m an action against distillers for selling untaxed Rullonsof whiskey, siiipped over the Miami Canal, the government i{i not allowed to put in evidencic entries in the (iertificate liooks of r.ertain c(dlcctors of ttdls on the canal, in the handwriting (»f deceased (derks, showing the arrival of freight at their respective ports, wlicre these entries were made u|> principally from informa- tion furnished by tlie freight biils presented liy the captains, and €)ceasi(mally friuii the simple statements of tint I'aptains thenisidves if di-emed rclialilc, many of tin* capt:iins not iicing produced, or accounted for, at the trial. "If now we apply the rule which we have mentioned to the certillcate-books of tlie canal c(dlecUirs their inailmissibility is evident. They were not competent evidence as declarations of the collectors, for the ctdlcctors had no |iersoiial knowlcd-.' (li tiie matters stated; they derived all their information either from the hills of lading or verbal stateiiu'nts of the captains. Nor Were the books competent eviiliMice a.-; de(darations of the «Mptains, liecause it does n(<t appear that thi' bills of lading were prepari'd by them, or that they had personal knowledge of their correctness, or that their verbal statements, when tin- bills id' lad- ing were not proiliiced, were founded upon personal knowledge; nnd besides, many of ilic certilicates were admitted without calling the (Mptains who signed them, and without proof id' their death or inaccessibility." Chaffee v. V. S., IS Wall. Tilt;, .-.i;j (l,S7;i). A reciird, made in eottrse of business, of the amount of plaintiff's Hour delivered to the did'endantH, kept by a miller's book-keeper, and fre(piently made up fnun niemmanda lilcd with him by some one who had delivereil tloiir in his absi-nce, are not competent. Smith r. Liine. 12 S. & It. SO (ISLM). If, however, A. can testify to the existence of a fact, and that hn eujiectly reported it to It,, It.'s entry, in the usual course of buHiness, is admiHstble, in connection with A.'s testimony, alter II. "s decease. CHAP. VII.] AMERICAN NOTES. 4r.3« An excellent illustration of tho extent to which modern methods of doing business liiive forced a moditicatioii of the re(iuiremeiit of jiersonal knowledge may l)e fduiid in Mayor itc. of New York V. Second Avenue K. IJ. Co., KH' X. \. ')7'J (iSSCt). Tin. action was one (d" contract to recover against the defendant lor work and materials in jmving tlie tracks id' tlie defendant road. In attenijit- ing to prove these, tlie city introduced a tiiue-hdok, kept Itv one Joiin H. Wilt, a foreman in tiu' employ of the department of jiuhlic works. In tliis hook he entered the nauie of each man employed. He visited the work twice a day. cliccki'd tlic time of each num as represented to him by the two gang foremen or iuad bosses, 'i'he latter did not see Wilt's en|-rics. Wilt said tliat lie knew tiit> faces id' the men and checked tliem ofl". <iang foremen testilied tiiat they hail re|KMteil time <'orrectly. 'i'iie jwilgi' ad- mitted book. He also admitted an aicount in Wilt's haudwritiiig (if materials used. This was made u]i in tlie same geiicr;il wav. e.xcept that the gang forenuMi claimed no present kiiowleili,'c o( tlie fpiantity. They said they had reported correctly. One .said tliat the count of stone was reported to him by the carmen wlio drew it, but not verihed liy him. The carmen were not called. .\s to this last item, the court say that it was mr-re liearsay, and if a specilio objection liad lieeii taken against it tliat it wmdd iiiivc been good. Ibit lieing general, and tlie others being good, that also must be overruled. (!ouri .say liusiness is, and must lie ciirried on in way mentioned. It is '"an account kept in the ordinary course i>( bu.si- ni'ss, of laborers employed in the proseculion of wiuk based upon daily reports of foremen who had charge of the men, and who, in accordaiKM' with their duty, reported the time to another subordinate of the same coii.nion master but of higher graih . who, in time, also in accordance with his duty, entered the tiaie as reported." Mayor iVe. of N. V. r. Second Ave. li. K. Co., KH' \. V. '.71' (ISSC). " I'liit at coimiion law, where the ideik who made the entries had no knowledge <>{ the correctness ol the entries, liiit miide them as the items were furnished by another, it was essential that the party furnishing the items should testily to their correctness, or that hatisl'aetory proof thereof (such as the transactions were reasonably suseeptilile of) from otlier sources should be produced." Stettauer c. White, W 111. :'-• (ISSI). Whet hi '• a surveyor's minutes would be evidence where a (diain bearer "ealh d olT" without prodin'ing the chain bearer, see Kay r. Castle, 7'.» N. C. r.H(> (1S7,S). I'uoMi' OK Kntuv. — That the entry in course of business was actually made by the deceased piMson whose decdaration it purports to be, inav be shown bv oroof of his hamlwritiiig. Chalfee v. V. S.. IS Wall. r,U\, r.li '(1K7;{); Welsh r. Ilarrett, IT. Mass. .TiO (1H1<»). \l 46883 AMEKICAN NOTES. [part ; :. But a copy iu ;.ho handwriting of a clerk cannot be prov* ^ Dy ( . itl«»ice of !iis hundwrltin''. Janu's c. Wharton Mi; Lean. »'.»'.; (IHit). "This is not a book of orij^inal entries, but a mere transcript from that book, luatle by ach'rk, who did not make tliose entries. The ground on wiiich ah)ne jiroof of tlie liandwritiiig of the (dcrk i,'ives validity to the book of at'(!ouiit,s is, tiuit it is the book of original entries; that the clerk is sui)[iosed to be cognisant of the tr.insai-tions which it rt.'cords; and, tluit tiu' entries niaih' by liini, were luiuUi at (»r lU'ar tlic time tin-y purpor., to iuive been luadc; and are, therefore, a part of the res gestie As a mere lopy, made by a clerk who did not keep the origiiuil book, proof of Ins iiand writing in no way conduces to establish tlie authenticity of the hook ollVreil in evi(h'U(;i'; iind it is, therefore, excluded from tiie consideration id' the jury." See also Creswell c. Slack. CS la. 110 (iHSo). In K. 11. Co. /'. Henderson, ,')7 Ark. K»J (l.SU;}), the entri"s of a deceased clerk must, it is said, "be autlienticated by his oath if he is living and liis testimony can be procured. If he is dead, or is out of tlie jurisdiction (d' thi' (lourt, or cannot be found, tliey may be admittfd on proof (d' ids hand-writing." An k.xtkn'oko Dkvki.oi'.mknt. — It is easy to recognize a pro- gressive ti'ndency toward e.\tending tiie rule so f.i • as to iu(dude all writings made in the course of business and witliout motive to deceive. 'I'lie distinction has not in all cases been (d»scrve<l between the rules governing account boolis (Ui lu-lialf of a party or nnuiioranda to refresli the recollection of a witness ami tiie rule under consideration. Tlie supreme (iourt of tin* United States, speaking of tlie entries on the books of collectors (d' tolls on a canal iiiadi^ in the usual — "Their ad miss i- ■ije whi(di governs the admissibility of entries n.a.le by privat > jMrUes in the ludinary course of business, lay down the rule as follows: bility must, therefore, be deteruiiiu'd by U' course o f th leir liusiness. And tiiit rule, with some exceptions not imduding the present case, rcipiires, for the admissibility (d' the entries, not iiiendy that they shall be ccuit'Muporanenus with the facts to which they relate, but shall bt( m ide by parties having personal knowledge of the facts, and be corroborated liy their testimony, if living and accessi- ble, or by proof of tiieir handwriting, if dead, f>r insane, or beyond the reaeli (d' the proeess or commission of the court. The testimony of living witnessrs pers(nially cognizant of the facts of which they speak, given under the sanction of an oath in open court, where they may be Hiibji'cted to cross-exainination, alTonls the grei*test security for truth. Their di'(darations, verbal or written, must, itowever, soieetimes be admitted when tht>y themselves cannot be cjivr. va.] AMKUIOAN NOTES. 4<!3« called, in ordor to prevont a faihite of jisticie. The adniissilulity of tilt! declarations is in su.;a casca lii.iitcd by t'u' necessity upon whioh it i.s founded." Cliatl'cio & (jo. c. IJ. S., .S Wall. o\(\, 540 (1 «:.'{). 'i'lic hooks of a bank showing tlio stato of a tlopositor's aecoiint liavc b'cn admitted, in a well considered Indiana ease, under a line of reasoning' wiiioli would praetically admit any at-eount book kept in the usual course of business as evidence per sr ; iuid it is ]irol)able tiiat such, ander certain safe},'iiiirds, is destined to become tiie settled state of the law on tiiis siibjetrt. "'I'he next (luestion for consideration is the ex.M'ption of the aiijiellant to the rulini,' of the court to the admission in evidence of the entries in the books of tile First National Maiik made in the usual (ioiirse of liusiness, showiii',' the state of the account of saiil Moses (,'. Culver at and 8ubse(iu(Mit to the execution of the checks sued upon. As pndiin- inary to the introduction of the entries in these books in evidence, it was shown l)y the clerks and oHicers of the Itank produceil in court as witnesses, and as to the (uitries made by such witne.'^-.es, that they were, at the time the entries were made, the jtrojier and authorized liook-keepers to make sucii entries; that the entries were made by them in the due course of business in the discharj,'fi of their duties, and were correct when made; that the entries made by them were orij,'inal, and entered by tlieni in books kept for that l)urpo8e, and that they had no recollection of the facts represented by the entries. As to the entries made by parties who were not witnesses, it was shown that the enterer was, at the time the entry was made, the jiroper book-keeper and ajjent of the bank to make the entries in the due course of business, that the entries wen* orif,'inal entries on ()ri^,'inal l)ooks inadi' bv such liook-keejicis in due course of busi- ness, and were in the known handwriting of sudi book-keepers, and that tiie enterer was dead or a non-resident of the State of Indiana. After the making <if 8U(di ]iri'liminiiiy proof tin- entries were admitted in oviilence over the objection of the appellant. . . . The bank with whom he did business, and upon whic'ii lie drew the check, kept books and made an entry of all their business, of the money deposited by (!ulver, and (diecks drawn by him and paid by the bank. The books were kept by disinti'n-sted parties, Some of the persons who at the time of the transactions kept the books, took the deposit, and plai-ed it to (,'iilver's credit, paid the checks drnwn by him, and entered them on the books or charged them to his account were dead, others were beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and others had no jiersonal r» iMdlection of the tniiis .etion oxce])t to know that the books wore kept in due ctiurse of the banking business, and were correct, and showed a correct state- ment of the account." Culver r. Afarks, IL'li hid. fiol, ML' (1889). V5 40836 AMEKICAN NOTK». [hart 111. Mi'. ,1- In the case of Feunerstein's Cliuiiipague, on an issiu; af the market value of ci^-tain invoicu-s of cliainpague at tlu; place of iiianufacturt", a lettur from a sflh'r of similar champagnes at about the same placo written to a tiiiril party has been received, tliougli by a divided court, in the absence of evi(h*nce that the writer was deceased. " \V»! think the letters in ipaestion in this case were properly admitted, in reaching tliis conclusion we do not go lieyond the verge of the autliorities to which we have referred. In some of th()S0 cases tiio person asserted to be necessary as a witness was (U;ad. Hut that can make no ditfereuce in tlie result. The rule rests u^ion the consi(L'ration tliat tiie entry, other writing, or parol declaration of the author, was within his ordinary busi- ness. In most cases he must make the entry contemporaneously with the occurrence to which it relates. In all he has full knowl- edge, no motive to fiilseliooil, and tliere is the strongest improba- i)ilitv of untrutli. Safer sanctions randy surround the testimony of a witui'ss examined under oatli. The rult^ is as lirmly tixed jis )ri; geiHM-al rule to whicli it is an exception. .Modern legisla- th e UK tion has largely and wisely liberalized the law of evidence \\< feid no disposition lo contract tliu just operation of the rule lure under consideration." Fein>crstein's l.'hampagne, .'J Wall. 1 1.> (1«(m). On the o'^'-er hainl, evidence of entries in an account-bo(»k by a deceased ns'ichant, proved to l)e in iiis handwriting, have been re- jeeti'd because, as is siid, it is "a general rule of law tliiit a jiarty cannot wuiko evidence for himsulf, and that a party cannot intro- duce his own dcidaralions, (u-al or written, a.i evi<lenci' in his owji Ixdialr. . . . It i-i true that when rntries liave been made, in the usual course of bi-.sincss, by merchants' clerks, and sucii clerks are ilcad, these entries thus made are admissible as evidence; but we kn«»w of no case wlu're such entries have Iteen lield admissible when in the Inm'-writing of the jiarty himself. N. c. .{7-' <is:i.) IM: inu >< W incn. (i.'i The state of judicial feeling on this suliject is tluis given in 1 Smith's I,. (' \m. Kd.) rui). " \ pail) s own books id' account and original entries are now, in most, if luit all, of tlie I'nited States, r '(ieived as eviden<'e (d' a sale and delivi'ry oi "oods to <u* ol wink (bine fcu" the advenie party. The practice is s mctiomd in some jurisdictions by the decision «>f the c«)urt • ; ru other by express legislative enactmeut. Ihit even in those > iates where ir is admitted by force of the common law, it is reganN' ' uh a depart i^re from the <dd common-ljiw rule that u party shall not nni c ( idence in his own fav(U', and if we nniy juilge from the languagt! .f the ()ourt8, is coubidered of (juestionable policy. The ti.. -on for its introdui-tmn h.'is never been placed, by any court, oti hijfh'M ground tlian that of necessity. For, in view of CHAl'. VI..] AMEKK'AN NOTES. 4G8» the numbor and frpquency of transactions of wliich entries iin- thiily required to be made, the dittieulty and ineonvenicnce of niakinj,' for- mal common hiw proof of each item would In- very j,M'eat. To insist upon it, therefore, would either r(Mider a credit system impossihlu or leave the creditor remedih^ss. IJut where a course of dealing between parties is shown to have existed, a degrcf of creilit, moro or less, will naturally attach to the rej^istration by the proper person, in the proper book kept for such purpose, in the usual course or business, of such transactions lus occur In^tween them. The admis- sion of books of account in evidence, therefore, inider proper restrictions and limitations, is not calculated to product- injurittus consequences, liut, inasmuch as the situation and circumstances of trade are gradually becoming such as very much to diminish tho reason of the departure from the common law rule, tlu; Courts in some of the states are inclined to restrain rather than enlarge the exception itself; Sickles '•. Mather, !.'(> Wi-nd. 7-; Larue v. ilowland, 7 Barb. 107; Dunn v. Whitney, J Karif. D." DHNQ DECLARATIOiCS, WHY ADMISSIBLE, f PAKT m. CJ3APTER Vm. D'rlNO DBCLARATIONS. f I, ' i ' I I ''^i •5 714.' The last of tho six exooptions, which it has been pointed out * that there nro to the general rule that hearsay evidence must bo r('j(!ctod, arises in tho case of (fi/iiiff decldrntionH. The principle on which evidonco of this description is admitted is " that such dwliirations are niiulo in extremity, when the party is at tlio point of death, and wliun every hope of this world is gone ; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considorations to Hpoak the truth ; a situation so solemn and so awful is considered by tho law as creating an obligation, oqiial to tliat which is imposed by a positive oath in a court of justice."' At one time an opinion prevailed that this general principle warranted the admission of dying deolaratijiii! in all eases, civil and criminal.* A contrary doctrine, howo/er, • Or. Ev. 5 1 50. iu part. Suiira, § 607. » B. t». W<hmI «*k, 17N)» (Kyro, O.B.) ; R. v. Dnuninond. 178|. Shakosponre mnkoH tho wuiiiiiIimI Moliin, tiiiditi^ hiiiiKcIf diHhi'liuvuJ while uunouuciug the iatoudud trfnchory of thu I)iiii))hiii I.uwiH, uxchtim : — *' lliivii I not hid<«)UM doiith within my view, Kt'tainin^^ hut a (|uuntity of lifo, Which l)h't'dH awuy, ovon uh ii form of wiix Ifi'Holvt'th from hix fi^fuit! 'gainst tlio hro!' Wliat in tho woi Id ►'liouhl nrnko mo imw deceive, » Pini'o I muHt loHo tho uh(( of all dccoit f Wliy hIiouUI I tlicn W ful«o. ninco it in true That I muHt die horo, uiid livo honco liy truth ?" — Kiiii/ John, A.vt 5, to, 4. * ThuH, tho dying dfclarations of a HuhHoriljing witni'ss to a forgi.'il in- Hti'umont could \w givou in ovidonoe to impeach it : Wriglit c. Littler, 1701 (lid. Mannliold) ; wliich, how- f'vor, ftH rc|tort<'d in Mlackstono, fitatcd that no general rule could hn druwu from the udniiMiou of tho uvi- donrn in tliat |)ai'ti(;ular caHO : Anou. (undated. Heath, J.), <!itod by I A, i-lllenliorough (who ap|)arontly ap- pntved of it) in .\veHon v. I<d. Kia« naird. ISO.'), and in llji. of I>urhu« r. Ileauniont, I.S08; oxplainnd Uy Hayley. .1., ui I>ik' i'. Uidgway. IS'.'U. Moruuvur, thu dyuig docluratiuuit uf 40i en. VIII.] DVlNd DKCLAKATIOXS, WHKN ADMlSSHH-i:. now prt'Viiils,' l»i)th in I']iip;lmi(l uiid .Viin'rica, an 1 cviilcn •(> (»f lliis d('st'ri|itiiiu is not lulnii-^sildti in any civil dusi'. In criniiniil ciisfH it is HO only in th« ono cumi oI" Initniriilr,- '• win r.- flit» dnatli of tlin (It'CiMiscd is tlio 8ul»jt'i't (if till" cliai;^!', jind tlio tiircnmslunccs of tilt' di'iith art! thti Bnl)jt>t4 t>f tlit> ilwnfj; do' laralion,"'' iintl wlitTo it itt oIl'tTt'd in tilt) vory words of iho tlfccuM'd, hith tjucstions and answirs bi'inp; given when* tjui'stions have hccn |tiil ^ S 71"). A utronjf instant't) of tlit» adinissihilily of tl^'infr do- clnnitions as ovidt-nt'o in cliarj^cs of honiiiidi' ' is, that wimro a prisontT who was chargfd with tho ninrdtT of A. had, in jxiisoning A., inailvtdttMitly also iioistHiftl \\. (whitjh was in law a niunlor of IJ.), thti dying tlfpositions id' H. wiro adnuttttl as t'vidcnotj for tlie ]tr<)st!fntion on jirisoner's trial for tht) ninnlcr of A., — for tho act which eanstid thts di-ath of A. also causi'd that of 15., md it was all one transai-tion.* On tho otlnr hand, tht) )irini!i|ilc tiiat tlying di'clarations aro only admissihlo as ovitltnco on charges of hoinicitlu* is shown by dying doclarutions of tin* party robhtid having boon rt'jootod on a trial ft)r robbery ;" ami by her statcnit^nts /// rxtirmiH being littld inatlniissiblo on an inilittinont fur administering ilrnga to u wonnin, with intont to procnro abortion;' whilo in Iroland, oven on a trial for niurdor, tho stattMnent of a thinl prrxon, who IiUB on his ileathbfd confessed that lit! comniilteil the olfcnco, has been rejecteil.* Where, too, a party, eonvitftttd of jiorjury, aftt)r obtaining a rnlo nisi for a new trial, shot tliti prosetrutor, the court rejected an aflidavit of tho dying declarations of the latter, as to tho transaction out of whiijh tho prosecution for perjury art)so.® As to civil cases, the dying declarations of a servant of tho u piiupor rt?»iit'ftiiiB his settleniont wi'K! (iiK'ti ii(liiiih(sil(le : It. r. limy St. KiIiiiiiimIh, 17>>-t ; Aldxitnii c iMins- wi>ll, !(>!)!). Hut ttiin ilui'triiie liiis Imi^; Ih'cii it\|i1ii(li'<l See l{. I'. .MiiT- 1,'willy, 18(11 ; Stobart i'. Diyiloii, IMKJ. ' S.'t! Stobiut I'. Diytlt'n. IH.'Ki, wliero tln! ciiM'S citecl in the |ir<!- cet'.in^ imto w '111 viituully nveriiili'd, Ulld iiIhii ('uses eiteil iti llotu *, illl'l'U. Hi'tl, t<i(), lllite, § .JtlH. • i.e., iiiiinler or iiuinsliiufjfliter. ' It. r. Me.el, IHJl; li. r. liilld, lN(iO; WiJBou V. Itooruiu, lnl«(Ani.). ♦ R. V. Mitcliell, iKilJ. * 11. <■. linker, IS;i7 ;('<iltll!llll, J., aftt^r ciiiisiiltiti;; I'arke, It.;, 'I'lio jiiiiiit ciiiilil not lie reH(ii'vt!il, uh pri- MIIHT WHS ll(l|llilt<'li. il II I I ...I I will 40.5 n-^ WHY LIMITED TO CASES OP nOMICIDE. [PAUT III. party last seised, as to tlie relationship of such party witli tl>o lessor of the plaintiff, have been rejected in an action of ejectment.' § 716.' The reasons for thus restricting the admission of this species of evidence may be,— first, the danger of perjury in fabri- cating declarations, the truth or fahehood of which it is impos- sible to ascertain, — secondly, the danger of letting in incomplete statements, which, though true as far as they go, do not consti- tute " the ichole truth," — and thirtUy, the experienced fact, that implicit reliance canaot in all cases be placed on the declarations of a dying person ; for his body may have survived the powers of his mind ; ' or his recollection, if his senses are not impaired, may not be perfect ; or, for the sake of ease, and to be rid of the impor- tunity of those around him, he may say, or seem to say, whatever they choose to suggest.'* As these, or the like considerations, are thought in ordinary cases to counterbalance the force of the general principle above stated, the exception to the general rule against admitting hearsay evidence, which is now under review, is restricted to cases of homicide, and is there recognised on the solvi ground of public iKTCHiiitf/. For as in such cases it often happens tliut no thinl person was present as an eye-witness to a murder, and as the party injure<l, who is the usual witness in other CBf"* of felony, cannot himself be called, it follows that if his dying docdarations could not be received, the murderer might often escape justice.'' It will be remembered, moreover, that the restriction of their adniissihility to oases of homicide applies only to such declarations as are teiidcrcd merely because they were made in extremis. Declarations (whether made by a dying person or not) which constitute port of the rea gestoB, or come within the exception of declarations against interest, or the like, are admissible as in other cases. S 717." Persons making dying declarations are considered as in the same situation as if they were sworn, the danger of impending • Doe V. Ridjot'iiy, 1H20. « Or. Ev. § 15(i, in part. • Thus, in Kin;/ John, Prince Iloury is mado to siiy : — " Donth's Hit'ffo is now Against t}ie mind, the which he pricks imd wounds Witli liiiiny hipionH of Htrangit funtiiHicH ; Which, iu th(*ir throntr and presH to that lust liold, Confound thoniHclvtm. — Act 5, so. 7. • JaclcBon r. KnilTon, 180(5 (Am.) (AmJ. (liiviiiL'ston, J.). • Or. Ev. § 167, in part » 1 East, P. 0. 353; 2 Johns. 3.5 4b6 CHAP. VIII. ] DAXaKR AND FEAR OF DEATH NECESSARY. death being equivalent to the sanction of an oath. Therefore, when the declarant, if living, would have been legally incompetent to testify (by reason of imbecility or tender age, &o.), his dying declarations are inadmissible.' On the other hand, as the testimony of an acoomplice is admissible against his fellows, the dying declariv- tions of a felo-de-se are admissible against one indicted for aHsisting the deceased in his self-murder.' And when a husband is charged with the murder of his wife, or a wife with the murder of lior husband, the dying declaration of the deceased will bo received.'* § 718. It is essential to the admissibility of dyin^' declarations, first, that the declarant should have been in actual (lanijvr of death at the time when they were made ; secondly, that he should then have had a /all apprvhcmion of hin daiiyvr ; * and lastly, that death nhould have ennaed} These three things must be proved to the satisfadion of thn judge before a " dying doclaratiou " can bo received.^ It ' is not, however, necessary that the dcclarniit should have expressly said, in so many words, that he was speaking nnder a sense of impendinij death. It will be enough if it satisfactorily appears, in any mode, that the dedarai ions were really made under that sanction ; as, for instance, if tliat fact can be reasonably inferred from the evident danger of the declarant,* or from the opinions of the medical or other attcnilants stated to him. or from his conduct, such as settling his affairs, taking l(>nve of \m reliiMons and friends, giving directions rc^'^'•'ctiIlg his funeral, receiving extreme unction, or the like. In short, all the circumstiuices of the case may be resorted to, in order to ascertain the state of the declarant's mind.' The length of tim<< which elap.sod between the ' H. V. Pike, 1829; R. v. Dnim- moiid, 17N-4. ^ 11. I'. TiiickUir, \-H\. » K. 1'. Woodcock, 1789; Stotip's C8P0, 171H). ' 11. r. Cleiuv, 18«'.». • In .SuHHcx I'.'or., 184-1, 11. L., I,d. Doniuiiu thuH laid down th« law : — " Witli ri'pird to dt«liirationH iiiado by piTHoim in oxti'uniiH, HU|ii)ONin(;ull iiocL'hsiirv niiittorH coiuiuitihI, hucIi uh iictuul (fiinptr, deuth following it, und u full u|)|)rt)h«>nm<)ii, ut tho tiino, of tho ditnp')', itnd of dfiith, Huch doclurutioutt cuu bu rucuivod in uvi- donpo ; })Ul (/// thf'O Diimj^ inimt runriir to I'fndvr Hiii'li ili'i'luriitiotiH iidiiiiH- nililu. Sllcli iiVlilclK (', ImWuViT, oll^'ilt to h<> I'l' ivcd witli caution, ln'cauHU it i8 Huiijoct to no cro.>*«-f.\iinunu- tioii." • Anto,.§2;}. ' (ir. Kv. § l'')8, ill jmrt. • .Seo U. i: Moipm, IHTS (I)(>n- inan, J.). lu H. c, Kcdiii^tiild, 18"!*, ('ockbiirn, C.J., di'diiird to r«ly I'll sui'li nvideni'o. Scd (ju. I' » K. V. Wooilumk, 17Ntt; K. «, John, 17»t); U. v. HoiiniT. 1h;J4 ; li. V. Vuu Butcholl, 182J; li. v. 4G7 IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) k A S^€ ^ <? V. 1.0 I.I 1.25 b^|28 |2.5 JA ill 1.6 - 6" V] ^ /] /: y /A Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY. M5S0 (716) •7a-4$03 4^ \\ '« \ ;\ h.'a ;iii' h ^ BELIEF OF IMPENDING DEATH NECESSARY. [PART III. declaration and the death of ihe declarant, furnishes no rule for the admission or rejection of the testimony ; though, in the ahsenoe of better evidence, it may serve as one of the exponents of the deceased's belief, that his recovery was or was not impossible. It is the imprcmon of impondiiuj death,' and not the circumstance that death in point of fact followed very soon after the declaration was made, which renders the testimony admissible. If, therefore, it appear that the deceased, at the time of the declaration, had any expectation or hope of recovery, however slight it may have been, and though death actually ensued within an hour afterwards, the declaration will be inadmissible.* On the other hand, a firm belief that death is impending^— hy which is meant, not, as once thought,* a belief that it will follow almost immediately, but that it will certainly happen shortly in consequence of the injury sustained,^ — suffices to render the statement evidence, though the sufferer may SHb.scqueiif/i/ express a hope of recovery,^ or may chance to linger on for some days, or even for two or three weeks.' § 719. In Scotland it is immaterial, except as regards the weight of the evidence, whether or not the declaration be made under the impression of impending death ; but where a party has received a mortal wound, an account of the matter given by him at any time I n Mosley, 1829 ; E. i'. Spilsbury, 1835 (Coloriilgo. J.); R. v. Mintou, 1800; 1{. r. Scalliui, 1838 (Ir.). See R. v. Nicolas, I8.>2 ; 11. v. Qualter, IHoi ; K. V. reikiiis, 1840. ' R. v. Fon-ster, 18G6 (Byles, J.), whoro tlio law sucms to havo been laid down ssoimnvhat too strictlj'. ■^ R. V. W.'llioni, 1702; R. v. ChriHtio, 1821; R. v. Jenkins, 18(50; R. r. Mackiiv, 18(18; R. ». Hay ward, IHXi; R. iC Crockett, 18;J1 ; R. v. Fa-^ent, 18;{,j; R. v. Mc'son, 1840. Dying declarations by persons who Buid, " 1 iiave no hope of recovering, unless it be the will of God" (R. v. Murphy. 1841 (Richards, B.) (Ir.)); "I think myself in great danger" (R. V. Errin'gton, 1838) ; or by a person previously t'.id by a doctor tliat there was '' L'tlr ar no hDjm of recovery" (R. ''. Mitchell, 1892), have been respectively rejected. See U. V. liowoll, 1840. ' R. I'. Goddard, 1882 (Hawkins, J., and Baggallay, Ij.J.). * HuUock, B., in R. v. Van ButchoU, 1829. See, also, R. v. Forester, 186() (Byles, J.); R. v. Osman, 1881 (Lush, L.J.). ' R. V. Reancy, 18J7. « R. i\ Hubbard, 1881 (Hawkins, J.). ' In R. i;. Woodcock, 1789, the de- clarations were made two days Ixjforo death; in R. v. Boiuier, 1834, thn^i days ; in R. v. Whitworth, 18,58, six days; in R. «'. TinckJer, 1781, ten days; in R. c Reaney, 18.i7; in R. V, Mosley, 1825, eleven days; and in R. V. Beinadotti, 18(i0 (Brett .*t Lush, JJ.), nearly throe weeks ; yet they were all received. In R. r. Mosley, 182J, and in R. r. Wliitwortli, 18o8, it a]ipearcd that the surgeon did not think the cus(! hopeless, and told the patient so : but the patient thought oth(nwise. See, also, R. v. I'eel, 1800 ; it. V. Howell, 1845. 468 \i C. T'.Il.J WHAT DYING DECLARATIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE. 8uV)sequont to the injury will be admissible in the event of his death, provided it were made seriously and deliberately, and whilst the deceased ai)peared to be aware of what he was doing, and in the possession of his faculties.* § 720.2 l^he dying declarations of a deceased are admissible only as to iiKitfcru to irldcli he would hare been competent to tcxtifji, if sworn in the cause. Therefore they must in general narrate i'ucts only, and not mere opinions ; ' and they must be confined to what is relevant to the issue. But it is not necessary that the examination of the deceased should have been conducted after the manner of interrogating a witness in the cause, though any departure from this mode may affect the credibility of the declanitions. Therefore, in general, it is no objection to their adniimhillti/, that they were made in answer to leading questions,* or obtained by earnest solicitation.* But where a statement, ready written, was brought by the father of the deceased to a magistrate, who accordingly went to the deceased and interrogated her as to its accuracy, paragraph by paragraph, it was, in Ireland, rejected, the judge observing that, " in the state of languor in which dying persons generally are, their assent could be easily got to statements which they never intended to make, if they were but ingeniously inter- woven by an artful person with statements which were actually true ; " and adding, " the magistrate should not have trusted to the relation of a third person, but should have taljen down the deceased's declaration from her own lips, or at least have had it taken down in his presence." •* Dying declarations by the victim of a homicide are, if properly made, equally admissible in favour of an accused as well as of the prosecutor.' S 721.** Whatever the declaration may be, it must be compJetr in itself ; for, if the dying man ajjpears to have intended to qualify it > Alison, rnic. Cr. L. (Sc.) -JlO- 512, «l»4- ()()■; 2 lluiiK!, Coin. ;i!)l — 3i»3; 1 Dickson, Kv. (iH, OT. The Rdino liiw scfnis to havd ])roviiilf'(l in En-^liind a cuntury iigo. iSoo 11. v. Bliindy, lTo2. * (Jr. Ev. § 150, in part. » 11. V. Sollovs. 17!)(). * li. V. Smith, 1SG5. ' R. V. I'lif^ont, 18 to ; I?, v. Reason, 17;H: Com. r. Vnss, IN.'U (Am.) ; II. V. AVhitwortli. In.jH. « K. r. iMtzfroralJ, 18-11 (Tr.) (Cnimpton. J.). 1 R. V. Siuifo. 18:50. Thn snme law jm'Viiils in ,'>c'-ithiiifl, 2 Iluriio, Coin. (Sc.) I{n3; op. R. i'. Orny, unto, § 77"). Or. Ev. §§ 159 and 101, in part. 469 ! I I 'HA m I. ,. VALUE OF DYING DECLARATIONS. [PART in, by other statements, which he in prevented by any cause from making, it will not be received.* Again, if the statement were committed to uriting at the time it was made, this writing must be produced, or its non-production accounted for ; and neither a copy, nor parol evidence of the declaration, can be admitted in the first instance to supply the omission." But where three declarations had been made at different times on the same day, one of which was made under oath to a magistrate, and reduced to writing, but the other two were not, it was held that these last two might be proved by parol, though the written statement was not produced.' If the deposition of the deceased has been taken under any of the statutes on that subject, and is inadmissible as such, iur want of compliance with some of the legal formalities, it seems that it may still be treated as a dying declaration, if made by a declarant who was in extremis.* § 722.* Though declarations, deliberately made under a solemn sense of impending death, and concerning circumstances wherein the deceased is not likely to be mistaken, are entitled to great weight, it should always be recollected that the accu&ed has not the power of cross-examination, — a power often as effectual in eliciting of the truth as the obligation of an oath ; — and that where a witness has not a deep sense of accountability to his Maker, feelings of anger or revenge, or, in the case of mutual conflict, the natural desire of screening his own misconduct, may affect the accuracy of his statements, and give a false colouring to the whole transaction. Moreover, the particulars of the violence to which the deceased has spoken are likely to have occurred under circumstances of confusion and surprise, calculated to prevent their being accurately observed, and leading both to mistakes as to the identity of persons, and to the omission of facts essentially import- ant to the completeness and truth of the narrative.^ > 3 Leigh, R. 797. » R. V. Gay, 1835 (Coleridge, J.) ; R. V. Reason, 1734. But see ante, $415. ' R. V. Reason, 1734, Piatt, C.J., dubit. See R. v. Scalkn, 1838 (Ir.). « R. V. Woodcock, 1789; R. v. Callugban, 1793. » Gr. Ev. § 162, in great part. * Jackson v. Knitfon, 180() (Living- Bton, J.) (Am.). ; R. v, Awhton, 1837 (Aldorson, B.). See, also, Mr. l-'vans's obsei-vations on the groat (auli in to bo observed in the use of thi.s kind of evidence, in 2 I'oth. VIA. 255 ('293) ; 2 St. Ev. 307 ; an' 1 Th. Ev. 292. 470 ml CHAP. VIII.] AMERICAN NOTES. 4701 AMERICAN NOTES. Dying Declarations. — An exception to the rule rejecting hearsay is that which on indictments for homicide admits statements by the deceased as to the circumstances attending the fatal injury, provided that the presiding justice is satisfied that sucli statements were made under a sense of immediately approaching death. "Dying declarations are made in extremis, wlien the party is at the point of death, when every hope of this world is gone, when every incentive to falseliood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations, to speak the truth; and is considered, in law, as creating an obligation as great as that created by an oath; and in prosecutions for murder, it is the common prac- tice to admit as evidence, the dying declaration of the person, with whose murder the prisoner stands charged." Hudson v. State, 3 Cold. 355 (18G6); State /'. Tool, 20 Ore. loO (1890); State V. Umble, 115 Mo. 452 (1893); Crump c. Cora. (Ky.) 20 S. W. 390 (1892); People v. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648 (1893). " When dissolution is approaching, and the dying man has lost all hope of life, and the shadows of the grave are gathering in around him, and his mind is impressed with the full sense of his condition, the solemnity of the scene and hour gives to his state- ments a sanctity of truth, more impressive and potential than the formalities of an oath — and such declarations ought to be received and considered by the jury, under the charge of tlie Court, as to their effect and weight, in all cases where the evidence of fact Avarrant their admissibility." Hill v. State of Georgia, 41 Ga. 484, 503 (1871); State v. Fearce, .56 Minn. 226 (1894). A Restkictkd RiTLK. — The limitations of the rule, as stated in the first paragraph of this note, are rigidly maintained. Tlie rule cannot be said to be one whose extension is judicially favored. In a deeply religious Christian community, thoroughly impressed with the certainty of a future existence of rewards and punish- ments, it is possible to believe that in the supreme moments of approaching dissolution, every other consideration and motive except that of a desire to tell the exact truth fades into the mental background, and the solemnity of den.th is equivalent to tliat of an oath. Under changed conditions, and, possibly, changed religious views, the force of this reasoning has been much shaken. The absence of cross-examination and the stringent consequences to the prisoner of admitting such evidence are compensated for to a very limited extert. Indeed, it is probable that at tlie present time it is mainly the supposed necessity of the situation which admits dying declarations rather than any equivalence between the sanction of consciously appro.aching death and that of an oath. 4702 AMEUICAN NOTK [I'AKT III. li'l'.W, ir ^T^ "Thpve would he tlie most lamentable failure of justice, in many cases, were the dyiii.^.deelarations of the victims of crime excluded from the jury." I'eople >;. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32 (18o8); :Morgan i: State, :n Ind. VX) (LSd'.)). The tendency to restrict the scope of this kind of evidence is marked. "The exception is in derogation of common right, for, independent of constituticnis and laws, an accused ])erson has the right to have the witness, who is to condemn him, in his jiresence, so that he may be subjected to the most rigid iiupiisition. To hang a man on the statements of one who is on his dying bed, racked with pain, incapable, in most cases, of giving a full aiul accurate account of the transaction, weakened in body and in mind, and though in. <irficii/o iiiorfis, harboring some vindictiv^e feeling against him who has brought him to that condition, is, to say tin; least, and has always been, a dangerous innovation ui)on settled princii)les of evid and no court ought to be disposed to extend it to endirace cases uo which it did not, in its inception, api)ly." Marshall i>. G. E. 11. 11. Co. 48 111. 475 (18G8). "For the reason that the admission of such statements is exceptional, the}^ ought always to be excluded unless they come within the rule in every respect." State v. ISelcher, l.'J S.' C. 4')'.) (1880). Of a ruling that dying "statements are worthy of more credence, under such circumstances, than ii made under the sanction of an oath, duly administered according to law," the supreme court of Texas say: "We think the charges here cited are clearly errone- ous, because they raise hearsay evidence to the highest testimony known. This is in conflict with the (dearly enunciated rule laid down by every writer on evidence to which we have had access, and contrary to the reason for ohe admission of proof to establish any fact. Hying declarations are admitted as evidence under an exception to the general rule, which is founded upon public neces- sity, and not because they are more worthy of credence than other testinu)ny. They are admitted under restrictions, and when so admitted, they are raised to the cliaractei if other evidence, which may, or may not, hiive great weight, according to the circumstances under wlii(di they were made; and it is for the jury, and not the court, to judge of those circumstances, and the credence to be given to those declarations." Walker v. State, 37 Tex. 3(j(), 380 (1872). An instruction that a dying declaration of deceased was as much entitled to (M'edit as the evid'^nce of a witness under oath was held properly refused in Campbell v. State, 38 Ark. 498 (188?). "As there can be no cross-examination of the declarant, as the accused can rarely meet his accuser face to face, and as there nu;st of necessity exist great danger of abuse, it should clearly appear that the statements offered in evidence have been made under a CHAr. Vlll.] AMKKICAN NOTKS. 4703 full realization that tlio solemn hour f)f dcatli has conip, and tho court should be satisticd that the decdanitiou was made nudcr an impression of almost immediate dissolution." State v. Simon, ;">(> Mo. 370 (1.S72); Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 1!)3 (IMGiJ); Lewis v. State, <J Sui. & M. 11") (1847). "It may be affirmed that no well-considered case lias varied from these rules, and that the teiideney is to greater stringeney, rather than to any relaxation in applying tliem to cases." State r. Medlieott, 1) Kans. 'jru , L\S3 (LS7L')- The modern feeling of restriction has followed on an early effort to make dying declarations admissible in eases other tlian those of lioniiciiki. Tlius, in Soutii Carolina, in a civil action on the cas^? for seducing the plaintiff's (huighter, her dying de(darations tliat the defendant was the father of her iinhoru cliild were held competent. McFarland v. Shaw, 2 Cai'olina Law Repository, lOli •(ISlo). This ijrecisB point was, however, decided the other way by tlie su[)reine court of Georgia. AVooten v. Wilkins, 39 Ga. 223 (l.S()'.)), the court remarking as to MeL";irland /•. Shaw, "It is directly contrary to the wiiole current of autiiority." And the rule is now well settled that dying (U'clarations are not admissible in civil cases. Wilson v. IJoerem, l~> .lolins. 2.S(J (1818). So the dying stateiuents of one killed iiy a railway acci- dent are not coiupetent in an action for damages. Marshall v. Chicago &c. 11. li., 4S 111. 475 (1868); Waldide v. New York Central &c. R. K., 19 Hun, 69 (1879); Kast Tennessee &c. K. K. V. Maloy, 77 Ga. 237 (1886); Daily /•. Xew York &e. K. \l., 32 Conn. 356 (1865). The rule is confined strictly to indictments for homicide. On a statutory criminal action for an abortion, dying declarations are incompetent, though death result from tlie illegal act. "Sucli evi- dence is admissible, in cases of Homicide, only where the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the circumstan(!es of the death are the subject of the dying declarations." People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 (18*74); State /•." Harper, ;!5 Uh. St. 78 (1878); Railing v. Com. 110 I'a. St. 100 (1885). Such declarations iiu»y be made competent by statute, Com. V. Thompson, 159 Mass. 5() (189.".). Scoi'K OK Dk( LAUATiox LiMiTico. — A dying declaration, more- over, must b(! confined to the circumstances immediately attending the fatal injury. It is not iieces.sary that the declaration should directly charge the defendant with being the assailant. State r. Cronin, 64 Conn. 293 (1894). The previous bad state of feeling between the prisoner and the deceased is not uch a fact as can be proved by a dying declaration. Ben V. State, 37 Ala. 103 (18(51). Or that deceased was uiuirmed. 470* AMERICAN NOTES, [part III. ['^ t n ; » ' , .1 }■= ■ i. State V. Eddon, S Wash. 292 (1894). Or that defendant had threatened to slioot the injured person through a window, though the deatli shot was delivered in this way. Benns v. State, 46 Ind. 311 (1S74). Or that deceased prayed God to forgive defendant. Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135 (1893). In other Avords the dying dt^laration relates to the res gesttB of the particular case under consideration. Where the fatal affray extended over a considerable period of time, this is a decisive test us to the admissibility of the declarations. Wilkerson v. State, 91 Ga. 729 (1893); Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135 (1893); Clark "w. State (Ala.), 17 So. 37 (1895); State v. Shelton, 2 Jones (N. C.) L. 360 (1855); Leiber v. Com. 9 liush, 11 (1872); State i;. Jones <Ia.) 56 N. W. 427 (1893); Hackett v. People, 54 liarb. 370 (1866); State r. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873); Archibald v. State, 122 Ind. 122 (1889). "To render these declarations admissible, it was only necepaary that the trial judge should be satisfied, 1st. That the death of deceased Avas imminent at the time the decla- rations were made. 2nd. That the deceased was so fully aware of this as to be without hope of recovery. 3rd. That the subject of the charge was the death of the declarant and the circumstances of the death was the subject of the declarations." State v. Banister, 35 So. C. 290 (1-891) ; Blackburn v. State, 98 Ala. 63 (1892). A short temporary interruption of a fatal assaiilt does not pre- vent the previous facts being admissible in a dying declaration. U. S. V. Heath, 20 D. C. 272 (1891). ''• ';re a portion of a written declaration m extremis does not ieu/.-i oO the res gestae of the particular transaction, tlie remaining p.''i+"jn of the declaration may be submitted to the jury. Temple V. State, 15 Tex. App. 304 (1883). It is not essential that the dying declaration should be adverse to the accused. It is equally competent, other conditions being present, if in his favor. Hurd v. People, 26 Mich. 405 (1872); Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 764 (1848); State v. Saunders, 14 Ore. 300 (1886); Mattox v. U. S., 146 U. S. 140 (1892); Com. v. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287 (1889); Brock v. Com., 92 Ky. 183 (1891). But it is necessary tliat the declaration should be by the person for whose homicide the indictment is found. The dying declara- tion of one of two alleged murderers, killed while resisting arrest, that he alone conmitted the crime, is not competent. Mora v, Peoide, 19 Colo. 255 (1893). Who may Declakk. — The general rule is that the only person whose dying declaration is aiiniissible is the person for whose homicide the indictment has been found. Consequently it is not competent for the accused to prove his own statements relative to the homicide, although made immedi- ately thereafter, and while he su]iposed himself to be mortally wounded. Brabston v. State, 68 Miss. 208 (1890). CHAP, vm.] AMERICAN NOTES. 4706 Neither is "the unsworn confession by another, that he had committed the crime, competent evidence for the accused," though made under a sense of impending death. West v. State, 76 Ala. 98 (1884). The dying declarations of a person wounded at the same time with the person for whose homicide the indictment is found are not competent. Radford v. State (Tex.) 27 S. W. 143 (1894). Form of Dkclauatiox. — The form of a dying declaration is immaterial. It may be in writing, reduced to that form by a witness and read to and assented to by deceased and signed by him. State v. Kindle, 47 Oh. St. 358 (1890); Drake v. State, 25 Tex. App. 293 (1888). Or may have been reduced to writing at the dictation of deceased and signed by him. King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617 (1892). Or reduced to writing by a third person in response to (questions asked deceased by a witness and signed by the deceased with his mark. Com. V. Haney, 127 Mass. 455 (1879). If the dying declaration be in writing, the "best evidence " rule applies to the document. The original must be produced or its absence satisfactorily accounted for, in order to permit secondary evidence to be given of the contents. People v. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32 (1858); State v. Tweedy, 11 la. 350 (1860); Drake v. State, 25 Tex. App. 293 (1888) ; Collier v. State, 20 Ark. 36 (1859) ; Krebs V. State, 8 Tex. App. 1 (1880); Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. 547 (1890); Boulden v. State (Ala.) 15 So. 341 (1894). " But where the accused, for any reason, procures the rejection of the writing, as he did in this case, it does not lie in his mouth ,0 object to 01 .1 testimony detailing what the deceased then said, p.'ovided it be shown that the statement was made under the condi- tions necessfi^y to render a statement admissible as a dying decla- ration." Mines v. Com. 90 Ky. 64 (1890). That there is a written declaration does not prevent the reception in evidence " of inde- pendent oral evidence of the same or similar dying delaratioi.s of deceased." People v. Vernon, 35 Cal. 49 (1868). A written declaration may be used as a memorandum to refresh the memory of the witness. State v. Whitso.i, 1 N. C. 695 (1892); Com. v. Haney, 127 Mass. 455 (1879). But the memorandum is not itself admissible. Beets v. St-*--, Meigs, 106 (1838). Where the witness took memoranda in writing and has lost them, the fact affects not the admissibility but the credibility of his evidence. State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873). Where the dying declarations were uakon down in writing by a witness but not read to, signed or as3cntea to by the deceased, tlie supreme court of Iowa held that the absence of the original need not be accounted for. Speaking of the opposite contention, the court say: "This would have been correct if the writing had been %' 4706 AMEUIOAN XOTES. [PAllT II r. m: tll signed by deceased, or, itrobably, road to .and i)ronounced by him correct." Htate v. Snllivan, 51 la. 142 (ISTD). It is not a valid objection to a dying dcchiration tliat it is nuub- in response to questions. Ihuinicutt *•. State, 1<S 'I'ex. A\>\). V.)H (18.S5); Anderson v. State, 7*.) Ala. o (ISS")); U. v. Si):irliau'. L'o C. W U. C. 14;; (IS75); r.oyle v. State, <)7 Ind. '.Vr2 (1SS4); V.iss V. Com. , .'] Leigh, 7.SG (bS.'il ) ; State v. Foot You, 24 ( )re. (U (IS'.).'}). Even tlion'^h tlie (juestions iire leading. 1!. /•. Smith, 2.'! ('. 1'. U. ('. .'512 (lS7;i). Or was made under oath. State c. Talhert, 41 S. C. r)20 (l.S<.)4). If the (leclar.ition is complete in itself, it is no objection that the deceased is unable, by reason of weakness, to answer a, subse- quent (jiu^stiou. McLean i\ State, 10 Ala. (')72 (1S-1;>). Or did iu)t state the entire transaction. State v. I'atterson, 45 Vt. 308 (l.SV;5); State (•. Nettlebush, 20 la. 2."')7 (l.S(!()). Tliat tlie deceased was obliged to express his meaning by signs is witliout importance on the question of admissibility. Junes v State, 71 Ind. GG, 7;") (ISSO); I'.axter *•. Stiite, l.** Lea,'(ir)7 (l-SS;")); Cou'. V. Casey, 11 Cush. 417, 421 (iSo.'!). "'I'iu' principal objec- tion relates to the admission in evidence of certain dying declara- tions of the deceased. There was a written dechiration and verbal declarations made at different times. They were all admissible. ' The prosecutor in a murder case cannot be confined to proving dying declarations made at one time, if tliore were others nuule at other times. All are competent. Nor can he lie coniined to prov- ing what was said at one time, when the statement was reduced to writing and signed at another.' G Am. & Eng. Enc. T^aw, l.'U; People V. Simpson, 48 ]\rich. 474, 12 N. W. G(!2." State v. Walton, 61 X. W. (la.) 170 (18<>1). CoxKiNKi) TO Dkath OF Dkclaiiaxt. — The ])revailing rule is to the effect that the declaration must relate to the death of the decl.ar.ant and even where others are killed at substantially tlie same time the scope of the declarations cannot be extended so far as to cover any injury except to him for whose death the indict- ment is brought. A wider scope has been given in certnin stntes. Thus where sever.al were claimed by the prosecution to have been poisoned by the prisoner, one Terrell, by strychnia, disguised in liquor, at about the same time, evidence is competent tiiat* one of the vic^tims, in view of apin-cacliing death, said, "There was some- thing strange .about the way ^Ir. Terrell h.ad acted;" "he Terrell had never left him in the store before .and told him to invite persons in to drink liquor;" "he was poisoned for the first time in his life," etc. State v. Terrell, 12 Rich. (S. C.) Law, .321 (1850). So where the decduraut "w.-.s wounded mortally by the same cHAi'. yui.] AMKIMCAN NOTES. 470" shot, or at least at the sanio time tlmt A. (for wliosc imirdor tlie ])risoiier is on trial) was killed. State c. Wilson, -'.'> I.a. Ann. 55.S (1S71). Tlie rule lias, however, been held to be otherwise in a majority of states. Thus in an Iowa case where several persons liad been killed at about the same time in a general fight with r(!volvers between two families in an attempt to settle a family feud, the dying deelarations of one son that tiie defendant killed him is not admissible on an indictment for the munh'r of liis brotlier, though the wounds were apjiarently made by tlie same instrument. "As to this case they were (dearly hearsay declarations, relating to a crime for which defendant was not on trial. This illegal testi- mony could not have been otherwise than prejudicial to tiie defendant. Its admission was erroneous.'' State v. Westfall, 4!) la. 3L'8 (1878). So where husband and wife were apparently killed in the same attempt at robbery of their house, the dying declarations of the wife are not competent on an indictment for the murder of the husband, lirown v. Com. 73 Pa. St. 321 (1873). " We do not think such declarations can be received, except as comin" from the deceased person for whose murder the prisoners are indicted." State V. Fitzhugh, 2 Ore. 227(1807); Hudson v. State, 3 Cold. 355 (18()6). "The decided weight of authority on the subject seems to be to the effect that it is a general rule that dying declarations, although made with a full consciousness of ajiproaehing death, are only admissible in evidence where the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death the sub- ject of the dying declaration. The admission of dying declarations as evidence being in deroga- tion of the general rule which subjects the testimony of witnesses as ordinarily received to the two important 'tests of truth,' an oath and a cross-examination, it is obvious that such evidence should be admitted only upon grounds of necessity and public policy, and should be restricted to the act of killing and the cir- cumstances immediately attending it and forming a part of the res gestfe." Leiber v. Com., 9 Bush, 11 (1872). The cases which admit the dying dpclarati(ms of a person killed at about the same time as the perscm for whose homicide an indictment is bi^ught, may perliaps be most satisfactoi'ily explained as part of the res gestaj. The reasoning of the court, liowever, frequently relies on the rule under consideration. Thus in the case of State v. Wagner, where several i)ersons were murdered on "Smutty Nose" Island, on an indictment for the murder of one, the outcries of a j^rior victim were held competent. "The doctrine which we hold is this: The outcries of a person deceased during 4; Kj I , i ^!' ' 47U8 AMKUKJAN NOTES. [I'AllT HI. tlie perpetration of the assault which results in death, or upon tin; approach of the assailant, are (competent evidence upon the trial of a party charged with the murder of such person, and may be con- sidered by the jury with other circumstances and testimony u])on the question of the identity of the accused. The outcries of another person who Avas murdered by the same party a few minutes previously during the perpetration of one and the same burglary, but on anotlier part of the premises, are admissible under like cir- cumstances for the same purpose upon such trial. Such outcries certainly partake much of the nature of res gestae, more distinctly so than the statement in Com. v. MePike, ubi supra, which accompanied the sending for a jihysician; but we think that the precise ground upon which their admission should be placed in a case like this, is substantially the same as that upon which dying declarations are declared admissible. Speaking of dying declarations, Koscoe says (Crim. Ev. p. .30): ' Evidence of this kind which is peculiar to the case of homicide has been considered by some to be admissible from necessity, since it often happens that there is no third person present to be an eye witness to the fact, and tlie usual witness in other felonies, viz., the party injured himself is got rid of; but it is said by Eyre, C. li., that the general principle upon which evidence of this kind is admitted is that it is of declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, . . . when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most power- ful consi<lerations to speak the truth. A situation so solemn and so awful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.' Roscoe adds: ' I'robably it is the concurrence of both these reasons which led to the admission of this species of evidence.' Both these conditions exist in the case at bar. There is as truly a necessity to corroborate the test'mony of a surviving witness, whose testimony to the identity of the murderer and the accused may be attacked on the ground that in the darkness and excite- ment she was liable to mistake, as there is to furnish evidence when no person who witnessed the assault remains alive. More- over, it is the danger that no surviving witness can be found, which operates to establish the rule, which is of general ai)plication, and the fact that in the particular case one did survive would not abrogate it. And as to the second condition, no one can doubt that the excla- mations of these two women embodied the truth as it appeared to each, and that the cries of alarm or supplication uttered by any and all human beings under similar circumstances, would express their perceptions of existing facts as truly as if backed by the sanction of all the oaths known in Christendom, To reject the ki fT' ■ I f CHAP. VIII.] AMKUICAN NOTES. 470» I ^ ?A>.i evidence afforded hy the agoiiizod entreiities of one standinjj laet* to face witli death in the person of a niuiderer wilh iiplilied weapon, when we would accept the account of tlie affair afterwards given by the enfeebled victim, witli perceptions and recollfctious darkened and dimmed l)y the mists and sliadows of approucliing dissolution, would be, we think, but a bad sample of ' the perfec- tion of luiinan reason.' It is not to such exelamiitions thiit any of the substantial ol)jections to hearsay testimony can be held to apply. Those outcries were as plainly circumstaiKies proju'r for the consideration of the jury in tiie attempt to ascertain whether the prisoner was guilty of that crime, as any other portion of the circumstantial evidence in the case." State v. Wagner, Gl Me. 178, l'.)4 (IST.'i). Exi'KcrrATio.v of Dkath. — The fact that the declarant at tho time of his statement expected to die may be proved by parol and need not .appear in the declaration itself. State v. Wilson, 2.'i La. Ann. 5r,H (1S71); R. v. Smith, 2.3 C. V. U. C. 312 (187.3); People V. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17 (1864); Kilpatrick v. Com. 31 I'a. St. 11)8, 215 (1858); Hill v. Com. 2 Graft. 5!)4 (1845); Com. v. Silcox, 161 Pa. St. 484 (1894); Wills v. State, 74 Ala. 21 (188.3); State v. Fletcher, 24 Ore. 295 (1893) ; Dixon p. State, 13 Fla. 636 (1869) ; Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577 (1890); Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193 (1869); Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229 (18.39); State ?,-. Russell, 13 Mont. 164 (1893). This is true even where the declaration is in writing. Com. v. Haney, 127 Mass. 455 (1879). Such a belief must, however, be made to appear in an affirmative manner. People V. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17 (1864); Kilpatrick v. Com. 31 Pa. St. 198, 215 (1858). " It is enough, if it satisfactorily appears, in any mode, that they were made under that sanction ; whether it be directly proved, by the express Language of the declarant, or be inferred from his evident danger, or the opinions of the medical or other attendants stated to him, or from his conduct, or other cir- cumstances of the case, all of which are resorted to in order to ascertain the state of the declarant's mind." Montgomery v. State, 11 Oh. 424 (1842); Graves u. People, 18 Col. 170 (189.3); State V. Nocton, 121 ISIo. 537 (1894). The court, in deciding whether a <leclaration was made under a sense of impending death may consider ''the evident danger and all the surrounding circumstances." Com. v. Matthew;?, 89 Ky. 287 (1889); McHargue v. Ccnn., (Ky.) 23 S. W. ,349 (1893); Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353 (1852); Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 261 (1895); McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672 (1849); Miller v. State, 27 Tex. App. 63 (1889); Sullivan v. Com. 93 Pa. St. 284, 296 (1880). -'The injured party need not, in express words, declare that he knows he is about to die, or make use of e(iuivalent lan- guage." Com. V. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287 (1889). 47010 AMERICAN NOTES. [part nii W il I The declarations are still admissible though the declarant subse- quently entertains hopes of recovery. State v. Reed, 53 Kaus. 707 (1894). It is not required that such declarations should be made in artk'iilo mortis. State v, Johnson, 102 Ala. I (l.SO.'J). Ill Dunuis V. State, 02 Ga. oS (1S78) the supreme court of Georgia sustain a charge to the jury tliat "the fact of conscious- ness of his condition may be shown by circumstances or by expres- sions made by deceased himself. You can take one or the other, or both together, and determine whether he Avas in exfreini's at the time tlie alleged declarations were made." As bearing on the question of tlie deceased's expectation of death, the fact that she had received the extreme rights of her (ilomaii Catholic) Church is competent. State v. Swift, r>7 Conn. 40(i (1.S8'.)); State v. O'Hrien, 81 la. 88 (18<)U). I'.iit the mere facts that declarant v.-as praying and in suifering are not sufHcient. Cole /;. State, (Ala.) 10 So. 702 {18i)4). While the consciousness of impending death may be proved by evidence afiiinde, there is no doubt that the natural evidence that th'2 deceased knew of his ajjproaching deatli, like jiroof of any other mental state, lies in his declaration to that effect. State v. Fitzhugh, 2 Ore. 227 (1807); Ilunnicutt ?». State, 18 Tex. App. 498 (188r)); Anderson v. State, 79 Ala. 5(188.-)); K. v. Sparhan, 25 C. V. U. C. 14;) (1875); St.ite r. P.lackburn, 80 \. C. 474 (1879); State v. pniiott, 45 la. 480 (1877); Com. v. Thompson, 159 Mnss. 50 (189.*)). Such a declaration is not conclusive. Bell v. State, 72 JMiss. 507 (1895). Declarations made either before or after the dying declaration are admissible on the question of knowledge of impending dissolu- tion. State V. Vaughan (Xev.) .'«) I'ac. 7.".3 0895). If the declarant "had any expectation or hope of recovery, how- ever slight it might have been, and though death ensued within an hour afterwards, the de(darations are inadmissible." Com. v. Koberts, 108 Mass. 290 (1871) citing State n. Center. 35 Vt. 378 (1802); People r. Knickerbocker, 1 Parker C. C. .'502 (1851); Sr.arkey !'. People. IT 111. 17 ( 1 8.T.) : Smith i-. Stiitc 9 Humph. 9 (1848)'; P,rown v. State. .12 Miss. 4.33 (18.-)0); .Moore v. St;ite, 12 Ala. 704 (1848). A written statement made while tiiere is hope of recovery b.ecomes comi)etent if affirmed after consciousness of impending death. Mockabee v. Com., 78 Ky. .380 (1S80); Million t.. Com., (Ivy.) 25 S. W. 1059 (1894); People v. Crews, 102 Cal. 174 (1894). It is not ai»iiavently neces.sary that the deceased should feel a sense of i.nmediately aiiproMching death. It is suflicieiit if he feela conlident tlint he has received a fatal injury. Kv;ins r. State, 58 Ark. 47 (1893). "Neither would it lie sufficient tli;it the declarant CHAP. VIII.] AMERICAN NOTES. 470" despaired of ultimate recovery, because that is consistent with the hope of indetinite continuancti of life, lint exactly how immediate must be the expectation of death, the authorities do not seiin agreed or clear. Some would seem to conlinc tlio rule of admi jility to those made at the very point of deatii. Tiie wciight of authority, however, does not seem to require so strict a rule, but to justify the admissions if the declarant does not expect to survive the injury from whicii he actually dies, and the injury is such tliat if must be expected to result s[ieedily in death." U. S. y. Schneider, L'l D. C. 381, 40;5 (iSiKJ); People i: Chase, 79 Hun, L'!)G (181)4). Where the deceased was infornuMl that her only liopc of recovery was through an operation, and nothing appeared to control this fact, the declaration was held inadmissible. Peak v. State, uO N. J. L. 17'.), 221 (1S8S). The fact that deceased desired the services of a ])hysician is immaterial. McQueen v. State (Ala.) 15 So. 824 (181)4) ; State v. Evans, 124 Mo. 307 (18<)4). Hut the expectation of death may exist notwithstanding that a physician extends hope of recovery. People r. Grunzig, 1 I'arker C. llt"p. 2!)l) (18.->1); State v. Caldwell, 115 X. C. 794 (18114). Fear of death is not sulficient. Certainty is required. iJrakelield v. State, 1 Sneed, 215 (1853). [t is not enough tliat deceased was actually in a dying condition and nodded his head when so informed. People'/?. I'erry, 8 Abb. I'rac. X. S. 27, 34 (1870). Or that he was in great pain, sent for a physician, and said he ('ould not stand it much longer unless relieved. Justice v. State, 99 Ala. 180 (1892). The definition is tlms given by the supreme court of Illinois. " Dying declarations are such as are made, relating to the facts of an injury of which the party afterwards dies, under the fixed Ixdief and moral conviction that immediate death is inevitable, without ojjportunity for repentance, and without hope of cscajjing tin; im- pending danger." Simons v. People, 150 111. 00, 73 (1894). Using the jjlirase " If I die" is not ncMicssarily fatal to the decla- ration if it appears upon all tlie statements of deceased that tlie certainty of death was recognized. 11. v. Sjjarham, 25 C. P. U. ('. 143 (1875). In a Missouri case, however, where the same expression, "If I die," was employed, the court held that, in the absence of ex])lana- tion, the uncertainty was fatal to the reeejjtion of the evidenco, and ]iroceed to m:ike tlie following excellent suggestions. " Any ])erson v/ho has been accustoiued to attend on those wlio are injured, or are very ill, knows how common it is for them to say that they will never recover, or that they will die. when there is no good or suHicient reason for the apprehension, and they are not conscious themselves that they are in any real danger. Such expressions 47012 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AKT III. ism are often the result of impatience, restlessness, or great suffering. liut at the same time let the attending ])liysician inform them that tliere is no liope, and that they must die, and they will be perfectly startled." State i\ Simon, 50 ]\[o. .'370 (187U). To the same effect is State v. Medlicott, 9 Kans. 257, 2S2 (1872). Such vague phrases as "I will die of it," "It is all over with me," "I will never recover," are insufficient. K. v. Peltier, 4 L. Can. Kej). .'! (1S53). "The admissibility of such declarations does not depend upon any particular forms of expression, for these will vary indefinitely; but it depends upon the view which tlie deceased took of his own case when in imminent danger of death." Com. v. Roberts, 108 Mass. 29() (1871). P.ut see State n. Center, 35 Vt. 378 (18G2). In rcoi)le v. Hodgdon, 55 Cal. 72 (1880), where the phrase was "P.elieving that I am very near death, and realizing that I may not recover," the fact that all hope was not abandoned was held fatal. It follows from wliat has been said tliat it is not sufliciont that these declarations are, in fact, mad>( la extremis. "Tliey arc only admissible where the party .laking them knows or thinks tliut he is in a tlying state. ... It is this ronsciousiifHs, coupled witli the condition of tlie i)arty, wliich sup[)lies tiie place of an oath, and peculiarly distinguishes <lying declarations from liearsay." l>ixon V. State, 1.') Fla. (J.'JG (18()0), citing with ajiproval ]\[ontgomery's Case, 11 Ohio, 424 (1842). " It is the impression of almost immediate dissolution and not the rapid succession of death in jioint of fact tliat rentiers the testimonv a<lmiss;ble. Vaughan v. (,'om., 8(5 Ky. 431 (1887); Starr V. Com.,\Ky.) 30 S. W. 397 (1895). On the otlu'r liand, tin; fact that (U'ath fails to ensue, as antici- pated by deceased, for a period of seventeen days is imniatcrial. State r. Daniel, 31 La. Ann. 91 (1879); Cum. *•. Cooper, 5 All, 495 (18r)2). "Our judgment concurs with that of tiie Kni,'lisli court of criminal appea.l, as expressed by chief Haron Pdllnck, in \\w latter of tlu.se eases. K. i\ Peaney, V Cox C. C. 20'.>. ' In order,' he says, 'to render such a declaration admissible, it is necessary tliat it slumld be made under the apprehension of deatli. The books certainly speak of near approacliing deatli; but there is no (\ase in which any particular interval, any number of hcmrs (ir days, is specified as the limit. In truth, the questicui does not depend u|)on the length of interval between the death and declara- tion, but on the state of the man's mind at the time of making the declaration, ami his Indief that he is in a dying state.' " Com. v. Cooper, 5 All. 4'.»5 (18(;2). The case is cited with approval in Com. »'. Koberts, 108 Mass. 29G (1871), where the interval was the BanH>. If the other conditions are present, a dying declaration is none CHAP. VIII.] AMERICAN NOTES. 470W 1. 11. irt r, ll.> 11(1 dl' .lb la- lio V. in the the less admissible if death does not ensue for twenty-five days. State V. Oliver, 2 Houston (Del.) 585 (18().'i). So of fourteen days. Jones V. State, 71 Ind. GG (1880). Ur sixteen. Baxter v. State, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 657 (1885). So an interval of six days. State i-. Center, 35 Vt. o78 (18(j2). Twelve: days. I'eople v. Grunzig, 1 Parker C. C. 21)0 (1851). Forty days. State r. Wilson (ISIo.) 20 S. W. ."557 (181)4). Or even two iiionths. Houlden r. State (Ala.) 15 So. 341 (181)4). iMPKAeuMKN'T. — It hardly need be said that the accuracy and veracity of the dying declarant may be impeached; e. g., wliere the declaration was as to the identity of the accused, by evidence that the deceased was in the habit of mistaking her friends for persons whom they did not resemble. " A defendant against whom dying declarations are received has not the o]iportiiiiity of cross-examining the declarant. Hence it is justly held that he is entitled to every allowance and benelit that he may have lost by the absence of the opportunity of a more full investigation by means of cross-examination." Com. r. Cooper, 5 All. 4115 (1S(J2). So the "peculiar character of the deceased for wicUcdncss and disregard of the law of God in his ()ut[)ourings of Idasphemy," is comi)etent evidence for the jury. "For if a man, even without hope of life in this world, nevertheless without belief in (Jod or in the divine revelation, while his declarations woulil l)e admissible, their weight and consideration should be weighed by the jury." Nesbit ". State, 4.'J Ca. 2.'>8 (1871). So it may be shown, to dis- credit the dying declaration, "that the deceased was a ilisbeliever in a future state of rewards and jmnishments." (loodall v. State, 1 Ore. .'};]3 (1801). The lack of belief in a future state, though usually not a grouml for rejecting the evidence, may still be received at least to iletraet from the value of a «lying declaration. Hill r. State, 04 Miss. 4.'il (1880); State v. Elliott, 45 la.. 48() (1877). Or the declarant may be iinpeaclu'd by proof (if his inconsistent statements whether made !ii <:r/rt'iiii's or not. "'i'lie (inly case ludding otherwise is that of Wroc r. State, 20 Oh. St. 100 i 187(t). This case has never been followoil. so far as wc have licea able to discover, and its reasoning is narrow and unsatisfactory. . . . To de[)rive thci defendant of the only possible method of iinpcacliing the credit or memory of the dctdarant, by proof of contradictory statements, would be a gross injustice." .Mondock r. State. IW) Tenn. 528 (181)1). "There is no reason why tiic same ]irinci]ile of law should not be apjilied to the contradictory statements of persons in. rxfn-inis and those of a jicrson on examination under oath. The court upon this point sliould have charged the jury, that if they believed that the contradiction in the dying decdara- tions of the deceased, were produced by ignorance on her i)art as to 470" AM El! IC AN NOTES. [PAltT m. wlio had committed the offence, and a mere surmise that it was the I)risoner, the}' ought to be rejected and not permitted to have any weight in coming to a conolusiou upon wliich their judgment was to be based; but that if tliey believed that tlie contradictions were produced by appreliension and fears of her husband, or an unwil- lingness to cliarge him with the offence, and not from ignoraiK^e as to liis guilt, then the contradictions might be reconciled, and that portion of her declaration charging the prisoner witli tlie ott'ence ought to be taken into consideration by them, and such weight ought to be given to it as from all the circumstances in the case they might think it justly entitled." McPherson v. State, 9 Yerger, 279 (1.S36). The declarant can not only be impeached ; he may be sustained by appropriate evidence. It has been held that where there is evidence tending to destroy the effect of dying declarations, it is competent for the state to corroborate them by showing that deceased made similar declara- tions a few minutes after the fight, though it did not appear that he was then UTuler the apprehension of immediate death. State v. lil'ickburn, 80 N. C. 474 (J.879). A Qi'ESTiox Foit TiiK CouBT. — Whether the circumstances necessary to entitle an alleged dying declaration to be received in evidence actually exist is a preliminary question for the court. "It is the duty of the court to determine, in the first place, \\\w\\ the admissibility of such declarations, and then it is for the jury to determine upon the weight, or credibility of them." Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 764 (1848); Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463 (18r.7); Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 424 (1842); States. Foot You. 24 Ore. 61 (1893); Roten v. State, 31 Fla. .514 (1893); State V. Center, 35 Vt. 378 (1862); liull «. Com., 14 Gratt. 613 (1857); State V. Simon, 50 Mo. 370 (1872); State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086 (1880); State v. Aldrich, 50 Kans. 6()() (1893); State v. Johnson, 118 Mo. 491 (189.3); State v. Nocton, 121 Mo. 537 (1894). Tlie court, it has been held, cannot leave the entire question, including admissibility, to the jury. State v. Center, 36 Vt. 378 (18(;2). Roten v. State, 31 Fla. 514 (1893). The decision is however subject, it has been held, to review. Donnelly v. State, 26 X. J. Law, 463 (1857). "The court does not discharge this duty l^y simjdy hearing the evidence produced upon the part of the State. Evidence, if offered, sliould be received upon the part of the defendant, and it should be weighed upon the determination of the question of admissibility. The declarations of a dying man are admitted on a sujiposition tliat in his awful situation, on the confines of a future world, he had no motive to misrepresent, but, on tlie contrary, the strongest mo- tives to speak without disguise and without malice. Roscoe's '^10^' CHAP. VIII.] AMEKICAN ^'OTKS. 470^5 m Criminal Evidence, p. 35. Before tlio judge decides the question of admissibility he hears all the deceased said respecting the danger in which he considered himself, and he should be satisfied that the declaration was made under an impression of almost immediate dissolution.'' t^tate c. Elliott, 45 la. 48G (1.S77); State V. Johnson, 118 .Mo. 41)1 (1893). The preliminary inciuiry may, it is said, be held either in the presence and heltiH^ig of tl"^ juiT) or otherwise, as the discretion of the trial judge may' dictate. .State c. Shaffer, 23 Ore. o'k) (18'.).'!). In a Georgia case it was held "tliat the proper course to be pursued was this: that a prima facie case of the moral ronscious- iiess required, should be exhibited to tlie Court in tlie Hrst instance, as preliminary to the admission of the testimony. This done, the evidence sliould be received and left for the Jury to determine whether the deceased was really under the apprehension of death when tlie declarations were made, which they might infer either from (iircumstances or the expressions used." Campbell v. State of Georgia., 11 (ia. 353, .376 (1851.'). Even if admitted by the court, the weight of the evidence is entirely for the jury. State /■. Elliott, 45 la. 480 ('877). "This preliminary adjudication of tl.e court upon the question as to the admissibility of the testimony, in case the evidence bo allowed, has decided nothing in regard to its credibility. That peculiar province still remains for the jury. It is every day's practice to admit evidence as competent, which the jury have no hesitation in disbelieving. The court may decide, U[)on examination of ])roofs, tliat a witness is not incompetent for want of reason or understand- ing; tlie jury may, notwithstanding, determine witliin their ])roviiice, what is the weight of his testimony, and may graduate tlie credit they will repose in it, from tlie point of total disbelief to tliat of the most implicit contidence.'' Vass's C'ase, 3 Leigh, 78(), 7!)4 (1S31); State v. Cameron, 2 Chandler (Wis.) 172 (18.-)0); Caniplxdl r. State, 38 Ark. 4i)8 (1882); State v. Foot You. 24 Ore. 61 (18!);}); TJrock v. Com. 92 Ky. 183 (1801); Jon.-s v. State, 70 Miss. 4(11 (1892). The supreme court of Georgia in Huiiias v. State, 62 Ga. .^8 (1878) sustained the following ruling on this point. "If the court is satisJied jirima fa,cie that the deceased is in extremis and eon- scions oF his condition, it will allow the flying declarations to go to the jury. The jury will look to the evidence to see if the ]MM'son making tliem was in extremis at the time, and was conscious of his condition.. If the jury believe the fact that the person was in extremis, and conscious of his condition, then they may consider the dying declarations as evidence." To same effect. Wallace v. State", 90 Ga. 117 (1892). In Com. V. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296 (1871) the ruling to the jury iSr 470^6 AMERICAN NOTES. [part UI. was "that the credibility of the evidence was entirely within the province of the jury, and they were at liberty to weigh all the circuiustances under which the declarations were made, including those upon which the court had already passed merely as i)relinu- nary to their admission; and tliat the jury were to determine Die state of mind under which the testimony was given, and its weight." This ruling was apparently sustained, svh silentlo. Leaving the question in this way to the jury does not, however, make either the ruling of the court on the admission of the evi- dence or the decision of the jury as to the .existence of the facts re'juired by the court, final so as to prevent the ruHng being reviewed upon exceptions. ''It was a ruling in matter ot" law; anil the life of a defendant may be involved in a ruling on this point. In many of the cases reported, the ■;',ourt have discussed the evi- dence on which the question turnod." Com. r. lloberts, 108 Mass. 296 (1871). The court will exclude tlie dying declaration where it appears tliat the declarant had no belief in (Jod or a future state of reward and punishment. Donnelly v. State, 2G N. J. Law, 4().'5 (ISi")?). Such disbelief will not be presumed. It must ap])ear by affirma- tive evidence. Ibid. Slaves are supposed to have a religious belief. Lewis r. State, 9 Sm. & M. 115 (1847). Opinion Exclitdkd. — The declarant should sta,te facts rather than conclusions. Mcliride v. People, 5 Colo. App. 91 (1804). Where a declarant, liowever, used tlie expression, "lie sliot me down like a dog," the expression was held admissible. "Declara- tions of a party in extremis, in order to be admissible, must be as to facts and not conclusions. They are permitted as to those things to which the deceased would have been competent to testify, if sworn in the case. But I do not think tlie expression of the deceased a eonclusion. It was given as a i)art of liis narrative relating to the affair, and I think it was merely intended to illus- trate the lack of provocation and the wantonness in whicli the appellant did the act. It was descriptive of the manner in whicli the act was committed. It conveyed the idea that tlie ai)])ellant disregarded the claims of humi-nity, and, without giving him any warning, wantonly shot him. It was the statement of a fact made by way of illustration." State c. Saunders, 14 Ore. .300 (1886). So of a declaration, "It was done without any provocation on his part." Wroe v. State, 20 Oh. St. 400 (1870). Ov that deceased was "butchered." State r. (Hie, 8 Wash. 12 (1894). "A mere expression of opinion by the dying man is not admis- sible as a dying declaration, and it is immaterial whether the fact that the declaration h mere opinion appears from the statement itself, or from other undisputed evidence showing that it was ';hap. vm.] AMERICAN NOTES. 470>" iinpossible for the declarant to have known the fact stated. If, upoiT a'.iy view of the evidence, it is possiLil, for the dechirant to know tlie truth of what he states, his declarations, being otlierwise competent, should be received and considered by the jury in the light 01 all the evidence." Jones v. State, 52 Ark. M'> (1881)); Einns v. State, 46 Ind. .'ill (1874); State r. Arnold, 13 Ired. L. 184 (1851); State v. Parker, % Mo. OSli (1888). A declaration by a deceased who was shot at niglit in a house from the outside through an aperture in the logs, made wliile in extre.iiis, "It was E. W. who sliot me, though I did not see him'* was accordingly rejected. State v. Williams, (57 N. C. 12 (1872). But the statement that deceased and accused "were play- ing, and that it was an accident" is competent. "To be competent as a dying declaration, the statement must not only relate to the immediate circumstances of the transaction resulting in the inquiry, but it must detail facts, and not the opinion of the declar- ant. In our opinion, the statement in this instance conforms to this rule. It is unlike the case wliere tlie injured party declared that he liad been killed for nothing. This was ]mrely his opinion and inference. Here the injured man said that lie and the accused were engaged in play, and that the sliooting was an accident. This, in our opinion, was the statement of a fact, more than tlie giving of an opinion, and the court properly permitted it to be proven." Com. v. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287 (188!)). The use of the phrase "Believing myself to be now on my death bed" does not imply opinion, and such a declaration is admissible. Doolin r. Com. 95 Ky. 29 (189.'}). " We apprehend there is a decisive test to which ' dying declara- tions' must be subjected, and by it their admissibility as testimony can be readily determined. That test is, whatever may be stated by a witness under oath, is admissible in evidence as dying decla- rations, made l)y one under the consciousness of approacliing death. The statement, under sucdi circumstances, is held to be as truthful as if under oath, and equivalent to a statement sworn to. But the opinions of witnesses under oath, as a general rule, a.re inadmis- sible in evidence in criminal cases, and hence opinions in dying declarations are excduded." Whitley r. State, 38 Ga. 50 (1808). The statement that the accused had no reason for the felonious assault is not objectionable as being an expression of opinion. Boyle V. State, 97 Ind. 322 (1884). MixoR CoxsiDEKATioxs. Thf admission of dying declarations does not infringe the ])ris<)ner's riglit to be confronted with the witnesses against liim. Bretwn r. ''im.. 73Ta. St. .'J21 (1873); State V. Saunders, 14 Ore. 3(10 (l.S.-iO); State v. Kindle, 47 OIi. St. 35S (1890); People v. Glenn. 10 Cal. 32 (1858); Walston v. Com., IC B. Monr. (Ky.) 15 (LS.m); Com. r. Carey, 12 Cush. 246 . t 470'8 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AllT i:i. jfjill m I l" n I ,JU Wl SI I m (185;5); Cami)bell v. State, 11 Ga. 353 (1852); Bobbins r. State, 8 •Oh. St. 131 (1858). "Tlie rule, however, was well settled before the adoption of our constitution, that the declarations of a dying person were admissible in cases of lioniicide 'where the death of the deceased is the subjeot of the charge, and the eircunistanc'es of the death are tlie subject of tlie dying declarations;' and we have no idea that it was the object of this provision in the bill of rights to abrogate this rule of evidence." .Miller r. State^ lio Wis. ;;.S4 (1870). "The Constitution does not alter the rules of evidence, or deter- mine what shall be admissible testiiiu)ny against the prisoner, but it only .secures to him the right to confront the witnesses who may be '• troduced to prove such uuitters as, according to the settled principles of law, are evidence against him. This objectitu, if carried out fully, would result in the rejection of ail dechi rations, even where they constitute part of the res gestcc. The law deter- mines the admissibility of testimony — the Constitution secures to the accused the riglit to meet the witness who deposes face to face. But what the witness, when thus confronted, shall be allowed to state as evidence, the Constitution does not undertake to prescribe, but leaves it to be regulated by the general principles of the huv of evidence. When the declarations of the deceased are offered to the jury, they cmstitute facts in legal contemplation, wliioh tend to establish the truth of the matter to which they relate. The l)osition, therefore, that their admission as evidence infringes upon the constitutional right of the prisoner to confront the witnesses against him, is wholly without foundation, and cannot be main- tained." Walston V. Com. 16 B. Monr. (Ky.) 15, 35 (1855). " The argument for the ex(dusion of the testimony, proceeds upon the hlea tliat the deceased is the witness, when in fact it is the individual who swears to the statenu".its of the deceased, who is the witness. And it is as to him that the ])rivileges of an oral and cross examination are secured." Campbe ' v. State of Georgia, 11 Ga. 353, 374 (1852). " This objection is founded in a misconception of fact. The accused is confronted by the witness on his trial. The deceased person is not the witnes.s, but the person who can relate, on the trial, the death-bed declarations, is the witness. The objection, if there be one, is to the competency of the evidence, and not to the want of the personal ]iresence of the witness. And it appears to be well settled, that dying declarations, within the restricted rule prescribed, fall within the exceptions to the general rule that hear- say is not evidence." Jtobbins v. State, 8 Oh. St. 131, 103 (1857). The sapreme court of Iowa, in a case where the point was not fully considered, suggest that if the question were a new one they might feel constrained to decide contrary to tiie existing rule on this subject, stated supra. State v. Nash, V la. 347 (1858). CHAP. VIII.] AMERICAN NOTES. 47019 IS is id LI le •d le if le to The dying declarations of a Imsband arc evidence on an imlict- ment against the wife. Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 704 (1S4(S) ; Pcoiile V. Green, 1 Ueuio, 614 (1845); "'jate v. Belclu-r. Hi H. C. 45U (1880). If the deceased die before comjileting his declaration that wliicli remains is incompetent and the conclusion of tlie declarant tliat the corrections were " immaterial " does not affect tlie rule. " \ f too much has been said, the narrative may be as damtiging to the accused as if it was i)artial. If it needs correcting, the defect — the error to l;j corrected — may be as injurious as if it were partial and inco-n!,4ete." Drake *-. State, L'5 'lex. App. J',),'] (1888). It is sufficient if the reporting witness is able to state the sub- stance of the dying declaratious. Such evidence is admissible "although the witness was uual)le to give the precise words." Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 4L'4 (1842); Ward v. State, 8 lilack. 101 (184(5) r Murphy v. People, ;]7 111. 447 (18(55). It is not necessary that the reporting witness should be sure of the precise order of the statements. King v. State, (Tex.) 29 S. W. 1086 (1895). The fact that a dying declaration was in a foreign language (dliinese), and introduced in evidence through an interpreter, affects merely the weight of the evidence. State v. Foot You, 24 Ore. 61 (189.3). Part of a dying declaration may be received and the rest rejected on a general objection by the defendant. State v, Wilson, (Mo.) 26 S. W. 357 (1894). "The true grounds upon which tlie declarations are receivable as testimony" are thus staged by the learned Judge Kedtield. " It is not received upon any other ground than that of necessity, in order to prevent murder going unpunished. What is said in the books about the situation of the declarant, he being virtually under the most solemn sanction to speak the trutli, is far from presenting the true ground of the admission; for, if that were all that is requisite to render the declarations evidence, the apprehension of death should have the same effect, since it would place the declarant under the same restraint as if the apprehension were founded in fact. But both must concur, both tlie fact and the apprehension of being in. extremis. And although it is not indispensahle that there should be no other evidence of the same facts, the rule is no doubt based upon the presumption that in the majority of cases there will be no other equally satisfactory proof of the same facts. This pre- sumption and the consequent probability of the cvinie going un- punished, is niiiuestionably the chief ground of this exception in the law of evidence. And the great reason why it couhl not be received generally, as evidence in all cases where facts involved 47020 AMKUICAN NOTES. [PAItT III. should thereafter come in question, seems to he that it wants one of the most important and indispensable elements of testimonj', that of an opjiortunity for cross examination by the party against whom it is offered." 1 Greenlf. Evid. § 150, note. CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS AND CONFfSaiONS. CHAPTER IX. ADMISSIONS. § 723.^ Admissions and confessions are often considered as decla* rations against interest, and, therefore, probably true. With regard, however, to many admissions, and especially those implied from conduct and assumed character, it cannot be supposed that the party, at the time of the principal declaration or act, believed himself to be speaking or acting against his own interest ; but often the contrary. Such evidence seems, therefore, more properly admissible as a substitute for the ordinary and legal proof ; ^ either in virtue of the direct consent and waiver of the party, as in the case of explicit and solemn admissions, or on grounds of public policy and convenience, as in the case of those implied from assumed character, acquiescence, or conduct.' Many admissions, > Largely Gr. Ev. § 169. * A8 to when the admissions of a party with respect to written instru- ments may be substituted for the ordinary proof of such instruments by their production, see ante, §§ 410 — 414. ^ According to Mascardus, this is the light in which confessions and admissions are regarded by the Eoman law. Illitd igitiir in priviis, ut hinc potiasimum exordiar, no7> est ignorandnm, quod etsi cimftsaioni inter pro- bationum species locum in prcusentia tribueritnus ; ciincti tamen fere Dd. unanimes sunt arbitrati, ipsam jintius esse ah onere prahundi nhvationem, giiam proprie probadonem : 1 Masc. de Prob. quaest. 7, n. 1, 10, 11; Menoch. de Prces. lib. 1, quaest. 61, n. 6; Alciat. de Proes. par. 2, n. 4. We fmther find that Eoman law distinguishes, with great clearness and precision, between confessions extra judicium, and confpssions in judicio; treating the former as of very little and often of no weight, unless corro- borated, and the latter as generally, if not alwaj's, conchisive, even to the overthrow of the presumptio jxiris et de jure ; thus constituting an excep- tion to the conclusiveness of this class of presumptions. But to give a con- fession this effect, certain things are essential, which Mascardus cites out of Tancred : — " Major, spont^, sciens, contra se, ubi jus fit ; Nee natura, favor, lis, jusve repugnet, et hostis." Masc. ub. sup. n. 15; Vid. Dig. lib. 42, tit. 2, de confessis; Cod. lib. 7, tit. 69; Van. Leeuw. Comm. book v. ch. 21. 471 !•' :: I w ,*T- ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS — DISTINCTION. [PT. III. however, being made by third persons, are recti viiblo on mixod grounds ; partly, as belonging to the res gestiu, partly, as nmdo against the interest of the person making thoni, nnd i»artly, bcfiniso of some privity with him against whom they are ofT<'red in evidence. § 724.' In our law, the term adinmiun is usually ajipliod to riril traimiction.s, and to those matters of fact, in criminal cusps, wliich do not involve criminal intent ; ^ while the term fDnfrxsion is gene- rally used in crhniml law, and as denoting an (irknoukdgmrnt of (juilt. This distinction will be better understood by an example. On the trial of Lord ^lelville, who was charged (amongst other things) with crimiiMl misapplication of moneys received from the Exchequer, the admission of his ogent and authorised receiver was held suffioiont proof of the fact of such agent having received the public money. But had such admission been tendered in evidence to establish the criminal charge of misapplication of money it would have been rejected.' § 724a. As the rules of evidence, respectively applicable to admissions and confessions, differ in some respects, the two subjects will be discussed in separate chapters. § 724a (i). With regard to all Admissions, the law, after several changes,* is now embodied in the li. S. (^ , 1883, Order XXXII. § 724a (ii). By Eule 1 of the Order just mentioned, "Any party ' Gr. Ev. § 170, almost verbatim. » Ld. Melville's trial, ISOU. ' Loid Chancellor Erskino said : — " Thi.s first step in the proof " (namely, the receipt of the money by the agent, ) "must advance by evidence applic- able alike to civil, as to criminal cas(!S ; for a fact must be established by tlie same evidence, whether it is to be followed by a criminal or civil consequence ; but it is a totally dif- ferent question, in the consideration of criminal as distinjruished from civil justice, how the noble person now on trial may be affected by the fact when BO established. The receipt by the Paymaster would in itseli involve im civillj% but could by no possi- bility convict him of a crime " : 29 How. St. Tr. 7H4. * See Beg.-Gon., 2 W. 4, 1832, reported in 3 B. & Ad. 392, ;«I3 ; Reg.-Gen., H. T., 4 W. 4, r. 20, 1832, reported in 4 Vt. & Ad. ])p. 2 — 8 ; Reg.-Gen., II. T., 1SJ3; 15 & 10 V. c. 70, §§ 117, 118; K. S. C. 1873, Ord. XXXII., rr. 1—4. Eor the practice on the llovenue side of the Queen's liench Division, see lleg.- Gen., 24 V. r. 17 ; 6 H. & N. xiii. ; for that in proceedings under the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874. 37 & 38 V. c. 85, see Reg.-Gen., 22 Feb. 1879, r. 40, and Form 39, cited 4 P. D. 201, 284 ; for that to bo used in the Court of Probate, see Rules of 1802, for Ct. of Prob. in contentious business, r. 72, and Form No. 2t). The Rules of 1805, 1809, 1875, 1877. and 1880, for the Ct. of Div. and Mat. Causes, are, for some unaccountable reason, silent on this subject. 472 C. IX.] H. C. liULES A8 TO NOTICES TO ADMIT DOCUMF.NTS. to a cause or nrnttpr may give notice, by his pleading, or otherwise in writing, that ho admits tlie truth of the whole or any part of the case of any other party." ' § "tiU (iii). Admissions,* properly so called, are properly the Bubjoot of a treatise upon Practice, and Practice is not the subject of this work. Therefore the matter of admissions will be only hero dealt with in a cursory way, and with a view to those points which are most likely to arise in actual practice at Nisi Prius. For further information the reader is referred to one of the well-known works upon Practice. § 724 A (iv). Subject to these general reservations, it may be noted that admissions are principally of two kinds, viz., (a.) Admissiona of (foeiiniciitii ; and (b ) Admissions oi facts. § 724a (v). As to admissions of documenU in the High Court, Rule 2 of R. S. C, Order XXXII., provides that "Either party may call upon the other party to admit any document, saving all just exceptions ; and in case of refusal or neglect to admit, after such notice, the costs of proving any such document shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the cause or matter may be, unless at the trial or hearing the court or a judge shall certify that the refusal to admit was reasonable ; and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice be given, except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the taxing officer, a saving of expense." * § 724b. The rule governing notices to admit documents, which has been set out in the preceding paragraph,'' does not specify any exact time at which such notice must be given. But such a notice must be given a reasonable time before trial. Where, however, it was given on a plaintiff's behalf to the defendant's ageiit in town . (■ ' If a partj' admits all the facts pleaded against him, the other side cannot call evidence. See The Hard- wick, 1883 (Sir James Hannen) ; Urquhart v. Butterfield, 1888, C. A. ' Admissions between co-defen- dants under this rule, to which the plaintiff is not a party, are not in- cluded in an order against him or in his favour for general costs of the action. See Dodds v. Freke, 1884. As to the practice gcnerallj-, see Order XXXII. in the Annual Prac- tice. » By Eule 3 of Order XXXII., a Porm of "Notice to admit Docu- ments" is furnished, which is Form No. 1 1 in Appendix B. * Viz., Order XXXU. r. 2. 473 DECIMIONS AS TO NOTICES TO ADMIT DOCUMENTS, [p. III. m ^ i . 1 ->.<■■ . ) ■.;■«-■ i i 4 I, i only four days before the oomrnission day at Newcastle, ^-lio two days afterwards refused to almit the documents without oljooting to the sufficiency of the notice, or requirijig further time, — the plaintiff was, however, held entitled to the .>osts of proof.' If an admission be made " with a saving of all just exceptions," it so far recognises the general character and accuracy of the documents, that no objection can subsequently be token to the nnthodiritii of any part of them,' or to their reception in evidence on the ground of any interlineation, however material, appearing upon them.' Unless this were so, great inconveniences would follow ; for as one main object of inducing a party to admit under notice, is to dispense with the necessity of formal proof of the instrument, it would obviously open a door to fraud, if the party admitting were at liberty afterwards to object to an interlineation, which the attesting witness might alone be enabled to explain.^ Accordingly, where a party admitted a deed as "the counterpart of a lease," an objection at the trial, that it was in fact a lease, and as such inadmissible for want of a sufficient stamp,'' was overruled ; ^ and a party who admitted an instrument, specified in the notice as bearing date the 10th August, was not allowed to call on his opponent for an explanation, though on the production of the instrument it was evident that the date " August " had been written on an erasure.^ § 724 c. A variance, too, in the description of the document, if not of a nature to mislead, will not release the admitting party from his obligation. For instance, an admission will not be vitiated because the date of a promissory note, otherwise correctly described in the notice to admit, is misstated.* A party will not, however, be entitled to the costs of proving any document specified in the notice, unless the witness called to establish this proof has, at least in his examination in chief, been questioned to no other faot.^ And, when a notice to admit documents is given, all that > Tinn v. Billingsloy, 1835. • Hawk I'.Freund, 18o8 (Byles, J.). • Freeman v. Stoggall. 1849. • Id. 208 (ColoridKO, J.). • 8oe now o4 & 65 V. c. 39 ("The Stamp Act, 1891 "), § 72. • Dog V, Smith, 1838. ' Poolo V. Pulmor, 1842 (Rolfe, B.). • Field V. Hemminfj, 1830 (Ld. Abinger) ; Bittlcston v. Cooper, 1H45. » Stracey v, Blake, 1835 (Ld. Abingor). 474 C. IX.] DECISIONS AS TO ADMISSIONS OF DOCUMENTS. can fairly be asked is, that the handwriting or due execution of tho papers specified should be admitted; so that where a party includes in his notice a demand to admit the authority by which the docu- ments had been written, and, on the other side refusing generally to make the admission as prayed, proves the documents at the trial, he is not entitled to recover from his opponent the costs of such proof. ^ § 724d. It is not necessary to show that the admitting party has actually examined the documents mentioned in the notice, if he has had an opportunity of doing so ; ^ and it seems to be unnecessary to identify the document produced at the trial with the one inspected, provided that it corresponds with the description contained in the notice.' On two occasions, however, the necessity for such evidence has been urged"* (if not acknowledged by tho court) ; and it will generally be prudent to be prepared with such proof, or, at least, to have the documents that are to be produced signed or marked by the party making the admission. § 724i) (i). Though a notice to admit do not contain any saving of all just exceptions, the party admitting may still rely on any valid objection to the admissibility of a document specified in it. Therefore, where a plaintiff admitted that a paper was a copy of a letter from himself to a defendant, who had suffered judgment by default, this was held not to entitle the other defendant to put in the copy, without first accounting for the non-production of the original, or tracing it to the plaintiff's possession, and proving the notice to produce.* § 724e. Rule 2 of Order XXXII. extends, moreover, to every document which a party purposes to adduce in evidence, whether or not it be in his custody or control,'' and whether or not it be put in issue by tho pleadings.' Neither will the case bo varied though the opposite party may have already, irrespective of the > Oxford, Wore, & Wolvorh. Ey. Oo. V. Scudamore, 18j7. » Doe V. Smith, Iti^JS (Piittoson and Coleridge, JJ.). * Id., Coleridge, J., who observed, that " t) ro(juii'o such ovidc i! would be multiplyiug pruufs, so ad to defeat the rule ol' court." * Clay ('. Thacknih, 1839 (Ld. Den- mun); Doo d. Tiuilal v. Koo, 1836 (Ld. Abiiigor). " Shaipoi-'.Lainb.lSlO. SooOoldie V. Shuttl.'worth, 1807; R(,ehfort v. Sodloy, 18()1 (Jr.). ' liuttev ('. Chapman, 1841. ' Spoucer v. Buiough, 1842. 476 :| ;' y ul] C. C. RULES AS TO NOTICES TO ADMIT DOCUMENTS, [p. III. notice, refused in positive terms to male any admission on the subject.* A party may even, as it would seem, be served with notice to admit a foreign judgment, or other documents in a foreign court, provided that his opponent will give him time to inspect them abroad, and pay his expenses incurred in so doing.'^ Still, the rules do not apply where ancient records of a public nature require, not proof, but translation and explanation, or where affidavits which have been filed must be produced by an officer; and, consequently, a party is entitled to the costs, either of a witness called to explain and translate the records, or of the officer who produced the affidavits, even where the other side were not previously called upon to admit these documents.' § 724f, In consenting to admit for the purposes of a trial, care must be taken lest, by the words used in the notice to admit, the party admitting should be entrapped into making a larger admis- sion than he intended. Where* the holder of a bill of exchange sued the acceptor, and the defendant's solicitor had written a letter admitting " that the acceptance to the bill on which the action is brought is in the defendant's handwriting," it was held that, though a plea denying the acceptance had been subsequently pleaded, the admission contained in the letter established a prim§. facie case on behalf of the plaintiff without the production of the bill itself. Again, in an action ' against three persons on a bill of exchange alleged to have been accepted hy tbem im-^or the style of " The Newbridge Coal Company," an admission under a notice to admit, which stated the bill to have been "accepted by Bishop /or the dt'fcndauts as the Newbridge Coal Company," was held to be not only an admission of the actual signature of Bishop, but to preclude the defendonts from, denying that he had authority to bind them by his acceptance. This last decision is certainly one Btrictissirai juris; and probably it would not be upheld at the present day." § 724g. In the County Courts, the Rule which governs notices to > Spencer v. Bivrouprh, 1842. • Smith ('. Bird, \WAb. • IJiistnrd V. Smith, 1839. • Chaplin v. Levy, 18J4, » Wilkos V. TIopkinB. 1845. See, also, Hunt V. Wiso. IS.M). ' Soerilgrimv. Uorchosterfiy.Oo., ISiid 476 CHAP. IX.] NOTICES TO ADMIT FACTS. admit documents is as follows:— "Where a party desires to give in evidence any document, he may, not less than fire clear days before the trial, give notice ' to any other pjirty in the action or matter who is competent to make admissions, requiring him to imped and (idtnif such document ; and if such other party shall not within three days after receiving such notice make such admission, any expense of proving the same at the tri.nl shall be paid by him, whatever be the result of the action, unless the court shall other- wise order ; and no costs of proving any docuniont shall be allowed unless such notice shall be given, except in cases where, in the opinion of the registrar on taxation, the omission to give such notice has been a saving of expense.^ § 7"J4h;. Coming now to the subject of notices to admit facts m the High Court, Rule 4 of R. S. C, Order XXXII., provides: — " Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not later than nine days before the day for which notice of trial has been given, call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of the cause, matter, or issue only, any specific fact or facta mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six days after service of such notice, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court or a judge, the costs of proving such fact or facts shall bo paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the cause, matter, or issue may be, unless at the trial or hearing the court or a judge certify that the refusal to admit was reasonable, or unless the court or a judge shall at any time otherwise order or direct. Provided that any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the particular cause, matter, or issue, and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other occasion, or in favour of any person other than the party giving the notice : provided also, that the court or a judge may at any time allow any party to amend or withdraw any admission so made on such terms as may be just." * ' C. C. R. l.SSi), Form 00. This is the Hiuno lis Form II in Ai)pi>ii(lix B, to U. S. ('., roforrod to ante, p. 47^. » C. C. H. 1H8!), r. 5. ' Rule J ])rovi(lo8, that "A notice to admit facts shall be in the Form No. 12, in Appendix B., and admis- 8i(ms of facts nhall \w in the Form Nil. i;j ill Ap])en(lix B., with Hiich variations as ciiiiumstauces may re- quire." 477 Ii J IN HIGH COURT.— TN COUNTY COURTS. LPAUT III. Rule 6 provides, that " any party may at any stage of a cause or matter, where admissions of fact have been made, either on the pleadings, or otherwise, apply to the court or a judge for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties ; and the court or a judge may upon such application make such order, or give such judgment, as the court or judge may think just." Rule 7 provides, with respect to the mode of proof, that " an affidavit of the solicitor or his clerk, of the due signature of any admissions made in pursuance of any notice to admit documents or facts, shall be sufficient evidence of such admissions, if evidence thereof be required;" and by virtue of Rule 9, the costs occasioned by any notice to admit unnecessary documents, " shall be borne by the pru Lv giving such notice." § 724i. In the County Court, notices to ndmit fach and admis- sions thereof, are governed by the following Rules of County Courts, Order IX. : — (7.) "Any party may by notice in writing, according to the form in the Appendix,' at any time not later than six clear days before the return day, call on any other party to admit,^ for the purposes of the action, matter, or issue onl\% any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or nesrlect to admit the same by the delivery of a written admission of tlie fact or facts as aforesaid, signed by the party, his solicitor, or agent, within three clear days before the return day, the costs of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by tlie party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the action, niattei-, or issue may be, unless at the trial the court certify that the refusal to admit was reasonable, or unless the court shall at any time otherwise order. Provided tluit any admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the j)articular action, matter, or issue, and not as an admission to bo used against the party on any other occasion or in favour of any ' Appendix to C. C. Rules, Form ft2A. corrospoiuliiifr to Fonu No. 12 in AppeucUx li. to R. 8. 0. ' Id., Form 93b, corresponding to Form No. 13 in Appendix B. to R. S. 0. 478 CH. IX.] WHOLE ADMISSION MUST BE TAKEN TOGETHER. person other than the party giving the notice : provided also, that the judge or registrar may at any time allow any party to amend or withdraw any admission so made on such terms as may he just." 1 (8.) "An affidavit of the solicitor or his clerk of the due signature of any admissions made in pursuance of this order, shall he sufficient evidence of such admissions, if evidence thereof be required." ^ § 725. It will now be convenient to discuss the general law of admissions, apart from any mere rules of Practice. Here the firsi imporfaiit rule to be borne in mind is, that the whole stutcment containing the admission must he taken together; for though some part of it may be favourable to the party, and the object is only to ascertain what he has conceded against himself, and what may therefore be presumed to be true, yet, unless the whole is received, the true meaning of the part, which is evidence against him, cannot be ascertained.' But though the whole of what he said at the same time, and relating to the same subject, must bo given in evidence, it does not follow that all the parts of the statement should be regarded as equally deserving of credit ; but the jury must consider, under the circumstances, how much of the entire statement they deem worthy of belief, includiug as well the facts asserted by the party in his own favour, as those making against him^ § 726. Simple as this rule appears, its practical application is not without difficulty. It will therefore be convenient briefly to refer to a few of the leading decisions on it. First, such rule applies oqualhj hath to written and to xrrlai ud/iiisaion-s. Consequently, where a defendant has rendered a debtor and creditor account to the plaintiff, which the latter produces in proof of his demand, it will be equally admissible in evidence of the defendant's set-off ; *• ' This ruf corresponds to R. S. C. , Old. XXXII. r. 4, supra, p. 477. * Covrespondinp; to R. S. C, Ord. XX XII. r. 7, supra, p. 478. 3 Thomson v. Austen, 1 823 (Abbott, C.J.); rictchcr r. Frof>:gutt, 1827 (id.); Cobbettj;. Grey, 1849. * Ijeimou V, Woodbridge, 1781 (Ld. Mansfield) ; Smith v. lUandy, 1825 (IJest, C.J.); Cray v. Halls, 182,j (Abbott, (\J.). "Soo, also, Whitwell V. Wyor, 1814 (Am.]; Oarey v. Nioolson, 1840 (Aui,); Kel- 8cy r. Rush, 1842 (Am.). » Raudio V. lilackburu, 1813. 479 I^li WHOLE ADMISSION MUST BE TAKEN TOGETHER. [p. Til. though the plaintiff will generally be at liberty, while relying ou the creditor side of the account, to impeach items which appear on the debtor side.' Where, however, to an action on an attorney's bill of costs, the defendant pleaded a set-off, and put in an account furnished to him by the plaintiff, in which the plaintiff credited himself for the amount of his bill, and debited himself for the amount of goods sold, it was held that the defendant could not exclude from the cons^ideration of the jury so much of such account as related to the bill of costs, on the ground that no signed bill had been delivered; since the non-delivery of a signed bill does not bar the debt, but merely, if insisted on, prevents its recovery by action.^ § 727. When the admission is contained in an affidavit, written examination,' signed pleading,'* answer,* plea^ in Chancery, or other document complete in itself, delivered under the old system of pleading and practice, the whole document is required to be read, though the jury are not bound to give equal credit to every part of it, and they frequently lent an academic faith to such portions as make in favour of the declarant.' So stringent is this rule, that where, in consequence of technical objections which had been taken to the first answer to a bill in Chancery, a second answer had been sent in, defendant was allowed to insist upon having such second answer also read, in order to explain what he had sworn in his first answer.* Moreover, a party, against whom an answer in Chancery is produced, may have the whole bill read as part of his adversary's case, on the ground that, like the ordinary case of a conversation, the answers of a party cannot be given in evidence against him without also proving the questions which > Hose V. Savory, 1835. See Moor- house V. Newton, 1849. '■' Harrison v. Turner, 1847. ' In Prince v. Samo, 1838, Cole- ridge, J., asked whether the question had ever been decided as to deposi- tions ? Counsei replied that no ex- press decision had been found. * Mariaiiski v. Cairns, 1851-2. In the Supreme Court the rule respect- ing the signing of pleadings is R. S, C. 18N3, Ord. XIX. r. 4. » See Cons. Ord. Ch. Ord. XV. rr. 5, 6. • Pleas in Chancery, where the matter of the plea did not appear upon record, must have been upon oath, and be signed by the parties pleading : Cons. Ord. Ch. 186U, Ord. XIV. rr. 2, 3. ' Bermon v. Woodbridge, 1781 (Ld. Mansfield) ; Blount v. Buitow, 1792 (Ld. Hardwicke); Baildon v. Walton, 1847 ; Percival v, Caney, 1851 (Knight-Bruce, V.-C). 8 R. V. Carr, 1669 ; Ld. Bath v. Bathersea, 1695; Lynch v, Clorke, 1690. 480 full CH. IX.] WHOLE ADMISSION MUS"" BE TAKEN TOGETHER. drew forth the answers.' The jury, however, might in such case he warned, that the statements in the bill were not admissions of the facts contained therein ; it being notorious that allegations, not consistent with fact, were frequently introduced into a bill, for the sole purpose of eliciting the truth from the oppo,-ite party. ^ § 728. Whore ^ plaintiffs, who were assignees of a bankrupt, gave in evidence an examination of the defendant before the commissioners, as proof that he had taken certain property, it was held that they thereby made his cross-examination evidence in the cause ; and as, in this cross-examination, he had stated that he had purchased the property under a written agreement, a copy of which was entered as part of his answer, this statement was considered as some evidence on his behalf of the agreement and its contents ; and fJiat, too, though the absence of the docunxent was not accounted for, nor had notice been given to the plaintiffs to produce it. Again, in an action against a magistrate for as.>^ault and false imprisonment, the warrant of commitment which had been put in by the plaintiff was held to be proof on behalf of the defendant of the information recited in it ; * and in an action against a sheriff, an undersheriff 's letter which had been produced by the plaintiff to affect the defendant, was held to be some evidence also of certain facts stated therein, which tended to excuse the sheriff.* § 729. It seems on the whole, however, to be now tolerably clear that where a sheriff or bailiff seeks to justify a seizure as against any party but the execution debtor, he must produce both the writ of execution and the judgment, and he cannot be relieved from offering such proof by any recital in the warrant which his opponent may put in evidence." § 730. The rule requiring the whole statement containing the admission to be taken together, has long prevailed to a consider- able extent in equity. Therefore, wher ) a defendant had been • Ponnell v. Meyer, 1838 (Tiudal, C.J.). = "id. ^ Goss V. Qiiinton, 1842. * Haylofk v. Sparko, 1853. This case seems to ovomilo Stevens i'. Clark, 1842 (Cresswell, J.). * Haynes ?;. Hayton, 1h;}7; recog- nized in Bessey v. Windhuui, 1844. « White V. Morris, 18,32 ; Glave v. Went )rth, 1844 (Piirke, H.); Mar- tin V. Podger, 1770 ; I-ake v. Hillera, 1698. See, also, Bowes v. Poster, 18j8 (Watson, B.). See, however, contra, Bessey v, Windliain, 1M44 ; and see, also, Ogduu v. iloskuth, 1849. 481 ' ■) READING OLD ANSWERS IN CHANCERY, [PART III. examined on two days before commissioners of the Court of Bankruptcy, and the plaintiff read the examination taken on the first day, he was compelled to read that also which was taken on the second day ; * and where a plaintiff in equity read that part of the defendant's account-book which charged the latter, the defen- dant was allowed to read the discharging part as evidence for himself.* With respect, however, to the old answers and examina' tions in Chancery, — which have now been superseded by statements of defence and anstcers to interrogatories, — the equity rule was far less comprehensive than that which was recognised at common law ; and although, if a party in equity admitted, in his examina- tion or answer, that he had received a sum, and then added in the same sentence that he had immediately paid it away, — or if he stated in a still more general form, that a person gave him 100/. as a present, — the charge and the discharge would be so blended together that the one could not be admissible without the other ; * still, if he once admitted the receipt of money as an independent fact, he could not refer to other parts of his examination or answer, much less to affidavits sworn by him, or to schedules attached to his answer, for the purpose of showing that he had liquidated the amount so admitted to have been received, by separate and inde- pendent payments.* So, if a plaintiff read a passage in the answer, as evidence of a particulnr fact, the defendant could not read other parts, even though grammatically connected with such passage by conjunctive particles, unless they were really explanatory of its iT'^aning.^ If, in order to understand the sense of the passage on ,»ch the plaintiff relied, it was necessary to read on the part of the defendant other portions of the answer, these portions would be evidence only so far as they were e.\planatory ; and any new facts introduced therein, though so immediately connected with the parts admitted as to be incapable of subtraction, would bo con- » Smith V. Biggs, 1832 (ShadweU, V.-C). * Carter v, Ld. Coleraine, 1740; Blount V. Burrow, 1792 (Ld. Ilard- wicke). 3 Ridgway V. Darwin, 1802 (Ld. Eldon) ; Thompson i'. Lamlio, 18()2 (id.); llobiusou v. Scotuey, ItJlG (Sir W. Grant, M.E.). See, also, Awd- ley V. Awdley, HJOO; Hampton v. Spencer, 169a ; Freeman t;. Tatham, 1846. * Cases cited an last note. • Davis V. Spurling, 1829 (Leach, M.R.). 482 CH. IX.] RULE AS TO ANSWERS TO INTERROGiATORIES. sidered as not read.^ This rule seems to have been adopted in consequence of the subtle contrivances of equity draftsmen, whose skill formerly consisted in so grammatically blending important points of the defendant's case with admissions that could not be withheld, as to render it necessary that both should be read in conjunction, and thus to prove their client's case by means of his own unsupported statements.* §731. In accordance with the practice in' equity as explained in the preceding section, it now is provided,' that " any party may, at the trial of a cause, matter, or issue, use in evidence an}' one or more of the answers or any part of an answer of the opposite party to interrogatories without putting in the others or the wliole of such answer : Provided always, that in such case the judge may look at the whole of the answers, and if he shall be of opinion that any others of them are so connected with those put in that the last- mentioned answers ought not to be used without them, he may direct them to be put in." § 732. The whole of a document may, as a general rule, be read by the one party when the other has already put in evidence a partial extract.* But this rule will not warrant the reading of distinct entries in an account-book,^ or distinct paragraphs in a newspaper,^ unconnected with the particular entry or paragraph relied on by the opponent ; nor will it render admissible bundles of proceedings in bankruptcy, entries in corporation books, or a series of copies of letters inserted in a letter-book, merely because the adversary has read therefrom one or more papers, or entries, or letters.^ If, indeed, the extracts put in expressly refer to other documents, these may be read also ; but the mere fact that the remaining portions of the papers or books may throw light on the parts selected by the opposite party, will not be sufficient to warrant their admission ; for such party is not bound to know whether they will or not ; and moreover the light may be a false one.* § 733. A similar rule prevails in the case of a conversation, in > Bartlott V. Gillard, 1826 (Ld. Eldoii). « Gr. Ev. § 13. 3 By E. S. C. Ord. XXXI. r. 24. * R. V. Queen's Cy. JJ., He Feehan, 1882 (Ir.). » Catt v. Howard, 1820 (Abbott, C.J.); Itoevo V. Whitmore, 1865. " Daiby v. Outseley, 18o(). ' Stiirp;o V. 15\u-hanan, 1839, * Id. (Ld. Denman). 483 DISTINCT MATTERS IN CONVERSATION. [pART 111. If \t % '}■; 1 V ill' ' ' f which several distinct matters have been discussed. If a part of a conversation is relied on as an admission, the adverse party can give in evidmce o«/y so much of the same conversation as may explain or qualify the matter already before the court.' For example, a witnesM who has acknowledged on cross-examination that he has heard the plaintiff admit on oath that he had repeatedly been insolvent, cannot be asked in re-examination whether tlio plaintiff liad not, on the same occasion, expressly stated that certain money was given to him, and not lent.^ § 734. With regard to kftcm, a party may put in such as were written by his opponent, without producing those to which they were answers, or calling for their production.' For, in such a case, the letters, to which those put in were answers, are in the adversary's hands, and he may produce tliem if he thinks them necessary to explain the transaction.' But if a plaintiff puts in a letter by the defendant, on the back of which is something written by himself, the defendant is entitled to have the whole read ; * and whore a defendant laid before the court several letters between himself and the plaintiff, he was allowed to read a reply of his own to the last letter of the plaintiff, it being considered as a part of an entire correspondence.* § 735. Questions not unfrequently arise as to the admissibility of letters, account-books, -^''c, which are tendered as admissions, in cases where their existence or contents have been discovered by means of a compulsory examination or answer of the party either in previous bankruptcy proceedings, or in some other legal inquiry; and it is often contended in such cases that the documents referred to therein cannot be read, without first producing the examination ,t - * It was at one time held, on high authority, that if a witness weie questioned as to a statement made by an adverse party, such party might lay before the court all that was said by him in the same conversation, even matter not pro- perly connected with the statement deposed to, provided only that it re- lated to the subject-matter of the suit (The Queen's case, 1820 (Abbott, C.J.), H. L.); but a sense of the extreme injustice that might result from allowing such a course of pro- ceeding has induced the courts, in later times, to adopt the stricter rule stated in the te.xt : Prince v. Samo, 1838. » Prince v. Samo, 1838. ^ Ld. Barrymore v. Taylor, 1795 (Ld. Kenyon) ; De Medina v. Owen, 18o0 (Parke, B.). * Dagleish v. Dodd, 1832 (Taun- ton, J.). » Eoe V. Day, 1836 (Park, J.). 484 CHAP. IX.] DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN EXAMINATIONS. or answer. But — whatever the correct doctrine may be witli respect to documents referred to in and actKalhj annexed to an examination or answer — no rule of law will, in other cases, compel a party to treat the document on which he relies as part of a previous exami- nation or answer.* § 736. It is even doubtful whether, if a document be annexed to an old answer in Chancery, the answer need be road, if it liave no connection with the cause in which the document is produced.^ If, however, the ktter in question be not written by the party against whom it is offered, though contained in the schedule of his answer, and if it be merely used against him, as raising an inference from possession that he knew of its contents, and had acted upon it, common fairness requires ^ that the letter should not be read without the answer; for the answer of the party might contain such an explanation of the circumstances under wliich the letter came into his possession, as also such a contradiction of any passages in it which seemed to bear against his rights, as utterly to neutralize its effect. If, in making a verbal admission, a persou refer to a written paper, without which the admission is incomplete, such paper must be produced, before the statement can be used as evidence against him.* § 737.' Where an admission, whether oral or in wi-itiug, contains matters stated as mere hearxai/, it is questionable whether such matters can be received in evidence. If tendered a</ainsf the party making the statement, they would seem (like hearsay declarations against interest*-) to be inadmissible unless coupled with a simul- taneous statement by the party who has made the admission that he believes such hearsay to be true, and at any rate they are entitled to very little weight. When they are offered in favour of the party making the admission they would appear to be equally inadmissible or worthy of weight. This is on the ground that one ' Long V. Champion, 1831 ; Stiu'ge V. Buchanan, 18;i9; overruling pre- vious Nisi Prius decisions in Yatos V. Carnsew, 1828 (Ld. Tenterden) ; Holland v. Eeeves, 18bj (Alderson, B.). ^ Long V. Champion, 1831 (Ld. Tenterden). 8 Hewitt V. Piggott, 1931 (Tindal, C.J.). * Jacobs. Lindsay, 1801; Falconer V. Hanson, 1808. » Gr. Ev. § 202, in part. " As to whidi see Ld. Trimlos- town )'. Iveuiuiis, 18-13, H. L. ; ante, § 685. 485 'P m w'^ I'i ^■'' ■ '■- |j:'li. k^ ra HOW FAR HKAHSAY MADK KVIDENCE BY ADMISSIONS, [p. III. party, by rending a part of the answer which hia ojiponent had pleaded to ii Ijill filed for discovery, " makes the whole admissible only 80 far aa to waive any objection to the competency of the party making the answer, ami he does not thereby admit as evidence all the facts which happened to have been stated therein by way of hearsay only." ' On the other hand, it may perhaps be successfully urged, that since an answer is offered as the admission of the party against whom it was read, the whole should be laid before the jury, for the purpose of showing under what impressions the admission was made, though some part of it were stated only upon hearsay and belief. § 7;58. The rule requiring the whole of an admission to be taken together is so important, that a judge will always do well to explain distinctly to the jury its bearing and e.xtent, whenever any portion of it is favourable to the jiarty against whom a statement is read ; but his neglecting to do so in a case where it is clear that the jury, in fact, took the whole into their consideration, will not amount to such a misdirection as to warrant a new trial. ^ S 739. A second rule respecting admissions is, that they are receivable in evidence tliongh thoi/ rchdo to the confpnts of a wriftcn imtrumenf, even v/hen such contents are directly in issue.' This rule has already been discussed, and it is therefoic needless to do more here than thus shortly to refer to it.* § 7'39a. a third rule as to admissions, is that any verbal adrais- Bions or declarations of the parties ic/iieh are not put dircdli/ in issue lij the pleadings, and which, consequently, have not been open to explanation or disproof, must be rejected, or at any rate musf n^t be relied upon.* This rests upon the ground, that under such circumstances the reception of evidence would facilitate tho pro- duction of false testimony.* The rule does not strictly extend to trritten admissions ; yet the fact of their not being put in issue by the pleadings will naturally detract from their weight, as the party ' 1^00 V. Ferrars, 1801 (Chambre, J.). See, also, Kahl v. Jansen, 1812. ^ ]3eckhain v. Osborne, 18413. 3 Slattorie v. Tooley, 1840. * Ante, §§ 410—415. See, also, ante, § 413, as to the admissibility of a confessio juris. ^ Austin V. Chambers, 1837, H. L. ; Attwood V. Small, 1838; Copland v. Toiilmin, 1840. ^ Austin V. Chambers, 1838 (Ld. Cotteuham). 486 CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS OF PARTIES TO TlIK RECORD. against whom thoy are offered in evidence will, in such case, have had no oj)[)ortunity of explaining them.' S 740.^ With respect to the pcvmn, irfioxr adiuimoun tnni/ be rrcrircd, the general doctrine is, that the declarations of a parfi/ to t!ie record, or of one identified in interest with him, are, as against such party, receivable in evidence.' Declarations proceeding from a stranger, who is still living, are, however, almost uniformly rejected ; * and, though the declarant be dead, his declarations can in general only be admitted upon some of the special grounds already considered.* The admissions of parties to the record are receivable in evidence whether made before or after the party had arrived at full age ; and, therefore, in an action against an adult for necessaries supplied during his minority, admissions made, and letters written by him while under age, may be proved on behalf of the plaintiff.8 § 741. The courts, however, now recognise a wide distinction between nominal and real parties. Therefore, if a consignee use the name of the consignor in proceeding against a shipowner, or if the assignee of a bond sues the obligor in the name of the original obligee, or if a cestui que trust brings an action in the name of his trustee. Courts of Nisi Prius, recognising the principles of equity, will reject the admission of the nominal plaintiff as evidence for the defendant.' For example, although a receipt in full may have been given by the nominal plaintifi to the defendant, the parties really interested may show that the money has in fact never been paid : ** and if a release from a nominal plaintiff were i)leaded in bar, a prior assignment of the cause of action, with notice thereof 838 (Ld. » McMahon v. Biin'hcll, 18-l(i (Ld. Cottenham) ; Crosbie v. Thoiiipson, 1847 (Ir.) (Brady, C); Swift v. M'Tiernan, 1848 (Ir.) (id.); Mal- colm V. Scott, 1843 ; and soo Mar- garoson. v. Saxton, 1835; Fitzgerald V. O'Flaherty, 1827 (Ir.) ; and Steuart t;. Gladstone, 1878 (Fry, J.). * Gr. Ev. § 171, in part. * Sparge V. Brown, 1829 (Bayley, '*" Barough v. White, 1825 (Little- dale, J.). As to when thoy are ad- missible, SCO post, §§ 759 — 7(35. * Ante, § C07. « O'Xoill V. Road, 1845 (Ir.). See 37 & 38 V. c. 62. ' Sto Payne r. Rogers, 1785; Lcgh V. Legh, 1820; Innell v. Newman, 1821; llickey r. Burt. 181(5; Moim- stephcn v. Brooke, 1819 ; Manning V. (/ox, 1823; Barker?!. Biuhai'dson, 1827; Johnson v. lloldswoith, 1835. This is contrary to the j)ractic'0 whidi formerly jjrevailed at common law. « See Wallace v. Kelsall, 184() (Parke, B.), exjdaining Skaife ?;. Jackson, 1824 ; and Farrar v. Hutck- inson, 1839, 487 '•' T ADMISSION BY A PARTNER OR CO-OBLIGOR. [PART Ilf. to the defendant, and an averment that the suit was prosecuted by the assignee for his own benefit, would be a good answer. The nLminal nlaintiff is never permitted to, in any manner, injuriously afPect the rights of his assignee in an action.^ § 74:2, On the principle just stated, the declarations of a proc/icin ami/ or {/ufirdian are not receivable in evidence against an infant plaintiff, since, though the names of these persons appear on the record, they are not really parties to the action, but merely olficers of the court specially ap^ioiuted to look after the interests of the infant.^ A solemn admission may, however, be made in a pending suit, for the purpn&e of that trial only, by a guardian or prochein amy in good faith, and will be equally admissible with like adniis- sioiis by the solicitor in tlie cause.* § 743, "When several persons are Joint/// interested in the subject- matter of a suit, the general rule is, that the admissions of any one of these persons are receivable against himself and fellows, whether they be all jointly suing or sued, or whether an action be brought in favour of or against one or more of them separately ; provided the admission relate to the subject-matter in dispute, and be made by the declarant in his character of a person jointly interested with the party against whom the evidence is tendered.* Accordingly, the representation or misrepresentation of any fact by one partner, with respect to some partnership transaction, will bnid the firm;' if it appear on the record, that an agreement sued on was made by the plaintiff on behalf of himself and tlie other projtrictors of a theatre, statements made by one of such projjrietors are admitted on the part of the defendant," and an admission by one of two joint and several obligors is evidence against the co- obligor, even though the joint defence raise a controversy as to the subject-matter of the admission.' ' See Welch v. Mandovillo, 181() (Am.); Mandeville v. Welch, 1820 (A.".). - Kc'clpston V. SpoKP, alias I'l'ttv, l(iSi»: Cowliu},' r. IClv. INIS (AlilHPt't, J.); Webb V. Smith, >'J1 (i,ittli(lalc, J.); Mo; ,au c Tiioiiie, 1,S4I (I'aike, B.); Siiioliii V. Siu'.^lair, \H-io; I'leclos V. Harrison, KS4.S. 'I'lu 'so cases over- rule Jiimes r. Hatfield, ITJM, Seo Doo V. lioborta, 1847, cited ante. ^ Seo post, § 772. * Whiteoml') c. Whitinj?, 1781 ; Wood r. Hiaddiek, 1808. » Kapj) r. Latham, 181!); Thwnites V. Iviehardson, l7!Kt; Niiholls r. ])owiiiiij;, 1810 (Ld, J'lUeiiljoroiigh); Lucas V. I)e la ('our, 181.'{. « Komblo v. ranen, 1829 (Tindul, C.J.). ' Urosau v. Bediugtield, 182L 4«8 m LL CHAP. IX.] LORD TENTERDEN's ACT. § 744. The Legislature has, hoAvever, greatly restricted the common law on this subject. For Lord Tonterden's Act' rendered mere verbal acknowledgments insufficient to take joint, or joint and several, debts out of the Statute of Limitations, by enacting that " in actions of debt, or upon the case grounded upon any simple contract, no acknowledgment or promise by words only shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take any case out of the operation of the enactments " contained in the old Statute of Limitations,^ " or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof, unless such acknowledgment or promise shall be made or contained by or in some writing, to be signed by the party churgenhle thereby." It also provides, " that where there shall be two or more joint-contractors, or executors or adminis- trators of any contractor, no such joint-contractor, executor, or administrator, shall lose the benefit of the said enactments or either of them, so as to be chargeable in respect or by reason only of any written acknowledgment or promise made and signed by any other or others of them ; ' jyrovidcd alirays, that nothing herein contained shall alter, or take away, or leasen the effect of, any pay- ment of any principal or interest made by any person whatsoever : provided also, that in actions to be commenced against two or more such joint-contractors, or executors, or administrators, if it shall appear at the trial, or otherwise, that the plaintiff, though barred by [the Act of Jac. 1,*] or this Act, as to one or more of such joint- contractors, or executors, or administrators, shall nevertheless be entitled against any other or others of the defendants, by virtue of a new acknowledgment or promise or otherwise, judgment may be given and costs allowed for the plaintiff as to such defendant or defendants against whom he shall recover, and for the other defendant or defendants against the plaintiff." ' § 740. This enactment having required that the written acknow- • 9 G. 4. c. 14, § 1. Soe ante, § fiOO. Similar rcstrirtions prevail in Ireland (hoo 1(5 & 17 V. c. 113, § 24), and in Masisachiisctts (see Rov. Stat. c. 120, § 14). » '21 J. 1, c. 16 ("The Limitation Act, Ui2;}"). » tsoe unto, §§ 600, 601. * Viz., 21 J. 1, c. 16 ("The Limi- tation Act, loj;}"). » § 4 of !) G. 4, c. 14, enacts, that the siiid Act of Jauios, and that /ict, " shall apply to the case of any doht on siinplu contract alleged by way of set-off on the part of any dofou- dant." 489 MERCANTILE LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 1856. [PART III. ledgment should be persomllj/ signed by the party cliargeable, and having left untouched the law which allowed part payment by oue of several co-debtors to operate as a bar of the statute with respect to the others, it was enacted by the Mercantile Law Araendiuent Act, 1856,' that* "an iioV-:.owledgment or promise made or con- tained by or in a writing signed by an (trfcnt of the party chargeable thereby, duly authorised to make su(;li acknowledgment or promise, shall have the same effect as if such writing had been signed by such party himself ; " and by another section ^ that " when there shall be two or more co-contractors or co-debtors, whether bound or liable jointly only, or jointly and severally, or executors or administrators of any contractor, no such co-contractor or co- debtor, executor or administrator, shall lose the benefit of the " Statutes of Limitations,'' " so as to be chargeable in respect or by reason only of payment* of any principal, interest, or other money, by any other or others of such co-contractors or co-debtors, executors or administrators." § 746. Under this last enactment, where two partners had given a promissory note in the name of the firm, and one of them afterwards died, leaving his co-partner executor; the latter, after continuing to pay interest on the note for some years, became bankrupt ; and, on a defence setting up the Statute of Limitations, in answer to a claim by the holder of the note against the assets of the deceased partner's estate, it was held that the ])ayments nnist be presumed to liavo been made by the bankrupt in his character of surviving partner, and not as executor of his deceased partner." It has also, under such enactment, been ruled that payment by one co-debtor, with the knowledge and mere consent of another, does not deprive that other of the benefit of the Statute of Limitations.' > 19 & 20 V. c. 97, ninondod by .•)3 & 54 V. c. 39, nnd by o() & J7 V. c. 71 ("Tho Siilo of Goods Act, ISiW"). ' § 14. This section apidics to § 24 of Hi & 17 V. 0. li:S (Ir.), us woU as to § I of Ld. Tcnti'rdi'u's Act. ^ As to India, ueu tbo ludiuu Act, IX. of 1871, § 20, niid Dinomovi Di'bl v. lUiy Lucliiiiissiit Siii<;li, 1870 (P. 0.). * 21 J. 1, c. K), § ;{("Tho Liiiiitii- tion Act, Ki'JU") ; ;{ & 4 W. 4, c. 42. §a; 1(5 & 17 V. c. ll;5, s. 20 (Ir.). ' Si'o ('oi'kiill ('. S])iirkcs, 1802. • Thoinjison v. Wiiitlinian, 1856 (Kiiidorsl.^y, V. (".). ' Jucksou V, Woolloy, 18o8. 490 CHAP. TX.] REAL rROI'ERTY LIMITATION ACTS. § 747. The Real I'roperty Ijimitation Act, 1874,' which came into operation on the 1st of January, 1879, contains a pro- vision^ respecting acknowledgments of a mortgagor's title by one of several mortgagees in possession, which is the same in principle as the enactments of Lord Tenterden's Act. § 748. "Where a member of a partnership has been adjudged bankrupt, and an action brought, under the authority of the Court of Bankruptcy, in the joint names of the trustee and of the bankrupt's partner, the latter has no power to release the claim to « 37 & 38 V. c. 57. ' § 7. This enactment has been substituted for § 2« of 3 & 4 W. 4, c. '27 ("The ]{oiil Property Limita- tion Act, 1S33"), and reduces the period of (wcntij years therein named to a period of huvire years — making nootlieralterationinthehiw — andisas follows; — "When a mortfiaj^ee shall have obtained the possession or re- ceipt of the profits of any land, or the receipt of any rent, comprised in his mortj^iifje, the mortgafror, or any person eluimiiifj; thnnijj;h him, shall not brinp; any action or suit to re- deem the mortfj;af?e but within tmh-r years next after the time at wliii li the mortfrajroe obtained such po-^cs- sion or receipt, unless in the ni> an- time an a('knowled>.!;ment in will iij^ of the titli3 of the mortpij^or, or of his ri<j;ht of red('m))tioii, shall have bei;!! j^'ven to the mortf^aj^or, or some jierson chiimiii}^ his (sstate, or to the aj;ent of such mort^'aj;or or jieisoii, si;;ne(l by tlu^ jiiortu'a^'i'e or th(! ]ier- son elaimin;; throu;;h him ; and, in such case, no siieb action or suit shall be broujrht but within tn-ilvv years nt>xt altt'r the timo at which such acknowlcdjjment, or tlu' last of such acknowledgements, if more than one, was fj;ivun ; ami when there shall be more than one mort^iif^or, or miu'o tluin one jierson claimin,t,' through the moi't;'ai;i)r or mort- {jagors, such acknowledgment, if given to any of such mortgagors or persons, or liis or thciir agent, shall be as elVectuul as if the same had been given to all such mort- gagors or persuus; but where there shall be more than one murU/aiier, or more than one person claiming the estate or interest of the mort- gagee or mortgagees, such uc/nioir- ledf/meut, aif/ned by one or mure of such mortgagees or persons, s/iull lie ejfietiinl oult/ u.i tif/uiii-it the purd/ or parties Miininij as aforesaid, and the person en- persons claiming any part of the mortgage money or land or rent by, from, or under, him oi th(!in, or any jiorson or jieisons en- titled to any estate or estates, inte- rest or interests, to take effect after, or in defeasance of, his or their es- tate or estates, interest or interests; and sliitll not uprriifr to i/ire to the morfi/in/ar or mortgagors a right to re<leem the mortgage, as <i<j(tiii4 file jivrfoii or ]iersoiis intif/iil to am/ ot/nr iiiiilirlilnl nr diriihd p'irt of the money or land or rent; and where such of the mortgagees or ])ers(>ns aforesaid, as shall have given such ackuow ledgiiieut, shall he entitled to a divided jiart of the land or rent comjinsed in the mniti^age, or snmii estate or interest theiein, and not to any ascertained ])art of tin* moi;- gaged mnney, tiie mortgagor (ir mortgairoi's sliall be enti'leil to i-e- deein tile sami! diviiied |)ait of the land or rent, on payment, with inte- rest, of the part of the mortgage numey which shall bear the same ja-oiiortion to the whohf of the mort- gage money as the value of siieii divided iiart of the land or rent shall bear to thi^ value of the whole of the land <u' rent com])rised in the mort- gaiie," See Uichardsou v, Younge, liSTl, C. A. 401 JOINT INTEREST — COMMUNITf OF INTEREST. FpART III. ',1' '1 . ^ si which the action relates, but any attempted release by him,' 13 expressly rendered void.* S 749. An admission made by one of several parties m fraud of the others jointly interested with him, and in collusion with the opponent, is, moreover, on these facts being shown, invalid as against the others.^ S 750. To render the admission of one person admissible against another, it must relate to some matter in which either both were jointly interested, or one was interested derivatkely through the othei ; and a mere community of interest will not be sufficient. Thus, the admission of a servant of a negligent act is no evidence against his master.* Again, if an action be brought against two persons in partnership as part-owners of a vessel, an admission by one, as to a matter which was not a subject of co-partnership, but only of co-part ownership, is inadmissible against the other ; * and where two executors were sued as such on a covenant by a testator for quiet enjoyment, the plaintiff, to establish this fact, was not allowed to put in evidence a declaration by one of the defendants, to the effect that he and his co-defendant both had a lawful title in their own right through the testator," since this admission had not been made by the party as executor, or in relation to any matter touching the testator's estate ; but it simply referred to something of which the two defendants had taken advantage in their individual capacities. Indeed, it may even be doubted whether an express promise by one executor in his representative character will bind the remaining executors in their representative characters." Cer- tainly the admission of the receipt of money by one of several » By46&47V.c. 52 ("Tho Bank- ruptcy Act, 1883 "), § 113. It would probably be void even without expro!=s enactment. See next section, and supra, § 741. - Hut the interest of the partner may be protected, " notice of the application lor authority to com- mence the action must bo given him," and if he claims no benefit therefrom, " he shall be ir.demnified against costs." ' See Rawstorno v, Oaudoll, 184G; Phillips V. Clagett, 1843 ; ante, § 741. * Johnson c. Jjind.say. 188!). * Jaggers c. Binnings, 1815 (lid. Elleuborough). See liiodie v. Ho- ward, 1855. « Fox ('.Waters, 1840. See Stanton V. Percival, 1854. ' TuUock V. Il.mn, 1826 (Abbott, C.J.); cited with approbation by Parke, B., in Scholcy c. Walton, 1844, questioning Atkins v. Tred- goM, 1823 ; and M.'Culloch v. Dawes. 182G, contra. IP l( 492 I '\n C. IX.] ADMISSIONS BY ONE OF SEVERAL TRUSTEES, ETC. trustees, who were joint defendants, but were not personally liable, cannot be re(!eived to charge the others.' H 7oi.^ On similar principles, where a joint contract is severed by the death of one of the contractors, nothing subsequently done or said by the survivor binds the personal representative of the deceased ; * nor can the acts or admissions of one of several executors bind any surviving executor ; * nor the admissions of one tenant in common be receivable against his co-tenant.' Moreover, it has, in America, been decided, that no such privity exists among the members of a board of public olKcers,'' or among several indorsers of a promissory note,' or between executors and heirs or devisees,* as to make the admission of one binding on all. Plainly, the admission of one defendant will not be evidence against any other in an action for negligence, or trespass, or other tort.' Still clearer is it that any such admission will not be evidence against anotlier person in criminal proceedings, since the law cannot recognize any partner- eliip or joint interest in wrong, much less in crime.'" § 752. An exception to this last proposition at first sight appears to prevail, where the uihabitaiifs of fowitnliipn, counties, or other territorial divisions of the country, sue or are proseouted eo nomine. But here such inhabitants are, in truth, regarded in the light of a corporation, of which each individual inhabitant forms a component part. Therefore the declarations and admissions of any one of such persons are, not really inconsistently with the rule just discussed, receivable in evidence against the collective body. Accordingly, the declarations of all rateable inhabitants, whether actually rated or not, may be given in evidence for the Crown, in a prosecution against a township for non-repair of a highway, while in a settle- ment case its opponents may give in evidence declarations by rated ' Pavirs V. Rid-c. 1802 (Ld. Eldon). » Gr. Hv. S 17(i. ill i>iul. » Atkins c/riv.ljjrold, lS2;i; Ford- ham ('. Wallis, lfto2-;J ; Sliiyinakcr V. Gundatker'M Ivx., l.Sj;j (Am.). * Slatrr r. Liiwson, LS.iO; Hatha- way V. IhiskcU, l.S-.:9 fAlii.). ° And this oven wnoro hoth are partio.H to the suit, and in the same intort'st: Dan v. Hrown, IH'Jj (Am.). • Ldckwodd c. Smith, LSI.' (Am.). ' (Sluyuiakor v, Guiidackoi'a Ex., 1823 (Am.). » Osj;(M)d V. ^fanhiittan Co., 1824 (Am.). iSoo, aUo, Fordham y. Wallis, ISVJ-,}. " Dani.'ls V. Poltcr, 18;}() (Tinchil, C.J.]; Morso v. Koval, Isofi (Ld. Kiskini)]. Sooll. ,.. I'lardwick, l,s(t.>, wlimv Ld. Elli!iihoi()iiii;h hiys down the rule somewhat too loosely, '" Grant y. Jackson, 17U3 (Ld. Ken- yon). 493 REALITY OF JOINT INTEREST MUST BE PROVED. LP. III. M: :!■ parishioners of a parish.^ In both cases the value of such evidence will of course vary according to the knowledge and position of the declarant, and will in many instances be exceedingly slight.^ § 753.3 j^n apparcMly Joint interest is obviously insufficient to make the admissions oi one party receivable against his com- panions, tvhcrc the realiti/ of that interest is the point in controversy. A foundation for such evidence must first be laid, by showing, prima facie, that a joint interest exists. Consequently, where in an action against a party for money had and received, plaintiff, to prove the receipt of the money by defendant, tendered certain statements, which had been made by a person whom defendant had taken into partnership subsequently to the transaction in question, such evidence was rejected because a joint liability could not be presumed merely from a subsequent partnership.'' The existence of a joi' t interest which is disputed cannot, moreover, be estab- lished by the admission of one of the parties sought to be charged, but must be shown by independent proof. Therefore, i xn action against three alleged makers of a promissory' note, the aumission of his signature by one defendant was under the old law insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover againbt him and the others, though theirs had been proved ; the point to be established against all being a joint promise by all f and in an action seeking lo charge several as partners, an admission of the partnership by one is not evidence of it whicli is receivable against any of the others ; but it is only after such partnership is shown by indopeiulent proof satisfactory to the judge, that the admisjions of one of the parties are received in order to affect the others.'' The admissions are, however, evidence against the party making them, and he will be bound thereby, either in an action against him as surviving partner, or even in an action in which he is sued on the joiut .1: Hi I Hi"-! - p; .ii ii- < ' R. V. Iluidwick, 1809; R. v. Whitley Lowor, 1811} ; R. r. Woburn, 1808. « R. V. Addcrbiu-v East, 1843; R. V. Hanlwick, 1809 (Ld. Ellen- borough ). =» Or. Ev. § 177, in Dart. * Catt V. Uoward,"lS20 (Abbott, C.J.). • Gray v. Palinors, 1794. • Niciiolls (,'. Dowdiiig, l.Slo; Gib- bons V. Wilcox, 1817 ; Grant v. Jack- son, 1793 (Ld. ivonyon) ; Van Roims- dyk V. Kane, 18i;j (Am.); Harris v. \Vil8on, 18;Jl(Aui.); Burgess y. Lane, 18'24 (Am.); Dutton v. Woodman, 1852 (Am.). 494 CH. IX.] ADMISSIONS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHERS. promise with his co-partners, iu which they have let judgment go by default.* § 754. In general, statements in the defence, or in the answers to interrogatories,* of one defendant cannot be read in evidence either for or against his co-defendant. The reasons for this are that, as there is no issue between the defendants, there can have been no opportunity for cvoss-examinatior ^ and, moreover, if it were allowed, a plaintiC might, by making one of his friends a defendant, gain a most unfair advantage.* Tlie rule dues not apply to cases where the other defendant claims through the party whose defence is otfered in evidence ; nor to cases where they have a joint interest, either as partners or otherwise, in the transaction.* But wherever the admission of one party would be good evidence against another party, the defence of the former may, a fortiori, be read agiiinst the latter.^ § 755. There would appear to be little doubt but that statements made by parties suing or sued in a reprcupnUdirc fharmivr hcfofc thnj uerc co)iiph'tehj clutlwd with that chamdci\ are not admissible against them, so as to affect the interest of the persons they represent. Lord Tenterden ruled that they are iiot,^ and it is submitted that he was correct. For it would be startling that the assets of a testator, and the consequent rights of legatees, miglit be all'ected by some inconsiderate statement made by the executor, before the death of the testator.'^ Even the sworn admission of a married woman, iu answering a bill in Chancery jointly with her husband, — cxccjit so far as it related to her separate estate," —has been rejected after his death, as against the wife, as it was considered as the answer of ' Snn.LjsUr r. ^Mazarrcdo, 1816 (Ld. Elloiilio'rouirh) ; Ellis t'. Watson, 1818 (Abbott, C.'J.). « 8oe Meyer v. Moiitriou, 184(5; Stoplioiis )•. lloathcoto, 18(J() ; I'lirkor V. MoiToU, 1S4S (L(l. Cottonliiiin); Iloiiiv i'. Jolui-tono, 1S;J8; Saltiiiiiish V. Iliirdy, 1873 (Ld. Solbovne, C). » Joni'S (\ Turberville, 1792; Morso V. Eoval, 18(1(). « \Vych V. Meal. 1734. » Pethcrick r. Turner, 1802 ; Trit- chavd V. Draper, 1830-1 ; lliliard v. riialey, 1723; Field!-. Holland, 1810 (Am.); Clark's Ex. v, Yau liuims- dvk, ISl.-) '(Am.). See Talker w. Moriell. 184.S, cited ante, § oli!». " Van liciniMlyk v. Kane, l>Sl;i (Am.). ' Fenwick v. TlicrntDn, 1S27. Sco, also, jMetteis r. Brown. lN(i3 (Pol- lock, C'.B't Tlant r. M'Ewen, 1S2,3 (Am.); contra, Tindal, C.J., iu ISmitli V. Morijan, 1S3U. " See l,v\:'^i^ V. Edmonds, 185.5, which couhrms the law as stated in the text. a Callow V. Ilowle, 1847 ; Olive «. Carow, 18J9. ' n 495 t I ADMISSIONS OF PERSONS INTERESTED IN SUIT. [vT. III. irs the husband alone.' Nor can the affidavit of a guardian of an infant defendant,'- or of the committee of a lunatic,^ be read against the infant or lunatic in another suit ; though it may be used against the guardian or committee himself, if he afterwards be sued in his private capacity, for it is an admission upon his own oath. Si 756.'* Persons who are not forraall3' parties to a record, but who are hdcimtrd in its siiliJrrt-iNaffcr, are considered by the law as real parties in interest, and accordingly their admissions have the same weight as tliougli they were formally parties. For example, there may be received in evidence against their respective repre- sentatives the admissions of the cestui que trust of a bond, so far as his interest and that of the trustee are identical ; ' those of the persons interested in a policy effected in another's name for their benefit ; " those of the shipowners, in an action by the master for freight ; ^ those of the indemnifying creditor, in an action against the sheriff ; ^ those of the deputy-sheriff tending to charge himself, in an action against the high sheriff for the misconduct of the deputy ; ° those of rated parishioners, in a settlement appeal, where the churchwardens and overseers of the poor are the nominal parties on the record ; '" and, in short, the admissions of any persons who are represented in the action by other parties." On similar prin- ciples, the declarations of voters against their own votes, whethei made before or after the votes were given,'^ and even though inva- ' Hodgson V. Merest, 1821 ; Elston V. "Wood, 1.S33. ^ Ecclcstoii V. Spoke, alias Petty, 1689 ; Hawkirs v. Luscombe, 1818 ; Story, Eq. PI. § 6G8: Gr. Ev. §§ 24, 323; Mills v. Doimis, 1818 (Am.). See ante, § 742. 3 Bousloy V. Maprrath, 1804 (Jr.). * Gr. Ev. § 180. in part. * Hant^on v. Parker, 1749. See, also, Harrison v. Vallance, 1822; Mav V. Taylor, 1843 (Maule, J.). «'Bell (-'.'Ansley, 1812 (Ld. Ellen- borough). ■' Smith V. Lyon, 1813. 8 Dowdon t'.'Fowle, 1814; Proctor V. Lainson. 183() (Ld. Abinger) ; Dyke v. Aldridgo, 1798 ; Young v. Siiiith, 1808; Haiwood v. Keys, 1832. » Snowball v. Goodricke, 1833, (luestiouing the language of Ld. Keuyon and Lawrence, J., in Drake V. Sykes, 1797, which Hccms to iden- tify the sherirtwith the luider-shorirt' to all intents : Yabsloy v. Noblo, 1G97. The declarations of imder- shcriffs, («• of the shoritt's baililYs, accompanying official acts, are ad- missible as parts of the res gestfe. See Jacobs v. Humphrey, 1834 ; Scott V. Marshall, I8;i2; North v. Miles, 1808 (Ld. Ellenborough) ; and ante, §§ 583 et seq. '» K. ?•. HarJwick, 1809 ; E. v. Whitlej' Lower, 1813. " In Hurt V. Hoin, 1809, an action of replevin, in which the declarations of the person, under whom the defen- dant made cognizance, were rejected (Heath, J.) as eviilence for the plain- tiff, is presumed not to be law. See Welstead v. Levy, 1831. " Southampton case, 1833; Kipon 496 CII. IX.] ADMISSIONS OF PERSONS INTKRI'STKD IN SUIT. lidafing such votes on the ground of their having recoived brihns,' arc adniis.^ible hi evidonco ; since, on a scrutiny, each oas-e is con- sidori'd as a separate cause, in which the supporter n the vote under discussion and the voter are tlie paities on tlie cue >:ide, and the opposers of tlie vote are the parties on the otlier.'^ S 7'"t7. The doi'hirations or aduiissions must, however, in all cases (as will presently bo seen^), have been made while the party making- them had some interest in the matter; and they, moreover, are reeeivallo in evidence only so far as the declarant's own interests, or the interests of those who claim through him, are concerned. Thus, if an action be brought by trustees, who repre- sent the interests of a variety of cestuis que trust, before the declara- tion of a cestui que trust will be admitted at all against a trustee, the nature of the interest of the declarant in the trust estate must be shown, so that it may clearly appear that he alone is entitled to the benefit resulting from the action,* — so that the statements of a person beneficially interested as tenant for life are, for instance, not evidence to prejudice the rights of the remainder- n:en in fee. § 758. In applying the above rule, a distinction exists between the position of a tenant fur life and that of a tenant in tail. A tenant for life cannot — unless empowered by some special statute' — prejudice, by an admission, the interest of a remainder- man or reversioner. But a tenant in tail is regarded as represent- ing the inheritance, and, therefore, what lie says or does will often be bindiug on the persons entitled in remainder. Accordingly, a release of an equity of redemption by a tenant in tail in possession,* or a decree of foreclosure against him, will bind the remainder- man ; ' and an acknowledgment by a tenant in tail of the existence of an equity of redemption which would, in the absence of such admission, have been barred by the equitable rule respecting limitations, has the effect, as against the remainder-man, of restoring the right of redemption.* case, 18;j;5 ; retorsfield case, 1833; Now "Windsor. 183.); Eiinis, 183j ; Uroitwich, 183j; licdfoidf^liiie, ITSJ; an<l other cases cited 2 Itog. on Elect. 139. ' Ipswich, 1835 ; and cases cited 2 Rog. on Elect. 139. * 2 Hog. on Elect. 139. » Post, § 794. * Doo V. Wainwright, 1838; May V. Taylor, 1843. ° See auto, § 092, note commenc- ing "In Uoddam v. Morlcj-," and j)o.--t, § 1088, note citiuir same case. " ]{iynol(lson ?i. I'eikins, 17(!9. ' I'undletou i;. liooth, 1809 (Stuart, V.-C). » Id. ' n 497 t'' ADMISSIONS OF PERSONS EXPRESSLY REFERRED TO. [p. III. § 759.' In some cases, admissions by third persons, who are ttrangera to the suit, are receivable. This is the case when the issue is substantially upon the mutual rights which, at the particular time of the admission, were respectively posse? •id by a party to he record and the person who made such admission ; in which cases such evidence will in general be let in as would be legally admissible in an action between the parties themselves. Thus, in an action by his trustee, the admissions of a bankrupt, made before the act of bankruptcy, are receivable in proof of the petitioning creditor's debt ; ^ but admissions made after the act of bankruptcy cannot furnish evidence against the trustee, bnoanse of the intervening rights of creditors, and the danger of fraud.'' § 7G0.'* The admissions of a third person arc also receivable against, and binding upon, a person who has rj.'prvssh) nfcrrcd another to him for information. Thus, executors who wrote to a plaintiff, that if she wished for further information on a certain subject, she should apply to a certain merchant in the city, were held bound by the replies of the merchant ; * whore the fact of the delivery of goods by a carman was disputed, a defendant who said, "If he will say that he delivered the goods, I will pay for them," ■was held bound by the affirmative reply of the carman." § TOOa.' It of necessity follows that where a person refers to another, who thereupon makes a statfmient in his presence, proof of snch statement is undoubtedly good evidence.* Whetfier the answer of a person thus referred to is eonc/iisirr against the party seems, however, not to have been finally settled. As a general rule it ought to be held that a party who refers to another is con- clusively bound by that other's decision ; for to make a proposition to be bound by what another may say, and after he has spoken to recede from it, is not only dishonest, but might be turned to > Gr. Ev. § 181. in part. * See Coole i: Bmliam, 1848. > Iloare t'. (\)rvton, 18! '2; Rolison V. Kemp, 18(t;3 ;" Watts v. Thorpe, 1808; Smallcombe V. Bruges, 18:24; Taj'Ior V. Kinloch, 1819. Those cases vh'tually overrule Dowton r. Cross, 1794. 8ee, also, Heruaseoui c. Fare- brother, 1M52. Of course, even snch admissions are still evidi'nce against the bankrupt himself: Jarrott v, Leonard, lis 14. ■• (Jr. Kv. § 18i2, almost verhatini. » Williams v. Innes, 1808 (Ld. Ellen borongli). 8 Danirl v. Pitt, 1808; Brock v. Kent, 1807; Burt v. Palmer, 18013; Hood V. Ueeve. 18'J8. ' (ir. J'^v. § 104, in p;roat part. * li. V. Mallory, 18S4, C. C. R. 498 |t;.| CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS BY PERSONS REFERRKD TO. very improper purposes, such as to entrap a witness, or to find out how far the party's evidence would go in support of his case.' In such cases tlie purposes of justice and policy are sufRtdcnily answered, by (as in the case of any award) throwing tlio biirthon of proof on the party questioning the decision, and holding lilra bound, unless he can impeach the test referred to by clear proof of fraud or mistake.'^ § 761. These principles apply whether the question referred be one of law or of fact; whether the porsc^ to whom reference is made, have or have not any pecidiar knowledge on the subjoc't ; and whatever the nature of the action in which the statements of the referee are proposed to be adduced in evidence. Accordingly, where two parties agreed to abide by the opinion of counsel ujjon the construct" u of a statute, the party against whose interest the opinion operated was held bound thereby ; ' and a disputed fact regarding a mine, having been referred by consent to a miners' jury, their decision was afterwards received in evidence.^ § 7t)2. A tenant may even dispute his landlord's title if such landlord having to his knowledge agreed with a third person to leave it to counsel's opinion to so/ who is entitled to the demised property, counsel has decided that the third person is entitled, and the tenant has accordingly attorned to such third person.* § 763. To render the declarations of a person refeiTcd to admis- sible it is not necessary that the reference should have been made by express words ; but it will suffice if the party by his conduct has tacitly evinced an intention to rely on the statements as correct. For instance, if a party, questioned by means of an interpreter, • Per Ld. Jvonyon, in Stovoiis v, Thacker, 179;5; "Lloyd v. Willan, 1794; Brotton v. Piettiman, lOfiG; Deleslino ?•. Grconbind, l"9o (Am.), ■where the oath of a thiid person was referred to. But in Garnet v. Balls, 18'22, on a question ■whether a hoi'so in defendant's possession ■was identi- cal ■with one lost hy plaintiff, the plaintiff havinc; said that if the de- fendant ■would take his oath that the horse was his, he should keep him ; and ho having made oath aceonl- injrly ; Lord Tenterden observed, that, considering the loose manner in •which the evidence had been given, he would not receive it as conclu- sive, though it was a circumstance on which he should not fail to remark to the jury. 2 AViuteheid r. Tattcrsall, 18.'34. ^ Price V. IloUis, 1S13. See, also, Downs r. Coo])er, 1S41. * Sybiay v. White, 183(5. ' ])iiwiis r. ('oin)cr, 1.S21 In such cases as the above, if the decision bo written, anil do not contain any recitiil of the agreements, it docs not on the face of it jmi'jiort to be an award, and is accordingly admissible in evidence without bi'ing stamped as such. See cases previously cited. 499 ADMISSIONS BY PERSONS R;'VERRED TO. [l»AUT III. 1 1 ' 1 I . -1' ^1 ('■ 1 " \ 3| l. give answers through the same medium, the langunge of the interpreter is considered as tliat of tlie i)arty ; and may, con'-e- quently, be proved by any person who heard it, witlioiit oiiUin<j^ the interpreter hinisislf ; ' if a party, on motion before a judge, use the affidavit of another person to prove a certain fact deposed to therein, suoli affidavit is, on any subsequent trial, evidence as against him of this fact, an'd that, too, thougli tlie ]ierson who made the affidavit is present in court ;^ and where a petitioning creditor, knowing that his servant could ])rove a ])articular act of bankruptcy, sent hiiu expressly for that purpose to be examined at the opening of the fiat, the depositions then made were held evidence of the act of bankruptcy as against the petitioning creditor on an issue as to that fact in a subsequent action between him and the representatives of the bankrupt's estate.' § 7Ij4-j. a party is not bound, however, by what his witness says at Nisi Prius.* ^ 760. It remains to consider the effect of ad missions hi/ married women when offered in evidence, either against herself or her trustees, or for or against her husband. § 76Ga. If a icifc sue or be sued as a single woman, no valid reason can be given why her admissions should not have the same legal effect as against her as those of any other person.* il, i: lilil: i'ii > Fatrigas v. Mostyn, 1776 (Gould, J.). » BiickoU V. Ilulse, 1837 ; Boileau V. Eutlin, 1S48; Pritchunl i'. 15ajj;- shiiw(!, ISol ; Johnson f. Wind, 1>S()6 (("liiiiiibro, J.). But seo Whito v. Dowliiiir, 184J (Tr.). » (iarilncr c. Moult, 1839; Boileau V. liutlin, 18-18. * (laidnor )'. Moult, 1839 (Ld. Dennian and Tatto-son, J.) ; BiiekoII V. llulise, 1837 (Ld. Doninaii and Colovidj^o, J.). See, also, ante, § 4()9. Yot, in one caso (("(do v. Ilt'adley, 1840), in an action for trespass to a close, tho de]iosition of a witness ■whom the plaintiff had called in a previous proceeding before mmjis- trafes for an alleged previous trespass to tho same close, but who had then disprovt'd plaintiff's possession of such close, was allowed to be read against the plaintiff. This was prob- ably because tho depositions were secondary evidence of oral testimony (as to which seo ante, § 4G4), the witness being abroad at tho time, ami the (picstion previously disputed before the magistrati's and that then being tried, being identical. Still, tlio case in<n/ jiossibly have boon decided on the ground stated in § 7G3, tho)igh it is not tho best ground on •whicl) to sujipoi t it. '' See Walton ». Greon, showing that a T.-ouian's admission that she id married is inadequate to ])rovo tho fa(^t till her helutlf. In iicconlanco with this ))rinciple, in Wilson v. Mitchell, 1813, where the defence to an action on ccmtract was that tho plaintiff was under covertuie when the cause of action accrued, Iiord Kllenborough is reported to have h(dd— on what grounds it does not apjiear — that it was not sullicient to show that she had acknowledged herself to bo married, v/ithout proof 500 CH. IX.] wife's admissions EVIDKNCE for HtTSHAVD. § 760ii. Again, if the frxstccs of a iiKirricd im„/iiii -sue or fir snrtf^ and tlio opposite party bo a strauger, tlie niarriud woman's adniis- Bions will, liko those of un ordinary cestui que trust,' bo clearly admissible as against the triistocs. § 7G(Jc. Where a wife and her husband have hostile intorosts, the wife's admissions ought to be received on his behalf to the same extent as her vivii voce testimony;^ for the principle of policy which admits the one should erpially admit the other. Thus, in an action against a husband by the trustees of his wife under a separation deed for arrears of maiutonaiice, the defence to which is adultery by the wife, jiroof of li(>r admission of criminal misconduct ought, it is submitted,— contrary to what was formerly the law, — to now be received.^ § 707. The admissions of a wife cannot, however, be received in evidence ./or /icr Itunhand in any suit between him an<I a stranger, unless, perhaps, in the single event of their constituting part of the res gestaj.* § 7G8-H. In connection with this subject of how far a wife's admissions are evidence for her husband, it should be pointed out that in the Divorce Division of the High Court, ^ a person's con- fession or admission is only evidence against that person himself. As against that person such confession or admission may be acted upon even tlionglt there he no other evidence ; but it is not evidence against anyone else. Consequently, a wife's confession of having committed adultery with him is no evidence against a co-respondent, nor is a co-respondent's admission to this effect evidence against a wife.^ Nevertheless, a wife's confession may be acted upon if the co-respondent admits the adultery, as he thereby makes an of an actual marriage, or at least of cohabitation. ' See ante, § 756. » See 10 & 17 V. c. 83. • Sclidlcy V. Goodman, 1823. * See Walton v. Green, Wlb (Ab- bott, C.J.). In the case cited, in un action ngninst a husbanrl for piods supplied, the defence being that the wife had ccjmmitted adultery, the •wife's confession of it was, indeed, admitted as evidence for the husband as part of the res gesta?. But that case is, as a whole, nevertheless submitted to bo cli'aily bad law, since in such cases the real que^tioU is wlu^ther the' wife liad, in fact, committed adulteiy — not wlu'ther the husband had so reasDuably sus- pected her of it that it had justilied liim ill turning her out of docas (as he tliere had done). 5 The Act of 20 & 21 Y. c. So ("The Matrinu)uial Causes Act, 18o7 "), and the Kules which regu- late the ])ractico of the court, are alike silent un this subject. « Williams v. Williams, 18C6. .01 (.1 wife's confession of adultery. [part in. admission against interest.' But as the unfettered reception of euch evidence might " open a wide door," the court looks with jealousy at confessions. Tlio n-('i(jht of the evidence in such cases is for the court, or for a jury if there he one.^ Accordingly, following the old practice of the House of Lords' Comniittoes, which existed when divorces were only ohtaiuiible by private Act of Parliament, and of the Ecclesi. tical Courts, the present Divorce Court requires corroboration of a confession. It has been said that " corroboration " is the proof of some fact leading to the supposition that a witness has sworn truly upon the matter as to which he has given evidence.'' In other words, "corroboration " is the proof of facts ojusdem generis with those deposed to by the witness.' The Ilimse of Lords, in pro- ceedings upon bil/n of divorce, was in i'lo habit of rejecting letters from the wife to the husband containing confessions of adultery,* unless they were offered in mcr? confirmation of circumstances which tended strongly to prove the defendant's guilt." Under these circumstances, however, such letters, if addressed to a stranger, or even to the husband's agent, were receivable in evidence, after proof that they were not written in conse(iuence of any threat or promise, and that the writer was then livivg apart from her husband ; ' and the wife's oral confes?:"!! of ^uilt to a third party was also admis.sible under like circuii .i uioes."^ Not only, however, were direct confessions rejected in the llouso of Lords, except under the circumstances above stated, bu'' all letters written by the wife after her separation, either to the husband or to tiie adulterer, were generally held inadmissible, unless they were connected with some particular fact," or could be referred to as part of the res ge.sta),'" or were tendered in evidence after a priniti iane case of guilt had been already established." In the Ecch'sinsticul Courts, ' liO Miiichiiut V, Le Marchant, l«7ii. » Williams v. "Williams, 1708, « li.Miltoii's case, IH;W) (Ir.). * SiimiKiii.s V, Simmons, 18-17. 6 Lil. Cldiifuny's caso, 1811, U.L. • jlnyly'H CII8H, 18.'i(). ' L(l! ClDiiciirry's cnso, 1811, If. L. " Ld. HlKMilioroujjh's cusk, lH.f(», I!. L. But BOO Wi.>i«iauu'sca8o, \H2l, II. L. » Diindiis's rase, 1814, IT. L. '» lioydcll's ca.so, 18;j(), II. L. " Kobiiison r. Kdliiiismi, 18.')8. In one caso, wlioio tin' husliaiid held a sitnutidii iit Mutla, ukI his wil'o, ill C(ilis('(|iii'ii; d i;! Iiiid ht>allll, had loft tho island, and had rcsidi'd ia Kiifjland for several yt^ars, during whiih timo uho hud livud with a 60S CHAP. IX.] WHEN ADMISSIONS OF WIFE BIND HUSRAND. moreover, also formerly (and till they were aLolishel) the practice was siiuilar to that of the House of Lords. A oimon ot 1H03' rendered a mere confession, unaccompanied by other circumstances, insufficient to support a prayer for a separation a mensa et thoro. This rule was there held applicable, though tlie confession was made under the apprehension of approaching dissolution, and was free from all suspicion of a collusive purpose.^ Nevertheless a confession was always admissible in evidence, and, if coupled with other facts of a suspicious nature, generally proved an ini[iortant ingredient in the decision of the court. ^ It was never settled in these courts, however, whether a wife's confession of adultery would be sufficient in itself to repel a suit instituted by her for restitution of conjugal rights.* Tliey had, however, decided that in a suit asking for a decree of nullity of marriage, by reason of a former marriage, the defendant's f-imple admission of such former marriage was not sufficient.* § 770." It remains to be considered how far the adniimom of the wife will bind the husband. Generally such admissions only bind him where the wife had authority to make them/ Sucli authority does not result, by operation of law, from the mere relation of Imsband and wife. It is a question of fact, to be found by the jury, as in other cases of agency. For, though the relation of parMTnonr and had boriip liiin four childron, tho House of Jjonls tid- iiiitti'd ;i si'iit's of loltors from tho wifn to her liu.sbiuid, wliicli woro tci (l('r('<l us acfountiii}:; for the cir- t',nin»tiiii('n of hi'r not goinp out to rojoin him, and as sliowiiifj thiit who liiid ]iractist'd ujion him the grossest deceit; Miller's ease, 1817. ' No. 105. ' J.jortinier v. Mortimer, 1820. ' In one ease, letters from tiiewife to tlie supposed paramour, taken in conjunctioii with other suspi<'ioiis eireiimstiincc^s, were, in tlie ahsenee of direct ])roof, even considered to estal)lisli her jrwilt, thone:li they con- tained no exi)ress avowal of a(lidtery, and though they never rea<'hed tho hands of the ])arty to whom they were aiMressed, as they weie inter- cepted liy the hnsliand : (irant v. (irai.t, is;{!»; Caton c. Caton, l«li) ; Fanssett v. Fanssett. 1849. In tho I'lcclesiastical Courts, lettiMs from tliu alleged jiaiamonr, found in the wife's jiossession, were adniissiMe; but if they did not necessarily imply tho commission of ailultery. or were not su])p(irted by other evithmco of iu- decent faniili.irities, they were in- snllicieiit to siip]iiirt a sentence of separation: Hamerton r. liamei'fon, bSJS. As to tlie admissihility of letters written by the adulterer to tho wile, in proceeiliiigs beloie the 11. of I,., see i,d. (jleraw liv s case, IS'Jl, II. L. » Mortimer r. Moitimer, 1.S20; liuige.S r, Ituigess, bSlT. » Searle I' J'liio, ISIC. » (Jr. Kv. § INJ, ill great part. ' Emiuson v. llloiiden, ITl't; An- derson r. Saiidi'rson. 1817; Carey w. Adkins, 1814 ; Meredith v. Footnor, 18i;i. 50.{ WHEN ADMISSIONS OF WIFE BIND HUSBAND. [PART III. mm f husband and wife is peculiar in its circumstances, from its close intimacy and its very nature, yet there is nothing peculiar in the principles of law which apply to it. The wife is, indeed, seldom expressly constituted the agent of the husband, and the ciises, consequently, almost universally, turn upon the question of implied authority, resulting from the degree in which the husband permitted the Avife to participate, either in the transaction of his affairs in general, or in the jjartieular matter in question.' § 771. The inference of the wife's agency to contract or to make admissions from circumstances, used to be left to the jury with great latitude. For instance, they were once allowed to infer authority in the wife to accept a notice and direction, in regard to a jjarticular transaction in her husband's trade, from lier being seen twice in his counting-house appearing to ccjuduct his business relating to that transaction, and once giving orders to the fore- man ; ^ and in an action against a husband for goods furnished to the wife while in the country, where he occasionally visited her, her letter to the plaintiff, admitting the debt, and ajiologizing for the non-i)ayraent, though written several years alter the transac- tion, was held, previously to Lord Tenterden's Act,'' sufficient to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations.'' lint of later years, however, greater strictness has prevailed. Indeed, wliere a wife, by her husband's authority, carried on the business of a shop, and attended to all the receipts and payments, admissions made by I " '1 ■ I:' i 'i -1^ ' See nnto, § 192. For inwtiince, wife's proiicity, ■which hiiiiponed he- wliere. uiidfr the ohl law (a uuiriied i'oiu thc! iii;irii:ijri'. nccivahlo after WiPiiiaii may now sue tor waj^es in liis death to allV'ct tlir li^'lit-^ of the her own name, 4,j & -Hi V. c. ~o, survivinj^ wile: .Smith r. Scuddur, §§ 1. -J), the hiisbaml sued for her 1824 (Am.). waj;rs, tlu^ mi'io luit that >*]h: had * I'limmer i'. Sells, 1H:!4. caiiK (I thi'iu did not authoii.se her to bind him t)y h<-r admissions of pay- ment (llallC. Hill, IT.JT); noreonid her unautliciiis(Ml declaiatioiiH atlVet him, cviii where he sued with her in hi'r ri,u'lit. ; for in tiioe, ami similar cases, the vv^]d was liis own, thoujjh ii((| ailed tliniu^'li lierinstrnmentalitv. Alhan '•. I'lilihelt, ITHf,; Krilv r. Small, 179!i; Drnn c. White, 17!»7, ns to the wife's admission of a ties- pass. Neither are the luistiaiid's tttl-Uiiasiuus ua to lucts res]ioutiiig his ' !» G. 4, c. 14, § 1, wliieh reqtn"red that an aeknnwle(lirnieiit. to tiiki' the ease out of the statute, sli'inld he in wri'in;r, "sijrned l)y the jiarly ejiai jje- ahle thereby." It muy imii' he sif,'n.'d by an authorised ap'Ut ; I!» & 2(1 V. V. !)", § !•■), cited ante, § T4i). Soh post. § 107;?. « CiVe>;oi'y v. Tarker, ISIIH ^Ld. Kllenho!(iuj,'ir : Palethiajx' /■. I'ur- uisli, 17.S;t; (lilVoi'd r. liurton. l.S2!l; I'ettv V. Anderson, l62o; Cotes v, Uuvls, 1S08. 604 CHAP. IX.] INCIDENTAL SOLICITORS' ADMISSIONS. her to the landlord of the shop rospeotiiig the amount of rent were held not admissible to bind the hvisbaiul.' § 772.'^ The admissions of solicifors bind their clients in all matters relating to the progress and trial of the action. Sometimes thej are even ('onclusive, and may be given in evidence upon a new trial, notwithstanding that, previously to such trial, the party has given notice that he intends to withdraw them, or though, where the alterations do not relate to the admissions,' the pleadings have been altered. To have this effect, however, the admissions must have been distinct and formal, or such as are termed solemn admissions, made for the express purpose of relaxing the stringency of some rule of practice, or of dispensing with the formal proof of some document or fact at the trial. ^ *5 773 Admissions made by solicitors, not indeed with the ex- press intent of dispensing with proof of certain facts, but as it were hicidchtaUi/, while they are referring to other matters connected with the action (which are generally the result of carelessness), are not regarded as conclusive admissions. But they, nevertheless, frequently raise an inference respecting the existence of facts, which the adversary would otherwise have been called upon to prove. Consequently, it is very important that solicitors should exercise great caution in the language they employ while corresponding with their opponents. For example, where in an action against the acceptor of a bill, defendant's solicitor served on the j)laintiff a Notice to Produce, which contained a description of the bill corresponding with that set forth in the declavation, and then went on to pay — " which said bil nan accepted by the said defendant" — such Notice was held prima facie evidence of the defendant's acceptance ; ' in an action against the owners of a ship, their joint ownership was infen-ed from an undertaking to appear for ' Meiwlitln-.Fontner, 1843. Had the udniiss.'<i()nB related to the receipt (if sliop goodH, they would hiive been evidence ; but the fact tlmt sbe wiw eonductinp a business for her has- bund, did not constituto hor his npont to niiiko ndinisjiions of an nntecedont contract for tho hire of the slioj), or to niako a now contract for the future occupation of it. ' Or. Ev. § 166, in part. ' Elton V. Lai kins. 1R:{2 (Tindnl, C.J.); Jioe V. Bird, l.S;{.'> (Ld. J)en- tnanj ; Lan>,'ley v. Ld. Oxford, 18.'{(i. ,"^ee Ilarfrravo v. Ilargrave, l.S.)0, as to the case where the client ia an infant. * See cases cited in last note. Also, ante. § 724a, et seq. ; and Youiir v. Wrijrht. 180" ; Doe v. I^)llinp;H, 1847. » Ilolt V. Squire, 1825 (Abbott, C.J.). 605 I I LETTERS BY SOLICITORS WITHOTJT PIIIDUDICE. [iT. III. hi Il ;:; them, signed by their solicitor, in which tliey were described as owners of the sloop in question ; ' and where, in an action of debt on a bond, the defendant's solicitor had admitted the signature of the attesting witness, this was held to amount by implication to an admission of the due execution of the instrument.' § 774.' Admissions contained in the tnere conversation of a solicitor, cannot, however, be received against a client, tliough they relate to the facts in controversy. The reason of this distinc- tion is that a solicitor is merely given authority to manage the action in court, and to do nothing more.* And a letter seut to the opposite party by a solicitor, expressed to be written " uith-Hit prcjudkc" cannot be received as an admission, nor looked at on a question of costs ; * neither can the reply be admitted, though not guarded in a similar manner." However, an admission made before suit will be binding, if it be shown that the solicitor was already retained in the action,' though in the absence of "ny evidence of such I'etainei, some other proof must be gi/en of authority to make ibc admission." Whoxi I he solicitor is retained in a cause, admis- sions made by his managing clerk, or his agent, are received as hia own. § 783. Admissions made by counsel stand on much the same footing as those by solicitors. Therefore, where a special case had been signed by the junior on each side, on a subse(iueut new ..ial, the production of the case was regarded as containing admissions by the parties ot the facts therein stated.'" As a general proposition indeed, both in the Chancery and Common Law Divisions of the High Court, a consent once given, or an admission once made, by Clitf, 1815 (Ld. C. ii ■ < ' ArursbiiU V. Ellfiilioroufi:!!). ■■* Milwunl V. Temple, 1808 (Ld. EllenboidU^^h). •' (ir. Ev. § 1H(), ill pint. * I'.'tc'h V. I,voii, 184f); Youn^ v. Wrif,'lit. 1807 ; i'arkiiis c. Iliiwkshaw, 1817 ; Doo V. ItiLbimls, 181.J. Hue WilsDU w. Turnor, 1808 ; Watson v. Kiiifi. 184(i. » Wiilktir V. Wiltshire, infra. • TiKidock V. ForroHtor, 1842; lloffhton V. Iloghton, 18,)2. Soo Jiiniiuo V. Sheridan, 184«> ; Williams V. Thoinivs, I8fi2; Kurt/ f. Sponco, 1888; Walker v. Wiltshire, 188i>, 506 V. ; and post, § 795. ' .Marsliall r. ClilV, 181o (Ld. EI- lenbiiroiigli) ; Guinst'ord v. Grammar, 18(K». « Wufrstaffr'. Wilson, 1832; liurp;- hart r. Angerstiin. 18;i4 (Aldcrson, li.); I'opo i>. Andrews, 18lO (Cole- ridge, J.). » Taylor v. Willans, 1831 ; Stand- ape )'. Civighton, 18.'{2; Griffiths v. Williams, 1787 ; Trnslovo v. liurton, 1824 ; Taylor v. Forster, 1825. «• Van Wart v. Wolley, 1823 (Abbott, C.J.) J Kdmunds v. New- man, 1823. a ■ CH. IX.] ADMISSIONS liV CULXSKI., WIIKX i:VII)ENCE. counsel under his signature, with the authority of his client, with a full knowledge of the facts, aud without some egregious mistcake, is conclusively binding, and cannot afterwards ha withdrawn ; ' and, after an admission has been made as to a fact, it is wrong to receive any evidence on the matter.^ Moreover, where counsel on both sides so conduct a cause as to lead to an inference that a certain fact is admitted between them, the court or the jury may treat it as proved ; ' and though the coun? el only assumed it with respect to one issue, the fact may be taken for granted for all purposes, and as to the whole case.'* Accordiagly, wh-^re plaintiff's counsel in his opening stated that his client had paid a particular cher^ie, but called no evidence in support of that fact, defendant was, after notice to produce, allowed to give secondary evidence of the con- tents of the cheque, without giving further proof of the plaintiff's possession, since if plaintiff had paid it he would get possession of i ':.* § 784. Where, however, on a second trial of a case, a party, having endeavoured to avoid part of his opponent's demand, by proving a mere statement made on the former trial, in his oppo- nent's presence, by his counsel in his address, the judge rejected evidence of what Lad been then said.'' It may be urged, in support of the above ruling, that statements made by counsel in the course of his address to the jury are often no other than embellisliments of the imagination or suggestions prompted by his own ingenuity ; and that as even bills in equity were formerly so regarded, and consequently were not evidence against the parties who filed them, much less ought parties to be bound by more oral speeches of counsel, which the client has not even had the advantage of considering before they are delivered.' • Hurvey v. Cioydon Union, &c., 1884, C. A. » Urquhurt v. Buttcrfiuld, 1888, C. A. 3 Stnicy V. IMiiko, 18;}(3; Doc J. Chilli i: Koo, 185'J. • JJolton V. Shoruiiiii, 183" (Ld. Abingor). ' Duncoinbo v. Daniell, 1837 (Ld. Dantnuu). But seo Muchell v. Ellis, 1845. • OoUodgov. Horn, 1825. The court in this case Bubsequontly gnuitod a fui'ther new trial ou othur giouuds, tho otlicr incuibors of it expressing no ojiinion as to tlio pminirty of tlm course taki'H at the M'ciuid trial, though Iforrougli, J., said tliiit if the j)laintill' was in couit. an<l heard what his cciuiiscl said, and made no objection, lie was bound by tlu^ stafc- Tiient. See 1{. '. Coyh', lcS,),j, llaller V. Wommn, iNfiO (Keating, J.) St'd qu. us Lo this lat-t (use. ' As to the autlioritj' of counsel to bind a client by a coiniironiiso or ugroenient mado at tho trial, see tiwiuiuu V. Swiuicu, I8al ; Chambuis 607 H iff- V '"'. ADMISSIONS BY PHINCIPAL, WHEN EVIDENCE. [PART III. § 785.' The admissions of a principal can somotimes (though only seldom) be received as evidence in an action agniiist the surety upon his collateral undertaking. In such cases if the declarations of the principal were so made during the transaction of the Lusiness for which the surety was bound, as to become part of the res gestse, they as such are admissible; but in any ether event ihey are not.^ For instance, where a surety has guaranteed ])ayment for such goods as the plaintiffs should send to another in the way of trade, admissions by the principal debtor, made after the time of their supposed delivery, that he had received certain goods, are not any evidence against the surety ; ' neither are confessions of embezzlement made by the clerk or collector after '.is dismissal evidence against a man who became a surety for the faithful conduct of such clerk or collector in his office.* § 780.' The declarations of a principal may, in some cases, though rarely, be evidence against the surety. For instance, entries made by the principal debtor in the course of his duty, or whereby he has charged himself with the receipt of money, will, certainly, after his death," and probably after he has absconded,' be received as evidence against the surety. Possibly, too, they are so if the defaulter be sued for his default, and thereupon gives his surety notice of the pendeiivij of the suit upon which the surety requests him to defend it. In such a case judgment against the defaulter is conclusive evidence for the surety in a subsequent action by him against his principal {i.e., the defaulter) for indem- nity, inasmuch as the principal has thus virtuullij become a party to V. Mason, 18.i8 ; Swinfen v. Ld. Cholinstord, ISOO; Tifstwich v. Foley, 18().); Strauss c.Fiancis.lSOG; Brady V. Curran, 1808 (Jr.); ILdt v. Jesse, 187(); Davis r. Davis, 1«8(). ' Gr. Ev. § 187, in great part. * So, in the absence of special aprepinent., a judpment or an award njrainst a jiriiicipal debtor is liot binding on the surety, and is not evidence ajrainst him if ho be sued by the creditor : I'lx p. Young, re Kitehin, 1881. » Evans V. H(>nttie, 1803 (Ld. Ellon- bnrougli) ; Hacon v. Chesncy, 1816 (id.), Longouecker v. Ilyde, 1813 (Am.). *■ Smith V. Whittineham, 1833. See. also. Cutler v. Nfwi. , 1S19 (Uolroyd, J.): Dunn r. Slco. 1810; Dawes' »'. Shed, IHIS (Am.); Fox- crolt V. Novens, iMiO (Am.) ; Hayes V. Seaver, 1831 (Am.); IJeuUv. Back, 1794. » Cir. Ev. § 188, in part. « Whitnasii v. Georfro. 1828; Mid- dlet(Wi V. Melton. 18'J!» ; Gossi>. Wat- bn^tou, 1S21 ; M'Gahoy v. Alston, J830. ' Ahbeyleix Gdns. v.SntclifFo, 1890 Ir.) ((!»'"'• O'Brien. J.): Town of ''nion V. Bermos, 1882 (Am.). « 608 CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS BY PRIVIES. to the suit. Accordingly, in an action by tlie sKeritf againirt the surety of a baiiiil', wlio had kept bick money, a written admission by the bailiJf of the receipt of this money was under these circum- stances held to be evidence against the surety, the bailiff being considered as substantially the defendant in the action.* § 7>"^7.^ The admissions of a person are also evidence against any other who is in pririfi/ with him. The term pririfi/ denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property ; and privies are distributed in several classes, according to the manner of this relationship. Thus, there are privies in estate, — as, donor and donee, lessor and lessee, joint-tenants, and successive bishops, rectors, and vicars; privies in blood,— as, heir and ancestor, and coparceners; privies in representation, — as, executors and testators, administratfU'S and intestates ; privies in law, — where the law, without privity of blood or estate, takes the land from one and bestows it upon another, as by escheat. All these are more generally classed into privies in estate, privies in blood, and privies in law.^ The ground, upon which admissions bind those in privity with the party making them, is, that they are identified in interest ; and of course the rule extends no further than this identity. The cases of coparceners, and of joint-tenants, are assimilated to those of joint promissors, partners, and others having a joint interest, which have alieady been considered."* In other cases, where the party by his admissions has qualified his own right, and another claims to succeed him, as heir, executor, or the like, the latter succeeds oidy to the right as thus (jualifiod at the time when his title commenced ; aad the admissions are receivable in evidence against the representative, in the same manner as they would have been against tbu party represented.^ Thus, the declarations of the ancestor, that he held the land as tenant of a third person, are » Porcharrt v. Tindall, IT.-o (Ld. Konj'on). Tho gmmul abovo mi'^- j,'L'stod is in iici'urilaiK'o rvitli tlio lulinuf, aud api)eiiia to bo tlio only way 111 which it can bo suppoitcd. A docuuiuut saying, "diwchargo iho dofondant out of custody ; I havo rocuivud tho iiionoy," sij^uod by tho bailiff, was there lield to ho for stamp purposes an authority, not a receipt, but Bulliciuut to charge the witness (the bailiff) with tho receipt of the money. ^ (Jr. ]']v. § 189, in fjreat part. ^ Vi). Lit. 271 a; Cai'vor c. Jack- son, l.^.iO (.Vin.); Wood. Inst. LL. En<j;. 2;J() ; Tonilin, L. Diet. Verb. Pririin. Heo Walktu's case, l.>8(j; Beverley's case, l(il),J-4; unto, § 90. * Ante, § 74;i. '• Coolo V. Bralium, 184S (Pai-ke, U.). 1 609 ADMISSIONS BY PRIVIES. fPAUT III. IF I'.- admissiWe to show that person's seisin in an action hj him against the heir for the land ; ' and the declarations of an intestate are admissible against his administrator, or any other claiming in his right.'^ $5 788.^ On the same principle, any declaration by a landlord, in a prior lease concerning the estate, is evidence against a lessee, who claims by a subsequent title;* admissions — whether evidenced by writing,'' such as letters, receipts, cases drawn for the opinion of counsel, answers in Chancery, or verbal statements, or even by conduct," — made by former bishops, rectors, or vicars, Avith regard to their several rights, will be evidence against their respective successors, in all cases where the same rights are in question. Ancient maps, books of survey, and the like, though mere private documents, are frequently admissible on the ground that a privity in estate exists between the former proprietor under whose direction they were made, and the present claimant against whom they are offered;' and the declarations of former owners or occupiers, made while in possession, are admitted against those claiming in privity of estate as evidence of the nature and extent of their title.* § 789. In general, the nnked declarations of a tenant will not be evidence against the reversioner.^ Accordingly, the declarations of • Doe V. VotU'tt. 1821 ; 2 Poth., Obi., 254 ; anto, §§ 684—687, aud cases there cited, ' Smith V. Smith, 18156. But the docliiratiiiiis of an executor, though made while ho was actinp; in that capacity, are not admissible ajjainst a spt'ciiil administrator, who has been apjiointed in conse(\ueneo of the exe<'iitor's protracted absence from England : Rush r. Peacock, INIJS (Ld. Denman). There the adminis- trator was appointed nnder ;S8 G. 3, c. 87. As to how far payments made by an executor de son tort to a creditor of a deceased person are binding on the riglitful executor, see Thomson v. Harding, ISj.'j. ' Gr. Ev. § 189. in i)art. • Crease v. Barrett, 18;ii5. See Doe V. Seaton, 18:H. • Bp. of Moath V. M of Winchester, 1836; Maddison v. Nuttall, 1829; Doe I'. Cole, 1834 (Patteson, J.) ; De Whelpdale v, Milburn, 1818 ; Carr v. Mostyn, lS,-)(). * See Lady Dartmouth v. Roberts, 1812, where a vicar wlio had filed a bill against his rector and certain landowners of the parivli for tithe hay, having abandoned the suit after the defendants in their answer had declared that the tith"s in ciuestion belonged to the rector, in a subse- quentactionfoi'snnilar tithes brought byasucceedingrectorag.iinst owners, who had j)urchased their lands from the paities to tlie former suit, the answer was held to be strong evidence in favour of the plaintiff. ' Bridgman v. Jennings, 1609. * Woolway v. Bowe, 1834 ; Doe v. Austin, 1832; Davies v. Pierce, 1787; Doe i;. Jones, 1808 ; Jackson v. Bard, 1809 (Am.); Norton v. Pcttibono, 1829 (Am.) ; Weidman v. Kohr, 1818 (Am.). » Tickle V. Brown, 1835 (Patteson J.). 510 it: ' ;i CHAP. IX..] ADMISSIONS BY TENANTS. WHEN' EVIDENCE. a former occupier of the defendant's land were held rot to be admissible against him, on an issue whether the plaintill had an easement in such land.' But in an action for the recovery of land the admission of the tenant in possession will, from the peculiar nature of the proceedings, be evidence against one who defends as landlord.* And in one case the receipts of a lessee of vicarial tithes wore hold at Nisi Prius to be evidence, in proof of a modus, against the vicar, by reason of priv'^y between them.' § TOO.* In consequence of privity of estate between them, ad- missions made bi( the msiynor of a personal contract or chattel previous to the assignment, where the assignee mu.st recover through the title of the assignor, and succeeds only to that title as it stood at the time of its transfer, bind such assignee. This, how- ever, occurs only where an identity of interest exists between the assignor and assignee. Such identity is deemed to exist both wbeu the assignee is either expressly or impliedly the mere agent and representative of the assignor,' and also Avlienever the assignee has acquired a title with actual notice of the true state of that of the assignor as qualified by the admissions in question, or wliere he has purchased a demand already stale, or otherwise infected with cir- cumstances of suspicion. § 71U.'' Accordingly, in an action by the indorsee of a bill or note, •which has been taken by the plaintiff either after it was due, or with notice of fraud in its original concoction and without con- sideration, the declarations of the indorser made while the interest was in him, are admissible in evidence for the defendant.' But as " the right of a person holding by a good titl- is not to be cut down by the acknowledgment that he had no title," t lerefore the doolcra- tions of a. former holder of a note, that such note was given without consideration, even though made while he held the note, are not ' Scholoa r. Cha<lwick, 18-13 (Cress- well. J.); I'api'Uilick v. Ihidgwater, 1855. "^ Doe V. Lithoiland. 1836. Seo E. S. C. 1883. Old. XII. IT. 'lb. 2(i. * Joues V. Cun-iiifft'in, 1S2-1 (I'tiik, J.). See, also, lllingworth v. licigh, 1800. ♦ Gr. Ev. § 190, almost verbatim. W'elsUiad v. Lovj, 1831 ; Hani- son V. yaliurino. 1822; fiibMehouco V. Stniiifi, \s\V> (Am.); Ilatoh r. Den- nis, ls:i:!(Aiii.); Siiel^rovo c Martin, 182;.' Am.). « (iv. !•>. § 190, in part. ' liBauiliamix'. I'ariv, 18.S0; Pcck- hnm V. Potter, 1824 (Ld. Giltord) ; 13onson v. Marshal (undated), cited in Shaw v. Broom, 1824 ; Shirley v. Todd, 1832 (Am.). 511 'ii; ADMISSIONS BY PRIVIES. [PART III. arlraissiWe against an indorsee, to whom tlie instrument has hoon transferred for good consideration, and before it was overdue; because sueh an indorsee derives his title from the nature of the instrument itself, and not through the previous liolder.^ § 792. The principle that declarations by a person through whom the jilaintiff claims are admissible is further illustrated by a ease'' in which an action was brought for taking three mares, and the defendant justified as lord of the manor under a hcriot custom ; the sole question between the parties being whether the tenant was possessed of the mares at the time of her death. Her declara- tions that she had given them to the plaintiff some time before were held admissible, as they were against her interest, and the right of the lord depended upon her title. Where, however, the issue does not distinctly raise the question whetaer the title of the party against whom declarations are tendered is dependent upon that possessed by the declarant, such declarations will be in- admissible. Therefore, where an issue was directed to try whether goods seized in A.'s house at the suit of the defendant were the property of the plaintiff, the declarations of A. respecting the pro- perty wero rejected.' Had the issue raised the question, whether at the tiittc of the execution the goods belonged to A., it would seem, on principle, that declarations of A. made before the seizure would have been evidence against the execution creditor (since, in an interpleader suit, the execution creditor ought to be con- sidered as claiming under the debtor) when they qualified or affected the debtor's title to the chattels in question.* In accord- \\\\ !!■ ,11 * Woolwayv. Eowe, 1834, explain- ing B;ii()iigh V. White, 1825 ; Smith t'. Do Wiuilz, Wlb (Abbott, C.J.) •, Boauchniiip v. Parrj', 183U. In ap- plying the principle indicated in the text, a note piiyable on demand, though not negotiated for some time after its date, will not on that account be treated us a note taken by an in- dorsee when overdue ; for such notes are intended to be continuing secu- rities, and may circulate for years without exciting suspicion : Barongh V. White, 1825; Brooks v. Mitchell, 184 1 . Neither will the circumstance that the declarations of the prior holder would, if received, prove his fraud in connection with the indor- see, render them admissible against the latter ; because all preliminary facts, which are necessary to .esta- blish the admissibility of evidence, must be proved aliunde, before sueh evidence is received ; Phillips v. Cole, 1839. See Heenan v, Clements, 1850 (Ir.). » Ivat V. Finch, 1808. » Stotherd v. Janus, 1843 (Maulo, J.). * Coole V. Braham, 1848. In this case a decision of Mr. Justice Wight- man (Ln Pi-osaer v. Qwiilim, 184;i), [}\2 CHAP. IX.] ADMISSION BY DECLARANT. f'> i ance with this view, on an interpleader issue l)ot\vopn tiie boldor of a bill of sale and an execution creditor, where the question was the usual one of fraud in the concoction of the bill of mle, the plaintiff was not allowed to suiiport the genuinone.-'s of the instrument by giving evidence of an admission by the execution debtor that a debt was due from him to the plaintiff, th(jugh stich admission was made prior to the assignment, and also in the absence of the defendant. § 79;J.* These admissions by third persons, through whom the person against whom they are received claims, as they derive their legal force from the relation of the party making them to the property in question, may be prorcd by aiii/ witness who heard them, without calling the party by whom they were made. The question merely is, whether the admission alleged was made, and not whether the fact is as then admitted. The truth of it may, where the adnussion is not conclusive, — and it seldom is so, — be controverted by other testimony, and even by calling the party himself ; but it is not necessary to jiroduce him, for his declara- tions, when admissible at all, will be received as original evidence, and not as hearsay.^ § 794. With respect to the time and circiinistances of the admis- sion, it may first be observed, that whenever the declarations of a third person are offered in evidence, on the ground that the party against whom they are tendered derives his t'tle from the declarant, it must be shown that they were made at a time when he had an interest in the property in question. For it would be manifestly unjust that a person, after having parted with his interest in proi)erty, should be empowered to divest the right of another claiming under him, by any statement which he may choose to make.* Accordingly, the admission of a former party to a bill of exchange, made after he has negotiated it, cannot under any cir- cumstances be received against the holder;* where a person had. rejectinp; flio declarations of the exe- cution (Icbtiir, on the fiioiind that the execution creditcn- ele.inied udversdy to him, is discredited. ' Gr. Ev. 191, almost verbatim. ' Anto. ^§ ,j7(), ()t»2, (iO;i, and eases there cited ; Woolway v. llowo, iy:i4 ; Uiickell V. riulse, is;}?. ^ Doe i: WVMht, KS;{4 {I A. Den- man); Foster c. M'Mahon, l!S47(Ir.); Lalor V. Lalor, l>S7!t (Ir.). * I'oeock i: Hillinj,', l.S'J4 ; Shaw V. IJrooHi, 1824. See Hoboita v, tlustice, 1S43. 513 ' .ri I' I •I, I'' m * It ••■ 11. "I' ifr, r OFFERS OF COMPROMISE, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART III. by a voluntary post-nuptial settloraent, convpyod away his iutnrpst in an estate, and afterwards executed a mortf^age of the same property, his admission that money had actually heen advanced upon the mortgage was hold not to he admis.sihlo on hchalf of tlie mortgagee, wlio was seeking to set aside the former settlement as V(duntary and void;' and the deolaratiim^ of a bankrupt, though good evidence to charge his estate with a debt if made before his bankruptcy, is not admissible at all if it were made afterwards.^ This most just and equitable doctrine will be found to apply to the cases of vendor and vendee, grantor and grantee, and, geimiall^', to all cases of rights acquired in good faith previous to the time when the adniission was made.'' § 79/5. We have before briefly notlned,' that coiiftdriifidl orrr/nirs of parijicfifion, and any other offers or propositions between liti- gating parties, expressly or impliedly made irif/ioiit prrjiidivr, are excluded. This is on grounds of public policy." If this were not 60, it would often bo dillicult to take any steps towards an amii able compromise or adjustment. Lord ^Nfansfield has observed that all men must bo permitted to buy their peace, without [)rejudice to them should '''e offer not succeed; such offers being made to stop litigation, without regard to the question whether anything is due or not. If, therefore, a defendant, on being sued for 10(1/., should offer the plaintiff 20/., at the same time stating that he made such offer " without prejudice," evidence of the offer woidd not be adinissible in evidence ; for it is irrelevant to the issue ; it neither admits nor ascertains any debt, and is no more than saying that he would give '20/. to be rid of the action.' An otler made " without prejudice " cannot be looked at even upon a question of costs.' • Doe r. Wobbor, 1834 ; Gully v. Up. of Exetor, 1S2.S. » Gr. Kv. § 18(1, in part. » Batemiin v. Uailcy, 1794 ; Sinitb V. Simuies, 179.J; Deatly v. ilani- Bon, 1815. See, also, Iliirwood v. Keys, 1832; and Koinpland v. Mac- aulov. 1791 (Ld. Kcnyon). * Wclstoadv. Low, 1831; Hartlott V. Deljirat, 1808 (Am.); Clark v. Waite, 18i5 (Am.1; IJiid-ro v. Kjrfilo- Bton, 1817 (Am.); rhcnix r. In- praham, 1809 (Am.); I'lackor v. Gunsalus, ISIj (Am.); I'atton Goldsboroufrh, 1822 (Am.",; Mwhhv. CU-'Uison, ls2.') (Am.); t'lowdor v. Hopkins, 184;j (Am.); Tadgott v. LiiwRMicc. 1843 (Am.). » Ante, § 774. • Cory r. Hic'tton. 1830 (Tindal, C.J.); "Iloab-y v. Thatcher, 18;W; Paddock V. Forrester, 1842; Jardino V. Shoridan, 1840; WIiilTcn v. Ilard- wri^fht, 1S48; ]I(if,'lit(m v. Iloghton, 18o2; J(.iu'.s c. Foxall, 18.J2. ' 15. \. r. 23(). 1). « Walker V. AViltshiro, 1889, C. A. »i4 11 ' ■« CHAP. IX.] OFFERS OF COMPI{0>fISK, WIIKN AHMISSinLE. Even tho giving of a small sura in onUtr to ohtiiin tho roleas-'o of a right, ciiunot be considurud as an ackiKtwlcdgnK'nt that a ri«'ht exists ; it amoviiits only to this — " I givo you so much for not seeking to disturb me." ' Perhaps, also, an offer of compromise, the esseueo of which is that the party making it is willing to submit to a Facrifioe, or to make a cm ncssion,- will bo rejected, though nothing at tho time was expressly said respecting its con- fidential character, if it clearly appear to have been made under tho faith of a pending treaty, into which the party hiis been led by the confidence of an arrangement being effcctecl ; ■' though, in this case, if the admission be merely of a coUatenil or indilffrcnt fact, such as tho handwriting of a party, which is capable of easy proof by other means, and is not connected with the substantial merits of the cause, it will be received.'' Tho American courts have held that evidence of the admission of any independent fact is receivable, though made during a treaty of compromise.' § 7!)(». In the absence of any ex[)re.><s, or strongly implied, restriction as to confidence, an offer of compromise is clearly admissible as some evidence of liability." The offer of a less sura than the amount demanded will not, in general, support a count on an account stated, since it may be a mere offer to j)urchase peace ; ' — nor, perhaps, will an offer by the drawer of a bill, who is threatened with legal j)roceedings upon it, to give another bill by way of settlement, obviate the necessity of ])roviiig at the trial that he has received due notice of dishonour.* Nevertheless, there are occasions when tho fact of an olfer having been made may be entitled to considerable weight,' as, for in.stance, if the drawer of a bill, whose signature is in issue, has projjoscd a settlement. On the other hand, in a case '" where the defendant was sued for keeping ' Undorwood v. Ld. Courtowii, 1804 (Ir.) (Ld. Kcdosdale). * TJiomson v, Auston, 1823 (13;ij-- ley, J.). 3 Waldiidge v. Kenuisoii, 17!M {\A. Konvon). « id. Mount V. Bogort, 181G (Am.) (Thoiiijison, V.J.); Murray r, Costnr. IS'Jo (.\in.); Fuller c. lliiiii)it()ii. 1824 (Am.); Suuboru v. Neil.soii, 1828 (Am.) ; Delogny v. Rontoul, 1812 (Am.). 6 WiilLico V. Small, 1830 (Ld. Toiitenlcn) ; "Watts r. Lnw.-on, is.'iO (id.'i; Nicholseu i: Smith, 1S22 (id.). ' Waymaii /■. llillianl, IS.)!!. * Ciiiniu;? /'. Frciich, ISdi) (Ld. Elli'nliiiriiii<,'li). See [lost, § 8()(i. ' llariliii;,' '•. Jones, 18;)."). '" 'I'liomas /•. Miiriraii. lN3j. !^oe, lidwuvoi', Sayers u. WaUh, 1848 (Ir.). Ol> nil H^ OFFERS OF COMPROMISE, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PAUT III, mischiovous dogs, which had killed three of the plaintiff's cattle, aiul it n]»i)eared that on being told of the injury done by his dogs he had offered to settle for it, the court held, that though this was a fact, which in strictness should have been submitted to tlie jury as evidence of the scienter,' it was entitled to little, if any, weiglit, "as it might have been made from motives of charity witliout any admission of liability at all." Admissions made before an arbi- trator are receivaljle in a subs(;queut trial of the cause, the reference having proved ineffectual.^ 8 707. As to a man's purchasing peace, or endeavouring to do 8o, the words of Lord EUenborougli,— when Sir WilU.im Scott was sued for illegally exoommunicafiiig one Beaurain, wliose animosity he had endeavoured to stifle by a gift, — are worth reciUing, " Let this action be a lesson for all men to stand boldly forward — to stand on their characters — and not, by compromising a i)rt'stiit difficulty, to actiumulate imputations on their honour."^ S 71)8.* Admissions made under circumstances of const mint, cannot be received when obtaiiu d by ///rr/r// duress ; ^ but are adiuissiblo, at least on tlie trial of civil acticms," if the compulsion unihfr which they were made was legal. Thus affidavits sworn by a party in former legal proceedings, answers filed by him in Chancery in a former suit, evidence given uy him in au action at law, or his examination taken in bankrup-tcy, will be evidence against himself in a subsecpient cause. They, under these circum- Btances, are admissible even though the 8ub.se4ueut opponent was a !■'<) I ' Thi-uhMiuddoctrinoof "BeienttT, ' as ii|i|>li('<ili!t! to uiiscliicvoiiH ilo^^i ■>(> l(»ii;.'iT pit'vuils in ItM fiitirL'fy. In Jri'laiid, '• till) owner of cvciy ilo<j is liiilil'- ill iliiiiii'i,'!!-* ior injury <l(iU(! to uny ^/i"/' liy lii-i <lo;,'," wi.etln'r sucli do;; Itc inisiliii'voiis or not : 'lit \' -'<i V. c. .»!» ("Tlui l)o;,'« (Ircliuid) Ai't, IhirJ "), § I, Ir. Slit), also, I'M it J!» V. c. .)0, Ir. A Hoincwliat similar anxiulnirnt of t!io luw has liccn in- tro lined infi: ivn^laiid and Scotlimd, onil lias lieon extended in tlu'socoun ' tries to inpuies euitsed l>y doj^s to «/,n;. or riiill,-; '.'(> iV •-'" V. c. 101) ("Tlie I)o;{s (Scotland) Art. IHU.'J"), I 1, «c. ; 26 & 2U V. c. (iO (^"The 5 "oRsAct, lS(i.)"). Tilt) word "ciittlo" heio used iucluiles horses; Wriglit v, IVarson, iMii). ■ (iie-oiy V. Howard, 18()() (Ld. Kenyou); Slack r. liuchannun, 1T(*U (id.). ' Fid. Mldon's Life, hv Twiss, vol. ii. jpi). -I'M -IVi, 'Jiid edit. * (ir. l'',v. § n».>. in part. » Stoekllrt'h r. DeTasti't, ISl I (Ld. I'lllenlioroufjh); I!o1)m)U i\ AlexaiidiT, IH'.'M. As to what (|Ue>tioiis ii wit- ness may refuse to answer, 8t>o post, §^ ll.").'i et se(|. • As to their adniissiliility in 'Timl- in// pi-oufodings, r;cu pvj.-t, J§ fcOfl— IG CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS MADE UNDER CONSTRAINT. utraTiger to the prior proceeding,' — tliougli the party who made tho admit^sion might, had ho thought fit, have siiccessfidly demurred to <he questions,'- — or though tho questions were irrelevant to the matter before tho court at tlie time of the examination, and were l)ut for the purpose of procuring evidence in another action depending against him,' — or thougli tlie witness had no oppor- tunity of fully exjdaining the testimony ho had given. For example, in an action^ for taking the plaintill's ship, the teslipiony given by the defendant as a witness in an action between other ]»arties, in which he admitted tlie taking of the ship, was idlowed to be proved against him, though it appeared that when, in giving his eviilence, ho was proceeding to state his reasons for taking tho ship, the judge had stopped him by saying that it was unnecessary for him to vindicate his conduct ; and where a defendant had been examined in bankruptcy, and, though the whole of what he said had not been taken down, the portion that was reduced to writing had been read over and signed by him, such portion was held to be receivable against him as a statement of facts, the truth of which he had admitted.* § 7!)9. An admission, obtained un<ler a conijiulsory examination, may, it is submitted," be evidence of an (ircottiif xfafai. If, for instance, an admission were contained in an answer to interro- gatories, it would most probably be regarded as good evidence of an account stated.' § 8(i0.* Passing now to a consideration of the nfttiire of ailmis- sions, it may bo ohscrved that no diffenMico exists, in regard to their admissibility, between direct admissions, and those which are ' Grant v. Jucksnn, 1"!>:{ (I-il. Ken- yon); Afhuioror. lIanly,l«H(J(l'iitto- Min. J.). - Smith /•. HfiulncU, 1807 (I.<1. I'illc'iilinnmjrli). ' Stoukllutli V. Do Taslct, IHIJ. If an t'xuniiniitinn has hfcii jht- vi'itt'il to iinpnipi'i' i)nri)i).-<'s, tlw rcnii'dy is by an ajijilicatimi f<> liavc thiM'xaniiiiation (akcn from lln' lilt'^* uiid cancelled (l,d. Mlleiilioroujjli'. ' Collett V. 1,(1. Keitll, lH(i;l (l,e I'.laiic. .1.). ■ Mil ward I'. Foibort, INO') (I,d. I'.lli'lihorouull). ' Tho contrary has been snpposi d, but til" case ill \vhi<'ii tliis jioinrr arose |irol)iilily restM on tlii^ j^roind tliat the iidiiiis-ioii was flure niiiclo to a thud ]iaity (Tucker c, Harrow, ls2N ;l,itth'>iale, .).)), while to h;ij)- jiort an account stated the udiuission must be made, either to tlie person to whom the money is owin^, or to Homeiine sent by him : Itieckon e. Smith. IN.M; ItateH v. Townh-v, IKIS. ' See MateH V. Towiiloy, 184!* (Ahh-rs!.n, II. \ - (ir. Kv. § nil, in paii. 617 NATUUE OF ADMISSIONS — DIRECT — INCIDENTAL, [p. III. I 1 ii V' mj I ':•' k! iuci(h'uf(il, or made in some other connexion, or involved in the admission of some otlier fact. One or two illustrations of this have already been noticed while treating of admissions made by soli- citors,' and the following may here bo added. In an action by the assignees of a Lunkruiit against an auctioneer to recover the ])roceeds of a sale of tho bankru[it'8 goods, the defendant's adver- tisement of the sale, describing the goods as " the projterty of D., a bankrupt," was held to be a conclusive admission that D. was a bankrupt, and that the defendant was acting under his assignees ; "^ and a party who, with a view of mnking a trader a bankrupt, had made an allidavit that the trader owed him 100/., and was become baukruiit, was not allowed to dispute the bankruptcy, when after- waids sued in trover by the assignees.'' ?i SOI."* Admissions are sometimes iinplivd from the assiimplioii or the rrrni/iiifion of a chnrnctor. Whenever the existence of ny domestic, social, or official relation is in issue, any recognition, whether by word or deed, of that relation, is prima facie evidence of its existence, as against tho person making such recognition.'* Thus, where one has (insitnicil to nvf in (in ii/ficiti/ c/inrnrfcr, this is an admission by him of his appointment or title to the office, so far as to render him liable, even criminally, for misconduct or neglect in 6uch office." This doctrine has been applied, among other cases, in actions or prosecutions against clerg^'men, for non-residence;' agiiinst military officers, for returning false musters;^ against j'Opish [iriests, for remaining forty days within tho kingdom, when this was considered an offence of no less magnitude than high treason ; ' against letter-carriers, for embezzlement ; "" and against eolicitors," toll-gatherers,'^ and collectors,'*' for penalties. ' Ante, § 773, ' Maltlty V. Clnintio, 179j, as ox- tlaiiicd (lid. Klli'uhoroiif^h) in Han- iii r. lloiii.T, IHl'.', ' l..'ilhclt.T M. SiiU, 1S28; IlaiintT t'. Ihivis, 1.S17. Mot) poHt, § Hj(), ad fin. * (Jr. l',v. § 19<>. in jiart. ' hickitiso'n V. ('..ward, 181M (Ld. I'llli ii1hh(i\i;;1iJ ; rccojj^nizi'd (Lil. TiVndlmi'st) in Infills v. Sponco, l^<;tl. • iSno ante, § 171. ' Bovan v. Williams, 1776 (Ld. Manslinhr. « It. I'. Gardner, 1810 {lA. Ellen - b(>ronjj:li). » 1{. r. K.'rni!, Unit; R. v. Broni- niich. I(i7i); K. v. Atkins, 1(J7!>. '" 11. r. IJoirott, l.s;j;i (Littl.idalo and H()xan<ini't, .FJ. ; Itolland, B.). Thu jirisnncr was indi(;tc'd under 2 \V. l, c. 4, now ro))t'aUid by 24 iSc 2.") V, c. !»,i, " ("rosH /•. Kiivo, 17!l(i, '•' Tio\vl)iid!r<'V. I'.iik.T, lK23(Am.) " i<istt;r l: i'rifBlly, ISIO. 518 I I CHAP. IX.] RECOGNITION OF CHARACTER OF OTHERS. § 802. Again, whore a man lias recofjnised the official character of another, by treating with him in such character or otherwise, this is at least prima facie evidence of his title against the party thus recognising it.^ For instance, where a person had obtained credit from the renter of turnpike tolls, and had afterwards accounted with him in that character, and made him a partial payment, he was not permitted to question the legality of his ap[iointment ; * where a farmor-genernl of post-horse duties brought an action for certain statute penalties against a person who let out horses for hire, proof of plaintiff's appointment was waived, the defendant having previously accounted with him as famier-goneral ; ' the clerk of the trustees of a turnpike road has been prevented from r-howing that a person who had acted as a trustee, and whom he had himself, while clerk, treated as such, was not duly qualified ; ■* in an actioii by the trustee of a bankrupt against a debtor, who has made him a purtial payment,* or has acknowledged his title in letters to the solicitor under the bank- ruijtcy," the plaintifE need not prove his title as trustee, though notice to dispute it has been given ; in an action by a solicitor for defamation, in charging him with swindling, and threatening to have him struck off the rolls, this threat was held to imply an admission that the plaintiff was a solicitor ; ' and in a similar action by a physician, where the plaintiff was spoken of as " Doctor L.," and the defendant had, as an apothecary, made up medicines prescribed by him, the Court of Common I'loas was equally divided upon the question, wliether the defendant's words and conduct amounted to an acknowledgment of the plaintiff's character.* In actions of this kind, however, if the words com- plained of charge a uant of qualification and not mere misc(mduct, the plaintiff must prove that ho posse8.«es the diaracter which has been impugned." ^ S0;{. Thus, in an action by a surgeon for work and labour, ' I'.MKOrk l\ IIlMTis, 1808. * S('t> iiiitt', §§ 1".'{ ' 17o. » IJadfoid r. M'lnt.ish. 1700. ♦ rritclmnl v. Walker, 1827 (ViiU(xhim, H.). * Itickiiison r. Cdwiird, 1818. • Iiiglis i'. fjiuact), \M\ ; Crofton V. I'dolo, ih;jo. ' ItcriTiiiuii i\ Wiso, 17!M. • Smith i\ Tnylcir, IHOJ; Sir J. MiiiiNlioliI mill Iji'itth, iT.,iilV., ]{<)(ikn ami Cliiiiiibni, J.F., neg. • 111. ; ('i)lliiiM (1. Camcgio, IMM (Lit. l>('iiiiiau). 61!) ADMISSIONS IMPLIED FROM CONDUCT. [PART III, where' the defence was that the plaintiff was a physician, and therefore incapable, by the law then in force,'" of maintaining an action for fees, it having besn shown that the ])laintiff had written prescriptions and signed hiniself M.D., Lord EUiMiborough was on the point of nonsuiting him— saying that " if a person passes himself off as u physician, ho miisi take tlie character cum onere" — when it ajipeand that the defendant liad paid money into court ; on this, his lordship thought tluit this act was tantamount to an admis>ion >u the phiiutiff's right to sue as a surgeon, and got over the objecition. S S04.'- Admissions may (as has already been mentioned wliile treating of presumptions'') be implied from the coiKliicf of the party. Thus, an attemjtt by a plaintiff to suborn false witnesses is cogent evidence that his cause is an unrighteous one;'* the sujjpres- sion of documents is an admission that the contents were deemed uufavoural'le to the party supfiressing them ; ^ tlie entry of a charge to a j)iirticular person in a tradesman's book, or the making out of a bill of parcels in his name, is an admission that the goods were furnished on his credit ; " the delivery, by a tradesman, of an invoice or account in whieli goods are deserihed as bonght from hira, is strong, but not conclusive, evidence that he was the real vendor ; ' the omission of a claim in a sclieJule of the debts due to the framer of it, which is given on oath, is an admission that such debt is not duo ; * and payment of money is an admission against the payer, that the receiver is the proper person to receive it, — ' Lipscoinbo r. llolmos, 1810. Sw, furtliiT, (111 this 8ul)j<'i'i, \l. V. l>iini(3s, ISI'!; Ciiinmin ('. siaitli, IHKi^Am.); Divoll c. Iiciiill)cttia-. lM2«i(.\m.). i« Sfo now '21 i^i '11 V. 0. !M), § ;{1 ; (Jil)')iiii i\ llinlil. lS(i:{; imd hye-liiw (if 'hi' Unviil (Julli';;(i of I'liysiciiiiis, thiit. no FilltiH! i\i tliii Colli'^"' sliiill bt! ontilli'il ID suo for ffes. This bj-c- lii.v, it will Im ohsoi'vixl, (loi'S not oxtiMiij to oi'.liiuiiy iiiniilicri of tlio Colli'^i'. iiml si'cli |)mMi>ns iiiiiy now sno hv virtlio of the Medical .Vet. ' (Jr. \'W. § 1!»IJ. in jKirt. ^ Aiitf, $§ Ml7, llii. 117, ITS, j.').5. * Moiiiuty V, Lontl. Clmt. & I). Kiiil. Co., 1^70. » Juiuu» V. Uiou, anil Owon v. Ki.ick, 18'.>(5; Ui-U v. rrankis, 1812; (.'uricwis ('. CoifiHld, 1811; I'liftou IK U. S., 181(5 f.Vm.); U. r. J.oud. HriKht. & S. Cimst Kiiil. Co., 18Jl {('oli'rid;^(\ J.); Sutton r. Dovoii- l)ort, 18.'i7 ; Kduionda v, Foster, 187.>. ' .Storr c. Scott, is.'J.'J (|,d. Tivnii- hurst). Sou Thomsou c. l)iiven|)iii't, 1820. ' IFoldin'j; i-. Elliott, \HoO. .See post, § 1 1. ■).'!. * In N'icholls r. DowncB, \>,M), Ld. Tentcrdcii hold it to bo conrbisivo, iippiircntly (|o('stioiiiny; lliiit c. Ncw- nnin, 1811, where lA. Mlli-iilioroiiKh troiitt'd it lis cntitli'd to little weij^ht. Sco Tilyiuniiu c. Fiwliur, 1840 (Am.), m CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS IMPLIED FROM CONDUCT. although not against the receiver, that the payer was the person who was bound to pay it ; for the party receiving payment of a just demand may well assume, without inquiry, that the party- tendering the money was the person legally bound to pay it.* H i<0o. Admissions from conduet may also arise in settlement cases. Thus, relief given at various times to a pauper while he is residing in fiuotlicr parish, is cogent, though not conclusive, ovideuce that liH is settled in the relieving parish.^ i^ ^00. Admissions by ooiulaot also arise in actions connected with bills of exohange. Thus, a distinct promise by the drawer to pay, or indeed any anknowleJgment by him of liability upon, a dishonoured bill, — as, for example, the suffering judgment by default in a prior action, brought by a former holder of the instru- ment, — w'U raise an inference that he has either received o" waived due notice of dishonour,' and, in the case of a foreign bill, that it has been duly protested;* and a jury will be justified in coming to the same conclusion on less positive evidence ; as, for instance, if the drawer, in disclaiming liability when threatened with an action, did not rest his defence on the want of notice, but on some different ground.* The maxim, expressum facit cessare ' Jamos V. Biou, 1826; CbapL.un V. Bounl, 1707. ' U. V. Burnsley, 1813 (Ld. Ellen- borough) ; R. V. WakoHold, 1804; 11. V. Stanley cum Wrenthorpe, 1812; K. V. East Winch, 1840; R. r. Yarwoll, 1829; R. v. Carnarvon- shire JJ., 1S41. Formerly the roliof must have bwin pivon by the church- wardens and oversowrs in order to furnish evidence against tiie parish, but the board of miiirdians now rc- priwont for this purpose every parish witliin the luiion (see 11. v, Cron- dall, 1847); and the clerk to the guardians n^jjri'nenfs the board (R. V. Wiffan, 184!>). Even a sinjfie iii- fitaiico of such relief having boon given will warrant a similar conclu- sion (R. V. Edwinstowo, 1828). Of course, the elVect of such ovidonco will Ihj much stronger if the exinni- natioii statt'sa distinct head of Lcttlo- inent in the rtilieving parish, thuu .di the technical proof may fail to esta- blish it satisfactorily (R. v, Bnding- ham, 18H (Ld. Donman)). On the other hand, the relief of a pauper, while residing in the relienini/ parish, is no evidence whatev^jr of a settle- ment, however frequently it may have boon bestowed: R. v. Chatham, 1807 ; R. V. Trowbridge, 1827; R. v. Coleorton, 18:{(t; R. v. St. Giles-in- the- Fields, 1841. » Kabey c. Gilbert, 18(51 ; "Woods 1'. Dean, lH(i2; Cordery '•. Colvin, 18();l; Kiliby v. Rochussin. \HIW). * lli.ks i'". L>. of Ueaiitnit, IS.JS; rampbi'll I'. Webster, I84,j; Patter- son r. HccUer, 1821 ; Brownoll ><. ]\i>uno.y, 1841; Fardoo d. O'Connor, 1848 (Ir.). See Boll /'. Frankis, 1H42; Ilolnu'; i\ Staines, 18.'»0. » Wilkins r. Jadis, 1831 (Ld. T.n- terden); Curlcwis v. CorfielJ, 1841. See ante, § 7UG. 521 ADMISSIONS IMPLIED FROM CONDUCT. fPART III. i: I I hM ^\k K taciturn, will here raise a presumption, which a defendant may Bud it difficult to rebut. § 807. Again : conduct may create a waiver of a determination of the relationship of landlord and tenant, which has previously been brought a>'out by forfeiture, under the terms of the holding, or by notice to quit. Such determination is waived by the land- lord's suing,' or distraining,- for rent accruing due since a forfeiture of which the lessor iias had notice, as also by the acceptance of such rent,' and perhaps by even the mere demand of it,* — unless, indeed, an action to recover the property has actually been brought previously.^ For those acts amount to an acknowledgment of the tenancv on tlie pait of the lessor." If, however, a breach be a continuing one, as the using rooms in a prohibited manner, or the omitting to keep premises insured or repaired, the acc('i)tance of rent after such breach will not waive the forfeiture incurred by subsequent user or omission.' A notice to quit will also in general be regarded as waived, if the landlord anrpfn rent subsequently accruing due, or puts in a distres.s for .such rent, or does any otlur act amounting to a rocognition of an existing tenancy, after the oxpiiatiou of the time when the tenant ought to have quitted according to the notice.** Wht^tlier a simple denutml of rent subse- quently accruing due, or the bringing of an action for such rent, will operate as a waiver of a notice to quit, is a question not of law, h ;l; ' Kno V. Minshiil, 17.')9: Dnndy '•. Nioholl, IHolS. Seo Tok'inim v. I'ort- Imrv, 1!S72. ■•'"Don V. r.rk. 18:U); Cotoswortli r. S]iukfs, ISiil ; Ward i\ Diiy. I.s<i4. •' WiirwicU r. JioHii.T, lS,-)0 (I,il. Truro, C.) : Crol't »: I,uiiil(!V, IH.m-S, 11. L. : I'rici) c. Worwooil. lHo<»; lliivinjxirt *•. The (iudcu. 1S77, 1'. T. Sec Jv'tMii i\ Miscoo, liS78. * Doo I', r.inli, ISiJt). ° (iiiiinvcKMl c. Mdss, 1872. " Gooihivjlit '•. l»iivitlH. 1778; Wal- nmil ('. lliiwkins, l.s7o; Koo r. lliini- wiii, 178H; l»<ic /■. Alli!ii, 1810; Doo '. Hci's, is;!8 ; Anihlty I'. Woothviinl, 1H27. In Inland, however, it has now for some yi'iirw boon providod l.y statuto(-j:S & 24 V. c. l.)4. § 4:») iliat where uuy lease, made after the 1st of Jaimary. 18()1, shall contain or ini])ly any condition, covenant, or a^^'rt'cnicnt to ho oh'^orvod or por- fornicd on the jiart of thi> tenant, no act done or sutfered hy tlie landlord shall h(! deemed a dispensation tliero- with, or a waiver of the lienetit of tiio sani" in respect of any hreach thereof, iiidess such dispensation or w. liver shall he si.Miitied hy the landlord, or hi-i autliorizod agent, in wi'itin;? under his hand. ' Uoo i\ Woodi,ri(U'e, 18.!!»: Doe V, I'eck. ' i(»; Hyde v. Watts. 1H4;1; i'rico r. Worwooil, 18.')!) ; Doe u, niadwin, l8|i'); Doo c. Jones, I8<j(). Seo jiost, § 847. " /oucli c. \Villinf,'ule. K'.H); Oood- right u. ('ordwt.'ut, 17!l'>; Doe v. Hatton, 1775 ; Doe c. Culvert, 1810. 622 CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS IMPLL:D PROM ACQUIKSCENCE. but of fact, which must consequently ho determined hy the jury.' When a valid notice to quit^ has had the legal effect of determiuiiig a tenancy, the waiver of such notice does not revive the tenancy thus determined, but creat'^s a now one.' § 808. To the instances above mentioned, in which the common law infers a waiver of the determination of a tenancy by conduct, must be added a case in which the TjPgislature * has provided a conclusive inference from particular conduct. For it has provided that if a lease granted under a powei- be invalid by reasou of some deviation from the terms of the power, the acceptance of rent under it shall be deemed a confirmation of the lease as against the person iiccepting the rent ; provided such person, or some one else by his authority, shall, before or at tlie time of accepting the rent, sign a receipt, memorundum, or note in writing, confirming such lease. S 809.' Admissions may also be implied from the acqiuon't'inr of tlio party. Acquiescence, to have the effect of an admission, must exhibit some act of the mind, and amount to voluntary demeanour or conduct of the party.*' And whether it be acquiescence in the conduct or in the language of others, it must plainly appc ar tliat such conduct was fully known, or such language fully understood, by the party, before any inference can be drawn from his passive- ness or silence.' The circumstances, too, must be u^ nly such as afforded him an opportunity to act or to speak, but such also us would properly and naturally call for some action or repl^' from men similarly situated.* Examples of ac(]uiescence are as follows. As between laudlonl and tenant, a landlord quietly suffenng a tenant to expend money in making altciations and improvements on the premises, is evidence of his consent to the alterations ; '•• and ' IJlytli j;. Dcniiott, 18.)3; Doo w. l?iitton, 17"j; Vuiico v. Vuiico, 1871 (Ir.)- ' Sec Holme i'. Uniiiskill, 1S77, 0. A. ; Aliourn v. liolhnun, lb7i», C. A. » Tavlfur v. Wildin, 186S. • lJyl;J & 14 V. c. 17, §2. • 1 Gr. Kv. § 107, ill j^ioat part. • AlUm I'. McKccn, ls:t:{ (Am.). ' Soo Smitli i\ lliiyi'y, lHf)7 (Ir.) ; IJuvicB 1'. Miir.xhall, 18G1 ; Bickott c. Morria, IbUU, U. L. " R. V. ifitclu'll. 1802: ^[.■loI, ,., Aiidli'ws, ISJil; ('xpliiilicil in Siiri]i- sou ('. l{ol)ins()ii, ISIS (1,(1, ])i'niii:ui); i{. ('. Xtnvmiiu, lS,j2; Hovil ''. Itiil- toii. ISI 1 (Ir.). Sou Bigjj' V. Strung, 1S,)7. » Doo I'. Allen, 1810; Doe v. I've, 179j (fid. Kciivon); Noulo v. Puikiii, 179.) (ill.). See, also, .Stiinlctv u. White, 1811; Cotchiii}? v. Ha'ssct. 18()2. But merely lyinj; liy iiiul im.asivoly wilucssiuj^ a hreacli iif cuveiiuut lor hovuiuI years iu uut 623 ADMISSIONS IMPLIED FROM ACQUIESCENCE. [pART HI. a tenant who, on pemonallif receiving notice to quit on a particular day, makes no objection, will generally, in England,' be deemed to liave admitted that his tenancy expires on that day ; ** but if he cannot read, or even if he did not read the notice in the presence of the person serving it upon him, it will be trciited as a notice not jiersonally served, and will go for nothing.-" For the purposes of the bankruptcy laws, a debtor wbo hears liimself inquired for and denied, thereby furnishes some evidence against himself that he is beginning to keep house with intent to defeat or delay his creditors, and, consequently, is committing an &' of bankruptcy.' In general, wherever one knowingly avails hiis " ci inother's acts done for his benefit, the jury will be justified i co it dering such conduct as an admission of his obligation to paj a reas .v:Me compensation.* Thus it was held that an executor who, having been served with notice of motion to pay into court part of the testator's estate, which was sworn by affidavit to have reached his hands, had, by his silence, and by refraining from disputing the facts deposed to, made a sufficient admission of their truth to justify the making of the order.* And where two brothers, claiming derivative settlements from their father, having been removed by successive orders, and the examination of the father proving his settlement having been served upon the appel- lants together with the firt^t order, against wliich tliere was no appeal, the fact of the appellants not objecting to the ground of such an acquiescence as to amount to a waiver of the forfeiture : Doe v, Allen, 1«10; Perry »,'. Davis, 1858; Macaulav v. Robertson, l>S8G(Ir.); But see Iveatinfjw. Bolton, 1887 (Ir.), and also ante, § 808. ' The Irish law is regulated, in part, by § G of 23 & 24 V. c. 154, which enacts that "every tenancy from year to year shall be presumed to have commenced on the last gale day of t!.e calendar year on which rent has become duo and payuble in respect of the premises, until it shall appear to the contrary;" and, in l)art. by § 58 of 3;J & 34 V. c. 46. ^ Doe V. Biggs, 180!); Thomas v. Thomas, 1811; Doe v. Forstor, 1811; Oakapple v. Copous, 1791; Doe V. Wombwell, ISll (Ld. Ellen- borough). See Walker v. Qode, 18(51. >» Doe V. Calvert, 1810 (Ld. Ellen- borough), explained Thomas v. Thomus, 1811; ])()o v. Forster, 1811. ' Key r. Sliaw, 1832. See 4G & 47 V. c. 52. §4, subs. 1 (F)). * In Morris v. Buidttt, 1808 (Ld. EUenborough), a candidate not bf)und by statute to piy for the hii>tiiigs erected for an electio!i, bad made use of them. In Abl>ot v. IL inion, 1830 (Am.), a schoolimuso had been used by the school district: Ilaydon v, Madison. lS;iO (Am.). » Freeman i'. Cox, 1878 (Jessel, M.R.); Hampden r.Wttllis, 1884, C. A. 624 P CHAP. IX.] NOr OBJECTING TO ACCOUNTS SENT BY POST. removal when they received the first sf>n, was lielil sHglit evidonce of an admission that the father was settled in their parish.' § 810. There, moreover, may, as between debtor and creditor, also be admissions by conduct. Thus, raising an objection to one item of an account and making no remark as to the rest, will be evidence of an account stated as to those items to which no objec- tion has been made;* and, (itnoiuj iiirrr/imifs, an aceoniit rendered will V)e regarded as allt)wed, if it be not objected to within a second or third pust,^ or, at least, if it be kept for any length of time without making an objection.'' Ordinary accounts which have been sent by letter are not admissible against him, as evidence that he had acquiesced in their contents, merely because they have been kept by the addressee without remark.* But what a party sni/s when an account is delivered to him by hand, or upon a statement made in his presence, may be given in evidence against him along with the account or statement, becanse what is thus offered is the act or declaration of the party to be affected by it, and the account or the statement is by reference made a part of such act or decla- ration ; though here, again, the naked fact that an account remains in the possession of a party to whom it was sent, does not amount to an acquiescence in its contents.* § 811. Lord Tenterden remarked' that " what is said to a man before his face, he is in some degree called on to contradict, if he does not acquiesce in it ; but the not answering a letter is quite different ; and it is too much to say, that a man, by omitting to answer a letter at all events, admits the truth of the statements that letter contains." A later case in the Court of Appeal also supports this view,* and it appears to be the law.^ Lord Denman > R. V. Sow, 1843. » Cliisiuiiii V. Count, 1841. ^ ."^lieniiiin v. Slicniiun, 1787 (Iliitfliins, Jid. Com.). * Willis V. Joiiiegim, 1741 {I A. lliinlwirke) ; Tickel v. Slioit, I'M (ill.), wIr'Io the account had boon kcjjt without objection for two years. » Price V. Kainsay, 1840 (In). • I'lico V. Jiain'say, I8i0 (Ir.) (lluslio. C.J.). ' in l-'uirlie v. Donton, 1828. * Wiedt-nian v. Walpolo, 1891. • However, in OaokiU v. ykeene, 18.i7, the (iuecii's Hcnch lii'ld, tliat letters conlainin}^ a di'iiiaiid, wiittiMi to a di'l'i'iKJaiit, and unanswered by him, were admissilde in evid(n<'e for tlie |daiiitilT, thoiij^li tliey also stated facts siiowinj; lunv the demand aroso ; but i)o>Hil)ly that case rested on tho grouiul, that the defeiaiant had made sonm nnsatisfactorj' statemi'nts re- spectinj; theso letters, in a subso- queiit conversation willi tho plain- titV's ajjent. On this last {;;round luianswered letters written to a farty have been udniittud us oviduncu iu ;■• ri .1/',. IV <|. EFFECT OF NOT ANSWERING LETTERS. [PART IH. too, once doelarod, that " it was a great deal too broad a proposition to Bay. that every paper wliich a man might hold, purporting to cliarg)> him with a debt or liability, was evidence against him if he l)r(Kluf'e(l it." ' 5i 812. An admission by conduct may, too, be made by being found in possession of lt'tt(!r8 and other papers, as it is a primA faeio inference that the jierson in whose possession tliey are found knows their contents and has acted upon them.^ Such evidence is occasionally available in a civil suit.* It is freipiently received in criminal prosecutions, especially those for conspiracy and treason, though its weight, as evidence against the prisoner, will in a great measure depend on the fact, whether answers to the lett(;rs or papers can be traced, or whether anything can be shown to have been done upon them.'' The mere ^ opportunity of constant access to documents may, indeed, sometimes, by raising a presumption that their contenta are known, afford ground for all'ecting parties with an implied admission of the truth or correctness of such contents.* Thus, the rules of a club, or a record of the proceedings of a society, contained in a hook kept by the proper officer and accessible to the members," — charges against a club, entered by the servants of the liouse in a book kept for tliat pm'pose oj)en in the club- room," and the like, — are admissible against the members ; their knowleilge of the cout(Uits of the books, and their a<'(juies- cence therein, being itnsuuiablo under the circumstances. On similar grounds, books of account which liave been kept between master aiid servant, tradesman and sliopnian, banker and customer, oi co-piirtners, will occiisionally be admitted as evidence even in favoui of the party by whom they have been written, ])rovi(le(l that the opposite parly has had ample ojiportunities from time to time foi- testing tlic aciiuraey of the entries." Amorioa: DuUon r. Wondinaii. IS.VJ * Seo, Iiowcvcr, T^illlIn:n■k'^^ case, (Am.). Si'f, also, Kci^ii r. l'i'n>st, 1S7«S, C. A.; (lisappritviii;.'!!!' Wlii-at- l.s.'iiS; I.iii y '■. Mtiiilli't, lS(iO; Caviio tiolt's rasf, lsT3 ; ami J'^x partu '•. St(«T. l.sdd; and (Joro c. Ilawsoy, liiowii, IS,) J. IS()2 (Martin, 15.;. « lfa--olt r. Mtis-ravc, 1H27 ' In l)()i' c. Fiaiikin, IWd. (Abliott, ('..!.); AIiIimmiu v. flay, ••' ILnvitt r. J'i;:.u(ilt, hs;n. 181(1 (I-c). Kllfiil>onm},'ii) ; Ashjiit'ul =• K. r. Ildiiii' Todko, 17JM (Eyre, v. Sercoiiilxs lsr»(). r.J.); ]{, V. Watson, ISlT. ' Wiltzic c. Atlamson, 17WI. * Ur. liv. § 1118, in i)art. * Symouds v. Gas Light uud Coke 626 ClI. IX.] SILENCE OF ACCUSED IN JUDICIAL INQUIRIES. § 813.' Admissions are too, sometimes, inferred from ncquicHceme in the oral sfatnin'iifx of otlivrn. At the same time the maxim, (iui tocet consentiro vidotur, — liowevor it may be recognised by the lover, — must bo applied by the lawyer with careful discrimination. " Nothing," it has been observed, " can be more dangerous tlian this kind of evicb^nce. It should always l)o ro(!eived with caution ; and never oixght to bo received at all, unless tlie evidence is of direct declarations of that kind which naturally calls for contra- diction — some assertions mado to the party with resjjcct to his right, which by his silence he acquiesces in." ' A ilistinrtion has accordingly been taken hetircrn (Icclarntioiix mado by a parfif iittcresfcd and those made hj/ a Htraiifjer ; and wliile what one jtarty declares to the other without contradiction is admissible evidence, what is said to a party by a third person may well bo ina<lmissible. It may be imijcrtincnt, and be best rebuked by silence.' Still less will statements made by strangers in the presence of a party be receivable against him, if they be not (linrth/ (ittdirnsitl to him ; because, in such case, he can scarcely under any circumstances be called upon to interfere.^ § 814. Moreover, to affect one person with the statements of others, on the ground of his implied admission of their truth by silent acquiescence, it is not enough that they were made in his presence, or even to liimself, by parties interested, but they must also have boon made on an orc/tsioii ir/ini a rrjthi from Iiiiii n'lii/Zif Itc proptr/i/ cxiicrtcd} Depo.sitions, therefore, taken in the prt'scncc of a party during a judicial investigation, observations made by a mtigistrate to the parties before him, and confessions of an accom- plice criminating his co-prisoner before the justices, will not, in general," be evidence in any subsecpient trial, whether civil or criminal, against the part}' who heard thenx in silence ; because in \ Co., ISIS; liounlinan v. Jackson. • Tliis cuiuint lii> laicl down as a 1H1;{ (ir.); Kilbco v. Sney.l, IS.'S strict vnh' of law iippliciihli- on all (Ir.); I.o(!p( /•■ I'lichai'cl. iS.j.'J; ()('('a>iou- ; for, as ],il. Di/iinian oli- l. S. C. l.SS;i. Ord. XXXIir. r. 3. scrv.'il in Siiii|..-.ou c Ito'.inM.n, iSlS, ' Gr. Ev. § 1!*!(, in fj;rcat ]iart. " (mscs may (•(■rtaiiilv li' coiti'i'ivi'il * Mooro 1'. Smith, lS:;(i (.Vni.) in wliich u jiaity. liy not diiiyin'/ a (Diuican, C.J.). (:liarj.'(! niadt! a;:ain-t liini in a cdiirt ^ Cliild r. (iravo, 182.) (B(>>t, O.J.). of jnstico, niiiy ]io-sil(ly alTord stron.i^ * Moore I'. Smith, l.SJd (Am.). proof that the imi>ntution is just." » Boyd V. lioltou, 1S4 1 (Ir.). See ii. v. Cojlo, 18 jj. 527 SILENCE WEAK EVIDENCE OF ACQUIESCENCE. [pART HI. • * ' •i t judicial iiuiuiries a strictuess of proceeding is adopted, which often preveiitb a person from interfering when and how he phrases, as he naturally would do in a common conversation.' The same inferences cannot, therefore, be drawn from his silence or his conduct on such occasions as might reasonably result from similar L'haviour, were he under no restraint ; and as it is only for the Hake of these inferences that the statements of ot\u)r parties can ever be admitted, they are properly rejected whenever they do not warrant the inferences sought to be drawn from them. A similar distinction has been recognised in the civil law, by which " confessio facta seu prajsumpta ex taciturnitate in aliquo judicio, non nocebit in alio."' § M5. If, however, the statement of one person calls forth a rrp/i/ from another, such statement may then be read in conjunction with the reply, and will become evidence a gainst the party replying so far as the answer directly or indirectly admits its tnith ; and it will make no difference in the application of this rule, whether the words were spoken by an interested party or a stranger, — whether they were addressed or not to the party replying, — or whether they fell from the parties, the witnesses, or the court, in a judicial pro(>eeding, or were uttered during the oo\irse of an ordinary con- versation.'' ^ 816.* But the mlence of the party, even where the declarations are addressed to himself, at a time, too, when he is at full liberty to reply ab he thinks fit, is, at best, worth very little as evidence of acquiescence ; * and if he has no means of knowing the truth or falsehood of the statement, the fact that he did not in terms deny it is almost valueless.^ In all these cases it must be distinctly remembered, that the statement made in the party's presence or hearing ' is not evidence against him, but his own conduct in con- sequence of such statement is the sole evidence. Magistrates often ' Melen v. J.); Short V Andrews, 1829 (Parke, . ytoy, i8;{(), cited in Boscoe, Ev. 54, 55, as ruled by Aldor- fon. n. : 11. V. Aiiploby, 1N21 (IIol- loyd. J.); K. v. Turnor, 1«3'2 (I'atto- Boi), J.); Child v. Grace, 1825. ^ 1 Masc. do I'rob. coucl. 348, n. 31. 3 Child V. Grace, 1825; Jones v. Morrell, 1844 (Ld. Denninn| ; R. v. Edmuude, 1833 (Tindal, C.J.); Boyd V. Bolton. 1844 (Tr.). ♦ Gr. Ev. § l!«>, in part. » See Ch, 26 of St. Matthew, v. 69 —63; and Ch. 27, v. 12—14. • Ilayslcp V. Gynier, 1834 (Parke, J.). See, further, on tlio subject of tiicit adnuHsions, The State v. liawla, 1820 (Am.); Butturs V. Sellers, 1820 (Am.). ' See Noile v. Jaklo, 1849. 528 CHAP. IX.] EFFECT OF ADMISSIONS WllKN IMJOVF.D. make mistakes on this subjoot ; but it is hijj'lily innxjituut that the distiiiotion hhould bo observed.' *i 817.* The rjf'ed of admissions, when proved, must next bo con- sidorod. With regard to their coiic/ii.sifriif-s.s, the policy of the hiw favours tho investigation of truth by all expedient methods ; the doctrine of estoppels, by which further invfvstigation is pn-cludod, being an exception to tho general rule, and bs'iiig adopted only for the sake of general convenionce, and for the j revention of fraud, is not to be extended beyond the reasons on wliich it is founded.' It is also to be observed, that estopi)el8 bind only parties and privies ; and not strangers. Hence a sheriff, who, in favour of a creditor, seizes goods as the property of the debtor, is not bound by an estoppel which would have prevented the debtor hiinself from claiming the goods.* Neither are the creditors or the trustee of a bankrupt bound by the bankrupt's admissions, because the court regards them as claiming adversely to the bankrupt.* Again, though a stranger may often rely on an admission, which parties or privies might set up as an estoppel, yet, in his case, it is only matter of evidence to be considered by the jury. §818. In an action" in which an alleged bankrupt sought to dispute his bankruptcy, the defendonts contended tliat the plaintiff was estopped from bringing this action, as (in addition to other evidence of his ac(piiescence in their title) he had given notice to the lessors of a farm which he held that he liad become bankrupt, and was Avilling to give up tho lease, whereupon the lessors had accepted such lease, and taken possession of tho premises. Upon the (piestion whether the jtlaintiif was precluded by this surrender from disputing the commission in the present suit, Bayley, J., said: "There is no doubt but that the express admissions of a party to the suit, or admissions implied from his conduct, are evidence, and strong evidence, against him ; but we think t).at ' Per Aldorson, B., at Maidstouo Sp. Aws. lH-i'2. MS. ; Dou V. I'ruukis, 1840 (lid. Deniiiiin). « Gr. J'^-. § •i()4, in part. » See unto, § HiK • Eic'hards i\ Johnston, 1839. » Ilairis r. IJicki'tt, l.S,')!t (Kram- wfdl, U.); ]')x paito Hovoli, In ro TollouittcLo, No. 1, 1884. « Iloane v. ]?o<,'ors, 18 "' See Morsiun c. rouchnian. IS.'iU; I'uintfr r Vh.>l. lS(i2 (Krl,., (\J.); W.dlund ( . .ill Co. r. Hiitliiiwav, IH.TJ (Am.); Jei. lings r. Wluttiikcr, 1820 (Am.). See, also, I,d. I.cinili'slicprnii^h's ca.so, 185."{; and l,d. LuudusbuiX)U<jh t». Fostui, 18UJ. 629 ADMISSIONS WHEN NOT CONCLUSIVE. [PAUT III. ho is nt Hborty fo provo that such adtniBHions woro miHtakon or were untrue, and is not ostoppod or conchidetl by them, uiiliws iniothor pcrHon lias boon indiioed by thorn to alter Ins (■i>nditi(«ii ; in sudi a case tho party is estopped from dixpiiting tlit'ir truth with ros[toot to that porgon (and those olaimnig under liini), and tluit trans, otion ; but as to third persons lie is not bound. It is a woll-ostablisliod nde of law, that estoppels bind only parties and privies, not strangers.' The (.ffor of surrender niaile in this ease was to a .sfnint/rr fo f/iix miil ; and though tho bankrupt may hav«j boon bound by his represent at ion that he was a binkrupt, and his acting as su:h, as between him and the stranger to whom that rospresontatiun was made, and wh » aeted upon it, h<; is not bound as betwoi'u him and the dof«>ndants, who did not aet on the faith of that representation at all." § Hi!). The doctrine propounded in the above judgment, that a party is always at liberty to prove that his admissions we''o founded on iiiistii/,< , unless his opjioncut has been iniluc(;d by them to alter his <'on(liiion, is as applicable ui mistakes in respect of legal liability, as to thoHo in rcspc.t of niuttcrn of fact ' In all eases of this natur<>, the jury with the view of estimating tho effect tlue to an admission, will bo juslilicd in considering tho eircumstancos under which it was made; and if it sliould aiipear to iuive 1 n made under an orr<).'i> ous notion of legal liability, they may ipialif its oUcc; ccordingly.' ii ."^'Jii. Hut while a<lmisM(»ns are, ax !i ruli', not iimr/iisirr, and may be shown to havti been made \ind«r '* n:istake, certain admis- »ions undoiditt'dly are eom-lusivo. I'irst amongst these are fift'ppvfM, which have bo(>n eonsideretl in a former jiart of this work: W(* havo then* treated of estoppels by deed, alluded to th tsc by record, an<l discussed that particular <lass ni esti p|iels in pais, which relates to the rights of laixlloi and tenant.^ In 'lie | resent chapter it has alreadv been ;.liown that admissions hi|i ninly niaiie in the course of judicial proceedings, whether .is a substitute for regular proof, or iu a case stated for tho 'pinion of tho eourt, are, on mofives of ' (' I, II. .1..) tiin. i IHk. » yewlon I'. H.'l.l,,!', 1818; and N'Wlnii I'. I.iiiiliiiil. IM8. Newt. Ill V. I.iailiun!. l«»H (I.<1. IIIUIIj. Ant", Si Hi»-io;i. 6ao CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS IN PLKADINO. poUoy nnd justice, deemed to be conclusive." It only remains to exiimin»* the law as it regards other co/ic/iisivf (nliiiixsioiiH ; and these will, in general, bo found to range themselves under one or other of the f(»llowing heads. First, admissions expressly or taritly made hy phwIliKjH ; secondly, admissions which have been acted upon by others. To these may be added a few oases of fraud and illegality, and some admissions on oath, where the party is estopped on grounds of public policy. H 821. With respect to (nhtii-sKionx In/ phtaliiKi, the law at present seems to be that statements which are containc<l in any pleading, though binding on tlie ]iarty making them for all purposes in tho caiise, ought not to be regarded in any Kid)se4U<'nt action as admis- sions.* It was at one time, indeed, thought that a parly might, by bringiug an action (m a contract, (sstop hinisell' from dcnyitig tho obligatory fo;'<'e of it as an agreement in a subsc([ucnt action iigainst himself. Accordingly, Tiiidal, C J.,'' once expressed a strojig opinion that if a corporation were to make an executor}' contract invalid against themselves for not being under seal, and then to sue thereon, this woidd amount to an admission on record that Buch contract was duly entered into on their part, so as to be obligatory on them ; and would e.stop them, in answer to a counterclaim in the same action, or to another action by tho defendants in a cross acfion, from setting up that it was not sealtMi by their common seal. 15ut the doctrine as a whctle on which this expression is founded, although uinpies',ioind)ly basinl on sub- stantial justice, has hitherto met with little favour, and will jirobably ere long Ix' expressly overruled.* S H'2'2. At any rate, an admission, iiiritloitfilli/ or tmUlii nuide in pleading in one suit, will not, as a rule, estop the party who has made it from denying in another suit, where ///vc/vf/y ///, sdinc, tntiffrr is not /ifii/n/n/, the fact so admitted. For instaiiie, wln-ro a pica to an action on a bond set out a corrupt agreement bettveen the parties irre.>*pective of the bond, and went on to aver that tho ' Ante, §5 772, 7N;«. * '^'•n ('..|.|m! Miii.'iV Co. r, Kox, ' Cum. M (lied in imte • ; N'ecHon V. \H,%\ ; Miiili'iin ' . Itiilliii, IH IS I'mke, Wnlter-, INlMi. n.); liiukiiiii-ler -. Miikd i.ilin, IN.VI ' l''iM)ini(iiijj)ti'H' Cu, V. ItulHTlHoii, (ill,): Tin' M.iy. nl' KiililiTiiiiuHtor v. I14U. Ilunlwirke, |!s7:i. IH'IU. 6ai M\ ADMISSIONS IN PLEADING. [part III. i'l ■• bond was given to secure, among other moneys, the sum men- tioned, in ihoNfiid a^^roomont; and tho replication, tacitl}' admitting the corrupt agnHMUi-nt, traver«ed the fact of tlie bond having been given in considciration thmoof, but tlio plaintiff failed on this issue ; the adnii«sion was hold available for the purpose of that suit only ; and the plaintiff was consociuontly allowed to dispute the corrupt natiire of the agreement, in a subseipiont action on a collateral security.' 51 823. An o.xeeption to this general rule arises, however, where the second action is brought on a juilgraont recovered in the first. For example, an executor or administrator who confesses judgment, or suffers it to go against him by defaidt, thereby admits assets in his hanils, and is estopped to say the contrary in an acti(m on such judgment, sugg(?sting a dovasfavit.'- In ordor to charge the exe- cutor or ailininistrati)r, indeed,* ven in such a ease, noiuf proof nnist be given tbat the assets have been wasted; but the slightest evi- dence will suflieo for this purpose ; and the more issuing of a writ of fieri facias, directed to the county where the action was laid, and a return of nulla bona thereto, has, for a long time past, beon deemed evidencit enough.' In aeeordanee with these principles, where, in an action against three executors, two had jili'aded plono administraverunt, and tins third admitted a.ssets to the amount of ''\HU,, in a sub.scipuint action against the third executor, sug- gesting a devastavit, the plaintiff was luild entitled to recover; defendant's admissions in the f<n'mer action being an admission of assets to the amount of 3H.'{/., and the fact that she hail givtm a ohetpie for that amount (which had been in fact dishonoured), bein;,' prima facie evidence of n t/rnisfarif to that amount /* S ■'^J f. Questions with respect to admissions in ])leading, chiefly, liowever, arise with reganl to their effect in the mmr suit. In Admiralty, for in.stanee, where a statement of claim in a salvage ai'tinii is admitted, no eviilence at all is in general receivable (unle>8 special leave for its reception is given) in support of the plaintiff's ease, whicsh the statement of claim is rocpiiied to state ' ("urtor I'. Jainos, 1S4 1. Sen Ili^^i V. Huiliiiljjf, INKi; iiihI lluttc, Mor- roll. IHI!» I'oll.Mk, V.W.). « Sk.'lloli r. Ha\vlm«, I7»l»; l{n TiiihUo lloliof Act, UigKiiib' Tnists, IHdI. • F.connr(l c Simpson, 18U3 (Tiu (lul. ('..!.). « Ct)opor 11. 'Jttjlor, 1844. 631^ 'I I el CHAF. IX.] ADMISSIONS IN PLKADINO. completely.' Andbotli in the Qiuh-h's l*>enoli and Chancery Divi- sions the brodd rule is tliiit " t-vcry iillfgiition of fiiot in any pleading, not being a petition or summons, if not denied specifi- cally or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the opposite party, shall be tnhiti to he n/htiiffx/, except as against an infant, lunatic, or peri^on of unsound mind not BO found by inquisition."* The proper understantling of tliis rule is tlie province of the pleader :'' and a dolailcd explanation of its effects must be sought iu works on pleading. The rule, however, operates only with respect to nuitti-iul allegntions. If, therefore, a statement of defence denies a particular fact alleged in the state- ment of claim, it does not thereby admit all the immaterial aver- ments, which the pleader has chosen to introduce as part of tho plaintilf's case.^ S H'Jf). Accordingly, where a plaintiff's claim — after slating that the defendants were oiiucrH of a vessel, on which the plaintiff caused to bo shipped some potatoes to bf» carried by tliem, as oirnrrs of the vessel, to Liverpool; and that in consideration tlH'icoj', and of freight, they j)roniised to carry the potatoes safely ax ajhirmid — alleged as a breach, that through their negligen<!e the goods were damaged; it was held, that a defence of tlu* genend issue in answer to such claim did not by implication admit that the defendants were owners, so as to niise the inference that the captain was their agent, since tho allegation of ownership was ininuiterial. Tho claim would have been eqtially good had no such allegation been nuide.* 8 8,'(). liut the omission to traverse a tnatniiil allegation, so far conclusively admits it, that the jmrfi/ iihu Ihim ji/nitJn onr cdinivf tlinprori' it. Therefore, where, in trover for goods, defendant pleaded that A. was factor of the plaint ills, and as such, before and at t/w tiitii' of the pledge mcntiomul in the plea, was iiitiuxtnl l>i/ tin in with, and u<ih in ixmrnHivn uf, dock- warrants relating to the goods ; ' Tho llimlwukc, 1kn;j. » U s. (). imn;i. Old. XI.X. r. i;». ]lut SCU, uml Uttl'llljit to li'i'cilii'lle, this rule Willi r. 13 of Onl. XXVll., ciliid i»iNt, ^ H-2i). * \'iiii Siimlttu V. Turuur, lN't<J(I.<l. iJHMiiau). * See liilijjhiilll r. Stiilih'y, IN 11; i'l'liliiiiii I'. 1 liivi-'dli, 1n;{M; J)iiiiIiii(1 r. iMittlex, IMI ^I'alki', It.); King (', Nol Ihllll, IN'17. » Itiiiiimu 1 . I'livixiii, IHIIH (I'lirku, 11.); ie(i>>,'iii/e(l (.Mill iKim, It. in Jiiitil'iinl ' . 'I'liittli'N, IH'14. bvu, uhtu, (iiuw t'. ilill, 164U. ft.'W ADMISSIONS IN PLEADING. [part in. m that ho lelivered the doel -waiTiin'^« to the de'crdftDt, nnd pledp^ed •with him tho goods, aa secnril;; for a loiui whioii the defendant then advaiictjd to liini on 'hv 1 uih of Dio said dock- warrants ; and that tho di'fomlant liad j.m notion that tli« factor was not tlio actual owni T ; tho ithiintill't; woo lu)ld to bo doharnMl from jtroving that tlio dock-wurrants liud not hoon deposited at tho time of tho advance; and won*, in fact, not then in existc^iuo, wljore thoy liad simply traversed tlio aUogation that tlie dofendant advan<'od tho money on the faith of tlio dock-wan-ants.' t^ 827. Un.hT 11. S. C, 188.'}, Ord. XXX IE., r. 6, " any party may, at any stage of a canso or matter, wliore admissions of fact have been made, cither on tho jiloiidings, or otherwise, apjily to the court or a ju<lgo for such judgment or order as, upon such adiniti- 8ions, ho nuiy he entitled to, without waiting for tiio detormiuation of any other (piostion between the parties ; and the court or a judge may upon sucli application make such order, or give such juilgmcnt, as the* court or judge nuiy think fit." Under this rule, in a jiartitloji action, wlurc tho defendants have, by their sfatcmcfnt of ilofcMico, admitted the fuels stated in tho claim showing tho jilaintilf's tith', the jdaintilf has a right, — lastttad of having tho 0(!tion set down for hearing, — to an order on mf)tion, dirouting tho usual impiiries us to the persons interested in the property ; * la an action betweon partners,* and in one between principal and agent,' un oi(h>r for iin account ami for tho delivery of securities has Im-oii made on motion bof(,ro the hearing, tho judge acting solely on tho admissions contained in tho pleadings ; * and a plaintilf may m<A>o fur juiigment upon admissions, although ho has joined i' i>o on the defence, and given notice of trial." But in eases under ihe rule, us the judge bus a disenttion whether ho will grant relief on motion or not, ho will s(>ldom take that step when any cpiestion of ililliculty is laisi'd ; n»>itlior will tho (yourt of Appeal, except in a cli-ar ease ol error, interi'oro with tiio judge's excr<is(> of his discretion.' 1 ' Ilciii/.i I'. Stewiirt, \Hi'2. S(>o, iiIho, Cniter c. JiiiiicH, IhH. ' (iillmit I'. Siiiilli, 1H7(J, i'. A.; Il"'llc iiiij.'1'iii V. l.oiij^rijTK. ••**"" (ll,.ll, V. -<*.). ' 'r.in|llilli(l I'. WiUnM, I' ':0, ^ iluiiiMiy (', liuutte, i6o. • Sec, uIkii, Ji'tikiiiM '•. MiivicM, ISTii; la I'll Siiiitli'iH I'iHtiito, Iti'iilHiiii r, Smith, isTii JIM, y.-C); lu ra lliilkoi'M I'lHtilte, IISTM (ill.). " lliowii.', I'dHKiiii, lN.sj(|''ry, J.). ' Moilur V. Hitlubiittiiiu, \H'l. 534 h CIT fX.J ADMISSIONS bi n^.M^TnTTING UNDKU OLD LAW. § 8'<S. IT?, del tho olu rules of pleading, a demurrer wns regarded by Co»ate :h Equity as simply raising the question of law v.ithout any numi^siou of the truth of the allegations in tiic bill ; hut in Courts of Law it was held to amount to an ahsolute admission of the facts stated in the paragraphs (hmmiTed to.' The Hli. S. C. of IHM have ahoiished demurrers altogether hy Ord. XXV., r. 2, and Buhstiluted i erlain other proeeedings.'* J) H'Ji>. Tt is further provided, by 11. S. C, 1888, Ord. XXVII., r. 13, thit "if the plaintiff does not deliver a reply, or any ])arty does not deliver any sub.se<iu('nt pleading within the period allowed for that purpose, the pleadings shall he deemed to he (dosed at the expiration of that period, and all the material statenuMits of fact in the pleading last delivered shall ho deevud to hace brni (Iviiivd and put ill issue,"* S 8;{(>. Marriages which took place between 30th July, 1874, and 1st January, 1^83, are governed by the Married Women's i'mpcrty Act, 1871,'' which enacted, with respect to such inarriiiges, tluit husbands and wives should bo jointly sued for debts incurred or t'tits committed by tlio wife before marriage, but that the luis- I'.nid shouhl be liable! to the extent only of tho assets thi>rcin spe- cified,^ provided that, if no jdea denying liability be jiltMuh'd, " t!io husband shall be deemed to have confessed his liability so far as osrtcts are concerned."* t^ 83 i. Next, as to the (dfect by way of admission of p'li/ing tt/oiii'i/ info cotirf,'^ and of tiii<lrriiif/ voiiipciisafioii. Payment of niont-y into court may be made, as of course, in ««//' acti(m which is bri Might to recover a debt or damages.'' Amends may also ho ' S.H M.'troj). Hail. Co. i'. Di'fri''^, IHTT; and IJiilfs i)f 187a. Old. A.Will. '■• .Sup, iils'i, rr. •'!, •!, Mlltl .') of HUinn Orti.T. S.M. ltm>tull .■. Mrvt'uH. IHHI. C. A « S.r. iilMo, 1{. s. r. Onl. .XIX. r i;i, (iti'ii unto, § MJt. » ;i7 iV ;tN V. o .Mi. ♦ §§ I, 2, unil .'». » I •!. S«.r MatthcwH I'. Whittle. IHMO (J(-MM.'I, M.l{.). Thi' Manit'tl 'NViiiiifU'H l''()]i<ity .\«'t, 1N"1, wan I(|ii iiliil liy I.I \ Hi V. c. ".') (■' I'Ih' Muriii'il Wciiii'irH l'ni|it'rty .Vet, tliii i'i'N|H!ctiv<t lialiilitirs of IiuhIiuikIs mill wivi'H iiianii'il Hinrc Ist ilaniiaiy, 1sn:1. • It iiiiiHt i'Xii'|it, jMiMsilily, ill Olio or two otIuT casi's ,a< to \vli!''h i-ch alili', § .'tl.'i, ail (ill.) 1)1' liiaili' iii'tnro ili'livri'iii;; a ili'fi'iii'i', ami iinint in any caM' ln' pliailiil. tlioii;;li it ma)' iii> Hii |>|i'ai|i'ii til till' wlioli' or any part lit till' )iliiiiitit>'s claini, Si'U 1{. .S. C. I SMI, (till. AMI. I. I. ' Sfi' ll!iwk«li'VC. i'.iailr^haw, I.SNO, ( '. .\., from wliirli it will ill' ...I'll that tlii'ri' ail! oni' or two f;i;i|itio i-. " H. .s. C. l.YSi, Oril. XXII. r 1, lb»2"), ij U, 10 of which ii'gniiilii Sihi, fuitiior, id. rr. !^, 4, und fl. 636 ADMISSIONS BY PAYING MONEY INTO COURT. [PART III. paid into ooiirt in sonio ^^teoiiil actions under the provisions of jmrtii'ulur stiitutos. l\»r iuHtiuK^e, in an notion for a lihcd contiiiiiod in any nowspapor or other jvMiiHlical pultlicafioii, whotlicr in England or Ireland, tho defendant may plead that the laiigii ijje eouiplained of was inserted without aetual malice, and without gross negligence, and that at tlie earlie;.t opportunity he had puhlished, or, in sonu) eases, had otVered to ]iuhlish, an ample apology, and that a (-(utain sum of money lias heeii paid into court by way of amends.' Many (tther statutes also authorise tho tender of amends and pleas of payment of money into court.' 5i iS;{'J-7. In these and other cases u payment into court, when nnac(M)jnpanied hy any defence denying lial)ility, is "taken to admit the claim or cause of action in respetit of which the payment is made." Defendants may now in any (fause, except in actions or counterclaims for lihel or slander, plead payment of money into court together with any other pleas, either denying tho pluiutiif's right of action, or set tin;.' up some special defence.' !i 838.^ Wlien judi( ial admissions, — hy which are meant admis- sions entered into in the tlut* course of legal j>roce(>ding», — have hecn I'litilf thi'oiiijli initilrortt'iu'i' or iiiistdkr, Uie court, in its discre- tion, wiii in sumo manner relievo the party from the oonseciuonces R. 7, Viy impiwnj? upoa the iiliiintilV the court: riruy v, Umtholoinew, thi> (hiiy "f giving tho (tel'cn.laiit ii 1H!M, ('. A. N|iicii»l iicti,! . ,>>;i'>«>i* hiia to the '' Thrsd pMienilly a|iply to ut'tii>ns risk ot' losiiiLr lii^ ■'> ts in tlic event hrou;;ht a^'iiiii'-t ]ii'I'hoiis tor nets et his uc(;lcctiii); to i'oin]>ly with tliiit done hy thciri. cither in exi ■ iitioii of riih\ See Liiii>.'[i.lp< I'. ('iini|il)ell, tlieiri>'li('e!«, or ill imiviiiUK r uikUt IS,",, lis exiiliiiiii'il hy lliiektou v, iliL'^'"*. "^T!) See, also, (Jn-iivos v. I'Meiniiiir. 1M7H. ' See Ii iV 7 V. e. !>li (" The Liliel ,\et. IHI.T"), § "J, ax iiini'iKhMl hy \1 \- til V. c. .■»!); iiii.l S \ !l V. c. 7.") ("Tlie I.ihel Act, Hi.r'), i J, as to Kniihiti.l: '..1(1 s \- it V. <•. 7.V § 'J. let to Ireliinil. In li- uhsi'iice of flie iillei.Mtiiin of piiytiit lit into Court, jilaintilY may treat the jileii iin ii nullitv. Tlie |>hiintilV is iihsoliitely entitled to money |i,iiil into court under thin .\ct, wluitever diima^res lie recover; I>iinn c heven, iVc. Nevvii.iiiier Co,. IXIM; hut nuuiev jmid into eomt under Old. .\ .\ 1 1 r. 6 la 8uhjuct to tho jurisdiction of the iiiitholifv ol A "ts of r.llliiiliiellt (see ante, J5i .'ill ;.!'»); and :'iiioiig these iiiav he mentioned, "Tin- l''lliiic Authorities I'lolection Act. ls;t;{" ;,')i|\ .?" V. c. (il), § 1 (e). set ml ante, |j 7i;a. "The Seamen'H Clotliiii^ .Vet, istllC" (;»•,> & ;i:t V. c. .•.7. § <>). " Tlio .Vrniv Act. isNI" (11 iV: ^.■> V. e, oS, § 170. siihs. J , and ••Th.- Militia .\et, 1H.S'.»" ; ,&. M> ':'. e. 4I», § ttl. Miih.s. ;i), " !i \. 0. l>>i. '»rd. XXli. r, I, cite.i Hilt!, \ ,h;>;, n. ". e\|Mes>ly roiH u' . Ihsi ei • triti"" illowiu',' sieh a defeiK .; in litwl e' sliw ler lueviously (•Htiiblished hy 'laws,- <ley r. Mrad- nhiiw, IHNO, c" .A, H .. a'l*j, Uerdiia ,'. (iieonwo. !, 1N7H, C. A. * Ur. Kv. S .:u(5, uoarly vorliutiia. • • caa i&i CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON RY OTMKRS. of liis error.' Even agrnomnnts tiiikIm out of court Ix'fwpon solicilorH, ('oiicfrniug iho oourso of pro(!(MMliii}»H in (;ourt, lire, iu olftK.'t, ('qually uiulcr tl>o court's control, by niciins of its cocrcuve power over tlic solicitor in all matters relating to professional character ami conduct. But, iu all these cases, the party will bo held to his adnsission, uulous it vU-arly appear that ho has auted through niistako.* {5 H.'{!).' It is a broad rule of law tliat every admission, which has bocu made with the intention of being ac^ted upon, and which has been uvted upon hi/ (ino//irr ptrsoii, is condusivft against the jiarty making it, in all cases between him and the individuid whose conduct he has thus influenced ; and this, whether suc^h admission be nuide in express language to the person who acts upon it, or be implied from the general (conduct of the party making it. In tho latter ease, tho implied declaration will be consid(*rcd as having been addressed to every one in particular, who may have had occasion to act upon it: and the rule of law is clear, that, where one by his words or conduct »///«//// (diuscs anoth(!r to believe in tho existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own jjnfvious position, the former is concluded from averring against the lattei a different state of things as e.\isting at tho sam<> time.'' Indeed, tho primiido may lie laid down still more broadly, as precluding any party, who negligently or culpably stands by, and allows another to contract <in the faith and understanding of a fact which he can contradict, from disputing that fa(!t in an acti(m against the person whom ho has lumself assisto*! in d(H;eiving.' In such case tlie party is pstoppeil, on tho grounds of ])ublic policy and good faith, from ropuiliating his own representations.'' ' I >!«. lib. 42, tit. 2. 1. 2. * Si'c I'l-iirso ii. (»ri>v<i, 17-I7 (I.d. Iliii'ilwicki')' Tln' l{niiiiin law was iiiliiiiiii.-<ti'H'(l in flic sumo Hiiiiit. "Si is, cum i|ii<i Iicp> Ai|uiliii af^itur, t'oiifcHHUH est sorvuia (icciilissc, licot IKH) occiilcrit, si (anicn occiHUH sit Imnii), «'x cDiil'i'Mso t<'iicttu'": Diff. lib. 12. tit. 2. 1. 4; i.l. 1. «. S»m. al(«>, Van Lemiw. Ciinun., I). V. I'll. 21 ; b^vurh, t'ouu. loo, a. '<i. "ronfcHSUH pro judicuto est": Dig. lib. 12, fit. 2, 1. 1. " (ir. V.v. § 207. in part. ♦ I'ickaril r. Sarn, INU7 (1,(1. Ken- man); M'cii^'ni/iMl (Wiiiid, V.-C.) ill Att.-(rt>n. '•. Stephens, In.),). * I'er I,ii. |)cniiian, in <ir»>pr;; v. WcHm, 1h;{!»; rccuirni/.cd bv I'iirko, Ji.. in Ilarrinon ''. Wright, 1S40. • tioo uuto, 55 ao ot st-q. oa? ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [.PAR" III. § 840. The meaning of the word " wilful," as used above, has been tho subject of divergent judicial remarks.' § 841. Another instance of a conclusive ailmission arises where a party, having a secret equity, chooses to stand by, and permit, the apparent owner to deal with others as if he were the absolute owner, in which case he will not be permitted to assert such secret equity against a title founded on such apparent ownership.'' For e.\ample, where'' a lan<lowner had signed, ami put into the hands of his agent, an autliority to consout to any exchanges uudei' an Inclosuro Act, and had directed him not to act upon this authority o.\('ej)ting under certain circumstances ; but the agent, in br( ach of liis private instructions, hud produced the authority and agreed toun exchange not under the stipulated circumstances, tlie landowner was held to be bound by the agreement made under these circumstances. The courts liave also acted upon this doctrine on several occasions, ill ' In Fri'dimn r. Ctxiko, IHJH. 1,(1. Wi'Uislt'ydtli' olisi'ivi'il :-" " I5y tliu tonii ' wilfully," wo iimst uiiiIit- stiiiul, if nut that tlm jmrty ri'- jircuciits tliiit !i> bti triK! which hi; klloW'S f(i be 1; , .('. Ill Icil.st ;llllt ho iiK'Uim lii.s ri']»ri'sriitiiti<iii to In- acted )ili(pii, and that it is acted u])(Hi ac- cordiii'jrly : and if. wiiatevcr a man's real int'iitiiin niay lio, he so cim- diicts himself tliat a reasonalile man wiinld take tlic ic|ii('sc:italion tn he trne, and helieve that it was nieaiit that he shiMild act njHin it. and 'hd act n|Min it, as tnie, tlie pai ly making' the lejHoentatidn would he I'lpially ]ire('hided from ciinle.-tin;; its truth [the inle, as lieni eiinnciated, was cx])re>sly udii]iteil hy the Court of l'',\clie(|uer in Cornish r. ,\liine:ton, IS.V,), See, too, Sweeny r, i'romoter Life .\.ss, Co., ISd;; (ir.^ ; 'riinmas c, jirown, I'^TO; and .NI'K'enyie v. iiriti-l, Linen Co., IsM, 11, J-.]; and conduct hy ne;,'li^'enc(i or omis- sion, wliere there is ,' duty tiist n])ou a person hy usay:e <if trade or otlielwi.se to disclose the truth, may often have the sann- elTect ; as, for instance, a n'tirin;; partner omittini: to inform his customers of the /i(i<, in till' usual mode, that the continu- ing jiartners were no longer autho- rized to act ns his aponts, is boiiinl hy all cold racts made hy them with third ]iersons on the faith of their heinj; so anthoiized." Jn Howard c. Hudson, l.S.VJ, Ld. Camphell nh- served: — '-'rhe party settin;; \ip suith a har to tho I'eception of the truth must show, both that there was a irll/'iil intent to make him act on tlio faith (d the represeidation, aial that heiiid soacf ," jtut Cromplon, N'.-C., says: "'riie rule takes in all tho inj]ioitant commen i:d cases in which a re])re-.entation is nuide, not wilfully in a'.v had sense of the word, not main 'limo, hut so far wi'''Mlly that the )ia(ty makine; the repivseuiatiou on which tiie othi'r acts iiiiiium it to he acted upon in that way. That is the true criterion," See, furtlii'r, on this subject, l'"oster <■. .Mentor Lit'.' .\ss. Co.. ',,s.VI. - .Man^'les r, Dixon. 1HJ{) (Ld. Cotteuhani). See, also, Att,-(iea. c, Navlor, isiil (W.ioil, V.-C,); Kamsden c. lt\son, isti.'i, II. L. ; l.'olt r. White, jsii-j (I,d. W.stbmy^ •' Itukeof lieautort r. Neald, IM-Vl, II, L. See (iralnon r. Ilirkenhead Kail. Co., Is.-id; Kent «. .lackson, I.S,-.l ;l{()milly. M.K.); Trickett «. 'i'oinlin.smi, iMOii ; Pole v. Ijuask, istil, 11. L. oas h % CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON DY OTRERS. where negotiations Imve boon entered into pn'pnratory to marriage. Tlie abstract rule deduciblo from the autboiitifs on tlio whole is, that, whenever a representation' of mmo fucf, — as contradistinguished from a mere represiiiitiition of infciifion,- — ^liaa been made by one party for the purpose of influencing the conduct of luiotlier, and has been acted upon by the latter, this will, in gcnei-al, be suflicient to entitle hira to the assistance of the court for the purpose of realising such representation.' § 842.* A further e.\am[ileof a conclusive admission arising from conduct occurs in the case of a man cohabiting with a mistress, and treating her in the fact* of the world as his wife. Here, though Im thereby ac(juir(>s no rights against others, they possibly way ilo so against him. For instance, if the woman during such cohabitalicm bo supplied with goods ostensibly for the use of tlie joint household, and the reputed husband be sued for their price, he will not bo '-ermitted to disprove the marriage, but tlm jury will be justified. 08 in the case of a real wiife, in dealing with the question as one of ordinary domestic agency.* Tlie old doctriiu) of th(^ presuniptivt» agency of a real wife has, however, been t^nc rna(lie<l upon, if not actually set aside, by an eniurtment in fhe Married Wnmeu's Property Act, 1S!);{," that^ "every <'oiitract hereafter entereil iuto by a married wtmum, otherwise than as an agent, Hhall be deemed («) to be a contract enteretl into by her with respect to and ' Till. Cranworth is xiiid to luivo i: llesHitor, 18.)4-.'i; Pulsfoid c. held tli;it till! rule d'n.s not apiily l{l^■llald^', IS.'il (linmilly, .M.lt.;; unless lliere l>e iiiisii iirrmiiltit i^ii . Vi'oniaiis r. Wdliailis, Isti.'); llod^r- Sed (HI. !^ee Miiiifv r. .lurdeii, 1(S.)2 ; Hint I', Iliiti^hi'iiMiii, ITIli; t 'uokrH c. I'uUfuid c. lin haii'l^, iNVi. MaMcall, HUM; \\ ^mklDii! r. IuIIiit- ■•' .Ii.ldilir. .Mi.liey. l^.VI.H.Ti. (I.il. ley. ItliM; Jilld.lH v. All-tiy, CriinwDilli, t'.. ami i.d. r.ri>ii;:lii4iii ; !7'.tii; Miildletini c I'lilliick. Ia |p..iiii Ld. St, l.eiiiiards diss.), iiViTiidiii^ a W'ltln mil, iHTli. ,*<ic Wri;_'li; r. .Sliowe, IMS; MauuKell /•. W liifr, IN.VI, 11. ii. ; liold ''. liiitcliiiisoii. iN.Vt : 'I'raill I', liaiin;:, isiil, * (ir. Ilv. § 'J07, ill jLiil, an tti lii.-l Bi'V-'ii lini'H. » WmI-oii c. 'riuilUiild, ITIIS ; ii'iliiii.-Miii . .N.iliuii, l.sos; .Miiiiiii V. Ill- t'liiMiaiit. isl.i. Si'i- aiiti', § \M\>. AIhu, .Mail' r. ("ad-!l, I77»; ri'i'ii;;iii/i'd ill Itatllii'W.s c, (iaiilido, Ld. .'^t, l.eiinanls (lis.-*.), oviTnilm^' a duiisiiiii lit lliiiiiilly, Nl.K., m Mimey V. Jiildeii, lS.'»J. Sii' .Ma IdisDii c, AldiisMii. is.s;!, II. I,., and iiin'stiiii- iu;.' LdlViis V. Maw, ISd'J ^Ntiiait, V.-t'.'. Si'e, al.so, itii.-.t. § l(l|:i, ^ llainnii'ihliy c. liamn di- lii'l, 1M». II. li (I'.'l. t'littenliain;; id. (I.d. ('anii>lM-ll) : Neville r. Wilkin- Heii. 1"N2: Moiiteliori r. Jiinitelii'ii, 17(>J; Iktntlev I'. .Maikav. I«'>:i ^Hnmilly. M.ll.); Uv.fi' r. FieldiT. l»2.s, IMJiJ ill.); 'nile V. l.iado, 18.S7 ; • .V. iV -57 V. e. tiiJ. tioo Mylu.s t Jdrdeii V. Mi.ney, is.VI, II. I,.; Hiirl.ii, 1H84 (Ir.). Moiuy I'. Jtudiii, Its.VJ; llultiili ' J !• 539 ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [PART IH. <"'' I '■" L m to Wnd her separate property, whether she is or is not in fact ])oss<sHO(l of or entitled to any separate property at the time when bIic cntors into such contract ; {b) shall bind all separate proporfy which she may at tliat time or thoreaftor bo possossod of or entitled to ; jind (<•) shall also be enfon.'eublf by prouess of law against all jiKipcrty which she may thereafter while discovert be possessed of or entitled to: rrovitlcil that nothing in tliis section contained shall rend('r available to satisfy any liability or obligation arising (mt of such contract any separate pro[(erty which at that time or thereafter she is restrained from anticipating." By § 2 of the same Act,' a married woman's sejtarate property which she is restrained from antici^"\ting may be made liable for costs, and a rec«nvi)r or a sale of it directed. S 843.* Yet another example of a conclusive admission arising from conduct is where a person knowingly permits his niuno to be used as one of the partners in a trading tinn, or an existing joint- stock company, under such circumstances of publicity as to sntisfy the jury that a stranger know of it, and believed him to be a partner, tor under such circumstances ho is liable to such stranger in all transactions, in which the latter engaged and gave credit upon the faith of his being such partner.' The mere fact of a i>orson ngie(<ing to become a member of the j'rocinional coiiimKtfe of an intended railway company, or even the fact of such person autho- rising his name to be published in a prospectus, which contains nothing more than the i> .■nos of the provisional committee-men, wjU not indeed render him liable for contracts nuuio by the other members or by the solicitor, for the purpose of promoting the objects in view; because such an intended ascociation does not amount to a jtartnorship, as it constitutes no agreement to share in protit and loss.* But if there bo eviilence that such person has «(/((/ with relaiioD to tho proposed schenn), as by attending meet- ings, giving directions, and the like, it will be for tho jury to ' 5(i & .)" V. c. (i:j. ' (ir. I'.v. 2(17, ill piirt. ' Dickiiisnn I. Valjiy, IH'JO (Piirko. J.); W.Mi.l V. I hike i.f Aruvll. \Mh (( 11 '^'NWcll. J.); lliii I'isiiik I', lii'utlioru, lMi;j (TLiiilul.'C.J.); I'ox v. Clifton, ]s;i(i^iil.). Si!i), iiIho. Kfll I'. Nuiiiby, Wi'iM; Uuiiluu t^. liobiiuu, 1609 ^Li<i. KUoiilxinDi^h). * l{cyiit'll V. lifwin. 1111(1 WyM v, Ilopkili!*, lH((i. Sec lv\ |iiiitiC 'little, Ih/iO; Kx iPiOtc lidlii'iis. l.v.')(i; Niinia I'. Ciittli', is.'id. 11. L. ; lluttDii V. I'lilill, IN.VI, ll.I,. ; I'.nv'lit r. llnttoii. anil lliittiiti ('. Knvlit, iN.°)l-.>.. 11. li.; M'Kwiiii V. (.'uiiipbvU, 1807, U. L. 640 CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON HY OTHERS. deterinlno' wliotlior ho has not thereby aiilliorisoil the innnaginp committoo, or the other nioinhors of the i)roviHioniiI (ioinmittoo, or the solicitor or socrotary of the iiitondoil (•f)niii!niy, to plodgo his (Todit for tilt) noct'Hsiiry and ordinary oxjmmisos to Ito iiiciirroil in foriniiifj the company ; and if tiioy docido this question in the idiinniitivc, tlmy may then }^ivo a vcrdirt nj^ainst liim, on furthnr findin",' that tlio work was done, and tho credit givou, ou the faith of hi« hcinp; liahlc' § HU. (Ju the Baino principlo, if a man, by holding out faLsc colours, induces a railway ooinpany to register him as a proprietor of shares, ami, subsotpicntly, to bring an action iigainst him for calb) on such shares, ho will bo [trocluded from disputing tho validity of the transfer to him, or from otherwise denying his character as u shareholder.' And, on tho other hand, where a company has registered a j)orson as a sharoholdor, and has induced him, on the faith of 8U(;h registration, to pay a call, thoy will not bo allowed to dispute his title to tho shares.'' Again, on tho same i»rinciple, an infant who has deceived a trailesman by fraudub'ntly representing himself to bo of full age, and thus obtained credit for goods, will bo held b(mn<l by his statijuient,'* and liable to pay tho debt; and a person who has assumed to act as a broker of the city of London cannot, as against a party who has omployoil him, protect himself from a discovery of his dealings with sudi party, on tlxt ground that his answer may expose him to jtcnalties for having acted as a broker without being duly tpialitied." > Williiinis V. Pi^ott, 1818 ; T.iiyrht * Unit r. Vr<mt\m.S;r.niM Miiiiii>r V. Ilultdii, iind lliittim i: Hri^(ht, Cm., 1,S70; !{•• liuliii iV Knincisro 1H,J1-.,'J, II. L. IJiiil.Cii. r. Tiittcii, '><1^. Sci', ulso, ' Iti'viicll i: LowIh, and Wylil v. AVfliln'. lli'iiie l!:iv li]i|>mviiii,' < 'oiii., Hopkins. IH Hi; l,iiko r. I). 1)1' Xr'.'vll, LSTO; anil .'^iiniii r. Anglo-Ainor. l.SH. Sou lli;,'i;inMC. llupldiis l.s'lS; T.'li'j,'. Co., ISSH, ( ' A. P.uriiMiilo i: Dayrcll, 1HI<»: Itnil. y r. " V.x ]iiiit.' I'nity Jt. St. Mutuiil ^laciinluv, iNto"; Itcnnic r. ('liii'kn. Hunk. Assodut., In iv Kinj.', Is.'jH; ISJO; U'cnnic f. Wyuii, 181!); V.x N.'lsoii r. Sticker, iSoS*. Tho olil paitt! He-ley, iS.'iO. eoniinon law rule, iis recoffnised in ' Shi'ilii'lil & Manch. n"il. Co. v, the folio win;; easiw, is no longer law. "Wooleock, IHII ; Clicltoniiani \- Ot. I'rico r. ll.'Wctt. IK.V.'; Liv.-rpool Wont. Union Hail. Co. ''. I'aniel, 1811; In re \oith of Mnp. .It. St. Ilk. Co.. Kx parte StralTon's l].xors., IH.'i.'l; Tavior >'. llnjfheH, 18M (•'••)• Sec Swau I'. North Brit. Austrul. Co.. i»6a. Ad-'lplii Loan A-o iat. r. I-'airhurst. 1,S.-)I: llartli'tt r. Wells, I.S()1; licUoo V. iM.-ter, ISli'i. " UohinsoM r. Kitcliin, 1866; Qreeu r. Weavor, 1827. 641 IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) Lvf 1.0 I.I 1.25 £ lit |2£ |U ■"IS 2.0 1.8 14 III 1.6 V v^ VI '^' Photographic Sciences ,v ^^ <> 6^ '^f^'' 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 1^ J^"^ ..**'A ,v ^ . "^^^ % :\ \ 6^ ■b^ ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [PART lU. § 845. (Conduct, again, furnishes an admission which is conclusive where parties have acted upon a state of facts mutually assumed as existing. In such a case their rights between themselves will depend on such assumption, and not upon the truth.* Accord- ingly, if a party has taken advjintage of, or voluntarily acted under, the bankrupt or insolvent laws, he will not be permitted, as against parties to the proceedings, to deny their regularity ; ^ the grantee of an annuity, whose duty it formerly was ' to have the memorial properly enrolled, was not allowed to take advantage of his own neglect, and set up the want of enrolment against the grantor, although the statute declared that in case of non-enrolment annuity deeds should be void ; * an agent or a workman who has knowingly rendered an untrue account to his princ'i[)al or em- ployer, whicli lias been adopted by the party to whom it wjs given, cannot afterwards gainsay it ; * the receipt of a man who thereby has acknowledged that he has received money from an agent on account'of his principal, and accredited the Jigent with the principal to that amount, is conclusive as to payment by the agent ; ^ a land- lord who has, with knowledge of all the facts, reccnved rem, from the widow of his lessee for several years is estopped from alleging afterwards that she has not taken out probate ; " if a person having a right to property, whether real'' or personal,^ permit or encourage a purchaser to buy it of another, the purchaser shall hold it against the person who has the right ; and if the owner of an instrument ' M'Ciinco V. Loud. & N. W. Rail. Co., 1S()4. - Like *■. Howe, 180G ; Clavko v. Cliuko, hSOG; Gouldie v. Gunston, ISUi; Wiit.-^oii V. Wace, 1826, cx- jdiiini'il hi Honne v. Hop^ors, 180(5; Moiior V. \Vis(\ liSOO ; Iliiniiar v. Davis, 1817 ; Flower i\ Ilurbert, 1S51. Sccanto, §§ 817, 818. ^ Under 53 (i. 3, c. 141, now re- pealed by 17 iV 18 V. c. !)(». * Molton r. Ciunroux, 184!). » Cavo V. Mills, 18(i'J; Skyriii^ Ciroenwood, 18'J.) 18'J,J. 8 ;5 St. Ev. 9o(i. 18j;j; llunter i Shaw r. I'ieton, See Kico v Walters, liice, 1870. .. -„„ , »—.- — -, The usual a(knowled{;;uieiit m a policy of inmiranco of tlio receipt of premium from the as.sured is ac- cordinn:ly conclusive of tlio tict as between the underwriters and the assured, although not as betwei'n underwriters and bi )kers : Dalzel) r. Mair, 1808 (Ld. Ellenbonnigh) ; Do Ganiinde r. Tifrou, 1812; Anderson V. Tliornton, 18j:j (I'arke. H.). ■ Kiinkeu r. M'Murphy, 18S!) (Jr.). " a Su>,'. V. & P. 428; 10th edit. : and id. (ill, l.'ith edit.; r('con;niz(^d by tlie court in Sandys n. Hodgson, 18;i!). See, also, Kanisden i: Dyson, 18()j, II. L. ; and Doe v. Groves, 1847 ; Dixon v. Miicklestone, 1872 L. C. ; Ho Lambert's Estate, 1884, C. A. (Jr.). " I'ickard v. Sears, 18;}" ; Gregg v. Wells, 18;J9 ; Coles i-. Bk. of England, 1839. 642 1 1 1 1 '; , hi"; ■c CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. which purports to be transferable by delivery, deposit it with his broker or banker, he will be estopped, as against a bona fide holder for value, from denying that it was transferable.^ § 846. Further examples of the doctrine that where both parties have acted upon a state of facts assumed by mutual consent are as follow : — Trespass is not maiutaiuable against a sheriff's officer who executes process against a man by a wrong name, either by taking his person, or seizing his goods, if before the process bo sued out, he is asked his name, and gives such wrong one ; '^ a party, who has entered into a bond by a wrong name, and is sued in that name, would be estopped from denying that the name in which he was sued was his real name.^ Where, on a compulsory reference, although the award was not made within the period limited by the statute, both parties have after the lapse of that period continued to attend before the arbitrator without olijecting to his jurisdiction, the losing party is estopped from alleging that the time has not been enlarged, either by the court, or by the written consent of the parties;* and where a judge, having tried a cause without a jury, with the couso;it of both parties who appeared before him, the unsuccessful party was not allowed after- wards to object that no written consent had been drawn up as the statute required.* § 847. Again, if the members of an incorporated company allow a solicitor to appear for them as defendants, and he consents to a reference, they cannot, after the award is made, object to the submission, on the ground that the solicitor had no authority under seal to defend or refer the cause ;^ a judge's order which was bad > Goodwin v. Eobarts, 1S7(), H. L.; Eunibiill r. Mctrop. Ilk., 1877. * Seo JJuiiston v. I'atovson, 18J7 ; Kelly V. liawreiico, 18(14; Price v. Harwood, 1811 (IaI. Kllcnborough) ; citi'd and recofrnized (Crosswull, J.) in Fisht>r v. Magiiay, 184;}. Si'o, also, Eeovcs v. Slater, 1827. As to a ca. sa.. see Morgans v. Biidjjos, 1818, and Magnay v. Tishcr, 184;}, ajipa- retitly overruling Cooto v. Lcigli- worth, lo'.X!, and dictum (Ld. Halo) iu Thurlmno ot al., 1(1()4, though in Freeman v. Cooke, 1848, Parke, 15.. intimated that it had alwavs been the oiiinion of tlie jtrofession that Coote i\ Leisrliwinth, loOli, was law. 3 R. ('. Woohhile, 1844 (Wight- man, J., citing Maby v. Sheplu'rd, KJ'JIl, and livckman v. fShotbolt, 1 o()7). See, al">o, ;{ & 4 W. 4, c. 42, § 11, and Willianis v. IJryaiit, 18;i!), * Tyerman i;. Smith, 18Jf). See, also, Haines v. E. India Co., 18JG (Sir J. Patteson), P. C. » Andrewes v. Elliott, 1856; 17 & 18 V. c. 12o, § 1. • FavioU V. East. Cos. Bail. Co., 1818. 043 ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [PART III. as a proceeding under a now repealed Interpleader Act,' for want of a statement of consent upon its face, was nevertheless held to be conclusive upon the parties, as they had by their conduct agreed to submit the matter in dispute to the decision of the judge ; ^ a lessor who, after giving notice to his lessee to do repairs within the period pres(!ribed by the lease, so conducted himself as to lull the lessee asleep and to lead him to suppose that he might refrain from doing the repairs, was not allowed (although a mere parol licence to break such covenant will not justify a breach thereof^") to insist upon a covenant of forfeiture, on the ground that the repairs had not been finished within the time fixed for them ; ^ an action for forfeiture by breach of a covenant to insure on the tenant's part, qualified by an option given to the landlord to insure if the tenant made default, and to add the premiums to his rent, was allowed to be defeated by proof that the landlord had represented to the tenant that he had exercised the power, and had himself duly insured the premises ; ■* while a tenant who has paid rent, and acted as such, is not (as stated more fully in another place,') permitted to set up a superior title of a third person against his lessor, since he derived possession from him as tenant, and therefore caanot be allowed to repudiate that relation. § 848. The doctrine of estoppel (or admission) by conduct is also applied to the respective relations of licensor and licensee, bailor and bailee, and principal and agent ; it being clear that neither licensees, nor bailees, nor agents, can be permitted to dispute the respective titles of their licensors, bailors, or principals." Accord- ingly a licensee imder a patentee is estopped from disputing the validity of the patent, so long as the licence continues in force ; ' and a warehouseman, wharfinger, banker, solicitor, agent, or other de])0sitary of goods or moneys (not being a mere pledgee) who has « Ante, §§ 101—103. 6 Dixon V. JIamond, 1819 (Ab- bott, C.J.) ; Collctt V. Hubbard, 184(5; Zuliiota v, Vinent, 1851-2; Phillips V. Hall, 1832 (Am.) ; Drown V. Smith, 1825 (Am.); Eastman v. Tuttle, 1823 (Am.) ; M'Neil v. Philip, 1821 (Am.); Chapman v. Searle, 1825 (Am.); Jewott v. Terry, 1814 (Am.)j Lyman v. I;ynuin, 1814 (Am.)- ' Crosslov V. Dixon, 1«G3, H. L. ; Clark V. Adie, 1877, H. L. > 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 58. * Harrison r. Wrip^ht, 1845. 2» Doo V. Gladwin, 1845; West v. Blakowuy, 1841. '" Uu-riics V. Motrop. Eail. Co., 1877, H. L. But see Kennedy v. Earl of Essex, 1891 (Ir.); Eobinson V. Wakeliel.l, 1892 (Ir.). * Don V. Sutton, 1841 ; explained by Patteson, .1., in Doo v. Gladwin, 1,S4.'); Doe v, Howe, 1825. See ante, J§ 804—808. 544 ir CIIAT. IX.] ADMISSIONS ACTKD UrOX BY OTHERS. once aoknowletlgod a person's title, and agreed to bold goods or moneys subject to bis order, or to sell goods and to account for tbe proceeds, will be estopped from setting up tbe title of a tbird person to tbe same goods or moneys, or from ot])erwise defeating tbe rigbts of bis bailor or principal, against bis own manifi^st obligations to bira.^ An exception to tbe general rule will, bowever, be allowed, wbere tbe bailment bas been determined by wbat is equivalent to an eviction by title paramount,* and, also, wbere tbe bailor or principal bas obtained tbe goods fraudulently or tortiously from tbe tbird person,^ provided tbe defendant in such last case can sbow, tbat be was unacquainted witb tbe circumstances wben be made tbe admission,* and tbat such tbird person has actually made a claim to tbe goods or moneys in question.' Perhaps tbe bailor's title might also be impugned, should the circumstances show that he, in connexion with some third person, had practised a fraud on the bailee, by representing goods to belong to the bailor, which, in fact, were the property of such tbird person, if proof were also given, tbat the defendant, in consequence of the fraudulent misrepresentation, bad sustained any real injury.® § 841). Moreover, where a person pfrd(jrx property to which he has no title, tbe pledgee is not estopped from delivering it to the rightful owner. For, on an ordinary pledge, the pledgor impliedly undertakes tbat the {)roperty is his own, and che pledgee merely undertakes tbat he will return it +o the pledgor, providcl it be not shown to belong to another.^ A common carrier, also, being bound to receive goods for carriage, and having no means of making inquiry as to their ownership, is at liberty to dispute the title of tbe person from whom be has received them ; and may establish a > Goslinp: V. Birnio, 1831 ; Wood- loy V. Covontry, 18().'i; Stoiiiiid i\ Duiikin, 18H) (Lil. Ellonl)()nmf,'li) ; Ili.nnan v. Aiideraiiii, 1809 (id.); Knijihts v. WitVcn, 1870; lluwes v. Wiitson. 18:i4 ; Dixon r. lluiiunond, 1819; IJohi'its v. OKilby, 1821; Anon. (Gould, J.) (iiiidiitod), iHM'ojinif'ed by Ld. Kouvon in Liicl<)iif,'li r. Towlc, IhOO; l'atrinj;don r. Clt'ik. 178J ; UoIl V. Ghtlin, 18;W; Nickolson r. Knowlos, 18'20; Evans r.Xichol, 1841. lSei',lio\vi'vur,Thiiriio '•.Tilbiii'v, 1858. » Bid.Uo r. liond. IMJ.5. 3 IIiudnKiiw.Wilcock,lS32; Biddle v. Bond, is(i'). * I'er AldiTson, J., in Gosling v. Birnio, l8'il ; Ex puit<? Davies, Be Siidlcr, 18,S1. * lk'tt.l.'v r. Kfid. \Hr.i. « Scott (•.■Cra\viV)id. 1842. ' C'hecsnian c. Exall, I8jl. 645 ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [PART III. defence by proving that he has delivered the goods to the real owner on his claiming them.* A vendor, however, who has sold goods to a party as a sole purchaser, and has directed his factors to weigh them over to such party, and to enter them in his name in their books, cannot, after such sale and transfer, dispute his title as sole proprietor, or detain the goods, on the authority of a third person, who claims to be a joint purchaser.^ § 850. Further examples of conclusive admissions (or estoppels) by conduct arise in connection with bills of exchange. Thus, in an action against the acceptor, the defendant cannot show that his signature has been forged il he has accredited a bill, and induced the plaintiff to take it, by saying that it wus his, and would be luly paid.' Moreover, althougli at one time it was deemed law, that no consideration of estoppel as between the parties could have any weight where the rights of the rcirnnr intervened ; and that, consequently, the maker of a cheque payable to bearer on demand^ might defraud even a bona fide holder for value, bj' proving that the cheque was post-dated, and, as such, inadmissible in evidence without a bill stamp,^ this doctrine has now been repudiated." The law now is, that if a cheque, — whether payable to bearer or to order, — appears, wlien tendered in evidence, to bear on its face a sufficient stamp, the court will receive the document, and will not allow any proof to be given that it had actually been post-dated, and that the holder had taken it with knowledge of that fact.' § 851. The acceptance of a bill is, moreover, deemed a conchime ai/mmion,^ as against the acceptor, of the signature of the drawer,^ and of his capacity to draw ; '" and if the bill be payable to the order of the drawer, of his capacity to indorse ; " and if it be drawn • Sheridan r. The New Quay Co., 1858. * Kiorun v. Siiiuliirs, ISUT. 3 Leach v. IJudianan. 180;5 (Ld. EUonborough); recnfiniziHl (Jiliskino, J.) in 8a!itler.s()n c. CoUiiian, 1842. * Whistler t). Fnrstor, 18;}.'5; Austin V. Bunyard, 1805 (^Cockburn, C.J.) ; Bull i..'()'Sunivan,'l871. ' Field r. Woods. 18;}7; reco<j- nii^ed ill Stcadniim r. l)uhiiinol, 18-15. • All-till r. Huiiyaiil. |S()5. ' Galty V. Try, 1877 ; Emanuel v. Eoharts. ISOS. » See 45 I't 4() V. c. fil ("The Bills of ExehiiiiKe Act, 1882 "), § 54. " Saudeis(in c. CoUnian, 1842; Bass V. Clivo, 1815. •0 Id. See Haly v. Lane, 1741 (Ld. Ilardwieke). " Taylor v. Croker, 1803 (Ld. El- lenboroufrh) ; Pitt v. Chappelow, 1841 ; Drayton v. Dale, 182;j. All thi^so cases were recosj-iii/ed by the court in Saiul< rsou r. Colliiiau. 1842. See, ulbo, Jjiaithw :utu v. Oardiuer, 546 liii C. IX.] WHAT ACCEPTOR OF BILL OF EXCHANGE ADMITS. by procuration, of the authority of the agent to draw in the name of the principal.^ In this respect it matters not whether the bill be drawn before or after the acceptance.*^ But the acceptance is not an admission on the part of the acceptor, either of the signature of the payee, though he be the same party as the drawer,^ or of that of any other huloner ; * and this, too, although, at the time of the acceptance, the indorsements were on the bill. * Nor does it admit that an agent, who has drawn a bill by procuration, payable to the order of the principal, has authority to indorse the same ; ^ nor, Avhere the bill has been drawn in the partnership name and made payable to tlie firm's order, does it estop the acceptor from showing that such bill was in fact not indorsed by the firm nor negotiated for any partnership purpose ; ' nor does it if it be given on a bill payable to the order of the drawer on which the name of a real person as drawer and indorser is forrjed, if given in ignorance of the forgery, preclude the acceptor from denying the genuineness of the indorsement, though it be in the same handwriting as the drawing which he is bound to admit.^ If, however, an acceptor, with hnou-leclge of the forgery, puts the bill in circulation, he will be estopped by that conduct from disputing the validity of the indorsement equally with that of the drawing.^ And if a bill be drawn in a wholly fictitious name, and the handwriting of the indorsement be the same as that of the drawing, the acceptor will also be estopped from denying it, because he admits that the bill is drawn by somebody, that is, by the person who indorses in the same handwriting, and the fair construction to be put on his undertaking 1845, where, in an action by indorsee agaiiif<t acceptor, dct'ciidaiit was held estopped from pleadin" that the drawer and first indorser was an uncertificated bankrupt when tlie acceptance was given, and that his assignees had demanded payment. So, in a siniihu' action, it was held that the defendant could not plead, under the old law, that the drawer and first indorser was a married woman from the date of the drawing down to the time of the indorsing of the bill : Smith v. Marsack, lfS-18. See ante, § ,S4'J. ' I'obiiison '•. Yarrow, IHIT ; Jones V. Turnour, 1H30 (Ld. Teiiterden). * Sclniltzi'. Astlov, 1836; Ilallifax V. Lyle. l.qf) ; I.ond. & S. West. Uk. ?'. Wontworth, 1880. lint see Baxen- dale V. Bennett, 1878, C. A. ^ Forster v. Clements, 1809 ; Mac- fei'sou ('. Thoj'tes, 17!)(); Bosanquet V. Anderson, 1800 (Lord Ellen- borougli); Cooper v, Meyer, 1830 (Ld. Tonterden). * Id. ' Smith V. Chester, 178"; Eobarts V. Tucker, 18,)1. ^ lioliin.'ion r. Yarrow, 1817; re- cognised in Bei (nan r. Duck, 1843. ' Garland v, Jacomb, 1873. " 1 iceman v. Duck, 1843. ■ Id 64: WHAT INDORSEMENT OF BILL OR NOTE ADMITS. [p. III. is, that he will pay to the signature of the f.ame person who signed for the drawer.' § 852. The difference which arises as regards their being estopped hy their action between the position of a drawer and that of an indorser, who signs the bill before the acce^jtance, will have been noticed. The reasons usually assigned for this difference are, that an (ircrj)foi' is only presumed to be accpiaint'^d with the handwriting of the drawer, and it consequently is sutR(nent if he ascertains that his signature is genuine ; that he is not bound to look at the back of the bill at all ; that, even if he were, he could not be supposed to know the handwriting of indorsers, who would probably be strangers to him ; and that a different rule would raise nice questions of fact in every case as to whether the bill was indorsed before or after acceptance, and would consequently embarrass the circulation of negotiable securities, by rendering the position of acceptors hazardous and undefined.' § 853. By analogy with the law which estops an acceptor from disputing the genuineness of the drawing, the indorsement by the payee of a promissory note is a conclusive admission of the hand- writing of the maker;' and the indorsement of a bill of exchange will also operate as an estoppel on the indorser to deny any of the preceding signatures* § 854. Having now fully discussed the effect of admissions which have been acted upon, we may point out that those admis- sions, which have not been acted upon either because t/ie// irere orUjinaUij made uithout any intention of being acted upon, or because for any other reason they, in fact, remain not aeted upon, or have not altered the -situation of the opposite party, are not conclusive, though they are receivable in evidence against the parties making tham.^ Thus, if A. contracts to sell goods to B., and gives him a delivery order, he may, on B.'s bankruptcy, provided B. has » Cooper V. Meyer, 1830 (Ld. Ten- terdon), oxpliiinod and recognised by Paike, B., in Ufeman v. Duck, 1843. See, also, .Sshpitel v. Bryan, 18G4 ; Phillips V. Im Tliurn, ISfUi. 2 See Story, Bills, § •Jfi.'i ; l<oi)inson V. Yarrow, I'SIT (Park, J.) ; Smith v. Chester, 1 787 ; Canal Bk. v. Bk. of Albany, 1841 (Am.). ' Free v. Hawkins, 1817 (Gibbs, C.J.) * 4.5 & 46 V. c. 61 ("The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882"). § oj. ' See Howard ;;. Ilndson. 1853; White :•. Greenish, 1861 ; Foster v. Mentor Lit" \ssiir. Co., 18.)4; Carr V. Lond. it N West. Eail. Co., 1875; Coventry c Gt. East. Rail. Co., 1883. 648 !' CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS NOT ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. neither paid for them, nor sold them to a third party, show that the delivery order was invalid, and tlu-refore did not amount to a constructive delivery of the goods ; ' the court will not treat the alter.tion of its locality, after complaint, as conclusive evidence that a trade was a nuisance ; " nor will it, in a petition for damages by reason of adultery,^ regard an admission by the defendant that at some othor and different time the " tetririma caimi " was the wife of the plaintiff as conclusive evidence tliat she was the wife of the plaintiff at the time when the adultery was com- mitted;' a sheriff's return, though con('lut<ive, in the particular cause in which it is made, or for the purposes of an attacliment, does not, in any other action or proceeding, operate as an estoppel, either against the sheriff or against his bailiff;* a creditor is not estopped from bringing an action against a sheriff for a false return, by accepting the amount levied on account and towards the satisfaction of the debt mentioned in the writ;** and a person who brought an action of trover for a dog, was held not to be precluded from proving his title to it, though he had previously authorised a third party (against whom the defendant had brought an action) to deliver it to the defendant, at the same time demand- ing it back on behalf of the plaintiff as being the hitter's pro- perty.' In these,^ and the like casee,'' no wrong is done to the other party, by receiving any legal evidence to show that the admii^sion was erroneous, and by leaving the whole evidence, including the admission, to be weighed by the jury. § y55. The doctrine that a person is not estopped by representa- tions which were not intended to be acted upon, or have in fact not been acted upon, has in one case b ^en extended to cases in which the representations were such that they ouijht not to have been acted upon. In an action against a sheriff for seizing the * Lack.iigton v, Atherton, 1844. » R V. Neville, 1791 (Ld. Kenyon). » See 20 & 21 V. c. 85 ("The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857"), §33. * Moriis V Miller, 1707; t'uither explained in Kio;g v. Curgonven, 1769. * Standish v. Ross. 1849 ; Brydgcs V. Walf'ord, 1817 ; Jackson v. liiJl, 1839; Eemmett v. Lawrence, 1850; Levy V. Ilule, 1849; Stinison v. Farn- ham, 1871. " Holmes V. Clifton, 1839, over- ruliny; Beynon v. Gun at, l.Si!4. ' Sandys c. Hodgson. 1839. « Gr. Ev. § 209, four lines. ' See ante, §§ 804— 80S. See, also, Machu V. Lond. & S. "West. Kaii, Co., 1848; Grefii)i=V' « White, 1801. 549 .4 ADMISSIONS NOT ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [PART III. plaintiff's goods under an eyecution against his brother, where the plaiutill', fearing an execution, liad removed his goods to the brother's liouse, and when tlie sheriff's officer came there had (erroneously supposing that the writ was against liijnself) warned tlie officer not to seize the goods, as they belonged to his brother, but on the officer jjroducing a writ against the brother, before the goods were actually seized, told him that such goods were the property of a third party, and the officer, disregarding this last statement, seized and sold the goods, as belonging to the brother ; the jury having fomid that the goods were the plaintiff's, but that, bi'foio the seizure, he had falsely stated to the officer that they belonged to his brother, and tliat the officer was thereby induced to seize them as his brother's, a verdict was entered for the plaintiff, on the grounds, first, that the plaintiff did not intend to induce the officer to seize the goods as those of the brother ; and next, that no reasonable man would have seized the goods on the faitli of the plaintiff's representations tahcn altogctlipr} % 9>')(S} Admissions l.ave also been held conclusive on grounds oi public po/ic// in some few cases connected with public justice and government. For instance, in an action for penalties for election bribery, a man who had given mc-iey to another for liis vote is not permitted to say that such latter had no right to vote;' where the owners of a stage coach took up more passengers than allowed, and an '"njury was alleged as having arisen from overloading, their conduct was held to be conclusive evidence that the accident was occasioned by the cause assigned ; * one who has officiously intermeddled with the goods of another recently deceased, is, in favour of creditors, estopped from denying that he is executor;' an executrix who treats the goods of her ' estator as the property of her husband, will not be allowed to object to their being taken in execution for her husband's debt;" where a statute made it illegal to publish reports of the meetings of suppressed associations, a report stating that a suppressed association lud held a meeting and purporting to report the proceedings at that meeting, was » FrcGman v. Cooke, 1848. » Gr. Ev. § 210. in part. ■> Combe v. Pitt, 17(54 ; Eif Cui'guuvon, ITCy. * Israel v. Clark, lO.'J (Ld. Keiiyon, rccojrnised by Ld. EUciiborough). ■g V * lleade's case, 16()4-.j. 6 Quick ('.Staines. 17'JS. •wick V, Laycock, 1841. 650 See Fen- CHAP. IX.] SWOKN ADMISSIONS— ADMISSIONS IN DEEDS. held, even in a criminal case, to be an admission that such a meeting had in fact taken place;' and a shipowner, whose ship after being forfeited for broach of the revenue laws, had been given up to him on making an application, verified by oath, that the forfeiture had been incurred by the master iguorautly and without fraud, was not permitted afterwards, in an action by the latter against himself for wages on the same voyage, to gainsay this statement, and to prove the misconduct of the master, even on proving that the fraud had come to his knowledge subscijuoutly.^ § 857. '^ Moreover, an admission is not rendered conclusive against the party by the mere fact tliat it was made imder oath ; though this circumstance greatly adds to its weight ami tlirows upon the party the burthen of showing that it was made under a mistake which was both innocent and is perfectly clear. Thus, in a prosecution under the gnme laws, proof of the defendant's oath, under an Income Act then in force, that the yearly value of his estate was less than 100/., was held not quite conclusive against him, though very strong evid 'ice of the fact.* The same principle is applitd where the fact sworn to was not, as it might be considered in the above case, a matter of judgment, but was purely a matter of fact within the knowledge of the party swearing.* Tlie defen- dant's belief of a fact, sworn to in an old answer in Chancery, is also admissible evidence against him, but no conclusive.^ § 858." Admissions in dcedn have alread 1' ii considered in regard to parties and privies,* between wli -y are generally ' Reg. V. Suftivan, 1887 (Ir.). » Freeman v. Walker, 1829 (Am.). But a sworn entry at the custom- house of certain premises, as being rented by A., B., and C, as partners, for the sale of beer, though conehi- sivo in favour of the Crown, is not conclusive evidence of the partner- ship, in a civil suit, in favour of a stranger. Ellis v. Watson, 1818. The dilforenco between this case and that in the text may be that, in the latter, the owner gained an advantage to himself, which was not the case in the imtry of ])artn(!rship ; it being only incidental to the principal ob- ject, nitniely, the designation of the place where an exciscable commodity was sold. 3 Gr. Ev. § 210, in part. * E. V. Clarke, 1799. » Thornes v. AVhite, 1833. « Doe V. Steel, 1811 (Ld. EUen- borougli). Statements of fact con- tained in answers in Chancery were at common law always admissible agiiinst the party ; but not strictly conclusive, niorelj' because they were sworn to. See B. N. P. TM, 237; Cameron v. Lightfoot, 1777 ; Grant V. Jackson, 1793; .Studdv v. Sanders, 1823; Do Wheljjdale 'v. Milburn, 1818. Cf. infra, note '^ § 8o9. ' Gr. Ev. § 21 1, in great part, » Ante, §§91—100. 551 Ill ul; ADMISSIONS IN RCCEIPTS, PASS-BOOKS, ETC. [pART III. regarded as estoppels, if properly pleaded.* Siicli adiiiisHions, even when not technically estoppels, are entitled to groat weight, from the solemnity of their nature.'' When, however, they are od'ired in evidence by a stranger, tlie adverse jiarty may repol tlieir effeot, in the same manner as though they wore only parol admissions.' § Hij\).* Various other admissions, even when they are in writing, are not conclusive if they have never been acted upon by another to his prejudice, nor fall within the reasons before mentioned for est()]i])ing the party aguiust gainsaying them. Such admissions are left to bo weighed with other evidence by the jury, lirccipts, mere acknowledgments, either for goods or money, and wliother on separate papers,'* or indorsed on deeds," or on negotiable securities,' are of this nature, as are also bankers' pans-hooks ; * an adju^inent of a loan on a policy of insurance, which has been made without full knowledge of all the circumstances, or under a mistake of law or fact, or under any other invalidating circumstances;" and so, too, are acvonntH rendered, such as a solicitor s bill,'" and the like." An old bill in Chancery is not admissible at all against the plaintiff in proof of the admimo>iH it contains, since the facts stated thei'ein are regarded as nothing more than the mere suggestions of counsel.'* § 860, An inventory of the personal estate of a deceased person, exhibited by a personal representative on the citation of a person interested, either in the Ecclesiastical Court under the old law, or 1 Fislimonsfers' Co. v. Robertson, 184;J ; Bowii.an v. Rostron, 1834. ' Doe I'. Stono, lH4(i. 3 R. V. Nevillo, 1791; Woodward V. liiirkiiifi;, 1M)1 ; May. of Carlisle V. lilamirn, 1807. * Gr. Ev. § 212, in great part. 6 Skaifo ('. Jack<on, 1824 ; Farrar r. Tlutchinson, 18;ji»; Wallace w. Kel- eall, 1840 (Parke, B.); Bowes v. Foster, 1858 (Martin, B.); Loe v. Lane. & Yorks. Rail. Co., 1871. These cases have virtually overruled Alner v. George, 180S. For Ameri- can cases, see Haidun v. Gordon, 1823 ; Fuller v. Crittenden, 1N32 ; Ensign v. Webster, 179!); Putnam V. Lewis, 1811; Stackpole ?;. ArimM, 1814; Tucker v. Maxwell, 1814; Williamson v. Scott, 1821. * Straton v. liastall, 1788; Lampon V. Corko, 1822 (Ilolroyd and Best. JJ.). As to cast's whore the receii)t of money is mentioned in the deed itself, see ante, § 9G. ' Graves v. Key, 18J2. * Commercial Bk. of Scotland v, Rhind, 1800, II. L. * Luckio ('. Bushby, 1853; Reyner V. Hall, 1813 ; Shepl'ierd v. Chowter, 1808 ; Adams v. Sanders, 1829 ; Christian v. Coombe, 1790. '" Loveridgo v. Botham, 1797. " See Bacoa v. Chesney, 1816; Dawson v. Bomnant, 180(5. " Boileau v. Rutlin, 1848 ; Doe v. Sybourn, 1790 (Ld. Kenyon) ; of. supra, note * to § 857. 552 C. IX.] INVENTORY, HOW PAl! AN ADMISSION OF ASSKTS. in tlio Probate Division of the TTigli Court under the now law,' being sworn to by the oxhihitant, will \w iirima i':icio evidence of assets ; and so also will a dn /((ration of the personalfy of a testator or intestate, wliioh has been made on oath by his representative before a final stttlenient of accounts,^ and since the 1st of June, 1H81, an affidavit received by the Commissioners of Inland lievenue from any person ap[)lying for probate or letters of administration, verifying the account of the deceased's estate or effects ; ' and the executor or adniinistrntor, if ho has pleaded plone administravit, will be forced to show, cither the non-existence of such assets, or that they have not reached his hands, or that they have been duly administered ;* and perhaps in the case last named the afTidavit will even be sufficient proof that such assets have been realized in due course.' An old probate stamp," though slight evidence of assets to the amount covered thereby, was not alone sufficient to throw upon executors the burthen of proving the non- receipt of such assets.' Coupled, however, with proof, either of long acquiescence in the payment of the duty, or of other sus- picious circumstances, it furnished a presumption of assets received, which executors found it difficult to rebut.* § 861.^ Evidence of oral admissions ought always to be received with great caution}^ Such evidence is necessarily subject to much imperfection and mistake ; for either the party himself may have been misinformed, or he may not have clearly expressed his » 20 & 21 V. c. 77 (" The Court of Probiito Act, 18j7 "), as amended by "Tlio Stiituto Law Revision Act, 1892," (55 & 56 V. c. 19); Rules of 1862 for Ct. of Prob. in contentious business, r. 76, and Form No. 27. '■' See Rules of 1862 for Reg. of Ct. of Prob. in non- contentious business, Form No. 18 ; and Rules for Dist. Reg. of Ct. of Prob., Form No. 18, and cases cited in note *, infra. => 44 v. 0. 12 (" The Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1881 "), §§ 27— 29. This law has prevailed in Ireland for some years past. See Rowan v. Jebb, 1846 (Ir.). * Giles V. Dyson, 1815, explained in Stearn v. Mills, 18;}3 ; Parsons v. Hancock. 1829 (Parke, J.) ; Hickey V. Ilay ter, 1795 ; Young v. Cawdrey, 1819. SeeHuttonv. Rossiter, 1854-5. * 44 V. c. 12, § 31. To understand the new law respecting probate and legacy duty, and duties on accounts, see, and study, 44 V. c. 12, §§ 26— 43. * An affidavit stamp is now substi- tuted for the probate stamp. See 44 V. c. 12, § 27. ' Mann v, Lang, 1835 ; Steam v. Mills, 1833. These cases overrule Poster V. Blakelock, 1826. « Mann v. Lang, 1835 (Ld. Den- man) ; Curtis v. Hunt, 1824 (Ld. Tenterdenl; Rowan v. oebb, 1846 (Ir.); Lazonby v. lUwson, 1854 (Ld. Cranworth). » Gr. Ev. § 200, in part. »" See post, § 862. 553 ORAL ADMISSIONS TO BE RECEIVED WITH CAUTION, [p. III. meaning,' or the witness may have misunderstood him,^ or may purposely misquote the expressions used.' It also sometimes happens, that the witness, by unintentionally altering a few words, will give an effect to the statement completely at variance with what the party actually said.^ But where the admission is delibe- rately made, and precisely identified, the evidence it affords is often of the most satisfactory nature.* » See Gospel of St. John, cL. 21, w. 21—23. 2 See St. Matthew, ch. 27, vv. 46, 47. ' See, and compare, St, John, ch. 2, w. 18 — 21, and St. Matthew, ch. 26, vv. 60, 61. * Ante, § 216, n. *. Alciatus ex- presses the sense of the civilians to the same effect, where, after speak- ing of ihe weight of a judicial ad- mission, "propter majorem certi- tudinem, quam in ee habet," he adds : ' ' Qure ratio non habet locum quando ista confessio probaretur per testes ; imo est minus certa cceteria probatiomhus," &c. : Alciat. de Proos., Pars. 2, Ccl. 682, n. 6. See Poth. Obi. App. No. 16, § 13; Lench v. Lench, 1805. ° Riffgv. Curgenven, 1769; Glassf. I'W. 356 ; Com. v. Knapp, 1830 (Am.) (Putnam, J.). As to Admissiuns by J.genta, see ante, §§ 602 — 605. 654 CHAP. IX.] AMERICAN NOTES. 5541 amp:rican notes. Admissions. — As stated in the text (§ 723), an admission, in the law of evidence is rather a leviuiicn probatlonis than ajwuljatio; — a fact to be proved by evidence iian evidence to prove a fact. In popular acceptation, an "admission" is a statement made by n party against his interest. Such is not the legal meaning of the phrase. A rule of procedure prescribes that no proof need be oifered of a rele- vant fact which the other sido has stated. It is, so to speak, one of the rules of the game ; — analogous to that wliich exemjited a party under common law pleading from the necessity of proving a fact not denied by his opponent. The statement of the relevant fact may have seemed liighly favourable to the interest of t'he declar- ant at the time it was made. It is competent evidence, notwith- ' standing. It is naturally to be inferred from the circumstance that the statement has become relevant to the cause of tlie opposite side that, in many instances, tlie declaration as made is really against the interest of tlie declarant. But the statement is not rendered competent by this fact. It is admissible because the other side made it. Powell r. Tarry, 77 Va. L'.jO (1SS3); I'otter r. Mellin, 41 Minn. 487 (1881)); (loodnow r. ['arsons, .% Vt. 40 (ISCS); Kobiii- son V. Stuart, G8 :\[e. fit (1878) ; Crowe v. Colbeth, Go Wis. 043 (188;")); Com. v. Gay, 102 Mass. 4r)8 (1894) ; " Tlie admissions of a party, if material to the issue, are always competent." Mears /•. Cornwall, 73 Mich. 78 (1888). Where part of a conversation, claimed to amount to an admission, is given by one side, the remainder of the conversation modifying the part given in evidence may be called for by the other side, though consisting, in jjart, of declarations in the declarant's favor. Williams v. Mower, 21) S. C. 332 (1888). " Where an admission against interest is offered in evidence, it must be taken together as a whole. The triers of the fact may give credence to that part only which is against the interest of the de- clarant, but the court cannot reject that ])art which is in the declar- ant's favor as having no probative force." JLormann v. Wirtei, o*,) Mo. App. 040 (1894). ''It is a wholesome rule, tliat where part of what a man says is used to charge him, he is entitled to the balance of what he said to discluirge lumself." Steele r. Wood, 78 N. C. 305 (1878). Tlie interest may be proprietary; as the admission of a tenant as to the character and extent of his tcnaney. Secor r. Testana, 37 III. 525 (1865) ; riummer /•. Currier, 52 X.'lE. 287 (1872). Form ov Declakatiox. — The form in which an admission is made is immaterial, so far as its competency is concerned. Various obvious considerations, arising from the circumstances under which, or the form in which, such au admission may affect the weight to be attached to it. 5542 AMERICAN NOTES. [part UI. ill An admission may be contained in a deposition, though " the cap- tion might have been irregular or even unjustifiable." Carr v. (Jrilliii, 44 N. H. 510 (1803). Or in an affidavit filed in court on removal of a case. Baker v. Hess, 53 111. App. 473 (1893). Ad- missions made in tlie defendant's answer in another case have been held competent. J'rintup v. Patton, 91 Ga. 421! (1893) ; Hadcl.vtTe r. IJarton, IGl Mass. 3L'7 (1894). It may consist of evidence gi\eii in a former trial, and is competent in this form even if the declarant is j)resent in court and can be called as a witness. Jiuddee v. Spangler, 12 (Jul. 210 (1888) ; McAndrews r. Santee, 57 l'.arl). 193 (1809); Lorenzana v. Camarillo, 45 Cal. 125 (1872); Woods v. Gevecke, 28 la. 561 (1870); German Nat. Bank v. Leonard, 40 Neb. 070 (1894). Such suit need not have been between the same parties, 'looker v'. Gormer, 2 Hilt. 71 (1858). If evidence, itself incompetent as an admission, is read over and assented to by a defendant, it becomes competent as his admis- sion. Beeckman v. Montgomery, 14 N. J. Ecp 100 (18()1). On an issue as to the value of certain premises taken by a rail- road, evidence is competent of the plaintiff's declarations, as to its value, of an offer to sell it at a certain price and of his sale of a portion of it at a certain price. East Brandywine &c. E. R. v. Banck, 78 Pa. St. 454 (1875). The admission may take the form of an entry upon an account book. McNutt V. IMcDonald, 3 Nova Scotia, 175 (1873) ; Robert's Appeal, 120 I'a. St. 102 (1889). An admission may be contained in a common law pleading. Soaps V. Eichburg, 42 111. App. 375 (1891). It is not objectionable that an admission is contained in an in- strument which is legally inoperative as to its own intended effect. The admission is still competent. Ilickev v. Hinsc.ale, 12 Mich. 99 (1803) ; Reis v. Hellman, 25 Oh. St. 180 (18^4). So a written promise made on Sunday, to j)ay a debt, while invalid as a new promise, is competent as an admission of the existence of the debt. Ay res v. Bane, 39 la. 518 (1874). So an admission contained in a sealed instrument executed by an agent who has merely a jiarol authority, may still bind the ])rinci- ])al. Morrell /•. Cawley, 17 Abb. Prac. 70 (180.'!). So of an admis- sion containcnl in an instrument executed by an agent without authority. Huffman r. Cartwright, 44 Tex. 290 (1875). Admissions may relate to the contents of a written document. Loomis V. Wadhams, 8 Gray, 557 (1857) ; Taylor c. I'eck, 21 Gratt. 11 (1871); Denver &c. K. K. r. Wilson, 4 Col. App. 355 (1894). Or even of a record. Smith t'. Palmer, Gush. 513 (1850). To the contrarv, see Jameson v. Conway, 10 111. 227 (1848). Threadgill c. White, 11 Ired. Law, 591 (1850). The contents of a record cannot be proved by an admission. Smith v. Palmer, Cush. CHAP. IX.] AMERICAN XOTKS. 5548 51.3 (1850). They may enure to the benefit of one not a party to the litigation. Burleson v. Goodnuin, 32 Tex. 220 (1869). They may be used to prove a book account. IJonnell v. Mawlia, 37 X. J. L. 11)8 (1871). FoucK OK AuMis.sioNS. — The weight to be attached to admissions lias been variously stated by difTerent courts. In IVuce r. ^Makepeace, (35 lud. 345, 3(55 (1879) the following charge to the jury was ap- proved l)y the supreme court of Iu<lia".a. '•Verbal admissions or statemoiits. consisting of mere re[H'titions of oral stateuu'iits made some time ago, are subject to mucli imi)erfection and mistake, for the reason thai the party making tliem may not have expressed his or her own meaning, or the witness may have misuu'lerstood him or her, or, by not giving their exact language, may have clianged the meaning of what was said ; such evidence should, therefore, be re- ceived by the jury with great caution. But adniissious deliber- ately made, and well understood, are enUtled to your consideration, especially when made against a party's own interest." Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind. 345, 305 (1879). " We do not think tliat admissions by parties are to be regarded as an inferior kind of evidence ; for, on the contrary, when satis- factorily proven, they constitute a ground of belief on which the mind justly reposes with strong confidence." Ector r. Welsh, 29 Ga. 443, 450 (1859). "The following instruction was proposed on behalf of the defend- ant, and refused: 'Admissions not being under oatii, and liable to be misunderstood, as against sworn testimony, are considered very feeble evidence, unless fully corroborated. The instruction was properly refused. Wiien a deliberate admission of a party against his own interest is satisfactorily proved, it is not necessarily feeble evidence, and does not require corroboration. It may be that the instruction was intended to refer to the proof of admissions, and not to tlie admissions themselves. Conceding tiiat the instruction admits of that inter[)retation, we still think it was |)n)])iTly refused. Tiie weight to be given to testimony of mere aduiissions is to be determined by the jury; yet it may be jjroper for tlu' court to say to tli(> jury that such testinu)ny is usually unsatisfactory and should b(' received with great caution. JJut it would scarcely h;' correct to say in every case, without (lualii'.cation or exception, that it is very feeble testimony unless fully eorroliorated ; for cases may readily be supposed, where an admission might in' satisfactorily proved by tlie uncorroborate<l testimony of a single witness.' " Saveland v. (ireen, 40 Wis. 431, 441 (187()). It lias even been held that where .admissioiis are not denied or controlled tliey "must be taken as true." Robinson v. Stuart, 08 Me. 01 (1S78). The probative force of admissions is naturally increased where the declarant was aware that tlie statement was against his interest. 554* AMKUICAN NOTES. [I'AKT III. ,i:"j III To Whom Made. — Declarations may be made to any ono. " There is no rule of law requiring such admissions to be made to the party or liis agent." Secor r. I'estana, 37 111. 525 (1865). Privity. — Under certain circumstances, the admissious of one porson bind another equally as if made by himself. These circum- stances substantially vary with the rules of positive or substantive law regulating the particular relationship existing between the de- clarant and the person claimed to be bound by his declaration. Whether, for example, the declaration of an agent binds his prin- cipal is a question in tlie law of agency. Whether sufficient privity exists between A. and his predecessor in title that A. is bound or affected by a statement made by the pr(>vious owner while in the possession of tlie jjroperty in question is to be decided by the law of property. When tlie rules of substantive law prescribe tliat certain of A.'s admissions may be taken to be those of 15., tlie ordinary rules of evidence admitting B.'s admissions are applied. Admission by Silkxck. — The rule regarding admission has been so far extended in many of the states of the American Union as to consider competent the fact that certain statements of relevant facts have been made under circumstances calling for denial it' un- true, in th(! presence of tl >' opposing party, and tliat he has not denied tliem. Cors<M- v. Taul, 41 X. H. 24 (1S(!0) ; .rolmson r. Day, 78 Me. 224 (ISSC) ; Humes v. O'P.ryan, 74 Ala. ()4 (l.SH.") ; Evans v. Montgomery, <J5 Mich. 497 (18915) ; Des Moines Savings 15anl<: (;. Colfax Hotel Co., 8S la. 4 (1S93) ; Wisdom r. Reeves (Ahi.), 18 So. Hep. lo (1895). So where repeated interviews took plac' 1) 'tween the ])laintiff and the officers of a (h'Tendant corporation, it is com- petent to sliow that tlie latter made no pretene(> that tlie defendant was not liable. Proctor /». Ol.l Colony K. K. 154 .Mass. 251 ( 1S91). " [t is somewhat like an omission to testify, or to i)ro(luce hooks, or to fnrnisli exjjlanations, when called on to do so." Proctor r. Old Colony 1{. II., 154 Mass. 251 (1891). 15y a parity of reasonin;-, •• The omission of a party to reply to statements in a letter about which he has knowledge, and which if not true he would naturally deny, when he replies to other i)arts of the letter, is evidence timd- ing to show that the statemiuits so made and not denied are true." Fen no t'. Wi'ston, ;]1 Vt. :545, .'552 (1858). 15nt a mere failure to answer a letter does not make its statements competent as admissions by sileiuM^ Li^irned /-. Tillotson, 97 \. V. 1 (1884) ; Thomas r. Gage, 141 N. V. 50G (1894) ; St. Louis, &c. K. ]{. /•. Thomas. 85 111. 401 (1877); Meguire ?;. Corwine, 3 McArthur, 81 (1879); Waring r. U. S. Telegraph Co., 44 Howard's (N. Y.) I'rac. ()9 (1873). 4Mie -'ule obtains in criminal cases. " A state- irent is made either to a man, or within his hearing, that he was con- cerned in tlie commission of a crime, to whicii ho makes no reply; the natural inference is that the imputation is well founded, or he m CHAP. IX.] AI^IERICAN NOTES. 5.545 would have repelled it." State v. Roed, C2 Me. 120, 142 (1874) ; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 (1S88) ; State /•. Crockett, 82 N. C. 5;)!) (1880) ; Ettinger v. Com., 98 Ta. St. 3:58, Sir, (1S81); Miller v. State, (58 Miss. 221 (18<)()) ; (tarrctt r. State, Hi Ala. 18 (1884). Wliere the defendant's wife in his presence exchiiiufl, •• We will sell liquor in s^jite of all the officers of station 1," the defeiidatit's failure to deny the stat(!nient was held " some evidence of an ad- mission on his part, if the declaration was undi'rstood by him in the sense first mentioned (that husband and wife were engagt-d in sell- ing liquor), and if the circuiustances were sucii that acconling to human experience he naturally would have repudiated it, if the iMii)lied assertions were not true." Com. r. Funiii, 14(j Mass. ~>~0 (18SS). The rule has been applied not only to the defendant in a criminal ease, but to the prosecuting witness. State c. Burton, •)4 N. C. 1)47 (188()). A Xkikssauy (JiJALii'MrATiox. — To render an unehalleng^d decla- ration maile in a [jcrson's presence evidence against him, it is essen- tial that he be in a position to reply, if so mind<'il. •• If a party is so situated that he is not called upon to say anything, and does not say anything, his silence under such circumstani'i's is not to be taken as furnishing any ground for an inference that he thereby made any admission." Proctor v. Old Colony \i. II.. 1.">1 Mass. 251 (18<)i) ; Corser v. I'aul, 41 N. H. 21 (isilO); (iibn.-y v. Mar- chay, 34 X. V. 3I>1, 305 (ISfKi) ; Loggins r. State, 8 Tex, App. 434, 444 (1880) ; Kaelin v. Com., 84 Ivy. 3.')4, 3(;7 (ISSO) ; P.-rk /•. Ryan (Ala.). 17 So, Rep. 733 (1805). It has been held by tli.- supreme court of Georgia that uncontroverted sr^tatcments made in presence of a party ar<! iuctjuqictent, '•uide>s it was at a time and inider eir- eumstances when it was his duty to speak. " Ciles /,•. Vimliver, 01 (}a. 102 (1802). Thus wheri>, in tlie course of jirevious judicial pro- ceedings, a statement is made in tlie jjresenee of the defendant, as he is not at liberty to interpose when and iiow he jileases, tliough a jiarty, no inference can hi; drawn, in a suliseipieiit eivil action, from the former silence. Johnson r. lloUiday. 70 Uu\. 151 (1881); M.. IClmurray ('. Turner, 8(1 Ca. 215 (1800); I'.ro.vles ,-. .State. 47 I-.id. 251 (IS74). So the defendant, not being at liberty to interrupt the taking of a dei)osition of a witness by a magistral ■. is not atfected by his failure to deny a statement containeil in sueli cleposition. tliough made in his presence. Tobacco Co. r. M dChvee. <);; X. C 71 ( 1S87). So when^ a derendant attended a certain interview on condition that he would '• let the old man say wiiat he pleased," no inference of an admission can be drawn from his silenei- under aei-nsation by the person rcd'erred to. Slatterv c. People, 70 111.217 (1^(75). "The defendant is not called upon to dispute the account on every occa- sion, and care should be exercised in determining whether the cir- cumstances called for it, so as to cause his omission to have weight VV 55# AMERICAN NOTES. [PAUT III. 1 1 against him." Cliurchill v. FuUiani, 8 la. 45 (1859) ; Ilviston's Estate, 1G7 Pa. St. 217 (189-'>). A plaintiff who has been seen ex- amining the defendant's books of account without objection has not thereby furnished evidence that he lias admitted the correctness of certain payments therein contained. Cheney v. Cheney, 1G2 Mass. 591 (18;)5). A married woman is not required to object, under jienalty of acquiescence, during a conversation held witli her husband, nor when, just before tlie death of her husband, when he could scarcely hear or speak, she, as the medium of communication between him and another person, repeated similar expressions without contradic- tion. " The interview was with her husband, not with her; it does not appear that she was inquired of in the matter. If she was not called upon to speak, was not inquired of, and made no response, then tlicre was no such acquiescence as would bind her, nor justify the master in finding from her silence any admission of the trutli of Nathan's statements. Whether a person is bound to speak when statements and declarations adverse to his interests are made, is often a perplexing question, and it is difficult to state a rule appli- cable to all cases, as the question so often depends upon the circum- stances attending each case. It has often been before our courts and the rule dedncible from the cases seems to be this, evidence tliat a party remained silent when declarations adverse to his inter- ests are made in liis hearing and presence, may be heard by the trier when the occasion upon which the declaration is u.ade calls for ad- mission or denial on liis part. In other words, vhenever he is called upon to speak ; whenever the circumstances demand a reply." Pierce v. Pierce, CG Vt. 3(59, 375 (1894). A minister cannot be allowed to prove his contraet with a reli- gious society by reading extracts from a sermon preached by him in their church, to the terms of which no open contradiction was made. It was litdd to have been " made under circumstances which could hardly require or admit a contradiction or disclaimer." Johnson n. Trinity Church Society, 11 All. 123 (18G5). So where the state- ment, though made in the presence of a party, is made when he is unable projjerly to understand or repl}' to it, no admission is implied. A statement is incompetent if made in the ])resence of a person asleep. Lanergan v. People, 39 M". Y. 39 (18G8). Or if made in pres- ence of a person so far under the influence of intoxication as not to understand what is said, — a question of fact which may be left to the jury. State v. Perkins, 3 Hawkes, 377 (1824). So statements made in tlie presence of a deaf person are mere hearsay. Tufts c. Charlestown, 4 Gray, 5.37 (1855). Where a defen;lant is under ar- rest, no inference can be drawn from his failure to answer charges made in his presence. State v. Howard, 1(»2 Mo. 14'J (1890). It natu- rally follows that where silence is due to al)sence of informition no CHAP. IX.] AMERICAN NOTKS. 554- inference can legitimately be drawn. "The silence of the party, even where the deelarations are addressed to hiujself, is worth very little, as evidence, unless where he had the means of knowing the truth or falsehood of the statement." Corser o. I'aul, 41 N. 11. 24 (18()0). So where the silence comes from the fact that tlie statement is not heard, no admission can be predicated on it. Cabiness r. Hol- land (Tex. Vav. App.), ;](> So. W. 6;i (l.S'Ja). "This kind of evi- dence should always be received with caution." Corser n. Paul, 41 N. II. -J4 (ISCiO). Whether the cireumstancH's are such as to call for a reply is said to be a preliminary question for the courts. Pierce v. Pierce, (W) Vt. .300 (1S04). CoMPUOMisic Nkgotiations. — The [)revailing opinion in the United States is to the effect that offers made in the course of com- promise negotiations are not competent as admissions. Harrington i\ Inhabitants of Lincoln, 4 Gray, HOS (lS.")o) ; Molyneaux v. Col- lier, 13 Ga. 4()() (IHoS); Commissioners v. Verbarg, 03 Ind. 107 (1.S7S) ; Daniels v. Woonsocket, 11 K. I. 4 (1874) ; Louisville &c. K. K. V. Wright, llo Ind. 378 (18S«) ; Montgomery v. Allen, 84 Mich. 056 (1891) ; Pelton v. Schmidt, (.Mich.) 02 X. W. 552 (18S)5) ; Smith V. Shell, 82 Mo. 215 (1884) ; Kierstead /;. Prown, 23 Neb. 595, 611 (1888) ; Smith /■. Satterlee, 130 N. Y. 077 (1891) ; Inter- national &c. P. P. /•. Pagsdale, 07 Tex. 24 (1880) ; Ibune Insurance Co. V. Paltimore Warehouse Co. 93 V. S. 527, 5-18 (1870) ; Perkins V. Concord P. P., 44 X. H. 223 (1,S02) ; Draper v. Inhabitants of Hatfield, 124 .Alass. 53 (1878) ; Wregc /•. Westcott, 30 X. J. Law, 212 (1802); Arthur r. James, 28 Pa. St. 230 (18.57) ; Parker v. Piishnell, 75 111. 220 (1874); Pichards v. Xoyes, 44 Wis. 609 (1878); Peynolds /•. .Manning, 15 Md. 510, 526 (1859); Darby w. Poberts, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 427 (1893) ; Olson (;. I'eterson, 33 Neb. 358 (1891) ; Huettenuin /•. Viesselmann, 48 Mo. App. 582 (1892); CJorham /;. Auerswald, 59 Mo. App. 77 (1894) ; Collier v. Coggins, 15 So. Pep. 578 (Ala.)' (1894) ; Columbia Planing Mill v. Ins.^Cc, 59 Mo. App. 204 (1894) ; Fowles v. Allen, M Conn. .350 (1894). •' The facts attenii)ted to be proved by plaintiifs are not facts admitting a distinct liability, l)ut were proposals that occurred in the conversation or negotiations to effect a settlement of the claim. This evideiHie was, therefore, properly rejected." Chaffe v. Mac- kenzie, 43 L;i. Ann. 1002 (1891). Where the offer of settlement is not for the sake of peace but for another consideration e. g. the contimuince of the case for three weeki- the offer is competent evidence of liability. Clapp v. Foster, 34 Vt. 580 (1861). Where an offer was made, "without prejudice" to a party claiming to have been injured in a railroad collision chat if he would submit himself to treatnuMit by certain doctors the company would settle by their report, the offer being 5548 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAKT III. t expressly made for the purpose of being used, if not accepted, at the trial as evidence of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, it was held that the entire offer was competent evidence for the jury at the instance of the plaintiff. Clark i\ Grand Trunk, '2[) Q. U. U. C. ]3() (IS(il)). A )iior<! offer to pay, not made on the faith of any pending treaty of settlement is of course competent. Smith »». Whittier, D;") Cal. 27!) (W.yj); Molyneaux r. Collier, 13 Ga. 40G (1853). JStato r. l>ru(!e, 33 La. Ann 18(J (1881). So of an olfer to pay if a survey shall show the existence of a trespass. Ashlock v. Linder, oO 111. 1G9 (18(59). The fact that an offer of settlement of a contested insurance loss has been made is competent though " dangerously near transgressing the settled rule that offers of compromise are not admissible" where the offer is not received as evidence of the plain- tiff's claim Init solely on the question of waiver of tlie requircMuent of i)r()ofs of loss within a limited })eriod. Gould r. Insurance Co., 134 Ta. St. r)70, 589 (1890). Where an ivinount is lixed arbitrarily, as being what a person is willing to pay rather than have a suit, " the rule is well settled that no advantage can be taken of otters made by way of compromise ; that a party may, witli impunity, attempt to buy his peace." Ten- nant o. Dudley, 144 N. Y. 504 (1895). So where a defendant, whose horse had run away and injured tlie plaintiff's horse, said to the ])laintift' that " it was an accudent and accidents would happen, but he would do wliat was right about it ; that he woiild ])ay the veterinary surgeon's bill and would let the plaintiff' have the use of a horse wliile tlu' injured horse was laid up," tlie statement is said to be "to some extent an iunnission.'' Bassett V. Shares, 63 Conn. 39, 44 (1893). "An offer of ]iaynient, whether accepted or rejected, is evidence when the ]»arty making it understood it to be, and made it as, an admission of his liability. It is not evidence when he made it for the purpose of averting litigation, not intending to admit his liability." This ((uestion is one of fact for the court. Colburn v. Groton, 6G N. If. 151 (1889). The Canadian practice places more insistence upon the forui.al use of the phrase " without prejudice " tiian is usual m the United States, ririe /•. Wyld, 11 Out. 422 (tS8()) ; Clark v. Grand Trunk 1\. R.. 29 (>. lb 1'. C. 130 (18G9) ; Burns r. Kerr, 13 Q. B. U. C. 4(58 (I8r,(;). It is believed that the following statement, iiulorsed by the court of appeals of the state of jMaryland in IJeynolds v. iVfanning, 15 Md. 510, 527 (1859), is correct at the present day; "The most, it' not all, of the American cases have . . . gone on the intrinsic character of the transaction, without requiring an exjiress declara- tion that the CMmmunication should be without prejudice." It has been held by the supreme judicial court of Maine that CHAP. IX.] AMEUICAN XOTES. 5549 wluMi evidence is objeoteil to on tlie ground that it is a statement made in course of an effort to compromise a dispute, and it does not as yet appear that such is the case, the court may properly receive the evidence de bene and h'ave the wliole matter to the jury, " with direction not to consider the eviiUMice if they found that tlie parties were trying to compromise when tlie admissions and offer were made." Webber v. Dunn, 71 Me. y;il. .'540 (ISSO); Hall v. Brown, 58 X. II. ();5 (1877). When negotiations for a .settlement luive failed and the confer- ence is breaking up, what is said by the ])arties is no longer priv- ileged. l?roschart ^■. Tuttle, 59 Cor.n. 1 (1S!)0). Conversely, where the offer of compromise has been accepted its terms may be shown on a bill in ecpiity to enforce it. Omnium Securities Co. v, llichard- son, 7 Ontario, l82 (1884). Communications made to a third party, not during the ])endency f oom])roniise negotiations, are competent. Moore /•. Gaus, 113 Mo, 98 (UV.)!')- T?;;.\s()\s FOK TiiJia^xcLi'sio.v. — Two reasons are assigned for the exclusion of compromise offers. First: — that it is against public policy that attempts to ttrminate litigation should be bur- dened by the danger of having any statements made in the course of them used against the declarant. So where the attempt was made to prove the plaintiff's admission of what he had offered to settle for, the court, in rejecting the evidence, say : — "It was but one of the modes of proving a fact which, upon the soundest principles of public policy, cannot be proved at all." Harrington v. Iidiabitants of Lincoln, 4 Gray, 563 (18.55). " Parties negotiating for a settlement woidd be shy of offering their best terms if their offers were not privileged.' Daniels v. Woonsocket, 11 K. I. 4 (1874). "The autiiorities seem, though not very numerous, to be clear upon the first j)oint, that letters written or communications made without prejudice, or offers made for the sake of buying peace, or to effect a compromise, are inadmissible in evidence. It seemingly being considered against public policy as having a tendency to promote litigation, and to prevent amicable settlements." I'irie v. Wyld, 11 Out. Kep. 4L'2 (188()). In Perkins v. Concord K. K., 44 N. H. 223 (18()2) the exclusion is said to be "on grounds of public policy." "This rule is founded in policy, that there may be no discouragenuMit to ami- cable adjustment of disputes, by a fear, that if not comi)leted, the party amicably disposed may I)e injured." Gerrish i'. Sweetzer, 4 rick. 373, 377 (1826). "This rule is well settled that no advan- tage can be taken of offers niude by way of compromise ; that a ])artv mav, with impunity. atteni[)t to buy his peace." Tennant v. Dudley, 144 N. Y. 50 1 (1895). Second; — because a statement made, not because it is believed to be true but as an inducement to the jiurchase or sale of peace is 654i'> AMKltlCAN NOTES. [PAUT III. 1 not siifflfiently probative of tlie truth of the statement as to war- rant its Ix'ing reet'ivetl in evidence. " I'eace is of such worth that a reasonable man nxay well be [iresumeil to seek after it even at tiio co'.t of his strict right, and l)y an abatement from his jtist elaiiii. Tile offer which a man makes to imrchase it is to l)e taken, not as Ills judgment of what lie should receive iit t-''> cud of litigation, but what he is willing to n ceive and avoi( larringtou /•. Inhair itauts of LiiHioln, i (ira\, ^(1;! (l!S,V»); ^mltll ik Sludl, .SI,' Md. 2ir> (1.S84). '■ To permit the introduction of such offers tends to dis- courage the adjustment of suits, and for that reason is against the policy of the law. If the object of the party in nuikiug the offer was to buy his peace (which is impliedly manifesteil by a mere proposition to pay a sum in settlement), it is deemed to have been made without preju'lice and will be excluded." International (See. R. K. V. liagsdale, 07 Tex. 24 (1«8G) ; Draper o. Inhabitants of llatheld. 124 .Mass. ,76 (1878). " It was a mere offer to pay a sum of money to get rid of a law suit, and was in no sense an admission that In? owed the plaintiff that or any other sum." Richards /•. Noyes, 44 Wis. (509 (1878). " It is never the intendment of the law to shut out the truth ; but to repel any inference, which may arise from a proposition made, not with design to admit the existence of a fact, but merely to buy one's peace. If an admission, however, is made, because it is a fact, the evidence to prove it is competent, whatever motive may have prompted to the declaration." Hartford IJricige Co. v. Granger, 4 Conn. 142 (1822) cited with a])proval in Fuller v. Hampton, o Conn. 410, 420 (1824). Where an offer is not an effort to settle a disputed claim but an admission of liability, it is competent. ilcKinzie v. Stretch, r>3 111. App. 184 (18!);}). Where a conversation is held, not "for the purpose of endeavor- ing to make a compromise; of disjiuted claims, or tluit an offer or offers might be made to purchase peace, but for the purpose of ascertaining the claims really existing ai\d justly due from one party to the other, that they might be fairly adjusted " such a con- versation, it has been held, " could not have been excluded by any well established rule of evidence." Cole v. Cole, 33 Me. 542 (1852). Similarly, where the conversation relates not to the existence of a liability but concerns contemplated methods of paying an ad- mitted claim, it is not i)rivileged. Hood t: Tyner, 3 Ind. App. 51 (1891). The question whether an offer is an admission of liability or a mere purchase of peace is a question of fact for the court, the decision of which may ha set aside when against the evidence. Colburn v. Groton, 0(5 X. 11. 151 (1889). CHAP. IX.] AMKUICAN NOTKS. r);J4'i Tndki'icndknt Facts. It is Piitircly consistoiit with the reason- ing oil wliic'li offers of coniproinisc aro oxchuled as adinissii)iis tliat statements of independent facts, thoiigli made in tlie course of (Mun- promise negotiations, are reganU'd as competent. Sucli independent facts are presiinnibly stated, not i'or tin; sake of peace, hut because they are believed to be true. So, wliih; an offer of settU-iuent of an injury caused by a defect in a liighway is incompetent, statements of tlie parti(!ulars of tiie injury arc! admissibh'. "Tlie presiding judge ruled that no offer of settlement, made by the j)laintiff in a conversation had with the agents of the defendants, with a view to tlie adjustment of the controvers}-, was competent; but that state- ments of independent facts, made in the course of such conversa- tion, might be admitted. The distinction is sound. The facts stated were capable of being jiroved by any competent evidence, iiududing the admission of tlie plaintiff. 'I'lie amount of a docttor's bill, the cost of board during sicdiiiess, the loss of time by absence from the service of his employer, were simple facts, capable of exact certainty — facts, the statement of which would not be modified by the occa- sion on which it was made, certainly not to the prejudice of the party making it." JIarrington r. Inhabitants of Lincoln, 4 Gray, o03 (lS5"i). " An admission of an iiide[)endeiit fact in no way con- nected with the offer of compromise, although made during the negotiations, is competent evidence.'* Louisville, &c. If. It. /•. Wright, 115 Ind. 378 (1888); I'erkins r. Concord K. \l., 44 \. H. 223 (1802) ; Draper r. Inhabitants of Hatti.dd, 124 Mass. 53 (1877) ; Wrege v. Westcott, 30 X. ,J. Law, 212 (I8(i2). "This rule seems coniined to the mere offer of compromise, for it is held that any independent facts admitted during the treaty for a compromise, may be given in evidence as confessions." (lerrish /•. Sweetser, 4 J'ick. 374, 377 (1820). '• The authorities seem well agreed that projHJsals made while a compromise is in treaty between the parties cannot be offered in evidence, but conversations in which an independent fact is disclosed may be admitted to prove it." Uroschart v. Tuttle, 59 Conn. 1, 23 (1890). So a statement by a plaintiff when approached witli a view to settling a cas(! that he knew nothing about it, that it was A.'s doings and A. "would have to foot it in the end" are couipe- t 'lit facts. " It was not an offer for a couipromise, but an uiupialiHed admission of a fact. This is the true distinction between such state- ments of a party as are admissible, and such as should be rejected on the principle that men must be allowed ' to buy their ])eace ' with- out prejudice." Marvin r. Uiclimond,3 Denio, ."8 (1840); McP^hvtM? Mfg. Co, V. Trowbridge, 08 Hun, 28 (1.S93). "The rule is strictly held in this State that an offer to compromise is not to be sliown, on account of the tendency such a jiractice would have to discourage the settlement of disputes. IJut it is at the same time held with equal clearness, that any independent admission, though made ia 564>a AMEiaCAN NOTK8. [I'AUT III. II i| the coursn of iiPKotiatioiis for a (•oini)r()inise, may be shown." I'lumiiicr c. Currier, ")!' N. H. L'«7 (1871'). In the hist-named ease it was ucc'irdingly hehl, in a case where a (inestion was as fo whether a tenant was to jiay rent, that an oifer by the defeuihint to submit tiie (juestioii iiow niiu-li rent was due to an award, was a competent laet. ////(/. "Admissions made on tiie occasion (d' an attempted settlement, if iiarcel of tin- treaty tor a eompromise, and ma(h' in furtiierance of tlie treiity, are privilei,'ed, and cannot bo given in evi(k'nee against tiie party malcing them, beeause they an; madt; upon a eontiih'n(;e and trust, and ant received as such l)y the party to wliom tliey are aihlressed. I?ut if a party during such treaty admits a fact to l)e true becanse it is a fact, and not because he is willing to treat it as a fact for the purposes of tiie tlien ]ieiiding compromise, it may properly be shown in evideiict ," Doon r. Kavey, 4'.) Vt. 'J'Xl (1877): Kalin r. Traders" Ins. Co. (Wyo.), ;i4 J'ac. liej). lorv.) (18'.)o). So, an admission tliat tlicre is iiotliing tiie matter with tiie plaintitFs side of an account, though n>ade in tlie course of an effort to settle a dispute, is competent. Goodnow ('. Parsons, 80 Vt. 40 (ISOo). A distinct admission of a contract may be shown even if made in tlie course of compromise negotia- tions. Scofield /•. I'arlin, &e. Co., 01 Fed. Kei). S()4 (1H<J4). " It is tiie policy of tiie law to facilitate! the settlement of contro- versies, and therefore an offer to pay a sum of money to compromise u dispute, is not admissible in evidence to prove that the sum offered was admitted to be due. P)Ut it is also the object of tlie law of evi- dence, to ascertain tlie truth, and therefore the distinct admission of a fact in a h iter or conversation, is not to be excluded beciuise it is accompanied by an offer to compromise the suit. l*roposals made while tlie compromise is on the carjjct, do not bind, but conversations in which a fact is disclosed may be admitted to prove it." Arthur V. James, 2S I'a. St. 2.">G (1857). So the payment of a sum of money to tlie mother of a bastard lor its support is acompetent fact thougli efforts at a compromise were still pending. Fuller v. Hampton, o Conn. 416, 420 (1S24). " Although the policy of the law fiivors ainiciible settlements of controversies and therefore iirohibits evi- dence of negotiations made by a party for the purpose of buying his peace, when during negotiations for a comjiromise a fact is con- ceded as in this instance without reservation, evidence of such ad- mission is competent against the party." Kutcher v. Love, 19 Col. o42 (1894). " Offers of compromise do not bind; but admissions or statements of the facts are evidence, though made in an endeavor to effect a settlement." Thoni i>. Hess, 51 111. App. 274 (1893). "The letter was a mere offer to accept $15.00 in satisfaction of the jilaintiffs' demand, and as such was properly excluded as an offer of coiniiromise. . . . Tlie question is a very different one from that which would have been presented had the letter stated that the ClIAI'. IX.] AMKKICAN NOTKS. r)04'8 wood ill iiucstion was wortli only JjilO.OO. KowIps v. Allen, (U Conn. ;!;")() (1894). So iiii iKlinission that one is a partnor, though niado in the course of ooininoinisf! negotiations, is eoiiipeteiit. (ianier /•. Myriek, '60 Miss. 4J.S (ISoo). So '' where tli(> execution of the contract sued on is denied by the defendant, a letter offering to conipioniise the claim, and making an express recognition of the contract, is admissible in evidence as an a<liiiission of the execution of the contract." Scotield v. I'arlin, Gl Fed. Rep. 804 (I8U4). An (lifer by the defendant to a bastardy complaint to pay half the expenses of putting the prosecutrix away from home is coiinjctent. Kobb V. Hewitt, .S!) Neb. 217 (181)4). Admissions and statements of facts are competent, though made in an effort to effect a settlement. Thoin v. Hess, ol ill. A])p. L'74 (180.3); Kutcher r. Love, 19 Col. o41i (1894) ; Tavlor v. U. K. Co., 101 Mich. 140 (1891). liut it has been held that the fact that a p:irticular claim is not made during the j)en(lency of compromise negotiatious is not com- peteiit. Kierstead v. Brown, 'J'.i Neb. r)9o (1888). Where the ot?er of compromise. actually contains cr amounts t;o an admission of liability, that fact is competent. McKinzie n. Stretch, r>3 111. App. 184 (18D;5). The su]ireiiie court of Indiana have apparently added a further (pialilication upon the rule admitting in evidences an admission of an independent fact made in the course of compromise negotiation, viz., that the admission of such independent fact should not have l.ieen designed to further the reaching of a compromise. This certainly seems within the " equity of the rule." "Even if it be conceded that the conversation between the parties related to a compromise, still a specific admission of a fiict, because it is a fact, maile in the (ioursc of such a conversation, and not made to open tiie way to a compromise, is admissible. The rule on this subject is thus stated by the court in one of the cases referred to by the appellant : ' An offer, concession, or admission, made in the course of an ineffectual treaty of compromise, and constituting, in itself, the ])oint yi(dded for the sake of ])pace. and not because it was just or true, is not competent evidence against tli(> party making it; but the law is otherwise with regard to an independent fact admitted to be true, but not constituting such yielde(l point.' Wilt v. P>ird, 7 Bhu-kf. 2oS. Substantiallj^ the same language is used in Cates v. Kellogg, 9 Ind. oOG ; and in Pattison r. Norris, 29 Iiid. lOo, a somewhat broader statement is made. The rule stated governs here, for the defendant admitted, as an independent substantive fact, that he had uttered slanderous words, imputing to the plaintiff a want of chas- tity, and did not make the admission for the purjiose of securing a comi)r(uuise." Binford c. Young, 115 Ind. 174 (1888). 554" AMERICAN NOTES. [PAUT 111. "NVjikx conclusive. — Admissions, as a nilc, are cai)able of ex- planation, and tlieir effect may l)e controlled by other evidence. Biizard tf. McAnulty, 77 Tex. 438 (1890); Kinney r. Farnswortli, 17 Conn o55 (184')). " Receipts and other admissions of parties are always oi)en to explanation, niiless under particular ciicumstaiiccs as where they have led to conduct in other parties, involvini'- loss to them, by reason of their having acted n|)on the faith of such admis- sions : or unless they can be treated all the way through as conclu- sive." Cuvillier (•. Browne, 4 Q. B. U. C. 10.") (10 Vk-.). ''it is insisted that tlie [jlaintiif had, after tlie accident, made certain state- ments or admissions tliat lie was walking backward at tlie time tliat his foot got cauglit, which were inconsistent with his testimony. Such statements go to the credibility of his testimony merely, and are for the jury."' Eastman c. Kailway Co., 101 Mich. 597, GO.'i (1894). Ho a pleader may show that his admission in pleading was made inconsiderately and without ade(piate knowledge of the facts. Smith V. Fowler, 12 Lea, IC'J (1883); Buzard v. McAnulty, 77 Tex. 43S (1890). So an admission in court may be retracted at a subsequent trial, though the fact of the previous admission is still com])etent. Terry r. Simpson Waterproof Mfg. Co., 40 Conn. 31.') (187.'!). See also Stowe /•. IJishop, 58 Vt. 498 (188()), to the effect that wiiere a man admitted negligence he can show that upon reflection he became convinced that his conduct was justified. ''In the circumstances of the case, negligence was a question of fact and not of law, and de- fendant's statements were evidence against him on that jioint; but as they wore non-contrac^tual and non-dis|)ositive admissions, ti\ey were not conclusive proof of that which he stated, but were open to neutralization by showing that on reflection and consideration he had come to think otherwise. Dennisou v. Miner, L' Atl. llei). 561 (Sup. Ct. of Pa.), is exactly in point." CoxcM'sivK AoMtssioNs ARK EsToi'i'Kt.s. — I'lulcr wliatcircum- stanccs an admission is conclusive is a ([uestion decided by the ordinary rules of equitable estoppel. Admissior.s, by silence or otherwise, which have been acted on by the j)erson to whom made, cannot be denied if their denial would work injury to one who has acted upon them in good faitli. Corser -<». Paul, 41 X. II. 24 (18G0) ; Cuvillier r. I5rowne, 4 (,). 15. U. C. 105 (1847); Welland Canal Co. c. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480 (1832). C. X.] ORAL CONFESSIONS TO BE RECEIVED WITH CAUTION. CHAPTER X. CONFESSIONS. § 862.' The only topic under the general head of admissions which remains to be discussed, is that of confessions of guilt in criminal cases. In such cases evidence of oral confession of guilt ought — as just remarked in regard to admissions in civil pro- ceedings,- — to be rrccivod with great caution.^ Not only does considerable danger of mistake arise from the misapprehension or malice of witnesses, the misuse of words, the failure of the party to express his own meaning, and the infirmity of memory,* but the zeal which generally prevails to detect offenders, especially in cases of aggravated guilt, and the strong disposition which is often displayed by persons engaged in pursuit of evidence to magnify slight grounds of suspicion into sufficient proof, ^ — together with the character of the witnesses, who are sometimes necessarily called in cases of secret and atrocious crime, — all tend to impair the value of this kind of evidence, and sometimes lead to its rejection, where, ' Gr. Ev. § 214, in great part. * Ante, § .SOI. ' Mui'iiulay has romarked, "Words may easily be niiaunilerstood by an honest man. They may easily be misconstrued by a knave. What was ppoken nictaplioriciilly may be»j)j)re- hended literally. What was s])oken ludicrouhly may bo apprehended seriously. A particle, a tense, a mood, an emphasis, may make the whole difference between Ruilt and innocence." History of England, vol. 1, ch. 5, p. oH:i. ♦ See Earlo v. I'icken, 1833 (Parke, B.); R. V. Simons, 18;H (Ahlerscm, B.); Coloinan'H case, 1718 (Ir.1. in Ho~p. 7'. Fields, 18'_>'2-4 (Am.), the court observed, ' ' llow easy is it for the hearer to take one word for another, or to take a word in a sense not in- teniled by the speaker ; and for want of uu exact ropr(!sentati(m of the tone of voice, emphasis, countenance, eye, manner, and action of the one who made the confession, how almost im- possible is it to make third persons understand the exact state of his mind and meaning ! For these reasons such evidence is received with great dis- trust, and uiul(>r apprehensions for the wrong it may do." ' For a curious instance of this kind of exaggeration, see the evi- dence adduced in support of Hugh Macauley Boyd's claim to the author- shi]) of Junius. 1 Woodfall's Junius, •133— Ma:. See ante, §67. 565 i! L, I t ORAL CONFESSIONS TO BE RECEIVED WITH CAUTION, [p. Itl. in civil actions, it would have been received. The weighty obser- vation of Mr. Justice Foster should also be kept in mind, that " this evidence is not, in the ordinary course of things, to be disproved by that sort of negative evidence, by which the proof of plain facts may be, and often is, confronted." ' § 863. In addition to these sources of distrust, which are often sufficient to raise a serious doubt whether the confession given in evidence was actually made by the prisoner in the words, or to the effect, stated by the witnesses, there is yet another reason why caution should be employed in receiving and weighing confessions. The statements, though made as deposed to, may be fahe. The prisoner, oppressed by the calamity of his situation, may have been induced by motives of hope or fear to make an untrue con- fession ; - and tlie same result may have arisen from a morbid 'I > Fost. C. L. 243. See, also, 1 Ph. Ev. 307 ; Lench c. Li'iu'h, 1805 ; Smith V. Burnhain, ls;i.S (Am.); E. V. Cro,ssHchl, lT9(j, per Mr. Adiuiis, iu hi.s luldrtss to tlio jury. The civilians plucod littlo roliaiico on nuked contossioiis of guilt, not corroboiiitod by otluu' tostiniony. Carpzuvius, after citing the opinion of Severus to that cttect, and onunic- ratiiig the various kinds of misery whieli tempt its wretched victims to this mode of siiicid(\ adds -"(juorum omnium ex his foritibus contra .so emissa pron>uiciati( , non tarn drlicti cronfcssiont' llrniati (^uf>"' vox '/c/cr/s, vel iiimiiifidiH oratio c.^t": Ca. t' Tract, lier. Cr. Pars 111. (iiv.st. 114, p. KiO. So. also, in the Kccles. (,'ourts it is regarded witii great distrust. S'>o per Sir W. Scott, in Williams /'. Williams, 17i»8. - In (InMi'.ioaf on ]']vidcnce, liith edit,, liSd'.', p. -1)0, various cases and dieta aie cited of confcssioUH which w ro false, and llnis show the nccnl of extreme eiiution as to acct'j)ting all confessions, .\mong other in- stances ([noted is the remarkable case of tlie two JJoorns (Am.), con- victe(l in tlie S',i])r. Court of Nei'inont in Sei)tember, l.Sl!>, of the nuirder of Russell Colvin, May 10th, 1812. It appeared that Colvin, wlio was the brotlier-in-law of the prisoners, was a pursoiJ nf weak mind ; that he wa« considered burdensome to the family of the ]>risoners, wlio were obliged to .snp])ort him ; that on the day of his disappearance, being in a distant held where the prisoners were at work, a violent quarrel bioke out between them; and that one of them struck him a violent blow on the back of the head with a club, which felled him to the ground. Some suspicions arose at that time that he was murdered, which wcie in- creased by the linding of liis hat in the same field a few montlis after- wards. Thi'so suspicions in process of time snlisided ; imt, in 1810, one of the neighbours luiving lepeateilly dreamed of the niurdei', with great minuteness of circumstance, both in regaid to his death and the con- cealment of liis remain *, tlie jjrisoners woie veliemently accused, and gi^no- rally believed guilty of tlie murder. Upon strict search, the ]inckct-knifo of Colvin aiul a button of his cletlies were found in an old <ii)encellar in the same field, and in a hollow stumj) not many rods from it wen^ discovered two nails and a number of bones, b(!lieveii to be those of a man. Upon tliis ovidenci', together with tlieir deliberatn confession of tin? iact of the minder and concealment of the body in thosi^ ]>la<'es, the jirisoners woi'o convicted and sentenced to die. On the same day they applied t*) the wa CHAP, X.] INSTANCES OF FALSK CONFESSIONS. ambition to obtain an infamous notoriety,' from an insane or criminal desire to be rid of life, from a reasonable wish to break off old connexions, and to commence a new career, from an almost pardonable anxiety to screen a relative or a comrade,- or even from the delusion of an overwrought and fantastic imagination.^ § 864. Still, the actual instances of fahe confessions of crime are very rare, and^ their just value has been happily stated by one of the most accomplished of modern jurists. " Whilst such anoma- lous cases," says the writer, " ought to render courts and juries at all times extremely watchful of every fact attendant on confessions of guilt, the cases should never be invoked, or so urged by the accused's counsel, as to invalidate indiscriminately all confessions put to the jury, thus repudiating those salutary distinctions which the court, in the judicious exercise of its duty, shall be enabled to make. Such an use of these anomalies, which sliould be regarded as mere exceptions, and which should speak only in the voice of warning, is no less unprofessional than impolitic ; and should be regarded as offensive to the intelligence both of court and jury."* Legrislaturo for a commutation of the seutouco of death to thiit of j)mi)utual imprisoiimont ; wliich, as to ouo of thoiii only, was {iraiitcd. Tho con- fession buiuf^ now witlidrawu and contradicted, and a reward offered for tlicdiscoveiy of tlie missing man, he was found in New Jersey, and re- turned homo in tiuK! to ])revent the execution. Ho liad tied for fear that th((y would kill him. Th<' boni's woio those of S(nue animal. Tliey had been advisiKl by some misiu(l;|r^i"ji i'ii"nds that, as they would certainly bo con- victed upon the circumstances proved, their only chance of life, by coininu- tation of punishmi'nt, depended on their makin^ra jienitential confession, and thereui)ou obtaining,' a recom- mendation to mercy. This case, of which there is a l?e])oi t in the Law liibrary of Ilarvaid IJniveisity, is criti(Nilly examined in a learned article in the Noitli Anu<r. l{ev. vol. X. ]>p. US 'fJit. For another of false confession, under a ])ro- case {)anl ^ari note to WarickshrtU's case, 1783. * One or other of these motives probably induced Hubert falsely to confess that ho set fire to London in l(!f)(). His confession cost him lus life. See (i How. St. Tr. 807— 809, 81!»— 821 ; and Wills, Cir. Ev. 70-7o. See, also, (leni'ialLiMi's assertion that he was the author of Junius, as nar- rated in 1 Woodfall's Junius, 'Vl'l, •12;j. ' Mr. Joy mentions the case of an innocent person makinj,' a false con- structive confession, in ord(>r to fix KUsi)icion on liims(,'lf alone, that his guilty bidthirs miu'ht liave time to escajK!, — a stratagem whicli was coni- pletely successful ; after wiiicji lie ])roved an alibi in the most satisfac- torv manner, Joy on Conf. (Ir.) 107 ; 1 ('hit. Cr. L. 8,j, S. C. ^ This is probably th(> true key to the frequent (unfessions of tlie poor Wl'etcli(!sin old times tried for witch- cralt. See Mary Smith's case, KJUi; Essex witches, \M'>\ SulVolk witches, I()()5; Devon witches tried in 1082. * Gr. Ev. § 214, n. 2. » 1 Hoffman on Leg. Study, p. 367. 667 DELIBERATE CONFESSIONS — JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS, [p.lll. 11 § 865.* Indeed, all reflecting men are now generally agreed, that (IcUbemt)' and voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved, are among the most effectual proofs in the law; their value depending on the sound presumption, that a rational heing will not make admissions prejudicial to his interest and safety, unless when urged by the promptings of truth and conscience.^ Such confessions, therefore, made by a prisoner to any person, at any time, and in any place, are at common law receivable in evidence,^ while the degree of credit due to them must be esti- mated bj the jury according to the particular circumstances of each case. § SfiG.* Confessions may be divided into two classes, namely, judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial cvifessions are those which are made before the magistrate, or in court, in the due course of legal proceedings ; and it is essential that they be made of the free will of the party, and with full knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confession. Of this kind are the preliminary examinations taken in writing by magistrates pursuant to statute ; and the plea of guilty to an indictment, made in open court. Either of these is suffiifient b}'- itself to support a conviction, though followed by a sentence of death, they both being deliberately and solemnly made under the protecting caution and oversight of the judge. Even on trials for treason or mispri>ion of treason, where the law in its clemency affords to the accused unusuul protection, a " willing confession without violence in open court," renders it un- neccfsary to call witnesses in support of the charge ;' and, perhaps, also, — though this would seem to be highly qTiei^tioiiable," — a con- fession made during the solemnity of an examination before a magistrate or other person having autliority to tnke it, will, if satisfactorily proved by two witnesses, be deemed sufhtieut evidence ' Or. Ev. § 21o, in part. " Wiivickshiiirscasu, 1783; Lambe's cnsc, ITHl ; ^tovtitiier v. Mortiiiior, 1820; Ilanis r. Hiinis, 1829; 1 Gilb. Ev. 21(1 ; Dig. lib. 42. tit. 2. tu^ Con- fess.; Van Lccuw, Comni. b. v. i-h. xxi. § 1 ; 2 I'oth. Obi. Apj). Numb. xvi. §■ i;{. • Lambo's case, 1791 ; M'NuIly, Ev. (Ir.) 42, 47. ♦ Gr. Ev. § 216, as to first twelve lines. " 7 W. 3, c. 3 ("Tho Tioiiaon Act, 1()9.) "), § 2 ; extended to In^land by 1 & 2 G. 4, c. 24; Gi(>f;},'"s cu.si>, 1708. * Hf'iwiok's casi', 174(); J{. v. Willis, 1710 iWni'il. C.B., and Eyre, 8.-0.). 668 CHAP. X.J EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS. to warrant a conviction.^ The canon law, too, — scrupulous as it :? on the subject of evidence, — regards a JitiUcial and free confession, made out of prison, and without any just fear or danger, as amount- ing, in the phrase of the Spiritual Courts, to a jdena probatio.* The doctrine of the Roman law, was also to the lilic effect, — con- fessos in Jure pro judicatia hubcri phrrf ; — and, indeed, it may be deemed a rule of universal jurisprudence.'' § 867."* Extra-Jmliciol confeifitoHs are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a magistrate, or in court ; this term embracing not only express confeissions of crime, but all those admissions and acts of the accused from which guilt may be implied. All voluntary confessions of this kind are receivable iu evidence, on being proved like other facts ; and thi.s, too, on trials for treason or misprision of treason, in like manner as on ordinary indictments ; except only that, on these uiore serious occasions, they will not supply the want of tlie two witnesses, whose testimony is required by the Act of William the Third. Conspqut'ntly, confessions, whetht-r proved by one witness or two, can only be treated as corrohoratire evidence of the orert act charged ;•' unless such overt act be the assassination of the Queen, or any attempt to injure her person, in which event the accused may be convicted on the same evidence as an ordinary murderer." § 8GS.' Whether, on ordinary indictments for felony or mis- demeiinor, extra-judicial coiifessioiis, uiirorroliorated by any other proof of the corpus delicti,'* are of themselves, in general, sufficient to ju>tify a couviutiou of a prisoner, has been gravely doubted.'* > I'o-t. C. L. 'J4(l— 243. » Avlilto I'iir. J4J. ' C«)il. Lil). 7, tit. 59 ; 1 Poth. Obi. ft. iv. eh. ;J, § 1, num. 71)8; Vau iL'Oiiw. Uoiinu. b. o, oil. 21, § 2 ; 1 Muse. (U; I'lob. Gone. 344. * (Jr. Ev. § 210, us to first fivo linos. U. ('. Willis, 1710; Post. C. L. 240-243; 11. n. Cios-liuld, 179(i. » 3!t vt 40 a 3, c. 93 ("Tho Trea- son Aut, 18(Mt"); 1 & 2 G. 4, f. 24, § 2, Ir. ; o & (i V. c. jl ('• Tho Tiua- eon Act, 1S42"), § 1. ' (ii'. Ev. § 217, ill pint. "As t" wli'ii the corpus delicti need not bu piuvud, uou auto, § 141. Seo. (ilso, R. V. Unklos. 1S73 (Ir.). 'In iioman law. sucli nuk>-d eon- fusi<iwn-i uiiiDunted oiily it a senii- )iliMi'i pi'iibatio. ujmn wiiji h uion«j no juilj;iii('ut could l>e fmin |i-il ; and, at m()>t, tho uccusrd. in pirticularcases, could Lilly !)•' put to til'.' t<.rtufo. But if volunturily made iu tlie j)rfSf'nce of the iiijurcil party, or if ifitt-rated lit diffcii'iit tiiui'j ill his ab-eoco, and jjorsisti'd in, thuy wcr« ivcfiviHl as plenary pioof: Evorh. Concl. xix. 8, l.xxii. j, cxxxi. 1, clxiv. 1, 2, 3, clxxxvi. 2, 3. 11 ; 1 Masc. do Prob. Coiid. 347, 349; Van Lt'euw. < 'omm. b. 5, ch. 21, «i> 4, .3; ('ai](Z. Pract. Ker. Cr. Pars. 11. Uux-st. 00, n. 8. 561^ CONFESSION OF ADULTICRY. [part III. In each of the English cases usually cited in favour of tlio sufTi- ciency of this evidence, some corroborative circurastanoe will bo found.* One case,^ indeed, seems to be in exception ; but it is far too briefly reported to be relied on as an authority.^ In the United States, a prisoner's confession, when the corpus delicti is not otherwise proved, has been held insufficient to warrant his conviction,* and this opinion certainly best accords with the humanity of the criminal law, with the great degree of caution applied in receiving and weighing the evidence of confessions in other cases, and is countenanced by approved writers on this branch of the law.* § 869. However, in the Divorce Division a decree for dissolution of marriage con, as we have seen,® legally rest on the respondent's admission of adultery, though unsupported by any confirmatory evidence. § 870.' In the proof of confessions, — as in the case of admissions in civil causes,** — f/ic iv/iok of what the prisoner said on the subject, ' Thus, for example, in E. v. El- dridgo, 1821, the piisomn-, wlio con- fessed, was indicted for horse-steal- ing ; the liorse wns found in his possession, and ho liad sold it for I'll., after asking 'AoL, which was its fair value. In iinothor case (E. V. Falkner and Bond, 1>S2l'), the person robbed was called upon his recognizanco, and it was proved that one of the prisoners, who confessed, had endeavoured to send a message to him to keep him from a])pearing. In yet another caso (1\. v. White, 182;i) there was strong circumstantial evidence both of the larceny from the prosecutor's stable, and of tho prisoner's guilt ; and in tho caso of another jjHsoncr (11. v. Tippet, 1828), who was indicted for the same lar- ceny, part of this evidence was also given, together with the additional proof that such prisoner was an under-ostler in tho same stable. In all these cases, too, oxcejit in that secondly cited (R. r. Falkner and Bond, 1822). tho confessions were solemnly made before tho examining magistrate, and taken down in due form of law ; and in the caso which forms th(! exception (R. v. Falkner and Bond, 1822) the confessions were re- peated, once to the officer who appre- hended tho prisoners, and again on hearing tho depositions read over which contained the chaige. In anoth'>r case, which is contained in a very brief note (Stone's case, l.')()l), it does not uj)pi ar that the corpus dtdicti was not otherwise ])rovod ; on the contrary, the natural inference from the re])ort is, that it was, See, also, R. V. Sutclitfe, 18,>0. 2 R. r. Wheeling, 1789. ' Tho report merely states that, " in tho case of John Wh(M'liiig, tried before liOrd Kenyon, at the (Summer Assizes at Salisbury, 1789, it was determined tliat a i)ri.soni>r may bo convicted on his contession, when proved by legal testimoi\y, though it is totally uncorroborated by any other cvidenc(!." * Greeideaf on Evidence, 14th (or 1892) edit., citing various American authorities. ' See Guild's case, 1828 (Am.) ; Long's caso, 1707 (Am.); and R. v, Edgar, 1831, cited 2 Russ. C. & M. 255, 82G n. h ; and see also, 4 Hawk. P. C. 425. • Ante, § 768. ' Gr. Ev. § 218, in great part. » Ante, §§ 725—734. 560 CHAP. X.] WHOLE STATEMENT MUST BE CONSIDERED. at the time of making the confession, should be taken together. It is not rt. 3onable to assume, that the entire pro])osition respecting the prisoner's connection with the crime, with all its limitations, was contained in one sentence, or in any particular number of sentences. As the meaning of a writing must, in civil cases, be collected from the wliole taken together, and as, when several instruments relating to the same matter have been executed at one time, they are all resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties, so here, if one part of a conversation is relied on, as proof of a confession of the crime, the prisoner has a right to lay before the court the whole of what was said in that conversation ; or at least so much as is explanatory of the part already proved, and perhaps, in favorem vitto, all that was relative to the subject-matter in issue.' For, as already observed respecting admissions,^ unless tlie whole is considered, the true meaning of the part which is evidence against the prisoner cannot be ascertained. § 871. But if, after the entire statement of a prisoner has been given in evidence, the prosecutor can contradict any part of it, he is at liberty to do so ; and then the whole testimony is loft to the jury for their consideration, precisely as in other cases where one part of the evidence is contradictory to another.''' Even witliout such contradiction it is not to be supposed that all the parts of a confession are entitled to equal credit. The jury may believe that part which charges the prisoner, and reject that which is in his favour, if they see sufficient grounds for so doing.'* If wliat he said in his own favour is not contradicted by evidence offcnMl by the prosecutor, nor is improbable in itself, it will be naturally believed by the jury ; but they are not bound to give weight to it on that account, being at liberty to judge of it, like other evidence, by all the circumstances of the case'' And if the confession implicate other persons by name, still it must be proved as it was > Per Ld. C. J. Abbott in tlio Queen's case, 18'2(», II. L ; as qunli- fled by the court in I'rincc r. Siinio, 18;)8; It. V. uoncs, 1827 ; IJ. v. llig- giuH. 18'.'9. Ante, §§ 7'25 — 729, and cases there cited. » R. V. Jone.s. 1S'J7 ♦ E. r. Iliy-ins, IS'Jf) (I'lirko, J.); K. V. Stc])t(io, 18 iO (I'lirk. J.) ; Kosp, V. McCaity, 1781 (Am.). " Per Ijittledule, J., in R. v. Clewee, 1830. 561 CONFESSIONS MUST BE VOLUNTARY. [PART HI. if': I 5-' it made, not omitting the names ; but the judge will instruct the jury, that it is not evidence against anyone but the prisoner who made it.' !5 H72 ^ Before any confession can be received in evidence in a criminal case, it must be shown to have been roJutitnrih/ made ; for, "a confession, forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape, when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it ; and therefore it is rejected." ^ The evidence as to whether the confession has been obtained by the influence of hope or fear, being in its nature preliminary, is, — as we have seen,* — addressed to the judge, who will require the prosecutor to show ojfirtnatively, to his satisfaction, that the statement was not made under the influence of an improper inducement, and who, in the event of any doubt subsisting on this head, will reject the confes- eion.* As the admission or rejection of a confession rests wholly in the discretion of the judge, it is difficult to lay down particular rules, a priori, for the government of that discretion ; (md the more 60, because much must necessarily depend on the age, experience, intelligence, and character of the prisoner, and on the circumstances under which the confession was made.^ Language sufficient to overcome the mind of one, may have no effect upon that of another ; a consideration which may perhaps reconcile some seemingly contradictory decisions. Still, it cannot be denied, that the principle of excluding all confessions induced by hope or fear on the part of the accused has been sometimes extended much too far, and applied to cases where no reason could be ul > R. V. Ilearne, 183(>(L:ttleflnle, J.); E. r.Clewes, 18;>U(i(i.); ll.v. Flctdior, LS29 (id.) ; R. v. Hall, lS;3:i (Alilor- 6on, B.); R. v. Foster, ]8;};i (Ld. Demiian); R. v. Walklcy, 1833 (Gur- ney, B,, who said it had been much considered by tlio judges) ; I'arke, J., thought otherwise in Barstow's case, 1831. A striking example of the last proposition stated in the text was contained in the cose of Robinson v. Eobinson and I,ano, 1858-9, in which a private diary kept by the wife, de- Bcriliiiig her intrigues with the co- res;^)ondeut, yras received as a con- fe!=sion against herself, though itwaa held to bo inadtnissible as evidence against her paramour. » Gr. Ev. § 219. in pp.rt. 3 Per ]-]yro, C.B., in Warickshall's case, 1783; McNully.Ev. -il ; Knapp's case, 1830 (Am.) ; Chabbock's case, 1804 (Am.). * Ante, § 23. « R. V. Wariingham, 1851 (Parke, B.) ; R. V. Thompson, 1893. « McNally, Ev. 43 (Ir.) ; Nate's case, 1800 (Ld. Eldon, when O.J.); Knapp's case, 1830 (Am.), 662 CH. X ] PROMISE OR TIIRKAT BY PERSON IN AUTHORITY. given for supposing that the inducement had had any influence upon the miiid of the prisoner.' § 873. Although no definite rule can he framed which shall he an unerring guide in every supposable case, there are some points, both in regard to the person hij whom the pi-onme or th-mt is made^ and also in regard to the nntaro of the itiduceittont itself, on which the judges have pretty generally agreed, a knowledge of which will materially assist the inquiry, whether any particular confession should be admitted in evidence or rejected. And ^ first, as to the person In/ irlioin the iiidiiecinont is offered. Here, it is very dear, that if the promise or threat be made by anyone hrin'n;/ anthoritj/ over the prisoner in connection with tlie prosecution,^ — as, for instance, by the prosecutor,* the master or mistress of the prisoner, when the oil'enee concerns such master or nustress,^ the chaivman of the company which is prosecuting him," the constable,^ or other officer,' having him in custody, a magistrate,' or the like,'" — the confession will be rejected as not being voluntary. The same rule will perhaps prevail, though the inducement was not actually offered by the person in authority, if it were held out by ani/one in his pre.seiier, and he by his silence naiietioned it." § 874. In these cases, as the authority possessed by the persons who make or sanction the inducement is calculated both to animate ' See the (/bservations of the judges in R. V. BalJry, 1852. » Gr. Ev. § 'I'll, ill part. 3 E. r. P.iiTittt. 18;U (A!dersoti,B.). which was a confossion by a sailor to his captain, who tlireutoued him with prison on a charge of stoalirij? his watch ; 11. v. Thompson, 1783 ; 11. v. Fleming, lS42(Ir.). * E. V. Cass, 1784 (Gould, J.); E. V. Jones, l.SOi); E. v. Jenkins, 18^2. » E. V. Moore, 18J'2; E. v. War- ringham, 18,")1 ; E. v. Upchurch, 183G; E. V. Taylor, ]8o9 (Patteson, J.); E. V. Ilearn, 1841 (("oltmaii, J.) ; E. V. iluwett, 1842 (Pattoson, J.). " E. V. Thompson, 18'J;{. ' E. V. Morton, 184:i(rolori(lgc, J.); R. V. Swatkins, KS:)! (Patteson, J.); . E. V. Mills, l,s;i:{ ((Jurm-y. 15.); E. v. Shepherd, 183G (Gasdee, J.). " In E. V. Enocli, 1^33, Park and Taunton, JJ., rejotted a confession, where the prisoner was left in charge of a woman, to whom slio confessed ; and iiiE. v. Windsor, I8(i4, C'haniiell, B., and Cronijiton, J., laid down the law in a similar manner. Sed qu., and see E. v. Sloeman, 18/3 ; and B, V. Vernon, 1872. 9 E. V. Drew, 1837 (Coleridge, J.); E. V. Cooper, 1833 (Parke, J.); Guild's case, 1828 (Am.). '" Qu. a surgeon ; see E. v. King- ston, 1830; E. c. Gainer. 1S48. In this last case the inducement waa held out by a surgeon, but in the presence of the jirisonnr's master. Uii. also, the husband of the prisoner: E. V. Laugher, 184(). " E. V. Ponntney. 1836 (Aldorson, B.); E. V. Tavlor, l'83<»(Patteson, J.); E. V. Drew, 1837 (Coleridge, J.) : R. V. Simpson, 183) (Ir.); E. t<. Laugher, 184G (Pollock, C.B.): E. r. Luckluirst, 1803. But Rfie li. i;. Parker, 1861. 663 INDUCEMENT HEI,D OUT BY PRIVATE PERSON. [PT. IH. the prisoner's hopes of favour, on the one hand, and, on the other, to inspire him with awe, and in some degree to overcome the powers of liis mind, the law assumes the possibility, if not tlie probability, of his milking an untrue admission, and, consequently, withdraws from the consideration of the jury any declaration of guilt which the prisoner under these circumstances may be induced to make. Moreover, — and this is a more sensible reason for the rule, — the admission of such evidence would naturally lead the inferior agents of the police, while seeking to obtain a character for activity and zeal, to harass and oppress unfortunate prisoners, in the hope of wringing from them a reluctant confession. It has been argued, with apparent reason, that a confession made upon the promises or throats of a person, assuming to act in the capacity of an officer or magistrate, and erroneously believed by the prisoner to possess such authority, ought, upon the above principles, to be excluded ; but the point is not known to have received any judicial consideration. § 875.' Whether a confession made to a prrsoii, who /laciiig no aiif/iorifi/ hciH held out ait iiir/iicnjiciit, will be receivable, is a question upon which judges entertain oj)posite opinions.^ Bosanquet, J., on two occasions, held that the fact of ani/ person telling a prisoner that it would be better for him to confess, would aliraijn exclude any confession made to that jx'r.son ;^ and one or two other cases may perhaps be cited in supnort of the same view.* On the other h^nd, PatL^on, J., is reported to have said, in a more recent case, that, iu the opinion of tlic jadija^, any confession is receivable, unless some inducement has been held out by a person in authoriti/ ; and with » Gr. Ev. § 223, in part. « 11. V. •6\wnwi\ 18'7 (I'lirke, B.). Ppo. also, li. r. roiintiicy, 183(5 (Aldorson. B.) ; II. )'. Gibbons. 1823. 3 R. V. Dunn, 1831 ; R. r. Slau-hter, 1831. In R. i: Downin-r. 1810, where a ■w'om.Tn was indicated for cliild-miiriU'i'. u confojssion ihiido by Inr to an eldLM-ly woman, who was liur neighbour and mirso, and wlio told her it was bettor for hor to con- fess, was held by Ld. Abingi^r to bo inadmissible ; and hia lordship re- fused to admit evidence! of a confcs- Bion -subsequently made to a surgeon. Bed qu. * I'or instance, R. v. Kingston, 1830, where Parko and Littledale. JJ., rejected a confession mado to a sur^joon who had held out an induce- ment. I'ei'haps, however, this case may rest f)n the ground that tho surgeon was a ])erson in authority. In R. V. Walkley. 1S3.>, where evi- dence of a confession was held inad- missible by Gurney, B., it does not appear whether or not the witness, to whom tho st:itement was mado, and who had offered tho induriement, was a person in authority ; and the same observation ap])lies to the ease of R. V. Thomas, 18.34 (I'attoson, J.). See, also. Guild's cas(\ 1828 (A.m.); and Kuupp's case, 1830 (Am.). i(i4 CUAP. X.] INDUCEMENT HELD OUT BY PRIVATE PERSON. reference to the particular facts of the case before him, and to have added that ho would liavo received in evidence the statement made by the prisoner to an indifPeront person, had the inducement been olfored by such person alone.' § 87(3. Both these contradictory decisions would seem to be open to one and the same objection ; namely, they endeavour to define, as a -strict nile of lair, what circumstances shall be deemed, in all cases, to have unduly influenced the mind of the prisoner in making the confession. Now, although the general rule which has been laid down with reference to inducements offered by persons in authority, is that as such inducements will probably succeed in a large majority of instances, the presumption that they will have this effect must, for the sake of uniformity and pre- cision, be adopted as applicable to them all ; yet it by no means follows, that the same nde will equally apply to all promises and threats held out by private persons. These last inducements may vary in their effect to almost any conceivable extent. They will often be obviously insufficient to produce the slightest influence on even the feeblest mind ; and, in such cases, the confession, which follows, but which, in fact, is not comcqiicnt on them, should be admitted in evidence. On the other hand, an inducement held out by a private individual may be, and, indeed, frequently is, quite as much calculated to cause the prisoner to utter an untrue statement, as any promise made to him by a person in authority ; in these cases the confession made to sucli private person should be excluded. It is therefore submitted, that, without laying down any positive rule, whether of admission or rejection, the judge should determine each case on its o-wti merits ; only bearing in mind, that his duty is to reject such confessions only as would seem to have been wrung from the prisoner under the supposition that it would be best for him to admit that he was guilty of an offence which he really never committed. - § 877.^ A promise or threat made by an indifferent person, who has officiously interfered without any kind of authority, will, how- ovcrj it is dear, nercr operate to exclude a confession made to any ' R. V. Taylor, lb39; R. v. Slee- man, 1833. 2 R. V. Court, 183() (Littledale, J.). 3 Gr. Ev. § '223, in part. 565 CONFESSION MAU1-: AFTKU INDUCEMENT HELD OUr. [p. III. 1:1 ot/ier prison, who has not himself sanctioned the inJuconiont.' This rule is founded, partly, on the supposition that such inducduieuts will seldom much iiitlu (uco tlio conduct of the prisoner; hut ohiolly, on the ground that, were a contrary rule to prevail, it would pro- bably open a wide door to collusive practices, and would certainly go far towards rendering all confessions inadmissible. § 878. Where promises or threats have been once used of such a nature as to render a confession inadmissible, all sitbactjiirnt admis- sions of the same or the like facts will be rejected, unless from the length of time intervening, from proper warning of the conse- quences, or from other circumstances, there be good reason to presume, that the delusive hope or fear which iiijfiiriicrd the first confession has been cJJ'eduuUij (Uspelled.^^ Where,^ however, it appears, to the satisfaction of the judge, that the improper in- fiiioire Iran totiilli/ done away hrforc the confession was made, the evidence will be received.-'' For example, where a magistrate told a prisoner that if he was not the actual culprit and would disclose all he knew, he would use his influence to protect him ; but on subsequently receiving a letter from the Secretary of State refusing mercy, communicated its contents to the prisoner, it was held that a confession, which the prisoner afterwards made to the coroner, who had also duly cautioned him, was clearly voluntary, and was admissible;* and wher:. ..a accused had been induced by promises of favour to make a confession, which was for that cause excluded, but some months afterwards, and after he had been solemnly warned by two magistrates that he must expect death and prepare to meet it, again fully acknowledged his guilt, the latter confession was received in evidence.'" Tndeed, it may be generally laid down, that, though an inducement has been held » R. V. Gibbons, 1823 (Park, J., and lliillock, B.); 11. v llardwiek, 1811 (Wood, 15.); E. v. Row, 180^; E. V. Tyler, lS2;j (HuUock, 13.). '» Joy ou Conf. (Ir.) (W ; Guild's case, 1828 .Am.); 11. v. llewett, 1842 (Patteson, J.), reeo>;nizing MjyncU's case, 1834 (Timnton, J.) ; Sherring- ton's case. 1838 (Patteson, J.); R. v. Cooper, li-L'S (Paiko, J.); Bell's cose, 1800 (It.), cited in Joy on Conf. (Ir.) 71, and in M'Nally, Ev. (Ir.) 43 (Ld. Kilwardon, C.J., and Carle- ton, C.J. of C. P.); R. V. Rosa Rue, 187(j; Roberts' case, 1827 (Am.); R. V. Walsh, 1843 (Ir.) (Jackson, J.). » Gr. Ev. § 221, in part. See R. V. Doherty, 1874. » See R. V. Chevorton, 1862. * R. V. Clewes, 1830 (Littledale, J.). See, also, R. v. Dinjiley, 1645. Guild's case, 1828 (Am.). 560 CHAP. X.] INDUCEMENT MUST EEFER TO THE CHARGE. out by an oflioor, a prosecutor, .or tho like, and thougli a confession has been made in consequence of sucli inducement, still, if the prisoner be subsequently wdrned by a porsou in equal or superior authority, that what he may say will bo oviilenoo against liiiusolf, or that a confession will bo of no benefit to hitn, — or if lie be simply cautioned by the magistrate not to say anytliing ugaiust himself, — any admission of guilt afterwards made, will bo received as a voluntary confession.' More tloubt may bo entertained as to the law, if the promise has proceeded from a person of superior authority, as a magistrate, and the confession is aft(!rwards made to an inferior olHeer ; because a caution from this latter person might be insufficient to effiuio the expectation of mercy which had previously been raised in tho prisoner's mind.'^ $i 879. Passing now to the luiture of tho induce mvnt, it may bo laid down as a general rule, that in order to exclude a confession, the inducement, whether it assume the shape of a promise, a threat, or mere advice, must be such as is calculated to influence the prisoner's mind with respect to his escape from the ehurgo. A confession, therefore, will be received, though it were induced by spiritual exhortations, whether of a clergyman,'^ or of any other person ; ■* for such a confession can scarcely be regarded as untrue ; and the law of England and Ireland, — unlike that which prevails in Scotland,* America, and in countries subject to the lloman law,"— does not, as will presently be pointed out,^ regard peniten- tial confessions to a priest in the light of privileged communica- • E. V. Ilowoa, 1834 (Ld. Den- man); 11. V. Lingate, 1815; R. v. Er)sii3r, 1821 ; 11. v. Bryan, 1834 (If.); Joy on Conf. (Ir.) 72—74. 8ee K. v, Eichaids, 1832. » 11. V. Cooper, 1833 (i'aike, J.). ^ R. V. Gilliam, 1828, explained in Joy on Conf. (Ir.) 52 - 5(J ; Com. v. Drake, 1818 (Am.). But see R. r. Griffin, 1853. • E. V. Wild, 1835 ; E. v. Nute, 1842 ; recognized in E. v. Hewitt, 1S42 (I'atteson, J.); E. v. Gibney, 1822 (Jr.); E. v. Hleeman, 1853. ' 2 Alison, Cr. L. of Sc. (Sc), cited in Joy on Conf. (Ir.), 57, n. a, 58. • In tho Eoman law penitential Gout'essions to the priests are en- couraged for tho relief of tho con- science, and the i)riest is bound to secrecy by the peril of punishment. " Coiit'es.-io coram sacerdote in \w\\i- tentiii facta non probut in judicio ; qtiiii K,iiiS(tur /itctii curam Jku ; iuio, si sacerdos eum enunciet, incidit iii pa'uam." 1 Alasc. do i'rob., Concl. 377. It was lawful, however, for tho priest to testify in such cases to tho fact, that the party had made such a penitential confession to him as tho Church re()uires, and that he had en- joined penance upon him ; and, with tho exi)ress consent of the jjeniteut, he might lawfully testify to the sub- stance of the confession itself. Id. '• Post, §§ <J1G, 917. 507 INDUCEMENT MUST RELATE TO THE CHARGE. [PART HI. 1 tions. But it is not necessary that at the time when the induce- ment is held out the charge against the prisoner should have been actually made ; for where a man was at that time threatened to be given into custody without any offence being then specified, but the nature of the charge was afterwards stated, and he confessed his guilt, the confession was held not admissible.^ I 880. A jiromise, too, of some merely colhderal benefit or boon, as for instance, a promise to give the prisoner some spirits,^ or to strike off his handcuffs,^ or to let him see his wife,* or perhaps (where she is a female) to abstain from an examination of her person,* will not be deemed such an inducement as will authorise the rejec- tion of a confession made in consequence. And confessions will in general be admitted, though caused by intimidating language, provided the intimidation has had no reference to the charge, and was not otherwise calculated to produce any untrue statement.^ Moreover, an inducement held out to a prisoner with reference to one charge will generally not exclude a consequent confession wliioh relates to another ; ' unless the two offences be so blended together as to constitute in reality but one transaction.' § 881." If no inducement has been held out relating to the charge, it mutters not indeed in what way the confession has been obtained ; f(jr whether it were induced by a solemn promise of secrecy, even con- finned by an oath ; '" or by reason of the prisoner having been made dnt liken ;^^ or even by deception practised upon him, or false repre- sentation made to him for that purpose;'- it will be equally > R. V. Lnckluirst, 18j:5. » li. V. Sexton, 1>S'J2, cited in Joy on Conf. (Ir.) 17 — 19, is to the con- traiv; but this cuso (cU'citlod by Hcst, .1.) Is probably not hiw. Son obstr- viitioim of Mr. GreavL'8 in 2 iUiss. C. & M. 827, n. (/,■). •' 1{. V. (irci'n, 1834 (Bosnnquot and Taunton, JJ.). * U. V. Lloyd, 18:t4 (Ir.) (Patteson, J.). ^ U. V. Cain, ISIiO. But uudor precisely theso circunistiinces, two abl(^ i'hitrbsh jiidfjes have declined to admit the evidence. 11. c. Bowden, 18,")!) (.Martin. B., after consultinfj: \Villes, J.); MS. ox relatione, Mr. Ch. liy. Uopwood. • • Sec R. r. Thornton, 1824. ' 11. c. Warner, 18H2 (i.ittledale, J.). » B. V. llearn, 1841 (('idtman, J.). » Gr. I'^v. § 22!), in i)art. »" 11. V. Shaw, 1834 (Patteson, J.); Coin. I'. Kna])p, 1830 (Am.). " R. V. Spilsbnry, 183.J (ColeridRO, J.), (jn. on the ground that in vino verita.s. In B. v. Si])pet, tried at Maidstone Ass. 183!), a confession, made by prisoner while tnlkiiKj in his slii'i), having been tendered in evi- dence, Tindal, C.J., doubtecl its ad- missibility, and it waa withdrawn. M.S. '» R. V. ])errin>;ton, 182<) (((arrow, B.); R. V. Biuley, 1818 (id.), alter- wards confirmed by all the judges. ■m n CH. X.] CONFESSIONS MAY BE ELICITED BY QUESTIONS. admissible. Much less will a confession be rejected merely because it has been elicited by questiom put to the prisoner whether by a magistrate/ officer^ or private person ;* and the form of the ques- tion is immaterial, even though it assumes the prisoner's guilt. ^ If a prisoner make a confession under the hope, held out by a person not in aut/ion'fi/, that he will thereby be admitted as Queen's evidence, it will be received against him ; * and so it will also, tliough his hopes have been excited by a constable or other officer, if on the trial of his accomplices he refuses to make a full disclosure, and thus violates the condition on which his claim to favour can alone rest.^ What the accused has been overheard muttering to himself, or saying to his wife or to any other person in confidence, is also receivable in evidence;^ though the wife, solicitor and counsel of the prisoner will not, on grounds that will be presently explained, be themselves allowed to reveal what he has said to them.* A voluntary confession, too, is admissible to whom- 8oe\er it may have been made, though it does not appear tliat the prisoner was urinied that what he said would be used against him, nay, though it appears on the contrary that he was not so warned." § 88'2. In most cases it is indeed advisable and proper to caution > R. V. Epcs, 18;<() (L(1. Denman); R. )'. liartlett, IMiT (Holland, B.); R. V. Ellis, 182(> (Littlodule, J.), citing a similar dociBiou of Ilolroyd, J., and ovorriilin<]f R. v. Wilson, 1817 (Richards. C.B.). » R. r. Thornton, 1824; R. t'. Gib- nov, 1822 (Ir.); R. >: Kerr, ls;57 ; R,"c. Johnston, 18(U (Tr.) (8 r. ;{.TJ.). The caso of R. v. Devlin, 1841 (Ir.), 18 contra, hut soonis not to bo hiw. 8 K. V. Wild, KSJi.J. « R. i: Wild, KS:!.-); R. r. Thorn- ton, 1824; R. r. Korr, ISIH (Paik, .).); Anon., undated (liittlcdale, J.). cited 1 I'h. Ev. 4()(). In the case of R. r. Doyle, 1810 (Ir.), a constable, after cantioning the ])risoii(^r, asked hei' how so much of her bine came into the child's stoniacii, and Bnshe, C.J., i.s re))oited to have rejectt'd the answer ; but this case, it is subiiuttcd, is not law. See Joy on (.'onf. (Ir.), 32-41, 12 4 1. • R. r. ItMijjan, 1841 (Ir.) (Cramp- ton, J.). This ease s(H'ms to over- rule R. V. Hall, 17iM) (Mr. Sergt. Adair). See R. v. Boswell, 1S42; R. r. Blackburn, Isjl}. See, also, post, § 88j. « R. V. Dinslev, 184:) (Pollock, C.B.); R. V. Barley, 1818, ajiproved of by all the judges. See R. c. (Jillis, 18(l«i. ' ]{. r. Simcms, 18;il (Alderscm, B.). In R. V. I'anienter, 1872, Kelly, C B., is reported to hav(! held that a hotter written l)y a pi isoncr to his wii'c, and iiiterce]itcd by a constable who had undertaken to jiost it, was iniidniis- sible. ihit this cane wouhl seem not to be law. » Post, « !)0i» ill,-,; R. r. Shaw, 18;{| (i'attcson, J.). » ii. c. Th(ai,ton, 1824 : P. v. Oibnev, 1822 (Ir.); P. v. Magill, 17!»!», nt'Ml in McNaliy, Ev. (Ir.) ;{8 ; R. r. P<,:ij.', 1S;« (OuVncy, B.); Joy on Conf. (Ir.) 4.)- -18 ; R. v, liaviu, I84;{(lr.) (Perrin, J.). 560 now FAR PROPER TO CAUTION PRISONER. [pART III. a prisoner in general terms that any confession he makes will be admissible against him at the trial, and can do him no service ; ^ the reason for this being that if it be not done in case of its f u ning out that any threat or inducement has been previously hold out by some person in authority, any confession, made by a prisoner wi h<>';t ijaving subsequently received such a caution, will, as bt-fore stated,'- be inadmissible. Still, it is not necessary, in general, to do more than to show that a party receiving a confession left the prisoner at full libeity to act and judge for himself; and though it shouM appear that immediately before the admission was made the accused was in the custody of another person, the court, unless some reason exists for suspecting collusion, will not compel the prosecutor to call such person as a witness, or to prove that he did not hold out any threat or inducement.' In order, however, to free the evidence from all reasonable objection, it will be ])rudent, especially in important cases, to call any persons in authority, who, shortly before the confession was made, either had the prisoner in custody, or held any conversation with liini.'' XotAsitlistanding that the law is as stated above, many justices of the peace, botlx in England and Ireland, are in the habit of (fixsii/idinf/ the culprit, with more or less earnestness, from disclosing any fact which may tend to establish his guilt. This practice (to be adnured for romantic generosity rather than for wisdom or for any beneficial consequences resulting therefrom to the public,'^ has been con- demned by several able judges, as an absurd and improper moJe of shutting up one of the most valuable sources of justice and truth.*"' S^ HKi.'^ It has been thought that illc(j(tl iiDpiiwiiiiivut is calculated to exert such influence upon the mind of the prisoner as to justify the inference that his confessions made during its continuance were > R. V. Grcon, 1832 (Guinov, B.); R. V. Arnold, 1838 (Ld. Deiiniun); R. V. Olk'Ulv. 1832 (Jr.) (Bull, J.). » Anto, § 878. 3 R. V. Clcwes, 1830 (Littlediilc, J.); R. V. Swiitkins, 1831 (I'uttesoii, J.); R. t;. Gihiiov, 1822 (Ir.); B. v. Couitnov, 18^0 (Ir.) (Bidl, J.); Joy on Cont.' (Jr.) Ji)— (il. * Sec ciisi's cited in last unto. » Ediub. Roy., Muich, 1824. « R. V. Green, 1832 (Gunicy, B.); R. V. Arnold, 1838 (Ld. Denniiiii). In R. )'. Curt, 18*8, Jjd. Dfuiiiun oh- served to some t'()n>tiibles, who were called as witnesses: — " Tho distinc- tion is very dear; you me not (o Kui)]iress tho truth, but you are not to take any measures of your own to endeavour to extoit it." ' Or. Ev. § 230, almost vorbutim. 570 CHAP. X.] WHAT AMOUNTS TO A PROMISE OR THREAT. not voluntary ; and, on one occasion, they appear on this ground to have been rejected.' But this doctrine cannot be considered as satisfactorily established.* § 884. The question remains, what language is sufficient to constitute such iuduceinent or threat. Here the reported deci- sions furnish a very unsatisfactory guide. Some reason may be given for applying the rule that the confession obtained by them is inadmissible to such words as these : — " Unless ^ you give me a more satisfactory account, I will take you before a magistrate ',"* " If you will tell me where my goods are, I will be favourable to you ; " ' "I only want my money, and if you give me that, you may go to the devil ; " ^ " If you will not tell all you know about it, of course we can do nothing ; " ' *' You are under suspicion of this, and you had better tell all you know ; " ^ " The watch has been found, and if you do not tell me who your pnrtner was, I will commit you to prison ; " ' " You had better split, and not suffer for all of them ; " '" or the remark to a third person who it is known will probably communicate to him, " It will be better for so-and-so (naming the prisoner) to speak the truth."*' Confessions have, however, been rejected in consequence of such expressions as the following having been used : — " It will be better for you to speak the truth ; " '- " The inspector tells me you make housebreaking tools ; if so, you had better tell the truth, it will be better for you." '^ " It is of no use for you to deny it, for there are the man and boy who will swear they saw you do it ; " " " Now, bo cautious in the answers you give me to the questions I am going to put to you about this watch." '* So anxious, indeed, was the court at one time to ' R. V. Ackroyd, 1824 (Holroyd, J.). » R. V. Thoniton, 1824. ' (ir. Ev. ^ 220, in part. * R. V. Thompson, 1783 (Ilotham, J}.); R. V. Liickhurst, IHM; R. v. Richiuds, 18:{2 (Bosanquot, J.), citod as R. V. Griffiths, 1832; E. v. Walsh, 1843 (Iv.) (Jackson, J.). » R. V. Cass, 1784 (Gould, J.); Royd V. The Ktato, undated (Am.). • R. V. Jones, 1809. ' R. V. Partridge, 1836 (Patteson, J.). See, also, Guild's case, 1828 (Am.). * R. V. Kingston, 1830 (Parke and Littled;ile, JJ.) ; R. v. Chevcrton, 18()2 (Erie, C.J.). » R. V. Parratt, 1831 (Aldorson, J.); R. V. Upchureh. 1830. '" R. I'. Thomas, 1834 (Patteson, J.). " R. r-. Thompson, 1893. " R. V. Garner, 1848. " R. V. Fennoll, 1881. See E. v. Mansliehl, 1881. " R. V. Mills, 1833 (Gurney, B.). " E. V. Fleming, 1842 (Ir.). ^' 671 WHAT AMOUNTS TO A PROMISE OR THREAT. [PAUT IH. exclude evidence of confessions, that exhortations not to tell lies but to speak the truth, have been deemed likely to induce a fake acknowledgment of guilt ; and, consequently, admissions made after such exhortations have more than once been rejected.' But this paradoxical opinion is now happily exploded.'* The judges have, however, of late years come to the conclusion that some of the cases of this class have gone too far in the direction of mercy, and have accordingly expressly overruled three of them.' § 885. Where the inducement relates to the charge against the prisoner, and comes from a person in authority, it is not necessary that it should be directly hold out to the prisoner himself; but it will equally have the effect of excluding his confession, if there be good reason to believe that it has come to his knowledge, and has influenced his conduct. For instance, where a superior clerk in the post-office said to the wife of a postman, who was in custody for opening and df^taining a letter, " Do not be frightened ; I hope nothing will happen lo your husband beyond the loss of his situation ; " the prisoner's subsequent confession was rejected, it api)earing that the wife might have communicated to him the substance of this statement ; •* and where, in a case of murder, Government had published a handbill, offering pardon to any one of the offenders, except the person who struck the blow, who should give such information as would lead to the conviction of his accomplices, and it appeared that the prisoner was aware of this offer, and was induced by it to make a confession, it was held that what he said could not bo given in evidence.^ And where prose- ' E. V. Shcphoid, 18;i6 (Giiscloo, J.); K. V. Enoch, 18;j;{ (Faik, J.); E. V. Wood, IM'J (Ir.) (Ciiiiiipton, J.); E. V. Lim-lior, 18Hi (I'oUock, C. B.); E. f. Lato, 1871 (Montayuo Sinitli, J.). '^ E. V. Ecovo, 1872 ; E. v. Ilohnos, 184;{ (EoU'o, ]i.); E. v. Court, 18;i(i (Littltidiilc, J.); E. v. II ■iris, 18:52; E. V. Eiildry, 18J2 ; E. v. Jiirvis, 18(17. 3 E. c. Baldry, 18,)2. Thcro, ii policoiiian, who had a piiHoiicr in custody on a chavgo of fohmy, said to hini, "You iiowl not say anything to criniinato youraolf ; what you say •will be taken down and used as cvidonce against you." The court liold that a confession subsequently made was admissible, oveiruling, E. ('. Harris, 1814 (jMaule, J.); E. v. Drew, l.s;i7 (Coleridge, J.) ; and E. V. Morton, 18i;j (id.); and followed E. V. Eoason. 1872 (Keating, J.); E. ('. Jonetj, 1872. But some of the Irish judges, neveitheless, appear to bo still inclined to I'oUow the former inaht praxis. E. v, Toole, 1S,)7. * E. )'. Harding, 1S42 (Ir.). » E. i\ Boswell, 1842 (Cresswell, J.). See E. V. Dingley, 1845, and E. V. Blackburn, 1853. 672 CHAP. X.] OLD PRACTICE OF TORTURE. cutor said to prisoner's brother, " It will be better for him to tf 11 the truth," expecting that the brother would, as he did, communicate to prisoner, a subsequent statement by prisoner was held inadmissible.* § 886.^ The rule that the confession must be voluntary, is equally applicable to cases where the prisoner has made a statement (luring the pre/iminari/ inqiiiri/ before the magMrate. »The practice of subjecting the accused to a compulsory examination, and even of putting him to the torture, was familiar to the Roman law,' and both these modes of proceeding were legal in Scotland so late as the reign of Queen Anne.* In England, too, down to the reign of Charles the first,^ the rack was occasionally employed,^ and evea Lord Coke was prepared to wink at, if not to justify, its use • ^ while Lord Bacon did not hesitate, as Attorney- General, to super- intend, in person, the torture of an aged clergyman.* But, however, just before the Grreat Rebellion, and in the year 1628, on the trial of Felton for the murder of the Duke of Buckingham, the judges unanimously resolved, that " no such punishment as torture by the rack was known or allowed by our law ; " ' and no attempt has since been made to revive this atrocious practice."' § 887. Though torture was thus formally abolished before the middle of the seventeenth century, it was not till after the lapse of many years that the common law doctrine, nemo tenetur proderc seipsum, was fully recognised, or at least was interpreted to mean, — as it does in the present day, — that all confessions should bestiictl}- voluntary, as will be apparent to any careful reader of the State trials. The practice of extorting admissions from prisoners still continues on the continent," and certainly is no mean instrument ' R. V. Thompson, 1893. * Gr. Ev. § 2"_'4, iu part as to first six linos. ^ See B. Carpz. Pract. Eor. Cri., Purs, iii., Qurest. llii, per tot. * 7 A. c. '21, 8. 6 ("Tho Treason Act, 1708"), abolished torture in Scotland : 2 M'Doiiall, lust. (So.) ()()(). I'or instances of the application of torture there, see G How, St. Tr. 1217—1222, and 10 id. G87, 691, 726—747, 7j1 — "08. » Till 11. V. Felton, 1628. * See Campion's case, 1578, cited (Weston, li.) in H. v. Collier, 1680 ; Poachani's case, 101.5. ' SeeLadyShrcwsliurv'scaso, 1012. * I'rachanis case, lOlj. .See thu niastcily life of Ld. Iiacon, in Lil. Caii)i)l>cir.s Lives of the Chanc, 2nd vol., 339— ;M1. » 11. r. Felton, 1028. '» In R. r. ('.■Iher. 1680, Weston. B., told tlio jury, that no person htid sufl'erod torture in Enj^'iand since Campion the Jesuit, put to tho rack in the 20th of Elizabeth. But this is a strange mistake. " Tho Belgian case of Madame Joniauxat end of 1894 and beginning 673 EXAMINATION OF PRISONER BY MAGISTRATE. [PART III. '4 for the discovery of truth, hut has long been regarded in this country, and always in America, as savouring of unfairness and oppression. § 888. The first Acts regulating the examination of prisoners before the magistrates were passed in the reign of Philip and Mary.' These statutes, the principles of which have been adopted in several of the United States,'* were followed in England by the Criminal Law Act, 1826, and in Ireland by a corresponding Act.' § 888a. The statute, however, which now defines the course of practice in this country is the Indictable Offences Act, 1848.* It is important that the provisions of the law should be strictly complied with, or (as we shall see presently) the statement by the prisoner may not he admissible. The directions of the Act^ are that " after the examinations of all the witnesses on the part of the prosecution as aforesaid shall have been completed, the justice of the peace, or one of the justices, by or before whom such examination shall have been > completed as aforesaid, shall, without requiring the attendance of the witnesses, read, or cause to be read, to the accused the depositions taken against him, and shall say to him these words, or words to the like effect: — 'Having heard the evidence, do you wish to say anything in answer to the charge? You aie not obliged to say anything unless y,u desire to do so, but whatever yoii may say will be taken down in writing, and may be given in evidence against of 189o, as reported in the Times. See Comments on the case of the Due de Praslin, in 7 Liiw Rev. Art. vii. ' 1 &2Ph. &M. e. 13; 2&3Ph. & M. c. 10 ; extended to Ireland by 10 C. 1, c. 18. 2 See N. York Cr. Code. Part 4, tit. 3, c. 7, §§ 195—199; Bellinger's case, 1832 (Am.); Elmer's Laws of Kcw Jersey, p. 450, § 6 ; Laws of Alabama (Tonlmin's l)ipr.), tit. 17, ch. U, § 2, p. 219 ; Laws of Tennensee (Carruthcr's and Nicholson's Dig.), p. 420 ; N. Carolina Rev. Stat., ch. 35, I 1 ; Ijaws of Mis.xissippi (Alden and Von iloesou'e l^ig.), c 70, § 5, p. 632 ; Laws of Delawaii (Rev. Code of 1829), p. 63 ; Brevard's Laws of S. Carolina, vol. i., p. 400; Laws of Missouri (Revision of 1835), p. 476; Laws of Michigan Territory, p. 215. See, also. Massach. Rev. Stat., ch. 85, § 25; Resp. v. McCarty, 1781 (Am.), (M'Kean, C.J.I ^ Viz., 7 Ceo. 4, c. 04. The cor- responding statute in Ireland is 9 Geo. 4, c. 54. « Viz., 11 & 12 V. c. 42. The corresponding statute in Ireland ia 14 & 15 V. c. 93. Amended by 52 & 53 V. c. 03. » In § 18. 574 CHAP. X.] EXAMINATION OF PRISONER BY MAGISTRATE. r m of s. of 16; ilo. 80, you upon your trial ;' and whatever tlio prisoner sliall then say in answer thereto shall be taken down in writing,' and mid over to liim, and shall be xigurd by the said justice or justices, and be kept with the depositions of the witnesses, and shall bo transmitted with them as hereinafter mentioned ;" that is, " the statement of the accused " shall, together with the other documents in the case, " be delivered by the said justice or justices, or he or tlioy shall cause the same to b^; delivered, to tb^* pro[)or ofhcer of the court in which the trial is to be had, before or at the opening of the said court, on the first day of the sitting thereof, or at such other time as the judge, recorder, or justice, who is to preside in such court at the said trial, shall order and appoint ;" ^ " and afterwards, upon the trial of the said accused person, the same may, if necessary, be given in evi- dence against him, witliout farther proof thereof, unless it shall be proved that the justice or justices purporting to sign the same did not in fact sign the same : Provided always, that the ?aid justice or justices, before such accused person shall make any statement, shall state to him, and give him clearly to understand, that he has nothing to liope from any promise of favour and nothing to fear from any threat, which may have been holden out to him to induce him to made any admission or confession of his guilt, but that ■whatever he shall then say may be given in evidence against him on his trial, notwithstanding such promise or threat: Provided, never- theless, that nothing herein enactt d or contained sliall prevent the prosecutor in any case from giving in evidence any admission or ' Tho foim is given in Sihod. N. to the Act. This form is legalised by § 28 of the Act, Init is not rcndeieil necessary. It i,s us follov" s : — " : A. r>. btands charged helore tho undersigned [oj((-J of Iwr Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the [(■««/////] (lf()re^^ald, tliis day of in tho >ear of our Lord , for that ho tlie said A. B., on at [dc, us in (hf lajition of thf (Ifjinniiidiis} ; and the .said charge being read to the i-aid A. B., and tlio witnessi s for tlie pioseeutioii, C. L). and E. F.. being sevrrally examined in his presenio, the said A. 15. is now addres-sod by me us follows : 'Having heard tho evidence, do vou wish to say anything in answer to the charge? Yon aro not obliyi'Ml to say .iJiything unless you desire to do so ; but whatever yon say will i)e taken down in writing, and may be given in evidence against you upon your trial; ' where- wpon the said A. B. su^'") as follows: [//ere slate tuhntvvir iiie prinuiitr tuny say, and in his very ivords, us nearly as possible. Git ium to sign it if he will,'} "A. B. " Taken before mo at the day and year first above mentioned. ♦• a. L." •§20, 575 EXAMINATION OF PRISONER BY MAGISTRATE. [I'MiT III. confession, or otLer statement of the person accused or charged, mffde at (dii/ fime, which hy law would be admissible as evidence against such person."' The provisions of the Irish Act* are expressed a little differently, but are, in substance, identical with those contained in the English Act, which are set out above. § 889. If the provisions referred to above be read in connection with the Form given in the schedule to the Act,^ it seems that, to render a prisoner's statement strictly valid as a statutory confession, the following circumstances must all have occurred. The charge must have been read to the accused ; ^ all the witnesses must have been examined in his presence,* and the depositions read to him after the examinations were completed ; * he must then, and not till then, be twice cautioned by the justice ; first, generally,' and, secondly, as to the inefficacy of any promises or threats which ma}^ have been formerly held out to him ; ® his whole statement must next be taken down in his own words ; * it must then be read to him,'" and he must be asked for his signature, as the form in the schedule directs, "get him to sign it if he will,"" though the Act is silent as to the effect of his refusing to sign it, or even to admit its correct- ness; the justice must also sign the statement;'* and this being done, it must be kept with the depositions, and be transmitted, together with them and certain other documents, to the court where the trial is to be had, on or before the opening of such court. '^ § 890. Notwithstanding these minute directions, it is not easy to see how the prisoner on his trial could avail himself of any neglect of them on the part of the justice, whether intentional or otherwise ; for the statement transmitted, if headed in the manner pointed out by the schedule, is made evidence against the prisoner on its mere ' § 18. » 14 & 15 V. c. 93, § 14, clause (n) (amended hy 52 & 53 V. c. G3). ^ Cited in last page, n. '. * See Sch. ' See Sch., and § 1" of the Act, cited ante, § 479. * See § 18. ' See § 18. As to the old law, see R. V. Green, 1832; R. v. Arnold, 1838. * See first proviso in § 18. » See Sch.; andR. v. Roche, 1S41; R. V. Sexton, 1822; R. ?•. Mallott, 1830, cited 2 Russ. C. & M. 8G7. «> See § 18 ; and 3 Russ. C. & M. 500. " See Sch. ; and 3 Russ. C. & M. 504 ; R. V. Lambe, 1791 ; Ji.v. Thomas, 1794 ; R. V. Foster, 1827 ; R. v. Hirst, 1828; R. V. Jelicote, 1819; R. v. Pressly, 1833. "See § 18; and R. v. Tarrant, 1 goo " See §§ 18 and 20. 576 CHAP. X.] EXAMINATION OF PRISONER BY MAGISTRATE. product ion, and witliout any proof of the mode in which it was taken down, unless it can be shown that the signature of the justice is a forgery. Whether Ihis was the intention of the Legislature may, perhaps, be doubtea ; but such is the apparent effect of the language employed. It is also clear, from the last proviso which is appended to the 18th section of the Act, that any statement made by the prisoner in the magistrate's presence, before the examinations of the witnesses for the prosecution are all completed, may be proved by parol evidence, and will be admissible against him, even though no caution has been previously given.' § 891. The judges originally felt some embarrassment in putting an interpretation on these provisions. It has now, however, been, decided that when an examination has been transmitted by the committing magistrate in the statutory form, it becomes admissible without further proof.'^ § 892. But although a written examination, if it purport to be taken in conformity with the Act, and to be signed by the com- mitting magistrate, is in strictness admissible without proof, it still is advisable in serious cases, as a matter of caution, to call either the justice or the clerk, so that it may clearly appear that tlie pro- ceedings have been conducted in the proper manner.' Indeed, this course may become actually necessary, if the document has not been drawn out in the form given in the schedule, or if it contains erasures or interlineations which require explanation.* If, too, the prisoner t .1 ' Seo post, §. 894, n. *, and, also, R. V. Stripp, 18o6. « E. ('. Saiisome, 1850. See S. C. as reported in 3 C. & Kir. 332. As reported in 4 Cox, 203, this case overrules earlier dicta of Alderson, 13. (in R. V. Higson, 1^49), and of Coleridge, J. (after consultation with Cresswell, J., in R. v. Kimber, 1849), as to the formalities in cautioning a prisoner, which are required by the Act. In 1 Den. 545, where the same case is reported, the above ruling will not be found : and this is the more remarkable as Mr. Donison was himself counsel in the cause. Parke, B., is stated to have gone so far as to assert that, in his judgment, it would be receivable in evidence, though neither of the cautions was stated to have been given. Too much reliance, however, should not bo jdacerl on this la!5t dictum : and until the * v is more clearly detinod l)v judicial construction, it certaiidy will be pm- dent for committing magistrates not only to ado]it the form set out in the schedule to the Act, but to give the prisoner in all eases the second caution (seo supra, § 88i»), as well as the first. •> See R. r. I'ikesley, 1839 ; E. y, Wilshaw, 1841. * See E. V. Brogan, 1834; R. v. Dwyers, 1843. In the last edition (1877) of Russell on Crimes, Prentice omits Loth Brogan's cane and Dwyers', but gives no reason for so doing. The cases nah.ed cannot be discovered to hav6"been overruled, and appear founded oa good seuse. 577 PROOF OF prisoner's EXAMINATION. [PART III. m tas not signed his name or mark to the paper, some witness, who was present at the inquiry, should, in prudence, ho forthcoraing to speak to its identity, and to prove that it was rend over to the accused, and as ■ nted to by him It would further seem to be necessary to the validity of an examination as evidence per se, that it should appear on the face of the document that it was taken while the prisoner was under examination on a charge of felony or misdemeanor, or of suspicion of one of those crimes, and that the justices signing it were acting as justices pursuant to statute.* Whether these facts must appear by a separate caption is a point which is not yet determined. Tlie form in the schedule gives a separate caption, but that form, though legalised, is not rendered necessary by the Act ; ' and under the old law, provided the examination was written on the same paper as the depositions, the heading at the commencement was held to apply to all the state- ments contained in the document.* In this respect the rule agreed with that which governs examinations taken under the Poor Law Acts ; where it is not necessary, — as Wv.s once supposed,' — that such examinations should have distinct captions, but it will suffice to state the names of all the witnesses in the first caption.' ^ .^93. As the admissibility of statutory examinations without proof rests on the presumption that the justices have done their duty, it seems to follow that no evidence can be received tending to contradict or vary the statements contained in the documents as returned. This was the law before the Act under discussion was passed,' and that Act does not appear to have introduced any change in the practice.^ Whether this presumption is of so conclusive a character as to exclude all parol evidence, which is tendered with the view of adding to the written examination, is a question of doubt and difficulty ; but as the Act renders it incumbent on the justice, not only to reduce to writing so much of the prisoner's > See E. V. Eeading, 1836; R. v. Ilearn, 1S41 ; E. v. Hopes, 1835; R. V. Hninos, 18;>0. Prentice, in the last cilition of Eussell, also omits this case, but the omission is liable to the same criticism as those in the last note. « See E. V. Tarrant, 1833. » § 28 of the Act. * E. V. Johnson, 1847 (Alderson, B.); E. V. Young, 1850. » E. V. Etttclitte Culey, 184fi. • E. V. St. Michael's, Coventry, 1848. ' E. V. Walter, 1836; E. v. Morse, 1838. « R. V. Bond, 1830. 578 ClI. X.] PUISONEli's EXAMINATION — PAROL EVIDENCE. examin.'ition as rnny be mntrrinl,^ but to take down his irhole staleniont,^ it would soera riglit to hold that he must be presumed to liave done this, and that no parol evidenne of any additional Btutenient dkkIc at the same time can be received.' § 8!)4. If, however, yiarol evidence of such additional statement be admissible on the part of the prosecution, the prisoner, a fortiori, would seem entitled to pray it in aid of his defence* "Whatever may be the rule upon this point, it is clear, from the last proviso, to *i '^ of the Act, that* a written examination will not exclude parol evidence, either of an extr.i-judicial confession, previously or subsequently made ; " or of a statement which has been made before the justice on a former investigation, and not incorporated in the examination returned;' or of anything incidentally said by the pri- soner while the witnesses were deposing against him, ev^n though it were addressed to the magistrate himself,** and no cautior. had been previously' given." So, if it can be proved that the prisoner's exami- nation was nf)t reduced to writing, parol evidence of what he said before the magistrates will be received ; '" though the presumjition that all things were done as the law requires renders it necessary for the Crown to give clear evidence on this point ;^' and the judges more than once have required that the magistrate or his clerk should be called to pio/e the negative fact.'^ Again, if the written exami- nation be shown to have been lost,'' or if it be wholly inadmissible ' This was tho lanfjuajje of the old law. Seo 7 Gr. 4, c. 04 ("Tho Criuiiiial Law Act, 18J(r'), §3. 2 Sio 11 & 12 V. c. 42 ("The In- dictable Otteiices Act, 1848"), § 18, and Sch. N., cited ante, § 888. ^ Soe, however, i{owland v. Ashby, 1825; 11. V. Harris, 1832; Leach k Sinijjson, 18;i'.» (Parke, B.). * This view of the law is sanctioned, not only by the case of Veiiafra v. Johnson, 18134 (Gaselce, J., after consulting judjjes of C. P.), but also by the authoritv of Mr. 8tarkio (3 St. Ev. 787 j aiid Mr. Phillipps (2 Ph. Ev. 82-88). » Gr. Ev. 5 227, in pnit. • E. V. Carty, 1797. cited in Joy on Conf. 97 (Ir.), and McXallv, Ev. 45 (Ir.) ; 11. V. Keason, 1722 (K'yie, J.). ' E. V. Wilkinson, 1838 (Littledale, J., and Parke, B.); E. v. Bond, 1850. 8 E. V. Bond, 1850 ; E. v. Spils- bury, 1835 (Coleiid^e, J.); E. v. Johnson, 1829 (Parke, B.) ; E. v. Moore, 1831 (id.); E. v. Hooper, 1842 (Erskine, J.); all cited in 2 Euss. C. & M. 879. But see E. v. Weller, 1840 (Piatt, B.). Sed qu. as to this case. » E. V. IStripp, 1850. '» E. r. Hall, 1790, cited by Grose, J., in E. V. Lamb, 1784; E. y. Huet, 17iiS. " E. V. Fearshire, 1779; E. v. Jacobs, 1784; E. d. lliiixiiian, 1791 (Ashhurst, J.), and It, c. Eisher, 1785 (Ilcnth, J.); E. V. MGovcrn, 185.'. '■- E. V. Packer, 1829 (Parke, J.), and E. >: P]iilli]is, 1831 (13o.<aiifiuet, J.), both cited 2 Ituss. 0. & M. 870, n. {}>); I'hillips v. Winburn, 1830 (Tiiidal, C.J.). " E. V. EeQBc>n, 1722 (Eyre, J.). 679 EXAMINATION TAKEN IMMJOPERLY ON OATH. [PAUT III. irii lit under tlie statute by reason of irregularity, parol evidence will be received to prove what the prisoner voluntarily disclosed ; * and in this last f;vent of the examination being rejected for infornmlity, it may still be used, either as a contemporaneous writing, to refresh the memory of the witness who wrote it,*^ or if it be signed by the prii'oner, it will be receivable at common law as his confession, the signature being first proved, and it being shown that he knew what it contained.' § 890. One species of irregularity, however, is said * to not only exclude the examination as evidence per se, but also to pi'event its being used to refresh the writer's memory, and lo shut out all parol testimony of what was said on the same ' occasion. The irregularity in question is where the prisoner's cxaniiiKition purports to have been ffi/icn upon outh.^ This rule rests upon two principles of law, the policy of both of which is very questionable. The first is the principle that the confession of a prisoner nuist be voluntary: and it is contended, that a statement made under oath is not so. This is certainly true in one sense, though not in that in which it is tised by the advocates for exclusion. A confession which is not voluntary is excluded, because it may be untrue. A confession made upon oath cannot be rejected on this ground; since it is absurd to contend that an oath, which, in all other cases is rightly considered as the most effectual test of truth, should, if taken by a prisoner, be regarded as an inducement to falsehood. But then, it is urged, nemo tenetur prodere seipsum ; a prisoner should not be compelled to criminate himself. Admitted ; but a prisoner, though sworn, is no more bound to criminate himself, than if he were simply interrogated without any oath being admin- istered to him. lie has still full liberty to decline to make any explanation or declaration whatever : though if he does consent to > R. V. Reed, 1S29 (Tindiil, C.J.). » R. V. Layer, 1722 (i'n.tt, C J.); R. V. Wiitsoii, isjl ; R. V. Wiitkins, 1831 (Hiisiinqxiet, J.); R. v. TiinMiit, 18:i:J (Pi.ttesoii, J.); R. r. I'ressly, 1833 (id.) ; R. v. Dewhiirst, 1825, and R. ('. Hirst, 1828 (Biiyloy. J.); R. v. Jones. 1828 (Biivlevand Gaselee. JJ., and Vaii'Jiiin, 15.)"; R._ v. I'.ell. 1831 (G:i^<i'lei'. J., and Ld. Tentenlen). * iSeu R. V. Suiisome, 1850. *■ Rut see R. v. Chidlcy, 1860, post, § 80!) ; argument, infra, against this view. ' R. V. Smith, 181(1 (Le Blanc, J.); R. V. Davis, 18;i3 (Gurnoy, B.) ; R. ?;. Bentley, 18:<3(id.); R. v. Rivers, 1835 (I'ark, J.); R. v. Owen, 1840 (Gurney, B.) ; R. v. I'ikesley, 1839 (I*ark(!, B., and Bosanquet, J.); R. V Wheeley, 1838 (Alderson, B.). 680 CHAP. X.] EXAMIWATIONS PURPOPtTINO TO BE ON OATH. answer the questions put to him, he may, perhaps, incur the penalties of jterjury should ho knowingly utter what is false.' " But a friendless accused is not aware of the law in his favour," This may bo so : but in what other case is a party at liberty to set up his ignorance of tho law ? If the maxim of the common law, ignorantia legis neminem cxcusat, be sound, as it unquestionably is ; and if, consequently, the defence of acting in ignorance cannot protect an offender even from punishment ; on what principle of justice is the accused entitled to say, "I confessed my ciime, and have sworn tliat my statement is true ; but you, tho jury, must not hear what I said, because I was not aware of the existence of a rule of law, which would have expressly justified me in holding my peace " ? § 8(;6. The second principle of law on which the rule under discussion rests is, that as the justices, in discharge of their duty, ought to make a true return of what took place bofr them, the court will presume that they have thus acted; and, therefore, as the deposition does not purport to be upon oath, parol evidence to vary or contradict the written document so returned will not be admitted Now, the fallacy of this reasoning is obvious. In the first pliiee, the presumption, omnia rite esse acta, is not conclusive in ordinary cases, and ought not to be so in this ; and next, even supposing that it should, it does not apply. The duty of the justice is two-fold : first, to examine the prisoner witliout adminis- tering an oath to him ; ^ and, secondly, to make a true return of his statement. If, then, an examination be returned, which purports to have been taken on oath, the presumption that this return is true is at least counterbalanced by the opposite presump- tion, that the justice has discharged his duty by not swearing the prisoner ; and the result is, that parol evidence should be received, in order to ascertain which presumption is in accordance with the fact. The principle, that written documents shall not be varied or contradicted by parol testimony, may apply to the body of the examination, which is taken down by the justice or his clerk, and is expressly assented to by the accused; but it should net extend ' This, however, seems doubtful, as tho inugistruto has uo authority to administer such an oath. 2 B. N. P. 242. tu 681 SWORN CONFKSSIOXS, WIIKN ADMISSIBLE. [PART III. to the mere formal heading or conclusion of the examination, ■which is not, or at loast need not be, read over to the prisoner, or adniittod to be correct by him ; and a mis-statement in which may, and, in fact, notoriou>ly does, often arise from the inadvertence or carelessness of the magistrate or his clerk. If the justice were liable to a penalty, as he ought to be, for taking a prisoner's confession O!' oath, he would clearly be entitled, if sued or prosecuted for such penalty, to show that, though the examination purported ou iis face to have been taken on oath, the prisoner was not in fa(^t sworn ; and no real danger could be apprehended, but on the contrary much benefit would accrue to the administration of criminal justice, if a similar course of proceeding were allowed, when the question was whether a confession was receivable or not. However, ;'-; before stated, the authorities in favour of rejecting examination ) which purport to be upon oath are so numerous and consist'^uf, that, without the aid of the Legislature, little hope can be entertained that a more satisfactory rule will be ado[)ted in practice.* § S97. Where a prisoner, on being mistaken for a witness, was partially examined upon oath, but, the mistake being discovered, tho deposition was destroyed, — a subsequent statement made by him, after due caution from the magistrate, was held to be clearly admissible.' § 898. ItIi-hiI, tiie rule excluding sworn confessions seems strictly confined, at c >mmon law, to the case of a statement, made by tlio piirty upon oatli, wliile uiu/pv cxainiiidtiou an a prisoner respecting the criminal clicirge.^ Thus, on an indictment for forging a bill of exchange, depos'Hous of the prisoner, taken on oath before commissioners of bankruptcy, after a prisoner has been charged before a magistrate with forging the bill, are admissible If ' Sco casps litid ante, § 8{)5, n. *. See, also, No. o'l of Law Ma;;, vol. '28, J)]). i;{ -1!», whi'io tlio anoinaiits iu tilt; i)iOM'iit law of conft'ssions ure auiUMiii:;lv f'xposc'd. » 11. I'.'VWbl), IHin (Oanow, P.). « 8'jo Joy on Couf. (IJ— ()S (Jr.). One or two decisions hy (imiioy, B., iiii;,'lit 1)0 cited, sccininir to ex- ti'iid tho lulo soiiicwliat fiirtiicr, and to I'l'udcr iuiitliiiissibU) coiifcssious niudo oil oath to uiagistiutcs or coro- nora by paitios, who, aftcjr being oxamiiK'd as witiitsaes, have thciii- eelvea boon coiiiinittod for trial (11. V. Lewis, 1k;j;{ (Gunicy, 1!.); U. r. Davis, is;j,} (id.); 1{. c. Owcii, 18-10 (id.). !Sco, al.so, 11. v. M'lIiiL'h, 18,)7 (Ir.) (IV'im-fathor, B., diss,)); but thcso diMisioiia luivo been ovcrnilod bv snbsi'oiiciit cases. (See 11. v, (iillis, 18(i() (lr.)(0'lla-an. J.); 11. v.Oooto 1873 (Sir K. Uoliioi)). 683 CHAP. X.3 SWORN CONFESSIONS, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. against him.' Where a bantrupt had been examined before a commissioner touching some matter irrespective of his trade dealings, and had not objected to answer the questions put, his examination was held to be admissible evidence against him on a subsequent criminal charge.'^ Where a trader was indicted for obtaining property on credit, within four mouths before his liqui- dation, under the false pretence of dealing in the ordinary way of his trade,^ his examination taken in liquidation under ii 97 of the Bankruptcy Act, 18G9,'* was admitted in evidi^nce against him;' and on a charge of arson, depositions made by the prisoner when under examination as a witness respecting the origin of the fire, have been read ngainst him." § 8!)9. Similarly, on the trial of an indictment for conspiracy, the answers in Chancery of the defendants, made on oath by them in a suit instituted against them by the prosecutor, have been received.' An affidavit sworn by him in a suit in Doctors' Com- mons has also been given in evidence against a prisoner;* and depositions made by prisoners, when examined as witnesses against other persons on criminal charges, have several times been admitted against themselves." Upon a trial for manslaughter, the [jrisiuer's deposition on oath, taken by the coroner upon the inquest is, moreover, evidence against him.'" So, the testimony, given by a prisoner before a committee of the House of Commons, may be read against him on a criminal trial. ^' A case '^ which is sometimes > R. V. Whcater, ISHS. See R. v. Chony, InTI. » R. V. Slojrsott, 18j(). Soo, also, B. V. Scott, 18JG ; and R. v. llillam, 1872. * Contrary to § U of tlio Dob'ora Act. I8(i!> {:i-2 & ;i;} V. c. 62), uiuonJod bv O'i & .J4 V. c. 71, § 20. '« 32 & :j:{ V. c. 71. » R. V. Widdop. 1H72. • R. V. C'ootts 187;J. ' R. V. Goldshoilo. 1844 (Ld. Don- man); R.i). IIi;;htii'ld,l>2S(Viuighuu, B.), cited 2 Riiss. C. & M. 8.09. » R. r. W.ilkcr, 18(i(> (I.d. Kllcn- boroiiffh), cited (Guincy, H.), in R. 1: Lewis, lh:(;i. » R. r. llinvorth, lS;{0(Purko, J.). In one ouho the very jioiiit Htut(!d in note, auto, ^ 8}t8, note ^, to liuve been decided by (Jurni'y, H., wu8 distinctly overruled by Cockburu, C. J. ; and a deposition was admitted nf!^aiii,st a prisoner, ir/ia liad, iinnle it In/ore tlic jnMicf.-i wliilt iiiidir e.i:<i mi na- tion as (I uitid'sa, and who, in coiiseinienuo of its felt'-criniinatinj^ eharai'ter, had been eoniiiiilti'd to take his trial : R. v. Chidley and ("luimiins, l.Sfid. See, also, R. y. Tolnifr, l,S(i4 (Martin, li.); R. v. Tubby, 18.i;j (Vau-han, B.); li. v. Braynell. IHMt. "' 1{. .'. liat.'iiian, 1800 (Martin, B., and WiUes. J.). " H. /•. M.'reeron, 1818(Abboft, .1.). This casM is, howia-iM", of little autho- rity <in tlie subject uiulei' discns^Kin, as the evidcui'e couhl hot then havu been j^ivcn en oath. See Ld. Teii- lenleu in \{. r. (lilliaui, l.SJ.S. '■■' li. r. Britten, 1833 vi'attosou and Alderson, JJ.), 683 SWORN CONFESSIONS, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART III. 0!-!: ! cited as a decision conflicting with the ahove proposition, is in fact no hostile authority, as it only determined that on an indictment against a bankrupt for not disclosing his efl'ects under the com- mission, his balance-sheet, which was only admissible in the event of the commission being valid, could not be given in evidence to prove the petitioning creditor's debt as a part of the commission.' § 899a. On the whole it seems clear, that if a prisoner, on being examined as a witness, has consented to answer queytions, to which he might have demurred as tending to criminate himself, and which, therefore, he was not bound to answer, his statement will be deemed voluntary, and, as such, may be subsequently used against himself for all purposes,* unless he be protected by the special language of some statute.' ^ 900. Although, however, a prisoner cannot, at common law, exclude his own confession, on the sole ground that it was made by him while a witness under oath, yet, if he can prove that, when questions tending to criminate him were put, he claimed the piotection of the court, and was still compelled to answer, his answers cannot be given in evidence against himself.* Testimony so obtained is excluded, not, as it seems, because it may possibly be imtrue, but because the right of the witness to be silent has been infringed ; and it is deemed expedient, on grounds of public jiolicy, to uphold the broad legal maxim, that no man shall be forced to criminate himself.* § 901. The statute prescribing the duties of coroners enacts that every coroner shall put in writing the evidence given to the jury before him, or as much thereof as shall be material, and shall certify and subscribe the same, and deliver it to the officer of the court in which the trial is to be," and it also contains provisions as to the issue of a warnmt by the coroner for the arrest of every person cliiirgcd on an inquisition found before him with murder or man- On various occasions, too, it has been assumed, that a sluiigliter.' ' I'attoson, J., in 1?. v. Whcator, IS^IS, cxpliiiiiiiiK tliiit (Icc'iHioii. ■' Milt si'o H. v. (iilliw. l.S(l(i (Ti;.), ■n'lioni a liiv;^t' iiiiijiirity of tlio Irisli iuil;^'i's tniik a (liilVrtmt viow of tlui law. Sc'd t\\i. ■' Set' iM)nl, § l-io'), as to these Btatiiloh. * U. V. Uuibutt, 1847. and t>. Ir. See poHt, ^ Id. J 5. 684 §§ M.i3 ot Roq., lis to what questions a witnesH niiiv refuse to answiT. » 1!. r. Ciiibett. IHIV (Alderson, H.). Hut see cases cit(3(l in § 808, ante. « ,50 & .Jl V. c. 71 ("The Coioiiera Art, 18S7"), § 4; 9 U. 4, c. 74, §§ 4 C. X.] rRDPERTY FOUND IN CONSEQUENCE OF CONFESSION. coroner has the same authority to take the examination of a pri- soner as a magistrate.' S 902.'^ When, in conacqucnce of information obtained from the prisoner in an improper manner, the property stolen, or the instrument of the crime, or the body of the person murdered, or any other material fact, has been dincorcred, proof is admissible that such dis- covery was made conformably with the information so obtained. The prisoner's statement as to his knowledge of the place where the property or other article was to be found, being confirmed by the finding, is shown to be true, and not to have been fabricated in consequence of any inducement. It is, therefore, competent to prove that the prisoner stated that the thing would be found by searching a particular place, and that it was accordingly so found ; but it would not be competent to inquire whether he confessed that he had concealed it there.' So much of the confession as relates diatinctlif to the fact discovered by it may be given in evidence, since this part of the statement, for the reasons already given, can- not have been false.'' ^ IfO'J.'' If, too, a prisoner be persuaded, by improper induce- ments, to confess, and to himfietf deliver up the goods stolen, his declarations, contemporaneous with and explanatory of the act of delivery, though they may amount to a confession of guilt, will be admissible.' But whatever he may liave said at the same time, not qualifying or explaining the act of delivery, must be rejected. And iv', — notwithstanding the prisoner's confession thus improperly ' R. V. Roid. 18'J9 (Tindal, C.J. R. V. Roche, 1841 (Ld. Doiiinun) Rropun's case (uiidat<!d) (Ld. liyiid- liiiiHt). Soc ri'uuirks auto, iiotus to § 8!ll>. ' (ir. Ev. § TAX, in ffVMxt pnrt. ^ I'll Ev. 411 ; R. c. Wiiiickshall, 17HU; R. V. Mowiy, 1784 (Huller, J., and I't'iiyn, R.); R. c Lockhart, I7N'; 1!. V. (Joiild, 1840 (Tiiidul, ('..[., and l'urk<>, H.); R. c TluutoU, 18-22, cited Joy on Conf. 84 (Ir.); R. V. Cain. 18:J!") (Ir.) ('rornniH, J.); Com. r. Kniipp, IK.'JO (.\in.). * 1{. V, Hutchor, l"i»8; and soo tho ciis(!H cited lll)ov•(^ n. ••, In Hiirvcy's ca«u, 1800, Lord Eldou laid down tho rulo soinewliat more strictly than it in statiMl in tho text, sayinj^ that whi^-o tlu! kiio\vhrdf.fo of any fuel was obtained from a ])risoner, under such a promise as excluded tho (sonfegsion from lieinjj {jivctn in ovi(len(!e, ho kIiouIiI dirt^ft an iUMpiittal, unless tho fact provoil would itself havt» heon sullicii'iit to warrant a conviction, without any confeHsion lendiufj; to it. Hut it is siilmiitted that the lesidt of the authoiitie** cited in the j)''ecediii;» and the fiillowin<7 note is us stated in tho text. ^ (Jr. Ev. § T,\l, in part. • R. V. Urilliu, 1809; R. v. Jones, INO!). 686 CONFESSIONS OF ACCOMPLICES — OF AGENTS. [PART III. induced, and any acts done in furtherance of the discovery, — the search for the property or person in question be iiicfcctital, no proof of either the confession or the acts can be received. The confession is excluded, because, being made under the influeuce of a promise, it cannot bo relied upon ; and the acts done uuder the same in- fluence, not being confirmed by the finding of the property or person, are open to the same objection. The influence which may produce a groundless confession may also produce groundless conduct.^ § 904. A prisoner is not liable to be afl'^oted by the confesaiom of his accomplices? So strictly is this rule enforced, that where a person is indicted for receiving stolen goods, a confession by the principal that he was guilty of the theft, is no evidence of that fact as against the receiver ;^ audit would be the same, it seemf if both parties were indicted together, and the principal were to plead guilt}'.'* § 91)0.* On similar grounds, no person is, in general, answerable criminally for the acts of his servants or agents, whether he be the accused or the principal in the matter, unless a criminal design be brought borne to such person himself.^ The act of the agent or servant may -bo shown in evidence, as proof that such an act was dono; for a fact must be establish' d by the same evidence, whether it be followed by a criminal or civil consequence.' JBut it is a totally different question, in the cousideraticm of criminal as dis- tinguifrhed from civil justice, how the principal may be atret:ted by the fact, when so established. For though the wrongful or fraudu- lent act of the agent may involve his principal civilly,* it cannot > E. V. Jenkins, 1822. » So is this Itoniiiu law. " Con- fe8>iio imiiis non i)i()l)ut in proojndi- ciiini iilturiuM, quia alias esset in niuuu contitentis dicuro c)uod vellot, ft sic ju.s altuii (lux'sitiuu auferro, (jnando ouiTiino juiii piolubont; ctianisi talis confitt'nst'sst'tijniniexi'ciitioncnmjur. Sed linntaliis, qminilo intiT partes convenit puioro cdufi'ssiiini et dicto unius altoiius." 1 Masc. do I'rob., Coucl. 480, p. 409. !Sco unto, §§ 01)3, bM. 3 li. V, Turner, 1832 (all tho judgus). * Id., citing an anonymous deci- sion of Wood, 13. * Gr. Ev. § 234, in ;rnut ])ait. • Set! ( 'oopor y. Slade, l>.)7-8, II. L. (Ld. Weusleydalo). liut even in ciiniinal cases there are ceitain ex- cei)tionM to tho gcnoial rulu : soo ante, § 115. ' Sco auto, § 724. • liaiwick V. Eug. Jt. Stock Hk.. 18G7 ; rioudfoot v. Montefioro, lti(i7 ; Moore V. Metrop. Hail, ("o., 1872; Mackay v. Com. 15k. of New liiiins- wiek, 1874, T. 0. ; Swiio i\ Erancis, 1877; lluimah Trading Corp. Liuu 586 I. CILVr. X.] CONFESSIONS OF AGENTS — NEWSPAPEKS. convict him of a crime, unless proof be also given that the princi- pal has directed, or, at least, assented, to such act.' Wiiere it was proposed to snow that an agent of the prosecutor, not called as a witness, had offered, a bribe to an intended witness, who, however, had not been called, the evidence was ht-ld. inadmissible ; though the general doctrine, as above stated, was recognized.* § 906. The rule thus generally laid down is open to an apparent exception in the case of the proprietor of a newspaper, who is, pripia facie, criminally responsible for any libel it contains, though inserted by his agent or servant without his knowledge.' Yet even here the defendant is, b^ Lord Campbell's Act,* now entitled to be acquitted if he prove that the publication was made by his servant without his authority, consent, or knowledge, and that it lid not arise from want of due care or caution on bio part. § 1)07. Confessions, like admissions, may be inferred from the cond'icf of the prisoner, and from his si/cut acquiescence in the state- ments of others, made in his presence, respei ting himself;* pro- vided they were not mr.de either before a magistrate, or under circumstances such as to naturally prevent the prisoner from replying." In both the casta just instanced, of course, there can be no admission by silence. In the well-known case of Dr. Newman,' on an information for libel, to which truth was pleaded as a justification under Lord Campbell's Act,* the defendant r, Miiza Mahomed Ally, &c., 1878, P. C. See lid. Boliubroke v. Local Bourd of llfiilth of Swindon, lh7 1 ; Sliiiw V. Tort I'hillip, &c., 1884. ' Ld. Molville's case, 1800; The Queen's case, 1820, II. L. ; auto, §724. « The Queen's case. 1820, H. L. * Ld. Teiiterden put this stronfjly (beinj? apparently pr .pared to make the ei'iiiinial liability even more than prima facie) in the following re- inai'ks : — " Surely, aijet'^on who de- rives ])r<)fit from, and uirnishos moans for carrying on, the concern, and iiitriists tlie »;(induct of the publica- tion to one wliom he soledn, and iii whom ho confides, may bo said to cause to bo puV)li.'^hed what actually appear? and ougiit to be answerable, though you cannot show that he was individually concerned in the par- ticular publiciition." R. v. Qutch, 1829. See, furthei-, as to the acts of agents, ante, § 115. « & 7 V. c. 96 ("The Libel Act, 1843"), § 7; Tv. .. Il'.ll.rook, 1877; S. C. on second trial, 1878. See, also, 11. V. IJiimsay, ; SS:{. » R. V. Hartlett. 1837 (BoUam', B.); R, V. Smithies, 1832 (Gasclee and I'arke, JJ.) ; ant* . §§ 809-81(5. Seo St, Matthew, ch. L'i, vv. 60—63, and ch. 27, vv. 12—14. • R. /•. Appl.b . (821 (Uolrovd, J.); Melen r. Andn-ws, 182!»(l'urlie, B); Joy on Conf. (Ir.), 77—80; ante, § 738. ' R. t'. Newman. 1822. • (i & 7 V. c. 96 ("The Libel Act, 1843"), $7. 587 ' ''Si ^i; ADMISSIONS BY STI^KXC'E. [PART HI. tendered evidence to prove that the very imputationj in the libel had been previously published in another work, and that the prose- cutor, though well aware of this, had taken no steps to obtain redress ; but the evidence was rejected as too vague to be any proof of aoquiescenoe. 588 /) In. bel CHAP. X.] AMEUICAN NOTES. AMERICAN NOTES. 5881 Confessions. — An admission of the commission of a criminal offence is, technically, a confession. Such an admissum is, under proper circumstiinces, competent evidence against tlie maker. State *'. Carrick 16 Nev. 120 (1881); Jilackburn v. Com., 12 IJusli, 181 (ISTO); Murphy v. People, G.'i N. Y. 5'.)(» (l.S7<i); State r. George, 9.'} N. C. 507 (1885) j \j. S. v. Kirk wood, 5 Utah, 123 (188G); State v. riiillips, 117 Mo. 38!) (l.S')3); I'.ell c. State, 31 Tex. App. 270 (1802); State v. Chambers, 45 La. Ann. 3(5 (18!)3); Walker v. State, l.'JG Ind. GG3 (18!)3). "The confessions of prisoners are received in evidence upon the presumption that a person will not make a false statement, which will militate against himself." Brown v. State, 32 Miss. 433, 450 (185G); IJasye v. State, 45 Neb. 2G1 (18')5). It is not necessary tliat a witness should remember all the confession. State v. Madison, 47 La. Ann. 30 (1805). CoxKESsioxs AN'i) ADMISSIONS. — Statements by one accused of crime as to the existence of particular facts are designated as admissions. Confession is the term reserved for the acknowledg- ment of. guilt. It is error to confuse the two in a charge to the jury. Klet:?hep V. State, 90 Ga. 4G8 (1892). "The term admission is usually applied to civil transactions, and to those matters of fact in criminal cases wiiich do not involve criminal intent; the term confession being generally restricted to acknowledgments of guilt. . . . The rules of evidence are in botli cases the same." Colburn v. Groton, (JG N. II. 151, 154 (1889); Taylor /;. State, 37 Neb. 788 (1893) ; .Mora v. People, 19 Colo. 255 (1893). So acknowledgment of the possession of goods belonging to a murdered woman is not a confession of nuinler. "lie may have been guilty of no other or different crime than that of whitdi the witness admits liis own guilt, namely, receiving and concealing goods taken from the murdered woman. The fa<'f of his possession of the goods raised a powerful jiresumption of his guilt of the murder. Hut his admission of such ]»oss('ssion was in no sense a confession of guilt. It will not to do to say tliat one on trial for a felony confesses his giiilt by admitting circuiustances tending, however strongly, to establish guilt. A confession of guilt is an admission of tlie criminal act itself, not an admission of a fact or circumstance from wliicdi guilt may be inferred. State r. Glynden, 51 la. 403." State v. Jfed, .53 la. GO (1880). "A confession is a person's declaration of liis agency (U- })artici])ation in a crime. The term is restricted to acknowledgments of guilt. An admission of a fact, not in itself involving criminal intent, is not to be rejected 5882 AMERICAN NOTES. [part m. CH as evidence (without the proliminary proof) merely because it may, when conne-ited with otlier facts, tend to estahlisli guilt." I't'ople V. I'avton, 4!) Cal. (jlVJ (1875). "All i)arts of the confes- sion, inculpatory or exculpatory, sliould be weighed tngetJier." State i: McDonnell, J5L' Vt. 4'.)], 532 (1860). r.ut tliL witness can give all he heard even if he did not hear the entire confession. People v. Daniels, lOf) Cal. 'Ji>2 (l.SUI). On a defence of alil)i tlie defendant's admission of the speed of his liorse is competent. "His sayings are admissihh' agiiinst hiui- self." Inastr r. State, 55 Ga. .'525 (1875). The fact lliat the defend- ant offered $(}i) to settle the case is competent. State r. JJruce, o.S La. Ann. ISO (1881). Only such portion of a confession is competent as reliu.es to the offence under investigation. The prosecution cannot introduce admissions l)y a defendant of general bad character. Com. v. Campi)ell, 155 Mass. 537 (1892). Judicial and ExTUA-jUDieiAr. Coxfession.s. — A distinction has been attempted between confessions made in court and tliose made in jjiiis. Thus the su])reme court of Missouri sny : " C'onfcssions are divided into two classes, nainely, judicial and cxtia-judicial. . Judicial confessions are those which are made before tlie magis- trate or in court, in due course of legal jtroceedings, and it is essential that tliey be made of the free will of the party, and with full and perfect knowledge of the nature ami consequences of tiie confession. Of tiiis kind are tlie ])reliminary examinations, taken in writing by tlie magistrate, pursuant to statutes, aiul tlie plea of guilty made in open court to an indictment. Either of these is .snilicient to found a conviction upon, even if it be followed by sentence of death, tliey being deliberately made, with tlie advice of counsel, and under the ])rotecting caution and oversight of the judge. Extra-judicial confessions are those wliich are made by tlie party elsewhere tlian before a magistrate, or in court, this term embracing not onl}' explicit and express confessions of crime, but all tliose admissions of the accused from which guilt may be implied. '* Whether extra-judicial confessions, uncorroborated by any other proof of the corpus delicti, are of themselves sulficient to found a convi(!rion of the prisoner upon, has not only been doubted, but, in the best considered cases, denied." State r. Cierman, 54 Mo. 526 (1874). See also Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472 (1871). FoitM OF CoNKKssiox. — The confession may be in the form of evidence given in another case. Dickerson v. State, 48 Wis. 288 (187".)); Alston V. State, 41 Tex. 39 (1874); Anderson v. State, 26 Tnd. 89 (1860). Or as evidence apninst another before the grand jury. State v. Broughton, 7 Ired. (N. C.) 96 (1846). :M( tr; Cc a Si ni. it t." iie CHAP. X.] /.MERICAK KOTKS. 5883 Or in a plea of guilty before the lower court. State v. Bowe, CI Me. 171 (1.S72). Or on a former trial of the same fase. "The statements made by tlie defendant while testifying at a iormer trial were com[)etent, eitlier as admissions or for the purpose of ".ontraclicting him. They were voluntary statements, in regard to his connection witli the tx'ansaction, and it is immaterial where or wiien they wert! made." Com. ('. Reynolds, X'22 Mass. 454 (1S77). Or before a coroner at a preliminary inquest. Teachout r. I'eople, 41 N. Y. 7 (ISGD); Snyder i\ State, ol) Ind. 105 (1S77); State v. Gilmau, 51 Me. L'(»0 (18()li). So of evidence at a tire inquest. Com. v. Bradford, 120 Mass. 42 (1.S7S). Or befor-^ a committing magistrate. State v. Brauham, 13 S. C. liH\) (1879). Sucli confessions are regarded as voluntary, especially where the declarant has been cautioned. Teacliout v. People, 41 N. Y. 7 {18()!)); State y. Gilman,51 Me. 200 (1SG2); Com. v. Clark, 130 Ta. St. (541 (1880); Com. v. Bradford, 126 Mass. 42 (1878); State V. liranliam, 13 S. C. 389 (1879); Snyder u. State, 59 Ind. 105 (1877). To the opposite effect, see State v. Garvey, 25 La. Ann. 191 (1873). On an indictment for bigamy, the fact of the prior marriage may be proved by an endorsement on a pliotograph "your dear hus- band." State V. Behrman, 114 N. C. 797 (1894). And it has been held that where A. testified against B. jointly indicted with himself but tried separately as confessions as to his connection with the offence cannot be used against him on liis own trial. "That he was cautioned by the circuit judge, at the time he testified against Robertson, that he need not tell about his own connection with the crime, does not affect tlie result. The prin- ciple is, that no statement made upon oath in a judicial investiga- tion of a crime can ever be used against the party making it, in a prosecution of liim for the same crime; because tlie fact tliat lie is under oath, of itself, operates as a compulsion ujwn him to tell the truth, and tho whole truth, and his statement, therefore, cannot be regarded as free and voluntary." Jackson v. State, 5() Miss. 311 (1879). If the confession has been reduced to writing, it becomes a written instrument within Mie meaning of the "best evidence" rule. "When confessions are taken by a trial justice, in writing, signed by the parties, such evidence is the best evidence u])on the subject, and if such confessions are relied upon against them, the defendants are entitled to have them produced in the very terms in which they were made. From the infirmity of memory there is always more or less uncertainty about parol testimony, especially 588< AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AKT 111, »■! in reference to (lerlaratioiis — nicro spoken words. Even in civil oases the rule is tliat jiarol testimony is not admissible to exjilain, vary or add to written instruments, which must speak for them- selves. In criminal proceedings there is even more reason tiiat only the best and most reliable evidence should be allowed. There may have l)een in the writti'U (ionfessions some ipialitieations or explanations, and, we think, when (U'liianded by the defendants, they should have been offered. It was error to receive parol testi- mony of confessions made in writing where there was no obstacle in tlie way of the written concessions being offered." State v, Branham, 13 S. C. -Wi), :m (187<»). To the same eftect, Cicero ('. State, 54 (Ja. laO (1875); Wright r. State, 50 :Miss. IV,V2 (1874). A letter is none the less competent as an admission that it is not signed. State v. AVinningliam, lL!4 Mo. 4'Jn {18',)4). Or because written at the dictation of another and signed by that other. State V. Sibley, (^lo.) .'51 S. W. Kt.Ti (1895). CoxKKssioN Hv SiLKNCK. — .\ confcRsion, like any other admis- sion, may be in the form of a declaration m.. ' in presence of the accused under circumstiinces (tailing for a rejdy; e. g. , by a fellow prisoner. Murphy r. State, 30 Oh. St. (il.'8 (1881); People v. Estrado, 49 Cal. 171 (1874); TIaberty r. State, 8 Oh. C. Ct. liep. L'fi2 (1894); Sparf /•. U. S.,150 U. S. 51 (1895); Com. /•. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180 (189L'). Failure to re]dy to an accusation of guilt is, if a reply is fairly called for, a comi)etent fact in tlie nature of a confession. State v. Keed, 02 Me. 129, 111 (1874); Com. >: IJrown. 121 Mass. 09 (1870h Kelley v. reo|)le, ru) N. Y. 505 (1874); Stater, r.nwnian, SOX. C. 4;]2 (1879): Drumright v. State. 29 (Ja. 4.30 (1859); State r. r.elknap,39 W. Va. 127 (1894); T.rown v. State, 32 Tex. Ai)p. 119 (1893). "Wiiero an individual is charged with an offence, or detdara- tions are made, in his jiresence and hearing, touching or affecting his guilt or innocence of an alleged crime, and he remains silent wluMi it would be iu'0])er for him to speak, it is the province of a jury to interi)ret su(di silence, and determine whether his silence was, under tlie circumstances, excused or exi)lained. At most, silence under sucli circumstance- is but an implied acquiescence in the truth of the .statenuMits made by others, and thus itresunqitive evidence of guilt, anil in some cases it nmy be slight, except, as confirmed and corroborated by otlier (dreumstances. ])Ut it is some evidence, an<l therefore, except in those cases where the statements are made n\Hm an occasion and under circumstances in whicli the individual sought to be affected could not witli pro]iriety speak, as in the ])rogres.s of a judicial investigation, or in a discus- sion between third persons not addressed to or intended to affect the accused or imluce any action in respect to him, so that for him CHAP. X.] AMKUICAN NOTKS. 5886 to speak would be u maniiVst iiitnision into a discourse t(^ wliich lie was not a l)arty, the evidfiiee is competent and sliould be admitted." Kelley c. l'eoi)k', T),") N. Y. od") (1,S74). So an uncontroverted statement, made in a prisoner's presenci^ at a judicial hearing, is not eompi-tcnt as an admission by him, "being made in the progress of an investigation before a judicial otKcer, when silence, if not recpiired, was at least justitied as a matter of decorum." Hell v. State. ().'! (Ja. ooT (l.S'.»4). It is no objection to the admissibility of sucli statements that tliey were made wliile tlu; accused was under arrest Kelley v. I'eople, ou N. Y. .W') (1874). r>ut, as has been said, tlie circumstances must be such as to make ft rejjly proper. Slattery i>. Teople, 7(5 111. -17 (l<S7r)); Kedley i\ People, 5") N. Y. olio (1H74); State v. Murray, (Mo.) lil) S. W. 700 (iSi)")); Com. r. Trefethcn, lo7 Mass. ISO (l.S'.tl.',. "The inference tiiat silence is tantamount to an admission of guilt must rest upon the idea of acquiescence, and it is not con- sistent with sound reason to imply an a('(piiesccn('e from silence, unless the circumstances are such as to iillord the party an oppor- tunity to act or sjjeak, but such, also, as would naturally call for some action or re^jly from iirudeiit men similarly situated. The rule is well and tersely settled in Com. r. IJrown, 121 Mass. (5!), as follows: *A statement made in the presence of a defendant, to which no reply is made, is not admissible against him, unless it appears that he was at liberty to nuUte a reply, and that tiu' state- nu'ut was made by such ])cr3on and under such circumstances as naturally to call for a. reply unless he intends to admit it. Ibit, if he makes a reply wholly or partially admitting the truth of the facts s'iated, both the statement and the rejdy are competent evidence. Com. v. Kenney, 12 Mete. (.Mass.) 2.'!').'" The circum- stance th<,t the accused is in custody, while entitled to weight, will not, of itsfdf, exclude the statement, if the circumstances otherwise ])roperly called for a replj' or denial by him. Com. r. Brown, 121 Mass. «!); Murphy r. State. .'Ul (»h. St. (;2S: Kellt>y V. People, 55 N. Y. oOo; Teoph' v. Went/. .-57 N. Y. .'{O.'i; McKee v. I'eople, .'!6 N. Y. 11.3; Com. /•. Cuffee. lOS Mass. 2S5; State v. Murray, (Mo.) 29 S. W. 700 (lS<r.). And it must be jn'oved that the defendant understood what was said. Sauls *•. State, ;!(> Te.\. \\)]). MO (1S91). The entire rule has been severely criticised. Tlius, the supreme court of South Candina say of a cliarge "that if a party hears a criminal cliarge against himself, and made in his pre.seiu'e, and says nothing, it is an admission on his part, ami, in the eye of the law, the i)arty accepts that charge as his confession," as follows: "The effect of this charge was to give the silence of the parties the legal force and effect of confession of guilt. It must, in this 6888 AMEUICAN NOTES. [PAUT III. respect, be distinguislied from the proposition that tlio conduct of parties under accusation of crime may be given to tlie jury, as circunistanci's to be Aveighed in connection with the ([uestion of guilt or innocenoo. To give the silence of parties such legal effect, is etjuivalent to holding that every person accused of crime by any ])ers(tn, regardless of time, place or circumstance, is bound to deny sucli accusation and alKrm his innocence. It is clear that the law imposes no such obligation on a party accused; but, on the con- trary, it is liis right to stand mute, and the burden of showing the guilt is on tliosc that make the accusation." State v, Edwards, 13 So. C. .'{() (l.S7'.>). In like manner, the supreme court of Alabama say: "The evi- dence in the cause before us was ])roperly admitted, liut the charge of the court upon it was calculated to mislead the jury, con- cerning the weight it was entitled to. They ought not to have been instructed, ' That the fact that the person who is charged with the commission of a crime says nothing, but remains silent, is a circumstance to which the jury may look as a confession of guilt.' It is often a circumstance, the significance of which may be wholly misunderstood; and it ought, therefore, always to be questioned very carefully, if not distrustingly, by a jury." Campbell v. State, 55 Ala. 80 (1876). Foiu'R OF CoxKEssioxs. — The j)robative effect of confessions is frequently more apparent than real. Instances of untruthful self- accusation of the gravest offences have been not infrequent. Cau- tions by the court seem therefore entirely justified. State v. McDonnell, ?>2 Vt. 491, 5;i2 (1860). In lirown v. State, 32 Miss. "433 (1856), the Mississippi court of appeals say: "We have no hesitation in saying that the 14th instruction granted in behalf of the prosecution was erroneous. That instruction is in the following words: ' Confessions made by a jjcrson charged with an offence, when made voluntarily, and not obtained bj' force, fraud, or threats, are regarded \)y the law as the highest and most satisfactory character of proof. If, there- fore, tlie jury believe from the confessions of defendant, as given in evidence, tliat defendant shot Tatum, the deceased, at a time when he knew that Tatum had no ])ower to do him any injury, then such shooting was unlawful, and defendant is guilty of either murder or manslaughter, according to his intentic;; at the time of shooting.' The confessions of prisoners are received in evidence upon the presumption that a person will not make a false statement, which will militate against himself. And while the elementary writers, and the courts, have not entirely agreed upon the weight to be given to this sjiecies of evidence, it is admitted by all that it should be received with great caution. * For,' says Blackstone, C1IA.P. X.] AMEIMCAN NOTKS. 5887 who miiintainod that nniifpssioiis in oasos of felony, wcri' tlic weakest and most suspitiioiis of all tcstinionv ; 'they arc very liable to be obtained by artitioe, false hopes, promises of favor, or menaces; seldom remembered aeeiirately or reported witii preci- sion, and incapable in their nature, of being disproved by other ne,i^'ative evidence. 4 Com. 'Anl. Subject however, to the projier cauti )n in reeeivint,' and weighing them, ' it is generally agreed that leliberaie confessions of guilt are amongst the most effectual l)ro()fs in tlio law.' 1 Clreen. Ev, ij I'lo. I'.ut that they are to bo ' regarded as the highest and most satisfactory character of jjroof ' has never been the doctrine; of this court." "Observation and experience have led the most eminent and enlightened Judges in the administration of the criminal law to the conclusion, and it has become the estal)lished doctrine and rule for the government of Courts, that tlie evidence of verl)al confes- sions of guilt is to be received with great caution." Cain /•. State, IS Tex. ;W7 (IS-)?). "Where parties make admissions or declarations against them- selves, the law presumes they are true because made against their interest; but this is only a j)resumption and may be rebutted. Statements, confessions and admissions, when given in evidence, must all bo taken together, and the jury will attach such credit to them as they deem them wortliy of. Tiiey may believe everything the party says in his favor, or they may reject the same. It all depends upon the circumstances surrounding the case, and the degree of probability there is in the truth of the statements, wlien viewed in the light of the whole transaction which they purport to narrate." State r. Ilollenscheit, (Jl Mo. .'{02 (LSTf)). On tiie other hand, circumstances may give a voluntary confes- sion of guilt very strong probative force;. For example, in State v. IJrown, 4,S la. 382 (1S78), "The defend- ant asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: 'Confessions allegeil to have been mnde by the prisoner in tiie presence of tho prosecutor alone, or in the presence of tlie prosecutor and one or more of his select friends, are the weakest of all testimony deemed competent in law, and should be received and considered as such, and confessions made in the presence of any one witness alone are deenu'd in law as weak and unsatisfactory, unless corroborated by other testimony.' This instruction was refused, and the court instructed the jury in tiiese words: ' When it is shown that a public offence has been committed, free and voluntary confessions of guilt, or of facts necessarily tending to show his guilt, by the party accused, are, by the law, jjresumed to be true, and are entitled to the highest credit and greatest weight as evidence of such fact or facts; but such confessions will not warrant a convic- tion, unless they are accompanied by other evidence that the crime has been committed.' 5888 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AKT in. "We think tlin instruction asked by defendant was proiioily refused. A voluntary confession of crime is not the weakest of all testimony (loomed competent in law. It is true, evidence of a confe^.si()n sliould bo examined with care; Imt when it is eleiiilv establisliod, whether made in the presence of tlio ijro.secutor or liis friends, or to one person alone, if made viduntarily, it should not ))(' regarded as weak and unsatisfactory. The instruction given by the court upon this subject, when con- sidiTod in the light of the facts of the case, was correct.. The evidence, without (n)nHict, showed a free and voluntary confession of tiie crime, with all its j)artienlars. In siudi cases the confession is entitled to the highest credit and greatest weight as evidence." The Kentucky court of ajipeals has held that the court is not wirranted in cautioning the jury as to the credibility of eonfes- sioMS. " Kvidenco of confessions, like evidence <tf otlier farts, is to be weighed by the jury, and the court has no more riglit to ca'ition them in reganl to such evidenee than in legard to anv otiier species of ovidenco." lihu-kburn /•. Com., ll' liusli. ISl (1S7G). In Com. I). Sanborn, 110 Mass. 01 ^1S74) the course of the nisi ]priMS judge was apjiroved. "At the defendant's rcMjuest tiie jmige instructed the jury that such evidence should be reeeived with great caution. Tlie defendant further re(piested the court to instruct tlie jury tliat no substantial ndiance could be placetl (ipon tills class of evidenee uncorroliorated. This tlie judge refused, but did instruct t, 'in that whether any sultstantial reliance oould lie ]dac,ed u|ion tliis (dass of testinumy depended upon tlie circuni- stances of each case, and that it was for the jury to say in this case how far tliey couM rely upon it." A similar view is tiken in Eiland v. State, AL* Ala. '.V2'2, .'!.">"> (1S7")): "CoiifessicMis or declarations, whetiier olf<'red in evidence in a civil or erimiaal case, nnist lie received as a whole The part \>iiie'' criminates nmst be taken eoniieet-ed with that which e,\cul- ]tates. 'I'lie law does not ascertain the creih'nee wliieli siiall be attaidi"d to eitlier ]iart. or to the confession or dcclaiation in its entirety. The jury are ii(»t iMiuiid to attach eipial credeiici' to every Jtart; tliey may, for sutlicieiit ?'e;isons, reject a part ami give eifect to a part; siieli ri'jection cannot be capriciously made, nor can credence lie < in.ricion.dy given to a [tart. 'I'hat wlii(di is favor- nlde to the party should not be rejecteil merely becau.se it is favorable to him. and because of the motives which may have induced him to make it. Tiie confession slioiihl be taken as a wlicde; the time and circumstances (d' its making, — its harmony or inconsistency witli otiier evidence, and tlie motives which may have operated on tlie party in making it, — should all be fairly considered by the jury. Tiieii, without regard to wliether tliey are CHAP. X.] AMERICAN XOTKS. 5889 clearly disproved or not, the jury should credit all which they find sufficient reason for crediting, and reject all which they find suffi- cient reason for rejecting." (JouRoHouATioN KKQiiKKi). — It has Ijceu held, for reasons partly given above, tliat an \inciirrohorated confession is not sufficient to warrant conviction of a criminal offence. "The elementary hooks generally stat(^ the law to he. tliiit confessions ahme are sufficient to convict; yet it is believed no court wouhl perniil a conviction for felony uiion mere confessions, math' out of court, witliout some proof that a crinu' had in fact been committed, or of circumstances corroborating and fortifying tlie confession. Tiie criminal law requires proof sufficient to satisfy the reason and judgment Iteyond a reasonable ilo\d)t of the guilt of the accused; and anytliing sliort of tliis will not justify a conviction. Mr. Justice lUackstonc, in speaking of confessions not made upon due caution and didibera- tion, and to unauthorized persons, says: ' they are tiie weakest ami most susjiicious of all testimony; ever liable to l)e obtaint'd by artifice, false hopes, promises of favor, or nuMiaccs; seldom remem- bered accurately, or repeated with due precision; and incapable in their nature of being disproved by negative eviilence.' And the same author apju-oves the rules laid down by Sir .Mattlii'w Hale: never to convict of larceny till the goods are jnoved to have been stolen; iu)r to convict of munler or manslaughter unless the liody he found dead. 4 lUack. Com. .T)". .'!.">.S and .'»")'.). Experience has shown that confessions have sometimes turned out unfounded; that the weak, to avoid apparent impending jieril, iind under the force of surroundings, exciting ap]irehensions, and imaginary dangers, iiave Ix'cn induced to state untrutlis which have produced their conviction of supposed (trinu's. The humanity (d' the law will not tolerate a general rule wliich, in its o}ieration, endangers the security of innocence, and is unsafe to life or liberty, in the administration of tiie law. Confessions ]iroved ar<' necessarily weak or strong evidence, acconlirig to tlie circumstiinces :itten<ling the niaiiing and the proving of tliem; and we think the oidy safe general rule is to reipiire some other evi- dence corroliorative of tiieir t nitJi." Iiei'gen r. People. 17 111. IL'<> (l.Sr.C); Williams r. State. iLf I,e:i. LMl (ISS;!). "An extrajuilieiiil confession, not corroborated by ini1c])endent ovideui^e id' tlie inr/ius ili-Hrfl, would not support a conviction for ftdoiiy." Joiiuson /•. State, iV.t .Ma. .'17 (tS77); State /■. (ierman, r)4 Mo. .".IT. (lS7h; State r. Knowles. IS la. .".'.(S MS7S); Smitli /•. Com., L'l (iratt. S(I<»(IS71); I'eople c. Thrall. .".(» C:il. IIT* ( 1X7.".) ; Pitts >'. St;ite. .|;{ Miss, r.i' (I.S71); V. S. r. Mii.vtield. .V.» Fed. ]{ep. lis (|S<);!): i{,van c. State. 1(10 Ala. •.»} (1S!»;!): Dunn c. Htato (Tex.), m S. \V. '.".'7 (lS<.>ri); Land.riglit c State. .'M Fla. r.ni (I.V.)h; People c. Sjnionsen. 1(»7 Cal. .".ir. (iS'.trO. So in a libel for divorce bir adultery. Lyon c. I.yon. Til' Karl). KJS (istjl). 58810 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAKT III. lint only siioli proof of the corjms delicti, outside the confession is required as tlie nature of the case admits. For example, in ciise of a liomitnde at sea, ]ilfii;iry ])roof of the crime is not required, U. S. 1-. Williams, 1 Clitf. 5 (ISuS). iSurrendoring stolen jiroperty with admission of guilt will wiii- raut a conviction. State r. ^lunson, 7 Wash. U,'}9 (ISl),'}). A lil^e effect follows finding property as stated in a confession. State v. Hansen, LT) Orej;. IVM (l.s;»4). On the other hand, a confession of guilt given while testifying as a witness on the trial of another has been held sutlicient, witli- out corroborative evidence, to support a conviction for fclonv. ''It would be ditticult to conceive of evidence of guilt onlimiiily more satisfactory to a sensible mind than a party's own statcnnnls, solemnly and freely made under oalh, upon tiic trial of another cause, when not himself accused, and when no motive or induce- ment is perceptible to beget a departure from the truth, and when falsehood would be wilful and corrupt perjury." Amlerson v. State, L'(J Ind. .SI) (ISCG) Must hk vollxtakv. — Before the evidence showing a confes- sion can ])roperly be received, it must affirmatively appear that the declarant's statements "have iu)t been obtaim-d by the influence of hope or fear, ajiplied by a third jierson to the jjrisoner's mind." Cain V. State, IS Tex. .^87 (lsr.7); Teople r. Soto, 4<.» Cal. (57 (1.S74); State r. Anderson, % Mo. L'41 (ISSS); Creen r. State, 88 (ia. .^)1(» (1S«»1); Com. v. Flood, 1")2 Mass. r>'2\) (t8<)(»); Searcy c. State, L'8 Tex. Apj). ol.'J (iS'.Kt); Jolinson r. State, ".'.» Ala. ;{7 (1877); State r. Crowson, *.)8 N. C. o'.to (1887); Colburn v. (irotnn, G(! X. H. lol (188<»); May t-. State, (Xeb.) ^G. N. W. S()4 (18'.«); Hubster i: State. 'Mi Neb.GG;] (18<»1). "Confessions are inailniissiblt! when induced by threats, or by a ])roniise of favor, made by jiersons apparently acting by authority." Teople >'. Clarke (Mich.), (V2 N. W. 1117 (18<.(r.). "We feel constrained by our fornu-r decisions to hold, that a confession induced by ho]ie or fear, exciteil in the mind by the re]»resentations of any one connected with the prosecution, or con- nected with tlic accused, who may, considering his relations and condition, be fairly supposed by him to have power to secure him whatever of benefit is promised, or to intluence the threntened injury, cannot be regarded as voluntary, and ought not to be received in evidence. The confessions in this case were made to a jjcrson who was engaged as a clerk in the store-house alleged to have been broken and entered, and the owiu'r of a jiart of the goods sai<l to have been st(den therefrom, 'i'hey were made while the prisoner was in jail, and upon pnuuises that he (the clerk) would not judsecuto him, and W(mld not a])pear as a witiu'ss unless compelled. It CHAP. X.] AjniRICAN NOTES. 588" would be a departure from the current of our former derisions, which have not favored the admissibility of confessions, unless plainly shown to be voluntary — uninfluenced by liope or fear — to pronounce these conlussions admissible evidence." Mnrjiliy r. State, C'i Ala. 1 (ISTD). "Eh-mentary writers of authority concur in saying tliat, whih^ from the very nature of such evidence it must be snbjected to careful scrutiny and received with i,'reat caution, a deliberate, voluntary confession of guilt is among the most effectual pro(d's in the law, and constitutes the strongest evi- dence against the i>arty making it that can be given of tiie i'acts stated in such confession. . . . lint tlie presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence, nanudy, that one wlio is innocent will not imperil iiis safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, (leases when tlie confession ajjpears to liavc bt-en made either in conse((uence of indncenu'nts of a tenqjoral nature, judd out by one in authority, toucliing tlie charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in tlie presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in. reference to the i:i.:'.!'g;-, ileprives him of that freedom of will or self-contrcd essential to make his confession voluntary witiiin the meaning of the law. Tested by these conditions, then' seems to have been no reason to exidnde the confession of the ai'cused; for the existence of any such inducements, threats or jtromises seems to have been negi'tived by the statement of the circumstances under which it was made." Hopt v. Utah, llO V. S. nn (1.SS4). A curious excejition to the exclusion of a confession under promise of pardon exists. A confession, made under hope of pardon, by one who turns "state evidence " is regarded as "volun- tary " if the jjrisoni'r rrf\ises to testify in ac<'ordance with his confession. " We cannot perceive how the prisoner, thus situated, could have any motive falsely to accuse himscdf, although he might have a motive to coutiniu' his false accusation against iiis accom- plices. And besides, if any sucli motive could be snjjposed to oi)erate, it was a new motive, and not arising from external inHuence. And it is no objection to the adniissinn (d' a conf"ssioi!, that it was made from interested motives and with the hope o[ favor, it' the motive is not excited iiy external inHuence. If the accomidices had been up.)n trial, it is clear that the testimony of the prisoner wo\ild have liej'u competent against them. It would be liable to great oliservation, and its credibility would be the fair and just siiliject ol' argunn'ut. I'ut still it wtnild be competent. Ami yet the motives which could operate upon his mind W(mhl be strong, to magnify the evidence against ids accon)pli<'es, but lie would have no motive to < riminate or accuse himself beyond the truth." Com. c. Knapp, 10 Tick. 477, 4'Jl (18;«»). 58812 AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AHT III. An involuntary confession will still be evidence against another one of the participants in a civil action. Newhall v. Jenkins '2 Gray, rM (ISn-i). The rejection of a confession regarded as involuntary is not based on any feeling of fairness to the accused. A confession obtained by eavesdropping is conijjetent. Woolfolk v. State H'> Cia. ('•*.), ',)'■) (IS'.K)). A e(>nfessit)n obtained inider promise of scerecy is competent. State r. Mitcliell, I'hilliijs (N. (!.) 447 (ISCS); State V. Darnell, 1 Iloust. Crim. Kep. .'!21 (ISTo). So of one obtained by deception. Com. v. Ilanlon, o lirews. 401, 490 (1S7<>). Or by falsely informing tluf prisoner that his aceomjjliees had been captured and liad betrayed him. Statt! i'. Jones, o4 Mo. 47S (I.S74); Trice v. SLate, IS Oh. St. 4 IK (l.SOS). Oi by false information that an accomplice had been shot. King r. State, 40 Ala ai4 (1S(;7). The reason for this rule is given in Price v. State (ubi sujira). "Tlie true rule seems to bo, that in order to excdude tlie evi- dence, tliere must have been something said or done calcuhited to induce a hoj)e of advantage, or feav of harm. Tlu^ fact that he was a prisoner, and that a fraud was practiced upon liim, is not stitHcient. Tlu'y have no tendency to make nim swerve from the truth. However we may condemn th(^ fraud, we cajinot reject the voluntary confession." Trice v. State, IS Oh. St. 41S (lS«iS). It is no objection to a confession that the detective "got into tlie eouiiilence " of the jirisoner by false jtretences. Cornwall 1:. State. '.tl (la. 277 (1S<)2); Stone ?>. State (Ala.) 17 So. 114 (ISOo). Or tliat the aeeused confessed on being threatt'ued by a f(dlo\v-eitizen witli a prosecution for Ids olfeuce. Uohanan r. State, '.(2 (Ja. 2S (■ISU.".). Or tliat tliere are tirearnis in tiu' room. Stater. Watt, 47 La. Ann. (WJO (IS'i.")). It lias, on the contrary, been held in Texas that wliere a confes- sion was obtained by false statenu-nts of tin- jirosecuting witnes . or otlier frau<l the ccnifession was not voluntary. Cook v. State, .'52 Tex. Ap].. 27 (ISK.'M. If a person is aware of wliat he is saying, the fact that advantage is taken of intoxication in procuring his confession does not atYect its admissibilitv. Kskridge r. State, 2r> Ala. .'50 (lsr»4); Williams r. State, 12 l/ea. 211 (ISS;)); Ktate v. 1-eltes, ol ia. 4!>r)(lS70); Lester r. State. .")2 Ark. 727 (1S7S). The rule is the same, even where intoxi'-ntiiig liiiuor is furnished bv the olHcer liimstdf. i'eople i\ Kamirez, 'id Cal. 0.'}.'! (ISSO); j'rlfcnls r. JN'oplc. .". i'arker, C. E. '.22, .".47, '.CO (lsr.2). Wiiether tiie accused was too intoxicated under the eircum- stmces to know what lie was doing is a (piestion fiu' the jury. "The court instructed tlie jury tliat the evidence of intoxication was an objection to the weight and not to the competency ol the CHAP. X,] AMEIJKWN NOTKS. 58813 testimony; and that if the (left'iidiint was so mucli under tlie influeiioe of liquor as not to understand what he was confessing, they sliouUl disregard tiu^ '".nfessings altogetlier. These instruc- tions were entirely right." Com. /•. Howe, '.> <iray, llo (1X57). The prisoner is at liberty to prove that lie was intoxicated at tlie time of a (ionfession. Lester v. State. 'VJ Ark. 7L'7 (iSTSj. .\nd while such evidence does not exclude the confession, it may affect the weight the jury may give it. White r. State, li'J Tex. A pp. 02.") (IS'.U). And the jury in deciding whetlier a person, was under the influence of delirium trenu'iis or knew the ertect of his statement, may he aided by experts. " Where a confession is siiown, and there is evidence tending to show that the defendant, at the time of the confession, was laboring umler d;dirium tremens, or Wiis otherwise insane, we think that the ojtiuiou of an expert may j)roperly be taken upon *■'>(> defendant's nuMital conditicin as indi- c.iteil by the jjroven facts. We see no reas<»n why liis insanity may not be established by any kind of evidence which is eiuphtyed in any ca'^e to establish such a fact." State v. Feltes, ."il la. 41)5 (INT'.)). A rather anomalous decision was reached in an early California case to the elTect tiiat statements made during sleep were not com- ])etent as confessions. "The hill of exceptions in this case states that certain words uttered by the defe- dant while sleeping were given in evidence against him at the trial, it is difficult to see upon what principle tliis evidence was admitted, and we are of opinion that tlu^ objection to it shoulil have been sustained. If the defendant was asleep, the inference is tlhat he was not con- scious of what he was saying, and wiu'ds spoken by him in that condition constituted no eviilence of guilt." I'ople v. Kol)inson, li)Cal. 40 (ISCI). What is I'nihI'; TN'i'r,rK\ri; ? — In many instances, especially where the motives acting on a ju'lsuner's mind ma}' be conjectured to be mixed, it is difficult to draw the line as to what persuasion to confession crosses the legal line. Mere adjurations to tell the trutli do not reiidiT a confession involuntary. State r. Anderson. '.Mi .Mo. LMI (ISSS); State c. Habib (R." !.). .'{o .\tl. If..") (1S«M). Hut "the words, ' you had lietter own iip. ' folhiwerl by, ' I was in the place when you took it: we liave got you <lown line; this is not tlie first you have taken; we iiavc got other things against you nearly as good as tliis,' spoken by one police officer to another, in .a p(dice station, and in the presence of the superior officer of the person addressed ami of the speaker, who has detected him in the aet of stealing, will render a subseipieiit confession of guilt by the accused person inadmissible at the trial of an imlictment !■ 588" AMERICAN NOTES. [l^UlT III. ■iHi against him for the laroony." Com. v. Nott, 135 Mass. 269 (1S83); Com. v. Myers, IGO Mass. 030 (1894). So where tlie prisoner was informed by a constable, v.'hile under arrest, tiiat "the truth wouUl go better than a lie,'' tlie cunlVssion so obtained was held inadmissible. 11. c. Konij). 17 Unt. ~}{\~ (1SS9). So wliere a prisoner was told, "it will be better lor you to make a lull disclosure," tiie eoni'ession so obtained is not voluntary. JVople V. Uarric, 41) Cal. .'542 (IS?."*). Where the prisoner was t(dd that "ii he was guilty, it could not [)Ut him in any worse eomlition, and he had better tell the truth at all times," the statement did not nuike a confession involuntary. Fonts v. State, H Oh. St. 98 (18.-,7). Where a constable informed a jirisoner, "you had as well tell all about it," a confession made a little later was held involuntary. Vauglian v. Com. 17 Ciratt. 'ud (1867). So where the oilicer said to the prisoner, "if yon are guilty, I would advise you to make an hor st confession; it might be easier for you. It is jdain against you," a confession made later, the indictment not being shown tt) have l)een witlidrawn, is not voluntary. State v. Drake, 113 N. C. 624 (1893). A remark by a jailer to a female prisoner that "if the common- wealth would use any of them as a witness, he stippo.sed it would prefer her to either of the others," does not render a confession involuntary, there being no threat or promise. Fife r. Com. 29 Pa. St. 429 (1807). Where the bailiff said to his prisoner that if lie would confess a larceny and tell where the stolen jiroijcrty was, "he should be turne<l loose," it was held tiiat a confession obtained next day was not vohmtary. "We cannot say that the hope thus inspired was not operating on him, when he made the confession on the next day, and during the continuance of the arrest." Ward r. State, .')(> .Via. 120 (1876). A statenu-nt to a prisoner that if Im confessed "it would go easy with him; tiiat it would be better for him to confess; tiiat the door of mercy was ojien, and that of justice closed;" togetiier with a threat "to arrest him, and expose iiis familv. if he did not confess," are suiKcient to make a confession inadmissible. ]5eery r. V. S., 2 C(d. 186 (1873). Tlie mere circumstance that a declarant is under arrest at the time is not conclusive against the receipt of a <'oiifession. "The confess lus t)f the prisoner made at the station-iumse in Hoston after ins arrest to the jxdice officer who arrested him, were ])roperly admitted in evidence. The confession was not iiidnced iiy any iiromise or tlireat and so far as appears was entirely v(dnn- tary. (People r. Wentz. 37 X. Y. .309). It is not sufficient to ex(dude a confession by a jirisoner tliat he was under arrest at the time, or that it was made to the officer in whose custody he was, or If :;■ fi- ' tl CIIAI'. X.] AMERICAN NOTKS. .588" . in answer to questions put by liiin, or that it was ina(l« under hope or ))ronuse of ii beneKt of a collateral nature." Cox r. l'eo)»l(!, iSO N. V. r>()(», ol.") (1<S8(>); Miirpiiy r. People, 03 N. Y. olH) (1.S7G); lliirilin.-,' V. State, 54 Ind. ooD (187<;); >'<tate r. George, '.).*{ N. C. .■)()7 (ISSo); Com. i\ Sego, 125 Ma.ss. 210 (1878); I'eople /•• ^Ic(;h)iu, !»l X. Y. 241 (188.'}); Veoi-le c. Chapleau, 121 N. Y. 2()i» (ISDO); Dickerson /•. State, 48 Wis. 288 (1879); State v. Jiraniiani, 13 S. 0. 389 (1879); I'eople v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 533 (1880); State r. Johnson, 47 La. Ann. 1225 (1895); Com. v. Coy, 157 Mass. 200 (1892); I'eople v. IHynn, 90 Mich. 270 (1893^. Even if the accused is a child of the age of fourteen years. Com. V. Smith, 119 Mass. .'J05 (1870). Or the prisoner is tied. State r. Rogers, 112 N. C. 874 (1893). Or is in irons. Sparf i\ U. S., 150 r. S. 51 (1895). And expecting to die from the effects of poison. State v. Gorham, 07 Vt. 3(55 (1894). Or where the arrest ir, illegal, e. g., without a suitable warrant. lialbo v. People, 80 X. V. 484 (1880). Hut where the grand jury sent for a prisoner and examined him under oath withcmt apprising him of his rights, it was held that a confession so obtained was not voluntary. State v. Clifford, 80 la. 5.j() (1892). Tlie fact that the officer used a revolver in effecting the arrest does not render a siibsecpient confession inadmissible. State v. IX'Graff, 113 X. C. 088 (1893). A remark by the owner of stolen goods to a clerk nineteen years of agb , V' after the latter had been arrested but was out on bail, •'I should like you to make a (dean breast of this matter," is not suffiident in itself to warrant rejecting the confession. "In this case there was no promise or threat." Com. v. Sego, 125 Mass. 21(> (1878). A mere undisclosed purpose on the part of an officer to make nv arrest does not so far amount to an arrest as to require tliat the accused should be wariu>d, in a state where sucli warning is required in the case of persons under arrest. Holmes v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 301 (1893). " It is also (piite well .settled, as a presumption of law, that the inHuence of threats or promises once made continue to operate until rebutted by proof clearly showing that it had ceased to operate. ... In the case at bar, the defendant, after having been once threatened witli death bv hanging, by ])arties in disguise, and again taken from the jail by the same parties, evidently for the l)urpose of again re])eating the threat, jiossibly in a more effectual manner, and without any assurance or cauti(m, was induced to make the confession proven on tho trial. Under such circum- stances, though one of the witnesses testilied that the confession was voluntarily made, yet without any proof why the deteudant I 08818 AMEUICAN NOTES. [PAKT UI. was so taken from tlie jail, or what was done or said to him to induce tlie confession, it woiihl be exceeding hard to convince a reasonable mind that the iuHiienoe of the former threat had wholly ceased." IJarnes v. State, oO Te.\. ouG (1872); Jieery v. U. S., 'J Col. ISO (1,S7;{). Ust; by a sheriff of the language "tiu're is no doubt but that you are one of the guilty parties, and if you will tell nie all about it, so 1 can get all the guilty parties, I will do what 1 can for you in your ease. It may be of interest to you, and to nie, too," to the defendant while a prison'.'r, is sulhcient, though accompanied by a (iaution th wiraev -r was said would be used as evidence, to render a c( ioi' inadmissible. Searcy v. State, 28 Tex. App. ')!;} (1S'.)(»). A eonfessio obtainjd by a sheriff when a mob is hanging over tile prisoner, is not 1 ,atary. Taylor v. State, .'57 Neb. 788 (iS'.Ki). So of a confession obtained by a mob itself, though assuring the declarant tluit only an honest confession was ilesired. Willams v. Stat.', 71.' Miss. 117 (IS'.M). "To make a coniessioii, therefore, evidence, it must be male, so far a^• ca?i be ascertaiiii'd, in the absence of any excitement whicrh creites .^ hojie to olitain favor, or to avoid a threatened pun- isliment. ]>ut the Court in such cases must judge of the motives which induce the coniessioii. from the confessicui itself, and the circumstances uinU'r which it was made." L'. S. r. Nott, 1 .McLean. \W (l.s;5<)). If the same inducements can be supposed to a])ply to a reiterated, as to an original, statement, the later confession is not admissible. Heery r. U. S., 2 Col. ISO (1S7;5). l>ut, on the contrary, "the rule, universally H'cognized, is that even though promises or threats have been used by jjersons in autliority. yet if it appears to the satisfaction of the judge that tlieir iidluence was totally done away beiorv' the confession was made, tiie evidence will be received. Early c. Com.. SO Va. '.(21 ( IS'.M »). "It is not to be |ires\imeil that, if one otlicer makes threats or ])roniises, their inHuence will lead the i)risoner to accuse himstdf falsely to another otlicer." Cdm v. Cutfee. lOS Mass. L'Sr» (1871); C<.ni."/-. .Myer.s, 100 Ma.ss. o.'JO (IS!) I). So where indu.'cnients, securing a confession objectionable as involuntary, were maih' by an otticer, but the sanu' statements a few hours later were repeated to the state's attorney after a caution that no favor need l)e expected, the latter confession is admissible. State V. Carr, ;]7 Vt. 15)1 (ISO J). Where, however, the confessions are afterwards rejicvted to the same person who h(dd o\it the inducements, it was held that a CHAP. X.] AMEUICAN NOTKS. i88'" strictiT rule must be apiilied. "How or whenci' does it aiipciir that the inotivcs which iuduecd the tirst confession, had ceased to operate wiien it was repeated; it is not incumbent upon tiie priscmer to show that tliey result' I from the same motives. It is presumed tiiat they diil; ami evidenc(^ of the most irrefraj,'able kind should be produced to sliow tliat they did not. It is sutticient that tliey may proceed from the same cause." State /•. Lowiujrne, GO X. C. ();{s"(l.S72); State i'. Drake, ll;5 N. C. OL't (1S<».'!). The opposite result has been reacdied in Massacliusetts, where subsecpient answers, though made to the same officer, were not nnide under circum.stances wliicii the supreme judicial court considered "such as to afford a reasonable presumption tliat the defendant's answers were influenced " by the previous inducements. Com. v. Myers, KJO Mass. .WO (1H<)4). The fact tliat the defendant is in fear from causes otlier than threats by tlie officer does not render a '"^Mifession involuntary. Com. V. Smith, 111) Mass. 3()r> (lUTCt). A threat or jiromise, in order to render a eon; ision inadmissible, must relate to punishment for the oifenc. tsel''. Wiiere a prisoner in solitary continenn'nt and chained was prom- ised by his jailor that if he confessed he ^^hould bi; unchained and allowed to associate with the other prisc.icrs, a confession so ob- taiiKMl was said, n/iitcr, to be uno! >ctionable. "This was the promise of a temporary and collateral ,)on, and not a iiope ot favor held out in respect to the criminal charge.'" State v. Tatro, itO Vt. 4.S;{ (1.S78). "Confessions obtained by the influence of hope or fear are in- competent evidence. l?ut it is not necessary tiiat the confession shouM be the prisoner's own spontaneous act; and if it be made under the promise of some collateral lienetit or boon, no hcie or fear being held out in respect to the criminal charge against him, it will be competent." State r. Wentworth, ;'>7 X. II. llMi (l.sr»S). It is hard to re(!oncile the case of Anderson v. Stati' (Ahi.), 10 So. lOS (IS'.M) witli this rule. "On trial for seduction, a witness for the state testilied tiiat, after defendant's arrest, witness told him he couhl not get out of the charge, and that it would be better to tell witness all aiiout it, as he would buy defendant's crop, and assist iiim to h'ave the country, and tiiat defendant replied, ' I have no way of proving myself clear, and am going to leave.' Il(dd, that the confession was not voluntary." Anderson c. State, KJ So. (Ala.) lOS (1S'.)4). IM'.usoN's i\ AiTiioRiTY — Where a friend advised a defendant, whos(' house was surrounded by a sheriff's posse for his arrest, that " it would b(! better for him " to confess and turn "state's witness," the confessitms so made were held voluntary. "The general doctrine is indisimtable, tbat confessions which are ' foi-ced from 58818 AMERICAN NOTES. [PAllT III. \^'i\> m the niiiid by the flattery of hope or the torture of fear ' are consid- ered as made uncU'r mental duress, and therefore incompetent as evidence; but whether they are so extorted must depend on the character of the autliority, power, or influence by whioli they are in(hu!ed; and it will not be presumed that a person liavinj^ no con- trol over a prisoner, or tlie charge ayainst him, or autliority to make good a promise or execute a threat, could without physical forcf, or duress at least, so far insjjire either iiope or fear in his mind as to induce a false confession of liis guilt. While therefore it is clear that confessions induced by the jjromises, threats, or ad- vice of the prosecutor or officer liaving the prisoner in charge, or of any one having authority over him, or tiie proseciitioii itself, or of ' a private person in the presence of one in autliority,' whose aitfpiiescence may be presumed, will not be deemed voluntary, and will be rejected, the rule is generally the reverse in relation to confessions su})erinduced Ijy inditt'erent persons, acting officiously, without any kind of authority; and confessions made under such circumstances will be admitted in evidence." Young r. Com., 8 Husii, 3GG (1871). The supreme court of Alabama has carried the doctrine of "authority" to the extreme in ludding that where a negro woman, suspected of infanticide, was waited on by four self- appointed neighbors to inquire the truth of the matter, and con'- fessed the deed on their assurance that her confession would "be the last of it," such a confession was inadmissible because the declarant must have supposed that her questioners "as clothed with some .authority to institute the investigation." Gregg v. State (Ala.) 17 So. .S21 (181)5). A young man living in the jailor's family, who occasionally, in the absence of the jailor, attended on the prisoners, and kept the keys of the jail, is not a person in autliority, whose threat or promise will exclude the confessions of a prisoner in the jail await- ing his trial. Shifflet i\ Com., 14 Graft. (ir>2 (1858). A "private detective " employed to work up a case is not a per- .son in authority. Early v. Com., 86 Va. 021 (18!)()). In a case of stealing from the post-office, a s]iecial "agent of the jiost-office department" is a person in authority as regards a con- fession made to him. Beery v. U. S., 2 Col. l.iO (l(S7.'i). A magistrate examining for committal for the criminal offence of rape is a person in authority. Austine v. People, /il 111. 236 (isni)). Where a witness for the state told the accused during an inter- view at the jail that if he would confess "he would get clear," prejudicial remarks by the accused, not amounting to a direct con- fession, are incomjietent. Johnson v. State, (51 Ga. .S0.5 (1878). Where an accused was visited in his cell after midnight by sev- eral persoi;3 in succession, t(, threaten and cajole into a confession CIIAl'. X.] AMERICAN NoTKS. oH8 10 of guilt, such confession was lield involuntary. "None of these IHM'soiis was the olHccr in charge; hut tlieir ailniission to tlic (m-I! at siicli an unreas(>nal)le liour carried witli it an iniplicaiutn of the olUcer's (U)nsent to their mission, and respondent could scarcely fail to he inipres.sed that their assurant-es were inatle witli full authority." i'eople c. Wolcott, ol Mich. V,VJ (l.SS;!). In a Massachusetts case, it ai»i»eared tliat " the jirisoner was taken and carried to New IJedford liy two police olh<'ers, upon suspicion tliat lie was guilty of tins murder of Ilowai'd; that they stripped him of iiis (dotliing, and searclied him, and placeil liim in a cell at the station-house; and that ahout ten o'clock at niglit tiiey took him out of his (m'H for the purpose of (pu'stionieg and cxaniining him, and examined him from tliat time till midnigld. witliont warn- ing liini of his right nut to answer unless he cimsc to do so, or otter- ing liim an oppiu'tunity to consult witli coiinsid or fricmls. The defendant's counsel objected to tlie atlmission in evidence of state- ments then made by the prisoner to the police officers, tending to show his guilt. l>ut it was ruled tiiat, in the ai)scnce of any evi- dence of threats or promises otiier tlian might he inferred from the above, such statenu'nts were admissible in evidence." The ruling was approved. C(mi. v. CutTee, lOS Mass. L'So (1.S71). So where the confession was made to a de]iuty slieriff, but one not having control of tin? jail, it was ludd tliat the confession was voluntary. State *-. (Jossett, 1) Kich. (S. C.) 4liS (1,S.')G). I'ractical exi)erience gives much force to the language of the supreme court of Georgia in (Jreen v. State, SS (la. old (1S*)1), "We shall content ourselves, in this (tase. with announcing our jiurpose to a<lhere closely to tlie plain nnindates of our own statute as expressed in §§ .'57'.>w and .'>7!K> of the code, and with juitting the seal of our condemnation upon the practice too nuudi indulged in by officers a'ul qm\si officers, such as detectives, in extorting or otherwise improjierly ol)taining confessions from ]irisoners in tiieir custody. It is a gross and inexcusable^ abnse of authority , on the jiart of men occupying otUcial positions ov assuming t«) -.ct ofH- cialiy, to thus take advantage of the heli)lessness or igr.orance of persons charged with crinu', who are to a greater or less cctent under their control or in their power, and we deiun it our duty to thus rebuke such conduct in nnmistakalde terms." IJiMKcrrKo AS rxHKi.iAHM:. — Till' rules regulating the rejection of confessions not deemed voluntary are analogous to those regu- lating the receipt of admissions made as an olfer of compromise. The confession deemed involuntary indeed, to some extent, is an attempt on the jiart of the accused to coniiiromise his offence with those connected with the proceedings, exerting moral or physical restraint upon his freedom of action. "In civil cases, what is confessed by way of compromise, or to riSS^o AMKUICAN NOTKS. [I'AUT III. hi m fi buy peaco, is novor allowod to bo takon advantage of, ami iiia<l»> t-vi(lciicc, inasiiiiudi as tlio admission may have been madf, not trom a (consciousness of the validity or justice of the chiini set \i|i, but from a desire to avoid liti^jation. The rule is not essentially dilTerent in criminal cases. In such cases, a confession, as we iiave before said, can never be received in (evidence, when the defendant has been intiiiiMMM-d by any tiiroat or proinisc. The promise in this case was, that tiic prosecution sliouid be dropped, and it was dropped, on signinj; the paper. IJiuU'r the circum- stances tlien surrounding him. tlie defendant was willing to make any sort of admission, not supposing it would be used against him before a grand jury, or eLsewhore.'' Austine v. I'eople, ol ill. L'.'JG (1S()<)). Such a confession, therefore, is rejected because the circum- stances under which it is nuule prevent the statement having a suHi- cient jirobative efl'ect. A f(U'(!ed confession is considered made, not booaiise of a belief in its truth, but to secure relief from a ])resent ditliculty. "The law excluding confessions is based in a spirit of charity ior the weakness of liuman nature, and rests upon tiie theory, tliat a man when charged with crime and threatened with the punishment of the law, or ])romised immunity therefrom, may be induced, while in an alarmed and excited con<lition of mind, to make statements that are not true." State /•. Carrick, U> Nev. ll'O, IL".) (IHSl); (Jarrard /•. State, ">() Miss. 147 (1S74); I'eople v. Wolcott, HI Mich. GIL' (ISS.-J); Heckham »-. State. 100 Ala. 15 (1S«.»;{). "When tlie comj)etency of a confession is drawn in (pwstion, the correct impiiry in every such ease hs, whether the inducement was such as to lead tlie pri.soner to snjipose tiiat it would be better lor iiim to confess himself guilty of a crime he did not commit." State /•. Harrison, 115 X. C. 70(> (l.S<J4). "Xo reliance can be placed ui)on admissions of guilt so obtained; for the very obvi(ms reason that they are not made be(\inse they are true, but because, whether true or false, the accused is led to believe it is for his interest to make them." I'eople r. AVcdcott, 51 .Mich. C)\'2 (ISS.'i). "In deciding tliis point the chief (piestion is, wliether the inducement iield out was calculatt'd to make the con- fession an untrue one. If not, it will be admissible." Fife v. Cim. 'JO I'a. St. 4l,'l) (l.S.">7). "In determining this (piestion, it is proper to take into view the reason on wliich confessions .so drawn out are excluded. It is not because of any breach of good faith in admitting thorn, nor because they are extorted illegally, (though there may be cases in which this would exclude them, .as where a magistrate ])uts the accused upon his oath,) but the reason is, that in the agitation of mind in which the ])arty charged is sup- posed to be, he is liable to be influenced, by the hope of advantage CHAP. X.] A.MKKICAN NOTKS. 0882' 'I so y, as iOIl or IVar of iiijury, to state things wliicli aro not true." Com. c. Kiiapp, 9 I'ick. 4%, 503 (IS.'Ki). •'Hence we liave the jud^'nient of Knj,'lisli jurists against tlie ailniissiltility of a eonfessi(;n ohtaineti liy teniporal indiieenient, iiehl out in the shape of threat, promise or hope of favor, touehiiij^ one's esea|)e from the eiiari,'e a<,'ainst liim, by a person in authority, (,v wliero such jx'rson appeared to sanction sucli tlireat or induee- nu'iit, and a master or mistress, or ]>roseeutor, is phieed, in this respect, in tlie cate^'(U'y of one in authority. 'I'he fouinhition. of all ruh'S, and of tlu? rulin<^ in eaeli individual cas(! upon this subject, rests upon an anxiety to exclude confessions tliat are jjrohalily not true; ami, tlu^'efore, to ex(dude those that are not voluntitry, he- cause sucli are probably untrue." State v. Vaigneur, "> Jlich. •'{'Jl, 400 (l.sr>L'). The same reasoning, tliat a confession is not admissible whore obtained by the threat or pronuse of one in authority bo(!anse presnmal)ly not true, applies to excludt? confessions obtained by otlier i'orms of duress. State r. Carrick, 10 .\ev. IL'O (INSI). I'\)i> example, to a case when! the dechirant had been captured by armed men and interviewed by the prosecutor in presence of the ollicer. State i>. Drake, SL' N. (i. oDli (ISSO). Or where a slave prepared for a whipping was olTcrc<l by his master a lighter punishment if he confessed. Joe v. State, ,'{S Ala. 41'2 (1S(>;{). Or where tlie dechirant was apprehensive of mob violencu' unless a confession is made. Seef r. State, G l>axter, -44 (iST.'i). liut where ;in accuseil was surroumlcd by a large uuinlier of meu who siiggested hanging him, the couit left to the jury to decide "whether the inducement was calculated to make tim testimony untrue." Cady r. State, 44 .Miss. :V.VJ (1870); lUitler /•. Com., 2 J)uval, 4.V) (ISGIJ). Inoki-knoknt Faits — Further following the analogy of admis- sions in view of compromise, it has been liehl that where indepen- dent facts are admitted in course of an invohmtiirv confession, the facts themselves are coui|)etent. U. S. ?i. \ott. 1 .McLean, 409 (IS.'JO); State v. (larrett, 71 N. C So (lS7f); T.owe x. State, 8S Ala. 8 (1S89); Vatcs /•. State, 47 Ark. 17L' ClSSOi; ("Icnmns r. State, 4 I.ea, 'J'.i (T .'9); Dulfv r. I'cople, 2(\ N. V. oSS (ISC.S); Helote r. State, 8C AFiss. 9(5 (1858); Massey /•. State. lo Tex. A]))). 045 (1881); U. v. Doyle, 12 Out. IIo]k .'547 (1880): Taylor /•. State, 37 Neb. 788 (1893); (Jregg /-. State (Ala.), 17 So. ;!21 (IS05). "The general riile is that, after threats or imlncements held out to a defendant, as in this ease, 'it would be better for him to tell, if he knew, where other articles were.' any admission made by him after that, would l)e incompetent. 15ut there are exceiitions to this rule, and it seems to us that this case comes within the e.xceptioii. i8H22 A.MKItU'AN NOTKS. [I'AItT III. Tliis rule is not iiitendeil for tho benefit of K"ilty (Icfondants, Init in till- interest of truth. And it luis 1 n wisely held that sinijile declarations and admissions, made under such inducements, are so unreliuhle that tlie law will exelude them from the eonsideration of the jury. I>ut it seems also to Im; well s 'Ith'ii. that any facts asceilained in (•(Mise(juonee of su(di declarations or confessions, are admissil)lt; in evidence. And the declarations, connected with and explaining,' sucli facts, l)eiu^' considered a part of tlie res ijestae, are also admissilile." State v. Winston, \H> N. ('. '.«»(> (1S<.>,".). 'i'lius where stolen .Ljoods were discovered in tlie possession of a ])artieular person in conse(iuenc(f id' an inv(duntary confession, it was li(dd that the prisoner's statement and tlie corrolioratiui,' dis- covery were competent facts; hut tiiat this diil not rendei' compt'- tent iiis eonfessKUi, at the same tinu'. that he had coiumitted tlie l)ur.;hiry ami larceny if sucii confession was improperly pnu-ured l.v promises 1) r tin eats It is not the entire confession, however, whi(di may he reccdved; it is only so much of it as ndates strictly to tiie material fact discovered, tiiat may he i,'iven in evidence; for the fact discovered hits a reasonalde teudemiy to contirm tliat part of tiie ctinfession, and to e,\(dude the idea <d' its falirication under ui.ilue iiiHiiences. . . , Applyiu}^ this rule to tlu' evidence in this cause, it was proper to leave to the consideration of the jury the fact that, in consecpu-nce of the statement made hv the jirisoner, u ]»art of the stolen ^ooiIh were found in the possession of a par- tu'ular person, recently after thi' huri^lary; Imt not his acknowl- edi^'Uicnt that he had liroken and entereil the store, or tiiat he had stiden the (^oods Tiiese are facts the jury must ccdlect or not from 11 tl le circumstances of the cast aiK 1 tl lev are ni it to 1 w aided liv contessions extorted from tiie excited hopes of the prisoner." .Murphy c Stiitc, ('..'{ Ala. I (1H7".>); State r. (Jarvey, '2H I,a. Ann. '.!'.'."» (isrri); (iarrard r. State, od .Miss. 117 n>i7h. " .\ moiIilic;itioii of the rule, whiidi exidmles a confession not rI.owii to lie voluntary, is, that if information, deiived thendrom, leads U) the discovery <d' material facts, which ^t to prove the com- mission of tlie Clime, so iiiuidi oi the confession as strictly relates to the facts discovend. and tin- facts theiuselves, will lie received in testimony, though the confesHion may not he shown to have lieeii viduiitaiy : for the reason, that tin- discovery of the tacts cor- roborates the trutli of the confession, to that extent. . . . 'I'liere is eviilenee showing that the body of the deceased was found at tho ]dace where accused stated it was left, piirtially coveri'd with leaves, as were also a broken-handled knite. watidi-idiain, keys, and a brown soft iuit. near the body." l.owe r. State, SS .Ma. S MHH!»). "It is. th'-refore. well settled uiitui reasiui. jirinciple and autluu- itv,that it is competent to show tiiat the witness was directed by the accused where to liiid the j,'oods. and th;it they were found there accordingly." (iarrard r. State, oO Miss. 1 17 (1S7J). hi CHAP. X.] AMKKICAN NOTKS. ')8S: iii So whore ;i eonfcssinj; in-isoiicr produced and .identificil a pdrtinn of the stohMi Kdhl (hist at tlie tiim- ol )iis cunressidii, the latter f'aet is eoiiiiieteiit. Heerv /•. l'. S.. 'J {\t\. \S(\ (1S7.">). And ulnTc a prisoner is incj,Mliy iiuhircd tu ^;(lllle^s the hiret-nv (if certain hnnher, liis act in produeinj,' and idciitih in^c tlie Iiinilier is c(inii>eteiit. I'. S. r. Ki(diar(h 1' ( 'rancli ('. Ct. I."'.! (INL'.'!). An (lifer til eomproniise a hiroeny is evidence of an aihiiission. Stat(! 0. Ko(lri;4Ues, 4.". I.a. Ann. 1(I4(> (ISl).".). Tlie witness, after lieiii;,' asked whether lie iiad a eonversatioii with the prisoner, and objection hein;^' made that the eonfcssion is iiivo Innt; irv, niav tl leii furtl ler as ked wiiat he "( lid it 1 eonsc (lucnee of what he said aliont if.'" J)iilT\ v. I'cdplc. I'd N. \. oNS (iSCi;!); Com, r. .lames, '.»•.> Mass. l.'tS (l.S(;,S). W icre till' prisonei', as promised m an incompetent ml ession, pointed out a place where the stolen money was found, that lact is (•oiniietent ; liut: the stati'iueiit dii nil th confession. liiiried the money there," is incompetent. People c. Hoy N'eii, ."tl Cal. 17(> (1S()7). "The indepeiuh'iit fact that the money was found was cer- tainly admissilile in evidence, ami there can lie no donht that it has h(M'ii a rule of law hmj,' and wtdl estalilislied that not only such a fact, lint acts and declarations of the accused, in so far as they explain and are ne(^essary to a( nnt for it. whether the acts or deidarations he volnnt;iry or involantaiy, may lie received for this purpose. . . . Sindi evidence when admitted for tiiis S(de purpose is not treated as proviiij^ a coiilession, hut as lieiii;,' a p.irt, id the res ;,'estae of the indepeinlent eviileiitiary fact. If what tiic ac- cused did and s.iid w;is the result of cipercion, however lui hi, It W(nild lia\e lieeii in.'idmissilile had not the searcii wiiich was made for the money resulted in its discovery. Tiie discovery lieini: n nuitcrial and reh-vant fact, what would contriliute to account for and explain it would he r(devanl .ilso. not for its own sake, hut for its e.\plaiiatiu'y function and value. It may lie that the wlude of the evidence would he inadiiiissihle aecordiiii,' to tlie trtie iiicaniiij; and spirit of the rule, if it appeared that crimin.il viideneo, siieh as whipping, was tised in coercini,' the act oi extortiiij,' the speech wliiidi led to tlie discovery. The fruits of phy.-ical torture as dis- tin'Oii^iied from tliosi' c'' mere fear, it would seem. (iu;^'ht to lie nnavailiUL'. iJusher ('. State, '.tl (ia. .'Mi;! (l.S'.H). The elfect \l| Mill tl le prisoner s |ios it ion of r(d'nsiu<' to admit his coiifessioi' of ^;nilt .ind yet reeciviuj; as competent facts jjleaiied thr(ii!j,'li the inf*(mipetent eoiifeHsioii, which, of conrsj', serve to give eoulirmat ion and crcdihilily to that wlii(di has hceii ex(dudeil as not jiroli it ive lieeansc pnihaldy iintiue, is thus disiuissed hy th« suiireme court of .\rkaii>as. "The except i(Ui that exist.H to tho general rule tliat eoiifessions in cases of larceny made under tlireats are not evidence, is shown hv tlie authorities to lie this; 6882* AMKUICAN NOTKS. [I'AltT MI. it:. li- I I m WliPii statomonts are made by tlio aoouscil that lead to tlie discov- ery ol' the stolen jnoprrty, tlieii tlie nilf is tiiat it is adiiiissil)lc to «li()W that tiie property li:id Ix-cii traeed liy means of iiiluniiMtion leeeived from the aeensed; and all that was saitl hy the accused m convey ill!,' the inl'orniation, wliich is din-ctly connected witli oi explanatory ol' the discovery, is also adniissihle. 'I'lie statement as to his knowledge where the stolen property was to he found, heinf,' tims conlirmcd by the fact of lindin^', is proved to he trne and not to ho lahricatcd in (Hiiiseijuence of tin* in'proper iiaMiia employetl to obtain the confession. ]tut tlie rule as to the dinrl confession of K'uilt remains intact, and the discovery of the pro- perty throu^'h information derived from thi' accused does not jus- tify th<' introduction of the confession that it had been stolen by him. That must lie excluded notwitliKtaiidiii;; the facts otherwise proven to be true, leavin;; the prisoner to reconcile, as best lie enn. bis kiiowledj^e of these fiiets with his iiiiioceiKU' (jf the crime." Yates V. .State. 17 Ark. 171,' (IS.S(i). Wliethi-r the involnnt iry eonies.-ior. itself, when verified iiv asceriaiiiiiij,' the independent lai-ts. becomes competent as now pre- sumably true is .pieried in Ilelote v. .State, .'Mi Miss. '.Hi (l.srjS). In Te.xas it has been held that an otherwise ailmissible confes- sion b« comes eonipetelit if, in <'onse(pience of what is said, the elothin^ of the dec»'aseil is found. Spearman r. State ('l"e.\.), .'Mt S. W. L'li'.l (ISiK't). <ir where, under a statute, stolen property is found in eoiiseipieiicc of sueli confession. .Sands /•. State, ;!(l 'I'cx. Ajip. r.7S (l.S'.U). Ill West Vir^iuia, it has been held that an involuntary eonlVs sion becomes itself competent "where the ('(uifi'ssioii is accom- panied with the surrender ami ii'storat loii of the stolen properly." Kn'driek <-. State. ."! W. \a. ("•'.I."'* (1S(1'.»). it h;is been riilecl that ".\n admission bv a In I eiiiisvlvani: prisoiii'r not competent as a confession is admissible when its tnilli is proved by the revelation of the fact by scandi." I-aios «•. Com.. HI I 'a. St. '-'<»! (tS77). On the contrary, it has been held in Loiiisianii, lh;it "the discov- ery tliroui,di a eoiifessifUi of facts. le|,'.illy admissible in evidence, and tendiii;,' to prove a defendant 1,'niity of the char^je a^-ainst him, would not render admissible tl nfession irsidf. if it was not v(d- untary and free from eonipul.-,ion or inducement." State c .loiies, ■K*. La". Ann. 1. ".',•.". (l.S'.tli. A (,)ri:srioN ion rm Coiiir. — Whether a confession is v(diin- tary is a preliminary i\\ ic t loll to be decided bv I lit urt. The videiiee to this point, beiiin in its nature preliminary, is addressed to till- .Imlv'e. who admits the proof of the confes^ioii to the jury, or rc|( 'cts it, as he ma y or may not liiid it to have been ibawn from the itrisoner by the applic:4tioii of those motives." Cain .•. State, CHAP. X.] AMKUICAN NOTKS. rm^ IH Tex. .'W7 (l«r.7); State r. Vann, H'J X. C. G.31 (ISSO); State »•. Crowson, '.»S N. C. r)'.*;") (1SS7); State *•. Vai-,Mieur, ") Ifirli. .•!<»1 (IS")!'); State ik Howard. :{.'» S. C. 1<»7 (IS'.tl;; Coin. /•. .Jolmsoii, 1()L' i'a. St. ().'{ (1S<)4|; (Joodwiii v. State (Ala.), If) So. IJei,. ."l (is'.H); ••••xiy '•• I' 1 Apii. 1). (". LM(;(1S;»;{); SlM-plianl r. State 8S Wis. l.S') (ISDt); State c, (Joiliaiii. <;7 Vt. .k;.' ( IS'.M). That this tiiuliiiK eaiinot lie reviewed in an apiiellate court, see State V. Vaiiii, SL' N. ('. O.-.l (iSSd). "'I'lie.se (tases estahlisli llie (lo(rlriiie al.so tliat while a niliiiy which undertake.s to ileliiie the iiiHiieiiee that exehide.s the eoiili-s- sioii, and does so erroneously, is the suliject of an aiipellate revi sion, its ex<'ieise in l)iin(,'in},' about the eonl'ession in a iiarticiilar instanee l)ein^' a fact, is not subject to the corrective power of this Court." Stato v. Crowson, <.)S N. C. .")'.)"> (1.SH7). On the I'ontrary, the suprenie court of rennsylvania holds that the lindiiij,' of the trial jiidije may he reviewed, hut 'Mheir ruiinK will lie set aside only for manifest error." Com. r. .lohnsoii, 1(>2 I'a. St. (\:\ (\S'.)\). Or as said in tlie court of appeals <if the District of Ctdnmliia this "in necessarily a nii.tter almost entirely within his discretion, the exercise of whiidi should not lie revised excfjit in case id" palpalile almse." iJrady r. V . S, I App. 1). C. I'lC. (1S<.»;!). To the .sanu- effect, see Hartley r. People (111.), 40 N. K. S;{1 (IS'.)".). "Whether it was made vcduiit irily, is :i (piestion for the consid- eration aiiit determination of the court, and is usually shown hy ne(,Mtive answers to suidi (inestions, as whether the pri.souer had lieen told it would lie better for him to confess, or worse for him if lie tlid not; or whether similar lan^'uai,'e had been addressed to him. The better test is a fair ami just consideration (d' the a^;e. condi- tion, situation and character id' the prisoner, and all the iiicnm- stances atti-ndiii;.,' tin- eoiifcssion. These may satisfy tin- mind, althou),'h tiie usual pndiniinary (piestioiis are .■iiiswcred in tlie iiej,'a- tive; that the confession was not v(duntary, but sprang,' from the •lattery of hope, or the torliire of fear unduly exeited. Or, tli(>ui,'h these (piestioiiH may not be answered nej;ativ(dy, tin- circnnislances atteiidin;^ the confession, connected with the character of the jiris- oner, may (dearly indicate that it was spontanediis, and not alfected by lunie or feai" sprinyint,' from the words or conduct (d' others." .I(diiison r. State. ■">'.» Ala. ."17 (1.S77). "Mut the principle is well settled that where the admissiiiility of evideiiet' depemls upon a lu'climinarv ipiesti<in td' fact, to be tried by the court, its decision is not to be reversed uiih'ss in a case (d' (dear and manifest error. Till' court that sees and he.irs the witnesses, must be prcsunuMl to have liettcr means nf jnd'jint,'. on a ipicstimiof fact, than the aji- pidlate triiimiil. wlicre the witmsses ar" iniliicr .seen nor heard, an I wlicic it oltcii happens tliat tlieir testimony is very imper- GHH^*^ A.MKKIC.iN NOTKS. fi'Mrr II . fectly , 'iMirtpd.'* Fifo v. Coin., 20 Ta. St. 429 (ISV). i^.n Aho Miiy 0. State, .*i.S Xob. 211 (1S!»;{). It has been lirld to Iti- cnor Id leave to tlie j;ij-v *lic (jues!i,))i wlietliei- a coulessioii is Voluntary. State /•. Duiieuii, (J4 Mo. 2(i2 (is:*)). (til the eiiiilraiy. it lias been deeided tiiat " wiiellier there was any iiidiiceiiieiit held out by the iiiaj,'istriite to make tlie eoulessioii, was a I'aet within thf |iro\iiice of the jury to decide." (iarraid r. State. .'.() Miss. Hi (I.S7I); People i-. "Cisshly, i:\li N. V. 012 (IS'.I.'). Ill Com. /•. Smitli, ll'.> Mass. .'505 (ISTCt) the (|uesr,ion of llireats or promises was apparently left to the jury. In 'I'e.sas, it lias lieen licdd tlian an involuntary conl'ession may be nse(l to im|ieaeli tlu^ credibility ol the accused as a witness. iJaiiis r. State ('l"ex.), 2(» S. ^v. IMS (i,s«j4). It is open to tlie defendant to show, if lie can, in opposition to the receipt of the confession in evidciue, that it was imt vobiiita^v. l'co|.le r. Soto, lit Cal. (17 (1S74); Com. /•. Culver, 12(; .Mass. 4(14 (1IS7'.I); f^tate /•. .Vnderson. 'M\ Mo. 241 (ISSS). "In tliis state tlie Imrdeii of provin;,' that a confession was involuntary, and thei:|ore not <'onipetent ovidemie at,';»inst iiim, rests upon the accused." Killer i\ The State, 2.") Oliio St. 4(il (lM7h. "Where the law imposes upon a party the linrden of establisiuii,:.,' a fact, -'iid upon a trilmnal the duty of determining' its existiMce, it would seem to bdlow, necessarily, that tiie lornier sIk uhl in per- mitted to pi'oiiuee within reasonable limits, and the latter required to hear .iiitl consider, any evidence that in its nature is peiiinent to tlie iiifpiiry. To throw upon a party the burden of proving'; a fact, and at the same time deny to him the ri,i,dit tn adiluce rhe p-ec ssaiy evidence, althoii^^h at hand and tci'dercil lor th.it purpose, is an iuio'iialy only justiliable by peculiar eirciimstaiiet's or eoiniitioiis wliiidi do not seem to ol)taiii in iiiipiiri< s like that under considera- tion." Leb'vre r. 'ate, ."•(lOli. -^!. ., .' (|,S!»;!). It is error to refuse to allow iln ('efemlant to introiluoe evi- dence, on the preliminaiy hearinn iiy the court, that the eoiifession was procured by tlireats ami intimidation. Palmer r. Slate I."i(! Iml. o'.i;; ( i.s'.i;!). Tlie defendant may f ross-pxamiiii' the witnesses testifyiiij,' to tin- vnbiiitary nature id the i-oid'ession. Willis c. State, I,"! Ncli. I<l2 (iN'.tl). "It is till' privih'K'e of delcndant',s counsel and the lic'.ter practice." //</»/. "When such a confession is oflered in a criminal case, it is in- cumbent upon the prosecution to lay tlie foundation for its intro- duction by preliminary proof showiiij^ prima facie that it was frcidy and voluntarily made." People r. Soto, \\\ Cal. (17 (|S7I); State c. (iarvey. 2S '|,a. .\iiii. '.L'.". (1X7(1); |{railford r. Stale (\la,). 1(1 S I. I(i7 (1H',»4;. •>l'J ats •(•II lie S. CHAl'. X.] AMKUICAN NOTES. y88a' IJut wliL'i'fi HO o'>j»>ctior ir, !n;v(l(, ti» tlic r('Ofii|)t of the oviih •»(•«•, it is not I'ss 'iitiiil tliiit ii pri'liiimiary investigation Imj l.a.l. State V. M.'ulison, 47 La. Ann. .'M) (IK ). In ut-nrn[ia, it i.s .said tliat wliile tlic licttcr jir.icticc is to slmw that the conU-ssion i.s voluntary bd'orc it i.s n-cfivcd, yi't tliis imtof may In- sniiplied, when oniiltt'(l, after the receipt of the evidenee. Sniitli ('. Statf, SS (iu. (VJ7 (IS'.M). The (^Mirt .slioiihl, it is said, i-xchnh' the conft'ssion if tJHTf is a rea.sonal)le doiiitt as to its beinf; vohmtary. Williams /•. State, 7- Mis.s. 117 (l.S')4). To the contrary, that all (M)ni'('ssions are jirima fa<-ie volnntary, and that it is for tlie dei'<ndaiit to sustain his olijcction by [irovint; the fact of uinhie iidliieiiee. see Com. v. Culver, 11^(5 .Mass. l(»4 (1S7'.>)- "i'rinia facie, all confessions are v(duntary, and it is for the party ot)jectiiij; to tiieir admission as evidence to show that they were uttered under such pressure of hope or fear as to raise a doulit (d' their ai-curacy. It is undoul)te<ily the duty cd' the court to f,'uaril (rarefully tlie rit,'hts of a defendant in this res|iect; and more especially so when the prisoner is in the eusto*!}- of tlie law and the hopes or fears are supposed to he raised hy an oflicer of the law. The fact tiiat a defendant may think it will lie Wetter for him if he confesses, or thinks it will lie worse for him if he does not confess, is immaterial, if that condition of luimi is hron^ht about by his own indepeiiilent reasoniii},'. It is when that state of mind is induced by promises or tiiieats or other indiicemciit from without, that the coiife.sfiion is to lie rejected." Coin. *•. Sej,'o, lL'."i Mass. I'll) (1S7S). The rule is the same in <Hiio. Lefevre r. State, 'A) (>h, St. ."iSl (IS'.C!). Mav srii.i. ciiNrKST i.ikoki; riiK Jikv. — Kveii after a ronfessio'i is admitted by the (roiut, as |irima facie voluntiry, it is still open to tilt* prisoner to contend that it was not .so in point of fact, and c. II U]ion the jury to disre;.,'ard it for that reason. "Iiefore evidence i- a coid'essioii can be ailmitted, it devolves on the proKccution to fl;p - isfy the Court that it was viduutarily made by the |irisoii, r. Hut il after it has been admitted, it appears that it was not so made, it i the duty of the Court to withdraw the evideiic' from the jury ; of the jury wholly to disrei,Mrd it. Where it lias been rec. .:.4, and has pnie to tiie jury, it is the undoubted rii^lit of the prismier to show, if he em. tiiat it was not, in fact, voluntary, and there- fore is not to h.ivc wci;.,dit a^^aiust him; and any evidence whicli eondiices in any detjree to that noncliision is admissible." Cain ;•. State, IK Tex. .'i.S7 I.S,'i7). "The |irisotii has always the ri«ht to reipiiri" of the jud),'e a decision of the <ompetencv of the evidence; and, I'Veii after the jud]LCe has decided the evidenee to be competent, the pris'iier has I lie ri;iht to ask (d thi' jury to ilisrej,'aril it, and to ■^■N* 588«> AMERICAN NOTES. [I'AHT III. givfi no weight to it, beciiuse of the cirfiuinstances under wliioli tin; (•oiifcssidiis were ()l»taiiie(l." Com. v. L'lilvcr, IL'O Mass. Kll (iST't); iAIilU'i- V. State, ".M (ia. 1 (I8'.»l); Williams v. State, 7L' Miss. 117 (iH<M). .\ii(l tlm court may leave the jury to discnulit Ihr (•(iiil'ession if their opinion of its being voluntary differs from tliat of the presiding justice. C'om. r. Kus.sell, IHd Mass. I'.KJ (IS'.tL'); Willis *'. State, '.Ki (la. I'OS (ISiK!). This ludd a i)roi.er cour.se where the evidence is contlictiiig. (!om, i*. Hurrough, KJli Mass. r.l;{ (1S<.).-.); I'eople i: .Mackinder, SO liun, K. (IStM). The jury may pick out s\ich portions of the confession as they may credit, rejecting the rest. State t'. Dooley, (la.) 57 X. W. 414 (IS'.M). State I'. Johnson, 47 T.a. .Ann. !L'2r. (isnr.). ,\itK UKiuTTAiii.K. — Like other admi.ssions, confessions, if be- lieved, are a /eranirn /irti/)iifion!s and may be controlled by evi- dence, "or instance, tiie prisoner m.'iy show, if lit; can, that his words, though retluced to writing, have been misunderstood. State r. llrown, 1 Mo. App. iSG (1S7()). 1^' \ X /