IMAGi EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) V / A O % U.. & fA 1.0 îî-itt IIIIIM l.l 1.25 1^ IM mil 22 140 II 2.0 111.8 U lli 1.6 4 WM^ -j^ ^ '^^ ^> %^ '%'■ CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Séries. CIHM/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques 1980 Technical Notes / Notes techniques The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Physical features of this copy which may alter any of the images in the reproduction are checked beiow. L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il 'ui a été possible de se procurer. 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Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage. The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol — ►(meaning COIMTINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"), whichever applies. Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la der- nière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole — *• signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole V signifie "FIN". The original copy was borrowed from, and filmed with, the kind consent of the following institution: National Library of Canada L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de l'établissement préteur suivant : Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Maps or plates too large to b^ entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper lAft hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: Les cartes ou les planches trop grandes pour être reproduites en un seul cliché sont filmées à partir de l'angle supérieure gauche, de gauche à droite et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Le diagramme suivant illustre la méthode : 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 i 3 M. L'ABBÉ F. CHS. BEAUBIEN ^^^. Curé du Sault-au- Récollet. LES AMEN M( INSAHIIK — — ooîO{oo~ Conférence faite au Cercle Ville-Marie de Montréal, ♦ » » « MONTREAL EUSÈBE SÉNÉGAL &^ FILS, Imprimeurs-Éditeurs 20, rue Saint-Vincent. 1892 K * ! / LES AMEN DE MONSABRÉ M. L'ABBE F. CHS. BEAUBIEN Curé du Sault-aa-RécoUet. LES AMEN DB MONSABHE 3î»ic Lecture faite au Cercle Ville-Marie de Montréal. MONTRÉAL EUSÈBE SENÉCAL c- FILS, LMi'Ki.MEUR.s-r:i)rjKUHS. 20, rue Saint-Vincent. 1892 « LES AMEN I)K MONSABRE Monsieur le Préside/it, li) Messieurs /es membres du Cercle Ville-Marie^ Mesdames et Messieurs, Il m'a fallu pour acctqjler la gracieuse invitation de vous adresser la parole, ce soir, céder aux charmes d'un souvenir. Je vois revivre dans le cercle Ville- Marie, l'œuvre excellente du Cabinet de Lecture inaugu- rée par un des supérieurs de Saint-Sulpice les plus distingués, le Rév. Mr. Granet. Me rappelant ce que j'ai maintes fois vu et ,') M. Ludger Monipetit, étudiant en môdi-cine I LES AMKN (jiUcndu, ici, il me semble que les échos de cette enceinte me sollicitent, m'encourai^ent à apporter mon humble tribut d'efforts, de zèle, je dirai même d'admiration pour une association qui sera la joie de notre ville, l'embeliissement de nos jeunes intel- ligences et la sauvegarde de la vertu. Pareille entreprise ne doit pas avoir à lutter contre l'indifférence, l'apathie ; il faut que chacun y mette la main suivant la mesure de ses forces ; et, je suis heureux de le con- stater, l'auditoire distingué que je contemple est une preuve que le cercle Ville- Marie a pour lui les sympathies de notre meilleure société canadienne. Ces sympathies sont tout à fait précieu- ses. Ce sont autant de prix d'encourage- ment qui font honneur à l'institution qui les reçoit, car ils témoignent de la haute consi- dération dont elle jouit. Mais, parmi ces nombreux prix d'encouragement dont vous un MONSAIiUÈ avez ctL- honorés, il en est un dont je vou- drais vous rappeler, en ce moment, l'aima- ble souvenir, à vous surtout MM. les mem- bres du cercle Ville-Alarie : celui qui vous a été décerné, Tan dernier, dans cette enceinte, par ce digne enfant de saint Domi- nique, dont la voix éloquente a laissé de si profondes impressions. Nous ne perdrons pas de si tôt le souvenir de ce régal litté- raire. Que voulait dire le célèbre dominicain en vous présentant le grand Lacordaire comme l'ami de la jeunesse? si ce n'est que le bon Père Babonneau se montrait bien sincèrement le vôtre en épanchant pour ainsi dire l'âme de son maître dans vos âmes, en vous tenant suspendus à ses lèvres pour vous dire lui aussi son affection et son dévouement. N'est-ce pas continuer en quelque sorte ce mémorable entretien que d'appeler, ce soir. LES AMEN votre attention sur un autre enfant de saint Dominique digne émule du grand Lacor- daire --puisque ce dernier paraît ne pou- voir être surpassé — le Très Rév. Père Monsabré, considéré non pas dans l'ensem- ble de ses conférences de Notre-Dame, mais plus spécialement dans cette synthèse lumi- neuse qui forme le couronnement de son édifice de haut enseignement religieux ? Ce que je me propose de vous dire n'est qu'une modeste étude sur la manière originale et très exacte du gnuid prédicateur d'expli- quer Wimen, dernier mot du symbole de notre foi. I Messieurs, il y a un tout petit mot qui conclut ou brise la paix entre les nations, frappe l'intelligence en lui rappe- lant les plus grandes choses, résume tout i ; I DE MONSABMK un monde d'idées. En le prononçant, l'es- prit du savant comme de l'icrnorant s'humi- lie, se prosterne et s(î soumet : c'est lobéis- sance et l'acquiescemcMit de tout l'homme, l'abandon complet du cœur, sublime et qénéreux résumé de la foi et dc! l'adoration, 1(; oui de rintellio:ence---c'est Xavicn. " Un jour, dit Lacordaire, le qrand '• poète anglais Pope, discutait avec un "jeune hommesur le sens d'un texte ij^rec. •' A[)rès quelques hésitations, le jeune " homme, qui était *un officier de l'armée " ano^laise, dit au poète--: lime semble " qu'en mettant un point d'interrogation à " la fin du texte, il deviendrait parfaitement " clair. Pope, mécontent qu'on l'eût pré- " venu en fait de sagacité littéraire répon- *' dit - : Eh ! Monsieur l'officie^r, ([u'est-ce " qu'un point d'interrogation ? L'officier, *• regardant avec un sourire à demi respec- '• tueux son illustre interlocuteur, qui navait K» LKS AMKN I * pu perdre, clans la i^loirc, le malheur d'être " grandement contrefait, lui dit ini^énieuse- *' ment : — Le point d'interroi^ation est une " petite chose (jui fait des questions." y\insi en est-il du Y Amen. l^etitc; chose, en apparence, mais en réalité pleine de conséquences : il donne la réponse à toutes les questions ; et celui qui le prononce avec respect et conviction résume tout ce que Dieu demande de lui. Le célèbre Monsahré ne peut descendre; de la chaire de Notre-Dame, sans accorder IxXavioi toute l'attention qu il mérite. Après avoir parcouru pendant dix-sept ans devant un auditoire de plus en plus avide de sa parole, tous les articles du symbole de notre foi, il s'arrête devant ce mot ([ui résume à ses yeux toutes les vérités c[u'il a si brillamment défendues, et il s'écrie : " Lorsque je vous ai introduits dans le " divin monument de la vérité qu'on appelle Dli MONSABHl'O II le symbole de la foi chrétienne, le do^^mie catholi(|iie, nous en avons admiré l'ensem- ble. De cette vue i^énérah;, vous avez reçu une impression de respect (|ui. \)r.n dant I 7 ans a soutenu votre relii^ieuse attention dans l'étude des détails du sublime édifice de la parokî de Dieu. Faisons aujourd'hui comme les visiteurs ravis qui, après avoir pai couru le teiTiple auguste où nous sommes assemblés, se recueuillent encore une fois sur le seuil et résument, dans un ])rofond et dernier regard, toutes leurs impressions, et pré- parons-nous à ce cri suprême de l'âme vaincue par la splendeur et la force de la vérité : Aineu ! " — " Ces vérités, lumi- neuse manifestation de la science divine, dominent tout, pénètrent tout, attirent tout à elles, donnent à tout ce qui reçoit leuremj)reii!te, un caractère de grandeur et de perfection qu'on ne peut obtenir de LES AME M ; ( I ! " la nature. Tout doit chercher en elles sa '* consommation, tout doit leur dire : " A}?icn ! — Amen de l'intelligence, a\ueii, du " sens religieux, avien du sens esthétique. " amen de la \ie morale ^ amen de la vie *■ sociale, amen de l'histoire humaine." Fel est le plan embrassé, poursuis;! et admira- blement rempli par Tillustre conférencier dans ses six dernières conférences. Ce qui frappe le plus, Messieurs, dans ces pages que je vais essayer de \'ous faire apprécier davantage, c'est cet ensemble de vues d une exacte et sûre pénétration qui place l'orateur sacré comme à genoux devant l'i ni périssable monument de notre foi, lui en fait énumérer les beautés en un féerique panorama, communique à son audi- toire émerveillé, la pure et sincère excla- mation de son âme sacrée : Amen ! c'est bi' . 'lit !• oui, réellement l'édifice est somptueux, divin !. . . Le dogme catho- DE MONSABHI'^: K5 lique en est la base, l'adhésion de l'intelli- gence, bénie par Dieu dans sa foi. devient le foyer radieux qui illuminera son enceinte. 11 y a dans ce palais habité par la Divinité, tant de pureté, tant d'enivrement, tant de transports sacrés, que la beauté la plus limpide y brille, l'harmonie y fait vibrer sa harpe d'or et l'inspiration y étale ses modes variés de séduction sainte. Quand une fois on y a pénétré, l'âme saisie d'admiration se sent plongée dans cette atmosphère qui lui convient, y refait ses forces avec les mil- lions de forts qui communient avec elle, rentre dans la société pour y perpétuer la vie qu'elle y a puisée, ajoutant ensuite, page à page à l'histoire de son existence jusqu'à Vamen de l'éternité. '■ Le dogme catholique, dit l'orateur, '• prévient les recherches de l'intelligence " humaine et l'affermit dans la possession " des vérités fondamentales dont elle ne )! I Jl t I I '.S I TiKS AMKN ' peut se passer et qu'elle peut connaître ' par SCS propres forces. Le dog-nic ca- ' tliolique grandit l'intelligence humaine, ' en la transportant dans les régions supé- ' Heures d'une science inaccessible à la na- ' ture. Prévenue, affermie, grandie par le ' dogme catholique, l'intelligence humaine ' lui doit un assentiment, un ameu qu'elle ' ne peut lui refuser sans s'amoindrir et ' sans déchoir." L'homme ouvrant les yeux à la lumière de la raison, considérant tout ce qui l'envi- ronne, pesant ses tendances, se sentant dominer par des inclinations, entraîner par les objets qui le captivent doit nécessaire- ment se faire des (luestions. La matière ne lui fournira pas de réponse satisfaisante ; et son âme ne trouvera pas en elle-même un fonds inné de solutions aux grands pro- blèmes qui l'embarrassent. Il se demande : Quelle est mon origine ? Que suis-je ? Quel 1 I iïàï- I)K MONSAHRÉ 15 est le but de mon existence ? Plus il avan- cera en âge, plus la dilliculté à répondre à ces (questions croîtra ; et si son esprit se borne à observer seulement la terre, il s'aveuglera de plus en plus en dépit des flots de lumières jaillissant sur sa tête. Le dogme catholique vient ; il aide, il illumine, rassure, console et sauvej^arde. Si un auteur célèbre a pu désigner notre sainte Eglise comme la meilleure école de respect qui soit au monde, ne peut-on pas ajouter, que c'est la plus merveilleuse institution de bon sens qui existe ? Sortez de ses rangs, — vous le pouvez, sans doute, — observez, et soyez sincères : vous verrez les sottes réponses qu'on vous donnera à toutes les questions qui, dans notre sens, se trouvent si lieun'u- sement élucidées. Que de beaux esprits, naguère l'admiration de tous, et aujour- d'hui relégués dans l'ombre et abandonnés de leurs meilleurs amis ! C'est le balancier 10 LKS AMKN de la fable qui les gênait ; ils l'ont rejeté Aussitôt fait que dit. Ll' l)alancier jeté, notre étourdi cliancèle ; Il se cassa le nez et tout le monde en rit. t , 1 1 I t i I iii, I I Ce qu'il y a de beau, Messie tirs, c est qtie ce procédé divin petit tout résotidre, s'adapte à toutes les intelligences, illumine les plus beaux comme les pltis faibles esprits. " Il y a un petit livre, dit Jouffroy, qu'on " fait apprendre aux enfants, et sur le([uel " on les interroge à l'église ; lisez ce petit " livre, vous y trouverez la sohition de " toutes les qtiestions posées par la philo- " Sophie, de toutes sans exception. De- " mandez au jeune chrétien d'oii vient " l'espèce humaine ? Oti elle va ? Comment " elle va ? Demandez à cet enfant poiir- " quoi il est ici-bas et ce (ju'il deviendra " après sa mort ? Comment le monde a été DK MONSy\BHÉ 17 " créé et à quelle fin ? Comment la terre à " été peuplée ? . . OrJL^nne de rhouMue, ori- " o^ine de l'espèce, (|uestion des races, des- " tinée de l'homme en cette vie et en l'autre, " rapports de l'homme avec Dieu, devoirs " de l'homme envers ses semblables, cet " enfant n'ignore rien de tout cela. Voilà " ce que j'appelle une grande doctrine ; "je la reconnais à ce signe, qu'eille ne " laisse sans solution aucune des ques- '* tions qui intéressent l'humanité." " Mais, dit Monsabré, c'est un grand bien- " fait pour nous, Messieurs, d'être mis en " possession et affermis dans la connaissance " des vérités premières dont nous ne pou- " vons pas nous passer, par la voie courte " et directe d'une affirmation divine à *' laquelle nous devons notre assentiment. " A ce bienfait se joint l'inestimable hon- " neur d'être transportés, par le dogme " catholique, dans les régions supérieures I.KS AMKN !i ■ I!!' I I " d'une science; inaccessible h hi natun;, •' d'une; science qui Ljrandit l'intellioence à ce " j)()inl., (jue toutes les connaissances (ju'elle " peut ac([uérir par ses propres forces sont " moindres, en comparaison des splendeurs " surnaturelles qui l'illuminent, que les " lumières d'emprunt, dont nous nous ser- " vons pour dissiper autour de nous les " ombres, en comparaison du soleil qui *• inonde l'espace de ses rayons. Comprenez bien, Messieurs, qu'il ne s'agit pas d'amoindrir ici la raison, de lui nier ses prérogatives, mais bien de l'enno- blir, de l'élever et de la grandir. Ah ! combien sont à plaindre ceux cjui se re- fusent à nous suivre dans cette voie de gloire et de véritable prospérité!.... Je ne vous ennuierai pas, Messieurs, en étalant devant vous, leurs mesquines sug- gestions et leurs systèmes dégradants. hi-: MONSAUiii'-: quand ils vicinuMit philosopht'i* sur [)\va\, surThoninic (tt sur IcMiiondc:. Mais jjouniuoi donc s'acharner à nu; montrer un dieu intérieur au mien, une religion (|ui m'oÙre moins d'avantas^es réels, qui me remplit de justes appréhen- sions, qui au lieu de m'aflermir, me débilite, me trouble et me fait l'égal d êtres sans raison ? Drôle de procédé que celui-là. Vous en save2, Messieurs, le secret. Il y a dans ces doctrines absurdes à nos yeux, comme un manteau qui recouvre plus d'une faiblesse, et si on voulait user de franchise, on prononcerait avec nous ce mot (jui résume une foule de choses : la jouissance. "Je ne refuse pas, dit l'orateur, à la ' raison et à l'expérience de m'éclairer ; " mais, emporté par une doctrine sublime '* dans des régions supérieures où je vois " grandir tout ce que je veux connaître, je I * I è ) 1! M . 'i ' «li I ijl I I I ; ! 1 20 LES AMEN " ne puis m'empêcher de donner mon as- " sentiment au do^-me qui me présente " un Dieu, une liumanité, un monde plus " L^rands et plus beaux que je ne les puis " concevoir par les seules forces de mon " intelliii^ence. Tout cela est trop i^rand " et trop beau pour n'être pas divin, trop " divin pour n'être pas vrai. " Amejt. — Il doit en être ainsi !.... II L'homme est poussé par le besoin de connaître le vrai ; et le do^^me catholique est le moyen le plus sûr, le plus loi^ique, le plus'consolant pour l'aider à accumuler ses connaissances, à les développer. Je dis : accumuler, parce qu'il s'en servira comme de de<^rés s'élevant de plus en plus jusqu'à ce que sa foi alimentée et bénie lui entrou- vre les parvis célestes. Mais voici Dieu DR MONSABRfi îl qui apparaît ; je sens, je vois qu'il existe et tout me porte à chercher à le connaître. " Le plus sublime objet de la connais- " sance, le plus haut clei^ré où clk; puisse " atteindre, le faîte de toute les recherches " humaines, c'est Dieu, dit saint Thomas. " Or, l'homme ne se contente pas de con- ** naître Dieu, explique Monsabré ; il veut " avoir avec lui un commerce positif et effi- " cace, mettre sa vie en rapport avec l'être " souverain qui le tient sous sa dépendance, •' et qui, après lui avoir donné l'existence, " peut lui communiquer encore de sa plé- '* nitude. En toute nature humaine, l'ins- " tinct intellectuel est accompagné de sens " relii^ieux, ou, si vous l'aimez mieux, de " la religiosité : besoin et faculté de se " mettre en rapport avec Dieu d'une * manière positive et efficace." Il s'agit pour le conférencier de constater dans l'humanité l'existence du sens reli- . i i ! il 'I I : ; 'I 1 .1 I II I II i 'il' a; il • ! il i ! '' ! 1 i iîi , h ' Il I !i 0-) LES AMEN g-ieux, d'en étudier les exioences et les as- pirations, et puis, en arriver à conclure victorieusement que ces exi^rences et ces aspirations ne peuvent être pleinement sa tisfaites que dans la direction donnée au sens religieux par le dogme catholique. " Quel est le peuple, quelle est la famille " humaine, dit Cicéron, qui, avant toute " science n'ait une connaissance anticipée " de la divinité ? " Et Plutarque : " Vous " pouvez trouver des ville:^ privées de mu- " railles, de maisons, de gymnases, de lois, . . " mais un peuple sans Dieu, sans prières, " sans serments, sans rites religieux, sans '■ sacrifices, nul n'en vit jamais. . Invoquons " Dieu pour l'heureux succès de notre légis- " lation ; qu'il daigne écouter nos prières, et " qu'il vienne, plein de bonté et de bien- " veillance, nous aider à établir notre ville " et nos lois." Voilà, Messieurs, l'aspiration d'un païen m MONSABUK '23 qui s'exhale dans le lointain des â^^es, plus de 300 ans avant la régénération du inonde par le divin Sauveur. Quel navrant contraste avec les utopies des pionniers de l'impiété moderne ! Ils s'acharnent à nier l'existence du sens religieux, le poursuivent à outrance, cher- chant à le détruire dans l'âme de l'enfance, persuadés qu'il ne manquerait pas d'être en- seveli dans les passions de la jeunesse pour apparaître au foyer domestique. Pour ar- river plus sûrement à ce but inique, les gouvernants de France détachent le Christ des murs,déchirent les i)ages du catéchisme, violent le pacte sacré du Concordat et s'écrient par un de leurs partisans : " Nous sommes ici quelques-uns qui ' n'avons pas besoin de prêtres. — Qu'est- " ce que j'en ferais ? je suis de ceux (jui ■' croient que l'homme (jui se respecte, '' arrivé à un certain âge, ne doit jamais I >' ; I 1 M 1) !i!! i (iillMI l"l i I I ;. ( 24 LES AMEN " s'agenouiller devant un roi, ni devant un '' prêtre, qu'il doit pour l'honneur de l'hu- " manité rester debout " — C'est bien là l'ab- sence du sens religieux. Heureusement, Messieurs, -je m'empresse de le dire — à côté de ces impies, la France a encore assez de forts qui s'inclinent dans la sincérité de leurs adorations pour pouvoir par la ferveur de la prière et par le martyre, s'il le faut, purifier et sauver la patrie. Du moment qu'on ne voit en celui qui commande ou en celui qui sacrifie qu'une figure humaine, pourquoi lléchir le genou, ou courber la tête ? Mais, pour nous, heu- reux mortels, le sens divin éclaire nos esprits, échauffe nos cœurs et provoque en nous les sentiments les plus salutaires. Nous saluons et bénissons dans le bras ([ui commande, la volonté divine qui nous dirige ; l'encens qui s'échappe des mains de nos sacrificateurs symbolise la sincérité de DE MONSAIiUÉ 25 nos prières ; nous adorons sur nos autels une victime divine, dont le sang continue à vivifier toute la nation ; nous tenons à nos croyances et nous voulons vivre et mourir dans la foi, l'espérance et la charité. Ces sentiments, Messieurs, ne sont pas seulement basés sur des habitudes, ils ne sont pas seulement le résultat de la réilexion et de l'expérience; iis prennent leur origine dans un besoin, dans une tendance de l'âme. Comme un enfant, avant de pouvoir se rai- sonner la chose, s'attache au cou de sa mère chérie parce que c'est sa mère, ainsi l'homme s'affaisse devant la divinité parce qu'il a besoin d'elle. " L'homme vivant, •' dit Monsabré, veut mettre sa vie en rap- " port avec la vie " — Comment (.*n effet demander la vie à ce qui l'environne ? Il voit sans cesse tout tomber autour de lui. La plante croît, s'épanouit et se dessèche. Les constructions les plus solides viennent 1: Î6 l,MS AMI-.N il i 41 I . 'I >' * • 'M iiiti fl t! l!,i 11 Il . . t . " ' ■ II à s'ollonclrcr dcvanl le voiU cl la IcinpcLc. Mais (|i)i donc a créé et conduit ces clc- mciUs qui se coalisent et (ju'aucune force humaine^ ne j)eut encliaîner ? j'ai vu des remparts ([ui me paraissaient intVancliissa- hles, et ils ont été détruits ; K^s villes se sont peui)lées et ont été réduites en cendre ; toute puissance terrestre est ébranlées et le concpiératit comme l'artisan viennent bien- tôt mêler leurs cendres dans le champ des morts II faut (pi'il y ait un être inlmi en grandeur et en majesté (jui commande à tout cela, et cpii coordonne tout : c'est le sens religieux cpii parle : *' L'Iiomme reli- " gieux, dit l'orateur de Notre-Dame, veut ■' un Dieu (jui s'occupe de lui et mette à " son service sa toute-puissance ; un Dieu " qui écoute ses prières, un Dieu qu'on *' n'appelle |)as en vain au secours des fai- " blesses et des misères humaines ; un Dieu *• qu'on invoque efficacement dans la |)eine ; M! 1)11 MONSAIilU'; 27 " mi I )icii (|iii bciiissc l(:s efforts cl les " fruits (In travail ; nii VYinu (jiii drlivrc dr " la douleur et console les souffrants; un " Dieu (|u'on puisse a|)peler le; Dieu très " bon aussi bien (jue le Dieu très ^^rand, " /J^o opthno wrM //;/o. - L'hoinnu' r('liL,M*eux " aspire à des rapprochements (pii mettent '' Dieu, non seulement à la portée de son " ai7î(!, mais à la portée de ses sens. . '• L'homme religieux tremble devant la jus- " tice de son Dieu. . L'homme reli^neux " aspire à rendre ses actes dignes du Dieu " qu'il honore et (pi'il iîn|)lor(!. .L'homme " religieux a besoin de signes sensil)les et " sanctifiés cpu' tenu^ignent de son désir " d'uijir sa vie à la vie de Dieu, etfpii s'ils " ne peuvent le grandir, soient au moins la " livrée de sa religieuse dépendance. . " L'homme religieux compte sur un Dieu " rémunérateur qui le récompensera de ses " mérites." T T Tl I "in I.KS AMKN \ OlIX M ( sM» \n '.. (Il >; l'vij^M m c; lilijM- <^\lsrs \\\\ \\ t) r'.t p.r; p. t »ni', de tiii » , «m'il l;ml rni»Mnri «U \( ',prt t l^" ' "' "' ';oi( iil 1» iniil • ■. \in ]vn\ nn«Mib »ph I l\Hin.(inl«' ";i> p.i'isc de Np»>ni.nU "> »lr \.\ \\,\\\\\ r,\'ir\\ n\l|MM 1 I 1,| < hnsr rvi'.tr. 11 \ .i l.^ wn l>rs»»in. iinr «Irm.nnlc \îivrnt(\ (t U^ d»\iMur i .uholujiK \ n jmml ^ ^onh.nt. Kl. l'illusti» ronlin nrin p;iss(> en u \ \ir 1rs ]>\iihip.iUs srrtrs «jiii <>nl <^ss,\\ (^ vl'x r< pv>n*li r 1 » »loi', \ (Ml', <'p.n rnrr vOs vloiaiK poiu iu»'Hir so\r< vos \ru\ l.i sv>l\uivtn i\c ce or.uul proMrin(\ " \ a' " y\o^\\\C K m\\o\\k\\U\ vlll l\M.Ur\n. n'oilhllV " rirn vlr v^c^ qui pr\U ron\ (Min .^ l.i rrli •' j^irust^ nature vl(^ riu>innu\ l ,(' s(m\s n^li '" i;ioii\ \ (ml s(^ inrtir<^ en rapp«>rl .ixcr " Piou. l.OvU\i;ino catholiqiir lui monhc " dans les oionx linlini vcc\ r\ \i\anl. un " Dion inailro dt^s inaitrc\s. roi des rois, "' Ivn oonvino un \\'vc qui ne \ cul (\ne \e hl'; MnriMAHiif', lU " Itif II (|( ms nil;ih(i;, »'(nMl' I' ii( . |»r(/rr'«; " •■( I Mttii 1rs rvMii' ♦ I , «tfh » -1 f ♦M -• '|(i( l'im " plitl • ni |r') ';»'| \i» » '; (|r ';;i |f .iih I iiii-,s;ifi( r ." < 'i";l liif II I /\ iiH II Il l'iiiq. «|;in'; iiih' »'Io(|ii'|iI' i'u\\i}\rr;\ I i< tii ( |« iK »'; ( I » t\ ,iii< ♦ s ' ( i\< no-; j ir ,il l'i II' N 1 (lit • H iisi';. r» (1 i! ' !{î .- h ,11 1 I \'r ;i |,i f '.((' lu ■;ii MM |in' " l« ( Il »(' iiM ( ,il lioli* jij' II' (Il , ;illir fil'', ' linii'; |i|Miii<( «( ii'iiii; ;ismn' l'I'rfi'llr " xislnii. 1(1(111' II' (i'»<;<,(': ',ioii, If-If ni' lU' " [(HiissaiH (> (l( I h' Il (|;iii^; l'un' 'I 'Km-, I;i " (II. III i(vivili('c. /h///// ! ( 'r\f Inrii ' III LIkhiiimc (".I (Il I »'»'.';'"/;i'>ii '!'■ I;i v'TlIf'. A|U('", r.ivoir 1 (•( li(i( lif''' ;i,vf( p'THrvfTanc^*, i| 'r.illliclioii (le sa vie : c'fsl, I': f|'>;.Mi)'; catho- li(|iic <|iii 1.1 lui pr(':sf:iil.'' Iraichf., raHj^:usf: { il i!ll t ni M6 LES AMEN ^* te zde depré en décoré l'éclielle éclatante *' qui vous élève de la contemplation des *'• beautés terrestres à la contemplation de *' la céleste beauté ; si d'image en image ** vous ne vous élevez jusqu'à leur arché- *' type éternel ; si votre contemplation de la '• beauté réelle n'est assez affranchie des " servitudes de i matière, pour vous empor- ** ter sur un souffle sublime jusqu'à la con- '' templation de la beauté idéale ; en un mot, *' si votre génie, porté sur les deux ailes ** d'une contemplation plus haute et d'un '• amour plus céleste, ne prend son vol pour " monter jusqu'à l'idéal lui-même, qui réside " en Dieu et qui est Dieu même, jamais, " oh! non, jamais, malgré riiabik'té de vos *• méthodes et la perfection de vos procédés, " vous n'atteindrez le point culminant de " la création artistique, parce que vous ne " mettrez jamais dans vos œuvres un reflet *' de cette divine beauté par laquelle toutes DK MONSABMÉ 37 " les choses sont belles, et sans laquelle *' rien de beau ni dans la nature, ni dans *' l'art ne saurait exister." Je dépasserais, Messieurs, les limites que je dois m assigner, ce soir, en entrant dans tous les détails d'analyse. Il faut nécessaire- ment me borner à certains passages plus frappants : " Le Christ est beau aux yeux '' qui le contemplent comme à l'esprit qui " le médite. Il se montre, c'est la divine *' beauté qui nous apparaît : il habite parmi " nous, c'est la divine beauté qui s'est faite *' notre hôte; iî parle, c'est la divine beauté " qui nous instruit, nous apprend les secrets " du ciel et reluit en sa sublime et profonde ''parole II commande à la nature et fait " des miracles, c'est la divine beauté, prin- " cipe et type de tous les êtres, de leurs *' formes et de leurs lois, qui prouve à la " fois sa présence et son souverain pouvoir. " Il pleure, c'est la divine beauté qui s'at- i 38 LES AMEN iM' •1 'Hi il! ^i! :iniiii H il! tendrit sur nos misères avant de les gué- rir ; il nous aime, il nous accable de bienfaits, il se livre à la justice du ciel, il souffre, il meurt pour nous, c'est la divine beauté qui veut nous ravir par le plus o-rand charme de l'amour, le sacrifice. Il triomphe de la mort, c'est la divine beauté qui nous montre le chemin de gloire que nous prendrons un jour pour aller la rejoindre au lieu d'où elle est descendue. Oh ! oui, Jésus était beau aux yeux de ceux qui eurent le bonheur de le contem- pler et de chanter //osanna sur son pas- saofe. Suit l'entraînante description de la copie la plus parfaite de la beauté divine qui apparaît sur la terre ; permettez que je mette sous vos yeux ce tableau de la Vierge. Il ne peut que réjouir les cœurs des habitants de Ville- Marie : *' C'est une femme, semblable par la DI'] iMONSAliRK 3'J nature à toutes les tilles de l'homme, mais douée de crrâces si extraordinaires et de privilèges si admirables qu'elle efface par sa beauté naturelle toutes les beautés de la nature. Jamais aucune souillure n'a |]étri ni son corps ni son âme sainte. Elle est pure, de la plus grande pureté qui se puisse concevoir après celle de Dieu. Réparée par une grâce sans exemple, elle unit en sa personne deux honneurs incon- ciliables, la virginité et la maternité. Con- trairement à la loi, l'honneur maternel ne détruit point en elle l'intégrité virgi- nale ; et rintéi:>rité \'iroinale rehausse l'honneur maternel d'un éclat que lui refuse la nature. Elle est mère d'autant plus admirable qu'elle est vierge, et vierge d'autant plus étonnante qu'elle est mère. " Passant de ce type original à d'autres secondaires, l'orateur sacré s'arrête devant la figure des saints. j|i I I 1:11 40 LKS AMKN Lc:s saints oiU trouve le moyen cfficiicc de leur asshnihition h l, ■'j8 LES AMEN S if ■ \ ; lii' lÉi! I Il ! i I l ! * I ! dant de l'erreur, pouvant la braver, la ter- rasser au besoin. Si donc, l'homme dans sa vie agitée se sent faiblir, il n'a qu'à redresser la tête, regarder avec confiance, user des moyens que Dieu lui assure pour refaire ses forces. Il peut se dire en toute sûreté: si je ne fais pas cela, je suis perdu pour toujours, où, si j'agis de telle façon, je me moque de la douleur comme des plai- sirs, je passerai à travers la souffrance, la mort même, j'arriverai à la joie éternelle — sdo cîd credidi, je sais en qui j'ai foi. Vraiment, s'il n'y a pas là le moyen de devenir meilleur, de panser les plaies de l'âme, de les guérir et de brider les mauvais penchants, où trouver mieux ? — Remarquez, Messieurs, il n'y a pas 1? une simple question de principes ; il est fa- cile de nous placer en face de faits et même d'en appeler à une expérience personnelle ; la fontaine de force est sous nos yeux, nous DE MONSABIlft iU y avons puise la vie de nos âmes. La vraie loi nous a été léguée avec les moyens de l'observer, moyens efficaces, à la portée de tous, abordables aux intelligences bornées comme aux talents les plus brillants. Nous n'avons qu'à ouvrir la première page de l'histoire d'un pays où la civilisation chré- tienne a pénétré, et nous verrons sur-le- champ les prodiges qu'ils ont opérés. '• Pour rendre l'homme humble, chaste, '• apôtre, frère, dit le grand Lacordaire, la " doctrine catholique a pris son point " d'appui en dehors de lui-même, elle l'a " pris en Dieu. C'est au nom de Dieu, " par la force des rapports qu'elle a créés '' entre lui et nous, par l'efficacité de ses " dogmes, de son culte et de ses sacrements, " qu'elle change en nous ce cadavre rebelle " à la vertu, qu'elle le ranime, le ressuscite, " le purifie, le transforme, le revêt de la " gloire du Thabor, et que l'ayant ainsi 's ■«*i,;!: 50 LES AMEN " arme de pied en cap, elle le jette comme " un homme nouveau dans la mêlée du " monde, faible encore par sa nature, mais *' fortifié par Dieu vers (|ui monte son in- '* cessante iiispiration." V IHi! ., \M r ! : flji'! m ■ ' I I 1 ,1 ' .1' l II Le dogme catholique obtient de l'intelli- gence la plus parfaite adhésion, de l'âme l'admiration, du cœur l'amour et la (jénéro- site, non pas seulement dans une certaine mesure, mais même poussés jusqu'à l'hé- roïsme. Uiuncn de ses iîdèles adhérents est donc complet, c'est dire par là même l'influence salutaire exercée sur toute la société. Ainsi en face des bienfaits innom- brables qui découlent pour elle de l'accom- plissement de la loi chrétienne, l'orateur de Notre-Dame veut en étudier les obliga- tions. La société est un corps composé DE MONSABKI^: 51 d'organes nombreux et distincts; pour que le bonheur, la paix et la prospérité y rc - gnent, il faut l'acconiplissernent de deux gra ds devoirs : le respect et l'amour — et pou) ceux qui commandent et pour ceux qui obéissent. Or, le dogme catholicpie est par excellence la doctrine du respect et de l'amour, donc les sociétés doivent lui accor- der avec empressement Xaniai de leur ac- quiescement, afm de participer aux avan- tages inestimables qu'il apporte à l'huma- nité. Mais, Messieurs, le respect et l'amour ne s'accordent pas sans raisons. Ce sont des sentiments trop nobles, trop profonds pour ne pas être motivés : " C'est à la tête *' de la société, c'est-à-dire, au pouvoir cpii " gouverne, dit Monsabré, q l'est dû le pre- " mier hommage du respect ; et vous com- " prenez tout de suite que cet hommage " est en raison de l'idée (|ue nous avons de " la dignité de ce pouvoir." LES AMEN *' 'lif. i i II' iSlil^ Le dogme catholique nous met devant les yeux l'origine, et partant ce qui fait la force et ce qui assure le légitime fonction- nement du pouvoir. Toujours Dieu entête de tout, toujours le foyer des vraies lumiè- res et des saintes inspirations en tout. Le divin soleil de justice lance un de ses rayons sur le front de celui qui est appelé à gou- verner, ce n'est pas d'en bas qu'il reçoit le pouvoir, c'est de Dieu de qui vient toute puissance : c'est comme un épanouissement de la grâce divine (}ui jette sur des épaules humaines le manteau de la vraie royauté. A cette vue les croyants courbent le front, se soumettent, respectent le sceptre comme les édits qu'il confirme; et de même qu'en vue des types divins et des représentations religieuses, ils chantent \amen du cantique de louange et du ravissement, de même devant la figure auguste de celui qui com- mande au nom de Dieu, ils volent, ils cou^ DE MONSABHK 53 rent, ils combattent et ils s'estiment heureux de mourir. Je ne m'inspire pas ici, M es- sieurs, simplement des idées qui ont heureu- sement prévalu, en certains temps, en cer- tains lieux ; je n'examine pas les personnes, je ne pèse pas même leurs actes, mais je dis que la religion qui m'a accueilli en naissant, qui secourt nos faiblesses et qui a droit à notre suprême soumission, nous montre sur un trône quelque chose de plus que de l'or et de la pourpre. C'est Dieu qui fait les grands, c'est Dieu qui les ennoblit, et c'est pour cela qu'il faut respecter, aimer et servir ce- lui qui commande en son nom. — ' Croyez, dit JMonsabré, qu'une nation peut se choisir des chefs, quand Dieu ne lui en donne pas ; qu'elle peut déterminer la forme et les con- ditions d'un gouvernement. Appelez cela, si vous le voulez, la souveraineté nationale. Mais, sans préjudice de cette souveraineté nationale, on doit dire avec un savant ju- 54 LES AMEN > 'i riste : " L'opération sociale a son principe dans l'autorité ; " et, avec le docte I)ellar- niin : " le pouvoir vient radicalement de Dieu seul ; car, étant annexé à la nature de l'homme, il procède de celui qui a fait la nature de l'homme. Le droit de nature étant droit divin, il faut conclure que le pou- voir est introduit dans l'humanité par droit divin. Avec cette notion maintenue chez un peuple, il nous est facile d'en toucher les résultats chez celui qui commande conime chez ceux qui obéissent, non seulement dans les rapports des organes du corps avec la tête, mais aussi des sujets entre eux. Le respect devient le modèle de tous : c'est comme une sève douce et forte qui circule dans toutes les artères du orand arbre social, (jui le nourrit et perpétue sa vigueur. Mais, dit- on, la société offre des inégalités ; ne vaudrait il pas mieux tout aplanir et pré- DE MONSABRK 55 seater un niveau parfait, sans distinction ? Que de ^ens de nosjours prétendent qu'on y gagnerait énormément ! Comme c'est facile à dire, Messieurs, et combien il est aisé de voir que ces prétendus niveleurs de l'état social font comme l'artisan c[ui se place généralement à bonne hauteur pour façonner la pièce de bois qu'il travaille ! Il reste des morceaux, qu'en feront- ils ? Pen- sez-vous que ce sera pour donner du pain, des habits à ceux qui pour le moment les applaudissent ? vous ne le croyez pas ; moi non plus. Il vaut mieux dire avec Mon- sabré : " Impossible de supprimer ces iné- " oralités et ces contrastes ; ils sont dus à des " causes indestructibles qui persistent " comme le monde et se renouvellent com- '* me les con^réoations. Les forces de la " nature, le talent, le caractère, le tempé- " rament, les passions, et par dessus tout la " liberté humaine combinée avec les autres 56 LES AMEN 'l'i!; m ■: 'l'.'j iii-i 111 i 1! " énergies de râine et mise en présence des *' iniluences extérieures, n'est-ce pas assez " pour faire ([u'il y ait dans une société des " grands et des petits, des puissants et des " faibles, des glorieux et des obscurs, des " riches et des pauvres ? Ces inégalités et " ces contrastes entrent dans l'arranoenient " des choses, dans l'ordre universel voulu " de Dieu et maintenu par la Providence. " Nous ne supprimerons pas, Messieurs, les " inégalités et les contrastes sociaux, mais " il est un moyen de les tempérer, de les " rendre supportables, de les faire concourir " à l'unité et à la beauté de l'ordre voulu " par la Providence ; ce moyen c'est la cir- " culation du respect dans la vie sociale." Le respect n'est pas suffisant. Il est vrai qu'une fois le principe de l'autorité admis, popularisé il en résulte tant de l^ien-étre, tant de confort, qu'on arrive à développer l'attachement ; mais le dogme catholique DE MONSABIU'-: veut aller plus loin, et c'est ce([iii fait dire à l'orateur de Notre-Dame : •' La charité ne *' orerme, ne s'épanouit et ne fructifie ([ue '' dans le ra)onnement des vérités sublimes " (|ue nous révèle le do!^;me catholi(|ue. 11 " nous en montre le type éternel dans la vie " divine elle-même, le législateur et le mo- " dèle dans notre propre nature, la source '* et le but surnaturel, et nous provoque '* ainsi à des (euvres d'amour et de dévoue- " ment qui comblent les vides, suppriment " les distances, atténuent la rudesse des " contrastes de la vie commune etfontcon- " courir toutes les saintes énergies au rap- " prochement, à la fusion intime et cordiale ** de tous les membres du corps social." Mais, me direz-vous, est-ce bien possible? Oui, quand on le veut ; mais quand on ne cherche c[u'à monter aux dépens des autres, (juand on veut s'arroger le droit de tout saper, de tout détruire^ quand on entend J8 LES AMEN ^Û^ 1 l'ordre social de telle faç.in que personne ne soit maître de son champ, ni de son avoir, fruit de ses sueurs, ni même de sa personne, tout cela au nom de la liberté, de la frater- nité, au l'eu d'avoir le respect, l'amour, — on sème partout les haines, les désolations et la révolte. *' Aussi, dit Monsabré, n'est-ce '' pas sur la nature (ju'il faut compter pour " nous aimer les uns les autres, comme le " Chr'st nous a aimés, mais sur la grâce '' dont le dog-nie catholique nous montre les " divines sources." VI |;l? Nous venons de voir successivement, Messieurs, que le grand orateur de Notre- ii :, Dame a mis le dogme catholique en rapport 1'' avec les besoins de l'intelligence, avec les aspirations du sens religieux qu'il satisfait, 1 1 avec le sens esthétique qu'il rehausse, avec DE MONSABIJÉ 59 la vie morale qu'il dirige aussi haut qu'elle peut monter, avec la vie sociale dont il as- sure le bonheur eL la paix par le respect et l'amour. Il ne restait plus qu'à ouvrir les pages de l'histoire et à constater (|uel rôle ce fameux dogme catholique a réelle- ment joué afin d'obtenir un dernier acquies- cement, \aiuen de l'approbation des siècles, du fait accompli. Ce sujet a recueilli les derniers accents de l'illustre conférencier. *• Dans cette lumière vivante, dit-il, que '• projette notre divine doctrine sur les '* temps anciens et nouveaux, parcourons *' rapidement l'histoire de l'humanité et de- *• mandons- lui son aillent Plus l'esprit cherche à sonder la profon- deur des temps reculés, plus il s'égare quand il ne suit pas les données du dogme catho- lique. On a cherché de toutes manières à amener un conflit entre sa doctrine et les découvertes de la science moderne ; mais 00 LKs ami-:n ' il'-' I ■ I" si l'on veut être de bonne foi, on verra (ju'on n'a pas réussi. — *' Nous avons con- trôlé, dit le savant abbé Vig-ouroux, au moyen des monuments authentiques des bords de l'Euphrate et du Tio^re, ainsi que des monuments des bords du Nil, tous les détails (|ue nous lisons dans nos saints Livres, même les plus minutieux, ceux qui ne sont donnés qu'en passant sous forme d'allusion, et pour ainsi dire, sans que l'au- teur lui-même s'en soit aperçu, et toutes les fois que le contrôle a été possible, l'assy- riologie et l'égyptologie nous ont répondu : La Bible a dit la vérité. Notre-Seio^neur Jésus- Christ nous l'avait promis : Si les hommes se taisent, les pierres prendront une voix et réclameront en faveur de la vé- rité. Ou'il en soit béni à jamais." L'orateur de Notre-Dame part du prin- cipe que toute l'histoire humaine est dans l'ineffable mystère de l'incarnation, s'ap- DE MOxNSABl{K 01 puyant sur les paroles de St-Paul : ** le Verbe, image du Dieu invisible est, selon les desseins éternels, le premier né de toute créature parce qu'en son incarnation la sa- gesse divine voit l'unité de tous. A ce titre, il lui appartient d'être le fondement même de l'univers. Dans le ciel et sur la terre, les choses visibles et invisibles, les principautés et les puissances, tout est établi sur lui. Tout est créé par lui, tout s'appuie, tout repose sur lui, tout se tient en lui, parce qu'il a plu à Dieu de lui donner toute plénitude." Voilà donc Jésus-Christ sur qui tout re- pose, vers qui tout converge, et dont la venue promise et attendue éclaire tous les siècles, d'une lumière qu'aucune impiété n"a jamais pu amoindrir. " Cette humanité, dit Monsabré, c'est Jésus-Christ qui l'a créée, non pas rudimen- taire et sauvage, mais belle, innocente, pure, heureuse, à l'imaQ^e et à la ressemblance de (1=2 LKS AMEN '! ' 'i: son auteur, ouverte par l'intelligence aux illuminations de la sagesse divine, maîtresse par sa volonté de tous les appétits, remplie de o-i'î'tce. faisant admirer dans la viro:inale beauté de son corps, le double épanouisse- ment de la vie divine et d'une nature par- faite, investie d'un souverain empire sur les créatures qui subissent le charme d( sa pré- sence, de son regard, de sa voix, dédoublée en quelque sorte dans un couple ravissant, dont le plus pur et le plus parfait des amours fait l'union d'où doivent sortir d'in- nombrables générations." Ici, l'orateur prévient l'objection qui peut s'élever de l'auditoire au sujet de l'unité de race. — *' Comment pouvez vous affirmer que cette multitude de peuples, différents de couleur, de physionomie, de langage, puisse descendre de ce même couple adamique que proclame votre dogme ? " im iMONSAUut: o:} Quelle étran^^'e chose, soit dit en passant, que cet acharnement de certains fameux esprits de vouloir ternir dans sa source, la beauté, la noblesse de notre provenance, et n'offrir en échange que des suppositions ridicules et des systèmes dégradants ! " Cherchez mieux, dit Monsabré, et en cher- chant mieux on découvre que, dans la di- versité des types, la nature humaine est partout semblable à elle-même quant à sa conformation générale, ses aptitudes et ses tendances ; que les ressemblances fonda- mentales, qui indiquent si clairement une seule et même nature dans l'humanité, doi- vent peser d'un plus grand poids sur nos jugements, que des différences superficielles, infiniment plus nombreuses et plus accusées chez d'autres espèces animales ; que la phy- sionomie et la coloration sont des phéno- mènes locaux purement accidentels, et à peu près insignifiants pour la détermination II! il 64 LES AMEN de l'espèce. . En cherchant mieux on s'ex- plique cet ensemble de traditions qui fait remonter notre origine à un couple unique et l'on se canvainc que le dogme catholique projette sur les commencements de l'his- toire humaine un rayon de vérité." Suivent les descriptions de la chute de l'homme et des malheureuses conséquences qui en résultèrent ; c'est alors que la pro- messe du divin libérateur est faite. " Dans " le rayon révélateur, dit Monsabré, où le " dogme catholique nous montre la chute de " l'homme, il nous montre le Rédempteur ; " c'est à ce titre que le Verbe de Dieu entre '" dans notre histoire." Ici, l'orateur pose cette objection : mais puisque la promesse du Rédempteur était déjà faite et assurée, pourquoi, attendre si longtemps après son accomplissement ? Le dogme catholique nous apprend qu'il fallait cette épreuve à notre orgueil, afin de DK MONSAIÎHK Gô prouver de la façon la plus évidente l'impos- sibilité où était le monde de se refaire par lui-même ; et,puis-je ajouter, malgré ce long- essai de forces humaines, en dépit de ces barbaries entassées les unes sur les autres, de ces cataclysmes, avertissements san- glants et prophétiques, même après que les temps de la régénération ont sonné leur heure de miséricorde, n'y en a-t-il pas en- core un grand nombre qui ont des yeux et qui ne voient pas, des oreilles et qui n'en- tendent pas ? Témoin, ce petit peuple choisi par Dieu, élevé, nourri plus spéciale- ment par lui, et qui, suivant l'admirable ex- pression de Monsabré — " est le mystérieux courant dans lequel les desseins de la Pro- vidence s'acheminent dans leur accomplis- sement." C'est ce peuple qui a été le dé- positaire de ses promesses, c'est lui qui nous a transmis les saintes Lettres. On y lisait clairement le temps, le lieu, le mode de la 1 Oi; LKS AMKN naissance du Rédempteur, et cependant les Juifs affecient encore d'attendre, -et com- bien, Messieurs, vont encore plus loin — celui qu'on vous a promis, disent-ils, n'est qu'un mythe ; vous êtes illusionnés '. . . — " Rassurez-vous, dit Monsabré, nous avons une longue suite d'oracles qui s'accu- mulent et se soudent l'un à l'autre, et dont le plus jeune précède de quatre cents ans le libérateui- annoncé. Près des oracles marchent les figures. Bref, tout dans la vie d'Israël parle de l'avenir, figure l'avenir, et dessine l'admirable plan de Dieu résu- mant rhistoire humaine dans son Verbe incarné." Les prédictions ont été faites, Messieurs, elles ont été conservées, les figures sont venues tour à tour prévenir à leur manière l'accomplissement du plan divin, et l'on peut dire que les excès, les crimes et les dé- bauches des grands comme des petits, ont DE MONSABKE G7 fait voir le monde comme un vaste océan d'iniquité sur lequel le vrai Maître devait apparaître pour apaiser la tempête, rame- ner le calme et indiquer le port du salut. C'est le fait providentiel des temps nou- veaux ; et ici., ce n'est plus l'âge lointain, mais l'agglomération de tant de preuves, de tant de merveilles, le déplacement de tant de saintes énergies que l'histoire tombe à genoux, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, et proclame son acquiescement. ^Inicn ! Oui, c'est bien fait ! Je ne vous retiendrai pas, Messieurs, pour passer d.i dogme catholique en dépit des hommes et des choses ; — une seule parole me suffit : --- le dogme catholique existe, donc il est divin. " Il y a, dit l'ora- teur de Notre-Dame, aujourd'hui un monde chrétien où le progrès moral s'élève à cette perfection transcendante que nous avons appelée la sainteté, fleur réservée des terres (IS LE^ AMEN fécondes où germent et se dcvelopi^ent les nobles et pieuses habitudes de l'âme humaine poussées par une culture inten- sive jusqu'à l'héroïsme." L'existence de ce fait, Messieurs, siiflît pour prouver qu'il a son origine dans li;s cieux. Oui, notre sainte religion est un mot (pii opère ce qu'il dit. C'est un lien qui part de la main toute puissante de Dieu. Il est jeté sur la terre, il attire, il attache, il perpétue sa force, et l'impiété moderne cherche en vain un glaive pour le rompre. Le fer n'est pas assez dur, l'acier n'est pas assez trempé, et les mains humaines qui s'en servent pour enlacer les ceda/ order. General order refers to the séquences and uni- formitics observable throughout the whole realm of nature. Spécial order relates to particular cases where things seem to bc adapted for each other. Though this distinction was hintcd at by the older natural theologians, yet McCosh was really the first in modem times who clearly pointed it out. In his work entitled "The Typi- cal Forms and Spécial Ends in Création," he distinguishcs vcry distinctly betwecn what is gênerai and what is spécial in the order of the universe. The "typical form" is gênerai order, and the "spécial end" is spécial order. The mathematical relations in a crystal, and the gênerai motions of the heavenly bodies are exam- ples of gênerai order. The adaptation of the eye to the purpose of vision, and the relation of the lungs in animais to the atmosphère are cases of spécial order. Flint lays but little stress on this dis- tinction, and scarcely does more than recogni.e that thcre is ground for it. It would, perhaps, hâve been bettcv if Flint had fol- lovved McCosh more closely on this point. Flint's discussion is certainly more confused than it would hâve been had he paid more attention to the différence betwcen the facts of gênerai and of spé- cial order. Moreover, he loses much argumentative power in pres- enting the proof in the form he does. Diman not only marks out this distinction very fairly, but he also carries it with him in his exposition. Hicks also emphasises the différence between gênerai and spécial order, though his decidedly polemical attitude towards the ordinary teleologîcal proofs renders his discussion less usefui than Diman's. It necd only bc added that we regard this distinc- ■ 80 THE METHODS OF THEISM, tlon to be a real and important one. General order îs the proper field of the eutaxio-theistic method ; spécial order belongs to the teleo-theistic proof, and vvill corne before us in next chapter. At présent, therefore, we hâve to deal with the facts of order in the universe in gênerai. In setting forth the scope of this method further another important question arises. This question has référence to the relation of the principle of causality to the inference of the eutaxio- theistic method. In regard to this question there is much diversity of opinion. Does the validity of the inference of this method dépend on the principle of causality? Is its conclusion sound apart from any partie"." r theory of causation? It was hînted in the discussion of the a^tio-theistic method that the principle of causality, on which the inference of that method is founded, was also indirectly related to ail the other methods of theistic proof. This point now requires further explanation. Hume and Reid, who differ on almost every other question in philosophy, agrée in resting the argument from order on the principle of causation. Though they do not agrée as to the nature of the causal relation in gênerai, yet they regard the argument from order as merely a form of the causal proof McCosh and many other writers on natural thcology hold the same opinion. This is also substantially Flint's position, though it is to be observed that he uses the word cause in a very wide sensé. Kant's criticism of the cosmological argument assumes that the validity of the inference from the facts of order involvcs the principle of causality. It is of no small moment, there- fore, to secure a well balanccd position on this question, for it may be that holding such a position will enable us to turn the edge of Kant's destructive criticism. To clear up the way hère will be of service not only to the method under discussion, but also for the teleo-theistic method. It will enable us to undcrstand the relation of the argument from order, and of the design argument as well, to the principle of caus- THE EUTAXIO-THEISTIC METHOD. 8l Mty, Is the relation the same as in the case of the causal argument proper ? We are inclined to the view that it is différent Then how is the eutaxio-theistic proof related to causation? Using causation in the sensé of efficient cause, it is only the aetio-theistic method that dépends absolutely upon it for the validity of its inference. If there be no efficient cause, there can be no argument for a first cause. Neither the eutaxio-theistic nor the teleo-theistic proofs dépend absolutely upon the principle of causality. The dependence is only indirect, and ail that we require to maintain is merely the reality of invariable séquence, in order to vindicate the inference of the argument from order. Invariable séquence will not, however, serve for the basis of the aetio-theistic inference. In the case of the causal argument proper, it is the nature of the con- nection betvveen cause and effect, as involving efficiency, that is prominent. In regard to the argument from order, it is merely the invariableness of the connection that is needed to justify the infer- ence. Hence, objections based on a déniai of efficient causation do not necessarily invalidate the arguments from order, or from design. Thus the criticisms made by Kant, and by Mill, cannot be so effec- tive as is supposed. We do not forget, however, that, having estab- lished the reality of efficient cause in the chapter on the causal argument, it will place the discussion of this chapter on even more secure ground to carry with us that idea of cause. We conclude, thcrefore, that the inference of the argument from order is only indircctly related to the principle of causality, and that the eutaxio- theistic method is valid if merely invariable séquence or gênerai order is admitted. In unfolding this method we cannot at any length outline the facts of order with which it deals. To give a mère sketch would be to survey ail the sciences, and transcribe many a page from many a trcatise on natural thcology. As we look at nature we observe, amid ail hcr changes, that there is order, systcm, every- vvhcre. Scientific rescarch is only cxpanding the range of our -0 B2 THE METHODS OF THEISM. vision in the field of order. We note a few typical instances of gênerai order. The lavv of gravitation in relation to the regular movements of the heavcnly bodies, ail that is implied in Newton's lavvs of motion, the facts connected with chemical affinity as thèse may be expressed in the terms of mathematics, the wonderful geo- metrical relations found in crystalline substances, the phenomena of light as illustrated in the colors of the rainbow, the mysteries of Sound as revealed in the oratorio, the regular return of day and night and the constant récurrence of the seasons, the orderly suc- cessions of plants aftertheir kind and of animais according to their species, the varions types which run ail through both the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and the uniformities observable in the mental opérations of man, are types of ten thousand times ton thousand instances of order which might be mentioned in setting forth this method of Theism. This wonderful order has been the thème of poet and philosopher, of naturalist and theologian in ail âges ; and never before has the vision reached so far, or the ob- «erving eye peered so decply into this remarkable realm as at the présent day. In making our survey of the field of order vve may notice atwo- fold feature running through it. There are unities and there are laws in the phenomena of order. Each of thèse supplies a distinct form of this argument. The former may be termed the (y/^-thcistic phase of the method under considération, and the latter the nonio- theistic. A sentence or two will mark out the subjcct matter of each. Typo-theism includes the facts învolved in the gênerai types under which many facts having certain resemblances may be unified. The facts brought out in the science of comparative anat- omy, and those unities in the animal and vegetable world which render the classification of the varions species possible, are exara- ples of this phase of order. The question hère is, whcnce came thèse unities? How are thèse types to be accounted for? THE EUTAxIO-TIIEIlTIC METHOD. 83 Nomo-thcism will include ail the phenomena ôf order denotcd by the so-callcd lavvs of nature. We cannot enter into a full dis- cussion as to vvhat thèse natural laws, of which so many accounts hâve been given, really are. They are not to be regarded as hav- ing any measure of efficiency in themselves, nor as being entities of any kind. They are merely expressions of certain séquences or uniformities in nature. They do not constitute the facts of order, nor do they control them. They are simply convcnient methods of dcscribing what we actually observe in the univcrse. The laws of gravitation, of motion, of chemical combination, of crystalization, of the seasons, and so on, do not produce the facts with which they are severally concerned, but they simply dcscribe certain featurcs in thèse facts. The problem hère is, whence came rhese laws ? How are we to account for thèse uniformities? The facts of order being admitted, the question next is : What is the proper explanatîon of this order? How comes it to be and to continue? There are at least thrce alternatives hère. Tke first is that of chance and fate. The second is based on a certain dynamical con^^otion in référence to the constitution of matter which has heer ^Iven by modem science. The third alternative is that order implies intelligence, and that we are justified in infer- ring mind from the facts of order. ^ The first of thèse alternatives nced not be very seriously con- sidered. As presented in either ancient or modem times it is at best but a very unlikely hypothesis. Whether we take the doctrine of the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or the theory of the necessary cndless séries as proposed explanations of order, we find the de- mands of reason far from satisfied. It is worthy of remark tha± modem scientific rcsearch has completely explodcd the doctrines of Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius, in regard to the way in which the universe, with ail its facts of order, came into existence. In regard to chance and fate, it is to be carefully observcd that they cannot really account for anything. They are not agents but 84 THE METHODS OF TIIEISM. mcre process. A process can neither cause nor explaîn îtself. Chance and fate are at most merely words uscd to dc-cribe the particular modes in which certain evcnts are supposed to occur. If we regard them as agents, then we are logically led on to posit intelligence. Thèse hypothèses are snpposed to hâve dispcnsed vvith intelligence, yet thcy really involve an agency which is nothing apart from intelligence. In the case of chance we hâve intelligence working in an arbitrary manner, in that of fate intelligence acts necessarily. We rejcct this alternative as absurd and contra- dictory. The second alternative brings before us some difficult questions. Thèse questions are concerned with certain modem dynamical théories in regard to the constitution and potency of matter. Thèse théories are presented in various ways. Matter and force are assumed. The former in some state is held to be eternal, the latter amid ail its modifications is persistent. Physicus and Spencer may be taken as typical advocates of this alternative. The reason- ing on this point is so profound that it is not possible to set it forth clcarly in the space at our command. A purely mechanical theory of the universe is not necessarily atheistic, but the dynamical theory may give us merely an anima inundi, or land us in a mate- rialistic pantheism. In the mechanical theory, so long as mind is not reduced to matter, but allowed its own independent existence, the theistic inference from the facts of order is possible. The dynamical theory, while in many respects it is a grander conception of the universe, is at the same time exceedingly dangerous to the argument from order. If it be assumed that matter possesses or is endowed with the germs of ail that appears in the universe, then life and mind, order and adaptation, are to be explained as the natural outcome of matter. When Physicus seeks to show that mind has its origin in matter he really destroys the theistic argu- ment, for if the human mind be denicd the rcality of the divine raind cannot be defended. The materialistic monism of Spencer THE EUTAXIO-THEISTIC METHOD. 85 virtually renders the proof of the divine existence impossible ; and it at the same timc makes the existence of God usclcss. The question still recurs, hovvever, in ail forms of the dynamical theory of matter, whence came this force which is persistent and hovv did matter corne to be, and to be crowned with the promise and potency of ail things. Spencer excludes God by the very assump- tions of his theory, and yet he is compclled to leave unexplaincd certr-'n things of which human reason urgently demands a solution, other than that which agnosticism supplies. Admitting the truth of the dynamical theory as a well attcsted scientific hypothesis, we may still ask for an explanation of the orderly laws or séquences observable in the facts of order, which this theory or hypothesis exhibits. This alternative is also rejected as defective. We adopt the third alternative, and maintain that the propcr inference from the facts of order in the universe is that thcre is intelligence or mind related to the vvorld of order. We see marks of order on every hand, and posit mind as the proper explanation of it. This is the kernel of the argument of this method. That order implies intelligence, we take to be a well grounded induction from the facts of order. The analogy with things under the con- trol of man comes in to illustratc the inference, though the reason- ing is not simply analogical in its nature. Having refuted the other two possible alternatives, it is only necessary to state the form of the eutaxio-theistic method in the bricfest way. It is as follows : Order implies intelligence or mind ; the universe pos- sesses marks of order ; thercTore the universe implies intelli- gence or mind. We infer the reality of mind holding a certain relation to the universe from the phenomcna of order manifest in the universe. We do not infer an infinité mind or intelligence, but only such an intelligence as the facts of order demand in order to satisfy human reason. We do not prétend to prove a personal God as the resuit of this method, but we simply assert the reality of mind as a proper inference from the facts which form the basis 86 THE METHODS OF TIIEISM. of this infcrence. Those objections which condemn this mcthod bccause it docs not prove an infinité personal God hâve thcrcfore no place. We cannot blâme the method for not doing what it ncithcr promises nor undertakos. This method brings us to an important stage in the vindication of our belief in the existence of God, wherein we find ourselves justified in inferring intelligence as the explanation of the order observed in the universe. The value of this conclusion is very great at the présent day, when such efforts are made to banish intelligence or mind from the universe, as we find made by some of the advocates of the positive philosophy. The facts of order are universally admitted, for no one thinks that the universe is a chaos. The question is whether the order can be accounted for without intelligence. If we can justify the postulate of intelligence, as this method enables us to do, then we can pass from the material to the spiritual, from the non-mental to mind. This is an important gain in favor of Theism. CHAPTER V. THE TELEO-THEISTIC METHOD. t. This method bids us enter the wide domain of what has gêner- ally been regarded as the sphère of natural theology proper. It invites us to consider what is sometimes called the design argu- ment, and sometimes the argument from final cause. It is, perhaps, the most vénérable of ail the proofs of the divine existence. It has ;j certainly been the most fully illustrated by a great host of writers jj in ail âges. It is the the only argument which is formally stated I; in the Scriptures, and its influence on the minds of ordinary men \ has been greater than that of any of the other theistic proofs. Even Kant, while whettinghis sword against it, admits that it is an argument not altogether to be despised. This method is at least as old as Socrates, though some writers are inclined to regard Anaxago- ras as its father. Plato in the Timaeus very clearly unfolded it, and \ Aristotle set it forth as distinctlyas Paley. In the middle âges we find Sebonde presenting it when most of the Schoolmen were busy with ? onto-theism. In modem times, after the manner of Niewentyt and | Paley, we hâve a host of writers heaping up illustrations from ail | sources in support of the inference of this method. For a time it \ was almost the only proof that theologians relied on in support of \ Theism. A host of critics hâve also arisen against the design argument and it has been subjected to severe scrutiny. The resuit of this criticism, when not irrational or illogical, has been good ; for (87) ; &B THE METIIODS OF THEISM. it must be admitted that many writers on natural theology a hun» drcd years ago vvere more éloquent than logical. They sought to prove an infinité personal God at a single Icap, instead of being content to move on step by step in thc Une of the various thcistic proofs to the desired conclusion. Criticism bas also helped to confine this argument to its proper sphère, and its proof has bcen made ail the more effective in that sphère during récent years. We shall divide our discussion of it into two sections. In the first we shall indicate the scope of the argument, and in the second we shall considcr objections to it. Since the most vigorous attacks made upon Theism at the présent day are directed against the tcleo-thcistic mcthod, thèse attacks demand carcful considération. Section I. THE SCOPE OF THE TELEO-THEISTIC METHOD. This method is popularly known as the design argument, but the term design sec; . ; to be open to thc objection that it assumes the main thing to be provcd. The reality of design or intention as implying intelligence is the matter to be proved. To assume design at the outset is really to bcg the question. The fact of design must first be establishcd ; then from that fact we may make the theistic infcrence. It must, thcrefore, be shown that there are those facts in nature which indicate the existence of an intelligence which adapts means to secure forsecn ends. The term final cause is also used to designate this method. Janet makes this term the title of his able and exhaustive treatise on this argument. Final cause is to be carefully distinguished from efficient cause, which is the principle of the ?etio-theistic method. Efficient cause points to that which brings anything about. Final cause dénotes the pur- pose for which anything exists. According to this vicw there is THE TELEO-TIIEISTIC METHOD, observed In nature certain adaptations of means to ends. There Î4 vyhat looks Hke a plan made beforehand, and then nature seems to be working up to that plan. An idéal future is presented, and then means corne into opération to realize this idéal future. AU this, it is maintained, justifies the inference that intelligence stands related in some vvay to thèse facts of foreseen plan or idéal future. In regard to the précise logical form of this method an impor- tant question arises. Is it entirely a-posteriori, or is there also an a-priori élément in it ? Is it merely inductive in its form, or does its inference rest on an intuitive basis? Is the principle of design an intuition, or is it a generalization from expérience? Are final and efficient cause the same in their nature ? Hère opinions dififer widely. Reid, Porter and others hold that final cause is intuitive. Mill, Janet and many others maintain that it is inductive. The expositior given in last chapter, regarding the relation of the eutaxio-thcistic and teleo-theistic methods to the principle of caus- ality, leads to the conclusion that final cause is not an intuitive principle, and that the inference of the teleo-theistic method is in- ductive in its form. Finality is a law of nature rather than a prin- ciple of reason. We do not think it into nature as a category, but •^zfind it in nature as a fact. It should be carefully observed that the inductive process in this method has for its spécial function the establishment of the premises of the argiment. When the pre- mises are confirmed, then a simple deductive process leads to the theistic conclusion. In this conclusion we only analytically unfold what is already contained in the premises. Hence, the vindication of the premises by valid induction is the real task for this method. Further, in regard to the logical form of the proof, we need to undcrstand whether the proof is of the nature of mère analogy, Analogy is the resemblance of relations between différent things. In the theistic controversy the method now under discussion has often been regarded as merely analogical in its nature. The force of the proof has been made to turn on the resemblance bctwccn OO ■ THE METHODS OF THEISM. marks of design perceivcd in works of human skill and similar marks observcd in nature. It is in this connection that the weak- ness of Palcy's argument appears. Perhaps Janet in the first part of his masterly treatise tends a little in the same direction. Kant evidently had the clément of analogy prominent when he penned his claborate criticism. While we admit that analogy aids us in illustrating this method, yet we do not think that analogy is the main principle of its infcrence. Those who présent this argument in the form of analogy compare the industry of nature with that of man. They argue that, since any human mechanism such as a watch is the product of intelligence, so in like manner a natural organism such as the eye must also be the resuit of intelligence. A little reflection will show that we cannot pass logically from human mechanism to nature's mechanism. It will be observed that in reaching intelligence we make precisely the same inference in both cases, only in one case the relation of intelligence to the mechanism is more clearly seen than in the other. From marks of adaptation in the watch we infer that it is the product of intel- ligence, and from similar marks in the eye we infer that it also is the resuit of intelligence. So far as logical validity is concerned, it is as proper to reason from the eye to the watch as from the watch to the eye. We infer intelligence propcrly in both cases, but each inference is logically indcpendent of the other. The mechan- ism of the watch may illustrate^ but it cannot prove, that nature's adaptations imply intelligence. We make thèse remarks not to weaken the force of the teleo-theistic proof, but rather to fortify it against certain objections which are based on the supposition that it is simply analogical in form. We incline strongly to the opinion that the argument now under review is strictly inductive in its principle, and at the same time capable of ample illustration by means of analogy. As inductive, it postulâtes the hypothesis of intelligence as the only adéquate solution of the facts of adaptation observed in n^Jure,^ THE TELEO-TIIEISTIC METHOD. 91 In regard to thc subjcct mattcr of this mcthod, it nccd only be rcmarkcd that this consists in ail thc facts of spécial ordcr alludcd to in last chapter, and thcrc distinguishcd from thc facts o{ gênerai ordcr. VVc hâve now beforc us vvhat McCosh calls "spccial ends," and what othcrs describe as fcaturcs of adaptation, plan, purposc, intention or design. To sketch thèse facts or fcaturcs at Icngth is not our purposc in this essay. Only a fcw typical illustrations inay bc givcn, and for thc rest we must refer to thc ordinary works on natural theology. Thcrc are adaptations in particular organs, as in thc eye and hand of man, in thc wings of birds, in thc trunk of thc clcphant, and in thc vvcbbcd fect of certain watcrfowl. Thcn thcrc are adaptations of certain organs to cach other, as in thc case ofthc hcart and lungs in animais, of thc pollen in maie and fcmalc plants, and of the teeth and digestive organs in carnivorous animais rcspcctively. Thcn, again, thcrc are adaptations of organs to the functions they perform, as is secn in thc case of the fcct for walk- ing, of fins for swimming, and of thc hcart for the circulation of the blood. Thcn, further, vve observe adaptations of thc organîsm to its environment, as in the case of birds to the atmosphère, of fishes to the water, and of the heavy fur of the whitc bear to the polar régions. Thcn, we might mention the adaptation of parts to the whole, and the évident plan and purposc running through the whole rcalm of nature on thc carth and in thc hcavens, as composing part of the subjcct mattcr of this argument. The phcnomena of animal instinct is generally included in the matcrial of this mcthod, but vve think it better to deal with its facts undcr the mcthod of sufficient rcason, as we hâve alrcady donc in dealing with the cosmo-theistic method. We may now state this method in its syllogistic form and in«Ii- cate its précise import. The syllogism is as follows : — Major premise : The adaptation of means to forescen ends or results implics intelligence. Minor: Thc spécial ordcr of nature présents such adaptation, Conclusion : This order of nature implies intel- IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) :<*/ 1.0 i.i l.2o UiKA ||IZ5 ■ 50 l"^" lllll 1^ lÂâ 12.2 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.6 v: î ?> ^v %' o^^ M >?<è:°' % ^^ <^ r^^- .■ 92 THE METHODS OF THEISM. lîgence. If thèse premîses are well grounded the conclusion îs vah'd. In former times the minor premîse was qucstioned, but at the présent day the major is more frequently disputed. At the présent day the assertion made in the minor premîse învolves but little difficulty. It is very generally admitted that nature contains numberless adaptations of means to ends, and marvellous adjustments of parts to parts. This premise simply States the fact that finality exists in nature, but it does not raise the question of the ground or cause of that finality. Only those, perhaps, who hold that nature is the product of the fortuitous concourse of atoms will deny the minor. It is when we turn to the major premise that we face the real difficulties in the teleo-theistic method. Many modem writers who admit the minor deny the major. The real question hère is : How can we pass logically from finality to intelligence, from adaptation to mind ? How are we to go out beyond nature to find an adéquate explanation of the finalf^^y admitted to be in nature? Or, do we nced te go beyond nature at ail for the explanation ? Is the finality not immanent in nature ; or may it notbe merely subjective and regulative of our thinking? It will at once be seen how pro- found the problem raised by the assertion of the major premise really is, and we must be careful not to assume its truth without examination. We can only in the very bricfest way indîcate the path along which the inductive process leads us in establishing the validity of this premise. The problem is to furnish a propcr expla- nation of adaptation and finality. We try différent hypothesis in order to get this explanation. Mère mechanism will not suffice, for it can never provide adjustment, adaptation, finality. Nor, again, can an adéquate explanation be found in vital proccsscs, or instinctive tendencies, for thèse simply work from within, and can- not adjust means to ends from v/ithout. Hence we must rise above mechanism and instinct, above matter and life, to obtain the solution of finality, We must pcsit intCiligence, working con- TIIE TELEO-THEISTIC METHOD. 93 scîously, adaptîng means to ends, and adjustîng parts to parts, as thc proper explanation of finality. The only finality of which \ve hâve any knowledge is that of a purposing mind ; and sincc finah'ty with us imph'es intentionality, we conclude that the infercnce from the finality in nature to intelligence or purposing mind is a strictly valid induction. It only remains to exhibit the content of the conclusion of thîs proof. The conclusion is that nature involves intelligence or pur- posing mind, and we must be careful not to put more into this conclusion thar thc premises warrant. In the first place, it is frankly admitted that this method by itself does not prove the ex- istence of a Creator. Création is one thing, and finality is anothcr ; and it is no objection to the argument from final cause to say that it does not prove a creator, when it does not undcrtake that task. The telco-theistic method simply vindicates the infercnce of an intelligence other than and above nature, as the proper explanation of the facts of spécial order which involve the principle of finality. In the second place, this method does not give us an infinité intel- ligence, or an infinité personal God. The facts are finite, and do not absolutely require an infinité intelligence to explain them. If, then, infinity is not in the premises we must not insert it in the conclusion. The reality of the infinité can be fully vindicated on other grounds and by other modes of reasoning, but it is not in the conclusion of this method. We are not to conclude, however, that this argument has no value even if has to be understood with thèse limitations. By confining the proof to its own proper sphère we relieve it from certain objections, and at the same time we concen- trate the force of its proof. VVithin its own domain it is almost free from well grounded objection, and it possesscs immense argu- mentative value. Theism is safe if the reality of an extra-mundane purposing intelligence is established. This we believe the teleo- theistic method does very effcctively, and it thus supplies one of the jnost satisfactory Unes of reasoning by means of which the reality 54 . TIIE METIIODS OF THEISM. of thc divine existence is established, and the belief in God îs up- hcld and justificd to human reason. Section II. OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED. Thèse objections may be divîded into tvvo classes. In the one class the logical form of the argument is impugned, and in the othcr its snbjcct inatter is questioned. Advocates of the former line of attack maintain that we cannot by a strictly logical process reach thc conclusion which the telco-theistic method seeks to establish. Those vvho call the subjcct matter in question claim that ail the facts of adaptation can be accounted for apart from the hypothe- sis of ail intelligence beyond nature. In regard to the logical objections we need not say very much. Ail objections bascd on the supposition that the proof is merely analogical are warded off when we show that the inference is strictly inductive. Analogy cannot prove ; it only illustrâtes, and answers objections. By induction we can solve problems, and tranform a well-grounded hypothesis into a properly reasoned truth. The objection that the argument from final cause puts the eficct in the place of the cause is refuted when we see the proper logical form of the proof, and understand what is meant by final as distinct from efficient cause. The only logical objection which requires further notice is that pressed by some récent writers, espe- cially by Hicks in his "Critique of the Design Arguments." The position taken is that the teleo-theistic argument cannot be stated without assuming the conclusion it professes to establish. Thcy admit that the eutaxio-theistic argument has logical validit ut assert that the tcleo-thcistic has not. The former does not assume intelligence, but the latter does. The facts of ordcr justify the THE TELEO-THEISTIC METHOD. 95 înference of mînd, but the facts of adaptation assume intelligence. The former is logical, the latter only reaches mind by being illogical. In answer to this objection we remark that if it bc valid it proves too much. If adaptation takes intelligence for granted so also does order. If spécial order assumes mind so also does gênerai order. If the teleo-theistic method is illogical so is the eutaxio-theistic. If Hicks has swept away the one he has dcstroyed the other. But the true view is thatboth are logically valid. The mistake Hicks makes consists in taking the two methods to be generically distinct. He also confounds the inductive and deduc- tive process involved in this method. Déduction starts with prin- cipes which are stated in the premises, and we can never get anything into the conclusion which is not at least tacitly in the premises. Hence, if the fact of intelligence be not in the premises» it can never get into the conclusion, according to the deductive method which merely unfolds analytically the content of the prem- ises. By means of induction, however, we are able to reach a conclusion beyond the facts, and synthetically discover a law or principle. In both the eutaxio-theistic and teleo-theistic methods we proceed inductively in establishing the premises. Thèse prom- ises are really the conclusions of inductive processes. When the premises are thus established a single déduction process enablcs us to reach the final conclusion of this method. Then, since by the inductive method we get intelligence into the premises, so we are justified in putting it into the conclusion. Both the order and design arguments occupy precisely the same logical position, and hold the same indirect relation to the principle of causality. Both are also logically valid. In the one we observe marks of order or plan, in the other we observe marks of adaptation or purpose. In both cases we posit intelligence as the adéquate explanation, and thus the objection vanishes. There are three objections bearing on the subject matter of this method which merit attention. The first is related to the ffi THE METHODS OF THEISM, doctrîne of suhjectivîty^ the second is connected with the theory of immanence^ and the third is involved in the hypothesis of évolution.^ We can dévote only a brief paragraph to each. The objection which springs from the doctrine of subjectivity does not absolutely deny finah'ty. It simply holds that what is called design is a necessary mental condition in relation to certain facts in nature. In other words, finality is a law of mind rather than a law of things. The observer does not find it in nature but he thinks it into nature. We make two remarks in reply. The fîrst is that it is a mistake to draw the line betvveen the real and phénoménal so strictly as the phenomenalism which underlies this objection really does. There are différent kinds of reality and various classes of phenomena. The resuit of the seperation be- tween the phénoménal and the noumenal, which Kant insisted on so much, is either a scepticism which dénies ail knowledge of reality or an agnosticism which claims that our powers do not enable us to know the real, or a positivism which asserts that ail we know is phenomena and their laws. In the second place, if the argument be inductive in its form, finality cannot be merely subjective. By the inductive proccss we observe in natitfe certain marks of pur- pose and adaptation, and thus we begin in the objective sphère. If finality were merely a mental principle then it would hâve the same necessity and universality that causality has. We would then see design in every thing. But as a matter of fact we do not observe finality in everything in nature. We see it in some things but not in others, and their must be an objective ground for this distinction. Finality is in things, we observe it there, and by induction we pos- tulate intelligence as its only proper explanation. The second objection is connected with the theory of imma- nence. This objection admits that finality exists as a fact in nature^ but it asserts that we do not require to go beyond nature itself for the solution of finality. Design in nature is admitted, but cxtra- mundane intelligence is denied. This objection is connected THE TELEO-THEISTIC METHOD. ^f chîefly wîth the name of Hegel. Some who hold thîs theory of immanent finality regard it as connected with absolute reason. This absolute reason may be vicwed as con&cious or unconscious, and and advocates of this objection dififer on this point. The world- soul of the Stoics and the Hegelian doctrine of immanency incline to the view that it is conscious, though in some places Hegel dénies that it is either conscious or free. Schopenhauer who admits a kind of finality maintains that it is unconscious though immanent. Two remarks may be made in refuting this objection. In the first place, the notion of unconscious immanent finality must either deny intelligence altogether or perish in a contradiction. Uncon- scious intelligence is an utter contradiction in terms. In order to give the objection even the appearance of cogency it must admit a measure of intelligence, and a degree of consciousness in the inner activity of nature which this theory says is sufiicient to explain the facts of adaptation. In the second place, the advocates of imma- nent finality admit that design or purpose is a fact in nature. The only question is as to the manner in which this finality is to be explained. Is a mère immanent intelligence conscious or uncon- scious sufiicient, or must we go beyond nature ? Almost everything that the upholders of immanency maintain may be admitted and yet the material of the teleo-theîstic method would remain. This immanent intelligence itself needs an explanation, and thus the theistic hypothesis is necessary, for an explanation which needs explanation can never be final. Hence, we conclude that the theory of finality neither destroys nor supersedes this method. The last objection comes from évolution. This important hypo- thesis calls for careful considération at the hands of both science and theology. Many of its advocates are anti-Christian, and some are avowedly atheistic. On the other hand, some able and thought- ful Christian men are prepared to admit that the main positions of scientific évolution are not inconsistent with Theism. At présent wc hâve to dcal with the bcarincf of évolution on the telco-theistic f)8 THE METIIODS OF THEISM. method. Doss évolution destroy, or enable us to dispense with the theistic inference connectcd with the design argument? In answering this question vve hâve to distinguish between the earlier and cruder forms of évolution, and its later or scientific forms. Wallace and Darwin are types of the former, Comte and Spencer of the latter. The former deal^chiefly with évolution in the biologicai sphère, but the latter seek to embrace ail the sciences under the principles of the evolutionary method. Our space per- mits only one or two critical rcmarks on a vast topic In regard to the Darwinian form of évolution, we observe that while it professes to supersede finality, yet it constantly falls back on the facts of teleology. The Darwinians speak constantly of sélection^ adaptation and fitnesSy terms which dénote the very facts to which finality relates. If we take the law of tendency to vary in ail directions, we are on the ground of the doctrine of chance already considered. If we take the law of natural sélection, by means of which the variation is modified under given conditions, the question at once arises, vvhy docs the variation take one line rather than another ? Only the answer of the teleo-theistic method is sufficient hère. In short, every upward movement in the pro- gress that évolution describes présents problems which demand the teleo-theistic inference. Of course, if évolution in any form essays to explain the origin of things it goes beyond its province, and will assume an atheistic form. The Spencerian évolution is bolder in its claims than the Dar- winian. It claims to be encyclopœdic. It is really a vast effort to build up a purely abstract monism. It is doubtful if Spencer has succeeded as well as Spinoza, who long ago made a similar attempt along other lines. In Spencer's hands the principlr; of évolution becomes a kind of transformism. It assumes atoms and force ; and a not very clearly defined relation of co-ordination between the homogeneous and the heterogeneous is taken as its fundamental principle. Even if we admit that Spencer's System gives a sound THE TELEO-TIIEISTIC METHOD. 99 natural hîstory of the dcvelopmcnt of thc cosmos from îts original condition of stable equilibrium in the homogcncous, the question still ariscs, how does the first step in the movement towards the hctcrogcneous take place? Is it fortuitous? Is it ncccssary ? lîoth thèse vicvvs hâve been disposed of in the prcvious chai)tcr. Thcn, again, does the homogcncous contain within itsclf thc prin- ciple of its ovvn development? If so, vve hâve mcrcly the doctrine of immanence in another form. This principle still rcquircs ex- planation. No explanation short of the hypothcsis of an intelli- gent power will account for the movement of thc homogcncous in any, much less a given direction. And, further, it is to bc obscrvcd that ail along the line of development, évolution gives rathcr thc natural history than the philosophy of the process. In order to défend the tcleo-thcistic method from this objection wc do not re- quire to réfute Spencer's doctrines gcnerally. We need only show that even if truc they do not supersede this method. Evcn if évo- lution bc admitted as a history of nature' s development, that de- velopment itself, in its origin, direction and progress, demands explanation. It is évident that thc séries in thc cosmos can ncithcr originate, direct nor continue itself. The ground of its explanation must lie beyond the séries. »^ «T/rï^ <:" CHAPTER VI. THE ESO-THEISTIC METHOD. Thîs chapter brîngs us again to the much disputed ground of intuition. When discussing, in the first part of this essay, the vari- ous methods of explaining the origin of the idea of God, vve found that the method of intuition properly understood affords the most satisfactory explanation of the genesis of theistic ideas. We novv approach the material there reviewed by a différent path ; and vve shall also proceed to use it for another purpose. In the former part of the essay we found the origin of the idea of the Divine Being in intuition ; in the discussion of this chapter we are invited to examine the nature of that intuition logically, for the purpose of discovering what évidence it affords of the actual existence of God. It will be observed that the question now before us has not référ- ence so much to the psychology of theistic ideas, as to the objec- tive validity of the intuition. Does the Being to whom the intu- ition relates cxtst^ and how can we vindicate the position that thcre îs an objective reality agreeing with the intuition ? In seeking to unfold the answer to thèse questions we require to consider two topics. In the first place, we must carefuUy unfold the content of the intuition ; and in the second place, we are required to indicate the logical significance of that content in vindicating the rational character of the belief in God's existence. It may be best to treat each of thèse in a separate section. (100) THE ESO-THEISTIC METIIOD. lOÎ Section I. THE CONTENT OF THE THEISTIC INTUITION. When discussing the methods of thc origin of the idca of God în the human mind, we found, in the chapter in vvhich intuition was dealt with, that the theistic belief was a simple and ultimatc convic- tion of our nature of which no further analysîs can bc givcn than that it is native to, and inséparable from, our vcry bcing. It is an ineradicable fact, and in its very nature not capable of being reduced to lower terms. This conviction or primitive bclicf is the product, neithcr of évolution, induction nor révélation. On the othcr hand, it must be pre-supposed bcfore theistic prcdicates can be applied to any object, and in order to make reasoiiing about God possible, or a révélation from God intelligible. It was also seen that the instinct of worship was associatcd with this conviction or intuitive belief concerning God. It was further hintcd that the most feasible metaphysical explanation of the ground or cause of this conviction is to be found in regard ing it as virtually God's testimony in the soûl of man to the reality of His existence, and to the direct spiritual relation He sustains to the human mind. A more detailed exposition of what is involved in the position just stated than was given in the previous chapter is necessary at this stage. We do not deem it requisite to enter into a full discus- sion of the a-pHori éléments of cognition in gênerai, nor do we think it necessary to vindicate at length the reality of the intuitive lactors in human knowledge. A few things in this connection, however, require to be emphasized and kept clearly in view, especi- ally in the theistic discussions of the présent day. The spirit of modem science looks with distrust upon the a-priori features of knowledge. Positive philosophy rejects ail entities, and banishes ail essences from its domain. Some writers who profess to be very advanccd in their thinking describe the région of intuition as the 102 THE METIIODS OF TIIEISM. haunt of mystcrics, and as a storchousc of cliiïicultîcs. Othcrs regard intuition as mcrcly a namc for certain subjective feelinf^s or opinions, vvhich havc no inhérent stability, and no objective validity. If thèse claims of modem scientific thought be well grounded, then both our philosophy and our thcology must bc phénoménal in its nature. To justify the gênerai positions of the intuitional thcory is nccessary, in order to provide us with an adéquate psychoiogy, and with the proper rational ground for Thcism and Christianity. VVc thcreforc maintain that the human mind in its original nature and endowment is not mcrely a tabula abrasa. On the con- trary, it posscsses certain native capacitics, and it involves certain fundamental conditions of cognition. Thèse capacities or condi- tions are not of the nature of innate ideas or fully developed prin- ciples of knowlcdgc. They are not cven to be regarded as matured powers or v/ell defined faculties. They are rather simple native powcrs or potcntial capacitics, which antedate ail definite empirical knowlcdge, and condition the modes of its acquisition. In the nature of the case, they cannot be the product of 'jducation, asso- ciation or expérience. They must be presupposed before éduca- tion can begin, before association can come into play, and before expérience can be rcalized. We hâve novv before us the the phil- osophical tournament of the âges. From Confucius and the Greek empiricists down to Comte and modem empiricists, we hâve the same contcst going on. We see phenomenalism with its empirical mcthod on the one side of the arena, and realism with its intuitive method on the other. In this contest we cast our lot with the intuitionalists. It is important to notice how the intuitive élément runs through ail dcpartmcnts of human knowledge. In varied forms it is prés- ent in ail cognition. Some advocates of intuitionalism hâve per- haps made a mistake in Connecting intuition with a spécial faculty, or in confining it to particular éléments of our knowledge. As we look upon it, intuition in some form underlies and conditions ail THE ESO-THEISTIC METHOD. IO3 the modes of cognîtion. This intuitive factor stands related to thc real and and the supersensible, which is manifestcd phcnomcnally through what has by some becn callcd the extcrnal and internai sensés. Thus intuition has a place in sensc-pcrception. In the knowlcdge of material objects about us, which wc hâve by the external sensés, the phénoménal clément is known by thc sensés, but intuition gives us the real or permanent factor in thèse objects. It is hère that the truth and error in Kant's doctrine of scnsuous intuition appears. In self-consciousness, also, in which we hâve a knowlcdge of self and its opérations, intuition is présent. The in- ternai sensé, as it has becn called, manifests, as phcnomcna, the products of the various mental opérations, whilc the real or perma- nent is givcn in thc intuition of self. This phase of intuition cor- responds with what Kant calls thc unity of appcrception, which he places at the root of the catégories. Then we hâve what may be called rational intuition, wherc we rise from phénoménal co-exist- ences and séquences to higher unitics or idcals. This form of intu- ition naturally divides into thrce branches, rclatcd to the îrue, the complète^ and the rigJit^ respectivcly. Thc truc corresponds with thc Platonic idca which is the real in thc phénoménal in this par- ticular sphère. Thc complète is the beautiful or idril connccted with what has oftcn becn callcd the ajsthctic faculty. The right stands rclatcd to the moral faculty or practical reason, which givcs us, not as thc resuit of induction but as the product of intuition, the knowlcdge of the real and abiding distinction betwecn things right and things wrong, in our moral nature and its activitics. Then once more, and rising a step higher in our analysis, wc find the intuitions of our religious nature. Hère we enter the shcre of religion proper, for religion is more than a matter of intellect, of émotion, or of morality. Thc thcistic intuition and the instinct of worship are to be located in what may be tcrmcd our religious nature. As to the reality of the facts of man's religious nature jthçrc can be no doubt. The question now before us has référence. r04 THE METHODS OF THEISM. to the significance of thèse facts. We deal now speclally wîth the :heistic intuition and with the instinct of worship. Has this intu- ition objective validity ? Is there any Being to worship ? Or is the intuition a mère création of reason, and the instinct of worship simply a subjective sentiment? Now, in order to justify the claims of intuition in gênerai, and of the theistic intuition in particular, certain tests are required to distinguish intuition from individual opinion. By what marks are we to know which are the ultimate éléments in our knovvledge? What are the tests of those éléments of cognition which cannot be reduced to lower terms ? Thèse tests hâve been presented in nearly the same way by différent writers. We may mention the three following as sufificient for our présent purpose : Necessity, Universality and Congruity. By necessity it is meant that those éléments in our knowledge which cannot be dispensed with, which are involved in ail our mental processes, wnich assert their présence amid ail the changes of the phénoménal, and which condition the mode in which the phénoménal shall be manifested,are tobe regarded as intuitive. Universality implies that those features in cognition which appear in ail âges, in ail circumstances, and among ail men as fundamental facts in regard to the way in which the human mind acquires its knowledge, are to be lookcd upon as intuitive. By Congruity it is understood that there must be harmony amongst our varions intuitions, and bctween our intuitions and ail the other psychological facts of our nature. Among our intuitions there must be no contradiction, but rather inhérent consistency. They, in their very nature, give unity to expérience, which would otherwise be fragmentary, unrelated and without cohésion. If we apply thèse tests to the theistic intuition and the instinct of wor- ship, we find that the intuitive nature of thèse facts is amply vindi- catcd. When this intuition and instinct first rises in the soûl it may not be fully formed. It may be vague and require many influences to reduce it to definitcncss. It is, however, the sponta- THE ESO-THEISTIC METIIOD. log neous outcome of the soûl, and not the resuit of reflcctioû or expérience. The question now before us has référence to the evidential value of this intuition in relation to the actual existence of God. What is its value as a method of proof ? Section II, THE LOGICAL IMPORT OF THE THEISTIC INTUITION. We now reach one of the mountain passes in the pathway along which we are pursuing the theistic inference. If we can cross the mountains and make good the claims of the évidence of intuition, Theism is sate on rational grounds. But the pathway hère is dangerous. Those who hold the doctrine of the rclativity of ail human knowledge will hcre oppose our advance. Hamilton, with his doctrine of the unconditioned, will invite us to turn aside into the byway of nescience which ends in a wilderness, and he will bid us look by faith up to the heights which, he says, reason cannot climb. The positivist will also introduce himsclf and solemnly assure us that there is no way over the mountains, and that thcre is no use of trying to scale heights which are ever hidden from the sensés in the clouds. Even the panthcist will appear on the scène and with a devout air will inform us that we shall bc sure to losc our way, if we try to cross the mountains. At the outset, therefore, it is of the last importance to undcr- stand aright the logical function of the theistic intuition What spécial purpose does it serve ? It neither forms nor proves its object ; it simply attests the reality of its object. It is neither a mechanic nor a logician ; it is only a witncss. Its function is entirely différent, therefore, from that of the gênerai conception or necessary notion, and also from that of inductive generalization." The conception frames its ovvn object, and necessarily leaves the k6 tue METHODS OF TIIElS>f. question of îts objective validity an open one. The intuition h rather a révélation of an object whose objective validity is attested by tlie very existence of the intuition. In this, too, lies the différ- ence between the onto-theistic inference, and the évidence of the eso-theistic method. Again, the intuition is not an inductive inference or generalization from expérience ; it is rather an axiom or postulate bearing testimony to the prior existence and reality of its object. Thus, again, the method of intuition differs logically from some of those methods already considered, where the induc- tive principle in différent forms is the key to the inference. We will also observe how this view of the logical function of intuition agrées with what was said when we were examining the psycho- logical nature of the theistic intuition. The ground of the intui- tion, it was suggested, may be found in the divine witness in man's soûl to the actual existence of God. It is a kind of inspiration. If, therefore, the intuition authoratively attests the objective validity of its object, then the suggestion formerly made regarding the psychology of the theistic intuition is confirmed. Those who reject the évidence of intuition in regard to Thcism, usually deny that we hâve a knowledge of anything but phénomé- nal séquences and their laws. This déniai, of course, dcstroys the évidence by annihilating the object to which it relates. If this be donc, then the problem of reconciling positive science and religion is solved by blotting out one side of the équation. But God is not phénoménal in the sensé that his essential being is manifested to the sensés. God is supersensible and noumenal. We may trace His footprints in nature, we may see îiis handwriting on the pages of human history, and we may find his doings inscribed in the record of the Bible, yet his real being is veiled in mystery so far as the sensés are concerned. But, in order that God may manifest himself or leave traces that he is, he must actually hâve existence. That such is the true state of the question there can be no reasonable i' ry ', ':'!.- cvi.lcnco cf :v/:\.-:'v) '.? ':.■' '.v:- *■:?.': ':]\:\t cS \'\c sr:v- ; THE ESO-THEISTIC METHOD. 10/ and by means of it the realîty vvhîch îs under or behind phenomena îs attested as actually existing. We do not now raise the question as to the nature of this reality, but simply find the intuition bearing witness to it. Perhaps the best way to vindicate the claims of the thcistic intuition to hâve objective validity, is to dravv évidence of a some- whsLt peculiar kind from the théories of those who reject intuition altogether. It is both interesting and instructive to observe the difîficulties in which those who repudiate intuition find themsclvcs, whcn trying to explain certain things in our knowledge, and in regard to the way in which it is acquired. Comte, for example, after constructing a most elaborate positive System, which is half science and half philosophy, goes on to set up idéal humanity as a kind of deity, and to prescribe, in connection with this deity, a vcry absurd cultus. In doing this Comte confesses the insufficicncy of his System, and gives valuable testimony to the reality of the theis- tic intuition and of the instinct of worship. In like manner Spencer assumes a reverential tone, and speaks almost devoutly of the dark and inscrutable mystery which lies beyond phenomena and their laws. This unknown or unknowable something or some one, whether it be substance, power, or personality, is virtually set up on a throne, and we a're exhorted to bow down before it and worship it as God. Hère again we may compel Spencer to bear unwilling testimony to the reality of the theistic intuition. Harri- son has pretty clearly shown that Spencer is inconsistent ; but we would combat Spencer, not as Harrison does by assuming the position of extrême positivism where even the reality of mystery is denied, but by presenting the theistic intuition with its accom- panying attestation to the reality of its object as the proper solution. * So, again, we would press into service hère the great scientific principle of which so much is made at the présent day, and from which so much more is expected in the near future. This principle is generally termed "the corrélation of forces." According to this I08 THE METHODS OF THEISM. doctrine, ît is held that ail force in the unîvcrse îs one and uniform. It may manifest itself in varions forms, but thèse are ail converti- ble. This force lies at the root of ail the changes going on in the univcrse ; and the mechanical, vital and chemîcal forms of this force are interchangable. Heat, Hght, electricity, gravitation, ncrve energy and will power, are ail the same in Ihcir essence, and along materialistic lines they are mutually convertible. Now, it is to be carefully observcd hère that force in its esscntial nature is ncvcr présent to the sensés. The sensés only pcrceive the phénoménal séquences, while intuition attests that there ij an ever présent potency behind thèse séquences. Even if we grant the truth of the doctrine of corrélation, vvhich we do only within certain narrovv physical limits, the question still remaîns as to the nature of this power or potency. Is it material or spiritual ? In the latcst deliv- erances of scientific thought, the necessity of admitting a spiritual background to phenomena is pressing itself more and more upon the minds of thoughtful men. But whether this force is material or spiritual, it is at least supersensuous, and as such is inconsistent with any System which confines knowledge to phenomena. In relation to this supersensible background intuition has a place and a function. Intuition attests the objective validity of this back- ground, and thus leaves room for Theism. In addition to the foregoing considérations, there are many others which point to the objective and noumenal validity of the theistic intuition, but we can only mention some of them. The feeling of dependence which so generally exists in the human mind testifies to a higher power outside of man's soûl. The doctrine of the world-soul is perhaps another vague effort to give expression to the objective reality of the theistic intuition. The almost uni- versal phe la of religions worship among men of al! races and âges is alsu mil of significance in this connection. But we cannot enlarge on any of thèse lines of confirmation, THE ESO-TIIEISTIC METHOD. I09 Assumîng, therefore, that the theistic intuition has objective validity, and that the intuition is at once a révélation from and a witness to the actual existence of its objcct, it remains to define, as far as we can, what the nature of that object is. We admit that the object vvhich the intuition bears witness to may not be an infinité personal God. Hcnce, we cannot agrée with Schelling and Calderwood, who hold that we hâve given in intuition an immédiate knowledge of the infinité, or absolute, as a Personal God. Nor is the object attested to by the theistic intu- ition a mère matter of faith. Hcnce, we cannot agrée with Jacobi and Hamilton, unless they mean by faith what we mean by intu- ition. Nor, again, is it a product of mère intellcction, so that we are unable to agrée with Fichte and others who take this vicw. The theistic intuition bclongs to our religions nature, as we havc already seen, and its object is what is usually tcrmed the absolute or infinité viewed in relation to the niind of man. In this connec- tion we may state that the terms infinité and absolute are taken to dénote substantially the same thing ; and, hence, we cannot acccpt Hamilton's usage of thèse words. He uses infinité in the sensé of that vvhich can never be complcted, and absolute in the sensé of that vvhich is complète in itself and unrelated. But the infinité should not be contrasted in this way with the absolute. The abso- lute is that vvhich has no necessary dependence on or relation to any other thing ; the infinité is that which cannot be completed by any finite additions, for example, infinité space and time. The infinité is thus the absolute viewed in relation to the finite. If we keep this in mind, it will enable us to avoid many diffî- culties, and it will clear the way for a bctter understanding of the nature of the object which the theistic intuition bcars witness to. We pointed out in a former part of the cssay that it was a mistake which caused much confusion to think of the infinité, or rathcr the absolute, under the category of substance. It should rather be ranked under the category of cause. If we so think of it, we hâve 110 THE METIIODS OF TIIEISM. thc proper vicw of thc objcct of the thcistic intuition. It is not the sum total of ail reality, (ens rcalissimum) nor is it pure bcing, but it is a présence, or a potency, which ever cornes before us in ail our expériences. The absolute viewed as cause or efficiency is that, the reality of which the intuition attests. We cannot say that it is a Personal God, but the natural inference is that that which pos- sesses power or efficiency, and is thus causal in its nature, must be an agent ; and, being an agent, it must be intelligent. In the présence of this power we ever find ourselves, and the theistic intuition enable us to go behind phenomena, with an unquestioncd attestation that there is an absolute reality or potency ever in the act of revealing itself to us. So long as this position is securely held, Theism has nothing to fear either from pantheism or positiv- ism. This potency cannot find its adéquate ground either in that which is purcly matcrîal or in that which is merely phénoménal. It must rest its feet in the temple of thc spiritual. CHAPTER VII. THE ETHICO-THEISTIC METHOD. We now reach one of the most cogent of ail the theistîc proofs. Next to the design argument, the moral argument has received in rec^^t times more elaborate discussion than any of the other proofs of the divine existence. It is almost as readily understood as the de- sign argument by the ordinary mind, and it is less opcn to attack, perhaps, than any of the proofs yet considered. By some writers it is relied on almost exclusively to establish the fact of the existence of God. Some even go so far as to say that the moral faculty is the religious organ of the soûl, that the dictâtes of conscience are the voice of God in man, and that by means of the moral nature man has an immédiate intuition of God as a distinct personality. It need scarcely be remarked hère that Kant, after he had shovvn as he thought and as many others hâve since thought, that ail the ordinary logical proofs were more or less inconclusive and contra- dictory, rested in the moral argument for the theistic inference. In a somewhat circuitous way he finds in the moral law without, and the categorical imperative within, man's moral nature a sure ground for belief in God, freedom and immortality. Hamilton takes nearly the same view, and says that for the belief in immor- tality and the existence of God, we must rest on the ground of man's moral nature. Flint and after him Diman work out this line ( i' pi(i ' ';i ;; wry cp.rcfi!! iir.d cff ctivc i::;-.;-.r.'jr. ïii THE METHODS OF TIIEISM. But it îs to be remembered that the theistic proof îs complex and cumulative. The moral proof is not the only valid line of infer- cnce ; it is merely one of the many lines ail converging tovvard the same conclusion. To stake the valîdity of the proof of the exist- ence of God on the ethico-theistic method alone, as some German writers and others hâve done, is to tell some of the best allies Theism has that they are not needed, and at the same time to flatter the moral argument even more than it deserves. It has its place, and a very important place, along with the other lines of proof. It may not do as much as some of the arguments already considered to establîsh the fact of the divine existence, but it will enable us to clothe the divine Bcing with nobler attributcs than any of the forcgoing methods hâve done. The moral argument, however, must be kept in its proper place. In unfolding the proof hère we find that it naturally divides itsclf into two branches. We hâve one line of proof conncctcd with the fact of duty, which fact involves the notion of right and the scnse of obligation. This line is largely psychological, and may be termed the deonto-theistic brandi of ethico-theism. The other branch of proof stands related to the moral order of the univcrse, and to the notion of the highest good,or siitnnmm bonum. This branch is rather ontological in its nature, and it may be dcsignated the agatho-thcistic phase of ethico-theism. A brief section will be devoted to each of thèse branches of the argument, A third section of this chapter will be devoted to a rcvievv of the Kantian crîticism of the theistic proofs in général, and of his rela- tion to the moral argument in particular. THE ETHICO-THEISTIC METUOD, II j Section I, DEONTO-THEISM. This section has to deal with the moral facolty, and the testî- mony it bears to the existence of God. What is the nature of the facts of conscience, and how far are we justified in making the theistic inference from thèse facts ? Some writers maintain that the validity of the inference does not dépend on any particular theory as to the origin of the moral faculty, and in regard to the nature of moral distinctions. Flint incidentally takes this position, but others assert it much more decidedly than he does. Taking the facts of our moral nature as they are, looking at the notions of rightness and oughtness as we find them, thèse writers say that we are justified in making the theistic inference apart from any theory as to their origin. We admit that this position may be successfully maintained, yet if morality is derivative and not ultimate in its nature, we feel that the argument it supplies for the existence of God is considerably weakened. If, thcrefore, the force of the proof is affected by the view we take of the nature of morality and of the origin of conscience, Theism cannot afford to bc indiffèrent to the form of ethical theory which it adopts. A brief outline of thèse théories may be given, with a view to the adoption of the true one, and for the purpose of bringing into clear relief how this method leads out to the vindication of Theism. In a gênerai way, ail types of ethical theory may be divided into four classes. We look at thèse in order, and estimate their theistic import. i To the first class belongs ail those forms of ethical theory which find the origin of the ideas of rightness and oughtness in some form of external law, restraint or authority. Thus Hobbes présents civil law and the authority of the state as the ground of morality. Bain and others maintain that conscience is merely the type within the :individual of the restraints, parental, civil and social, by which he *8 114 THE METIIODS OF TIIEISM. is surroundcd. Morality thus springs from a kind of fear, and obli- gation, in thc first instance at Icast, is nothing more than a drcad of thc penalty of violated extcrnal law. It is clcar that ail such doctrines eithcr présuppose the notion of right, or place moral dis- tinctions on a purcly arbitrary basis. The idea of right undcrlies that of law, and law can hâve no inhérent and absolutc authority unless it is founded on thc notion of rightness. The rtght and thc ongJit are ethical atoms, and are incapable of further analysis. The thcistic inference may perhaps be propcrly made from this view of morals, yet it is clear that it does not follow neccssarily from it. In the second class we would range ail those théories which make pleasure, self-love, or utility in any form, the basis of morals and the source of the idea of rightness. Hère we hâve Epicurus, Helvetius, Bcntham, Paley, Mill, and many others who, with cer- tain différences in détails, agrée in their gênerai principles. Thèse views, taken together, are generally termed the Utilitarian System. It assumes two gênerai forms. The lower form is purely individ- ualistic or egoistic in its nature. This is the selfish System, where the idea of duty rests on that which conduces to the happiness or utility of the individual. The higher and more modem form of the thcory is what is called universalistic or altruistic hedonism at the présent day. Hère the notion of the général good of mankind is made the ground of morality. That which tends to the good of the greatest number, that which is benevolent rather than selfish, is right and ought to be donc. AU thèse views agrée in denying that the ideas of rightness and oughtness involved in the notion of duty are simple and ultimate. They are derived from self-love, happiness, or utility in some form, and are thus developed. It is évident that utilitarians do not succeed in either reducing the no- tions cf right and ought to lower tcrms, or in showing clearly how facfjs which are first expressed in terms of self-love come to be ex- pressed in tcrms of right or ought. The utilitarian doctrine, even in its most refined form, cannot fuUy explain the fact of obliga- THE ETIIICO-TIIKISTIC METHOD. Il5 tîon. It may postulate it and cmphasîsc îts import, but it cannot cyplain it. The désirable which is merely optional, can ncvcr, on utilitarian principlcs, be transformcd into thedutiful wliich is oblii^- atory ; nor can thc self-intercstedncss from which thc utilitarian starts evcr bc elevatcd by him into the disintcrcstcdncss which he must admit in human conduct, without violating thc fundamcntal principlcs of his thcory. If hc attempts to do so the notion of right will cithcr be ignorcd or assumcd, and thc notion of ought will be Icft unexplaincd by this thcory. The natural tcndcncy of thîs thcory is thereforc anti-thcistic ; and if it be truc, Thcism has at Icast uncertain footing so far as thc moral argument is conccrncd. As forming a third class we may mention thosc vicws of cthics which arc connected with scientific évolution. Tl'csc vicws are mostly quite rccent in thcir origin. Spcnccr's Data of Ethics made the first attempt to covcr the ground of morality by the mcthod of évolution. This book has value, not so much in itself, as on account of the fact that dircctly or indircctly, polcmically or apologctically, it has bcen instrumental in giving us such trcatiscs on ethics as we hâve from Grecn, Siclgwick, Bradlcy, Stcphen and Martineau. Evolutionists must account for ethical facts. They must explain the origin and delivcranccs of conscience by means of the principlcs of their System. They must also provide a basis for moral obligation. Their cxplanations run along hcred- itary and socialistic lines. Those things which tend to cf iiscrve Society are by a kind of natural sélection lifted up above those things which do not, and in the course of time men bcgin to cal! thèse things right and to say that they ought to be donc. Thcn cach successive génération leaves what may be termcd an ethical deposit to which the ncxt génération falls heir, and so by dcgrces the ideaof rightness clearly émerges, and the notion ofoughtncss is clothed with commanding authority. Morality thcn rests in those things which are necssary for the existence and well-being of the social fabric. It seems pretty clear that evolutionists hâve not yet Il6 THE METIIODS OF TIIEISM. succccdcd in prcscnting an adéquate cthical systcm, Thcy hâve givcn an claboratc natural history of thc way in vvhich ethical facts arc dcvelopcd or modified, but thcy hâve not rcduced duty to lowcr tcrms, nor hâve they shown how moral obligation cornes to be absolute in its nature. Evolutionary ethics even if truc may not dcstroy thc thcîstic infcrence, but thc form of that infcrcncc must be modified, if not rcconstructed, in ordcr to mcct thc ncw condi- tions of the problem. In thc fourth class vve place ail those théories whîch maintain that the principles of morality are ultimate, that conscience is an orig- inal faculty, and that thc idcas of rightncss and oughtncss are simple and irrcduciblc in thcir nature. The gênerai Systems holding this view may diffcr in détails, but thcy ail agrce that moral principles are ultimate, and incapable of further analysis. From Socrates down to Hutchcson and intuitionalists gencrally we find advocates of this theory. We bclicve that this isjthe true doctrine ; and what has been alrcady said when discussing the method of intuition prépares us for the acccptance of this theory vvithout much addi- tional exposition. Conscience or the moral faculty we take to be an original or intuitive élément in our nature. The distinction between things right and things vvrong we believe to be ultimate and underived. The authority of conscience, and the control it exercises not only over what we ought not to do, but also over what it commands us to perform is simple and absolute, and can- not be resolved into anything else. This being the nature of conscience and of the notions of rîght- ness and oughtncss, the theistic inference is easy and natural. We cannot stop with a simple statement of the psychological nature of obligation ; we are naturally led to infer an objective ground for this authority. The form of the infcrence hère is nearly the same as in the method of intuition, only the materîal of the inference is différent. The moral nature, with the facts of rightness and ought- nes3 belonging to it, bears testimony to the existence and moral ■ THE ETIIICO-TMEISTIC METIIOD. Il/ attrîbutcfi of God. The postulatc of thc existence of God, and that hc is moral govcrnor, will more fully satisfy ail thc conditions of the problcms of duty than any other. It will givc an objective ground for the idea of right, and for the sensé of obligation, which is in harmony with the psychological nature of thèse facts. Con- science, it may be remarked, does not givc us a direct intuition of God as moral governor, for the direct object of conscience is morality. But the lavv to which conscience requires obédience can- not be the product of my own moral nature. It must come from a lawgiver other than myself. The de jure authority of conscience is an abiding attestation to a source of authority which is above it. If, therefore, man's moral nature does not contain within itself the explanation of ail its facts, the theistic hypothcsis is not only the natural but also the neccssary solution of its problcm. Section II. AGATHO-TIIEISM. This section has to discuss the theistic significance of the notion of the highest good. This good has to be rcgardcd as not only for the individual but also for thc moral order and well-bcingof socicty. Is there a good towards which men may strive, and strive not in vain ? Is there an idéal to which society may look forward, and a good in which it hopes some day to rest? Is there a moral order in the universe, where in the long run, either in this life or in a future State, the right shall triumph and the evil be overpovvered ? Is pessimism or optimism thc true philosophy of human life? In ancient times the question of the nature of thc highest good was largely discussed by moralists. The Platonists, thc Stoics and the Epicurcans, from différent standpoints, gave prominence to this idea in their Systems. Il8 THE METIIODS OF THEISM. The question of the relation of thegood to thc right is confcss- cdly a difficult one, and cannot be fully discussed hère. As the aspiration of man's nature rises up and longs for an idéal désirable good, how far is it to be controllcd by the right? It would be a mistake to subordinatc the right to the good, for this would throw us on the ground of expediency, where the measure of obligation would bc detcrmined by conséquences rather than by the idea of right. In the long run we believe that the good and the right will harmonize. A thing is never right simply becmise it is good and makes us happy, but the right will in the end ever be found to conduce to our highest good in the true sensé of the term. In Society, too, we find that no real good is ever lost. Virtue never dics. Truth is immortal. This is the morning star of an optimism which aspires hopefully towards the realization of the suprême good. The attainment of this idéal is to be secured not so much by striving sclfishly after it, as by the careful performance of right conduct. If this be the case, we would laturallycxpect that there should be harmony bctween the right and the good, between the dutiful and the désirable. We see how it is also that ** we get happiness by doing right, and yet we are not to do right for the sake of happiness." The inference hère seems simple. If there be in man an aspir- ation after an idéal good, and if we find in society a graduai move- ment on towards higher and better things, the conclusion seems natural that ail this points to an all-controlling Being, who is Himself absolute good as well as absolute right. To make good the inference hère we do not require to remove ail difficultics, or explain, for example, the origin of evil, or the existence of pain and suffcring. It is enough if we find that virtue brings its own reward and vice its own punishment as a gênerai rule. Even when right conduct may bring présent pain, yet in the end we find that it élevâtes, ennoblcs and purifies the soûl. The advance of the race towards the goal of the good may be very slow, but it is THE ETHICO-THEISTIC METHOD. lip nevertheless sure. With passing years there îs substantîal pro- gress, and slowly but surely victory is declaring itself for the good. We conclude from ail this that there is sufficient in thèse things to justify the conclusion that there isaBeing who contains in Himself ail the perfections towards which the individual aspires, and to the attainment of which society âge after âge is tending. There is a power which makes for righteousness. With the theistic infcrcnce thus vindicated we may cherish and rejoice in an optimism which is the beacon light of man's destiny. Atheism or agnosticism can only lead us down the dark and cheerless shades of pessimism^ This form of the inference might be expanded and illustratcd at any length, but this very brief statement of must suffice. Section III. THE KANTIAN CRITICISM. The critîcism of the current arguments of the natural theology of his day made by Kant requires spécial attention, both on ac- count of its logical acuteness, and on account of the immense influ- ence it has had upon the estimate put by very many writcrs since Kant's day, on the value of reasoning concerning the existence of God. Some, following Kant, rely almost entirely on the moral argument ; and others, thinking ail argumentation inconclusive, rest on révélation, or on the intuition of an infinité personal God, as the only safe ground to take against atheism. To see how far we should go in the direction Kant has marked out, and so many since him hâve followed, is a very important thing to do at the présent day. Our conviction is that too much vveight has been allowed to Kant's criticism of the ordinary rational proofs of the divine existence, and too much praise has bccn bestowcd upon him !20 . THE METHODa OF THISISM, . for the way in which he présentée! the moral proof. To justify this position will be the object of this brief section. The exposition hère may be conveniently divided into two parts. In the first we shall examine Kant's critique of the theistic proofs, and in the second we shall enquire as to his consistency in retain- ing the moral argument while rejecting the rational proofs. A few paragraphs only can be given to each of thèse points. In the first place, we examine Kant's destructive criticism of the rational proofs of the existence of God. He first classifies thèse proofs under three heads. Thèse are the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological or physico-theological. This classification might be criticised as imperfect, if we wished to be very severe on Kant. But we only remark that his error hère is, that he classifies thèse argurhents as if they were entirely independ- ent of each other, whereas they are supplementary to, and confirm- atory of, each other. The next stage of his criticism takes up thèse arguments in order, and proceeds to show that the ordinary proofs contained therein, if followed out, must land us in logical contradictions or antinomies. We hâve already hinted once or twice at some of his criticisms in our discussion of the onto-theistic proof. He says that the judgment concerning the existence of a necessary Being is ana- ly tical, not synthetical ; and in making the theistic inference, he as- sorts that we cither assume the existence of the object of the neces- sary idea, or identify our tJiougJit of the object with the object. He also dénies that existence is a real predicate, and maintains that the fact that there is in the mind a conception of a necessary Being is no reason for concluding that such a Being actually exists. We ad- mit that Kant's reasoning hère has force against those torms of the onto-theistic proof which argue from the présence of the necessary idca to its objective validity. But we remark, first, that the necessary idca is not a conception, and hcnce not open to the criticism which Kant would make of the onto-theism of Anselm and Descartes. And THE ETHICO-THEISTIC MËTHOD, lit we remark, secondly, that the position aiready takcn in this essay, tliat the postulate of the divine existence is the condition of the trustworthiness of human knovvledge is notaffected by the Kantian criticism. This is the stronghold of onto-theism, which need only surrender when absolute scepticism ascends the throne of human reason. In dealing with the cosmologîcal proof Kant handles it with considérable severity. We pass by, for the présent, the fact that he virtually résolves it into the ontological argument. He main- tains that the principle of causation, which is the ground of the cosmological proof, belongs only to the realm of expérience and to the sphère of the phénoménal. The theistic proof, he says, makes a transcendental use of the category of cause in employing it to prove the existence of God, who is, of course, noumenal. In like manner, in the infinité séries of phénoménal séquences, he says that we cannot get bcyond the séries to a first cause which is non- phenomenal. We make two remarks hère. In the first place, this absolute séparation betvvcen noumena and phenomena is not justi- fiable, so far as the thcory of knowlcdgc is concerned, and it has done harm to the interests both of philosophy and thcology. It must land us in idealism in regard to the contents of cognition, or in agnosticism so far as the existence of the nou menai reality either of mind or matter is concerned. Fichte and Spencer are the logi- cal descendants of Kant. In a true theory of cognition we belicve that the intuitional and empirical éléments so unité ail along the line, that we hâve a knowledge alikc of the noumenal and the phén- oménal in ail our cognitive acts. In the second place, we do not admit that the principle of causation belongs to the empirical sphère alone. The only supposition upon which this might be true, would be that there is no such a thing as efficient cause. Ail that we find in expérience is change or succession, but this is merely phénoménal. We hâve also the conviction of power, potency or c.T.ciency, and this we maintain is the rcal notion of cau^e. It is -.122 . . THE METHODS OF THEISM. given in intuition, it underlies change at every stage of the séries as well as stands at its beginning. Kant can only make good his contention that tiie cosmological proof is invalid, by first bind- ing the strong man of efficiency who dwells in the citadel of the noumenal and then spoiling his house. He treats the teleological argument with a measure of respect, and has perhaps rendered good service in confining it to its legiti- .mate sphère, His criticism of it in tb2 first instance at least, is h'mitative rather than destructive. He shows that it had been used by natural theologians to prove too much. He pointed out that the design inference only justified the positing of a framcr or an arranger of the universe, not an originator of it. God can only be the architect not the the creator of the universe according to this argument. In like manner, the teleo-theistic proof does not war- rant the conclusion that God is an infinité Being. The marks of intelligence in the universe may be many and évident, but they are nevertheless a finite quantity and may require a very great intelli- gence, but do not logically justify the inierence that this intelligence has the attribute of infinity. Most Theists now frankly admit the propriety of both thèse criticisms. At the same time we maintain that the teleological proof has much value. The idea of infinity can be vindicated op other grounds, and the reality of a first cause who is originator or creator can be justified by other methods, and then the degree of intelligence demandcd by the marks of design will most naturally attach itself to this first cause. We must not suppose, however, that because Kant very properly limited the design argument in this way, that we hâve '^o good rational ground for bclicving in an infinité Being who is creator. Another important remark remains to be made in regard to the manner in which Kant proceeds with his criticism. It has been already stated that Kant résolves both the cosmological and teleo- logical arguments into the ontological. He proceeds to do this in a very ingenious way, and endeavors to show that before the THE ETIIICO-THEISTIC METHOt). 125 thc'stic înfcrence proper îs really rcached ail the arguments must enter the domain of onto-theism. Then since the ontological proof is inconclusive both the others are also inconclusive. He, in short, reduces the stronger to the form of the weaker that he may '.he more easily destroy both. The theistic proof, vve need only again remark, is cumulative in its nature, and the validity of the proof does not dépend on the force of any single argument strong or weak, but on the combined scrength of them ail taken togcther. One argument establishes one élément of the proof and another another élément, and vve must not reject ail argumentation simply because any given proof does not establish the whole theistic posi- tion. Observe, further, what happens as Kant reduccs the cosmo- logical and the teleological proofs to the terms of the ontological, in order to reject them ail. The onto-theistic proof is the only one that is a-priori. In the other tvvo arguments there are a-posteriori éléments. When Kant reduces thèse tvvo to the a-priori form he quietly drops out of sight the a-posteriori éléments altogcther, and coolly ignores their logical significance. This considération is of very great importance when taken along with Kant's statement that the design argument is th*^ oldest and thebest of ail the proofs used to establish the fact of the divine existence. We cannot but feel that Kant either fails to show that thèse three arguments are idcntical in principle, or he succeeds only by ignoring the distin- guishing a-posteriori factors in those that he reduces to lower terms. We conclude, therefore, that Kant's criticism of the rational proofs of the existence of God is not nearly so effective as is generally supposed, and that he has by no means shown that ail arguments to prove the divine existence are necessarily inconclusive or self- conîradictory in the sphère of reason. Let us now see whether Kant is logically consistent when he passes to establish the theistic position by means of what has becn called the moral argument. With him the idea of God was mercly regulative of our thinking in the domain of pure reason. In thq 1^4. THE METHODS OF THEISM. sphère of practîcal reason, however, ît is othcrvvise. The moral law is authoritative, and not merely rcgulative. The famous phase, the categorical imperattve, dénotes the scnse of obligation which we feel we are under to do the right. We cannot now enter fully into the merîts and demerîts of the Kantian ethîcs. There seems much to confirm the opinion ex- pressed by Patton and Schurman, that Kant should not bo classcd with the intuitionah'sts proper, and that in applying the categorical imperative to practical conduct he must surrcnder to utilitarianism. In regard to the theistic significance of Kant's doctrine we make three remarks of a critical nature. The first is, that Kant draws the lîne too sharply between pure and practical reason. He should not separate between the intel- lectual and moral faculties so distinctly as he does. If truth be the object of reason and right be the object of conscience, then the theistic inference stands in the same relation to both. If God as absolute right be the postulate of conscience, then God as absolute truth is the postulate of reason, To be consistent, Kant must either allow more significance to reason, or admit less on behalf of conscience in the argument for the existence of God. He cannot barter God away to the sceptic on the ground of pure reason, and Qxpect to hâve him restored with little difficulty in the domain of practical reason. In the second place, practîcal reason, like pure reason, must enter the ficld of expérience before it can hâve its form filled with content. The categorical imperative is as empty as the catégories are prior to expérience. To say, then, that practical reason enables us to reach the noumenal more clearly than the pure reason enables us to reach that région iserroneous. In ordertohave content both pure and practical reason alike must move in the région of expé- rience, where according to Kant ail is phénoménal. In this case conscience brings us no nearer to God than reason, and on Kant's premises neither gives anything more than phenomena. In the THE ETHICO-THEISTtC METIIOD. Î25 one case ît pcrtains to knowledge, in the other to conduct, but in ncither do \vc reach the noumenal. Both forras of the proof rin;htly understood hâve force, but Kant's doctrine is clearly inconsistent with itself. The third remark relates to the précise basis of the moral arg^u- ment and its relation to the other theistic proofs. In criticising the cosmological proof, Kant confines the conception of cause to phenomena, and refuses it any transcendental validity. Nor docs he allow any proper place for the principlc of sufficient rcason. In this case it is difficult to see how he can justify the infcrence of the moral argument. The principles of cause and sufficient reason are at least indircctly related to the moral argument, and if the appli- cation of thèse principles cannot be made beyond expérience, then it is difficult to know how Kant can maintain a rational position in the ethical sphère for the proof of God's existence. He can only do so by falling back on a direct intuition of God, or on merc faith. But we maintain that if this be a valid procédure in the realm of ethics, it is also good in the sphère of reason. The direct object of conscience is moral principles, and the inference we make does not so much give us the fact of the divine existence, as it will ena- ble us to clothe the first cause with certain moral attributes. Rather than stake the rational justification of the belief in the existence of God upon the moral argument alone, as based on the facts of con- science, we would put it in its place along with the other theistic proofs, and rejoicc that while it rests on some of them, they in turn are helpcd by it. ^ï CHAPTER VIII. THE IIISTORICO-TIIEISTIC METIIOD. We now come to tlie last method our plan requires us to dîs- cuss. The ficld of the historico-theistic proof is very wide, and only a fcw hints can be given of thc way in which the theistic argu- ment herc may be framed. There are two centres round which this évidence may be marshallcd. Both are really historical in their nature. Thc one takcs hold of the ail but universal religious sentiment and belicf in the existence of the deity or deities, and seeks its explanation. The other fixes attention on the march of human history, and asks how its facts can be accounted for. In the former case we hâve the familiar argument for God's existence from the consensus gentium, or as it is sometimes called — the proof from the consensus populorum. In the latter case we hâve the question of the philosophy of history raised, both in regard to the individual and in regard to the race. To each of thèse a section may be devoted, though a volume would be required to set forth 2ven the leading facts which come under review hère. In the présent practical âge historical évidence is regarded of the highest value ; and hence, if Theism and Christianity are capa- ble of clcar historical justification on the one hand, and if on the other Theism and Christianity alone furnish the key to understand the phenomena of history aright, we are entitled to lay a good deal of stress on this method of Theism. In both the branches just indicated we find forcible éléments of theistic évidence, (126) THE HISTpRICO-THEISTIC METHOD. IC/ Section L THE CONSENSUS GENTIUM. The universality of the belief in God is now seldom called în question. The cases mentioned by Lubbock can hâve little vveight against such a mass of testimony as cornes to us from ail âges and from every land. Plato says that the belief in the gods is a natural and universal instinct. Aristotle says that ail men hâve an opin- ion or belief regarding the gods. Cicero states the same thing at greater length. Calvin and Grotius give much évidence of the same nature. In modem times we find évidence of importance coming to us from two sources. In the first place, we hâve a vast mass of facts gathered by those who seek to explain the phenom- ena of religion by naturalistic methods, and according to the prin- ciples of scientific évolution. If there is one thing more than another that positivists and evolutionists hâve donc during the présent century, it is to show that the belief in deity, and the prevalence of the sentiment of worship, are found everywhere among men. We may borrow this material from the positivists for our présent purpose, and return them our sincère thanks for the use of the same. In the second place, the study of what is now tcrmed the science of comparative religion has added much addi- tional force to this form of the évidence. The religious Systems of ancient and modem times, of savage and civilized peoples, hâve been carefully studied. The sacred literature of thèse religions has been minutely examined, and their religious rites and elaborate cérémonies hâve been analyzed. From the religions of Egypt, Greece, Rome, India, China, Persia, Scandanavia, with their respec- tive literatures and rites of worship, we hâve a vast mass of material put at our disposai. We gladly use it in the présent argument, for it is easier to make bricks when we hâve the straw gathered for us. Among ruder tribçs of the race we also get facts of a similar kind. 128 ■ • THE METHODS OP THEISMi ' Travcllcrs in uncivilized countries incrdcntally state many întcrest- ing things in this connection. The Indian tribcs of our own conti- nent, the Savage tribcs of Central Africa, and thc inhabitants of tiie South Sca Islands alilce supply us with material out of which to frame an effective inductive proof in favor of the thcistic conclusion. What thcn is thc proper infcrence from thèse facts? Is it cnough to stop with a simple enumeration of the facts, or must we cnquire for thcir thcistic significance ? Those who adopt the prin- cipes of the positive philosophy will say that we hâve finished our task when we hâve discovered and classified ail thèse facts. We hâve no warrant, thcy say, to cnquire for causes, or even to raise a metaphysical question at ail. This of course vvould make religion pure materialism, and God will be either shut out of view alto- gether or he must be a création of our own. This way of cxplain- ing the problom cannot satisfy human rcason, and it is rcjected without any hésitation. It is a mcre natural history of religion, as we hâve secn m another connection, and uttcrly inadéquate as a philosophy of it. A careful examination of the vast array of facts now bcfore us goes to show that thc consensus populoruni has objective validity. It contains not merely a subjective sentiment, but it also involves a bclicf that the dcitics worshipped hâve a real objective existence. This is a very important point, and its significance is sometimcs overlookcd. Man's religions instinct, as shown by the facts bcfore us, is not a mère idca or feeling of the mind, but it rcachcs forth and rests on an object bcyond itsclf. This gives an important hint. It may not prove absolutcly that there are dcitics, but it at least shows that men behcved that such dcitics did exist, and that thcy acted as if thcy were convinccd that thèse dcitics wcre not merely the créatures of thcir own minds. This fact has grcat argumentative value. But we need not enlarge on this mcthod. Its infcrence is a simple induction from thc facts. Thcsc fads z\\\\ for an cwplana- THK IlISTORICO-TIIKISTIC MKTIIOI). 129 tion. The thcistic hypothcsi.s is an ail sufficicnt cxplanation. The supposition that thcrc is a God is sufficicnt to account for the univcrsal bclicf in God, and thc ^encrai observance of rcligious rites atid cérémonies as expressions of thc sentiment or instinct of uorship. No othcr hypothesis will sufficeto cxplain ail thèse facts, and so we rest in thc theistic inference. It may bc addcd that wc cannot suppose that ail the races and tribes hâve been undcr a delusion alon^ the apes in regard to the dictâtes of their religious nature. Is it likely that there vvould be in man those almost uni- vcrsal sentiments wcre Ihere no real existinj^ object corresponding to them ? It can scarccly bc conceived that man vvould possess in thc first instance, and retain during successive af^cs, thc instinct of worship, if there wcre no real deity to bc worshipped. Another remark may be addcd. Thc argument from the consensus gctitiuin gives hiiits of a primitive monotheism. As stated in a former part of thc essay, thc science of comparative religion not only brings out the fact that religions sentiment is univcrsal, but it also shows pretty clearly that the earliest primitive belief wa.s monotheistic rather than polytheistic. The primitive religions belief of India was no doubt monotheistic, and so with that of othcr couiitries. Polytheism secms to hâve been a later dégradation of an early monotheism. Novv, this primitive Theism could not resuit from éducation, nor is it ail likely to hâve been an invention of man himself. Thc natural inference from such a univcral bclicf is that the primitive bclicf was monotheistic. And the reasonable conclusion from such a univcrsal and primitive belief or instinct is, that thc Being to which it testifies, and bcfore whom it bids us bow dovn and worship, has real objective existence. 130 THE METIIODS OF THEISM. Section II. THE INFERENCE FROM HISTORY. The question hcrc relates to the philosophy of history. The matcrial to be considérée! is very extensive and also varied in its nature. We need scarcely vvondcr that the philosophy of history should only be reccntly attcmptcd, and that it should be yct in its infancy. When we think how much a single lifc means, and how much the expérience of one man involvcs, we need not wondcrthat the material gathered from ail history should be so vast as to rcn- der the task of reducing it to its principlcs an exceedingly difficult one. It comprises ail that bears on the wcll-bcing of man, and everything that relates to science, art, lavv, social life, thought and religion among men in ail âges. A complète massing of ail the facts, however, may not be necessary to justify an important thcis- tic inference. Various attempts hâve becn made to unfold a philosophy of history. Comte and the evolutionists explain history in accord- ance with certain socialistic and physiological principles. Ail such attempts are failures. However patiently they may bring the facts into orderly view, they mcrely state the problem in a very partial way, but do not provide any solution for it. Herder and othcrs, among whom Vico and Buckle may be mentioned, seck to give certain explanations of the facts of history, which arc rather social- istic or political than philosophical in thcir nature. They are ail imperfect. Edwards and Bossuct procecd to give the religious cx- planation, with the idea of rédemption underlying it. Their views are doubtless true, but they présuppose the thcistic conception of the universe and of human destiny, vvhcrcas this is the very ques- tion to be settled. Is the true philosophy of human history to be found in Theism? Does Theism solve the problem of human activity and destiny which sociology and philosophy can only TIIE IIISTORICO-TIIEISTIC METIIOD. I3I propouncl ? This wc takc to bc thc rcal statc of the question. Science may state, but Thcism solvcs the problem. Tvvo able attcmpts havc bccn made to unfold a philosophy of history on purcly rational grounds. In thc first place, vve hâve that of Hegel in his Philosophy of History. The two leading ideas vvhich Hegel unfolds are those of Reason and Frecdom. Thefun- damental thought of his systcm is that there is Reason in hunian history. This Reason, it must be remembered, is absolute and really unconscious, and yct it energizes in society, and it is the principle of the development of humanity vvhich unfolds itself in the varicd facts of history. The fact of Frecdom follows from that of Reason. The history of the human race is just its progress ac- cord ing to Reason towards Frecdom. This Frecdom is not so much povver of choicc, as conformity to vvhat is rational, whereby men become spiritually free. Thèse are Hegel's principlcs, but vve cannot follow them out through the various pcriods of the vvorld's history as presented by him. There is an important truth in Hegel's view. It cmphasizes the truth that amidst the myriad facts of human history there is a Reason and a Wiil, there is thought and frecdom. The develop- ment of history is not blind and irrational, nor is it under the iron heel of fatc or neccssity. Hegel, howevcr, does little more than state the problem vvhich really demands to be solved. Whose Keason and Will is this vvhich \ve see in history? Is it man's ovvn ? It cannot be, for man fcels that he is not entirely his own governor, but under a higher povver and control. Is this reason and frecdom merely immanent in thc march of history, and in no sensé transcendent? It may be that this is ail that Hegel meant by his thcory, but vve cannot think that he should hâve rested in this conclusion. This idca or reason vvhich is in history can only be adcquately accountcd for by the hypothesis of a transcendent reason. The principle of sufficient ground demands the theistic postulate. This postulate will fully explain ail the facts, and will I,32.' THE METHODS OF TIIEISM. provide a stable and ample ground for the rcason and will which announce themselves in the history of the vvorld. A second attempt to give a philosophy of history was madc by Schlegel in his Philosophy of Histoy. His conception is loftier than that of Hegel. The materials found in history are the resuit of the conflict. between what is human and what is divine in the activitv of the race. The goal tovvards which history tends is the restoi'cxtion of man to the image of God. In this conception there is an élément of truth, which gives a good starting point for the thcistic inference. Christlieb and Ebrard take substantially the same ground in stating the fonction of Apologetics, and the aim of Christianity. ■ The inference herc is clear. We can connect human history into an organized unity or whole only on the hypothesis that there isa God, whois intelligent, moral and free, and who governs men and nations. The life of man is not made up of a séries of detached and arbitrary détails, but man feels that there is over him a power which he should heed, and a will that he should obey. The sum total of the history of the race is not merely a vast mass of unre- lated and unmeaning facts, but it is the orderly product of the administration of a power which is intelligent, Tree and moral. To give detailed illustration hère is out of the question. We hâve room only to state, in this very brief way, the proper principle by means of which we may interpret history. Many able and popular treatises, after the manner of the " Hand of God in History," sup- ply abundant illustration of the true nature of the events which hâve happened in the march of history. To thèse we must refcr for détails hère. Ail we can do now is to emphasize the truth of the position, that we hâve in the theistic conception of the history of mankind and of the destiny of the human race, a natural and suincient exphmation of ail the facts which come before us in this connection. No other view of history can give such an explanation. Only the Thei'it çan understand and interpret history aright. THE lîîSTORICO-TIIEISTIC METIIOD. 133 The value of this historié mcthod is of a very high ordcr. Even if thc materialist could hold thc ground on the ficld of nature, and explain ail things in the hcavcns and on the carth of a purcly physical charactcr, yct the facts of human history would still call for explanation. And even if the intellectual and moral constitu- tion of man could be cxplained apart from the theistic hypothesis, vve are satisfied that the agnostic does not hold in his hand the key to unlock the secret of thc real mcaning of history. It would bc easy hcre to rise a step highcr than Thcism, and find materials to confirm Christianity as well, in vvhat \ve sec in history. God's spiritual kingdom is the scène of his empire hère belovv. Thc laws of that kingdom are for thc govcrnmcnt of men. Rédemption comes in to restore the harmony that has been broken. Christ is the central figure of history. Thc history of mankind can only be understood in relation to Christ and His kingdom. This being the case, thc infcrcnce which the facts of history justify is of the very highest ordcr. By mcans of it vve stand at the threshold of Christianity, rcady to pass in by the gateway of révélation to the secrets of the spiritual kingdom itself. With the hand upon thc liftcd lacch rcason Icavcs us standing on that threshold. CHAPTER IX. THE CONCLUSION. We have now travelled over the ground whîch the plan of this essay required us to review. We shall not forget that in such an extensive field the discussion could only be cursory in its nature. In a few concluding remarks we may bricfly recapitulate some of the main points which have corne before us, and indicate the gênerai conclusions which have been reoched. The two great questions with which Theism is concerned are the origin of the idca of God in the human mind, and the proof or vindication of the divine existence. Thèse questions, though in their nature closely related, must be kept apart in the course of their discussion. In regard to the former of thèse questions, we found that the origin of theistic ideas lies, primarily, in neither natural évolution, in divine objective révélation, nor in any kind of a reasoning process. It is to be found in intuition properly un- derstood, and it is given to us in its primitive form as the native delivcrance of our very constitution. The ground or cause of the idea in the human mind, it was hinted, may be found in God's own testimony, as an inspiration in the spirit of man, to His own actual existence. The methods of proof which deal with the second great ques- tion of Theism were considered in order. Thèse methods were arranged in eight classes, though some of them are so closely related that they almost run into one anothcr. In several of the (134) THE CONCLUSION. I35 methods we havc nearly the same principle of inference, but it îs applied to différent materials of proof. Thèse proofs vvere merely outlined, and an estimate given of their respective import and value. In regard to vvhat we should expect from thèse so-called proofs, a remark may be made. Some writers hâve set too high a value upon them, and others hâve put too low an estimate on what they may do for us. Let us try to sccure the golden mean hère, and, perhaps, we vvill then be as near the truth as we can get. In the first place, it is not the function of thèse proofs to orig- inate Theism, or to produce the idea of God in the mind. It is admitted that by means of argument and the force of reasons a sceptic may be led to believe in God. But, observe that this can- not mean that he had no idca of God in his mind previous to the effect which argument may hâve had upon him. Even when he denied God, if his déniai was intelligent, he necessarily had some idea of the Being whose existence he was denying. Scepticism does not lie against the rcality of the idea of God, but rather against his actual or objective existence. This goes to show that reasoning or proof does not produce the idea, nor explain its origin in the human mind. In the second place, it is not the function of thèse methods of proof to deinonstrate the existence of God with strict logical pré- cision. Mathematical ccrtainty and moral certainty are différent in their nature. The methods of theistic proof give us the latter rather than the former. With the exception of the cso-theistic, and certain forms of the onto-theistic method, ail the methods pro- ceed on the principles of induction, causation and sufficicnt reason. Though the proof moves in what may be called the sphère of probability, yet it may be of the very strongest and most cogent kind. We should observe, also, that when we make an induction, and bring the theistic hypothcsis to explain any given problem we use the idea of God, and make the hypothcsis of the objective validity of that idca the unknown x which solves the équation. 136 THE MI-rriIODS OF TIIEISM. This being the case, the function of proof and reasoning about God is really to vindicate the rational character of the intuitive or native conviction of the human mind that therc is a divine Being. If our discussion of the varions methods of proof has gone to show, in any satisfactory way, that Theism is a rational bclicf, and that its déniai is at least unreasonable, then we havc secured, on grounds of rcason, ail we require in order to provide a rational basis for Christianity. If we find, therefore, that the theistic conception of the natural world, of man, and of society and its history is consonant with reason, and that it sheds light on many of the dark problems which corne before us ail along the way, then we shall be more than justificd in entertaining this conception. We shall be content, moreover, to entcrtain it till a better is given us. If the Theist holds in his hands the golden kcy which cnables him to unlock mysterics before which the atheist must stand helpless, and the sceptic look on with wonder, surcly we shall be wise if we join Company with the Theist. VVe shall be contented if the discussion of this cssay has helped to show that Theism is capable of rational confirmation, and that it has unquestioned right to claim that it is a reasonable and well founded belief. If we hâve shown that it is the atheist, not the Theist, who is illogical, our work has been successful. In the third place, it is to be observed that the discussion of Theism not only vindicates the rational nature of theistic belief, but it also enlarges and defines the primitive knovvledge of, and belief in, God which is connatural in the human mind. As we hâve seen, this original primitive knowledge is at first little more than a vague conviction that God is, rather than a clear knowledge of zvJuit God is. The theistic conviction is at first a vague feeling, a gentle whisper, or a distant écho. This conviction attests or witnesses to the Being tovvards which that feeling points, and to the Being whose voice is hcard in the secret recesses of the soûl. The objective révélation of the Bible cornes in to enlarge and make THE CONCLUSION. 137 clear this intuitive belief. Rcasoning in ail propcr forms also renders important service in the samc direction. One of the great uses of the methods of proof, which we hâve been discussing, is to Unfold to us some of the attributes of God. God bcing given in intuition, can be understood by reason ; and vvhat He is may be made known, in part at least, thereby. If vve had space to follow out this remark, vve would see how each one of the methods comes with its tribute of knowledge" to increase the dcgree of definiteness which the idea of God may assume. Being, spirituality, unity, efficiency, consciousness, personality, intelligence, infinity, moral perfection, and righteous government vvill ail clearly émerge as the resuit of our discussion. Then, further, if we reach by means of the methods of proof this enlarged and definite knowledge of God, it is clear that many false théories which claim to be theistic must be rejected. Not only is atheism excluded by the very conditions of the problcm, but materialism, pantheism, and even deism are also ruled out by an adéquate rational présentation of the methods of proof. The conception of one personal God, who is first cause and moral governor, thus clearly appears above the horizon. Rév- élation and Reason unité in enlarging our primitive theistic convic- tion into a well defined monotheistic belief. In the last place, a good deal might be said in regard to the best order in which to présent thèse various proofs, so as to secure their greatcst argumentative force. We cannot go fully into this discussion now, however. One line of proof may hâve most weight with one man, and another Une with another man. One mode of reasoning may be more effective against one false view, and another against another error. We may rejoice that, -vhen ail the proofs are massed together, they form such a strong array of évidence that a man cannot reject it without doing violence to the deepest convictions of his intellectual and moral nature. A man may deny that there is a God, just as a man may put his hand in the fire, but in both cases violence is done. 138 THE METHODS OF THEISM. Our discussion enabjes us also to see something of the relation subsisting between God and the universe. The unîverse must be from God, and hence it is not self-existent, nor is it eternal. The natural order of the physical universe, and the moral order under which man is placed, alike testify to the truth of this conclusion. Nature is not ail there is ; but nature, is only because God is. And again, since nature has the marks of order and design, since man has rational, moral and religious intuitions, and since human his- tory shows plaîn marks of a moral purpose running through the âges, we believe that we are justified in concluding that God, who is first cause, real being, and absolute efficiency, possesses those attributes which thèse features of nature and of man unfold. We thus reach a conclusion, on good rational grounds, which lays a strong and suitable foundation for révélation and rédemption to rest on, as they proceed to unfold the Christian System. That foun- dation is at once a rational theology and a theistic cosmology. THE . END.