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D., TORONTO, ONTARIO. VROH fametfcsn Joutnal ot Xnsanttj?, July, 1892. UTIOA, N. V. ^. & ■ r it ys lii'i I ADDRESS OF THE RETIRING PRESIDENT OF "THE ASSOCIATION OE MEDICAL SUPERINTENDENTS OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS FOR THE INSANE."* JJY DANIEL CLAKK, M. I)., Si'.|)i'niit«ii(h'iit of th(' Asylum for the Insauo, Toronto, Oiitiiru i' V (iENTLKMEX — My accomi)li>she(l predecessor in this cluiir told you hist yeiir how great had been liis difhculty in selecting a subject for iiis retiring address, on account of the able treat- ment of almost all topics in the line of our Avork by previous presidents ol' this Association. This task of selection has been greatly increased in my case, seeing that his masterly effort is now added to this symposium of the ])ast. After looking the field over it has seemed to me that it would not be unprofitable to discuss for a brief time the doctrines of the two great scliools of. thought which stand to-day -n antagonism to one another in respect to the relationship of mind and body, and to endeavor to find ou' if they have not, to a large extent, much common ground over which no controversy should take place. It is evident to me that there is much confusion in respect to definitions, and less in respect to interpretations of phenomena. I need scarcely say that this subject is germane to our work in the care and treatment of the insane. If insanity be a fixed physici'l disease, which affects and controls abnormally the language and conduct of tlie individual, then is aught ap})ertaining to mind and its organ of paramount ♦Ketid at ho Forty-sixth Annual Mecthij,' of the Association of Mi'dical Superin tendeuts of Auiorioiiu ln.stitutions for the Insane, hvld at Washington, T). C, May 8, ISifcJ. K- : 1 fct ADDRESS OP THE RETIRINd PRESIDENT. w,_ im})()rtiince to us. Wo judge of liisnnity by its abnormal nientiil inanifestations, yet we treat it tlirougli physical condi- tions; hence tlie importance of studying psycliiatry in relation to mental pliysiology. Every tiling connected with the life history of the individual is a matter not only worthy of our 8tudy but is necessary to a successful prosecution of our work among the insane. Sanity must bo put in juxtaposition to alienation, in order to enable us to measure the mental standard of any man. It is a matter of comparison and relationship. We cannot know what is abnormal unless we have a normal standard to go by, although, ])hilosophica]ly speaking, there is no abnormality in nature anywhere, as everything is under tho reign of law. Throughout the centuries a verbal war has been carried on, over the relation which mind and body bear to one another, and what influence one has on the other; there have been two sides to the shield, and each disputant has claimed that his field of vision is the only correct area of primary investigation. The pendulum of speculation has swung from one extreme point of a segment of the great circle of truth to the other. It has scarcely ever halted in its transition movements at the mean between'the two farthermost positions of antagonism. It has been ever thus in all the fields of varied controversy. The duality of man in one form or another has been an accepted doctrine from the earliest period of human history. The prevailing conception among the lower races, including even most of the ancient Greek philosophers, and the early Christian fathers, was that body and soul were two material substances of different degrees of density, and with different qualities of existence. In the days of Socrates, Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle; among the later Christian fathers, especially since the days of Augustine; by the schoolmen, and up to the present day, it was and is held that man is either a dualism of mind and body or a trinity of spirit, soul and body — the former opinions meaning simply that body is a gross form of matter, and the latter that mind is a substance but not matter; the former as being tangible and visible, and the latter being an entity having none of the properties of matter except existence, and possessing neither primary nor secondary qualities. BY DANIKI- (U,AKK, M. D, In tlio liittcr rliiys iin old theory liiis boon revived by modern physiologists, whicli is si'ni)ly timt nil is matter, mind is only a secretion or a function of nerve activity, nerve action being causal, and mentality being the ctrect. 'IMio materialistic i)hysi- ology of to-day insists upon the doctrine of monism, inasmuch as the whole man is only matter, and psychic power one of its manifold manifestations. Tiiis view led Ficht^, Spinoza and their school into i)anthoism; the Divine mind and man's not being analogous, but identical; and so matter was God and God matter. This i)antheistic idealism is boldly stated in Shelly's "Queen Mab:" "Infinity within, Infinity without, Ik'lio Crciition. The inoxterininiil)le spirit it contains is Nature's only God." Upon this doctrine of unity foreshadowed by Lucretius in his wonderful i)oem "])e Rorum Natura," and by Plato before the Christian era, is founded the monistic doctrine of Carpenter, Herbert Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, Romanes, Maudsley, Be;Je, Lewis and Tyndall. It is interesting to note tlie history of these great movements of thought, and to see that after all, so much that is called new is only old opinions considered from new standpoints. The old writers labored among metaphysical speculations, and the latter based their opinions upon physical phenomena. It is worthy of observation in the history of psycbology how extreme views not only were in antagonism throughout the centuries, but how they also came into juxtaposition at certain points of their history. AVe can correctly label the landmarks of human history simply from a knowledge of the schools of thought in the various epochs of man's progress. This is the age of a renewed form of materialism based on biology, instead of existing in the shifting sands of metaphysical subtlety. At this hour, on the other hand, a school of thought exists which denies that brain functionates all mental processes. It denies that the personal I is only a congeries of functions, whose fountain head is a nerve molecule or monad. In fact, it refuses to believe in the exist- ence of matter altogether, except as a phenomenon of mind, and rules the material world out of being, except as a concept. Stallo, of Cincinnati, in his able work on "Concepts of it |e 3t [of ADDKKRH OF THE UKTIRINO PUKSIDKNT. T**- -;* Modern Pliysics," voices the opinions of tlieso modern tliinkcrg und treulH with ncorn tlie doctrines of modern pliysiologints in rcKpect to men till i)Iienomcnu in relation to gross mutter. This is seen in such opinions us the following, viz: "Neither mass nor motion is snhwtuntiully real, but hotii ure concej)ts or ruther constituents of u concept iiuitter. 'I'hcy are ultimate products of generalization. Matter is the huihvikih iji'inis of tlie classification of bodies on tlie basis of their physical and chemical projicrties. It is not, therefore, n real thing, but the ideal complement of two attributes, belonging to all bodies nliko," (]>age 140.) This school sneers at what is calletl the utomo-mechanical theory of Tyndall and Iluxley, in which is the Lucretiun idea that "matter has in it the jiromise and potency of every form and quality of life;" in which is also an old idea of Bacon and Schelling. The latter says "Matter is the general seed-coru of the universe, wherein every thing is involved that is brought forth in subsequent evolution." Stallo says that these mechanical theories " take not only the ideal concept matter, but its two inseparable constituent attributes, and assume each of them to be a distinct and real entity," (page 150, supra.) The one class of thinkers knows of nothing but matter and its manifestations, and the other has no conception of anything but mind and its oi)enitions, or, as Hegel puts it, " All things are evolved from Heing and that universal being is wholly devoid of attributes." As was said in the days of Locke and Hume, one reasons away mind, and the other matter, so we have nothingness as a resultant, and as a corollary they leave to us an alleged concept to which they give the term Zero, or nothingness. These are the doctrines of philoso])hcrs, ant! yet they do not occupy permanently the wards of hospitals for the Insane. Here we have man on the one hand as a mere automaton with nerve ganglia as the supreme cause of psychic life; all mental phenom- ena being per force the resultant of nerve causation. On the other hand it is asserted that there is nothing but a void in the universe, or, at best, only mentality. The former makes sensa- tion, volition, emotion, consciousness, and moral judgment productions of nerve vitality. The latter makes these mental phenomena the sum total of existence. By the former sponta- neity of mind is believed to be a phantasm of metaphysicians. ■ijf HV nANIKf, rr.ARK. M. If, cers in Miin is ruled by the oxtonml inlluoncoa, from tho tlinildom of wliinh tlicro is no miininniHsion, boinj;, us Ktncrson would say, in "tho luinds of tlio cliorubiin of dostiny." My tho latter it is stated there is no world oxc(tj)t a unit of mental uctivitioH. 1 ronu'iiibcr when 1 was a youn;? man at (h)IIoj^o reading the controversy whi(!ii was ^'oin^' on at that time on the tlieological dogma of ])rode8tination and free-will. I got hold of a work of Jonathan Edwards "On tlie Will." His work is a marvol of meta|)liysical logic to prove tiuit man had no free will, but was guided in all his actions by the influence of what he called "ex- ternal motives." Man had no spontaneousncss of will, but was of necessity iniuitely created for good or evil. IIo was good enough to say that wo had our life history modified very much by education, exporieneo And what wo now-a-days call "environ- ment." In spite of these sunny glints wo were doomed to weal or woo because of want of volition; that is how I remember this remaikable book. Ono of his oi)p<)nents gave the example of a man standing hungry and wistful between two loaves of bread of equal appearance and uttractivness. The external motives being ecpuil and there being no free will to choose cither of them, the man must of necessity starve to death in the midst of plenty. The opponent to Edwards' doctrine of fatalistic necessity fairly argued that the man would soon break through these so-called equal attractions with a spontaneous alacrity which would aston- ish the New England divine. There was hunger iirging and bread was wanted to allay it, so no mere equable external attractive- ness would binder prompt choice of one of the alternatives. Even Tyndall is forced to say "Wo are woven by a power not in ourselves." Ilaeckel is forced to say that "Organization is a result of life." Then is life an entity antecedent to its work and does exist independent of it. If that be so in the more primitive chemical as well as the vital forces, then why deny it in the psychic force, seeing it is more complex than these and has in its manifestations new elements of a higher order than aught below it in the scale of being? The contest is over the definition of I. The monist vehemently asserts that all nerve action or function means the living I, yet he acknowledges its existence as an agent antedating the organ which creates it. This seems a contradiction in terms, making both effect and cause^ or sequent and consequent identical. Herbert Spencer is ' •>\, AHDRRHH OF THK RKTIRINO PHESIDBNI'. forced reluctantly toudmit, (Hiolo^'y, piipe 107,) that "It may be arguci on the liypotliesiH of ovolution, life necesHaiiily comos before organization. On this livpotliosis organic matter in a state of ]i(ini()goneou8 aggregation must precede orga^.ic matter in a state of lieterogeueouH aggregation. Mut since passing from a struptionless state to a structured state is itself a vital process, it follows that vital activity must have existed while thoro was yet no structure; structure could not else arise." Lionel Healo says, (liioplasm, i)age 'iO'.)., Ed. 1H72,) "Tlie vital i)ower of tlio highest bioplasm in nature is the living I." Darwin calls this creative power "innate" in defining life. Lewis in his " IMiys- ical Basis of Life" holds the same view, as well as docs Bastian in his work, "The \Wmn as an Organ of the Mind." The whole of his school of thinkers acknowledge an agent which must have an existence anterior to its work of organization. 'J'he egoist on the other hand declare.s tliat there is an entity called mind, affected by, but not being gross matter, although in intimate relation to it, and capable of exciting it to action in will, emotion or desire. lie appeals to our consciousness for proof of our jjower at will to i)roduGe physical effects by exer- cising volition, and stirring to intensity the affections, not as a secondary but })rimary cause, lie holds that those efforts are initial, and are not primarily sensational in all mental activity. In such a simple act as that of raining my arm consequent on a volition, if the primary im[)ulso is a command of tlie nerve molecules to do so, something gave them the hint that tliis illus- tration was re(iuii'ed at this oi)portune moment. I am told that my will to do so, is only a function of these molecules, and can not be at any time an initiatory impulse. In some mysterious way they got to know that this movement was required at this particular time. In other words, it is necessary in every volition to suppose a goading primary sensation and conseciuent reflex action from the power developed. It is held the same is true of memory and the wildest flights of imagination. My will, imagin- ings, reminiscences and conscioi;snes8, are all said to be the reHitlt of acts of the brain, which determines in an autocratic way their intensity, kind and variety, being amenable to no motive power higher than itself and the laws by which it operates. The I in its multifarious states and activities is merely molecular brain action and is not a personality but a congery of functions. UT DANIKL CLARK, M. D. 1)0 linos II II tter jroiii was foiilo the I his \\ya- Itiiin liolo lilVO Mental activity thuH becoinos a eoquonco of iintooedont Imiin niocliaulHin, and that tho ro8ult of HouHational oxporionco. Tho wild iiiipoHHibilitioB of Milton — tlio croations of Sluiko- Hpoaro — the word ))ictui'ing8 of Ilonior, TaHHo, Danto, Scott and Lon^jfollow— thewondorfnlcombinationH of Mondolssolin, llundol or Mozart, arc only fortuitonn proHontniontH of a molecular grand jury, knowirig n(» nmetcr 'ih r.rtni, receiving no prompt- ings but tbrougl) sunsatiou, and hooding no dictation indeponilout of themselves. Ab Sully puts it in his ''Outlines of Psychology:" "'rho dis- cussion as to what mind is in itself passes on to that of tho relation of mind to its foreign companion, a material organism; and the attomjjt to interpret tho fact of the concMuitanco between tho physical and tho psychical has necessarily involved a consider- ation of the ({uostion what mind is as substance. But sometimes che one, sometimes tho other question has assumed special prominence." It lias ])eon suggested that tho properly |)8ycho- logical study of the mind has no tendency to reduce mental phenomena to terms of matter and movement. Tho fundamental modes of mental manifontation, feeling, kiu»wing, and willing, and tiio laws whicii govern tholr devolopmont, aro perfectly distinct from the phenomena and laws of the material world. With rG8i)0f!t to the connection between body and luiiul ph} siolog- ical psychology is iu a fair way to nuike out that all pBvchical activity has as its concomitant some mode of ph;. ical action. Mental life is thus a chain of events, j)arallol to another chain of physical events. More })articularly mental life coincides witb certain active central. i)ortion of tho nervous series, namely, cerebral processes. Aro these series indoi)endcnt of one another, or is there any causal connection and interaction between them? Is the })sychical event the result of the lirst stage, sensory siimula- tioni' On the other side, is tho mental process a condition of tho linal stage, tho nmscular action? Or is this a case of mere par- allelism without actual causal contact? These questions have not yet bcin answered by accepted ecientilic methods. The physiologist setting out with physical phenomena as his realities and following the familiar methods of physical science, is disposed to regaid tho chain of nervous events as complete and self-explanatory, and to view the accompaniment of consciousness as an accidental appendage or ** collateral re- k. '■--•'I Si'. bt [of an 5 Iv 'Si*' 8 *AUI;REgS OF THE RETIRING PREf IDKNT. suit " of the physical events. On the other hand, the psycholgist setting out from the inspection of the internal serios of psychical events maintains tlat these are .it least as real as tlie i)hysical processes, and cannot be brought under the general effects of physical action; also that they must be included as co-operant factors or agents in the whole complex series. It would thus appear that in the concomitance of the physical and the psychi- cal we have a unique fact not to be explained by being brought under the interpretation of ordinary laws of physical causation. The- insolubility of this question by commonly accepted scien- tific methods, and the double way of approaching its solution, are clearly illustrated in the different philosophical theories propounded to meet the case. On the one hand, we have as the earliest attempt to solve the mystery, materialism, or the doctrine that the material body is the only existent substance and active principle, and that what we call the mind is an effluence from, or product of, the activity of this substratum. Over against this tendency we have Spiritualism, or the doctrine that the material is relatively dead or inert and unreal, and that the principle of life and activity is a spiritual princij^e. The materialistic tendency allied itself to a mechanical view of nature, which seeks to reduce organic life to the effect of mechanical arrangements. The spiritualistic tendency, on the other hand, led rather to a theological view of nature, to the theory that so- called inanimate objects are vitalized by a principle which involves purpose or end. Besides these tendencies acting singly we have combinations of them which aim at giving equal substantive reality and power to the material and to the mental or spiritual. The first crude form of such a combination is Dualism, accord- ing to which two co-ordinate substances exist side by side, but exert no influence one on another; the appearance of interaction being due to a Divine arrangement. Finally the desire. to meet the claims of each of the two connected terms, and at the same time to account for their connection or union has given rise to the doctrine of Monism, according to which the material and the mental are related as two attributes of the same substance, or as two aspects of oiiO reality, like the convex and concave sides of a mirror. This accepted monism asserts that the mind or psyche of man has developed together with, and as conjoined functions of, the BY DANIEL CLARK, M. D. » ;i6t (cal [cul of int IU18 Ihi- rht nerve masses. The human mind or the mental capacity of tlio human race has developed gradually, step by step, from the minds of the lower vertebrates, being the same in kind if not in degree. There is no such thing as "freewill" in the usual sense. On the contrary, in the light of this monistic conception of nature, even those phenomena which we have been accus- tomed to regard as most free and independent, viz: tlie exercise of the human will, appear as subject to fixed material laws as any other natural i)henomenon. Indeed, each unprejudiced and searching test applied to the action of our "free will" shows that the latter is never really free, but is always determined by previous causal conditions, whicli are eventually referable either to heredity or adaptation, or rejjetition or automatism. Hypothesis is, of course, not science, though it seems as if scientific men sometimes think that it is. It may be reasonable and likely, but if large ])ortions of the htws of phenomena Avhich it ought to include are inaccessible, by reason of time or space, or Avant of opportunity, it is beyond the domain of science. It cannot be employed in argument, and has no validity as against ascertained facts, which no such interpretation of phenomena can fully solve. The well knovn rule that if a hypothesis explains all the phenomena, then is it probably true, is not applicable where there is only partial solu- tion by its assumption. These master thinkers founded their opinion on the asserted facts of biology, especially embryology. Comparative anatomy, vivisection, physiological development, and pathology all do duty in this direction. The growth of body and mind based upon environments, functional necessities, inhevant aptitudes and selective powers arising from the necessities of existence, are presented as proofs. They study mind and body from three radical sources : ( same general laws of existence. ke I , iA an «^;■ 4 'Mi I' k i: i I' I >t; 10 ADDRESS OF THE RETIRING PRESIDENT. (v.) The introspection of states of consciousness and the study of their conditions in rehitiou to the nb extra world. These subjective and objective jjhenomena are noted and classi- fied, and as a rsult it is held that not only does all evidence go to sliow the intimate relationship which exists between mind and body, in health and disease, but also that there is no reason to believe that mind is a distinct essence, but rather a resultant of nerve energy made manifest as psychic force. In other words, it is only a function or secretion. There is nothing excejjt body •and its qualities. In the somatic theory of Cabanis this doctrine is put in one sentence: "All intelligence consists in sensation, and all sensation resides in nerves; as the liver secretes the bile, so does the brain secrete thought." There is no mind at birth, says Bhiridford in his lectures on insanity, and all knowledge can be reduced to sensation. Locke held that mind existed at birth, but that it was as a sheet of white paper, with no mental impressions on it, or as he states, ^' no innate ideas.'' Strange to say, this doctrine of negation of ideas, coupled with the assertion of the opinion tliat there was an existence which had ideal potentiality in the initial stage of extra uterine life, yet possessing no definite mentality, held sway over the minds of metaphysicians of Britain and America for many years, until Sir William Hamilton took up the cudgels against this view. A great deal of misunderstanding has arisen in connection with this and kindred subjects because of want of exactitude in the use of terms. Logomachy is constantly going on over differences in the meaning of the words used in the discussion of abstruse and scientific subjects rather than over essential facts of controversy. The word mind is one of these terms. In its widest sense, as understood among the ancients, its synonym, pai/rhc, was meant to include in the term all things living, from the must simple plant to the greatest philosopher. The thistle has soul as well as the body of a living Socrates. This definition was much more expansive than is that of the theologian who knows of no spirit except in man, and who divides up man only into soul, spirit and body. Of course, this tripartite division was necessary in order to bring his terms into line with his exegesis, which gives man and beast two distinct entities in common, but adds soul or spirit in its summary of the intellectual and moral endowment of man. To doubt this khe id. psi- Igo Ind to of Ids, Idy |hig in Ites BY DANIEL CLARK, M. 1). 11 W,'.' stutement would expose us to the condemnation of that class of interpreters who sees in such hermeneutics what is called "the higher criticism," and looks upon the division into duality as rank heresy. To such the generic term mind has no signifi- cance in the strict physiological sense of that term. The dualist scouts the idea of such a triumvirate of forces in man, and reduced the number to two, namely, that of mind and body. One class of thinkers believes the mind to be a non-material something, and has no doubts about the existe ^e of the gross matter of the body being the medium in which it manifests itself. The other class teaches that mind is a subtle form of matter, in short, a higher form of that ascending series of material forces which begins with chemical action, then cell life, then vegetable life, then organic life, then psychic life. They deny that these correlate, but only acknowledge that the higher manifestations depend on the lower in a subsidiary way, and not as a necessary condition of existence . The monist puts this theorist in the witness box, and asks for solutions of facts in experimental physiology, in pathology Jind in natural history. Such take the form of present.ition, which is seen in the corre- lation of force in chemical affinity, motion, light and electricity. They do not claim, nor can it be proved that the correlation is entirely interchangeable or precisely convertible as in chemical action, but insist that the same general law is in force along this line of operation as between mind manifestations and organic activity and vice versa. - With Maudsley we are to put memory in every molecule, and consciousness as being only the recognition by a molecule of the influence of sensory impressions; lilRK88 OK THE RKTIRINO IMIKHIOENT. unothor. Tliey wore of nocossity cotompomnoouH. Take another illustration. I put ditTcrent kinds of seed into a box of earth, of uniform fertility. Tiie same heat is applied, tiio same water, and the same sunlight. The materials from which eacii seed draws its food ar^ the same. 'I'ho seeds sprout; tlioy throw out their rootlets; they select from this storeiiouso of nature what is specially needed, according to the nature of each. The result is, that the fibers of the stems, the shape of the loaves, the petals, the coloring, and the properties of each are as varied as the seeds, each according to its kind. The vital principle in each is differ- ent, according to species and genera. This selective and building up force wiiich is so familiar and yet so wonderful has the chemical union as a basis, but it has taken a much higher step in variety and complexity. These more skilled workers, although for the time latent in the seed, have all the potentialities of the flower or the mighty tree in them although undeveloped. The vitalizing power was in t^sHC before the structure had taken form. Take another illustration. I have taken my dinner, composed of a variety of dead matter. It has gone through a chemical process of digestion. The glandular laboratories have changed the chemical into vital bodies in tlie blood corpuscles. Did the process of organization stop here, we would die of inanition. The thousand and one workshops in each body have master builders in them who are crying out for material. Xo two manu- facturers carry on the same kind of work. The arterial stream carries in it the needed raw substances and each organ takes out of it only what is wanted for its distinctive structure. Each organ has its own peculiar cell which will seek for nothing but what it wants. From the lung cell to the liver coll; from the cartilage cell to the bone cell; from the muscle cell to the fat cell, and from the lent: i ell to the brain cell are created structures, different in histological construction, in functional activity and in growth renewal. Tliis is a great step in advance of chemical union and of merely vegetable life. The differences between the varied organs of our bodies are far greater than is evident in the world of nature below them. There is, however, one common bond of union in the nerves and the ganglia which brings about harmony of action in this community of interests. It will be accepted without controversy that a subtle force was not only contemporaneous with, but was the creator of these organisms IIY DANIBI. CLARK, H. D. 17 lior til, er, )od ut is 18, lis, and Hfcampod upon ouch its function in tho unimul orouomy. Muscnltir nativity, eocrction, excretion, structurrtl power and necessary decay jjo on night and day under tho dominion of this residuary force, which called specialized functions mid organs into heing. So far there are manifest three active agencies in this ascending series of existences, interdependent ujjon one another. All agree so far as organs and functions are concerned, as we have had gross matter merely to deal with in ever changing forms, but obedient to law. These substances have primary and secondary qualities. They have density, gravitation, extension, divisibility, figure, occupy space, and such like properties which belong to matter in its crude form. We take a step higher in the scale of being, tut in this wo have no new material organisms. We como in contact with forcQs, powers, faculties and states of being, which seem -to have nothing in common except existence with this gross molecular world, which thus far has been presented to our senses. We give these new forces the names .of instinct, feel- ing, volition, I'oasoning, imagination, memory, emotion, atten- tion, reflection, consciousnegs and such like. To a greater or less extent we llnd these wonderful powers, conditions and faculties resident in all nerve substance. They seem to have no qualities in common with gross matter, and yet they are cogni- tive entities. None of them can be weighed, nor divided, nor measured, nor made tangible, nor tested by chemists, yet we know they are in existence as surely as we know we live. What are these startling phenomena which are, at this stage of development, interjected into nerve substance? Now comes the battle of opinions, jiro and con. And from the days of Lucretius, down to the latest idealist, the diverse opinions have raged, now on one side, now on the other. In the later days biology has entered into the controversy, and with it agnostic physiology, which knows nothing and acknowl- edges nothing beyond what is seen or inferred in the natural phenomena of gross matter. It cannot put into the usual formulae the attributes of these mental existences, so it classifies them as functions of nerve substance. It is chemical force plus vegetative force, plus vital force, plus mind as a resultant finale of all combined. Simply this and nothing more. This contest is largely V - r ie lof an id A ■• > V. t .'■■I •i .w I 18 AODKKHH OK TilR KKTIIIINO PKKHIDKNT. focalized on what Ih nioaiit by consciouHnosH. If it can be shown that conHoiourincBH merely consintnof oenHational iinprcHsionH and as Heoting as they, then munt its ovidonce no nnsatisfactory. If it is simply a series of perceptions, memorized then is it self outside of nelf looking at self, which is contradictory. If it is simply mental acts, then has it no abiding and continuoiiH existence. If it is a faculty, then it is only a function of bruin and dependent upon this organ for its very existence. Augusto (Jomtc says: "It is out of the (|ueBtion to make an intellectual observation of intellectual processes; for the discorncd and discerning organs being here the same, its action cannot bo pure and natural. In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity; yet it is this activity that you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause, you cannot observe; if you do not effect it, there is nothing trt observe. Comto's Positive Philosphy led him to believe that consciousness is a faculty or a sticcession of perceptions, when in truth it is merely a Ktatf of mental existence. Tho positive school of Comto scouts introspection and dogmatically adheres to purely objective methods of research. Even Herbert Spencer is forced to give up sensation as tho only source of knowledge when dis- cussing consciousness, although he evidently does so with reluctance, as did his co-laborer, John Stuart Mill, in his theory of ** The Association of Ideas." Spencer says: "There must be a residuary consciousness of something, and this indefinite something constitutes our con- sciousness of the non-relative or absolute. Impossible though it is to give to this consciousness any qualitative or quantitative expression whatever, it is none the les3 certain that it remains with us as a positive and indestructible element of thought. The momentum of thought inevitably carries us beyond condi- tional existence to unconditional existence; and this ever persists in us as a body of a thought to which we can give no shape, and transcends not only human knowledge but human conception." Hero he, gives up the physiological idea of the monistic school, that sensation is the sub-stratum upon which all human knowl- edge is based, and with it the theory of mechanical evolution is abandoned. In other words he cannot ignore what Sir AVilliam Hamilton callr the idea of "The Unconditioned," namely, the conception ol space, duration, and continuity in which is no sensation as a primary condition. Iliown |H (UK If |fc self ifc JH IIIIOIIH bi'iiiii II Y DANIKI. <;LAUK, M. V. 19 As David Tlumo would Biiy, oonsciouHticss is ** tho original " furnituro of tho mind," and not a socondaiy product based on Hcnsation. TIicho eonoosHioiiH are important when they are made by those who see nothing but a physical basis for mind, and wlu) hold body and mind to bo merely cause and resultant. They cannot shake thcmHelves loose from those problems of mental introspection and continuity. They felt that sensation alone, however multifarious in its receptivity, failed to explain all tho enigmas of psycliic life. Elements of combination, of unend- ing synthesis in which, as su(^h woro no previous sensational experiences, must have an abiding nature as evident to our experiences in subjective life, as are the phenomena in the oh extra world which are presented to our senses and recognized by us only inferentially. As (Joetho puts it: " Who of the liviiifif seeks to know and toll, Strives just the livinR spirits to expel. He has in hand the sep^inito parts alone, But lacks the spirit l)ond that makes them one." Consciousness remains with us during all tho mutations of our physical system. In that time millions of brain molecules have grown to maturity — produced their like — and having become an excretion, are cast out as useless dead drones from tho busy hive in the ambulances of nature. Each parent monad has left to its child a legacy and a biography of the past. Each succeeding • generation has garnered permanent and ^'oeting 'mpressions to be harvested and appropriated, by the living tenant as emergencies arise. The older the facts of memory in childhood the more vividly are they portrayed in the vast picture gallery of the brain. The molecules change in substance and possibly in contour, as do the other parts of our physical system. Every impression, mental or physical, makes a fixed change in the ultimate elements. From this storehouse, at will or by association, the past is brought up to mental view with all its varied experiences. The instrument is ever changing in essence and capability during revolving years, but consciousness remains true to its impressions in spite of these disturbing transitions, and even of much organic lesion. What hypothesis can con- sistently explain this, if our consciousness were only a function . or a secretion? No wonder that Maudsley takes every opportunity to have a tilt at it, and calls it only an "indicator" re I 1.11 tlQ '»?d ■ll « i 20 ADDHKHfl OK TIIR HKTIItINO PRRfllDRNT. to tell wliut thu iiioleculur ugoiit iu doiii)^, for if it bo u Htuto taking cognizance of tlio conditions and actH of the ego, or rather the ego itself acting in a cognitive atatc, Huuh a iivin^^ fact would strike a fatal blow at the HubHtratum on which iK built the doctrines of the school of Comte. Professor Huxley Hays justly: "Nobody, 1 imagine, will credit me with the desire to limit the empire of physical science; but I really feel bound to confess that a groat many very familiar and, at the same time, extremely important phenomena, lie (juite behind its legitimate limits. I cannot conceive, for example, how the ])henomcna of (lonsciousnoss, us such, and apart from the physical process by which they are called into existence, are to be brought within the bounds of physical] science. Take the simj)lest possible example, the feeling of red- ness. Physical science tells us that it commonly arines as a eon- sequence of molecular changes propagated from the eye to a certain part of the substance of the brain when vibrations of the luminiferous ether of a certain character fell upon the retina. Let us suppose the process of physical analysis pushed so far that one could view the last link of this chain of molecules, watch their movements as though they were billiard balls, weigh them, measure them, and know all that is physically knowable about them. Well, even in that case we should be just as far from being able to include the resulting phenomena of consciousness, tho feeling of redness, within the bounds of phytical science, as we are at present. It would remain as unlike tha phenomena we know under the names of matter and motion as it is now." Huxley sees no way to span the unknown chasm between, physical activity and mentality, yet many of his followers lightly trip over it and describe the way with exactitude and dogmatic assurance. The same differences of opinion exist in respect to the formulation of our moral' judgments. The generic name of conscience is given to this faculty of the mind. By one class of thinkers this ethical power is said to be instinctive, and is capable of judging intuitively of the value of human motives and conduct by the rightnesa and wrongnesa of acts. This- power is said to be inherent in the human mind, and is unerring m m BY t>ANIKI. C'LAKK, M. P. 21 lute or in its verdir^tH in roupoct to 'he morul (|ii'i]itiuH of human iictionH> In fiu!t, it is Hiiid to ho " U . ''h vicegoront upon oiiith." Wiiyiiind, I'liloy, Aloxandor and other aiithoritioH of tho thoolo^ical Hciiool, clin^ firmly to tliiu view, and ima^fiiio tliat woro tliiH founihition Htono romovod, Hin, choice of action, and responsihility, would bo mythu, und moral (;haoH niuHt of necossity follow. Tho alarm \h not unreasonable were those doductiouH of the theological school sclf-ovident ;md conclusive. On the other hand, Darwin hcos no congenital faculty in conscience. In his "Descent of Man," (Vol. I, page GS,) ho says "that any animal whatever, endowed with well marked social instincts, would inevitably ac(|uire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual jHjwors had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed as man." llaockel in his "Evolution of Man," sees no moral in this little world of ours. lie says with emphasis that "tho moral ordering of the world is evidently a beautiful poem which is found to be false by actual facts. It exists neither in nature nor in human life, neither in natural history nor in the history of civilization. There is no such thing as 'freewill' in the usual sense. On the contrary, in the light of this monistic conception of nature ovon those phenomena which we have been accustomed to regard as most free and independent, such us the expressions of the human will, appear as subject to fixed laws as any other natural phenomena. In short, each unpre- judiced and searching test applied to the action of our 'free will' shows that the latter is never really free, but is always determined by previous causal conditions which are evidently referable either to heredity or adaptation." By one fell swoop, free will and moral distinctions are swept away and mechanical law is put in their place. Mental spontaneity, ethical judg- ments, and the data of consciousness are soquents of blind force,, from whose thraldom there can be no appeal^ as conscience, moral obligation and volition, abstract ideas of infinitude in time and space, of number and form, of artistic conceptions and of our own identity and continuity are simply secretions, whose creator is living nerve tissue in formative operation. Now, great as seem these differences, there is much common ground in all these definitions and doctrines which all could agree upon: t i :>' !l an ,?d 22 ADDRESS OP THE HETIRING PRESIDENT. 1st. Evolution is accepted if it includes .i volution, that is, the protoplasm includes all the potentiniities of subsequent change and diversity. 2d. There is a definite relation between brain cells and mentality; given the one, the other is present in corresponding strength and activity; just as the magnetic iron has magnetism in it in proportion to its weight, yet one is not of necessity a resultant gecretion of the other. 3d. It may be possible that ethical powers depend in a large degree on environment, education and experience, as Herbert Spencer says in his "Data of Ethics," or it may be they are instinctive in a rudimentary way, and like intellect, are only in need of st'muli to bring them into moral activity. The writer of this monograph is convinced that moral judgments depend on the intelligence for evidence, in every step of their formation. The conscience is only a judge to pronounce verdicts accord- ing to the intellectual evidence presented, and is as likely to give wrong judgments as right if the intellectual presentment, is false; hence it is a fallacious court of appeal unless true evidence is given. So it is that the man with an enlightened conscience is the highest type of humanity. At the same time we find among our criminal classes many who have never had their minds drawn out to the highest appreciation of the grandeur and beauty of moral obligation. They may be educated, shrewd, cunning and in the ordinary acceptation of the term clever, yet no crime however heinous would cause them the loss of a night's sleep, or deprive them of appetite. They do not know what is meant by remorse. They have been well styled "moral idiots." Oa the other hand we have the Hindoo mother, crushing out the natural instincts and killing her offspring to appease the anger of some imaginary God. Her religious edu- cation has neutralized the natural affection of the mother, which in animal and man is the strongest of all passions. In the former, conscience was never developed, and in the latter custom has obliterated it or at least neutralized its potency, as nature had planted it In the mind of all well organized human beings. Examples of all kinds might be given to show how variable and unstable is the moral faculty of man in active operation. The mental structure is built up from sensation to ideation; from ideation to intelligence; from intelligence to reasoning; from BY DANIEL CLARK, M. D. 28 reasoning to the formation of moral judgments. "We see in in- sanity how often the tearing down is in inverse order to the building up. '4th. Absolute free will is not to be found. We are "cribbed and cabined" in an organization which hampers our mental organization to a greater or less extent. Traits of character, such as temperament, habit, education and state of health give bias to our thoughts and impulses. This is conceded by both schools of thought. At the same time we are conscious of a certain amount of mental freedom which no reasoning, sophistical or otherwise, can deprive us of. A moment's reflec- tion will convince us of posessing this power of spontaneity within certain lines of volition. Pressenc^, in his "Study of Origins," puts the other side of the question as follows: "That which is fatal, as it seems to us, to Herbert Spencer's whole theory as to conduct and the constant adaptation of* existences to their environments, as applied to humanity, is the fact that humanity never maintains a fixed correspondence between its stage of evolution and its intellectual development. If evolutionism were true, if man developed psychologically in his moral and physical nature in accordance with the principle of the conservation and trans- formation of energy, every stage of evolution reached should be permanent, there should be no possibility of retrogression; for progress having been produced necessarily by the operation of the laws which govern the universal mechanism, and by virtue of which man's bi-ain is modified coincidently with his mind, (mind being after all only a function of the cerebral organ,) we fail to conceive why a generation, or a whole people, having attained a fresh stage of evolution, should not invariably remain there till it was prepared for a yet higher stage. The adapta- tion has been spontaneous, the human agents have been only its passive instruments. How comes it then that they are constantly reti-ograding, and that their conduct is so habitually at variance with their social environment ? In our day, this social environ- ment in accordance with the law which resolves the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, and the heterogeneous into the complex and definite, is something immeasurably above self-asserting individualism. We are assured that we have arrived at the ]^eno6. ot altruism, which subordinates the interests of each to |e ) ^■,- -t 16 Ct (of %n '*. 'in 24 AOURESS OF THE BBTIRINO PRESIDENT. ihe ink ;ests of all, and yet every day >;•? see individual interest insolently asserting itself and imperilling toe social community. Whence the falls, these retrogressions? How can we explain the sorrowful saying, so often verified by experience, " Video meliora, deteriora segiiorl" Let it be observed that these falls are now the fault of a few individuals, that there are whole generations and nations which fall back upon the dominion of sheer selfishness and violence. We recall the witty saying applied in the last century to the collective error of a great department of State: * One horse may stumble, we allow, but a whole stableful at once — .' Such repeatedly recurring alter- ations of advance and retrogression in the moral history of mankind are surely a proof that conduct is not with man, as with the mineral, vegetable, or animal, a mere necessary and inevitable adaptation, but some thing in which his will comes into play. Determinism renders these fluctuations altogether inexplicable. It is equally opposed to that education of the conduct which the English physiologists admit. They seem to hold it possible to influence the destiny of man and of a nation by strengthening the action of certain motive forces, that is by the intelligent organization of the social environment. We ■confess that we do not understand how human intelligence can act upon this vast mechanism, of which it is merely one of the wheels. It may gradually come to work more smoothly by friction, after the manner of machinery, but it can have no power to change its nature in a world wholly subject to the inflexible laws of motion." This whole subject is a matter of paramount importance to every student of man, either in health or disease. Strange to say, that intimately connected as man necessarily is with himself in his objective and subjective states of being, yet no subject of study has given rise to more diversity of opinion in all the range of human knowledge. This study must be of intense interest to us, who have to do with the mind in an abnormal condition, and we cannot ignore its claim upon our att'ention if we seek to be thoroughly equij ped for our work. Pathology is important, but it is merely a study of ruins . Physiology is a great study, but it means observation of a machine in active operation. Hental alienation is an object of surpassing interest, and shows 'that this machine is out of repair and needs reconstruction. ItY IJAMKL rr>ARK, M. P. 25 le BO lis le )f \S it It Bui miin in lieiilth is surely not less an iniportimt object of contemplation, and in a sound condition he is the standard by which we measure all deviation from normal condition in each person . Such being the case, the writer has taken this oi)portunity to add his humble contribution to this vast subject. There are many in this Association who doubtless differ from him, being ardent followers of the so-cal ' i lew Psychology, but he is sure that they will appreciate ho.. convictions, come from whom they may, even if uttered by those who may be considered too conservative in their oi»inions, in this age of advanced thought. i