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BY MAJOR GEORGE T DENISON, Jr., OOH KAHDIHO " THE a07XB50B OENSSAL'a BOOT OCAKO," UFP» CAMAOl ; AUTHOB OV "MAirr AL OF OI7TP08T DUTIXB," " OBaiBTATIOKS 09 rat BBBT DSnilSITB VOBCB FOB CAVADA," BTC, XTC. ROLLO & ADAM. BUFFALO: BREED, BUTLIR * 00. 1866. *! \ M ^ >>:$■ ml L-^ F50 76 274400 ( . p-' f ■n-j r ■ >; i ^ f f 11- J V :■ 3. 1 ^ ^' J M^ ^! 11 > .^^ S i' PREFACE. At the suggestion of a iriend I had decided, early this spring, to write, if possible, an account of the Fenian Raid which we both felt confident would take place on the Niagara Frontier during the summer ; consequently, on being ordered to the front to aid in repelling the invaders I kept the idea constantly in view, and was continually gathering up infor- mation of what was passing around me, in every quarter in which I could obtain it ; speaking on every opportunity with anyone likely to give me further insight into the proceedings. This gave me a great advantage in striving to gain the truth, 1 was not obliged to depend for my account on what I could glean from the newspapers and from the official docu- ments alone, but was able to supplement it with information obtained personally on the spot, and at the time events were transpiring about ine. The account in the following pages will dift'er to a small extent from the ideas popularly entertained, which are based on the newspaper reports. Reporters on the field, writing at a time when the wildest stories and the falsest rumours are flying about with marvellous rapidity, writing generally in great haste are unable to trace rumours to their foundation, and have not time to apply tiie test of truth to the numberless stories which are retailed to them ; thus the most reliable reporters will be sometimes unavoidably deceived, and false impressions thereby publicly promulgated. ill ■A *' V I m • ii f: Ifiil m ■'I .» IV PREFACE. I have liiken every pains to make the story J have written as accurate a? possible. The description of the scene of operations is to a great extent based on personal observation, as ] am well acquainted with the whole of that section of the country. The account of the crossing of the Fenians was obtained partly from the newspapers, partly from the people living on the spot, and partly from an officer in the Fenian Forces who courteously gave me a great deal of information as to their crossing, their line of march, and their subsequent movements. My information on the Plan of Campaign was obtained by personal observation, and from conversation with all the lead- ing officers of each column, and there is no doubt as to its correctness. The chapter on the Battle of Ridgeway gave me more trouble than all the others united. The accounts were so conflicting that I almost gave it up in despair ; each person that I spoke to about it knew what had happened immediately in his own neighbourhood and with his own company ; all that had occurred elsewhere he either knew nothing about, or elsf; had heard accounts of it second hand. The great diffi- citlty I experienced was in dividing what the relator knew o* his own knowledge, and what he had heard ; in some cases the information from both source^ was so thoroughly knitted together that I failed, but after having heard about a hundred different stories, and cross questioned as many different people, I think I have arrived as close to the facts as is possi> ble. I not only enquired of volunteers engaged, but went to the scene of the fight three different times, going over the ground and enquiring of farmers, some of whom had reen the whole fight from the Fenian lines, some from our own. I do i| Ridge wt| correct, what hal satisfied. contradi( credit to I I havej the burd have hit prejudice elation o hou*- for that the those wl am boui accurate! opinions. Althoi " Robb ' Dennis's J honestl sible cor still I C£ him crec Brigade in whic^ ness an< thrown I can under i Wf JfPEFACE. -V I do not expect that any ne man who was engaged at Ridgeway will think the whole ^ ^ my account of that battle correct, but H'each one finds that I have described accurately what happened of his oivn knowledge I shall feel perfectly satisfied. Of course, in some points, accounts have been very contradictory, where I could not reconcile them, I have given j-redit to the weight of evidence. I have been obliged from the facts as they occurred to lay the burden of the failure on other shoulders than the publii have hitherto been inclined to place it, and I know that the prejudices have become so strong from an incorrect appre- ciation of the circumstances, that it is impossible at this late houi* for me to attempt to counteract them. Stili I have felt that the facts in "^ military point of view tend to exonerate those whom the people find fault with, and, consequently, I am bound to place them before my readers truthfully and accurately, even though they may be contrary to their settled opinions. Although in the account of the expedition on the Tug " Robb " I have been obliged to animadvert on Colonel Dennis's actions from a military point of view, and although J honestly d». not think him a good officer to have a respon- sible command in the field, for the reasons I have mentioned, still I cannot allow the opportunity to pass without giving him credit for his valuable services when afterwards acting as Brigade Major to Col. Lowry, for the active energetic manner in which h . perfomried his arduous duties, and for the kind- ness and courtesy shown to all the officers and men who were thrown in contact with him. 1 cannot condlude without expressing the obligations I am under to Col. Peacock, Lieut.-Col. Booker, Major Gilmor, I ¥ pM 'S, ■ ■' •■ 'a'"*'! {,'■ ^'A im \ i m VI PREFACE. Adjutant Olter, Captains* Brown, Dixon, Bonstead, Adams Gardner and Whitney, and many other officers, non-commis- sioned officers and men, for information kindly given me rela- ting to the movements in Port Colborno and at the Battle of Ridgeway. I must also thankfully acknowledge the kindness of J. C. Kirkpatrick, Esq., Reeve of Chippawa, who not only gave me a great deal of information as to the movements of Friday night in Chippawa, but also kindly drove me in his carriage over the road Col. Peacock's column marched, and also along the route the Fenians took to the Battle of Ridgeway, The opportunity of going over the ground was of the greatest value to me in writing the account, and enabled me the better to appreciate the designs of the Fenian leaders. To Mr. Couper, Postmaster of Chippawa, Dr. Kempson, John Douglas, Esq., Headley Anderson, Esq., and Samuel Dennison, Esq., of Fort Erie, I must also express my acknow- ledgements for information kindly given to me. Toronto, 1st August, 1860. ; r iH' > . i . ) ' .1 1 .. ..) ■'.» •~t ORIGIN SCENE 0] CROSSING PLAN OF BATTLE MARCH < EXPEDIT MOVEME OCCUPA APPEND A. I B. I C. ( CONTENTS. Chapter I. ORIGIN OF THE INVASION „ 9 Chafteb II. . SCENE OF OPERATIONS 15 Chapteb III. CROSSING OF THE FENIANS AND ANTICIPATED MOVEMENTS. 17 Chapter IV. PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN 12 Chapter V. BATTLE OF RIDGEWAY 39 Chapter VI. MARCH OF COL. PEACOCK'S COLUMN 49 Chapter VII. EXPEDITION ON THE TUG "ROBB" 59 Chapter VIII. MOVEMENTS OF THE FENIANS ' 65 Chapter IX. OCCUPATION OF FORT ERIE BY OUR FORCES 71 APPENDIX 15 A. List or OrriCBRB knoaoed at the Battle or Ridobwat 75 B. List or Killed and Wounded 76 C. OrriciAL DEaPATCHKS 76 PI m Ml I ^r ■ K-'i- m m CHAPTER I. ORIGIN OP THE INVASION. .I-' About seven hundred years ago, Sirongbow, Earl of Pem- broke, at the head of his English archers, effected a landing on the coast of Ireland, and after various successes over I he Irish chieftains, at last secured so firm a lodgment, that Henry II. of England compelled him to hold from him as his sovereign lord, the lands he had acquired by conquest. From that lime until the present day, Ireland, or the greater part of it, has been an appendage of the British Crown. Looking back through th«' long course of years that have since elapsed, we find that the history of Ireland is little more than an account of a con- tinual series of wars and insurrections, in which the native Irish, or the Celts, have endeavoured to throw off the yoke of their Saxon conquerors. Although in England the Norman conquerors and the Saxon conquered have, through a series of centuries, so intermingled and united that at the present day an Englishman neither knows or cares which blood predominates in him ; and al- though the Jacobite party and the causes which led to its formation, have ceased to exist in England, and the feelings lo which they gave birth have been forgotten, yet in Ireland tlie very reverse has been the case. There, the two parties, the Celts and the Saxons, have as bro d marks of distinction and are as utterly divided as in the wars of Cronjwell and William the Third. Religion among them seems to form a grand distinguishing mark, by which the national feelings are kept alive, and their traditions of hostiliiy confined to well known bounds. Since the reign of William III., Ireland has been gradually improving, and the foelings of the two parties becoming less intense than before. ;? m 10 omats or the invasion. Nevertheless, the intrigues of the French Republic aiding the disaffected party in Ireland, caused an outbreak in 1798, which was soon put down by the Government, the rebel* being dispersed, and a number of the leaders taken and exe- cuted. In the year 1800 the Union of Great Britain and Ireland wa» effected. This measure was very distasteful to the National Irish party. They found their parliament taken away from them, their chief city deprived of its position as a capital, and their nation of its national character. It was not alone the effects of this measure which was so obnoxious to them, a* the flagrant bribery with which they charged it was carried through the House. This feeling has led this party continu- ally to regret what they call " the ancient glories of their race and country,'* and several attempts and agitations have been instituted in order to effect a repeal of the Union. The more moderate men have endeavoured to effect this by legitimate means, by the means provided for in the constitu- tion, and have agitated in this way to secure the end desired. The more enthusiastic and violent, those known better as the Voung Ireland party, have endeavoured to effect the same end by violently dissolving the connection with Great Britain, and forming an independent government of a republican character. These attempts of both sections of the party have hitherto sig- nally failed. The unhappy state of affairs in Ireland, as well from these continual agitations as from a very severe period of famine under which they suffered, caused large numbers of the dis- affected to emigrate to the United States of America, where many of the escaped rebels had also found a refuge. The emigration to the United States assumed immense proportions, and the increase of the people there, as well as constant addi- tions, have so increased the Irish population that they are now numbered by millions. The Irish race in America, living under republican institu- tions, and thriving in a country far richer and more prosperous ORIGIN or THE INVASION. 11 than the land they had left, naturally became imbued with republican ideas and tendencies, and jon imbibed a hatred to England and the British Empire, not only from the nursing such a feeling would receive among a people who themselves had thrown off the English authority, but also from the teach- ings and urgings of the leaders who had escaped for their lives from Ireland, and who blamed England because their native land was not as prosperous as the land which gave them refuge. This feeling on the part of the Irish people in America was made use of by the leaders of the rebellion of 1848, or at least by the most enthusiastic among them, who believed that by uniting their race in Ireland and America they would be in a position to realize their day-dream of having their country an independent republic, or at least a kingdom ruled over by some modern Brian Boru. In order to carry out this idea, a few of these men organized a small society in New York, which afterwards, enlarging in its dimensions, became the Fenian Brotherhood. James Stephens, one of the men of 1848, took upon himself the duty of organizing the brotherhood in Ireland, while the task of furthering its interests in America devolved upon Colonel O'Mahoney. This was about the year 1857. For some years after that its progress seems to have been very slow, and its movements were little known, and, if known or heard of, attracted but little attention. When the war broke out in the United States, it gave a great impetus to the Fenian organization. Up to that time the present generation had not undergone any experience in war. After a lengthened peace men get so accustomed to peaceful pursuits, and the idea of war becomes so hateful to them, that the military spirit of a nation becomes almost ex- tinct, or at least exceedingly sluggish in its action. When a people are in that condition, it is useless to attempt to get them to embark in any undertaking likely to lead to war and bloodshed. After, or during a war, on the other hand, the military spirit is awakened, and in some instances even created, and after a . 12 ORIOIN OF THE INVASIO^r. timB becomes very active : men who have left peaceful pur- suits, and hive become accuslomed to the bustle of camps und the excilemi'nts of a soldier's life, return to their usual avoca- tions with reluctance, and abandon their military duties with regret. Such men will generally be willing at any moment to re-engage in war, and will be alwayts ready, upon a fair pretext, to join any cause which is likely to give them an opportunity of indulging their fondness for a soldiei's life. The leaders of the Fenian Brotherhood, fully appreciating this feeling, sought to turn it to their own advantage as well as to the benefit of the cause for which they were working. It was at once promulgated that the Fenian organization pur- posed attempting the deliverance of Ireland from the control of the British Government as soon as the United States authori- ties had bucceeded in subduing the Confederate States of America. And it was also stated, in consideration of large numbers of Irishmen, with the consent of the Fenian body, enlisjting in the armies of the Union in defence of the Union^ and in support of its constitutit)n, that the United States Gov- ernment would, on the conclusion of its war, assist the Fenians in their designs against the British Empire. Although there can be no doubt that the United States Government could not have authorized any such compact on its behalf, still it is much to be regretted that recruiting agents, lured by the large bounties olFered, driven by the difficulty of getting rocruits, and compelled by the urgent necessity of the case, often held out as an inducement to Irishmen to enlist the hope of assistance on their behalf when their own war was over. A more cruel and heartless expedient could scarcely be devised, or one more degrading to those engaged in it. If they never intended to help them, they were guilty of getting the life's blood of brave men to fight the battles of the Union on false pretences ; and if the help was intended to be given, it was a conspiracy against a friendly nation — a conspiracy -without cause, and one likely to embroil a peaceful country in a bloody and unprc^vjked war. ORItilN OF THE INVASION. 13 Thus yrar by year, ihrongh ibe Civil War, the Feninn order prosporrd, its ranks were largely increatiod, its funds wore improving day by day, and the spirit of its membi-is b'com- ing more enihusiaslic. As soon us the war was over, and matlers had partially settled down, the Fenian excitement began to increase. It became bolder in its movements, and made no sf'cret as to its designs. A public organization was efTecled, a President and Senate appomted, and an Irish Republic, without a territory, was formally proclaimed. The public; offices of state of this so-called Republic were filled np, and a large mansion in New York having been rented, the Irish Repuf)lic i:)ecame the possessors of a " local habitation," the " name " having been previously assumed. On these preliminary arrangements being completed, the Secretary »,f the Treasury of the new Rcjaiblic, under the direction of the mock Government, issued a large nniount of bontis, which were distributed for sale throughout the United States. They were bought up readily by the people, especi- ally the Iri^h, for some time, and by this means large sums of money were obtained. Soon, however, a disturbance took place among them, and the Secretary of War, General Sweeney, and the greater |ior- lion of the Senate, headed by Colonel P.oberrs, s«'parated Irom Colonel O'Maliony and formed a ne ,v Repuhlie, Colonel Roberts being President, and Geneial Sweeney Secn^tarv of War. 'i'he cliii'f causes of dispute between the two factions i-Sweeney faction thought the true road to Ireland lay through Canada. As far as regards the first cause very little i.s known, and even what is known is of no interest to those not engaged in the organization. With reference to the second cause of dis- i It :.«] 14 ORIGIN OF THE INTASIOfT. pute, it might be well to consider the matter a little before the invasion itself is treated of. There can be little doubt that O'Mahony's plan of sending men, arms, and money from New York to Ireland to compete with the whole power of the British Empire, is one of the wildest of wild schemes. The difficulty ot evading the British fleet, the immense disadvantage at which stores could be sent to such a distance, and the facility with which England could concentrate her troops in Ireland, show the folly of O'Mahony's plan of operations. , On th*^ other hand. General Sweeney considered that by attacking Canada he was attacking England, and attacking her in her weakest point, in a point far removed from her base, and along a frontier of a length difficult to be guarded. By attacking Canada he would be able to bring into play all or nearly all his men, and in all probability, from the feeling some citizens of the United States have against ( anada, hir forces would be largely augmented by recruits from that class. Again, if he was able to take a sufficient portion of Canada to enable him to form a belligerent government, one recog- nized by the United States, vessels could be sent to prey upon British commerce, and the oft'er might be made to the United States to give up Canada to them on condition of iheir giving assistance in freeing Ireland. Agam, by attacking Canada they might have better opportunities of fomenting a war be- tween the United Stales and England, which alone would give them any ultimate chance of success. By fighting Eng- land in Canada, a large number of the English regular troops would be occupied and prevented from fighting against the Fenians in Ireland, who, of course, would rise there simul- taneously with the Canadian invasion, or at any rate with its probable success. For all these reasons, theielore. General Sweeney and his party decided upon directing all their elforts against Canada, and it is with a view of giving an account of the principal attack which was made by General Sweeney upon this province that the following pages are wriilen. CHAPTER II. THE SCENE OP OPERATIONS. The Niagara frontier has always been, and always will be, a point on which an army directing its eflbrts against Canada from the United Stales would in all probability march and endeavour to effect a crossing, and it will be advisable here to give an explanation of the relative positions of the important points, in order to enable the reader the better to understand the movements which took place. The Niagara River leaves the lower end of Lake Erie at Buffalo, and running in a general northerly direction for about thirty-five miles, empties itself into Lake Ontario. About four miles from Lake Erie the river is divided by Grand Island, the main channel running between the Canadian shore and the Island. At the fool of Grand Island lies Navy Island, on the Canadian side, it being about fifteen miles from Lake Erie and about one and a-half miles above the Falls. From the Falls to Queenston, some seven or eight miles, the river flows precipitously between perpendicular banks some 250 feet high ; at Queenston the banks diminish to some sixty feet in height, and the river flows smoothly for eight miles into Lake Ontario. Two miles from the Falls is the Suspension Bridge, the only means of crossing between Chippewa and Queenston. The Welland Canal, which connects Lakes Erie and On- tario, runs from Port Colborne on Lake Erie, distant about seventeen miles from Fort Erie, norther y through the villages of Welland, Port Robinson, and Thorold, to St. Catharines, and thence to Port Dalhousie on Lake Ontario, following a course nearly parallel to the Niagara River, and at an average distance of about thirteen miles from it. The Welland River, running from the west at right angles to the NiHgara River, intersects the canal at Welland, and empties into the Niagara at Chippewa just above the Falls. It will be seen from this ■■r 16 THE SCEWfc: (F OPERATIONS. that there is a square ?ection of country enclosed between the Welland Canal and the Niajrnra River, and Lake Frie and the Welland River. It mny here be mentioned ihal the Wel- land River is navigable from wliere it intersects the canal to its mouth. Between Port Robinson and the Niagara River there are only three bridges on the Welland River — two, the railway and the carriage rond bridges, sid ■ by side at Chippewa, and the other lout niles up at a place called Mont- rose. The section of country which has just been described was the scene of the whole operations of the Fenian and Canadian forces, and it is very well inierf^ected with rai ways. First there is the old Buflulo and Lake Huron Road, now called the Grand Trunk Railway, which connects with the Great Western at Paris and runs through Port Co: borne along the lake shore to Fort Er'e ; Second, the Welland Rlief that the design of the Fe- nians was to efleet a crossing on the St. I/ivvrenee, or in the Kastern Townships, and not .• t Fort Erie. There were many, however, who wer(^ not deceived by thi<. It had lonL' been anticipated by those who took the trouble to think uptn the mattei, and by those who, contrary to the g neral opinion, be- lieved that the Feninns intended to attack Canada, that Fort Erie would be the first and most likely place to be attacked. There were many reasons on which to ground such a belief. In the first places, ii was absolutely necessary that the move- ment sliou d be conducted wi'.. the greatest celerity and se- crecy ; and, it was therefore absolutely impossible to concen- trate a lar^e number of men in a countiy lace or a small town, without attracting a great deal of atff nlion, and with- out experiencing a great difficulty in feeding them. In a large ciiy, on the other hand, like Biifl'alo, 2 or 3,(;()() men could Lc c.sily accommodultd, without any diflicully, as to », ■I- i ■ m m THE CROSSIPTd OF THE FENIANS. food ; and without, to any great extent, inconveniencing the inhabitants, or even attractiog their attention. Their num- bers could be more carefully concealed, and their movementj« could not be so easily inlertered with. In BuHklo there were more resident Fenians than in any of ihe border cities ; and, the immense amount of shipping in the harbours of liulialo and Black llock, rendered it easy for the Fenians to procure the means of eifecting a crossing, v^hile the enormous amount of trade which is continually going on there, the active move- ments, hither and thither, of numberless canal boats, tugs, schooners, and steamers, employed on legitimate business, rendered it almost impossible for the United States authorities to search out and discover which particular boat, or set of boats, was engaged to carry over the Fenians. Again : there were no Canadian or regular forces in Fort Erie, or within 50 miles of it ; and, the chance of taking it, an 1 pushing on, and destroying the Welland Canal, was a prospect that appealed strongly to their feelings. The des- truction of the Welland Canal ; or, at least, the suspension of traffic on it for a time, would be an enormous injury to Canada and her trade, while it would be a great advantage to Buffalo, inasmuch as the whole trade, or the greater part of wh it now finds its way to the sea by the Welland Canal, would be diverted to Buffalo, and through the Erie Canal lo Albany and New York. On Thursday evening, the 31st May, the authorities in Canada first began seriously to apprehend an immediate crossing. The Fenians gathered that night, at their various head-quarters in Buffalo— many of them armed with r^nskets, bayonets, &c. — and it soon became currently rumoured about the streets that a movement would probaoly be attempted that night. At a later hour they separated at their head-quarters, appirently going homi^ for the night. They marched off in straggling p:irties, by different roads, their movemepts being skillVilly confused, until thc^y reached Black Rock, where the several co unms united, and proceeded, wiih silence and cele- C01 be an ve THK CBOSSING OF THE FENIANS. n rity, to Pratt's Furnace, a little below Black Rock, where some canal boats and a tug were in readiness to convoy them across the river. Nine waggons, heavily loaded with arms and ammunition, were also waiting lor them. •The whole force was carried across, carrying their stores with them, and were landed at the Lower Ferry dock — about a mile below the Village of Fort Erie — immediately in front of Mrs. Ander- son's residence. They landed with loud cheers, and having distributed their arms, immediaiely threw out pickets in every direction. The Fenians, shortly after landing, moved up to the village. Col. O'Neil, who was in command of the force, ordered Dr. Kempson, the reeve, to furnish rations at once for one thou- sand men : a meeting of the municipal council was hurriedly called and arrangements made to provide the food. Immedi- ately after this was done. Col. O'Neil sent a force along the Grand Trunk Railway towards Port Colborne ; this force burnt Sourwine'L- Bridge on that road. The main body moved down to Frenchman's Creek, and encamped on Mr. Newbigging's farm, hurriedly strengthening their position by rough breastworks formed \, illi the fence rails. Small par- lies were sent out in every direction, seizing horses and hur- riedly organizing a force of mounted men lor scouting purpo- ses. The greater part of Friday, the 1st June, was passed by the Fenians in this way. It wt , of course, impossible for our Canadian authorities to form any accurate idea of the intentions and plans of the Fenian leaders in this section of the country. There was little doubt, however, that the first object, on their part, would be the destruction of the Locks on the Welland Canal. To effect this, their proper course would have been as follows : — From the description of the general features of the country, given in a former chapter, it will be remem- bered that Lake Erie, the Welland River and Canal, and the Niagara River, enclose a section of country very nearly square, with a railway running from Chip- ■■u i., .!, .1 '!■;..;: 11 20 THB CROSSING OF THE FENIANS. pawa to Fort Erie, and another from Port rolborno to the same ])!aco. Col O'Neil would rcadil) .10 that our forces would come down upon him by one of these routes, and most [)rob;]l)ly would make use of both. His base of opera- tions consisted of the Niagara River, between Chippawa and Fort Krie, with the possibility, in eertain eontingeneies, of its being changed to the lake j»hore, between Port Cnlborne and Fort Erie. If he marched upon Port Colborne along the Grand Trunk Railway, he was leaving himself liable to be cut off from his l.ase by a force coming down from Chipj)avva along jho Erie and Ontario Railway. I'he proper plan for Col. OWeil to have adopted, assuming that the Welland Canal was his objective point, would have been to have landed a small portion of his cotutnand at the lower Ferry, who should have marclx'd to the Village, there breakfasted, and then, pushed on along the lino of the Grand Trimk Railway as far as they could get in the direction of Port Colborne, burning all the bridges along the road, and (Mitting the telegraph wires. \^ ith the main portion of his force, he should have dropped down the Niagara River in his boats, to Chippawa. lie landed at the lower Ferry at half- past three in the morning, if he IkhI gone straight to Chippawa he would have reached thereat half-past five, two hours later. After breakfasting there, and burning the bridgesover tlii* Wel- land River, he should then have marc^hed by the right bank of the river to Port Robinson, a distance of some eight miles, burning the Montrose Bridge on his waj, the only bridge on the river between ( hippawa and Port Robinson. At Port Robinson he wor.ld have been in a posit i(ni to destroy the locks on the Canal, and also the Welland Railway which passcii through the Village. By pnrsu'ng this course, the Fenians would have thorough- ly protected their right flank by the destruction of the bridges over the Welland River, that river being navi^iahh' throughout the whole distance, and being therefore perfectly unfordable. In addition to this, our forces wore not prepared at the lime THE CROSSING OF THE FF.NIAK8. 21 with pontoon trains, and had no means of eflbcting a crossing. The K'fl liunk of the Fenians would by this plan have been protected by Lake Erie, and our forces would have been com- pelh'd to alluck llieni from the front, between VVelland and Port Colnoine, they could then have easily fallen back to the river, and escaped on their boats to the other side, this could all have be^n accomplished in one day, had they been suffici- ently energetic. Fortunate indeed was it for us that they bung- led and hesitated as they did. Having thus considered and discussed what the Fenians might have done, and what our authorities had to fear, I shall proceed to show in the next chapter the movements made to counteract their designs. fy' i ■'•> .:, i"'^i.,C nt CHAPTER IV. THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. Early on Friday morning, General Napier who commands the reguhir troops in Upper Canada, received information of the crossing at ^ort Erie. The evening previous, the Govern- ment had ordered 400 of the " Queen's Own " Rifles of To- ronto to be in readiness to leave for Port Colborne at an early hour in the morning, they left on Friday morning early by the steamer City of Toronto for Port Dalhousie, and then proceed- ed by the Welland Railway to Port Colborne. Col. Dennis who was in command, being ordered to occupy, and if neces- sary to entrench a position there, and wait for re-inforcements and further orders, btfore any attack was made on the enemy. The greater portion of the Volunteer Force of Western Can- ada, except the cavalry, was ordered out for active service at an early hour in the forenoon, and a proclamation issued plac- cina: them under the Imperial Military authorities, arrange- ments were at once made for providing transport for troops, trains were held in readine«s, and steamers detained for mili- tary purposes. But for some hours General Napier did not send any more troops to the Niagara Frontier, as from the numerous reports of landings of Fenians in different directions, he had reason to fear that the raid on Fort Erie was a feint to draw troops from other places. About 12 o'clock on Friday, finding all was quiet elsewhere, he began to concentrate troops for the purpose of drivin^^ out the force which had land- ed at Fort Erie. Col. Peacock commanding the 16th Regiment, was at once placed in command of the whole force on the Niagara frontier, and iustructed to proceed to his post. A Battery of the Royal Artillery under Lieut. Col. Hoste, and 200 of the 47th under Major Lodder were despatched about noon to Hamilton, and being joined there by Col. Peacock with 200 men of his batta- TME PLAN or CA5IPA1GW- 23 lion, llie whole proceeded by Great VVeatern Railway to St. Caiharines. Col. Peacock's instructions were that he was to make St. Catharines his base, and to act according to his own discretion, as to advancing on Clifion or elsewhere, and to attack the enenny as soon as he could do so with force suffi- cient to ensure success. At this time he had under his command, in addition to the force which accompanied him, seven companies of Volunteers stationed at St. Catharines under command of Lieut Colonel Currie, the " Queen's Own " at Port Colborne, under com- mand of Lieut. Col. Dennis, and the 13lh Battalion Hamilton Volunteers, under command of Lieut. Col. Booker at Dunnville, and he was informed he would be re-inforced at St. Catharines, that evening, by eight hundred men, and two troops of cavalry. On Col. Peacock's arrival at St. Catharines, he received in- formation that 800 Fenians were marching on the Suspension Bridge, and were actually within two or three miles of Chip- pawa. He immediately pushed on to the Bridge leaving directions for all troops arriving at St. Catharines to follow him as soon as possible. On arriving at the Bridge, he heard that the enemy had not as yet reached Chipp iwa, and being anxious to save the bridges over the Welland River, and being well aware of the importance of Chippawa as a strategical point, he pressed on with the 400 Infantry in the train, preceded by a pilot engine, ordering the Battery to march by the road, there being a doubt as to whether there was platform accom- modation at Chippawa to unload the guns. It was dark when Col. Peacock and his force arrived at Chippawa, and conse- quently he bivouacked there that night, making his head- quarters at the house of J. C. Kirkpatrick Esq., the Reeve. Col. Peacock was at this time fairly entered on his first campaign, and during this night had to decide upon his plan of operations, and take steps to carry it into execution ; and before relating any further the events of this night it will be well here to consider the circumstances under which he was placed, and the disadvantages under which he laboured. . » i-i % 24 THE PLAN or CAMPAIGN, In \\ui first pijioe his groalost want was a small force of Cavalry for (scouting j)nr[)os('s, in fact the frontier should have boiMi pickelcJ with a boVould never have taken place, and if it had, the mounted men hovermg about the enemy would never have lost siglit oflhern) would have prevented thi-m from spreading over the country, Would have saved the farmers' horses and provisions, would have found out the numbers and designs of the enemy, and our authorities would have received full and accurate mfor- mation of all iheir movements. No cavalry were on the front, however, and none were ordered out until the last moment when it was too late for them to do real service. Then^ is no doubt, whatever, that to this great want of cavalry may be attributed the failure of the whole campaign. The cavalry force of this Province is small in numbers, and, consequently, weak in influence. All the ofTie.ers in high positions in this country are either infantry or artillery ollicers, and consequently they have not any sympathy with the cavalry arm of the service, nor as full an appreciation of its value as a cavalry officer would have. In addition to this cavalry have latterly been much decried and neglected, and a stron,'^ prejudice exists among some members of the ministry against that force. They have heard it said that c.ivalry cannot break squares although the military history of the last 2000 years proves conclusively that they can ; and allhougb Napcleon hardly ever fought a battle where his Cuirassiers did not overthrow infantry squaresi They have heard it .said that this country is too much cut up with fences and woods to allow of charges of cavalry to be made, and for these reasons ihey jump to the conclusion that cavalry in future wars may be done away with. They forget or do not know that cavalry are the eye«, the ears, the feelers and the feeders of an army. They forget that there ire generally 20 or 30 days of marching and eoun* termarching, of camping and bivouacking, lor one day of THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. t6 battle, and that during these 20 or 30 days, the general depends for his information, the troops for the safe arrival of their pro* visions, the camp for its security while asleep, the men for time to rest, on the activity, vigilance, and efficiency of the light cavalry. Without cavalry the general can learn nothing of the movements of the enemy, the camp can never be secure against surprise, and the men compelled to keep up a great degree of vigilance would be wearied out with incessant watching. It is particularly unfortunate that this prejudice, thia unrea- sonable prejudice against cavalry should have so strong a hold upon some of our authorities and especially upon the mind of the Minister of Militia.* Although we must admit that he is right not to waste the money of the people in supporting a branch of the service which he really believes is useless, and although he is to be commended for thus acting conscientiously in his administration of an office of public trust, still it cannot be too much regretted that he is unfortu- nately so imbued with this prejudice against the cavalry force, that he will not permit the increase of its numbers, or even make use of it for outpost duties, a service for which it is peculiarly applicable. f In consequence of this feeling no cavalry were ordered out until Friday afternoon the Ist June, so that at the time they were really wanted Colonel Peacock was deficient in that force. • It cannot be that Col. Macdoiigall can approve of the small number of cavalrj in this country. In his very raluable work on the "Theory of War," he lays down the proportion of cavalry in an army; at oue-foarth of the whole. In Canada, the cavalry consists of about one-seventieth of the whole ! t As an instance, it may be mentioned, that Captain Carter was posted on the frontier, in the eastern towusbips, with 200 infantry, as an outpost, and was ordered to fall back on his supports, in case of attack. Accordingly, on a rumour reaching him that the Fenians were coming, he retired, with such haste, that it is a question whether cavalry could have caught him. The section is very suitable for cavalry ; but the Minister of Militia, not believing in that arm of the service, used infantry instead. The result proved be was right. It was more economical, which is a great point in war ; and his fleet-footed infantry showed, by their speed, that there was no use paying foi horses when the men's legs could carry them as fast as they could go mounted. The country should congratulate itself on the new description of force wliich it is producing. c .,.;<< I ■ ♦ ■;; ■•■ I'" ■I . i, 26 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGiV. It may be considered lluit as an officer of volunteer cavalry I have no right to criticize the acts of my superiors. I joined the volunteer cavalry from patriotic motives, from love of the service, and for the purpose of defending my country in case of need. During eleven and a half years spent in that service I have sacrificed large sums of money and injured my busi- ness seriously by time devoted to it gratuitously. I do not consider that these services, these sacrifices, take from me the right as a loyal subject to agitato as a citizen those princi- ples which I believe advantageous to the country I belong to. If I see a campaign lost, a great moral advantage gained to the enemy through the eft'ects of a prejudice on the part of the Minister of Militia, I consider it rny duty as a loyal citizen to endeavour to have it rectified in the future. Again, as a cavalry officer, I would bo unworthy to hold a commission in that noble arm of the service, did a desire to obtain favour for personal advantage prevent me from speaking out or writing plainly on behalf of the service to which I have the honor to belong. Another grout want that Col. Peacock laboured under was a good military map, one showing him the roads, villages, &c. He was supplied with Dewe's post office map, a map well suited for the purpose for which it was published, but calculated to be of more injury tlian benefit to an officer plan- ning a campaign. The efl'ect of the inaccuracies of this map will be explained hereafter. The want of an efficient staff was also felt not only by Col. Peacock, but much more still the next day by liieut.-Col. Booker when he was engaged with the enemy. Colonel Peacock being deficient in cavalry endeavoured to improvise a scouting force, by getting a few mounted men in the neighbourhood to ride out in the direction of Fort Erie to seek information * These men being civilians, most of them • It has been said, that Col. Peacock sliould hnvp mountCrl some of his officers and 8cnt them out as scouts. The economy of this idea of sending educated men, (paid highly to act as officers in looliing after their men,) away from their THK PLAN OF CAMPAIGV, m unarmed or but partially armed, without, any of the ideas of a soldier, without the feeling that they had embraced the duties of a soldier, and that their bus-inoss was to light, without the esprit de corps of a regular force, without tlie feeling of confi- dence which a small patrol will give to each other, formed but a sorry substitute for a cavalry scouting force. Tlie con- sequence was that the information brought bade by Ihem was very conflicting and in many cases very erroneous. The numbers of the enemy were magnified, and although the general weight of evidence lixed the location of the Fenian camp at Frenchman's Creek, the fears of the scouts and their local feelings led them to imagine or to report upon very slight foundation that the whole force of the enemy were coming to Chippawa.* In planning his campaign, therefore, it will be seen that Colonel Peacock was at Chippawa on Friday Night with 400 regular infantry and a battery, and that he expected to be reinforced in the night or morning early, at Chippawa, by the St. Catherines volunteers, Lieut. -Col. Currie, the 10th Royals, Major Boxall, and 150 men of the 47th, under Lieut.-Col. Villiers, in all about 1500 men; at Port Colborne he had the Queens Own, Lieut.-Col. Denhis, and the 13th Battalion, Lieut.-Coi. Booker, and the York and Caledonia Rifles, in all about 850 vmder command of Lieut.-Col. Booker ; and as above stated the information was that the enemy were roughly entrenching at Frenchman's C.'^ek, and were marching or commands), to do duty which would be done better by a small force of cavalry, at a smaller cost, is so striking, that I suppose I will only hare to hint it, to have it acted upon in the future. • To show the value of scouts improvised in this way, an incident worthy of mention is said to have occurred in New Germany ; while scouts were being gathered up a man vohmtoered to vide down to the Fenian camp and bring back valuable information if he was provided with a horse ; being very enthu- siastic in his loyaltj nd offers of service, a horse was pressed for his use, and he went ofif to the Fenian camp and gave them iAl the information possible about Colonel Peacock's force, and gave them the horse to use. lie baa noi since been seen, the hprse was found a day or two afterwards thoroughly used up, and our government have paid the value of it. ;-'r ■■-Ml tU ■*.' ■',! i( - ■ i m 28 THE PLA.W Ob' CAMPAiaN. likely to march towards Chippawa ; and that their force was between 1000 and 1500 and likely to be reinforced before morning. Colonel Peacock, although an ollicer who had never seen service in the field, is nevertheless a thoroughly educated military man, having obtained with the highest honors a first- class certificate in the senior class at the great Military Col- lege at Sandhurst. Ke is a strict disciplinarian, active, intel- ligent, and vigilant, cool, and calculating ; and although i\ man of undoubted pluck, is nevertheless too good a soldier to risk the loss of his command for the sake of winning the doubt- ful reputation of bravery by a reckless carelessness in the management of his men. Being, as I have said, a thoroughly educated military man, and of a decided military talent, he at once perceived the difficulty and probable danger of attacking on two lines of operations. He had several plans good and bad open to him. 1st. He might have marched by the river road to Fort Erie, and sent Lieut.-Col. Booker by the Grand Trunk Railway and along the River to Frenchman's Creek, and have cut off the Fenians, and attacked them in concert. This was Ihj plan afterwards proposed by Lieut.-Col. Dennis and acceded to by Capt. Akers. This plan could only have originated in an unmilitary mint', and one perfectly ignorant of the military art. The first great principle of war is " always to oppose the mass of your army to fractions of the enemy ;^^ and another great principle, a deduction from the first, is " always to act upon interior lines''' — that is to say, uiion the inner lines, so that your army may concentrate upon any one point before the enemy can concentrate there. Of course this is but to prevent the application of the first principle against yourself. Now in this plan both these principles would be violated. Colonel Peacock's force and Lieut.-Col. Booker's would be acting upon exterior lines. The Fenians being between them, or upon the interior lines, by marching towards Chippawa or Port Colborne, could fall upon one column before the other THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. could come up ; or, in other words, oppose the mass of their army to the fractions of ours. This was what actually hap- pened afterwards by the activity of the Fenian leaders. Again, if the idea were to prevent them getting away, it is to be remembered that Colonel Peacock's duty was to protect the Wetland Canal, to drive them out of the country, and to confine their depredations to as small a compass as possible. And it must be also remembered that if their retreat was cut off from the Niagara River, they would certainly endeavour to retreat some other way, and the road being open to the Welland Canal, they would make a dash for it, and seizing some of the numerous vessels which are always to be found upon it, they could embark and make their escape even if they did not delay long enough to destroy some of the locks on the canal. Taking all these points into consideration, there is no doubt that this plan was very injudicious, and not calcu- lated to effect the end Colonel Peacock was ordered to keep in view. 2nd. Another plan would have been to have concentrated his whole force at Chippawa, Port Colborne, or Port Robin- son ; but this was not advisable, as by doing so he would have uncovered some of those places. Srd. A third plan, and the one which he adopted, was to unite his forces from Port Colborne and Chippawa at some point midway between these places, and from there march united upon the Fenians. On looking at his map, Stevepsville was the only place marked upon it at which he could unite. It was well chosen for the purpose ; it was about ten miles from Chippawa, about thirteen miles from Port Colborne, and about ten miles from Fort Erie. If Colonel Peacock had his forces united at Stevensvillo, he was in a position to prevent their march towards Chippawa as well as towards Port Col- borne, and would be able to fall upon them in full force whichever road they took ; at the same time his position there would have thoroughly protected the Welland Canal. In order to carry out this plan, he telegraphed for oil his M, .1: tm 30 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. $ !'.<: i >:-■ I reinforcements to push on and join him at Chippewa, order- ing them at the same time to bring provisions with them in their havresacks, so that there should be no delay in breakfast- ing. In order to preven* the Fenians, as far as possible, from receiving reinforcements, or from escaping, if so inclined, he telegraphed to Port Colborne to Lieut.-Col. Dennis (Lieut. - Col. Booker not having arrived at this time) directing him to place a detachment on board the International Ferry Boat, which he had ordered round from Buffalo, and to send it down to Fort Erie to patrol the river and prevent reinforce- ments coming over, or^///c Fenians from escaping. Lieut. Jol. Dennis, finding that the International Ferry Boat was not coming, telegraphed to Dunnviilo for the tug " Robb," owned by Captain McCallum, to come down. Colonel Peacock then made arrangements for the junction of his forces with Lieut.-Col. Booker's. At the time he de- cided upon the hour of meeting, the greater portion of his force was yet to arrive, and not knowing at what hour in the night or in the motning they might come in, he was unable to name an earlier hour to start than C a.m., which would make his hour of arrival at Stevensvillc between 10 and 11 a.m. Not having a map showing the roads about Port Colborne and between there and Stevensvillc, and being unable in Chippawa to obtain accurate information as to the roads or the condition of them, and having received at the same lime very conflicting information as to the movements of the enemy, he found that it was impossilile for him to lay down the route Lieut.-Col. Booker should take, or the hour at which he should start in order to meet him at Stevensvillc between 10 and 11 a.m. Under these circumstances he thought il desirable to send an officer across to Lieut.-Col. Booker who should be thoroughly acquainted with his plan, and would be able, in case of doubt or difficulty, to consult with Lieut.-Col. Booker, and see that the spirit of the plan was carried out even if the details were varied. Acting upon this idea, Colonel Peacock chose Capt. Akers, R.E., for this service, and explained his plan and the THE ri.AN O;' CAMI'MGN. 81 reasons which induc«d him to adopt it, and explained to him t hat ho wished the junction to take place at Stevensvillo, be- tween 10 and 11 a.m.; but, with reference to the roads, he left it entirely optional with Lieut. -Col. IJooker and Capt. Akers to choose a road after making thorouj>li enquiries as to the most available route, and the route most remote from the position of the enemy — going even so far as to tell Capt. Akers that they might go along the Welland Railway, nor- therly, to a point opposite Slevensville, and then march due east to Stevensville ; or, take the Grand Trunk Railway for some miles and then cut across the country in a diagonal direction to the point of junction. Ridgeway was never mentioned as a point to leave the railway ; and, there is little doubt that, with a correct map, Col. Peacock would have positively forbidden it — Ridgeway being nearer Fort Erie than Stevensville, and the further march being, consequently, brought nearer to the enemy's position than the occasion called for. From information obtained since there is no doubt that the shortest and safest road lay from Shark's Crossing across country to Stevensville. We will now^ leave Col. Peacock in Cliippawa, listening to the reports of scouts, and farmers coming in, and obtaining information as to the roads, etc., and follow Capt. Akers to Port Colborne, and dej^cribe what happened there, and how ■the plan of campaign was carried out. n We must go back a little, in the order of our story, and give an account of what happened at Port Colborne, until the arrival of Capt. Akers. It will be remembered that Lieut.- Col. Dennis was sent there, on the morning of Friday, with 400 men of the Queen's Own, and directed to occupy and, if necessary, entrench a position there and wait for further orders beibre an attack was made. He arrived at Port Col- borne about noon, and hearing the enemy were not very near the village, billeted the men, to enable them to get their din- ners, and sent out scouts during the afternoon, to discover the position of the Fenians. The day and evening was occupied -ir ^fi.;.-] m I 82 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. in this way ; no attempt whatever at entrenching having been^ ill Hi in made. In the evening, about 11 p.m., Lient.-CoK Booker arrived with his battalion, the 13th of Hamilton, and being the senior officer, took command of the whole force. At 10 p.m., Mr. Graham, the Collector of Customs at Fort Erie, arrived with information of the exact position of the Fenian camp. This was on Frenchman's Creek, a mile be- low the Lower Ferry, on Mr. Newbigging's farm. He had been in their camp at 6 o'clock that evening, and was of opi- nion there were not more than 700 men, and that, as they had been drinking hard during the day, they would certainly fall an easy prey to any force that might attack them. Lieut. Col. Dennis' orders were positive not to attack until further orders — the same orders were binding on Lieut.-Col. Booker — and, consequently, they could not properly move to the attack which Mr. Graham urged them to make, and which he stated would certainly be successful. In order to induce them to move at once to the attack, he suggested that, pro- bably. Col. Peacock was endeavouring to keep the volun- teers back in order that the regulars should have all the credit of capturing the Fenians. This reasoning, and the prospect of success, was too much for Lieut.-Col. Dennis. Col. Dennis is a volunteer officer who, for a year, commanded the Toronto Field Battery ; and, on leaving that, was appointed Brigade Major. When the Military School was first organized, he obtained a first class certificate ; and, at the camp at Laprairie, was appointed a Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General ; but, at no time did the officers of the force look upon him as a good drill ; al- though, as an office-man, in the position of Brigade Major, no one could do the duty better. He knew nothing of military science, or of the diflferent branches of the art of war. He is possessed of an exceedingly sanguine and enthusiastic tem- perament ; never thinks of defeat ; is rather visionary in his plans, and never provides against disaster. He is not defi- cient in pluck, but has not that sound, cautious judgment be ■.:Hl THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. $$ which is absolutely necessary in a man holding a responsible command in the field. It seems that. Lieut.-Col. Dennis prevailed upon Lieut.Col. Booker to decide upon moving at once to Fort Erie, by rail, to attack the Fenians at Frenchman's Creek. The troops were all put under arms about 12 or 1 o'clock that night, and were loaded upon the cars, and a message sent to Col. Peacock by Col. Booker, informing him that he had given orders to attack the enemy at Fort Erie, subject to his approval. Col. Pea- cock did not answer this knowing that Capt. Akers would be there before his answer could arrive, with orders for their guidance. Capt. Akers arrived at Port Colborne about 1.30 a.m. on Saturday morning and found the whole force under arms and in the cars. On his arrival, Lieut.-Col. Dennis was anxious to move off at once to the attack, and Lieut. -Colonel Booker was prepared to carry out the proposal if properly authorized. Whether any of the three had reflected on the propriety of moving a large force by rail, through a wooded country, at night, and through a section not properly recon- noitred, and in close proximity to an active enemy, does not appear in the official reports. The result was, however, that the tliree decided upon a plan that may be best told in Capt. Akers' words : " The plan was as follows : — Lieut.-Col. Booker to proceed by rail to Erie, with the greater part of his force, to arrive at Fort Erie at 8 a.m. Lieut.-Col. Dennis and myself to go round the coast in a steam tug, taking a company of Volunteer Artillery to re- connoitre the shore between Fort Erie and Black Creek, and to return to Fort Erie in time to meet Col. Booker at 8. Should Col. Peacock approve of this he would march by the river road from Chippawa, and make a combined attack with Col. Booker at some point between Fort Erie and Black Creek, cutting off the enemy's retreat by the river, — the tug to be employed in cruising up and down the river, cutting off any boats that might attempt to escape, and communicating between the forces advancing from Chippawa and from Fort ; 5 ' i :. * m n I- i 't»;V h!A 34 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. •^ Erie. I comnumicated this proposed cliange to Co). Peacock both by letter and telegram. '•' The plan was merely a modification of that proposed by Lieut.-Col. Dennis who wished to move at once with the volunteers, without arranging a junction with Col. Peacock. Before receiving an answer from Col. Peacock, I went off in *he tug with Col. Dennis and the Company of Artillery, leav- ing word with Lieut.-Col. Booker to take care and obtain Col. Peacock's approval to the proposed change before acting on it, and explaining the plan previously determined on, in case Col. Peacock should desire him to adhere to it."* The above oflicial account by Capl. Akers shows at once the position Col. Peacock was placed in, the difliculties he laboured under, and the little chance he had of succeeding when his orders were disobeyed, as the report, above quoted from shows. In the first place, there was the commanding officer's plan cliangcd by his subordinates, almost at the moment of cecution. The three officers whom he had charged with the execution of his orders, even including the staff officer who carried them, coolly forming themselves into a i. "mic council of war, aided by a customs officer, and unit* Jly deciding upon a plan which has been previously shown to be absurd, a plan for cutting off their retreat to the east, but leaving the whole country open to them to the west, as well as uncovering the canal they were sent to protect. Again, Lieut.-Col Dennis' instructions were to wait further orders before any attack was made, and yet Capt. Akers says he was anxious to move with the volunteers at once, without * The substance of these initructions were taken down in writing at the time, bj Lieut.-Col. Booker, at Capt. Aker's dictation. They were as follows : — *• Memo. "Move at not later than 530. b, if Bread be read)'. Move to depot, at Erie, and wait till 7. If not coinniunieateil with, before 7, march to Frenchman's •Criek. " If ' no/ by telegraph : — '' Disembark at Ridgeway and march to Stephensville at 9 to 9 89. Send pilot ^'ng'ae to ooR\rjunicRte with Onl, Dennis, at Erie, with telegram*." aw nn m. the had THE FLAN or CAMPAJON. 35 arranging a junction with Col. Peacock. Capt. Akers was sent to go with Lieut.-Col. Booker, and considt and advise with him on Col. Peacock's plan, and assist him in carrying it out. Col. Dennis was sent to command the " Queen's Own," and yet, before receiving any answer from Col. Pea- cock, both these olUcers, in disobedience of orders, went off in the tug to carry out their own plan. The only way in which their conduct can be accounted for is, that they were so confident that Colonel Peacock would at once fall in with their plan of operation in lieu of his own, that th'.'y never, for one moment, calculated that his answer would be in the negative. Being imbued with this idea, it can readily be imagined that Capt. Akers would not be very particular in going into details, and explaining minutely to Lieut.-Col. Booker the plan which they both looked upon as virtually abandoned, it can also be conceived, even if Capt. Akers did enter minutely into the details of the plan laid down by Col. Peacock, that ^^ieut.-Col. Booker, believing that it was a useless precaution, would not give so close attention to it, or be able so clearly to remember it, as if he felt when he heard it that lie was about setting out to put it in execution. It also happened, unfortunately, that Capt. Akers, fearing the delays which so often occur in the movements of a large number of men, as a matter of precaution, directed them to start an hour earlier than they should, and to h?. an hour earlier at Stevensville, thinking that in all probability at least an hour would be lost in setting off or on the march, and that if they were before the time they might be kept back a little on the way. If he had staid with them to have kept them back, it would have been all right, but unfortunately he was away when he was wanted. Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Capt. Akers, as stated in the report, without receiving any answer from Col. Peacock, left Port Colborae about 4 a. m. in the tug " Robb" which had at that time arrived, taking with them the Welland Garrison Battery under command of Capt. Richard S. King, and a few men of 1: !: ■ « ' hi il 6 i\ i I 36 THE FLAW OF CAMPAIGN. the Dunnville Naval Company under command of Capt. Mc- Callum. The particulars of ihis expedition will be described in a later chapter. After they had left Port Colborne, Lieut. -Col. Booker re- ceived in answer a telegram* from Col. Peacock, directing him to adhere strictly to the first plan, ihe particulars of which had been carried to him by Capt. Akers. Lieut.-Col. Booker therefore had to set out upon his march, without the assistance it was intended he should have received from Capt. Akers, and without the opportunity of referring to him for enlightenment on those parts of his instructions which he did not clearly un- derstand. Having his men all ready to start in the cars, and having heard that the Railway was clear as far as Fort Erie, he de- cided to go by train as far as Ridgeway, and to keep his men in the cars, or at least under arms for the short time he would have to delay before starting. Having his men thus all ready to start, there occurred none of that delay which Capt. Akers had anticipated, and to provide against which, he had named an earlier hour for starting. Being all ready in the cars to start, and only waiting for a particular hour to arrive, it can readily be believed that he would be likely to start a little be- fore the time, rather than after it. However this may be, there is no doubt, that Lieut.-Qol. Booker started at least, as early as 6 a.m., an hour or more earlier than necessary. Immediate- ly after the force had left, a telegraph arrived from Col. Pea- cock, directing Lieut.-Col. Booker to delay his march for one hour, which would make his time of arrival at Stevens- ville between 11 and 12, cautiously feeling his way in the direction of the rendezvou j, Mr. Stovin of the VVelland Rail- way, seeing the importance of the message, took a hand-car and followed Lieut.-Col. Booker as fast as he could. On get- * Col. Peacock's telegram was as followH : CbippawB, 3.45 a. m. Have received your meaBage of 3 a.ra, I do not approve of It. Follow original plan. Acknowledge receipt of tliii. GiOBOi Pkaoock. THE PhAN Ofc' CAMPAIGN. 37 ting near Ridgeway the men refused to go any larlher, and getting out he got a waggon and drove on in the direction of where the battle of Ridgeway was at this time commencing, after going as far as the man could drive him, he walked on and gave Lieut. -Col. Booker the message. It will be necessary to leave Lieut. -Col. Booker's column on their way to Ridgeway, and go back to Col. Peacock whom we left at Chippawa gathering up information and trace the causes which led to his telegram directing Licut.-Col. Booker to delay an hour. As mentioned in the [beginning of this chapter, Col. Pea- cook's re-inforcements were to join him some time in the morning, and being anxious that there should be no delay in starting, he telegraphed back to Hamilton and St. Catharines, directing that the re-inforcements should bring with them a supply of cooked provisions, so that no delay should be oc- casioned by waiting to get breakfast for the men, after they arrived. At about 4.30 a.m. the expected re-inforcements came up, and after being unloaded. Col. Peacock mentioned to the officers commanding that he should start at six o'clock, it being then nearly five. They at once objected on account of their men not having had any breakfast, and very little to eat the whole of die previous day, and they had been unable to bring anything with them, as they were unprovided with havresacks in which to carry it. Being unwilling to set out upon a very severe march, to finish probably with a severe battle, and through a country where it would be difficult to get food. Col. Peacock decided it would be better to wait an hour to enable the men to get breakfast, and immediately telegraphed to Lieut.-Col. Booker to delay his march an hour. This message, it will be remembered, did not reach Lieut.-Col. Booker till he was already engaged with the enemy. Had he started at the proper time, he would have received the message before he left, for even to have reached Stevensville at 9.30, it was not necessary for him to have left Port Colborne until 6, he ■' I p ml 38 TTIE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. was at the battle gron.nd 3 miles Irom Stevensville at 7.30, and if not interrn[»fed would liave reached Stevensville at 8.30, about an hour earlier than Capt. Akers mentioned, and two hours Vjelore Col. Peacock's time of junction. This mistake of one hour led to his not receiving the message to delay, and therefore caused him to be really three hours too soon, it must not be fm-gottcn, that, at the time (.."ol. Peacock de* cided to wait, Ihfit there was no reason for him to fear any ill result from the delay. At that time he expected that a heavy battle would take place, before the Fenians would be driven out, and that instead of the object being to prevent them get- ting out of the country, the opinion of every one was, that the great difficulty would be to drive them out, and that he was right in proceeding cautiously with that object in view. At any rate he anticipated that the tug would have prevented their escape. Such was the plan of campaign adopted, such were the orders given, such tlie mistakes made, such the exact position of affairs, as each column marched oft' to perform its allotted share in the contemplated operations. How these combined movements dovetailed into each other, how they became dis- j Dinted in their working and confused in the execution, will be better understood by following the course of the three columns into which our forces were divided, considering first, Lieut.-Col. Booker's command and the engagement it entered into ; secondly, the march of Col. Peacock's column ; and thirdly, the expedition on the tug " Robb," under the guidance of Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Capt. Akers. CHAPrFJA* V. THE BATTLE Of HIDGKWAV. *,■■ We have already seen that Capt. Akers, acting upon the nformation received from the Customs otHccr as to the posi- tion of tlie Fenians, had derided that the best route from Port Colborne to Stevensvilie, was by rail to Ridge way and from there to Stevensvilie by the road. The information was, that the Fenians were encamped at Frenchman's Creek at 6 p.m. But that was no proof where thoy would be at 7 a.m. next morning. Hereafter, in describing the F'enian line of march, it will be shewn that they were on the march to Ridgeway on Lieut.-Gol. Booker's arrival there. Lieut.-Col. Booker was, on this eventful morning, for the first time in his life, in command of a Brigade. He was an old volunteer officer, although still young in years. He had served in the Hamilton Field Battery for some time before the Volunteer force of 1855 was organized, and from that time to the present has been an enthusiastic and zealous officer. He was appointed commandant of the active force in Hamilton, in 1857, and a few years ago, while still holding that position, he organized the 13th Battalion of Volunteers in Hamilton. He always had tlie reputation of being a good officer, and was the first to obtain a first class certificate from the Board for examining Volunteer Officers. During his whole military career he had never commanded a Brigade of Infantry, even at a review, and was sent to the front merel}' as commanding his regiment, the 13th, and not in any other capacity. Chance threw him into the position of a Brigadier General on the morning of a ba'tle, without any staft', without any mounted orderlies, without artillery, or cavalry, and without a mounted officer in the field but himself. Such was the position in which he found himself when forming up his command at the village of Ridgeway, after taking them off the cars. 10 THE HAXTLi: C)t KIDGEWAY Finding that lie could not procure vehicles to carry on his stores, he sent them back to Port Colborne in the train, le^'t the great coats of the men at the station, and set off by the Ridge Road in the direction of Stevensville. The Queen's Own, being the senior corps, took the lead, being under the command of Major Gilmor, an excellent offi- cer, brave, active and energetic, one in whom the men had the utmost confidence, and one with whom they were all accustomed to serve. It will be remembered that Lieut.-Col. Dennis, who was sent in command, had left the regiment and had gone off on the Tug " Robb " along with Captain Akers. How it came to pass that Lieut.-Col Dennis, who belonged to another district, was sent in command of a Regiment which had its own officer to command it, one who had much more experience than he had, is difficult to conceive. It seems very unfair that the command should have been taken away from the officer who had all llie trouble and hard work for months before in making his battalion efficient, and that the command of the best Volunteer Battalion in both provinces should be given to an officer who had never previously taken any interest in it or been connected in any way with it. The principle was bad for this reason: — If the Battalion covered itself with credit it would be due to the previous training and exertions of its own officer, and Lieut.-Col. Dennis would not be entitled to the credit, and if it did not act so well. Colonel Dennis could not be blamed for it, as he had never before been in command of it. No. 5 company of the (Queens Own, (Captain Edwards) being supplied with Spencer Hilles, were sent in advance as the advance guard ; after the " Qi ecu's Own " marched the York Rifles, then the 13th Battalion, and lastly the Caledonia Rifles, under command of Captain .lackson, forming the rear guard. The force had proceeded in this way for about two miles when just before they had arrived to where the garrison road interaects the Ridge road the advance party signalled that the hai I THK BATTLE OF HIDGEWAY. 41 enemy were in sight. No 5 company immediately extended from the centre and No. 1 moved up and extended on their left and No. 2 on the right ; No. 3 forming the centre .support and Nos. 4 luid G the left and right supports; aft(;r moving on in this way for some distance No. 7 t-ompany was sent out as a flanking party to the left supported by No. 8, the Trinity College company. The force was in this position on arriving at the garrison road, lietbre proceeding further with the movements it will ho desirable to des(a'ibe the nature of the ground and the position of the Fenians. The Ridge road runs from Ridgeway in a direction north- erly and easterly, following the course of the Lime Ridge from which the road takes its name ; this ridge is about 30 or 40 feet in height, in some places steep, in others of a very gradual ascent ; at the point where the battle was fought the ridge is about half a mile wide, of a very gradual rise, the road running along the ridge about half way up. The garri- son road running from the west towards Fort Erie ascends the ridge crossing the Ridge road almost at right angles, about half a mile or perhaps a little farther there runs a road parallel with the garrison road which also leads to Fort Erie. It will thus be seen that in moving along the Ridge road from Ridgeway that the ground rises gradually for about a quarter of a mile on the right, and slopes downwards for about the same distance to the left ; on both sides there are cultivated tields ; on the right extending as far as the top of the ridge where the summit is covered with woods ; on the left for half a mile, at which distance the view is shut out with a large hardwood bush. At the north west corner of the garrison road is a tavern called " The Smugglers Home^^^ and on the south east corner of the next cross road there stands a brick farm house with an orchard around it, and a large orchard along the opposite side of the cross road to the right of the Ridge ■ jad. It should also be mentioned that these tields on both sides are much cut up with orchards, and that a large number o :tj Ts if..}. I M 42 THE BATTLE OF RIDOEWAV. beautiful shade trees are scattered about. These trees and the peculiar conformation of the ground renders it exceedingly difficult to gel an extended view in any direction over the scene of the fight. The Fenian position was as follows : their main body, the reserves, were posted nearly quarter of a mile to the north oj the further cross road, to the north of the brick house beyond the orchard ; their position being behind a rail fence thickly grown up with shrubbery which almost hides it, some second growth shade trees being also thickly scattered along ; their first line was posted along the south side of the road above the garrison road, where they had erected a barricade along the southerly fence with the assistance of the rails taken from the fence on the north side ; this was done by laying the rails slanting outwards leaning against the top rail ; this barricade was erected very hurriedly, not having taken them more than ten minutes to complete it. Their advanced skirmishers were posted along the rail fences about half way down to the garrison road, with a few files in the woods on the upper side of the ridge. After moving on in liie order before mentioned as far as the garrison road, a few nf the Trinity College company moved down as far as the woods on the left, and the company was afterwards in skirmishing order on the extreme left for re- mainder of the fight. Nos. 1, 2, and 5, and Nos. 3, 4, and 6, who afterwards relieved them, moved on in the most gallant manner, driving in the enemy's skirmishers before them, pushing on from fence to fence.* In this advance Ensign Mc- Eachren fell, mortally wounded. As soon as they had crossed the garrison road a short distance. Col. Booker again directed the Highland Company, Captain Gardner, to form a flanking party to the right, and to scour the woods on the top of the ridge. This service was performed by this company witli on • About this time the University Rifles were sent to tbo right of the line to skirmish, tlie Highland Company in support, shortly after the Highliind Com- jiany was recalled and fell in with the reserves. tah am tio THE BATTLE OV RIDGEWAV. 4S -great spirit, the Highlanders driving the Fenians before them in such haste that they left company rolls and papers of various kinds behind them on the ground, the Highlanders penetrated across a wheat field at least as far as the road along which the Fenian first line was posted ; while there is very little doubt that the University company on their left had even crossed it and had advanced as far as a wood on the left of the Fenian line. The Trinity College company on the left and the University and Highland company on the right were not relieved during the fight. About the time the , •'>nk companies were sent off, or per- haps a little before, M j^i Gillmor reported the centre compa- nies of his battalion short of ammunition, and Lieut.-Col. Booker ordered the 13th Battalion, Major Skinner, to move up and relieve skirmishers on the right of the road. The 13lh Battalion, having only 6 companies, w^ere only able to relieve that number, leaving the Highland Company and the University liifles still out on the extreme right, and the Tri- nity College Company and No. 7 supporting them on the ex- treme left. For some reason, the company of the I3lh, which was to have relieved No. 6 (Capt. Adam), moved up to the brick house where No. 6, after driving out the enemy with great gallantry, had established itseli ; and both companies remained in that position, fighting together ; the left subdivi- sion, with Lieut. Campbell and Ensign McLean, pushing across the road as far as a barn on the left side of the Ridge Road. No. 7 company was recalled from the left, and then soon jifter sent out on the riglit, in support, under Capt. Mc- Pherson ; and the York Rifles, Capt. Davis, took their place on the left, in support of the Trinity College Coips. The whole of the skirmishers pressed forward with the greatest gallantry, driving in the enemy's skirmishers on the first line and dislodging it from the strong position they had taken up behind the rail barricade. The whole of the Feni- ans were now concentrated on their main body, in the posi- tion already described, beyond the orchard, and our troops 4,,. ■If :i 1 :' ^^^rl ■<;. i 44 THE BATTLE OF RIDGEWAY. i' m had moved on and taken np a position behind the rail barri cade. No. 6 company of the Queen's Own and a company of the loth holding the cross roads, the brick house, and stretching across the road to the barn on the Jeft front ; two companies of the 13th were on the right of the house, along the barricade ; the Highlanders, who had cleared tlie woods, were in a wheat field iu advance of them, to the right of the 13th, and the University Rifles between the right of the 13th and the Highland Company, in a wood, in advance of the cross road ; and the Trinity College Company on the extreme left. The remaining companies of the Queen's Own were in reserve, in a close column, on the Ridge Road, about 400 yards in rear of the skirmishers. The other three companies of the 13th were in support of their skirmishers, except a small parly with the colours in rear of the Queen's Own. Our troops had been in this position for some time, when it seems that the Fenian leaders decided to charge again, to drive our men back from tlie line they had carried. In order to encourage their men onward, the officers rode out to the front, and two or three of them, mounted, led their men to the attack. As I have before stated, the wind- ings of the road, the gentle undulations of the ground, and the orchards and shade trees prevent a clear view in any di- rection of more than about 100 or :^00 yards. The skirmisii- ers, seeing the mounted men coming towards them, thought a body of cavalry were going to charge ; and, raising a cry that cavalry were coming, began to run back, calling out to the reserves to look out for cavalry. The reserves were on the road, and these mounted men were also seen upon it. Lieut. - Col. Booker, from his position in front of the reserves, could not possibly see for himself whether the report was true or faise ; but, on hearing it reiterated, he called out to Major Gillmor to " Look out for cavalry ! " Major Gillmor thereupon ordered his battalion to form square. This was done ; the bugler sounded the " prepare for cavalry," and the companies on the flanks ran in — some forming in rear of the square^ Wi th( hn )a] THE BATTLE Or RIDGEWAY. 45 md L\VO Others lorming rallying squares in the fields, and afterwards falling back on the main body. These companies, coming in on the double, and being obliged to climb over the fences to get into the road where the square was situated, tumbling in from both sides in the confusion caused by the fences, endea- voured hastily to form in rear of the square. Tiie front and side faces of tlie square were formed with the coolness of a parade movement, but by no possibility could the rear face be properly formed in the short time in which there was to do it. At this moment, while the men were endeavouring to form up, the F'enians came in range of the square ; the bul- lets whistled fast and furiously among them, and the men were dropping wounded and dead on all sides. Seeing, by this time, that no cavalry were coming, Major Gillmor endea- voured to extend his regiment. He ordered No. 1 company (Capt. Brown) and No. 2 (Capt. Dixon) to advance and ex- tend, in order to enable the square, under cover of their fire, to regain its formation. These companies advanced nobly, and endeavoured to extend, but the rear portion of the square, which had never been able to form, feeling the fire of the enemy, began gradually to dissolve, falling back to the rear. At the same time, the advanced skirmishers, running in along the road — being unable to go round the flanks for the fences — broke through the 1st and 2nd companies, who were advanc- ing, and forced their way through the square. Seeing the impossibility of re-forming under so heavy a fire, the order was given to retire ; and, the two regiments, retiring along the same road, became mingled together : some few running hurriedly to the rear, others retiring more slowly, while a large body of red coats and green, fighting gallantly, slowly pnd sullenly retired, covering the retreat, and holding the Fenians at bay. With this rear guard were most of the officers, who, throughout the entire day, fought nobly — encou- raging their men and exposing themselves recklessly to the enemy's fire. Lieut. Campbell, No. 6, and Ensign Fahey, No. 1, "Queen's Own;" and Lieut, Routh, of the 13th, re- •ceiving serious wounds. m 46 THE BATTLE OF KIDGEWAY. r '' '' m The Highland Company and the University Rifles being, as we have seen, so far advanced on the right, did not know of the squares being formed, until they heard the retire sounded. The whole force were falling back at this time, and the two companies had to cross, diagonally, the full fire of the enemy, in order to reach the road. Had the Fenians advanced promptly, they would, in all probability, have cut off the retreat of both. A portion of the Highland Company retreated across the fields, along with the University Rifles, while the remainder fell back through the woods, and rejoined the main column by the Garrison Road. It was through this retreat across the front of the Fenians, ihat the University Rifles suffered so much loss. After retiring some distance. Col. Booker endeavoured to rally his command at the edge of a wood, which came up to the road. In this he was ably seconded by many ol the officers, all of whom behaved well. Major Gillmor, Major Skinner, and Captain Hennery (13th), and Captains Brown, Dixon, Whitney, Adam, Gardner, and Sherwood ; Adjutant Otter, and Lieut. Arthurs, of the " Queen's Own," and Cap- tain Davis, of the York Rifles, did their utmost, assisted by their officers, to restore order. Captain Sherwood suc- ceeded in forming part of his company at Ridge way, so, also, to a greater extent, did Captain Adam ; and there, also, one or two companies of the 13th were rallied by their officers, bat, not being properly supported, they were obliged to resume the retreat, which was continued to Port Colborne. Before leaving this subject, it will be desirable to consider the circumstances which led to the retreat of the volunteer force, on this occasion. Lieut.-Col. Booker, being without a mounted staff, was acting at a great disadvantage, which, of course, must have had an ill effect on the whole of the movements. The broken nature of the ground, and the impossibility of thoroughly understanding the enemy's posi- tion, was another great difliculty. THE BATTLE OF HIDGEWAY. 47 The substantial cause of the retreat, however, was, without doubt, the fact of the reserves being in close column, and in square, so close to the skirmishers as to be under fire. The most difficult tiling that soldiers can be called upon to perform, is to deploy or execute any movement from close or quarter distance column, while exposed to the fire of the enemy. The best disciplined veterans in the world will often be thrown into confusion, if endeavoring lo deploy from column under fire. The Old Guard of Napoleon, the victors of a hun- dred fights, the men who never failed to retrieve the fortunes of their Emperor, wherever he trusted to their efforts, failed him at his last great battle, at the battle that was to decide his fortunes forever. They did not fail him for want of bravery, from want of enthusiasm, or from want of endur- ance, but solely because they were thrown upon the English line in immense columns, in a formation in which they could neither fight, manosuvrc, or retreat in order. If these veterans could not deploy from column under fire, how could our lads, who, for the first time in their lives, were seeing shots fired in anger ? If the French columns at Albuera were cut to pieces by Cole's B"'usilier Brigade, and the Russian column at Alma driven off the field by Lacy Yea and his regiment, by reason of their using this heavy forma- tion, how could we hope for more from ihe inexperienced volunteers at Ridgeway ? This was the great mistake : had the reserves been a few hundred yards farther back, they could have deployed or extended, and, perhaps, have retrieved the day. Under any circumstances, the fences on the flanks should have been at once levelled, when they took up their position, because, where they stood, being cooped up between fences, they could not execute any manoeuvre without getting into confusion. The Fenians only followed them as far as Ridgeway and about a quarter of a mile beyond it. There was no doubt that the men and officers behaved well ; they fought with the greatest gallantry, and, had it 1 1 1 II ■• i 48 THE BATTLE OF RIDOEWAY. {i : not been for tlie unfortunate cry of " Cavalry !" and the mistakes I have mentioned, would have von a brilliant victory. Where all did so well, we cannot make invidious distinctions. Reflections have been made, in some of the public prints, on the conduct of the 13th Battalion. After thoroughly enquiring into the whole matter, I am strongly of opinion that there was no difference between them. Both fought nobly. They were mingled in the retreat, some in front, some in the centre, and some behind, fighting bravely, covering the remainder. In all these different positions, each battalion was represented. the ant )US the Ifter of oth in >ns, k CHAPTER VI. THE MOVEMENTS OF COL. PEACOCK'S COLUMN. Col. Peacock having ordered Lieut.-Col. Booker to meet him at Stevensville between 10 and 11 a.m., and having after- wards changed the time of meeting to about 11.30 p.m. set oft* from Chippawa at 7 a.m. In deciding upon iiis route to Stevensville, he had the map, Dewe's Post Office maj, as has been before mentioned for his guidance, aided by the infor- mation he could obtain from the people of the neignbourhood. This map shows a direct road from Chippawa to Stevensville through Black Creek, making an almost imperceptible obtuse angle at Black Creek. Now the only road in fact, or at least the only travelled road to Black Creek is the river road which follows the windings of the river bank. At that place a road strikes back into the interior to New Germany, and from there due south to Stevensville. In addition to this, the bridge on the river road over the mouth of Usher's Creeks being broken made this road longer still, by rendering a detour necessary to avoid the obstruction. There was another road from Chippawp direct to New Ger- many and Stevensville called the Sodom Koad, this was men- tioned to Col. Peacock by Mr. Kirkpatrick the Reeve, but the guides all representing that the river road was the best, and that the Sodom road was in so bad a -tate that artillery could not go over it, he allowed them to take him by the former road to Black Creek and thence to New Germany. It was unfortunate that his column did not take the Sodom road. In moving up to join Col. Peacock with my command on the afternoon of the same day, I marched by that road, and found that it was quite suitable to move troops and artillery over, and by marching some seven miles my corps reached New Germany a point to arrive at which. Col. Peacock had marched about 10 miles. ^r 50 MOVKMKNTS OF COL. I'EACOCK S COf.UMN. i:^ w Strange to say, along this roail we met scores of vehicles ot" every description belonging to people of the neighbourhood, who had by this time discovered that the Sodom road was the best way home, and were using it to get back from the camp, to which place they had followed the troops. Whether the fear that the Fenians were coming up the river road to Chippawa, or the fear that they might move up while Col. Peacock was marching down the Sodom Road had any effect on the minds of the guides in deciding upon a route to take, it is of course impossible to say ; but there is no doubt, that they all acted for the best, and Col. Peacock ought to feel grateful to the many inhabitants of the sections through which he marched, for the assistance they gave him, and for the readiness with which they devoted their time, night and day, to the service of the country. Col. Peacock's column then marched on by the river road to Black Creek, and thence to New Germany. Saturday the 2nd June was the first really hot day of the season, there was hardly a breath of wind stirring and the heUofthe sun was excessive. Ti)e men were all warmly clad, and it being the first hot dav, they suffered far jnore seriously from it than if they had become inured to ii i)y a succession of warm weather. After marching some miles the men began to fall out from fatigue and exhaustion caused by the heat, the regulars suffer- ed more and fell out to a greater extent than llie volunteers, on account of being heavily loaded with knapsacks, &c. The column however still kept pushing on, arrived at Black Creek and moved on towards New Germany the men still falling out in great numbers, till at length, on arriving near Black Creek, Col. Peacock who was riding with the advanced files received a few words written by Lieut. -Col. Booker at 7.30 a.m. stating that he had been attacked in force by the enemy at a place three miles south of Stevensville. At the same lime he received information that he had retired on Ridgeway. The receipt of this caused him (being anxious to reach Stevensville) to urge the column on faster. Im- MOVEMENTS OF COL. PEACOCk's COLUMN. »t 3S Ot ood, was n the mediately after he receiveci word from the rear that the men were giving up with the heat, it being then about 11.30 am. and that great numbers were straggling. Just afterwards Lieut.-Col. Hoste sent him a message stating that his escort had so diminished that it would not be right to goon without having it increased. This decided Col. Pea- cock to halt for a time to rest, and accordingly after pushing on as far as New Germany so as to hold possession of the cross roads he camped in the fields about the village, and ordered the men to get dinner. By this time he knew that Lieut.-Col. Bookor was falling back and would be unable to meet him at Stevensville, and that he would have to depend upon his own column without the immediate assistance of the other. The time the men rested was occupied in sending out scouts hunting up information and discovering where the enemy were and the direction they were moving,* Here again he felt the want of Cavalry, here one single troop of Cavalry would have made a difference of two or three hours in gaining information, but the effects of the unfortunate feeling against Cavalry were not yet over, and the result was the Fenians had time to escape. Had Col. Peacock had a force of cavalry with him at Chip- pawa, he could have moved his whole force from Chippawa to Black Creek, by rail, sending the cavalry spread across the country for two miles, on each side of the track, to see that all was clear. Fifty men could have done it, with perfect safety, and could have retired, and warned the train to retire, or to halt, in case they came upon the enemy. Cavalry, starting an hour before the train, could have seaiched the woods, and pushed on about five miles an hour, tlje train •This being absolutely necessary to eniible him to decide ia Avbich dir'jction to move his coluiun. If he had moved to Fort Erie, and the enemy had marched to Port Colborne he would have left the column unsupported, while on the other hand, if he had marched towards Port Colborne while they bad gone to Fort Erie, he gave them a good opportunity to escape, or to march to Chippawa and on to the bridg«. 52 BIOViSMKNTS OF COL. PEACOCk's COLUMN. 1 I'N keeping about a mile behind, would have gone fully twice as fast as the force could h«^.ve marched, and the men would have arrived at Black Creek quicker and fresher, and would only have had a few miles then to march to Stevensville. This would have preclnded the necessity for a halt at New Germany, and the force could have pushed on to the Ridge- way battle ground, and thence to Fort Eric. In the afternoon, about four o'clock. Col. Peacock received absolute information tb '( the Fenians were falling back on Fort Erie, and he imns^idiately made arrangements to move off in pursuit, honing to reach them before night. It was particularly unfortunate that Col. Peacook had not decided to move on Fort Erie three hours or so sooner ; had he march- ed direct to Ridgeway, he would at once have obtained posi- tive information as to the Fenian retreat, and could have followed them direct to ii.- nver, and might have defeated them before dark. liad this delay not occurred, the Fenians in all probability wou!d not have escaped, or at least not without loss. It was abc.ut half past five when he started from New Germany ; and the colui.ins had only just got in motion, when he was joined by the " Governor-General's Body Guard," under my command. On reporting to him, I was immediately ordered to push on to the front, and form the advance guard. This we did, at the gallop, being loudly cheered by the column while passing. The column mo\'ed on past Stevensville, and down the Lower Ferry Road, towards Fort Erie. After marching about nine miles, it began to get dusk, just as the advance guard had arrived at a point on the road where the woods (after skirting it on both sides for nearly a mile, at the distance of about 600 or 700 yards) came close up on both sides, leaving only the road allowance clear through, for about a quarter of a mile. The cavalry advanced files, on arriving within about 200 yards of where the woods came up to the road, noticed a body of men standing in the opening. They immediately MOVEMENTS OF COL. PEACOCK 8 COLUMN. ss hailed, and signalled back, that men were in sight. I gal- loped on to tlie front, and, encjuiring from my men, heard that a force was in front, and continually dropping into the woods on the right, and, on looking myself, saw that it was so. Col. Peacock, soon after, also galloped up, and, on learning the cause of the halt, requested me to send two men on to reconnoitre more closely. By this time, nearly all had gone into the woods on the right. I rode on with Cornet Denison and three men, and, detaching him with two to go down a side road, to the right, rode on myself, with the other, to where we saw, in the dusk, a vidette standing, where the others had been. He, also, moved into the woods, w^hile we were yet some distance from him. We rode on about 150 yards through the woods, but, by this time, it had got so late that I could see nothing under the trees, it being much darker tbrre than in the open road. They did not fire on us, conse- quently I could form no opinion of their position or probable numbers. I thereupon returned to Col. Peacock, and reported that I could see nothing, suggesting to him, that, as their outposts should properly have fired upon us to alarm their camp, their not having done so, was a sign their force were on the alert, and, the place being so suitable, it seemed to point to an ambuscade, and that I thought the wood should be searched. , Col. Peacock seemed to have had a somewhat similar opinion, as, in my absence, he had sent for two companies of the 16th to come up to search the bush, the main force being some distance to the rear. While we were speaking, the two companies came up, and I went on with Col. Pea- cock, who moved with them to direct their movements. They opened out to the right of the road, to skirmishing distance, and moved on to the front. It was so dark, by this time, that the men could not, its the woods, see Irom one to the other, and, there being a great deal of tangled brush and logs, and being very marshy and wet, the men could make no headway whatever. At this time, while I was sitting close beside Col. ■:v':M 54 MOVEMENTS OF COL. PEACOCk's COLUMN Peacock, a voice in the dark said, " You can't go down that >¥ay, sir !" On looking closely, we saw that it was a farmer, living about a quarter of a mile back, who had given us some information as we passed. Col. Peacock asked him, " Why not?" He answered, "The bridge is broken." The Colonel questioned him closely, and he adhered to it positively, that he could not get through. This information, together with the inability of the skirmishers to make their way through the woods, decided Col. Peacock to halt until daybreak. He at once recalled the skirmishers, and, going back about 200 yards met the 47th Regiment, sent one company out, in skirmishing order, to the right of the road, and ordered the remainder of the regiment to form up in a line, about 200 yards behind the skirmishers. The 16th took up a similar position on the left of the road. Tiie 10th " Royals " sup- ported the 47th, in a line about 200 yards in the rear, the two right companies, wheeling to the right, and extending in skirmishing order, connecting with the skirmishers of the 47th, and circling round to the rear, as far as the road. The 19th Battalion, Lieut. -Col. Currie, took up a similar position on the left, in thu rear of the 16th. The cavalry were in column on the road. The artillery in the rear of them, and the baggage waggons in the extreme rear. In this formation the men slept on their arms all night. The disposition was admirable, as the force could show front to either flank by merely changing front on the centre of each regiment, and to the rear by countermarching, or quicker still by facing about. ' I have entered very minutely into the circumstances that caused Col. Peacock to delay that night and to bivouac until day break, because there have appeared in the newspapers many strictures upon him for not pushing on at once, and because no account of the reasons which induced him to halt has ever been published. I was struck at the time with the pertinacity with which he endeavoured to push on, wondering .MOVEMENTS OF CGI,. PEACOCK S COLUMN. dd myself how he would be able to execute a night attack upon a force of whose situation or position he was ignorant.* It should also be remembered that Col Peacock was under the impression, as was every one else, that these Fenians meant to fight, and that even if they did not he thought he had secured against their escape by means of the Tug " Robb " which he had sent round for that purpose. The bivouac having been formed, no fires were allowed to be lighted, and the men laid down in their ranks and went supperless to sleep, with no covering but the sky. It was a novelty to them, that, and the hope of meeting the Fenians the next morning, kept up their cheerfulness, and with numberless jokes on the comparative merits of their beds and the warmth of the bed clothing, the mass of them went to sleep. The cavalry men laying on the dusty road with their arras through their horses bridles, while the horses either laid down to sleep along with their riders or nibbled at the grass on the road- side. The artillerymen slept on their waggons and under them. The officers generally were wakeful, being under the impression that the enemy were within a mile or two of them. During the night, while the watchful ones were looking anxiously for the day to break, so that they could move on once more. Col. Peacock received some important informa- tion. He heard that a reinforcement had reached his old camp at New Germany, and that Col. Lowry with an addi- tional force was on the way to join him. Before day he also received a telegram informing him that large reinforcements to the extent of some 2000 or 3000 had crossed over from Buffalo and joined the Fenians. The news of the enemy being augmented to an extent that would have given them a great preponderance over his com- • It turned out afterwards that the force wo had seen were the regular line of Fenian pickets, and that seeing us push on tliey had retreated into Fort Erie, reporting that they had been driven in by a detachment of the British cavalry. This statement of theirs was published very generally in the papers. 56 MOVEMENTS OF COL. PEACOCK'S COLUMN. mand, and the knowledge that reinforcements for himself were within two or three hours aiarch of him caused him to decide to wait until these other forces came within supporting distance before he moved to the attack, and it being then breaking day he ordi!red rations to be distributed an the men to prepare their breakfasts ; after they had made a rough meal, it being then about 5 o'clock, he decided to move on at once without waiting longer, thinking that his reinforcements would come up before the action (which the whole force ex- pected was about to take place) had fairly commenced. The troops were preparing to fall in when Lieut. -Col. Cameron rode into uavnp and said he had heard the Fenians had gone. Col. Peacock about the same time requested me to ride on with my command and reconnoitre, sending him back all the information I could obtain. I shall now leave Col. Peacock preparing to start and describe what took place on the Tug " Robb " and the pro- ceedings of the force that left Port Colborne in it. i ifi'i ■ CHAPTER VII. THE EXPEDITION ON THE TUG " ROBB." m ■j\n and pro- In a former chapter it will be remembered that we stated that Col. Peacock, in forming his plan of campaign, decided, as a portion ol it, to send a vei«sel round from Port Colborne to Fort Erie, to patrol the river and prevent, if possible, rein forcements coming over, or the Fenians from escaping. It will also be remembered that Lieut.-Col. Dennis, in carrying out his orders, telegraphed for the Tug " Robb," from Dun- ville, which came down under Captain L. McCallum who also brought with him a portion of his company, the DunnviUe Naval Brigade, and that on its arrival the Welland Canal Field Battery, under command of Captain R. S. King of Port Robinson (being armed with Enfield Rifles) were placed upon it, and that Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Captain Akers proceeded to the Niagara River to patrol between Fort Erie and Black Creek. On passing down the river they saw the enemy's camp at Frenchman's Creek, which had been evacuated by the Fenians about 9 p.m. the previous evening ; they moved on down as far as Black Creek, carefully examining the shore, but seeing no signs of any armed force. They went ashore there and were informed the enemy had moved from their camp during the night. After getting all the information possible from the inhabitants, they went back to Fort Erie, in order to keep their appointment with Lieut.-Col. Booker at eight, in accordance with the plan which, as before stated, had been agreed upon between them before starting. As Lieut.-Col. Booker and his command did not appear, Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Captain Akers came to the conclusion that Col. Peacock had disap- proved of their plan, and that Lieut.-Col. Booker was carrying out the original arrangement. Col. Dennis then landed the artillery company, and desired EXPEDITION ON THE TUG " ROBB." 4-1 - Captain Akers, with one half of it, to proceed inland about a mile and a-half or two miles, and to patrol down one of the side roads which lead to the river, in the direction of Black Creek ; and ordered Captain King to patrol by the River Road in the same direction, with the other half of his command. These two parties, consisting of about 25 men in each, picked up a few stragglers, and took over some prisoners which had been captured by the citizens, and, meeting at some distance from Fort Erie, the whole company marched on by the River Road towards Chippawa. After landing the artillery. Col. Dennis went on with the Tug to Black Creek, which is about eight miles from Fort Erie ; in consequence of the swiftness of the current he reached that place while the force with Captains King and Akers were yet five or six miles from it. Between Fort Erie and Black Creek there is no dock at which the " Robb " could have put in to have embarked the artillery, consequently that corps, for some two or three hours, were blundering about inside (as we may say) the Fenian lines, and part of that time divided, without any opportunity of support if attacked, and without the slightest chance of escape in case of defeat. It was the merest accident that the fate which befel this command in the afternoon of the same day did not overtake them at any moment on this march. What was to be gained by sending them on shore, and especially by dividing them, cannot readily be imagined. The few prisoners that were captured, mere stragglers as they were, were certainly not worth the risk of disaster that was undergone in taking them, especially when it is considered that the object for which the vessel was sent was to prevent the escape of the whole force, and to secure its ultimate surrender. Col. Dennis, on arriving at Black Creek the second time, communicated with the rear end of Col. Peacock's column, which, as we have seen, marched up the river road as far as that place, and then turned inland towards New Germany. He did not see Col. Peacock, however, as that officer was EXPEDITION ON THE TV(i " ROBB." 59 riding at the head of the advanced j^iard, and was by that time some distance in the interior. Colonel Dennis, on his returning to Fort Erie, met Captains King and Akers, and the force with them, about two miles from Black Creek. They were embarked by means of small boats and all the prisoners were taken on board and placed below ; this occupied some little lime. The Tug then pro- ceeded up the river as far as the village of Fort F.rie, where she was moored to the dock, and a portion of the Artillery landed and some more prisoners which had been taken by the citizens of the place were taken over and placed on board. After staying there some time, Col Dennis, and Captain Akers, decided to leave the Welland Canal Field Battery* at Fort* Erie in charge of the prisoners and to go round with the tug to Port Colborne for information and further orders. Captain King remonstrated against this, and especially against leaving the prisoners with him, for fear of their being rescued. Dr. Kempson, also advised them not to leave them. It was de- cided however to billet the artillery in the village, and arrange- ments were being made to carry it out, when parties began to arrive from the interior, with news that the Fenians were coming in full force from the west, and that a battle had been fought on Ridge Road. Lieut.-Col. Dennis, and Captain Akers, did not seem to lay much stress on this information, for Captain Akers, took a buggy and went off in the direction of the Railway tele- graph office up the river to see if telegraphic communication had been reopened between Fort Erie and Port Colborne. Before he could get back the Fenians had cut him off from his '■ m I i t ■f * N.B..— It i8 to be distinctly remembered that although called a Field Battery this corps was little else than an infantry company armed with Enfield Rifles. Their guns bad been taken away from them some months before, from a fear that they might not be able to defend them in the exposed place in which they arc situated at Port Robinson. The noble way in which these brave fellows in spite of this discouragement, fought against ten times their number, proved thitt the gOTe. nment did not appreciate their value, and has since had the effect of causing their guns to be restored to them. EXPEDITION ON THE TUO " ROBB." ' i ' 1:^ H If :' force, and he made for Port Colborne by way of the Lake shore. Col. Dennis, after repealed solicitations from Captain King, allowed the men to embark on board the tug. They were scarcely all on board when he came over from a house which he had been using as a sort of head quarters and ordered them all on shore again, except a small portion of the Naval Com- pany. The force landed consisted of about 52 artillery and 18 of the Naval corps. He led them on to the road running along the front of the village between il and the dock and marched them up towards the Railway Station. A body of the I nians were by this time coming down the road. The Volunteers were drawn up in line to meet them, but, almost immediately, a very large force appeared along the top of the hill (which runs parallel to the river at the distance of about 300 yards) they were moving northwards as if to surround them. The firing began at once, and after a volley or two Captain King, seeing they were outnumbered ten to one, ordered them to break, and get under cover, and tight independently, as they were thoroughly exposed in the position in which they were placed. At this time Lieut.-Col. Dennis, seeing he would soon be cut off ran down the river for about a quarter of a mile with two artillery men, and took refuge in Mr. Thomas' house, the three concealed themselves, the artillerymen were captured, but Col. Dennis, escaped and disguising himself made his way through the enemy's lines, and joined Col. Peacock in the night. The remainder under Capt. King getting cover behind a pile of cordwood, and behind houses and fences kept up a heavy fire, keeping the Fenians at bay for some 15 or 20 min- utes. About 25 or 30 who had taken refuge in the house of Mr. George Lewis the Postmaster, fought desperately for some time longer firing out of the hcuse with the greatest spirit, in- flicting heavy loss upon the Fenians. This house was a wooden one clapboarded on the outside, and lathed and plastered on the inside, and consequently afforded no protec- EXPEDITION ON THE TUG " ROBB." ef shore. King, ■ were which i them Com- nd 18 mning k and )ody of The almost 3 of the f about dthem. aptain td them I as they ey were lid soon ile with use, the aptured, his way k in the ehind a jpt up a 20 min- louse of for some pirit, in- : was a lied and ) protec- tion against the bullets, which whistled through it by scores. When our forces entered Fort Erie this building showed proofs of the desperate nature of the fight which had taken place about it. The walls were perfectly riddled, one small room having some 32 bullet holes through it, all the windows were broken, and it seems a perfect miracle that any of them es- caped. Seeing at length that it was impossible to prolong the resistance, this gallant little band of men were obliged to surrender. Those who with Capt. King fought around the pile of cord- wood behaved with the greatest gallantry, fighting desperately against overwhelming odds even until the Fenians had closed in upon them, some of them using the bavonet freely. There is no doubt that one man was killed by a bayonet thrust while endeavouring to effect an entrance into Lewis' house, and I myself found among the prisoners taken by my command the next morning, one man who had a terrible bayonet wound in his chest close up to his neck, this man was wounded by one of those fighting with Capt. King. Capt. King himself behaved nobly, he stayed with his men encouraging them to fight to the last, and even when struck to the ground by a shot that caused him the loss of his leg, he still cheered on his men setting the example by emptying his revolver at the Fenians while lying on the ground. Seeing the enemy closing in upon him, and not wishing to be taken, he rolled himself off the dock into the river, and was carried by the current under the wharf used by the Waterloo ferry boat, where he held on to one of the piles keeping himself above water. After the fight was over he was taken out by some of the citizens and was sent over to Buffalo with Col. O'Neil's consent. It would be useless to particularise instances of bravery in this affair, where all behaved so well, Capt. L. McCallum, with fifteen men, after fighting gallantly for some time, re- treated along the river road, firing as thoy went, and were able, some distance down the river, to got on board the tug, i fii 3f -ill u I J' 62 EXPEDITION ON THE TUG " ROBb/' which had been set adrift by the officer in charge, who saw that the vessel would, probably, be captured in case he delayed. This little force, without doubt, in this affair, covered itself with glory ; and, to them is due the highest post in the roll of honour in this campaign. Although completely overpowered, they fought to the last, suffering severely, several brave fellows, including the Captain, losing limbs, and many others being seriously wounded. As a proof of the pertinacity and stub- bornness with which they fought, it may be stated that they killed and wounded more Fenians than had the Queen's Own and 13th both together at the fight at Ridge way the same morning. Col. Bailey, one of the F 3nian leaders who commanded the attacking pirty, was shot through the body while bravely riding at the head of his men leading them on. His being mounted drew all the fire on him, and he was very soon brought down, although the wound was thought mortal at the time, strange to say he has recovered from it. He was the only Fenian officer of rank wounded in the raid. The Fenians lost at Ridge way six men killed dead, and probably one or two may have died since — how many were wounded it is impossible to say. At the engagement at Fort Erie seven were killed and a great many wounded, some of whom afterwards died. This was the entire loss, although the general impression has been that the loss was much greater. Wild stories have been circulated of immense graves filled with Fenian dead, and waggon loads carried away, but there is not a word of truth in them. They arc only the effects of the strong imaginative powers of that class of people who indulge their love for the marvellous at the expense of the truth. The result of this fight was the loss of the whole expedition. The two commanding officers were wandering about the coun- try, the main body of the men captured or lying wounded, about the village, the Captain of the Artillery struck down with KXPEDITION ON THE TUO " ROBB." 63 the loss of a leg, and the " Tug " almost denuded of men, and the few left so hampered with a lot of worthless prisoners as to be unable to undertake anything. Capt. McCallum finding he had no force with which to effect anything, decided to go back to Port Colborne and place the prisoners in safely. In doing so he was obliged to run the gauntlet of the fire of th(i Fenians who posted along the shore, kept up a heavy fire on them as they were steaming past, fortunately no one was hurt, the only effect being a num" ber of bullet marks in the vessel. It was most unfortunate that Col. Dennis and Capt. Akers so exceeded their instructions as to land their command at all. Col. Peacock would never for one moment have author- ized the disembarkation of so small a force, especially as there was no object to be gained by it. It is remarkable that neither of these officers and one of them an engineer officer, should have thought of trying to strengthen the bulwarks of their ves- sel, and place her in as favourable a condition for fighting as possible. There was a pile of cord wood on the dock at Fort Erie and plenty also at Black Creek, if that had been piled up against the bulwarks, sloping up from the inside it would have made them musket proof, and the men could have fought behind a defence of that kind with comparative safety. The wheel could also have been protected m a somewhat sim- ilar manner, and then the vessel and its crew could have mov- ed about with perfect impunity. What was to have been gained by landing the men at Fort Erie cannot be imagined. Why these officers should give up the advantage of their vessel to fight ten times their number on shore is perfectly unaccountable. Had they barricaded the vessel and staid in the stream they could have made the village too hot to hold the enemy, and would, without doubt, have inflicted great loss on them, and have prevented vessels from coming over to lake them away, or if they had come over could have run them down if they attempted to leave. Even had they been unsuccessful in all these points still it Il r It ;i 1 i li V I 64 EXPEDITION ON THK TUO " ROBB." would have been better than as it turned out, for they would not have been separated from their command, and would have had the satisfaction of knowing that they had obeyed orders,. a satisfaction which under the present circumstances they are deprived of. m are CHAPTER VIII; THE FENIAN MOVEMENTS. In a former chapter an account was given of the manner in which the Fenians effected their crossing and their movements until they camped at Frenchman's Creek on Friday, the first of June. They remained there until about 9 or 10 o'clock that even- ing, when they again took up the line of march and set off in the direction of Chippawa, by the river road. After marching some two or three miles they turned off from the river by a cross road that comes out quite close to McCarfy's farm ; they then marched westward until they came to the Black Creek, and, spreading out upon both sides of the road, they camped in the anijle formed by the Creek and the Niagara River, keeping the Creek between them and Chippawa. In this place they were quite close to the railway track. Their position here was admirable. How they happened to discover it so soon is extraordinary, and tends to show that they must have had the ground reconnoitred, and the position of their camp chosen, before they came over. The Black Creek, rising to the south-west of Stevensville, runs in a general north-easterly direction, and empties itself into the Niagara River, about eight miles from Fort Erie, at the village which takes its name from the stream. It is very sluggish, running through a marsh for a portion of its course, and for two or three miles from its mouth appears quite deep and unfordable. Its left bank on approaching the river is low and marshy, while on the right bank, close to the stream, a ridge about ten feet high and about thirty or forty yards wide, runs parallel to it nearly as far as the river. This ridge is covered with trees, and forms a natural entrenchment in rear of the stream, which makes a natural moat in front of it. There are only two or three bridges across Black Creek al 66 THE FENIAN MOVEMENTS. l! '■' ' i'- in N HI •I this place. There is a good deal of bush on the southerly side of the stream, while the fields on the other bank are open and cultivated for half a mile back. Behind this creek, taking advantage of the cover obtained by the ridge, and the obstruc- tion afforded by the stream, the Fenians made their camp. Had Colonel Peacock pushed on by rail on Friday night with a pilot engine, (that popular idea of an advanced guard), as some of the press have been abusing him for not doing, he would have received the summary chastisement his reckless- ness and want of judgment would have so richly deserved. The Fenians knew he was at Chippawa with a force of artil-' lery and infantry, and mig''t probably come on in the night, so they moved up to Black Creek and were ready to waylay him if he attempted it. After remaining there and resting some three or four hours they obtained accurate information from Port Colborne that a force of volunteers were there, and that they were preparing to move down by rail towards Fort Erie. It will be remem- bered that the force at Port Colborne were put in the cars about twelve o'clock that night ; the Fenians heard of it about three o'clock on Saturday morning, and at once set off for Ridge way, in order, if possible, to meet the volunteers and defeat them before the force under Colonel Peacock could move to their assistance. After breakfasting they accordingly set off for Ridgeway, marching up the right bank of the Black Creek for about two miles or more, and then turning to the east as far as a side road which strikes the Ridge road at a place called Orchard's farm, and thence they followed the Ridge road until they came to the battle ground. I was much struck while driving along this road with the ability with which their route was chosen. It may have been the result of accident, or they may have decided uj)on it by design, but under any circumstances the local features of the ground wer.; certainly most favorable for their purpose. During this maroh the only way in which they had reason to oxpect an attack was from their right flank, and Ifil THE FENIAN MOVEMENTS. 6T for two miles this was thoroughly protected by the marshy stream, which, with its thick shrubbery and tall trees, formed an impenetrable screen, behind which they pursued their march with perfect safety. The road they used was an old track through woods and low ground which had been fenced up, but was opened out by them as they went along. So bad was the road that they lost an ammunition waggon in one of the bogs they were obliged to go through. This march at early day break was so skilfully and secretly effected that for many days after they left their movments were a perfect mystery, their real line of march has never before been published to my knowledge, and it was only after close investigation that I was able to discover it accurately. After leaving the bank of the Black Creek *he Fenians as be- fore stated moved by a side line on to the Ri^ge Road, which runs along on the top of the Limestone Ridge, which extends in a circular direction from Lake Erie around to the Niagara River ; to the west of this ridge where they came upon it for a mile and a half or two miles wide, extends an unbroken plain of open cultivated fields, on which troops could be seen dis- tinctly for two or three miles if coming from that direction. If, therefore, the Fenians had been attacked at any point on this march on their right tlank, by merely facing to the right they occupied a beautiful position on tlie top of a hill, 30 or 40 feet high, tliickly covered with shade trees and woods, which would hide their position and give them cover, while the broad expanse of level unbroken coimtry ibrmed a glacis that would not afford the slightest cover to an attacking force against the heavy lire that might l)e brought to bear against them. Along this ridi;e might be erected a splendid line of works to cover Fort Erie if it was usod ns a bast! by an army attacking Canada. While the Fenians were marciiit)g along the Road, a short distance from the scene of the fight, a few mounted scouts who were some distance in advance heard the whistle of the locomotive of the train which at this time was just arriving at f: It' ! 69 THE FENIAN MOVEMENTS. Ridgeway Station, with the forces under Lieut.-Col. Booker. They immediately halted and listened and soon after hearing bugle sounds they went back and met the main force, which on receipt of the information was at once halted and closed up in its formation ; they then moved on until they came to the fence dividing Hoffman's from Kirkpatrick's farm, where the mounted men had already turned in, and here the main body were posted along that fence as stated in the chapter relating to the battle ; about half or more were then moved on to the cross road and the rail barricade already referred to was hastily constructed, while a few advanced skirmishers were thrown forward almost as far as the Garrison road. In this position they awaited the attack, their numbers being between 750 and 800 men. After the retreat of our forces they followed them at a respectable distance, as far as Ridgeway and a short distance beyond, when they were recalled, and during the afternoon marched back by the Garrison Road into Fort Erie, where they came upon the Welland Canal Field Battery and Dunn- ville Naval Company as already described. After defeating them, when night came on, the leaders hearing of the near approach of Col. Peacock's force, and of its numbers, desired either to be reinforced or to withdraw. At first it seems to have been decided by the leaders in Buffalo to reinforce them and a very large force was embarked for that purpose, but whether they were afraid that they would not succeed in eluding the vigilance of the United Stales vessels which were patrolling the river, or that they would be unable to effect a crossing of sufficient numbers to ensure success it is impossi- ble to say ; but the result was that the Fenians in Canada were to be withdrawn. A scow was taken over by a Tug and they were loaded upon it and taken out into the river where they were arrested by the Tug Harrison, and being taken down the stream were moored under the guns of the U. S. Revenue Cutter Michigan. A few days after they were taken on shore and released. It was the loading of the scows THE tENlAS MOVEMKNTS, r.9 in Buffalo with reinforcements thai led to Col. Peacock being informed in the night that 2000 or 3000 more Fenians had crossed. Before closing this chapter I must mention that from all accounts the Fenians, except in so far as they were wrong in invading a peaceful country, in carrying on an unjustifiable war, behaved remarkably well to the inhabitants, I spent three weeks in Fort Erie and conversed with dozens of the people of the place, and was astonished at the universal teslimony borne by them to the unvarying good conduct of this rabble while among them. They claimed food and horses, but they can hardly be blamed for that as an act of war, but can only be blamed because the war itself, which alone could give them the right to t^ke these things was unjustifiable and wicked. They have been called plunderers, robbers and marauders, yet, no matter how unwilling we may be to admit il, the posi- tive fact remains, that they stole but few valuables, that they destroyed, comparatively speaking, little or nothing, and that they committed no outiages on the inhabitants, but treated every one with unvarying courtesy. It seems like a perfect burlesque io see a ragged rabble without a government, country or flag, affecting chivalrous sentiments and doing acts, that put one in mind of the days of knight errantry. On taking a number of the VVelland Battery and the Naval Company prisoners they treated them with the greatest kind- ness, putting the officers under their parole and returning them their side arms, taking them down to the wharf on their depar- ture and releasing them, bidding them adieu with expressions of good will. Another incident occurred worth mentioning. A number of them went to a widow lady's hduse near Fort Erie, and asked her for something to eat. They were about going into the kitchen to sit down, and she told them she would not let them in, they laughingly replied, " very well maam, we'll do here very well, it is a very nice yard," and accordingly they sat 70 THE FENIAN MOVEMENTS. :t:i I IN U' "I J) , ♦'■■ down on the grass and ate the bread and butter and milk that she gave them. Another squad in the same wr.y took break- fast there. In the evening, a man came ragged and tired, looking for something to eat. Seeing a loaf of bread on the table, he took it up. The lady said, " That is the last loaf I have." The man looked at her and said slowly, " Is that the last loaf of bread you have? " "Then I'll not take it ; " and laid it on the window-sill. Seeing this, she asked him lo take half. After pressing it upon him, he at length took a portion of it. This story is un- doubtedly tiue, as I obtained it from the lady herself, with whom I am intimately acquainted. It perhaps does not come with good grace from a Canadian to give any credit to the Fenians, who without any ground of complaint against us invade our country, and cause the loss of valuable lives among us, but as a truthful narrator of facts, I must give them credit on the only ground on which they can claim it. 't k that break- tired, on the loaf I lat the " and CHAPTER IX. OCCUPATION OF FORT ERIE BY OUR FORCES. In the sixth chapter we left Col. Peacock just preparing to start when Lieut.-Col. Cameron came in with a rumour that the Fenians had evacuated Fort Erie. It was also stated that Col. Peacock had ordered the " Governor General's Body Guard " to ride on in the direction of Fort Erie, to reconnoitre and send back information to him as received. I at once moved on with my command down the road lead- ing to the Lower Ferry, and inquired from all the farmers that I met the petition and number of the Fenians. It was only about 5 a.m. and not many people were stirring, but they all agreed in stating that a large force of Fenians were in the woods on our right, where we had heard they were the night before ; these stories were so confirmed by every one I saw, that by the time I reached the river I felt rather conAdent that my retreat to Col. Peacock's column was cut off. On coming in sight of the river we saw a scow black with men crowded upon it, who had just been emptying their rifles into the stream ; wishing to obtain accurate information before sending back to Col. Peacock I went to a gentleman who lived almost opposite to where the scow was lying, and was told by him that the men on it were a reinforcement which had been prevented from crossing, and that the Fenians were still on our side.* Fearing that Col. Peacock might be under the impression they had gone, and feeling that my command was cut off from his force, I sent an orderly to him at full speed with the substance of the information I had received, sending back, at the same time, a small patrol to give notice * This mistake was occasioned by the fact that the tug after capturing the Bcow up the river took it down by the American side, and then turned outwards and moTed over to the middle of the stream, where it was moored; seeing it came from the far side he concluded it was a reinforcement. ii u ii n OCCUPATION OF FORT £RIB BY ODR FORCES. m I: ",,t of any force that might attempt to close round our rear, and also detached a number of scouts into the interior, to the right and up the river road towards Fort Erie, to search the woods and give notice of the approach of the enemy, whilst I pro- ceeded up the bank in search of a boat, in order to go on board the Michigan. By the kindness of Mr. Molesworth, Civil Engineer, 1 was enabled to reach the Michigan, and was informed by Captain Bryson that the men he had cap- tured were the main force, that had been in Canada, and that he did not believe there were many left. On reaching the shore I sent a despatch to Col. Peacock stating these facts and stating that the first information I had sent him was incdrrect. This dispatch was about fifteen minutes after the first. Recalling .some of the scouts we then proceeded on the gallop up the river road towards Fort Erie, being informed by the people we met that a number of Fenians were still there ; on coming in sight of the village we saw men dodging in every direction, but when we got up nearly all were hidden or gone ; muskets, bayonets, and belts were scattered along the road, where men had dropped them in their flight ; a few prisoners were taken by us and the wounded were placed under a guard. Here we saw a number of the men who had been captured^ in the fight in Fort Erie, they received us with great manifes- tations of delight. We ourselves were greatly relieved on seeing them, as news had arrived in the camp the night be- fore to the effect that the whole command, with the exception of four, had been killed and thrown into the river. After placing guards over the prisoners and over the arms, which were lying on the dock, the men and horses were billeted in the taverns, as both were nearly used up by about 40 hours almost continuous exertions. We reached Fort Erie about 6 a.m. Col. Peacock shortly after our departure from his camp started for Fort Erie, turning to the right immediately on OCCUPATION OF FORT ERII BY OUR FORCES. 73 r, and right voods I pro- go on w^orth, 1, and 1 cap- id that ng the 5 facts n was ter the on the ned by there ; jing in hidden i along a few placed aptured^ [lanifes- ved on ight be- [ception After }, which leted in 10 hours le about IS camp ately on leaving his camp, and moving down to the next cros? road. With one portion of his command he took that route to the village, sending the other portion under command of Lieut.-Col. Villiers down in the direction of the Lake shore. Just as he was starting he received the first message sent to him by me, to the effect that there was still a body of Fenians about the old Fort. He consequently threw out skirmishers, and advanced in proper order to secure them. He soon re- ceived my second message contradicting the jfirst, but he heard eo many stories from the people similar to those which had at first imposed upon me, all corroborating each other, that he continued his march with skirmishers thrown out. A few stragglers were seen, and four reported shot, one of whom un- fortunately turned out to be a farmer in the neighbourhood, who had foolishly armed himself with a Fenian musket and bayonet which he was taking home as relics of the raid. This column afterwards captured a number of stragglers in the woods. While Col. Peacock was marching in by the west and south west, CoL Lowry with 4 guns under Capt. Crowe, R.A., the Oakville Riflles under Col. Chisholm, a battalion of Simcoe Volunteers under Lieut.-Col. Stephen, in all about 500 men, after having staid at Clifton over night, left there at 3.40 a.m. for Black Creek, and waited at that place until he was joined by 200 rank and file of the 60th Rifles under Capt. Traverse and 140 of the 16th under Capt. Hogge, who had been at New Germany during the night, while waiting for them, Lieut.- Col. the Hon. J. H. Cameron went on in a pilot engine to ex- amine the state of the road, on his report that the road was passable. Col. Lowry moved on to Frenchman's Creek where he unloaded his force from the cars, and sending some skir- mishers into the woods moved out to the river, and there was informed by Col. Wolsely who had passed on horse-back to the front that they were too late, that the Fenians had escaped. He then marched onto Fort Erie, reaching there about 8.15 a.m. Col. Peacock arrived shortly after. 74 OCCdPATlON Ot fORT EftlE BY 6Vn rOftCfiS. The column at Port Colborne being placed under the com- mand of Capt. Akers, by Col. Lowry with the consent of the officers, was also ordered in the night to move down in the direction of Fort Erie tc j>artake in the engagement which it was thought would ^ pbce on isunday. At 3 a.m. Capt. i. 3rs c dered the reveille to sound, and arrangements were made for '^ 'ing out rations and ammuni- tion. At 5 o'clock he started by rail towards Eort Erie with about 1000 men, preceded by a pilot engine, leaving the 13tlr behind to guard Port Colborne. Arriving at Shirks' crossing, he disembarked the men and threw out a line of skirmishers with supports from the 7th P.A.O., with orders f3r the flank supporters to wheel outwards and extend at once in case of any sign of flank attack. In this order he advanced to the Garrison road, and by that tt> Fort Erie. After resting the men for about an hour at the scene of the battle of the day before, the command marched quietly into Fort Erie, and were encamped on the high ground above the village, where the other corps had already been stationed. By noon on Sunday, about 3500 men were con- centrated on the heights above Fort Erie, while the 13th Battalion held Port Colborne, and a battalion of 450 men Tinder command of Lieiit.-Col. Robert B. Denison were sta- tioned at Clifton to hold the Suspension Bridge. The force at Fort Erie was reduced during Monday and Tuesday the 4th and 5th June, to about 3000 men which were detained there for three weeks watching the proceedings of some 0000 or 8000 Fenians, who were said to have gathered jn Buffalo and intended to effect another crossing, after some days these Fenians were sent to their homes, the United! States Government furnishing their transportation, and there- upon the main portion of our force were sent home, 800 men and 6 guns, without cavalry, beingf detained on the frontier for some three weeks longer. % , Sn O ; com' of the in the hich it d, and mmuni- ic with tie 13llr en and the 7th itwards ck. In that to at the Hatched ground iy been ere con- he 13th 150 men vere sta- day and ich were dings of gathered fterr some 3 United nd there- 800 men J frontier APPENDIX LIST OF OFFICERS PRESENT AT THE BATTLE RIDGEWAY. )F "queen's own." Major Charles J. Gillmor. No. 1 Company. — Captain Brown, Lieut. Davids, Ensign ?ahey. No. 2. — Captain Dixon, Lieut. Morrison, Ensign Benr tt. No. 3. — Captain Boustead, Lieut. Beaven, Ensign Wli n. No. 4. — Captain Douglas, Lieut. Arthurs, Ensign Davis. No. 5. — Captain Edwards, Lieut. Lee, Ensign McEachren. No. 6. — Captain Adam, Lieut. Campbell, Ensign McLean. No. 7« — Captain McPherson, Acting Lieut. Stinson, Acting Ensign Smith. No. 8. — Captain Sherwood, Lieut. O'Reilly. No. 9. — Acting Captain Whitney (Trinity College Company). No. 10. — Captain Gardner, Lieut. Ramsay, Ensign Gibson. Paymaster W. H. Harris, Quartermaster Jackson, Adjutant W. D. Otter, Surgeon J. Thorburn, Assistant Surgeon May. 13th battalion. Majors Skinner and Cattley. No. 1 Company. — Captain Grant, Lieut. Gibson, Ensign McKenzie, No. 2. — Captain Watson, Lieut. Sewell, Ensign Baker. No. 3. — Lieut. Ferguson, Ensign Armstrong. No. 4. — Lieut. Routh, Ensign J. B. Young. No. 5. — Captain Askin, Lieut. Ritchie. No. 6. — Ensign Roy. ' Adjutant Henery. YORKRIFLES. Captain Davis. Lieut. Davis, Ensign Hill. CALEDONIA RIFLES. Captain Jackson, Lieut. Thorburn, Ensign Cbrystal, Ensign Mc^ Kinuou (attached). V: 76 APPENDIX. LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED AT THE BATTLE OF RIDGEWAY. Killed. — Ensign Malcolm McEachren, No. 5 Company, "Queen's Own" Rifles. Sergeant II. Matheson, No. 1, ditto. Private Christo- pher Alderson, No. 7, ditto. Private M. Defries, No. ,3, ditto. Private W. F. Tempest, No. 9, ditto. Private William Smith, No. 2, ditto. Private J. II. Mewburn, No. 9, ditto. Private M. McKenzie, No. 9, ditto. Private F. Lackie, No. -, ditto. Wounded. — Captain J. B. Boustead, No. 3 Company, "Queen's Own" Rifles. Lieut. J. H. BeaAcn, No. 3, ditto. Lieut. W. C. Campbell, No. G, ditto. Ensign Fahey, No. 1, ditto. Color Sergeant Forbes McIIardy, No. 10, ditto. Private C F. Bell, No. 5, ditto. Private W. Vandersmissen, No. 9, ditto. Private Kingsford, No. 9, ditto. Private John White, No. 10, ditto. Private Paul Bobbins, No. 6, ditto. Private Thomas Oulster, No. I, ditto. Private William Thompson, No. 2, ditto. Private Charles Winter, No. 3, ditto. Private Colin Forsyth, No. 10, ditto, Private Edward Copp, No. 5, ditto. Private J. H. Rutherford, No. 6, ditto. Private E. J. Pater- son, No. 9 ditto. Private Joseph Lugsden, No. 4, ditto. Private Alexander Muir, No. 10, ditto. Private E. T. Paul, No. 9 ditto., Sergeant William Foster, No. 7, ditto. Color Sergeant John Tuck? York Rifles. Private Robert Cranston, ditto. Lieut. Routh, and 6 Privates, 13th Battalion. i : ■, Adjutant General's Office, Ottawa, 21st June, 1866, The following reports relating to the Volunteer Force have been received by His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, and are now published for the information of all concerned. P. L. MacDOUGALL, Colonel, Adjutant General of Militia. Fort Erie, 4th June, 1866. [Copy.] Sir, I have the honor to make the following report of my operations in the Field since the 1st instant. In compliance with a telegram received from you, I joined at 2 o'clock, at Hamilton, with 200 men of my own Battn.^ the force pro- pnrl thai ed givf APPXNDIX. •n E OF Queen's :hristo- Privftte , ditto. No. 9, Queen's W. C. lergeant 3, ditto. , No. 9, lobbins, William 1, ditto. , No. 5, r. Pater- Private 9 ditto™ in Tucky 1866, ave been I are now • nel, )f Militia. (, 1866. 'rations in tined at S^ force pro- ceeding from Toronto to St. Catharines consisting of one Batty- Royl. Arty., under the command of Lt. Col. Hoste, C. B., and 200 men, 47th llegt. under the command of Major Lodder. You had also placed under my Command, for the defence of the frontier, 7 Cos. Volunteer Force stationed at St. Catharines, under the Command of Lieut. Col. Currie, the Queen's Own Regt. of Volun- teers at Port Colborne, under , and the 13th Batt. Volunteer Militia commanded by Lt. Col. Booker, at Dunnville, and you had in- formed me that I should be re-inforced at St. Catharines that evening by 800 men. Your instructions were that I was to make St. Catharines my base, to act according to my own discretion as to advancing on Clifton or elsewhere, and to attack the enemy as soon as I could do so with a force sufficient to ensure success. On arriving at St. Catharines I received telegrams to the effect that the Fenians, about 800 strong, were marching on the suspension bridge and were actually 2 or 3 miles from Chippawa. I pushed on imme- diately to the bridge, leaving orders for all troops arriving at St Catha- rines to follow as soon as possible. On reaching the Bridge I heard the enemy had not yet reached Chippawa, and, being anxious to save the bridge over the creek, I pressed on with the 400 Infantry in the train, preceded by a Pilot Engine, the Battery marching by road in consequence of the reported want of platform accommodation at the Chippawa Station. It was dark when we arrived at Chippawa. We bivouacked there that night. I here received numerous reports from scouts sent out by Mr. Kirk- patrick, the Reeve. They agreed generally in the statement that the Fenians had entrenched themselves roughly a little below Fort Erie, at Frenchman's Creek avd had sent on a party towards Chippawa. Their strength was variously estimated from 800 to 1,500. I resolved on effecting a junction with the force at Port Colbornei to which place I had already ordered the Battn. from Dnnnville. With this object in view, I selected Stevensville as the point of junc- tion and having explained to Captain Akers, Royal Engineers, who accompanied the force from Toronto, what my object was, and that this point was chosen because, judging from the information received we could not be anticipated at it by the evening. I despatched that Officer at 12 'o'clock to communicate with the Officer Commdg. at Port Colborne, to make him conversant with my views, and to order him to meet me at Stevensville between 10 and 11 o'clock next morning, informing him that I should start at 6 o'clock. I continued to send out scouts during the night, and to receive re- ports which made me believe that my information was correct, and that the enemy had not left their camp. At about 2 o'clock I received a telegram from Col. Booker, dispatch- ed before he was joined by Captain Akers, informing me that he had given orders to attack the enemy at Fort Erie. 18 APPENDIX. .141 At about 3:3Ul received another one from Cnptain Akcrs, dispatch- ed after he had reached Port Colborne, sayinf; that the enemy was iit French Creek, and proposing that Lt. Col. Looker's force should advance on Fort Erie and join us at Frenchman's Creek. At about 4:30 o'clock 1 was joined by the 7 ('os. of Volunteer Force from St. Catharines, formed into a Battalion 350 stronj?, under Lt. Colonel Currie, and by the expected reinforcement under Lt. Col. Vil- licrs, 47th Regt., which consisted of 150 men 47th and of the 10th Royals 415 strong, under Major Boxall. The Volunteers being unprovided with means of carrying provisions and of cooking them, had not been able to oomply with an order I had sent the previous evening, that they were to bring provisions in their Haversacks. I saw that the absolute necessity of furnishing them with some would cause delay, and I telegraphed to Fort Colborne that I should be one hour later in starting. "We marched at 7 o'clock, leaving the Garrison, Volunteer Batty, from St. Catharines, under Captain Stoker, to hold Chippawa. The day was oppressively hot, and our guides took us by a road much longer than necessary. When about 3 miles from StevensTiUe, at about 1 1 o'clock, I received a few lines from Lt. Col. Booker, writ- ten at 7:30 o'clock, to the effect that, he had just received my telegram, but that he was attacked in force by the enemy at a place 3 miles south of Stevcnsville. At the same time I received information that he had retired on Ridgeway. I encam])cd a mile further on at a small place called New Germany, across a roau leading due south to Stevcnsville.. At about 4 o'clock, having gathered information that the enemy was falling back on Fort Erie, 1 left everything behind which would encumber the men, and started to follow them. At the moment of starting we received an important accession to our strength by the arrival of the Cavalry Body Guard of His Excellency the Governor General, 55 strong, under Major Denison. We marched until dark, and halted 2^ miles from Fort Erie, the men sleeping on their arms and due precaution being observed. During the night I sent out scouts to collect information. It ap- peared that the Fenians on retiring had posted themselves at once near the old Fort ; some said they had been reinforced, some that they were attempting to recross into the United States. I also heard that 3 Cos. 16th Regt. and 3 Cos. 60th Rifles had arrived at our vacated camp at New Germany and that a force had reached Black Creek, also that 10 more companies of Volunteer Militia had arrived at Port Colborne. The Volunteer Garrison Battery which I had left at Chippawa joined me during the night. Anxious to prevent the escape of the Fenians, I sent word to the Officers Comdg. at those three places that I was going to attack Fort Erie, and asked when they would be able to co-operate. M; gii APPENDIX. 79 Force Lt. Vil- 10th Subsequently, fresh reports of attempts of the Fenians to escape having reached me, I determined on advancinsj at once. We were about to move when Lt. Col. the llonble. John Ilillyard Cameron, came into Camp and informed me that they had escaped. This intclliiience caused gre^t mortification in my little force. 1 de- sired Major Dcnisou to scour the country and enter the town ; he sent me a message that he was informed that there were still a body of Fenians about the old Fort. We at once marched in that direction skirmishing tlirough the woods though Major Denison soon informed us that they really had es- caped, as many scouts and farm people assured us thry had not escap- ed. We took a long sweep through the woods, our riglit on Lake Erie ; a few stragglers were seen and 4 reported shot. On entering; the Old Fort traces were found of its bavins; been re- cently occupied. During the short operation which extended only over forty hours, the troops under my command underwent very great fatigue, and bore it with the best spirit and great cheerfulness. I received all possible support and co-oj)cration from ofiicers of all ranks, the conduLt of the men was excellent — a great nuuiijer of pri- vate individuals rendered me services; in various ways and the inhabitants generally displayed a good and loyal feeling. Mr. Swinyard. Manager of the Great Western Railroad, gave me the benefit of his services in person ; he placed at my disposal the resources of the railway and the ofiicials on the line exerted themselves to render these available. I have the honor to enclose a report of Lt.-Col. Booker, of his operation on the 2nd instant. (Signed,) George Pkacockk, Col. and Lt. Col. 1 Major-Gknekal G. Napier, C. B., Commanding First Military District, Tor ito, C. W. IGth Regt. Sir, Port Colborne, 2nd June^ 18(i6. I have the honor to report that in accordance with instructions re- ceived from Colonel Peacocke through Captain Akers, I proceeded by train at ^ a.m., today to Ridgeway station, on the B. and L. H. R. R. with the Queen's Own of Toronto, Major Gilmor, say 480 men of all Tanks, the York Rifles, Captain Davis, the Caledonia Rifles, Captain vTackson, and the ] 3th Battalion of Hamilton, together about 360 men total of all ranks, "n; s-^iL' men, in order to form a junction with Col. Peacocke at Stevensville at 9 to 9:30 a. m. On arriving at Ridgeway i sent the G. W. B. traia away, and as I could uot obtaiu a horse or 80 APPENDIX. hi I'' ;■;!■ ^igon in the place for conveyance of stores, I was compelled to leave without the stores, and sent them back to Port d Iborne. At a little before 8 a. m., we were feeling our way upon the Stevensville Road, and were about three miles from that village when our advanced guard felt the enemy. Major Gilmor extended the Queen's Own in skirmish- ing order, in admirable style ; the men advancing in good spirits, they were supported and relieved as required, by the 13th of Hamilton, and the Rifle Companies from York and Caledonia. After Major Gilmor had expended much ammunition, he reported to me that his ammunition was failing at 9:30, after being engaged under a hot fire for an hour and a half, I observed the enemy, throwing back his right and reinforcing his left flank. I immediately ordered up two compa- nies in support to counteract the movement ; at this moment I received a telegram by the hands of Mr. Stovin, Wellaud R. R., on the field, informing me that Col. Peacoo-: :ould not leave Chippawa before 7 o'clock, instead of 5 a.m., the h:>ur named by Capt. Akers on his be- half. The enemy was strongly j.>osted in the woods on the west of the Garrison Road, the road forming the entrance as it were, to a ('ul-de-Sac. We out-flanked him, when he brought up his centre re- serves, and out-flanked us. We drove them in the first place, over a mile, and held possession of their rifle pits. A cry of cavalry from the front, and retreat of a number of men iu our centre on the reserves caused me to form a square, and prepare for cavalry. This mistake originated from relieved skirmishers doubling back, i immediately reformed column, and endeavoured to deploy to the right. A panic here seized our men, and I could not bring them again to the front. I regret to say we have lost several valuable ofticers and men. I es- timate the strength of the enemy as greater than ours, and from the rapid firing they were evidently armed with repeating rifles. I have, Sec, (Signed), A. Booker, Lt.-Col. Com. Vol. Militia. m [Copy.] Head Quarter Force, Fort Erie, 7th June, 1866. Sir, Fort Erie, C.W. 5 p.m., 4th June, I8G6, In accordance with your orders I left Toronto per Train at 2 p. m. on the second instant with four Field Guns, &c., under Com- mand of Captain Crowe, ? A. and ficcompaniid by Col. Wolseley, A. Q. M. G. by Lieut. Turner, P.F. by Lieut. Dent, 47th, and by Lieut. -Col. Cumberland, Provincial A. D. C. to the Governor Gen- eral and Managing Director of the Northern Railway, who had i^ i-PPENDIX. 81 18G6. kindly placed his services at ray disposal. There were also two gentleiTien, Mr. Clarke end Mr. Kiiigsmill, possessing considerable knowledge of the country through which we were to pass, attached to me by order of the Major General, and Mr. Hunter, Telegraphic Operator. On arrival at Oakville, I was joined by its company of Rifle Volun- teers, 52 Rank and file, under Capt. Chisholm. Or. arrival at Hamilton, I, requiring information, telegraphed to Officer Commanding at Port Colborne, asking to know the state of affairs there, and requesting an answer to St Catharines. At the Hamilton station, I learned that the detachment of the 60th Royal Rifles, and 1-1 6th Regiments which had been at first ordered to join me there, had already proceeded by Railway to reinforce Col. Peacock, who, the Superintendent of the G. W. Railway said had twice telegraphed for reinforcements. Under these circumstances, and finding at St. Catherines no answer from Port Colborne, and that difiiculty and delay would be occasioned in getting the train from the G.W.R. to the line of the Welland R.R., I determined to proceed to Clifton, and thence to the support of Col. Peacock en route to Foi't Erie. I arrived at Clifton about 8 p.m. and was there a few hours after joined by Col. Stephens with a Volunteer force to tlie number of 350, which had been dispatched from Toronto to Port Dalhousie to meet me at St Catnarines. At Clifton, J received pressing telegrams urging me to proceed to assume command at Port Colborne, whence I also received urgent re- quest for rations rnd ammunition, reported exhausted. Believing early arrival at Fort Erie to be most important, I de- spatched all the rations and ammunition 1 could spare to Port Col- borne. I telegraphed to Col. Peacock to send Lieut. -Col. Villiera, if pos&; jle, across the country to Port Colborne, to command the Volunteers at that place, but soon finding that impossible, telegraphed to Capt. Akera, R.E. to assume that duty, adding that I did not anticipate pressure at that point. Having waited for the Erie Railway line to be cleared of other trains, I proceeded at 3.40 a.m., 3rd instant, to Black Creek, at which place I had telegraphed to Officers Commanding Detachments of 60th Rifles and l-lGth Regiments, if not in communication with Col. Pea- cock, to meet me at day break. After some dolay I was joined by 200 rank and file of the 60th under Capt. Traverse, and by 140 rank rnd file of the 1-lGth under Capt. Hogge. As the Railway line had not been previously open for transport, I awaited its examination by Lieut. -Col the Hon. J. H. Cameron, who had joined me at midnight at Clifton, from some point in advance and who proceeded with a Locomotive Engine for that purpose. ■ n : w 82 APPENDIX. ml On Lieut. Col. Camoroti's report that the road was passable. I j)ro- ceeded to a point about three miles north of Fort Erie, called Fieiicli- rnan's Creek, said to be the neares^t })oint to where the Fenians were reported skirmishinsj; and fast eseapiusr neross the river. TIere, uuloaJint; the force from tlie liaiiway (.'ars, I advanced with some Volunteer (-ompauies, tlie detachment 1-1 6th IJej^iinent and OOth U.K. towards the Niagara River, throwing out an advanced guanl and a few skirmishers in the woods on either flank. As soon as 3 Fiehl Guns coule authorize the miiveiueut ; nor did I think it prudent, as from tbi. accounts we had received »♦ appeared j)robable that the enemy's force wouii^ be doubled duriiir ilc nigbl. lla' 'j; ' ^(' 'rtni. ed, however, tliat, the railway bridge at Ridgeway, partial!) jurnt in the niof i.ng, had been repaired, and that the line to Erie ^hm npen, \ arranged a somewluit different plan of attack, subject, of ciiurse, to (olonel Peacocke's approval. The plar -ns as follows : Lieut. -(■ol. Booker to proceed by rail to Erie with tho grerter part of hm force, to arrive at Fort Erie at 8 a.m. l^^^ APPKNtilX. Lieut. "Col. Dennis and myself to go round the coast In a steam tug, taking a company of volunteer artillery, to reconnoitre the shore between Fort Erie and Black Creek, and to return to Fort Erie in time to meet Lieut. -Col. Booker at eight. Should Colonel Peacocke approve of this, he would march by the river road from Chippawa, and make a combined attack with Lieut. -Col. Booker at some point between Fort Erie and Black Creek, cutting off the enemy's retreat by the river. The tug to be employed cruising up and down the river, cutting off any boats that might attempt to escape, and com- municating between the forces advancing from Chippawa and from Erie. I communicated this proposed change to Colonel Peacocke both by letter and telegraph, omitting however, I think, to mention the use proposed to be made of the tug. The plan was merely a modification of that proposed by Lieut. -Col. Dennis, who wished to move at onco with the volunteers without arranging a junction with Colonel Peacocke. Before receiving any answer from Colonel Peacocke, I went off in the tug with Lieut. -Col. Dennis, and the company of artillery, leaving word with Lieut. -Col. Booker to take care and obtain Colonel Peacocke'a approval to the proposed change before acting on it, and explaining the plan pre- viously determined on in case Colonel Peacocke should desire him to adhere to it. We arrived at Fort Erie about 5 a.m. Steamed along there, and past Frenchman's Creek, where we saw the enemy's camp apparently deserted. After carefully examining the shore from Erie to Black Creek, and seeing no signs of any armed force, we went ashore ai; Black Creek, and were informed that the enemy had broken up their camp during the night. A part was seen by the inhabitants moving along the river in the direction of Chippawa, and the remainder to have turii«ed nland al Black Creek. As far as I could make out from the size and appearance of their Cimp, and from the reports of the people, their combined lorce could not have exceeded 700 or 800 men. 1 then returned with Lieut. -Col. Dennis by water to Fort Erie, r.s appointed with Lieut. -€ol. Booker. That officer not i:aving arrived, I became aware that Coionel Peacocke had acted on his original plan, but from the information I had gained, was of opinion that he would not have more than 400 or 500 men to contend with. Lieut. -Col. Dennis then landed the Company of Artillery, and I proceed.;')!ig supports in rear, and ordered the re- mainder of the Ironps to )i- down and get what rest they could. I telegraphed m various directions for food and ammunition, and by 2 A.M., Sunda) 3. 'i, hh^' an ample supply of both. About 1 o'clock tiie ularu; was sounded, and officers and civilians rushed up, informing me that the enemy was marching on us in force, and within 500 yards 'est of the town where I had placed no pickets. The ahum was entirely without foundation, but had the effect of depriving he troops of the few hours rest they might have had. All through the night reports were oming in of large forces being landed on the shore between Colb^rue and Erie, also entirely without foun- dationt I sent the tug boat, however, still ktyi at our service by its owner Mr. McCallum, to watch the shore between Colborne and Erie, and called on some of tlie civilians to act as scouts, and keep me informed of any movements in the neighbourhood. APPfiJffDIX. 8t lleveille yfrAH sothided at 3 and I immediately made what arrange- ments I could for serving out rations and ammunition. At 5 o'clock, sending a pilot engine in front, I moved by rail towards Erie, taking the whole of the troops, except the i;5th, whom. I left to guard Port Colborne. Hearing that the enemy were posted near Ridgeway, and finding a favourable position for forming up the troops at B in sketch, on a road known as Shirks crossing, I disem- barked the men, threw out a line of skirmishers with four supports from the 7th P. A. O. with orders for the flank supports to wheel outwards and extend at once, in case of any sign of a flank attack. In this order and with a strong rear guard, I advanced from. B to the Garrison road and from thence towards Fort Erie. On coming to the scene of the previous days engagement at C, I ascertained that the enemy had attempted to cross the river during the night and that Erie was in possession of our troops After halting the men for about an hour at thig spot, I marched them quietly in to Erie, where I reported myself to Colonel Lowry, Ou the following morning I was relieved from my command. I have, &c., » (Signed), CIIAS. S. AKERSy Capt. R. E. Erie, ine [Copy.] Erie, 4th Juue, 186G. Colonel Lowry, Commauding Niagara Erontler'. Sir, Availing myself of the earliest; moment, I have the honor to re- port I'or the information of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, the following narrative of events connected with the late Fenian" In- vasion at this place, ih which 1 was directly concerned, ctubBc^'iently to my leaving Toronto on the morning of Friday last. My orders were on that occasion to proceed with the 2nd or Queen's Own, 400 strong, to Port Colborne, ocrupy, and if neces- sary, entrench a position there and wait for re-inforcementa and further orders before any attack was made on the enemy, who it was represented nutnbered some 1,500 men and was advancing on that point — although finding great excitement at the different sta- tions along the Welland E.R., on the way up, at Port Colborne, where I arrived about noon, things were quiet, no definite newa having reached there in consequence of the Fenians having cut the wires at Fort Erie, out of which place they had driven the officials at 5 a.m. that morning. Report, however, said thf.t they had some two hours subsequently, sent a party up the track and burned a bridge crossing a small stream known as Sarwine's Creek, sii aailea 88 APpeNOix. I!;!' 'm ■ )3 frooa "Erie, on fclio Rillw.vy to Port Cjibirae. No luv.Vd of tiny {viV' tlior a|)|n'oach having boea brouglit in by any of tlio nuineroa;'. Bcouts .ieiit out by the villagers during the forenoon, I proceeded to billet the men in order to get them dinner, and then before deter- mining to commeuce the couutruction of any defences, I despatched measeugera acroaa to Buck's Tavern and Stevensville, between Erie and the town of WelJand, to ascertain and report any movement of the enemy in that direction, which I thought probable, as sufficient time had elupaed to enable him to reach Port Colborne, had that been his intention, and having through the kindness of Mr. Lar« niont, the Superintendent ot the Line, obtained a locomotive, I started down the railway upon a re-connoisaance, getting down to within six miles of Erie. The burning of the bridge mentioned preventmg any closer approach. I then learned that the bridge had been destroyed by a party of some seven men who had come up about seven, a.m., who in addition stole a number of horses from the farmers in the vicinity, and then went back towards the main bod}^ which from testimony 1 received, it appeared had gone down the river about a mile below the lower Ferry — and camped close to the river road on one Newbigging's farm. Their numbers variously estimated at from 450 to 1,200 men. This testimony was corroborated by the statement of the mounted scouts fro .; Buck's Tavern and Stevensville, who returned in the evening an I went to show that with the exception of parties out stealing horses there Lad been no Fenians seen in that direction and was rendered certain by the arrival about 10 p.m. of Mr. Graham, the Officer of CustomK at Fort Erie, who had been in their camp at six o'clock that evening. vShortly before this time, however, Lt.- Col. Booker, of Hamilton, had arrived with the 13th Battalion of vulunteers, and being senior officer, took command, and c(mtinued the communication by telegraph which had been going on between Col. Peacocke and myself respecting the position and strength of the enemy and best method of attacking him. Col. Peacocke, then at Clifton, having at about 5 p.m. telegraphed me that he had ordered the International Railway Steamer up to Port Colborne for me to put upon her a gun or detachment, in order to patrol the Kiver from Fort Erie to Chippawa, she not having arrived at 1030 p.m., I ordered the •' llobb," a powerfui Tug Boat, owned by Captain Mc- Callum, down from Dunnville for that purpose, intending to place upon her the Welland Battery without guns, (the men armed with Enfield Eifles), and received a reply that she would be down at 3 a.m. the following morning. This was the position of affairs when Captain Akers, B.E., arrived from Chippawa, sent over by Col. Pea- cocke, to consult and to explain Col. Peacocke's views as to the best Biof'.e of attack. After due consideration between Captain Akers, Lt.-Col. Booker and myself, a certain course was decided arranging for an attack in APPENDIX. 89 • fur' led to Jeter- itched 1 Erie ent of Qcieut i that '. Lar- bive, I 3wn to itioned ge had me up 3 from le maiu e dowu iloae to lO men. louuted in the iea out iou and rraham, acip at er, Lt.- aliou of ntinued jetween h of the then at ordered r me to e Kiver p.m., I ;ain Mc- to place ned witli )wu at 3 irs when ;ol. Pea- the best . Booker attack in concert on that morning, and Colonel Peacojke wna telegraphed ac- cordingly. In accordance with this plan Capt. Akers and myself embarked on the Tug,* which did not arrive (however) till about 4' a.m., hav- •ug been delayed in couaequence of Ciiptain McCallum wishing to bring with him his Naval Company from Dunnville, and proceeded down to reconnoitre the river and Fenian Camp, arranging to meet the Port Colborno Force back at the Kailway Depot, 3 mile.s above the enemy's camp, at 7 or at the latest half-past 7. On our way past the village of Fort Erie we were brought to by the armed Patrol Tug Boat from the U.S. Str. "Michigan," who on iluding out who we were informed us that tiie Fenian Camp on the Nevv- bigging farm had been broken up at 3 a.m. that morning, the enemy riaving marched down the Kiver Eoad. AVe proceeded down the River to the mouth of the Black Creek, S miles above Chippawa, when we learned that they had turned off the River to the West a short distance above and were then at a point 2 miles directly in rear of a place called "New Germany." A messenger was at once sent off to Col. Peacocke, presumed then under previously concocted arrangement, to be near there moving up, and we returned with the Tug in accordance with that arrange- ment to meet Col. Booker and the Port Colborne Force at the Upper R.R. Depot, at Fort Erie. On our arrival there we could see or hear nothing of them. This was accounted for subsequently, by the fact that Lt.-Col. Booker had received after we left an order from Col. Peacocke directing him to turn oft' the R.R. at llidgeicay, some 8 miles above Fort Erie and cross the country in order to meet and attack in concert. This being the case, presuming a combined attack would be made in the course of the day, of the result of which we could have no doubt, I considered as I could not then join my proper force, that important service could be rendered by patrolling the River to in- tercept and capture fugitives and to prevent by every possible meana the escape across the river of any large body of the enemy. This having been determined on Captain Akers and myself were engaged all day in patrolling the shore, and scouring the woods along the river as far down as Black Creek, arresting in all, inclu- ding 6 prisoners made about 9 o'clock in the morning, at Fort Erie, some 23 men ; during the course of the afternoon we learned through some of the prisoners that an engagement had taken place at some point in the interior, in which the Fenians had been utterly dispersed. This I was quite prepared to believe as I had from the steamer observed Colonel Peacocke with a strong force on his way up from Chippawa turn in from the River Road towards New Ger- many, and 1 knew that Lt.- Colonel Booker's force was coming down upon him from the south. Concluding that the action which had been known to coue oif 90 APPENDIX. m ) Vi « Names. 1. Dan. Dnimmoiid, 2. Pat. O'Nally, 3. Bonj. Perry, 4. Jno. Coriiey, f). John Malioney, (!. W. Matldigan, 7. Jno. HuKties, 8. W. H. Harden, or Slarin, 'J. Penis Lanahan, 10. Jno. Murphy, il. Owen Kennedy, 12. Francis Miles, 13. J. A. Hecknian, 14. W. Baker, 15. W. Orr, 16. Jno. Maxlield, 17. Terin McCarthy, 18. Michael Kilfather, l(t. Jno. Gray, 2U. Rev. Jno. Lumoden. had resulted in the capture of the enemy, I returned to Fort Erie about half-past 5 o'clock, p.m., proposing to get vliat information T could about the position of our troops, and to telegraph for instruc- tions as to what should be done with the prisoners, who had amoun- ted now, including those taken in the village and neighbourhood during the day, also, to some 60 or 65 men. The numbera I cannot give precisely as 1 had only got as far as those names «];iven in the margin, making out a memo- randum of each case, and (having in the mean- time made up my mind to send the prisoners by the Tug to Welland Gaol) had brought down and embarked those in confinement in charge of the Reeve, when the alarm was given that the Feni- ans were entering the town in force. In fact, the first messenger had hardly delivered the news when a second came in to say that they were within a quarter of a mile, coming down the street along the River. I went over from the Pier to satisfy myself and saw them, in numbers, as I judged, about 150, advancing upo.i the street indicated. Supposing them to be of the material and of the same miserable character physically as the prisoners we had been taking all day, I thought the detachment I had with the boat, even if we had to resort to the bayonet, sulfieient to do for them, and concluded that my duty lay in making a stand against them. This detachment consisted, as before mentioned, of the Welland Field Battery, 54 men and 3 officers, and of a portion, some lii men and one officer, exclusive of the Guard ov(?r the prisoners on the boat, of the Dunnville ]N[aval Company. I first took the precaution to put the prisoners under hatches, and then advancing to meet the enemy about 150 yards, drew up ray little command across the street ; as they came within about 20D yards they opened fire on us when my detachment by order tired a volley from each of the companies, upon which a severe flank fire was opened on iis from the west, and on looking in that direction I ob- served for the first time two considerable bodies of the enemy running northerly parallel with the river, evidently with the intention of cutting us off, and getting possession both of us and the steamer at the same time. Under the circumstances, as 1 considered, if we tried to escape by the Tug the enemy might be here aa soon as us, and so achieve his double object ; and I therefore concludetl that my duty lay in saving the prisoners we had on board and preventing the enemy frori getting possession of the vessel, what 1 knew, and he probably also, was his only means of escape, and I therefore ordered the Cap- tain to cast off and get out in the stream and ordered my men to re- treat and do the best they could to get away each man for himself. APPENDIX. 9t During this time a heavy fire was kept up on us both front and flank and I had the grief of seeing several of my men fall ; we retreated down the Front Street under a very heavy — though, comparatively, ineflective fire — several of the men contrary to my advice taking shelter in a house the door of which stood open as they passed. There being little or no cessation in the fire upon us in retreat, 1 had no desire to remain under it longer than was necessary, and ac- cordingly turned into the premises of a friend in the lower part of the village, where I lay concealed, although the premises were search- ed twice, the rufilans stating their intention to cornea third time, and threatening, if I were not given up as they had seen me enter the gate, that tiiey would destroy the property. Two of my men, one of them wounded, had previously taken shelter in the house, whom they captured. Fearing another search I dressed in disguise furnished by my friends and then came out and remained in the village till night fall when I got through the lines, and struck across the country in eearch of Col. Peacocke, finding his camp out about 5 miles back of Fort Erie, arriving there at 3 o'clock A. ^1., I then accompanied his force to this place, during its operations later in the day of all which, as also of the escape of the enemy, during the night, that ofiicer's re- port will doubtless inform you. On my return, I was able to learn for the first time something of the casualties in the afftiirs of the previous evening. I feel rejoiced not to have to report any loss of life in my detach- ment, although I was given to understand that there were some 5 wounded in the W'elland Battery, 3 of them so severely as to result in each case of the loss of a Leg, among which cases I regret to say Captain King, of the Welland Battery, and one man of the Dunnville Naval Company. None of tbe Officers excepting Captain King were wounded. A. return of the Casualties is appended hereto. The enemy suflered more severely. Three of his number were killed outright, and 4 were mortally wounded, 2 of whom died yes- terday morning. The other 2 had b< fn allowed under the circum- stances by the Jleeve Dr. Kempson, with the permission, as I under- stood of Col. Lowry, to be taken to the Buffalo Hospital. Mv. Scholfield, the Lieutenant of the Welland Battery, having gone to Welland to get his men together again, some of them hav- ing escaped across country to their homes during the night, is or- dered without delay, wlien in a position to do so, to prepare an ac- curate list of the casualties in the Battery. I have detained this report somewhat in order to get his return. Should there prove to have been an^ casualties not as yet report- ed, I will lose no time in sending forward a list of the same. I append the report of Capt. McCallum, Commanding Dunnville Naval Company, and owner of the Steam Tug referred to, to whom particularly, as also to his Lieutenant W. Eobb, the sailing master IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // ^ ^^ 1.0 1.1 |jg ^^ MM ■ii Uii 12.2 ■u .3/, Inii Ui lift Wuu ■ 4.0 1^ — 1.4 1 1.6 < 6" — ^ / v: V j»* > '/ ^ Hiolographic Sdences Corporation 33 WIST MAIN STRUT WUSTIR.K.Y. USM (71«) 171-4303 4^ > 92 APPENDIX. of the Steamer, I have to express my obligation for their zealous and efficient assistance during the operations of Saturday. I have also the gratification of saying that the other Officers and the men forming my little Command behaved moat nobly in the affii,ir during the afternoon at .Fort Erie. I firmly believe, that had I not ordered them to retreat they would have remained steady and fought until shot down in their ranks. (Signed) J. STOUGIITON DENNIS, Lieutenant-Colonel, Ccmmandiiiji: Detacliment on Saturdav, 2nfl .fune. To Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis, Fort Erie. Sir, At your request I have the honor to make the following Ke- port : — On Saturday last, 2nd June, between the hours of three and four p.m., after your departure, I retreated down the river under a gall- ing fire, a distance of about three mile.', vvith two men of the Naval Brigade, and thirteen men of the AVelland Oanal Field Ba":ery, the rest having been cut off and consequently taken prisoners, including the following officers, viz : 2nd Lieutenant Macdonald, of Naval Brigade, and Lieut. Scholfield and Ensign Nimmo, of Field Battery, being wounded, and one man of the Naval Brigade. Lieut. Eobb, with steamer " Eobb," came in boats and took us on board. I then held consultation with Lieut. Bobb as to future proceedings, we then determined on account of being encumbered with so many pri- soners on board (fifty-seven in number) and so very few men left to guard them, to run to Port Colborue and send the prisoners to a place of safety. In passing Fort Erie up the river we, for a distance of a mile's run, were under a heavy fire of musketry from the Can- ada shore ; we passed without any casualties worth mentioning and arrived safely at Port Colborue, at half-past six, p.m. of same day, and delivered the prisoners over to Lieut. Col. McGiveriii, with commitment and names inserted. All of which is respectfully submitted. (Signed) L. MoCALLUM, Captain, N.B., Dunnville. zealous I have be men during ordered lit until olonel. ing Ke- siud four ir a gall- le Naval ':ery, the acluding )f Naval Battery, t. Eobb, I then ings, we lany pri- m left to ners to a distance the Can- ning and lame day, rill, with UiM, )unnville.