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J;-, By the Author ofCoNsiDEftATtONS on the fame S il fi j e c t< The THikD EDITION. s^ IM . ■ ■- MMia LONDON: Printed for Joan WiLkts, at the BiUe« ]% St. Paul's Church'Vard. M^DCC^LXI. ,,';5 ■ •joi\t^dAyi6i3hoo^ f*' ^ J* .^ •■» *t #''■ '•■«1— vr^- •. *y»a>>f n4 |(Nr>i^j'''i» iijntw» t iwi»iiM H ii i ^iif ^ « ■jj^W** "

*-«<«^^ ^'^ o a i v) » i V.' I. ■^ ii;j ,ui^j.'^ ..im^l !■>} >.tn:,^ i^ J sJT'*. J: /\ iff /i «f>' ',-■•1 ( w , A '^ '?-- :f '(:%, & ml ^•^•^HWUP" n \ mmsi^mmssEm r^-- POSTSCRIPT TO THE • ^ CONSIDERATIONS on the prefent GERMAN WAR. Writ immediately after the Firft Day of the laft SefBon, and intended for the Second Edition. ' f ■;• AS the leflening of the chief nurferies of our enemy's feamen, and dividing with them their foreign fugar trade, feems to the Author the great obje6l of the prefent war, he hopes that he may be allowed to obviate any obje6i;ions which may happen to arife. / Should it therefore be faid, that a nation may ever conquer itfelf : and by being fed with more con- ' quefts than it can digeft, may have the overplus turn to furfeit and difeafe inftead of nourifhment. To this it may be anfwered : /»>.T A fmall (late, fuch as was that of Venice, for inftance, by extending its frontiers among a num- ber of adverfe power^s, may lay itfelf under a ne- B - , ceflity 1 i ( o ccfUty of keeping np a greater landing army than it can either fupport, or retain in due fubjeftion ; and in that manner may over conquer itfelf. But had the Venetians attended more to their marine, and confined their conquefts to tbeir iflands, without pufhing into the continent of Italy and Dalmatia, they had given lefs umbrage to the other ftates of Europe, and had more eafily maintained their own. Whether the whole continent of North America be too large a conqueft for Britain to grafp at, may polTibly be a queftion. But whether Martinico, whofe exports are of ten times greater value to our enemies than thofe of Canada, and which may be kept by England for a tenth part of the expence, be too great a conqueft fot it, never furcly can be a queftion. At a time, therefore, when we are feli- citating ourfdves upon the reduction of a whole con- tinent, and when the moft favoured addrefles had digefted fo vaft a meal, nothing which may b^ve been faid about ficknefs and difeafe, can con- clude againft our conquering an ifland for fear of . a lurfeit. ' ":' . ■ 'v- : Our prefent iQands lie each of them expofed to much larger ones of our enemies, and are there- fore necelTariiy calling upon us for a fleet, to ferve as a portable garrifon for their protedion. By an- nexing Guadalupe and Martinico to them, we fhall fecure our prefent little iflands under the Ihelter of thefe ( 3 ) thcfe larjge ones ; and by extending our poffeflions, ihall really leiTen our frontiers. Inftead of having the French and Spaniards both to guard againft, we (hall thereby in a manner get rid of the French, by whom alone we can ever be endangered, and have only the Spaniards to guard againfl-, who know that rhey have much more to lofe themfelves by war, than they can hope to gain from us. Can thefe iilands fet up for independence ? Are they lefs acceflible to our fleets, or lefs amenable to our jurifdidion, than the midland forefls of Ame- rica ? Will they require that infinity of jiores^ which we have heard complained of, as taking up fo great a fart of our fleet to fupply them ? Will their kinds of produce interfere with thofe of England, or with thofe of our prefent vaft northern Colonies ? Thefe therefore, are not the conquefts which will turn to difeafe. On the contrary, fugar, rum, cotton, in- digo, coffee, and cinnamon, make of all other com- modities the moft proper food for the commerce of Britain, which it can the moft eafily digeft, and turn into the richeft nourifhment. If it be really matter of doubt, whether we have not aheady over- conquered ourfelves ; what then ^re the twelve millions for ? Are they all to be con- ilimed in Germany, where only there is no poflibi- lity of our making any conqueft at all ? B 2 1 Jkall ( 4 ) IJhall he very thankful, it has been faid, to pro- ceed to a treaty with all thofe conqucjis in our hands^ which we now have. Can our enemies then take them out of our hands during the war ? Might we not, when we proceed to a treaty, find ourfelv^s upon better terms with our rivals, if Martinico alfo were in our hands, rather than theirs ? Are they not the more likely to leave us one, for our having both in our pofTefllon, and holding the rod over their part of St. Domingo, as they have done over us in Germany? Would not our own people be better fatisfied with the giving up of one, for our retaining of the other ? In the prefent increafe of our nor- thern colonies, can we well do v/ithoutoneof them,? Are thefe to depend on French iflands for the con- fumption of their produce ? Are we to people the vafl: continent of America for the French to have the beneFxt of fupplying it ? or oiily to enlarge the market for the planters of our prefent iflands ? to render them fo much the lefs capable of rivalling the French in any foreign markers, and make them more en- tirely mafters of our own ? To be braved with pro- perty in more than fourteen counties^ and double that influence in our councils, which is already fo predominant ? * There '. . t * The reader will apply this reafoning to thfe importance of our fixing our property in, and fetding of, what are falfely call'd the Neutral Iflands: If indeed, after all our conquefls ( 5 ) I There has another danger been mentioned, that of giving umbrage to other nations, by pufhing our conquefli too far. But whatever may have been conquefts, we muft give up Guadalupe to our German de- pendencies.-— Our prefent iflands never have produced much more fugars than are neceiTary for our own Britifh confumption. Unlefs therefore in our future treaty, the two great objedls of the war be attended to ; and fome check given to the growth of the French fifliery in New- foundland (which, from the time of its firft difcovery to this day, has been acknowledged in every treaty to be ours ; and which Lord Oxford was impeach'd f for al- lowing to the French the ufe of the north part of) and fome increafe made to the £ngli(h growth of Sugar, and (hipping in the Weft-Indies ; we may very poffibly in a few years fee the French marine rifing up to an equality with our own : and may then find too much employdient for our fhips at home, to be able to fpare any for the pro- te£lion of diftant little defencelefs iflands. Or fhould we after that fee a French garrifon in Cape Breton, or any other fortified Ifland, and a French £eet interrupting our Newfoundland fifliery, under pretence of prote(Sing their own, and a French army ready to march into Weftphalia ; the nation may then at length be too well convinced, that after boafting of our conquefts all the world over, we have given up the moft valuable part of them ; and have fpent lixty millions of our treafure, to enlarge the market for, and enhance the price of Jamaica fugars. f See the 1 3th article of the treaty of Utrecht, and the 1 3th article of Lord Oxford's impeachment. faid . ( 6 ) faid on this head, cannot refer to the Weft-Tndies. "When we have already been difgufting all the nor- thern powers by a land war in Germany, we cannot furely h?ve any real apprehenfion of danger in our keeping down the French marine in the Weft In- dies, for fear of giving umbrage to the Spani- ards ; when that Spanifh power never can be for- midable to Britain, but in conjundtion with the French.* .. '» " .--ff- X After all, we readily admit the juftntfs of tem- perate maxims, and acknowledge that there is a moderation which every State ought^ to obferve. But is this moderation in our councils to be confi- ned only to our acquifition, and not at all to re- gard our out-goings ? Muft it not therefore feem a little hard to a common underftanding, and ought it not to fling the breaft of every good man, to obferve that at that very time, when by advancing to twelve millions inftead of eight, we declare that we have hitherto not done enough for Germany ; we fhould chufe, at that very time, to exprefs our apprehenfions, that we may have already done too much for Britain, or that we cannot hereafter do too little for ourfclves. * So very different was the language of lafl year from the prefent. ; There ( 7 ) THERE is a remarkable obfervation, which, arifes from confidering the particular time, when this argument was made ufe of. We were not to conquer Martinico ; an Ifland, which would yield us the largeft returns, and could liberally pay us for the expences of keeping it ; for fear of over-conquering ourfelves : and yet we now know, that at that very time, and for feveral months after, the public was amufed with an expedition againft another Ifland ; which having only a bad road, and no harbour, could anfwer no one good purpofe ; and tended only to divide our force, and multiply our expence ; and which was therefore a conqueft of that very kind, which has the moft di- refl: tendency to hurt us. For a moment let us fuppofe, that we had gone on in the fame courfe ; and conquered firft Oleron, and then the Ifle of Rhe. Fifteen thoufand men would have been want- ed to garrifon thefe. The national defence would have been thereby fo much weakened ; and thefe men would have been kept upon the enemies coaft, to fpend their pay upon French produce, and would have required a fleet of viduallers, as thofe of Bell- ifle now do, to preferve them from ftarving, and a fquadron of men of war to prevent the French from landing and carrying them ofi; % I have ( B ) I hi I have one more obfervation to make on this head; In the laft Seflions, as well as in this, the German war was reprefented as a war of diverfion. But we know now by the €vent, what was thon the obje6t of our councils. He therefore who Ihall then have faid that the German war was to divert the French force, and thereby favour the Englifh operations elfewhere, muft then have faid nothing better, than that he refolved to fpend feven millions of the na- tional treafure in Germany, to prevent the French from fending fuccours to Canada, which we had al- ready conquered, or to Marrinico, which we did not intend to attack ; or elfe that all this expence was incurred merely to favour the Conqueft of Bellifle. A conqueft, which, we fee by the Nego^ tiations, our enemies laugh at us for having made, and will fcarce take again, when we ojffer it them. "Was then the German war intended to divert the French force from invading us ? This, I think, is now the arg;umenc in fafhion ; .and therefore, though I have already obviated every thing, which has fince been offered on this head, yet^ it may dc- ferve to be reconlidered. cr u '•' cr NONE but fuch as are unacquainted wltK the mafitirne force of Englanci, can believe ** tfhat, withiout a dlverfion on the continent to em- *' plbjr part of the enemy's force, (he is not in ^ •' condition to hope for fuccefs, and maintain hef ** fuperiority at fea.- ^They mUtV be \^ery ig- " liorant indeed, who imagine that the forces of •*^ England are not able to refift thofe of France, ** uniefs the httet hi hindered frbni turning all het* •• efforts to the f^af." "T ^be King of England's ConduSi as EleUor of Ha^ ,^ mver : in anfwer to the parallel of the conduB '''' 6f France with thdt of the King of England ' Ele^or of Hanover^ in the year tysS, ■ III I Have often thought with mjTfelf, what could be the modves which induced the late Minifter to embark the nation fo deeply in a German war. The opinion of its being a religious one has been long C exploded. hi <'S ;i^l w ( 10 ) exploded. After enquiring of my friends what were the reafons, which he himfelf; when he was in power, ufed to give for this meafure, 1 never could hear of inore than thefe two. The one, that he found us in Germany, and did not carry us thither ; the o- ther, that the German war is a diverfion of the French Forces, and enables us to exert our own in diftant operations without fear of cin invafidn. Up- on thefe two reafons taken together, one naturally afks, if this fecond reafon be a good one for going into Germany, what need is there for apologizing for it by the fir ft, and faying that he found us there : wifdom is juftified of itfelf, and looks not to ac- cident fpr its fupport. But the affigning of two oppofite motives for the fame adlion, is apt to create a doubt whether either of them be the true one. What may be the cafe here, the reader will en- able himfelf to judge by a few plain obfervations. ■'i^A r^ s* .. '~:\ •"* '>\'.i In the firft place then, whoever fuppofes the German war to be a wife and eligible meafure, as a diverfion of the French from invading us, muft fuppofe, that there really exifts a probability of danger. I don't infift that the probability of fuch invafion (hould be great, but fome probability there fnuft be, greater or lefs -, becaufe mere phyfical pof- fibilities are no motives of action. :^' s:;?>i^|ir!n\!» r^;^ -fio M n Vr In y : ( II ) In the next place I obferve, that if the German war be really chofen as a war of divcrfion to keep the French from invading us (or from fuccouring their colonies, or invading ours, for this argument vriil equally hold good in ail thefe three cafes) then that diverfion will be more or lefs ncceflary, in proportion as the danger is greater or lefs ; and a Minifter will certainly prefs moft For the war of diverfion at thofe times, when the danger of in- ▼afion is greateftj and be lefs concerned about fuch a diverfion, at thofe times, when there is lefs danger of in vafion. ' \- - r t ,V ^'m^ ' '■' ' '•■' > '• ' ' " \ • ■. ". r '^ • :■■ ..J. • ' The danger toEngland of being invaded by France is greater or lefs, according to the number of their troops and of their Ihips. As to troops, France, in time of peace, has never lefs than two hundred thoufand men in its pay, and muft therefore always have foldiers enough for an invafion of England, which ordinarily does not keep up twenty thou- fand. The real danger therefore to England muft be in proportion to the numbers of troops which the French have actually upon their coafts, and the number of their tranfports to carry them, and of (hips of war to proted them : or, in other words. C2 111 ( " > lljjl 10 proportion to the ftrength of their navy. Thffe are fuch plain axioms, that the reader, I Aippofc, will rather condemn the mentionir^ thetn, than be iadined to difpute them. Now then let us fee how the paft events will quadrate with the opinion that this has been the motive for the German war. ^t. "<'• Jn the beginning of the Englilh war the ♦** Frgncb ** were preparing a great feet at Breft and Rocbfort^ ** reftoring Dunkirk^ marching dovjn an hundred and *' twenty battalions So thfir coafts, and ail the roads *• to Flanders, Normandy, and Britatr^, were cover'* ^ ** ed with carriages laden with cannon and arms^ «* and all the apparatus for fome great enterprixe " then in hand;** which, fays the Memorial fof| the requifirion of t;hii Dutch troops, can he no ^thef^ than a d€f€e>?t upon Great Britain. I don't enter r into the queftion, whether the real intention of; the French was to invade us, or only to fright usJL perhaps to invade us, if their fleet 0iould be read]^ before ours, or elfe to go to Minorca and LouifVJ burg: but w'atever were their intention, all that mjS argument requires is, that there was an appearai^c? atleaftof danger, ) ^3 a •i'a«|li;i"n^!^A "^ . / -V i Every '»! ( IS ) Every one nd^, who ii in the kaft acqudntecS \ricb our parliamemar y debates, inu& know, that 4ufMig all this time, while the Ff«nch fleet was the mod formidable, and when our fleet and army were not yet arrived at much more than half of their prefcnt ftreng^h^ every one, I (fay, knows, that during the yeflt 1755 and ^756, this Gentle* man and his friends were continually inveighing againft a continental war, and all our German ope- rations. They fpokc* they wrote* they were tiirn^ ed out, and receiv<4 their gold boxes upon that ac- count. It was then reprefented as a betraying tht intereft of their county to fight for Hanover ^ or to hire Hedian and RuHian fbldiers for that pur« n -L j-'i* V. \>t t •■■= Thus things continued til! the end of the year hysjy by which time the enemy's naval force was greatly broken *, we had many of their (hips jn our ports, and more than half their Seamen in our prifons. Our arrwy was ftrengthencd by the rftifing a great number of new battalions, and our fhipa and feamen all in full vigour. Then it was that this gentkmaD's mind became fuddenly il«' lumin'd : and as the dangers of an invafion grew ]eA» he now.percmved the neceHity of a diverfion in Germany to ^row gutter ; and having difgraced a Qeneral pf our own Royal Fars^ily, for having fhewn (limfelf too gphd an Englifhman, in putting an end to the %ft German w^r by the treaty of lo ' Clofter \.^^ !UM \A iti ji4, C H >' U ■,\ «* I IM^'' ill Ciofter Seven, which was then called an infamous padlock put upon the Hanoverian /words ; he entered upon a new German war of double the extenti and quadruple the ex|>ence. ]mk V'*^^i*Un ■ -yy ... .,.,,j-<, _,■ .{.y ,. . ., ,, r\ Far be it from me to judge of other men's pro-^' feffions ; but it is inipoffible not to lament the im- becility of the human mind, when we fee. a great patriot, who had long flood firm on an Englifh bails, all at once fall off to a German intereft, and then bewilder himfelf with an imagination, that though in the beginning of the war, when the French navy was in its greateft ilrength, and our*s veakeft, we did not want any fuch diver (ion for our fecurity ; yet now that the French navy was reduced, and the Englifh every where triumphant, we ought to run into a German war, as a necefla^ ry precaution to divert the French armies from, in> y^dingus. ^^^t^m. ': W^ i.:y^^.^■i' X* *'-^^fA ■*^''-'''' Once indeed, (ince that time, our enemies had got together a fleet, and having that, they found no difHculty in bringing down twenty thoufand men to iheir coafls. The German war was not fuch a diverfion to their arms, but that in three months time after our boafted vidlory at Minden, when this diverfion was in its grcatefl force, the French formed the defign of invading us. And having once provided fhips, they had men enough to em- bark on board them to anfwer any purpofe either ( '»5 ) of fuccburlng Canada, ;#r invading Irela:nd, ftrll facing- us in Germany with an army fiiperior to QOrs. By the fea- fight off Belleifle, their navy has been entirely broken, fo as to render k irrecover- able during the prefent war. Without fhips, with- out feamen, and wichout erade, how is it pofTibJe for them to raife a marine, which can be in the lead: degree formidable to ours ? From that time therc- fdr6 the German war, far from being a diverfron of the French force from invading us, has been nothing but a diverfion of the Englilh treafure to cxhauft us : Yet ever fince the battle of Mindcn, the whole force of our cflforts has been employed in Germany. With forty j millions. fpent,^fcaree a fingle new e^cpedition of any valuable confe- quence to Britain was attempted in two years af* ter thit time. Martinico, and evpn-.St. Lucia, rc- inained untouched. Inftead of fending our^forces abroad to fuch inviting conquefts, ^^e haVe been trifling near home in an ifland, wichout harbour^ aod without produce ; which we now fee neither our enemies by the lofs of it, nor we by the pof- feflion of it, have yet found the ufe of. , Only one regiment has been fent to the Eaft Indies 5 and not- withftanding the fnperior advantages we have for (ending (hips and men thither, all our fucceifes in thofe parts have been obtained with an inferior force. While fix njiillions have been fpent on the German war, twenty thoufand pounds only has •-'-'^nr^l ill :. ;*' 7fiti ,'j'^aLi:. .q "■ (.'>;''--f\ :;••;; been ( It ) .J i I been i^oted for the Eaft Indkiii. Tl^r falling: Itm of ourfund?^ and of our treaty, bdth fhew what this German diverfsoa tends to. Shail v^ find the produce cf Hefic and Hanam equal to that of Guaci^oupe ? Or will the opening the naTigation of the Rhine and the Maine prove as great z niUtr-^ fcry for French feamen a$ the trade of Newfowncf- land ? Already had We, in our treatyr, givew ap for Gernnainy alithe advantages we h d gaiiitd ii? die ^fhery and the iugar trade :: and (hoold tih» ^itie war ofdivenfion^goonimudi longer^ we (hall^BBdy chat uxftead of Bghcing ini Gesman^? for Anderfcav wt ihall ha^re really loft Americaini Gertmny. WhatJ* ever may have bSsn th? cafe fejfore, yec now that the French' unarinc: is totally funk, fhould any one now affirm, that su German war is necelTary for us as adiverfion; wlien^tbetiiis ic to become^'teffl Ae^ ceiiaryi or wheni ase we to be w ithoQt one^ But fhould any. .geoelensaif; who in th^ b^gimniftg^ ^hen the Frecrch navy was in full ^gour, was the. moft carnefi; pleader agiind a German war, be now the moft pofnive fbr it ; fiich ah one may,, if irepleafes, value himfeif upon his former firmnefs^ in not fearing dhnger, wberd it poffibly v^as s but it will be hard to prove che^ merit of having pm Mh to an expcnce of twenty millionis, to prct^«ot itl where it certainly was not. Ad mit that the French invafton in thebe'gioning of the^war was but a- fpec^- tre, yet even fpe£bres may be allowed t(»frigiit:% their firft fuddea appearance. But with ill grace 3 fhall ( n ) ihall he boail his fortitude, who in the very adl of triumphing over others for their fudden fears, can own, that this fpedlre, long (ince laid to every other eye, has for'fouV years together (till appeared rohis : That ufe and tin^e cannot recover him from its ter- rors, but the longer he beholds it he fears it fo much the more ; and after having already parted with four, five, and fix millions, is now fweat- ing out the lad eight inillipns under the dread of It. > '':■ ^ . . . . U^ %,: r TH E following lift of French Ihips, taken or deftroyed in the courfe of this war, was publi(hed a few weeks ago in the papers. I don'c anfwer for its exaftnefs : but if it be near to the truth, it (hews how very powerful our enemy's navy will grow in a few years interval of peace, and how little we hstve to (cur from it, during the reft of the war. 4 • . V - -■-• <«r ■• -0im i^ .1 .v;. A LIST -! c; (I A mmttmuf r*8 ) \ A LIST «f .•li '1} f:' , ^.i .ri..ii ^, 5iJj/x taken from the Ftenth from the Uginmtlgtff the war to the ift ofO^ber, 1761. Ship»w 4 14 2 I -• a- ■ V v Numbk of Gum. 841 :. ;* J,.<5 v\j:' 74 66 ^^ i. Line of battle 47 -i.. r:^' 1^ I ' 11 i^r-i '- ^ V^ M 441 40 34 32 28 24 12 20 18 •'./. , 'V-*'" *'■• '•/>'> y Frlgj ■ * . r- 'J ■ - / :^;?^t»;^, t^l '..1 w't -J*«./>.J »JI ■' ' -j til ates( 1.PV, 4 8 14 12 8. Al>DI^ 4^ -#* a 'V, * ► ., ?; ">' ^y " 'V }, ^'-- ,-T ADDITIONS . CONSIDERATIONS , ■ A «V"r ' ^«^. *»' . ' J J ,,^ '," ^ ,-r I •»., ON THE PRESENT GERMAN WAR: Which *e Author thinks a FuH: S^p^Y to all . which has been olijcascd by his MNn^cfiUS Mz .•^^fiwcpcrs: 1- 0':^, '-it- ■' 3»U. "■..i^^ D a ■ii: ( JO ) T ^ ADDENDA T O T H E CONSIDERATIONS O N T HE - ^^ • ^ GERMAN WAR, ^ (Printed in May laft.) • - .■ '■ r r Iff* • *,*■*■ y PAGE 14. line 15; This independency of tire feveral German States eftablifhed by the treaty of Weftphalia, is what the German Princes call the libicrties, and conflicution of Ger- many *. ♦ The guarding againft any events, which mayjhake the eon/iitutiofiy or averturn the fyflm of the Empire ; or in other words, the prefervation of their own in/dependoicey miy be a very intereAing concern to the feveral German Princes in their own German Diet at Ratifbon : but was never made an obje£i of a Britifli parliament's regard, till the end of the year 1756: when by a fatal miftake of a } rtnch intereft for an Englifli one, it was propofed as a motive for the prefent German War. The unnatural union of councils abroad, the calamities, which in confequence of this unhappy co'^junSiion, may, by the irruptions of foreign armies into the ewpire^ Jhake its confiitution, overturn its Jy/hmy and threaten opprejjion to the protejiant inter efl there^ ( 21 ) *«r# tvents, which muji fenftbly affe£l the minds of the nation^ and have fixed the eyes of Europe en this new and dangerous erijis* Till that time, when we firft openly avowed the caufe of the petty German Princes, the intereft of £ng. ]and, and the peace of Europe had always led us to wifli rather to fee fome one great power eftablifhed in Germa- ny, which fhould be the natural rival of, and balance againft the power of France. L w Page 31. Is there any fort of oeconomy in our having in three years time put ourfelves to an ex- pence of twelve millions, to prevent France from getting fix hundred thoufand pounds out of Ger- many ? ♦ ♦ One of my foreign anfwcrers (whofe work, Le Faux Patricse Anglois, I hoped to have feen done out of French for the benefit of the £ngli(h reader) accufes me of rea* foning as a merchant, and makes here the following re- marks : *^ I leave you, Sir, to judge if this is the right « way pf calculating in affairs of general politics: whe- *< ther fome pounds flerling more or lefs ought to regulate , f( the determinations of cabinets." Page 50.' ■ And again: ... f-tr ' <* If the electorate were now in the fame flate of im- " becility, in which it was, when its fovereigns were *' called to the crown of England ; its falling under the *< dominion of a new potentate, would perhaps be in itfelf ^' a matter of indifference : But Hanover is ^owno Jon- <' ger an inconfiderable power : it has great influence on ** the aCairs of permany. Since its ele£lors have become *< kings of England, the riches, which they have made to '* pafs into that country, have given it a much greater •• degree 3 ( ^^ ) «( hf degi^ of force than it had before ; and the ft^e by lie- ^< ing we^ilthitf is become more powerful. The rafift- «< ance it has made to France in this war, is a coriviQ* cing proof of this>." Page 6.8. • . . , *i This aiiCvi^rer, I fuppofe, does not Jcnonr that theelec^ tordi troops axe paid and fed by ^ EngUQx jvirji^i^^t. He goes on, page 71. " The Englifli nation has often '' complained of this difpofltion of thing?, wh ♦ " Prance is finking j (he knows herfelf finking; this •« is the lajl effort of a dying power \ 'tis the convulfioti " of deaths the eftbrt o(defpair .• let us but refift it firmly, <* let us a£l with the vigour of fuccefs, and we need not *< fear any thing (he can do from defpair. > , , \ ill •* The war in Germany has given us elbow-room s •« the vi^ory of Minden has made way for the conqueft •* of America \ the operations in Germany has given us, ^^tbtfUnwroomofayear" ,.; . . ;. •' . !I £ Sue!) V! n ( ^6 ) I I ' ■■' ■* i' ■ Iti, w Such was the confidence of our prefumption, and fudi were the flowers of oratory, which (hot up early the next fpring after the battle of Minden. Yet with all that elbow- room, our Britifb war during the next year totally Ian- guifhed : not a fingle fquadron in eighteen months after failed for any new BritiHi conqueil ; nor was a fingle bri- gade fent out on any other than a German (ervice. Far from gaining elbow-room, our arms have been pinipn'd down to the defence of Hanover : while the French were cramping our trade in the courfe of that year more than in any preceding one, by their privateers in our own feas ; and the Martinicans were braving us to con- quer them, and by taking two hundred of our fliips with the privateers of that ifland, were daily reminding us of the importance of making it ours. ,-.t' Page 99. Confidering it merely as a treaty for the hire of troops, it was much cheaper than any we have made (ince. * \ W . ,, ' . * We have already mentioned the pay of the year 1759 : but the feveral articles of our German expenc? have been fo carefully concealed, that there is no judging of the account of a campaign, till the end <^ the following feflSons. By the refolutions of the 27th of November and 20th of De- cember, it appears that we paid to the Landgrave 426,725 I. for 19,012 men. The Hanoverians for nearly the fame fum (447,882 1.) furniflied us with more than double that number (38,750 men). The price of 55»ooo Ruflians (exclufive of any allowance for the galleys and greater pro- portion of horfe)would at the fame rate amount to 1 ,230,000!. fo oiuch more temperate in their demands are Hanoverians thaia a C 27 ) thanHeflians, and Ruifians than either of them. Thefe laft were to have maintained themfelves, not only in their own country, but when they marched out of it : but our German friends expert that we fhould feed them at their own homes ; and, by an article, lucrative enough for mercenaries, but unknown among allies, have learned to double their demands upon us for forage and extraordina- ries. Should the reader ftill wonder at the difproportion of thefe fums, he will recolle£fc that very lingular one of iixty thoufand pounds, which in the affluence of our mil- lions, was given, to be paid as his moftferene Highnefs Jhall think it moft convenient, in order to facilitate the means, by which the moft ferene Landgrave may again fix his refidence in his own dominions', and give fr;i(b courage to his faithful fubjeSfs by his prefence, which isfo much %viJhedfor, What- ever may have been our compaflion the former year, for an old gentleman returning from Hamburgh to his own houfe ; men muft have winked extremely hard on thefe fine words, to renew the grant a fecond time in the very fame form, when the old Landgrave's refidence was already fixed at his own houfe, or rather he was dying at Rinte- len i and when his fon, being a new converted papift, might not have his prefence fo much wifh'd for by his more faith- ful proteftant fubje^s. This firft charge of fixty thoufand pounds was fubmit- ted to, upon account of the merit of having got rid of a wordf faid to be of dangerous import in the former treaty, Dedommagement : when by the convention of the ifl of April, the nation was much more efFe^lually bound to take upon itfelf a reafinable Juccour in money of four time;. !he fum. , *«; Hi| •■If/" ii 11 I £ 2 The I^ « !• s* a. (• • ' For I9jOI2 Helfians ' ' } i >,■ i . i. For a 2d facilitating the means of.. ^ the ferene Landgrave's Hxing his .. refidence at his own houfe nine months after he had not been out of it, ■ .- ^ " : " For two augmentations of his ' troops, amounting to ^392 mCin - For the Heflian fliare of forage and ' extraordinaries, being one fourth ' of 2,167,903 1. 12 s. 6 d. For releafmg the Landgrave's ene» mies from a Dedommagement, ' ' and taking upon ourfelves the ' • : obligi n to grant him a reafon- able fuccour in money • - ,( ' : 121,872 8 7 \ < I «. . 1 54i>?75 j8 I : ■'U 220,000 J>3'0»573 8 2 ♦ ■ ■ ! ! . , >f\ ^ Upon comparing therefore the r^tf^s of the two jtf eatjes, it appears that Britain pays as n^uch money for 22,494 Heffians, as w(3i;!d have pyrchaf^d 14.2,000 Rqfll^s. ,,So inattentive hap our eafe of bpffpykririg made u& to the vajue of our money. ....... , ■ 1 The nun^ r of Heffian troops which we are to pay for ij ft«ted in . ^. ToUf to be ^2^404; but no one, it is hoped, it . . ' - » li ( 29 ) hoped, will Ihiojc the ?iUthor yitzk emough to imagine, t\^*jt thjit number really exift€4 ^oy wh&re elfe. The npblc lord, who .was «^£iflii(v charged wkh the defence of t^eipt wi\e;i the l^^owCe w,-^ to graiu t^ 220,000 pounds, hn^ too ^eat a regard for his hpi^our, Xo fay, that there w^& any jTych nUimW in the fieW j or j^at Jie had receiv- ed ^y regular retu.r^ of thqm. Eveiii the return, which h^(^ been ii[W(jle up ,^nd kj^t him th^t morning by the Heiljan minifter fojr the opcafio^, could ;iot raife their number to n^ori? th|i;i 1,6,000 >men, and ,466 mu- flcians; and the general ppinipn of ,the houfe feemed to fet it much lower. It w^as in/decd fajd, that they were not much more deficient fhan the £iigli(h troops. But we have an army here at ho,mie, on pvirpofe to ferve as a nurfery for the German confumption, from which drafts can be made all the fummer without obfervation. Where- as thedefe£l of thefe Heflian troops is irremediable -, becaufe our enemies, being in pofleffion of the country, choofe to take all the young fellows of it into their own army, rather than fend them to ours. One of my anfwerers has faid, that France fubftdizes more powers than we do, and in all probable conje^iure ai a much higher price. It would have been fome confolation to us, if inftcad of groundJefs con- jcdlurc, he had produced an inftance of the French fub- iidizing to the half of this heighth. We know the rate of Ruffian fubfidies. Do the Wirtemberg rife to a fourth of our Heflian ? Will the French fuffer that duke to take their money, while we take his men ? Should the reader obje£l to this laft article of 220,000 1. being charged to the account of the year 1760, he will confider that the expence incurred by the French contri- butions was in that year. We fliall have ?. new bill of charges made out for their inroads next fummer, if indeed the next parliament will fubmit to pay it. If i r: ( 30 ) I ir tbe poor fufferers are to have this money, 'twere to to be wifh'd at leaft, that it may not be diftributed among them, till the end of the war. The giving It them now»' will be only rendering them (o much the more tempting a bait for the French to come and eat them up again, and enabling the Landgrave to prove againft us fo much the greater damages. It would be enriching the enemy at the Englifli coft, and inflaming our future reckoning with the lofs of our own money. Far be it however from me to imagine, that the ferene Landgrave, with his known hu- manity and tendernefs, will not diftribute it among the poor fufferers $ and farther ftill that it was intended here that he (hould put it all into his own pocket. That would carry in it too much of the idea of a fet of proteft- ants bargaining with a popifii fovereign for the ruin of his proteflantfubjedls. ( 3' ) ';r;:r" THE foregoing notes were all written during the laft Seflions, but the author had intended td have done with this fubjedt. It is now with ex- treme regrety that he finds it necelTary to appeal to the public to judge, whether every thing which was advanced in thefe Confiderations the laft year, has not been verified by the experience of this. We have adtually fpent twenty millions : are our ene- mies brought at all the nearer towards giving us a peace ? The greateft part of thefe have been em- ployed in Germany, and in fcrvices relative thereto. Montreal was taken laft year, and Pondicherry the very beginning of this : not a Shilling therefore of thefe twenty millions has been ufed in either of thefe fcrvices. Yet tho* fo much of the ftrength of go- vernment has been exerted in Germany, the French force there during the whole of this fummer, as well as in all the foregoing ones, has been greatly fuperior to ours. The diflenfions among their com- manders, and the Hngle valour of the Britiih troops, have now a fecond time prevented their defeating us, as before at Minden. This has been pompoufly re- preiented to the public as a great vi6lory ? But what did Britain gain by this viftory ? Was it worth to us even the value of the candles, which we burnt in the illuminations for it ? Did the French court fall in their demands after the battle of Fellinghaufen ? sordid we? ;omc >■;■, i-i 1 I m II li ! 1) • l:i!l -"•' m Some, of his anfwerers have charged thc'author with sirrogance, fbv prefiiming to differ from the public wifdpm. One^ood man,, after accjuatnting m, that his' life' i^^'phlcfly fpent ' in his chambers at *Edinburghi fends us up from thence the fenfe of the nation ; and Wonders that any private man Ihould c6ntradi(S, what has been the rcfult cf fiich frequent debates in the Britifli parliament. Such men perhapis will be furprized to hear, th^t the late parliament, tho' it granted away feventy eight millions of the public treafure, yet from the •time of fending th'6 firft troops thither never had the queftion in debate, whether the war in Germany, ani the fending over the Britifh forces, was a right mca- fure or a wifong one. All the great men in the kingdonl, had either at the end of the lad war, or in the beginning of this, declared it was a wrong thing : not one great ' man in the laff parliament offered at an af guhient ta prove it a right one. CH /ff v.. rT/iVlr.) .1 •' 'Xhere is a mode and falhion in thinking, which is apt to hurry men out of the po0e(rion of their better judgment, But fcvcn years ago the ycrjr thought of* fending our troops into Germany woul^ not have been born. Is there any intelligent in«n living, who, if at that time he had been added* wKetlier it would be right for Britain Cngly to en* gage in a land war with France^ Germany, Sweden^ and Ruffia; w^ould not have thought the profiofer of fuch a queftion mad, and turned from him with the ^> ( 33 ) > the utmoft difdain ? Did not the one part of our ad- miniftration profefs thcmfclves at the end of the laft war, convinced of the folly of fighting other nati- . ons battles; and declare that for the future the powers of the continent muft learn to take care of themfclves ? and did they not refolve never again to involve their country in any fuch foreign German quarrels ? Did not the other part of our adminiftra- tions at the beginning of this war, fpeak, write, proteft, and even refign upon the fame account ? And yet all the extravagancies of pad wars have been tripled in this, and that by the very party ^ whofe fpeeches are well reinembred, and whofe writings are flill extant, foretelling all the evils, which we now fufFer. * Did we not in one place hear a famous fpeech end with a wiih, that the word Hanover was expunged out of the Englijh DiSl'wnary i And have we not * See a very excellent pamphlet call'd Deliberate thoughts on the fyftem ol" our late treaties with Hefle-Caf- fel and Ruffia. Printed for J. Scott in Pater- nofter- Row, 1756. Said to have been written by a gentleman who at that time came into place and went out again with the late ininifler. :ii I acknowledge him as an elder brother, and a much Wlfer, though I had not feen his work till fome month* after the publiihiing of the Confiderations. t; i f f 1. i).f i it") ( 34 ) in another feen a great commoner draw forth even a gouty right hand from it; (ling in his bofom, and lay it upon the table, as the folemn pledge of his faith, that not a man Ihould be fent to Hanover ? Little minds view every thing in the light of par- ty i they read only to compliment their own fagaci- ty in finding out whether the writer be for or againft the fide they efpoufe, and think no farther. Is then the honour of a great commoner, or the keeping three or four Peers in their places, a matter of high- er importance, than the faving cf our country ? Do not both parties know, and fecretly confefs, that the nation was in the late reign facrificing the blood of its fubje(5ts and exhaufting its treafures even to the brink of ruin in a quarrel, which did not be- long to it : and to gratify the avarice of German Princes, every one of which have even in this pre- fent war been offering themfelves to France ? Did not the Duke of Brunfwick declare that ht had negociated at Verfailles and at Vienna, and had agreed to lend the French his troops ? * Did not the late Landgrave at the fame time fignify to that court, that he defired nothing more ardently than to attach himfelf wholly to France ; and to make a treaty for that purpofe. Offering to that crown, his troops and his vote at the general and particular Dyets, * See his expoftulatory letter to Prince Ferdinand for carrying off his fon from Hamburgh againft his father's confent, to ^1 I « ' ( 35 ) n id f to put an end to the troubles of the Empire. Has not this court of Hefle been ever fince threatning to leave us, as often as they wanted an increafe of their fubfidy ? What elfe is the meaning of the fpring treaties of the year 1759, 1760, and 1761? Or what lefs than this is implied in the reafon which has been affigned for making them : That there was danger of the great enterprizes then in hand mifcar- rying, if the Landgrave's demands had not been complied with ? Have we not for three fprings fol- lowing, fince our German general took the com- mand, feen enterprizes formed by him, every one of which have mifcarried : the firft it was faid by his own delay, the next by that of a Hanoverian ge- neral, and the laft by the treachery of another ally, who never yet kept his faith with us : and every one of which, if they had fuceeded, could not have brought the lead benefit to this country ; but each of them had a diredl tendency to amufe the parlia- ment then fitting, to exhaufl: the treafury by a drain of two or three hundred thoufand pounds a month, and to give the German courts an opportunity to take advantage of our necefllties, and raife their de- mands upon us. Have not both parties, during the late reign, (hewn but too great a compliance in bringing the nation into this ftate of dependence ? And when the public funds have been finking under the preffure of more than a hundred millions of debt, have not each F 2 fhewn I. ( 3^ ; IV' i li II Pt It'' fhe^vn themfelves but too ready to heap on more td the load, if they could but lay the blame of it upon tlie other? To 'talk of ceconomy, whilfl: we perfift in thf fame' ruinous courfe, is only throwing duft into the people's eyes. By attempting things impradlicable, we have been fubjedling ourfelves to the power of foreigners, whofe fole end is to plunder, and make the moft of us, and we would then quarrel witii others for fufFering them. We give away the pub- lic treafure'by millions in one place, and then fend our feconds down to another, to msKe a merit of ceconomy about hundreds. We have multiplied Commiflaries without end and without ufc- At firft the pay of one was thought too much. We then fent eight, then fix morej and then three more Commiflaries of con- iroul upon them. What has all this done, but only multiplied the expence ? I mean not here to lay blame Upon any one, but rather to commend. The combined force of both parts of the adminiftration was exerted this fummer, to put a flop to the ex- orbitant abufes in the expence of forage and extra^ Oidinaries. Able men were fought out for the em- ployment of Commiflaries of Controul. Very fenfible and difcerning men refufed the off*er 5 I doubt not but that the gentlemen who have accepted it, have done their utmoft in the public fervice. What has ^V.;;;* f 37 ) has been the fruit of their labours ? The Germari ar- my this year has been lefs numerous, and more ex- penfive than the foregoing. What can be done in a ruined country, where all hate us, and all, from the head to the loweft, are in a combination to im- pofe upon us ? What can be hoped for in a fervice, in which no one Prince upon earth has any com- mon caufe with us ; where our allies, and even our Generals are all hired by their penfions, and have not the leaft concern for any one thing belonging to us but our money. Men may feek to get a name by talking of ceconOmy in the public hearing -, but if they defire to do good, let them apply their cure to the part where the evil grows, and plead for ceco- nomy in thofe courts, whofe fole aim hitherto has been to imprc*ve every advantage over us, which our necefllties furnifhed them with. Bu^ to talk in public of OEConomy, after having privately laid us at the merc) of a German chancery, is infultingthe nation in its diftrefs, inftead of relieving it. 'Tis the mode and the feat of the war (as was very juftly obferved) which muft be changed, if we really mean to confult ceconomy. 'Tis t!ie bringing it from the land to the fea; from Germany to the French Weft-Indies, which muft fhew a real pub- lic concern. But to plead for a German war, and then to talk of ceconomy, is firit creating an in- curable evil, and thqn feeking a merit in calling out for a remedy. 1 have, t ■V; I. iK >-r?i, ^-iiii n T'4 » i 1'! 1 ; It If ;i''i II ( 3^ ) ^ I have for the reader's fatisfaftion, extradcd from the Votes the feveral grants for the hire and pay of our German army for the year 1 760*, From it the expence of our Heflian troops appears to be fo ex- orbitantly great, as would have been incredible if we did not fee the account. The grand objedion againll fending our national troops abroid in all former wars has been this, that we could hiiEi a number of foreign troops for half the money which our own would coft us : But fo much is the value of Englilhmen now funk, that we give for a Heffian foldicr double the price of a Bririfh one. Nay, fo extremely improvident have we been, that we pay a much larger fum for twenty-two thoufand HeflTians than the price of forty -three thou- fahd Wolfcnbuders, Hanoverians and Brunfwickers, or of an hundred thc-'and Ruffians f*. Yet, at that very time, when in our treaties we were thus pro- digal of the public treafure, the defenders of them were perpetually declaiming about oeconomy. There are many among us, who -^re often talking of the expence of the militia. Why thefe country troops fhould wOt be as good, and deferve as much as any other, I confefs I don't fee. Thofe men at lead ought to think well of them, who truft them with our chief defence at home, while they are fend- ing our national troop to hght for a foreign inter- cft t 5ee Page 28, j".^ 4 1759* N°^* 27* 1760. Feb. II. April 29. 29. ir 17^0. ■i'%' ' d. S oh II ^P^ I. s. d» It r- ,■ »•• ■' ! ' t , .*%•, i;f'^^ -- '-r T ', ■• -r -T- l^-o" • Une quarter ^r this (hould be deduaed. %\ m I Mi 1759* Nov. 27. 1760. Feb. II. April 29. 29. * GRANTS for the hire of foreign i FOR 38750 Hanoverians, Wolfenbuttlers, Sax - 1 thans and Buckeburgers — — For For J 1 001 light horfe (Hanoverian) 959 horfe ^ Bruniwickers 1454. foot For a 1000 men Augmentation of ditto — 43,164 1760. Dec. 16. To make good a deficiency in the fum voted lad fefli for thefe troops — — ■ — 1759. Nov. 27. For 27. For C 2 1 20 horfe ( 9900 foot 5 920 horfe I 6072 foot i Heflians — — > additional HeiTians »759« 1760. 1761. Dec. 20. To facilitate the means by which the moft fereneLandg may again fix his refidence in his own dominions Feb. 1 1 . For 4 Squadrons of Heffian hunters and huffars April 29. For a farther augmentation of Heflian horfe and foot March 7. For a reafonable fuccour in money for damage done by French in Heffe, during the year 1700, fettled 1 20,000 1. to be paid immediately, and loo^oc more in two years ■ — J; ' '. -ril 29. For i 505 horfe 2 5 00 foot »759- »759- An augmentation to theKing's a of five battalions, confilUng e of 1 01 horfe and 500 foot - This is a corps faid to be compofed of dl nations, i deferters from all fervices, which as no country ii many will own them, is called the Britannic legic To the King of Pruffia — — Nov. 27. For 57,294 Englifh troops, including thofc in Ge 1,383,748 O ID. For 24,'- 00 Britilh troops in Germany, reckoned onl one third of the above number — — — For forage and extraordinaries admitted the lafl feiSt have been ■ " ■ — — _ Dec. >7- ■ • ■ . 1. 1759. Sept. 30. For the ordinary of the ordnance for the 2 2^0 206 land fervice • ■ ■ —J 3 > 9 i;6o. Dec. 2. For the ettraordinaries of the ordnance of ? . ,^ . ._ theland-fervice in 1760 — — — 5 ^ '^^^ The proportion of this, chargeable to the German fervice, is not afcertained. 656,645 1 761. Dec. 9. 200,000 1761. Feb. 17. For tranfport- fervice, and vi£luallingland-' forces, from the ill Odl. 1759 to the^ 479,035 30th Sept. 1760 ■ J For one whole year's pay of the Heflian 1 troops, which the nation is bound for ( at the end of the war, by the treaty C of the ifl April, 1760 .— j To the Hanoverian chancery of war,for bread, forage and firewood, furnifhedi to the HefTian troops in the year 1757! and 1758, being only the ballance of I a much larger fum 336,479 14 i, For the charge of the militia, which could J not have been called out, if the national > 472*8^^3 troops had not been fent to Germany j [ To face page 38. ] ^rI le hire of foreign troops for the year 1760, 1. s. d. Wolfenbuttlers, Sax -Go- J ..-88210 luckeburgers — — —J ^^'' ^ anoverian) — — — ' 34»333 8 o [liwickers ■■ uion of ditto — 66,926 3 oj 23>843 5 i» 1. d. the fum voted lall fefllons 7 lal Hefllans jrave? he"! at I 2,569 10 o 268,874 16 8 97,850 4 10 6o,coo o o irS'Sii' 17 4* ch the mofl: fercne Landgrave in his own dominions hunters and huflars ■^— 20,776 5 5 ' HelTian horfe and foot ■— 101,096 3 2 mey for damage done by the the year 1760, fettled imediately, and 100,000 220,000 o o mentation to theKing's army "i ; battalions, confilling each > 1 horfe and 500 foot ' j ompofed of ail nations, and of s, which as no country in Ger- called the Britannic legion. including thofe in Germany 768,597 10 I 52,902 19 2 670,000 O O Germany, reckoned only as 7 ^^,^^^g ^ ^ ^^^^oned 500,000 o o :s admitted the lall feffion to7 2,167,90312 6 1. »n to? s. d. 4.734958 19 I J ancejbr the | ^^^^^^^ ^ ^ e ordnance of 2 ...^^^ ^ ^ '^\ 426, 656,645 9 3 German fervice. uallingland-"^ 1759 to they 479,035 19 2 ' the Heffiani is bound for ( „^^ ___ _ _ ^1 ^ . > 200,000 o o jy the treaty f ' y of war,for >d, furnifhed he year 1757 ballance of 6.479 14 1 , which could 1 f the national > 472)833 14 to Germany y > i}8o8,5i4 9 9 38.] "f »Y^ f * •* 'iilf ■ > ,f %.' .fc '"i V p I! J. . .1 • I ' m In IS " m ;. t! s ;r,' vf5 v^, "••* t '^f >:>??'' ;^<;- "it >■'•■' v:^' ' '■"- A. t-^ ' » V,-- ";' ' C' I , -X: I! I [f, \-.J f^' VH l;.. V !.». , '■ « ■ • - ■ '■[ if f r 'I iM it I 11^" ■ ^ SceTage 2^7" ^ ( 39 ) " tfl: in Germany. I have cad np the fums vqted for the mUida-fervice for the year 1760 ; and all put together amount to 472,833!. is. 4d. The reader may fee them in the margin *, But how juftly foever this objeflion of greater expence may lie gainft a militia, thofe gentlemen furely cannot be iuppofed to make it from any real concern for their country, who can quietly fee and vote for the fending more than double that fum out of the kingdom to maintain little more than half the number of foreigners. Will any man hereafter talk of the expence of the militia, when we give more money for German Boors, than an equal num- ber of militia would eoft, if they had every man the pay of an enfign ? — Will a Britifh parliament rate the fervice of a German common foldier, equal to * 1759, November 6th, For the militia in South Britain and two Scotch bat- talions for 122 days, from 25th December, 1759, to 25th April, 1760 102006 4 8 1760, April 28th, For militia in England and Scotland to 24th 0^.1760260104 16 8 For cloathing of Ditto for the year 1760 30,722 o May 4th, For uncmbodled militia to the 25th March, 1761 . 80,000 o o 472*833 I 4 . » * One quarter of this fhould be deduced. M i i> I . if f. I li ?-:* P- I; ( 40 ) to that of an Engllfh officer, mercJy bccaufc he is nou fighting for En^^ nc* The reader will naturit jy fufpe6i: that the 60,000 1. for bringing the Landgrave home is charged twice : but I have charged it no oftener than it is voted. Nor does it appear that the public has credit given it, by the return of either of them. Nor could it be intended to be returned for that year. The fixty thoufand for the year 1760, was voted in the beginning of the Seffions, December 18th, 1759, the feparate article promifing an indemnification, was not made till the next April, and the protocol, which de- termined the fum, which this reafonable fuccour fliould amount to, was not figned till the 3d of May, 1 761. What then is it which the nation gains by the claufe in the protocol, (including therein the extra- ordinary fubfidy ? ) I anfwer, words, and nothing elfe; The Landgrave had received his fixty thoufand pounds for the year 1760; he hoped to make a new de- mand of a reafonable fuccour for the French ravages in the year 1761, and he is content to renounce the claim of fixty thoufand pounds hereafter, in order to intitle himfelf to alk of us four times that fum. Others perhaps may objedl to the making thefe Heffians debtor to one fourth of the charge of forage ^nd extraordinaries •, but their original number of twenty two thoufand four hundred and four is a quar- m ^> ( 41 ) '4 s s e ;r re >f r- ftC ter of the army ; and the noble Lord, who by his office muft have been the bed acquainted with their feveral returns, informed his hearers that he believed that the Heflians were as compleat as the feveral other corps ; 1*310,573 pounds therefore, divided by 16000, give an allowance of 8i 1. i8d. 3d. a man. The odd money will make up for the greater pay of the officers, and leave eighty pounds a man for the common foldiers. So hardly has the nation been ground between our negotiators and our allies. But this is far from being the whole of their expence to us. I have inserted in the account an article of 336,479 1. 14s. id. for bread, forage, and firewood to the Heflians, but have not added it •, becaufe it does not properly belong to the account of the year 1 760, but of two foregoing years : 'tis here inferred only to give the reader an idea of the arrears which the nation has to expeft to be brought in at the end of the war. 'Tis faid that there are many fuch articles. One very extraordinary one, to the amount of fome hun- dred thoufand pounds, appears in the Heffian treaty for the year 1760, by which the public is bound to give the Landgrave a year's pay after the end of the war. I have read over a dozen fubfidy treaties, the far greater part of the fubfidy treaties made fmce the Revolution, not one of which has any fueh article. The moft which has ever been given at difmiffion has been a month's pay. But our great Minifter, whofe chief meafure of greatnefs in his plans, .' . G feems ii i 'I III ( 42 ) A* 'I' r h 1: *? 1^ J i-r i;i Ij I i'ecms to have been the greatnefs of their cxpence, has given to the Landgrave no lefs than twelve months pay. Yet fo implicitly was the laft parlia- ment guided, that the public feems never to have taken notice of it. Thefe troops are now faid to be ftill more defec- tive in their mufters : But even on the former (late of them, they are a lefs numerous corps, than the clergy of this kingdom. I have now before me an eilimate of the prefcnt value of all the ecclefiaftical livings in the iQand ; and after calling up the feveral incomes of our Archbilhops, Bilhops, Deans, Arch- deacons, Prebendaries, Reftors, and Vicars, the value of the whole (with that of the Kirk of Scot- land thrown into it) amounts to a much lefs fum, than that which is now fent out of the kingdom to maintain an inferior number of Heflians. Can we think of a worthy clergyman, devoting his life to the duties of his cure, and maintaining his family tor forty pound a year ; and then think of our fpending twice that Him upon a common foldier ? "Will the fathers of our church concur in voting the fervice of a Heflian Boor in Germany to be equsl in value to the labours of two Englilh Curates ? If the whole number of his Majefly's fubjeds in Britain, Ireland, and the plantations be reckoned at eleven millions, ten millions at lead of thefe confift of people, who have not forty pound a year to fpend upon themfelves. Yet fo highly do we rate the (ervice c: our German mercenaries, as to fct the meaneft of them upon the rank of our lower gentry^ f 43 ) gentry. Wherein had the whole poor of Britain offended, or what had an EngHfh day-labourer done againft the late parliament, that when he by the fweat of his brow can earn but a (hilling a day, he fhould have even that fmall pittance taxed, to maintain a foreigner of his own rank at fourfhiliings and fix-pence a day ? — Will the reprefentatives of the Connmons of England go on with fo unequal a diilribution of the public treafure ? In the lad war, his Britannic Majefty purcha- fed the prefervation of the Houfe of Auftria, which was efFeded by the peace of Aix la Chap- pelle, with the blood of his fubjeds, and bf means of the mod important conquefts of his Crown. Thefe are not my words, but his late Majefty 's *. In the language of an admired politician, " he laviflied his treafure, and his troops, ** and facrificed the intereft of his kingdoms to '* reinftate that Princefs in the poffefllon of the *' inheritance of her fathers f." Does any one doubt, but that we (hall equally condemn ourfelves a year after the next peace, if we fhould make the like facrifices to another German Prince i who probably never had it in his will •, certainly ne- ver cm have it in his power, to do to the Crown of Britain any the leaft for vice ? . * See the Memorial of the Ele£lor of Brunfwick to the Diet of the Empire, in November, 1758. f The King of Pniffia's Expofuion of the Motives. I G 2 Arc % ( 44 ) l'■ mca- ■:A ir \ A it jr /• •* "r ^_ j.. .-> ii K f C 19 n f'.*^ <: 1- V*T' ue r- (M as ad by T'^^f O-V V * "■•X t i Vi' f'^' ed he ch ;r- fVJ e- • €i' ri^-v ■v , - \ ng nd ert u ■f-.i^ <•;*• »S'"''...^;.'i i h c - A\ M ACCOUNT O F GRANTS for Subsi- dies and Foreign Forces; And of Votes of Confi- dence to concert Mea- fures with Fcreigm Powers. 1721 72,000 o o 1726 125,000 o o 1727 250,000 o o 1728 60,000 o • 1721 - - - - 1726 7SjOoo o o 1727 270,000 00 — ^7^S 305*923 II 8 - 1729 316,259 I 3 — — -. 1730 266,259 13 — — ^ 1731 247»509 « 3 '- — 1732 22,694 7 6 — — — 1734 39>937 10 o — 1734 3^*37 '«^ o 1735 5^^250 00 — 1735 10,393 5 II 1736 569250 o o 1737 42,187 10 o 1739 70>583 6 8 L. 1,768,853 9 7 — 1739 476.340 17 <» 1,024,971 12 II V768,853 9 7 Total L, 2,793,825 2 k [ To face Page 45. ] T ( 45 ; ^ Hjeafures with foreigi. powers : all thefe added to- gether amount in the courfe of twenty years to 2,793,825!. 2 s. 6d. Tliefe were the mighty fums, which let out fuch torrents of eloquence ; and employed the whole force and vigour of that nunnerous patriotic band, who have ennobled them- felves by their oppofition. I have not a word to oflfer in defence o\ giving a fingle Ihilling for Ger- man purpofes. But light lie our cenfures upon his afhes, who, by fuch fmaller facrifices of about a hun- dred thoufand pound a year, could footh the natural prejudices of our German Kings for their native country, and keep the kingdom in peace. Well have thefe patriots lived to embalm hi^ memory, who can now readily concur, and vote at leaft, if not write, for our fpending upon a German fervice twice the ibm in one year, which he fpent in the whole courfe of twenty. The thoughtlefs multi- tude have a ready reply to make to this : That was a time of peace -, this is a time of war. But they ^.hemfelves are too wary difputants, to afTign that as an excufe, which makes the principal aggravation of our misfortune. They will not lay, that our being engaged in a war of our own, which cofts us fix millions a year, can be a reafon why we (hould run into another war, which is not our own j or can the better enable us to fpend fix, feven, and eight millions mere upon a German one. :«■ \ mean w> ( 46 ) I \' ¥ '.. r' ;! ! I mean not to offend, and therefore doubt not the being forgiven : But in the debates of tFie year 1732, upon the dangers of a (landing army (which then confided of but feventeen thoufand men, whereas our prefent Englifh army amounts to one hundred and feventeen thoufand men,) I meet with the fol- lowing paffage, which I fhall be excufed the quot- ing, as I intend it only to point out the extreme lengths which we are going: Mr. P— - — y very truly added, *' That the reafon why a Britifh army cofts the publick more than a foreign one, was the greater pi ©portion of officers. And that ftxty thoufand men might be maintained in Germany for the fame money that maintained eighteen thou^ '' fand in Great Britain: and that he had been in- " formed that the twelve thoufand Heffians in the " government's pay were maintained for much lefs than they coft the nation yearly."* How would the great men then on the ftage have looked upon each other, could it then have been known that we Ihould live to fee the time, when the converfe of this propofition would become true •, and that we ihould actually vote as much money to maii.:ain eighteen thoufand Heffians in Germany, as fixty thoufand Endifhmen coft us in Great Britain : yet this is the ftate of our prefent Britifh and Hef- fian eftablifhmsnt. f «( Cl 4( (( C( m V i I I i * Rapin's C In. t 1:59, Nov. 27. For 57,294 Englifh troops - - - i6,coo Heffians cofl (page 28) befide the one year's pay. 1. s. d. 1,383*748 o o i>3Jo>573 o o What ( 47 ) What did we not hear from the next fett of patriots, of Hanover councils, a Hanover fteerage> and a Hanover rudder. Yet we Iiave now literal- ly freighted a veffel with Britifti gold, and fent (hip, freight, rudder and all to Hanover. 1 he found of millions is grown familiar to us, and they who re- gard not accounts, may perhaps weigh our expen- ces in the lump. I fpeak not upon guefs, but on ftrift arithmetic. The bed built Ihip of five hun- dred tons will not carry the weight of pure gold, which this whole war has coft us. Happily for us the national vcflel, beyond all expedtation, has proved to be of a greater burden : but with fo rich a cargo on float, who does not tremble for the voyage ? Or who of us for the fake of any perfonal or family intereft, can think fo defperately, as to go on to try how many more tons are wanting to fink it ? That whole fyftem of Europe, by which all the other dates of it were united in guarding againfl: the powers of France; thofe grand alliances by which Bri- tain gained fo many real viftories on the continent, and to which, as I fliall prefently obferve, it once en- tirely owed its fecurity, are now no longer to be ho - ped for. I have in the Confiderations hitherto rea- foned upon the fuppofition of there being ftill fub- fifting fuch a thing as a balap.ce of power in Eu- rope, and a common intereft to preferve it : becaufc every argument for our concerning ourfelves wii;ii the wars of the continent muft imply this. So ( 48 ) m II. i I 111;;* w ;;?i I' "''' 1 . I; I I i'i I it I So long as this conGcrn for the balance of power in Europe was fubfifting ia the minds of the chief ftates of it, it was certainly the intereft of Bi'itairt to keep up that additional foreign guard againft our moft dangerous rival -, but now the feveral powers of the continent, and all the German courts are fo totally disjointed, and we have been fo long making ourfelves parties in their feparate quarrels^ that there is not the leaft hope of feeing any general union of Europe againft the French : nay, we have been fo long afFedting to fliew our riches and influence, and have by turns made every power in Europe fo much our enemies, that they feem to be as jealous of us, as of France ; and inftead of our holding the balance of power between them and France, they are now watching for it between France and us. Iho' there- fore that old principle that Britain had nothing to do with the continent, was certainly wrong, while the ftates of it were really united with "js and with each other ; yet now that all the powers of the con- tinent have renounced us, it is as certainly right. We can have nothing to do with them, for they will have no concern with us, except only to take our money, to do their own bufinefs with it. Now therefore Britain muft itfelf provide foi its own fecurity. Its fafety againft France depends, under providence, fmgly upon its own arm. _^ ,, . , By the diftradions, which the French encourag- ed the King of PrulTia to railc in the Empire dii- 3/ ^''''o ( 49 .) ring the laft war ; by oqr forcing the Emprefs Queen into the arms of France in this : and by deriving the French forces into Flanders, in the laft*, and thereby ftripping our natural allies of their beft guard there : the whole fyftem of Europe is now changed^ The barrier itfclf, as well as the barrier treaty is now no more ; Holland is become fo expofed to France, that the Dutch dare not aflift us, if they were ever fo W€ll afitded to us. Britain's whole fecurity there- fore againft an invafion now refts upon the one fingle defence of her fleets. The maintaining of that fuperiority, and preventing the French marine from ever riling again to an equality with ours, is now therefore become a matter of double the importance which it ever was of before: It concerns our very being. We have 'tis true at prefent ruin'd it : tho* with fuch an immenfe increafe of debt, and fuch a mortgage upon our induftry, as muft be a heavy burden on our trade after the peace, and long difable us for any future war. Alarming confiderations to every thoughtful man ! However, the enemies navy is now happily broken. But can any man fay, if "we fhould be forced to give up our conquefts, and leave their fifhery and fugar Trade intire, to what height an able miniftry, and a ten years peace, may raife it. Men may be as fanguine as they pleafe, and think, after we have beaten our enemies once, that we muft always do fo. It may be of ufe to abate our confidence^ to recoiled that in Charles the lid's time, • H the ( 50 ) ;Af 111 I ^. t; iip If :: i ; i the French had only one (hip in our Teas to join to the Dutch fleet : that was the whole naval force which they then had in Bred. They afterwards brought round from the Mediterranean fifteen fmall (hips under the Duke of Beaufort, which did nothing. Yet foon after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle Lewis the XI Vth raifed a fleet of fixty line of battle fliips ; and in the year 1690, the French marine was grown to fuch a heighth, as to beat the united fleets of Eng- land and Holland off Beachy-Head ; and for a great part of the fummer their fleet remained fole mailers of the channel, and adlually lay hovering over us, with all our coafl: expofed to them. Then Britain owed its fecurity only to its alliances on the conti- nent. The French troops were engaged on their diftant frontiers againlt the united force of Germa- ny, Spain, and Savoy, (who made this diverfion at their own expence and not at ours :) and the battle of Flerus had fo broken their army in Flanders, that they could not draw otFtheir troops and form an army to invade us. But this is a means of deliverance which we mud never hope for again : Surely there- fore it imports us now to look to our own fecurity, rather than that of diftant countries which we have no concern with. The two nations are now brought to fuch a ftate, that a great luperiority in our naval force ib neccfiary to our very being: Providence has put it in our power for ever to fecure that fuperi- ority, and nothing but the moft fatal attachment to CJcnr-an) can prevent it. By ( 51 ) nn rce rds lall ng. iwis ps ; own ^ng- ^ rreat fters r us. itain :onti- their erma- erfion 1 battle i'l, , that 1 1 army | trance f By By the treaty of Clofter Seven the firft German war was brought to an end. England was abfo- lutely releafed from all concern with it by the ex- prefs adt of all the feveral parties. Now there- fore we are engaged in two wars, which are totally diftind from each other: a Britifli war, and a German: a war of neceflity, and a war of choice : a war of acquifition, and a war of ex- pence. The very laudable prejudices of the late reign, the interefted views of courtiers, and the over- bearing influence of particular planters, have joint- ly confpir^^d to make us confound thefe two wars with each other : and the want of diftinguifhing them has betrayed us into an expence of forty millions, to ruin Germany, and to ferve no one good Britiih purpofe, nor indeed to ferve the in- tereft of any one court in Germany, except that of Berlin. Now that the French marine is deftroyed, there is not any the lead connexion between our Britifh war and our German one. They ar. a . fe- parable from each other as any two wars wliich England can be engaged in. As diftindl as a Spa- nifli war and a SwediHi. Make but this di(lir»6tion, and the national intercft will immediately point out what ought to be done. Party inen on each fide choofe to confound thefe two together, each that they may find a pretence to condemn the con- du£t of their advcrfaries, and to jullify their own. We muft have a peace, fays the one party among VIS •, the expence of the war will ruin us. Vv^e H 2 have ( 5* > '•H lUJ' r) :Ei F: H I' 'ill ¥ i ■I;' >. have money enough, fays another party ; people are as ready to lend, as the government is to borrow ^ don't let us make an ignominious peace. Both of thefc fpeak truth of one war, and falfely of tht other. Neither regard their country only, or they would make the ncceflary diftiiidtion. Do they, who fay we mud have a peace, really wifh to fave the nation from the ruinous expence it is now at ? Why then do they not do it ^ Inflead ol looking to our enemies for a peace, let us make it for our- felves. ^id opus eft volts ? fac ie ipfe felicem. In- ilead of wifhing for a peace, let us call home our troops, and there is a peace. Let us only (top the voluntary free gifts which we are every year making to our allies, over and above what they can pretend the leafl: right of treaty to, and from that moment the German war ceafes, and there is a peace. The war of acquifition, if our enemies will not treat with us, may go on, if wc choofe it ; but the war of expence will be at an end. Britiih blood will be no longer Ihed, and Britifh treafure will then be fpent only upon Britifh fub- jedls. Not thrown away in Germany merely to prevent our conquering too faft, and to keep us bleeding there, till our fpirits are lower'd enoughj to make us accept of any peace which our enemies will grant us. i i ^ } ■ ^^ On the other hand, do thoie men, who clamour againft making a bad peace, really mean that we fhould make a good one ? \^'hy then do they not addrefs ( 5S ) >le * » of the ley fey, [ave lat? :ing >ur- In- m addreis to put an end to the war of expence, which they know muft at laft force us into a bad one ? Or why do they not purfue our war of acquifition only, which every one fees muft be the diredt means of forcing our enemies to grant us a good one ? In (hort, if Britain be a free and independent fovereignty, Providence has now put it in our power to fupport our own war as long as we pleafe ; and bring our enemies to what terms we pleafe, which I hope will always be moderate ones. If, on the other hand, this country is made only fo/r the defence of another, which it cannot proteft, we muft then ftruggle on a little longer, till our money or our patience Ihall be more endrely exhausted ; but the terms of peace will be of the French prefcribing, and not ours ; and our enemies will, after that, ever hold us in thraldom, with the fear of evils, which they know we muft not fuffer, and cannot prevent. . . .., To tell us that this is to be the laft year of the war, and attempt to comfort us with the notion that our enemies are bankrupt, and come to ruin, is »3nly taking advantage of our ignorance, and de- ceiving us to our own. For three winters following, we have been told the fame thing. Frmce, it was faid, the next fef- fions after the battle of Mindcn, is ftnkingy Jbe knows (': '] 1. V' ''if i^-i- f^' 1. ., If 4 Bi 1 -;^ i\ M ( 54 ) iwwi ^^r/^y /»^/»J' ; this is the laji effort of a dying power^ the convulfton of death. Yet we have found her every fummer in Germany to be in ftronger vigour than ourfelves. Perhaps it may be faid, that the next campaign will certainly be the laft. And, if fo ; it may be worth all the reft : and it is pity to lofe a fheep for a penny- worth of tar. Eloquence indeed will not ex- prefs himfelf in fuch uncourtly terms : but fup- pofe that, hereafter, inftead of homely proverb, we Ihould hear the fame fentinient drefled out in bold poetical phrafes, beautiful allufions, full flow- ering metaphors, and metonymies budding out of them : would that make the fentiment at all the more true? All thefe flowers of rhetoric may form a very elegant nofegay for Englifli ladies to fmel! to : — but Frenchmen won't die of them. Nor would the war be at all the nearer being brought to a happy iffue, for our ftatefmen amufing themfclves with the bundling of tropes and fi miles. In vain, alas, do we hope to humble our ene- mies in Germapy, a country in which they have nothing to lofe, and which we are utterly unable to defend. Five times have we efTayed to roll this mighty ftone up the hill, in order to turn it over the fummit, upon the heads of our enemies on the pth'ir fide : and, could we have fifty times tried it, we ihould ftill have found the attempt to be beyond . our e o )S le ( 65 ) our (bength, and feen it come rolling back again on our own. With evil omen, therefore, (hall the claflics be called in aid to our politics. Virgil and Horace, however often turned to, will not befriend us. Old Homer, and all his mythology turns againft us. The Fates have decreed this Syfippeaa labour to be in vain 5 and Virtue itfelf, however urging, cannot prevail againft the Fates. Long before the pinch of the hill, the ftone has always fallen back again ; yet our inexorable tafk-mafter, with more than Rhadamanthean feverity, is ftili ready, even fmgly, to condemn us to exert the force of all our millions to heave it up again; It is curious to obferve how hot and cold may be blown by the fame breath. Can any man ferioufly think, that we are in the laft mo- ments at the end of a French war, and the next in the eve of a bpanilh. If the Spaniards are difpos'd to begin with us ; muft they not be well aflured that the French are not going to end with us? — Yet, The nation is now threatened with a Spanifli war. God forbid that we (hould court it ; but if we are at liberty to purfue only the Britilh intereft, we can have no reafon to fear it. Were the French marine in its • full s/>' Kl • 'i lit I' !■ I • 'i ( 5^ ) full v^Mir, JTuch as It was in the be^nnlng 6f the lad war, and of this, and fuch as it will be flgainft the next war, if we now negled the proper means to fccurc ourfelves ; the addition of the Spa- ni(h marine to it, would in that cafe be a juft ground of concern : but can thofe men really fear a SpanWh war ; in which, now that the marine of Spain muft be unfupported by that of France, we can have no- thing to fear, and muft have every thing to hope for; and yet wantonly run the nation mto an expence of ten millions for a German quarrel, in which we have not the leaf): concern, and from which not die leaft good can reiult to Britain ? Can men be really afraid of meeting a weaker power than ourfelves at fea ; and yet go to Germa- ny to foek out a power at land, which is in itfdf ftronger than we, and is fupported by all the other ppwcrs of Europe befide ? On the other hand, can any man, who thinks a Spanifh war unavoidable, dill advife the charg- ing ourfelves with new expences, even in thofe parts of a German war which are avoidable, and which indifputably we may with good faith re- 1 ' But fay others : Though it may have been wrong at firft to have entered into fuch engagements, yet it is one thing to begin, and another to go on. Not, unlefs ( 57 ) linlefs the nation be bound by any treaty to continue in that wrong courfe ; otherwifc that which was wrong done the firft time, cannot become right by being done a fecond time. So far as the public ftands bound by any exprefs covenant, fo far (if it be not ruinous -, or beyond our ftrength) we tvuil go on : but in every other cafe, it has always been thought a mark of wifdom to recover a falfe ftep, father than to repeat it. Apply this to a prefcnt inftance, which mud pfob^ibly come this year be- fore Parliament. By the feparate article of the trea* ty with the I,3ndgrave, of the ift April, 1760, as the account is liquidated by the protocol ofi76i, we have paid to the Landgrave an hundred and twenty thoufand pounds down, and have engaged to pay him fifty thoufand more for the two fucceeding years. But fhould the Landgrave come another year with a fecond demand, and refufe to let his troops march without another two hundred and twenty thoufand pound, does any treaty oblige us to do fo wrong a thing a fecond time ? The firft treaty may have been made through inadvertence ; but he who knows it to have been wrong, and yet makes a fecond, is felf-condemned. Should the true reafon be : fuch an one has bade two hundred and twenty thoufand, therefore I muft bid as much -, that is the nation's misfortune. But no man's underftanding will there- fore fay that wrong repeated becomes right. Two negatives here don't make an affirmative, but vehe^ mentius negant. If wrong done once^ is wrong ; I wrons 9 : ( 58 ) wrong done twice, is twice as wrong. No man can fay, let me reap the benefit of doing wrong, and let others bear the blame of it, for having done fo before. Nor ran any one really tliink, that be- caufe we have once given to a German Prince more than he defcrvcd, we arc therefore bound to repeat it, and give him more and more of the public money, as often as he is pleafed to want it. Not to add that it is ridiculous to talk of the faith of treaties, v/ith a Prince, whofe troops are eight ,or nine thoufand men deficient. (.1 I'. :; i tV- . But we are now got into the war, and how can we get our ? They who a(k this queftion would have us think that they reckon it a bad thing, and that they really wifli to get out of it. If fo, the anfwer is eafy. By not getting faither into it. There is no need of violating any treaty *, let us faithfully ad- here to all our engagements *, but let us not make fVcfh ones, and that alone will finifli the war. Lall year it was faid, that the bell thing in the Pruflian treaty was its being but for a year. Why then jhould we renew it again ? Whatever may bef?jd about our making peace, this nation cannot be bound to give the King of PrutLa four millioris of crowns, as long as he fliall be pleafed to make war. The annual treaty of 1758 expires intheprefent month, and cannot be renewed without the confent of parliament. Let any man read it, and then fay, whether it be fuch an one 5 as that it can be fuitable to I an ( 59 ) can to the dignity of the Britifli crown to renew it. I^ have printed the whole of it at the end of the Con- iiderations. The preamble pretends to fay nothii.g more, than that we want to give him money, and we want a treaty merely to make him take it. If the fecond article does not give us a right to de- mand for the defence of the Eledorate the troops raifed with our money, 'tis the moft humiliating treaty to be found in the Bridfli annals. If we mud deliver up our money, could v/e not have given it him without a treaty ? and fuch a treaty too as is even more mortifying in the terms of it than in tTie expence of it : 'tis a treaty which obliges him to nothing. In the modern llile, it has no reciprocality in it. We put it in his power to keep us at war for ever •, and debar ourlelves the liberty without his confent of making peace with France, which he is not at war with, and there- fore may be at peace with when he pleafes. The only thing he promifes is to purfue his own quarrel, and not to make peace with the houfes of Meck- lenburgh, Saxony and Auftria, which, of all others, it is moft for the intereft of England that he Ihould not be at war v;ith. Men who have great interefts to ferve, may offer many reafons for this German war ; but the true realbn is but one : and that too would ceafe, and be- come none, by a general concurrence ; but while our great men are full of mutual jealoufy, and eve- ry one fufpicious, that what he might fay in one I 2 place, ( 6o ) f Wl: ■■.'; V. M' i place, will be made life of to his difadvantage in another, this reafon will ftill fubfift; Is then nothing worth the hazarding for our country ? Muft wc only bewail the misfortune of our party difpures, and again fee a proof, that thofe (e J ions, when the public thinks mod about great men, are the very times, when great men think Iciift about the public. This reafon in the prefent t times can be at firft created only by the falfe court which fLippofcd it, and muft be ftrengthned and confirmed only by the fame means. That may prompt men to invent a variety of plaufible excufes for continuing the German war, and putting off the evil day a year longer, but all thefe oftenfi- ble rcafons will prove vain before the face of truth, which every private man's uuderftanding will di6late to him. Authority alone will not govern the thoughts : all men will not fliut their eyes, becaufe one man fays he will guide. Sometime^ the aid of commerce is called in : and we are afraid that our enemies will be all powerful upon the continent, and we fhall lofe our trade. Not as long as we can make our goods and keep ; pur commodities. Even our enemies will buy them of us, as long as we can fell che^prfl: : and our friends won't take them, when they become deareft. The French and Flemings at this time annually buy near three hundred thoufand pounds worth of our tobac- co ; and Dunkirk, Havre, and Cette are now by |hat means our moft prolitable ports. "Will Ham- burghers, ( 6i ) in burghers, think we, refufe to take Guadalupe or Martinico fugars of us, becaufe both thofe iQands are not in French poffefTion ? Sometimes we have been told that our religion was in danger : and we hired Brandenburghers to murder and ruin Mecklenburghers in order to ftrengthen the Proteftant intereft. At other times the German war is neceflary as a diverlion ; and we have for four years been fpending twenty millions to prevent the French from fuccour- ing their colonies ; when half the troops and treafurc employed in this diverfion, would two or three years ago have given fuch an irrefiftable fuperiority to our fleets and expeditions, as would have left our enemies no colonies to fuccour. Sometimes it has been doubted whether we can get our troops home if we would : if fo, then it is at leaft a clear thing that we ought not to fend any more. If our own General could in the midfl: of a campaign and even in the face of a vidlorious enemy, make good his retreat to Stadt, it will be very hard if our foreign general can't eflfeft fuch a march when the French are gone into winter quarters *, At * The hearing fuch a doubt as this publickly ftarteJ, naturally leads us to bethink ourfelves, whofe fcrvice it is to which the general of the army now in Germany be- longs ? %tl \ I 1^ ^ HI ■■■•I : ( 62 ) At other times our compafllon Is applied to : we can't leave thefe poor people to be eat up by the French ; to have their country turned into a defert > their very apparel fold at auction for the'x contribu- tion * ; their houfes plundered, or pulled down for the foldiers firewood, and the helplefs inhabitants cxpofed to ftarve without covering or fhelter. Why then don't we proteft them ? We can't do it. Send over our whole army and the militia after them, the !ongs ? He was in the King of Pruffia's fervice. It has never publickly appeared, either that he has renounced the fervice of that crown, or put himfelf into the pay of ours, or taken any oaths to our government. Should his mafter therefore command him, in the laft refort, to march to Majdeburgh, inftead of Stadtj perhaps the judgment of a German civilian, concurring with his own inclina- tion and intereft, may determine that he ought to obey, and deliver up our troops to the King of Pruflia. The Court of Berlin feems by their Gazette to have a(5lually attempted this in the year iJSIf ^"^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^" P**^" vented only by our having then a General, who was too good an Englifliman to liften to them. Thefe are doubts which the author would not .lave been the firft to create ; but the being able clearly to fatisfy thefe doubts, is a mat- ter which nearly concern thofe men, who have committed the lives of twenty-four thoufapd Britilh fubje^ts to a ftranger, who poflibly may be ftill in the fervice of a foreign crown ; probably has never taken the oaths to our government; certainly is not accountable to our parlia- ment, nor amenable to the juftice of this nation, either in his perfon, or in any thing which belongs to him, eX' t-ept only in his Irifli penfion. * See the laft Gazette of November 1761. enemy ( H ) enemy will flill beTuperior. The French may go home in winter^ and let us fpend our money there, that the country at their return may be the better worth fqueezing, and our Gazette may tell us how Prince Ferdinand has drove them before him : but the next Summer the French army will be there again ; and all that we can do is to enrage thefe poor peoples enemies ten times the more, and furnlfh them with an excufe for all their excefles. Let gene- rous Britilh hearts more juftly exprefs concern for them. But what is it which this argument would fugged in their behalf? Far from offering any relief, it would have us bribe the Landgrave by a great fum to fell his fubjefts afrefh to ruin, and let the French come next year and commit the fame cruelties over again. In breaking the treaty of Clollcr Seven, Britain took a falfe ftep, which nothing can recover, but the bringing us to it again. France has no quar- rel with any of our allies ; they may all make their terms with France juft as they did before : Brunf- wick, HefTe, and the Hanoverian chancery itfelf, under the mediation of Vienna, were then treating at Verfailles. France has now no quarrel with any of them, nor can regard them as enemies any longer than while they can hope to fee us ruin our- felves by regarding them as friends. At other times we have been told that Holland and the Netherlands would be in danger. This 6 was it,: lif If I-''! f Hi ( ^4 ) was the pretext in the laft war, and fdr the fake of a fatal diverfion, we lent over oiir national troops into Flanders, againft the will of the Dutch, to keep the war out of the Eledlorate, and ruin the barrier; and put our moft natural allies into the power of FrancCi , ^ j. ; ^ We may now be told, that Gerniany is fh Jrlii- ger, and the French King will make himfelf Eledlor of Hanover, or Lord of Bremen, and gain a port upon the Wefer and the northern ocean. And is not this a reafon againft our 'giving fix hundred and feventy thoufand pound to keep the houfes of Auftria and Brandenburgh in blood, who would be the firft to take umbrage at fuch an attempt ? and who, with Sweden and Denmark, would be the neareft concerned, and the only powers able to prevent it? ,v^w,-'- 'i^^ ^'»3Tr r..5 In Ihort, it is impo^ible to (ay what may be the oftenfible reafons, which interefted or indolent men may alledge, to conceal the true one. But all this is only giving to every man of common undei*- ftanding an advantage, which no fuperiority of rank or parts can compenfatc for. I have before fhewrt, that the war itfelf, in its firft principle, is wrong ; againft the true intereft of Europe, of Germany, and of Britain, and therefore, in the nature of things, there can no argument be brought for it, which will not be convertible into a much ftronger againft it. PCS T- ' f f '^ ( 65 ) POSTSCRIPT, / ^ TH E reader is not to think that the forego- ing table contains the whole expepce of the Gernian fervice. The article of forage and ex- traordinaries is there put at 2,167^903 1. 12 s. 6d. {jecaiife that was the fum which the friends of the war admitted it to coft : but the feveral grants for the year 17^0, applicable to that fervice, amount to 3,661,747!. 16 s. 10 d. What deductions arc to be made does not appear by the Votes, nor per- haps can eafily be known from the accounts, as they have hitherto beep delivered into parliament. T FINIS.