IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) Y // / i^o 1.0 ■^ |||M *- u 1.4 IIIIM 11= I.I III 1.8 1.25 J4 <^ /a ^/ e^ o^. ^'S w ^. I Photographic Sdences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. M580 (716) 872-4503 ^ •s^ <\ ^^\^^ ,v V % V .s*^** <^..'%^ '^"<^ ^ 41 ^. ?\? ^^„.>^ '\ci;i'T oi- WFi.i,. It is of the utmost iniportanci' to atti-mpt, first of all, to define the conceptions which are to form the subject of our study. What do the terms * Will' and ' Willin.ij ' si.irnjfy ? The extension of these terms have varied widely, as is well known, with diiTerent authors. With many writers ' Will ' is only used to denote a conscious choice between alternative directions of activity, and is i)redicated only of such individ- uals as are capable of rei)resentinj^>^ to themselves such possi- bilities.' Other i)hilo.so))hers widen the conception bv omit- tin<^ from it the element of consciousness, and ihat of repre- sentation of alternatives, and thus extend the notion of will, so as to make it synonymous with force or enerj^'-v in <^eneral. In this broader sense of tlu- w(jr(l. Will is i)redicable not onlv of persons, but also of all phenomena of the Tniverse, and of the Universe itself as a whole.' between these extreme limits, we find various definitions and uses of the term, as one or other of the elements constitutin,^; the concept has been em- phasized or removed.^ As for the last mentioned theory, that of vSchopenhauer and his school, we can only protest a^aiust such a confusion of ideas under one term. We know ' Will ' only throu(,rh our own immediate experience, and as an element of our con- scious life ; and, as thus known, consciousness, not less than force, is always an element of the empirically given fact. To quote from Sigwart : " From this point of view an uncon- scious Will is a contradiclio in adjecto. It may be believed ' Martitieau. A Study of Rrliffioii, I. j), 19S ; II. p. iSS. Si^wart, A'/fin^ Schriftcn, Vol. II, p. iiS fl. = vScliopenhauer, l^ie IVelt als IVillc. Wcrkc, H, pp. 1 1 3 ff. ' For various uses, see Marlineau, Study of Religion, II., p. 18S. 1 • rikt Will. that uiicotiscious activitits take place-, and have the same re- sults as those which we call will ; we may perhaps even be justified in eallint; these activities Will in a wider sense, but only because we have first leariud to know a conscious Will ; and it will always be safer to choose for the broader concept another term. " ' ( )n the other hand, it seems to me that the notion of will as a separate I'aciUty has tended to unduly limit the notion. The old l*sycholo<;-y rejj^arded the activities of the self as manifested through a number of ' I'aculties' such as Think- inj^', I'erceivin^, Willing, etc. It was toooften for<.j'otten that these faculties were not each sin' ileum's, and that they indi- cated nothiu,i,r in themselves apart from the nature of the con- scious ])rocesses. Apart from the definite content of con- sciousness, the uni\'ersal form of activity is only an abstraction whicli leads us astray and defies treatment. As a result of the same separation, too, a larj^e part of our ment:d life was con- ceived as j^oinjj^ on without any relation to the Will. It was sup- posed that ordinarily the Associative process, with its own pe- culiar laws, sufficed to explain mental occurrences. I>ut at cer- tain points, more or less fre(pient in the life of the individual, the Will as a kind of miraculous function, as a power of an al- / //'///. ^J tlif inner and ontcr activitv of tlu- Will. '" ' 'riunkin<,s IV'f- ccivin.i;, etc., ..ic (lilTt-ifnt nanu's wliicli si;^iiif\ {\\v iniploN-- nicMil (.f this activit\- in dilTiTiMit splu-rrs, and ii].(.ii (iili\i,.iil kinds of snl)ji-ct niattfi'. \\\' nia\ name all ])s\eliic-al arlivit\, all intlnriux^ whiil, the si-If exerts npon the eoinse of events, // /// /;/ ///, hnuuirr ,NV//w of the lirni. In so far as the self asserts ilsrlf a.yainst inner or onter (.-vents, ami niodifa-s, or strives to niodif\- them, it ma\ l)e said to will. I'.ut. it nia\- Ik- asked, whv should the other psyehieal aeti\-ities he- snhsnined nnder willinw ? 'i'he answer to this ([Uestion is to hi- fonnd in the faet which will he emphasized throughout this c-ssav, that tlu- will pi,,, eess has really its root in ilu- selecti\e aetivit\- of attention. And it is true that this activity finds employment in lli..- con- strnetiou of our perceptive world, and in tlu- formation of our concepts and jndunients re;4ardinM it, no K-ss than ineffcetinir chanj^cs in the stream of thon,^ht, or in hodit-s lyin- external to ns. < )nr perce])tive world, the world with which we cnic into immediate contact in cver\- day exi)erience, is the result of choosinj^r, out of the iulinite variety of things hv whi<-h we are snrronndcd, some objects wdiich arc to us particnlarl\- in- terestin^r. As no two men's interests are exactly identical, the worlds in wdiich they live can not be absolntelv identical. The painter's world is more rich in beautiful forms and colors than that of the ordinary man ; the musician detects ill the moanino; of the wind harmonies that arc h^st on an ear le.ss sensitive. The scientist's percejitive world is made np of a variet)- of details wdiich simply do not exist for the ordinary man. The influence of the attention in constitntin^r and de- terminin^r our world for ns i.s plainly .seen as we pa.ss from U.niudzui^r^.j, /'/lysiol. P.ur/io/,>o-u; ist Aui]. y,. 726; (Y. also MotTdiii^r On//,>u's-o/P.m/!o/c>^y,Kuir. trans, j pj,. 3,4; ■• u is ,,(,1 uk.ukIi U, say that will i.rece.k-s coKniti..ii and feeling, for tlu-se latu-r, looked at one from one side, are themselves manifestations of will in the wider sense." lO The Will. ri' childhood to manhood. I was very much interested h\*:ely in walkinj^'- witli a little boy to find that the thinj^s he saw were almost entirely different from tliose which made an impres- sion U])()n me. Talkin*^ to him afterwards of what he had seen, I foimd that the objects of his experience, what he had actually seen and remembered, were thini>s which are prac- tically absent for the ordinary adidt. This fact of the selective function of the will in ])erception is well illustrated by Professor James : " Let four men make a tour in luiropc. One will brint( home only pictnres([ue im- pressions of costumes and colors, jxirks and views and works of architecture, pict'ire and statues. To another all this will be non-existent ; distances and prices, populations and drain- aj^e statistics will take their ])lace. A third will j^ive a rich account of the theatres, restaurants, and public halls and naujfht beside; whilst the fourth will perhaps have been so vvra])i)ed in his own subjective broodin.tj^s as to tell little more than a few names of places thr()U,q;h which he ])assed. Kach has selected out of the same mass of presented objects those which suited his private interests, and has made his experi- ence thereby." ' Leaviu}^ now this field of percejition, and comin.i;;' to what is usually rej^arded as the higher mental activities, we find that they, tc^o, manifest to a striking dej^ree the .selective ac- tivity of the self. Concepts are formed from percepts by abstraction, and attention. That is, the concept-process con- sists in i)ickinii; out from a variety of percepts, those which seem to us, in accordance with our interests or practical needs, to Hc* the most essential attributes of the thinj^s presented to tia lie elements thus .selected are bound together by means oi i common name. While thus essentially individual in tb.i" ai*-nre, the common or universal aspect of concepts is intelligible from the fact that liuman beings, as mendjers of the same world, have to a large degree the same practical l^ritn i pies of Psychology y Vol. I, p. 2S6. TJie Conci'pl of Will. 1 1 needs. Reasonino, again, may ])e de.scril)e(I as a selection of one ont of many conceptions each of which stands in snbordin- ation to a hi.i^lier, and of that parlicular ^v/,- which will serve as a connectin.o; link between that higher and some lower conce])t or individnal with which onr i)ractical interests lead ns to connect it. Thus in the svlloLnsm. M is \\ S is .M, vS is \\ what we done is to .svAvV from the nnnK-rou.s notions which are comprehended in \\ the ap})ropriatc one J/l)\- means of which vS can ])e bron.L;-ht into relation with /V I^nt not only this formal process of rea.soninj^-, bnt th.e very content of one's thon.^hts is the result of selection. .Vs the accouiiKuiimjut of physiolooical currents playin.o; throu^-h the brain, there are constantly offered to consciousness ideas of which the i^reater number vanish immediately and without bein,t,r reflected ujion. I choose certain of these ideas, in accordance with my theoreti- cal interests or practical needs, aud ponder over them and their relation to other ideas. I deliberately make them the subject of my thou,<^ht, direct my attention to them, and, at the same time, io;nore the ,u:reat rank and lile of the actual mental proces.ses, which, con.sequently. take lio jilace in mv thought .series. Out of the infinitude of ideas in the stream of consciousness, I choo.se tho.se about which I wish to think, 1 emphasi/ce some and neglect others, and thus literally make my experience what I will it .>liall l)e. It is, perhaps, so obvious as to scarcely recjuire mention that our external actions are oul\- the outcome of a series of selections. As a rule, when I ])erform any bodilv act, contract this or that group of mu.scles, some other movement isalwavs physically po.ssible ; and in so fa'- the act ])erformed may be re- garded as cho.sen. Hut to say that an act is willed, expres.ses something more than that an e ent has taken place which 'i ' O • JatUfs, /'y:>n-ip/t's of /\v,/i,)!oo\\\ Vol. li, p] )■ ,vii If. 12 The Will. % ■' may be ref^ardud as one of several possibilities. Because the results are the same as if willed, because events have oc- curred which from our point of view can be rcij^arded as selections, wc- have no ri<4]it to reijjard them as manifestations of Will, so lonjj; as we understand the term in its ordinarv sij^nification. What I mean when I sav ' I will' is not onlv that one out of a number of ]:)ossibilities will result, but that the selection is the outcome of a conscious acti\'it\' which I idenlif\- with myself. There can be no meaniu<; in the term ' Will ' unless we underst;ind b\- it, the act of a conscious l)ein.n-.' P)Ut we have still more difncull (juestions before tis. So far, we are on j^round which toda\' is ■carceh' dis|)Uted. vSelection and consciousness are uni\-ersall\- admitted to be inx'olved in the sition, • no will without end,' is analytic, just as ' no effect without a cause ' is analytic.' It must certainly be admitted that all action is for the sake of somethinj^ ; but this is not the same thin<^ as to say that this 'soniethin<^' for the sake of which we act, is clearly present to our ordinary consciousness. It ap- pears to me that it is necessar>- to distin,t>;uish sharply be- tween the ordinarN- unreflective consciousness which accom- ' It iiiij4;hl perhajis l)e said that not only consciousness, but also a nitioual consciousness is ])rt'-su]ii)Oscd in a real act of will. As Professor Watson has lately retnarked : " Only a rational l.-einj.; can have a will." 'K/eiii'' Sc/iyi/ti)t, //., /)<•>■ /i,xr([f (/cs Wollois. 1; The Concept of Will. '3 panics a lar<,re part of our dailx- life, and the more delibera- tive critical conscionsness which is evoked when we psycholoo-ize, or when some crisis arises which .lemands closer consideration. In every day life, a conscious end to which we refer each act is as mnch a fiction as the theorv of separate isolated sensations which are consciouslv comi)ared and related. Bnt analysis proves that the end' is alwavs present /;/ poln/lin, in the sense that it has been a real factor in the choice. Snbseqnent reflection, too, niav ])rino to lio-ht the part which it has plaxed. We may perhaps make the matter clearer in another wav. On an analysis of my consciousness, I find over and above the transient i)sychical states, certain more permanent ele- ments. In addition to the jxissin,.; sensations of si,.. that of takin- a walk, or of makin.tr a visit, that an act of will is necessaiw to con- tinue my work. If, however, these competin,!,^ attractions present themselves and I still decide to remain where I am, it is because this has been willed \n oppositioii to the other courses which have presented themselves to me. Further, Will must be directed to sometliin.L,r which I be- lieve myself capable of realizino-. It must have reference to an act which I can perform, or believe that I can perform. It is not possible that I should will that a raiin- dav should become fine; because I can not represent this'to mvself as lying within my power. The means for the realization of any end which I will must be such as .seem to be subject to my control. To will the end implies the willing of the means ; and, further, a belief that these means are such as lie within our reach. It is true that sub.seciuent deliberation may teach us that we were mistaken, that the end can only be obtained through the employment of means which we are unable or unwilling to adopt, but when this becomes obvious, we do not any longer will that the end shall be realized. 1 6 Thr Will. %. K What has just l)cen said enables us to distinguish between ' Desire ' and ' Will '. The former implies only a mere lookinjj^ towards the end, without any eonsideratiou of means. The latter is i)ractical, it sets the machinery agoino; to ac- complish the end, and 1)e<^ins with the member of the series which lies nearest to hand. A wish, then, may be di- rected to what lies wholly beyond one's power to re- alize, and it may be wliolly uni)ractical ; /. <'., take no account whatever of the means. Thus, for example, one may desire win<^s, or the power to l)e in two jilaces at the same time. For the same reason, it is quite pd .ible to desire certain ends while the sole means for their realization is not at all desired. For example, I may desire to become learned or rich, and still may not desire to burn the midnight oil, or to practice prudence and economy, as these ends demand. One word further regarding the relation of Desire and Will. We have seen that mere Desire is inoperative and in- effectual in attaining its object. Desire, however, passes into Will when the unpractical ' would that it were ' is re- inforced by the rational ' let it be,' or it ' must not be ' of the self, which speaks with a consciousness of what the act really involves. Desire, we may say, is the expression of the nature of a sensitive being, while Will, in the sense in wdiich we propose to use the term, belongs only to a rational being who has already attained some capacity for ' looking before and after," and who is able to perceive the essential unity of end and means. In conclusion, we may emphasize the fact that will is a mental and not a physical phenomenon. It is not necessary, that is, that an act of will shall be manifested in a series of muscular movements. We may will without moving a muscle. All the ])henomena of will ma)- be present in con- sciousness though there is no perceptible result so far as the external world is concerned. As Professor James some- where says, ' willing is a relation between the mind and its ideas, not between the mind and the external world.' The 1 I -» I'H, r ■ r 1 1 The Concept of Will. J- phenoiiiena wliich are to form the subject of tliis study, then, are psycholo,o;ical processes, aud it is uiaiuly with au ai'ialNsis and description of these phenomena that we shall be con- cerned tlirou-hout tlie two followin- chai)ters. When this task has been completed, we shall, howe\-er, proceed to discuss the relation of mind and bod>-, and shall fniallv con- sider in what sense it is possible to speak of the freedom of the will. CHAPTER II. Tin-; 1)i:vi;l()I'MI';nt oi* wii.i,. There is no doubt that it will be more easily possible to analy/e an overt and clearlv conscious act of will, than to de- termine the nature of jjrocess which arc lari^eh' instinctive, and which ^o ou for the most part below the threshold of con- sciousness. In attem])tinp to analyze the phenomena ])resent in consciousness durin*;;- an act of volition, we shall accordiuj^ly select such an overt act as the subject of our analysis. lie- fore we bej^in this undcrtakin.^, h()we\-er, it seems advan- tay;eous to see what lij^ht is thrown uj)on the nature of the explicit will processes by attemptin,t:[ to trace brielly their genesis from earlier and more simple forms. In the fir.st place, we remark that the will is an elementary and ori^^inal process of our conscious life. Xo matter how far back we may ])ush our investi.i;ations, we shall always find the will present as a reaction of the .self upon the con- scious content. All attempts to derive will from st)mething which is generically from it, must necessarily prove fruitless. This assertion scarcely needs proof at the present time, and we may perhaps content ourselves by referring to the futility of Herbart's attempt — which is perhaps now almost uni- versally acknowledged — to derive will from the relation be- tween representations. While emphasizing the uniquene.ss of the will process, however, modern psychology also points out the organic unity and interrelation of the whole mental life. Wliile the old faculty theory separated sharply between knowl- edge and volition, modern psychologists maintain that in all sensation, all association and comparison, will is also present as a factor. The voluntary control of thoughts is regarded as a process involving will not less than wdiat we usually call vol- untary acts, and which produce an elTect in the external world. In short, we may say with Hoffding, " the problem of will is 1 Tlir l^r:eIop))irnt of' Will. 19 coiiccriK-d with the \v^\\\. conception and uudcrstandini^ of attention."' To understand the natntc of will, that is, we must be^dn with will itself. In other words, our develoii- ment must he (iiil,[ornrn'(\ not thtcyoocnilicr We UHr-;t .L;i\e up all attempts to derive will from something dilTerenl from itself, and confine ourselves to an in\esti.L;ation of how eoni- ple.x deliberative acts are e\()lved from more simple i»ur])ose- less acts. There are, sa\s Wundt,' two (piestions to he an- swered : (I) ''What are the relations of the ])rimiti\-e inner activitN'of will to the other phenomena of consciousness? (2) How does the outer activity of will arise '"rom tlie inner?" We shall so far as jiossihle treat these (piestions separatelv, althotioh it will he fon.nd, as we jirocecd, that inner and outer manifestations of will act and react n])on each other. We have already asserted, that in every sta.^-c of conscious develoi)meut, there is always some acti\ity manifested 1)\- tlie individual, which, however, becomes explicit onlv in volition. This is the activity of apperce])ti()n ; and without this our ex- perience would be a mere series of .sei)arate feelinjr.s, entirely wanting- in an\- unity. But since it is in virtue of the s\nthetic and dynamic character of consciousness that our ex])eriencc forms a whole, we ma\- re}.,^ard apperception as an orijrjnal ele- ment. As we fnul tliis activity in lower forms of conscious- ne.ss, however, it is a blind, irrational resjKjnse to some ob- ject which is immediately plea.sant or unpleasant. When strou,i;- or absorbing- sen.satious fill consciousness, this activitv seems crowded out and to give no sign of its existence. At- tention in such cases seems to be ' a function of the object ' rather than of the subject. I'.ut a more or less rapid change of content is a condition both of conscious activity and of con- sciousness itself. When a change takes place, when a new sensation makes its appearance, the activity of the Will i.s man- ' Vicrteljahrscli. f. wissfusuli. Pliih.s., 15(1. Xl\'., Ht't. 3, \^\^. 29. ' Cf. also Haldwiii, Firliiiff auii Will, ]>. 34-7. ' WuikU, (.riduhui^c dcr P/iysiol. /'s_niiolo,i;/t; 7,'" Ann. Hil. II, p. 465 20 Thr Will. ifosUd ill lilt.' iiiD'K' of its ivccptiDU. 'I'lic two \va\-s in which this iiivohiiUiiry appc-riH-jitioii iiianifcsts itself arc liy attraction ami rc'|)nlsion. If the new stale is infirrs/im^, i. c'., if it in- troduces a pleasant chan!L,a- into iIr- existiiij^- stale of con- sciousness, tin- attention is directed towards it ; if, for any reason, it is unpleasant, the acti\'ity is employed in snpi)ress- in<^ it so far as ])ossil)le. This constitutes, as IIi'ilTdinn' re- marks "an elementary choice, and determines the manner in which thin.i^s shall appear to us. As plants turn to the li.i^ht, so our percejitive faculties turn to that which excites ])leasure and interest, and away from that which excites pain. '" ' The selection at this sta,t;e, however, is altogether hlind and instinclive. It is a mere straiuin;.^ towards what is immedi- ately pleasant, and awa\- from what is immediateU' painful. A hii^her sta^e can only he attained throuj^h the de\elopnient of memory and intellect. This is reached when ihe ac- tion is <»-nided \)\ the idea of the result, as hased on pre\-i- ous experience, and represented to consciousness. There is thus a kind of i)rei)aration for the result. Tlie function of the representation thus present to consciousness is to determine to a threat extent what shall be perceived. W'e see and hear nuiinh' what we look for and exi)ect. This preparatory action of attention, or of the will, is also shown in the ex- periments on reaction time. When attention is din.'cted to the movements to he performed, the reaction time is much les.s than in the cases where it is directed toward the expected stimnlus. At this period of development, we have ^ot beyond the sta<;e of blind instinctive action, and are at the stage of impulse. We have not a.s )'et Will in the narn^wer sense of a choice between motives, but Will which follows a single re])resentation. There can, under these circumstances, be no voluntary choice in the strict sense of the word ; for there is only a single motive present, and the action follows unhesitatinglv in its direction. ' Ih'WTdiiitr, ()iii/i)u-s of Psvcholoiiw p. 314. Tlh nt:;l,>p)>h Ht of Will. 21 A ival clioicc tirst arises wIkmi diflVivnt iinptilsrs t-oiitlict witli taoh ollicT, and \vc aiv acrin(liii,i;!y CMtiipL-llfd to \vm\sk- and si'tllf tln' rival clainrs of ))ossil)k' coniprtiuj^ linrs of .irlion. It is lA-idtnt lliat wi' do not find >ncli powc-r of dtdihcralion to an\- extent anions^ the lowir animals. In tluir ease, tiien- is no hahnieini;- ol niotiws, no \vei<,diin}; of attraetions against eaeh other. In the same wav, tile child's arts are at first all inipiilsive in character. The object of the whole curse of liis practical education is to make him ///////•; /. r., to inhihit impulsive action ])y the idea of conse.iuenees ; or, at a later sta.L;e of devclo])nient, hy th.e desire to l)rin,i; all the acts of the individual life into relation with somelliiii,L,r which he re- o;ards as an end in itself. Sneji a idioice recpiiivs a de.L;ree of mental deve]oi)iiient, and a pov,er of deliberation and coiii- ])arisoii, which is not found in youn;; children nor in most an:mals. Ilowex-er important an advance is marked 1)\- a de- liberate (dioice between se\eral coni])etin,L; nioti\-es, \et it is exident that such selections have developed ,L;rarlf set-nrs more conscious than the activity of tln' instinctive or ini])nlsive stajLje.' As l)efore remarked, it is impossible to draw any sharj) dividing line between uni-niotived and i)lnial-niotived acts. 'I'he one j)asses l)\ imperceptible sta<^es into the other. Ncveriheless, it is a moment of ilu- utmost importance for the development of the Will, when a tonllict between differ- ent motives arises, and the ori^^-inal impulse is resisted. Xow for the first time the action becomes volnntary. The volun- tar\' act, howewr, is not something which suddeidy comes upon the scene and supersedes all other modes of action. Hut throujj^hout iifi- the ^rcat majorit\- of our acts are per- formed from instincl or impulse, and a deliberate choice is more rare than is j^i-'Uiralh- inia*x), Tlh' /),:r/,)pnirnf of Will. n tile iilca of soiiK' piTiiiaiU'iU mil. W'r can iii unmisiakahK in V()lnntar\' acts. In lurnin.i; the attention now to this, now to that possihilitN', in deliheiatin<4- and relleclini^ over llu- coii- .secineiices, and evaluating the diffennt im])nlses in ndation to an end, tlu' Will manifests itself as the a))solute ceiitie of personality. It is this iuteusitied form of Will which compels recojj^nition, and which can not he e.\])laini'd as niercK- the per- •sistenci' in consciousness of the strongest impression, h'or my own j)arl, it seems indisputable that attention is more than * predominance of an idea in consciousness.' It is the iuiniediali' consciousness of our own acti\il\', as thus emphasized and intcnsitierl in the act of choice, \ hich C(»nstitutes our feeliui; of iMXedoui, upon which the sense of rcs])onsil)ility is often supposed to rest. .\s an empiricallv given fact, this exi)erience ,L;i\'cs no tcstimon\- ret^aidin.L; the ultimate (piestion of freedom ; hut only asserts that we act without compulsion, that we are forced or pushed 1)\- nothinj^ outside ourselves, that the .self is the centre from which it has orij^inated. ' Without that feelinj^r, iln^ uioral judi^tncnts which we pass u|)on our own acts would he unmeaning. With that feeling, and because of it, we recogni/.e the action to be our own and accordingly hold oursel\-es responsible. " This i.s the basis of our practical freedom, while the more ultimate and metaph.ysical question can be answered either way without ])rejudice to our notions oi duty or responsi- bility. '■ We have now to consider the development of outer acts of •Cy. WuiuU, I-:tliik. 1st ed.. ]>. 39S. ' HolTdiiijr, Die GfSt'l-indssii^kril Jr>- f>syiiiisLhi'u .hliz'ilat, V. f. w. Phil. XV., pp. 373 fr. 'Siilgwick, 'J'/tc Methods of I'lthics, \). 70 ff. 24 The Will. Will, as nianifcstcd most iiniiicdiately in chanj^es in the mus- cles of onr own body. This de\elojMnent, of course, f^oes alonj^r with, and is supplementary to, the j^rowth of Will as phenomena of consciousness. We have treated of the de- velopment of the latter separately so far merely for the sake of clearness. All bodily movements may be divided into two classes, the jMirely ])hysiolo<^ical, and the ps\cholo<^icai. The ph\siolo}^i- cal movements ^6 on mechanically, and are not attended by consciousness, or, at most, it is only the result of the mo\'e- ments which enters into consciousness. In i)s\ch()lo<^ncal movements, on the contrary, a more or less distinct representa- tion of the movement, or of its couseciuence, precedes its actual occurrence. The former class of movements may be either automatic or refle.x. Automatic or spontaneous movements ori<,nnate within the organism itself, from some chan<;-e in the conditit)n of the blood, or through some other chani^e in the ort^anism. A reflex, on the other hand, takes ])lace when the nerve current which has been carried to the sensory centre passes out by the motor path without any state of conscious- ness havinj^ preceded. Automatic movements are y;enerally random and purposeless, and continue throu.t^h life, blind, spontaneous discharijes of physioloj^ical eneri^y. Rellex mover.ients differ from these in bein^i; usualh- purposive when ihestimidus is of medium intensity. 0\iQ theoiy of the de\elopnient of outer acts of will holds that ail acts were at llrst either automatic or reflex ; and that from these, voluntary movements were developed. Bain and Preyer suppose that at first all movements were j^urely phvsi- oloi^ical, consciousness in the meantime beinj^ a mere on- looker and oliserving the results. In the coui'se oi time, however, it learns to direct these movements for its own ends — to inhibit those which have painful results, and to ])ro- duce those which are j)leasant. At first the influence of con- sciousness is small ; but it gradually gains power over the phvsiological movements, and subordinates them to its cou- \ -i iMi The Drrelopnicnt of Will. trol. If now \vc separate, as tliis thcorv does, conscioii 25 s 11 ess from tile ori<>;iual inovenieiits, it is (lifTienlt to luulerstand how they are aoaiu to be eoinbined. Just how tlie Will should at a certain point take control of movements which previous- ly went on independently of it, we are not told. It is (piite in- explainable on this theory, too, how the Will should discover that certain movements are subject to its fiat, and change from a mere onlooker to an actual a,L,aMil. Mt)reover, as Wnndt says : " What an absurd conclusion to suppose that animals and men have c(Mne to the world as purely theoretic beino;s. Alter they have experienced many perceptions, and deliberated much, do the\- suddenly arrive at the idea. How would it be if we should ourselves execute these movements? Said and done; and for the future a new and useful jiower is o:ained. The only part of this account whicli has an\- rela- tion to the facts is the existence of rellex niovenienls. lint we neither know that reflexes must always precede voluntary movements, nor that the will e\er takes the former into its service. . . We can ])rove that in many case v*!>luntary movements become mechanical ; for the o])posite view, on the contrary, there is scarcely a sin,^le trustworthy obserxation.'" It .seems to me that we must refuse to se])arate outer and inner acts of will as this theory does. There is no doubt that in animals and youn,^- children we do fnid automatic and spon- taneous acts ; but there is no evidence that these ever become voluntary. What seem to us like i)h\siolooical reflexes are, however, oftentimes psychological rellexes ; that is, at least a lart>;e part of the movements even of yonn.i; children are mani- festations of Will. In lower forms of conscious life, ever\- inner act of will manifests itself by means of a movement lhrou; process of the idea is the inner act of Will upon which the outer manifestation :it once follows. We are indeed able in adult life to forn'i the rei)resentation of a mo\'ement without it actually takinj^ place ; hut this is because we inhibit the nunement b\- thinking at the same time of its not takinjr ])lace. There is _i(()od reascm to su])p()se that Apperception and outer acts were ori<;inally inseparable, and that their separation rests upon a later develoj^meuL of consciousness." This kind of action, whicli has been named /V/r^;-motor, is the type of all movement, and depends upon the law that every idea of the mind tends to realize itself in movement unless held in check by the idea of other nio\emcnts. There seems, then, stroniL^^ reasons for refusing- t(j separate inner acts of will and outer movements. Wundt arji^ues that we cannot point to a sinj^le case where reflex acts have become voluntary, while experience constantly shows us that the opposite is the case. If the will were al)le to assert its mastery over a sure workin*;- reflex mechanism, all the more complicated movements would be accpiired at a single stroke. As a matter of fact, however, we learn such movements as walking, dancing, piano-playing, by long practice. It is only after they have been performed vohnuarily for a hmger or shorter time that they are handed over to a mechanism.^ The order of development of outer acts of will, then, is from psychological reflexes or impulsive acts to voluntary, and MVuihU, (•nnidziii^r d:s f>/iysio/. /'svr/io/Oi; if, Hd. II, p. 470. ■WuikU, (in//i(/z/ii;t' drs fy/iysio/. f^syc/io/oi^ir, Hd. II, p. 471. Compare also JaiiRs, Psyoholoj^y. \'o]. II, ]>p. 526-27. 'WiiiuU, Essays, j). 294. ' >l The nrrcIopHwnt of II 'ill. 27 il again from voluiUary niovcmcnts to mecliaiiical or physicv logical reflexes. The impulsive or instinctive acts are first rationalized ; /. <•., ])ronglit into harmony with some universal end, as i)reservatiou of self, or species. Indeed, many of these imj)ul.ses are themselves rational from the l)eginning. It IS not the task of reason to crradicate these natural im- pulses but to direct and control them. When habits have become formed, con.sciousne.xs, having done its \vt)rk, ceases to attend these ])rocesses, and the\- go on themselves in a purely mechanical way. We sometimes are able in later life to catch a glimpse of these old untamed imi)ulses when a tem})tation .seizes us at times to do some utterlv senseless act ; and sometimes, too, it takes all our will i)ower to inhibit and control such impulses. Of course, this account does not necessarily implv that ;ill actions go through this transfornuition. .Many movements remain throughout life at the imi)ulsive stage. 'IMie\- may even continue to be subjects for deliberation, or at least con- tinue to be attended by .some degree of consciousness. Such, it .seems t(j me, are many of our most comuKiii im])tdses, as for e\am])le, that for food, or for revenge. Again, nian\- of the acts which were once i)erformed volunt irilv nia\- not >et have entirely pa.s.sed over to the mechanical stage, but may still be attended bv more or less distinct consciousness. The presence -f actions of this kind .seem, howeser, rath.er to con- firm our tlieor}- than to be opposed to it. I"\)r such move- ments represent intermediate stages of the process, they are acts which are on the way, one ma\- .say, to become refle.x. Id chapt1':r III. AN ANALYSIS OV WII,I.IN(^ Will (Iocs not exist as an isolated clement of our conscious- ness which is ; states of mind. As Mr, Ward sa\'s : " Iirstead of three coordinate species, coi^^uition, emotion, conation, we have three distinct and irreducil)le facts, atten- tion, feelinj^-, and ohject or presentaticju ccjustitutiuj^ one con- crete state of mind or psychosis. "" ( )ur problem will then be to analyze and descril)e the em- pirically ,^iven content of that ps\-cliical phenomenon which we name volition. Although much attention has been Ije- stowed upon this subject, and much keen introspection has })een euiplo\ed, \et psx'choloi^ists b\- no means a^ree in their descriptions of the facts. Howexer, upon one point all are air Ia-Ihx vkii (kii (i(.iiuillislH\v(.-^ung(.Mi, " /'////. Studiiii, VI., p. :vS2 IT. '^J:\ine< Ward, MiJid, •• rsyi-]i(il(>,i;ical rriiici])les," No. 45. See also the saiiu' author's arlicli," rsyiiiolo<4;y " in \\\k.- Knov. Isril. h/ .liiaivsis ()/' II '////;/;'. 29 nntar\- nioveinciits presuppose and are (le\-elMpeil fruiii iii\-(il- untary. \Vc find, iheii, that, our al)ilit\" to perform an\- e\- tern.al act at first depends upon our a1)ilit\- accuralel\' to pie- tnre to ourselves how the necessary uioeenient feels, /.(•., to reproduce the sensations whieli ha\e pre\iousl\- arisen from muscle and joint duriuj;- its performance. These sensations ha\'e been called the kinaesthetic impressions ; and the\- are of the ti^reatest imi)ortance in learnin,!;- an\- new niowiuent. But after an act has been, jierformed a number of times, the kinaesthetic impressions are no Ioniser called up, but more remote sensations, often of si^ht or e\'en of the couse(iueuces of them are all that are necessar\- for the successfiil aceoin- plishment of the recpiired mowment. As Professor janies has pointed out in his adnnrable chapter on the Will, ' seir^atious which are of no practical importance tend to pass out of con- sciousness. When in learniuL; to row, for example, I ha\'e h\- .some chance taken a stroke in ^ood form, m\- atteiii])t to re- peat it consists in strivin.i;- to reproduce the A>7 of that stroke, the kinaestlietic impression of that mo\ement. Later, how(.\er, when I luue by practice Ijccome more expert in the art, i am guided by the more remote sensations derived from sight or sound. But besides these repre.sentations of the more or less remote results of the action, conceruiui; the i>resence of which psy- chologists are agreed, is there aught else juesen?? Miinster- berg agrees with the ordinary descrii)tion of volition so far as to admit that there is also ])resent a feeling of inner activity." How he proposes to explain this activity-feeling, we shall learn in a short time. Let us now, however, turn to the same author's statement of the pr(^ljleni before us : " Modern Psychology names the last analysable elements into which the content of consciousness can be di\'ided sensations" {^I-^mpfiudiDigoi). The will, then, so far as we are concerned i 'James, The frimi/'ii's of /'\r(/i(>/i>:;v. \'u\. II., ])]). 4.S6 594. - Miiii,sUTl)t.T,i,', />/';■ U'illt-iis/iaiiJhiiii^ . \)\>. 60-6;,, 3" The Will. with it, is onh- a complex of sensations. "The g:roup of sensations wliich we name will, may by its complexity and constanc\' he {listinj^niishcd from other sensations, yet the ele- ments which result from the analysis are coodinate with the elements of ideas. Our ])rol)lem then is to determine what intensit}', (|uality, and feelinj^ tone belonfj to this _q;roup of sensations which we call Will." ' This statement seems lo me to be^;- the (luestion in a \'ery obvious fashion in faxor of the jMjsition .Miinsterberg is con- cerned to maintain. The statement that sensations are the last elements into which our conscicjus phenomena can be an- ahsed, is true only of those elements which enter into com- pounds, or form parts of an objective representation.- The Will, the primary activity" of the self, cannot be known as an idea like other ideas, as Berkeley long a^o maintained. And to seek for a definite state of consciousness with a fixed indi- vidtiality of its own is to rest the problem, it seems to me, upon a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of con- scious states. ^liinsterbcr*;- seems to demand that there should be found some peculiar i)i(iividiial state of conscious- ness which we call Will, and failing to find this he seeks no further. Wundt, in the article above referred to, excellently describes this tendency to substantialize the content of con- sciousness. " I'\)r the adherents of this the(-)ry the mind is a bundle of presentations [I'oi-stellitugoi.) Like the perma- nent objects of the outer world to which they refer, the pre- sentations are supposed to modify each other in our conscious- ness ; but, at the same time, to constitute for us only t)bjects of passive ob.servation. We can add nothing to them, nor take anything from them. Our own activity is only a pre- sentation, which, like all others, is subject only to our obser- vation. What is not given to us in this way does not exist. i ' MiiiisU'rliLTt;, the ll'il'riisiuuuiliDi}^', \). 62. ' Cf. Wundt, " Zur Lehre von den Guinulhsbewtgungen," /'////. Stiidii'n. VI, p. 3^4. * A// A>ialys}s of ll'i!/i}ii^. 31 Our will, tlicicforc, must be a presentation which is analy- sablc into definite sensations that can be traced back to some physioloj^ical stiniulns.'" ' It is clear that this strictly intellectnal account of con- sciousness is entirely niytholo.t,Mcal. The true view is rather that there are three ' asjiects ' in every conscious state, all of which are essential in niakin.i; it what it is. These aides which belon,L;' to every conscious jirocess are: ( i ) kno\vled,Lre of its sii^nification ; (2) its 'emotive' or 'alTective' as]K'ct ; the way, that is, in which it affects me; (3) the manner in which I relate myself to it. This latter element, it ai)pears to me, is known as directly as either of the others. We fiaiiir the state accordin.t^^ to its signification for knowledge, and fall into the mistake of su]-»posino; that this aspect com- pletely exhausts its content. Dr. Miinsterberj.,^ contents him- self with analyzin|T^ the content of consciousness into so manv ' phenomena ' each havino; a definite content and remainino- what it is, altoj^ether indei)endently (,f its relation to the subject. He materializes the i)henomena of ccmsciousness and makes the self a mere onlooker. Then, since it is found there is nt) such phenomena in the case of Will to analyze and name, the conclusion is reached that the latter can be at the bottom only 'a complex of sensations.' Not sensations nor reproduction of sen.sations as siic/i constitute the phe- nomena of Will, but sensations and their reproductions which stand in definite relations to one another and to the spiritual es.sence.'- A mental state is not .something- whose sijrnification is known out of all relation to the self; but the attitude of the self to the sensation is an element in its nature which must not by any means be neositions this activity can l)e nothinj^- more than certain sid)Stanti\e states of mind. Dr. Miinsterberg first examines tlie case where the will is confined to tlie contnjl of attention and the direction of the proces.ses of thon^ht. In all cases of \'olnntary chanij^e of content, tliesc in'cceded the clear consciousness of any representation another state which, in re<^ard its content, already contained the former. In e\-ery case of in\-oluntary chan^t^e there was no element preceded the new state which contained it. When I arrive at a thront^h l> by invohintary association, these states may have certain characteristics in common, but b does not con- tain a. When, on the contrary, I think of a and .seek it in mv mcmorv, what I |)erceive is not ii nevertheless it is sonie- thino- which aj^recs with it in content. vSo \o\\^^ as a is not found, I ])erceive only an .r ; but this .r exists in a series of relations throu^^h whicli it can be known only as a and nothin«4 else." Let US now examine this somewhat detailed statement a little more closely, usin<^ the concrete example which I\Iiinsterberj4' himself emplo\s, that of trying- to recall a name. " I try to think of a word, I remember the place 'SiiK'f tlie above was wriUcn this ])i)inl has bton much niore clearlv and fully worked out by Trofessor Anchew Selh. ' Ivxidenlly if ])heiioiuena or ob/rcls of Consciousness are alone lo be acce])led as fads,' says Professor Selh, ' then all real activity on the \YAYi of the subject is necessarily elim- inated.' .Utiii's P/acr in tlw (^>si)ii>s, ])p. 94, ff. ' Dit' ll'ii/ens/nunl/to/i^ , \^\). 67, IT. .h/ .Inn/ysis of' Willim^. ii where I read il, I know exaelh- its iiu'aiiiii^, hiit // is i''| 'Miinsterberg, /)!i' ll'illt'its/ianctlitiii^, p. 67. Iv * 34 T//C 11'///. of the will. Rellection, ncvcrtlR-lcss persuades us that we lia\c hctn active 1)\' the use oi the most iinjxntaMi criterion, that the rc])rescntati()n of the completed act in such cases was always present to consciousness in the i)revious moment. I'or this reason, then, we conclude that we have heen aj^ents. Hut, as a matter of fact, " we can onh will tr so lonj^- as it re- mains in us; and so lonj,r as it remains, we cannot, as em- pirical personalities, set it aside. Our Will in this case means only that t7 has remained in our consciousness, that the content of every moment was already contained in the f()re,i;<)in<4 state." ' iMirthermore, if we are conscious of our own activity dur- \u'^ the action itself as we are sometimes in tliinkinj^- and must always ])e in bodily actions, this feelin}.;can l)e aualy/.cd into feelinj.,fs of strain in the or^j^ans or a ti<(htcninji; of the skin of the head. Now it is doubtless true that inner nuini- festations of Will arc invariably accompanied by such bodily feelings. If we try to discover the phenomena of volition, the.se are the only explicit 'states of consciousness ' which can be named and described. Vet these bodily sensations are not themselves the feeling of activity, nor do they constitute the essence of Will. They nia\- often fuse with this latter feeling or be mistaken for it, but yet it is possible by intro- spection to distinguish the activity feeling from such strain sensations. These bodily sensations which often remain after the feeling of activity has disappeared ; and, moreover, after they have vanished, they can be recalled. The feeling of inner activity, on the other hand, is a something altogether siii £;cnrr/s^ and expresses certain relations of the ego and its content, as opposed to the passive side of representations, which we objectify. The feeling of activity is that which constitutes chiefly our immediate experience of the self, with- out which bodily sensations would not be experiences at all. " How can one," asks Lipps, *' seek in anything which be- ' Mihistcrbcrg, Die Wil/nis/uuul/im,::^, p. 'o. h/ .h/ti/ys/^ oj W'illiir^, 35 l()n;^N 1(1 till- woiM, tli;it tVcliiij; of (.'iTdrt 1)\' iirmus <.'>{ whicli wliat i.-: and liappriis Ixitli in llif cxlfrnal world, and in llir world (if the l)t)(l\-, bccoiur tor our consciousness an filijcct of (loinj; or suffL'rill<^^" ' In the case of in\-oluntary chan,m-s of content, the new ideas appear as sonu-tliin}^ foreij^n ti> mir- selves, sonielliin,^ Iielon.^inj^ to the Xon-ei^o. In the case of N'oluntary alterations of conscious content, tlndiij^h tlu' aj^fcncy of the feelint; of activity, they are known as mine; /. c.y as helon;^- to nie in a peculiar sense. IIow then can this fceliii<;, in \irtne of which the world is first made rv^rv, or is opposed to ns, he attrihuted to an\- element of the world itself? In thns defmin.L; the fcelin,L,^ as that which expresses the relation of o])position hetween the self and the world of objectix'e phenomena, we must reniendier that this definition is not identical with the fact .^ix-eii in immediate ])erception. The sii^nification of tlie feelinti^ is discovered onlv hv reflec- tion ; in actual experience itself, there is no knowledj^a- or no separation of what is j^ixen as imier and outer." It doe> >eem to nie, howex'er, that we do know of feeliujus and \'olitions innncdiately, in the same wa\' as coi^niitions are known, and not merel\- throuj^h results. When we xolnntariK- attend to any object, our attention is withdrawn from other object. Instead of bein Th, in//. haw till' contraction without the actixity i-xpi-ricncf. The iiuTc ])rc(!oiiiiuancc or pcnnaiuiicc in conscionsucss of any idea is not, then, snlilicicnt to explain this I'ci'lin^. As Mr. Ward >a\s: " It is ohx'ionsly ini])ossil)U' that what is a con- stitmait in crt'iy psychical c\cnt, can l)c cxplicahlc in Icrtns of psychical events. .\n(l the demand for such an explana- tion leads lojuicalh- to a tacit denial of any lietero,ycncit\' in mind at all.'" Xe\ ertheless, Mr. Ward seenr> to hold that attention can ne\er he known prr s<\ It is rather a neces- sary inference, a sin(' (jita inni of explanation ih.ma i.wV which can he known immediately. !!(.• writes: " !t is aLithera pre- sentation nor a lelalion anioni^ presentations, nor, strictly speaking, an nnanalN'sahle element in the I'resentations them- .sclves. .\n nnanalysahle element in e\ery state of mind, I admit, hnt one which even in rellective consciousness is ne\er directly presented. 1 see no wr\- serious ohjection to sayinj^ that all ',»e know a/xuil it is an intellectual construction, or even an inference, proxided that it he allowed that e\'ery proposition in ixsych.oloj^)- is completely eviscerated if thi.s inference is nej^lected." - HolTdin<; also arj.;;uesa*;ainst an immediate C()}.(nition of the activit)' of the self. vSuch a state, he contends, if immediately percei\'e(l, must he simple and unconnected like our sense im- pressions. It must appear with a definite (juality wdiich is as little to he mistaken as the quality (jf the sensation of color. Now, activitv and passivity are only relati\e notions which are indicated hy a t"leii referred to in this eha]»let ; thi- demand for sotiu- delinitr eoiKhtions of eonseioiisiiess which can l)e elassifKil as jiheiiomena of wiU, eaeh ha\-in,L;a tixed eon- tent whieh is as delinite as a eoh)r tone. Ihil our arminunt has ^^oiie to «>liow that jn--t heeause the Will is indi^peii'^ahle to /'// mental life, it is difrieiill to discowr aii\- special mental state to wliieh we can point and saw ' lo, it is here." As wi- do not l)a'>e our notion of t!ie self upon aii\ partieular feeling; or representation, neither caw we do so in the ease of the Will. I'lirther, in rejiK- to I ir)ffdin,t;\s objection, we ma\- sa\' that there is iiothim; to prew'H a decision whic-h has once been made from eoiiiin,!.', np a<^aiii for consideration. JAery decision re.t^^ardiiiL; the future is made onl\- h\ polh.etically ; and another da\ ma\- brin^' additional li.i;ht, or a different frame of mind. IhU lIoiTdin.L; urj^es, further, that even when we appear to be most eiearlv e(»nscious of a resolution, when It is so explicit that we say Wll the real lecidinj4 i)oint does not He here, but the whole mattei was realK' determined much earlier. The ex])licil M'lat ' is often only the official expression of thai which has been already decided. It is no d()id)t true that in such cases the decision cousist.s in refernniL,'- the act under consideration to some c\\(\ i)re\i- onsl\- adopted, as a permanent jirinciide of action. In this way, man\- of our cust/i>i;\\ i I'.w^. trans. \ ]>]). _:,.((> IT. 3« The Will: this linic the minor ])rcinis(.' of tlu- practical sylloj^asin, 'this is a case of that kiiiil ' has liccn \\antiii]L;'.' W'c now return to our anahsis of W'ilK and shall c has stronger immediate attracting power. IIow shall we describe the act of will by means of which A is chosen ? If we Iea\e out of account the \arions j)rocesses of sensa- tional strains which acc(Mni)any the volition, as well as the representation of the various conscfpiences of the alternatives under con.sideration, we must sa\' that the essential moment o*" will consists in fixing- the one alternati\'e before us by nil .tis of the selecti\e attention. Puttini^ our analysis in te ins of content, we may say that the volition is the imme- diate feeling of activitx', ])lus the steadiness and predomi- iiaiice in consciousness of A. When we can atteiul t(j A soleh' and continnouslv, then, as Professor James saws, it is willed. " We liavi^ thus reached the heart of our incpiiry when We ask by what process it is that the thouj^lit of any- tliin*; comes to [)revail stably in the mind. . . . We sec that attention with eiTort is all that any case of \-olition implies. The cssoitial ac/iicvcDiriil of the will in sh<>rl, lelioi it is most voliDiiary^ is to attend to a difficult object, and hold it fast before the n/intl.'' - Notwithstanding this excellent statem Mit, however, the tendency of James's anahsis is to make too little of the conscious activity involved in \-olun- tar\- experience, and to describe the volition pr.'-cl\' from the side of content. When this is done, the alternative chosen .seems to fill corsciousness becan.se of its superior attracti\-e- i '.VrisU>lk',.\'/V<);;/(\f(7/('(/;/ t://iiis., ]\k. \'II. •Jriiuiples of /\\'iiiii/o,ii_\\ Vol. II, j). 5^1. .!// .l//(i/ys/s ,)/ U'/'/Iino. 39 iiess. In other words, the subject a])i)ears to he passive rather than active. This is prohal.lv the dauoer in pnttiuo the description of ;,n act of will solelv in terms of attentio," Or, perhaps, we shouhl sav tliat it on-ht to he remenihered that the attention is not nierelv the power of raisin- certain mental jn-ocesses to a greater de-rer of in/rusi/y- l,nt is als,, an intellectual function which has iIk- powrr of relating and incorporating ideas with the rest of our experience. It ?s not entirely true, then, it seenrs to nie, to describe :i case .,f de- liberate willin- as a mere act of holdiu- a representation in consciousness. The i:ical fact when the act i)ecoiiiesan external one, and effects •some chauo^e in the world of objects. The arirumeuts of James- and Miinsterbcrs;- '■ seem cpiite convincino- a,t;ainst the existence of any si)ecial innervation feelinos; and even Wuudt has modified his position on this (luestion. ' It is not neces- ary that we should first have the volition as an internal fact, and then add something; to it to -et external volition. The 'Hal(hviii, /•'(,• Uni^s ami Will, y. ;,55. ''■ Principles of /'sir/io/ooy. Vol. II., pp. 494 (f. •' /h't- U'il/rns/uunilioii;, jip. 75 (T. U/nanizitoy ifcr P/ivsiol. /'sir //oh trie, 3"^' .\(if1., ]],\, i, pp. J^,y, fj 40 riic Will. truth rntlier sct-nis to be that tlic division hctweeii internal and external volition is itself an artificial one. Kvery state of consciousness has its j)hysical side. A N'olition is at once a psycholoi^ical fact, and a nio\in,t; force in the external world. .As James says: " We ilo not first have a sensation or a thou<;hl, and then have to add soincthin<; to it to <^et a nioxenien;. Movement is the natural immediate effect of feelin*;', iiresi^ective of what the ijUcditN'of the feelin,L; may be. It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expn ssiou, it is so in voluntary life. " ' Xo anahsis of deliberate acts of will, however, is complete whicli does not take account of the subordination of ])articu- lar acts under a permanent end. In order to '">mplete the analysis of such an act of volition we i)ass on to a brief treat- ment of this subject. In impulsive actions, there is no reference to anythinjj^ be- yond the act itself. There !.. j^resent in sncli cases a loss of equilibrum in the psychical condition, and a more or less dis- tinct desire of s(jmethinj^ to be realized ; but there is no con- ception of an end under which the action is to l)e brought, or to which it is referred. ICnd and means in this case coincide. Impulsive actions may be defined as movements which follow immediately the ])erception of the inciting ol)ject. There is nothing beyond the immediate act present to consciousness, and so there can be no thought of an end. The actions of children and of animals are almost altogether of this sort. Mankind, however, does not remain at this stage, l)ut in \irtue of his reason soon ri.ses above it. " Human Will is not de- termined by that only which excites, that is, immediately affects the .sen.ses ; but we possess the power to overccjine the impressions made on the faculty of our sensuous desires by representing to oun^clves what in a more distant way may be useful or hurtful. These considerations of what is desirable Primi/^lrs of /'syr/io/oi; r. \'(>1. II., ]>. 527. Ill .lita/ysis of WHlinj^. 41 witli re!;;ar(l to ciir whole staU-, that is of wliat is j^ood and useful, aiv l);isi(l (.•nliiilx- ou reaxni.'" ' It is man's al)ilitv to hold bcfoTc hinistlf possihililies .is \et un;Utained, whii-h la-- conR' for him laws, that makes liim capable of reaehini; a hi*;lier intellectual and nidial pi, me than the animals. I'esides the im])ulse to ]ireser\ation 01 life and oiT>prin}^ which num shares with the lower animals, and which ni'cessi- tates some union for the sake of protection, there are other irresol\-alile tendencies-' which we re,L;ard. as pecidiarK- liuuuiu. The first of these is the feelim; ot s\ni])atli\ in the pleasure or ])ains of another, in \irtneof which we are able to idcntifx' (iursel\'C-> \s itli h.im, and for , le time' to make his en.ds ours. Thus we speak of .i man who is iiicapable of s\ nipath\- as inhum;in. The second of these peculiarl\- human impulses uia\- be called the intellectual moti\'e. The animal intellect is the ser\-ant of desires and ai)peliti.s, ;md is onl\ called into action throus^h their deuuind.-;. At first, indeed, in the his- tor\- both of the iudi\-i(lual and the race, it is j)ractical needs which arouse int(.'llectual acti\"it\'. The end at this sta^e is set b\- some practical neces.sit\', and the intellect is moved to seek means for relief. P)Ut while these pr;ictical needs must alwa\s renuiin end.'' for us, man as an intellectual beiu!:; huds satisfac- tion in the exercise of thou,i;ht for its own sake ; and withont any practical end in view, rellects upon jjlienomena and their reU UL'S. Wl 11 latious, purely for the pleasure which such acti\'ity brii The result of this reflection is speech. It has be remarked that animals do iu)t speak because the\' iui\e noth- ing to say. The\' ne\er exercise their faculties for the sake of d iscovernm truth 1, l)ut always witli some practical end m view. Man, on the othei hand, in virtue of this inlellectual impulse is able to make truth his <.(oal, and to disco\-er facts re^ardiuo; phenomena and their relations which he exi)resse.s in lan<;uaj;e. Hut if these were the only additional eciuipnient of a man, K;iiil Kr. (!. r. V., ! .MiillirV Trails. >, ]i. 6SS, 42 Tlu Will. llicy would in\-(il\x' him in hojic-lcss rL-alisni with himself. .Sym])alh\- and self low, e.^tiism and altruism come into invconcilabk- conflict. In the rej^ion of theoretical reason, too, o])j)ositions and antinomies arise. In o\ercominj^ these di.scords and contradictions, man realizes the hi,i;he.st j^oal of Ir's intellecttial and moral nature. It is the last class of human imjMdses which leads us to seek a harmotiN', a union in the play of different motives, and a<;reement and (M-der in the i)henomena ()f our intellectual life. Just as in the intel- lectual spliere the hij^hest ])lea.sure is experienced when " unit\- is introduced into the manifold," s<- the center of our soul life which is tlisturbed and j^ained by the clash of cli.sharmoniou.s motives conceives the idea of a union in a supreme end which will include in itself and harmonize all the ends of life. Reason, as Kant tells us, is a "function of unity.'" In its spcculatixe employment, it leads us to jjostti- late an absolute .-.ynthesi.s, and furnishes the conceptions of truth and beauty, the ideals of vScience and of Art. When it is practical, it seeks to subordinate conflicting; ilesires to a hi.^her principle. It seeks beside the many thiut^s which we name <4oods, one vSupreme (rood in which these other goods are taken up, and throuj^^h comjiarison with which their rela- ti\-e \-aluesare assiy;-ned. This impidse after unity introduces order and harmony into the sold, and so pla\s the same part as Justice in Plato's Republic. Just how this liij>hest j^^ood, this unconditional end, is to be defineil is a (piestion to which different aj^es and peoples have oiven ver\- difterent answers. Why this is so we shall see later. At present, we can say that man's potentiality of advancement depends upon the presence of these ends. To the lower animals, even if they had the pre ini[)erative in their demands. The distinctly lunnan im- pulses, o\\ the other hand, are rather i^entle forces whiih work imperceptibly in the individual and the race, and tin- ends which they prescribe are not so irresistible as to comi)el man to embrace them. ( )ften the more nri;ent demands of life crowd them out of si^ht, and the\ fail lo make their in- fluence felt. This may happen in the moral sphere thron.nh either the altruistic or the e,i;-oistic impulses (more frecpiently the latter) assumin<; such projiortions that they dominate the whole life; i\o.,:\ man may be so eonsistently selfish that no conllict is felt. Ihit where this lack of harmony does exist, it ma\- lead to a desire to ox'crcome the disunion, or the in- dividual ma\' be swa\ed in turn by selfish and unselfish motives. When the latter is the case, his life is made up of inconj^ruous i)arls, ami does not form a consistent whole. It is now necessary to consider the part which eiuironment plays in j)rescribin<4' ends for the indi\-idnal. We ha\e hitherto s])oken as if the ends of life were wholly i)rescribed l>y peculiarly human intluences. While it is no doubt true that the form is wholly (»r in part prescribed by natural imoulse, yet the content of the end is larj^ely determined by external iullueuce. The intellectual development of the individual, the moral status of the communit\' to which he belongs, or of the persons with whom he is most intimately associated, pre- scribe to a larj^e extent the ideals which ai)peal to him. It is a familar truth that example is more forcible than precept, and that a nuin may be known by the compaiu he keeps. Every .society has certain norms of conduct which it ])rescribes for its members, certain standards to which it expects them to conform. These are adopted by the individual in a blind iinconscious way, and l)ec(jine part of himself. He breathes them in with the air, and, since they are tlie common proj)- erty of societN', they form a bond of union between the indi- 44 The Will. vidual mcinljcrs. Tlie common slock of lio])e.s aiul fears, wants and ])lcasnres, constitnte tlic soli(larit\' of mankind. These ideals are as mncli a ])art of the inheritance of the indi\'i(hial as liis lan,t;-na,<4e. \\-l these norms can not in iwr\- c'rcnmsta.nce of life lay down a complete code of cop.dnct for the in(li\i, we can not speak of anv of them as ends except in an antici])at(.r\- wa\-. At hrst thev are all representations external to the self; when afterwards one is chosen, it is taken np into the self, and the rejected possibilities are to ns henceforth as nothin-. We have been all alon,<^ atteni])tin.L,^ to show the close con- n.ection between specnlatiw and ])ractical Reason. In the f(,rnier not less tlian in the latter, we have one end which we strive to realize. What we kee]. ])efore ourselves m tlnnkin,^, as the .^oal tovwirds which onr efforts are di- rected, is the completion of the ])rocess itself; the nnder- .standin.o; and clear perception of a s\steni of relations which we tliink of as alread\- existiiiL; in reality, whate\er nieanin,L^ we attach to realitw In willin^-, the end son^ht for is some new condition or event which we wish to call into bein.o-. Vet the two processes are not essentially difl'erent, and canni)t be divorced from each (^ther. While Will cannot be de- rived from thinkino-, or tliouj.,dit from Will, \et each ^ rocess involves the other. At least all cases of conscious volition involve thou<;ht, and are in fact only an ai)p]ication of the practical .syllojrism. In other words, ''every actioii im])]ies a .sense of a creneral principle, and the applyin. 266. cii.\1'Ti-:r i\-. Till'. I'SVCIIOI'IIVSICAI, rROin.I'.M. .\Uh()U,t,^li " volition is a psychic or moral event pure and sini- j)le, and is absolutely coini)leted when the stable state of the idea is there," ' yet it seems to produce effects in tiie external world. The most immediate result of such an outer act of will is a movement, due U) some modification of muscular ti.s.sue. It is not, however, the fact that there are movements which .seems to demand e.\planati(Mi, but that these movements should C(-rrespon(l to, and seem to obey, states of consciousness. Thou^di there remain many ^ajxs for physical science to fill in before we can understand exactly what takes place in the dif- ferent staji^es of the volitif)nal process, yet we can not doubt that asa ])h>'siolo|L,dcal event it can be accounted for mechanically. Xevertheless the direction of nerve currents, the fact that the orji^anism is directed and controlled according to the idea of certain ends, seems to indicate a connection between the two series — indeed at first sight it points to the dependence of physical phenomena upon psychical. On the other hand, there are certain facts which point to the dependence of mental states upon physiological processes. In the first place, it is to be noted that the psychic phenomena with which psy- chology busies itself, do not form a continuous series. There are gaps which it seems impossible to fill up completely from the mental side. Consciousness appears in the first place to derive all its original material in the form of sensations through the media of the brain and nervous svstem. These onrans seem to hand over to consciousness ' the raw material ' of sensation, and to be constantly introducing foreign matter into the thought series. It is undeniable at the same time that the nature of psychic states, and even their existence, is con- 'J;iiiR'>, I'iiiiiif>lts of Psvrholoffy, Vol. II., ]>. 560. Tlh' l\t lation of' Mi)i. ii6. 48 Thr Will. 'Ml ,1 |i -11 mill']. It has to atU'iiipl Im iliscoW'v :i Iciia'nK' tlicors' ol" tin- uhimalL- uikU-iIn in^ Miiit\ in \irUu' (.- that all slatf> of f()nsfior:siirss ;ii(.' acconipanicMl l)\- conx'spoiidinj;' irt\'ous stales. \\\- know tliat an\- considfval)!*.' fhan,i;L- in tiu' pl'.ysi- cal ()r,L;anisin, i)arlicul;ul\- in ilu' brain, is atlciuk'd 1>\ dis- turbances in the nic-ntal splu-rr. W'c al>o bccann.- ooiuiiu-cd, in anaUsini.,^ the pliciujnK-na of Will, that wIumi an\- representa- tion hlls eonscionsne.ss a nmscnlar nio\einent at onee follows. iMirther, we nia\- point to the fact of the (plant' tatixe relation between the external stiinnlns and the resnltin.t.; sensati(jn whieh has i)een fornmlated by Weber's law. All these fact.s of eorrt'Spoiidence seem lo indicate that the two series are not nltimatelv sei)arated, but belong; in some way to the same world. ' 'I'he (piestion which will fnst concern ns is that re^ardinj.>; the relation wdiich, from the scientific standpoint, we are war- ranted in prcdicatini^ between mental and ])hysical phenoine- iia. There are at least three ])ossible attitudes toward thi.s cpiestion. The first of these conceives it to be tlie ])iisiiie.ss of .science to limit itself to some i)articnlar field, and to attempt to find iiuariable connections and secpiences between the phe- nomena in that field. The science of Psycliolo- to which one mental state succeeds another. '\ - The subject matter of neurology is the nervous system and its functions and chan<;es. There must then be no confusion of the resj)ective splieres of these two sciences. " iMinctions of the brain may correspond to, or may hold some other relation to mind ; )-et mind and brain are not the same, the study of the brain is not the study of the mind, physioh^'jy of the nervous system is not psychology. '* 'All exi'ilk'iit account of tliu ])arallfls and analo^^ies of the two serie.^ is j^ivL'ii by Hc'ilTdin.i^, (hif/inrs of Psvc/ioloi^w i \\n\:,. trans.) Chap. II. -Mill, System of' /.(';,'/''- Hook VI., Cha]). IV. ', Script mv, " Tho I'rohlom i)f rsycholoj^y," }fi)id. No. 6.v \ sc Tilt' l\t /n of Mimi anii liihh. Y) It is III) <]()ul>l oftt'ii .'ulvaiit.'ij^cotts and (k-sirahlo wlicrt' ntu' scries can udI. he coniplvtctl, where some i>f its Hnks ate wanting;, lstitnti\sy W'liile thns limit- ing IMiysioloj^A- and I'sycholo^y to a partienlar sphere, the (piestion is still left open as to the u/t/»/(itt' relation of the ])he'nomena witli which the\ (Kal. " It is not to hi' niider- stood that hy this limitation of the jMohlem of ])syc-holo!:;\- an\- ojjinion whate\'er is exjjressed re^ardin,^ the relation he- tween mental phenomena and hodily phenomena. Let the relation he what it will, the ipiestion mnst he kept ont of ps\clu)lo,^y." ' ( )ne cannot hnt ap])ro\e lieartiK" of snch a clear statement of the snhjeet-matter (jf the two sciences. It cannot he donhted either, that a protest is called for a.^ain>t the tendency discernihle in the writings of some psNc-liolo- (^ists, to explain mental phenomena hy fnrnishinn a more or less m\-thical account of wliat takes jjlace in the brain. There is, however, another set of facts which is not iii- clnded in either of these sciences, which we ma\- call the fact of the lorrcspondt-HCi' of the physi(jlo}^ical and the menial scries. If we say that it is the province of jjliysioloj^ical-ps)- ':holo<4y to in\'esti<4ate the correspondences and connections of the two series, the (jues'.ion inevitahU- recnrs concerning,'- the relation wdiich snch a science is able to ])redicate re^ard- in<4- the relation of the two kinds of phenomena with which it deals. It ma\- he said that it is the hnsiness of a science, as a science, to discover nniformities of action, invariable se- qnences between i)henomena. As a science, it knows nothin-^ of any bond linking- the ])henomena to,i;ether, or of any action or interacti(jn between antecedent or consequent. It professes onh" to discover seqneiices and nniform modes of actinj^. ' .'^criiiture, " TIil' I'roUk'tn of PsvcIioIo.l;)'," M'nid, Xo. 63. 50 : .If Will, Nc'VcillR-kss, wf do call " llial luitt'ccdciil which is imariahly present wduii the- iihi'imiia-iia folUiws, ami iii\aiial)ly ah- st'iil wluii the latkT is ahsc-iil, other ciicuiiistanci'S leiiiain- iiij; the saim-, the cause of the pheiioiiieiia in these ciiciiiii- stauces." Shall we not use '.he sauu' word in describing the relation helueen the phenomena with which pin siolo^^ical- psNcholoj^A' deals ? If the word 'cause' denotes only invariable sccpience, there can, of conrsr, he no (piestion ahoiU its use in this ease. I Iowe\cr, it must not be forj^^otten that, from its emi)loyinent in describing; the relations of ])lienomena in the material world, the term has taken on some peculiar shade's of meaning which are alto<;elher inapplicable in dealinj^ with thr plie- nonnna of consciousness. This ])t.'culiar niodilication which has come to attach to the word ' cause ' in recent times is the residt of the relation of e(|uivalence, which we alwa\s think of as obtaininj"^ between the cause and effect in the material world.' I)\' ' e(piivalence ' we mean that the series is con- ceivably re\-ersible, Jiat cause and effect have the same ]iower of doiuj;- work. This fact is expressed in the law of the conservation of eneri^ry. This law has come to be an a.xiom of modern physical science, and is a direct conse- quence of our postidate that the anioinit of matter in the uni\erse remains constant. Now such a law can ha\e no application for ps\choloj;y, or for psycho-physics. If this is clearly recoj^nized, it seems to be a mere matter of word.s whether we shall or shall not use the term ' cause ' to describe the relation between the phenomena with which these sciences deal. If we speak of causal connections between mental states, or between nervous states and states of con- sciousness, we must do it with the express recognition that here the principle of ecpiivalence has no place. The second point of view is that held by the advocates of the so-called 'automaton theorv.' This view can not be re- ' WuncU, Ethik,-\'rX cd., p. 399. Till l\i liitioii ii/' Mini/ tiiii/ /!('i/v 5» )4ai(U(l as a www iiiiliiali. iii mI' tlu- iMopcr siilijii't-iiialUr of physical and iiKi.tal sfieiKX' ; il is a iiulaphv sical i1k'<>i\ which asserts the imixpssihiliiy ol" .in\- cunmrtidii \vhati.\cr hclwiiu thi- iihysical and the mental winiil. However t'loc and in\arial)K' is the eonneeliim helween IhmHIv ninseiiunls and stales of eon^iMonsness, \et /// >ialil\\ il i> niaintaimd, they };() on in entire independence ot" each other. " I'.nl little rctlcclion is reciuirid to sIkav that conscionsness does not make the mij^hly dilYerence whii li is commoidN' su|»]iosed. Conscionsness, when il is piesent, i> the li,u;ht whic-h lightens the process, not the a.^xnt in it> acconii>li>hnient. W'c are never cc^nscious of the thin- nntil the thinj^ is. Conscious- ness does nol j^d before the e\ent, il onl\' comes into heillj,^ with its accomiilishment." ' I'rom this ]ioinl of \ie\\ con- scionsness is a mere ' epiiihenonnnon,' a shadow whii-h ' on.i;ht not to exist.' The adxocates of this lheor\- not onh' recoi-. \\\/x- the onlf which Descartes pointed out lietween matliT and mind, hut they make it aI)>olule. There are three rea- .sous ur^ed for thus wrenching the w -rid apart. I-'irst, the utter disparateness of the two kinds of phenomena; secondly (and partly in conse(|Ucnce of the tir.st), the impos.sil)iHl\- of conceivin^M)f an_\- action or reaction between the two worlds ; and, thirdly, the direct con.sc(iuences of the law of the con- berx'ulion of eneri^w All kinds of physical cnerL;\', it is said, are comparable be- cause they are all forms of motion, and can be reduced to a common mea.sure, so many foot-pound.s of work. States of mind, on the contrary, are inconimensurable with an\- form of motion, and we do no/ /licrcforr cxp/ain aiiytliiiio b\' refer- ring them to some physical event. Supi)ose that we grant this to be a valid ground for keeping /lie /ivo sciences sepa- rate, yet the objection says nothing regarding the ultimate relations of members of the two series. The phenomenal dis- ' IMaiidslfy : " The Cerebral Cortex ami ils Work." J//«i/, X\', ]i]), 171- 52 The Will. ii'^' paratencss of the two series may be a reason for prohibiting a science which deals witli one set of phenomena from ex- phiinino- b}' means of meni])ers of the other series ; ])nt there is so far no j^ronnd foi l)elie\'ing that this disparateness is the ultimate fact. The constant correspondences of the two series, and the fact, upon which I shall not dwell here, of the adapta- tion of the bodily movements to the external environment, forbids ns to suppose that such an assertion as that of the au- tomatists is a final statement re<^ardin_<;- the nature of the two series. There still remanis the rational demand that the seeming- disixu'atcness of these spheres hhall be harmonized. And the \-ery fact that the phenomena of these two fields are manifested in conjunction, not only strcn^rthens our belief in their ultimate unity, but shows that reconciliation is not im- possible. In the second place, it is asserted that the action of con- sciousness on brain, or (>: brain on consciousness is incou- cei\';d;k. 'The ])assa<;e from tlie i)ln'sics of the brain to the facts of consciousness is unthinkable, ' and b\ unthinkable is meant picturable, " continuously imaginable.' " It seems to me that, as before renuirked, while this nui}- be an aroument for refusing- to entan.i^le ps\-cholo<4\' with plusiolo.i^ical ex- planations, it can sa\- nothinj^ re,L;ardiu,^ the tdtimate connec- tion of he different \ arietie.s of the real. The word ' incor- ceivable' has, as Mill pointed out," three meanings at least. Anythino- may l)e termed inconceivable which we are unable to believe. Thus it was inconceivable to the I'rench jjeasant \(\\\ that the Ciermans could take Paris. Or, secondly, tlie term may refer to something- which contradicts a fundamental law of our thinkiui;-, as that two and twoshonUl amoinit to 'i\\<:. Thirdly, any thing or any event nuiy be pronounced inconcei\able when we are unable to represent it 1)\- aw inuige in our con- sciousness. It is nuinifesth' in this last sense that action or ' AliinsU'rlR'rt^. Dir Wil/i'iis/uuiii/iim;, y. 27. " /:.\(rii/i>i(i/io)/ o/'Sir U'i/liain I/aiiii/loii's /'/n7()so/)//r, ]>. 151' The Rclaiio)! of Mind ami liodw 53 reaction between brain and conscionsness is held to be in- conceiv.d)le. I can not picture to myself how 'the idea of a beefsteak should bind to<;ether molecules ' in such a wavasin any way to modify niv movements. \\'c mav say in .ijeneral that we can onl\- represent to ourselves wh;;t has been lirst presented. Since, then, this act on the i)art of consciousness (supposing; it to take i)lace)is never imir ".ialely known, it is plain that it must forever remain in this sense of the word 'inconceival)]e.' We are ajit, however, to talk as if there is no difficultv in conceivino- just how one ])hysical bodv acts upon another. The ^:re n.clls the wax before our eves ; l)ut, after Hume, we are conr-elled to admit that we have <'iven only an antecede'it and cou.^eipieul, and know nothing of anv bond which uniies tliem. We can say t^'o that after Lotze's analysis,' it is im])()ssil)le to ihiid< of any state, or of any action, as jxissin.!^- over from cause to effect, ^b)dern l)hysicists, too, are abandoning- the concepti.>n of a force which detaches itself frou. one object, and attaches itself to another, and beoinnin.i; to admit that they know n(»thino re.L,^ir(linjr the nature of force at all — u\ racher to doubt whether or not there is an\ thino- which C( 'responds to that conception. It .seems then the reciprocal action of brain and mind is incon- ceivable, in the sense that it is not ' conti'.niously imai^dn- able ' how ;niy one thin,«^ acts upon any other. We may per- haps admit that there is more difficulty in conceivinj^- how any reaction could take ])lace between mental and material phenomena, than, there is in the ca.se of phy.sical can.sation, but tliis dirferencL- is not sufficijut support for a metaphysical theory. The third, and perhaps the stron-est argument for the inde- pendence of the two series, is taken from the la.w of the con- servation of ener«;y. " .Vccordino- to the cairsal principle everywhere maintained in ])hysiolo^ical iuvestioations, we can speak of a causal connection between phenomena, only Lotze, Metaphysics, Hook I, Cliap. V. >t The Win. ( «! •■f wl'.cn the effect can be derived frDiii llu- cause accordiu.^- to dcfi'iite laws. Such a derivation is ])()ssil)le oul\- when we are dealiuj^ with lioniove'^ous ])h.enresented as e(ini\-alent to the can.se. That is, under sj)e- cial conditions, the causal relation can he re\-ersed. . . It is evident that there cmi be no (lucstion of such an (.(juiwa- leu'\- between our representations and the j^hysiolo^ical ]>he- noniena which, accompany them. As the effects of the latter, nothiu!:; but i)liysical phenomena can ever come into existence. In this way alone is tliat closed system of nature ])ossil)le which finds its most ])erlcct exjiression in the law of the con- servation of eneri^y. This law would be \-iolated if an\'- where a physical cause should l)rin}4 about a mental effect." ' Thus also Scri])ture, in the article (juoted above, writes : "There is one fundamental axiom on which Psych oh JL^'-y can work, and without which it becomes involved in the mazes of theory. Mnital phoiomoia can not iii//itriu'(\ or he in/lu- I'liccd In' Diatrrial p)u'>io)ti('}ta. . . The disco\-er\', the de- velopment, and the ])roof (^f the law of the couserxation of enerj^y by Mayer, Helmholt/'., and Joule, ha\e rendered the opposite of the axiom inconceivable." '" There can be no objection to these statements, in so far as they arc to be understood mercK as pre- .scribing the limit for the physical sciences. It is a work- ing postidate of physiology, that material phenomena shall not be explained by anything- exce])t material phenomena; and of jisycholo^y that psychical states shall be referred only to some antecedent psychical states. Vet this is not (piite the same thiui; as the a.s.sertiou which is so often made that ' mental phenomena can not innncuce, or l)e iuHu- ' WiiinU, A'v,V(M,v, (,\'//!r// niiJ SiU'!,-. '' Scri])tun', " Tlu' I'r I'llini dI" 1S\ iliu!c>;^y," MiiiJ, Xo. 6_v 'flu- Relation of Mi>id ami Ihniv. 55 enced hy pliysical pliencniciia/ Such a slaU'iiicnt sceius to doo-inatise re,u;anlin- tin- metaphysical (|nestion couccniiiijr the ultimate nature of hodv and mind. If it is trm- that the as- sertion is to be regarded as indicating the final trntlnvoardin,<,r phenomenal facts— that in realitv one set of i)lienomena ])ro"^ ceeds in entire independence of tlie other— it is difficnlt to understand how anv metaphysical tlieorv can overcome the dualism. ( )i-, ])erhaps, it would be better to ,sav that the state- ment is a metaphysical theory. I5ut if, on the other hand, it is only intended to indicate the mode of procedure of the jdiysicil .sciences, and the ideal which ]xsvcholooy must hold nj) for it- self, we must keep constantly in mind that this division isonlv a methodolooical one, and not a statement reoardino realitv itself. This is all that the writers from whom I have .pioted mean to convcv ; yet it seems to me that they have stated what is an axiom of science reuardin^- its own mode of -.-x- plainino- facts, as if it Wvire an expression of the ultimate nature oi these facts themselves. In the same wa\-, it is not unusual for psychologists to take lii^di .ground when dealing- with the law of the conservation of euero-y. It is not unconnuon to find it referred to as ' proven by Maver, Hehnholtz, and Jotde.' or as ' a fact that has now been fully demonstrated.' .\ little consideration, how- ever, shows us that the law has never been proved— nor can it ever be — in the innversal sense claimed for it. It would of course be forever impossible for jdiysiolooists, bv means of ac- tual measurements, to demonstrate that the nervous processes which are attended by consciousness, do not intluence the latter in any way, and are entirely uninfluenced bv it. The law has been verified, with greater or less exactitude, in fields where consciousness can not be thou.. 657. *l.Ui Hois RcviiuiiKl, I 'ihcr dit' liiTiizi'ii lies Xa/iiirrktiniiiis, y. 16. The Relation of Mind and /u>dv. 57 injT natural pliciioinena and their modes of hchavior. Mod- ern physio]oo;y owes, perhaps, all its success t(. the adoption of iliis j)oint of view, and its al)andonnient of the principle of ' vital force.' In accordance with this princii)le, everv ehan.^^e in the or<,mnisni has its 'clieniical or physical eqnivalent either in the oro;anisni or withont it.' Snch hypotheses have justi- fied their adoption by jjrovin,^- themselves useful ; /. c, by re- dncin.tr to unity and (lofinitcness the relations of what seems at first .glance hetero.Ljeneons and disparate ])henomena. vSo lono;, then, as we remember that we are dealing with niethod- olo.o;ical hypotheses, no objection can or should be raised. But a protest must be nroed a<,^'^inst anv attemjit to make snch hypotheses the basis for assertions respectin.i;- the ulti- mate constitution of thin.^s, and the universal order of nature. This is doubtless a danoer to which sciemific iiivestioaiors are e\]M)sed, especially when dealing v/ith lono-standiii- h\- potheses. "So thorou.o:hly axiomatic have the doctrines of the absolutely iu(K])endent and passive existence of matter, and of the constitution of bodies as a.i;<;reoates of absolutely constant i)hysical units, become in the minds of modern physi- cists that the\- not oulv re.^ard them as the indispensable foundations i)f the whole structure of physical science, but do not hesitate to use them as suj)ports for profes.sorial chairs of metaphysics." ''' Hiolo.ists and ph\siolo_oists ma\ hold fast llie law ot the co.i.-.eivation of ener^\- as a fruitful workin,^ hy- pothesis, without assertiii.L,^ do,<;iiiatically that life isoiih- a ])lay of molecules. This law should be regarded nierelv as a didac- tiveor 'regulative' principle, not as a meta.plivsical theor\- of 'vSiall Seriis. i '/■//(■ (o/Kr/y/s ail,! '/y/coiics n/' J/,, :/,■)// J7ivsiis. XIII. Int. Siiiir 58 The Will. tlu- iKiluic of iiltiniaU- facts. It may, ])eilia])s, justly (jlTcnd tho sciculiric instincts ol many persons to sp'/ak of conscionsu'jss ' l)indin^'- molecules to^reih-r,' or of ' the idea of a beefsteak as directinn' ner\'ons currents" in one diri.'t'tiou rather than an- other. Stattineiits of thi> kind ai'e thorou.^hh- false and ob- jectionable, because the\- insade the scientist's territorx', as it were, and make use of the scientist's cate.i^ories and C(>ncei>tious to connect phenomena which, from the staud- ])oint of the ]);irticidar sciences, are not co l)e brought to- j^ether. A>.;ainst an\- such a naive tormulation of the rela- tion between body and mind, or at^ainst the attempt to make iina,(;inable the connection between consciousness and brain, the law ()!" the conservation of enernA- has its jn'oper sphere and ]c,i;itimate use. At the same time, we must remember that the assertion that 'mental states do not influence or are not influenced 1)\- material states,' is ecpially mi.' ..hievous when it i.s understood as a metai)hysical statement of ' jnirallelism ' or dualism. HofTdiuii;-, after enumerating; \-ery fully and clearly the correspondences between mind and body, writes : "We must assume that these parallels have a real si<.^uilicaiice ; there must be an inner connection between conscious life and the brain." ' Hut the law of the conservation of ener}.(y is sometimes assumed to be identical with the causal postulate itself; or, at least, the want of e(piivaleuce between antecedent and con.se- quent amou,^; the phenomena with which psycho-physics deals, is ur^ed as a _nround why we can never say that a causal relation exists. It is of course perfectly plain that no qiuintative etiuivalence is ever to be found I)etween states of brain and states of consciousness, and that if this is to be the criterion of causality, we are forever excluded from postulat- in.i>- such a relation. lUit the demand for explauation, which is the source of the causal jjostulate, does not seem to me neces- sarily to imply the fact of equivalence. We shoidd still seek " ' H()tT(lin^r_ Outlines of /'s\r/iol(\i^y \ Vav^. iraiisl. i, j), 59. Tlic l\ilati(>n of Miiiii niui Hotix. 50 for the causes of natural ])lRMioiiK'na nnd construot our scit-'iKvs, if tlie enerjfy of the efl'ect was, say, only ,'', of ihal of the oanse. If there were (i)iy fixed ratio between tluni, we eo;il■(>>/ 1^, •• Dr. ;\IiinsU'rber}.;'s Tln.'or\- of Mind and I'.i xiy and its CiMi-^i.'- quences," Phil. Rt-v., \'ul. I, Xu. 2. 6o The WilL Whik- lliis is tnu-, it is also Inic lliat, e\-en <^raiitinj>- the c-(|iii\-a]inc(.- (if ])liysical canst- and plivsical eftVct, wc do ncil nndtrstand in tlu- kast, f\tn in this fitdd, how one thin^ can proiiitit' another. Xor (k)cs science atleni])t to (k) so. It seeks onl\ for in\ariahk- SKiUences jind nnifonnities. "The Law of Catr^ation, the recognition of wliich is the nij'.in ]iillar of in(hicti\i- sc-ience, is hnt the faniihar truth tliat in\aria])ilitv of succession is found 1)\- ol)servation to oh- tain between e\ery fact in nature, and some otlicr fact wliich has |)rece(k-d il, inck-pendentlx' of all c/<'s us to undcr- staiid Ixttor tliau he/on' the uaturc a)id la'a's of some of the Si(fuc)ici'sy ' Since, then, we use the term Causation to ex- ])ress the relation between antecedent antl conse(pienl both in the ph\sical and mental s]iheres, and since the word when used in jihvsical science does not imj^ly any conception of one \.\\\w\^ producino^ another, but only denotes an invariable uniformitx', I see no reason why it should not be used without any metaphysical implications of tlic uniformities which i)syclio-physics discovers. In em])loyintr it in this field, we shall, of course, be oblij^cd to keep in mind that we denote somethini^ different from physical cau.'-alit}'. 'Phere is sti 1 :^nother psN'cho-pliNsical theory which is a '.Mil!, System of /.<[■;■ !<\ Hook III, Cii.ip. \', Sect. 2. O-Iill, //)/(/. Book HI, Cl3aj). V, vSect. ic Tfu' Rilatii)>i of Minii and I^^dy 6 1 1)k'n(liiij^ of llif comnion-sensc and antomalon theories, atid which wc may connect with the name of Miinsleiher.i^. Ac- cordin^j^ to this theory, j)hy.sical movements of the ori;ani>m <^o on in entire independence of conscionsness. Tiiey are mere mechanical results ; and Miinster])ert; describes in de- tail how snch a machine as tlic ner\'on> system, caj)al)le of transmittinj^ and coordinating; forces in snch a wa\- as to brin*;- ahont j)nr[)osive actions, conld arise in accordance with the laws of evolution. lint, on the oilier hand, he points ont that ijsychical i)hen(,mena do not forma continr.ons series 1)\- tliemselves, but depend on, and are conditioned b\-, physic, d I)henoniena. ' In the same wa\, Huxley, while emphaticalh' denyinj^' that the i)h\-sical series can be interfered with b\- the mental, declares that we have as much reason for belie\'in^ that physical processes are the cause's nf nieutal j)roces'>es as we have for believin,i:^ that any one tiling is the cause of an- other. ' If these assertions are intended onl\' to indicate scientific nuthodoloj^ical principles, they mi,i;!iL ])erliaps be allowed to pass unchallenged. Psycholo^'y is dependent upon the physiolo^^-y of the brain and mr\-ous system. The plie- uonieua with which it deals do api)ear to b<.' discontinuous and incomplete, and it is compelled, at least pro\-isionaIl\-, to com|>lete its ex[)lanation by attemi)tint4- t(;<^ive an account of the parallel j)hysical seric-s. I ha\'e already noticed the dan- (^ers to which this method of exjdauation is expensed. Hut i materialistic i)S\cholo<(y too (jflen takes the reference U) the ner\-ous s\-steni as the final word on the subject. When this \-iew is jMit forward as a metaplusical iheors it seems to me to iiu'oh'e a double absurdit)'. In tlie lirst ])lace, if states (;f brain 'condition' states of luiud, ali talk about the utter dis])arateness of the series, and llie mconceivabilit)' of any relation between them, must cease. The })rocess from consciousness to brain, which Miin- ' ;\Iiinsteri)i'r-. />/V W'illrii^liaiidlHii^ , p. 109, -'JIaxlf\-, /'.'v.vcM' 0)1 /)i\siaitis. in /.ay Si'm/oiis au'f . Iddivsst's. r.2 The will. slc'rht-r.^- rc-jcfls tui llu- ^roiiiid thai il i'- ., w coniiiiuouNlN iin- a<4ina!)k', is just as iintliiiikahk' wluu \vc altfiupt to trace il in a r(.'\'cTsc (liifi'liiiii. I'urllRriiioii.', this Uk-oiv docs N'iolciu-c- to tlic law of coiiscr\alion of i-iicrj^'v. I'd:" to assert llial a ])hysical stale a has as its result auollu'r pluNical slate of exactly the sauie auiouut of iuer,iL;\', /*, j)lus a stale of cousciousness, i\ is to uiake the elfecl ;;reater than the eau>e. ' Moreover, il scciiis lo uie that this |)rinci])le, if rcj^ardcd as a slatenient of fact, is oi)])osed to the conception of causalitw Acticju is unthinkable without iuleraclion. l'"\ery case of causality when ri<;htly understood is seen to in\'ol\e the concej)lion of reciprocity. It seems to nie, then, that if stales of brain con- dition states of consciousness, it is impossible to supptjse that the former are totally unaffected by the latter. We must leave the di.scussiou at this point without at- temptin_i;- to answer the ultimate metaphysical question re- gardiu}^ the relation of body and mind. W'e have attempted to clear up some of the confusions which attach to the ways in which the ]M"o1)lem is often stated. In the mean'Mue, we must conclude tliat such a relation e.\ists. The fact that it cannot be embraced in the somewhat simple formula provided by the law of the conservation of enert^y, shows us that this relation is more complex than that which obtains between the phenomena of physics and chemistry, Imt it throws no doubt upon the fact of relation. ' Cf., Scri])lurc, " The rrolikm of I'syclioloj^y ", Mind 6j: CIIAI'Tl'.K \-. Tin; I'KI.I.I'oM ol- THI-. WII.I. Wf have still to cdiisickr iIk- \c'.\c(I (itRslidii of iIk' \-\\u- (l(»iii of the Will. 'I'his has hecii llic' .Sphinx prohlciii of niocleni i)hilos(i])hy. and is n.oi nnri lalid to tlR- (iicik tincs- tion, whether \irtne is innatt.' or ac(|uiiv(l. 'I'he (liltienlu of the prohlcin is iluv to the faet that thr deniands of onv inlel- lectual ami moral natures slx'Ui to l)i.' antaj^ouistie. if expe- rienee is to he possible, we must rej^^ard nature as a >\st(.ni of necessary laws. " W'e ean explain nothinj^ hut that whieh we can reduce to laws ; whemxer the determination li\ necessary laws ceases, there ceases also the possiI)ilit\- of any explanation." ' lint, it is maintained that if our morality is to he real, we must jiostulale a certain sphere where e\cry phenomenon is not necessarily determined hy that which precedes it, or a realm of I'reedom. 'JMiese postidates, hnih of which aj)pear absolutely neces.sar\-, the one for knowledge, the other f(;r our moral life, seem to be incfimpatible. Thus arises the antinomy which it a])pears can onl\- be solved by doinj^ \iolence to the denuinds of either our intel- lectual, or of our ethical coirseionsness. ( )n the one hand, it is pointed out by Detcrminists that the individual is moxed to action by certain motives ; that his actions are the re- sultants of certain inlluences playing upon his character. Tliis character again is the product of prexiousacts, either of his own, or of his ancestors ; so that at any time the act jjcr- formed is tlie necessary expression of the individual under the given circumstances. Those who adopt I)etermini>m point out further, that there is an unbroken line between actions which are governed by im])ulse or instinct, and where consequently there can be no talk of freedom, and the most complicated and deliberate acts of choice. Ik' Kaiit, Metaphysics of Morals, Abbott's Translation, \). 79. 64 Th,' Will. Oil tlu' iillier side, it is aij^nu-il hy those* who coiitt'tnl for lMc(.'osition, that tht' reason, tin- )>L-rsonalit\', cannot he represented as one factor, on a par with others ; ])nl that it is the deti'rniinin;^ j^ronnd in reference to whicli. and throni^h wliieh, motives have any \alne for lis at all, iMirther aru^nments are achhiced to pro\-e that it is onl\' on the hypothesis of I'reedom that we can ^ive an\- meaniiijL,'' to such terms as ' Duty,' ' Ohlii^'ation,' ' Remorse,' etc., and that these terms express real experiences of mir moral life. If we are to attempt a reconciliation of these views, it is well to try what admissions can he made by each side to the ar.i;iiments of the opposite j)arty. To hej^in, then, it appears that the Determinist mnst admit that man is more than a part of Nature. If we sjjcak of him as determined 1)\' motives, these mnst not betaken to indicate mere external objects, oroccnr- rences in time or s])ace. b"or it is only when external event.s and objects are taken nj), ex'alnatcd, and identified with the self, that the\- ha\e any sij^nificance as moti\'es at all. Just as in the intellectnal sphere the nnderst-'^'.::lin>;- makes Xatnre, and the nnrelated sensation is * as t^ood as nothin,t;-,' so it is only as adopted by a self that ' circnmstances ' or ' envin^nment ' can ha\e any meanint; for ns. There can be no external de- termination of our actions : the conscious self is the centre from w hich they ])rocee(l. It is just as impo.ssible to explain acts of Will without reference to the self, as it would be to conceixc of our knowle(l,L;e as thru.st upon us from without. Xor is tile st;',tement that our acts are the resultant of an ex- ternal and internal factor an accurate account of the facts; just as it is not a true account of our knowledj^e, to describe it as a compound, one element of which is j^iven from with- out, the other contributed by the nnderstandinij;-. In both cases, the internal factor is logically prior, and is the pre- sui)position of the external. There is alwa\s a translatinjt*-, a coordinating', and evaluatin;^, of the externally j^iveu riif I'yciiiom of tlw Will. ^)S elc-mt'iit ; and it is oiiK as thus hroiij^lit into relation to that pcnnaneiil ctiiltr of t. xpcricncc which coiislituti-s oiirsclvfs, tliat t'xlcnial ohjt-cts can W in an\ sense motives for ns. ( )n tlie other hand, the iniuk-rn defenders of I'reedoni ha\e j^M\en 11]) (at least in name), their claim to a freedom of in- dilTerence. it is ([iiiti' evident that sneh a conception contra- dicts all onr experience. N'o art of Will can he retjanled as nnniotix'ed. V.ww when onr volition is determined hy mere whim or caj)rice, tluri' is always present some motive — i. may be the mere irrational desire to do somethinj^ nnn^nal. The i(U'a of moti\-e or end i-- an essential part of an act of Will. .\n act which is not directed to some I'ml, were it pos- sihle, conld in no sense he the ohjcct of ])raisr or hlatni-, hnt wonld he wholly irrational and irrcsjKJnsihle. Xor wonld a Libertarian of today claim that an act of choice has no refer- ence to the character of the ai^ent. lie wonld, ho\\e\ii, jnsth- i)oint ont that the character is not somethinj^ external to the individnal, a forei.^n power which deti-rmines his ac- tions. If there were no relation between the act of the indi- vidnal and his character, how wonld either dej^eneralion or re,<;eneration be i)()ssil)le? I'nrtherniore, whatever view we take of I'recdom, we mnst admit the condiiioninjj^ effect of the environment in which the lot of the individnal is cast, h'.x- ternal forces, snch as climate, soil, and ^eoiL^rajjliical position, limit within certain bonnds the directions which the activity of a particular individual can take. The social environment has an even more powerful conditioning inllnence than the physical. The s^rade of societv into which a man is born, the education which he receives, and the moral ])recepts which he imbibes, are all potent factors in his life. It is worthy of note that neither ])hysical nor social en\i- ronmeut can be said absolutely to determine the conduct of an individual, though both circumscribe its sphere. This limitation takes place in two ways. In virtue of envi- ronment, certain lines of conduct may be closed, and so can not possibly be willed. Hut oftentimes a line of activit\- may 66 y:S' //'///. also l)c iiiipo^sihlc siin|)l\- lit-caiisc it nr\xT occurred to ns, I lo»i() 1(1 III It 1)1 potest (Ilia lit II III Slit. Tlic free man can choose only betwee.! ])ossil)ihlies wliicli lie knows, and cannot create his ))nr|)oses at i)leasnre out of nothini^. lie cannot attain a jierfeclion, the thoui^ht of which has ne\-er come into his mind. He cannot decide for sometliint^ whicdi is not a possible object of his will, since it exercises no inlluence uj)on hi!n. lie is onl\- able to prefer one end which solicits liim to another, to turn away from one moti\'e in order to 'follow another. ' ' All this, it seems to me, will ])e readily admitted b\ an advocate of l-'reedom, without jjrejudicin^ the cause which he isseekiu!^- to defend. " It is not necessar\- to moral I'reedom ( the I'"reedo.n which tlu- Libertarian is concerned to maintain ), that on the part of the person to whom it be- ]on<;s there should be an indeterminate ])()ssibilit\' of l)econi- iuLi^ and doini;- anythiu_ij and everxthin,^'. " "' The onl\- I'ree- dom whicli is recpiired is the abilit}' to choose, within a lim- ited sphere, the possibilities which present themscKes to us as ends. Let us now seek todisco\er a single pro])osition which may jierhaps be admitted by both i)arties as formin,^- a i)rovisional statement of the relation between the individual and his ac- tions. 'IMie favorite determiuistii^ formula is that 'every ac- tion is the necessary result of character and circumstance.^. ' To this statement we may at this statue bring- the objection that it is not correct to speak of the character a.s a permanent factor, on a par with the external euvironinent ; and, secondly, to denominate the act as necessary, is to l^ej.; the very point for which the Libertarians contend. \Ve shall perhaps avoid the above mentioned objections, and find a propositiou in which both parties can agree, if we say that ' all deliberate action is the exjjression of a man's character or self as it reacts upon given circumstances. ' It is true that a single act may not be '■Tirceii, t'r(i/(X(iiH('>/(i to /i/t/irs, j). 1 ui. The Frci'do))! of f/^r Will. ('1 a c<;inplete or adcjuatc c-xprc-sion ..f tlu- j.L-nnaiK-m rliaiartri of llic iiulividual, yet, if i' is not made afti-r dclihcratio,;, it must ivpuscMit tlic self of the nionieut. We have now to ask what is implied in the term ' cliarao- ter' wliieli up tu tliis time we have u>ed in a merelv pn,- visional way? What notions does tlie word inehide ? Cha.r- acter is attributed lo races ..r ehisses, as well as to individuals. We speak of the national character of hhi-lishmen, I-reneh- men, etc., and also ,,f Hk- character which heh.n-s to diilVrent a.L;-es and sexes. It is scared \- necessar\- to point out that the notion ,,f character has no nieanin- apart irom the act in which it expresses itsJf. A> an independent entitv or realitv.it is an a'vstrartion ; for if we say that it <;enotes ''hollowe onlv exproses the fact that the nerve currents most often run in t!;is direction. " Character is si;u])lv that of which individual pieces of (-in- duct are the mauifestati..n ; it is ihe force of which conduct is the expression, or the sul)..tance (,f which conduct i> the attribute.'' ' Hut if we define character simply as a mode of res])(.n(liu,!.r in a deiinite set of circumstances, our 'previous proposition will he true, yet ma lifestly identical. What is evidmtly contained in the notion, is the thou-liL that there is, both ii'i individuals and races, a somewhat constant mode of actini^- under o-iven circumstances. The solicilin- power of diffLreu"t representations retain a more or less constant ratio to each other. Xo individual is enpially receptive for all motives; but each proves tlirou.t^h his actions that he has a standard of valuation, in virtue of which he chooses one object ratlier than another. It is just this i)ernianent core of individuality, as practically nrmifested, which we name character. Furthermore, human character seems to imply some- thin.t,^ more than a mere de<»:ree of uniformity in actiuJ.,^ Althou<;h the lower animals act with almost invariable .VlLxaiidcr, Moral ()nltT ami Pivotrss, p. 49. 68 The Will. rc}>^ularit\- in like circumstances, yet we do ni)t jscrihe 'character' to them in the same sense as we do to human heins^s. Tliere is imi)lie;l in the conception of human character, tlie additional idea of the possession of definite ends or ideals, int'» relation to which (Mir natural springs of action, as mei impulses, have to be brouj^ht. Thus there are for mankind Iwo standards of value which mav be used to determine the efficiency of any imj)idse. Kirst, its mere streniL>th or impetuosity, ( Hii'/iokn't) \ an[rces with the permanent ends of the individual, the ipies- tion of Freedom would ne\-er have arisen. We would then be in possession of the only Freedom which appears to me to have any meaning, the Freedom which is juescribed by rational considerations. .\ freedom of indifference, or the abilitN' to choose any of the presenting- possibilities without reference to any more ultimate consideration, would not be the mark of a rational beinir. The greatest amount of I-'ree- dom conceivable is the abilit\- to determine one's self by the thought of the highest end, ami not the power of acting out of all relation to that end. WhCii we speak in this way, how- ever, we must not regard the end as something objective, with Tin Fncdo))! ,,/' the ll'ilL 69 tlic valuation of wliidi wi- liavc notliin- to do. As wc have already had oceasion to reiuark, the end is not to he tliou-ht of as something external to ourselves; hut it is eonstitiUed hy us, and receives its value ])artlv from its iniuiediate hold upon our frelin-s, ])artly from its relation to some more uni- versal end. The hi.t^hest end, that which is not sou-ht f.,r the sake of anything else, is so constituted simple on the ])asis of its immediacv as feelin- It is the hi-hest' -ood for us simple because of its intimate connection with our inm..st hcin.q-. It is for the time hein.^r ourselves, to cease to strive for its realization would l)e to lose our identit\-. The chief, perhaps the oidy jisn eho!M_o;ical argument whicli IS used hy Libertarians, consists in an appeal to the fact t which consci(aisness testifies in volition— the sense of I'reedom which seems to assert our ability to choose between alterna- tives. "Iliold, therefore," savs Professor Si(l<,^wick, "that a-ainst the formidable array of cumulative evidence olYered for I)eterniinism there is but one opposin.- argument (;f real force ; the immediate a^^lrmati^)n of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action. And certainlv when I have a distinct con- sciousness of choosin- belwee!) alternatives of conduct, one of which I conceivr as ri-ht or reasonable, I find it impossible not to thi:ik that I can now choose to do what I so conceive— supposin<; that there is no ol)stacle to mv doinn- it except ab- .sence of adecpiatc moti\e— however stron.!L,^ mav be my in- clination to act unreasonablw and howe\er uniformly I mav have vielded to such inclinations in the i)ast.'" Tliere can be no doubt re-ardino- the feeliu- of Freedom, theonlv .pies- tion is as to what fact it attests. Xow. it appears to me that the evi.leiice of this feelin- at the moment of actin,*,^ is that when we act we are not compelled l)v anything outside ourselves. Our external actions maybe constrained b\- for- ei.i^n ])owers, our UKutal life is free. " I"reedom is the capa- bility of a bein^; to determine himself throuHi eonscious ' Si.1,i,rwick, Tlh- ^hihod$ of /iZ/iirs, p. 69. 7() II w ll'ilL in<)li\-t'.s. . . It is not want of causality', bnt a])sence of snch causality as \v(Mi1(1 wlioUy or partly destroy the ])sy- cliolooical causality. . . ( )ne cannot appeal to the con- scit)usuess of iM'eccloni in this (lUestiou ; f'..>r it only tcstities that VI.' act without external compulsion, hut never that we act without cause ; or that the reasons which 'leterniine us are !n(lej)(>n(lent of (nir orii^inal structure or the e\ents (jf our own life.'"' Hut it may be ar^ed that we are not con- cerned to prove that we act without causes, ])Ut only that al- ternatives are o])en to trs. " It is not the ])ossil)ilit\- of merely indeteriuinate ch(^ice, of an arl)itrar\- freak of im- moti\-ed willing with which we are concerned from an ethical point of view, l)Ut the i)ossibilit\' of action in conformity with practical reason."'" Does consciousness then hear wit- ness to such a power to conform to the rules of reason or to refuse to conform ? Wiiile we are yet in a state of delibera- tion, either alternative seems to us eipially i)ossible, we have the immediate consciousness of I-'reedom, llial llir lifc/s/on lies xvliollv in / com- pelled. I)Ut this t'eeliuL^ cannot be used retrosp^ectiNely as an evi- dence that in au\' j^iven case we coiild ha\'e acted otherwise. It is often ur^ed that wilhor.L sncli an interpretation ' Re- morse ', and ' Sense of Sin ', must be regarded as delnsi(jn,s. I shall have to return to this point later on, but here I need only mention that actions for which we afterwards feel re- morse are not ,i;enerall\' attended by such a distinct feeling of Freedom. In cases wdiere we sin and come short, the temj)ta- tioii seems to destro\- the sense of l'"reedoni. 'iMiere can be no tK)u!)t that this feclinj^' is more prominent in cases where the immediate solicitin,;- power of an impulse or appetite has ' Wuiiilt, I'.thik ' i>t cd. ), ]). 397. ■ Siil}j;vvick, The Mctliods of I'.thics, j). 67 iiioli'), riii- Fm'thu)! of ///(■ Will. been subordinated to some more |K-rma!ient and remote .i^ood. It is to eases of lliis latter elia.raeter that (k'feiiders of the I-'ree Will theory always point; the eausalitv of the i^^o as attested toby immediate eonseiousness is natnralh- then so stron,^ as to make it imi)ossible for them nd to belirve that tliev eoidd have acted differently. P.ut if the theory of alternatives is valid, ve ninst face the other side, whieli is unfortunateK- too common, where the action seenrs 'to follow the line of least resistance. ' In our anahsisof \\ lilin^ ( Chap. III. ), we found that the essence of volition consists in holding; fast one representation in consciousness, and that if we could succeed in retaininj^ the proper representation, the act would take place ( f itself. Xow the cpicstion of Freedom will come to he whether, in cases where the ideal by means of which we ou.^ht to determine ourselves, is crowded out of consciousness b\- some jjresent attraction, it is reallv possible to hold fast to it, and res- oluteh- keep it before C(5nsciousness. ( )nr experience in cases where we succumb to the immediate solicitatioirs, is that the object is so interesting^ and attractive that it appears to take possession of us, and the more remote ideal is allowed t(j slip out of si<4lit. It may ]U'rha])s be poiuted out here that a i^eiieral v\v\ or in-incij)le of action is rarely, if e\er, conscioush- abandi.ned. It is pushed more and more into the backnroinid and e\isce- rated by sin.i^le acts. We excuse oursel\-es iu each case with tile thou.i^iit that for this once it does not matter, or that there are here some jiecnliar circuurslauces and the act does not really couHict with the end. As Aristotle sa\s : "'idle minor premise — this act is of a certain kind — is unknown. "' Many examples could he oi\-en to show that under the inlluence of some attractive force, our intellectual insii^ht is per\-"rted, and we reall\- jjcrsuade ourselves to believe what we wish. To return to the prohlem of freedom. Theipiestion vhich wv wcreconsiderim^- was \vlr.'thor, in the case where the decis- ion had been made in what appears to be ' the line of least re- 72 The Will. sistance,' tlie act of will can be called free. It apj^ears to me that since we have snpposed the chc^ice to have been made after deliberation, the act in this case is alscj the expression of the self, and therefore free. It is jnst because the individual {possesses such a definiu- character, that this line of action seemed to him at the moment of deciding;, the j^reater i^ood. What is to appear to him as the most desirable line of conduct cat any time, is determined by his orij^dnal constitution, and. by his wdiole past hislorx-. ( )f c(»urse, that histor\" is to a larjj^e extent his own ])roduclion ; but it is im- ])ossible for an individual to wijje (jut the past, and start as if it h"! nevei existed. Advocates of iM'ee Will differ ;j^reatlv rey^ardinj.^ the inHuence of character upon an individual. Pro- fessor Sidja^wick sa\s : " I recoj^nii/.e that each concession to vicious desire makes the tlifficnltN- of resistini;- it .greater when the desire recurs ; but the difficulty alwavs seems to remain se])aratc(l bv an impassable ^nlf from impossibility.'" On the other hand, Dr. Maitineau, an even more strenuous defender of Free Will, writes : " In the earlier period of res- ponsibile life there will, no doul)t, be some waverint^ and al- ternation between defeat and victory ; but so rapidh' does weakness or fo^^e of conscience .set in and become habitual, that everv lapse is a fearful portent of another, and everv faithful achievement a presumption of more ; and the voli- tions of the sane mind fast assume a determinate complexion, rarely dirferiui; much from the premonitory symptoms of its first pn^b.'ition. Men certainly differ j^reatly . . . but rarely does a man \-ary j^^reatly from himself, victor today and vancpiishetl tomorrow. .l)i inralciilablr proportion of 'a'Jiat arc called diz'crsitics of cJiaractcr arc conslilntional rather than moral distinctions, no )noi c the i^rou)id of atty judicial azvardy than the fact that when you xoere tempted I did not sin. Were this class of differer'^^'s removed and men ar- ranj/ed soleh- In- their fidelit\- or infidelitv in dealiny- with Siilt,'\vick, ■/"//(■ .V.f'ih/s of Kt/iiLS. \). 67, Tlh' !'')■( tdnui of tin- in//. I o tht-ir (nvn prchlcms, uli<. shall say how lu-ar thcdassificalion would approach the two-fold distribution of the cvur viddiii^r and the L-vc-r firm." ' It is iinpossihlc f(.r aiiv individual to be-in as if his past wc-iv not. I-lvc-n if wc wciv t.. take the original first pair in the -arden, we sh,,nld have to sav that the for].i(hlen fruit was a temptation to them, heeanse in vir- tue of their nature thev were receptive to its iullueiiee. At tlic nK.ment of choice, snpposino it „, i,,. ,„,„],. .lelii.eiatelv, U must have appeared to them as the ..l.ject most to he de- sired. It will he necessary once more to insist, lu.wever, that lciiii)tatioii does not come fn.m without, l-nt from within. ' We are tempted when we are led awa> l.y our .,wn lusts .nid enticed.' Tlie witches cmild u<.t have tempted Macheth had not his own s.-ul resp<.uded to their su-uestions. I^aiupio is 'armed so strono in houestv ' that their word> have no effect "l'"!> liini. Xo solicitation fn.m without can take possession <'• =1 niau a-du.t his will. ' Mv p .vertv, hut not uiv will consents,' says the apothecarv tr. Hamlet ; hut at the luo.neut ot theexchan-e, the m.Muv he received for the pois.m was more important in his e\es than a human life.- It appears, then, that the cousHousiiess of freedom cannot be appealed to after the act lias heen i)erfornied, as an evi- dence tliat we miuht have done otherwise. Such an idea, when referred to a i)ast action, must he regarded " parth as tlie coufusion of a luetaphvsical notion with i-svcholooical experi^r.ce, partly as an illusi<.n, which is verv natural when the individual, with his n, w conviction, and with the strono desire to have acted otherwise, vividly conceives himself a't the moment of action, without, however, hein.!,< \nl I •• IlR-.leci.fsl .l.lltTeiux. praclically in Hr. ,„„ral lilf .,1 .nan" i. ihe .lillVn lietwitn ihf tasy K'-in^ and ih^ ^tn-nnons niw(,d. ■' ■Cf. Pn.k-.ssor C.rson's lutroducHoii /o S/i„/:,-sp,;iir, ],].. 22; If. ticc 74 The Win. tion at llu- time.'" ' After the individual has willed the act, and has repented of it, Ju- i)r()iect.s himself into the past, and ima,t,dnes th it the act mii^dit have taken place at tliat fiiiir, as he >ii>7i' wishes that it had. Ajjjain, the eonditioii of the self lookiniL,'^ l)ack upon the act with remorse, is wideK' differ- ent from that in which it made the decision, yet we ascribe to the ])ast self ' oth the mental .status which led to the \-oli- tion, and that which at the i)resent moment leads to its con- demnation. I'^nither, anv state of del-')eratio is i state of in- hibition. Tl; v-olition is the rerio"'i''.;' of ' ..ikcs w'.iich ha\e pre\ente them. If we call a fntnre act contin- j^cnt, we mean by ihe word, that any one of se\-eral pos- sibilities may occnr ; or better, that onr knowleds^e does not enable ns to make any prediction. ( )n the other hand, ' necc.ssit\' onl\' expresses onr expectation fonnded npon mii- forniit\' of ex])erience, or npon com])lete knowledi^e of all the conditions at work. " .\ tiling can in no res])ect be called contini^ent excei)t in relation to the imperfection of onr knowledt^e, and our ij.;;norance of its causes. It is only ' llolTdiiiii, ()/i//ii/i-s of /'svc/ioloi^w \i. ,^4S. '■'('/'. II(")rfilin.iL;, "Die (ii'S(.'l/ni;LSsi.uk<.'it (Kr psychi^clR'ii .Vi'tivital,' I'icrtcljahrsih . f. i.'issi'iisc/'iaftl. /'/iHosof^/iit', X\'., 4. Thi I'ticiimn of !/ir Will. 75 called ii<(rss(n V wlu-n our stilf 'u knowk'dL;^ is sncli lli.it wi i)c-rcci\-c' that it will (Vv/^c/;//)' liap])!.'!!. " ' It is(|uil<.' usii:'.! to coiH ivc of things as suhslaiiccs with cxTtaiii lii^lits and prcro;., NX'S of tin ir own apart fmui liu- ordi'i" of llic world to wliicii they l)(.'loti<4 ; or pfrliaps i nion coniiiion niixk' of tlu)U<,f! * regards a law as an aI)solult' | nus o\'er and above the thi .i^s and events in which 't is nianifcstc(l. Uoth of tliese views cvidenth- d- .end nj)on a false abstraction of our thought. As Loize says, " The fact which we have to recog- nize is the p'-'^'^.'ss of hecouiing itself, anhich we mean to denote when we call any e\eut necessary. Ihit in the ca.-iC of a conscious indixidual, we use no concejtlious analogous to those of the couser\ation of matter and eneri^y. These material n.otions, as we luue already >een (j). 50), lose their meaning when applied to the acti\ilies of know ing and willing. In the sj)iritual sphere, there is an increase of nun- tal force in the development of each individual. " As an im- mediate consequence t. cd. ', ]■.. 4(Ki I'll,- I'lt'iiiom of thr Will. one alteriiati\c' rathor iIkui the oIIrt, rn'siik's th' etTiot- of which I am tlic acciunulatinn, I t-Iaiiu also a />r/ w^y/rr/ i-aii>- ality which is still left oxer, when my phcimmiiia Iiaw l(»l(l mc the talc of what thc\- arc and dn." ' Thtisc wlit) tijihtild this theory maintain thai il i> t-oncciwiMc that \.\\v si-lf shonld ori.i;inalc ahsolnlcly r.cw hcj^inninj^s in the c )nise of thinj^r.s. IC\'ery snch a new l)c;4innin«4 ninst, just be- cause il is a l)c^;inninj4, he ine\|ilicahle as re<,^'lrds the \va\' in which it couio lo pas-,; for to explain means nothing; nioic than lo show thai a dctinile e\enl is ihe le- sult of ils anlecedenls in accordance with j^eneial rules. If it is claimed that such a hej^inniiiu; is nnlhinkahle, lhc\ rej>l\- that the iiicomi)rehensil)le character is im .ir^mneiit a,^ainsl the as.sumplion of it, hut, indeed, is a residl of that wry as- sumption. " A necessit>- of hai)j)enin;^^ for human ihouj^ht and an antecedent real necessity are two i'nlirel\' different thin<.;s." ■ The real truth which .qi\es plansiliilils- lo ihis ]»o.sition is found in the fact thai ihe self is more ihan ihe .sum of its con- ditions. W'e can ne\'er full\' explain an ai'l of aii individual by i^ivin^ .in acconnl of the conditions under which he li\ed. The individual is somelhin<4 o\er and abo\e this .sum ,• he is the sv)ithcsis of the conditioirs ; \et apart from the coudiliou> he is nolhin.t;. The Iranscendent self is a mere cttpitt iiioi lu- U))i. To make the result depend upon the action of such a self would be to contradict all experience. It would be to call in ihe aid of a dens rx nKuii/na lo exjjlaiu what we are as yet unable to reduce to kuv. True, the self is the center into relation with wdiich all external a<;encies are brou^^ht and from which the\' all receive their value. This is the freedom of self-determination, which must, as the action of a rational beini^, take place accordin.n lo laws. The point of view of those who contend for contingency, ' Marliiuau, Types of l\tlui\il T/horv. \u\. II, \<. ;,9, ■■' RiiiiKliii, /\'i\li-ii iti/,/.l/if'ssyi/io/<\f iliosc- who l).i>r iliiir faith (Ml ihc niiiac-iil( 'iiN in uaUiii-. 'I'lir iiiiii)r(.-niai-y <-t' th(.- si)iriltial i)rinc-ij)k' as^aitisi a material rom-rpliMn ot" tli'- unix'crsi-. The nlil Mt's of the (li\-ine existence. ju>l in the same \va\', it ha-^ lieen lo-i .ifu-ii the cnstoni to write ami sjirak as if in tile greater part of the mental life, the self wiTe a mere on. looker. I'.nl \-el in order to (lenionstraU' llu' existence of the self, who>i- fniK-lion tluy ha\e almost taken awa\ , the -^ame writers claim that at certain points in the history of theimli- vidnal, ihis jjiwer steps in and ori.^nnates new l)e,i,dnnin;^s. lioth these truths rest on a snrer l)asis than sneh defenders have found for them. Wv- ha\'e not in psycholo<.;y to vindi- cate and exhihit the ac-tion of self at this point or that. < )n the coMtrarv, we ha\c foiuwl reason for maintainin,| that the whole ])s\ tdiical lifi' is a manifestation of the self. \'o part of our expe- rience can he re.i^ai'ded as i^oin,;;' on antom.itically, or as handcrr. /\vilioloi^'it\ \\u\\ I. •' lM)r ;i full and cuiiviiiciiij^ tlfiiiDiistratioii of this i)oiiU, rj. II6ff(^inJ,^ t'))t.T WieiUTfrkfTiiu-n, .Issociatioti, i-tc," \'. f. \v. I'hil., 1SS9-90. I Ik /'i; ,i/>i»t i>/ f/ir Will. 79 is iiii|iliitl Ix'tli ill llu' n-w.mls uiu! iiuni.sliiiKiit> lli;ii .m- (li'all oiil I)y llic >t;iU' In its (.'iti/iiis, and also in tli<- iiitii.il jud^'iiKMils wliii-li Wf i)a>s ii|>.iii niii (iwii (.'Dtiiltirl or thai of ollui^. !l is j^rmrally adniitli'd that il i> iiiip(»sil)K' to (.'x- plaiu or justify iiKk-U-niiinisiii t'loin ,i iliroirlical slaudpoint, bill yc-l il is claiiiui! as a iKi'c's-ars jxtslulaU' lioih of i-riiuiiial law, and of tlu- fai-ls of om nioial lifr. \\\- shall li.ivt- lo exaniinf llusr cases scparalt-U . In tlir liisi ])iac'c, il is niaintaiiK'd that ri'siionsil>ilit\- hi- forc- llif law implies c-oiilin.m.-iic\ , or a power of aeliiij; ollur- wisc. A ,)ud,ii;c is iiol jiisiilk-d in condrinninu; a i)risonfi to loss of lihrrty or l<» ollur pniii^hiiunl, il i-> said, iinli>s \w is convinced thai llic man (.■■uiM haw ackd dilTcrcnlly. All due j)lacc for ihe fiinclion of iiniiishnunl as a rcforniin,!^ and (IcUrriiiL; iiitliiciicc hcin^; coiu'cded, il i> (.-lainu'd thai lliesc tdcmcnls 1)\ no means e\han>l its nature, and ihal there is soniethinj;- still necessary to explain its nalnic and jiislifs its txisleiice. This additional eleiiienl is coiilaiiieil in llie thon^hl ihal justice demand> llial the oiTeiider >h:dl he pnni>lied. 'I'liis is alone what iii>li;ie> pniii>linieiil, or al Icasl whal jiislilics ns in aw irdin.^ se'.'ae pniiisliiiKiil for great crimes, and in inini>liin,:^ with le--^ se\irilv for smaller offences.' "What i> reilK- irne for the ordinar\- conscious- ness, whal il eliiii;-- to and will not let .^o ... is the neces- sary coniieelioii lielween re>ponsil)ilit\- and lial)ilily lo pnn- ishnienl, helweeii piinislimeiil and deserl or the findini; of gnilliness before the law or moral tribunal." "' In oilier word>, the idea of jnslice demands ihal llie offender shall suffer and make reparalion for his crime. This view is slroiij^ly em- phasized by Kanl in the k'l dtfsli ln(.- "judicial pnnishnieiil {poena fnrcnsis), which is dislin.miishable from tlu- natural punishment (poi iia naf'' '(jlis) which overtakes wickedness 'Kiiiiulin, h'nttii /I . Iit/'sii/::i\ ' '1 hir(iiiii;tf>xyiii. !'iir(iiissi/-:ittn;<>/ c/is Sti\ifii(/its. -'Bradley, lithiial Studies, y. 5. I If*- Ho Th,- Will. Vr- and i>f wliicli the la\v-<^ivcr lakes no account, can never l)e rej^anled as a mere means to the i^ood of cither the indi- vidual liimself, or of societN'. Hut it must always he directed aj^ainst the transj^ressor hecause he has hroken the law. . . . The individual must he found worth v (jf punishment hefore there can he any thought of makiu!:;- this punishment of ser- vice to him or to his felhiw citizens. The law of punish- ment is a cate,!L,n)rical i)unishmeiit, and woe to him who follows the serpentine windings of a utilitarian theorx- in order to discover what advantaji;-e ihere is to be derived from punishment, according; to the pharisaical maxim, 'it is better for one man to die ratiier than all the i)eoj)le i)erish.'' For if rii^hteousness should cease to exist, human life would no longer ha\e any value. . . . ( )iil\- the ri.s^ht of retribution {jus tali(>nis) as exercised, of course b\' a jud}.;c, not b\' a ])ri\ate iiidi\idu;d, is a real and accurate description of the (pialit\' am'; (luantils (.'!' punishment ; all other descriptions are wavering; and evasive, and have no resemblance to the dictates of justice in its slren^•lh and purity." ' The same, or almost the same view of the funclion of punishmenl is taken by Ile^el, who re<;ards punishment as the inevitable ne<^atin,i>^ of the crime." vSeveral modern writers also insist upon 'the idea of rejjaration or retribution,' as a necessary element of the idea of i)unishment.' In spite of such hi^h authoriiies, however, I cannot ad- mit that criminal law presupi)oses the power of alternative on the part of the law-breaker. It is only if we insist in > % M'C.iul, \\'t-tki\ IM. XII.]!]!. 11'), I S" i n.irti.'iisti'iir> I'll. ). • U^i'ii'i'. liil. \'II1, p. i,iS- -Siiu'f this r>sa\- was wriUi'ii >^i'V(.'ral arlick-s (Ualiiin willi IKj^i'l's lludiy oi" iiunisliiiunl \inw a])]HMn.il in ])liil()S()|il-.ical journals. ('/'. J. I'",. .'Mf'ra.um'rl, /i/i. Jonni. of /■'l/iits. X'ol, \'I, ]>]>. 479 tT. ; ami S. W". Dydi', "I tempi's 'riu-Kiy of CritiU' and I'unishiiuiit," /'////. A'l'riVw, VII, ii]). 6.> IT. ■W/'. J. Si'th, "Tlic Tluory of ruuislinii'ia."' l)il. Jouru. 0/ /Ctiiics, Vol. II. No. 2. \.' The /-'nri/oii/ of (Ih- Will. 8i findin,^; in puiiisliiiK'nt a rdrihutorx' (.k'HUiit, an altcinpl oil llic pari of the stale to ohlaiii a (juid fiio (/no, thai we leiiuirc t(.) allrihtile anv such unacc'mntahlc jxjwit to the in. TIk- instinct to take \en- <,H-au(-e, howe\er useful it uia\- have heiu in a militant stale of society, does not !iud a place in the eivili/atiou of the present time. The prevalent \iew of the present a^^e is thai p'nni.-.hment is not retribution f^r pasi crime; l)Ul thai its purpose is to prt.'- vent future wron^doiu^. What is aimed at. and w ha! i> felt to !)(.• tlu- ouK jusiification of punishment, is the refMinialinn of tile criminal, and the proieclinu of sucieU-. This laUr end is aceom]:)lislied in two wa\s ; uamelw 1)\- freeirn^^ M>ci(.'l\' from those w ho \-iolale its laws, and 1)\- deterring others fr^ n\\ follow- ing^ their examjtle. The second dul\' which the >lale owes lo its eili/ens, that of education, is !)ecominL; more- and more prs. Thoc aie rci^arded a- a class who retpiire souu- s])ecial a.ltentiou ou the pail of the stale, not as wilful and deliherale offi-uders upon wdlo'.U the state is called to lake \-eU!4ea!lce. There are two conditions under whicdi it is possible to sa\' that if the individual cannot he']; doinu; the acl, he should not he imuished. iMrsth', if the act is not the expression of the character of the indi\idual, if it has heeii extorlid from hiin 1)\' an external a,L;ency, he is not juslK- considered dan- t;erous and separated from the rest of societ\-. Xor has he shown that he re{|uires that S])ecial treatment which the state deals out to those who do not realize themseh'es in confor- mity with the recpiired norm. vSecoudl\', if his character were fixed and unalterable, all efforts toward reform would be in vair., and it mi^ht be a (pieslioii as to how far the slate is justiiied in usin^ him as a ' means ' to (h.-ter others. I!ut pun- ishnient obtains its tinal justilication from the fact that the ofleiuler can be induced to act differently. That is, ihrouj^h the help of tlie means provided by the state, he can become 82 The Will. anolliL'T man, accjuirt.' new ends, and take up a diHerent atti- tude toward the world. Tile reformation of the criminal, and the protection of societv, ap])ear to me, then, the only ends which are, or should be, aimed at in punishment. Hut in a certain sense we may say that all punishment is retributive. Punishment is the denial or negation of the wrong by the reaffirmation of the right ; and the wrong exists in the will or self of the crim- inal, therefore by i)unishing him we seem to destroy the evil which we may regard as perscjuified in him. This is in effect what really does take place, and what the ])oj)ular C(/nscious- ness demands. The state, then, as the su])i)ressor of crime and promoter of good, may be regarded as a moral or spiritual agent ; ' yet, although legal punishment is retributive in its nature, it is not retribution which is consciously aimed at. Such a theory would offend our moral natures. Its truth, however, has been well expressed by Mr. Alexander as fol- lows : "The value of the theory lies in its placing human punishment in a line with the process of self assertion by which species maintain their life. The human institution of punishmeiit is comprised under the wider law of nature, of the reaction of an organism against anything which impedes its vitality. From this comprehensive point of view, punish- ment, therefore, is retributive. Men do like the rest of the world. Jiut though it is true to say that i)unisliment avenges the evil deed, if we go on to say, that we punish for the sake of vengeance, or that punishment is its own end, we are not only stating something repulsi\'e in itself, but are guilty of positive confusion."" ( )ur conception of ])unishment, then, seems to square as ' Cf., Rashilall, fii/. Join ii. of' Hlliiis, " Tlu'Tln'ory df PunislniKiit," Vol. II, ])]). 2() fT. ■■.-Vk'xandcr, J/oni/ ih-i/cr and f^iOi^irss, p. t,2^, Cf. Also Ht'fj;el, Wcrke VIII, n. I '^o. "/>>/(■ That ik's Vtrhrecheiis isl iiiclil dii Krsles, I'osilives . . . » zii wolchei.i (lie StialY- als NL.L,'ation kiiiiie ; soiiduni eiu Negatives, so dass die Strafe luir Negation der Negation ist." The Frcedotfi (^f thr Will. 83 well with (Icterniini.sin as with freedom. Indeed, we may claim, that onh- uj)()n the supp().siti(;n that a man's acts repre- sent his character, and take place accordin.i^ to fixed laws, does there apjiear to be an\- hoj^e of intlnencinj^ him in anv- way. We ma\-, j)crhaps, then assert, that if the retril)ntory theory of jmnishment postnlales freedom of alternati\es, the reformatory conception demands as a j)resnp])osition, deter- minism. It is jiist hecan.se a man aviih'/ lirlp acting as he does, that he recpiires to he sej)arale(l from society, and snh. jected to a special kind of treatment. The distinctiveh' moral ari^niment is based on the feel in j^ of ol)li<.(ation, and the retrospective jnd.<.i;ments we jiass on onr own condnct. It is contained in Kant's famons statement, " the onii^ht imi)lies tiie can." Xow it is nr^ed with jj^reat force by some modern writers, that althony^h, from the jjoint of view of psychi)lo^;v, we cannot escape deterministic con- clnsions, vet tlie fact of morality compels ns to postnlate in- determinism. In either words, the reco<.jnition of an act as one which I om'ht to perform, implies abilit\' on m\- part to perform it. The feeling of remorse, which is the consecpu-nce of the net^lect of some dnty, W(Mdd be ntterly vain and nn- nieaninij, it is said, if I am so con^titnted as to be incapable of actinj^ otherwise. " hjti.vr free will is a fail, ; arj^-nnient aj^ainst it. h'or it is undoubtedly true that the facts f)f our moral consciousness are as real and authoritative as any other facts of our life. I venture to think, however, that moral conceptions and facts will not be found incompatible with determinism. We may ' Martint-au, Type^ of Ethical Theory, Vol. II., p. 141. 'J. Sc'lli, h'>cedo)n . 24. t'' i «i Tin Will. indeed have to modify to some extent our traditional notitMis of nioralit\-; but I l)t'lie\-e that wlien thus nKxlified, they will be mole in accordanee witli our e\er\-da\' exj-erience, and with till- laws of psycIiolnL^y. iMrsl, then, it seems e\ideiit that the im])ortanee of freedom as an ethical pDStnlate has i^rown onl of ihi.- eonc-eplion of nioralitx' as moral law. " It is lhn)UL;h ihe jural conception of ethics that tlie contniVL-rsy of f'ee will chielly becomes imi)orlant. A plain man (V^k:<~ nut n.ituralK- luonire whelher lie is free or not to seek his own !l;oo<1, proviiled tniK' that he knows what it is, and that it is atlr.inable by voluniar\' aclion. i'.ut when his conduct is compared with a v^A^^ to the violaPMiiof which punishments are attached, the «|Uesliti( . to -pun- ish him." ' liut in modern tinu> we seem to ha\e reverted to Aristotle's coiiee])tion of nioralit}' as action according; to an end. it Sfeins (piite possible, tlK'U, tliat mor;dit_\- will re- main just what it is, whether we are free or determined. hUhics, like lo,u;ic, is a norinati\'e science. Just as io^ic pre- scribes certain laws or standards for llionoht, so L'thicN at- teiii])ts to ili.scover the norms K^{ ri^ht conduct. 'iMiese norms may be- prescribed by scjciety, >'et the indi\-idual in virtue of his moral nature, must ado])t them as his own. The feeling; of oblii^ation is simpU tlR- imiiK-diate con- sciousness of the individual that these ends have a ri.^ht Vo him. 'rhe\- carry with them, as Kant remarked, a certain di^nitv' and majestx' before- \\hi(di our moral nature bows down. A feelini; of oblioaiiou is simply the reeoi^nition of the anthorit)' and universalitv of certain norms of couduci. What then is the truth in the ar.^nnu'Ut that the "t)U,L;ht' im- plies tiie ' can ' ? Xot that we could ha\-e acted otherwise ' SiilK^vick, llisloiv ' /'./liiis, \\. lo. (.%im])aix' P.-uilsin's iKscriiitiiiu of till- ])i()l>k:ii as Dili- " V. lui 'i ii(>u- 'iiiUt eurlaiii ooiidilions ami has disa])- ])t.'ar(.'(l with ilu' (lisai)])t.'arain'.' m" ihcs uiiditions, a prnhlfiii wliich exists only lor a llicolo^ic il or schoia i:c iihiloso])liy." I'ltliik. p. 357. I'hr l-i(',tioni i<)nie- thin,^- as that which ou.^dit to he realized is the sole condition of fntnre progress. The I'eelin- of ohlioaiion, so to speak, contains in it 'the promise and jxilency' of all moral im- provement. .And it is hecan^e we reco,<^ni/e these moral ends as attainable that they have an\- l.indin.i^ force for ns. if onr characters were not snhject to chan.^e, fatalism wonld he the logical ontconie of Determinism. If 1 were persuaded that an\- external force ])re\ented nie from hecoiniiii^ other than 1 am, no ideals of a better life wonid bi- reco.^nized as obliuaiovy. TIk' fatalist sav^ ; 'If m\ act is the resnllanl oi m\- character and environment, m\ fntnre condnci is ab- solnleK- nece.ssar\-. My character is .-i\ en .md niv circnm- stances as well, therefore the resnll is something- over which I can ha\e no control.' If such were tlu .ainal facts of the case, moral oblijj;alion woidd be <.nlirel\ meaninj^less. The leelin,i,f of responsibility which has as its basis 'the imme.li- ale conscionsness of iMeedoni " is a wilio ai;^ument against an\- snch position. We have next to consider in v.'hat way a Determinist can interpret the feelin;j^ of remorse, and the coirscionsness of sin. It is nr.i^ed with j^reat force by the advocates of I"ree Will, that if we do not admit the po.ssibilit\- ofdoinj^ otherwise, at least in crncial ca.so, these term.s represent mere illnsions. We ina\- err, it is said, bnt we cannot sin, nor can we have any reason for remorse. I venture, iiowever, to think that a real meanin,^ and a sufficient ju.stiCicalion can be i^isen to thcst t\>elin-r.s without recoj^nizin^r anv such i)o.stidate. If the in- dividual admits that tlie action in (pie.stion has been con- sciouslv willed in- him, and that uothinj^- but his own char- acter led to its adoption, and if now he has come to a belter 86 The Will. iniiul and recognizes that it is not in c(3nf()rniity with some ideal wliicli is rc<^arded as hij^lier, and hence as oblij^atory, he has ever\- possiljle motive for reproachin^"^ liimsclf. The feelinj^r (jf remorse is the immediate resnlt of the i)ercej)tion of the discrepancy existinj^ between the ideal and the actnal. Tile Determinist, i-ej^rardin*^'- his act as the expression of liis character, and not of some mnnotived freak of willinj^, has the stnjnj^est ])ossible reasons for feelin<4- remorse. It is when Tie fnlly realizes that the act i- his own — that he is a man of sncli a character — that his feelin<; of remor^^e becomes most poij^nant, and he i.'. ready to abhor himself and exclaim, ' wretched man that i am ; who shall deliver me !' He jndj^es and condemns not merely the act, bnt his own char- acter, which the action has shown to fall so far short of what it oujj^ht to be, and of the standard v/hich his (jwn moral natnre demands. K'emorsc when apjilied by an individnal to his (3wn character in tliis sense, has a real regenerating in- fluence. If, on the contrary, it is indulged in as vain regrets regarding the jiast, it is debasing antl lunnaid}-. The j)ain which I feel today when some act has shown me that I am mean or cowardh-, 1)ccomes a force, a motive, to lead me to a better life, b'thical jndgments, whciher passed upon our- selves or others, are justifiable onl\ if they are used as ethical forces in or^Ier that a different course of action may be followed. " When we i)rouounce ethical judgment up