^ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) I.C I.I 1.25 S4IIIIIM 112.5 ^ IIIM ^ m Ir 140 2.0 lA. I! 1.6 % /a i^l^'>/ ^^M' % m 1 c?>% y w Photographic Sciences Corporation ^ fV «? N> A<5 ^9> \ o^ , CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICIVIH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques Technical ami Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiquas The Institute has attonr^pted to obtain the best origin£l copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below. L'Institut a microfilm6 le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a 6t6 possible de »s procurer. Les details iJe cet exemplaire qui sont peut-dtre uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui pauvent modifier une >mage reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la methods normals de filmage sont indiqu6s ci-dessous. D n Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur I I Covers damaged/ Couverture endommagee Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaur6e et/ou pelliculie Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque I I Coloured maps/ I I Coloured pages/ Cartes g^ographiques en couleur n D D Pages de couleur Pages oamaged/ Pages endommagdes Pages restored and/or laminated/ Pages restaurSes et/ou pellicul^es Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages d6color6es, tachetdes ou piqu^es Pages detached/ Pages d6tach6es D n n Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que blcus ou noirei I I Coloured plate signifie "A SUIVRE", ie symbols V signifie "FIN ". Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. Thta following diagrams illustrate the method: Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre film6s d des taux do reduction dif^drents. Lorsque le -iocument est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul clich6, il est film6 A partir de Tangle sup6rieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images n6cessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la m6thode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 THE DEFENCE OF CANADA, BY A CANADIAN liANDHOLDER. The Dominion of Canada posses.srs all tiie elements which should make of its inhabitants a great people — courage, ener^^v, endurance, enterprise, intelligence, patriotism and moraliiy ; but whatever the attributes of the people may be, no community can be said to be deserving the title of a great nation which is content to rest its political existence on the forbearance of a move power- ful neighbour. Yet that such is now the condition of Canada will probably be conceded by most of the readers of these remarks. It is customary to believe, at least to assert the belief, that England will spend her last man and her last shilling in defending Canada in the event of her being attacked ; and indeed as the only attack that can be anticipated must come from the United States, and as the only cause for such an attack would be found in the attachment of Canada to Brr'iain, it would be an indelible stain on the escutcheon of England if she were to leave Canada defenceless. It is believed that the English people in the mass are sound on this question, that they fully recognize their obliga- tions in this respect, and thai in the event of war with the United Slates England would put forth her whole power to defend Canada. There are, however, two different methods of defence : the direct, and the indirect. The direct method would consist in opposing an invading army on Canadian soil. The indirect method would consist in waging a naval warfare against the United States sea board, in the hope of inflicting such damage to the enemy as should compel him to make peace on our own terms ; a method which would have the disadvantage of leaving Canada temporarily to her own resources, to wage an um'cjnal contest against an invading enemy greatly her superior in numbers and in ail the applian^jes of war. 2 Now in order to diTend Ciinada directly with any prospect of success, it is necessary that ccMiain precamionary nK^asnressliouId be adopted ; and thoj'j de|)end mainly on the Canadian people themselves. It wonM he a pnre delusion to imnn;ine that Canada can be a success nl field of battle I'or Kngland against America, if the coinmm.icitions of that battle field with its base of operations are IjV a line three thousand miles in length across a stormy ocean, while the enemy is figditing at his own door. The l)ase ol optMat ons ior the defence of Canada against the United wSiates must be fmind in Canada itself; and the manner in which thnl base should be organized beforehand, so as to render the sviccessfid defence of the country, with England's co-opcu-ation, not only possi!)le but enfcy, at a minimum of cost, it is the aim of these remarks to demonstrate. However desirable and advan'ageous il might be in the abstract that (Canada should consiantly maintain any thing like an ade- quate fi)tce of highly trained Militia, the fin mcial circumstances of the Dominion, tiie s|)arsily of population as compared with the rj-ea of country, and the industrial habits of the people, all fi>.bid I he expectalion that such a force will ever be provided as an insurance against a contingency, which although possible is not certain, nor in the opinion of many, even probable. But nei- thcM* would the measures herein advocated be found to be unrea- sonably «- )sdy ; nor would their adoption lay any umqnal pres- sure ud(len call. But the country should insure the cheerful service ol the ofiicers and men composing this advanced guard by treating them lil er- ally. 2. The militia bill likewise provides for the formation of the car/?*es of a first battalion of regular militia in every regimental district throughout the country by the appointment of the officers and non-commissioned oflSirers, ail of whom are to be trained ^or a certain number of days in each year in camps of exercise. The privates of all these battalions will be enrolled through the operation of a very simple machinery, and may be called ojit for service in case of need in such proportions as may be deemed necessary. It is evident that if we could have the officers and non-commis- sioned officers, representing an army of 100,000 riK n., faiily instructed, and the privates available though untiained, (^mnda could not justly be reproached wiih having no a-my. \\ is tine that that army would, at die outset of a war, rtquiie thesuppoit of entrenched camps in the diflerent centies of population, wheie ;lie tnililia of the district would sooii actpiie orginizalion and dipscj- • pline thron:5h the ePo^ts of the tmincd ofHcers and non-commis- sioned ollicters. 3. Now comes ill? question as to the arming of the piivat<'S of thi!< anuy. Thi'y mast of course l)e armed and wilh iht; same weapon as the British sohlier ; but then? are insuperable objections to the distribuiion of 100,01)0 of tliese valuable arms among the dillerent regimental liistricis. They might indeed be stored at the entrenched camps, to be issued only when by reason of emergency the miliiia of the district are there asseujbled. But this plan admits of no previous acquaintance with the weapon. The operations of the Dominion IliHe Association may be made the means of reconciling the dilficuliies attending this question, in some such manner as the following : An «'n!husiasm for rille shooting must be created ; but in a poor country, such as Canada, it is impossible that private subscriplion can oiler the same inducements to emulation in rille shooting, as have heen easily supplied by the wealthy classes of Enirliind. The Government shoidd therefore devote a liberal sum in each year lo provide prizes for competition ; and it would be good to establish as the minimum public contribution, an equal sum to that which might be raised in each year in the Dominion by private subscri|)tion. Next let the Government announce that it will retail Snider Enfield rifles at a refo;ehand. This is, of itself and taken alone, by far tin most efleclive measure of dcjfenee that can be adapted. Without thi-se camps, the organization of any such 1 Mi * XoTF. — This stisgosticn is borrows J from aa exoellout pamphlet publishQd in tha antumn «f 1860, by Dv. Howitt. commis- rivalcs of it the saiiK^ 1 >biections •33 iiong the /'■r ed at the . nergeney this plan may bo ling this J but in a f privale *n in riilo classes of . '-li ' eral sum # A^ould be 1 an etiual ■■■• )ominion il Snider ■]:. an ad i an, '■y ' 200,000 ol tliese •y at the la IS per d by the 0,000 of form the ake care incited for rifle associa- d camps would loiit Jiny d taken lat can ny such hod in tli« Militnry force as it is possi!)le to anlieipale in Ciinada woidd be < I' little avail ; and no force, however niuiierous. possessinii; no previous organization, could oppose a discipl ncd ent'niv in the field with any prospect of success; for without pr<'vious organi- zation and training, in the attempt to oppo>e disii[)rmed troops, great numbers would only ensure great slaughter. The construction of these camps, in combination with the other mensures above advocated, would, it is confidently contended, render the successful defence of Canada not »robulil(', but certain ; in the hypothesis that the people at large desire to maintain their connection with England. As the subject is one of great importance, «nd one on wh'ch every Canad,ian shoidd possess the necessary data for forming a judgment, it is thought advisable here to argue the tjuestion some- what in detail. The following remarks are borrowed from a pamphlet published by Colonel MacUongall in 1S()5. " The basis of all reasoning on the defence of Canada must be that, in the first instance, certainly, the defenders will not Ijc what is called a manoeuvring force, and that, in the jiresence of an enemy (practised in war, they could not safely quit the 'shelter of fortifications, except for the purpose of a sudden dash or sally. With the force it is assumed the Americans coidd wield, the tide of their invasion would overspread and submerge the country. H'he entrenched camps proposed to be constructed would then show like so many island rocks above tht; general flood — places of refuge isolaKMl for a time and self-sustaininir, from which the defenders would wat(;h their opportunity for offensive action, if such slionld present itself. Each camp v^'^ould, in short, form the base of oj)e- rations for the organized militia, and the levy en munse of the surroundinj? district. " It is not to be supposed that the militia must of necessity slu.it ^itself up within its camp on the first alarm ; it would be em- ployed in any such operations in the field to delay the advances of an enemy which it might prudently undertake, avoiding anything like a battle except under verv favourable conditions, and laUmg back, when necessary, on its own secure bas(!. " The number of men actually enrolled in the militia would hear a small proportion to the numl)er who would turn out to delcnd iheir homes and property, provided a fair (iliance were afforded them of opposing the invaders with any prospect of success ; and this fair chance could be provided in no other manner than by the construction of a few entrenched camps at central |)oin1s, on which the militia, as well as the levy en masse of each district would sirartn on the first alarm, and into which the grain and cattle (*f the surrounding country should immedia:;ly l-e jjjathered. " In fills manner, mid in this rnannor alono, every man in Canada capable of bearing a iiis or nsini^ a i^pade or axe, rnif^lil be utilized in the detcnce of liin eoiintry ; and althom^h the territory of Canada would be over-run in ilie first inslanee at a eo>t of vast loss and suflerinii; lo tin? colonists, the province couitl never be concpicred so lonj^ as there existed an ori^anized force supported l)V iinpresj^nabje f(»rlilic:jtions, and daily increasing in efficiency ; for a hostih' army would be very unlikely lo remain in Canada in vvint»>r, rincM' it is obvious that il it were lo go into winter quarters it would be li;il)le lo constanl surprises, Ixung iti an enemy's couitry, and within reach of a sudden couibined movement from perhaps two or niprc of the fortified places. If the invading army altempled t<» maintain the invcsiment of one or more of the cam{)s during winter, the dangosiii()n an isessed. It the guns of ler of earth l,()UO yards, lown to lhsiing lines uiust be rather jDore than 18 miles. Supposing, now, that the besieging force jiiuinbered 100,000 men ; that number distributed over 18 miles ^Wouk} giv9 a proportion of about 5,500 men to a mile. Suppose 'finally that apart iVom ilu; gurrisons of die forts, 50,000 men were tnasscd in the* interior of the camp, it is evident that, by a sudden Jially, the mass of the defensive force might be directed agairst «any point at pleasure of the weak investing line, and would there fmeel with opposition from, at the utmost, 10,000 men. These vsorties could be repeated daily, the time and the {)oi!it of attack beiui^ varied every day, so that the besieg(;rs coul I never know Iwhen and where ihey might be altackt^d. It seems utterly luipos- Isible that the regular operations ol a siege could be pushed under such circumstances. For stich sorties it in by no means iu*cessary that the defensive force shoidd be higldy disciplined, as it would not in such operations ever be required to venture more than 3,000 yards from its secure base. " Lei us admit, however, for the sake of argument, that the beseigers were free to form their extended lines of investment, and , ,,lo commence regular approaches against the place. The expe- rience of a recent trial at Newhaven has demonstrated that one Armstrong hundied-pounder shell gim, firing from a distance of ;1,000 yards, made a clear breach 30 feet wide in a well-rammed tarthen parapet 25 ft'et thick, in less than three hours. The same .result could probably be achieved by two such guns firing at the , same description of parapet, from a distance of 3,000 yards, within the same time — since the accuracy of fire varies hardly at all at ^the two distances above staled, and the explosive ertect is always the same. How then would it be possible to carry on siege approaches in the face of such a gun, which would destroy the ^beseigers' batteries more quickly than he could erect them? % " It requires little argument to prove that the forts composing the isystem would each be Impregnable to direct assault : provided with deep ditches and ma.f^onry re veteirienfs^ and the ditches swept with a fire of grap& from works constructed ia and across the ^'Ji ^(f u 8 ditches for that purpose, nono but madmnn would think of ass:iiili- ini; such a work wit'ioiii having prt'viou^ bodies 5,000 men for the garrisons of ilie ibrls, iiiid you would have; the interior spsice oecupieil by .}5,OliO men ; and this without Cfmnting any of the regular troops, " It is noi to he supposed that the actual scheme of defence eon- templafes ;in e(|ual nuniDer of forts or an ecjual garrison for all the camps ; so.uie would have more, some less : the numbers here given are only for die sake of convenient example. " In summer, if an attack were threatened, the defenders of each ciUTip would scon connect the forts by parapets of earth. In winter, parapets of snow, well stamped and watered, would be quite as elTeetual. '' Kach fort, such as has been above supposed, would mount 20 guns and hold a garrison of 500 men. Depots of arms, ammu- nitioii and military stores, would be formed in anticipation at eaci) cnnp, sulHe.ieni for tlie supply of the levy en masse^ as well as for the organized militia of its surrounding district. And means should be prepared for housing and storing the grain and cattle." To recapitulate ; supposing the above recommendations to be adopted, we should have in case of need. 1. An advanced guard of 40,000 volunteers. 2. The trained olficers and non commissioned officers repre- senting an army of I0'),()00 men. • 3. Th(.' privates of that army, a large proportion of them already armed with the best Military llilie in existence and skilful in using it. 4. The entrenched camps, wherein the above named force would be conceniraled at the first warning of real danger. In short Canada would be secure in the consciousness of her own strength, and the feeling of confidence such a sense of security would engender, could not lail to react beneficially on the general prosperity. The measures herein urged are perfectly within the financial means of the people of this DominiuQ. Apart from the cost of r 9 -)f assimll- ach in it, in winter, I'd by the of regular s, and the nen ; that )0l) at the I) camp of len for the lor spacf any of llic fence cotj- :% for all tli(' f ril>ers here rs of each earth. In would be mount 20 IS, ainmu- ;ipation at sc, as well Lud means nd cattle." ions to be jers repre- !m already skilful in med force er. iiess of her sense of jficiaily on e financial the cost of fortifications, the maximum yearly charge on the revenue for the Militia service and for other purposes heicin set forth, need nol exceed tw<'lve hundred tl.ousand dollars ('^l,!i()O,O()0). Is the object to be achiev«>d worthy of that outlay ? 'J'liere never has been, and there probably never will be again, so favorable a lime for disposing of this irritating (juestion once and for ever ; for it must surely be irritating, nay galling, to a Canadian lo be told so often from the other side of the Atlantic, that hiseountry i'< deUincelexs, that he l;nows it is so, and that he will iK)t do anything to remedy the evil Although the writer feels certain the American people have neither the desire nor intention to go to war with us ; although he does not believe \\ prohnldr tliat siu;h a war will be bronglil about through any combination of circumstanc^es ; although it may be conceded that out of twenty chances, nineteen are against such an event ; still the one unlikely chance somelimes turns up, and who shall say that it may not do so in our own ease. Just as men in thc^ management of their private all'airs an; con- tent to incur a certain exj)ense to provide against the eonsecjuenee of a very improbable event, when they insure their lives and pro- |)ertie8, each year, against death or fire ; so the outlay re(|uired to be undertaken to provide against the possil)le ehanee of a war with the United States, should be considered in the light of an insurance to avert a great possible calamity. The Fenian organi;:al ion and designs have not been here advert- ed to because th;?y are too insignificant to be? taken into account ; contemptible should be the word if a society of assassins could jjro- perly ^>e so called, liul so far as any attempts on Canada are concerned, the shade of 'J'htimas D'Arcy McGee will guard our frontiers more etfectualiy than a Military lorce ; and the kindly and gifted man whom they have murdered, and who in life was their most dreaded enemy^will in his death [ixovv. thei, uestroyer. All the true and sincere thi^ugh mistaken men, of whom it is to be hoped there are sorm in their ranks, will fall away trom that exe- crable society, which amid all the ameOiorating influences of the 19th century, has reduced assassination to a system, and wdiich has so desecrated the holy name of patriotism by linking it with midnight murder : — a socie which, in the words of the New York Herald " being too we.xk to accomplish any good, has turned its hand to evil, most cowardly and detestable."