s^M ,%. V^*", xO. Q^. \^>Tv^. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) y ^fd? / i^ .V'.^ /!/. f/> ^ 1.0 I.I 1.25 11 55 2.2 ]20 i.8 llli U llli 1.6 P^ <^ /}. m ^w /. Photographic ^Sciences Corporation ^ m. ^^ \ \ \ 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 ^^ fC <"\ <^ > 6^ ^^^ % V '^ v^ ^ ""-is '^O CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Insiitut Canadian de microreproductions historiques iV Technical and Bibliographic Notes Notes techniques at bibliographiques The Institute has attempted to obtain the oest original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below. n Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur □ Covers damaged/ Couv erture endommagde □ Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaurie ei/ou pelliculie □ Cover title missing/ Le titre >'e couvertui couverture marque laps/ Cartes giographiques en couleur Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bieue ou noire) Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur d with other material/ avec d'autres documents I I Coloured maps/ I 1 Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ I I Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ Bound with other material/ Reli« D n n Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/ Lareliure serree peut caus'sr de I'ombre ou de la distorsion le long de la marge interieure Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajouties lors dune restauration apparaissent dans le texts, mais, lorsque cela dtait possible, ces pages n'ont pas iti film^es. Additional comments:/ Commentaires suppldmentaires; L'Institut a microfilm* le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a et* possible de se procurer. Las details de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-*tre uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la mithode normale de f^lmage sont indiquAs ci-dessous. I I Coloured pages/ Pages de couleur Pages damaged/ Pages endommagies Pages restored ar.d/oi Pages restaur^es et/ou pellicui^es Pages discoloured, stained or foxe< Pages d*color*es, tachet6es ou piquees Pages detached/ Pages d^tachees Showthrough/ Transparence Quality of prir Qualit* inigale de I'impression Includes supplementary materia Comprend du materiel supplemantaire Only edition available/ Seule Edition dispon:ble r~7| Pages damaged/ r~~j Pages restored ar.d/or laminated/ j~7] Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ I ~] Pages detached/ I A Showthrough/ j I Quality of print varies/ I I Includes supplementary material/ I n Only edition available/ n Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/ Les pages totalement ou partieilement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure. etc., cnt *t* film^es d nouveau de facon a obtenir la meilleure image possible. This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked be^ow/ Ce document est film* au taux de reduction indiqu* ci-dessous. ^OX 14X 18X 22X 12X 16X 20X 26} SOX 24X 28X 32X The copy filmed h«r« has b««n r«produc«d thanks to tha ganarosity of: Legislature du Quebec Quibec L'axamplaira fllmA fut raproduit grics k la giniroait* da: Legislature du Quebec Quebec Tha imagae appaaring hara ara tha baat quality poaaibia considaring tha condition and lagibllity of tha original copy and in kaaping with tha filming contract spocificationa. Original ccpias In printad papar covars ara filmad baginning with tha from* covar and ending on the last paga with a printad or illuatratad impraa- sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copiea are filmed beginning on the first page with a printad or illuatratad impres- sion, and ending on the laat page with a printed or illustrated improaaion. The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol —» (meaning "CON- TINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"), whichever appliea. Mapa. piatea. charts, etc.. may be filmed at different reduction ratioa. Thoae too large to be entirely included in one axpoaure ara filmed beginning in the upper left hand comer, left to right and top to bottom, as many framea aa required. The following diagrama illustrate the method: Lea imagea suivantea ont tti raproduitea avec le plua grand soin. compta tenu de la condition at da la nettat* de I'exemplaire film«, at an conformiti avec lea condltiona du contrat de filmage. Lea axemplairea originaux dont la couverture en papier eat imprimie sont filmte an commandant par le premier plat at en terminant soit par la dernlAre page qui comporte une smpreinte d'Impreasion ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, seion le cas. Tous las autrsa •xemplairas originaux sont fllmte en commandant par la premJAre page qui comporte une empreinte d'Impreaaion ou d'lllustration at en terminant par la derniire page qui comporte une telle empreinte. Un dee symbolea suivants apparaitra sur la demiAre image de cheque microfiche, snion le caa: le symbols — ^ signifle "A SUIVRE", le symbols V signifle "FIN". Lee cartes, pianchea. tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre flimte A dee taux de r^uction diff^rents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul ciichA. il est fllm« i partir de I'angle supArieur gauche, de gauche it droite, et de haut en baa, en prenant le nombre d'images n^essaire. Lea diagrammes suivants iliuatrant la m^thode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 i ■;& CdJ OPINIONS OF THE COLONIAL PRESS. W\ *' THE VOLUNTEER REVIEW," Canada, Jan. 27, 1874, We heave to acknowledge the receipt, from Mr. T. D. Sulhvan, late 56th Regiment, Literarian and Assistant Secretary to " The Royal Urrlted Institution," of a pamphlet "On Golo'.:al Defence," by Captain J. 0. R. Colomb, late R.M.A., read before the Royal Colo- nial Institute on 28th June, 1870, which we deem of sufficient value to reprint for the benefit of our readers, because it contains not only a vast amount of sound military strategy as appHed to a subject considered almost without the pale of that science, but clear logical deductions which point unmistakably to the political as well as practical necessity which exists for the appHcation of the Federal principle to the dependencies of the Empire. The strategy of defence as applied to its outlying and isolated dependencies is treated with the confidence of a master-hand, and the total ignorance of the principles on which it is based as mani- fested by the British Government, illustrated by incidents in the career of Admiral Semmes and the Alabama, showing how England paid three millions sterhng, not because of the damage done by that bold cruiser, but because Mr. Wells, the United States' Secre- tary of the Navy, was utterly ignorant of military strategy. We quite agree with the gallant lecturer, that a Federation of the Empire is a necessity— that a Federal fleet and a Federal army are requirements of the day, and that the defence of Great Britam, as well of its most insignificant dependency, is incomplete without it. We are also certain that the Ct)lonies are prepared to pay their share of the cost as well as to bear their share of the burthens ; as far as Canada is concerned no difficulty would be found in applying any portion of her army to Imperial purposes if necessity required, nor would she be AvhcUy defenceless as far aa naval power is concerned ; one of her people (Sir Hugh Allan) controls the largest and finest line of ocean steamships possessed ^ opinions of the Colonial Press. by any company in the world-vessels that would realise the gallant captain's idea of efficient ocean cruisers in the amplest sense of the term. With all those advantages wo still require political consideration, and the infusion into the councils of the Empire of an clement that will always enlarge the political idea, and teach the English people that its defence means something more than the " hedge-rows " of the United Kingdom. Speaking for our- selves, we want the recognition of the prhiciple that there is no dilfcrence in the Imperial policy hetween the County of Middlesex m England, and the County of Middlesex in the Dominion of Canada. Captain Colomb has fonuulated that idea, conclusively shows how It can be carried out, and we leave his valuable pape- to our readers, with the assurance that it will meet their approval and be worthy their attention. , "THE ENGLISHMAN," Calcutta, April 24, 1874. By a late mail we received a paniplilGc on " Colonial Defence," beiu^ a lecture delivered on that subject before the Eoyal Colonial Instf- tute by Captain J. C. E. Colomb, late E.M.A. As this officer justly observes, it is diflicult to deal with so important a subject in even a paper of twenty-five pages, much more so is it impossible to do justice to it in an editorial. It is more than probable that the question wiU be fully discussed this session in Parhament. As Captain Colomb remarks, "England with her Colonies is a giant among nations and wituout them she would be a dwarf." The question thus re-' solves Itself into the following :—- What have we done for the defence of our Colonies ? What is the best means to adopt to secure our trade, to protect our mercantile fleet and our Colonies '> , What we have done to protect our Colonies requires no considera- tion. We have done literally nothing, except saying to them, ' Be to the mother country as inexpensive as possible, be self-rehant expend as much money as you can afford in protecting yourselves' and, if war breaks out, we must contemplate your handing over your lives and property to any foe with whom we happen to be at war.'" • ^^^^«°^*"b^^<^io"s from Colonies in aid of military expenditure m 1873-4 was as follows .—Cape of Good Hope, £10,000 • Ceylon ^146,155; Hongkong,£19,677;Malta,£6,200; Mauritius, f 32,760 • Natal, £4,000; Straits Settlements, £59,300; West Indies £4 OOo' < 1 ( r f ci I I » a a t] C a tmm mmm im n: Opinions of the Colonial Press, 8 In tho Army estimates for 1873-4, we find the following : ^920 000 iTn .'nn^'^"'"'^ of Bermuda Dockyard ; at Gibraltar, for alterations, A1U,5U0 ; and £5,000 for similar Avorks at Malta, and £20,000 for the defence of its now dockyard ; whilst for home-defences Parlia- ment passed £20,000 for a battory on Dover pier, £15.000 for the ^1 r nan f "'' ^^'''''^' ^'^^'^^^ ^""^ ^^'' ^^^^«"«« ^^ Havwkh, and 410,000 for new powder-magazines on the Medway. At a glance It IS thus seen what we expended at home, and how much wo placed at the disposal of our Colonies ; without which England would bo reduced to the position she occupied in the world before her Colo- nial Empire commcuccd. Some years ago it was the habit of some politicians to depreciate the value of our Colonial possessions, and describe them as a sheer encumbrance and a dead-woight In 1859, on the motion of General Peel, a Committee, composed of one member from the War Office, one from the Colonial Office, and one from the Treasury, met to take into consideration the question of Colonial defence. Three reports were the consequence, but as they were diametrically opposed in their views, the result was nil. Mr. Mills stated in that year that the annual expenditure for our Colonies was £4,000,000, but that he would not include Malta f^ Gibraltar, Hongkong, and tlio Ionian Islands in the report ; vet it was subsequently shown that in the total he did include the ex- penses of those Colonies. However, years have passed on, and wo have reduced our mihtary expenditure to the minimum, and at this moment, not including British troops in the three Presidencies of India, we have twenty-five battalions in our Colonies. To show of how little value to England are her Colonial possessions, in tho year 1873 we exported to our British possessions goods to the value of £66,441,237, which is exactly a third of the value of all our exports to every part of the globe-the imports from British possessions in the same period amounting to £79,372,853 In case of war what are we to do for the protection of this commerce^ To quote the words of Captain Colomb, '« The ground to be de- fended consists of ten groups of territory, separated by Ion- sea- distances— the British Islands, British North America, the^West Indies, the West Coast of Africa, the Capo, tlie Mauritius, Austra- lasia, Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, and India." The Imperial main Hnes of communication are :— " To British North America across the North Atlantic ; to the West Indies, to India, China' and Australasia by the Mediterranean ; to India, China, and Aug' tralasia round the Cape ; from Australasia and the Pacific round Cape Horn." How are we to protect these lines ? We must have a fleet of ships capable of carrying the heaviest armament, yet B 2 If 4 Opinions of the Colonial Press. affording ample space for a I'arge supply of coala. Wo must have our coalmg Btations well protected . What is the use of our depots for coals if any of the enemy's fleet ha>. simply to proceed and destroy them ? In the West Indies, as Captain Colomb states, the groat coaling station, St. Thomas, is not in our possession." home people are inclined to argue that we have the command of the seas. Command with what ? With steamers, with the coalinr. depots not secured, with no arsenals well protected from bombard" ment where they might obtain munitions of war, with no docks secure from an enemy's fleet. Wo have only to look to the case of the Ala- W sunk in Enghsh waters, because she had no place to refit, no dock to which she might proceed, " to be overhauled, and have her boilers repaired." So. without sufficient ammunition, and in her imperfect state, she was sunk in seventy minutes. Have wo a large naval arsenal in the Eastern seas ? Have we Port Defence vessels ? Are all our harbours protected by torpedoes ? And if they were, have we a body of men instructed in their use ? ' It would appear as if we laboured under the opinion, in case of war that our enemies would never think of bombarding our ports of mterfering with our commerce, of destroying our supplies of co'als or of attacking any of our possessions. We have withdrawn our troops from the Colonies, and we have said to them, " Protect yourselves," and we have given them no arms and no guns, so that they might follow the advice given. We have five millions of surplus at home, a large portion of which is derived from our cus- tomers ; and we are oblivious of the fact that, if they ceased to exist, our revenue might possibly decrease. The next point is, what is the best means to adopt to secure our trade, protect our mercantile fleet and our Colonies? Captain Colomb is of opinion that we must centralise our efforts on the protection of our main lines of communication :— " The line to Canada. The only point here to be considered is the terminal one Hahfax. The line to the West Indies. Here we must strengtLen Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Antigua. The line to India, the East, and Australasia, by the Mediterranean. The points here are Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Bombay, and King George's Sound on the main line ; with Trincomalee, Singapur, and Hongkong on Its northern branch." Were these lines secure, and we had a strong naval arsenal in the Eastern hemisphere, with ships and stores m reserve, we should then have a base for our naval opera- tions in the East. At present, in case of a war with any maritime power, we should have (in the opinion of Captain Colomb) to ask private firms to supply our fleet with coals, and all they reonired .JH^j Opinions of the Colonial Press. ff to keep them in a state of efficiency. Of all the Imperial lines which we should have to defend, the one to the East will be the most difficult. It might bo imperative to occupy in force the Isthmus of Suez. We should require a largo fleet in the East ; but how is it to be kept in a state fit for naval warfare, unless there exist means in the East for supply and repair, independent of our home resources ? Anyone acquainted with the geography of our Colonial possessions can with ease ascertain for himself whether wo are secure in case of war. We are well aware that we Lave not vessels in our fleet so constructed as to bo capable of remaining at sea for a long period of time, and be able fully to hold their own against any maritime power. As Captain Colomb Btates, " The fleets necessary for the safety of the Channel and the Mediterranean are not adapted for the protection of distant lines, nor are the vessels suited for the defence of those lijies of any value as a reserve force in the defence of the Channel and the Mediter- ranean." The whole question thus resolves itself into consideration of the best position for erecting a large naval arsenal in the East ; the protection of our coaling depots ; fortifying the strategic points of our lines of communications ; and our having at disposal docks where our vessels could be repaired, and at the same time be secure against bombardment from an enemy's fleet. The question as to the miHtary force for the protection of our Colonies is far beyond our limits. But if they are to be self-rehant, we should provide them with guns for the armament of their batteries, as also other warlike supplies. We should give the Colo- nies the best arms we can supply them with. We might go further, and give them drill-instructors. We believe we are right in stating that the two monitors stationed at Bombay for the protection of the harbour are too weak in men to be able to work their guns with the proper reserve necessary for a naval action. It is there- fore self-evident that the question of Colonial defence is not deemed worthy of that consideration which the question merits. It is true that last September the Duke of Manchester and Colonel Jervois had a little quill-war as to the defence of Canada. The latter stated that, '' Although the Canadian frontier cannot be defended against the passage of an invading force, yet, if proper military measures be taken/^the defence of Canada can be rendered possible, much in the same sense that the defence of Belgium has been ren- dered possible by means of the great entrenched camp at Antwerp The Canadian Government voted a million of pounds sterling for the purpose, but it has subsequently been apphed to aid in the construction of the Pacific Railway." % ! I Opinions of the CuUmial Press. The Imperial census has lately given us the population of our Colonies. Wo have in the Dominion of Canada 8,789,370 iuliabi- tants, occupying an area of 8,870,925 square miles. The West India Islands, with an area of 18,109 square miles, have a popula- tion of a little more than one million. In the African Continent and the adjacent islands we are masters of 230,800 square miles of territory, peopled by 1,818,450 inhabitants. In the Indian Seas, before reaching' our Indian Empire, we have the Mauritius, with an area of 708 miles, and a population of 880,400 inhabitants. In our Australasian settlements wo have West Australia, with 978,000 square miles, and 24,785 inhabitants. South Australia, with 700,000 square miles, and a population of 185,020 white, and 8,809 aboriginal inhabitants. Victoria, with an area of 88,000 square miles, has 781,528 inhabitants (including 17,935 Chinese). New South Wales has on its 828,437 square miles 508,981 inhabi- tants. Queensland and Tasmania have a population of 210,432 ; Norfolk Island, 401 ; and New Zealand, " the England of the' southern hemisphere," and one of the youngest born of the Colo- nies, had a white population in 1871 of 250,893, whilst the abori- gmes were estimated at 37,500. Then we have India with her countless millions ; Ceylon, with a population of 2,405,287 ; Sing- apur, 197,000; Pcuang, 07,000; Province Wellesiey, 71,000; Malacca, 77,000; Hong-Kong and the Peninsula of Kowloon! 120,000. To this world-wide and enormous population, all owing allegiance to England— without which she would cease to be a paramount power— she gives from her revenue a few thousands of pounds for defensive purposes, forgetting, as before stated, that we exported in 1873 to our British possessions goods to the value of sixty-six millions, whilst our imports from those possessions exceeded seventy-nine millions. ** THE NATAL MEECUEY," May 28, 1874. On the 28th June, 1878, a clever paper " On Colonial Defence" was read before the Eoyal Colonial Institute at their annual meet- ing by Captain J. L. C. Coi.omb, His Grace the Duke of Manchester being in the chair. It is not our present purpose to review the Buggestions and opinions of the author in so far as th j entire ques- tion under discussion is concerned, but only to touch upon o^^ im portant point of vital inte-'cst to the future political construct of South Africa. '■'-*•%-. ...nMki^'- Opinions of the Colonial Prest. 7 Captain Colomb profacoa his papor by stating, and vory truly stating too, that " in time of profound poaco we hko to tallt of our vast Colonial Empire, our extended commerce, and interests in every part of the globe." It is " habitually foryot.that Eugland with her Colonies is still a giant among nations, and that without them she would bo a dwarf" — "practically disbelief in the giant is evinced by seeking refuge in the arms of the dwarf." It is " the duty of statesmen to cast their eyes beyond the shores of happ" England, to look beyond the streak of silver sea, and to face this truth, viz. that the security of the United Kingdom against in- vasion ia but a part of the great question of National Defence." ** Our commercial prosperity is in direct proportion to the froedorn with which we can carry on trade with our Colonies and other, countries. Commerce is, in fact, the link that binds together the several interests of the scattered territories oompriHing the Empire." In order to protect commerce it is evident communications must be secured ; and Captain Colomb, adopting this f^xiom, deduces cleverly that " communications, whether by sea or land, whether long or short, can only bo secured by a firm grasp of the pomts which command them." In fact, a base of operations is essential for our ships; "naval stores and coaling stations are vital neces- sities for our men-of-war at the present day, for,' asks the author, " can we dream of private firms duri maritime war taking con- tracts to maintain, in a state of e^iciency, war fleets G,000 and 10,000 miles off ?" A Colony is not now removed from danger of attack by remote- ness, and the vessels which England in case of war should furnish to defend her Colonies must plainly be during war time independent to a large degree of home support. Ports of strategic importance, where docks, a coaling station, machinery for repairs, &o., are available for our commercial fleets in peace, our protecting squad- rons in war, are of vital necessity, and reserve naval arsenals are of the utmost moment. Here on the east coast Delagoa Bay is naturally a magnificent harbour, and our " strategic port." Batteries on Inyack Island would protect Port ^lelville from any attack, and a few guns under Point Eeuben, and on the Mapoota side of English River, would secure Loren90 Marques from all interference. For years the ques- tion of boundary has been discussed between England and Portu- gal ; the fl J of each country waves by turns over Inyack, and petty squabbles and recriminations, involving heavy losses to en- terprise and commerce, have in too many instances taken the form " 'J?^K!li;ij.W.t' 8 -ii Opinions of the CoUminl Press. of ua lonal reprisals, to the injury of British suhjoote. It is hiah time the arbitration of this disputed territory should he swiftly urged to a climax. Lydonburg Gold Fioldn promise to grow inta larger dimonsioiie and develop trade ; land and houses have quad- rupled m value at the town of Lorenvo MarquoH ; yet we heir no word from England, see no s.^n from our Government ; and in the meanTVuiIe the fair island of Inyack is useless and unoccupied, savo by a few Amatongas, who anxiously press for British rule. Lorenzo Marques we cannot claim, but why should wo not offer, as the German Government did. to farm the port for 100 yea s? Portugal enteaamod the question readily, and an ai^angem^t wal only upset by an unfavourable report from oflicors sent to examine feVnl'rr ;?x'"*M, '^^'''' i'^Pre^-o"^ were influenced by t[rzlr <• "'". T!'^ ''''^' ^^^^^^ ^"^y "°^ only control t e Zulu3 influence the labour market, and ensure Amatonga hlTrn / '" P'^^^^'^^ «^o qualification required by the Transvaal L n? ^'f't'-f ''',''• . ^"ti'^l^ rule is sadly wanted to control and counterac the deadening Portuguese thraldom in which the native races are held^ A httle money «pent on Inyack would carry our ZirwJl^ T^^""'' ""'^ '^" ^^""^ *" «^°P ^"*^"^' «l^ve trade on that river than •' the noise of many cruisers " thi^s^Zn r' "'"""" f"'^ ^° '""^^^ "**^"*^''" *^ *^^° importance of rl^] r '^''''*''^; ^"' °^J^^^ ^" ^"^^^"^g attention to Captain Colomb 8 clever paper has been gained. ^ I • " THE NATAL COLONIST," Moy 27, 1874. By a recent mail we were favoured with the receipt of a copv of an admirable paper read before the Eoyal Colonial Institute on fb! subject of Colonial Defence, by Capt'ain J TXITiI Whf Xfoffi"^- ^^^T-y-^ t^e paper w'asrcLu? tiom the gallant o&cer named, bearing a recent date, and in which 1 * ■ ...M^l Opinions < :' the Colonial Vress. '• It was cxcliulotl from all considoratiou in the reorganisation of of naval and military forces by our late Government, and there is some reason to fear thnt, owing to a want of knowledge of tho broader principles of modern warfare, a consideration of this grave question may bo postponed until it is too late. *• National defence has, in the mother country, turned on a narrow pivot of provision for tho proieotion of tho lives and pro- perty of Her Majesty's subjects at home, to the total exclusion of all consideration for those abroad. It only needs visible danger to prove that tiue defence must bo Imperial, and not national, and that if we are to maintain our position as an Empire, wo must bo prepared to defend it as a whole. This may be accepted as truth, but it mu&^, not be forgotten, if we really mean to act upon it, that peace affords tluj only oppc/tunity . ' husbonding and de- veloping our Iinperial rescources. He who would trace to its true source the glory and stability of the German Empire must not seek for the causto in the brilliant victories and dazzling successes of its army during tho Franco- German war, but will find it only in the careful, painstaking working out of well-known principles of policy and the military art, in the quiet, silent years of peace which preceded it. One was the effect ; tho other was the caase. I happen to know that Colonial Defence has been treated as some- thing outside tlie question of army and navy reorganisation, because eminent authorities at home consider Colonial feeling has not been as yet sufificiently pronounced to warrant more decided action in the matter.'" From these observations tho general drift of Captain Colomb's paper may bo gathered. His object, in a word, is to arouse the Empj -T to a practical recognition of tho fact that England and all }'er dependencies and Colonies are one. The late Government has often been accused of the design of dis- membering " The Empire," and even those who would not go quite so far as +o charge them with any such active purpose have im- puted to them a culpable indifference as to the maintenance of its integrity. Captain Colorab apparently regards the advent of a Conservative Ministry to power as a suitable opportunity for urging his opinions anew, and it is with much pleasure that we shall afford our readers the opportunity of judging for themselves, so far as our space will allow, at once what these opinions are, and of the practical measures he recommends for giving them effect. We cannot admit the soundness or justice of a claim very generally put forth on belialf of the Tories, or their modern repre- sentatives the Conservatives, of being piv excellence the patrons and :i| 10 Opinions of the Colonial Pn ess. guardians of the Colonial possessions of tho Crown. If it be truo that tho Colonies are a danger to and a drag upon the mother country have belonged to the school of politicians Ihc style W solves Liberal, it is no less true tnat the chief oppressors of the Colo- tTolTT "^'^"'^'""^^'"^'^ '^^^" ^^^"^^^ --»o^ the ranks of those to whom we are now taught to look for support in the asser- tion of our constitutional rights as Englishmen and as Colonists, and for the maintenance of our connection with the mothei country. We need not spend time in arguing a point which is not of tue greatest practical importance to us, though by way of mode- rn mg he assertion of unjust claims, we may remind those who are inchned hus to boast that it was in the days of the old Tory ascendancy that the American Colonies were first driven into rebel lion, and the bond tluu united them to the mother country was cut with the sword. One real danger which we as Colonists have to guard against IS that of being deceived or beguiled by names ; of trustmg to Whig or Tory, to Liberal or Conservative. Mr Disraeh s former Ministry, as Mr. Gladstone's late one, alike sup- ported the representative of the Crown in his unconstitutional usurpation of popular rights, and if it was a -Liberal " Secre- tary ot btate who m plain words recognised that we had been - in oiu: rights throughout the long contest it was the same - Liberal" Minister who himself attempted to fasten upon our necks the yoke of a charter which gave the lie to his profession of leavin-^ the Co onists .0 manage their own affairs. These reflections may seem to be somewhat beside the question of Colonial Defence, but may be pardoned if they tend to prevent any from placing too much laitli in mere party names or cries. Inretm;ningto'Captain Colomb's paper, we must guard at the outset against the misconception of his being supposed to refer in any but the slightest way to that kind of defence to which the minds of our fellow-Colonists most naturaUy revert at the mention of the word-defence against attack by the natives within our borders or around us. The Colonial defence of which Captain Colomb trea s is a defence of the Colonies against the attacks of the enemies of the British Empire upon them as integral parts of that Empire, or ra lier upon that Empire through them. If, therefore witn wars and rumours of war in the midst of and around us' readers may be mchned to regard the paper as but of Httle interest for them, we would remind them that the otlicr question-that to which Captain Colomb addresses himself-can never be without interest for us, and that the more highly we prize our Colony for ^S^^s^iBw.&'igfc, :ij.. .. Opinions of the Culonial Press. 11 its own internal riches or productiveness, or as the inlet arid out- let of a rich interior, the more must we also regard it as offering a point of attack to the enemies of England. Our sugar-fields or our bheepwalks may offer no great bait to the cupidity of the future enemy of England, bo he German, or Russ, or Yankee, or what he will, but if our coalfields are what we are so fondly led to hope ; if our port is to make Natal the main, and at once a direct and healthy highway to the oxhaustless diamond and perhaps still richer gold fields of the interior, then in proportion to these advan- tages will be the temptation she will present to make her a point of attack. The " inexhaustible fields of excellent coal," of which we have heard so much, but whose existence remains as uncertain as it was when the late Sir R. Murchison urged us to have out a thorough mining engineer ; — these coalfields, if their existence were established beyond doubt or question, would of themselves make Natal a most desirable possession to any Power who in future years may go to war with Great Britain. There is, happily, no pi-esent reason to fear such a calamity, but even a young man may remember how suddenly the clouds of war appear, and gather, and fill the heavens, and none can tell how soon England may be embroiled, as France and Germany were but the other day. Let Natal then gain her desire ; let her come to be regarded as a coal- ing station for the shipping in these seas ; let her be made the highway to the diamond and the gold fields of South Africa, and she will become the mark for the assaults of enemies, for England's sake and her ov^n, from which, were war raging at this moment, her jjresent poverty and insignificance would give her immunity. So much by way of showing that our interest in the question dis- cussed by Captain Colomb is greater and more real than many may have been in the habit of regarding it. Captain Colomb at all events merits the gratitude of all Colonists for the earnest and able way in which he vmdicates their claims to the attention and the care of England as being integral parts of the Empire. His whole paper, in fact, may be regarded as an appeal to England to realise the fact that her Colonies are the members of a body of which she is the head ; that attacks upon them are attacks upon her ; that, in short, to use his own words, to suppose that defence of the United Kingdom against invasion is "the one thing needful in the matter of national defence, is a grievous error." This is the error he sets himself to combat, and this done he proceeds to show how the integrity of the Empire ia to bo maintained inviolate by treating the mother country and her dependencies strictly as one, and guarding her at every possible ■'!.vsiif»j!m"i!mmmn&iiS:mssmigasiim>.- i ll 12 Opinions of the Colonial Press, IZltZZ '' ?'"^. ^^ ^'''^'''' *° ^° *^"« ^^ ^-^t leave to Ska V ow' 'T '"';"" °^^^^^'^'^ '^^ *^^^ P^^«^^* ^i*l^ these Ttt ul^^ct '^'""^ '" "'^ '' "^""'^^ *^^ ^^^^-'^ attention " THE TIMES OF NATAL, AND AGRICULTURAL CHRONICLE." Wednesday, June 24, 1874. clZf r'? T' .*T ''"''' " P'^P^^' «^ " C°^<^^i-1 Defence," by Sfoll ?rtf ; \"^. """' '''^ ""'"''^ ^ y^^^ ^°° ^^^°^^ tl^e Royal <^olonial Institute, at the annual meeting mau'er "'Jv''; *!"' *'*!? ^'l'*^^^ '^^^'^^ " ^^^'^'^^^ ^^^^^ °f tl^« ««Mect whoL Rvr ; V' '''"^ *^' '"^^^^*^°^ ^^ ^ «3^«t^^ ^y ^vhich the ^ at W 1 ^;^7"-^^^-y be made secure agamst hostile attack ; sXinvtol''^"^' " ^^*^^^°' *^°^^^^^^ preparation for re-' bpp! nf fr '"°^' ''^*'' *^' ^^'''^^ ^^^ «^lfi«^ ^i^^« ^liicli Iiave cstabhsl pf ^'''r.^'*, °^^^ unblushingly advocated, but almost cstabhshed as pohtical axioms in England, to hear Englishmen once again extending their sympathies, so long contracted within the silver streak ; once more recognising the fact of a British n^Z! ' T'^T^ ^^""^^ *^ ^^' ^''''''^^' «^ "^i«^' as absolutely necessary for defence. ^ the^rfntr*^' TT^ Government, we may reasonably hope that the reaction which appears to have set in will increase in force and fZV U '' '' ^''' *^"^ ^'^' ''''' ^^^' i" tl"« -'Sleeted corner of the ^orld, presume to add our feeble voice to the chorus which Tder tm TJ"'""" "'] '''''''''' '^ '^' ^^'^'' ^^^^« ^^^- live under the Enghsh flag, and speak of England as home. A chorus of men crymg for the renewal of the old home-ties, so rudely broken in some cases,^so crueUy strained in others ; for the framinrl of new bonds of union, bound on better principles than those which have now either ceased to exercise any binding power or threaten im- minent rupture for the consohdation of the great British Empire, rather than centralisation into one great whole; in other words for the combination of the whole strength of England and he^ Co onies to secure the defence of their territory, and the protection of their commerce. Captain Colomb very justly remarks, that hitherto the defence of the Empire has been conducted, at different times, upon two oppo- site prmciples, representing the extreme views on opposite sides of ^ ;;.r- ^j^j^J|^s> opinions of the Colonial Press. 13 the question. One, that which prevailed at the close of the Peninsular War, and against which the great Duke, then in his seventy-eighth year, remonstrated in vain, viz, the principle of " scattering the armies and fleets of the mother country over the face of the glohe, while the United Kingdom (the Imperial base of operations) was left destitute of any power of resistance. The other, that which is openly avowed by some who are called " advanced thinkers " of the present day ; that which has given a character to the policy of the late Government, viz. that of confining defensive measures to the protection of Great Britain and Ireland, and ren- dering the soil of the British Isle secure, while " her vast Colonial Empire, her extended commerce, her interests in every quarter of the globe," are left to the mercy of an enemy, who, in attacking the Empire, would naturally prefer " cutting our unprotected com- munications, and appropriating our undefended Colonies and possessions, to a direct assault upon a small island bristling with bayonets." " Our Imperial eagle," says the writer, " whose wings covereth seas, buries her head in the sands of the defended shores of England, and, blinding her vision of danger with a few men, guns, volunteer reviews, and Autumn Manoeuvres, her statesmen bid her believe she is safe ! " These two principles Captain Colomb terms the ScyUa and Charybdis of the question ; and his object is to show the true course between them which the Empire may safely steer. He contends that Great Britain has less reason to fear invasion than investment ; and that, when the former becomes possible, the latter is a certainty ; i.e. ^that whenever Great Britain loses the com- mand of the Channel waters, the Imperial lines of communication will be cut off ; and that the heart of the Empire, thus cut off from its sources of supply, must cease to beat. That the first line of defence should be the Channel, to secure the Colonies from being locked out from the mother country ; and that there, and in the Mediterranean, the largest naval force should be maintained. This he terms the frontier of Colonial Defence. But beyond this, he strongly recommends that all the Imperial lines of communication, which he describes and enumerates, should be protected ; 1st, by a special class of cruisers, adapted to the special service and capable of keeping at sea for a long time. 2nd, by the maintanence of a sufficient military force at the several points or bases which command tVsom ; so that while the navy does the skirmishing or patrolling, the army may secure its bases or arsenals. Captain Colomb then fixes on certain points, on each of the great ■•WP'^SiSaBHKl w- .1 14 Opinions of the Colonial Press. lines, as stations where such military force should be maintained: ana on this suuject enters too much into detail for us to follow him at present. It will interest our readers, however, to be informed, that of the imperial roads, the one we Imow best as the P. & 0. line is stated to present the greatest difficulties, owing principally to our having no control over the most commanding portion-the Isthmus of buez This defect, at a point of such immense importance, points to the absolute necessity to the Empire of having a commanding and strongly defended great naval arsenal in the Eastern hemi- sphere; as it would not be safe to calculate upon the resources of Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham for the supply of our war fleets throughout the world ; while it would be still more absurd to rely upon private firms for maintaining them in efficiency at a distance at from 6,000 to 10,000 miles. The site of this reserve naval arsenal is left open to future con- sideration ; but, while on cHmatic grounds an Australian port is suggested, the writer lays stress on the etrategic importance of Bombay Natal is altogether passed over, though it would seem to combine many of the requisite quahties : notably, a healthy climate, a large harbour, with natural capabilities requirin- only skill and capital for their full development ; an almost unSmited supply of coal, and a position which would render it available for the Cape line to Australia, as well as for that by the Eed Sea. It is of course, out of the Hne between Aden and Cape Comorin ; but not much more distant than are the Fiji Islands from the line between Australia and Vanco; , r's Island ; and they are cited as givin- a commanding position. The control, too, which the selection of Natal as an arsenal would give to England along the whole line of the Eastern Coast of Africa, the utter check-mate it would give to the slave trade ; the immense impetus that it would add to the progress of civihsation in the interior ; and more than all, the stability It would give to British rule throughout South Africa,— all these are points weU worthy of consideration, and which when the time arrives, will, ,we trust, be strongly represented in the proper quarter by our Government. Captain Colomb lays peculiar stress upon the selection of the coaling stations of the Empire, and upon the necessity of their being under our own control. But for the placid indifiference and general'supineuess of our benighted Government in days past, it would long ago have been widely Imown how eminently Natal is fitted for this purpose ; and she would not, in such a paper as this, have been passed over in silence. I a r 1: V c a a Opinions of the Colonial Press. 15 " AVLile we congratulate ourselves," continues Captain Colomb, "that even the stores of coal needed for marine locomotion are principally ours, wo must remember that they are ours so long as we protect them from destruction by bombaidment, or from cap- ture by assault. It is therefore of paramount importance that our coal depots along the Imperial hues should be efficiently and thoroughly defended ; that they should not be selected at haphazard, or situated at places in the possession of any foreign power when it can possibly be avoided." If, as there is every reason to be assured, the upper part of Natal, the Free State, and Transvaal, and, in all probability, a large portion of the Zulu coimtry, abound with coal ; if it is pro- bable that all these countries must, at no distant date, owe allegiance to England ; and if the present Government, as may be fairly expected from their avowed principles, support and inaugurate some such scheme as that suggested in the paper before us, we are sui-ely indulging in no wild dream when we confidently look for- ward to the selection of Natal as one of the Eastern depots— if we hope to see our port enlarged and improved, thronged by merchant- men, and protected by regular defence vessels and torpedoes. We need not say that the plan suggested is based on the pre- sumption that the Colonies, being interested in keeping open the Imperial roads, would contribute towards the cost ; that it contem- plates a system of mutual co-operation between Great Britain and her Colonies ; that it pre-supposes Federation, or the consolidation of provinces or small Colonies into Territories or Dominions ; or that it leads almost inevitably to that great Confederacy of the whole Empire which some may deem chimerical, but which we firmly believe to be the only real solution of the anomalous rela- tions now existing between the Colonies and the mother country. Captain Colomb's concluding remarks are worth transcribing. He says : " The mother country has put her own construction on the word ' home,' in applying the principle of calling into existence mihtary forces which can only be used to put up her shop shutters, and to bar her doors. She calls on her children to adopt her defi- nition of its meaning, and to follov /-e'- example, and some of them have done so. But who among tne armies thus organised, for what she is pleased to call ' home defence,' can determine the exact distance from a man's home at which the obligation ends ? Who can draw the magic circle which is to include the territorial area of his duty to die for his country ? Home is something more than an abstract idea having reference only to locality ; its foundations are laid in common interests, sympathy, affection. A « silver streak 16 Opinions of the Colonial Press. of sea ' cannot divide those interests, nor can miles of oceans sever the strong ties of affection and sympathy. Hence it is that, from whatever quarter of the Empire a cry for help comes-wherever the British flag waves over Englishmen struggling on their own ground for all thoy hold uoar— it is there our home is in danger, there is the rallying-point of forces created in its defence. While we boast of armed hosts here and in the Colonies, whose proud motto is ' homo defence,' they must ' survey the Empire ' to « behold our home.'" These words are golden ; and we are suro that our readers will require no apology for the long extract. It is evident, however, that the Government needs— we might perhaps say, courts— pressure from the Colonics in this direction. The President of the Royal Colonial Institute, in the few observa- tions made by him at the close of the lecture, used these remarkable words : «« He feared that the House of Commons was too restricted m Its policy and measures to look at so wide a question as this. He thought they must look to the Colonies to get this policy adopted and enforced. They should not rest satisfied until Federa- tion had been achieved; and then the Colonies shr-ild insist upon their right in mutually contributing to the defence of the Empire; and after this was done, in controlling the disposition of the forces they had helped to maintain." We have no doubt that Natal is willing and eager to raise her voice m so great a cause, and to take her part in the great Con- federacy. But Natal, with her handful of inhabitants, with the overwhelming pressure of a vast savage population weighing down her energies and crippling her resources, has no audible voice to raise, no aid to proffer. Far different would be the voice of united South Africa ; of a nation extending from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, from the tropics far into the Southern Sea. Her appeal would carry the weight of a British dependency perhaps more deeply interested than any in the preservation of the British Empire ; more exposed to hostile attacks, because lying midway on one of the chief high- ways between England and her more distant possessions. Let us hasten, then, to claim a part in this great work ; first throwing aside the leading-strings which cramp our action; then multiplying our strength by a close union with the southern continent, of which we form a part ; lastly, by urging in the Council of a great Federa- tion such a policy as the paper before us indicates. The cry wiU soon be raised by other Colonies ; wiU, ere long, swell into a universal chorus ; let us, though one of the smallest 4 . i'«1j Opinions of the Colonial Press. 17 and weakest, not be the last of the great British family to claim our share in this noble and patriotic scheme. It was the mouse that, by steady perseverance, gnawed through the ropes that bound the lion ; the task to rouse a country sunk in sloth and selfishness may be equally diificult and tedious, but is equally feasible, while time and circumstances seem to favour the attempt. We must reap honour ; we cannot fail to secure some substantial benefit ; we may find our share in this great scheme to be such as, in our wildest dreams, we have never anticipated. We believe that Captain Colomb intends bringing the subject of his paper before Parliament during the present session ; and in that case, its reception will enable us to judge of the probability of a changed policy. Meanwhile we heartily trust, that from every . British Colony, and from pens more influential than ours, he will receive that support and encouragement which he thoroughly deserves. Ill "THE NATAL MERCURY," June 80, 1874. TO THE EDITOR OF " THE NATAL MERCURY." Sir, — Your Maritzburg contemporary, the Times of Natal, in a late issue has a lengthy leader criticising Captain Colomb's paper on " Colonial Defence." Has the editor any idea of the rank of a captain in the Royal Navy ?" If he has, he would never speak of that gallant officer as " Mr. Colomb : " he might as well say " Mr. Durnford." But the great complaint in the above article is the manifest injustice done to Natal and her harbour by passing over such a central position, and giving preference to such insignificant, out-of-the-way harbours as Bombay and the Australian ports. Has the editor ever seen a first-class harbour or an ironclad ? Is he aware that one of the smallest sea-going armoured cruisers, such as the Pallas, let alone the Ocean or the Chinese station flag-ship, would be like a " bull in a china-shop " in this puddle called Port Natal ? Does he think for a moment of the vast expense of deepen- ing a sufficient expanse of water large enough to moor a squadron of ironclads and wooden vessels, all of them as large as the R.M.S. Danube, to an average depth of thirty feet, as the ships require on the average twenty-five feet to float in, without thinking of the difficulty of making large dry docks, to repair such ships in ? * Mr. Bellville, while pointing out an error, has fallen into a similar one. It is a small matter what inaccuracy occurs on such a point, but the author referred to is a Captain R.M.A. , not R.N. C 18 Opinions of the Colonial Press. Is he aware that Bomhay harhour is over ten miles long and three to four broad, with la'r^'c private and Government dry docks and well protected ? That Port Philip is fifty miles by forty miles with a narrow and easily-protected entrance and every other ad' vantage ? That Port Jackson has in its several arms a length of nearly thirty miles, with an average breadth of two miles, wit"h dry docks, and coal mines only some fifty miles to the'north, close to the sea ? Has he ever heard of Trincomalce, with its deep-wator and spacious land-locked basin ? Does he think that these splendid harbours are to be put aside for Natal, with her bare two square miles of deep water, the probability of her railway being made some day, and coal brought to the coa^t ? No; Natal may have her use even in Imperial designs, but it will never be that of a great naval arsenal. If it were not for its unl.'ealthiness, Delagoa Bay would be far preferable, as there, there IS a good harbour, and close proximity to the coal and iron fields of South Africa. Hoping that this may tend to enlighten your contemporary. Yours, &c., Alfked Bellville, F.E.G.S. Durban, Juno 26, 1874. ?i Hi ■ Z'\ "THE TIMES OF NATAL," July 8, 1874. We scarcely know whether we feel more elated or depressed by the rebuke administered to us by Mr. Alfred Bellevnie in a late issue of the Natal Mercury. On the whole, perhaps, the feeling of elation predominates, though somewhat counterbalanced by a due sense of our inferiority. For a poor Colonist to be instructed by such an august personage, not only in nautical and geographical details, but in the social grammar, is an honour almost over- whelming, while it affords a happy instance of the condescension in which great men sometimes indulge. With such a Mentor at our side, we might almost overcome our natural modesty, and venture upon the audacity of addressing either of the two illus- trious officers placed so aptly in juxtaposition by Mr. Belleville, without fear of committing a social solecism, or exposing our un- doubted rusticity. But as Mr. Belleville's entire letter is an interrogation, or rather a series of interrogations, and as we are content to sit at the feet of this Gamaliel for the nonce, we will answer his questions as best we may. pfiiJL Opiniom of the Colonial Press. 19 over- i i» V. Wo have never seen the harbom-H of which he speaks, nor have wo had the opportunity of measuring or sounding them ; nor, referring to our article, cnu we discover that we have termed them "insignificant" or " out (,f the way." Perhaps, however, Halifax, with the Bedford basin, New York, and San Francisco, will do as well for samples as Bombay, Tort Philip, and Port Jackson. With regard to our own little " puddle," as Mr. Belleville contemp- tuously calls Port Natal, we are not quite alone in believing that its capabiUtics may bo very largely increased ; and that there is no Utopianism in the anticipation that, though not perhaps as a " great naval arsenal," yet as a point of some importance in the Imperial lines of communication, it may have its use in the design so ably sketched by Captain Colomb, who, had wo criticised his paper in the same tone and spirit vdiich characterise the letter in the Mercury, might possibly conceive the impression that vhat- ever our ignorance on nautical and social matters may bo, we were at all events uninstructed in the old motto " manners maketh a man." We are surprised that the writer did not, in pity to Colonial ignorance, print his adnomen in full ; for want of a glossary, its meaning is, of course, among the mysteries of Cores to us. We have written this, we trust, in a very proper spirit of humi- lity ; but we cannot avoid this concluding remark, viz. that if we were as great and important a personage as Mr. Belleville, we would seek " a foeman worthy of our steel ;" and not waste such power of sarcasm, such a fund of knowledge, so much authorita- tive assertion, and so many notes of interrogation, in the fruitless attempt paper, to " enlighten the obscure editor of a Colonial news- C. B. "THE DAILY PKESS," Hongkong, May 1, 1874. We have received a copy of a very valuable paper upon the im- portant subject of Colonial Defence, which was read by Captain Colomb before the Eoyal Colonial Institute, the Duke of Manchester in the chair. The paper is written in a clear and masterly style, and gives evidence of very careful and mature thought. Captain Colomb raises his voice against the mistaken idea that the defence of Great Britain and Ireland against inv- "ion is all that is neces- sary for the security of the British Emp.. ,. The key-note to his essay may be found in a single sentence, which he used in speaking on the same subject on a previous occasion : " The defence of the c2 fj\ 20 Opinions of the Colonial Press. United Kingdom apfaingt invn.slon is an object of primary im- portance, but to suppose thot this is the one thinf? needful in the matter of national defonco is a grievous error. We are bound to look to the general welfare of the Empire. The sources of our greatness arc the possession of India and our commercial pros- pen y. Our commercial prosperity is in direct proportion to the Iroedom with which we can carry on trade with our Colonies and other countries. Commerce is, in fact, the liuk tliat binds together the several interests of the scattered territories comprising the jLmpire." Captain Colomb urges, therefore, that before the ques- tion of military reorganisation was practically dealt with, it was the duty of statesmen to cast their eyes beyond the shores of Mr. Gladstone s - Happy England." and his "streak of silver sea." ^ The author gives a vivid description of the defenceless condition m which the majority of the British Colonies would find themselves in the event of war with a power possessing a large navy ; and bases his arguments upon the fundamental principle that the success of all operations of war, whether defensive or offensive, depends upon the disposition of force in such a manner as will best secure the base of operations, and ensure safety and freedom of communication. To Great Britain it is, therefore, of vital impor- tance to secure the great sea lines of communication between the different parts of her Empire, and he especially urges the necessity of being careful not to neglect this precaution on the more distant seas where, for the protection of such lines, a special class of cruisers capable of keeping at sea for long periods is required, the strength of this patrolling force on each line being in proportion to the value of the line, and to the force against which it may have to contend. Captain Colomb points out that it would not meet the end in view to leave the naval force alone responsible for the pro- tection of such stations, and quotes a statement of Sir John Burgoyne on the subject, to the effect that "under such a system a small squadron, with 3,000 or 4,000 troops in Eastern seas in time of war, would take the Mauritius and Hongkong, and destroy the naval arsenal and means at Trincomalee. if it did not capture the whole island of Ceylon." That this is not an exaggeration of the danger that would be in- curred will be readily believed from the fact that when the last great war broke out on the continent, and it was rumoured that England would be involved in it. the question as to the safety of Hongkong was discussed here with anxietj, as, small though this colony IS, it would bo a most important blow to British prestige in the whole of Chma, and as a necessary consequence also in India, ii; Opinions of the Colonial Press. 21 were it captured even for a short period by a foreign power ; and the evil effectH which would bo thus produced might bo an object in time of war. In Hongkong, a regiment is stationed, and there are usually a fair number of men-of-war on the station ; but if hostilities broke out at home the naval forces might possibly bo reduced even further than they have been by the retrenching poHcy of the Government of late years, and the danger above in- dicated be incurred. This colony pays a miUtary contribution of £20,000, which has not unjustly been objected to, because the forces are stationed here as much in the general interoHt of Great Britain in China as in those of Hongkong, and tho amount is very heavy for so small a c(.lony. Captain Colomb suggests that a general and enlarged scheme for tho defence of tho sea comnmni- cations of tho Empire can only be made by the Colonies co- operating, and one of the ifirst things that would have to be done would be to adjust the contributions from the different Colonies upon a well-considered and equitable basis. At present, these contributions are levied capriciously, and frequently cause much discontent ; but there can be little doubt that the Colonies for the most part would willingly contribute towards the general defence of the Empire if, in return, they had some voice in the government ; and it would be a good adjunct towards the consummation of such a policy as Captain Colomb agitates that some measures for the representation of the Colonies in the Imperial Parlio-.iient were taken. To return, however, to the scheme itself. The author of the paper urges that such considerations as are above sketched out point to the absolute necessity of having a commanding and strongly defended great naval arsenal in the Eastern hemisphere ; and with regard to the site to be chosen, he points to the strategic im- povtance of Bombay ; but considers that the most commanding position would be the Fiji Islands. At the time he wrote, these Islands hud not been annexed, but we learn since b telegram that this has been done ; and it is to be hoped that the reason whid' ' - advances will induce the home Government to make use of ; ■ u ultimately in the manner he suggests. In Hongkong, wo a,re more inclined to look upon the question of naval and military defence chiefly as it affects our general position in China ; and it is satisfactory to find that thoughtful and com- petent men are directing attention to the question of defence abroad in its largest aspects. The moral effects of the adoption of such a system as is foreshadowed by Captain Colomb in our deaHngs with such countries as China would be immense, as the certainty that ■;% 22 III ()pininii8 of the Colnnial i'rsat. wo were always prepared Ijo act would bo the greatest flocurity against the outbreak of hoHtilitioa. \\ nolioo a very importaut sug-oHtiou which in made in tho paper, but whioli, an it is of too wide a bearing to discuss iuUy on the preseut oc.asioii, wo give in Captain Colomb'a own wordn IIo says : — •; The forces necessary for tho dof(mco of the Imperial communi- cations should bo under tho control of one directing head. As military force is necessary to tho support of naval power, and as in our case military force is in its turn dependent upon naval pou,,r, the distribution of tho one must have reference to that of the other. It, therefore tho military force is under tho control of one depart- ment, and the naval force under that of another, tho defence of our communications is, to use a homely piirase, ' between two stools.' In vain might our ' Admiralty ' despatch fleets to distant seas, if tlie basis of fheir operations are not secured by the ' War Oflice • ' equally valueless would bo tho distribution of military forco for the protection of those places by the War Oflice, if the Admiralty did not keep the communications between thorn open. Unless there be a war minister, responsible for and controlling the gencr.d principles which should govern the notion of each department, nothing but con- fusion can result when the Imperial communications are in dan-er." ^ Tho suggestion is a bold one, and it shows tho tliorou-di and independent manner in which the writer of the paper has thought out Ins subject. There is certainly no necessary division between the two services, and if such a fusion as he suggests could be made, it would appear undoubtedly hkely to be advantageous in many important respects. The Duke of Manchester, after the paper had been road, ex- pressed ns warm concurrence with the pohcy which was indicat. ,], and his hope that as the Colonies grew in wealth and stren-ih they would see in what their true interests lay ; they should uut rest ...fisf^od until Federation had been achieved, and then the Colonies should insist upon their right in mutually contributing to the defence of tho Empire, and after this was done, in contiol- Img the disposition of tho forces they had helped to maintain. In order to bring about Hus sati'^ factory result,' however, it will be necessary to careful!., t.: un.uler the whole of our Colonial admin- istration, and to mar,nu:iate a policy of such a character as will substantially incorporate the Colonies into tho Empire as an mtegi-al part of it ; and to attain this end tho first step would seem to bo some plan by winch their voice may be heard in tho Imperial Legislature. Opiniom of the Colonial Prc^n. 28 In coiK^ltision, wo heartily rocomracntl Captain Colomb'B paper to the pi-rusul of all intcrestoil in ^Ue very important subject which it troat.s. It is the production of an cniinontly astute and obbor- vant mind, nud 'u Hu;,'ge8tivo of mucli vahuiblo tliou{,'lit to the general reader as well as to those Hpocially interested in naval and military matterH. ••OVERLAND CHINA MAIL," Mail 9, 1874. The question of Colonial Defence can scarcely fail to be one of considerable importance to most of our readers, and as many of them may not bo as fortunate as ourselves in recoivinu; a copy of the paper treating of this subject, road by Captain Colomb before the Royal Colouial Institute in June last, wo shall perhaps be ex- cused if wo refer to the pamphlet at some little length. For our- selves, we only regret that want of space will not allow of us giving Captain Colomb's tract as much notice as it deserves. The paper is written in an unlaboured stylo, but the reader can at once see that the subject has boon most thoroughly thought out by the able writer, and that in putting the matter before the pubhc in such a clear and lucid manner, he has performed a task by no means easy. It opens by a st' tement for which all, we thir.k, will admit there are sufficient grounds : that " Colonial Defence " can no more bo considered an • ^ tract question than can " National Defence " be taken to mean simply the defence of the United Kingdom. The author reminds his hearers of the fact that although England with her Colonies is a giant among nations, with- out thorn she would be but a dwarf ; and he then goes on to point out that it is necessary not simply to protect the heart of the giant, but also to so protect the remainder of his body that the arteries and veins may be kept open for the egress and ingress of commerce. As Captain Colomb says, he was one of the first to advocate the withdrawal of a few troops quartered in certain Colonies and possessions where they were quite insufficient as a protection ; but he did not, in thus arguing, propose to leave the question of the defence of our Colonies and possessions altogether in the air, as it has been. What ho then said was, that the de- fence of the capital wa? of primary importance, as the heart is the most vital point, but he did not intend that the work of pro tection should end there. The thorough defence of the British Islands may be sufficient to keep us alive as a nation ; but if we 24 Opinions of the Colonial Press. I ! ': ■ Wish to be prosperous we must look further than that, and see that our commerce is properly protected. Commerce is in fact, as the writer of the pamphlet before us says, " the link that binds together the several interests of the scattered territories comprising the Empire." Captain Colomb urges very strongly the possibihty of investment, and reminded his hearers at the Eoyal Colonial Institute that investment, practically, consists of the loss, tem- porary or permanent, of the command of the waters surrounding the British Islands. This can only be done by cutting our Imperial lines, which are considered by him to be to British North America, the West Indies, and to Australasia and the Pacific round Cape Horn on the one hand, and to India, China, and Australasia (either by the Canal or round the Cape of Good Hope) on the other. All these lines, of course, radiate from the waters surrounding the British Islands, and it is perfectly evident that, supposing them once to be cut by a hostile force". Great Britain would be invested. The prevention of this contretemps is, in the opinion of Captain Colomb, the great thing to be guarded against, and the question of " Colonial Defence " is shown to be one inti- mately connected with the carrying out of this most desirable end. The writer of the pamphlet insists, and we think quite rightly, that whereas in the defence of land communications a purely mih- tary force only is required, in the defence of the sea lines both a purely mihtary and a purely naval force is required. The Navy furnishes the patrolling or skirmishing force, while the Army secures to it its bases or arsenals. To leave the naval force responsible for the protection of its base would, he observes, be to tie its hands. It would be " using the fleet to maintain its arsenals, instead of the arsenals to maintain the fleet." Some years ago, a governor of an Eastern Colony proposed to leave such places almost exclusively to naval protection, and the late Sir John Bur- goyne thus speaks of the value of the proposition : " Under the system proposed, a small squadron, with 3,000 or 4,000 troops in Eastern seas in time of war, would take the Mauritius and Hongkong, and destroy the naval arsenal and means of Trin- comalee, if it did not capture the whole island of Ceylon." Of the Imperial hnes, of which our readers are probably most inter- ested, he thus speaks of that to India, the East, and Australasia by the Mediterranean : — " The points here are Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Bombay, Cape Comoriu, and King George's Sound on the main line, with Triu- comalee, Singapore, and Hongkong on its northern branch. " Of all the Imperial roads this is the most difficult to defend, ' J. — -v! ■■ » . Opinions of the Colonial Press. 25 1 > owing to its want of continuity. The most commanding position — the Isthmus of Suez — is not in our possession. Here our Hne can be most easily cut, and here we have least power to prevent the con- tingency. So long as the canal is neutral, or in the hands of a neutral p^ .yer, so long is it at the disposal of friend and foe alike. A/ere it in the hands of our enemies, it is only open to them and not to us. To make this line safe, the occupation by military force of the liithmus might, under certain conditions, be a necessity. Are we prepared for that ? . . . . " Supposing it to be neutral, it must be remembered that if purely naval power cannot be entirely relied on for the local pr' 'faction of our outposts, neither can it be relied on to prevent the entry into the Nile of vessels of our enemy, and once there thc^y would have the whole of our Eastern possessions at their mercy, unless we have a force sufficient to blockade the Red Sea." What, then, would be absolutely necessary supposing a hostile fleet were once to obtain the position here pointed out ? All British Possessions to the east of Suez must either be self-supporting, or they must be able to obtain ample means of supply and repair from home round the Cape. As to the latter means of obtaining assistance, long before it could be rendered by a home fleet, the whole of our Eastern Colonies would probably have fallen into the enemy's hands, and supposing the home resources were cut off, say by a hostile fleet cutting the Imperial lines, at the point of convergence in the waters round Great Britain, what possible means have our Eastern Colonies of protection ? Were such a thing to happen at the present moment, there is little doubt but that we might be stripped of every small possession this side of Africa. India would in all probability be able to prevent actual capture until relief could be obtained, but Trincomalee, Mauritius, Singapore, Penang, and Hongkong, would all be in the hands of the enemy. And supposing the enemy to be Russia or some other power having Eastern possessions, from which she could draw a sufficiently large force to hold the places of which she had obtained possession, we might find it no easy job to regain our former occu- pancy. Captain Colomb then considers that all along our chain of possessions we ought to establish coaling stations, that is, places well defended by a purely military power, and well provided with munitions of war of every sort likely to be necessary for the refit- ting of a fleet. These stations ought also to contain dockyards, having docks in which the largest ocean ironclad could be placed, and thoroughly well supplied with every material necessary for the repair, if not even perhaps the building, of a fleet. The Fijis are ^i^^^SI 26 Opiiihns of the Ciitumnl Press. ZZ,1n" " "''""™"y '""*'«' f"'- «"> P^Tose, an,l a« they offer bett,>r 1, It / ., "'^ °' commerce would probably oltei better eou.Iitions for the trial of the experiment. To sneak a l.te more plainly, would not the Straits or Hon .kon. ma to a al ":' tt'""" """: ' "'"^'^^ "' I='""» -«o Snr from oXarv tr. f put mg forward the prior claims of places in the V "oo^ m, •■ "."'' °- '"= ''^ ™ ■"'^^"» '>'i»l' to 'l^'T ae ready to admit the desn-abUily of making the Fiji Idands tlio aZu. b trl ■■"""' ""' ""'^ ""= «"'' Soa. Whether it si ouM ,W n " """,'""• ^"^■'°"' Si-S"P<»-e. 0.- Hongkong, we ir ffi. en r , '"■' • .''"' '° "'"'•"'" "«" ""'" »" tl'^^o places the "'f """'y/f^g t» Protect themselves from being taken by teastlTo':7"V"r'f''?' '"■ "'■^' P»n>ose, things wm no' take t S n/r tP' , "' ""' l"^'™' ''"'' '■' ^■"-"''-' «?■"<= """W doubt W. '" "'-'.^f >'<=™o of our men-of-war there is Uttle vent an I. T ^'"'°"' " '^""''^ fortification that could pre- wTr to break r* 1"" ' "" '"*'*°"' "' ^"''^'- ^"''- ^'^ ™™ cTl,- r t, °-"?''™^^' " «">gk «1"P belonging to the enemy r„ ,11 V ? ' ,• "' ^^^"''^ ^'^ '='•"''1 ^-^ " '^''ot in return we should iind ourselves defenceless. Our powder magazine here's fired f^'^tf ■ ""'.' " """''' ™^"y •'^ ''™''-^ '" pieces by ho ,t J r ; ™""'' ^"^ " ^™ ''■'""^ ""'o™ i°to the city would we doubt no, soon convince the powers that be that the Twses or not this IS to be the coalmg station of the East, is not the ones- ion we are now r.aising. What we say is, that every place of sTch commercial importance as Hongkong should be properly fortified and so fortihed that, in the absence of a defendL fleet the nrcr 01 T' " " > •'"" '"' *° °'^"'" " «°"'' P»-«on il 'fr " 01 tiie city lor placing Ins guns. inT.trt!,''™r"' f "°"''''' Hongkong would probably apply in a greater or less degree to all ports of call between here and Suez; and although we can hardly be expected to take as much °'T " ^1^°''''"°"°'' °"'«P>»ees as in this, yet we doubt not their inhabitants wonid gladly join with om-s in making such rha?r'„r " '° ^''rii^ent, as will convince them of th fact that we are m no way protected, and that for the interests of the Oinnions of the Colonial Press. 27 British Isles it is necessary that we should be. As to the question of cost, we must defer that to another time, when we hope to be able to point out the way in which it should be divided amongst the colonists and those liviuw at home. " THE WEST INDIAN," April 2, 1874. In a paper read at the Colonial Institute, London, on 2Bth June last, pubHshedin the European il/rtiV, Captain Colomb insists on the defence of the British Colonies as an essential part of the defence of the British Empire. Referring to a former statement of his concerning the distribution of our " War Forces, "made in a lecture at the United Service Institution, he says : — " The defence of the United Kingdom against invasion is an object of primary importance ; bi;+' to suppose that this is the one thing needful in the matter of national defence is a grievous error. We are bound to look to the general welfare of the Empire. The sources of our greatness are the possession of India, and our com- mercial prosperity. Our commercial prosperity is in direct propor- tion to the freedom with which we can carry on trade with our Colonies and other countries. Commerce is, in fact, the link that binds together the several interests of the scattered territories comprising the Empire. . . . Bearing this in mind, let us suppose that the view which limits national defence to the protection of Great Britain and Ireland against invasion be practically adopted, and that the whole resources of the country have been wholly and exclusively directed to rendering the soil of the British Isles secure, and that this object has been fully attained, Avhat would our posi- tion be in time of aggressive war, on the part of one or more great powers ? Does it not stand to reason that, as the object of all aggressive war is either to acquire territory, or to weaken, if not destroy the power of the nation against which war is made, the easiest and the safest mode is adopted to carry out these objects : under the circumstan jes we have supposed, therefore, an enemy would naturally confine his efforts to deiofcroying our commerce and our power in India, leaving the British Isles to watch his proceed- ing with impotent dismay. " If the heart and citadel of the Empii'e is alone protected, will it ' surprise us to hear ' that when the Empire is attacked, our enemy prefers cutting our unprotected communications, and appro- I^i: 28 Opinions of the Colonial Press. priating our undefended Colonies and possessions to a direct assault upon a ' small island bristling with bayonets ' " ? In elucidation of tiiis argument, that in any system of National Defence must necessarily be comprised provision for Colonial Defence, and keeping open the communication between the mother country and her Colonies, Captain Colomb proceeds to describe the British Empire as consisting of ten groups of territory spread over the world at long sea distances, viz. the British Islands, British North America, the West Indies, the West Coast of Africa, the Cape, the Mauritius, AustraHa, Hongkong, the Straits Settle- ments, and India, The United Kingdom being considered as the Imperial base, the lines of communication to be kept open are — 1. To British North America across the North Atlantic 2. To the West Indies. 8. To India, China, and Australasia by the Mediterranean. 4. To India, China, and Australasia round the Cape. 5. From Australasia and the Pacific round Cape Horn. _ An enemy at war with England might proceed directly by inva- sion, or, indu-ectly, by cutting the Hues of communication with her Colonies and destroying her commerce, the chief source of her wealth. As an illustration, Captam Colomb refers to the late war between France and Germany, when we saw, "first of all, an attack upon the advanced positions on the lines of communication ; next, the cutting of the Hnes ; and, lastly, as an inevitable consequence! Paris fell." TI.e close of the Peloponnesian war by the fall of Athens as related in Grecian History, accomphshed first by the destruction of her navy in the harbour of Syracuse, the aHenation of her alHes and dependencies in the ^gean Sea, the ruin of her commerce and burning of her ships in the Hellespont, preparatory to the investment and capture of the city, affords another equally convincing illustration of the argument. " Consider," says Captain Colomb, " for one moment on what the presumption of possible invasion rests. It rests on this— the loss, temporary or permanent, of the command of the waters surround- ing the British Islands. But remember that the Hnes of communi- cation all radiate from these waters : the loss, therefore, of our command here cuts every one of the Imperial lines ; and what is this but investment ? " This was just what the great Napoleon waited for in 1805, with his army at Boulogne ready to cross the Channel, if the fleet had come up in time to cover the landing of the troops. The inva- sion was prevented by the fleet being intercepted and destroyed •ect assault »f National ir Colonial tween the roceeds to )f territory sh Islands, of Africa, dts Settle- l base, the Opinions of the Colonial Press. 29 lean. '/ by iuva- 1 with her je of her 3 late war an attack 3n ; next, sequence, lie fall of st by the ilienation in of her 3paratory !r equally what the -the loss, urrouud- ommuni- e, of our -nd what i05, with fleet had he inva- iestroyed at Trafalgar. The same thing occurred in 1588, when the Prince of Parma had his array also ready in the Flemish ports for the invasion of England, on the appearance of the Armada in the Channel ; and historians express little doubt of the conquest of England by the Prince, but for the violence of the weather and the dispersion of the fleet. Since then England has grown up to be the greatest maritime power in the world, through her commerce and Colonies, quite as much as by the prowess of her arms. One main cause of her success is that pointed out by Captain Colomb — her command of the Channel, which not only secures her lines of communication with her Colonies, but gives her the key of all the ports of Northern and Central Europe from the Baltic to Brest. Let anyone cast his eye upon the map of Europe, and he will see how it has come to pass that a small country like the United Kingdom has obtained maritime supremacy. It is owing to her command of the Channel, and holding such important posts as Gibraltar and Malta in the Mediterranean. Without further reference to the observations of the writer on these lines of com- munication, we confine ourselves to the second, that to the West Indies, with which we are more particularly concerned. He says of it : — " Here we have Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Antigua. The strategic value of Bermuda is in some dee;ree understood. The military value of the Bahamas was fixed by Sir John Bur- goyne. Jamaica, from its central position and capacious harbour, is of considerable importance. I add Antigua for two reasons — (1) because Jamaica is far too leeward to be of value as a coaling station or arsenal for cruisers acting in the defence of communica- tions to the Eastern Islands ; such vessels would burn a great quantity of fuel in steaming up to their station from Jamaica against the trades ; (2) vessels bound for the greater Antilles and Gulf of Mexico generally pass between Antigua and Guada- loupe." Bermuda is a convenient half-way house between Halifax — the terminus of the first line of communication — and the West Indies ; and the importance of keeping up the inter-colonial communica- tions is only secondary to that with the mother country. With regard to the Windward and Leeward Islands, we may be naturally biassed in favour of the advantages offered by the situation of Barbados, to windward of all the others, and in a more central position, in considering it to hold a better strategic position than Antigua, with a harbour equally easy of access and as capable of defence, and " affording as safe and commodious shelter " for 80 Opinions of the Colonial Fre& Bhips of war and merchantmen. It is for this reason and its salubrity that it has been made the liead-quartcrs of the troops in t^ie command and the first port of call for the steamers of the Wl Af Z^ v'"! ^"^^^'^ ""^ ^ '^^-^^^ ^^''- It - alBo in the ■ ChTi ir/^ .1 '•''' '"'^ ^''''^'''' ^^•^"^^^^' ^^"^1^ P^«« through Caihs e Bay on their way to and fro, although they only call in able as that of Antigua in reference to Jamaica, and more favour- able in regard to the growing Colonies of Trinidad and British Guiana, the latter particularly, which is far in excess of any other in the value of her imports and exports, with a power of cZTZZ TT"'^ y "°"' '^^'''' ^"^^*^^^ °"ly ^y the population. Cap ain Colomb pomts out the advantage of having coaling stations on these points the selection of which should be governed by the tollowing conditions : — ° . •" "1. They must be in our possession, and on or near a line of com- mumcation. 2. They should possess natural advantages, such as safe and commodious shelter for the war and commercial fleets easy of access, and capable of defence. They should be as far as possible the natural rendezvous at all times of vessels passing and repassing a ong the line, and the chief, if not the only, coaling station of the district they command. "Too much attention cannot be paid to the selection of the coaling sations of the Empire. They should be under our con- tro . Take for example the West Indies. The great coaling station in that dis„.ict-St. Thomas-is not in our possession The consequence is, that were we engaged in hostilities in that quarter a arge portion of our force would be necessarily employed in the blockade-so far as our enemy is concerned-of this point, and would be so much deducted from the force available and required for other purposes. We have confined ourselves to a brief statement of the argument as set forth m Captain Colomb's pamphlet, and propose in a follow- ing number to show how it concerns the West Indies-a very incon- siderable portion of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain, but still a par and occupying a position of equal strategic importance with any other line of communication, as he observes, between North and bouth America and commanding the trade of the Southern and VVestern Atlantic. on and its troops in icrs of the ho in the ss through ily call in '< us favour- re favour- id British 3s of any power of opulation. ig stations Bd by the le of com- 'i, such as iial fleets, as far as sing and r, coaling 'n of the our con- coaling ssession. in that mployed is point, ble and :gument 1 foUow- y incon- but still ce with Tth and irn and I Opinions of the Colonial Press. 81 •'THE WEST INDIAN," April 7, 1874. That the Colonies of England are a main source of her wealth and greatness, wo take it is beyond dispute. But from Captain Colomb's pamphlet, it would seem, it has not been sufficiently recognised.in the Colonial policy of the late Administration. It is not our intention to discuss this question. What we seek to show is the value of the connection between England and her posses- sions in the West Indies considered relatively with her connection with India and the other British Colonies. In the first place, the connection with the West Indies dates from an earlier period, and the names of many of the naval heroes of England are associated with their history. But what is of much more importance is their geographical position. In early times a voyage to the Plantations meant a visit to the West Indies, even in the case of vessels with settlers bound for the New England States. The outward voyage was made across the l^ay of Biscay to the Spanish coast, and thence to Madeira and Barbados, from which ports a fresh de- ::arture was taken via Bermuda for the New England States. S^ m communication has put an end to this round-about course, but in the meantime the commerce of England has extended beyond the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn into the great Southern Ocean, and the track of the ships outward or homeward bound lies just outside of the chain of the Windward and Lee- ward Islands. These islands have become so many stepping- stones from North America to South America, affording convenient stations for the telegraph wires, which stretch from Demerara to the Havana, and from there to Washington and New York. A lighthouse is being put up on the east coast of Barbados, at the joint expense of the Island Legislature and the Imperial Govern- ment, for the benefit of vessels passing to Wmdward, as well as those bound for Carlisle Bay, or any other West Indian port. The trade between the West Indies and the United States and British North America is only secondary to that with the mother country. They obtain breadstuffs from the former, and lumber and fish from the latter. It is a mutually advantageous trade, and it is increasing every year. With the countries of the southern half of the Continent, with the exception of Guiana, there is but little trade carried on, and that chiefly with the Plate River, since the establishment of the telegraph, of vessels calhng here for orders. The position of Barbados to Windward of the chain of the 32 Opinions of the Colonial Prcsn. m Antilles, and in the track of vessels from the South Atlantic bound to the States, or to Europe, attaches an importance to it that must increase with the extension of commerce in the Southern Ocean. Anotlicr consideration is, the climate of the West Indies: the islands are healthier than the mainland, the settlements upon which are generally at the mouths of great rivers subject to malaria and mosquitoes. The increase of the population of Barbados is duo to the greater salubrity of the cli- mate, the abundant water supply, and the facilities for sea-bathing. Barbados supplies a large contingent of labour and population to Demerara every year, and in consequence there is a larger trade carried on between the two than between Barbados and all the others put together. Now, Demerara has unlimited resources; the large sugar estates are all central factories, producing from 1,000 to 2,000 tons of the finest quahty sugar. The production at present averages about 100,000 tons, and there is only need of time, capital, and labour, to augment it to a million of tons. It is the most flourishing British ^Jolony in the West Indies. Trini- dad is a growing Colony also ; and as they lie at the extremity of the chain of islands, the position of Barbados in their neighbour- hood, and to Windward of them, gives it additional value as an outpost and a commercial centre. Governor Bawson has directed attention to a further advantage derived from the position of Bar- bados, as affording the most eligible site for a meteorological observatory, and for the transmission by telegraph all through tlie islands to Washington, of the changes of weather, and approach of cyclones in the hurricane season, which generally arise in the latitude of Barbados, sweeping across the ocean in a north- westerly direction, by which means timely notice of them might be given to mariners, and precautions taken by vessels in port or about to leave, against the danger. Keference to statistical returns will show the value of the com- merce carried on between Great Britain and her Colonies in the West Indies. On the whole, the value of their imports and ex- ports is about equal. The greater part of the exports go directly to the United Kingdom, and a large portion of the imports, con- sisting of merchandise and manufactures, is also obtained from there, giving employment to a great number of British ships. It is further to be considered that not only is this profitable trade in the hands of British merchants, but the shareholders of the Colonial and other banks are for the most part Englishmen, as well as the owners of a great number of the sugar estates and other property in the West Indies. It is not too much to say '--:-'^1tttflltf''-" ..imJSltki:' th Atlantic tanco to it rce in tlio lato of tho inland, tho IS of great mse of tho of tho cli- )a-hathinfj. )ulation to irger trade ud all the resources ; icing from production ily need of tons. It s. Trini- tremity of leighbour- 'lue as an iS directed n of Bar- iorological trough tlie approach se in tho a north- ern might n port or the com- 3s in tho and ex- directly orts, con- ned from hips. It ! trade in s of tho imen, as ates and h to say Opinions of the ddonidl Press. 88 that nearly one-half of the annual profits of the sugar cultivation of the West Indies, directly or indirectly, goes into tho pockets of absontoo proprietors residing in the Uritcd Kingdom or elsewhere. Tho West Indies alford a protitable invostmont for British capital, and a good market for British mauufactaros. Thoy also give em- ployment to a considerable number of persons sent out from the mother country to fill places in the civil service, and to act as agents and overseers. Many of these, after acquiring wealth, either send their children home to be educated, or return to end their days there with then: families, and with tho wealth they have accumulated. This is the case more or less with all the Colonies, but applies much more to the Colonies within the tropics than to Canada and Australia, where the climate and tlourishing condition of the country are inducements for permanent settlement. British subjects are not all of the same race, as the British Empire ex- tends over all parts of the world. The Queen of England, it has been said, is the greatest Asiatic potentate, and her crown is not less nobly sustained in the Western hemisphere and in South Africa and Australia. The British Empire consists of a number of growing states, which are every year gathering strength and assuming larger dimensions, and tho more closely they are bound to the mother country the more they contribute to the strength of the Empire. England must follow the example of ancient Rome, and give to all her Colonies and foreign possessions the right of citizenship and tho name of British subjects, and of being con- side ved integral parts of the British Empire. It is due to her greatness and to the maintenance of her position amongst the foremost nations of the world. If she is content to limit her dominions to the British Islands, and desires to cast off her Colo- nies and to leave them to work out their own destinies, she must withdraw from the first rank and give place to the United States, Russia, France, and Germany, and see herself, at no long distance of time, reduced to a level with her own Colonies in Canada and Australia. ]]ut we cannot believe that this is the view taken by British statesmen, Liberal or Conservative, of the question, or which would be sanctioned by the British Parliament. With re- gard to the question of " Colonial Defence," as put by Captain Colomb, to consist in the command of the Channel, and keeping open live main lines of communication with the Colonies, it seems to us, though we speak with diflidence, being quite aware of how little importance attaches to the opinion of a West Indian news- paper, that so long as England holds her position of maritime supremacy she has nothing to fear for the maintenance of her i> 84 Opinions of the Colonial Press. reaching to the Pacific Ocean ? As for tL wLt T i ^i "''' ,ue.t. During the tJi^tfoL ; IrltLf /'f ''°"'- possession of the French an,l n„t„l r. i ' ^"^'"""^ '"<''' ""sy on the conclusion ofTetetehi,„»t"r' "?»'■-"'«'• "-■» retention. The Brit s^WesT I. 1 "f "'"='2^ '» '''^ S»' by their islands from Demema tolle l!„> '°™ " '""8 '""= o'' «■"»« withnobaseandno centre am '• n°"' '■"°" ""''^^ '""S" land was to throw tlU ^1 not wo^rt ' °' '''"™"- " ^"^- the connection, we believrwirh Capta n rn'"'- ":? °' "'""""« taken over by the Government „tw, .'"''' "'"^ """''' ^e long time been desbZ T„u ^'.^'"''""e'™. which has for a warfandLe war? "l r B t w7 ' '"'™' ■"•'' '" ""^ ^'"''■ a«ch a calamity, which for a 1„ "T°° ^"""""'l'*'"^ would be eauailvMt ,:,^ 1 ff™' ^^ ''""= "'"'"^'i "b"™. parties. " ^ ' ""^ '''""=''"^'* "» ^ »™^1 ^""riflce, by both Opiiwms of the CoUm'ud I'ichh. 85 ifficult to Iiulia by ng in the , but the lU has a army, of I able to ? to fear ■eignty of Southern aotene> 3, iir capa- tit, what cl States, mguage, and are carry on mniense of eacli, ey must 3 hanils hem, or eir con- )k easy d them oy their 'f small !s long, [f Eng. taining )uld be 3 for a Wind- ipating above, y both "THE WEST INDIAN," April 10, 1H74. TiiK future relations of England and her Colonies have a bearing on the question of Colonial Defence of more practical importance than any other consideration. They will b(! found to afford grounds for more satisfaction and encouragement than is derived from the history of the past. England has thriven by her Colo- nies, and may reasonably expect to continue to thrive by them in a greater degree in proportion to the development of their resources. Her Colonies are at all times, in peace or war, her best allies. It was India and the Colonies that supported England through the war with Napoleon, when almost all the ports in Europe were closed against her. Since then the Colonial Empire has extended its boundaries and acquired an importance much beyond what it possessed at the beginning of the century. What new markets are opened in the East, in Australia, in South Africa, in the West Indies, and in British North America, for the commerce of England, and a constant stream of the productions of every climate and quarter of the globe, poured into her lap to enrich her I The Colo- nies of England are so many centres of English ideas and influence in every part of the world. The more they grow in numbers and in wealth, the greater the strength of the nation, and the stronger the bonds which attach them to the mother country. It is through the Colonies thai the English nation spreads itself over new coun- tries in the East and West, and finds a boundless field for its energies. England is reproduced in New Zealand, in AustraHa, in South Africa, and on the shores of the Pacific in British Co- lumbia. All these centres of British enterprise and industry have been opened up in the reign of Queen Victoria. How wonderful is their growth and flourishing condition at the present moment ! What is there to check it ? Unchecked, and going on at the same rate of progress during the next ten years, to what a height must it rise ! The progress of the United States of America is unprece- dented ; but it may be doubted if it is greater than that of the British Empire in Australia and Canada ; and more doubtful if it will exceed them in the next decade. Putting the United States aside (and what are they but an English Coluny ?) there is no other nation that can compete with the British in the increase of its population and the development of its resources. And what we would observe is, that this growth is chiefly through tlie Colonies of the Empire. The Colonies, then, are the roots that supply the D 2 SG Opiiiioitu <>/ ihf ('i)hiiuiil Piths. H ■ Hiip ami rciiuw tlio hriuiclioH of tlio two. Siiioly thoy rto in nlacrity in tho dcfcnco of h.'r Colonics, howinrr rcnioto or insif,'ni- ficant. What is it wo learn hy tch-.i^'raph to-day ? TJiat tho Quoon II nd tho Princo of Wales, tho Didco of Edi"ni>urf,di and Princo Arthur, woro prosont a day or two a^o at a roviow of the troops, on then- return from Capo Coast, ujider Sir (}. Wolseh^y. What woro tiuy sent out there to do? To (i-ht the Asluuiteo kin^'. and to jnotoct tho liritish settlements on tlu) Coast, and the iuMj,dd)()urin<,' trihes from heinj,' plundered and carried into slavery. Thoso sottlementa aro kept up nioro to prevent tho carryni<,' on of tho slave trade, than for any comnun-cial advanta^'cs derived from tiiem ; l)ut Kn^'land will not ahandon Miem when threatened hy a forniidahle enemy, whom they are unahle to eontend with. Is it to bo supposed that she will a(h)])t a less f t!io Colonics ? Wliiit has India to fear ? What havo tho Aust'-lian Colonies and South Africa to fear fr(»ni a forei^'n attaclv ? \'v^(! leave these (luestions for otlusrs to answer. We con lino our ohaervations to tho West Indies, for tho reason wo havo pfiven before, because wo are nioro co'icorned with them. Tho West Indies are important in connection with tho lines of comnnniication with tho South African and Australian (Colonies, »tid with tho trad(! between North .md South America, and from till! South Atlantic. On this account thei)' d"t'ence must always be an object to En<,dand. Tho West Indies, uidiko the larj^'er Colonies, must always remain d(>pendencio8 up(m tho power that holds tho maritime supremacy. With tho exception of Guiana they havo no room for expnnsion ; thoufjjh in meat of tbem, Barbados and Jamaica excepted, there is a want of population, and in all con- siderable improvements, material as well as social and political, mi^'ht bo introduced. It has been Hug},'osted that coaling' stut'oiis should bo provided in Jamaic. and in ono of the Windward and Looward Islands for the supply of II. M, ships, and bo protected by fort or batteries from being d(!stroyed by an unexpected attack of an enemy's cruisers. This could bo done at no great expense, and so easily and quickly that it might be left to be done when there was reasonable ground for apprehension of a war between Great l^-itain and some other maritime power in a position to send cruisers to tho West Indies. The future of the West Indies oliers no such groat expectations as are formed in tho larger Colonies ; but tho prospect is full of encouragement. With a view to the consolidation of tho scattered islands, the Imperial Government proposes to confederate them in groups, and to introduce greater uniformity in their tariffs and administrative di'partments. Tho introduction of tho telegraph wires, railways, new lines of trans- atlantic steamers, and central factories, cannot fail to produce the same beneficial results in tho West Indies as elsewhere ; and with tlicse tho education of all classes of tho inhabitants is better jn-o- vided for than heretofore. It cannot be denied that the condition of the labouring class has been improved of late, and the results of the great Act of Emancipation are beginning to be realised in the formation of an intelligent and industrious population, and the softening down of jealousies arising from distinctions of colour and race. Time is wanted for the working out of those iutiuences. ill 38 1 Opinions of the Colonial Pre ss. which If not conntcnicted, will at the end of the next ten years coanbute materially to strengthen the ties that bind the Colonies to the mother country, and to the consohdation of the interests of trie Colonies themselves. .Pn!oi'r'"/"T-''\!^'''' '' *^'' P^'°'l'^^* °^ ^^'^ continuance of peaceful and friendly relations between Great Britain and the other nations 01 the world for a series of years, during which the Colonies wil have fane to grow to maturity and to strengtlien themselves by drawing closer the bonds of union. The West Indies form an important link in the chain of communication be ween those situated on the shores of the North and South Atlantic and even between the Austrahnn Colonies and England, the chief trade l,eing carried on round the Capes. It is in the common interest of all that this link of the chain should not be alowed to drop out or to be broken, for the question of Colonial It^t"?" 'T?'^^ , ,,,,,, ,,^, J, .^ ^ lesp ct of any particular Colony, or of the defence of inland of^ufjrf "^- T' *'" '""^"'^"^^ ^^ *^- Channel onfy, but of all the Colonies, which arc integral parts of the Empire and keeping open the communications between them across the seas Towards this union and consohdation of interests nothing avails alhance by all the parties to it. What these are may be seen in one-,n India, where the British name is a tower of strength a talisman against internal dissension and jealousies, us weU as sSif alX'^^^^^^ ?^ '^° '' ^"°^-^^ g-rantees tl safety of all those who cross the seas, while it secures peace and good government everywhere. The Colonies enjoy the benefits of he equal laws and free institutions of the mother'^.ountrr eLii I -IS Its own local administration, making its own laws, and raisti. and appropnating its own revenues, without derogati n fr^ M dignity and prerogatives of the British Crown. So Ion. Z he sense these mutual advantages prevails in the CoWs! tha loyal attachment which they have always shown towards the mother country, and none more so than the'west Indies, wiU ct tmue to exist aiul continue to be the strongest assurance of their trust m England,-the ground on which they look for her pro tection m the hour of danger. ^ '■^^x. •^. -J Ojnnions of the Colonial Press. 39 pro- "PUBLIC OPINION," Malta, Wednesday, Ajml 1, 1874. The subject to which Captain J. C. E. Colomb, of the Royal Marine Artillery, has for some time past been endeavouring to call the attention of the Imperial Parhament and of the Colonial Legis- latures, is well deserving the study of all those who have at heart the interests of the great Empire which Captain Colomb wishes to have so defended, as to be able to resist any combination that may be formed with the view of dismembering it. The naval and military policy recommended in the lecture before us is most com- prehensive and, as far as it goes, complete ; and it would be well if this most important subject were seriously attended to by the statesmen who have been called upon to uphold the greatness and the integrity of the Empire. Whilst attaching the greatest importance to the measures re- cently taken for placing England in a position to resist any in- vader, Captain Colomb says : " The defence of the United ICing- dom against invasion is an object of primary importance ; but to suppose that this is the one thing needful in this matter of national defence is a grievous error. We are bound to look to the general welfare of the Empire. The sources of our greatness are the possession of India and our commercial prosperity. Our commer- cial prosperity is in direct proportion to the freedom with which we can carry on trade with our Colonies and other countries. Commerce is, in fact, the link that binds together the several in- terests of the scattered territories comprising the Empire. . . . Bearing this in mind, let us suppose that the view which limits natural defence to the protection of Great Britain and Ireland against invasion be practically adopted, and that the whole re- sources of the country have been wholly and exclusively directed to rendering the soil of the British Isles secure, and that this object has been fully attained, what would our position be in time of ag- gressive war on the part of one or more great Powers ? Does it not stand to reason that, as the object of all aggressive war is either to acquire territory or to weaken if not to destroy the power of the nation against which war is made, the easier and the safest mode is adopted to carry out these objects ? Under the circumstances we have supposed, therefore, an enemy would naturally confine his efforts to destroying our commerce and our power in India, leaving the British Isles to watch his proceedings with impotent dismay. . . . K i : ) I i ; 40 Opinions of the Colonial Press. ^ If the ],oart and citadel of tlie Empire is alone protected, will t surprise us to hoar ' that when the Empire is attacked, our enemy prefers cutting our unprotected c -mmunications and appropriat- ig our undoiended Colonies and possessions to a direct assault upon a small island bristhng with bayonets ' 9" Now,_as Captain Colomb very justly observes, the security of that island IS no guarantee for the safety of twentynine-thirtieths of W fiffi ''f t/' °' ^'' *^'' protection of the hves and properties of n R0?r f ' ^'T'^'' '''^'^'''' ' ''^"^^' '^« Sir C. Pasley wrote in 1808, the strength of an empire composed of several islands or possessioas, divided from eaeli other by the sea, will be further moditied by the geographical position of its respective parts : the strGn..th of an empire of any kind, whetlicr insular or continental, will be greater or less, with equal resources, in proportion to the ac hty with winch its several part, can afford each other mutual assistance when attacked, and to the difficultv whieV an enemy may find m supplying and supporting his invading force. From this ab.e exposition of a great mihtary truth two great principles are established : — -^ x i 1. That it is of vital importance that the safety of the Imperial communications be secured. 2 That it is essential to the military strength of the Empire that forces created or existing for the defence of one portion be not l^^^Z^: '"'''-''' ^^-l-«i^ility of using them in the Applying these two fundamental principles, Captain Colomb lays down with great ability a scheme of Colonial Defence, combining, the naval and military resources of the Empire for the protectioS ot the whole ; and whilst regretting our inability to find room for the lucid exposition of the chief lines of communication and the commanding points in each, we shall make no apology for repro- ducing the gallant officer's concluding remarks, which, it is to be aXriiles .r^ ^""^ ^"^ ^' '''''*"''^^ considered by the Imperial - The communications of the Empire being the common property of all Its component parts, each portion, according to the use it makes of them, has a direct interest in their defence, and should con- tribute to that object. -The forces intended for the defence of the communications must be Imperial and not Colonial. They must be prepared to act at any point on the Imperial lines where they may happen to be \T7to ^''^'^"^'''^ ^^'^'^ '^'^''^''^ "^^^er the Naval Defence Act of 1865 are only of value, and that to a very limited extent, to Opinions of the Colonial Press. 41 meet tlie necessities of the second or interior line of Colonial De- fence. The forces necessary for the defence of the Imperial com- munications should be under the control of one directing head. As military force is necessary to the support of naval power, and as in our case military force is in its turn dependent upon naval power, the distribution of the one must have reference to that of the other. If, therefore, the military force is under the control of one department, and the naval force under that of another, the de- fence of our communications is, to use a homely phrase, ' between two stools.' In vain might our ' Admiralty ' despatcli fleets to distant seas, if the bases of their operation are not secured by the ' War Office ; ' equally valueless would be the distribution of mili- tary force for the protection of those places by the War Office, if the Admiralty do not keep the communications between them open. Unless there be a war minister responsible for and controlling the general principles which should govern the action of each depart- ment, nc thing but confusion can result when the Imperial com- munications are in danger. If the Colonies are really in earnest in matters relating to their defence, it is time they should combine to force on the attention of the Imperial Parliament the neglected state of the Imperial roads, and the necessity for devising adequate means for their security. They must, however, be prepared to bear their fair share of the burden. " If the mind of the mother country is morbid, and, from dwelling continually on the terrors of invasion, has lost the power of com- prehending the consequences of investment, it is time her young and vigorous offspring should awaken her to a true sense of her position. " A Eoyal Commission to inquire into the defence of the Imperial communications, if properly constituted on an Imperial basis, would lead to most important results. It may be taken as a cer- tainty that such a commission would recommend the permanent strengthening of the great strategic points, which it would be in a position accurately to define. It might possibly determine the just limits of Imperial and Colonial responsibilities in the question of defence. " With the creation of Imperial fortresses commandingthe Imperial roads, would grow up a feeling of common security. They would be links in the chain which binds together the military forces of our Empire — stepping-stones by which those forces can cross to afford mutual assistance and support. " Such a commission and such measures might prepare the way for a federation of tlie war forces of the Empire, which is essen- iS«S» 42 Opinions of the Cnlnnial Vi-chh. tial to Its safety. It wonid be easier in a ^nvcn time to collect forces from all parts of the Empire at a given point now, than it was to concentrate the mihtary forces in the United Kingdom on any particular place on the coast line sixty years ago. It is singu- lar that when science has done and is doing so much to increase our power of concentration, Imperial policy should be undoin- her work by i.ersisting in the creation of local forces which it is im- possible to move, and all this at a time when concentration is the great pnnciple of attack, and the power of concentration is the great principle of defence. Though by nature and by science we possess all the physical means necessary for the concentration of military forces, we have neglected to turn them to account, and iurther, by limiting the action of military forces to the particular 13ortions of the Empire where they are raised, we wilfully destroy the necessary power of resisting concentrated attack bv a combina- tion of Imperial resources, which is in these days the true source 01 strength. ''It is only in maintaining the second line of Colonial defences that local forces are of real value, but it is the duty of the Empire to see that they are provided with the means and weapons to enable them to act. For the first and third hues, thev are of no avail, so long as the necessary power of concentration at the weakes pomt is absent. It is mihtary necessity, and not consti- tutional law, which determines where the greatest power of resistance is to be apphed. " While we acknowledge and applaud the principle, that it is everv man s duty to defend his home, it is to be regretted that our ideas ol Its practical application are lamentably indistinct. The mother country has put her own construction on the word ' home ' in applymg the principle of calling into existence military forces which can only be used to put up her shop shutters and to bar her doors. She calls on her children to adopt her definition of its meaning and to follow her example, and some have done so But who among the armies thus organised, for what she is pleased to call 'home defence,' can determine the exact distance from a man's home at which the obligation ends ? Who can draw the ma^ric circle which is to include the territorial area of his duty to die for his country ? Home is something more than an abstract idea havin- reference only to locality— its foundations are laid in common interests, sympathy, and affections. ' A silver streak of sea ' can- not divide these interests, nor can miles of ocean sever the stron^ ties of aftection and of s^-mpathy. Hence it is that, from whatever quarter of the Empire a cry for help comes— wherever the British Opinions of the Colonidi Press. 4a flag waves over Englishmen struggling on their own ground for all they holtl clear — it is there our home is in danger, there is the rallying point of forces created for its defence. " While we boast of armed hosts here and in the Colonies, v^hose proud motto is ' home defence,' they must ' survey the Empire ' to ' behold our home.' " Without entering into the Imperial questions of the highest im- portance raised by Captain Colomb in his able and patriotic paper, we shall confine our attention to the measures that ought to bo taken with the view of defending this commanding point in the main line of communication with India, China, and Australasia by the Mediterranean. There can be no doubt that the Imperial Govern- ment is fully alive to the great importance of Malta as a naval and military station : the improvements recently carried out in its armament and the additional works of defence which are even now being constructed, appear to have rendered the island absolutely impregnable. On the other hand, are the warHke stores and the war material on the spot, sufficient to meet the emergencies con- templated by Captain Colomb, and which alone can justify the annual expenditure of so much treasure ? And what is of still greater importance, is the number of men permanently stationed here sufficient to man even the most important works of defence ? Where could be found a safer or better defended depot for both men and war material to be used, not only in defending the Island, but also to be despatched, at the shortest notice, to India and the other distant dependencies of the Crown ? Is the dock accommodation sufficient to repair and refit such ships as may be disabled in an engagement at so great a distance from England ? And what about the coal depots ? These are all considerations which have no doubt occurred to the able naval and military commanders on the station ; though they may have remained unheeded by the central govern- ment, especially under the rigid economy preached by the late Administration. Indeed, if we are to judge from the reduction lately effected in the R. M. F. Artillery against the deliberate opinion of H. E. the Lieutenant-General Commanding, we cannot form a very high opinion of the wisdom or the statesmanship by which such measures are suggested and carried out. At a time when artillery is acquiring so much importance in the composition of all armies, — at a time when owing to the additional works that are being constructed, a greater number of artillerymen would be required, — the War Department effected a reduction of nearly 300 men, that cost much less than the Royal Artillerymen, each of whom had to be conveyed from the United Kingdom and re- ■ -'w y jin ^w ^-wi 44 Opinions of the Colonial Prrs.t. oonvcyccl tliitlior after Ins limo of .service ha.l expired, at no inconsulerablo expense. But us if to slu.w that not economy but only a wluni was tlie motive by whicli the Secretary of State was actuated, wliilst tlie men were struck off the strength is to be of the R M. F. A., tlio officers liave all l)oen retained. It x„ .., .,o hoped that this was d(mo with the intention of soon restorino-'tliis useful corps to its ori-inal stren-th ; r-vl ^\o Poo.ier this intention is carried out, the better will it be for , ' 'ties concerned. Not only has a deal of suiferin.!,' been entu i •. on the poor men dis- charged and their families, but the people at large could not but feel offended at the reduction of the only native corps whicli has been left in the service of Pier Miijcsty. It is, wo believe, the opinion of high military authorities that the garrison of Malta should be increased rather than reduced; and considering the peculiar circumstances of the Island, we think it would be Avlse to raise another corps of native artillery, that would be comparatively of very little cost and would prove most useful, not only in case of an attack, but also in time of peace. Besides an increase both in the British and native forces of which the permanent -arrison should be com- sed, Ave think corps of volunteers should bo organised, and instructed principally in the handling of artillery, for service in case of an attack. We have on former occasions proposed the formation of such corps, but hitherto without any efl'ect. Nor should the British Government lose sight of the fact that the goodwill and affection of the people is a most important clement in the defence of a country situated like IMalta ; and it would not be difficult, if the Imperial authorities were to examine with their own eyes, to effect such reforms in the government as would satisfy the Maltese, and show them that besides the security of the fortress of Malta, the British Government are not unmind- ful of the existence of the civil population, whose happiness and prosperity they are anxious to promote. The fleet might also be more largely recruited from among the seafaring population, whose steadiness and sobriety the naval authorities have had ample opportunities of testing. But we have already said more than we originally intended, and we must conclude. Captain Colomb's paper appears to us to' con- tain suggestions of the highest importance ; and a royal commis- sion as proposed by him would tend to enlighten both the Govern- ment and the public concerning the defence of the Imperial communications to be established on an Imperial basis. Inquiries of such magnitude and importance can only be made in times of profound peace like the present, which are also most suitable for Opinions of the Ctilniiiiil Press. 45 0(1, at no economy, icrotary of e strength It is to be torinf;- tills ! intention uc(i. Not • men dis- ci not but vhich has ilicve, the of Miilta cring the be Avise to paratively in case of e both in garrison houhl bo artillery, occasions Iiout any the fact mportant i ; and it examine ment as i security unmind- less and : also be n, whoso \ ample led, and i to con- Qommis- (xovern- 'mperial nquiries imes of able for the taking of such defensive measures as shall efficiently protect from a combined attack all the parts of the Empire to which Eng- land owes so large a share of her wealth and commercial prosperity. And if England is to maintain that position among the European nations which she has so deservedly earned, she must be prepared to assert that position much sooner, perhaps, than may bo generally expected. That, when the hour of trial and of danger arrives, she may be found strong and invuhu'rable in all points, is a consumma- tion which all her sons cannot but be most anxious to px emote. "THE ST. HELENA GUAKDIAN," Muij 7, 1874. Wk have received, and have been requested to give public expres- sion to our opinion upon, a remarkable pamphlet upon "Colonial Defence," read before the Eoyal Colonial Institute a few months ago by Captain Colomb, late of the II. M. Artillery. In the ac- companying letter, dated 1st March, Captain Colomb justly describes his subject as one which of late years has been treated either with apathy or neglect by the Imperial Parliament, but yet one of vast importance boir to the mother country and to every portion of the Empire, nc .latter how fragmentary. It may be thought that this is especially a professional question, and that the request for further facts and opinions might have been more properly addressed to naval and military authorities than to newspaper editors. Yet nowadays even newspaper writing has its value if only the condi- tion can be impressed on readers that facts are honestly given and opinions carefully formed. The pamphlet we allude to is placed for perusal in the public library. In it the main scope of the writer's argument is to show that while formerly Great Britain, having immense foreign possessions but a comparatively small army, committed the grave error of scattering that small force in detachments over the whole world, and locked up a great part of it in positions that could never be of any military importance, in later times the very opposite error has taken place. The whole available military force has been concentrated at home, leaving the most important positions abroad, except India, quite defenceless. Captain Colomb lays it down as an axiom that communications whether by sea or land, whether long or short, can only be secured by a firm grasp of the points which command them. He divides the great routes of the world into five lines of communication : — 46 Opinions of the Colonial Press. i 1st to Canada; 2ncl, to the West Indies; 8rd, to India by the 2ltlT" ' /''^' ''r' ''"" '''' ""''' '''''''' --^^ the Cape. ami fitli, the route roimd Ciipo tloni. We at Kt. Helcua are cliiefly coucometl with the fourth route or fiveat oeoau h,,,hway from the Jia-st. an,l wo find that C °'a,a A^oTttr "?"'" ^'""'" -"->".o-Sierra J« " Asccusiou bt. Helcua, Simon's Bay, Mauritius, aud Ki„..Cieor..c-8 Souui As regards Sierra Leoue, St. Heleua, aud Aseo, ,"ho the Imperial roads rou.ul the Cape mid round Cape Horn cros, each other at a point on the e,uatar about 23« west longitude an J that If a moderate eirelo be described on the chart from t li pd t It will inch.de the three stations named. Now we are i. cZ to bchcvo that he ha., placed the point of meeting of the routes a little too far wes , and that in the event of war, which is the veiy on- oi call of all homeward ships round the Horn, and then their point of meeting the homeward route round the Cape of Good Ze would be so near to St. Helena, that practical y. in oven of an em ing European war in which our country we™ concerned St Helena would be the point of meeting of these two routes amla very important point of defence, and that neither Sierra L 'no nor ouT':f 't[r 'TM "7 '^'" ""i«"-'-- '-"- «-' from bo"; ou of the merchant track either outward or homeward, and Z latt r from the few facilities oiiered by nature-the absen e o safe anchorage, convcnent landing, fresh water, or other refl, melt; Everything there depends upon a lavish Government expci„Ut°r7 to which If thei-e should be any interruption, the Island rem n, a mere barren rock. At St. Helena we have had some lcsso„""S, Captam Colomb's views gain acceptance, m.^y be of vah,r li he Eussian War of 1804.5, and in the American Civil 4r o 1862.4, w-e had here at St. Helena illustrations of the va u of '.tes in r.f"" V' "7'T"°" '" ""'■ "^"^- Had the Rul irigates in 18 j4 made a dash at this Island and carried it thev could without doubt have held the place for si. months at lea 1 ad what mtcn-uption and damage to our shipping would have en," may be iniagmed. The famous cruise of Uie AlalZ n he American War will show what might be done by one sin" rui, between the Cape and St. Helena if there were no force at ha dt protect our commerce. Many officers of the navy and army of considerable experience hehef that bt. Helena is a point of great importance ; that its Opinions of the Colonial Press. 47 remarkably puro and healthy climate, abimtlauce of fresh water, ami capabihty of producing supplies of fresh provisions, as well as its excellent anchorage and freedom from the rolling surfs of Ascen- sion and the coast of Africa, all offer advantages possessed neither by Ascension, Sierra Leone, nor the Capo do Verd Islands ; that it is naturally fitted to be the head-c^uarters of the African squadron, and that the commanding ofticcr of that squadi-on should be its governor, with a garrison of marines. Suppose for a moment that this idea had been carried out, and that last year the Governor of St. Helena had been free to sail to the Gold Coast on the first breaking out of hostilities, accompanied with a battalion of European troops accustomed to a healthy yet tropical climate, and within five days' steam of the scone of operations, — tlio result could not have been more successful, but the bill of expenses might have been considerably diminished and the hospital casualties perhaps lessened. In the course of these last operations on the coast it was represented to the authorities that St. Helena was the finest tropi- cal climate in the world, empty barracks in perfect order for 500 men, a little model military hospital side by :;ide with a civil hospital, both furnished with appliances more than needed for their ordinary occupants ; also a Government House unused, con- taining thirty-eight furnished rooms with beautiful grounds and every other appurtenance for comfort, offered as a hospital and sanatarium for officers, and all within five days' steam of the Gold Coast. But this came to nothing, and hundreds of sick were sent to St. Vincent, Madeira, Gibraltar, and many other out of the way places, and not one to St. Helena. Two small Islands in the South Atlantic Ocean are both possibly of importance in some contin- gency — St. Helena and Ascension. In the ordinary course of things it would be imagined these two little Islands should be united under one Government. But no, that is not at all the case. Ascension belongs to the Admiralty. It is not a Colony, but a ship ; while St. Helena is admitted to the full honours of a British Colony and is governed by the Secretary of State. The conse- quences may not be apparent to the uninitiated, but they are im- portant. At Ascension, whatever money is wanted to be spent is procured by the commanding naval officer asking the Admiral to sanction it in the name of the guardship stationed there — say the old Flora; and whether the sum be twenty pounds or Jwenty thousand pounds, is practically the same ; the expenses of Ascension are never brought before Parliament, and the only thing a carious inquirer can find out is that a guardship at Ascension is always the most expensive vessel in the Navy. Now St. Helena, being placed i1 \> ; '■"^mmmm Iil' [.! k 'is Opin'inius ,,/' (he C.loiiiiil Press. nn.lor tlio Colonial OlUco, lias to provido lor its local cxpcndlliiro by local taxation, ati.l hIiouM anything' hvyond tliiH bo rninircd it must 1)0 introdiicod into somo padiauiontary voto and be subject to parliamentary (luestionin-. Yet tlioro is as <,'ood roason for tlio one Island beiiiL,' sujiported by Inip(>rial funds as tlie other, and many distin-uisluid ollicers, both naval and military, have advocated this view. In his latest Governor's ivport, Vice-Admiral Tatey, who, however unpopular here, is a j];ood authority on professional subjects, says that " the situation of St. Ileleua in mid-ocean renders it a most important position for Imperial purposes as a coalinj,' station and depi.t for vessels of war." iMoi-eover if wo were engaged in hostilities tiie sinking of a ship in tlu^ Suez Canal might close that passage, and then St Ijekaia would be hiu'dly less valu- able than Malta or Gibraltar. " Two or throo steamers statio-.od hero," says Admiral Patoy, " would intercept the whole! returning trade from the East." '' A former Governor— Sir Thomas Go- 3 Browne— held the same opmions, and beijig here at the outbr. ak of the llussian war of twenty years ago, adopted the most energetic measures of pre- caution lest the Island might be surprised and captured by Russian frigates, of which more than one were supposed to bo cruising in these seas. Admiral Hornby, when commanding the Africai- Squadron, was of the same opinion as to the importance of St. Helena in the possible event of war, and we have some roason to believe, although we write without authority, that Commodore Ilewett, now in command of the station, takes a similar view of the value of this Island. Much more could be said on this subject, but our space is limited and om- article already very long. " THE SYDNEY MOENING HERALD," Jinie 8, 1874. Ostentatious assurances of peace have been too often the harbingers of war. Lulled into false security by the interchange of peaceful compliments, nations have suddenly found themselves Uxrn-epared to meet aggression and repel invasion. The Machiavellifja policy has been daringly pursued of late in European politics, and even now the words of amity and concord are possibly used to conceal thoughts, after the fashion of Talleyrand. Anyhow, we lay but feeble stress cu speeches which are really guarded though seem- ingly candid, and on the press opinions of countries Avhose aims, hopes, and resolves point in an opposite direction. All is halcyon- Opinions of the Colonial Vrcna, 49 like at prosont ; but tho cycloiio is as unexpected as terrible wlieu it como8. Thoro is nothing, in fact, to Hiitisf^ us that there is flottlotl traiiquilHty, or that men may follow their every-day avoca- tions without a thought for tho morrow. Tho viown of the situation are delusive — the descriptions are forced and unreal. •' Tho voico is Ji.cob's voice ; but the hands are tho hands of Esau." Wo are no alarmists, but neither are wo over-credulous. Tho signs of tho times betoken a change in the political weather, and oven tho far-seeing public men have not failed to toll us so. Before Mr. Disraeli succeeded to power ho drew a gh)omy forecast of tho future, and hinted that our foreign affairs should be entrusted to a clear head and a strong hand. Whatever ]\Ir, Disraeli's opinion in general may be worth matters little hero, but great coming events have often cast their shadows before in his speeches. Tho ques- tions asked in the English Parliament regarding the prospects of peace also indicate the existence of many misgivings and fears among those usually best informed. The advancnig preparations in Russia and the open counsel of Von Moltko also favour tho conclusion that, though no panic need be provoked, no quiescent self-satisfaction need be encouraged. England has no immediate dread of the war troubles that periodically affect nations, yet she may well prepare for the stormy day. Let us fervently hope that that day may be long ave"ted. But in times of peace, far removed from the din of battle and the tumult of opinion, it is well to consider dispassionately the position we occupy, and how we would be situated in the event of war. Besides, it is only in such times that we can fully realise the best and the worst of existing policies and systems, and alter or amend them in accordance with the dictates of prudence and the fullest experience. The greatest battles of lato years were battles fought on clearly-defined principles and the amplest infor- mation. It is well known that the Germans, in anticipation of the bitter revival of the Rhine question, made France a special study, and found good means to draw from her in peaceful years the secret of her overthrow. Nowadays, as ever, to be warned is to be fore- armed ; and further, to test and reflect on the policy we espouse is to make us more fit to grapple with any difficulty that may arise. European complications may ere long attract our notice, without touching us home in the smallest degree ; but, meantime, it is as well to look in the face aught that might endanger us then. The question of Colonial Defences is, of courr.e, paramount with us. We are thankfully confident that the soil of Britain is likely to remain as sacred and free as ever from the foot of the invader, E \in m ■'111 a ,■'1 i I ■nil ""-wiM ^ C : . J.*L- ^jmm "^ 50 I I Optiiinns of the Colonoil Press. \\' H n i an.l wo oxpon.>nco no tropi.liition on tlm. hcoit. Tho well diillo.l Voluntary iorco, auxiliary to a p -oporly-rccruitea and poworful ro.^Milar Army, vucm-hd, Um, by the finest and stronj^ost Navy in the world may dinpol any l\,,rs wu mij^dit foolishly entertain "T'r ;!" \!' ""^'^^ "^" "•" ''^''^'"^ ''""'^'- ^^»t it is not flo with tho mst of tho Lmp.ro. Tho cc-ntro, tho citadol. is Bocnro, h,it tho out- posts aro not mvulnoral.lo. Tho scattorod immonsity of our Mmpiro loaves ,t peculiarly open and li-ihlo to attack, nnless measures arc con(.-rtod and carriod out for its duo and full protection. The altered polioy of the Imperial (h)vernment renders this fact dnnhly s.jTnihoant and urgent. When tho violatioti of sokmn treaties. Which wore bonds written in blood, is permitted or connived at and our;; moral "inlluonco is tho only supremo influence wo can boast, 1 in, ..ed it is worth bra-inj? about, it is hif^h time to scan tho pohtica honzoH and w,.f.h for the black clouds that may loom even over tho Kuxino. At a time, too, when a faithful ally and tho control of a highway to some of our richest lands aro surrendered voluntvrdy, wo may bo chary of trusting hasty politicians or in- cautious and oyor-sympathotic statesmen. It is blazoned on our patriotic shield that tho sun never sots on our Empire, and that yory truth i is which proclaims to us tho dangers our vast posses- sions wealth, and commerce entail on us. Eyerywhero our fla- ihos tho honour of England is at stake, and a shock or injury to any member of the Empire is felt at tho remotest extremity. No wonder, then, that the subject of Imperial defence is en^^a^Mnr. the anxious attention of many of our foremost writers,%;cl%.hat addresses dohvored on tho subject, in London, should reac . us hero. An able address on «' Colonial Defences," by Captain J. C. E. Colomb. 1 .M.A., has boon forwarded to us, and we gladly pro- ceed to consider It. It has boon already st.mped with the approval o the Royal Colonial Institute, as it well dosorved to bo in yirtue of tho position and ability of tho author. If we do not altogether agre^ with Captain Colomb. wo thank liim none the less for the e-.collen persistency and intelligent advocacy ho has displayed in urging this question on Parliament. A clear yiew is here presented to us of the change which has come over the spirit of ho Imperial droam. The existence of an in- dii^ovont party IS alluded to, or rather, we are reminded that certain autJionties in Ingland evince little concern for either tho present or the future oi the Colonies. We are well acquainted witl their language and tactics, and can afford to treat them with reciprocal mdifteronce^ loi-tumttoly the hgature which connects tho mother country and the Colonies is yitally close, and cannot be severed Opinions of the Colonial Prcmt. 61 without dauj,'or to both. In raco, language, and intorestri tlioy aro <)(u> ; and any Htatosmau wlio talkn superciliously or acts callously towards the Colonies, re-' " by withdrawing tho insufficient garrisons formerly maintained on the Colonial outposts ; for, with slight exception, they were needless, expensive, and happily got rid of. To the exception we shall recur. Meantime it may bo observed that the Colonies are quite satisfied with their own little armies. They will be able to do all the work that is required of them. The New South Wales soldiers are men who literally have an interest in defending their homes, for the guerdon of their service and efficiency is a portion of the land they occupy. This material stimulus to patriotism is, how- ever, unnecessary, for in a time of imminent peril our citizen army would bravely take the field. We want— we require no standing army here. If England does her duty this Colony at least will do hers. Increased and stronger harbour and coast defences, and a gradual filling up of the ranks, will go far to protect all that we hold dear. Besides, in those days of rapid communicaticm, addi- j.; 2 ■ 52 Opinions of the Culimiul Virss. xo send assiitanoe to the places most likely to need it. Difficulties d^:;lrdT°■'"','""^'"'™ '''"''' '™ --»*!" almos nal s^,l *"""l"'-™"y °™™»»- The story of Hannibal "thlt/°Tr'T"-''^^°»''™'''"''l'"'P™'='- of enforcing her from w' ; „??i^ *";8«s that would menace us could only arise couHr„n /fr™"'""'' y'=' <=™ «'™'^'^ repeat, En-land robins S f "■'^'f' ™* ''«■■ «- '» "id ''» Colonial armies. Fo°r the tTsperkillrf'^^ And fir °"''<^,'''''"««. "" ™-y genius of a self-made people. Aud ,f tie general rule of self-reliance "fails to solve the probem But'tTeauet"™ i' " """",'*" «°^^ '^'^ '"^'"^ itaXfon iiut the question bears an altered complexion when we come to of her commerce would be the ruin of Britain. She must sMl rule The geographical position, conditions, and resources of 0«r.«A, and other Colonies referred to by Oaptai;, Colombarso dlsMar tothoseof Ausralasia that wo need not descant on them here Neioner do we think it necessary to follow him in his snrmTes ^l' prognostics regarding the possible victory of «.rAme Z 1: t West Indies, and how far such a conquest would »ft».t .1,! /; b r"tf d <; ^'""'■"" ''"■"""°™- ^'-^ ^oMe^iti fflcit ^ but rctai^ the proper study and drift of the question. They lend no weight to the argument they are made to sustain, and the ar™ ment itsc.f is a weak one. It is argued that fragmentm-y seltelhnt forces are of no use, for to be of any value tli^y must be frted to move from one attacked point to another. Now th s stri. „7» ° «,ot of what may be called our system of domrs«c defl'cr "nIw bouth Wales, for mstance, should not, cannot indeed, be asked tl pour her defenders into Ceylon or the West Indies, nor wotildll Opinions of the Colonial Press. 58 expect to be similarly assisted. The only movable troops available arc those of the Imperial army. They ought to be shifted from one threatened or assailed place to another, as the occasion demands. The self-reliant, isolated armies of the " fragments " of the Empire will do yeoman service on their own ground, and that is all that may be expected of them. That is the reason of their being, and that is the object of the movement which has met with such laudable success. The two great principles laid down by Captain Colomb, and which Are deduced from the able exposition of Sir Charles Pasley, published sixty-five years ago, are — " 1. That it is of vital importance that the safety of the Imperial communications be secure. " 2. That it is essential to the military strength of the Empire that forces created or existing for the defence of one portion be not so constituted as to preclude the possibility of using them in the defence of another." We have already alluded to this second principle, and, so far as we are concerned, fail to see its applicability to the circumstances for the reasons assigned above. But the first is the all important principle. " The lines of communicati )n all radiate from the waters surrounding the British islands ; the loss, therefore, of our command there cuts every one of the Imperial lines." This is so self-evident as to require no proof. Further: " Of what avail is it if our Colonies, though protected in their own immediate neigh- bourhood, are " locked cut " from the mother country by a force in the Channel against which we are unable to contend ? Of what use is it protecting our commerce on distant seas if it is to be destroyed within sight of the shores of England ? " None whatever. But then we assume that the first line of communication will not be broken, that English statesmen are sagacious enough to maintain a fleet sufficient for all purposes. Again : " The defence of commu- nications, whether long or short, can only be secured by a firm grasp of the points which command tliem. The greater the extent of line, the greater is the number of defended points necessary for its safety. In order to cut a line of communication, the first thing to be done is to seize the point which commands it, and in defend- ing a line the point which commands it is the last to surrender. Such points are the minor bases of operation of forces acting in defence of the line. The relative importance of such points to the line and to each other can only be estimated by the circumstances of their geographical position and their distance from the main base from which the line spring^;." 54 Opmiima of the Colouhd Press. no! r° "'•"'"■"""''■'J' "'" "onxi'lcratious wliich affect the ouUyin-- pmhon. of the Empre. Secure au,l unbroken oomm,mieatior witil mimsite to ensure tins are decideaiy within our reach. The first becoud tire existence of a snifieicnt force in each of tlie most exposed out,,„sts ; the third, the existence of additional forces ready to be moved af re,„ired to other distant possessions ; and ut fourth, the existence of a fleet to protect the Imperial centre to guard our eommcrce, and to transport the necessary troops 'on emer^oncy. England must ever have an army of oJo , ^a fon n Ind,a ami gamsons in her foreign dependencies, and " towers along lie steep." Her sentry-boxes along the ocean highway mus IB quite a d Wereat thing from planting a standing army in tho- rough y English Colonies. Besides, the troops required to streii^t en her valuable posts and garrison her strategic points, may be™! d " It is important to bear in mind that the more war fleets relv on machinery and artirtcial motive power, the more neceTsary at fixed bases of operation to their action, and the greater m^st be the resources of those bases. Hence it is that as' tte ciW ot at he g eat strategic points, and for efficiently protecting them t™ 'tl'l '"""r" ^"" '^ i"'li^™tabi; i.d sugg-est veT; To Uioif; „±t 'br"t " H °' r""""""'''» "'^ ■"°™ --""We positions must be strengthened, and their natural resources de veioped and protected for England's advantage. The importance of coahng stations, for instance, cannot be overlooked These a e indispensable necessities in these days of steam warfare. Enlhnd possesses almost a monopoly of this material force, ^d she can judicionsly expend it. Strongly-fortifiod islands m ght b mlde depots for coal, m case our cruisers' supply became short. Sy T The^ateTtl"""'" ,"' fT'' ^ ^''' ''"■' "-"^ -ntioned "s one. The value of these islands has been enhanced by the estab- Miment of the San Francisco mail service, and their suitabil y as a place of call is now beyond dispute. They form, too, a m ddJe point of defence between Australia and Vancouver's Islairrand would be either a groat strength or weakness to us in the^^nrof rsTc^Ze;-;: ""^''™' "^' "•- ^^ -^^ ^ »-'»"""« - :?/ Captain Colomb further advocates the establishment of a great Opinions of the Colonial Press. 55 naval arsenal in this hemisphere. The suggestion is feasible and practicable, and, next to the strategic stationing of our ships, demands earnest and serious attention. Indeed, the one thing de- pends on the other. A large, scattered, defnnsive steam fleet requires repairing, and ammunition as well as coal ; and the erec- tion of depots is not more essential than the construction of aa arsenal. The outlay would doubtless be great, but even in times of peace the docks might be profitably used for the Government advantage. Wherever such an arsenal might bo situated, whether in Bombay or in Australia, it would, we venture to believe, be a great and invaluable sui)port to our defence. But vre need not follow Captain Colomb farther, unless it be to record another disagreement between us. He believes that any expense incurred in repairing " the state of the Imperial roads" ought to be shared by the Colonies. We think not. We impose no burden on the mother country for the maintenance of our safety ashore, and so long as we are integral portions of the Empire we believe it is her duty to keep the roads in repair. Her honour,^ wealth, and supremacy are dear to us all, but they concern herself first and principally. Our share of the obligation we willingly do, and to the statesmen of Great Britain we look for the rest. We may refer by and by to our more immediate local defences. "THE SYDNEY MOENING HEKALD," June 15, 1871. In dealing with the larger and Imperial question, we followed Captain Colomb as far as we could, even to difl'ering often with him. But we cannot forgot that in putting this question so clearly and forcibly before the world he has challenged criticism, and deserves to have his plans and projects carefully and rationally treated. Fortunately, his scheme is the outcome of g/eat technical and practical knowledge, and can bear the brunt of opinion adverse to his views. Yet there is little, after all, upon which we can differ. His Australian proclivity is marked, and marked with reason. We care nothing about thf^ flippant writers who conde- scend to portray us after a flying visit, or who, after seeing the " Sow and Pigs," write feebly about defences. Such visitors may sojourn at the " Heads." But when a man of known and recog- nised experience in military matters, and whose voice had some strength in it when the distribution of the forces was the main 56 Opinions of the Colonial Press. I question tells us a few l.ome trutl.s, we arc bound in courtosy, and really in tins instance in fairness, to listen to him ^ Indan ^^^^ „^^^«* ^!^ ^^"f. ^^^^essity ought to be AustraHan or |pn , " \i ' ^»ytl"ns:. Ins inclination leans towards us, and ~s S- as B 'T''' '^'"^^- ^^"''^^ '^^y --^^ »^^ ^^^f-^"^ to tall nf 7 T' '"""^""^ ^'^'^""^ ^^^ '^"^i°^« attention. But to talk of It as the centre of repairing, fitting-up, and coaling in from S; T"' *° T'r'i' "^ ''''' Woolwicl^Portsmouthaw ro m England, is rank absurdity. TJie circumstances and condi- tions are averse to the position. Bombay is ours throu^l force and IS but a portion of our wealthiest dependency. As we saidTn cons lucted save among our own people. Fortifv stren-fl,Pn IS tlie IS only so long as tlieu- prudout strength is asserted It is to otherw.se with AustraH... Here is a lojal people, having th W^Ti Her Mrr"%°'"r """'"^ "^ much.t 'heart as fho fto^tt tas'l^S'la"'""' "•"''™'"^ ''-' vrctorious troops An arsenal must he constrncted somewhere in these sonthem seas, (or m the days of steam fleets no one can gainsay th neeT Ammunifon, repairing, coals, are all suggested by this great feci Now, the question naturally arises, Whereas the fittest^^nd mosi secure place for such an arsenal ? We have scanned the map Tn thelmiMnaUntorcst, and have come home with the fortified con vict.on hat Sydney must be the place selected for this wariike preparation. There is no harbour that can be so easily made irn pregnable and there is no strategic point of greater value. SyduTv can i.ad,ly furnish the proper kind of supplies for a steam fleet' Coal IS to be had in abundance. From the south and the west by raU and from the north by sea, coal can be brought without diffi cnltyand at httle cost, and stored up in quantities suSntt meet any emergency. And as this forms an essential point in the calculation, It is m itself enough to justify the advocacy of Sydney as the fittest situation for the proposed arsenal. ^ ^ It must not be forgotten, however, that the site of the arsenal is an war time an especial object of attack. To destroy the arsenal or to capture it for mimical uses, is the grand aim of every Tar ! hme power during hostilities. It is therefore obvious that that site must be made so strong as to repel the notion of attacking it li will require a vast outlay to satisfy all the requirements of the Opinions of the Colo)iial Press. 57 position, for the defences must be strengthened to an extent com- mensurate with the Imperial interests at stake. Neither skill, labour, nor money must be spared when a decision has been come to. The honour of England, and the safety of her fleet, are not trifling considerations, and a nation so affluent can well afford the means to pay for increased security ; for it cannot be supposed for a moment that any of the expense would fall on the Colony. The work suggested is Imperial, not local. The Colonists cannot be asked to contribute towards the erection or protection of an arsenal which increases their dangers. Kather, they may well think it is the duty of the mother country to take upon herself every burden incident to this standing invitation to attack. Wherever the arsenal may be placed, the same reasons must accompany the con- sideration of its defence; so it is with no personal feehng that we offer these necessary remarks on the altered position Sydney would occupy when made the great Imperial depot for coals and ammunition. The lines of communication being strongly guarded, and the strategic points thereon sharpened against the enemy, the defence of territorial areas would become quite a secondary matter. Never- theless, every conceivable opening for the enemy's forces must be closed up, and the weak points along the coast strengthened. Wherever the temptation to land exists, the means of repelling invasion must be multiplied. But, after all, the harbour claims pre-eminent and urgent consideration, and how best to fortify and protect it is the main question at present. It is the duty of this. Colony to see that nothing is wanting to its support. If no arsenal is built here, that duty will be the more imperative, but if built here, then the Imperial Government may wisely be requested to help in defending it. Harbour defences have attracted much attention lately in America, and the comparative value of forts and torpedoes have been intelli- gently tested. As a means of defence against steam vessels, forts are out of date. The attack on Forts Jackson and St. Philip, below New Orleans, during the American war, has been cited in proof of this statement. These forts were in every way equipped and prepared for the fight, and they had the notable advantage of an excellent situation. " To assist the forts were several tow-boats and steamships, which had been partly plated with railroad iron and converted into rams ; a number of immense barges had been filled with lightwood and smeared with turpentine, which were fired and sent adrift to impede the progress of the advancing ships. The Confederate navy had also some force present." Yet, despite these precautions and prepared strength of the forts, seventeen out ■I 58 Opinions of the Colonial Press. Hi I of twenty steam vessels went by successfully. '< The fleet formed m CO umns of twos, half sweepmg past Fort Jackson, close aboard, and the other half steaming by St. Philip, yard-arms hanging ove^ the parapets nearly." These strongholds once passed, the key of the situation was gained, and the consequent resistance proved to be both feeble and miavaihng. Now, let us take Port Jackson and view Its position in the light of the following observations. Sup- pose he same fleet to be outside the Heads. '« Having a purpose to enter and lay our town under contribution, would we feel com- fortable ? They would wait for the flood tide at night, and, instead of having a four-knot current to contend against (as in the case of Fort Jackson and St. Philip),' they would have it in their favour and go spmning by at the rate of fifteen miles an hour ; and, hug- ging the high clifi-s, they would scarcely be perceptible to the gunners at the fort." True there are, fortunately, many impedi- men s to this easy entrance into Sydney Harbour ; but allowing for these does not materially weaken the remaining dangers, iiiese are, indeed, great and numerous enough to awaken concern and to suggest improved and stronger defence. Our forts, if here and there defective, are as good as anything that could be devised, but here we do not propose to discuss their relative strength, but rather to inquire whether they are the only or the best means of defence we could have. That they are neces- sary IS indisputable, but that they are sufficient we do not believe Aided by movable iron forts they might constitute as powerful a guard as Sydney required; but something more is wanted to com- plete the defence, and enable us to banish all fear of investment Torpedoes have been recently tried, and we all know with what result. The material for their construction is at hand, and neither delay nor serious cost need be incurred in furnishing a supply of these indispensable weapons. Not only must torpedoes be laid down at the more vulnerable points, they must be propelled by vessels ; for it has been proved that the torpedo boat " with power and speed is a match for the ironclad." The essential and incalcu- lable importance of relying mainly on such boats would be inevit- ably felt if we were ever subjected to attack, and had to defend our harbour against a powerful fleet. Nor is the expense of this invin- cible defender tantamount to its value. " Small but very powerful tugs, driven by twin-screws, carrying a torpedo on a staff-head is all that IS needed." These must be sufficient in number, and ever ready to strike when tlie enemy assails our forts. They could be built and equipped at the arsenal, in the protection of which they would be largely employed. ^Oinnions of the Colonial Press. 59 But let us return again to Captain Colomb. Ilis scheme lias less reference to harbour defences than to the disposition of land forces. We have already expressed our dissent from the proposal to draft troops from one Colony to another, or from one Colony to some remote possession. Self-defence and self-reliance must be the watchwords; and each Colony will do its duty if it provides a force sufficient to protect its own territory. New South Wales has, however, not gone far enough yet in the right direction. Two or three thousand soldiers could do little against any foe that obtained a landing on our shore. The enemy might laud on the Hawkes- bury, or in Botany Bay, or make a diversion at one place while forcing a footing on the other. Our troops would then be able to show but a feeble resistance, for divided they would form but slight lines of defence. It is, indeed, our bounden duty to set our mili- tary house in order. The tocsin of war may any day be sounded, and be heard across the waves. We must not be found insuffi- ciently protected, nor rely on anyone more than on ourselves. Our little army must be increased, and that as early as possible. We can perceive no objection to the adoption of the simple scheme we here propose. Twenty to thirty thousand troops could easily be raised by a system of gentle compulsion. All Colonists between the ages of seventeen and thirty, and not exempt by doctors' certifi- cates or on professional grounds, should be called up for (say) one month in each year, in addition to occasional attendance at drills after business hours. In this way efficiency would be promoted, and our citizen soldiers formed into something like an army. And with this suggestion we leave the question for the present. •« THE COENWALL CHRONICLE," June 22, 1874. The mail by the E.M.S.S. Nubia brought to hand a letter ad- dressed to us by Captain J. C. R. Colomb, E.M.A., dated "Junior United Service Club, Lond( n, 1st March, 1874," and accompany- ing a paper read by him at the Eoyal Colonial Institute, the Duke of Manchester, President, in the chair. Amongst numerous English and Colonial members of the Institute present were Sir Francis Smith, Edward Wilson, Esq., and F. S. Button, Esq., the latter Agent-General for South Austraha. Captain Colomb referred, almost at the outset of his remarks, to the panic which had seized England in 1859, when the population imagined that France Mm 60 Oplniom of the Colonial I'rcss. M threatenec their safety, and even their existeuco as a nation ; and yet the policy of the Gladstone Government was to sliut their eyes the fact of the possibihty, not only of the invasion of England but the possibility of investment^the cutting off tlie Imperiail hne of communication, with attacks upon lier vast Colonial Empire, Th?^ff.°.?' /T'f '' '"^^ '''^''''^' ^^ ^^^^-y ^"^rt^r of the globe. Ihe_ effect of that pamc was, to cause the recall of England's ZJeTf ;?^Vt'.T''''''^ indiscriminately over the globe, to protect the heart of the empire-the result, that the late Govern- ment was in a position to say that England is now better prepared o resist an attempted invasion than during any past period of her unprotected. Under these circumstances, when an enemy attacks wm he not prefer cutting off Britain's unprotected communications and appropriatuig her undefended Colonies, to making a direct assau t upon a small island bristhng with bayonets ? This is the forcible point in Captain Colomb's excellent paper, and it is one which comes home very closely to every Colonist. Great Britain proper comprises only one-thirtieth of British territory and one- Wth of Her Majesty's subjects, the other four-fifths 'being left comparatively speaking, unprotected from foreign invasion. These' are told o arm themselves, and protect their hearths and homes, to be self-rehant, and do as the mother country does. The JJommion of Canada has succeeded best in this way ; other British Colomes and possessions are following her example. In this part of the world New South Wales and Victoria have done, and are domg, much for the defence of their principal ports ; but to quote from a work by Sir C. Pasley: "The strength of an einpiro, whether insular or continental, will be greater or less, with equal resources in proportion to the facility with which its several ports can afford each other mutual assistance when attacked, and to the difficulty which an enemy may find in supplying and supporting his invadrng force." Although this had no reference to the Austrat has and was written as far back as 1808, no stronger argument could be adduced in the present day in favour of Colonial Federa- tion. In reference to the boast that the British fleet is so powerful that, therefore, it has command of the sea. Captain Colomb points out that this term -command of the sea " is a very vague one. " To some it conveys the idea of covering the sea with numerous fleets; to others the possession of a few ships more powerful than those of other nations. Few reahse that the command of he sea can only be maintained by a scientific com- bination ol three things -strategy, purely military force, and M^^iMk- opinions of the Colun'ial Press. purely naval power. The command of the sea is nothing more nor less than the command of the Imperial roads, the secm-ing of the first lines of Colonial defences." Passing from theory to recent historical facts, he instances the career and exploits of the Sum pier and Alabama during what was but a civil war, or a schism of the Southern from the Federal States of America. The latter sent the I'owhattan, the Xiaijara, the InnjUins, the Kej/stonc, and the San Jacinto in pursuit of the Sumpter, and not one of them ever caught her. The destruction caused by the Alabama cost Great Britain, by the result of the settlement of " the Alabama claims," £3,200,000. All the naval force of the United States was power- less to arrest a single ship in her progress, simply because it was applied without reference to general principles which guide the distribution of force for the protection of communications. " There is no proportion between the force used in the interruption of sea communications as compared with the amount of force required to secure them. To cripple the action of a single steamer, several cruisers would be required at certain points. A regular attack upon sea communications, therefore, involves the employment of an enormous force in their defence ; and as the stations and posi- ons are necessarily fixed, so must the bases of operation be at hand to supply the wants of that defending force." The United States' Federal Naval force of 700 ships and 40,000 men was unable to prevent the interruption of American commerce in distant seas, though it blockaded all the ports of the rebellious States. If the Colonies are really in earnest in matters relating to their defence, Captain Colomb warns them it is time they should combine to force on the attention of the Imperial Par- liament the neglected state of the Imperial roads on the high seas, and the necessity for devising means for their security ; but he warns them they must be prepared to pay their fair share of the burden. Captain Colomb's paper is an able, well-reasoned pro- duction. His closing sentences would reflect credit on the ablest British soldier or statesman who has ever written or spoken on this grand question, so vital to the very existence of the British Empire. He says : *' From whatever quarter of the Empire a cry for help comes — wherever the British flag waves over Englishmen strugghng on their own ground for all they hold dear — it is there our home is in danger ; there is the rallying-point of forces created for its defence. While we boast of armed hosts here and in the Colonies, whose proud motto is ' home defence,' they must survey the Empire to behold our home." His Grace the Duke of Man- chester, at the close of Captain Colomb's remarks, in thanking 'r il ■MM 62 OpinionH of the Colonial Press. Inm 111 tlio name of tlie Society for lii.s al.Io iiiul patric.tic piipc r, said : " He lioped the Colonics would not rest Katisliud until Fede- ration had been achieved, and then the Colonies should insist upon their ri^'ht in mutually contributing to the defence of the Empire and after this was done, iir controlling the disposition of the forces they had helped to maintain." Wo dealt with this very question Federation, briefly in cur issue of the 20th May, and expressed surprise that one of such vital importance should have been omitted from the programme of the last Intercolonial Conference Wo repeat that wo hope to find it taken up by the present Ministry, and dealt with in such a manner as may seem best calculated to induce its serious consideration throughout the Australias. "THE BRISBANE COUrjER," Jtine 11, 1874. " My relations with all foreign powers continue to be most friendly:" such, by a coincidence which can scarcely be accidental, were the exact words which the Queen addrest'ed to Parliairent on two late occasions sepan.ted by an interval of five years. In the one case they appeared in the speech from the Throne as prepared by Mr. Gladstone in 18G9, after the election of a reformed House of Commons. In the other case they have been made to appear in the Queen's speech when Mr. Disraeli met Parliament after the result of the last general election. During the intprv.! an event, the most memorable in modern history, has changed the map of Europe, and has re-distributed the balance of power. Yet, during that troubled period, the relations of the British Empire with foreign powers have been most friendly. That is, indeed, a subject for most profound thankfulness. Nor is it solely in dependence on our Imperial greatness or our national vitahty, on the wisdom of those who rule or the self-control of those who are ruled, that we are justified in hoping for a continuance of the blessings of peace. Our trust is not wholly in ourselves, it is in a perception of our mutual dependence on influences unmeasured and im- measurable, which are bearing us on over the stream of time. " I pray "—and the prayer is doubtless the heartfelt aspiration of a great Queen and a united people—" I pray that the Almighty may never cease to guide your deliberations." This nevertheless, we hope, indicates a devout frame of mind by no means incompatible with complete warlike capacity. '• To possess peace be prepared for war ! " Such ever has been, and such unfortunately still is. Opinions of ihe Colonial I'riHS. 68 iin indiaputablc condition of national {^roatnoss. It is even doubt- ful if it would inevitably conduce to the mental or material pro- gress of man if the gates of Janus should bo irrevocably closed. As a people, thoroforo, it is to bo hoped that wo shall continue to be animated by a wholesome sentiment of precautionary selfishness, and that, next to a huinblo but intolli<,'out dependence on tho Supremo dispositicm of events, we shall take caro to keep such powder as we have in store perfectly dry, and the very best of its kind which can bo obtained. The party of which Mr. Gladstone has lately been the distin- guished leader is accused of indiiTerenco to tho national greatness, .",ud wo havo often been told that Great Britain as a European power should concern liersolf more in European politics than she has lately done. In truth Great Britain is something more than a European power, and it is for that very reason, perhaps, that she is less concerned than she once was in Continental questions. But even as such she has shown no want of self-conscious dignity when the occasion for a display of it has been necessary, and no one will assert that under Mr. Gladstone's administration cither the Army or the Navy have become less efficient than they were. The abolition of purchase in the Army has at least effected the reform of an abuse which was freely admitted, but which was so firmly entrenched in tho stronghold of privilege that no British statesman had previously felt himself strong enough to attack it. But it is to Mr. Gladstone's successors in office that we are entitled to look, as wo are told, for a fuller and more complete embodiment of all the accidents of Imperial greatness which are represented by effective military or naval dispositions. The "cheese-paring" ■which has so often been attributed to Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Lowe, will of course disappear from the calculations of Mr. Disraeli and Lord Derby. It is even more than possible that tho question of " Colonial Defences " may assume a greater prominence in the programme of a party who have always claimed to promote the integration of the Colonies and the consolidation of the Empire. In the elucidation of such questions as these the Eoyal Colonial Institute affords no inappropriate medium for tho expression of opinion. It is, in fact, not long since the subject was mooted in a paper read before the members. Captain Colomb then contributed an elaborate statemeat on " Colonial Defence," and endeavoured to show that National Defence could not in any worthy sense be field to refer to the United Kingdom only. The withdrawal of the regular troops from outlying and detached porticms of the British Cobnial Empire does not, wo are hai)py to observe, meet with iT- •^riKfn^Sli^if 64 Opiniom of the Colonial Prcus. any (Icnunciation in this paper. Tlic policy of concontratlon has indeed been accepted with ahno.st unanimous concurrence, and in the case of what was thou;,'ht to bo the moat vuhierabio portion of the British Colonial Empire, it lias called forth such an encourag- inc: demonstration of military capacity for organisation, that no politician of any iHtablishod rc.'putation would dream of reverting to the principle of garrisoninj,' the Colonics with men drawn fron'i any other source than the Colonies themselves. It is now admiHed on all hands that tlioy arc at least as capable of protecting them- selves as the people of the United Kingdom are. But we take it that it was the purport of Captain Colomb to show thxt the defence of what is called the British Emjure involves world-Wi.'o considera- tions, which cannot bo narrowed to tlio confines of th islands se- parated from the continent of Europe by the British Channel and the German Ocean. The maintenance of what ho calls the Im- perial main lines of communication are essential to the successful defence of the Empire, and in effect ho invites the Colonies to say how they would propose to assist one another in assn-ting the maritime supremacy of tho British Empire, for that is really what it amounts to. It is time, Captain Colomb seems to think, fhat the young and vigorous British Colonies should rouoo to action the mind of the mother country, grown " morbid " on the subject of inva- sion. To this end it is suggested that a royal commission should be appointed to inquire into tho defence of Imperial communications. He infers that the result of such an inquiry would be to recom- mend tho permanent strengthening of certain greai strategic points which it would be in a position to define. It would also be its duty to determine the just limits of Imperial and Colonial respon- sibility in the matter of defence. A royal commission for such a purpose might, no doubt, attract attention to the subject, and prepare the way for a consideration of that much larger subject, which includes tho confederation of the British Empire. The Duke of Manchester tells us that in this matter we of the Colonies should claim this as our right. That is to say, he tells us we have a right to be an integral part of an Em- pire of which at present we are only dependencies. We should assert a right not only to contribute to the maintenance of these strategic points, but to guide and control the policy which rao-in- tains them. But, as His Grace says, "the House of Commons is so apathetic;" and we fear we may add the Colonies are also. They are growing, it is true, in wealth and strength, but as yet they are scarcely educated into a perception of the full benefits of these Imperial privileges, and of the Imperial responsibilities which await OpiniouH of the Cohnhd I'h'hh, G5 them. In tho moantimo we Jioro in AuHtralia hive scarcely yot entered on tho threahokl cf tuo iiKiuiry. Wo have not yet taken tho Btill more nouilful nnil ptchmiuary Htop of providinj?, after tho t'xami)le of Canada, for a Federal (ioverument, competent to deal with qnestionb involviujj aiich soriouH international questions. Tho lloyal Colonial Institute is no doubt a little in advance of tho times, but perhaps there is no harm in that, for speoulativn opinions expressed within tho bosom of such an association are sure to bo wholesomely modilicd by tho intense repu^'nanco which the practical British-Colonial mind has to tho consideration of questions involving tho I'ortificntion of strategic points, and other matters of high Imperial consideration. Groat as is tho support which wo now receive from our i'-limato and attached relat'ouship to the mother country, it would be vain to deny that in th ) event of war tho interests of British commerce and of intorni tional comity might bo subserved in a higher and more Imperial .^onse by tho absolute independence of the federated Canadian or Austra- lian Colonics than thoy could bo by Iho fortification of strateglT points as recommended by Captain Colomb. We have said " in the event of war," but a war between Great Britain and a com- bination of great maritime powers is not a contingency wliich we can at present contemplate. Meanwhile, let us avoid that, and taking coimscl from tho source of all good counsel, let us keep our powder dry, and work on towards union and strength among our- selves. "WANGANUI CHRONICLE AND PATEA AND RANGITIKEI ADVERTISER," June 5, 1874. The military defence of the Colonies is a subject about wliich much has been written, but wo do not think it has ever been treated in so comprehensive and scientific a manner as by Captain J. C. R. Colomb, R.M.A., in a paper entitled " Colonial Defences," read by him to the Royal Colonial Institute. Captain Coloirb urges, what must have struck everyone who has reflected upon this matter, that while under the late military system pursued by tho Home Government, the armies and fleets of the Empire were scattered indiscriminately over the face of the globe, leaving the Uiiited Kingdom, which is the Imperial base of operations, destitute of the power of resistance ; ' :. present system is equally faulty, inasmuch ix.s it goes to the opposite extreme, and confines itself to " the defence p 66 Ol>iiiivns of the Cuhnial Press. safety of onv Impcnal commimicatious, tho securitv of omcT S^'if ", ;7""™™»" °* "■"■ 1»-- « . ^y " train of close rsonLg which our hmited space will not permit us to explain. The "self rehant pohcy " does not meet with much mercy L hi hanS T^" Colomes and other British possessions may raise volunteers and adopt her measures to guard themselves aglinst attack k such preparauons wdl not be available for the supreme object of 1 eath frtmenf 'S T P "'' ''^' ' " ^'"^ P™ "^ '•«»i'"»™« <>f v,w, ,r,°^ the Empu^e can only bo measured by a compa- ■son between its population, its geographical position and naS defensive advan ages, and those of its possible enemy. It is rim" y rl?°°' "/'"^ "y™^ °f »"'■ West Indian Islands to bT!d^ united btato^. If tins general rule is the basis of our plan of Impena defence, and is to be apphed, it means in plain Cish that m the unhappy event of a rupture ,vith America, we offer U at nation peaceable and quiet possession of 100,000 square mTles of territory, and make over the lives of 1 J miUions of British s„rects " This, however, woiUd be cari-j-ing the self-reliant pohcy to 1 ab urdity. By Uiat pohcy we do not understand that England^ o leave any portion of her territoiy to bear the full brunt of aL enemy « a tack, but only that each district is to provide all tZ means in its power to resist invasion, and England ill do the res Surely the most ardent advocate of self-reUanco would not a gu e that, in the event of the United States concentrating all their reZf J '" "" ^?"* "P°" ^^^ ^''^ I"''^"'^' »«='» B'-iS^i" ■should reframfrom sending a soldier or sailor to their defence ( Sup. posin.; r ugland and the United States were at war, and the latter Opinions of the Colonial Press. 67 made an attack upon Jamaica with all tlieir military power, it is evident that the other parts of the British Empire would, for the time, be relieved from the danger of attack, and thus the concen- trated assault could be met by a concentrated defence. Of course, a hostile alliance against England v/ould be far more harassing and dangerous, but in that case, extreme danger would put the whole of the Empire on its mettle, nor do wo fear that the result v;ould be less favourable to England than similar perilous crises have been. Of course, Canada and the West Indies occupy a very different military position to tlie Australias, but what strikes Colonists in this part of the world is their expose .'e to sudden raids upon their shipping and seaport towns. It would be a most difficult task for any foreign power to invade Australia or Nev, Zealand, and even if an invading force effected a landing, its surrender or re-embarka- tion would very soon take place. But light armed cruisers might do us enormous damage by picking up Colonial merchantmen and levying contributions upon our seaports. There is not a seaport town in New Zealand which is protected against such a visitation. Not a torpedo has been sunk in one of our harbours, or a heavy gun planted to command them. Yet there are plenty of trained artillery-men in New Zealand, and sums of money have been spent upon " Defence Purposes " which would have furnished every town of the Colony with two or three guns of the heaviest calibre, whose presence would be quite enough to deter any vessel of the Alabama class from dropping in at Auckland or Wellington some fine morn- ing and asking for a donation cf £100,000, with the certainty of getting it. The subject has been discussed by secret committees of the General Assembly, and been reported upon to the Govern- ment by an experienced engineer officer ; but nothing has been done. The danger is not visible, and procrastination is so easy. The Australian Colonies are little better in this respect, although Victoria has done something for the protection of Melbourne. But there is one important part of the military defence of these Colo- nies which has been entirely neglected, and that is the protection of our coal depots. To the necessity of i)rotecting the coaling stations of the Empire, Captain Colomb draws special attention, and the force of his reasoning is obvious now that sailing war- vessels are obsolete. The grand coaling station in the Southern hemisphere is Newcastle N.S.W., and that town ought unques- tionably to be fortified. At present, we believe it is just as defence- less as the city of Wellington. To secure lines of communication, a firm grasp of the points C8 Opinions of the Colonial Press. winch command tlicm is requisite, and Captain Colomb points out how tins IS to bo obtained. Two of his recommendations forcibly impress a Now Zealand Colonist. One is that a naval arsenal should be established for the Eastern portion of the Empire. An Australian port he deems would be best adapted for the purpose ; at the same time, tho strategic importanco of ]Jombay cannot be ovcrloolced. The other recommendation is- that tho Imperial Government should take possession of the Fijis in order to com- mand the lino between Australia and Vancouver's Island The military importance of the Fijis has been urged again and again by tho Australian and New Zealand journals ; and it may safely be asserted that unless the Imperial Government assumes their sovereignty in time of peace, tho first thing the ^us+vnlian Colonies will have to do for self-protection, upon war breaking out, will be to seize the group, lost it should become the refuge of a host of privateers. Imperial and local interests manifestly run concur- rent here, as tliey do in reality throughout. But the difficulty is to nnpress that fact upon tho Colonists. Theoretically they might agree with Captain Colomb upon the importance of maintainLg the Imperial lines of communication ; but if he asked them to accept the logical conclusion, and help to pay for the defence of those lines, they would draw back. They have become so accus- tomed to shirk their national duties, that it will take a long while to ^-et them out of the selfish groove which they find so nieasant, but which is rapidly denuding them of patriotism and^ making them a set of mere money-hunters. A great calamity might possibly awaken in them a nobler spirit. " POET ELIZABETH TELEGEAPH," Ma;j 23, 1874. Sooner or later the subject of Imperial Defence will compel atten- tion. At present very few persons, and these men of little real weight in the Councils of tho Empire, bestow any thought upon it T'rue, we hear mucli about National Dofenco, and are" somewhat famihar with the (piestion of Colonial Defence. As popularly un- derstood, these two (piestions have very contracted meanings : the one signifying the protection of the British Islands, and the other the guarding of some particular Colonial border. To our thinking, however, National Deieuce can no more be considered an abstract question than Colonial Defence can be regarded as connected only with the defuLce of this or of that British Colony or depen- Opinions of the Colonial Press. 69 (lency. Imperial defence may be said to embrace the former two, as those terms are generahy apphed. Now, we regard Imperial defence as an obligation binding upon the nation at large. How this is to be attained a Captain J. C. E. Colomb, late of the Royal Marine Artillery, has endeavoured to show in a paper recently road by him at the Royal Colonial Institute. The title of the paper is " On Colonial Defence." The author, however, has not limited his mquiries vithin such a narrow compass, but has indulged his hearers and readers to a well-thought-out treatise on Imperial defence. A few extracts will suffice to indicate the general tendency of his remarks, and afford some conception of the aim and scope of his valuable paper. The principal question which suggested itself to the author's mind in dealing with the subject he had un- dertaken to discuss was, "What are the general principles on which the defence of the Empire must be based ? " To this his reply is (1) that it is of vital ir-iportance that the safety of the Imperial communications be secured, and (2) that it is essential to the mih- tary strength of the Empire that the forces created or existing for the defence of one portion be so constituted as to be available for the defence of another. " The success of all operations of war, whether defensive or offensive," observes our author, " depends upon the disposition of force in such a manner as will best secure the base of operations, and ensure freedom of communication." " It is useless," he continues, " to do one without the other, for in the one case neglect of the rule must lead to a ' lock-out,' in the other to the ' lock-up ■" of mihtary force. Our former disposition of our force (before the recall of the troops from the Colonies) risked the ' lock-out ' of military force by rendering the capture of the base possible : our present plan endangers, nay courts, the ' lock-up ' of military force at the base, by leaving our communica- tions exposed, and our outposts undefended." In the late war, as our author reminds us, we saw first of all an attack upon the advanced positions in the lines of communication ; next the cut- ting of the lines of communication ; and lastly, as an inevitable consequence, Paris fell. The United Kingdom being our Imperial base, our author defines the Imperial main lines of communication to be (1) to British North America, across the North Atlantic ; (2) to the West Indies ; (3) to India, China, and Australasia, by the Mediterranean ; (4) to India, China, and Australasia round the Cape of Good Hope ; and (5) from Australasia and the Pacific round Cape Horn. Recognising the fact that couimunications, whether by sea or land, whether long or short, can only be secured by a firm grasp of the points which command them, he advises o 70 Opinions of the Colonial Press. their being put into a conditiou of defence. These pointB he enu. meratcs as follows :-0n the lino to Cunada-Hahfax ; to the West Indies-Bermuda, the Baliamas, Jamaica, and Antii,nia; to inc la, the East, and Australasia by the Mediterranean-Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Bombay, Capo Comorin, and King George's Sound on the main lino, with Trhicomaleo, Singapore, and Hongkong on its northern brrmch ; to India and the East and Australia, round the Cape, Sierra Leone, Ascension, St. Helena, Simon's Town the Mauritius, and King George's Sound; and from Australasia and Vancouver s Island round Cape Horn-Sierra Leone,Ascension, the Falkland Islands, and Sydney. The two latter points, however he considers valueless for the defence of the lino between Vancou'- ver 8 Island and Australia without the Fiji Islands, now happUy at the service of the Imperial Government. The natural rendez- vous of commercial fleets being in our possession, our author recommends their being also at once put into an efficient state of defence The lines of Colonial defences may, according to om: author, be thus summarised : (1) The defence of their communica- tions, which involves fortifying the Imperial strategic points, and the existence of a purely naval and a purely military force ; the one equal to the task of keeping open the roads between the points, the other sufficient to secure those points from capture in the necessary absence of the fleet, (2) The interior line of sea defence, which must provide against the destruction by bombardment from the sea oi ^ naval resources at the strategic points in cases where the object cannot be secured by land batteries and military force. (It also includes similar provision for the protection of Colonial mer- cantile ports, to prevent their commercial reduction by enormous requisitions.) And (3) The defence of the soU of aU Colonies and places not necessary to the Empu-e as military and strategic posi- tions. " The communications of the Empire being the common property of all its component parts, each portion, according to the use it makes of them, has a direct interest in their defence, and should contribute to that object." We quite concur, and are like- wise of the author's opinion when he says that the forces intended for the defence thereof must be Imperial, and not Colonial, and must be under the control of one directing head. If the mother country is ever to be induced to initiate a system of Imperial defence adequate to the requirements of the Empire, the Colonies should be mindful to urge her to this course, pledging themselves to do their diligence to contribute their fair share of the cost in men, material, and money. Captain Colomb recommends the issue of a Koyal Commission to inquire into the defence of the Imperial Opinions of the Colonial Press. 71 communications, and we cordially endorse liis recommendation. This seaport, for instance, is at present defenceless, and yet, by a small expenditure , in the event of a war between England and another naval power, it might be protected from the depredations of some new ylluhama. A few Armstrong guns, with the needful ammunition and a few torpedoes from the Imperial stores, with the Naval Brigade resuscitated, would impart a sense of security to the community it has not felt since the commencement of the Crimean War. A federation of the war forces of the Empire is indeed essential to its safety. We thank Captain Colomb for his useful paper, and we trust it will receive at the hands of the press of the Empire, and especially at the hands of the Colonial journals, that attention and that consideration which his well-timed and ably expressed suggestions so fully merit. The defence of the Empire may possiblybecome a popular cry when it is too late to save many of its most valuable outlying portions. " QUEENSLAND TIMES." Ipswich, June 4, 1874, The question of Colonial Defences is on - which has at various times, when there were rumours of wars, occupied a good deal of attention in England, but it has never yet been considered of sufficient importance, or urgency, to require being dealt with in a systematic manner. When Canada a few years ago was threatened with invasion, the Government of the day expressed its intention, if need were, to defend that dependency with it^ last man and its last ship ; and no doubt, had the occasion arisen, thousands of British soldiers and millions of British money would have been poured across the Atlantic. At about the same period all the small military detachments which had previously been stationed in the Australasian Colonies were withdrawn, and we were, in effect, told that we must ourselves provide for the defence of our " hearths and homes." Some of our neighbours set to work, after a fashion, to prepare to receive an enemy : New South Wales did a little in the way of fortification at Sydney, as did Victoria at Port Philip Heads, Sandridge, and Williamstown ; and the latter-named Colony went so far as to invest in a turret-ship. As a portion of a well- devised scheme each and all of these works would probably prove effective ; isolated as they are, at the most they could but protect a very limited area. The thing, to be successful, must be treated m 72 Ophiions of the Colonial Press. Le. X e:™E:i\ '''''' ''"' ™.f»"-to.y Las not Mtherto efforts tho co^,; j^^r "rv™-"™"s'='' r^^^^ lively futilo ° "Kl,v,aually make would be oomrara- by him beSn „ V ''"''"' °" " C°'™'''' Defences " read WW ha mot ,]n r'',"'' °' "'" ^"y"' Colonial Institute, i„ commerce and interests in every part of the clobe " R^f ^l dang» threatens, it ,: , forgotten [hit "En^and wi h hef ci:^:: a dwarf, and practically show a disbelief in the " giant " bv seehng refngo m the arms of the " dwarf." He continues 1 ' IT / -.f ," *''° ''"""' "f l^'^'-' "»'' "» ••e«n»8- We were in a s ate of wJd alarm. We imagined that France threatened our safety, nay, our existence. We took fright at her succestfn ,. and her powerful iieets capable of tran^porttg tl^ -m t".^: steadfastly shut our eyes to the fact that the possibihty of the r, vasjonof England involves, as a natural conL^uencMhe p ssT bihty of mvestment. the cutting of the Imperial lines of commun cabon, and attacks upon ■ our vast Colonial Empire, our eTnded commerce and n.terests in every quarter of the gobe; we in short, forgot everything except our personal safety, and instlak of taking measures for defending the Empire, we were sa isfied wiO, tahng measures for defending the hedgerows of England We atftoldrvtirr ""'' '" 7' "iU'-y ^J^tem totte last panic. fnrttsxt;:brof rr s^ ^t;;," '"^.^^-^ pohcy has been to disar^ the giant irorr^:!^ th "dwrf""^ ;f^te^;?:;z--t^:-— i:-^es™ in Opinions of the Colonial Vrcas. 78 ground to be defcnaed the Colonial dependencies are divided into ten groups, of which AuRtrahisia is one. Taking, of course ^he United Kingdom as the Imperial baso, it ' next shown that the lines of communication arc — 1. To British North America across the North Atlantic. 2. To the West Indies. 3. To India, China, and Australasia by the Mediterranean. 4. To India, China, and Australasia round the Cape. 5. From Australasia nnd the Paciiic round Cape Horn. The Imperial base can be r( luccd in two ways : 1. By direct assault : invasion. 2. By indirect means : mvcstmciit. _ Captain Colomb then points out how indispensably necessary it is that tlie above routes sliould be kept or< vi and protected, at the same time contending that this would be rendered impossible m the event of an investment of the British isles, were all her naval and military force concentrated within nnd immediately around their shores. He lays great stress upon the necessity of keeping open the Channel, arguing that " it is our first line of defence agamst in- vestment, and the front of our first Hne of Colonial defence ; " and he asks, " of what avail is it if our Colonies, though protected in their own immediate neighbourhood, are ' locked out ' from the mother country by a force in the Jhannel against which we are unable to contend?" Leavin.; the shores of Great Britain, a review of the different Hues of communication with the various groups of Colonies is made, and several points are selected as suit- able for military stations as supports to the vessels of the fleet. The importance of protecting every coahng station is particularly dwelt upon. Captain Colomb urges the Colonies, if they are really in earnest in matters relating to their defence, to combine to force upon the attention of the Imperial Parliament the neglected state of the Imperial roads, and the necessity for devising adequate means for their security; but he warns us that w^ must be prepared to bear our fair share of the burden. And this is where a great difficulty would arise, for in time of peace— when alone such a scheme could be carried out-it is to be feared many a Colonial Legislature would fail to see the necessity for voting the requisite money, and the Imperial Cxovernment would be powerless to enforce payment. Having at great length explained the principles of his scheme Captain Colomb gives the following summary of the hnes ot Colonial defence he proposes:— e .-f ■ „ 1. The defence of their communications, which involves tortitying '??%.■ 74 Opinions of the Colonial Press. the Imperial strategic points, and the existence of a purely naval and a purely mihtary force ; tl t one equal to the task of keeping open the roads between the pohits, the other sufficient to secure those points from capture in the necessary absence of the fleet. 2. The interior line of sea-defence, which munt provide against the destruction by bombardment from the sea of naval resources at the strategic points in cases where that o1)ject cannot be secured by land batteries and mihtary force. It also includes similar provision for the protection of Colonial mercantile ports to prevent their commercial reduction by enormous requisitions. 8. The defence of the soil of aU Colonies and places not necessary to the Empire as military and strategic positions. _ The thanks of the Colonics are due to Captain Colomb for the immense labour he must have bestowed upon his subject, which, it will be admitted by all, he has treated in a masterly manner. We have only been able to notice a few of the principal features of his scheme, which as a whole is well worthy the study of persons at all acquainted with mihtary matters ; and indeed of members of the Legislature. 4 D.NWIN BROTHERS, PEINTEltS, tONDON AND CHILWORIH.