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"t'r'-dZ-r?- 
 
 i/ 
 
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 •■<■ ,-. r 
 
 JESUIT MAXIMS 
 
 111) Moral 
 
 ifolopiioffcHai 
 
 ^? 
 
 The End and the Means. — Mental Reser- 
 vation. Restitution and Charity. 
 
 (No. 2.) 
 

 -4 
 P 4 
 
 d 
 
 CANADA 
 
 NATIONAL LIBRARY 
 BIBLIOTHEQUE NATIONALE 
 
 \ 
 
4: 
 i 
 
 -I 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 The Toronlo ^[ail (March 9, 1889, page Si favours its readers with 
 a long extract from the English Qjiarterly Rcvii-u< of 1875. We must 
 thank. " our friends the enemy" that they have, in the present anti- 
 Jesuit craze, shown little inventive genius, but have deigned to confine 
 themselves to the old calumnies so often brought forward, hut inva- 
 riably met with a crushing rejoinder. The motive of our gratitude 
 may be conjectured ; for amid many othc- and more interesting occu- 
 pations we have little leisure left to devote to original apologetic. 
 l)apers. But as those of fourteen years ago, and ue might just as well 
 add of one hundred and fourteen, meet fully the charges made, we have 
 reproduced in these pages a series of articles from the London Month, 
 which we respectfully dedicate to the 'l'or<into Mail, whose editors 
 have not blushed to adopt as their Moral Theoi.oci.xn, the Theolo- 
 gian quietly laid to re&t bv the Reviewer of the Month. 
 
 This pamphlet forms tlie secondof the series o{ Jesuit Maxims. The 
 following, if our share in the $400,000 be not entirely exhausted, will 
 treat on Probabilism, Tyrannicide, and Jesuit I,oyalty. 
 
 St. Mary's College, 
 
 Montreal, March 12, 1889. 
 
 A. E. JONES, S. [. 
 
m 
 
 Li 
 
 IN 
 
 Ol lllK 
 
 QlAltTEUL 1 REVIEW 
 
 i>iiKi.i.^iH\Ai<Y iti:.n iitiis. 
 
 (Thf Month, London, February 1S75, j). 228.) 
 
 The QiKirter/y for January contains a ])ai)er on tlie Jesuits, in 
 continuaiion of the article that appea'ed in the number for last Octo- 
 ber. This time the Reviewer addresse.s himself to the doctrines ot the 
 Society Wq feel at some loss how to proceed in noticing this fresh 
 effusion, and that for two reasons. In the first place, in our remarks 
 upon his first article we pointed out a considerable number of inaccu- 
 racies and misconceptions into which this writer had fallen, both from 
 his own ignorance of the matter on which he professed to treat, and 
 from his relying upon the work of an author whose claims to the title 
 of historian are laughed at. in Germany, and indeed, whose authority 
 the Reviewer regarded on Jiis own showing as worthless. As our 
 allegations ha\e neither been admitted as true nor denied as false, we 
 should be quite entitled to regard the Reviewer as outside the boun- 
 daries of fair controversy, and so dismiss him as beneath further recog- 
 nition. We will venture to say that in his wanderings in the laby- 
 rinths of Catholic moral theology he has nowhere found a doctrine 
 which teaches that the honest and hcjnourable course for a man detec- 
 ted in the propagation of injurious falsehoods is to take no notice of 
 their exposure, and go on to something else, as if he had no debts of ' 
 conscience to discharge before he can claim any further hearing. 
 
 In the secuiid place, inasmuch as his present article is addressed to 
 the discussion of principles of mo'al doctrine and casuistry, which are 
 on his own avowal, those that are recognized by the prevailing theo- 
 logical schools of the Church, Avriters of the Society are free from any 
 special obligation to f illow this writer through the mazes of miscon- 
 ception and sciol'sm in which ht involves himself in this ecjualiy as in 
 his former paper. At least thesi considerations leave us at liberty to 
 deal with him at our own conve lience, andreliev^e us from the demand 
 for an immediate reply. We shall therefore content ourselves with,. 
 
I 
 
 « 
 
 pointing (tut one or two more |)al|)al)lc absurdities into which the 
 Reviewer lias fallen, as saini)Ies of the rest. 
 
 Of the well-known letters, A.M.D.Cl., which signify, "to the greater 
 glory of Ciod," we have the following account : "Through the motto 
 abbreviated into these four initial letters, the Society of Jesus ostenta- 
 tiously advertises itself as in possession of a sujierior knowledge in 
 divine things, that can furnish means of specific efficacy for insuring 
 the upward progress of humanity towards a state of purified existence 
 capable ol retlecting llic bright imagery of G(jd's enhanced glorifica- 
 tion." We do not iirf),ess to understand tnis conglomeration of 
 words, but as far as we can extract any sense out of them, they are 
 both filse and ab.^ird. The principle of action symbolized by the 
 letters A.M.D.Ci. is simi>ly this, that the members of the Society should 
 strive lo choose such actions, where free to choose, and ])erform them 
 in such a spirit, as may conduce to the greater glory of (jod. It is 
 simjily a question of proposing the highest possible standard of moral 
 and religious life, not of pretension to higher lights, nor of invidious 
 com[iarison wiili other religious corporations. Than such assump- 
 tion, nothing t ould l^e more contrary to the spirit of St. Ignatius. 
 
 The Reviewer discourses Iarj.'ely. of course, on Probabilism. Let 
 us take an example of his trustworthiness from his manner of dealing 
 with its first principle. We take his translation of Gury's definition of 
 a probable opinion, as " any judgment resting on some really grave 
 motive, even though combined with dread {sii-} of the opposite." 
 Whereupon he proceeds to cr>mment — " This means that, notwith- 
 standing an irrejiressible inward impression that truth is really in 
 0])position to j. given opinio pi obabilis, yet any opinion, in behalf 
 vvhereof can be adduced what is technically termed a grave motive, 
 may be safel}' accepted in full warrant tor taking action in its sense." 
 Now what does this writer mean by " an irrei)ressible inward impres- 
 sion " 'f Does it amount to moral certainty, grounded therefore on 
 certain reasons? If so, there can be no ])robable opinion oi^posed to 
 it, for moral certainty excludes all ])robability on the other side. If 
 this irrepressible impression, on the other hand, does not amount to 
 moral certainty, it is itself only a probable opinion ; and then all that 
 remains is a question of balancing jjrobabiliiies, and of deciding the 
 precise amount of obligation to this line of action or the other. Then 
 what is "termed technically a grave motive," is theologically a motive 
 resting on reasons sutificiently solid to justify the action of a prudent 
 man ; and thus the opinion based upon it becomes probable. In short, 
 we have the " gravest motives " for tliinking ;hat this Quarterly Reviewer 
 is absolutely ignorant Of what the Probabilism means about which 
 he undertakes to write. 
 
 Again, the Reviewer says of Gury : " He then considers whether 
 absolution can be obtained by one who ignores {sic) the Mysteries of 
 the 'I'rinity and Incarnation " ; and again, afier some circumlocution, 
 his conclusion is, "that according to the more probable opinion, he 
 can be validly absolved if only he be living in invincible ignorance." 
 Of course Gury is speaking of a man who is tgnorani o/i\\Q Mysteries. 
 His " circumlocution " here referred to only contains some rules to 
 the effect that a confessor cannot absolve such a j)enitent except in 
 ca.se of necessity, as in danger of death for instance, otherwise he is 
 
licli till* 
 
 to instruct him to the bjiictit of the sacrament. Should it be found 
 that iiis ignorance is invincible, then is such case the Sacrament of 
 Penance may be administered : for why should the mercies of Clod be 
 closed agauist hiui ? 
 
 We take one other example. The Reviewer cjuotes the dicta of 
 JiusembauMi, l,aymann, and Voit, to the effect that when a ligitimate 
 end is in view, it is also legitimate to use the means reciuisite to the 
 attainment of that end; anil hence concKides that the doctrine im- 
 )»lies that all means are legitimate and may be used where the end is 
 good. It so happens that (Jury explains this maxim by saying that 
 only means that are in themselves indifferent, that is devoid of inhe- 
 rent malice, are i)ermissil)le ; yet the Reviewer is not satisfied with 
 this distinction, but assures use on his own authority that " the words 
 j>er sf indiffercntia cannot be held to limit in any effective degree the 
 license involved in the other terms of the proposition." Ciury also 
 declaresth.it "all choice of evil means is evil;" that "he who uses 
 an evil means to attain a good end, ccjntracts the guilt attaching to the 
 use of such means" (i). I'hat is, this writer's object is to fasten on the 
 Jesuits a charge of maintaining that the end justifies the means. And 
 to attain this holy end of misrepresenting the Jesuits, he has used the 
 equally holy means of attributing to their writers that which they 
 expressly deny 
 
 We cl(jse our remarks for the present with the writer's view of 
 invincible ignorance. " Let," he says, " an individual be surrounded 
 by ])reachers straight from heaven, speaking with tongues of divine per- 
 su:ision. and yet according to the definitions given of what constitutes 
 invincible ignorance, he might with impunity withhold acquiescence, 
 alleging miral inability to ccjinprehend what was s|>oken. while in fact 
 he was obdurately bent on not ex|)ressing assent, from the design to 
 establish a plea for the indulgence of a ^icltish purpose." 
 
 Now, these words prove at least one ihing. the utter ignorance, 
 whether vincible or invincible we do not pretend to decide, of the 
 writer, as to what invincible ignorance is, (lury tells us that vincible 
 ignorance is that which can be dispelled by the use of adequate dili- 
 gence ; invincible ignorance is that which cannot be so removed" (2). 
 But according to the words above quoted it seems that a man may 
 be in invincible ignorance who is "obstinately bent on not exjiressing 
 assent, from the design to establish a i)lea for the indulgence of a 
 selfish piiri)ose."' Such a man would be in bad faith, and bad faith 
 and invincible ignorance are incompatible. This common-sense doc- 
 trine is the best excuse which we can find for the Reviewer. His 
 ignorance is so portentous as to excuse him from the charge of malice. 
 But it is not the less a phenomenon worthy of the ?atention of all who 
 are interested in English periodical literature, that the pages df our 
 chief Quarterly Review should bj open to an article on so important a 
 branch of learning as moral theology, the writer of which displays 
 throughout the most childish igiioran<;e of th«. very elements of the 
 science and oi the meaning of the terms used by its professors. 
 
 (1) Compniil. Tkeol. Mur. t' in. i. p. ^l^^. Rome. 18 W. 
 (5) lbH\s. 15. 
 
f! 
 
 PART I. ' 
 
 l'll4> I'.IMI .tll«>liti4>«i lIlO >l<'tlllM. 
 
 (TliL' MiiNiii. London, Manli 1S75, )>. ,?'''2.) 
 
 Wc have already, in our !a;>t luinilier, j;i\^'n brief expression to our 
 sen.se of the value otthi- paper in the current number of the Quarterly 
 Krvii'Ki, on " 'J'he Doctrines ol tlie jesnils." 1'he writer of the article 
 shows, aiuKJst in every line, liis utter incapacity to deal with the sub- 
 ject he has ventured to treat : so nuich so, indeed that were it not for 
 the literary dignity of the organ which has admitted his lucubrations 
 into its pages, we should not consider him worthy of further notice, 
 liut as the conductors of the Qitarter/ij have yielded so far, in a 
 moment of weakness, as to endorse his stri<tures on the moral doc- 
 trine.«., we will not say of the Jesuits, but of the (jatholic (Church, a few 
 words to point out one or two of the Reviewer's numberless blunders and 
 misapprehensions may. perchance, have the efrc<t of infusing a little cau- 
 tion into thieir counsels for the future, and render them less precipitate 
 in giving iheir sanction to articles that have no higher merit than that 
 of l)eing decorated with a sensational title. 
 
 Ila^4' IIU' .l4'>>llilM 31113 4l4M'lrJll4'*> |»4'4'llliai' l4» lll4'lllN4'lV4'M? 
 
 And in the lirsl jilace, as we have >aid, the attack of the Reviewer is 
 Jevelled not at any special or singular doctrines of the Jesuits, but at 
 the moral teac hing of the Catiioiic ('hur( li. It is true the Quarterly 
 writer takes especial pains to jjroduce ihe impression that there are 
 special doctrines ujjheld by the Society, as distinguished, we presume 
 from the doctrines of the Church, although he his not hajjpy in the 
 proofs he alleges in suppon of is view. He brings forward Moullet, for 
 instance, as an authority : but Moullet was not a Jesuit. Oury, indeed, 
 recognizes Moullet's authority, as he might well do, for the teaching of 
 the latter was drawn from Jesuit sources ; but still his book came out, 
 not with any sanction from the .Society, but with the authorization of 
 his own Ordinary, the Hishoj) of Lausanne, who, as the Reviewer in- 
 forms us, jjarticularly recommended it to the whole clergy ofh s diocese 
 on the special ground of its keeping to the happy mean between 
 " rigour'sm and laxity. " So far, then, as the case of Moullet is con- 
 cerned, it goes to show the identity oi the Jesuits' teaching with that 
 of the Church, at least in the instance of the diocese of Lausanne. 
 
 But the Reviewer further attempts to fasten the charge of specialty 
 of doctrine on the Society, from the fiict that the Society's official im- 
 primatur must be affixed to any book published by a Jesuit author, and 
 this, he argues, must throw the responsability for the opinions con- 
 tained in any such work upon the whole body of the Society, and that 
 all the more ou account of the minute regulations laid down in the 
 C<!>»sti.tutions to secure uniformity of doctrine and opinion in the 
 teaching of the Jesuits. In support of this he says : " In the ' Consti- 
 
II to our 
 {}iliirt(-r/y 
 
 ic article 
 the sul)- 
 
 t not for 
 
 iibrutions 
 jr notict.'. 
 
 Ihr, in a 
 loral doc- 
 re li, a few 
 ndcrs and 
 
 little cau- 
 )r(.'(:ipitate 
 
 than that 
 
 ll!>H'IV«'!H? 
 
 eviewer is 
 lits, but at 
 Quarterly 
 there are 
 .' presume 
 ipy in the 
 [oullet, for 
 v, indeed, 
 eaching of 
 came out, 
 ri/ation of 
 ;vie\ver in- 
 1 s diocese 
 
 1 between 
 llet is con- 
 ; with that 
 ianne. 
 
 if specialty 
 official ivi- 
 uthor, and 
 lions con- 
 % and that 
 iwn in the 
 on in the 
 
 2 ' Consti- 
 
 tutions ' it is written that no difTcrences of opinioti arc adtnissible, 
 whether in conversation (i\ or ])ul)lic discourse, or written books, 
 whi< h last it is not allowable to publish without approval and consent 
 of the (ieneral, who, however, may contuie their examination to three 
 men endowed with soinid doctrine and eminent judgment. 
 
 Now here, before jiroceediug further, U-t us notice one of t'^e Re- 
 viewer's habitual inaccuracies in dealing wiih the l.aiin text. The ori- 
 ginal words in the ( 'onstitutionr, are : " J)oitrin<c igitur differentes non 
 admittantur, nee verbo in concionibus vel lectionibiis publicis nec 
 scriptis libris, qui (piidem edi non poterant in lucemsine ai)probatione 
 atque consensu I'r;vpositi (leneralis " The literal translation of these 
 words is as follows : '■ Different doctrnies, tlierelVire. are not to by 
 allowed, neither by word of mouth in sermons f'coiicioiiibus; or public 
 lectures, nor in written books, which last may not be publi>lnt; wiihoi.it 
 the ap|)r(jval and consent of the Oeiu'ral. "' There is (piesiion, then 
 here (jf doctrines, and not opinions; lor doctrines and o]iiiiions may 
 be ver\ different things, and the prc)hiliition of (liffereiice m sut h doi-s 
 not exlend to jjrivate i onversation, as tlie Reviewer, by his blundering 
 translation fif the word " concionibus " would impis. but li>i.- reterenee 
 to ])ublic teaihiiig. whether in the lecture-room or pulpil. 
 
 Then, if the (Juiirtcr/y writer had turiied to the I )e(;l;ir.ition appen- 
 ded to the Cha[)ter of the C'on>iiiutions in which the forei/oing words 
 are contained, he would have discovered wliatrule !•> to he folhjwed 
 by the members of the Society in order to exclude diifereiices of 
 opinion. The Declaration m (juestion is as follows : " New opinions 
 are iK)t to be admitted ; and if any one entertains an opinion that differs 
 from that which the Church and her Doctors ordinarily hold, he ought 
 to submit such opinion to the judgment of the .Society according to the 
 declaration in the (ieneral Kxanieii. And even with, respect to o|)inions 
 in which Catholic Doctors dilfer or liold opposing views, care must 
 be taken to secure agreement in the Society. '' (2) 
 
 h'rom the ibove extract the nature of the great rule by whicli unifor- 
 mity of doctrine and opinion is to be secured and fostered is abun- 
 dantly evident; none other, in fact, than confonmiv to the doctrines 
 and prevailing oijinions of the Catholic Church. J!ut here we cannot 
 put the matter more clearly before our readers iha 1 by (pioting the 
 words of Father de Ravignan. 
 
 llus till' .Society of .Icsus any flcicti iiics. |iiiipiTly spcMkiiiL;', |ii'iiiliiii' to ilscll"' 
 \\ hat spirit dirci'ts it in its (l();finatic uihI inoi'al doctrines iin I'cli^iion '' 
 
 St. Ii^iiat ins (Icsircil two tliinj:s: sociiril\ ofdoctrinc — liie sjiinl ot' Kvaiiirclical 
 ("liarity and Zeal. 
 
 I will state lliat the .Society has no doctrines. pro|ierly speaking, pccn liar to itscdt' : 
 it follows the most f^eiierally iiutlioil/,ed doctrines in the Cliii.idi ; and as I'or tree 
 opinions, it leaves liherty of spirit ii. nnioii of liearts Saidi was tin' wise thonfrhl 
 of its founder. A lioily recinnes. aliove all thiiies. interior harmony atid pea<'e ; 
 the union of its members is its life, DiU'erence otOpinion and ol doctrine. Iiy crea- 
 ting a division of Ihoiiiihls. incurs the risk of creating a division of feeling. \\'e 
 may well imagine, then, that, St. Ignatins slionid have recommended the religions 
 of his Society to avoid, as much is possible, that diversity of opinion \vlii(-h. by 
 rela.xing union, weakens stietigtl.. and <anses the ruin of truth ilsidf. The supe- 
 riors are bound carefully to wai(' oil this danger. 
 
 It is with this oliject, and to w itch over the integrit v of docti'ine. that our f'ons- 
 
 (1) The italics are ours. 
 
 (li) CoiLst. Pars iii.c. i. •$ 18. 0. 
 
 :3S 
 
 itS" 
 
litutioiis iiiiljinit to ]irfrMniiiiii\v exftiuiniition and imthorization all the books that a 
 iclijrious of the .Society may wish to piibli.'^h. 
 
 Tliis guarantee is lu'csssaiy ; it is morally suflicieiit. Never, however — and I 
 laii easily understand it— lias the Society, l)V those wise precautions, thought of " 
 holding lint the pretension that the least opfnion of its writers or its professors 
 should become the opinion and the doctrine of the whole body ; nor that the approba- 
 tion of tiiree or four examiners and of a superior, should stamj) on a Jesuit's book 
 a sanction of irrefrajiablc truth. I see no ditliculty in acknowledging that Jesuit 
 authors, tlieir eMiniincrs and their superiors, may be, and have been deceived. 
 
 Hut it appears to me evidently as equally repugnant to justice and to good sense, 
 to impute to a wiiole body the o|iinions or the errors of some of its members, as it 
 would l)c tluit tiie individuals should be considered irreproachable, whilst the 
 whole body is criminal and worthy of condemnation, since sound members will 
 never t irni a corrupted liody (.'!). 
 
 Ill a word the opinions of the Society are those which are most 
 a|)i)roveci oy the Church, those most in accordance with the common 
 opinions of her Doctors ; hut more especially St. 'i'homas is declared 
 to be the theologian to be followed both by masters and pupils in the 
 schools of the Society, without the obligation, however, to follow blindly 
 all and each of his ojiinions (4). Thus in the fifth General Congrega- 
 tion directions were given to professors : 
 
 I II any case where the ojiinion ofSt. Tiiomas is ambiguous, or in those (|uestion8- 
 iioi perhaps treated of hy St Tiionuis, in which Catholic Doctors differ, it is per- 
 mitted t(i onis to take either side. — 
 
 ])rovided always that due charity and consideration be exercised 
 towards those who hold to the opposite view- of the question. 
 
 And this rule is of great importance, because it has in fact governed 
 the practical application of the other rules of the Society for securing; 
 uniformity in doctrine and tt-aching. In the course of the Society's 
 history there has been no manifestation of that servitude with which 
 the members of the Society have been recently taunted by a great 
 authority, on the part of the great Jesuit waters and theologians. To 
 tpiote I'alhcr de Ravignan once more. 
 
 Thus, in (|uesti()ns freely discussed among theologians, the Jesuit is free 
 to embrace that part thai is tlu' most consonant to his own views. The only com- 
 mand imposed on him is to observe moderation and charity, in omnibun charitas. 
 Tiie authors of tlie Society are full of these free differences cf opinion amongst 
 lliemselves. Their works are accessible to everyone: and what becomes, in the 
 ]iresence of a fact, so easy to verify — wiiat becomes, I ask, of this doctrine, said to 
 lie peculiar to the .lesuirs, and of this system of teaching that belongs only to 
 them'.' Now once ..ore, ! state, we have no doctrines\ peculiar to ourselves; we 
 have a spirit of our own, but that -is very different. 
 
 TIk' KfviOMvr'N Mkill t\n a truiislntor. 
 
 But enough has been said on the general bearing of the question. 
 Before preceeding to the details, let us point out a few more instances 
 of the Reviewer's skill as a translator; for the mistakes he commits 
 may be taken as no bad index of his competency to deal with the sub- 
 ject—a subject so full of subtle and minute details, and requiring more 
 than any other the pcssession of accurate technical knowledge on the 
 
 f;i) Thr Jf!Kiiil!>. tli)'ir InsHltite. Doclrini'x, kc. C. 4. 
 
 (4) Const, Pars iv. c. 5, § 4 ; c, 14. § 1 ; Cougreg. v. d. 41. § 5. 
 
 mm 
 
 mtf 
 
 ■I 
 
9 
 
 books that a 
 
 fever — and I 
 6, thought of 
 
 ts professors 
 the approba- 
 
 Jesuit's book 
 
 g that Jesuit 
 
 eceived. 
 
 o good sense, 
 
 embers, as it 
 whilst the 
 
 lembers will 
 
 are most 
 e common 
 s declared 
 ipils in the 
 ow blindly 
 Congrega- 
 
 )se (|uestions- 
 h'v, it is per- 
 
 exercised 
 
 t governed 
 or securing 
 J Society's 
 vith which 
 -ly a great 
 ians. To 
 
 Hit is free 
 e only com- 
 iiin charitas. 
 ^n amongst 
 ines. in the 
 ine, said to 
 iga only to 
 rselves; we 
 
 question. 
 
 mstances 
 commits 
 the sub- 
 
 ing more 
 
 e on the 
 
 part of any one who undertakes to handle it — into the discussion of 
 which he has so rashly thrust himself. 
 
 We have already called attention to his rendering of ignorans by 
 " ignoring " Again (5), we meet with the sentence : Father Gury care- 
 fully points out that mental reservations are of two kinds, the i/r/V//)' 
 and the latently mental. " Now Father Gury's words are " Restrictio 
 mentalis est : \\) pure ?,^\\ stricte menta/is, si sensus loquentis percipi 
 nuUo modo possit, et hiec, proprie ff/e//ta/is, d'lchur ; (2) /ate seu 
 bnproprie mentalis, si sensus projiositionis ex adjunctis possit col- 
 ligi " (<i). Late is here rendered by latently. What might possibly be 
 the difference between a. purely mental, and a latently mental reserva- 
 tion, we do not attempt to realize. Of course the sense of the pas- 
 sage is, " A mental reservation is {\) purely or strietly mental being 
 such that the meaning of the Hjjeaker can in no way be perceived, and 
 this is mental reservation jDroi^er : (2) mental in a iciJe or improper 
 sense, being such that the sense of the propcsicion may be gathered 
 from the circumstances in which it is uttered." And Gury ])roceeds 
 to say that mental reservation in the strict sense is never lawful; but 
 cases may occur in which it may be used in the wider and improper 
 sense. 
 
 Then we have (7) the following case ]5resented. "In the section 
 about Contracts we find this'query : ' If a donation has been promised 
 on oath, but has not yet been delivered, is it still binding?' which is 
 answered negatively on the gn^und that, as the deed is incomplete, it 
 is void in substance, and consecpiently no oath in reference thereto 
 can be held to have binding force.'' Father Gury's query is, "An 
 obliget donatio jurata, sed non ac( eptata .'*" Does a donation that 
 has been jjromized on oath bind before it has been accepted not deli- 
 vered t 'J"o understand the blunder, wc must understand what moral 
 theologians mean !)\- a donation. According to them it is a contract, 
 " by wliich the donor deprives himself actually and in an irrevocable 
 manner, of something in fiivour of the recipient who has accepted the 
 gift." (8) A gift may be accc|)ted either in tlie very act of receiving it 
 into possession ; or by intimating to the donor the accession of the 
 recipient to the contract even before the gift is actually delivered. 
 Till such acceptance is given, in one way or the other, the contract 
 does not exist; and therefore no obligation that might result from 
 such contract can, according to the oi)iuion of some, be binding. The 
 writer plainly either did not take the ]iains to read Gury on the matter ; 
 or, if, he did read, he certainly did not undei stand. 
 
 But more than this. Father (iury's reply to the query is twofold. 
 In the first place he answers negatively. A man under such circums- 
 tances is not bound, because an oath follows the nature of the act ; 
 but a donation before acceptance is not a completed contract, there- 
 fore the obligation ceases. .And in support of this decision he cites 
 .St. Alphonsus Liguori. in the next place he gives an affirmative 
 decision, to the effect that the oath is to be observed as long as it can 
 be kept without sin. And or this solution of the question he quotes 
 
 (5) P. 04. 
 
 (tj) Giipv. t. i. p. 47:'., li'iiii I', 18 ;g. 
 
 ,7) 1' li,-). 
 
 (8) T. i. 749— 7.') 1. 
 
I t 
 
 ■ '10 ^ 
 
 Layniann. So that it turns out that the Reviewer is convicted at once 
 of ignorance, of suppression, and of stating what is not the fact. For 
 Father Gury does not answer negatively, as is implied ; he gives no 
 reply at all or. his own authority ; he merely states the conflicting 
 opinions of two most competent authorities in moral theology, St. 
 Alphonsus and Laymann ; and os it happens it is the non-Jesuit, St. 
 Alphonsus, who gives the solution as the one commonly received, 
 that the Reviewer seems to repnjbate, and the Jesuit Laymann who is 
 opposed to that solution. 
 
 Again, (9) we have "■ S(-iI(riii gcneratim loqueiuio ; quia excipiunt 
 noil paiici^ ' (10) thus translated: "I say speaki/i^i^ generally^ for there 
 are not a few exceptions." The niatter under discussion is occult 
 compensation, and Father Gury has answered the query, whether 
 servants can have recourse to occult compensation on the ])lea thut 
 they are underpaid, negatively, at least generally speaking, for not a 
 feii< except three cases — not many cases (i). If the labourer has been 
 com])elled by force or fear to consent to work for an inadequate 
 wage. (2) If he has been driven by necessity to accej^t it, provided 
 that the emjiloyer could not justly have got others to work for the 
 same low rate of payment, or t^avc him work merely out of charity. 
 (3) If he is unwillingly burdened with oppressive labour. 
 
 It may be said that these mistakes do not amount to much, and 
 ]ierhaps looked at sim];ily and singly in thems-^lves this may be true. 
 But taken altogether they indicate either great slovenliness and inac- 
 curacy on the part of this writer ; or they betray what is still worse, as 
 far as trtith is concerned, an entire want of due i)rei)aration, not to 
 say radical unfitness to treat the subjects he has taken in hand. 
 These blunders go far to destroy confidence in his powers to deal 
 thoroughly and comi)letely with any of the matters, so subtle and so 
 critical in their nature and bearings as so many of ihem are, that he 
 has put himself forward to discuss, and that too with the view of affect- 
 ing the reputation of other men by the conclusions that he pretends 
 to arrive at. 
 
 Let us now follow the Reviewer more into det.iil. He says, (11) 
 " Advocate and antagonist will alike admit that the system of lax opi- 
 nion popularly charged against the fesuit divines rests on three 
 cardinal j^ropositions — of ])robabilism, of ment.d reservation, and 
 justification of means by the end;" and he forthwitli jjroceeds to dis- 
 cuss each subject in turn. We have said proceeds to discuss, though 
 in using such an expression we have conferretl an honour on me 
 Reviewer's process which it can lay no claim to. Anything more 
 sli|)shod than his method of treatment can liardly be imigmed. There 
 is nothing to indicate the slightest insight into the princiijles involved 
 in these momentous questions of moral science; nothing that gives 
 evidence of any consistent study of those principles : nothing beyond 
 a few garbled extracts, disjecta membra torn from their context and 
 surroundings as far as principles are concerned, and then a confused 
 mass of cases the bearings of which for the most part the writer 
 
 (D) I'. 78. 
 
 (10) (liirv, I. i. ].. i!i: 
 
 (11) r. -.'ii. 
 
icted at once 
 le fact. For 
 he gives no 
 e conflicting 
 theology, St. 
 on-Jesuit, St. 
 ily received, 
 inann who is 
 
 iia excipiunt 
 //)', for there 
 on is occult 
 ery, whether 
 he plea thnt 
 ig, for not a 
 rer has been 
 inadequate 
 it, provided 
 U'ork for the 
 t of charity. 
 
 ) much, and 
 nay he true. 
 ^s and inac- 
 till worse, as 
 Ltion, not to 
 en in hand, 
 vers to deal 
 ibtle and so 
 are, that he 
 'iew of affect- 
 he pretends 
 
 le says, ( 1 1) 
 n of lax opi- 
 ts on three 
 vat ion, and 
 Jceds to dis- 
 cuss, though 
 lour on me 
 y thing more 
 ned. There 
 les involved 
 I that gives 
 ling beyond 
 context and 
 a confused 
 the writer 
 
 n 
 
 grossly misunderstands, is to be found in the dre.iry waste of pages 
 that he has filled with his helpless guesses and speculations. 
 
 We ])ropose to reverse the Reviewer's order of dealing with the 
 subjects that he has selected, and to begin with the last-named, that is, 
 the charge that the Jesuits uphold the principle that the end justities 
 the means. We give this matter the precedence for two reasons ; 
 firstly b-cause, as the Reviewer observes, " no charge has more power- 
 fully tended to raise popular ]:)rejudice against the Jesuit Fatheis;" 
 and secondly, because a clear understanding of what Jesuit theologians 
 do teach is required absolutely as a preliminary to the discussion of 
 th:s or any subject whatsoever ; for unless we can show the falsehood 
 f)f this c:harge, we shall always lie open to the ac( usation that we are 
 falling l)nck upon the doctrine in ([uestion in our very treatment of 
 it, and alleging what we know to be untrue because that is a necessary 
 means for the refutation of the charge and to set ourselves right in 
 the eyes of the world. And in connection willi this matter we are 
 here led to enter our ])rotest once for all against the monstrous per- 
 version of truth and outrageous violation of all tairness of interpreta- 
 tion involved in the following jiroj^ositions. 
 
 (Incc uior(> We irn|ircs?! (in tlie it'iidfr thai, in ilodiicinsr infcreni'c frnni ]iioiK)si- 
 tions in ./esuit w i itc's, we ii<lvisiMily jiroiccd njiun tiii' iiiirn'ii)k'. tliiit llii.' terms to 
 lie iipincr-iaitMl ni ilnir vaine. tnusi be tested \^s every sense tliey <'iUi he nnide tit 
 licar without ,t <ila;int;ly forced .-strain. For aecoidincr to .Jesnit doctrine any 
 o]iinion that can lie lnonsrlit into apparent conformity ^vitli term.-; employed by any 
 single \vriter of aiitlioiity, nniy lie safely accejited and acted niion liy an imlivi- 
 liiial. even in nppusition to the mind of his spii'ituiil ad\ iser (|i S'.i). 
 
 It is sufficient tor the ])resent to record our refusal to siilimit the 
 writings of any theologian whatever to a test so utterly sul)versive 
 of all ])rinci]j!es of hf)nest interpretation as that i)roposed in the first 
 of tlie above propositions. As regards the latter proi)ositioii, we ineet 
 it with a point-blank denial of its truth, and we challenge the Review- 
 er to adduce one shred of ])roof m support of his assertion. 
 
 M'litit tlio l{oviOMOi' coiiMidiT.** a (loiiioiiNtralWin. 
 
 But let us now ])roceed to see what the Reviewer h.is to say with 
 reference to the maxim of means being justified in virtue of tlu end to 
 which they are aijjjlied. He proceeds as follows — 
 
 We lieiieve it to be demoiistralile that tiie nia\ini has been liroached clearly and 
 tletinitidy, by an niibroken cliain if .lesuit divines of liist-iaak standiiiy;. from 
 ISusemlianm down to (liiry and Lrlieratore. 
 
 In snbstantiation of this statement we snbmit a S;'ries of (]notations froia writers 
 wliose authority cannot be disowned by tiie Order. The list is trom Ihuenibaiitn 
 (will) may be called the patriareii of the maxim), whose MdhtUa has jrone thrimsrh 
 more than liftv editions, and. by its re|)rint. not many yeaisa;ro, in Home, at tiie 
 ]ircss of the I'ldpajriiiida. can idi im tiie continued and solemn aiiproval of the 
 Supreme Aiithority of the Clmr h. '•('iini linis e'<t lieitns. eti' ni media sunt 
 licita." are liis wdrds ; and a^ai i, •' Cni licitiis vfX li'iis. etiani iieviit media.' (12) 
 Amontrst .lesnit Inniiiiaiies ot' ti:st rnafjnitnde ranks Layinnnii, of whom Gary 
 Bays : ' ' Inter ma.\imos tlieolojjia' moialis doetores sine dnbiii relereiidns.'' In his 
 Thtiiliii/iii J/11/V///.V (.Miinicli 11)25) we meet with the same proposition in almost the 
 identical formnia : " Cui concessns est linis, conces*i etiani sunt media aJ tiiiem 
 
 (12) I'p. :'.20 and riUl. Kdii. Franeofoi'ti, M!."..!. 
 
12 
 
 ordinnfa.' In 17<i2 tlip Jesuit Wngomann, Professor of Morals at the I'niveisiiy 
 of Iiiiis]irurk, pulilished a Hvnopsis of iM oral Theology, duly anthenticiitcd by 
 official approbation, in which occurs thi'* passage: ''Is the intention of a good 
 end rendered vicious by the ciioice of bad means? Not if the end itself be inten- 
 ded irrespective of the uieans,' a proposition which he tlins exemplifies ; ('aius is 
 minded to bestow alms, without at the siiine time taking thought as to the means ; 
 suhseciucntly from avarice lie elects to give it out of the proceeds of theft, which 
 to that end he conse(|uently commits; and so Caius would be entitled to the 
 merits of chaiity. though he has aggravated the offence of violence by the motive 
 of avarice. WagemMtin is not a doctor who deals in obscure words, for he says : 
 " Finis determinal probitatem actus," a delinitiou of singularly neat precision. 
 
 
 Catliolic teaching on the 3IorHllt.v or Ilninan Aetn, 
 
 Before descending to particulars in replying to the above, we will 
 brierty state the doctrine of Catholic theologians with respect to the 
 morality of human acts. When this has been done, we trust that our 
 readers will be in a position to estimate the bearing of the quotations 
 adduced by the Reviewer, and to ap|)reciate, at the same time, the 
 utter shallowness and ignorance beiriyed by the interpretations he puts 
 upon them. And here we shall simply follow Father dury, as his work 
 is accessible to all. After discussing the nature of morality, and some 
 of the conditions that it presupposes in respect of human acts, he pro- 
 ceeds, in his second article to treat of the .Sources of Morality, or 
 those princijjles which assign their specific moral character to human 
 acts or modify them, each within its own specific range. (13) These 
 sources of morality are threefold: 11) The object of the act; (2) the 
 circumstance of the act, or those accidental determi'.iations that 
 accompany its i)erformance, but do not affect its substantial character, 
 though they may have a certain effec. ujjon its moral complexion. 
 Thus an act may be differenced by the accidental character of the 
 agent, whether he be single, or married, or charged with some sacred 
 office ; or by the diversity of the (piality or the t[uaniity of the object 
 of the act ; or by the means and inslrcments employed by the agent ; 
 or by some accidental extrinsic motive apart from the object i)roi)er : 
 or by ihe consideration wheii^er it is performed in good faith or in bad 
 laith, or with a greater or less degree of intensity or adverteiice ; or 
 by the period of time consumed in the operation ; (3) the end of the 
 act, or that to which the agent directs his intention m its accomi)lish- 
 ment. 
 
 The ConoliiNioiiM of Ciinry. the Jcnnit. 
 
 Having established the existence of each of these principles, Father 
 (iury goes on to lay down the following conclusions as resulting from 
 them — 
 
 \. The election of evil means is always o\\\. but on the contrary it does not 
 follow thai the election of good means is always good. Thus, no one is held to 
 be w (-rtliy 111 p:aise because he abstains tiom diiuk out ofavai'ice: and he is to 
 be hehl culpable v.ho steals money in order to give alms. 
 
 2. ^^ linsoever chooses an honest means to an honest end, performs an act of 
 double houesly. if the honesty of the act in lioth cases falls within his intention. 
 Ill like manner he is guilty of double malice who elects an evil means to an evil 
 end, as tor instance, if any one stole miuiey in order to get drunk with it. 
 
 3. Whosoever employs an evil means for a goud end c(uitracls only the malice 
 
 (I.^) T. 1. 11. 27. se-i. 
 
13 
 
 lit flic I'liivcisitj 
 nithcnlicutctl hy 
 'iition of a good 
 i itself be iiiten- 
 plifies : ('aiiis is 
 as t(» the ineiiiiH ; 
 ^: of theft, wliich 
 entitled to the 
 ■e by the motive 
 d-J, f(jr he s^ays : 
 eat precision. 
 
 nan Aetn, 
 
 above, we will 
 
 esiject to the 
 
 trust that our 
 
 the quotations 
 
 ame time, the 
 
 tations he puts 
 
 rv, as his work 
 
 ility, and some 
 
 n acts, he pro- 
 
 f Morality, or 
 
 cter to human 
 
 ;e. (13) These 
 
 act ; (2) the 
 
 ^linations that 
 
 itial character, 
 
 al complexion. 
 
 laracter of the 
 
 h some sacred 
 
 Y of the object 
 
 by the agent ; 
 
 :)bject proper : 
 
 faitii or in bad 
 
 dverteiice ; or 
 
 the end of the 
 
 ts accomplish- 
 
 it. 
 
 iciples, Father 
 resulting from 
 
 trary it doeis not 
 10 one is held to 
 ice ; and lie is to 
 
 rfoims an n<'t of 
 in his intention, 
 leans to an evil 
 with it. 
 iinl\ the malice 
 
 arising from the choice of sncli means, as for instance if any one told a lie to free 
 hi« neighbor from danger. So. on the other liiind, he who makes use ot honest means 
 for n bad end contracts only the malice arising from such end. 
 
 4. Whosoever makes use of a means indifi'erent in itself, that is not having any 
 .specific (duiracter of good or evil, in ordei' to a good or a bad end. contracts only 
 tlie goodness or malice arising from the end propusi'd. 
 
 It is hardly neces.sary to point out how entirely opposed these prin- 
 ci])les are to the construction put by the Reviewer on the jiassages 
 which he has (pioted from Busembaum, l,ayiTiann, and Wagemann. 
 To account for such difference we are driven to one of two supjiosi- 
 tions. Either Father (jury contradicts the above-named theologians 
 in the i>rincii)les he Inys down on this subject, and then we have a 
 contiict on this fundamental question amongst the Jesuits themselves ; 
 or the Quarterly writer has mistaken the sense of the passages that 
 lie cites in proof of his accusation against the Society. \\'e can only 
 decide which of the lwosup|jositions is the correct one, not by forcing 
 any i)Ossible meaning out of the passages in question that the words 
 in themselves may bear, according to the Reviewer's canon of inter 
 ])retation, but by taking them in connection with the conte.xt and 
 scope of the subject matter to wiiich they belong, in agreement with 
 the hermeneutical rules that are followed in all other cases. 
 
 If the JJeviewer had jjroceded in harmony with those rules, and 
 exercised common fairne,>s in their ajiplication, he would have escaped 
 from the, at Last material, injustice of adducing a chain of [esm't 
 writers in support of an immoral principle which those writers repu- 
 diate or rejirobate as fully as himself; and would on the other hand 
 have been guided to recognize the fact that there is a sense of the 
 phrase, -'the end justifies the means," that is sound and v.ilid, and 
 which does but exijress not only a common axiom of law br,t a dictate 
 of common sense, that the right to the end carries with it the ritrht to 
 employ all lawful means to that end, without for a moment implving 
 that the use of means that are by their own nature evil can be per- 
 mitted. Had the Qi/arttr/y writer done this, he would then have 
 been free to inquire whether the Jesuit or other theologians had in 
 any case overstepped the prescriptions of this distinction ; and such 
 inquiry coiiid have afforded no ground for comjilaint as falling fairly 
 within the limits of legitimate controversy. 
 
 Till' Je.snif BuMOinl»anni. 
 
 The Reviewer begins w ith Busembaum by quoting the words, Ci/m 
 finis est /icitus, etiaiu media sunt licita — "' When the end is law ful the 
 means requisite to that end are also lawful." We presume it is 
 because of his use of these words, and similar expressions in the second 
 case quoted, that iiusembaiun is dul)l.)ed by the Reviewer as the 
 patriarch of the m...xim. But why these two quotations should entitle 
 Busembaum to si.ch as honour we do not know : for the maxim in 
 ([uestion, and a v.'ry sound m.ixim it is when rightly understood, is a 
 common axiom i'l canon law. and we sujjjiose would not be repudiated 
 in civil jurisprudence. (14) 
 
 (14) At least we have the analogous Wi.i.^ims ; ■•' P.opfernecessUatem. illicitum 
 tflicitur licitum. (Von agitnr hi<- de illicito in se). Plus semper continet in se 
 t(Uod est minus, (.'ui licet tiuod est plus, licet (Uii|iie quod est minus ' (/iV//i(/«; 
 Jiirii, apud Craisson. Man. .fur. Can. i. [). II'.J.) 
 
 £ 
 
14 
 
 The ca^e in which the first quotation occurs is that of a prisoner 
 who atteinpts to escape from coiifineinent, and who finds that certain 
 means are necessary to effect his j)Lirpose. Take the case of Louis 
 the Sixteenth in the Temple ; or that of the Due d'Enghien at Vincen- 
 nes. There could l)e no (juestion as to their rigiit to make their escape 
 ifjKissible; l)ut in order to do so it might be necessary to practise 
 dece[)tion on the keepers, to lull them into security, to place food and 
 drink before them to induce carelessness or sleep, to draw them off 
 from their post ; or it might be requisite to free themselves from 
 tetters, and otherwise break through o])i)osing barriers as they best 
 could. Shoulu scruples arise as to the legitimacy of using such means 
 of regaining freedom and escaping from death, how would common 
 sense reply to them? Of course you are at liberty to use them ; for the 
 actions involved in them are not evil in ihemselvcs, and you have a 
 right to your freedom, therefore you have a right also to employ 
 tliose means by which alone you can regain your freedom. 'J'he right 
 to perform any action carries with it the right to use all means neces- 
 sary to that action jjrovided they be not absolutely evil by their very 
 nature. And this is all that Jiusembaum means when he says that 
 the means requisite to :.n end are lawful when the end itself is lawful. 
 But he does not say that evil means can be employed for a lawful 
 end ; far less that a lawful end converts bad means into good. 
 
 It is true that Busembaum does not confine the application of his 
 principle to innocent prisoners only ; but then he considers that under 
 certain circumstances even guilty and condemned malefiictors may 
 legitimately effect their e:.c?.pe from prison, a question which we do 
 not enter into here, so that the com])lexion of the case is in no wise 
 altered as regards the pnnciijle at stake." (15i 
 
 The second ciuoiation, '• To whom the tnd is lawful, the means also 
 are lawful," has reference to a case in which the performance of a 
 certain natural action is concerned, and the reply of Busembaum simply 
 amounts to this, that means which, if employed to give effect to sinful 
 affections and desires would themselves !)e sinful, may be used without 
 sin in order to the It-gitimate act in ([ue Jon, for the jjlain reason, that 
 they are more or less necessary and natural adjuncts to it. The case 
 therefore is merely a repetition of the one Me have just considered, (ibl 
 
 Wag 
 Froi 
 Voit 
 imm 
 und( 
 
 If 
 
 rciul 
 Tlu' 
 ul' hi 
 til.' 
 hy 111 
 y'ivil 
 
 The .lONiiit liiiyiiianii. 
 
 The Reviewer quotes Laymann, but as he gives no reference, and 
 Taymann's works fill a bulky folio volume, we have been unable to 
 find the passage to which he alludes ; but we have no hesitation in 
 asserting that it will admit of an explanation analogous to those already 
 given. 
 
 Tlie JeNiiit MaKCiiianii. 
 
 Wagemann is next quoted—" Is the intention of a good end 
 rendered vicious by the choice of bad means ? Not if the end itself be 
 intended irrespective of the means." We do not possess a copy of 
 
 (!.")) Piiscinlmu'ii, 1. i. vi. c. .'<, l^e rro. art. 2. noniif, 18U. 
 (16) Rtiscmhinun, 1. vi. Tnict. vi. c 11, art. 1. 
 
f a prisoner 
 that certain 
 se of Louis 
 1 at Viiicen- 
 their escape 
 
 to practise 
 e food and 
 w them off 
 ) selves from 
 s they best 
 such means 
 Id common 
 em ; for the 
 you have a 
 to employ 
 
 'J'he right 
 eans neces- 
 ■ their very 
 e says that 
 If is lawful, 
 for a lawful 
 3d. 
 
 tion of his 
 that under 
 ictors may 
 lich we do 
 in no wise 
 
 means also 
 lance of a 
 um simply 
 t to sinful 
 ed without 
 -■ason, that 
 The case 
 ered. (ibi 
 
 tnce, and 
 unable to 
 iitation in 
 e already 
 
 ood end 
 itself bc 
 copy of 
 
 15 
 
 Wagemann's book, but the case referred to is found in the Ttadatus 
 Prodromus, written we belie\e by Wagemann, which is i)refixed to 
 Voit's T/ieo/ogia Mora/is, a work that is quoted by the Reviewer 
 immediately afterwards. Tlu reply to the above query, which is given 
 under a distinction, stands as follows — 
 
 Tf the ciiil is intoni]e(l with a (lotiTiiiinaic i-clation to Imd iiu'iuis, tlu' net is 
 rcMih'icii lull! ; liiit not, it' IIr' cml In; iiitciidfii wiilnnit iiiiy rt'terciicc to such means. 
 Tin' foiiowii.t; are fc.\eni])li's — Tit ins .steals in oiiier \o c-ivc alms o\it oft lie ]iidcei-(is 
 of Ills theft: and Cii'ms intends to irive alms, tiiinliinf; al tlie moment notiiin^alioiit 
 tile means : hut afte; wai'ds, beinu' nioveil |i\ avarice, he chooses to liestow liia alm.s 
 hy means <if tlieft, wiiicli lie commits with thai end in \ lew ; the first intention of 
 ^riving aims was go(jd m (,'aiiis. (IT) 
 
 The Reviewer omits the last clause, and proceeds to say — " And so 
 Caius would be entitled to the merits of charily though he has aggra- 
 vated the offence of violence by the motive of avarice." This sentence 
 is clear in nothing save this, that it is an utter misstatement of Wage- 
 mann's conclusion ; a misstatement indeed so palpable that it strains 
 the Reviewer's title to indulgence on the grounds of his habitual inac- 
 curacy to its utmost limit. I'he whole question is, whether \\\t iiitetition 
 of doing a deed of charity — which is tiie niental act referred to — is 
 vitiated bv the, what he may call, collateral intention of using a bad 
 means to perform that good deed ? The reply is given at once. Most 
 certainly. Titius makes an act of the mind that he will steal in order 
 to give alms, and he commits a sin by so doing. Caius, on the other 
 hand, forms his intention irrespective of the means; and his act of the 
 mind is good. It is only subsequently that he commits sin by the 
 election of a bad means to carry out his good intention. 
 
 The Reviewer's case is made worse by the fact that he had before his 
 eyes, not more than half a page above the e.vtract that he has given, 
 the following most clear and distinct statement, a statement that en- 
 tirely coincides with the principles laid down by Father Gury. It is 
 asked — 
 
 '• Does a choice derive its morality from the means as well as from the end ?" 
 R. If the malice of the means he specifically distinct from I lie malici' of the end, 
 the choice contracts a twofold malice, one from the lueMiis. the other from the end, 
 and tile result will liea sin of a kind different tnitn either (for as we have already 
 said, there will not he two distinct sins in one act, hut one sin of a different 
 .species) : the same holds jrood of a ijrooil act recoi;ni/.in(if and emhra'iujr mi end 
 and means diverse in sjiecific if, odness ; for example, he who ileti'iinines to steal 
 that he may have money to give lo his concnhine; and he who {fives alms to an 
 indigent per.son who is his enemy that he may effect a reconciliation with him. 
 
 The first case of course .llustrates the double malice of an act that 
 involves the choice both o'an evil end and evil means ; the latter the 
 double goodness resulting from the choice of end and means that are 
 both good. 
 
 Wagemann then proceeds to say in a corollary — 
 
 [I ] If the means he iudifercnt, the choice derives neither troodtiess normal ice fron» 
 it, as is evident. [2] It the means is of ilu^ naint- xpi'citir imi/icp or goodness as the 
 end, the choice does not superinduce a new species of morality. [3] Every choice 
 of «i7'/ W','flns is evil ; but on the other hand, not every choice ot tjood iifaii-i [^ 
 
 (17) Voit, Tract. Prod. c. ?i. nn. 27, 2"). Lugdun and Paris. 18,^0. 
 
poHitivcIv \ruin\ : fiif, us WHS said nl)()ve, to will uii olijei't tliiit is knowti to lie Imd 
 suffices for the pH.-tii'i|iiitioii in evil ; in onlei to eiiilow mi act with the trdoilness 
 of tiie olijert, tliis jriKuliiess miiat he positively iiiteiiiiett, at least in some way, 
 even though it siioiihl he confused and undefined. 
 
 « 
 
 Tt is needless to point out how completely the principles laid down 
 in the above extract overthrow the Reviewer's next ignorant objection. 
 " Wagemann is rot a doctor who deals in obscure words, for he says— 
 'Finis dett-rminat probitatem actus,' a definition of singularly neat 
 precision." All words are obscure to those who cannot penetrate 
 their meaning ; and the Reviewer has utterly missed the meaning of 
 the words he quotes. '• The end determines the probity of the act." 
 Of course it does. The end, as Father Gury has told us, is one of the 
 .sources of the morality of actions. But not the only source; for the 
 object and the circumstances also contribute their share ; and Wage- 
 mann has just told us that every choice of evil means is evil ; and 
 Father (iury states that he who employs a bad means to obtain a good 
 end contracts tlie malice of the bad means. All this is expressed by 
 the axiom — Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumqun defectu, 
 
 Tlie .loMiiit Voit. 
 
 The Reviewer passes on to an extract taken from Voit's Moral 
 Theology. 
 
 Tie puts the fuilowinjr I'asc — • Arcadius kills Caius in some city where the law 
 JiiHicts capital pnnishinciit on a i.'iui'dci'cr. Arcadius is delivered up and condem- 
 ned to death, Imt he e^cajics. forcildy lireakinf^ out of prison, thougii foreseeing 
 that he may render his gaolers lial)le to grievous injury. The question is, whether 
 Arcadius, liy escaping after sentence had been pronounced, has done wrong. My 
 answer is in the negative.... Has Arcadius then done wrong hy rupturing his 
 chains and forcildy lireaking out of pris(Mi ? . . . He has dune no wrong, Cui eniin 
 licet ji»i.'<. cut iiiedi- /i •riiiis.iu ■■luiit." [18] 
 
 The case from Voit is correctly stated. Voit grounds his solution 
 on tne principles of St. Thomas, and therefore even if the solution 
 were wrong, it is not exclusively Jesuit doctrine" (19). The ground 
 taken by St. Thomas amounts to this, that a prisoner may make his 
 escape because he is not bound by the penalty of the law to contribute 
 in any way to his own death, but only to submit himself patiently to 
 the executioner who carries the sentence into effect. But to remain 
 in prison when he might escape would be to contribute remotely to 
 his own death ; he is therefore quite within his own rights if he avails 
 himself of any chance of escape offered to him. This reasoning rests 
 upon the further principle that the State being charged with the main- 
 tenance of public order may use all necessary means not absolutely 
 wrong to attain that end. The punishment of death is one such 
 means, and therefore legitimate under extreme circumstances. But it 
 is a further stretch of power to bind the criminal in conscience to 
 cooperate in any way in his own death ; and such an exercise of 
 power is not required for the attainment of the desired end. There- 
 fore such an application of power would be superfluous ; nor can we 
 conceive that it would be in accordance with the moral order of the 
 
 [18] Voit, Theol. Mor. p. 98. 
 
 [19] St. Thomas, 2. 2 q. 09. a. 4. ad 2. 
 
own to be bad 
 
 I the gooilness 
 
 in some way, 
 
 :s laid down 
 It objection, 
 or he says — 
 
 ularly neat 
 ot penetrate 
 
 meaning of 
 of the act." 
 s one of the 
 ce ; for the 
 
 and Wage- 
 
 s evil ; and 
 
 btain a good 
 
 expressed by 
 
 defect II. 
 
 ^oit's Moral 
 
 where the hiw 
 p and condeni- 
 igli foreseeing 
 ion is, whether 
 le wrong. My 
 
 rupturing iiis 
 ong, Vui etiiin 
 
 I his solution 
 the solution 
 The ground 
 ay make his 
 to contribute 
 
 patiently to 
 t to remain 
 
 remotely to 
 ; if he avails 
 Lsoning rests 
 th the main- 
 It absolutely 
 
 is one such 
 
 ices. But it 
 
 onscience to 
 
 exercise of 
 
 :nd. There- 
 
 nor can we 
 order of the 
 
 IT 
 
 world that God has established. The reason given why Arcadius does 
 not sin in breaking out of prison even at the expense of his keepers is, 
 that the loss incurred by the latter is not intended, but only follows 
 accidentally on the exercise of Arcadius' right to escape from punish- 
 ment if he can. And Voit goes onto say that anyone who help?> 
 him by counsel or otherwise to effect his escape commits no sin, unless 
 indeed he be under some special obligation like tliat, for instance, im- 
 posed on warders. This last clause ought to have shown the lieviewer 
 that not every means was lawful ; that a means involving sin could not 
 be lawfully employed : and therefore that the ni.ixim, tliat the m?ans 
 are permitted to him who has a lawful end in a view, does not include 
 means that are sinful. 
 
 Tlio JcHiiK liiborntorc. 
 
 Then follows Father Liberatore, who afier an elaborate argument in 
 su[)port of the indefeasible title of the Church to press into her service 
 the agency of jihysical means, thinks to f^trengthen his position by the 
 maxim, "that from the obligation to attain an end arises the right to 
 procure the means needful and useful for obtaining the same." We 
 have not the book referred to at hand, but wc accept the Reviewer's 
 authority for the accuracy of his statement, for the case is perfectly 
 clear, and the principle enunciated is one of the merest common 
 sense, upon which indeed the whole fabric of law, and the social order 
 depending upon law, ultimately rest For we may ask, upon what 
 other principle does the power of inflicting, we will not say capital 
 punishment, but any punishment whatever, depend but this, that the 
 end cf all social regulations is the peace of the community, and that 
 the right of employing penal measures follows as a necessary adjunct 
 to the primary necessity of maintaining the well-being of the social 
 organism, t"or as a matter of fact it is found that society cannot exist 
 without falling back upon such distasteful auxiliaries ? 'i'he Reviewer 
 does not mean to assert that penal enactments are unlawful ? 
 
 MoiiNlrouN tloctriiK' inipiitiMl to Ciiiiry. 
 
 We cannot undertake to follow the Reviewer through the hereto- 
 geneous mass of cases that he has huddled together ; nor indeed is it 
 necessary, for we have laid down, as we trust, sufficiently the princi- 
 ples on which his objections and misrepresentations may be easily 
 solved. We will therefore touch upon only one more case, and that 
 because it affords a further and very stricking illustration of help. ess 
 blundering. Father Gury is credited [20] with laying down distinctly 
 the monstrous propos tion, " that no evil intention can render wicked 
 any deed which in it? elf must not by nature be necessarily evil." Pas- 
 sing over the clumsiness of the wording, we presume the Reviewer 
 would make Father Gury say that any action may be good, with what- 
 •ever evil intention committed, provided the said action be not abso- 
 lutely evil in itself apart from all question of the intention of the agent. 
 The possibility of such a statement on the part of Father Gury has 
 already been precluded by the principles which we have seen that he 
 
 [20] P. 73. 
 
i 
 
 18 
 
 upholds. Hesiiles, the proposition hoars so great an al)surclity on the 
 very face of it, that the serious attril)ution of it to, we will not say any 
 grave author, hut to any man of ordinary coininon sense seems to be 
 almost ])ast heiicf. However, in support of his charge the Reviewer 
 (piotcs in a ncne the expression, Ad injur i it in iion siijficit mala intentio 
 — " A had intention is not siifficieiu to constitute an injury." We do 
 not find these words in dury, hut we have the following: " Prava 
 enim inentio ncjn etficit, ut injustum sit illud opus, quod ex se res- 
 l)e(tu terlii injustum nonest"[2i . I'he case is that of a man who 
 steals, and escapes suspicion, whic i rest en a third party who is inno- 
 cent, and there is question w heiher the thief is bound in commutative 
 justice to make compensation to the innocent man f(jr any loss he 
 sustains. (iury gives the different opinions on the subject, and 
 amongst them one which denies any liability because, even if the thief 
 has contributed to fasten the false charge on the other man, " his evil 
 intention does not make an action nn/i/st, which is not of its own 
 nature iin/nst with respect to the third person in question." Causing 
 suspicion to light on a man is not a thing that of its own nature causes 
 material loss ; though such loss is very likely accidentally to follow. 
 The Reviewer therefore translates i/ijitstiiin by ' wicked,' instead of 
 by unjust, and thus shows that he entirely mistakes the point at issue. 
 (Uiry does not say that such an act would not be wicked and sinful, 
 hut that in the oi)inion of some if would not bean unjust act in the 
 technical sense of the word ; that is an offence against commutative 
 justice, and therefore burdened with the obligation of restitution. 
 
 Oil 
 
 llllKlll 
 
 to th 
 |ilii'ii 
 
 the 
 
 Iiidifroroiii iotioiiM. 
 
 We will conclude for the jirescnt with a ftnv remarks on the Review- 
 er's strictures on Gury's doctrine as to the imiiffcrcnce of certain 
 actions. He quotes a dictum of Father (iury [22] to the effect that 
 where 'the end is lawful, the means also are lawful provided they be 
 indifferent in themselves." There is here plainly a limit put to the 
 means available for any end ; what that limit is we shall see presently. 
 We will not follow the writer through his confused discussion, but con- 
 tent ourselves with producing his somewhat impressive conclusion — 
 " Here we confine ourselves to the opinion — and we assure those who 
 challenge our view that we have arrived at it not lightly — that accor- 
 ding to Father Gury's delinitions the words * per se indifferentia ' 
 cannot be held to limit in any effective degree the licence involved in 
 the other terms of the proposition." W^ell, let us see what Father 
 Gury's definitions are. 
 
 In his remarks on the object of an act, regarded as the chief source 
 of its morality, he says that an object may be good, bad, or indiffe- 
 rent according as it agrees with or is opposed to reason, law, or the 
 right order of things, or as it does not fall wiih'n the scope of law and 
 order. Again, an object may be intrinsically good or intrinsically 
 evil ; and in what the intrinsic evil of an object exists he explains as 
 follows — 
 
 t2j"] Gurv, t. i, p. G47. 
 [22] P. 71. 
 
i 
 
 ^surdity on the 
 v\\\ not say any 
 ise seems to be 
 e the Reviewer 
 /f mala iiitentio 
 jury." We do 
 k'ing : " Prava 
 nod ex se rcs- 
 of a man who 
 ty who is inno- 
 n commutative 
 ^r any loss he 
 ; sui)ject, and 
 /en if the thief 
 man, " his evil 
 ot of its own 
 3n." Causing 
 1 nature causes 
 ally to follow, 
 .'d,' instead of 
 point at issue, 
 id and sinful, 
 Hst act in the 
 : commutative 
 stitution. 
 
 n the Review- 
 nce of certain 
 the effect that 
 ^'ided they be 
 lit put to the 
 see presently, 
 sion, but con- 
 conclusion — 
 Lire those who 
 — that accor- 
 
 indifferentia ' 
 :e involved in 
 
 what Father 
 
 I chief source 
 i, or indiffe- 
 n, law, or the 
 pe of law and 
 intrinsically 
 e explains as 
 
 19 
 
 Ohjprts llmt iiro iiitiiiisii'iillv evil me of tlirot' clasff^^. 1 .Soiii' (u»' sm!; 
 (ilntiilitli Iji, mill iiiili'iitinlciit of all circunHbiiio's : litcuuso tli('\ involve rf|)ii(.'iiiinc'V 
 to the \\\i\\\ ami atisoliiti'ly ncci'ssaiy onlcr, as for iiistaiuc, haticij ot (loil, blas- 
 pIll'IllV, Mini My foitli. 
 
 2. Otiicis arc iiilriiisically evil, not inciisplv in tlicinsi Ivcs, hiu liv nn.'-'oii of" 
 sionif ailiunct or coiiilitioii thai (l('|irnil> on the -^ovcrfif;!! powop of (lod or man : 
 such arc takinji what hclon'r-' to otlicr.-i, injury to liody or rciiiitiition,mul iiucli like, 
 wliii'li Honictiiiics ln'conic lawfnl. 
 
 .'!. (Itlu'is iijiain arc only fvil hy rea.<on of the ilan<„'cr which onlinarih attcniln 
 llicni, snch as lookinif at h.'isc olijcclH. rcailiiiL'' bail hiioks. ami ^o on. Tficsf foi' a. 
 rcarfoiiahlc caiisu. ami where the ilaiigcr !;? reiiioveil, nni}' heconie licit. 
 
 The last mentioned cinss concerns those who arc called to moral, 
 legal, or medical studies for instance, and may be dismissed ; but it is 
 the second class that falls more immediately within the scope of our 
 l)resenl discussion ; though of course our principle is lawful and 
 ai)|ilies to actions within the sphere of both these classes Let us 
 illustrate what is meant, 'lake for instance, a man's right to his 
 l)roperty, his good name, his personal security, his life. His right to 
 such things is based upon (loi's will and order that he sliould enjoy 
 them. The range of his rights in such matters is commensurate with 
 (lod's will and appointment with respect to them To deprive a man 
 of his possessions within that range is to infringe his right ; and this is 
 in the ordinary course of things always wrong. But contingencies 
 may arise in which ( lod, with Whom rests the supreme disi)osing 
 power, may dejuive him of ihem; and if so, God can also delegate to 
 men some portitni of His power. Thus He concedes to the State the 
 right to take away life when a man has been guilty of a grave crime 
 against public order ; nay, even to a private individual when it is 
 indispensable tor just self defence. J->ut how do we know that God 
 grants those powers? We reason thus. God has cominitted to the 
 State as an end the care of public order. But the maintenance of 
 public order requires that murderers be put to death. Therefore God 
 must have given to the State the power of life and death in such cases.. 
 And why? Iiecausc He wills the end, and must therefore to be consis- 
 tent will the means necessary for its attainment. Ciii conceditur finis r- 
 concediintur media, {nrccssaria.) 
 
 But astiod wills that the criminal's life should lie taken from him 
 the latter lias no longer a right to it ; consequently the means is not 
 bad the putting him to death, that is, in order to the security of public 
 order, for the condition on which, as Father Gury says, the badness 
 of the act is based, the right that a man has to his life, has bee:H 
 removed. 
 
 IVhoii a right to the End give.H a right to the ]fI<'aiiH. 
 
 From what has been said, then, in order to apply the principle, that 
 a right to the end gives a right to the means, three conditions must be 
 complied with. 
 
 1. That the end shall be good. 
 
 2. That the means ])e not sinful. 
 
 3. That they be necessary for the attainment of the end. 
 
 As regards the second condition, from what has been said, the 
 following conclusions may be drawn, (i) That there are certain means 
 which are absolutely and intrinsically bad in themselves ; and such can 
 
20 
 
 never he cinploycd. (2) Others, thiit arc indifferent, tliat is, have no 
 specific morality in thcniselves, such as are the actions of walking, 
 sitting, and so forth ; and these nnay be always used, (j) A class 
 which lies between these two, consisting? of acts which in the ordinary 
 course of things are bad, but ma) under peculiar conditions beconu- 
 la\»ful, and be u>ed as means in cases of a special and abnormal kind. 
 
 We could give many references, ranging from |)age 420 to page 430 
 of (lury's first volume in ( ontirnuition of the above conclusions; but 
 we trust we have said siitVicient to show upon what a mass of misaj) 
 prehension anil misrepresentation the Reviewer's attack upon the 
 nn»ral teaching of the Catholic Church is based. 
 
 We believe that some time ago offer was made in the Gi'imaiiin to 
 bestow a hundred thalers on any one who could produce a bond fuii- 
 passage that would convi( t tlie Jesuits, or any Jesuit, of teaching the 
 doctrine that the end justifies the means, as that maxim is vulgarly 
 understood. The reward has not been gained in Ciermany ; perhaps 
 England may be more fortunate ; and if so we shall be glad to transmit 
 the name of the successful ai)plicant to the bureau of the Gennaiiia, 
 and w(j have no doujit his ( laiin will be duly honoured if duly substan- 
 tiated. But the Quarto /} Reviewer has certainly so far not establish- 
 ed his title to the prize ; a matter to be regretted by his friends, as 
 otherwise he might have invested the hundred thalers in a hatin 
 Dictionary, aii article that he i'- manifestly much in need of. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 ^^('iilal l<4'M>i'viili4»ii. 1*111*0 ** Till I out. 
 
 (The MoN iH, London, April, 1875, p. 482.) 
 
 In our last number we discussed one of what the Quarterly Reviewer 
 calls the cardinal pro])ositions on which the popular charges against 
 the moral teaching of the Jesuits rest, that namely which asserts that 
 the end justifies the means. We showed that this maxim may admit of 
 two interpretations : one that where the end is legitimate, the use of 
 means necessary to such end is legitimate, provided that the means 
 involve no sin in themselves ; the other that provided a good end is 
 intended, all means whatsoever whether good or bad may be used, 
 for in fact the goodness of the end imparts goodness to the means, 
 whatever their moral complexion may be considered in themselves. 
 The first meaning is the true one, and that accepted by theologians : 
 the second is false, and repudiated not only by every Catholic theolo- 
 gian but by every honest man. How far the Reviewer himself may 
 have adopted this second signification of the maxiiti in his own literary 
 practice we leave it to the appreciation of our readers to determine. 
 This much, however, we may say is certain, and for the truth of our 
 assertion we appeal as well to what we set before our readers in our 
 last number, as to what we shall advance in our present paper, that the 
 Reviewer in carrying out the end proposed to himself, of fastening on 
 
 ;«il>«* 
 
21 
 
 1 1 is, have no 
 IS of walking. 
 
 (j) A class 
 I the ordinary 
 tions hcconn- 
 )n<)rmal kind, 
 o to page 430 
 
 lusioiis : but 
 lass of niisaj) 
 ack upon the 
 
 German in to 
 a ho ml Ji,/,- 
 teaching the 
 m is vulgarly 
 my .; perhaps 
 ;id to transmit 
 le Cienuania, 
 duly substan- 
 not establish- 
 lis friends, as 
 s in a J.atin 
 of. 
 
 'riy Reviewer 
 irges against 
 h asserts that 
 may admit of 
 :e, the use of 
 t the means 
 good end is 
 ay be used, 
 3 the means, 
 
 themselves, 
 theologians ; 
 holic theolo- 
 himself may 
 own literary 
 
 determine, 
 ruth of our 
 aders in our 
 per, that the 
 fastening on 
 
 the Cailiolic Church a system of al)surd and immoral doctrines, an end 
 not justifiable in itself without the gravest and most convincing proofs, 
 has not shnnik from the use of means that if consciously employed 
 would at once brand hirn with immoral indifference to the character of 
 those means themselves. In his attempts at proof we convicted hiin ot 
 mistranslation, of garbling, and of misrepresentation , and such means 
 will commend themselves to no honest mind as legitimate and justi- 
 fiable sources of demonstration, even though made vi^e of in support; 
 of the loftiest ideal theories of moral purity witli which the modern 
 world is dazzled or bewildered, and with which for the most ))art it^ 
 practice so painfully contrasts. 
 
 I'hmohI'n Provincial li<'(t«'r)>>. 
 
 We now turn to the Reviewer's second cardinal ])roposition, that 
 which concerns Mental Heserv.ition. 'I he Reviewer ojiens fire on this 
 " second cajjital count in the po|)uIar indictment against Jesuit 
 princi|)les" by a quotation from the Pi oviiiciales Of course the 
 Proviihiairs contribute greatly to the Reviewer's article in this and 
 in other matters where their inspiration is not openly acknow- 
 ledged. This is only what was to be exi)ected in the treatment of any 
 subject where Jesuits are concerned ; it will not be out of ])lace there 
 fore, before prececding to the Reviewer's mob of objections, to put 
 once more on record the estimate of these celebrated letters that has 
 been from lime to time formed by writers of various schools of Ffcmh 
 thought. Father de Ravignan, himself a Jesuit, though previously a 
 brilliant member of the magistracv of France, thus expresses the result 
 of his own investigation into the truth of the charges of Pascal, that 
 had created prejudices against the Society in his own mind, and had 
 weighed with him as a seri(Mis ])reliminary objecti(Mi to which he was 
 bound to seek a satisfactory repl\' before lie could enrol iiimself in the 
 Institute of Ignatius. Mc thus gives the conclusion that his in(|uiry 
 brought home to his mind : "Pascal, your genius has led you into a 
 great crime, that of establishing an alliance, jjerhaps imperishable, 
 between falsehood and the language of the French people. Von have 
 fixed the vocabulary of calumny; it still rules supreme, but it shall 
 not do so with me" (i). And others have appreciated the true place 
 of the J'lovincial Letters in the world of literature, and what is more, 
 their true effects upon society at large. Pascal aimed at blasting the 
 good name of the Jesuits ; he succeeded to a great extent, but he suc- 
 ceeded in a great deal more that was quite beyond his wish or intention. 
 He contributed by his satire to level the barriers that opposed the 
 advancing tide of unbelief that was so soon to lay the .stately fabric of 
 the French Church, and the proud throne of the Bourbons in the dust. 
 '■ It was a work," says Lemontey, speaking of the Provincial Letters, 
 " that did more harm to religion than honour to the F'lench language"(2). 
 Lerminier says, "'Pascal wrote the Provincial Letters, and the demon 
 of irony was let loose against holy things. The Jesuits, as far as 
 appearance goes, receive all the blows ; but religion is smitten along 
 
 (1) Dt" rExistt'iifc (le rinstilul (ies .li'siiite-:. [1. 3<.; Fifth Eiiitioii. 
 
 (2) Hist, de la Hrgi'iui-, toiii. i. p. 15'i. 
 
I 
 
 V ith them. Pascal has prepared the way and VoUaire is free to come"(3). 
 After the fall of the Jesuits in 1762, d'AIembcrt writing to Voltaire. 
 <;ould estimate its effects, and the hand that Jansenism had had in the 
 <atastrophe. " By my faith," he says, " this is a very serious matter, 
 and the Parliamentary Courts go to work with no !ight hand. 'J'hcy 
 think that they are saving religion, but they are aiding reason without 
 suS|)ecting it. 'J hey are the hangmen of philosophy, whose sentence 
 
 they execute without knowing it As regards myself, to whom all 
 
 things ai;])ear at present coulcur dc rose, I see the Jansenists quietly dying 
 next year, after liaving this year brought the Jesuits to a violent end, 
 toleration establisiied, the Protestants recalled, the j^riests married, 
 • onfession abolished and fanaticism crushed without any one being 
 the wiser " (4). Such were to be the fruits of Pascal's work. 
 
 The passage quoted by the Reviewer from the Piovincial Letters 
 Mands as follows : " ' One of the most embarrassing things in the 
 world,' says the Jesr.it, 'is to avoid telling a lie, especiall}' when you 
 want someihi.ig to be believed that is false, (^ur system of equivo- 
 cation 1^. a great help in this matter. But do you know how to proceed 
 where equivocal words cannot be found?' 'No father.' 1 thought as 
 r.HJch,' said he, 'that is new; it is the doctrine of Mental Reservations.'"' 
 ^'hereupon the Reviewer, having made his quotation, falls straightway 
 ■ UK.) the piitall of his distinction between i)urely and latently Mental 
 Reservations. 
 
 Now first of all with reference to the quotation itself, Pascal asserts 
 in it what is not true, when he says that the doctrine of Mental 
 Reservation was new, and an invention of the Jesuits. Escobar more 
 ^'specially is the reputed father o<" the doctrine, but he had no real 
 claim to the |)arentage : for in maintaining it, he did but pass on the 
 common doctrine of theologians, and he never taught the lawfulness 
 of jjurely Mental Reservation. 
 
 a lie 
 ■jnan, 
 but 
 cont 
 the 
 lie it 
 
 • disci 
 
 • of ci 
 thoi 
 law 
 the 
 circi 
 with 
 by 
 thoi 
 misi 
 of n 
 us 
 
 Filviiioiilar.y iiotioiiw on Triilli siiid FalM'liood. 
 
 But in order to the understanding of this question a few words of 
 I'.eliminary matter are necessary. We have first to inquire what is 
 rj'.eant by truth, or s|)eaking the truth ? Or, again, in other words, what 
 js meant by a lie? As Father (Jury is the Reviewer's bete noire in this 
 and other matters, we will take his definition of a lie — Mendacium est 
 hiiitio vcl s'gnificatio contra nientem cum voluntatc fallcndi. ^\'e may 
 fcxplam this definition thus : A lie is a sjieech or intimation contrary to 
 ihe mind with the intention of deceiving, or it is a form of words of 
 V iiich the-meaning is not in conformity with and does not express the 
 thoughts of the mind of the speaker about any subject of which there 
 may be question, and such form of words becomes a lie formally when 
 littered with the intention of deceiving others. Truth, then, as far as 
 intercourse with our neighbour is concerned consists in the agreement 
 of the words we utter with the thoughts of our mind on any given 
 .jubject. A lie is the wilful departure from such agreement with a 
 deceitful intention : these two conditions being requisite to constitute 
 
 (.t>^Reviio rk-s (loiix Moiides. l,"i Mai. 1H42. 
 <4>.- Letter t(i \<»lliiire, Ma., 4, 1702. 
 
23 
 
 etocome"(3). 
 I to Voltaire, 
 ad had in the 
 rious matter, 
 liand. 'J'hey 
 eason without 
 lose sentence 
 to whom all 
 quietly dying 
 violent end, 
 csts married, 
 ly one being 
 3rk. 
 
 //a'a/ Letters 
 hings in the 
 1}' Avhcn you 
 m of equivo- 
 w to jjroceed 
 1 thought as 
 servations.'"' 
 i straightwav 
 •ntly Mcnta"! 
 
 iscal asserts 
 
 - of Mental 
 icobar more 
 had no real 
 pass on the 
 
 - lawfulness 
 
 ioo<l. 
 
 '■ words of 
 lire what is 
 \'ords, what 
 oire in this 
 'ihiciiini est 
 ^\ e may 
 contrary to 
 'f words of 
 >;press the 
 lich there 
 lally when 
 , as far as 
 agreement 
 »y giver. 
 It with a 
 ■onstitute 
 
 a lie in its formal character. For instance, when I say John is a good 
 •jTian, really believing and thinking him to be such, I speak the truth ; 
 but when I say, notwithstanding my well-grounded belief to the 
 ■contrary, that John is a bad man, and am moved to such utterance by 
 the desire to injure John's character by deceiving his emjjloyer, I tell a 
 lie in the formal sense of the word. Now the whole of the present 
 ■discussion hinges on the question whether in any possible conjuncture 
 • of circumstances, the departure from the conformity between word and 
 thought which constitutes the truth of any utterance, can be considered 
 lawful.-* And if in any case allowable, the further question arises as to 
 the degree of such departure. May we legitimately undergiven possible 
 circumstances utler words in direct contradiction with our thoughts, 
 with what we know to be the facts of the case ; or are we not bound 
 by the very nature of truth to maintain agreement of word and thought, 
 though the agreement may be oi such a kind as to be cajjable of 
 misinterpretation? For example, John comes to our house w iih a gang 
 of ruffians to murder James, who is lying concealed within, and asks 
 us who know with absolute certainty what John's intention is whethc-r 
 James is here, can we reply absolutely, No. he his not, in order to 
 ])revent the perpetration of crime and to save James' life? (Jr. in order 
 to keep uj) cont\)rmity between word and thought, ought we Kj have 
 recourse to some such device as this : we are standing near the door 
 of our stables, and we answer. No, he is not here, meaning within the 
 stables, though knowing well that John's question ajiplies to the 
 ])remises at large, and that he will therefore be deceived by our answer. 
 'I'his is a case of mental reservation in the wide or improper sense, for 
 the Words of the answer agree with the thought in our mind, and 
 though John, not being able to see wiiat is in our mind, inter])rets 
 them according to his own meaning, and so is deceived ; yet he might 
 by a little retiection have det^'cted the lurking equivocation, and pies- 
 sed his question home by saying, 1 do not mean here in this stable, but 
 is James concealed within your premises at all ? In such a case, where 
 similar questions may be i)ressed until further reservation becomes 
 well-nigh 'mjiossible, what answer shall be finally given •' Shall we give 
 John to understand that we answer No, according to his own sense of 
 the question ? or shall we, by acknox\ledging his presence, leave James 
 to his fate ? 
 
 I^ir Iloiiry Wotton'M cloMoriptioii of an Aiiil>siN.«>a4lor.— 
 fiiiiixot's rvMcrvc— TiOi'd l*aliiii'r.«itoii*.*i Ifiliic lt4»4»k. 
 
 Now it is clear that cases like the above will arise in the various 
 relations of life, in which there will be an apparent conflict between 
 positive duties. There is on the one side the obligation to sjjcak the 
 truth ; on the other, the claims of charity, or of i)'iblic duty, or of self- 
 jireservation, which will be set aside and sacrificed in divers cases by 
 speaking tlie truth. The existeiice of such difficulties is acknowledged 
 on all ha""'ds, and they receive -i practical solution by men of the world 
 without much attempt at the c instruction of a scientific system of the 
 moralities of speech. It is no. too much to say that such solutions are 
 too often guided by the rule of thumb alone. As far as statesmen are 
 concerned this is notorious. Without committing themselves perhaps 
 

 m 
 
 to the full to the acceptance of the famous dictum that language was 
 given to conceal men's thoughts, or Sir Henry Wotton's description of 
 an ambassador, as a good citizen sent to lie abroad for the good of his 
 country ; it is to be feared that modern statesmen are not troubled 
 Avith many scruples about acting more or less freely on the spirit ot 
 those sayings. Even the proper and precise M. Guizot could say in a 
 debate in the French Chambers : " I have a few preliminary remarks 
 to offer. When an ambassador does me the honour to call on me and 
 ask me questions, it is not to an interrogatory that I submit. I am in 
 such a case bound to the truth, but I only reply so far as suits the 
 interest of my country " (5). When we find M. Guizot thus falling 
 back upon the j^rinciple of reserve in the conduct of international 
 affairs, we are quite prepared for a wide adoption of the same by one 
 so little troubled with scruples of any kind as Lord Palmerston. The 
 notorious " Afghanistan " Blue Book is a case in point, wherein des- 
 ]:)atches were either entirely suppressed or partly mutilated, and 
 important matter thus withheld from the knowledge of Parliament by 
 tampering with documents professedly prepared for its instruction and 
 enlightenment. The defence of Lord Palmerston for such garblings 
 and omissions was no dcnibt that advanced by M. Guizot for the 
 economy of sijeech, the interests of the public service and the good of 
 the country. (6) 
 
 TIk' ]>(>an of CliOMtcr'N variouN NlindCH of incaiiiiig. 
 
 Nay, even beyond the lange of worldly politics we have had a recent 
 avowal not only of the adoption of the principle of reserve, but even of 
 mental reservation in what the Reviewer would call its most Jesuitical 
 phase, by a somewhat prominent dignitary of the Anglican Cliurch, in 
 the region of theological discussion Tiie Dean of Chester felt called 
 upon last autumn to busy himself with the Old Catholic Assembly at 
 Bonn, and being of a loquacious turn made use of certain language 
 that was objected to by some of his more matter-of fact brethren. The 
 Dean's ground of defence in his own words was as follows : " At Bonn 
 it was our wisdom to keep many things in the background. We were 
 reaching out our hands towards those who had been separated from us 
 for centuries, if by any means, even by the temporary use of language 
 admitting of various shades of meaning, we might come to a mutual 
 understanding" (7). There is a delicacy and finish in the Dean's 
 ai)preciation of his own perfomances at Bonn that would have rejoiced 
 Pascal as manifesting the work of an adept in the art of mental 
 reiervation. The "temporary use of language admitting various shades 
 of meaning," bespeaks a proficient at the least. Whether the Dean's 
 reservations were " latently" mental we leave to the Reviewer to decide. 
 
 fit, TliomaM and N<'otii8^ Principles. 
 
 The above examples sufiiciently show the nature of the difficult 
 circumstances in which men will from time to time be placed in 
 
 C)) February r., 1847. 
 
 (1;) Fiscliel."77(^ L'lKf/ish f'nnxtilution. Shee's Translation, p. 480. 
 
 (7) J'a/l Mall Gazette, October 7, 1874. 
 
19 
 
 t language was 
 s description of 
 the good of his 
 e not troubled 
 '11 the spirit ol 
 could say in a 
 ninary remarks 
 call on me and 
 bmit. I am in 
 ar as suits the 
 zot thus falling 
 f international 
 same by one 
 merston. 7'he 
 t, wherein des- 
 mutilated, and 
 ■ Parliament by 
 instruction and 
 such garblings 
 Guizot for the 
 nd the good of 
 
 iiicniiiiig. 
 
 t'ehdd a recent 
 ■ve, but even of 
 most Jesuitical 
 :an Church, in 
 ster felt called 
 c Assembly at 
 tain language 
 jrethren. 7'he 
 's : " At Bonn 
 nd. AVe were 
 arated from us 
 ie of language 
 
 to a mutual 
 n the Dean's 
 
 have rejoiced 
 irt of mental 
 ■'arious shades 
 ler the Dean's 
 :wer to decide. 
 
 " the difficult 
 3e placed in 
 
 practical life, when they are called upon to decide between the claims 
 of two apparently conflicting duties, and the various methods they 
 naturally employ to escape from the difficulty, without perhaps troubling 
 themselves to construct theories on the subject. And yet the two 
 methods that we have given do in fact illustrate the two different 
 principles that Catholic theologians have suppHed for its solution. The 
 first system is that of St. Thomas, in whose view a lie is always malum 
 in se, intrinsically and absolutely evil (8). Nothing, therefore, according 
 to this teaching, can justify the use of utterances not in conformity 
 with the contents of the mind. Under sucii a system, which be it 
 remarked is distinguished by the strictest and most delicate and jealous 
 care for the maintenance of truth, there is no other means of meeting 
 difficulties like those we have been considering than recourse to equi- 
 vocation and mental reservation in the wider acceptation of the term. 
 If we are asked by a murderer whether his intended victuii lies con- 
 cealed in our house, which is the actual fact, unless we are prepared 
 to sacrifice the life of another by the most rigid construction of St. 
 'J'homas' principle, we must fall back upon the Dean of Chester's- 
 different shades of meaning in the framing of our answer, for the 
 protection of the man who has put his life into our keeping. 
 
 The other view is that intimated by Scotus, (9) who regards truth as 
 a part of justice, and im]jlies that in consequence critical circumstances 
 may arise in which the obligation to truth loses its force; just as the 
 law " Thou shall not kill " is suspended when the public good requires 
 the execution of a criminal, or under the exigencies of self-defence. 
 'J'hus, then, in the case above given, this view would sanction direct 
 denial in reply to the murderer's question, because the law of truth, or 
 of conformity of word with thought, does not hold in the face of the 
 much greater evil that would result from the death of an innocent man, 
 than from the apparent violation of the law. 
 
 Joroiuy Taylor. Milt4»ii. I*sil<\v and .IoIiiimoii 
 on till' (lillioiilty. 
 
 Other theories have been constructed in support of the above con- 
 clusion. That tor instance \\hich distinguishes between communicable 
 and incommunicable knowledge. The ])hysician, the lawyer, the con- 
 fessor has cognizance of the things, the knowledge of which he is by 
 common consent not only allowed but bound to deny. Again with the 
 same view, a lie has been defined to be " a speech contrary to the mind 
 of the speaker, made to another from whom he has no right to conceal 
 the truth." Cases where the right to conceal the trutli would exist are 
 similar to those which we have adduced above, or like those mentioned 
 by Dr. Newman in the passage wliere he exhibits the agreement of 
 many English writers of great authority with what we may call the- 
 Scotist view. 
 
 Great Eiiorliiih milliors. Jeroni • Taylor, Milton. Puloy, Jolinson, men of very 
 • liti'ert'iit ficTioolt* of thought, dis'iiK'tly say that under certain extiuonlinary cir- 
 ciinistances it is allowal)le to tel a lie' Taylor says : '' To tell a lie for charity, to 
 
 0. 
 
 (8) St. Thomas. 2. 2. q. 110. .1. .!. 
 (!l) Summii. •-'. 2. q. 110. .3, (list. 38. 
 
1 
 
 'a 
 
 save a ui 
 
 2«j 
 
 c.,.,c .» u.an's life, the life of a friend, of a husband, of a prince, of a useful and a 
 public person, hath nut only been done at all times, but commended by great and 
 ■Hi,se and good men. Wiii) would not save his father's life, at the charge of a 
 harmless lie, from persecutors or tyrants?" Again. Milton says : " What man in 
 his .senses would deny that there are those whom we have the best grounds for 
 considering that we oujiiit to deceive — as ooys. madmen, the sick, the intoxicated, 
 enemies, men in error, thieves? I would ask'. By which of the Commandments is a 
 lie forbidden '.' Vou will say by the ninth '.' If tlien my lie does not injuremy neigh- 
 bour, cei'tainly it is not forbidden liy this Oonimaudment." PaUysays: "There 
 are falsehoods which are not lies, that is, which are not criminal." Johnson; 
 '• The general rule is. that truth should never be vickiated ; there must however lie 
 some e.xceiitions. If. for iiistiuue. a murderer should ask you which way a man is 
 gone." (10) 
 
 In putting these two views before our readers, while avowing our 
 own preference for the latter, we had chiefly for our object the 
 endeavour to place before them the nature of the circumstances under 
 which the Catholic theologians who uphold the lawfulness of equivo- 
 cation in the modern sense of the word, or of mental reservation, 
 considt r its application permissible ; and having done this, we may 
 ask theni whether the ])rinciple is of such a nature as to merit the 
 obloquy that has been cast upon it from the time of Pascal to our own. 
 The system in fact has been excogitated out of the tenderest regard for 
 the interests, and on the highest j^ossible estimate of truth ; whether its 
 ap])lication to cases in the concrete has been always cajntble of justifi- 
 cation is a matter of detail, which we shall deal with when we come to 
 consider some of the Reviewer's examples That Father Ciury guards 
 against niisajiplication, is most evident from the rules that he lays down 
 with respect to the cases in which mental reservation is not lawful. 
 He declares that equivocation in the wide sense, cannot be employed, 
 without reason or with the sole intention to deceive : nor if the interro- 
 gator has a right to the truth; nor if any damage to one's neighbour 
 should result from it, against the precept of charity ; nor in the framing 
 of contracts, where justice is concerned, (i i ) 
 
 We feel that we have laid ourselves open to the charge of tediousness 
 by dwelling at such length upon a subject that has been worn well- 
 nigh threadbare : our only ai)ology is that for dense ignonnce like 
 that manifested by the Quarti'/iy Reviewer, no amount of explanation 
 can be sufficient. In any case we feel that we cannot conclude this 
 branch of our subject better than with the words of the Saturday 
 Reviewer, speaking of Father Morris' edition of Father (ierard's 
 Narrative of the GunpoMder Plot. " The Editor has given in addition 
 a brief account of the remaining thirty-one years of (lerards' life, after 
 which he proceeds to institute a deliberate defence of his veracity, 
 and enters into the general question of equivocation and direct lying 
 under certain difficult circumstances. This dissertation seems to us 
 wholly superfluous. The whole question has been discussed with 
 unequalled delicacy and refinement in Dr. Newman's Apologia, and 
 the treatment it received from that master-hand is familiar to all who 
 care anything at all about the subject." (12) 
 
 Let 
 the Re 
 After 
 purely 
 follow;- 
 
 •• I'or 
 «? also ' 
 gucli 
 and not 
 device 
 ■which 
 
 He 
 
 Cons 
 can be 
 sworn, 
 deparli 
 cii>le 
 moral < 
 the pi'r 
 apiui'li 
 
 (10) Ih.ilor;/ 0/ ni;/ Ri'/i'/iniiit Ofii/iinn^, 
 
 (11) T/ieol. Mor. tom. i. p. 4T4. 
 
 (12) Saturdai/ lierh'W, April -'O. 187'J. 
 
 p. "274. Cf. note 4. 
 
I II useful and a 
 hy great Hn<l 
 jhe charge of ji 
 r What man in 
 Jt grounds for 
 lie intoxicated, 
 landments is a 
 Ijnrenivneijrh- 
 Isavs: "There 
 •Johnson : 
 |st however lie 
 
 way a man i:< 
 
 vowing our 
 
 object the 
 •ices under 
 
 of equivo- 
 •cservation, 
 ■'^j ^ve may 
 niL'rit the 
 to our own. 
 t regard for 
 whether its 
 
 of justifi- 
 "^ couie to 
 iry guards 
 l.iys down 
 >ot lawful, 
 eui ployed, 
 1^' iiiterro- 
 neighbour 
 'cfrauiing 
 
 diousness 
 orn Well- 
 "ice like 
 ilauation 
 liide this 
 Saturday 
 CJerard's 
 addition 
 ifc;, after 
 ■'eracity, 
 ct lying 
 ns to us 
 ;d with 
 'iiu and 
 ill who 
 
 # 27 
 
 Tlic K4>vi<'M(M''M garbled <>xti'a€tM. 
 
 Let us now pass on to the disjointed mass of garbled extracts that 
 the Reviewer heaps together under the head of ^^ental Reservations. 
 After his novel and ingenious discovery of the distinction bet\veen 
 purely and latently mental reservations, the Reviewer proceeds as 
 follows — 
 
 "For grave reasons" it is "lawful at times to nuxkc- use of Uiliul reservations* 
 «s also of eijnivdcal terms." it lieing (|Mite essential, however, that the terms be 
 euch "as make it possible for the listener to iindfi stainl a nutter as it really is, 
 and not ,is it may sound. In I'ther woriis. it is a condition .«//('>(///(? /k//( for tins 
 device to pass muster, that it shuuld lie carefully cousti iicted out of terms into 
 V liich a doulilc nioaniiijj' can possilily Ik' impj)rted." 
 
 I'l'OiiiiNOM himI 4>hI1i!». 
 
 He then proceeds — 
 
 r(UisisteMtl\ with this I'uling. \\ c learn lliat no natli in'( i| be binding of which it 
 ■can be alleged that a sense of pressure conduced at the time to its having been 
 pworit. ('(H'iciou may very fairly betaken as an extenu.iting circumstance for 
 departure from an eujiagement : but it is startling to lind it enunciated as a ])rin- 
 ciple, in the standard liamibook for t In.' instruction of Roman Catlndic youths in 
 moral obliiiations, that an oath may be repudiated with ))ertccl impunity, if only 
 the iii'i'son who has sworn i)lcads to liaviug lieeu inllueuceil in his luind by some 
 apprehcnsi(Ui of jiossiblx injurious conse(|Ueuces. unless he did so swcjar (p. (14). 
 
 > \\'c select the above passage because it gives a sample of the 
 Reviewer's method of trealiiieiit ihruughout his article. 'J'here is in 
 the first place a |)al('hing of things together thtt have no necessary 
 connection. What bearing has the question of the o!)ligation of an 
 oath taken on compulsion with equivocation ? The nulter to be decided 
 is the binding force of an act, not the interpretation of a form of words. 
 Next there is gross and most unfair garl)ling and \\ hat we may call 
 letting down of the force of w ords, so as to give the i>assage referred 
 to a sense not at all intended, if not actually opposed to that of the 
 original. Thus we here have il stated that an oatii taken under a sense 
 of pressure ithe italics are ours) need not be binding. .And again, that 
 an oath may be repudiated with perfect impunity, if only the person 
 who has sworn pleads to having been at the time intluenced in his 
 mind by some apprehension q^ possibly injurious consequences. 
 
 l*al(\v anil Ciiiiry on l*i'oiiiJM('!^. 
 
 Now how does (Itiry put the case and solve it.^ (1^:5) .-/// o/</i^i^ef 
 juramcntum proinissoriuiu nicin gravi et injusto extort urn i Does a 
 promissory oath bind that has been extorted under the pressure of 
 weighty fear unjustly unflicted ? Not, mark, mider a sense of pressure, ox 
 of some apprehension of I'ossiblv injurious eonse(juenees ; but under fear 
 caused by grave ar ". unjust concussion, (iury replies thus : " This is a 
 matter of controversy. The first and more common opinion is that it is 
 binding, because although the simjile contract would be void as far 
 as natural law is concerned, yet it becomes binding in virtue of the 
 oath that has been superadded ; for an oath must be kept ex re/ignine- — 
 
 (1,3) Tlool. Mor. torn. i. p. I'.Hi. Roma-, ISiW. 
 
bv force of the virtue of religion — as often as this can be done withom 
 sin." In support of this view (iury (juotes St. Alphonsus, adding thai 
 nevertheless the upholders of this opinion maintain with St, Alphonsu> 
 that a dispensation from such an oath may be legitimately sought : 
 or that even if the terms of the oath have been complied with, tho 
 injured party may seek remedy at law, or, where all other means o\ 
 obtaining his rights fail, indemnify himself by occult compensation. 
 
 ''The second opinion, which seems to l)e sufficiently probable, 
 denies the obligation of the oath, since an oath cannot confirm that 
 which is null and void by the law of nature ; for an oath follows the 
 nature of the act." Our readers can now form a judgment of the 
 Reviewer's trustworthiness. For ourselves, we do not hesitate to brand 
 his treatment of the above question — and it is only one sample out ot 
 many — as a fraud upon the public, our hope being at the same time- 
 that by his utter incompetency to deal with the subject, he will be 
 relieved from the penalties that would attach to conscious deliberation. 
 
 As a comment on the above soUition of the difficulty by Gury, we 
 give Paley's way of meeting the question. But first we will quote what 
 he says as to the obligation of promissory oaths. He simply says, 
 '' Promissory oaths are //o/ hiiufni\;, where the i)romise itself would not 
 be so" (r4). Having laid down this principle, let us see how he deals 
 with a promise extorted by fear or violence. 
 
 It lias loiip; liocn controvirteii iinmiig't moriili:<ts, wlietlicr prdtiiiscs be himliiii; 
 wliicii jiro extoitcd liy viok'iice or tear. The oliligiitioii ot all promise!^ results, we 
 have seen, frnm the necessity or the use of that eontideiiee which inaukiiul repose 
 in them. The i[iu'Stioii. therefi)re. whether these ])romises ai'c binding, will depend 
 upon this, whether mankind, npon the whole, are benefited by the confidence placed 
 in such promises? A hii;'hwaynnui attacks yon — and bein^ disapjiointed of his 
 booty, threatens or i>repares to murder yon; — yon promise, \s\\.\\ nniny solemn 
 asseverations, that if he will sjiare your life, he shall tiinl a jturse of money left for 
 him at a place apiioinled :— upon the f'aitli of this promise, he fiuhears from further 
 violence. Now, yonr life was saved by the conlidence reposed in a promise ex- 
 torted liy fear: and the lives of many others may be saxed by the same. This is a 
 j;ood coiyseipience. On the other hand, a confidence in proniises like these woulii 
 greatly facilitate the jierpctration iif robberies: they mifiht be iniide instruments 
 of almost unlimited extortion. This is a bad consequence: and in the question 
 between the iuipo-tance of these ojiposite consequences, resides the doubt concern- 
 ing the oblijration of such piomises. (1.^)) . 
 
 Paley then on his own utilitarian principles gives the same solution as 
 Gury; that is, he gives the two different opinions entertained by mora- 
 lists on the matter, and there leaves the question. 
 
 Obligation oi' l*roiiiiwcv>ii heloro ac'ot'ptaiioi'. 
 
 But let us proceed — 
 
 Tt is well (the Reviewer says), to follow out Gary's doctrine as to the force of 
 solemnly contract.eii promise's. In the section aboiit CoiUracts we find this querv : 
 '•If a donation has been promised on oath, but has not yet been delivered, isit 
 still binding'.' '• which is answered negatively on the ground that, as the deed is 
 incomplete, it is void in substance, and consecpiently no oath in reference thereto 
 can be held to have binding force. 
 
 We have already pointed out the blunder of the Reviewer with reference 
 
 (14) Mnrnl Philoso/ihif, bk. iii. ])t. i. c. bl. 
 
 fi.", 
 
 ) Ibid 
 
done without 
 k adding that 
 pt. Alphonsus 
 ttely sought : 
 I'ed with, the 
 ler means of 
 [pen sat ion. 
 ■W probable, 
 Iconfirm thai 
 follows the 
 bment of the 
 itaie to brand 
 iample out ol 
 le same time- 
 lie will be 
 deliberation. 
 ~>y Gury, wo 
 ' quote what 
 simply says, 
 elf would not 
 low he deals 
 
 •'3 be liiiidiiii. 
 
 ■•^I'S I'fSllltS, Wu 
 
 aiilvind repose 
 'S,'- will depend 
 "idence placed 
 pDiiited of liis 
 
 many .solemn 
 money left for 
 •s from further 
 n pi'onii.se ex- 
 Qie. Tlii.s is a 
 ' tliese Would 
 " iiistruiuents 
 
 •liL' question 
 Jnlit eoncerii- 
 
 •solution as 
 d by moia- 
 
 i'. 
 
 ic ''occe of 
 this fjuerv ; 
 \'t'''ed, is"it 
 he deed i,< 
 '(■e tliereto 
 
 reference 
 
 29 
 
 to the word "delivered ; " the proper translation is, "accepted." (i6) 
 Now what does Paley say about the obligation of promises bifore 
 acceptancn ? That they are not binding, tor they are only in that case to 
 be regarded " as a resolution in the mind of the ])romiser, which may be 
 altered at pleasure" (17). But he has already lold us that oatiis are not 
 binding when the promise itself is not so ; therefore in the present 
 case Paley agrees with Ciury in deciding that the oath is not binding. 
 
 Oflior liniitulioiiM. 
 
 I'he Reviewer goes on — 
 
 Father Gnrv--and lie is in accord with the divines of his Oi'der-luH. however, 
 more to sny in limitation of the olili^iatioii lollowinfr im oaths. He lays it down, 
 that uccordinji' to more prohahle opinion, no oath is biiulin^- " if made with the 
 intention indeed of swcarinrr, hut not of liindin<r." tlioMiih he admits that to |io 
 deiiherately thoufrh the seudilaf.ce of fin oath without any intention tu l;'"'i) It, 
 does involve " a venial sin .amountinji to a lie, with a taking in vain of (<rid's 
 name.'' 
 
 As usual the Rev'ewer here jumbles things up together that ought to 
 be kept distinct. In the place referred to Gury treats of two separate 
 questions ; first he says that a fictitious promissory oath, uttered that 
 is externally, without the intention of swearing, is not binding for want 
 of the will to make it so. But he adds that a person thus simulating 
 an oath sins, more probably venially only, /tv se loquemlo, looking that 
 is at the mere nature of the act itself, for the .natter does not amount to 
 more than a lie, to which the taking God's name is added. But he 
 proceeds to say. the sin may often become mortal, by reason of the 
 ])rivate or public loss that may ensue. And Father Eallerini in a note 
 cites a proposition condemned by Innocent the Eleventh to the effect, 
 that " when cause is given, it is lawful to swear without the intention 
 of swearing, whether in a trifling or in a weighty matter." Ballerini 
 adds, that .St. Alphonsus indeed agrees with Gury in the above solution 
 about a fictitious oath, in saying that the offender sins venially only, 
 but that he limits this opinion by saying that it is true only if the person 
 fictitiously swearing, really has the intention of fulfilling his promise : 
 for other7C'ise, the Saint says lie 7,.'0'ilii sin mortally. 
 
 Gury then passes on to the consideration of another case, and states 
 that the more probable opinion is that an oath taken with the intention 
 indeed of swearing but not of binding oneself d'.v reli,i^ione, that is to 
 say, by the sanctions of the virtue of religion, is null and void ; and 
 that for the reason that such an act is nugatory, carries with it in fact 
 its own nullification. To understand this we must bear in mind that 
 theologians define an oath ioht, invoeatioiiivini nominis in testimo/iinm 
 vcritatis ; a calling upon the name of God, that is, in testimony of the 
 truth of an utterance, or, we may add, in confirmation of a promise. 
 \n oath thus regarded they moreover consider to be an act that fixlls 
 under the virtue of religion, or that virtue which corresponds to the 
 ])rescriptions of the first table, to render due honour and worship to 
 God. If then a man were to take an oath expressly e.vcluding at the 
 same time any obligation arising from this virtue of religion, he would 
 
 (Ui) P. (55. 
 (17) Loe. elt. 
 
80 
 
 simply be taking away from his act the essential character of an oatii, 
 and be i)relendinf^ to do that which he was especially guarding himsi'lt 
 against doing. His act tVoui the very nature of th^' case would be >i 
 pretence and a nullity. And this is the reason why in our cour s ot 
 law the oath of a man who does not believe in (lod is not accepted ; 
 for an oath involves the existence of God, and the recognition of Him 
 in the very act of swearing, and thus carries along with it its own 
 religious sanction and biiuling l"orce. But a man who does not believe 
 in God practically puts it out of his power to enter into such relations 
 with Him. 
 
 But (iury proceds to say, an oath taken with the intention of 
 swearing, but not of obliging oneself (W Jnstitia ant ex Ji//c/ifate, in 
 justice and good faith, is still a valid oath. Cleady, whatever may be 
 said about obligations from other motives, suih an oath is a religious 
 act, and as such bears with it its own binding force. 
 
 We are perhaps trying the patience of our readers by entering into 
 what they will think very subtle niceties, but we consider it absohitely 
 necessary to do so in order thoroughly to expose the juggling method 
 of treatment adopted by the Reviewer. With the cunning sleight of 
 hand of the onjurer with his cups and balls, he changes and mixes up 
 one subject with another till he throws what he ])rotesses to be treating 
 of into an obscurity that utterly confuses the reader's mind, and renders 
 it capable of only one conclusion, that there is evidently something in 
 such doctrines ])rofoundly bad and immoral, though he has no more 
 notion of what those doctrines themselves are, nor in what their 
 immorality consists than most i)robably the Reviewer himself. 
 
 The Reviewer continues on his way — 
 
 To rciniive all doiiht as to \\\m\ is implicil, fliis exiitanation is pfiveii : •' Tlie 
 bindiiiji' force otiiii oatii lias to he iiitcrprctcil ao(:or(iiiii>' to tlie tacit conditions 
 eitiier incliidi'il or implied (xiihii'>fU -7'/.'') therein ; wiiieliaie; [1] If! could have 
 done so " iihoiit irrave iiijni'v ; [2^ if'ruatter.< had not notal)!}- chanj^ed ; [vi] if the 
 rights iu. I will of the .Superior were not contrary ; [t] if the other had kept his 
 faith; [.'>] if the other doe.s noi waive his right.'' [IH) 
 
 The connection between this citation and what has gone before is not 
 at all obvious. There has been question hitherto as to the existence 
 of an oath under certain circumstances ; and the Reviewer now passes 
 on to discuss the obligations of an oath when it exists, which is quite 
 another matter. Besides, he only dtags in one portion of Gury's 
 statements in relation to the determination of the extent to which this 
 or thrt oath obliges, not his whole explanation on the subject. But 
 let this pass. Then he proceeds- 
 
 We have here supplied the italics in the above passage for the purpose of 
 asking our readers to compare, the expressions thus emphasized with 
 the first condition to which reference is made. .SV poiucro sine gravi 
 
 '181 Gurr, i. p. 345. 
 
 i^"' 
 
'f of an oat I), 
 Ningliinistli' 
 \voiild be ,, 
 pur cour s oi 
 f't accepted ; 
 Jition of Hini 
 |t'i it its own 
 pnot believe 
 r'l relations 
 
 I intention ot 
 yiffclitate, in 
 fv'er may be 
 a religious 
 
 nteiing into 
 f absolutely 
 '"g method 
 ? sleight ot 
 iJ mixes up 
 ^ Ije treating 
 and renders 
 )niething in 
 IS no more 
 ^\liat their 
 elf. 
 
 piven ; •' The 
 't foiiditions 
 f could Imvt- 
 ^\m if the 
 ''ad l<e|)t his 
 
 ore is not 
 ■ existence 
 'o\y passes 
 'i is quite 
 3f Gury's 
 v'hich this 
 ect. But 
 
 !.t virtually 
 It to allege 
 Ae serious 
 sled pariv 
 fgestUselV 
 
 Jrpose of 
 zed with 
 'te gravl 
 
 81 
 
 dumno^ says Father Gury. If I could havedone so without .i^vr^rr injury y. 
 says the Reviewer ; and then stryightway. in the face of his own 
 translation, ton"s down the words i^'/vir-f iiijnry, involving in the mind 
 of Father Gury the notion of heavy loan, (graz'i t/amno) mxo serious 
 discomfort, and then adds that it is left r;uite to the mere will of the 
 person bound by oath to find out some such discomfort as may be a 
 justification for breaking his oath, when the I)reaking of it may be 
 pleasant ti) him rather than the keeping of it — a case, we fear, not 
 unlikely to hapjjen. 
 
 We ask, not wheiiier such tampering with and gross misinterpretation 
 of te<:hnical words having a fixt-d and definite meaning in moral science 
 be woi thy of a scientific mind, but wluther it be consistent with fairness 
 and honesty ? We are quite willing to leave this (pK.'stion to the judg- 
 ment of our readers. Thin the Reviewer asserts in his own involved 
 and roundai)out style th.it there is no check placed ui)on the interested 
 party to hinder him from Hxlling back ujion fictitious motives for 
 breaking his oath in any given case to his own advantage. No check 
 except this — that Christian divines are writing for the guidance of 
 Christian men ; that both one and the other acknowledge an all-seeing 
 God Who will one day judge them according to their words and works. 
 And this is a check to which the Reviewer would do well to pay heed, 
 for it is one that especially demands that in moral matters words should 
 be used rigidly according to their recognized scientific meaning. 
 
 Aiiotlicr iiiMtaiK'e ol' tlio Koviewor'N 
 fraudiileiil iik'UkmI. 
 
 \\'e will take orle more example of the Reviewer's fraudulent method 
 of dealing with Gury. 
 
 The pioliihitiiiii asiiinst S|)iiitiial iulvisers iiitt';fei'iii<r to muki- .SD-ciilIfil ppTiItcntg. 
 fiiteitiiiii ft ri^nil sense (it'iliity ai\' eliiliorati'ly cxplic'it. TIkhiuIi lie niiiilil iiave 
 li^rouiidrsto entcrtdin '' doiilitsiHto I lie sincerity df tlie])enitriir." the cnnfVt.sor is yet 
 fiiinply Id ficeept his stit1einent3. Even in tlie ciise of " hiivinjr certJiin knowledije 
 that a sin has been kcjit hack or denied," the coiitessor is nut to extract its admis- 
 8ion unless in a roundalioiit manner, hut he shall jfinnl absolution bei'iiuse th& 
 penitent must he helieved, whether speakinfr for or ajiiiinst himself ; and " if he 
 really did commit the sin in (|nestion, it may he presnined he has forgotten it, or 
 confessed it \ci another, or has some j^reat cause for keeping it secret, or that the 
 informers were deceived." [[i. 1)5]. 
 
 We have here, if possible, a worse case of disingenuous misrepre- 
 sentation than those we have considered. In the first jjlace the opening 
 clause involves positive untruth. No such prohibition exists ; the suj)- 
 position that confessors are to be kept from forming as rigid a sense 
 of duty as possible in the minds of those who seek their ministry is a 
 gratuitous calumny. Again, we have another instance of two cases 
 being fused together in such a way as entirely to obscure the bearing 
 of the question, and to present the matter to the reader in the worst 
 possible light. Then, when he says that where the confessor has a 
 certain knowledge that a sin has been kept back or denied, the penitent 
 is to be absolved, for he must be believed, whether speaking for or 
 against himself, the Reviewer states precisely the opposite to Gury's 
 solution. The latter says, if the confessor is quite certain that the sin 
 was committed by the penitent he cannjt ab-iolve him while he denies. 
 
32 
 
 it, that is, if he is also certain that ihi man has not forgotten it, oi 
 has no just ground for withholding it. The rule, "'J'he penitent is tn 
 be beheved for as well as against himself," holds indeed wheie certainty 
 is wanting, not where it is present. 
 
 The other case is to this effect —If the confessor knows that the sin 
 has been committed from information received out of confession from 
 a third party, the penitent has as much right to be believed as the 
 other, and therefore absolution may not be withheld. But this is 
 merely a (piestion of probable evidence, not of certainty, and the 
 penitent having a strict right to absolution on the supposition of his 
 sincerity, the doubt that may exist in the confessor's mind, after having 
 taken all means to arrive at a right decision, is not a sulficient ground 
 for withholding the enjoyment of his rights from the ])enitent. Tne 
 (|iiestioning in a roundabout manner by the confessor to which the 
 Reviewer refers, is connected with an entirely different case ; that in 
 which the confessor has obtained the knowledge of some sin of one 
 ])enitent through the confession of another, perhaps an accomplice; 
 and such knowledge cannot be used in any way that might betray the 
 source of his information, tor that would involve a breach of the seal 
 of confession. In such a case therefore he can only proceed with the 
 greatest possible caution in his endeavours to help the penitent to 
 realize his state before God. In short, the whole question is an 
 evidence of the care with wliicli the Church proceeds, and is bound to 
 proceed, in a matter of such delicacy as that of voluiitary confession, 
 where the penitent is at once accuser and accused ; and it shows more- 
 over the groundlessness of the charge of tyrannizing over consciences 
 in the tribunal of penance by the ministers of the Church. Every 
 precaution is taken to give perfection to a voluntary act of humiliation, 
 and to se'ure to the penitent his just fr(!edom in the discharge of a 
 solemn duty which concerns himself alone. (19) 
 
 The Reviewer then tacks on to what has been said above a case 
 which has no possible connection with it. 
 
 What room for e((niv(uation i^^ utForded liy this nilint?, tlie following exemplifl- 
 <'atioii will siiow. "Anna liuviiit;- lieen guilty of iidiiltcry. and being interrogated 
 by her lui.-sliand, who ha-? formed a suspicion, iiiiswers tlie first time, that she has 
 not violated wedlock ; tiie second time, having in the interval obtained absolution, 
 she replies, 1 :in\ i/ni////;.s.'< o/xiir/i crime. The tliird time she absolutely denies the 
 adultery, ami says, / /mr/' not r<)iiimille<l ii . meaning within herself such particular 
 adultery as 1 am bound to reveal, or. 1 have not committed an act of adultery that 
 lias to lie revealed to you. Is Anna to be blamed?" Gury's reply, too loiig'to be 
 given here, justifies each answer of the adulterous woman, siipjtorting his ruling 
 by a grave array of .Jesuit authorities, ainongs which figure Suarez and St. Liguori — 
 
 St. Liguori not being a Jesuit all the same. 
 
 We repeat here that the two cases are quite distinct. In the former 
 there was question cf a priest in the tribunal of penance who had a 
 right to interrogate so far as was necessary to the discharge of his 
 office ; in the latter case the interrogator had no such right. 
 
 Then, the Reviewer keeps back the trufh, tl\at none of Anna's 
 equivocations would have been lawful if her husband had possessed 
 the right to question her, she was not therefore bound to answer him. 
 
 and wa 
 those w 
 permit 
 On the 
 
 III 
 
 [19] Gury, t. ii. p. 516. 
 
ptten it, 01 
 
 -niteiit is to 
 
 I'le certainty 
 
 ''lat the sin 
 ssioii from 
 ved as the 
 iut this is 
 \y, and the 
 tion of his 
 'ter having 
 "t ground 
 tent. Tne 
 \\hich the 
 e ; that in 
 sin of one 
 ccomplice; 
 '^L'tray the 
 <>'" the seal 
 'd with the 
 Jeniient to 
 ■on is an 
 hound to 
 onfession, 
 lows more- 
 onsciences 
 h. Every 
 iimih'ation, 
 large of a 
 
 ve a case 
 
 83 
 
 and was free to protect herself as she could. To help her to do that, 
 those who hold that the law of truth can never he suspended, would 
 permit her to have recourse to equivocation and mentui restriction. 
 •On the other hand, those who take the opposite view, would say with 
 Palcy, that "where the person you speak Id has no right to know the 
 truth," a falsehood ceases to be a lie ; or, that in this case the prmciple 
 ■of English law aj)plies, that no one is bound to sjjcak the truth, "when 
 a full discovery of tlie truth tends to accuse the witness himself of some 
 legal crime." In other words, no one is bound to criminate himself, 
 unless a gnive public danger requires it. Now this was Anna's case. 
 Had she acknowledged her crime, she would have been liable to legal 
 penalties; therefore the Law of truth was sus])ended in her case ; her 
 husband was seeking to know what he hatl no right to ask ; she could 
 then reply by flat and absolute denial. For ourselves we can only say 
 that the latter solution commends itself to us as most in keeping with 
 ■straightforwardness and common sense. The matler may perhaps be 
 made a little clearer by reversing the case. Supj)ose that it had been 
 Anna who was questioning her husband ^Villiam about his violations 
 of wedlock, would William have felt hinisrif bound to give categorical 
 answers to Anna's interrogations ? Most probably the answer would 
 have been, You have no right to ask me such questions ; mind your 
 own business. But if the urgency of suspicion was not thus easily to 
 l>e put aside, would W'illiam in the long run have hesitated to use 
 Anna's equivocations, or to answer, No ? Our space comi)els us to 
 pause here for the present, but we have by no means yet done with 
 the Quarterly Reviewer. 
 
 PART III. 
 KoNtitiilioii and Cliaritj. 
 
 ■ exemplifi- 
 iterrogated 
 iiat she bus 
 nljsolution, 
 denies the 
 particular 
 'Itery that 
 long to be 
 'lis ruling 
 ijiguori — 
 
 2 former 
 10 had a 
 ■ of his 
 
 Anna's 
 assessed 
 er him. 
 
 (The Month, Loiidon, May 1875, p. 71). 
 
 We propose to conclude our notice of the Quarterly Theologian by 
 a iew remarks in the present paper upon two subjects that exercise him 
 sorely and betray him into endless confusion. We confine ourselves to 
 these, because it wo\iId be quite impossible to follow him through his 
 motley mass of disingenuous patchwork without committing ourselves 
 to the composition of suijdry and lengthy moral treatises. Two of his 
 topics, besides, have already been discussed in the pages of the Month, 
 and dealt with sufficiently by anticipation to dispose of the Reviewer's 
 blundering and misleading method of handling them. We refer to 
 Probabilism and Tyrannicide. The former was treated of in our January 
 number of 1868, in a Paper entitled, " What is Probabilism? " and the 
 latter in an article contained in the number for March — April, 1873. 
 
 The points to which we shall now direct our readers' attention are 
 Restitution and Charity ; subjects to which the Reviewer addresses 
 himself more or less from page 72 to 85 of his article. We shall not 
 attempt to follow him in all his details, but shall content ourselves, in 
 
 / 
 
11 
 
 :i4 
 
 tlic first place, with laying down the general theological principles 
 which govern tlicsc nialtcrs ; and then, in the second place, showing 
 from some of the examples adduced by the Reviewer, and from his 
 attempts to understand them, how entirely he is without any intelligent 
 grasp of tlie principles in (pieslion. 
 
 1>llti«'M ol* JllMliC<>. 
 
 To begin with Restitution, which is a part of natural justice, and 
 therefore, under certain circumstances, an obligatory duty. All our 
 <!uties spririg from the various relations in which we stand, either to 
 (iod, to ourselves, or to our ftllow-men. Our duties to our fellow-men 
 are of two kinds : duties of justice and duties of charity. Justice is 
 defined by Father Gury as a moral virtue, which constantly inclines the 
 will to render his rights to another, or to each individual man. The 
 intention, then, of justice is to insist that all shall have their due, and 
 to maintain due equality anu)ngst men in general, or between man and 
 man in i)articular. Justice, theretore, has regard to such matters as the 
 restitution of what has been unjustly taken from another, the repara- 
 tion of injury, abstention from fraud, the keeping of faith in compacts, 
 and the maintenance of every man in the full enjoyment of his rights. 
 
 Again, the duties prescribed by justice are divided into different 
 classes, according to the different aspects under which justice is viewed ; 
 for there is a legal justice, a distributive justice, a vindictive justice, 
 and a commutative justice. The three first refer to the relations of the 
 ruler to the subject ; the last, that is, commutative justice, refers, it is 
 sufficient for our present ])urpose to say, to the relations between pri- 
 vate ])ersons. It is under commutative justice alone that cases of res- 
 titution fall ; for restitution simply means the giving back what belongs 
 to another person when it has been wrongfully taken fiom him. Hence 
 it follows that for an obligation of restitution to exist, there must exist 
 on the other side a right to receive it. 
 
 The obligation to restitution may arise in three ways : from taking 
 or receiving what belongs to another unjustly ; from unjustly causing 
 dainage in goods, in person or in character, to another ; or from unjust 
 co-ojicration, which results in either of the above ; thus, in matter of 
 fact, the last-mentioned ground of restitution resolves itself into one of 
 the two former grounds. 
 
 Forniii Kx(<>^rniiui et Forum CoiiHolcnliip. 
 
 There is still another matter which requires to be made clear II 
 connection with the obligation to restitution, and that the more urgent- 
 ly because of the utter confusion of mind betrayed by the Reviewer 
 on the subject. We refer to the distinction between the Forum Inter- 
 num and the Forum Externum. The word Forum may be taken for 
 jurisdiction, or judicial power in general. The Forum Internum refers 
 often entirely, always principally, to the secrets of the heart. Thus it 
 is sometimes called the Forum Conscientiae, because it takes cognizance 
 of acts by which a man, knowing himself in relation to the great law 
 of right and wrong, impressed upon his intelligence by the hand of 
 God, conforms himself or places himself in opposition to that great law,. 
 
principles 
 
 li showing 
 
 from his 
 
 Intclhgcnt 
 
 fee, and 
 All our 
 cither to 
 How men 
 ustice is 
 tlincs the 
 II. 'i'hc 
 due, and 
 man and 
 rsas tlie 
 rcpara- 
 >ni pacts, 
 rights, 
 different 
 viewed ; 
 justice, 
 IS of the 
 ers, it is 
 veen pri- 
 ;s of res- 
 Ijelongs 
 • Hence 
 Jst exist 
 
 I taking 
 causing 
 I unjust 
 Uter of 
 one of 
 
 35 
 
 The periiliarit\ of this court is that there i> liut one witness who is able 
 to give testimony. *' No man knoweth the ihwiights of a man save the 
 spirit of a man that is within him." The accused and the accuser are 
 identical. ISiit what guarantei- is there that tne "vidence given !)>' such 
 a j)arlial witness shall he true ? J'here is this giiariUitee, and it is abun- 
 dantly sufficient. The absolution given in the tribunal of Penanee, the 
 special court of this Fonnn liilcimnu, must indeed be pronounced by 
 God's Minist(,'r, i)ul (i()(l Himself must ratify a' (1 execute it. ( l<»d 
 cannot be deceived. If he who accuses himself tells the truth, and is 
 otherwise properly disposed, the pardon pronounced will take effect ; 
 if he tells untruths, the pardon is worthless — nay, worse than worthless, 
 for it adds the guilt of sacrilege to his other sins. 
 
 In the I'orum /•'.xternii>/i, on the other hand, ii is the Church or the 
 State, each in its own re^pwctive courts, w hich both pronoimces and exe- 
 cutes the sentence. 'I'he matter to be judged consists of external acts 
 and of intentions only so far as they can be judged of from their out- 
 ward expression. 'I'he accused may elude by untruths the sentence of 
 such a court ; it becomes his interest then to bear fal.se witness. But 
 on the other hand, the matter of oflcn( e being external, is such that 
 others also can bear testimony to its existence and its nature. Thus, 
 in this external court, it is both necessary and jiossible to hear wit- 
 nesses other than the accused, and to suspect him rather than to trust 
 him in his own cause. 
 
 The bearing of this distinction between the Forum Internum and 
 the J''oruin Jistertium, more especially ui)on the (]uestion of restitution, 
 will be evident from the I'ollowing principles laid down by Father (lury 
 in connection with the obligation loreiiairany loss that may have been 
 unjustly caused to another ; in the case, that is, where injury has been 
 done to the rights or goods of another |)erson wit'iout jny benefit 
 accruing to him who causes the injury. It is clear that the matter of 
 restitution pertains both to one Forum and the other ; this being so. 
 the question naturally arises whether the decisions of the two separate- 
 courts mav not sometimes come into colli.sion. 
 
 PriiicipU'M wlii<'li roK"liit<' KcMtiliitioii in llic 
 Foruiii CoiiMciciiliir. 
 
 ear in 
 
 irgent- 
 
 v'iewer 
 
 Inter- 
 
 Jn for 
 
 refers 
 
 lus it 
 
 zance 
 
 t law 
 
 Id of 
 
 tlaw^ 
 
 Now, the ])rinciples that regulate the Forum Conscientiae in tliu* 
 matter of restitution are (i) That the action causing the loss for which 
 restitution is sought, shall be unjust ; for otherwise, where there is no- 
 violation of strict right, or of commutative justice, no obligation t© 
 restitution can exist. If John's cattle damage a field unjustly ocGupie^ 
 by James, whatever restitution may be due, it is certainly not due to 
 James. (2) Then, the action causing the loss, must be the truly effica- 
 cious cause ; must be such that is, that the loss can be truly said to 
 follow from it ; and also, that it be truly imputed to th^. person incrimi- 
 nated. For clearly, no action can be imputed to a person unless it be 
 his own proper action ; nor can the loss resulting from any action be 
 attributed to the doer, unless that action be the true and efficacious- 
 cause of damage. Thus, if William gives Peter a sword without the 
 slightest suspicion that Peter will make bad use ofit, could William for 
 
 / 
 
 ,M^ 
 
36 
 
 one moment he accounted resj.'onsible for the murder committed by 
 Peter with that sword, or for the damage resulting to the family of the 
 murdered man ? Or again, suppose Edward rushes hastily into the 
 middle of the Strand to save a child's life that is in danger of being run 
 over, and by so doing causes a carriage-horse to take fright and rush 
 through the i)late glass of a jeweller's window, to the sore detriment of 
 both window and carriage ; would any one in his senses say that 
 Edward would be liable to restitution? His praiseworthy action would 
 be said to be the accidental, but certainly not the efficacious cause of 
 the loss ensuing ; it could not be imputed to him with a view to res- 
 titution in any real sense. 
 
 But let us vary the supposition. Instead of a man engaged in a 
 benevolent action, take the case of a thief who has been detected in the 
 very act, and is rushing across the street with the police in full pursuit. 
 A dog terrified by the uproar takes to Hight, and dashes amongst the 
 legs of the horses of a jiassing carriage. The catastro])he supposed 
 in the last case is reijeaied : horses and carriage, and windows and 
 jewels, come to great grief. \\\\o is responsible for the damaj^fe ? 
 Would any cou't of justice m the world say that the thief was ? The 
 unjust action which was rlu; origin of the whole affair, was obviously 
 of such a kind that no ingenuity could twist it into the relation of effi- 
 cacious cause with respect to the remote consequences that followed 
 from it. As far as these ccnsecjuences are concerned, the whole thing 
 can only be regarded as accidental. Nor again, is the connection of 
 the consequences with the act of i)ilfering so close, as in any way to 
 imply the omission of any prudent precaution that might have pre- 
 vented the disaster. The results were beyond the ordinary range of 
 human prevision ; there could be. therefore, no valid plea of negligence 
 against the culprit, nor again of evil intention. The whole occurrence 
 in the street could not but be utterly unforeseen. 
 
 All this brings us to another condition that theologians require that 
 the obligation of restitution may lie in any given case, at least in Foro 
 Inter no. The damificatory act must >> rheologicallv culpable. By 
 theological fault is understood a fault v i -h \.\ .he forum of conscience 
 involves an offence against God either r-Oitui or venial. 
 
 There is also according to the Roman law a fault that is called 
 juridical, which involves some degree of negligence, varying in degree, 
 by which loss is entailed on another in person or property. Now, it is 
 clear that such negligence may involve sin, or it may not ;it may arise 
 from sheer inadvertence, without the slightest prevision, even in a con- 
 fused way. of the evil consequences that may ensue from it ; or it may 
 be negligence voluntarily allowed with the bad intention of bringing 
 about the very consequences that follow. Of such intention the Forum 
 Externum, conversant ,as it is with external acts, can take no cogni- 
 zance , nor again can it judge of the measure of advertence or inad- 
 vertence. The Forum Externuin*ca.n only proceed by the constructive 
 method ; judge, that is, whether such external indications exist, as to 
 justify the imputation of negligence or evil intention. If such indica- 
 tions are sutiiciently ascertained, then the presence of negligence or 
 bad intention is consideied to be sufficiently made out for all legalpur- 
 
 clai 
 jvid 
 ( 
 the 
 anc 
 be 
 
 obi 
 
 On the other hand, in the forum of conscience, the conscience itself 
 
 ILS'JKW 
 
iiitted by 
 
 |ily of the 
 
 into the 
 
 feeing run 
 
 ind rush 
 
 'iment of 
 I say that 
 
 )n would 
 [cause of 
 rv to res- 
 
 37 . 
 
 claims to be beard, and appeals to the judge that judj^es righteous 
 judgment in the last resort, when cases of this kind occur. 
 
 Occasionally, then the two judicatures will come into collision and 
 the Forum Internum will sometimes joronounce the accused guiltless 
 and free from all obligation, when the Forum Kxtcuum judges him to 
 be guilty, and burdens him with the obligation of restitution. At the 
 same time the Inner Forum is careful to uphold the authority of the 
 Outer Forum, and acts upon the principle that, where the fact of negli- 
 gence has been established, even though inadvertent and free from 
 all bad intention, and the sentence of a court of law has imjjosed the 
 obligation of restitution, then such sentence is also binding in Fore 
 cor.scicntiae ; and this on the broad ground that the public security 
 depends on obedience in such cases, and therefore obedience cannot 
 be withheld The exception, however, must always be made of the case 
 where there is a false presumption of fact, for the law always presup- 
 poses the fact, something that has been done, in which negligence has 
 intervened, though possibly without blame in the Forum of Con- 
 science. But if such fact be falsely imputed, then ihe sentence is 
 unjust and can carry no obligation to restitution with it. Such briefly 
 is the teaching of Father Gury on this subject, (i) 
 
 The Koviewer"!* iloro^atury ovproMNioiiK. Tlioir 
 UiitriitliriiliiOM)>. 
 
 Having laid down these principles let us now turn to the Reviewer's 
 examples and interpretations. But. in the lirst i>lace let us premise, 
 that the exjilanation we have given, of the distinction between the 
 Forum Externum and the Forum Internum, at once shows the I'utility 
 and untruthfulness of the derogatory expressions with which the 
 Reviewer so ])lentifully interlards his i)ages. These expressions are 
 inspired by his estimate of " that capital feature of the Jesuit doctrine, 
 providing the unfailing sanction for laviicss in the ai)plication uf prin- 
 ciples, namely, the unlimited discretion accorded ♦^o the individual in 
 assertion of justificatory jjleas " (2) I'hus we have phrases like these 
 used with reference to a penitent in tiie tribunal of penance, " provided 
 he will allege ;" " the unlimited discretion accorded to the individual ;" 
 "will posses an inward disposition ;" " that a person should vehe- 
 mently affirm ; " and so forth ; the object of foisting such ])hrases into, 
 or of connectmg them with Gury s text, being eptirely to falsify his 
 decisions as interpreted by the principles that he lays down. They 
 refer of course to the solenm act by which a penitent by his own act 
 and deeil constitutes himself a criminal in some degree or other before 
 God ; he opens his mind to his confessor, audit then becomes the con- 
 fessor's part not to be satisfied with allegations, or vehement asser- 
 tions, or any amount of professions ; but to judge that the penitent is 
 sincere and truthful in his statements and accusations. Even when 
 satisfied on this jjoint, his subsequent action can only be equivalcntly 
 interpreted in some such f:ishion as this. " Well, I accept the truth of 
 your statements, and in consequence I can only declare that this or 
 
 (T) Oiirv. )>'• Jiiif ■>( ■hi'''>:> I. rap ii. 
 (2) i'. 70. 
 
 iirt. 
 
38 
 
 that obligation rests upon yon in the matter of commutative justice — 
 for it is that which we are discussing at present— or that you are free 
 from all obligation ; but then remember after all that you are here 
 speaking especially before Cod. and He will judge all this just as it is. 
 If such be the true testimony of your conscience, He will ratify what 
 I have done and decided ; if it be false, you will have to answer to 
 Him. Upon your own soul be the responsibility." Either conscience 
 is to have something to say in such matters or it is not. If the latter, 
 then axdit (jincstio ; if the former, then we cannot conceive any other 
 manner in uhich its claims can be recognized and its dictates allowed 
 -lieir due weight than that which is based on the principles of Catholic 
 theology on the subject. And these principles are, that man knowing 
 liimself, a id not only knowing himself but knowing himself relatively 
 to Ciod and to (iod's law, is ultimately responsible for his own judg- 
 ments. His judgments when according to such knowledge, are the 
 ])ractical guide of his life. When in practical opposition to such know- 
 k'dge. they are the grounds of his final condemnation. Nothing can 
 release him from th'S responsibility of standing or filling by the judg- 
 ments formed at every moment in the innermost recesses of his intel- 
 lect and heart. No uicre human law can oblige or absolve, where the 
 practical dictates of man thus consciously acting, acting that is with the 
 full knowledge of himself, of his relations, and of the facts in any par- 
 ticular case, pronounce against obligation or absolution. It is into this 
 supreme cou^^ of conscience that a man jnits himself when he enters 
 the tribunal uf penance, and according to the true dictates of his con- 
 scious intelligence in that tribunal he must stand or fall. If then our 
 readers would substitute the word "is " for the misleading expressions 
 so freely used by the Reviewer, or rather so ignorantly and unfairly 
 inserted into (iury's text, such as ''if he but professes," " if he alleges," 
 and so forth ; they would find that doctrines, which according to the 
 Reviewer's method of handling them, seem to outrage every right ins- 
 tinct, resolve themselves into conclusions in agreement with the highest 
 right and the soundest common sense. 
 
 Ill 
 
 A IV'w <'lioi<'(> vxiiLiiplvx f r«»iit the <|iiai*tci'l.v. 
 
 Now for one or \\\o of the Reviewer's examples ; we shall not weary 
 our readers with many. The first we shall cite is that ofQuirinus, 
 which the Reviewer introduces with the following remark : "The 
 following exem])lification of what roguery may perpetrate with every 
 security against disturbance of conscience, will probably seem yet 
 stranger." ^Vho says that the act that the Reviewer proceeds to com 
 ment upo)i can be " per[)etrated without disturbance of conscience?" 
 Certainly not Father Gury ; certainly no Catholic moralist. The man 
 would be guilty of sin who did such act, and would be amenable to 
 God in the forimi of conscience for it. But sin is one thing, and the 
 effects of sin, as aftecling the question of commutative justice, another. 
 The man would be a sinner before God, most certainly ; but would 
 the obligation of repairing the damage following upon his bad act exist 
 in such a case ? That is the question Father Gury considers, and not 
 whetlior there would be disturbance of conscience or not. Disturbance 
 of conscience there must be, if the malefactor ever came to reflect. But 
 
31) 
 
 slice — 
 re free 
 e here 
 s it is. 
 [y H'iiat 
 wer to 
 science 
 -^ latter, 
 y other 
 lloAved 
 athoh'c 
 nowin^f 
 latively 
 |n judg. 
 are the 
 1 knou'- 
 ng can 
 ne judg- 
 is intel- 
 lere the 
 vith the 
 ny par- 
 nto this 
 enters 
 his con- 
 hen our 
 sessions 
 unfairly 
 illeges," 
 ; to the 
 ght ins- 
 liighest 
 
 weary 
 irinus, 
 " The 
 every 
 111 yet 
 
 com 
 ce? " 
 ■ man 
 )Ie to 
 1 the 
 •ther. 
 'ould 
 exist 
 
 not 
 mce 
 But 
 
 this is only one other instance of the helpess incapacity of the Reviewer 
 to see the most common distinctions. If he dislikes the charge of 
 ignorance, we can offer no other alternative than that of wicked and 
 •criminal misrepresentation. There is no middle term between these 
 two extremes. 
 
 ti> ( liitty. 
 
 But let us have the case. It is this. "Quirinus, with the intention 
 to steal a piece of cloth, breaks into a shop at night and lights a candle, 
 taking due precaution to guard against the danger of tire ; but by some 
 sudden chance, for instance the leap of a cat, the candle is pitched 
 into the straw ; quickly the whole shop is in Hames, and the thief taking 
 tiight only just gets off safe. What about Quirinus ? Why he is /ia/'/c 
 to nothing, inasmuch as he never contemplated the danger. He is 
 certainly not liable for the cloth it was his intention to steal, even 
 though he had laid his hand on it, for its destruction is also involun- 
 tary ; neither is the seizing of the cloth the cause of the injury, nor did 
 the carrying of the candle create the immediate peril of conllagration, 
 sutlicient care having been em[iloycd." (3) 
 
 Now, as has been said, there is no question here about the sin of 
 Quirinus. That is clear and admiued. The sole question is about 
 the damages ensuing. Is he liable to restitution ; and, if so, to what 
 amount of restitution ? Glory's reply is that he is not liable to all; 
 and for the two fold reason, that in the first place the theft of the 
 cloth had not been accomplished ; and in the second place, the con- 
 flagration could not be attributed to the criminal act of trespass of 
 which he had been guilty by his burglarious entrance into the house, 
 for conflagrations do not follow upon acts of that kind in the ordinary 
 course of things. Nor, again, however guilty he was in his burglary, 
 as far as the fire was concerned no fault, either theological or juridical, 
 can be attributed to Quirinus, for there was no intention to burn the 
 house ; and not only that, he had taken all the ordinary, prudent pre- 
 cautions against such an concurrence. We are not sufficiently versed 
 in English Common Law to offer a definite opinion on the question as 
 to how far the presence of (Quirinus in the house with a felonious inten- 
 tion would affect the question of consequential damages. It is certain 
 tha*" the charge of arson could not be sustained. And it is equally 
 certain that the questicm of wilfulness or inadvertence enters into the 
 estimate of damages from trespass, as well as in cases of consequential 
 damages in breaches of contract. Thus Chitty says that a claim for 
 such damages may be made good, "' provided such damages may be 
 fairly and reasonably considered, either as arising naturally — i.e., 
 according to the usual course of things — from the breach of contract 
 itself, or may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation 
 of the parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result 
 of the breach of it." (4) Here the element of absence of wilfulness and 
 of advertence is fully admitted in abatement ; but how far ai English 
 -court would carry it in the present case we do not undertake to decide, 
 
 (■-J) P. 75. 
 
 (4} lilackstoue, Cum. iii. lik. Hi. c. 1'-'; Ciiitt.v, Lmr nt Conl mcls. p. 81(1. 
 
40 
 
 €a«e «f Kxtr4»iue l^^cesBlty. 
 
 The Reviewer next rises to a great heiglit of moral indignation at 
 Giiry's doctrine of Extreme Necessity. 
 
 Just as for the proliability of opinions and the invincibility of ignorance, so also 
 the determining test for the jileii of authorising an invasion of other people' = pro- 
 jierty restb on the «)<«(' ifeiV of the party interested in exemption from established 
 law; tor wild can verify tiie existence of an inward apprehension as to necessity 
 \)eing i mini II f7it! All that is wanted in the eyes of Gury is, tiiat a person shoulli 
 vehemently affirm his having been prompted by some inscrutable dread of threat- 
 ened distress. Of necessity, itself, however, a'^definition is given. It is of three 
 degrees : ordinary, in which j)au])er mendicants as a rule find themselves; grave, 
 in which life is kept up with great labor ; and "extreme, in which life itself is in 
 risk.' An individual in this last Jilight is i)ronounced to be entitled ' to make use 
 of as mtich of another person's property as may suffice for relieving himself from 
 the said necessity, on the groutid ihiit diviKinn of i/oods, however it may have been 
 made, nerer can drroi/iite Jruiii the niitural riijht apiiertaininif to every one to provide 
 for hiiiinflf. when mi fVeriit!/ from ejtreiiw nieeasiti/. hi mch vircumstances all thingn 
 therefore hi'conie rominon. hd /hut an;/ one reeeivini/ another /jeriion\s projierti/for hm 
 'iirn Kiiceotir receives a tnili/ etniiiiiun thimj whieh he eon verts into hin own,,) list as if 
 thin were hdfiiniiinij lufore the division ofi/oods. Consequentlf,- he commits no theft (p. 7C). 
 
 A Di»«gra<'eful FalNificatioii. 
 
 We have here, in the first place, one of those disgracefjl falsifica 
 tions of Gury's doctrine, and not his alone, but that of St. Thomas and 
 St. Alphonsus as well, of which we have already so many times con- 
 victed the Reviewer. In the present case, however, he convicts him- 
 self. He states wiut according to Gury extreme necessity is ; that, 
 namely, in which a mans life is in peril from want ; and then Gury's 
 doctrine that a man in this ])light may take what is required to sustain 
 life without being guilty of the sin of theft. This doctrine is twisted 
 into a case of conscience after the act — as to whether a man when he 
 took something belonging to another, really was in extreme necessity 
 or not, and if so how it can be verified. We reply as before, in no 
 other way than by the testimony of a man's conscience speaking before 
 God, accompanied by such indications as justify a ]irudent judgment 
 of veracity. But to twist the matter into a case of this kind is to alter 
 the whole issue of the question. It is not the question whether this man 
 or that is sincere in stating that he was on a certain occasion in extreme 
 necessity, and took somethmg belonging to another to relieve it, but 
 whether granting the fact that a man is in such necessity, the taking 
 so much as enables him to sustain life is a sin and a theft or not. It 
 is no question as to whether a man " vehemently affirms," or is 
 '" prompt I d by inscrutable dread of threatened distress," (5) but whether 
 he /> in actual, woX. t//reatencd dintr ess ; whether in one word he is 
 starving, and within a few hours of the end of his life unless his hunger 
 be relieved. In such a case Gury says, the starving wretch who snatches 
 a loaf from the baker's stall does not commit the sin of theft ; and that, 
 as we have seen, on the ground that the law of property yields in such 
 an emergency to the great law by which every one has a right to his 
 life. Property then becomes common, so far as such community is 
 necessary to meet the exigencies of the case. 
 
 (5) The italics are ours. 
 
41 
 
 indigftation at 
 
 gnorance, so also 
 lior people' <? pro- 
 f'rom established 
 1 as to necessity 
 a person shoulli 
 dread of threat- 
 It is of three 
 jmselves ; grave, 
 i life itself is in 
 led ' to make use 
 ng himself from 
 it may have l/een 
 ?ri/ one. to provide 
 stances all thingit 
 I ftrojierti/for fiin 
 in oivii,Jtist as ij 
 ts no theft {\^. 76). 
 
 cefLiI falsifica 
 . Thomas and 
 ly times con- 
 convicts him- 
 ssity is ; that, 
 d then Gary's 
 red to sustain 
 ne is twisted 
 man when he 
 me necessity 
 before, in no 
 caking before 
 snt judgment 
 ind is to alter 
 :ther this man 
 3n in extreme 
 relieve it, but 
 y, the taking 
 t or not. It 
 iffirms," or is 
 ) but whether 
 word he is 
 ss his hunger 
 who snatches 
 ift ; and that, 
 'ields in such 
 I right to his 
 lommunity is 
 
 Pal«\y*M PriiioipU' Corrobora(<>M C>iiry%. 
 
 Nor is Gary alone in holding this princij^le. Paley makes statements 
 that lead directly uj) to it. He says, si)eaking on what the right of 
 property is founded ; "We now speak of Property in Land ;and there 
 IS a difificulty in explaining the origin of this property consistently with 
 •the law of nature ; for the land was once, no doubt, common, and the 
 question is, how any particular part of it could justly be taken out of 
 the common, and so apjjropriated to the first owner, as to give him a 
 better right to it than others, and what is more to exclude all others 
 from it." (6l Subsequently Paley states that "the real foundation of our 
 right \s f//t' 1.1170 i>/ ///e Zand." Property then rests on positive law, 
 according to this ; the right that a man has to his life, and therefore 
 the means of life, rests on natural law ; therefore in a case of collision 
 between the two the inferior must yield to the suj^erior ; positive law 
 to the law of nature. 
 
 But this is not all. Paley bases the obligation to bestow relief on 
 the ]ioor j^recise')' on this princijjle. He says — " JJesides this, the poor 
 have a claim founded in the law of nature which may be thus explain- 
 ed : All things were originally common. No one being able to pro- 
 duce a charter from heaven, had any l)etter title to a particular pos- 
 session than his next neighbour. 'J'here were reasons for mankind's 
 agreeing upon a sejiaration of this common fund : and ( iod for these 
 reasons is supjiosed to have ratified. But this seiJaration was made 
 and consented to upon the expectation and condition that every one 
 should have left a sufliiciency for his subsistence, or the means of jjro- 
 curing it : and as no fixed laws for the regulation of property can be 
 so contrived as to provide for the relief of every case and distress 
 which may arise, these cases and distresses, when their right and share 
 in the stock was given up or taken from them, were supposed to be left 
 to the voluntary bounty of those who might be acquainted with the 
 exigencies of their situation, and in the way of affording assistance. 
 And, therefore, when the partition cf property is rigidly maintained 
 against the claims of indolence (.v/V) and distress, it is maintained in 
 opjjosition to the intention of those who made it, and to //is Who is 
 Supreme Proprietor of everything, and Who has filled the world with 
 plenteousness, for the sustentation and comfort of all whom He sends 
 mto it." (7) 
 
 l>i'. Wlionc-Il and Klacktone on C'aM'M of ]\oc'<MSHity. 
 
 Again, Dr. Whewell, speaking of cases of necessity, says — 
 
 In such cases it lias l)een decided by tlic Roman Law and its eomrnentatnr.-J, that 
 the Riglit of Property must give way. Necessity, tlicy -lay, overrules all laws. Hut 
 this is to IjB required only in extreme rases, when all otiier courses fail. To which 
 is added by n.ost .lurists, that when it is possible, restitution is to be made for the 
 damage committed A like rule is recognized in Knglish Law, 
 
 It has been held by some English lawyers, that a starving nuin may justly take 
 food; but others deny that such a necessity gives a right; inasmuch as the poor 
 are otherwise provited for by Law. (.s, 
 
 («) Moraf. Phil. bk. iii. c. 4. 
 
 (7) Moral. J'hil. bk. iii. j). 2. c. ."). 
 
 (8) Klevwnta of Monilitji, n. 700. 
 of these statements, Grotius ii. "2, •;, 
 
 Cambridge, 1804. Whewell cites ti sujiport 
 4 ; Kent's ('omnu-ulnrirx, ii. 338, bl<. iv. H2. 
 
42 
 
 This last is Blackstone's doctrine. lUit notwithstanding Poor Laws 
 and charitable organizations, every now and then we hear of some poor 
 wretch's being found stiff and stark, and wasted to a skeleton under an 
 archway on a bitter winter's morning. How did poor laws and flowing 
 soup kitchens help that poor soul in the last bitter agony of hunger 
 and thirst? If you tell us that such a man was guilty of sin before God 
 for stretching out his hand to a loaf to save himself in his bitter extre- 
 mity, we can only say in the name of outraged humanity, and in the 
 name of the God of love and mercy, "Out upon you, hypocrites ! you 
 forget that man was not made for the law, but the law for man." This 
 is certainly true of all human law ; a truth borne out in the present 
 case by that eternal law according to which man has been fashioned,^ 
 and which alone is a rule of life that admits of no dispensation. Of 
 course what has been said would have much greater force where pool 
 laws do not exist. 
 
 Ih it C'oiiiiniiuiMiii ? 
 
 The passage that we have been discussing is followed by another 
 page filled with base insinuations on the subject of Communism, the 
 presence o!"— l'-^'' ''^e Reviewer affects to detect under the above prin- 
 ciple of R. 'w: \. Communism we have always understood to mean 
 the denial ol ! J ^h. of private proper:y altogether. Tj attempt to 
 confound this with thi; above principle as applied and confined to the case 
 of extreme necessity, berr-iys the source of the writer's ins|)iration. It 
 is merely one ,_iore shaft r\v •n from the quiver of German misrepre- 
 sentation ; it is wortu/ of K.'^^iii; "k and his unprincipled crew of slaves 
 and sycophants, but shanieu'' as jjroceeding from one of free English 
 blood. Mistranslations and blunders as usual abound in the page in 
 question ; but out of mercy to our readers we abstain from exposing 
 them. We pass, therefore, on to one other topic, that we shall constrain 
 ourselves to touch ujwn as brieJy as possible. 
 
 The <|iiai'<orly*M iuikIiIUmI notions on the liiiM of 
 
 Charity. 
 
 The Reviewer has, as we have seen, been placing the law above all 
 the dictates of what we should call charity in the preceding case. He 
 now passes to the other extreme, and gives charity a development that 
 might have very uncomfortable consequences in respect of some of his 
 readers, if fully realized in actual practice. We will let him speak for 
 himself. 
 
 Amongst not a few Christians it lias become an accieilited notion tiiat cliarity 
 is a virtue of capital merit : l)ut if we accept Fatlier (Jury's rulinof we Ci n liardly 
 avoid looking upon it as a trivial, if not a downright silly practice. In tlie section 
 devoted to a definition of whit is demanded \>y love of one's neighbour, we find tho 
 following canon : " First Rule — Every one is bound *•/«/</// and dhKohileli/ to love 
 himself more than his neighbour, for ihe reason that every one stands nearer to 
 himself than does any one else. Hence, love of oneself is by Christ laid down as 
 the standard for love of a neighbour — Loi'f t/ii/ ii'-i(fhhour ii.'< l/ii/si'/f This, besides, 
 is clear from the natural and insuiterable disposition to love oneself more than 
 one's neighbour, whence the common maxin—C/ian'ti/, well unlcrxtmxt, hci/ins at 
 Aonf." In Montaigne or La Ilochefoucauld such a sentence would have sounded 
 not outof character, but in an approved " handbook of morals,'' itfalls on us with 
 a rather startling ring (p. I'l). 
 
48 
 
 With a startling ring doubtless in empty heads, but not in otliers it 
 would seem. A Catholic theologian regards man as a being composed 
 of soul and body, and believes that the end of his creation is the union 
 of the soul with (iod in eternity. This end indicates man's place in 
 the divine order of creation, and it supplies also the divine rule of his 
 being and of his life. For a man, therefore, to prefer anything to the 
 attainment of this end, or to sj^eak in ordinary terms, co his own salva- 
 tion, would put him out of harmony witli the divine order, and be a 
 breach of that highest charity by which he is united to Clod even in 
 this world, and is intended to be united to Him in fullest measure in 
 the world to come. It would therefore be a violation of God's order, 
 a contravention of His designs, a contradiction to the fundamental 
 l)rinciples of his own being, for a man to love in this sense any created 
 thing as much as himself. 
 
 11 
 ;e 
 lat 
 lis 
 or 
 
 "ly 
 
 oil 
 the 
 
 to 
 
 &i 
 
 les, 
 
 lian 
 
 at 
 
 ied 
 
 filli 
 
 St, TlioiiiiiM aiiid Ciiiir.v on wi'll-ordorcil Charity. 
 
 And this is the meaning of the somewhat subtle reasoning bX 
 which St. Thomas arrivtis at the same conclusion. He sayst 
 " A man loves Clod as the principle of good, which ii- blessedness ; 
 he loves himself, as a sharer in that good ; but he loves his neighbour 
 as associated with himself in the enjoyment of the same good. But it 
 is a weightier motive for loving to jiarticipate of blessedness in oneself 
 than to have a fellow-shaier in that blessedness ; just as unity *ran>- 
 cends union ; therefore a man by virtue of charity ought to love him- 
 self more than his neighbour." (9) In other words, (Iod is the Sui)reme 
 Source and the Supreme Object of love ; to be united to Him, there- 
 fore, in one's own person must supply a greater motive of love and 
 gratitude than the mere fellowshi;) of another with us in the same union 
 and resulting blessedness. 
 
 The full bearing of this doctrine will be brouglil home to us more 
 clearly by considering Clury's rules in regard to the order of charity ; 
 rules which the Reviewer as usual garbles and misrepresents. Thus 
 Clury says that we must succour our neighbour in extreme spiritual 
 necessity, that is, wltere his salvation is at stake, even at the risk of our 
 own life ; and this for the reason that the eternal life of our neighbour 
 is of higher value than our own temporal life. 
 
 On the other hand, in extreme temporal necessity, where, that is, 
 there is danger of temporal life, we are bound to succour our neigh- 
 bour at the risk of great loss, but not of the greatest ; of laying down 
 our own lives, for instanc;r ; for this exceeds the dem.inds of duly 
 ordered charity. 
 
 These instances are sufficient to illustrate the meaning of the maxim, 
 " Charity, well understood, begins at home " In other words, the 
 prescription, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," even if taken 
 to involve equality of affection as regards our neighbour and ourselves. 
 cannot be taken to mean equality as to effects. To suppose that a man 
 is bound to show the reality of his love for his neighbour in the only 
 way in which it can be shown, by its real effects, in precisely equal 
 measure, first to himself and then to each man and woman in the 
 
 (9) St. Thomas, 2. •>. q. M a. 4. 
 
44 
 
 world, would he a simple absurdity, which it requires no words to 
 expose. There must therefore be order in giving effect to our love 
 for our neighbour, and if so, such order must have a starting point ^ 
 and where can that starting point be but in ourselves ? 
 
 l*rol(>staiil DivlneH on the love of our .\<'i{;liboiir. 
 
 What has been said is borne out by Protestant divines. Pole in 
 his Synojjsis, commenling on the words "Thou shalt love thy neigh- 
 bour as thyself," after a jjreliminary discussion of the text, in which he 
 says it is not prescribed, "more than thyself, that is, in the same order 
 of benefits, but we ought to sacrifice our lesser good for the greater good 
 of our neighbour; thus for our brethren, that is for their salvation, we 
 ought to lay down our temporal life," so agreeing with Gury's rule ;. 
 goes on to add : "Christ here wished two things ; (i) To correct that 
 vice of selfishness by which, to the neglect of others, we care only for 
 ourselves; (2) to prescribe the mode of loving our neighbours. He 
 therefore here ])laces our neighbours on an equal footing with ourselves, 
 and joins each and all in one body and as in one mutual embrace. But 
 if you understand by this that we should regard all with the same 
 love as ourselves, it would follow that there are no degrees of love, but 
 that all are to be equally love 1, since the love with which we love our- 
 selves in one. The meaning therefore is. as has been said. Be thou 
 thyself the measure of tliy love to thy neighbour. I.ovc each as thou 
 wouldst be loved by them wert thou in their place." 
 
 We have in the new Whole Duty of Man the following passage : 
 • In like manner, the duty to love our neighbour as ourselves is not, 
 either that we should love any neighbour with equal tenderness as our- 
 selves — for that I r-onceive is hardly possible — or th it we should love 
 every neigh.bour alike, which, if we suppose possible, \\ere neither just 
 nor natural ; or that we should do for our neighbour all that he now 
 does or that we, if in his circuniit^/.ces, might perhaps wish and 
 desire to be done for ourselves for such desires m.ny be irregular, 
 or if not sinful, yet unreasonable ; l>ut it is to do all that for him 
 v.-hich, were our case his and his ours, Ae should V: reason expect 
 and be glad to hav-e done to ourselves." (to) 
 
 Kiitlcr oil tlio Naiiio hiiIiJcoI. 
 
 So again, Butler, in his second sermon upon the love of our neigh- 
 bour, on the hypothesis that an equality of affection is commanded, 
 shows that even so there must be inequality of effects, from the very 
 of man's nature as regards our love to ourselves and our love to our 
 neighbour ; and that for the sole reason that no man can be closer to 
 any one than to himself. The passage is somewhat long, but it is 
 worth quoting at length — 
 
 If the words " as thyself" woro to hp uiuleistood of an [eouality of affection, it 
 woiihi not be attended witli those consequences which pernaps may he thonght 
 to follow from it. Sii])|uise a person to have the same settled regard to others as 
 to himself; that in eveiy deliberate S'lheme or pursuit he took their interest iiiti> 
 
 (10) Sundiiy \ii. ; 
 
 'I'o 
 
 incun 
 
 and )h 
 
 the oil 
 
 snpeil 
 
 "extH 
 
 relievi 
 
 rfoes a 
 
 statioi; 
 
 «'ducai 
 
 guests, 
 
 to us tl 
 
 ritv mi 
 
 fully i, 
 
 of sec u 
 
 j'ksonn 
 
 lion car 
 
 sarily 
 
45 
 
 ligh- 
 
 led, 
 
 /ery 
 
 our 
 
 hr to 
 
 lit is- 
 
 jti, it 
 Lught 
 Irs as 
 iiiti> 
 
 ■cf'oimt ill the same dcj^frce iia lii:^ dwu, su tV 
 
 (jiiiilit.v (if iitl'iMMinn would 
 
 oducethi^; yet he would, in tiu-t, mid ouKlit to tic. iiukIi iiioic luktti up and 
 finployed nboiit liiinself, mid liiM own coiiciM-n-i. tlimi iiboiil others jind thi-ir 
 intere.slH. For, licsuh'S the one coniinoii all'cctioii IowumIs hiiiiself and liis iiciirli- 
 
 liotir, lie woidd liave several otl 
 
 )articii!ar atlV-etioi 
 
 IS, |)tis.4ioii^!, a 
 
 lid 
 
 appetire.s 
 
 which he could not possilily feel in coniiiion botli tor hinisel)' and for otht'r.i. Now 
 
 these .sensations; themselves verv tiiiicli cm 
 
 iloy us, ii.iiu have pciliaps as ji'reat an 
 
 iiitlnence us .self-love. So far indeed as self-love and cool rcMcciioii ii|ion what i.s 
 for our interest, would set us on work to jrnin a siipidy of our own wants ; so far 
 
 the love of our iieitrhliour would make us <lo the same tor 1 
 
 inn ; 
 
 hut the dcffree in 
 
 which we are put npon scekiuj^ and m iking use of the means of g.-atitiratioii, by 
 the feeling of those attections, appetites, aii<l passions, must necessarily h,' peculiar 
 to ourselves. 
 
 That there are particular passions [suppose shame, resentmetitl wiiicli men seem 
 to have, and feel in common iiotli t'or themselves and others, makes no alleralioii 
 ill respect to those passions and appetites which cannot possibly he thus felt in 
 eoinmon. From hence [and ]perhaps more things of the like kind might he men- 
 tioned] it follows, that though there were an e(|ualily of atfectiou to both, yet 
 
 regard to ourselves would 
 others. 
 
 pre 
 
 valelil than atlelilion to the conceiiis of 
 
 And from moral consiilerations it ought to he so, supposing still the e(|uality of 
 
 aft'ection to lie commanileil ; liecanse we are in a peculiar maim*: 
 
 I may speak. 
 
 intrusted with ourselves ; and therefore care of our own interest, as well as of our 
 conduct, ])articularly belongs to ns. 
 
 To these things must be (uhled that in(U'al oldigations can extend nofiirther t ban 
 to natural ])ossibilitie.=;. Now we have a perception of onr own interests, like 
 consciousness of our own existence, which we always carry alauit wiili us; and 
 ■whicdi, in its continuation, kind, and degree, seems impossible to lie felt in ropect 
 to the interests of others. 
 
 From all these things it tully ajipears, that though we were toloveourneighbonr 
 in the same degree as ^.i- love ourselves, so far as this is jiossible : yet the care of 
 ourselves, of the individual, would not be neglected ; the apprelieiided danger ot 
 Avliich seems to be the O'lly (jlijectioii again-t uiiderstandiii^i the peri-c|it in thi; 
 .strict sense. 
 
 In a word, the view taken by Catholic divines on the riiiestion ni.iv 
 be siunmed up in the words of St. Thomas, that " the love a man bears 
 to him.self is as it were the exemplar of the love which he Dears to 
 others. But the example is higher in degree than that which is moulded 
 on the example. Therefore a man ought out of charity to love himself 
 more than his neighbour." In fact the words of our J.ord in the text 
 under consideration denote similitude rather than equality. 
 
 Furtlica* iiiisiM'preHt'iitatloiiM of C-ury'M toacliiiitf. 
 
 We will venture to notice one more passage — 
 
 To clear away all ninbignity. Father (liiry expl.sins that acts of charity are 
 inenmbent only on those who '" are toleraldy well otf, and either the alisoliilo lords 
 and administrators of their jiroperties : '' aiid that in cases of ordinary aece.ssity, 
 the obligations of ch.irity cannot involve more than certain assistance, '' out of 
 superfluities, to the extent of some privation of pleasures.' Even in cases of 
 
 "extreme necessity no one is bound to lay out any large sum of money for 
 
 relieving a poor nian frcmi peril of death." Only in cases of the gravest necessity 
 does a call exist for some contribution " out of tlie strict necessaries for the doiior'a 
 station," which are enumerated as comprising not merely "what is needful for the 
 educatien of the family, but als.) the maintenance of ser\ants, the reception of 
 guests, the cost of fitting presents, and of customary eateitaiaments." It seems 
 to us that in virtue of this definition of " necessaries," aiiv one disinclined to cha- 
 ritv might escape its calls on the plea of impecuniositi?, while this had been art- 
 ful'ly incurred by wasteful expenditure on lavish feastings, with the express view 
 of securing a plea which must be held valid by a .lesuit crafessor for shirking an 
 irksome obligation. For Father Gury lays it down distinctly, that no evil inten- 
 tion can render wicked any deed w'hich in itself must not by nature be neces- 
 sarily evil— a proposition illustrated by various remark ible exemplifications. A 
 
 I ' 
 
46 
 
 jiulj.'!' is dcrliiroii tree t'idm lilmiif wlm niiiy have luiidinm ;(1 n murderer to death, 
 iliuiijrii lie was m timted in (iniiKiiiinintr the .eciiti'ticf liy personal iifttred, because 
 llie sentcriL'e wus witliiu iiis lcn»l attn 'iites | pi'. "'-'. T".j. 
 
 Now here, first of all, in the edition of (niry before us, the words 
 '• who are tolerably well of," do not occur, (i ij Then as to almsgiving 
 the whole question discussed by Gury is that of strict obligation, and 
 not that of voluntary generosity. He states that there exists a true and 
 real jireeejjt imposing the obligation of almsgiving ; and that this 
 obligation is under pain of mortal sin in cases of extreme or of grave 
 necessity ; and then proceeds to consider what is the precise measure 
 of strict obligation under the varied circinnstancesof those upon whom 
 the i^recept rests. We cannot follow the Reviewer into details, but we 
 assert without fear of contradiction that if any one will study lather 
 (jury's exposition of the subject, they will find his requirements rise 
 
 m 
 
 beyoud what it is to be feared is the common pratice of the world 
 the matter of almsdeeds. 
 
 ]Vlor4' lliHiioiiONf llimtortioii. 
 
 We pause a moment again to point out another instance in this 
 ])assage of the dishonest distortion and mixing up of things that have 
 no connection that prevade the whole article. A man, it is stated, 
 may, on the jjlea of impecuniosity, brought on by his own wasteful 
 expenditure, indulged in simply in order to evade the obligation of 
 almsgiving, shirk an irksome duty with the approbation of a Jesuit 
 confessor. He might so act, but whether with or without the consent 
 of a Jesuit or any other contessor, he would do so at the expense of 
 mortal sin. Moreover Ae are certain that no confessor who had 
 studied (iury could ajjprove such an evasion of a solemn obligation. 
 Then comes the old story that " no evil intention can render wicked 
 any deed which in itself must not by nature be necessarily evil." Gury 
 says no such thing. He is speaking of justice, and not of wickedness 
 in general. 'I he case of the judge is, where he justly and legally 
 sentences a murderer to death ; in such a case, though his breast may 
 be filled with rancorous hatred against the criminal, his judicial act is 
 no infringement of the murderer's rights, and therefore no offence 
 against justice. There can therefore be no question of damages ; no 
 obligation to restitution. Sin there is ; wickedness there is ; but he 
 must answer for that to God. In such a case Gury says, the evil inten- 
 tion could not make an act unjust, injustnm, which \sd,% just in itself. 
 The intention was sinful ; though not a sin against justice. The judge 
 therefore is not declared free from blame, but only from the effects of 
 a sin against justice. (12) 
 
 Other inaccuracies and interpolations might be pointed out in the 
 above citation. For instance, the Reviewer uses the words absolute 
 lords, so as to convey the impression that only very wealthy persons 
 are bound ; whereas Gury uses the phrase in antithesis to wives, chil- 
 dren, and servants, with reference of course to their master's property. 
 Again, the words '■ to the extent of some privation of pleasures," hxz 
 not found in our edition of Gury. 
 
 [11] T. i. p. 222. Romio 18tJ6. 
 [12] Gury, t. i. p. 592. 
 
 \l\ 
 
 l\ 
 
47 
 
 I'rcaoliliiK iiiKl Prnetloo. 
 
 We cannot conclude this subject however without a few remarks on 
 this new view of charity and almsgiving, thus given to the world 
 undci the iiusjjices of the Quarterly. According to the Reviewer, 
 charity and almsgiving would seem to be convertible terms ; and as 
 he repudiates the maxim that you are bound to love yourself more 
 than your neighbour, he must be held to admit that he is bound to love 
 his neighbour as much if not more than hiniself. \\hat a vista res- 
 l)lendent with the rectification of the abuses and miseries of ages, is 
 thus ojjened out to the poor human race 1 Father (lury indeed does 
 state that we are bound to help our neighbour in his extreme spiritual 
 necessity at the risk of our life ; and in his extreme temporal necessity 
 generally at great though not excessive loss to ourselves ; but this 
 does not satisfy the expansive benevolence of the Reviewer. He can 
 only show his appreciation of these rule by falsely saying that a man 
 is, according to Gury, bound to prefer any want however slight of his 
 own, to any need however great of his neighbour. Poor Father Gury's 
 rules are all too narrow for his large heart. Let then the sounds of 
 joy and gladness be heard in St. Giles', and Whitechapel, and the Isle 
 of Dogs ! The Gospel according to the Quarterly has gone forth : the 
 golden age has come. Violets will bloom in the Seven Dials ; and the 
 rose and the honeysuckle shed sweetness in Spitalfields, It is now no 
 matter of generous self-sacrifice to help your poverty-stricken neigh- 
 bours \ you are bound to— -to divest yourself of ajipliances generally 
 thought to be necessary for your station in life a. the cry of ordinary 
 need. The great Conservative party will no doubt at once respond to 
 the new revelation ; its peers and members will lay aside their carriages 
 and prancing steeds, and modestly go down to the House on veloci- 
 pedes ; while the Radicals not to be outdone, will go on foot to St. 
 Stephen's in goloshes and waterproofs, with cotton umbrellas in their 
 hands. As for the aristocratic Whigs, how they shall comport them- 
 selves under the change, we must leave to the grave decision of Earl 
 Russell at the least. We might suggest aline of omnibuses, from which, - 
 despite the name, the general public should be rigidly excluded. But 
 then, being, only of enslaved intellects, our suggestion would most pro- 
 bably be at once laughed to scorn. Mayfair will languish and Bel- 
 gravia become a wilderness ; the turtles will gambol uncaptured in 
 tropic seas ; Mansion House banquets will subside into frugal suppers, 
 and there will be no demand for citrate of magnesia or Holloway's 
 pills. Rookeries will disappear, and the festering dens of poverty, of 
 wretchedness, and of crime will be swept away ; starving men and 
 women will no longer slink into quiet corners to die, nor will the 
 muddly waters of the Thames again be appealed to by the desperate 
 leap to quench the last gnawings of hunger, and still the bursting 
 brain. 
 
 We shall not grieve over such results ] on the contrary we shall 
 rejoice at them. The old Catholic teaching that men should not be 
 satisfied with the bare discharge of strict obligation, but should stretch 
 beyond that in the spirit of generous self-denial, has no doubt been a 
 teaching fruitful of untold good and blessing to the poor and needy, 
 50 much so that we seem to have recollections of reproaches being 
 
 I 
 
48 
 
 levelled at it as something quite overdone ; hut notwithstanding it 
 cannot be said to have done all that might h.ivo been done, or reduced 
 the mass of misery to a minimum in the world, Let us trust that the 
 new principles of strict obligation will have belter success. 
 
 Tlio SitUv iiilMii|»|>ro|»ri]i(iiiK C'liHritiil»lo BoqiiONlN. 
 
 At the same lime we are haunted by an uncomfortable misgiving. 
 We seem U) remember liearing within the last year or two of moneys 
 left for i)ious and charitable ])urposes being confiscated for the uses 
 of I lie State, or otherwise divcrtid from the objects to which the donors 
 had (levoied them. Communities of men and women too, who had dedi- 
 cated their lives, given up not their substance only, but themselves, to 
 the work of relieving human distress, have been driven out of Kuro- 
 l<ean lands, and their loving labours thus frustrated and brought to 
 nought. What we fear is tliot this sjjirit of Swiss honesty, Italian 
 uprightness, and Cierman culture will militate against the grand future 
 that has been opened to mankind. Jiut no doubt the Reviewer is 
 deeper in secrets of this kind than we are, and we can only express the 
 hope that our a])prehensions will prove groundless. 
 
 i'oiiMcieiK'o VN. Military ItiMCipliiio. 
 
 There is one other j)oint upon which we will touch very briefly. The 
 Reviewer says : "It is declared that every soldier who consents to 
 serve in an unjust war will be directly c/i<Vi;ral>/r with responsibility 
 for every act of injury per])etrated by himself individually during its 
 course, Viwd J>rof>oriioiiai!y for the total injury wrought by the army ; 
 thus introducing a principle absolutely subversive of all military disci- 
 ])line, that at eve-y call to arms each soldier is to make himself judge 
 whether to obey it will be in accordance with his conscience." 
 
 So then it seems soldiers are to leave conscience behind them when 
 they enter the ranks, aiid to content themselves with killing any one 
 they are told to kill. An army is to be regarded in fact as a collection 
 of bravos. And perhai)s this is only the necessary sequence of the yast 
 system of standing armies that oppresses the world. At any rate it is 
 well to liave this principle avowed and plainly put before us. 
 
 But it is not thus that Catholic theologians look upon war and the 
 soldier's trade. According to them war is the last weapon in the hands 
 of justice, and can only be used justly. And every soldier can demand 
 some guarantee, and ought to demand it, that the war in which he is 
 asked to engage is just. This guarantee is, that due examination into 
 the causes of the war has been made by the competent authorities, 
 that reparation has been sought for at the hands of the aggressor, and 
 that a solemn judicial pronouncement, after all such preliminary steps 
 duly taken, has issued, sanctioning the decl-.ration of war. Upon such 
 a guarantee every soldier can. and is bound to form his conscience as 
 to the justice of the war in which he engages ; if such guarantee is 
 wanting, war not having been declared in legal form, he cannot embark 
 in it with a safe conscience Legal declaration of war is not a final 
 proof of the justice of the war, but it furnishes the presumption of that 
 justice sufficiently for the formation of the conscience of the soldier 
 
40 
 
 and of the nation. Such presumption would not yield to .inything short 
 of positive proof of the injustice of tlu- war Such is the teaching of 
 Father (lury and of Catholic theologians generally on this suhjoct. 
 Nor of Catholic theologians alone lirotius, for instance, says, " Tliat 
 if soldiers were certain that the prince was doubtful as to the justice of 
 the war, it would not be lawful for them to tight, how much soever 
 they might he his subjects, because such war would be unjust ; just in 
 the same way as a lictor could not lawfully execute the sentence of a 
 judge that he knew to be unjust 113) 
 
 The Wcstuiiu^itcr Jle\iow, F. W. iVoHiiiun and Toiilniin 
 
 Suiilli on War. 
 
 In a very able paper in the IVest minster Review (14) Mr. F. W. 
 Newman says, "There is no more fundamental pri:icif)le of freedom 
 (for it is evv;n admitted under despotism), than that no nation shall be 
 dragged into a war by its executive against its will and judgment ;" 
 and he ])rcceeds to show by a mass of precedents collected by Mr. 
 Toulmin Smith, that in former times the greatest care was taken to- 
 give those who engaged irv a war the guarantee si)oken of above. It 
 was not left in old Kngland, to the freaks and perverse judgment of a 
 practically irresponsible minister to drag the country into war, but the 
 consent of the Great Council and of the Parliament elicited after due 
 examination into its causes, was necessary before a war could be law- 
 fully entered upon. And we know that the first Chinese war was 
 branded by the English courts as piracy because the steps necessary 
 to guarantee its justice had been neglected. But this is too la-ge a 
 subject to discuss in the present article. 
 
 Conft'ont tlic <|narU'i*I>''H <lnotationN with the Original. 
 
 We cannot follow the Reviewer into further details; but we trust 
 that sufficient has been said to show his utter untrustworthiness, his 
 total incapacity in any point of view to speak on the subject with which 
 in an evil day for himself and for the Quarterly Review he has pre- 
 sumed to meddle. By way of still further illustration of the Reviewer's 
 manner of treatment, v/e wi 1, in conclusion, draw the reader's attention 
 to page seventy-nine of the Quarterly article. In this page alone, and 
 almost the same may be said of the following page, at least nineteen 
 hlots may be detected by a careful collation of the so-called quotations 
 wi h the original. These blots consist of garblings, suppressions, the 
 use of ambiguous words, so as to give a false colouring to the author's 
 iDcaningand to insinuate bad impressions, dove-tailings of things toge- 
 ther that have no immediate connection, substitution of suppositions 
 fox focts, and all with the view of putting the basest construction 
 upon every line he touches ; to say nothing of the lamentable igno- 
 rance that is displayed at every turn of the process. 
 , To g've a sample or two. There is the old trick of putting "wilT 
 profess " instead of is with reference to the disposition of the woman 
 
 [13] Be Belli et Facia Jur. Pram. s. 29, 30. 
 [14] No. 34, April, 1860. 
 
I ' 
 
 so 
 
 mentioned to make her abstractions good. There are also suppressions 
 in the statement of the case. Then there is the insertion of the word 
 " it follows," connecting a case of grave injury with theft, and thus 
 perverting the meaning, and mis applying the solution. And this is the 
 more disingenuous, because Father Gary expressly says that the case 
 of injury differs from that of money accumulated up to a grave sum by 
 petty thefts. In the latter case he decides that the thief is bound to 
 restore sub gravi- (15) And Father Ballerini in a note on the solution 
 of the case of injury, disagrees with Giiry, and holds the opposite view. 
 Besides it is not true to say that the injurer is free from all obligation. 
 He is bound to make good under pain of venial sin for each petty act 
 of injury that he has been guilty of. Then there is the usual insinua- 
 tion conveyed by the words " shrewd enough ; " ** if he has only been 
 careful to scatter the injury over various victims ;" intended to indicate 
 that the man has been acting on a deliberate system derived no doubt 
 from his moral instructors. 
 
 Again it is stated that "an incendiary who has burned down a 
 .stranger's house, in the mistaken belief that it belonged to one he 
 hated, is free from obligation of compensation because such an action 
 was unintentional towards the sufferer " Now will the reader believe 
 that in this case Father Gury's first solution is suppressed, in which 
 he affirms the obligation of restitution ; while in the second given by 
 the Reviewer, he merely says that some deny this because the action 
 was not voluntary in relation to the injured person ; but, he adds, 
 " this reason from what has been said, seems to carry little weight with 
 it ? ' (16) Let this example stand for the rest ; we cannot venture to 
 weary our readers with further instances. Sufficient has been said to 
 show that our assertion with reference to this and the succeeding page 
 is not mere assertion, but can be abundantly substantiated. And 
 indeed well night the same may be said of every page of the article. 
 
 ^1/ 
 
 The iHall's Theologian a Disgrace to '' 
 English Fairness. 
 
 The whole production is discreditable to English literature, a blot 
 upon English fairness and disreputable to the pages of the Quarterly 
 Review. What would be said of a man who, without any further know- 
 ledge of law than that obtained by a cursory perusal of " cases " and 
 other law books not even amounting to the respectable process of 
 cramming, should presume to appear before the Lord Chief Justice to 
 plead in an intricate cause ? We can imagine the fiasco that would 
 ensue. 
 
 And yet this is pretty well the exact parallel of the Reviewer's 
 position, though his conduct is rendered even worse by the number of 
 cases he blunders upon. Would it not savour more of English 
 manliness and straightforward dealing, instead of viewing' questions 
 of moral theology through the distorting medium of Pascal's Letters 
 and German obfuscations, to enter into communication with those with 
 whom such questions are a matter of daily practice, and try to ascertain 
 
 ri51 Ourj i. n. 666, 630. 
 [16] I. p. 644, n. 644. 
 
51 
 
 the application that they give to the principles, and the construction 
 they put upon statements that have involved the Reviewer in such 
 endless trouble and confusion ? Such an act of frankness would con- 
 tribute very materially to the clearing of his mental atmosphere. And 
 we can assure him that every facility will be most cordially extended 
 to him by living Catholic theologians if he should see fit to condescend 
 to so sensible and profitable a course. 
 
 In the meantime, in parting for the present with the Reviewer, we 
 feel bound to say ihitwe can in no wise withdraw any hard expres- 
 sions that we may have indulged in against his production. On the 
 contrary, the more we have looked into it, the more unfavourable has 
 our judgement of it become. The whole structure of the article in the 
 Quarterly is just such as might have proceeded from one who set 
 about of set purpose to produce the worst possible impressions in a 
 moral point of view of those that were opposed to him ; impressions 
 utterly unwarranted by any fair and straightforward construction of 
 their writings. How far this may have been the case is a question 
 that can only be decided by the Reviewer himself. We would hope 
 for the honour of English literature and of the English name that such 
 a surmise is groundless ; but we must say that as far as external 
 appearances are concerned, the weight of proof goes far to justify the 
 opposite conclusion. 
 
a. 
 
 ^M 
 
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 1 
 
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This pamphlet and others bearing on the Jesuit 
 
 Question may be had at SADLIER & CO., 
 
 Montreal and Toronto.