>%.

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)

1.0

I.I

1.25

m 1 2j

^ IM

- m

f M

1.8

1.4

1.6

'cr-l

c^.

v^ a

f ->:

c^' ...--'

■5>''

.->. ■■^

Photographic

Sciences
Corporation

^9)

23 WEST MAIN STREET

WEBSTER, NY. 14580

(716) 872-4503

v %

^/2^

re'

CIHM/ICMH

Microfiche

Series.

CIHM/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.

Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best
original copy available for filming. Features of this.,
copy which may be bibliographically unique,
which may alter any of the images in the
reproduction, or which may significantly change
the usual method of filming, are checked below.

□

□
D
D
D

□

Coloured covers/
Couverture de couleur

Covers damaged/
Couverture endommagee

Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restaurde et/ou pelliculde

Cover title missing/

Le titre de couverture manque

Coloured maps/

Cartes gdographiques en couleur

Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)

Coloured plates and/or illustrations/
Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur

Bound with other material/
Reli§ avec d'autres documents

Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion
along interior margin/

La reliure serree peut causer de I'ombre ou de la
distortion le long de la marge intdrieure

Blank leaves added during restoration may
appear within the text. Whenever possible, these
have been omitted from filming/
II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajouties
lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte,
mais, lorsque cela 6tait possible, ces pages n'ont
pas 6t6 filmdes.

Additional comments:/
Commentaires suppl^mentaires;

L'institut a microfilm^ le meilleur exemplaire
qu'il lui a 6t6 possible de se procurer. Les details
de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-dtre uniques du
point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier
une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une
modification dans la m^thode normale de filmage
sont indiqu6s ci-dessous.

I I Coloured pages/

Pages de couleur

Pages damaged/
Pages endommagdes

Pages restored and/oi

Pages restaurdes et/ou pellicul6es

Pages discoloured, stained or foxei
Pages d6color6es, tachetdes ou piqu^es

Pages detached/
Pages ddtachdes

Showthrough/
Transparence

I I Pages damaged/

I I Pages restored and/or laminated/

I 71 Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/

r~l/Pages detached/

I ~y Showthrough/

I I Quality of print varies/

D
D
D

Quality in^gale de ('impression

Includes supplementary material/
Comprend du materiel supplementaire

Only edition available/
Seule Edition disponible

Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata
slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to
ensure the best possible image/
Les pages totalement ou partieliement
obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure,
etc., ont 6t6 film6es d nouveau de fapon d
obtenir la meilleure image possible.

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/

Ce document est film6 au taux de reduction indiqu6 ci-dessous.

10X 14X 18X 22X

26X

30X

12X

16X

20X

24X

28X

32X

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks
to the generosity of:

National Library of Canada

L'exemplaire filmd fut reproduit grSce d la
g6n6rosit6 de:

Bibliothdque nationale du Canada

The images appearing here are the best quality
possible considering the condition and legibility
of the original copy and in keeping with the
filming contract specifications.

Les images suivantes ont 6x6 reproduites avec le
plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et
de la nettet6 de l'exemplaire film6, et en
conformity avec les conditions du contrat de
filmage.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed
beginning with the front cover and ending on
the last page with a printed or illustrated impres-
sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All
other original copies are filmed beginning on the
first page with a printed or illustrated impres-
sion, and ending on the last page with a printed
or illustrated impression.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en
papier est imprimde sont film6s en commengant
par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la
dernidre page qui comporte une empreinte
d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second
plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires
originaux sont filmds en commengant par la
premidre page qui comporte une empreinte
d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par
la dernidre page qui comporte une telle
empreinte.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche
shall contain the symbol — -^ (meaning "CON-
TINUED "), or the symbol V (meaning "END"),
whichever applies.

Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la
dernidre image de cheque microfiche, soion le
cas: la symbole — »>signifie "A SUIVRE", le
symbole V signifie "FIN".

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at
different reduction ratios. Those too large to be
entirely included in one exposure are filmed
beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to
right and top to bottom, as many frames as
required. The following diagrams illustrate the
method:

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent etre
film^s 6 des taux de reduction diff6rents.
Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre
reproduit en un seul clich6, il est film6 6 partir
de Tangle sup6rieur gauche, de gauche 6 droite,
et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre
d'images n^cessaire. Les diagrammes suivants
illustrent la mdthode.

1 2 3

4 5 6

"t'r'-dZ-r?-

•■<■ ,-. r

JESUIT MAXIMS

111) Moral

ifolopiioffcHai

The End and the Means. — Mental Reser-
vation. Restitution and Charity.

(No. 2.)

-4
P 4

CANADA

NATIONAL LIBRARY
BIBLIOTHEQUE NATIONALE

4:
i

-I

PREFACE.

The Toronlo ^[ail (March 9, 1889, page Si favours its readers with
a long extract from the English Qjiarterly Rcvii-u< of 1875. We must
thank. " our friends the enemy" that they have, in the present anti-
Jesuit craze, shown little inventive genius, but have deigned to confine
themselves to the old calumnies so often brought forward, hut inva-
riably met with a crushing rejoinder. The motive of our gratitude
may be conjectured ; for amid many othc- and more interesting occu-
pations we have little leisure left to devote to original apologetic.
l)apers. But as those of fourteen years ago, and ue might just as well
add of one hundred and fourteen, meet fully the charges made, we have
reproduced in these pages a series of articles from the London Month,
which we respectfully dedicate to the 'l'or<into Mail, whose editors
have not blushed to adopt as their Moral Theoi.oci.xn, the Theolo-
gian quietly laid to re&t bv the Reviewer of the Month.

This pamphlet forms tlie secondof the series o{ Jesuit Maxims. The
following, if our share in the $400,000 be not entirely exhausted, will
treat on Probabilism, Tyrannicide, and Jesuit I,oyalty.

St. Mary's College,

Montreal, March 12, 1889.

A. E. JONES, S. [.

Ol lllK

QlAltTEUL 1 REVIEW

i>iiKi.i.^iH\Ai<Y iti:.n iitiis.

(Thf Month, London, February 1S75, j). 228.)

The QiKirter/y for January contains a ])ai)er on tlie Jesuits, in
continuaiion of the article that appea'ed in the number for last Octo-
ber. This time the Reviewer addresse.s himself to the doctrines ot the
Society Wq feel at some loss how to proceed in noticing this fresh
effusion, and that for two reasons. In the first place, in our remarks
upon his first article we pointed out a considerable number of inaccu-
racies and misconceptions into which this writer had fallen, both from
his own ignorance of the matter on which he professed to treat, and
from his relying upon the work of an author whose claims to the title
of historian are laughed at. in Germany, and indeed, whose authority
the Reviewer regarded on Jiis own showing as worthless. As our
allegations ha\e neither been admitted as true nor denied as false, we
should be quite entitled to regard the Reviewer as outside the boun-
daries of fair controversy, and so dismiss him as beneath further recog-
nition. We will venture to say that in his wanderings in the laby-
rinths of Catholic moral theology he has nowhere found a doctrine
which teaches that the honest and hcjnourable course for a man detec-
ted in the propagation of injurious falsehoods is to take no notice of
their exposure, and go on to something else, as if he had no debts of '
conscience to discharge before he can claim any further hearing.

In the secuiid place, inasmuch as his present article is addressed to
the discussion of principles of mo'al doctrine and casuistry, which are
on his own avowal, those that are recognized by the prevailing theo-
logical schools of the Church, Avriters of the Society are free from any
special obligation to f illow this writer through the mazes of miscon-
ception and sciol'sm in which ht involves himself in this ecjualiy as in
his former paper. At least thesi considerations leave us at liberty to
deal with him at our own conve lience, andreliev^e us from the demand
for an immediate reply. We shall therefore content ourselves with,.

pointing (tut one or two more |)al|)al)lc absurdities into which the
Reviewer lias fallen, as saini)Ies of the rest.

Of the well-known letters, A.M.D.Cl., which signify, "to the greater
glory of Ciod," we have the following account : "Through the motto
abbreviated into these four initial letters, the Society of Jesus ostenta-
tiously advertises itself as in possession of a sujierior knowledge in
divine things, that can furnish means of specific efficacy for insuring
the upward progress of humanity towards a state of purified existence
capable ol retlecting llic bright imagery of G(jd's enhanced glorifica-
tion." We do not iirf),ess to understand tnis conglomeration of
words, but as far as we can extract any sense out of them, they are
both filse and ab.^ird. The principle of action symbolized by the
letters A.M.D.Ci. is simi>ly this, that the members of the Society should
strive lo choose such actions, where free to choose, and ])erform them
in such a spirit, as may conduce to the greater glory of (jod. It is
simjily a question of proposing the highest possible standard of moral
and religious life, not of pretension to higher lights, nor of invidious
com[iarison wiili other religious corporations. Than such assump-
tion, nothing t ould l^e more contrary to the spirit of St. Ignatius.

The Reviewer discourses Iarj.'ely. of course, on Probabilism. Let
us take an example of his trustworthiness from his manner of dealing
with its first principle. We take his translation of Gury's definition of
a probable opinion, as " any judgment resting on some really grave
motive, even though combined with dread {sii-} of the opposite."
Whereupon he proceeds to cr>mment — " This means that, notwith-
standing an irrejiressible inward impression that truth is really in
0])position to j. given opinio pi obabilis, yet any opinion, in behalf
vvhereof can be adduced what is technically termed a grave motive,
may be safel}' accepted in full warrant tor taking action in its sense."
Now what does this writer mean by " an irrei)ressible inward impres-
sion " 'f Does it amount to moral certainty, grounded therefore on
certain reasons? If so, there can be no ])robable opinion oi^posed to
it, for moral certainty excludes all ])robability on the other side. If
this irrepressible impression, on the other hand, does not amount to
moral certainty, it is itself only a probable opinion ; and then all that
remains is a question of balancing jjrobabiliiies, and of deciding the
precise amount of obligation to this line of action or the other. Then
what is "termed technically a grave motive," is theologically a motive
resting on reasons sutificiently solid to justify the action of a prudent
man ; and thus the opinion based upon it becomes probable. In short,
we have the " gravest motives " for tliinking ;hat this Quarterly Reviewer
is absolutely ignorant Of what the Probabilism means about which
he undertakes to write.

Again, the Reviewer says of Gury : " He then considers whether
absolution can be obtained by one who ignores {sic) the Mysteries of
the 'I'rinity and Incarnation " ; and again, afier some circumlocution,
his conclusion is, "that according to the more probable opinion, he
can be validly absolved if only he be living in invincible ignorance."
Of course Gury is speaking of a man who is tgnorani o/i\\Q Mysteries.
His " circumlocution " here referred to only contains some rules to
the effect that a confessor cannot absolve such a j)enitent except in
ca.se of necessity, as in danger of death for instance, otherwise he is

licli till*

to instruct him to the bjiictit of the sacrament. Should it be found
that iiis ignorance is invincible, then is such case the Sacrament of
Penance may be administered : for why should the mercies of Clod be
closed agauist hiui ?

We take one other example. The Reviewer cjuotes the dicta of
JiusembauMi, l,aymann, and Voit, to the effect that when a ligitimate
end is in view, it is also legitimate to use the means reciuisite to the
attainment of that end; anil hence concKides that the doctrine im-
)»lies that all means are legitimate and may be used where the end is
good. It so happens that (Jury explains this maxim by saying that
only means that are in themselves indifferent, that is devoid of inhe-
rent malice, are i)ermissil)le ; yet the Reviewer is not satisfied with
this distinction, but assures use on his own authority that " the words
j>er sf indiffercntia cannot be held to limit in any effective degree the
license involved in the other terms of the proposition." Ciury also
declaresth.it "all choice of evil means is evil;" that "he who uses
an evil means to attain a good end, ccjntracts the guilt attaching to the
use of such means" (i). I'hat is, this writer's object is to fasten on the
Jesuits a charge of maintaining that the end justifies the means. And
to attain this holy end of misrepresenting the Jesuits, he has used the
equally holy means of attributing to their writers that which they
expressly deny

We cl(jse our remarks for the present with the writer's view of
invincible ignorance. " Let," he says, " an individual be surrounded
by ])reachers straight from heaven, speaking with tongues of divine per-
su:ision. and yet according to the definitions given of what constitutes
invincible ignorance, he might with impunity withhold acquiescence,
alleging miral inability to ccjinprehend what was s|>oken. while in fact
he was obdurately bent on not ex|)ressing assent, from the design to
establish a plea for the indulgence of a ^icltish purpose."

Now, these words prove at least one ihing. the utter ignorance,
whether vincible or invincible we do not pretend to decide, of the
writer, as to what invincible ignorance is, (lury tells us that vincible
ignorance is that which can be dispelled by the use of adequate dili-
gence ; invincible ignorance is that which cannot be so removed" (2).
But according to the words above quoted it seems that a man may
be in invincible ignorance who is "obstinately bent on not exjiressing
assent, from the design to establish a i)lea for the indulgence of a
selfish piiri)ose."' Such a man would be in bad faith, and bad faith
and invincible ignorance are incompatible. This common-sense doc-
trine is the best excuse which we can find for the Reviewer. His
ignorance is so portentous as to excuse him from the charge of malice.
But it is not the less a phenomenon worthy of the ?atention of all who
are interested in English periodical literature, that the pages df our
chief Quarterly Review should bj open to an article on so important a
branch of learning as moral theology, the writer of which displays
throughout the most childish igiioran<;e of th«. very elements of the
science and oi the meaning of the terms used by its professors.

(1) Compniil. Tkeol. Mur. t' in. i. p. ^l^^. Rome. 18 W.
(5) lbH\s. 15.

PART I. '

l'll4> I'.IMI .tll«>liti4>«i lIlO >l<'tlllM.

(TliL' MiiNiii. London, Manli 1S75, )>. ,?'''2.)

Wc have already, in our !a;>t luinilier, j;i\^'n brief expression to our
sen.se of the value otthi- paper in the current number of the Quarterly
Krvii'Ki, on " 'J'he Doctrines ol tlie jesnils." 1'he writer of the article
shows, aiuKJst in every line, liis utter incapacity to deal with the sub-
ject he has ventured to treat : so nuich so, indeed that were it not for
the literary dignity of the organ which has admitted his lucubrations
into its pages, we should not consider him worthy of further notice,
liut as the conductors of the Qitarter/ij have yielded so far, in a
moment of weakness, as to endorse his stri<tures on the moral doc-
trine.«., we will not say of the Jesuits, but of the (jatholic (Church, a few
words to point out one or two of the Reviewer's numberless blunders and
misapprehensions may. perchance, have the efrc<t of infusing a little cau-
tion into thieir counsels for the future, and render them less precipitate
in giving iheir sanction to articles that have no higher merit than that
of l)eing decorated with a sensational title.

Ila^4' IIU' .l4'>>llilM 31113 4l4M'lrJll4'*> |»4'4'llliai' l4» lll4'lllN4'lV4'M?

And in the lirsl jilace, as we have >aid, the attack of the Reviewer is
Jevelled not at any special or singular doctrines of the Jesuits, but at
the moral teac hing of the Catiioiic ('hur( li. It is true the Quarterly
writer takes especial pains to jjroduce ihe impression that there are
special doctrines ujjheld by the Society, as distinguished, we presume
from the doctrines of the Church, although he his not hajjpy in the
proofs he alleges in suppon of is view. He brings forward Moullet, for
instance, as an authority : but Moullet was not a Jesuit. Oury, indeed,
recognizes Moullet's authority, as he might well do, for the teaching of
the latter was drawn from Jesuit sources ; but still his book came out,
not with any sanction from the .Society, but with the authorization of
his own Ordinary, the Hishoj) of Lausanne, who, as the Reviewer in-
forms us, jjarticularly recommended it to the whole clergy ofh s diocese
on the special ground of its keeping to the happy mean between
" rigour'sm and laxity. " So far, then, as the case of Moullet is con-
cerned, it goes to show the identity oi the Jesuits' teaching with that
of the Church, at least in the instance of the diocese of Lausanne.

But the Reviewer further attempts to fasten the charge of specialty
of doctrine on the Society, from the fiict that the Society's official im-
primatur must be affixed to any book published by a Jesuit author, and
this, he argues, must throw the responsability for the opinions con-
tained in any such work upon the whole body of the Society, and that
all the more ou account of the minute regulations laid down in the
C<!>»sti.tutions to secure uniformity of doctrine and opinion in the
teaching of the Jesuits. In support of this he says : " In the ' Consti-

II to our
{}iliirt(-r/y

ic article
the sul)-

t not for

iibrutions
jr notict.'.

Ihr, in a
loral doc-
re li, a few
ndcrs and

little cau-
)r(.'(:ipitate

than that

ll!>H'IV«'!H?

eviewer is
lits, but at
Quarterly
there are
.' presume
ipy in the
[oullet, for
v, indeed,
eaching of
came out,
ri/ation of
;vie\ver in-
1 s diocese

1 between
llet is con-
; with that
ianne.

if specialty
official ivi-
uthor, and
lions con-
% and that
iwn in the
on in the

2 ' Consti-

tutions ' it is written that no difTcrences of opinioti arc adtnissible,
whether in conversation (i\ or ])ul)lic discourse, or written books,
whi< h last it is not allowable to publish without approval and consent
of the (ieneral, who, however, may contuie their examination to three
men endowed with soinid doctrine and eminent judgment.

Now here, before jiroceediug further, U-t us notice one of t'^e Re-
viewer's habitual inaccuracies in dealing wiih the l.aiin text. The ori-
ginal words in the ( 'onstitutionr, are : " J)oitrin<c igitur differentes non
admittantur, nee verbo in concionibus vel lectionibiis publicis nec
scriptis libris, qui (piidem edi non poterant in lucemsine ai)probatione
atque consensu I'r;vpositi (leneralis " The literal translation of these
words is as follows : '■ Different doctrnies, tlierelVire. are not to by
allowed, neither by word of mouth in sermons f'coiicioiiibus; or public
lectures, nor in written books, which last may not be publi>lnt; wiihoi.it
the ap|)r(jval and consent of the Oeiu'ral. "' There is (piesiion, then
here (jf doctrines, and not opinions; lor doctrines and o]iiiiions may
be ver\ different things, and the prc)hiliition of (liffereiice m sut h doi-s
not exlend to jjrivate i onversation, as tlie Reviewer, by his blundering
translation fif the word " concionibus " would impis. but li>i.- reterenee
to ])ublic teaihiiig. whether in the lecture-room or pulpil.

Then, if the (Juiirtcr/y writer had turiied to the I )e(;l;ir.ition appen-
ded to the Cha[)ter of the C'on>iiiutions in which the forei/oing words
are contained, he would have discovered wliatrule !•> to he folhjwed
by the members of the Society in order to exclude diifereiices of
opinion. The Declaration m (juestion is as follows : " New opinions
are iK)t to be admitted ; and if any one entertains an opinion that differs
from that which the Church and her Doctors ordinarily hold, he ought
to submit such opinion to the judgment of the .Society according to the
declaration in the (ieneral Kxanieii. And even with, respect to o|)inions
in which Catholic Doctors dilfer or liold opposing views, care must
be taken to secure agreement in the Society. '' (2)

h'rom the ibove extract the nature of the great rule by whicli unifor-
mity of doctrine and opinion is to be secured and fostered is abun-
dantly evident; none other, in fact, than confonmiv to the doctrines
and prevailing oijinions of the Catholic Church. J!ut here we cannot
put the matter more clearly before our readers iha 1 by (pioting the
words of Father de Ravignan.

llus till' .Society of .Icsus any flcicti iiics. |iiiipiTly spcMkiiiL;', |ii'iiiliiii' to ilscll"'
\\ hat spirit dirci'ts it in its (l();finatic uihI inoi'al doctrines iin I'cli^iion ''

St. Ii^iiat ins (Icsircil two tliinj:s: sociiril\ ofdoctrinc — liie sjiinl ot' Kvaiiirclical
("liarity and Zeal.

I will state lliat the .Society has no doctrines. pro|ierly speaking, pccn liar to itscdt' :
it follows the most f^eiierally iiutlioil/,ed doctrines in the Cliii.idi ; and as I'or tree
opinions, it leaves liherty of spirit ii. nnioii of liearts Saidi was tin' wise thonfrhl
of its founder. A lioily recinnes. aliove all thiiies. interior harmony atid pea<'e ;
the union of its members is its life, DiU'erence otOpinion and ol doctrine. Iiy crea-
ting a division of Ihoiiiihls. incurs the risk of creating a division of feeling. \\'e
may well imagine, then, that, St. Ignatins slionid have recommended the religions
of his Society to avoid, as much is possible, that diversity of opinion \vlii(-h. by
rela.xing union, weakens stietigtl.. and <anses the ruin of truth ilsidf. The supe-
riors are bound carefully to wai(' oil this danger.

It is with this oliject, and to w itch over the integrit v of docti'ine. that our f'ons-

(1) The italics are ours.

(li) CoiLst. Pars iii.c. i. •$ 18. 0.

:3S

itS"

litutioiis iiiiljinit to ]irfrMniiiiii\v exftiuiniition and imthorization all the books that a
iclijrious of the .Society may wish to piibli.'^h.

Tliis guarantee is lu'csssaiy ; it is morally suflicieiit. Never, however — and I
laii easily understand it— lias the Society, l)V those wise precautions, thought of "
holding lint the pretension that the least opfnion of its writers or its professors
should become the opinion and the doctrine of the whole body ; nor that the approba-
tion of tiiree or four examiners and of a superior, should stamj) on a Jesuit's book
a sanction of irrefrajiablc truth. I see no ditliculty in acknowledging that Jesuit
authors, tlieir eMiniincrs and their superiors, may be, and have been deceived.

Hut it appears to me evidently as equally repugnant to justice and to good sense,
to impute to a wiiole body the o|iinions or the errors of some of its members, as it
would l)c tluit tiie individuals should be considered irreproachable, whilst the
whole body is criminal and worthy of condemnation, since sound members will
never t irni a corrupted liody (.'!).

Ill a word the opinions of the Society are those which are most
a|)i)roveci oy the Church, those most in accordance with the common
opinions of her Doctors ; hut more especially St. 'i'homas is declared
to be the theologian to be followed both by masters and pupils in the
schools of the Society, without the obligation, however, to follow blindly
all and each of his ojiinions (4). Thus in the fifth General Congrega-
tion directions were given to professors :

I II any case where the ojiinion ofSt. Tiiomas is ambiguous, or in those (|uestion8-
iioi perhaps treated of hy St Tiionuis, in which Catholic Doctors differ, it is per-
mitted t(i onis to take either side. —

])rovided always that due charity and consideration be exercised
towards those who hold to the opposite view- of the question.

And this rule is of great importance, because it has in fact governed
the practical application of the other rules of the Society for securing;
uniformity in doctrine and tt-aching. In the course of the Society's
history there has been no manifestation of that servitude with which
the members of the Society have been recently taunted by a great
authority, on the part of the great Jesuit waters and theologians. To
tpiote I'alhcr de Ravignan once more.

Thus, in (|uesti()ns freely discussed among theologians, the Jesuit is free
to embrace that part thai is tlu' most consonant to his own views. The only com-
mand imposed on him is to observe moderation and charity, in omnibun charitas.
Tiie authors of tlie Society are full of these free differences cf opinion amongst
lliemselves. Their works are accessible to everyone: and what becomes, in the
]iresence of a fact, so easy to verify — wiiat becomes, I ask, of this doctrine, said to
lie peculiar to the .lesuirs, and of this system of teaching that belongs only to
them'.' Now once ..ore, ! state, we have no doctrines\ peculiar to ourselves; we
have a spirit of our own, but that -is very different.

TIk' KfviOMvr'N Mkill t\n a truiislntor.

But enough has been said on the general bearing of the question.
Before preceeding to the details, let us point out a few more instances
of the Reviewer's skill as a translator; for the mistakes he commits
may be taken as no bad index of his competency to deal with the sub-
ject—a subject so full of subtle and minute details, and requiring more
than any other the pcssession of accurate technical knowledge on the

f;i) Thr Jf!Kiiil!>. tli)'ir InsHltite. Doclrini'x, kc. C. 4.

(4) Const, Pars iv. c. 5, § 4 ; c, 14. § 1 ; Cougreg. v. d. 41. § 5.

mtf

■I

books that a

fever — and I
6, thought of

ts professors
the approba-

Jesuit's book

g that Jesuit

eceived.

o good sense,

embers, as it
whilst the

lembers will

are most
e common
s declared
ipils in the
ow blindly
Congrega-

)se (|uestions-
h'v, it is per-

exercised

t governed
or securing
J Society's
vith which
-ly a great
ians. To

Hit is free
e only com-
iiin charitas.
^n amongst
ines. in the
ine, said to
iga only to
rselves; we

question.

mstances
commits
the sub-

ing more

e on the

part of any one who undertakes to handle it — into the discussion of
which he has so rashly thrust himself.

We have already called attention to his rendering of ignorans by
" ignoring " Again (5), we meet with the sentence : Father Gury care-
fully points out that mental reservations are of two kinds, the i/r/V//)'
and the latently mental. " Now Father Gury's words are " Restrictio
mentalis est : \\) pure ?,^\\ stricte menta/is, si sensus loquentis percipi
nuUo modo possit, et hiec, proprie ff/e//ta/is, d'lchur ; (2) /ate seu
bnproprie mentalis, si sensus projiositionis ex adjunctis possit col-
ligi " (<i). Late is here rendered by latently. What might possibly be
the difference between a. purely mental, and a latently mental reserva-
tion, we do not attempt to realize. Of course the sense of the pas-
sage is, " A mental reservation is {\) purely or strietly mental being
such that the meaning of the Hjjeaker can in no way be perceived, and
this is mental reservation jDroi^er : (2) mental in a iciJe or improper
sense, being such that the sense of the propcsicion may be gathered
from the circumstances in which it is uttered." And Gury ])roceeds
to say that mental reservation in the strict sense is never lawful; but
cases may occur in which it may be used in the wider and improper
sense.

Then we have (7) the following case ]5resented. "In the section
about Contracts we find this'query : ' If a donation has been promised
on oath, but has not yet been delivered, is it still binding?' which is
answered negatively on the gn^und that, as the deed is incomplete, it
is void in substance, and consecpiently no oath in reference thereto
can be held to have binding force.'' Father Gury's query is, "An
obliget donatio jurata, sed non ac( eptata .'*" Does a donation that
has been jjromized on oath bind before it has been accepted not deli-
vered t 'J"o understand the blunder, wc must understand what moral
theologians mean !)\- a donation. According to them it is a contract,
" by wliich the donor deprives himself actually and in an irrevocable
manner, of something in fiivour of the recipient who has accepted the
gift." (8) A gift may be accc|)ted either in tlie very act of receiving it
into possession ; or by intimating to the donor the accession of the
recipient to the contract even before the gift is actually delivered.
Till such acceptance is given, in one way or the other, the contract
does not exist; and therefore no obligation that might result from
such contract can, according to the oi)iuion of some, be binding. The
writer plainly either did not take the ]iains to read Gury on the matter ;
or, if, he did read, he certainly did not undei stand.

But more than this. Father (iury's reply to the query is twofold.
In the first place he answers negatively. A man under such circums-
tances is not bound, because an oath follows the nature of the act ;
but a donation before acceptance is not a completed contract, there-
fore the obligation ceases. .And in support of this decision he cites
.St. Alphonsus Liguori. in the next place he gives an affirmative
decision, to the effect that the oath is to be observed as long as it can
be kept without sin. And or this solution of the question he quotes

(5) P. 04.

(tj) Giipv. t. i. p. 47:'., li'iiii I', 18 ;g.

,7) 1' li,-).

(8) T. i. 749— 7.') 1.

I t

■ '10 ^

Layniann. So that it turns out that the Reviewer is convicted at once
of ignorance, of suppression, and of stating what is not the fact. For
Father Gury does not answer negatively, as is implied ; he gives no
reply at all or. his own authority ; he merely states the conflicting
opinions of two most competent authorities in moral theology, St.
Alphonsus and Laymann ; and os it happens it is the non-Jesuit, St.
Alphonsus, who gives the solution as the one commonly received,
that the Reviewer seems to repnjbate, and the Jesuit Laymann who is
opposed to that solution.

Again, (9) we have "■ S(-iI(riii gcneratim loqueiuio ; quia excipiunt
noil paiici^ ' (10) thus translated: "I say speaki/i^i^ generally^ for there
are not a few exceptions." The niatter under discussion is occult
compensation, and Father Gury has answered the query, whether
servants can have recourse to occult compensation on the ])lea thut
they are underpaid, negatively, at least generally speaking, for not a
feii< except three cases — not many cases (i). If the labourer has been
com])elled by force or fear to consent to work for an inadequate
wage. (2) If he has been driven by necessity to accej^t it, provided
that the emjiloyer could not justly have got others to work for the
same low rate of payment, or t^avc him work merely out of charity.
(3) If he is unwillingly burdened with oppressive labour.

It may be said that these mistakes do not amount to much, and
]ierhaps looked at sim];ily and singly in thems-^lves this may be true.
But taken altogether they indicate either great slovenliness and inac-
curacy on the part of this writer ; or they betray what is still worse, as
far as trtith is concerned, an entire want of due i)rei)aration, not to
say radical unfitness to treat the subjects he has taken in hand.
These blunders go far to destroy confidence in his powers to deal
thoroughly and comi)letely with any of the matters, so subtle and so
critical in their nature and bearings as so many of ihem are, that he
has put himself forward to discuss, and that too with the view of affect-
ing the reputation of other men by the conclusions that he pretends
to arrive at.

Let us now follow the Reviewer more into det.iil. He says, (11)
" Advocate and antagonist will alike admit that the system of lax opi-
nion popularly charged against the fesuit divines rests on three
cardinal j^ropositions — of ])robabilism, of ment.d reservation, and
justification of means by the end;" and he forthwitli jjroceeds to dis-
cuss each subject in turn. We have said proceeds to discuss, though
in using such an expression we have conferretl an honour on me
Reviewer's process which it can lay no claim to. Anything more
sli|)shod than his method of treatment can liardly be imigmed. There
is nothing to indicate the slightest insight into the princiijles involved
in these momentous questions of moral science; nothing that gives
evidence of any consistent study of those principles : nothing beyond
a few garbled extracts, disjecta membra torn from their context and
surroundings as far as principles are concerned, and then a confused
mass of cases the bearings of which for the most part the writer

(D) I'. 78.

(10) (liirv, I. i. ].. i!i:

(11) r. -.'ii.

icted at once
le fact. For
he gives no
e conflicting
theology, St.
on-Jesuit, St.
ily received,
inann who is

iia excipiunt
//)', for there
on is occult
ery, whether
he plea thnt
ig, for not a
rer has been
inadequate
it, provided
U'ork for the
t of charity.

) much, and
nay he true.
^s and inac-
till worse, as
Ltion, not to
en in hand,
vers to deal
ibtle and so
are, that he
'iew of affect-
he pretends

le says, ( 1 1)
n of lax opi-
ts on three
vat ion, and
Jceds to dis-
cuss, though
lour on me
y thing more
ned. There
les involved
I that gives
ling beyond
context and
a confused
the writer

grossly misunderstands, is to be found in the dre.iry waste of pages
that he has filled with his helpless guesses and speculations.

We ])ropose to reverse the Reviewer's order of dealing with the
subjects that he has selected, and to begin with the last-named, that is,
the charge that the Jesuits uphold the principle that the end justities
the means. We give this matter the precedence for two reasons ;
firstly b-cause, as the Reviewer observes, " no charge has more power-
fully tended to raise popular ]:)rejudice against the Jesuit Fatheis;"
and secondly, because a clear understanding of what Jesuit theologians
do teach is required absolutely as a preliminary to the discussion of
th:s or any subject whatsoever ; for unless we can show the falsehood
f)f this c:harge, we shall always lie open to the ac( usation that we are
falling l)nck upon the doctrine in ([uestion in our very treatment of
it, and alleging what we know to be untrue because that is a necessary
means for the refutation of the charge and to set ourselves right in
the eyes of the world. And in connection willi this matter we are
here led to enter our ])rotest once for all against the monstrous per-
version of truth and outrageous violation of all tairness of interpreta-
tion involved in the following jiroj^ositions.

(Incc uior(> We irn|ircs?! (in tlie it'iidfr thai, in ilodiicinsr infcreni'c frnni ]iioiK)si-
tions in ./esuit w i itc's, we ii<lvisiMily jiroiccd njiun tiii' iiiirn'ii)k'. tliiit llii.' terms to
lie iipincr-iaitMl ni ilnir vaine. tnusi be tested \^s every sense tliey <'iUi he nnide tit
licar without ,t <ila;int;ly forced .-strain. For aecoidincr to .Jesnit doctrine any
o]iinion that can lie lnonsrlit into apparent conformity ^vitli term.-; employed by any
single \vriter of aiitlioiity, nniy lie safely accejited and acted niion liy an imlivi-
liiial. even in nppusition to the mind of his spii'ituiil ad\ iser (|i S'.i).

It is sufficient tor the ])resent to record our refusal to siilimit the
writings of any theologian whatever to a test so utterly sul)versive
of all ])rinci]j!es of hf)nest interpretation as that i)roposed in the first
of tlie above propositions. As regards the latter proi)ositioii, we ineet
it with a point-blank denial of its truth, and we challenge the Review-
er to adduce one shred of ])roof m support of his assertion.

M'litit tlio l{oviOMOi' coiiMidiT.** a (loiiioiiNtralWin.

But let us now ])roceed to see what the Reviewer h.is to say with
reference to the maxim of means being justified in virtue of tlu end to
which they are aijjjlied. He proceeds as follows —

We lieiieve it to be demoiistralile that tiie nia\ini has been liroached clearly and
tletinitidy, by an niibroken cliain if .lesuit divines of liist-iaak standiiiy;. from
ISusemlianm down to (liiry and Lrlieratore.

In snbstantiation of this statement we snbmit a S;'ries of (]notations froia writers
wliose authority cannot be disowned by tiie Order. The list is trom Ihuenibaiitn
(will) may be called the patriareii of the maxim), whose MdhtUa has jrone thrimsrh
more than liftv editions, and. by its re|)rint. not many yeaisa;ro, in Home, at tiie
]ircss of the I'ldpajriiiida. can idi im tiie continued and solemn aiiproval of the
Supreme Aiithority of the Clmr h. '•('iini linis e'<t lieitns. eti' ni media sunt
licita." are liis wdrds ; and a^ai i, •' Cni licitiis vfX li'iis. etiani iieviit media.' (12)
Amontrst .lesnit Inniiiiaiies ot' ti:st rnafjnitnde ranks Layinnnii, of whom Gary
Bays : ' ' Inter ma.\imos tlieolojjia' moialis doetores sine dnbiii relereiidns.'' In his
Thtiiliii/iii J/11/V///.V (.Miinicli 11)25) we meet with the same proposition in almost the
identical formnia : " Cui concessns est linis, conces*i etiani sunt media aJ tiiiem

(12) I'p. :'.20 and riUl. Kdii. Franeofoi'ti, M!."..!.

ordinnfa.' In 17<i2 tlip Jesuit Wngomann, Professor of Morals at the I'niveisiiy
of Iiiiis]irurk, pulilished a Hvnopsis of iM oral Theology, duly anthenticiitcd by
official approbation, in which occurs thi'* passage: ''Is the intention of a good
end rendered vicious by the ciioice of bad means? Not if the end itself be inten-
ded irrespective of the uieans,' a proposition which he tlins exemplifies ; ('aius is
minded to bestow alms, without at the siiine time taking thought as to the means ;
suhseciucntly from avarice lie elects to give it out of the proceeds of theft, which
to that end he conse(|uently commits; and so Caius would be entitled to the
merits of chaiity. though he has aggravated the offence of violence by the motive
of avarice. WagemMtin is not a doctor who deals in obscure words, for he says :
" Finis determinal probitatem actus," a delinitiou of singularly neat precision.

Catliolic teaching on the 3IorHllt.v or Ilninan Aetn,

Before descending to particulars in replying to the above, we will
brierty state the doctrine of Catholic theologians with respect to the
morality of human acts. When this has been done, we trust that our
readers will be in a position to estimate the bearing of the quotations
adduced by the Reviewer, and to ap|)reciate, at the same time, the
utter shallowness and ignorance beiriyed by the interpretations he puts
upon them. And here we shall simply follow Father dury, as his work
is accessible to all. After discussing the nature of morality, and some
of the conditions that it presupposes in respect of human acts, he pro-
ceeds, in his second article to treat of the .Sources of Morality, or
those princijjles which assign their specific moral character to human
acts or modify them, each within its own specific range. (13) These
sources of morality are threefold: 11) The object of the act; (2) the
circumstance of the act, or those accidental determi'.iations that
accompany its i)erformance, but do not affect its substantial character,
though they may have a certain effec. ujjon its moral complexion.
Thus an act may be differenced by the accidental character of the
agent, whether he be single, or married, or charged with some sacred
office ; or by the diversity of the (piality or the t[uaniity of the object
of the act ; or by the means and inslrcments employed by the agent ;
or by some accidental extrinsic motive apart from the object i)roi)er :
or by ihe consideration wheii^er it is performed in good faith or in bad
laith, or with a greater or less degree of intensity or adverteiice ; or
by the period of time consumed in the operation ; (3) the end of the
act, or that to which the agent directs his intention m its accomi)lish-
ment.

The ConoliiNioiiM of Ciinry. the Jcnnit.

Having established the existence of each of these principles, Father
(iury goes on to lay down the following conclusions as resulting from
them —

\. The election of evil means is always o\\\. but on the contrary it does not
follow thai the election of good means is always good. Thus, no one is held to
be w (-rtliy 111 p:aise because he abstains tiom diiuk out ofavai'ice: and he is to
be hehl culpable v.ho steals money in order to give alms.

2. ^^ linsoever chooses an honest means to an honest end, performs an act of
double houesly. if the honesty of the act in lioth cases falls within his intention.
Ill like manner he is guilty of double malice who elects an evil means to an evil
end, as tor instance, if any one stole miuiey in order to get drunk with it.

3. Whosoever employs an evil means for a goud end c(uitracls only the malice

(I.^) T. 1. 11. 27. se-i.

lit flic I'liivcisitj
nithcnlicutctl hy
'iition of a good
i itself be iiiten-
plifies : ('aiiis is
as t(» the ineiiiiH ;
^: of theft, wliich
entitled to the
■e by the motive
d-J, f(jr he s^ays :
eat precision.

nan Aetn,

above, we will

esiject to the

trust that our

the quotations

ame time, the

tations he puts

rv, as his work

ility, and some

n acts, he pro-

f Morality, or

cter to human

;e. (13) These

act ; (2) the

^linations that

itial character,

al complexion.

laracter of the

h some sacred

Y of the object

by the agent ;

:)bject proper :

faitii or in bad

dverteiice ; or

the end of the

ts accomplish-

it.

iciples, Father
resulting from

trary it doeis not
10 one is held to
ice ; and lie is to

rfoims an n<'t of
in his intention,
leans to an evil
with it.
iinl\ the malice

arising from the choice of sncli means, as for instance if any one told a lie to free
hi« neighbor from danger. So. on the other liiind, he who makes use ot honest means
for n bad end contracts only the malice arising from such end.

4. Whosoever makes use of a means indifi'erent in itself, that is not having any
.specific (duiracter of good or evil, in ordei' to a good or a bad end. contracts only
tlie goodness or malice arising from the end propusi'd.

It is hardly neces.sary to point out how entirely opposed these prin-
ci])les are to the construction put by the Reviewer on the jiassages
which he has (pioted from Busembaum, l,ayiTiann, and Wagemann.
To account for such difference we are driven to one of two supjiosi-
tions. Either Father (jury contradicts the above-named theologians
in the i>rincii)les he Inys down on this subject, and then we have a
contiict on this fundamental question amongst the Jesuits themselves ;
or the Quarterly writer has mistaken the sense of the passages that
lie cites in proof of his accusation against the Society. \\'e can only
decide which of the lwosup|jositions is the correct one, not by forcing
any i)Ossible meaning out of the passages in question that the words
in themselves may bear, according to the Reviewer's canon of inter
])retation, but by taking them in connection with the conte.xt and
scope of the subject matter to wiiich they belong, in agreement with
the hermeneutical rules that are followed in all other cases.

If the JJeviewer had jjroceded in harmony with those rules, and
exercised common fairne,>s in their ajiplication, he would have escaped
from the, at Last material, injustice of adducing a chain of [esm't
writers in support of an immoral principle which those writers repu-
diate or rejirobate as fully as himself; and would on the other hand
have been guided to recognize the fact that there is a sense of the
phrase, -'the end justifies the means," that is sound and v.ilid, and
which does but exijress not only a common axiom of law br,t a dictate
of common sense, that the right to the end carries with it the ritrht to
employ all lawful means to that end, without for a moment implving
that the use of means that are by their own nature evil can be per-
mitted. Had the Qi/arttr/y writer done this, he would then have
been free to inquire whether the Jesuit or other theologians had in
any case overstepped the prescriptions of this distinction ; and such
inquiry coiiid have afforded no ground for comjilaint as falling fairly
within the limits of legitimate controversy.

Till' Je.snif BuMOinl»anni.

The Reviewer begins w ith Busembaum by quoting the words, Ci/m
finis est /icitus, etiaiu media sunt licita — "' When the end is law ful the
means requisite to that end are also lawful." We presume it is
because of his use of these words, and similar expressions in the second
case quoted, that iiusembaiun is dul)l.)ed by the Reviewer as the
patriarch of the m...xim. But why these two quotations should entitle
Busembaum to si.ch as honour we do not know : for the maxim in
([uestion, and a v.'ry sound m.ixim it is when rightly understood, is a
common axiom i'l canon law. and we sujjjiose would not be repudiated
in civil jurisprudence. (14)

(14) At least we have the analogous Wi.i.^ims ; ■•' P.opfernecessUatem. illicitum
tflicitur licitum. (Von agitnr hi<- de illicito in se). Plus semper continet in se
t(Uod est minus, (.'ui licet tiuod est plus, licet (Uii|iie quod est minus ' (/iV//i(/«;
Jiirii, apud Craisson. Man. .fur. Can. i. [). II'.J.)

The ca^e in which the first quotation occurs is that of a prisoner
who atteinpts to escape from coiifineinent, and who finds that certain
means are necessary to effect his j)Lirpose. Take the case of Louis
the Sixteenth in the Temple ; or that of the Due d'Enghien at Vincen-
nes. There could l)e no (juestion as to their rigiit to make their escape
ifjKissible; l)ut in order to do so it might be necessary to practise
dece[)tion on the keepers, to lull them into security, to place food and
drink before them to induce carelessness or sleep, to draw them off
from their post ; or it might be requisite to free themselves from
tetters, and otherwise break through o])i)osing barriers as they best
could. Shoulu scruples arise as to the legitimacy of using such means
of regaining freedom and escaping from death, how would common
sense reply to them? Of course you are at liberty to use them ; for the
actions involved in them are not evil in ihemselvcs, and you have a
right to your freedom, therefore you have a right also to employ
tliose means by which alone you can regain your freedom. 'J'he right
to perform any action carries with it the right to use all means neces-
sary to that action jjrovided they be not absolutely evil by their very
nature. And this is all that Jiusembaum means when he says that
the means requisite to :.n end are lawful when the end itself is lawful.
But he does not say that evil means can be employed for a lawful
end ; far less that a lawful end converts bad means into good.

It is true that Busembaum does not confine the application of his
principle to innocent prisoners only ; but then he considers that under
certain circumstances even guilty and condemned malefiictors may
legitimately effect their e:.c?.pe from prison, a question which we do
not enter into here, so that the com])lexion of the case is in no wise
altered as regards the pnnciijle at stake." (15i

The second ciuoiation, '• To whom the tnd is lawful, the means also
are lawful," has reference to a case in which the performance of a
certain natural action is concerned, and the reply of Busembaum simply
amounts to this, that means which, if employed to give effect to sinful
affections and desires would themselves !)e sinful, may be used without
sin in order to the It-gitimate act in ([ue Jon, for the jjlain reason, that
they are more or less necessary and natural adjuncts to it. The case
therefore is merely a repetition of the one Me have just considered, (ibl

Wag
Froi
Voit
imm
und(

rciul
Tlu'
ul' hi
til.'
hy 111
y'ivil

The .lONiiit liiiyiiianii.

The Reviewer quotes Laymann, but as he gives no reference, and
Taymann's works fill a bulky folio volume, we have been unable to
find the passage to which he alludes ; but we have no hesitation in
asserting that it will admit of an explanation analogous to those already
given.

Tlie JeNiiit MaKCiiianii.

Wagemann is next quoted—" Is the intention of a good end
rendered vicious by the choice of bad means ? Not if the end itself be
intended irrespective of the means." We do not possess a copy of

(!.")) Piiscinlmu'ii, 1. i. vi. c. .'<, l^e rro. art. 2. noniif, 18U.
(16) Rtiscmhinun, 1. vi. Tnict. vi. c 11, art. 1.

f a prisoner
that certain
se of Louis
1 at Viiicen-
their escape

to practise
e food and
w them off
) selves from
s they best
such means
Id common
em ; for the
you have a
to employ

'J'he right
eans neces-
■ their very
e says that
If is lawful,
for a lawful
3d.

tion of his
that under
ictors may
lich we do
in no wise

means also
lance of a
um simply
t to sinful
ed without
-■ason, that
The case
ered. (ibi

tnce, and
unable to
iitation in
e already

ood end
itself bc
copy of

Wagemann's book, but the case referred to is found in the Ttadatus
Prodromus, written we belie\e by Wagemann, which is i)refixed to
Voit's T/ieo/ogia Mora/is, a work that is quoted by the Reviewer
immediately afterwards. Tlu reply to the above query, which is given
under a distinction, stands as follows —

Tf the ciiil is intoni]e(l with a (lotiTiiiinaic i-clation to Imd iiu'iuis, tlu' net is
rcMih'icii lull! ; liiit not, it' IIr' cml In; iiitciidfii wiilnnit iiiiy rt'terciicc to such means.
Tin' foiiowii.t; are fc.\eni])li's — Tit ins .steals in oiiier \o c-ivc alms o\it oft lie ]iidcei-(is
of Ills theft: and Cii'ms intends to irive alms, tiiinliinf; al tlie moment notiiin^alioiit
tile means : hut afte; wai'ds, beinu' nioveil |i\ avarice, he chooses to liestow liia alm.s
hy means <if tlieft, wiiicli lie commits with thai end in \ lew ; the first intention of
^riving aims was go(jd m (,'aiiis. (IT)

The Reviewer omits the last clause, and proceeds to say — " And so
Caius would be entitled to the merits of charily though he has aggra-
vated the offence of violence by the motive of avarice." This sentence
is clear in nothing save this, that it is an utter misstatement of Wage-
mann's conclusion ; a misstatement indeed so palpable that it strains
the Reviewer's title to indulgence on the grounds of his habitual inac-
curacy to its utmost limit. I'he whole question is, whether \\\t iiitetition
of doing a deed of charity — which is tiie niental act referred to — is
vitiated bv the, what he may call, collateral intention of using a bad
means to perform that good deed ? The reply is given at once. Most
certainly. Titius makes an act of the mind that he will steal in order
to give alms, and he commits a sin by so doing. Caius, on the other
hand, forms his intention irrespective of the means; and his act of the
mind is good. It is only subsequently that he commits sin by the
election of a bad means to carry out his good intention.

The Reviewer's case is made worse by the fact that he had before his
eyes, not more than half a page above the e.vtract that he has given,
the following most clear and distinct statement, a statement that en-
tirely coincides with the principles laid down by Father Gury. It is
asked —

'• Does a choice derive its morality from the means as well as from the end ?"
R. If the malice of the means he specifically distinct from I lie malici' of the end,
the choice contracts a twofold malice, one from the lueMiis. the other from the end,
and tile result will liea sin of a kind different tnitn either (for as we have already
said, there will not he two distinct sins in one act, hut one sin of a different
.species) : the same holds jrood of a ijrooil act recoi;ni/.in(if and emhra'iujr mi end
and means diverse in sjiecific if, odness ; for example, he who ileti'iinines to steal
that he may have money to give lo his concnhine; and he who {fives alms to an
indigent per.son who is his enemy that he may effect a reconciliation with him.

The first case of course .llustrates the double malice of an act that
involves the choice both o'an evil end and evil means ; the latter the
double goodness resulting from the choice of end and means that are
both good.

Wagemann then proceeds to say in a corollary —

[I ] If the means he iudifercnt, the choice derives neither troodtiess normal ice fron»
it, as is evident. [2] It the means is of ilu^ naint- xpi'citir imi/icp or goodness as the
end, the choice does not superinduce a new species of morality. [3] Every choice
of «i7'/ W','flns is evil ; but on the other hand, not every choice ot tjood iifaii-i [^

(17) Voit, Tract. Prod. c. ?i. nn. 27, 2"). Lugdun and Paris. 18,^0.

poHitivcIv \ruin\ : fiif, us WHS said nl)()ve, to will uii olijei't tliiit is knowti to lie Imd
suffices for the pH.-tii'i|iiitioii in evil ; in onlei to eiiilow mi act with the trdoilness
of tiie olijert, tliis jriKuliiess miiat he positively iiiteiiiiett, at least in some way,
even though it siioiihl he confused and undefined.

Tt is needless to point out how completely the principles laid down
in the above extract overthrow the Reviewer's next ignorant objection.
" Wagemann is rot a doctor who deals in obscure words, for he says—
'Finis dett-rminat probitatem actus,' a definition of singularly neat
precision." All words are obscure to those who cannot penetrate
their meaning ; and the Reviewer has utterly missed the meaning of
the words he quotes. '• The end determines the probity of the act."
Of course it does. The end, as Father Gury has told us, is one of the
.sources of the morality of actions. But not the only source; for the
object and the circumstances also contribute their share ; and Wage-
mann has just told us that every choice of evil means is evil ; and
Father (iury states that he who employs a bad means to obtain a good
end contracts tlie malice of the bad means. All this is expressed by
the axiom — Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumqun defectu,

Tlie .loMiiit Voit.

The Reviewer passes on to an extract taken from Voit's Moral
Theology.

Tie puts the fuilowinjr I'asc — • Arcadius kills Caius in some city where the law
JiiHicts capital pnnishinciit on a i.'iui'dci'cr. Arcadius is delivered up and condem-
ned to death, Imt he e^cajics. forcildy lireakinf^ out of prison, thougii foreseeing
that he may render his gaolers lial)le to grievous injury. The question is, whether
Arcadius, liy escaping after sentence had been pronounced, has done wrong. My
answer is in the negative.... Has Arcadius then done wrong hy rupturing his
chains and forcildy lireaking out of pris(Mi ? . . . He has dune no wrong, Cui eniin
licet ji»i.'<. cut iiiedi- /i •riiiis.iu ■■luiit." [18]

The case from Voit is correctly stated. Voit grounds his solution
on tne principles of St. Thomas, and therefore even if the solution
were wrong, it is not exclusively Jesuit doctrine" (19). The ground
taken by St. Thomas amounts to this, that a prisoner may make his
escape because he is not bound by the penalty of the law to contribute
in any way to his own death, but only to submit himself patiently to
the executioner who carries the sentence into effect. But to remain
in prison when he might escape would be to contribute remotely to
his own death ; he is therefore quite within his own rights if he avails
himself of any chance of escape offered to him. This reasoning rests
upon the further principle that the State being charged with the main-
tenance of public order may use all necessary means not absolutely
wrong to attain that end. The punishment of death is one such
means, and therefore legitimate under extreme circumstances. But it
is a further stretch of power to bind the criminal in conscience to
cooperate in any way in his own death ; and such an exercise of
power is not required for the attainment of the desired end. There-
fore such an application of power would be superfluous ; nor can we
conceive that it would be in accordance with the moral order of the

[18] Voit, Theol. Mor. p. 98.

[19] St. Thomas, 2. 2 q. 09. a. 4. ad 2.

own to be bad

I the gooilness

in some way,

:s laid down
It objection,
or he says —

ularly neat
ot penetrate

meaning of
of the act."
s one of the
ce ; for the

and Wage-

s evil ; and

btain a good

expressed by

defect II.

^oit's Moral

where the hiw
p and condeni-
igli foreseeing
ion is, whether
le wrong. My

rupturing iiis
ong, Vui etiiin

I his solution
the solution
The ground
ay make his
to contribute

patiently to
t to remain

remotely to
; if he avails
Lsoning rests
th the main-
It absolutely

is one such

ices. But it

onscience to

exercise of

:nd. There-

nor can we
order of the

world that God has established. The reason given why Arcadius does
not sin in breaking out of prison even at the expense of his keepers is,
that the loss incurred by the latter is not intended, but only follows
accidentally on the exercise of Arcadius' right to escape from punish-
ment if he can. And Voit goes onto say that anyone who help?>
him by counsel or otherwise to effect his escape commits no sin, unless
indeed he be under some special obligation like tliat, for instance, im-
posed on warders. This last clause ought to have shown the lieviewer
that not every means was lawful ; that a means involving sin could not
be lawfully employed : and therefore that the ni.ixim, tliat the m?ans
are permitted to him who has a lawful end in a view, does not include
means that are sinful.

Tlio JcHiiK liiborntorc.

Then follows Father Liberatore, who afier an elaborate argument in
su[)port of the indefeasible title of the Church to press into her service
the agency of jihysical means, thinks to f^trengthen his position by the
maxim, "that from the obligation to attain an end arises the right to
procure the means needful and useful for obtaining the same." We
have not the book referred to at hand, but wc accept the Reviewer's
authority for the accuracy of his statement, for the case is perfectly
clear, and the principle enunciated is one of the merest common
sense, upon which indeed the whole fabric of law, and the social order
depending upon law, ultimately rest For we may ask, upon what
other principle does the power of inflicting, we will not say capital
punishment, but any punishment whatever, depend but this, that the
end cf all social regulations is the peace of the community, and that
the right of employing penal measures follows as a necessary adjunct
to the primary necessity of maintaining the well-being of the social
organism, t"or as a matter of fact it is found that society cannot exist
without falling back upon such distasteful auxiliaries ? 'i'he Reviewer
does not mean to assert that penal enactments are unlawful ?

MoiiNlrouN tloctriiK' inipiitiMl to Ciiiiry.

We cannot undertake to follow the Reviewer through the hereto-
geneous mass of cases that he has huddled together ; nor indeed is it
necessary, for we have laid down, as we trust, sufficiently the princi-
ples on which his objections and misrepresentations may be easily
solved. We will therefore touch upon only one more case, and that
because it affords a further and very stricking illustration of help. ess
blundering. Father Gury is credited [20] with laying down distinctly
the monstrous propos tion, " that no evil intention can render wicked
any deed which in it? elf must not by nature be necessarily evil." Pas-
sing over the clumsiness of the wording, we presume the Reviewer
would make Father Gury say that any action may be good, with what-
•ever evil intention committed, provided the said action be not abso-
lutely evil in itself apart from all question of the intention of the agent.
The possibility of such a statement on the part of Father Gury has
already been precluded by the principles which we have seen that he

[20] P. 73.

upholds. Hesiiles, the proposition hoars so great an al)surclity on the
very face of it, that the serious attril)ution of it to, we will not say any
grave author, hut to any man of ordinary coininon sense seems to be
almost ])ast heiicf. However, in support of his charge the Reviewer
(piotcs in a ncne the expression, Ad injur i it in iion siijficit mala intentio
— " A had intention is not siifficieiu to constitute an injury." We do
not find these words in dury, hut we have the following: " Prava
enim inentio ncjn etficit, ut injustum sit illud opus, quod ex se res-
l)e(tu terlii injustum nonest"[2i . I'he case is that of a man who
steals, and escapes suspicion, whic i rest en a third party who is inno-
cent, and there is question w heiher the thief is bound in commutative
justice to make compensation to the innocent man f(jr any loss he
sustains. (iury gives the different opinions on the subject, and
amongst them one which denies any liability because, even if the thief
has contributed to fasten the false charge on the other man, " his evil
intention does not make an action nn/i/st, which is not of its own
nature iin/nst with respect to the third person in question." Causing
suspicion to light on a man is not a thing that of its own nature causes
material loss ; though such loss is very likely accidentally to follow.
The Reviewer therefore translates i/ijitstiiin by ' wicked,' instead of
by unjust, and thus shows that he entirely mistakes the point at issue.
(Uiry does not say that such an act would not be wicked and sinful,
hut that in the oi)inion of some if would not bean unjust act in the
technical sense of the word ; that is an offence against commutative
justice, and therefore burdened with the obligation of restitution.

Oil

llllKlll

to th
|ilii'ii

the

Iiidifroroiii iotioiiM.

We will conclude for the jirescnt with a ftnv remarks on the Review-
er's strictures on Gury's doctrine as to the imiiffcrcnce of certain
actions. He quotes a dictum of Father (iury [22] to the effect that
where 'the end is lawful, the means also are lawful provided they be
indifferent in themselves." There is here plainly a limit put to the
means available for any end ; what that limit is we shall see presently.
We will not follow the writer through his confused discussion, but con-
tent ourselves with producing his somewhat impressive conclusion —
" Here we confine ourselves to the opinion — and we assure those who
challenge our view that we have arrived at it not lightly — that accor-
ding to Father Gury's delinitions the words * per se indifferentia '
cannot be held to limit in any effective degree the licence involved in
the other terms of the proposition." W^ell, let us see what Father
Gury's definitions are.

In his remarks on the object of an act, regarded as the chief source
of its morality, he says that an object may be good, bad, or indiffe-
rent according as it agrees with or is opposed to reason, law, or the
right order of things, or as it does not fall wiih'n the scope of law and
order. Again, an object may be intrinsically good or intrinsically
evil ; and in what the intrinsic evil of an object exists he explains as
follows —

t2j"] Gurv, t. i, p. G47.
[22] P. 71.

^surdity on the
v\\\ not say any
ise seems to be
e the Reviewer
/f mala iiitentio
jury." We do
k'ing : " Prava
nod ex se rcs-
of a man who
ty who is inno-
n commutative
^r any loss he
; sui)ject, and
/en if the thief
man, " his evil
ot of its own
3n." Causing
1 nature causes
ally to follow,
.'d,' instead of
point at issue,
id and sinful,
Hst act in the
: commutative
stitution.

n the Review-
nce of certain
the effect that
^'ided they be
lit put to the
see presently,
sion, but con-
conclusion —
Lire those who
— that accor-

indifferentia '
:e involved in

what Father

I chief source
i, or indiffe-
n, law, or the
pe of law and
intrinsically
e explains as

Ohjprts llmt iiro iiitiiiisii'iillv evil me of tlirot' clasff^^. 1 .Soiii' (u»' sm!;
(ilntiilitli Iji, mill iiiili'iitinlciit of all circunHbiiio's : litcuuso tli('\ involve rf|)ii(.'iiiinc'V
to the \\\i\\\ ami atisoliiti'ly ncci'ssaiy onlcr, as for iiistaiuc, haticij ot (loil, blas-
pIll'IllV, Mini My foitli.

2. Otiicis arc iiilriiisically evil, not inciisplv in tlicinsi Ivcs, hiu liv nn.'-'oii of"
sionif ailiunct or coiiilitioii thai (l('|irnil> on the -^ovcrfif;!! powop of (lod or man :
such arc takinji what hclon'r-' to otlicr.-i, injury to liody or rciiiitiition,mul iiucli like,
wliii'li Honictiiiics ln'conic lawfnl.

.'!. (Itlu'is iijiain arc only fvil hy rea.<on of the ilan<„'cr which onlinarih attcniln
llicni, snch as lookinif at h.'isc olijcclH. rcailiiiL'' bail hiioks. ami ^o on. Tficsf foi' a.
rcarfoiiahlc caiisu. ami where the ilaiigcr !;? reiiioveil, nni}' heconie licit.

The last mentioned cinss concerns those who arc called to moral,
legal, or medical studies for instance, and may be dismissed ; but it is
the second class that falls more immediately within the scope of our
l)resenl discussion ; though of course our principle is lawful and
ai)|ilies to actions within the sphere of both these classes Let us
illustrate what is meant, 'lake for instance, a man's right to his
l)roperty, his good name, his personal security, his life. His right to
such things is based upon (loi's will and order that he sliould enjoy
them. The range of his rights in such matters is commensurate with
(lod's will and appointment with respect to them To deprive a man
of his possessions within that range is to infringe his right ; and this is
in the ordinary course of things always wrong. But contingencies
may arise in which ( lod, with Whom rests the supreme disi)osing
power, may dejuive him of ihem; and if so, God can also delegate to
men some portitni of His power. Thus He concedes to the State the
right to take away life when a man has been guilty of a grave crime
against public order ; nay, even to a private individual when it is
indispensable tor just self defence. J->ut how do we know that God
grants those powers? We reason thus. God has cominitted to the
State as an end the care of public order. But the maintenance of
public order requires that murderers be put to death. Therefore God
must have given to the State the power of life and death in such cases..
And why? Iiecausc He wills the end, and must therefore to be consis-
tent will the means necessary for its attainment. Ciii conceditur finis r-
concediintur media, {nrccssaria.)

But astiod wills that the criminal's life should lie taken from him
the latter lias no longer a right to it ; consequently the means is not
bad the putting him to death, that is, in order to the security of public
order, for the condition on which, as Father Gury says, the badness
of the act is based, the right that a man has to his life, has bee:H
removed.

IVhoii a right to the End give.H a right to the ]fI<'aiiH.

From what has been said, then, in order to apply the principle, that
a right to the end gives a right to the means, three conditions must be
complied with.

1. That the end shall be good.

2. That the means ])e not sinful.

3. That they be necessary for the attainment of the end.

As regards the second condition, from what has been said, the
following conclusions may be drawn, (i) That there are certain means
which are absolutely and intrinsically bad in themselves ; and such can

never he cinploycd. (2) Others, thiit arc indifferent, tliat is, have no
specific morality in thcniselves, such as are the actions of walking,
sitting, and so forth ; and these nnay be always used, (j) A class
which lies between these two, consisting? of acts which in the ordinary
course of things are bad, but ma) under peculiar conditions beconu-
la\»ful, and be u>ed as means in cases of a special and abnormal kind.

We could give many references, ranging from |)age 420 to page 430
of (lury's first volume in ( ontirnuition of the above conclusions; but
we trust we have said siitVicient to show upon what a mass of misaj)
prehension anil misrepresentation the Reviewer's attack upon the
nn»ral teaching of the Catholic Church is based.

We believe that some time ago offer was made in the Gi'imaiiin to
bestow a hundred thalers on any one who could produce a bond fuii-
passage that would convi( t tlie Jesuits, or any Jesuit, of teaching the
doctrine that the end justifies the means, as that maxim is vulgarly
understood. The reward has not been gained in Ciermany ; perhaps
England may be more fortunate ; and if so we shall be glad to transmit
the name of the successful ai)plicant to the bureau of the Gennaiiia,
and w(j have no doujit his ( laiin will be duly honoured if duly substan-
tiated. But the Quarto /} Reviewer has certainly so far not establish-
ed his title to the prize ; a matter to be regretted by his friends, as
otherwise he might have invested the hundred thalers in a hatin
Dictionary, aii article that he i'- manifestly much in need of.

PART II.

^^('iilal l<4'M>i'viili4»ii. 1*111*0 ** Till I out.

(The MoN iH, London, April, 1875, p. 482.)

In our last number we discussed one of what the Quarterly Reviewer
calls the cardinal pro])ositions on which the popular charges against
the moral teaching of the Jesuits rest, that namely which asserts that
the end justifies the means. We showed that this maxim may admit of
two interpretations : one that where the end is legitimate, the use of
means necessary to such end is legitimate, provided that the means
involve no sin in themselves ; the other that provided a good end is
intended, all means whatsoever whether good or bad may be used,
for in fact the goodness of the end imparts goodness to the means,
whatever their moral complexion may be considered in themselves.
The first meaning is the true one, and that accepted by theologians :
the second is false, and repudiated not only by every Catholic theolo-
gian but by every honest man. How far the Reviewer himself may
have adopted this second signification of the maxiiti in his own literary
practice we leave it to the appreciation of our readers to determine.
This much, however, we may say is certain, and for the truth of our
assertion we appeal as well to what we set before our readers in our
last number, as to what we shall advance in our present paper, that the
Reviewer in carrying out the end proposed to himself, of fastening on

;«il>«*

1 1 is, have no
IS of walking.

(j) A class
I the ordinary
tions hcconn-
)n<)rmal kind,
o to page 430

lusioiis : but
lass of niisaj)
ack upon the

German in to
a ho ml Ji,/,-
teaching the
m is vulgarly
my .; perhaps
;id to transmit
le Cienuania,
duly substan-
not establish-
lis friends, as
s in a J.atin
of.

'riy Reviewer
irges against
h asserts that
may admit of
:e, the use of
t the means
good end is
ay be used,
3 the means,

themselves,
theologians ;
holic theolo-
himself may
own literary

determine,
ruth of our
aders in our
per, that the
fastening on

the Cailiolic Church a system of al)surd and immoral doctrines, an end
not justifiable in itself without the gravest and most convincing proofs,
has not shnnik from the use of means that if consciously employed
would at once brand hirn with immoral indifference to the character of
those means themselves. In his attempts at proof we convicted hiin ot
mistranslation, of garbling, and of misrepresentation , and such means
will commend themselves to no honest mind as legitimate and justi-
fiable sources of demonstration, even though made vi^e of in support;
of the loftiest ideal theories of moral purity witli which the modern
world is dazzled or bewildered, and with which for the most ))art it^
practice so painfully contrasts.

I'hmohI'n Provincial li<'(t«'r)>>.

We now turn to the Reviewer's second cardinal ])roposition, that
which concerns Mental Heserv.ition. 'I he Reviewer ojiens fire on this
" second cajjital count in the po|)uIar indictment against Jesuit
princi|)les" by a quotation from the Pi oviiiciales Of course the
Proviihiairs contribute greatly to the Reviewer's article in this and
in other matters where their inspiration is not openly acknow-
ledged. This is only what was to be exi)ected in the treatment of any
subject where Jesuits are concerned ; it will not be out of ])lace there
fore, before prececding to the Reviewer's mob of objections, to put
once more on record the estimate of these celebrated letters that has
been from lime to time formed by writers of various schools of Ffcmh
thought. Father de Ravignan, himself a Jesuit, though previously a
brilliant member of the magistracv of France, thus expresses the result
of his own investigation into the truth of the charges of Pascal, that
had created prejudices against the Society in his own mind, and had
weighed with him as a seri(Mis ])reliminary objecti(Mi to which he was
bound to seek a satisfactory repl\' before lie could enrol iiimself in the
Institute of Ignatius. Mc thus gives the conclusion that his in(|uiry
brought home to his mind : "Pascal, your genius has led you into a
great crime, that of establishing an alliance, jjerhaps imperishable,
between falsehood and the language of the French people. Von have
fixed the vocabulary of calumny; it still rules supreme, but it shall
not do so with me" (i). And others have appreciated the true place
of the J'lovincial Letters in the world of literature, and what is more,
their true effects upon society at large. Pascal aimed at blasting the
good name of the Jesuits ; he succeeded to a great extent, but he suc-
ceeded in a great deal more that was quite beyond his wish or intention.
He contributed by his satire to level the barriers that opposed the
advancing tide of unbelief that was so soon to lay the .stately fabric of
the French Church, and the proud throne of the Bourbons in the dust.
'■ It was a work," says Lemontey, speaking of the Provincial Letters,
" that did more harm to religion than honour to the F'lench language"(2).
Lerminier says, "'Pascal wrote the Provincial Letters, and the demon
of irony was let loose against holy things. The Jesuits, as far as
appearance goes, receive all the blows ; but religion is smitten along

(1) Dt" rExistt'iifc (le rinstilul (ies .li'siiite-:. [1. 3<.; Fifth Eiiitioii.

(2) Hist, de la Hrgi'iui-, toiii. i. p. 15'i.

V ith them. Pascal has prepared the way and VoUaire is free to come"(3).
After the fall of the Jesuits in 1762, d'AIembcrt writing to Voltaire.
<;ould estimate its effects, and the hand that Jansenism had had in the
<atastrophe. " By my faith," he says, " this is a very serious matter,
and the Parliamentary Courts go to work with no !ight hand. 'J'hcy
think that they are saving religion, but they are aiding reason without
suS|)ecting it. 'J hey are the hangmen of philosophy, whose sentence

they execute without knowing it As regards myself, to whom all

things ai;])ear at present coulcur dc rose, I see the Jansenists quietly dying
next year, after liaving this year brought the Jesuits to a violent end,
toleration establisiied, the Protestants recalled, the j^riests married,
• onfession abolished and fanaticism crushed without any one being
the wiser " (4). Such were to be the fruits of Pascal's work.

The passage quoted by the Reviewer from the Piovincial Letters
Mands as follows : " ' One of the most embarrassing things in the
world,' says the Jesr.it, 'is to avoid telling a lie, especiall}' when you
want someihi.ig to be believed that is false, (^ur system of equivo-
cation 1^. a great help in this matter. But do you know how to proceed
where equivocal words cannot be found?' 'No father.' 1 thought as
r.HJch,' said he, 'that is new; it is the doctrine of Mental Reservations.'"'
^'hereupon the Reviewer, having made his quotation, falls straightway
■ UK.) the piitall of his distinction between i)urely and latently Mental
Reservations.

Now first of all with reference to the quotation itself, Pascal asserts
in it what is not true, when he says that the doctrine of Mental
Reservation was new, and an invention of the Jesuits. Escobar more
^'specially is the reputed father o<" the doctrine, but he had no real
claim to the |)arentage : for in maintaining it, he did but pass on the
common doctrine of theologians, and he never taught the lawfulness
of jjurely Mental Reservation.

a lie
■jnan,
but
cont
the
lie it

• disci

• of ci
thoi
law
the
circi
with
by
thoi
misi
of n
us

Filviiioiilar.y iiotioiiw on Triilli siiid FalM'liood.

But in order to the understanding of this question a few words of
I'.eliminary matter are necessary. We have first to inquire what is
rj'.eant by truth, or s|)eaking the truth ? Or, again, in other words, what
js meant by a lie? As Father (Jury is the Reviewer's bete noire in this
and other matters, we will take his definition of a lie — Mendacium est
hiiitio vcl s'gnificatio contra nientem cum voluntatc fallcndi. ^\'e may
fcxplam this definition thus : A lie is a sjieech or intimation contrary to
ihe mind with the intention of deceiving, or it is a form of words of
V iiich the-meaning is not in conformity with and does not express the
thoughts of the mind of the speaker about any subject of which there
may be question, and such form of words becomes a lie formally when
littered with the intention of deceiving others. Truth, then, as far as
intercourse with our neighbour is concerned consists in the agreement
of the words we utter with the thoughts of our mind on any given
.jubject. A lie is the wilful departure from such agreement with a
deceitful intention : these two conditions being requisite to constitute

(.t>^Reviio rk-s (loiix Moiides. l,"i Mai. 1H42.
<4>.- Letter t(i \<»lliiire, Ma., 4, 1702.

etocome"(3).
I to Voltaire,
ad had in the
rious matter,
liand. 'J'hey
eason without
lose sentence
to whom all
quietly dying
violent end,
csts married,
ly one being
3rk.

//a'a/ Letters
hings in the
1}' Avhcn you
m of equivo-
w to jjroceed
1 thought as
servations.'"'
i straightwav
•ntly Mcnta"!

iscal asserts

- of Mental
icobar more
had no real
pass on the

- lawfulness

ioo<l.

'■ words of
lire what is
\'ords, what
oire in this
'ihiciiini est
^\ e may
contrary to
'f words of
>;press the
lich there
lally when
, as far as
agreement
»y giver.
It with a
■onstitute

a lie in its formal character. For instance, when I say John is a good
•jTian, really believing and thinking him to be such, I speak the truth ;
but when I say, notwithstanding my well-grounded belief to the
■contrary, that John is a bad man, and am moved to such utterance by
the desire to injure John's character by deceiving his emjjloyer, I tell a
lie in the formal sense of the word. Now the whole of the present
■discussion hinges on the question whether in any possible conjuncture
• of circumstances, the departure from the conformity between word and
thought which constitutes the truth of any utterance, can be considered
lawful.-* And if in any case allowable, the further question arises as to
the degree of such departure. May we legitimately undergiven possible
circumstances utler words in direct contradiction with our thoughts,
with what we know to be the facts of the case ; or are we not bound
by the very nature of truth to maintain agreement of word and thought,
though the agreement may be oi such a kind as to be cajjable of
misinterpretation? For example, John comes to our house w iih a gang
of ruffians to murder James, who is lying concealed within, and asks
us who know with absolute certainty what John's intention is whethc-r
James is here, can we reply absolutely, No. he his not, in order to
])revent the perpetration of crime and to save James' life? (Jr. in order
to keep uj) cont\)rmity between word and thought, ought we Kj have
recourse to some such device as this : we are standing near the door
of our stables, and we answer. No, he is not here, meaning within the
stables, though knowing well that John's question ajiplies to the
])remises at large, and that he will therefore be deceived by our answer.
'I'his is a case of mental reservation in the wide or improper sense, for
the Words of the answer agree with the thought in our mind, and
though John, not being able to see wiiat is in our mind, inter])rets
them according to his own meaning, and so is deceived ; yet he might
by a little retiection have det^'cted the lurking equivocation, and pies-
sed his question home by saying, 1 do not mean here in this stable, but
is James concealed within your premises at all ? In such a case, where
similar questions may be i)ressed until further reservation becomes
well-nigh 'mjiossible, what answer shall be finally given •' Shall we give
John to understand that we answer No, according to his own sense of
the question ? or shall we, by acknox\ledging his presence, leave James
to his fate ?

I^ir Iloiiry Wotton'M cloMoriptioii of an Aiiil>siN.«>a4lor.—
fiiiiixot's rvMcrvc— TiOi'd l*aliiii'r.«itoii*.*i Ifiliic lt4»4»k.

Now it is clear that cases like the above will arise in the various
relations of life, in which there will be an apparent conflict between
positive duties. There is on the one side the obligation to sjjcak the
truth ; on the other, the claims of charity, or of i)'iblic duty, or of self-
jireservation, which will be set aside and sacrificed in divers cases by
speaking tlie truth. The existeiice of such difficulties is acknowledged
on all ha""'ds, and they receive -i practical solution by men of the world
without much attempt at the c instruction of a scientific system of the
moralities of speech. It is no. too much to say that such solutions are
too often guided by the rule of thumb alone. As far as statesmen are
concerned this is notorious. Without committing themselves perhaps

to the full to the acceptance of the famous dictum that language was
given to conceal men's thoughts, or Sir Henry Wotton's description of
an ambassador, as a good citizen sent to lie abroad for the good of his
country ; it is to be feared that modern statesmen are not troubled
Avith many scruples about acting more or less freely on the spirit ot
those sayings. Even the proper and precise M. Guizot could say in a
debate in the French Chambers : " I have a few preliminary remarks
to offer. When an ambassador does me the honour to call on me and
ask me questions, it is not to an interrogatory that I submit. I am in
such a case bound to the truth, but I only reply so far as suits the
interest of my country " (5). When we find M. Guizot thus falling
back upon the j^rinciple of reserve in the conduct of international
affairs, we are quite prepared for a wide adoption of the same by one
so little troubled with scruples of any kind as Lord Palmerston. The
notorious " Afghanistan " Blue Book is a case in point, wherein des-
]:)atches were either entirely suppressed or partly mutilated, and
important matter thus withheld from the knowledge of Parliament by
tampering with documents professedly prepared for its instruction and
enlightenment. The defence of Lord Palmerston for such garblings
and omissions was no dcnibt that advanced by M. Guizot for the
economy of sijeech, the interests of the public service and the good of
the country. (6)

TIk' ]>(>an of CliOMtcr'N variouN NlindCH of incaiiiiig.

Nay, even beyond the lange of worldly politics we have had a recent
avowal not only of the adoption of the principle of reserve, but even of
mental reservation in what the Reviewer would call its most Jesuitical
phase, by a somewhat prominent dignitary of the Anglican Cliurch, in
the region of theological discussion Tiie Dean of Chester felt called
upon last autumn to busy himself with the Old Catholic Assembly at
Bonn, and being of a loquacious turn made use of certain language
that was objected to by some of his more matter-of fact brethren. The
Dean's ground of defence in his own words was as follows : " At Bonn
it was our wisdom to keep many things in the background. We were
reaching out our hands towards those who had been separated from us
for centuries, if by any means, even by the temporary use of language
admitting of various shades of meaning, we might come to a mutual
understanding" (7). There is a delicacy and finish in the Dean's
ai)preciation of his own perfomances at Bonn that would have rejoiced
Pascal as manifesting the work of an adept in the art of mental
reiervation. The "temporary use of language admitting various shades
of meaning," bespeaks a proficient at the least. Whether the Dean's
reservations were " latently" mental we leave to the Reviewer to decide.

fit, TliomaM and N<'otii8^ Principles.

The above examples sufiiciently show the nature of the difficult
circumstances in which men will from time to time be placed in

C)) February r., 1847.

(1;) Fiscliel."77(^ L'lKf/ish f'nnxtilution. Shee's Translation, p. 480.

(7) J'a/l Mall Gazette, October 7, 1874.

t language was
s description of
the good of his
e not troubled
'11 the spirit ol
could say in a
ninary remarks
call on me and
bmit. I am in
ar as suits the
zot thus falling
f international
same by one
merston. 7'he
t, wherein des-
mutilated, and
■ Parliament by
instruction and
such garblings
Guizot for the
nd the good of

iiicniiiiig.

t'ehdd a recent
■ve, but even of
most Jesuitical
:an Church, in
ster felt called
c Assembly at
tain language
jrethren. 7'he
's : " At Bonn
nd. AVe were
arated from us
ie of language

to a mutual
n the Dean's

have rejoiced
irt of mental
■'arious shades
ler the Dean's
:wer to decide.

" the difficult
3e placed in

practical life, when they are called upon to decide between the claims
of two apparently conflicting duties, and the various methods they
naturally employ to escape from the difficulty, without perhaps troubling
themselves to construct theories on the subject. And yet the two
methods that we have given do in fact illustrate the two different
principles that Catholic theologians have suppHed for its solution. The
first system is that of St. Thomas, in whose view a lie is always malum
in se, intrinsically and absolutely evil (8). Nothing, therefore, according
to this teaching, can justify the use of utterances not in conformity
with the contents of the mind. Under sucii a system, which be it
remarked is distinguished by the strictest and most delicate and jealous
care for the maintenance of truth, there is no other means of meeting
difficulties like those we have been considering than recourse to equi-
vocation and mental reservation in the wider acceptation of the term.
If we are asked by a murderer whether his intended victuii lies con-
cealed in our house, which is the actual fact, unless we are prepared
to sacrifice the life of another by the most rigid construction of St.
'J'homas' principle, we must fall back upon the Dean of Chester's-
different shades of meaning in the framing of our answer, for the
protection of the man who has put his life into our keeping.

The other view is that intimated by Scotus, (9) who regards truth as
a part of justice, and im]jlies that in consequence critical circumstances
may arise in which the obligation to truth loses its force; just as the
law " Thou shall not kill " is suspended when the public good requires
the execution of a criminal, or under the exigencies of self-defence.
'J'hus, then, in the case above given, this view would sanction direct
denial in reply to the murderer's question, because the law of truth, or
of conformity of word with thought, does not hold in the face of the
much greater evil that would result from the death of an innocent man,
than from the apparent violation of the law.

Joroiuy Taylor. Milt4»ii. I*sil<\v and .IoIiiimoii
on till' (lillioiilty.

Other theories have been constructed in support of the above con-
clusion. That tor instance \\hich distinguishes between communicable
and incommunicable knowledge. The ])hysician, the lawyer, the con-
fessor has cognizance of the things, the knowledge of which he is by
common consent not only allowed but bound to deny. Again with the
same view, a lie has been defined to be " a speech contrary to the mind
of the speaker, made to another from whom he has no right to conceal
the truth." Cases where the right to conceal the trutli would exist are
similar to those which we have adduced above, or like those mentioned
by Dr. Newman in the passage wliere he exhibits the agreement of
many English writers of great authority with what we may call the-
Scotist view.

Great Eiiorliiih milliors. Jeroni • Taylor, Milton. Puloy, Jolinson, men of very
• liti'ert'iit ficTioolt* of thought, dis'iiK'tly say that under certain extiuonlinary cir-
ciinistances it is allowal)le to tel a lie' Taylor says : '' To tell a lie for charity, to

(8) St. Thomas. 2. 2. q. 110. .1. .!.
(!l) Summii. •-'. 2. q. 110. .3, (list. 38.

save a ui

2«j

c.,.,c .» u.an's life, the life of a friend, of a husband, of a prince, of a useful and a
public person, hath nut only been done at all times, but commended by great and
■Hi,se and good men. Wiii) would not save his father's life, at the charge of a
harmless lie, from persecutors or tyrants?" Again. Milton says : " What man in
his .senses would deny that there are those whom we have the best grounds for
considering that we oujiiit to deceive — as ooys. madmen, the sick, the intoxicated,
enemies, men in error, thieves? I would ask'. By which of the Commandments is a
lie forbidden '.' Vou will say by the ninth '.' If tlien my lie does not injuremy neigh-
bour, cei'tainly it is not forbidden liy this Oonimaudment." PaUysays: "There
are falsehoods which are not lies, that is, which are not criminal." Johnson;
'• The general rule is. that truth should never be vickiated ; there must however lie
some e.xceiitions. If. for iiistiuue. a murderer should ask you which way a man is
gone." (10)

In putting these two views before our readers, while avowing our
own preference for the latter, we had chiefly for our object the
endeavour to place before them the nature of the circumstances under
which the Catholic theologians who uphold the lawfulness of equivo-
cation in the modern sense of the word, or of mental reservation,
considt r its application permissible ; and having done this, we may
ask theni whether the ])rinciple is of such a nature as to merit the
obloquy that has been cast upon it from the time of Pascal to our own.
The system in fact has been excogitated out of the tenderest regard for
the interests, and on the highest j^ossible estimate of truth ; whether its
ap])lication to cases in the concrete has been always cajntble of justifi-
cation is a matter of detail, which we shall deal with when we come to
consider some of the Reviewer's examples That Father Ciury guards
against niisajiplication, is most evident from the rules that he lays down
with respect to the cases in which mental reservation is not lawful.
He declares that equivocation in the wide sense, cannot be employed,
without reason or with the sole intention to deceive : nor if the interro-
gator has a right to the truth; nor if any damage to one's neighbour
should result from it, against the precept of charity ; nor in the framing
of contracts, where justice is concerned, (i i )

We feel that we have laid ourselves open to the charge of tediousness
by dwelling at such length upon a subject that has been worn well-
nigh threadbare : our only ai)ology is that for dense ignonnce like
that manifested by the Quarti'/iy Reviewer, no amount of explanation
can be sufficient. In any case we feel that we cannot conclude this
branch of our subject better than with the words of the Saturday
Reviewer, speaking of Father Morris' edition of Father (ierard's
Narrative of the GunpoMder Plot. " The Editor has given in addition
a brief account of the remaining thirty-one years of (lerards' life, after
which he proceeds to institute a deliberate defence of his veracity,
and enters into the general question of equivocation and direct lying
under certain difficult circumstances. This dissertation seems to us
wholly superfluous. The whole question has been discussed with
unequalled delicacy and refinement in Dr. Newman's Apologia, and
the treatment it received from that master-hand is familiar to all who
care anything at all about the subject." (12)

Let
the Re
After
purely
follow;-

•• I'or
«? also '
gucli
and not
device
■which

Cons
can be
sworn,
deparli
cii>le
moral <
the pi'r
apiui'li

(10) Ih.ilor;/ 0/ ni;/ Ri'/i'/iniiit Ofii/iinn^,

(11) T/ieol. Mor. tom. i. p. 4T4.

(12) Saturdai/ lierh'W, April -'O. 187'J.

p. "274. Cf. note 4.

I II useful and a
hy great Hn<l
jhe charge of ji
r What man in
Jt grounds for
lie intoxicated,
landments is a
Ijnrenivneijrh-
Isavs: "There
•Johnson :
|st however lie

way a man i:<

vowing our

object the
•ices under

of equivo-
•cservation,
■'^j ^ve may
niL'rit the
to our own.
t regard for
whether its

of justifi-
"^ couie to
iry guards
l.iys down
>ot lawful,
eui ployed,
1^' iiiterro-
neighbour
'cfrauiing

diousness
orn Well-
"ice like
ilauation
liide this
Saturday
CJerard's
addition
ifc;, after
■'eracity,
ct lying
ns to us
;d with
'iiu and
ill who

# 27

Tlic K4>vi<'M(M''M garbled <>xti'a€tM.

Let us now pass on to the disjointed mass of garbled extracts that
the Reviewer heaps together under the head of ^^ental Reservations.
After his novel and ingenious discovery of the distinction bet\veen
purely and latently mental reservations, the Reviewer proceeds as
follows —

"For grave reasons" it is "lawful at times to nuxkc- use of Uiliul reservations*
«s also of eijnivdcal terms." it lieing (|Mite essential, however, that the terms be
euch "as make it possible for the listener to iindfi stainl a nutter as it really is,
and not ,is it may sound. In I'ther woriis. it is a condition .«//('>(///(? /k//( for tins
device to pass muster, that it shuuld lie carefully cousti iicted out of terms into
V liich a doulilc nioaniiijj' can possilily Ik' impj)rted."

I'l'OiiiiNOM himI 4>hI1i!».

He then proceeds —

r(UisisteMtl\ with this I'uling. \\ c learn lliat no natli in'( i| be binding of which it
■can be alleged that a sense of pressure conduced at the time to its having been
pworit. ('(H'iciou may very fairly betaken as an extenu.iting circumstance for
departure from an eujiagement : but it is startling to lind it enunciated as a ])rin-
ciple, in the standard liamibook for t In.' instruction of Roman Catlndic youths in
moral obliiiations, that an oath may be repudiated with ))ertccl impunity, if only
the iii'i'son who has sworn i)lcads to liaviug lieeu inllueuceil in his luind by some
apprehcnsi(Ui of jiossiblx injurious conse(|Ueuces. unless he did so swcjar (p. (14).

> \\'c select the above passage because it gives a sample of the
Reviewer's method of trealiiieiit ihruughout his article. 'J'here is in
the first place a |)al('hing of things together thtt have no necessary
connection. What bearing has the question of the o!)ligation of an
oath taken on compulsion with equivocation ? The nulter to be decided
is the binding force of an act, not the interpretation of a form of words.
Next there is gross and most unfair garl)ling and \\ hat we may call
letting down of the force of w ords, so as to give the i>assage referred
to a sense not at all intended, if not actually opposed to that of the
original. Thus we here have il stated that an oatii taken under a sense
of pressure ithe italics are ours) need not be binding. .And again, that
an oath may be repudiated with perfect impunity, if only the person
who has sworn pleads to having been at the time intluenced in his
mind by some apprehension q^ possibly injurious consequences.

l*al(\v anil Ciiiiry on l*i'oiiiJM('!^.

Now how does (Itiry put the case and solve it.^ (1^:5) .-/// o/</i^i^ef
juramcntum proinissoriuiu nicin gravi et injusto extort urn i Does a
promissory oath bind that has been extorted under the pressure of
weighty fear unjustly unflicted ? Not, mark, mider a sense of pressure, ox
of some apprehension of I'ossiblv injurious eonse(juenees ; but under fear
caused by grave ar ". unjust concussion, (iury replies thus : " This is a
matter of controversy. The first and more common opinion is that it is
binding, because although the simjile contract would be void as far
as natural law is concerned, yet it becomes binding in virtue of the
oath that has been superadded ; for an oath must be kept ex re/ignine- —

(1,3) Tlool. Mor. torn. i. p. I'.Hi. Roma-, ISiW.

bv force of the virtue of religion — as often as this can be done withom
sin." In support of this view (iury (juotes St. Alphonsus, adding thai
nevertheless the upholders of this opinion maintain with St, Alphonsu>
that a dispensation from such an oath may be legitimately sought :
or that even if the terms of the oath have been complied with, tho
injured party may seek remedy at law, or, where all other means o\
obtaining his rights fail, indemnify himself by occult compensation.

''The second opinion, which seems to l)e sufficiently probable,
denies the obligation of the oath, since an oath cannot confirm that
which is null and void by the law of nature ; for an oath follows the
nature of the act." Our readers can now form a judgment of the
Reviewer's trustworthiness. For ourselves, we do not hesitate to brand
his treatment of the above question — and it is only one sample out ot
many — as a fraud upon the public, our hope being at the same time-
that by his utter incompetency to deal with the subject, he will be
relieved from the penalties that would attach to conscious deliberation.

As a comment on the above soUition of the difficulty by Gury, we
give Paley's way of meeting the question. But first we will quote what
he says as to the obligation of promissory oaths. He simply says,
'' Promissory oaths are //o/ hiiufni\;, where the i)romise itself would not
be so" (r4). Having laid down this principle, let us see how he deals
with a promise extorted by fear or violence.

It lias loiip; liocn controvirteii iinmiig't moriili:<ts, wlietlicr prdtiiiscs be himliiii;
wliicii jiro extoitcd liy viok'iice or tear. The oliligiitioii ot all promise!^ results, we
have seen, frnm the necessity or the use of that eontideiiee which inaukiiul repose
in them. The i[iu'Stioii. therefi)re. whether these ])romises ai'c binding, will depend
upon this, whether mankind, npon the whole, are benefited by the confidence placed
in such promises? A hii;'hwaynnui attacks yon — and bein^ disapjiointed of his
booty, threatens or i>repares to murder yon; — yon promise, \s\\.\\ nniny solemn
asseverations, that if he will sjiare your life, he shall tiinl a jturse of money left for
him at a place apiioinled :— upon the f'aitli of this promise, he fiuhears from further
violence. Now, yonr life was saved by the conlidence reposed in a promise ex-
torted liy fear: and the lives of many others may be saxed by the same. This is a
j;ood coiyseipience. On the other hand, a confidence in proniises like these woulii
greatly facilitate the jierpctration iif robberies: they mifiht be iniide instruments
of almost unlimited extortion. This is a bad consequence: and in the question
between the iuipo-tance of these ojiposite consequences, resides the doubt concern-
ing the oblijration of such piomises. (1.^)) .

Paley then on his own utilitarian principles gives the same solution as
Gury; that is, he gives the two different opinions entertained by mora-
lists on the matter, and there leaves the question.

Obligation oi' l*roiiiiwcv>ii heloro ac'ot'ptaiioi'.

But let us proceed —

Tt is well (the Reviewer says), to follow out Gary's doctrine as to the force of
solemnly contract.eii promise's. In the section aboiit CoiUracts we find this querv :
'•If a donation has been promised on oath, but has not yet been delivered, isit
still binding'.' '• which is answered negatively on the ground that, as the deed is
incomplete, it is void in substance, and consecpiently no oath in reference thereto
can be held to have binding force.

We have already pointed out the blunder of the Reviewer with reference

(14) Mnrnl Philoso/ihif, bk. iii. ])t. i. c. bl.

fi.",

) Ibid

done without
k adding that
pt. Alphonsus
ttely sought :
I'ed with, the
ler means of
[pen sat ion.
■W probable,
Iconfirm thai
follows the
bment of the
itaie to brand
iample out ol
le same time-
lie will be
deliberation.
~>y Gury, wo
' quote what
simply says,
elf would not
low he deals

•'3 be liiiidiiii.

■•^I'S I'fSllltS, Wu

aiilvind repose
'S,'- will depend
"idence placed
pDiiited of liis

many .solemn
money left for
•s from further
n pi'onii.se ex-
Qie. Tlii.s is a
' tliese Would
" iiistruiuents

•liL' question
Jnlit eoncerii-

•solution as
d by moia-

i'.

ic ''occe of
this fjuerv ;
\'t'''ed, is"it
he deed i,<
'(■e tliereto

reference

to the word "delivered ; " the proper translation is, "accepted." (i6)
Now what does Paley say about the obligation of promises bifore
acceptancn ? That they are not binding, tor they are only in that case to
be regarded " as a resolution in the mind of the ])romiser, which may be
altered at pleasure" (17). But he has already lold us that oatiis are not
binding when the promise itself is not so ; therefore in the present
case Paley agrees with Ciury in deciding that the oath is not binding.

Oflior liniitulioiiM.

I'he Reviewer goes on —

Father Gnrv--and lie is in accord with the divines of his Oi'der-luH. however,
more to sny in limitation of the olili^iatioii lollowinfr im oaths. He lays it down,
that uccordinji' to more prohahle opinion, no oath is biiulin^- " if made with the
intention indeed of swcarinrr, hut not of liindin<r." tlioMiih he admits that to |io
deiiherately thoufrh the seudilaf.ce of fin oath without any intention tu l;'"'i) It,
does involve " a venial sin .amountinji to a lie, with a taking in vain of (<rid's
name.''

As usual the Rev'ewer here jumbles things up together that ought to
be kept distinct. In the place referred to Gury treats of two separate
questions ; first he says that a fictitious promissory oath, uttered that
is externally, without the intention of swearing, is not binding for want
of the will to make it so. But he adds that a person thus simulating
an oath sins, more probably venially only, /tv se loquemlo, looking that
is at the mere nature of the act itself, for the .natter does not amount to
more than a lie, to which the taking God's name is added. But he
proceeds to say. the sin may often become mortal, by reason of the
])rivate or public loss that may ensue. And Father Eallerini in a note
cites a proposition condemned by Innocent the Eleventh to the effect,
that " when cause is given, it is lawful to swear without the intention
of swearing, whether in a trifling or in a weighty matter." Ballerini
adds, that .St. Alphonsus indeed agrees with Gury in the above solution
about a fictitious oath, in saying that the offender sins venially only,
but that he limits this opinion by saying that it is true only if the person
fictitiously swearing, really has the intention of fulfilling his promise :
for other7C'ise, the Saint says lie 7,.'0'ilii sin mortally.

Gury then passes on to the consideration of another case, and states
that the more probable opinion is that an oath taken with the intention
indeed of swearing but not of binding oneself d'.v reli,i^ione, that is to
say, by the sanctions of the virtue of religion, is null and void ; and
that for the reason that such an act is nugatory, carries with it in fact
its own nullification. To understand this we must bear in mind that
theologians define an oath ioht, invoeatioiiivini nominis in testimo/iinm
vcritatis ; a calling upon the name of God, that is, in testimony of the
truth of an utterance, or, we may add, in confirmation of a promise.
\n oath thus regarded they moreover consider to be an act that fixlls
under the virtue of religion, or that virtue which corresponds to the
])rescriptions of the first table, to render due honour and worship to
God. If then a man were to take an oath expressly e.vcluding at the
same time any obligation arising from this virtue of religion, he would

(Ui) P. (55.
(17) Loe. elt.

simply be taking away from his act the essential character of an oatii,
and be i)relendinf^ to do that which he was especially guarding himsi'lt
against doing. His act tVoui the very nature of th^' case would be >i
pretence and a nullity. And this is the reason why in our cour s ot
law the oath of a man who does not believe in (lod is not accepted ;
for an oath involves the existence of God, and the recognition of Him
in the very act of swearing, and thus carries along with it its own
religious sanction and biiuling l"orce. But a man who does not believe
in God practically puts it out of his power to enter into such relations
with Him.

But (iury proceds to say, an oath taken with the intention of
swearing, but not of obliging oneself (W Jnstitia ant ex Ji//c/ifate, in
justice and good faith, is still a valid oath. Cleady, whatever may be
said about obligations from other motives, suih an oath is a religious
act, and as such bears with it its own binding force.

We are perhaps trying the patience of our readers by entering into
what they will think very subtle niceties, but we consider it absohitely
necessary to do so in order thoroughly to expose the juggling method
of treatment adopted by the Reviewer. With the cunning sleight of
hand of the onjurer with his cups and balls, he changes and mixes up
one subject with another till he throws what he ])rotesses to be treating
of into an obscurity that utterly confuses the reader's mind, and renders
it capable of only one conclusion, that there is evidently something in
such doctrines ])rofoundly bad and immoral, though he has no more
notion of what those doctrines themselves are, nor in what their
immorality consists than most i)robably the Reviewer himself.

The Reviewer continues on his way —

To rciniive all doiiht as to \\\m\ is implicil, fliis exiitanation is pfiveii : •' Tlie
bindiiiji' force otiiii oatii lias to he iiitcrprctcil ao(:or(iiiii>' to tlie tacit conditions
eitiier incliidi'il or implied (xiihii'>fU -7'/.'') therein ; wiiieliaie; [1] If! could have
done so " iihoiit irrave iiijni'v ; [2^ if'ruatter.< had not notal)!}- chanj^ed ; [vi] if the
rights iu. I will of the .Superior were not contrary ; [t] if the other had kept his
faith; [.'>] if the other doe.s noi waive his right.'' [IH)

The connection between this citation and what has gone before is not
at all obvious. There has been question hitherto as to the existence
of an oath under certain circumstances ; and the Reviewer now passes
on to discuss the obligations of an oath when it exists, which is quite
another matter. Besides, he only dtags in one portion of Gury's
statements in relation to the determination of the extent to which this
or thrt oath obliges, not his whole explanation on the subject. But
let this pass. Then he proceeds-

We have here supplied the italics in the above passage for the purpose of
asking our readers to compare, the expressions thus emphasized with
the first condition to which reference is made. .SV poiucro sine gravi

'181 Gurr, i. p. 345.

i^"'

'f of an oat I),
Ningliinistli'
\voiild be ,,
pur cour s oi
f't accepted ;
Jition of Hini
|t'i it its own
pnot believe
r'l relations

I intention ot
yiffclitate, in
fv'er may be
a religious

nteiing into
f absolutely
'"g method
? sleight ot
iJ mixes up
^ Ije treating
and renders
)niething in
IS no more
^\liat their
elf.

piven ; •' The
't foiiditions
f could Imvt-
^\m if the
''ad l<e|)t his

ore is not
■ existence
'o\y passes
'i is quite
3f Gury's
v'hich this
ect. But

!.t virtually
It to allege
Ae serious
sled pariv
fgestUselV

Jrpose of
zed with
'te gravl

dumno^ says Father Gury. If I could havedone so without .i^vr^rr injury y.
says the Reviewer ; and then stryightway. in the face of his own
translation, ton"s down the words i^'/vir-f iiijnry, involving in the mind
of Father Gury the notion of heavy loan, (graz'i t/amno) mxo serious
discomfort, and then adds that it is left r;uite to the mere will of the
person bound by oath to find out some such discomfort as may be a
justification for breaking his oath, when the I)reaking of it may be
pleasant ti) him rather than the keeping of it — a case, we fear, not
unlikely to hapjjen.

We ask, not wheiiier such tampering with and gross misinterpretation
of te<:hnical words having a fixt-d and definite meaning in moral science
be woi thy of a scientific mind, but wluther it be consistent with fairness
and honesty ? We are quite willing to leave this (pK.'stion to the judg-
ment of our readers. Thin the Reviewer asserts in his own involved
and roundai)out style th.it there is no check placed ui)on the interested
party to hinder him from Hxlling back ujion fictitious motives for
breaking his oath in any given case to his own advantage. No check
except this — that Christian divines are writing for the guidance of
Christian men ; that both one and the other acknowledge an all-seeing
God Who will one day judge them according to their words and works.
And this is a check to which the Reviewer would do well to pay heed,
for it is one that especially demands that in moral matters words should
be used rigidly according to their recognized scientific meaning.

Aiiotlicr iiiMtaiK'e ol' tlio Koviewor'N
fraudiileiil iik'UkmI.

\\'e will take orle more example of the Reviewer's fraudulent method
of dealing with Gury.

The pioliihitiiiii asiiinst S|)iiitiial iulvisers iiitt';fei'iii<r to muki- .SD-ciilIfil ppTiItcntg.
fiiteitiiiii ft ri^nil sense (it'iliity ai\' eliiliorati'ly cxplic'it. TIkhiuIi lie niiiilil iiave
li^rouiidrsto entcrtdin '' doiilitsiHto I lie sincerity df tlie])enitriir." the cnnfVt.sor is yet
fiiinply Id ficeept his stit1einent3. Even in tlie ciise of " hiivinjr certJiin knowledije
that a sin has been kcjit hack or denied," the coiitessor is nut to extract its admis-
8ion unless in a roundalioiit manner, hut he shall jfinnl absolution bei'iiuse th&
penitent must he helieved, whether speakinfr for or ajiiiinst himself ; and " if he
really did commit the sin in (|nestion, it may he presnined he has forgotten it, or
confessed it \ci another, or has some j^reat cause for keeping it secret, or that the
informers were deceived." [[i. 1)5].

We have here, if possible, a worse case of disingenuous misrepre-
sentation than those we have considered. In the first jjlace the opening
clause involves positive untruth. No such prohibition exists ; the suj)-
position that confessors are to be kept from forming as rigid a sense
of duty as possible in the minds of those who seek their ministry is a
gratuitous calumny. Again, we have another instance of two cases
being fused together in such a way as entirely to obscure the bearing
of the question, and to present the matter to the reader in the worst
possible light. Then, when he says that where the confessor has a
certain knowledge that a sin has been kept back or denied, the penitent
is to be absolved, for he must be believed, whether speaking for or
against himself, the Reviewer states precisely the opposite to Gury's
solution. The latter says, if the confessor is quite certain that the sin
was committed by the penitent he cannjt ab-iolve him while he denies.

it, that is, if he is also certain that ihi man has not forgotten it, oi
has no just ground for withholding it. The rule, "'J'he penitent is tn
be beheved for as well as against himself," holds indeed wheie certainty
is wanting, not where it is present.

The other case is to this effect —If the confessor knows that the sin
has been committed from information received out of confession from
a third party, the penitent has as much right to be believed as the
other, and therefore absolution may not be withheld. But this is
merely a (piestion of probable evidence, not of certainty, and the
penitent having a strict right to absolution on the supposition of his
sincerity, the doubt that may exist in the confessor's mind, after having
taken all means to arrive at a right decision, is not a sulficient ground
for withholding the enjoyment of his rights from the ])enitent. Tne
(|iiestioning in a roundabout manner by the confessor to which the
Reviewer refers, is connected with an entirely different case ; that in
which the confessor has obtained the knowledge of some sin of one
])enitent through the confession of another, perhaps an accomplice;
and such knowledge cannot be used in any way that might betray the
source of his information, tor that would involve a breach of the seal
of confession. In such a case therefore he can only proceed with the
greatest possible caution in his endeavours to help the penitent to
realize his state before God. In short, the whole question is an
evidence of the care with wliicli the Church proceeds, and is bound to
proceed, in a matter of such delicacy as that of voluiitary confession,
where the penitent is at once accuser and accused ; and it shows more-
over the groundlessness of the charge of tyrannizing over consciences
in the tribunal of penance by the ministers of the Church. Every
precaution is taken to give perfection to a voluntary act of humiliation,
and to se'ure to the penitent his just fr(!edom in the discharge of a
solemn duty which concerns himself alone. (19)

The Reviewer then tacks on to what has been said above a case
which has no possible connection with it.

What room for e((niv(uation i^^ utForded liy this nilint?, tlie following exemplifl-
<'atioii will siiow. "Anna liuviiit;- lieen guilty of iidiiltcry. and being interrogated
by her lui.-sliand, who ha-? formed a suspicion, iiiiswers tlie first time, that she has
not violated wedlock ; tiie second time, having in the interval obtained absolution,
she replies, 1 :in\ i/ni////;.s.'< o/xiir/i crime. The tliird time she absolutely denies the
adultery, ami says, / /mr/' not r<)iiimille<l ii . meaning within herself such particular
adultery as 1 am bound to reveal, or. 1 have not committed an act of adultery that
lias to lie revealed to you. Is Anna to be blamed?" Gury's reply, too loiig'to be
given here, justifies each answer of the adulterous woman, siipjtorting his ruling
by a grave array of .Jesuit authorities, ainongs which figure Suarez and St. Liguori —

St. Liguori not being a Jesuit all the same.

We repeat here that the two cases are quite distinct. In the former
there was question cf a priest in the tribunal of penance who had a
right to interrogate so far as was necessary to the discharge of his
office ; in the latter case the interrogator had no such right.

Then, the Reviewer keeps back the trufh, tl\at none of Anna's
equivocations would have been lawful if her husband had possessed
the right to question her, she was not therefore bound to answer him.

and wa
those w
permit
On the

III

[19] Gury, t. ii. p. 516.

ptten it, 01

-niteiit is to

I'le certainty

''lat the sin
ssioii from
ved as the
iut this is
\y, and the
tion of his
'ter having
"t ground
tent. Tne
\\hich the
e ; that in
sin of one
ccomplice;
'^L'tray the
<>'" the seal
'd with the
Jeniient to
■on is an
hound to
onfession,
lows more-
onsciences
h. Every
iimih'ation,
large of a

ve a case

and was free to protect herself as she could. To help her to do that,
those who hold that the law of truth can never he suspended, would
permit her to have recourse to equivocation and mentui restriction.
•On the other hand, those who take the opposite view, would say with
Palcy, that "where the person you speak Id has no right to know the
truth," a falsehood ceases to be a lie ; or, that in this case the prmciple
■of English law aj)plies, that no one is bound to sjjcak the truth, "when
a full discovery of tlie truth tends to accuse the witness himself of some
legal crime." In other words, no one is bound to criminate himself,
unless a gnive public danger requires it. Now this was Anna's case.
Had she acknowledged her crime, she would have been liable to legal
penalties; therefore the Law of truth was sus])ended in her case ; her
husband was seeking to know what he hatl no right to ask ; she could
then reply by flat and absolute denial. For ourselves we can only say
that the latter solution commends itself to us as most in keeping with
■straightforwardness and common sense. The matler may perhaps be
made a little clearer by reversing the case. Supj)ose that it had been
Anna who was questioning her husband ^Villiam about his violations
of wedlock, would William have felt hinisrif bound to give categorical
answers to Anna's interrogations ? Most probably the answer would
have been, You have no right to ask me such questions ; mind your
own business. But if the urgency of suspicion was not thus easily to
l>e put aside, would W'illiam in the long run have hesitated to use
Anna's equivocations, or to answer, No ? Our space comi)els us to
pause here for the present, but we have by no means yet done with
the Quarterly Reviewer.

PART III.
KoNtitiilioii and Cliaritj.

■ exemplifi-
iterrogated
iiat she bus
nljsolution,
denies the
particular
'Itery that
long to be
'lis ruling
ijiguori —

2 former
10 had a
■ of his

Anna's
assessed
er him.

(The Month, Loiidon, May 1875, p. 71).

We propose to conclude our notice of the Quarterly Theologian by
a iew remarks in the present paper upon two subjects that exercise him
sorely and betray him into endless confusion. We confine ourselves to
these, because it wo\iId be quite impossible to follow him through his
motley mass of disingenuous patchwork without committing ourselves
to the composition of suijdry and lengthy moral treatises. Two of his
topics, besides, have already been discussed in the pages of the Month,
and dealt with sufficiently by anticipation to dispose of the Reviewer's
blundering and misleading method of handling them. We refer to
Probabilism and Tyrannicide. The former was treated of in our January
number of 1868, in a Paper entitled, " What is Probabilism? " and the
latter in an article contained in the number for March — April, 1873.

The points to which we shall now direct our readers' attention are
Restitution and Charity ; subjects to which the Reviewer addresses
himself more or less from page 72 to 85 of his article. We shall not
attempt to follow him in all his details, but shall content ourselves, in

:i4

tlic first place, with laying down the general theological principles
which govern tlicsc nialtcrs ; and then, in the second place, showing
from some of the examples adduced by the Reviewer, and from his
attempts to understand them, how entirely he is without any intelligent
grasp of tlie principles in (pieslion.

1>llti«'M ol* JllMliC<>.

To begin with Restitution, which is a part of natural justice, and
therefore, under certain circumstances, an obligatory duty. All our
<!uties spririg from the various relations in which we stand, either to
(iod, to ourselves, or to our ftllow-men. Our duties to our fellow-men
are of two kinds : duties of justice and duties of charity. Justice is
defined by Father Gury as a moral virtue, which constantly inclines the
will to render his rights to another, or to each individual man. The
intention, then, of justice is to insist that all shall have their due, and
to maintain due equality anu)ngst men in general, or between man and
man in i)articular. Justice, theretore, has regard to such matters as the
restitution of what has been unjustly taken from another, the repara-
tion of injury, abstention from fraud, the keeping of faith in compacts,
and the maintenance of every man in the full enjoyment of his rights.

Again, the duties prescribed by justice are divided into different
classes, according to the different aspects under which justice is viewed ;
for there is a legal justice, a distributive justice, a vindictive justice,
and a commutative justice. The three first refer to the relations of the
ruler to the subject ; the last, that is, commutative justice, refers, it is
sufficient for our present ])urpose to say, to the relations between pri-
vate ])ersons. It is under commutative justice alone that cases of res-
titution fall ; for restitution simply means the giving back what belongs
to another person when it has been wrongfully taken fiom him. Hence
it follows that for an obligation of restitution to exist, there must exist
on the other side a right to receive it.

The obligation to restitution may arise in three ways : from taking
or receiving what belongs to another unjustly ; from unjustly causing
dainage in goods, in person or in character, to another ; or from unjust
co-ojicration, which results in either of the above ; thus, in matter of
fact, the last-mentioned ground of restitution resolves itself into one of
the two former grounds.

Forniii Kx(<>^rniiui et Forum CoiiHolcnliip.

There is still another matter which requires to be made clear II
connection with the obligation to restitution, and that the more urgent-
ly because of the utter confusion of mind betrayed by the Reviewer
on the subject. We refer to the distinction between the Forum Inter-
num and the Forum Externum. The word Forum may be taken for
jurisdiction, or judicial power in general. The Forum Internum refers
often entirely, always principally, to the secrets of the heart. Thus it
is sometimes called the Forum Conscientiae, because it takes cognizance
of acts by which a man, knowing himself in relation to the great law
of right and wrong, impressed upon his intelligence by the hand of
God, conforms himself or places himself in opposition to that great law,.

principles

li showing

from his

Intclhgcnt

fee, and
All our
cither to
How men
ustice is
tlincs the
II. 'i'hc
due, and
man and
rsas tlie
rcpara-
>ni pacts,
rights,
different
viewed ;
justice,
IS of the
ers, it is
veen pri-
;s of res-
Ijelongs
• Hence
Jst exist

I taking
causing
I unjust
Uter of
one of

The periiliarit\ of this court is that there i> liut one witness who is able
to give testimony. *' No man knoweth the ihwiights of a man save the
spirit of a man that is within him." The accused and the accuser are
identical. ISiit what guarantei- is there that tne "vidence given !)>' such
a j)arlial witness shall he true ? J'here is this giiariUitee, and it is abun-
dantly sufficient. The absolution given in the tribunal of Penanee, the
special court of this Fonnn liilcimnu, must indeed be pronounced by
God's Minist(,'r, i)ul (i()(l Himself must ratify a' (1 execute it. ( l<»d
cannot be deceived. If he who accuses himself tells the truth, and is
otherwise properly disposed, the pardon pronounced will take effect ;
if he tells untruths, the pardon is worthless — nay, worse than worthless,
for it adds the guilt of sacrilege to his other sins.

In the I'orum /•'.xternii>/i, on the other hand, ii is the Church or the
State, each in its own re^pwctive courts, w hich both pronoimces and exe-
cutes the sentence. 'I'he matter to be judged consists of external acts
and of intentions only so far as they can be judged of from their out-
ward expression. 'I'he accused may elude by untruths the sentence of
such a court ; it becomes his interest then to bear fal.se witness. But
on the other hand, the matter of oflcn( e being external, is such that
others also can bear testimony to its existence and its nature. Thus,
in this external court, it is both necessary and jiossible to hear wit-
nesses other than the accused, and to suspect him rather than to trust
him in his own cause.

The bearing of this distinction between the Forum Internum and
the J''oruin Jistertium, more especially ui)on the (]uestion of restitution,
will be evident from the I'ollowing principles laid down by Father (lury
in connection with the obligation loreiiairany loss that may have been
unjustly caused to another ; in the case, that is, where injury has been
done to the rights or goods of another |)erson wit'iout jny benefit
accruing to him who causes the injury. It is clear that the matter of
restitution pertains both to one Forum and the other ; this being so.
the question naturally arises whether the decisions of the two separate-
courts mav not sometimes come into colli.sion.

PriiicipU'M wlii<'li roK"liit<' KcMtiliitioii in llic
Foruiii CoiiMciciiliir.

ear in

irgent-

v'iewer

Inter-

Jn for

refers

lus it

zance

t law

Id of

tlaw^

Now, the ])rinciples that regulate the Forum Conscientiae in tliu*
matter of restitution are (i) That the action causing the loss for which
restitution is sought, shall be unjust ; for otherwise, where there is no-
violation of strict right, or of commutative justice, no obligation t©
restitution can exist. If John's cattle damage a field unjustly ocGupie^
by James, whatever restitution may be due, it is certainly not due to
James. (2) Then, the action causing the loss, must be the truly effica-
cious cause ; must be such that is, that the loss can be truly said to
follow from it ; and also, that it be truly imputed to th^. person incrimi-
nated. For clearly, no action can be imputed to a person unless it be
his own proper action ; nor can the loss resulting from any action be
attributed to the doer, unless that action be the true and efficacious-
cause of damage. Thus, if William gives Peter a sword without the
slightest suspicion that Peter will make bad use ofit, could William for

,M^

one moment he accounted resj.'onsible for the murder committed by
Peter with that sword, or for the damage resulting to the family of the
murdered man ? Or again, suppose Edward rushes hastily into the
middle of the Strand to save a child's life that is in danger of being run
over, and by so doing causes a carriage-horse to take fright and rush
through the i)late glass of a jeweller's window, to the sore detriment of
both window and carriage ; would any one in his senses say that
Edward would be liable to restitution? His praiseworthy action would
be said to be the accidental, but certainly not the efficacious cause of
the loss ensuing ; it could not be imputed to him with a view to res-
titution in any real sense.

But let us vary the supposition. Instead of a man engaged in a
benevolent action, take the case of a thief who has been detected in the
very act, and is rushing across the street with the police in full pursuit.
A dog terrified by the uproar takes to Hight, and dashes amongst the
legs of the horses of a jiassing carriage. The catastro])he supposed
in the last case is reijeaied : horses and carriage, and windows and
jewels, come to great grief. \\\\o is responsible for the damaj^fe ?
Would any cou't of justice m the world say that the thief was ? The
unjust action which was rlu; origin of the whole affair, was obviously
of such a kind that no ingenuity could twist it into the relation of effi-
cacious cause with respect to the remote consequences that followed
from it. As far as these ccnsecjuences are concerned, the whole thing
can only be regarded as accidental. Nor again, is the connection of
the consequences with the act of i)ilfering so close, as in any way to
imply the omission of any prudent precaution that might have pre-
vented the disaster. The results were beyond the ordinary range of
human prevision ; there could be. therefore, no valid plea of negligence
against the culprit, nor again of evil intention. The whole occurrence
in the street could not but be utterly unforeseen.

All this brings us to another condition that theologians require that
the obligation of restitution may lie in any given case, at least in Foro
Inter no. The damificatory act must >> rheologicallv culpable. By
theological fault is understood a fault v i -h \.\ .he forum of conscience
involves an offence against God either r-Oitui or venial.

There is also according to the Roman law a fault that is called
juridical, which involves some degree of negligence, varying in degree,
by which loss is entailed on another in person or property. Now, it is
clear that such negligence may involve sin, or it may not ;it may arise
from sheer inadvertence, without the slightest prevision, even in a con-
fused way. of the evil consequences that may ensue from it ; or it may
be negligence voluntarily allowed with the bad intention of bringing
about the very consequences that follow. Of such intention the Forum
Externum, conversant ,as it is with external acts, can take no cogni-
zance , nor again can it judge of the measure of advertence or inad-
vertence. The Forum Externuin*ca.n only proceed by the constructive
method ; judge, that is, whether such external indications exist, as to
justify the imputation of negligence or evil intention. If such indica-
tions are sutiiciently ascertained, then the presence of negligence or
bad intention is consideied to be sufficiently made out for all legalpur-

clai
jvid
(
the
anc
be

obi

On the other hand, in the forum of conscience, the conscience itself

ILS'JKW

iiitted by

|ily of the

into the

feeing run

ind rush

'iment of
I say that

)n would
[cause of
rv to res-

37 .

claims to be beard, and appeals to the judge that judj^es righteous
judgment in the last resort, when cases of this kind occur.

Occasionally, then the two judicatures will come into collision and
the Forum Internum will sometimes joronounce the accused guiltless
and free from all obligation, when the Forum Kxtcuum judges him to
be guilty, and burdens him with the obligation of restitution. At the
same time the Inner Forum is careful to uphold the authority of the
Outer Forum, and acts upon the principle that, where the fact of negli-
gence has been established, even though inadvertent and free from
all bad intention, and the sentence of a court of law has imjjosed the
obligation of restitution, then such sentence is also binding in Fore
cor.scicntiae ; and this on the broad ground that the public security
depends on obedience in such cases, and therefore obedience cannot
be withheld The exception, however, must always be made of the case
where there is a false presumption of fact, for the law always presup-
poses the fact, something that has been done, in which negligence has
intervened, though possibly without blame in the Forum of Con-
science. But if such fact be falsely imputed, then ihe sentence is
unjust and can carry no obligation to restitution with it. Such briefly
is the teaching of Father Gury on this subject, (i)

The Koviewer"!* iloro^atury ovproMNioiiK. Tlioir
UiitriitliriiliiOM)>.

Having laid down these principles let us now turn to the Reviewer's
examples and interpretations. But. in the lirst i>lace let us premise,
that the exjilanation we have given, of the distinction between the
Forum Externum and the Forum Internum, at once shows the I'utility
and untruthfulness of the derogatory expressions with which the
Reviewer so ])lentifully interlards his i)ages. These expressions are
inspired by his estimate of " that capital feature of the Jesuit doctrine,
providing the unfailing sanction for laviicss in the ai)plication uf prin-
ciples, namely, the unlimited discretion accorded ♦^o the individual in
assertion of justificatory jjleas " (2) I'hus we have phrases like these
used with reference to a penitent in tiie tribunal of penance, " provided
he will allege ;" " the unlimited discretion accorded to the individual ;"
"will posses an inward disposition ;" " that a person should vehe-
mently affirm ; " and so forth ; the object of foisting such ])hrases into,
or of connectmg them with Gury s text, being eptirely to falsify his
decisions as interpreted by the principles that he lays down. They
refer of course to the solenm act by which a penitent by his own act
and deeil constitutes himself a criminal in some degree or other before
God ; he opens his mind to his confessor, audit then becomes the con-
fessor's part not to be satisfied with allegations, or vehement asser-
tions, or any amount of professions ; but to judge that the penitent is
sincere and truthful in his statements and accusations. Even when
satisfied on this jjoint, his subsequent action can only be equivalcntly
interpreted in some such f:ishion as this. " Well, I accept the truth of
your statements, and in consequence I can only declare that this or

(T) Oiirv. )>'• Jiiif ■>( ■hi'''>:> I. rap ii.
(2) i'. 70.

iirt.

that obligation rests upon yon in the matter of commutative justice —
for it is that which we are discussing at present— or that you are free
from all obligation ; but then remember after all that you are here
speaking especially before Cod. and He will judge all this just as it is.
If such be the true testimony of your conscience, He will ratify what
I have done and decided ; if it be false, you will have to answer to
Him. Upon your own soul be the responsibility." Either conscience
is to have something to say in such matters or it is not. If the latter,
then axdit (jincstio ; if the former, then we cannot conceive any other
manner in uhich its claims can be recognized and its dictates allowed
-lieir due weight than that which is based on the principles of Catholic
theology on the subject. And these principles are, that man knowing
liimself, a id not only knowing himself but knowing himself relatively
to Ciod and to (iod's law, is ultimately responsible for his own judg-
ments. His judgments when according to such knowledge, are the
])ractical guide of his life. When in practical opposition to such know-
k'dge. they are the grounds of his final condemnation. Nothing can
release him from th'S responsibility of standing or filling by the judg-
ments formed at every moment in the innermost recesses of his intel-
lect and heart. No uicre human law can oblige or absolve, where the
practical dictates of man thus consciously acting, acting that is with the
full knowledge of himself, of his relations, and of the facts in any par-
ticular case, pronounce against obligation or absolution. It is into this
supreme cou^^ of conscience that a man jnits himself when he enters
the tribunal uf penance, and according to the true dictates of his con-
scious intelligence in that tribunal he must stand or fall. If then our
readers would substitute the word "is " for the misleading expressions
so freely used by the Reviewer, or rather so ignorantly and unfairly
inserted into (iury's text, such as ''if he but professes," " if he alleges,"
and so forth ; they would find that doctrines, which according to the
Reviewer's method of handling them, seem to outrage every right ins-
tinct, resolve themselves into conclusions in agreement with the highest
right and the soundest common sense.

Ill

A IV'w <'lioi<'(> vxiiLiiplvx f r«»iit the <|iiai*tci'l.v.

Now for one or \\\o of the Reviewer's examples ; we shall not weary
our readers with many. The first we shall cite is that ofQuirinus,
which the Reviewer introduces with the following remark : "The
following exem])lification of what roguery may perpetrate with every
security against disturbance of conscience, will probably seem yet
stranger." ^Vho says that the act that the Reviewer proceeds to com
ment upo)i can be " per[)etrated without disturbance of conscience?"
Certainly not Father Gury ; certainly no Catholic moralist. The man
would be guilty of sin who did such act, and would be amenable to
God in the forimi of conscience for it. But sin is one thing, and the
effects of sin, as aftecling the question of commutative justice, another.
The man would be a sinner before God, most certainly ; but would
the obligation of repairing the damage following upon his bad act exist
in such a case ? That is the question Father Gury considers, and not
whetlior there would be disturbance of conscience or not. Disturbance
of conscience there must be, if the malefactor ever came to reflect. But

31)

slice —
re free
e here
s it is.
[y H'iiat
wer to
science
-^ latter,
y other
lloAved
athoh'c
nowin^f
latively
|n judg.
are the
1 knou'-
ng can
ne judg-
is intel-
lere the
vith the
ny par-
nto this
enters
his con-
hen our
sessions
unfairly
illeges,"
; to the
ght ins-
liighest

weary
irinus,
" The
every
111 yet

com
ce? "
■ man
)Ie to
1 the
•ther.
'ould
exist

not
mce
But

this is only one other instance of the helpess incapacity of the Reviewer
to see the most common distinctions. If he dislikes the charge of
ignorance, we can offer no other alternative than that of wicked and
•criminal misrepresentation. There is no middle term between these
two extremes.

ti> ( liitty.

But let us have the case. It is this. "Quirinus, with the intention
to steal a piece of cloth, breaks into a shop at night and lights a candle,
taking due precaution to guard against the danger of tire ; but by some
sudden chance, for instance the leap of a cat, the candle is pitched
into the straw ; quickly the whole shop is in Hames, and the thief taking
tiight only just gets off safe. What about Quirinus ? Why he is /ia/'/c
to nothing, inasmuch as he never contemplated the danger. He is
certainly not liable for the cloth it was his intention to steal, even
though he had laid his hand on it, for its destruction is also involun-
tary ; neither is the seizing of the cloth the cause of the injury, nor did
the carrying of the candle create the immediate peril of conllagration,
sutlicient care having been em[iloycd." (3)

Now, as has been said, there is no question here about the sin of
Quirinus. That is clear and admiued. The sole question is about
the damages ensuing. Is he liable to restitution ; and, if so, to what
amount of restitution ? Glory's reply is that he is not liable to all;
and for the two fold reason, that in the first place the theft of the
cloth had not been accomplished ; and in the second place, the con-
flagration could not be attributed to the criminal act of trespass of
which he had been guilty by his burglarious entrance into the house,
for conflagrations do not follow upon acts of that kind in the ordinary
course of things. Nor, again, however guilty he was in his burglary,
as far as the fire was concerned no fault, either theological or juridical,
can be attributed to Quirinus, for there was no intention to burn the
house ; and not only that, he had taken all the ordinary, prudent pre-
cautions against such an concurrence. We are not sufficiently versed
in English Common Law to offer a definite opinion on the question as
to how far the presence of (Quirinus in the house with a felonious inten-
tion would affect the question of consequential damages. It is certain
tha*" the charge of arson could not be sustained. And it is equally
certain that the questicm of wilfulness or inadvertence enters into the
estimate of damages from trespass, as well as in cases of consequential
damages in breaches of contract. Thus Chitty says that a claim for
such damages may be made good, "' provided such damages may be
fairly and reasonably considered, either as arising naturally — i.e.,
according to the usual course of things — from the breach of contract
itself, or may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation
of the parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result
of the breach of it." (4) Here the element of absence of wilfulness and
of advertence is fully admitted in abatement ; but how far ai English
-court would carry it in the present case we do not undertake to decide,

(■-J) P. 75.

(4} lilackstoue, Cum. iii. lik. Hi. c. 1'-'; Ciiitt.v, Lmr nt Conl mcls. p. 81(1.

€a«e «f Kxtr4»iue l^^cesBlty.

The Reviewer next rises to a great heiglit of moral indignation at
Giiry's doctrine of Extreme Necessity.

Just as for the proliability of opinions and the invincibility of ignorance, so also
the determining test for the jileii of authorising an invasion of other people' = pro-
jierty restb on the «)<«(' ifeiV of the party interested in exemption from established
law; tor wild can verify tiie existence of an inward apprehension as to necessity
\)eing i mini II f7it! All that is wanted in the eyes of Gury is, tiiat a person shoulli
vehemently affirm his having been prompted by some inscrutable dread of threat-
ened distress. Of necessity, itself, however, a'^definition is given. It is of three
degrees : ordinary, in which j)au])er mendicants as a rule find themselves; grave,
in which life is kept up with great labor ; and "extreme, in which life itself is in
risk.' An individual in this last Jilight is i)ronounced to be entitled ' to make use
of as mtich of another person's property as may suffice for relieving himself from
the said necessity, on the groutid ihiit diviKinn of i/oods, however it may have been
made, nerer can drroi/iite Jruiii the niitural riijht apiiertaininif to every one to provide
for hiiiinflf. when mi fVeriit!/ from ejtreiiw nieeasiti/. hi mch vircumstances all thingn
therefore hi'conie rominon. hd /hut an;/ one reeeivini/ another /jeriion\s projierti/for hm
'iirn Kiiceotir receives a tnili/ etniiiiiun thimj whieh he eon verts into hin own,,) list as if
thin were hdfiiniiinij lufore the division ofi/oods. Consequentlf,- he commits no theft (p. 7C).

A Di»«gra<'eful FalNificatioii.

We have here, in the first place, one of those disgracefjl falsifica
tions of Gury's doctrine, and not his alone, but that of St. Thomas and
St. Alphonsus as well, of which we have already so many times con-
victed the Reviewer. In the present case, however, he convicts him-
self. He states wiut according to Gury extreme necessity is ; that,
namely, in which a mans life is in peril from want ; and then Gury's
doctrine that a man in this ])light may take what is required to sustain
life without being guilty of the sin of theft. This doctrine is twisted
into a case of conscience after the act — as to whether a man when he
took something belonging to another, really was in extreme necessity
or not, and if so how it can be verified. We reply as before, in no
other way than by the testimony of a man's conscience speaking before
God, accompanied by such indications as justify a ]irudent judgment
of veracity. But to twist the matter into a case of this kind is to alter
the whole issue of the question. It is not the question whether this man
or that is sincere in stating that he was on a certain occasion in extreme
necessity, and took somethmg belonging to another to relieve it, but
whether granting the fact that a man is in such necessity, the taking
so much as enables him to sustain life is a sin and a theft or not. It
is no question as to whether a man " vehemently affirms," or is
'" prompt I d by inscrutable dread of threatened distress," (5) but whether
he /> in actual, woX. t//reatencd dintr ess ; whether in one word he is
starving, and within a few hours of the end of his life unless his hunger
be relieved. In such a case Gury says, the starving wretch who snatches
a loaf from the baker's stall does not commit the sin of theft ; and that,
as we have seen, on the ground that the law of property yields in such
an emergency to the great law by which every one has a right to his
life. Property then becomes common, so far as such community is
necessary to meet the exigencies of the case.

(5) The italics are ours.

indigftation at

gnorance, so also
lior people' <? pro-
f'rom established
1 as to necessity
a person shoulli
dread of threat-
It is of three
jmselves ; grave,
i life itself is in
led ' to make use
ng himself from
it may have l/een
?ri/ one. to provide
stances all thingit
I ftrojierti/for fiin
in oivii,Jtist as ij
ts no theft {\^. 76).

cefLiI falsifica
. Thomas and
ly times con-
convicts him-
ssity is ; that,
d then Gary's
red to sustain
ne is twisted
man when he
me necessity
before, in no
caking before
snt judgment
ind is to alter
:ther this man
3n in extreme
relieve it, but
y, the taking
t or not. It
iffirms," or is
) but whether
word he is
ss his hunger
who snatches
ift ; and that,
'ields in such
I right to his
lommunity is

Pal«\y*M PriiioipU' Corrobora(<>M C>iiry%.

Nor is Gary alone in holding this princij^le. Paley makes statements
that lead directly uj) to it. He says, si)eaking on what the right of
property is founded ; "We now speak of Property in Land ;and there
IS a difificulty in explaining the origin of this property consistently with
•the law of nature ; for the land was once, no doubt, common, and the
question is, how any particular part of it could justly be taken out of
the common, and so apjjropriated to the first owner, as to give him a
better right to it than others, and what is more to exclude all others
from it." (6l Subsequently Paley states that "the real foundation of our
right \s f//t' 1.1170 i>/ ///e Zand." Property then rests on positive law,
according to this ; the right that a man has to his life, and therefore
the means of life, rests on natural law ; therefore in a case of collision
between the two the inferior must yield to the suj^erior ; positive law
to the law of nature.

But this is not all. Paley bases the obligation to bestow relief on
the ]ioor j^recise')' on this princijjle. He says — " JJesides this, the poor
have a claim founded in the law of nature which may be thus explain-
ed : All things were originally common. No one being able to pro-
duce a charter from heaven, had any l)etter title to a particular pos-
session than his next neighbour. 'J'here were reasons for mankind's
agreeing upon a sejiaration of this common fund : and ( iod for these
reasons is supjiosed to have ratified. But this seiJaration was made
and consented to upon the expectation and condition that every one
should have left a sufliiciency for his subsistence, or the means of jjro-
curing it : and as no fixed laws for the regulation of property can be
so contrived as to provide for the relief of every case and distress
which may arise, these cases and distresses, when their right and share
in the stock was given up or taken from them, were supposed to be left
to the voluntary bounty of those who might be acquainted with the
exigencies of their situation, and in the way of affording assistance.
And, therefore, when the partition cf property is rigidly maintained
against the claims of indolence (.v/V) and distress, it is maintained in
opjjosition to the intention of those who made it, and to //is Who is
Supreme Proprietor of everything, and Who has filled the world with
plenteousness, for the sustentation and comfort of all whom He sends
mto it." (7)

l>i'. Wlionc-Il and Klacktone on C'aM'M of ]\oc'<MSHity.

Again, Dr. Whewell, speaking of cases of necessity, says —

In such cases it lias l)een decided by tlic Roman Law and its eomrnentatnr.-J, that
the Riglit of Property must give way. Necessity, tlicy -lay, overrules all laws. Hut
this is to IjB required only in extreme rases, when all otiier courses fail. To which
is added by n.ost .lurists, that when it is possible, restitution is to be made for the
damage committed A like rule is recognized in Knglish Law,

It has been held by some English lawyers, that a starving nuin may justly take
food; but others deny that such a necessity gives a right; inasmuch as the poor
are otherwise provited for by Law. (.s,

(«) Moraf. Phil. bk. iii. c. 4.

(7) Moral. J'hil. bk. iii. j). 2. c. .").

(8) Klevwnta of Monilitji, n. 700.
of these statements, Grotius ii. "2, •;,

Cambridge, 1804. Whewell cites ti sujiport
4 ; Kent's ('omnu-ulnrirx, ii. 338, bl<. iv. H2.

This last is Blackstone's doctrine. lUit notwithstanding Poor Laws
and charitable organizations, every now and then we hear of some poor
wretch's being found stiff and stark, and wasted to a skeleton under an
archway on a bitter winter's morning. How did poor laws and flowing
soup kitchens help that poor soul in the last bitter agony of hunger
and thirst? If you tell us that such a man was guilty of sin before God
for stretching out his hand to a loaf to save himself in his bitter extre-
mity, we can only say in the name of outraged humanity, and in the
name of the God of love and mercy, "Out upon you, hypocrites ! you
forget that man was not made for the law, but the law for man." This
is certainly true of all human law ; a truth borne out in the present
case by that eternal law according to which man has been fashioned,^
and which alone is a rule of life that admits of no dispensation. Of
course what has been said would have much greater force where pool
laws do not exist.

Ih it C'oiiiiniiuiMiii ?

The passage that we have been discussing is followed by another
page filled with base insinuations on the subject of Communism, the
presence o!"— l'-^'' ''^e Reviewer affects to detect under the above prin-
ciple of R. 'w: \. Communism we have always understood to mean
the denial ol ! J ^h. of private proper:y altogether. Tj attempt to
confound this with thi; above principle as applied and confined to the case
of extreme necessity, berr-iys the source of the writer's ins|)iration. It
is merely one ,_iore shaft r\v •n from the quiver of German misrepre-
sentation ; it is wortu/ of K.'^^iii; "k and his unprincipled crew of slaves
and sycophants, but shanieu'' as jjroceeding from one of free English
blood. Mistranslations and blunders as usual abound in the page in
question ; but out of mercy to our readers we abstain from exposing
them. We pass, therefore, on to one other topic, that we shall constrain
ourselves to touch ujwn as brieJy as possible.

The <|iiai'<orly*M iuikIiIUmI notions on the liiiM of

Charity.

The Reviewer has, as we have seen, been placing the law above all
the dictates of what we should call charity in the preceding case. He
now passes to the other extreme, and gives charity a development that
might have very uncomfortable consequences in respect of some of his
readers, if fully realized in actual practice. We will let him speak for
himself.

Amongst not a few Christians it lias become an accieilited notion tiiat cliarity
is a virtue of capital merit : l)ut if we accept Fatlier (Jury's rulinof we Ci n liardly
avoid looking upon it as a trivial, if not a downright silly practice. In tlie section
devoted to a definition of whit is demanded \>y love of one's neighbour, we find tho
following canon : " First Rule — Every one is bound *•/«/</// and dhKohileli/ to love
himself more than his neighbour, for ihe reason that every one stands nearer to
himself than does any one else. Hence, love of oneself is by Christ laid down as
the standard for love of a neighbour — Loi'f t/ii/ ii'-i(fhhour ii.'< l/ii/si'/f This, besides,
is clear from the natural and insuiterable disposition to love oneself more than
one's neighbour, whence the common maxin—C/ian'ti/, well unlcrxtmxt, hci/ins at
Aonf." In Montaigne or La Ilochefoucauld such a sentence would have sounded
not outof character, but in an approved " handbook of morals,'' itfalls on us with
a rather startling ring (p. I'l).

With a startling ring doubtless in empty heads, but not in otliers it
would seem. A Catholic theologian regards man as a being composed
of soul and body, and believes that the end of his creation is the union
of the soul with (iod in eternity. This end indicates man's place in
the divine order of creation, and it supplies also the divine rule of his
being and of his life. For a man, therefore, to prefer anything to the
attainment of this end, or to sj^eak in ordinary terms, co his own salva-
tion, would put him out of harmony witli the divine order, and be a
breach of that highest charity by which he is united to Clod even in
this world, and is intended to be united to Him in fullest measure in
the world to come. It would therefore be a violation of God's order,
a contravention of His designs, a contradiction to the fundamental
l)rinciples of his own being, for a man to love in this sense any created
thing as much as himself.

11
;e
lat
lis
or

"ly

oil
the

les,

lian

ied

filli

St, TlioiiiiiM aiiid Ciiiir.v on wi'll-ordorcil Charity.

And this is the meaning of the somewhat subtle reasoning bX
which St. Thomas arrivtis at the same conclusion. He sayst
" A man loves Clod as the principle of good, which ii- blessedness ;
he loves himself, as a sharer in that good ; but he loves his neighbour
as associated with himself in the enjoyment of the same good. But it
is a weightier motive for loving to jiarticipate of blessedness in oneself
than to have a fellow-shaier in that blessedness ; just as unity *ran>-
cends union ; therefore a man by virtue of charity ought to love him-
self more than his neighbour." (9) In other words, (Iod is the Sui)reme
Source and the Supreme Object of love ; to be united to Him, there-
fore, in one's own person must supply a greater motive of love and
gratitude than the mere fellowshi;) of another with us in the same union
and resulting blessedness.

The full bearing of this doctrine will be brouglil home to us more
clearly by considering Clury's rules in regard to the order of charity ;
rules which the Reviewer as usual garbles and misrepresents. Thus
Clury says that we must succour our neighbour in extreme spiritual
necessity, that is, wltere his salvation is at stake, even at the risk of our
own life ; and this for the reason that the eternal life of our neighbour
is of higher value than our own temporal life.

On the other hand, in extreme temporal necessity, where, that is,
there is danger of temporal life, we are bound to succour our neigh-
bour at the risk of great loss, but not of the greatest ; of laying down
our own lives, for instanc;r ; for this exceeds the dem.inds of duly
ordered charity.

These instances are sufficient to illustrate the meaning of the maxim,
" Charity, well understood, begins at home " In other words, the
prescription, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," even if taken
to involve equality of affection as regards our neighbour and ourselves.
cannot be taken to mean equality as to effects. To suppose that a man
is bound to show the reality of his love for his neighbour in the only
way in which it can be shown, by its real effects, in precisely equal
measure, first to himself and then to each man and woman in the

(9) St. Thomas, 2. •>. q. M a. 4.

world, would he a simple absurdity, which it requires no words to
expose. There must therefore be order in giving effect to our love
for our neighbour, and if so, such order must have a starting point ^
and where can that starting point be but in ourselves ?

l*rol(>staiil DivlneH on the love of our .\<'i{;liboiir.

What has been said is borne out by Protestant divines. Pole in
his Synojjsis, commenling on the words "Thou shalt love thy neigh-
bour as thyself," after a jjreliminary discussion of the text, in which he
says it is not prescribed, "more than thyself, that is, in the same order
of benefits, but we ought to sacrifice our lesser good for the greater good
of our neighbour; thus for our brethren, that is for their salvation, we
ought to lay down our temporal life," so agreeing with Gury's rule ;.
goes on to add : "Christ here wished two things ; (i) To correct that
vice of selfishness by which, to the neglect of others, we care only for
ourselves; (2) to prescribe the mode of loving our neighbours. He
therefore here ])laces our neighbours on an equal footing with ourselves,
and joins each and all in one body and as in one mutual embrace. But
if you understand by this that we should regard all with the same
love as ourselves, it would follow that there are no degrees of love, but
that all are to be equally love 1, since the love with which we love our-
selves in one. The meaning therefore is. as has been said. Be thou
thyself the measure of tliy love to thy neighbour. I.ovc each as thou
wouldst be loved by them wert thou in their place."

We have in the new Whole Duty of Man the following passage :
• In like manner, the duty to love our neighbour as ourselves is not,
either that we should love any neighbour with equal tenderness as our-
selves — for that I r-onceive is hardly possible — or th it we should love
every neigh.bour alike, which, if we suppose possible, \\ere neither just
nor natural ; or that we should do for our neighbour all that he now
does or that we, if in his circuniit^/.ces, might perhaps wish and
desire to be done for ourselves for such desires m.ny be irregular,
or if not sinful, yet unreasonable ; l>ut it is to do all that for him
v.-hich, were our case his and his ours, Ae should V: reason expect
and be glad to hav-e done to ourselves." (to)

Kiitlcr oil tlio Naiiio hiiIiJcoI.

So again, Butler, in his second sermon upon the love of our neigh-
bour, on the hypothesis that an equality of affection is commanded,
shows that even so there must be inequality of effects, from the very
of man's nature as regards our love to ourselves and our love to our
neighbour ; and that for the sole reason that no man can be closer to
any one than to himself. The passage is somewhat long, but it is
worth quoting at length —

If the words " as thyself" woro to hp uiuleistood of an [eouality of affection, it
woiihi not be attended witli those consequences which pernaps may he thonght
to follow from it. Sii])|uise a person to have the same settled regard to others as
to himself; that in eveiy deliberate S'lheme or pursuit he took their interest iiiti>

(10) Sundiiy \ii. ;

'I'o

incun

and )h

the oil

snpeil

"extH

relievi

rfoes a

statioi;

«'ducai

guests,

to us tl

ritv mi

fully i,

of sec u

j'ksonn

lion car

sarily

ligh-

led,

/ery

our

hr to

lit is-

jti, it
Lught
Irs as
iiiti>

■cf'oimt ill the same dcj^frce iia lii:^ dwu, su tV

(jiiiilit.v (if iitl'iMMinn would

oducethi^; yet he would, in tiu-t, mid ouKlit to tic. iiukIi iiioic luktti up and
finployed nboiit liiinself, mid liiM own coiiciM-n-i. tlimi iiboiil others jind thi-ir
intere.slH. For, licsuh'S the one coniinoii all'cctioii IowumIs hiiiiself and liis iiciirli-

liotir, lie woidd liave several otl

)articii!ar atlV-etioi

IS, |)tis.4ioii^!, a

lid

appetire.s

which he could not possilily feel in coniiiion botli tor hinisel)' and for otht'r.i. Now

these .sensations; themselves verv tiiiicli cm

iloy us, ii.iiu have pciliaps as ji'reat an

iiitlnence us .self-love. So far indeed as self-love and cool rcMcciioii ii|ion what i.s
for our interest, would set us on work to jrnin a siipidy of our own wants ; so far

the love of our iieitrhliour would make us <lo the same tor 1

inn ;

hut the dcffree in

which we are put npon scekiuj^ and m iking use of the means of g.-atitiratioii, by
the feeling of those attections, appetites, aii<l passions, must necessarily h,' peculiar
to ourselves.

That there are particular passions [suppose shame, resentmetitl wiiicli men seem
to have, and feel in common iiotli t'or themselves and others, makes no alleralioii
ill respect to those passions and appetites which cannot possibly he thus felt in
eoinmon. From hence [and ]perhaps more things of the like kind might he men-
tioned] it follows, that though there were an e(|ualily of atfectiou to both, yet

regard to ourselves would
others.

pre

valelil than atlelilion to the conceiiis of

And from moral consiilerations it ought to he so, supposing still the e(|uality of

aft'ection to lie commanileil ; liecanse we are in a peculiar maim*:

I may speak.

intrusted with ourselves ; and therefore care of our own interest, as well as of our
conduct, ])articularly belongs to ns.

To these things must be (uhled that in(U'al oldigations can extend nofiirther t ban
to natural ])ossibilitie.=;. Now we have a perception of onr own interests, like
consciousness of our own existence, which we always carry alauit wiili us; and
■whicdi, in its continuation, kind, and degree, seems impossible to lie felt in ropect
to the interests of others.

From all these things it tully ajipears, that though we were toloveourneighbonr
in the same degree as ^.i- love ourselves, so far as this is jiossible : yet the care of
ourselves, of the individual, would not be neglected ; the apprelieiided danger ot
Avliich seems to be the O'lly (jlijectioii again-t uiiderstandiii^i the peri-c|it in thi;
.strict sense.

In a word, the view taken by Catholic divines on the riiiestion ni.iv
be siunmed up in the words of St. Thomas, that " the love a man bears
to him.self is as it were the exemplar of the love which he Dears to
others. But the example is higher in degree than that which is moulded
on the example. Therefore a man ought out of charity to love himself
more than his neighbour." In fact the words of our J.ord in the text
under consideration denote similitude rather than equality.

Furtlica* iiiisiM'preHt'iitatloiiM of C-ury'M toacliiiitf.

We will venture to notice one more passage —

To clear away all ninbignity. Father (liiry expl.sins that acts of charity are
inenmbent only on those who '" are toleraldy well otf, and either the alisoliilo lords
and administrators of their jiroperties : '' aiid that in cases of ordinary aece.ssity,
the obligations of ch.irity cannot involve more than certain assistance, '' out of
superfluities, to the extent of some privation of pleasures.' Even in cases of

"extreme necessity no one is bound to lay out any large sum of money for

relieving a poor nian frcmi peril of death." Only in cases of the gravest necessity
does a call exist for some contribution " out of tlie strict necessaries for the doiior'a
station," which are enumerated as comprising not merely "what is needful for the
educatien of the family, but als.) the maintenance of ser\ants, the reception of
guests, the cost of fitting presents, and of customary eateitaiaments." It seems
to us that in virtue of this definition of " necessaries," aiiv one disinclined to cha-
ritv might escape its calls on the plea of impecuniositi?, while this had been art-
ful'ly incurred by wasteful expenditure on lavish feastings, with the express view
of securing a plea which must be held valid by a .lesuit crafessor for shirking an
irksome obligation. For Father Gury lays it down distinctly, that no evil inten-
tion can render wicked any deed w'hich in itself must not by nature be neces-
sarily evil— a proposition illustrated by various remark ible exemplifications. A

I '

jiulj.'!' is dcrliiroii tree t'idm lilmiif wlm niiiy have luiidinm ;(1 n murderer to death,
iliuiijrii lie was m timted in (iniiKiiiinintr the .eciiti'ticf liy personal iifttred, because
llie sentcriL'e wus witliiu iiis lcn»l attn 'iites | pi'. "'-'. T".j.

Now here, first of all, in the edition of (niry before us, the words
'• who are tolerably well of," do not occur, (i ij Then as to almsgiving
the whole question discussed by Gury is that of strict obligation, and
not that of voluntary generosity. He states that there exists a true and
real jireeejjt imposing the obligation of almsgiving ; and that this
obligation is under pain of mortal sin in cases of extreme or of grave
necessity ; and then proceeds to consider what is the precise measure
of strict obligation under the varied circinnstancesof those upon whom
the i^recept rests. We cannot follow the Reviewer into details, but we
assert without fear of contradiction that if any one will study lather
(jury's exposition of the subject, they will find his requirements rise

beyoud what it is to be feared is the common pratice of the world
the matter of almsdeeds.

]Vlor4' lliHiioiiONf llimtortioii.

We pause a moment again to point out another instance in this
])assage of the dishonest distortion and mixing up of things that have
no connection that prevade the whole article. A man, it is stated,
may, on the jjlea of impecuniosity, brought on by his own wasteful
expenditure, indulged in simply in order to evade the obligation of
almsgiving, shirk an irksome duty with the approbation of a Jesuit
confessor. He might so act, but whether with or without the consent
of a Jesuit or any other contessor, he would do so at the expense of
mortal sin. Moreover Ae are certain that no confessor who had
studied (iury could ajjprove such an evasion of a solemn obligation.
Then comes the old story that " no evil intention can render wicked
any deed which in itself must not by nature be necessarily evil." Gury
says no such thing. He is speaking of justice, and not of wickedness
in general. 'I he case of the judge is, where he justly and legally
sentences a murderer to death ; in such a case, though his breast may
be filled with rancorous hatred against the criminal, his judicial act is
no infringement of the murderer's rights, and therefore no offence
against justice. There can therefore be no question of damages ; no
obligation to restitution. Sin there is ; wickedness there is ; but he
must answer for that to God. In such a case Gury says, the evil inten-
tion could not make an act unjust, injustnm, which \sd,% just in itself.
The intention was sinful ; though not a sin against justice. The judge
therefore is not declared free from blame, but only from the effects of
a sin against justice. (12)

Other inaccuracies and interpolations might be pointed out in the
above citation. For instance, the Reviewer uses the words absolute
lords, so as to convey the impression that only very wealthy persons
are bound ; whereas Gury uses the phrase in antithesis to wives, chil-
dren, and servants, with reference of course to their master's property.
Again, the words '■ to the extent of some privation of pleasures," hxz
not found in our edition of Gury.

[11] T. i. p. 222. Romio 18tJ6.
[12] Gury, t. i. p. 592.

\l\

I'rcaoliliiK iiiKl Prnetloo.

We cannot conclude this subject however without a few remarks on
this new view of charity and almsgiving, thus given to the world
undci the iiusjjices of the Quarterly. According to the Reviewer,
charity and almsgiving would seem to be convertible terms ; and as
he repudiates the maxim that you are bound to love yourself more
than your neighbour, he must be held to admit that he is bound to love
his neighbour as much if not more than hiniself. \\hat a vista res-
l)lendent with the rectification of the abuses and miseries of ages, is
thus ojjened out to the poor human race 1 Father (lury indeed does
state that we are bound to help our neighbour in his extreme spiritual
necessity at the risk of our life ; and in his extreme temporal necessity
generally at great though not excessive loss to ourselves ; but this
does not satisfy the expansive benevolence of the Reviewer. He can
only show his appreciation of these rule by falsely saying that a man
is, according to Gury, bound to prefer any want however slight of his
own, to any need however great of his neighbour. Poor Father Gury's
rules are all too narrow for his large heart. Let then the sounds of
joy and gladness be heard in St. Giles', and Whitechapel, and the Isle
of Dogs ! The Gospel according to the Quarterly has gone forth : the
golden age has come. Violets will bloom in the Seven Dials ; and the
rose and the honeysuckle shed sweetness in Spitalfields, It is now no
matter of generous self-sacrifice to help your poverty-stricken neigh-
bours \ you are bound to— -to divest yourself of ajipliances generally
thought to be necessary for your station in life a. the cry of ordinary
need. The great Conservative party will no doubt at once respond to
the new revelation ; its peers and members will lay aside their carriages
and prancing steeds, and modestly go down to the House on veloci-
pedes ; while the Radicals not to be outdone, will go on foot to St.
Stephen's in goloshes and waterproofs, with cotton umbrellas in their
hands. As for the aristocratic Whigs, how they shall comport them-
selves under the change, we must leave to the grave decision of Earl
Russell at the least. We might suggest aline of omnibuses, from which, -
despite the name, the general public should be rigidly excluded. But
then, being, only of enslaved intellects, our suggestion would most pro-
bably be at once laughed to scorn. Mayfair will languish and Bel-
gravia become a wilderness ; the turtles will gambol uncaptured in
tropic seas ; Mansion House banquets will subside into frugal suppers,
and there will be no demand for citrate of magnesia or Holloway's
pills. Rookeries will disappear, and the festering dens of poverty, of
wretchedness, and of crime will be swept away ; starving men and
women will no longer slink into quiet corners to die, nor will the
muddly waters of the Thames again be appealed to by the desperate
leap to quench the last gnawings of hunger, and still the bursting
brain.

We shall not grieve over such results ] on the contrary we shall
rejoice at them. The old Catholic teaching that men should not be
satisfied with the bare discharge of strict obligation, but should stretch
beyond that in the spirit of generous self-denial, has no doubt been a
teaching fruitful of untold good and blessing to the poor and needy,
50 much so that we seem to have recollections of reproaches being

levelled at it as something quite overdone ; hut notwithstanding it
cannot be said to have done all that might h.ivo been done, or reduced
the mass of misery to a minimum in the world, Let us trust that the
new principles of strict obligation will have belter success.

Tlio SitUv iiilMii|»|>ro|»ri]i(iiiK C'liHritiil»lo BoqiiONlN.

At the same lime we are haunted by an uncomfortable misgiving.
We seem U) remember liearing within the last year or two of moneys
left for i)ious and charitable ])urposes being confiscated for the uses
of I lie State, or otherwise divcrtid from the objects to which the donors
had (levoied them. Communities of men and women too, who had dedi-
cated their lives, given up not their substance only, but themselves, to
the work of relieving human distress, have been driven out of Kuro-
l<ean lands, and their loving labours thus frustrated and brought to
nought. What we fear is tliot this sjjirit of Swiss honesty, Italian
uprightness, and Cierman culture will militate against the grand future
that has been opened to mankind. Jiut no doubt the Reviewer is
deeper in secrets of this kind than we are, and we can only express the
hope that our a])prehensions will prove groundless.

i'oiiMcieiK'o VN. Military ItiMCipliiio.

There is one other j)oint upon which we will touch very briefly. The
Reviewer says : "It is declared that every soldier who consents to
serve in an unjust war will be directly c/i<Vi;ral>/r with responsibility
for every act of injury per])etrated by himself individually during its
course, Viwd J>rof>oriioiiai!y for the total injury wrought by the army ;
thus introducing a principle absolutely subversive of all military disci-
])line, that at eve-y call to arms each soldier is to make himself judge
whether to obey it will be in accordance with his conscience."

So then it seems soldiers are to leave conscience behind them when
they enter the ranks, aiid to content themselves with killing any one
they are told to kill. An army is to be regarded in fact as a collection
of bravos. And perhai)s this is only the necessary sequence of the yast
system of standing armies that oppresses the world. At any rate it is
well to liave this principle avowed and plainly put before us.

But it is not thus that Catholic theologians look upon war and the
soldier's trade. According to them war is the last weapon in the hands
of justice, and can only be used justly. And every soldier can demand
some guarantee, and ought to demand it, that the war in which he is
asked to engage is just. This guarantee is, that due examination into
the causes of the war has been made by the competent authorities,
that reparation has been sought for at the hands of the aggressor, and
that a solemn judicial pronouncement, after all such preliminary steps
duly taken, has issued, sanctioning the decl-.ration of war. Upon such
a guarantee every soldier can. and is bound to form his conscience as
to the justice of the war in which he engages ; if such guarantee is
wanting, war not having been declared in legal form, he cannot embark
in it with a safe conscience Legal declaration of war is not a final
proof of the justice of the war, but it furnishes the presumption of that
justice sufficiently for the formation of the conscience of the soldier

and of the nation. Such presumption would not yield to .inything short
of positive proof of the injustice of tlu- war Such is the teaching of
Father (lury and of Catholic theologians generally on this suhjoct.
Nor of Catholic theologians alone lirotius, for instance, says, " Tliat
if soldiers were certain that the prince was doubtful as to the justice of
the war, it would not be lawful for them to tight, how much soever
they might he his subjects, because such war would be unjust ; just in
the same way as a lictor could not lawfully execute the sentence of a
judge that he knew to be unjust 113)

The Wcstuiiu^itcr Jle\iow, F. W. iVoHiiiun and Toiilniin

Suiilli on War.

In a very able paper in the IVest minster Review (14) Mr. F. W.
Newman says, "There is no more fundamental pri:icif)le of freedom
(for it is evv;n admitted under despotism), than that no nation shall be
dragged into a war by its executive against its will and judgment ;"
and he ])rcceeds to show by a mass of precedents collected by Mr.
Toulmin Smith, that in former times the greatest care was taken to-
give those who engaged irv a war the guarantee si)oken of above. It
was not left in old Kngland, to the freaks and perverse judgment of a
practically irresponsible minister to drag the country into war, but the
consent of the Great Council and of the Parliament elicited after due
examination into its causes, was necessary before a war could be law-
fully entered upon. And we know that the first Chinese war was
branded by the English courts as piracy because the steps necessary
to guarantee its justice had been neglected. But this is too la-ge a
subject to discuss in the present article.

Conft'ont tlic <|narU'i*I>''H <lnotationN with the Original.

We cannot follow the Reviewer into further details; but we trust
that sufficient has been said to show his utter untrustworthiness, his
total incapacity in any point of view to speak on the subject with which
in an evil day for himself and for the Quarterly Review he has pre-
sumed to meddle. By way of still further illustration of the Reviewer's
manner of treatment, v/e wi 1, in conclusion, draw the reader's attention
to page seventy-nine of the Quarterly article. In this page alone, and
almost the same may be said of the following page, at least nineteen
hlots may be detected by a careful collation of the so-called quotations
wi h the original. These blots consist of garblings, suppressions, the
use of ambiguous words, so as to give a false colouring to the author's
iDcaningand to insinuate bad impressions, dove-tailings of things toge-
ther that have no immediate connection, substitution of suppositions
fox focts, and all with the view of putting the basest construction
upon every line he touches ; to say nothing of the lamentable igno-
rance that is displayed at every turn of the process.
, To g've a sample or two. There is the old trick of putting "wilT
profess " instead of is with reference to the disposition of the woman

[13] Be Belli et Facia Jur. Pram. s. 29, 30.
[14] No. 34, April, 1860.

I '

mentioned to make her abstractions good. There are also suppressions
in the statement of the case. Then there is the insertion of the word
" it follows," connecting a case of grave injury with theft, and thus
perverting the meaning, and mis applying the solution. And this is the
more disingenuous, because Father Gary expressly says that the case
of injury differs from that of money accumulated up to a grave sum by
petty thefts. In the latter case he decides that the thief is bound to
restore sub gravi- (15) And Father Ballerini in a note on the solution
of the case of injury, disagrees with Giiry, and holds the opposite view.
Besides it is not true to say that the injurer is free from all obligation.
He is bound to make good under pain of venial sin for each petty act
of injury that he has been guilty of. Then there is the usual insinua-
tion conveyed by the words " shrewd enough ; " ** if he has only been
careful to scatter the injury over various victims ;" intended to indicate
that the man has been acting on a deliberate system derived no doubt
from his moral instructors.

Again it is stated that "an incendiary who has burned down a
.stranger's house, in the mistaken belief that it belonged to one he
hated, is free from obligation of compensation because such an action
was unintentional towards the sufferer " Now will the reader believe
that in this case Father Gury's first solution is suppressed, in which
he affirms the obligation of restitution ; while in the second given by
the Reviewer, he merely says that some deny this because the action
was not voluntary in relation to the injured person ; but, he adds,
" this reason from what has been said, seems to carry little weight with
it ? ' (16) Let this example stand for the rest ; we cannot venture to
weary our readers with further instances. Sufficient has been said to
show that our assertion with reference to this and the succeeding page
is not mere assertion, but can be abundantly substantiated. And
indeed well night the same may be said of every page of the article.

^1/

The iHall's Theologian a Disgrace to ''
English Fairness.

The whole production is discreditable to English literature, a blot
upon English fairness and disreputable to the pages of the Quarterly
Review. What would be said of a man who, without any further know-
ledge of law than that obtained by a cursory perusal of " cases " and
other law books not even amounting to the respectable process of
cramming, should presume to appear before the Lord Chief Justice to
plead in an intricate cause ? We can imagine the fiasco that would
ensue.

And yet this is pretty well the exact parallel of the Reviewer's
position, though his conduct is rendered even worse by the number of
cases he blunders upon. Would it not savour more of English
manliness and straightforward dealing, instead of viewing' questions
of moral theology through the distorting medium of Pascal's Letters
and German obfuscations, to enter into communication with those with
whom such questions are a matter of daily practice, and try to ascertain

ri51 Ourj i. n. 666, 630.
[16] I. p. 644, n. 644.

the application that they give to the principles, and the construction
they put upon statements that have involved the Reviewer in such
endless trouble and confusion ? Such an act of frankness would con-
tribute very materially to the clearing of his mental atmosphere. And
we can assure him that every facility will be most cordially extended
to him by living Catholic theologians if he should see fit to condescend
to so sensible and profitable a course.

In the meantime, in parting for the present with the Reviewer, we
feel bound to say ihitwe can in no wise withdraw any hard expres-
sions that we may have indulged in against his production. On the
contrary, the more we have looked into it, the more unfavourable has
our judgement of it become. The whole structure of the article in the
Quarterly is just such as might have proceeded from one who set
about of set purpose to produce the worst possible impressions in a
moral point of view of those that were opposed to him ; impressions
utterly unwarranted by any fair and straightforward construction of
their writings. How far this may have been the case is a question
that can only be decided by the Reviewer himself. We would hope
for the honour of English literature and of the English name that such
a surmise is groundless ; but we must say that as far as external
appearances are concerned, the weight of proof goes far to justify the
opposite conclusion.

I •

This pamphlet and others bearing on the Jesuit

Question may be had at SADLIER & CO.,

Montreal and Toronto.