V
* v s



ORIGINAL SIN
AND

HUMAN MISERY

By

Right Reverend Msgr. John A. Ryan, D.D.

New York

THE PAULIST PRESS
401 West 59th Street



Nihil Obstat:

Arthur J. Scanlan, S.T.D.,

Censor Librorum.

Imprimatur:

© Francis J. Spellman, D.D.,

Archbishop of New York.

New York
,
August 8

,
1942 .

Copyright, 1942, by

The Missionary Society of St. Paul the Apostle

in the State of New York

printed and published in the u. s. A.

BY THE PAULIST PRESS, NEW YORK, N. Y.

DeaMed



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PACE

Preface 5

CHAPTER

I. The Canons of the Council of Trent 9

II. The Supernatural Order and Its For-

feiture by Our First Parents 1

1

III. Captivity Under the Devil 17

IV. Corporal and Spiritual Deterioration 20

V. Nature of Original Sin 31

VI. The Question of Concupiscence 34

VII. God’s Justice and Goodness 43

VIII. The Sad Condition of Mankind—Summary

and Conclusion 46

Discussion Club Outline 56

Bibliography 61

Postscript 62





PREFACE

Not long ago, an article appeared in a prominent

Catholic weekly entitled, “Original Sin: That Is Our

Trouble.” According to its author, World War II, and

all the sins, crimes, injustice, uncharity, suffering, and

stupidity therein involved, were caused by original sin.

If our First Parents had not disobeyed God in the

Garden of Eden, all their descendants would have

come into, and passed through, this world equipped

with all the supernatural and preternatural endow-

ments which Adam and Eve possessed before the Fall.

The men, women, and children of this generation would

have escaped World War II and all the mental, moral,

and physical misery that have flowed therefrom.

The Catholic Church teaches that all this is true

historically. If Adam and Eve had not fallen, the

condition of the human race would be infinitely, or at

least indefinitely, better than it is actually.

From this historical fact, inferences are sometimes

drawn which are very discreditable to existing human

nature. According to these, the human nature that

men now possess has become vitiated or weakened,

either intrinsically or extrinsically. Whether this view

is shared by the author of the article mentioned above,

I do not know. At any rate, it is accepted by others,

both Catholics and non-Catholics. They attribute the

sins and miseries noted above to hereditary defects in

human nature itself, to divergence from the normal type

of human nature, as it exists in the mind of God. Ever

since the Fall, mankind— to paraphrase the words
s



6 Original Sin and Human Misery

which Richard III applies to himself—has been “sent
into this breathing world, scarce half made up.”

Undoubtedly this assumption of a radical decadence

in human nature provides a plausible explanation of

the world’s moral, intellectual, and physical miseries,

not only for this age but for all the ages of recorded

time. Is the assumption supported by philosophy or

psychology? Is it in accord with Catholic teaching?

How can the infliction of defective human nature upon

rational creatures, because of a sin they have not com-

mitted but only inherited, be reconciled with the jus-

tice and goodness of God? If the assumption of radical

deterioration in human nature is not tenable, how shall

we explain the existence in the world of manifold evil?

In the following pages the attempt is made to dis-

cuss these questions briefly and to answer them, so far

as I am able.

John A. Ryan.

Washington,

August IS, 1942.



Original Sin and Human Misery

by

Right Reverend Msgr. John A. Ryan, D.D.

T^HE official, authoritative, and de fide pronounce-

ments of the Church on original sin are presented,

for the most part, in the decrees of the Council of

Trent. The sessions of this Ecumenical Council were

held at Trent, near Salzburg, Austria, and Bologna,

Italy, at various periods between 1545 and 1563. The

principal occasion of the Council was the revolt of

Luther, which had occurred in 1517, and the rapid and

devastating diffusion of his doctrines. “Its main ob-

ject was the definite determination of the doctrines of

the Church in answer to the heresies of the Protestants;

a further object was the execution of a thorough re-

form of the inner life of the Church, by removing the

numerous abuses developed in it.”
1

The decree on original sin was formulated mainly in

five canons against the corresponding erroneous doc-

trines. It was promulgated within six months from the

opening of the Council. Previous to this action, the

only dogmatic decrees proclaimed by the Council (in

Sessions III and IV) were those dealing with the sym-

bol of faith, the canon of Scripture, and the editions

and use of the Sacred Books.

Obviously this was the appropriate order to follow.

The Reformers had denied the traditional teaching of

the Church on the rule of faith and the interpretation

1 Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XV, p. 30, col. 1.

7



8 Original Sin and Human Misery

of the Bible. These were the primary and most funda-

mental doctrines. Next in importance came the ques-

tion of justification, whether it is achieved by faith and

good works or by faith alone. That topic could be

logically and effectively dealt with only after the dis-

cussion of original sin, inasmuch as Luther’s doctrine

on justification arose directly from his errors concern-

ing the Fall. In his opinion, original sin consists in

the hereditary corruption of man’s nature and particu-

larly in concupiscence. As a consequence of this bane-

ful inheritance from Adam, the soul of man, said

Luther, is so impaired and depraved that it has lost

the power of free will.

Against these propositions, and variations thereof

in the teachings of the other Reformers, were directed

the five canons of condemnation noted above .
2 The

following four paragraphs describe and summarize the

positive doctrine:

2 Sessio V., De Peccato Originali.



CHAPTER I

THE CANONS OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

Canon 1 . By this sin, Adam lost the sanctity and

justice in which he had been established, and incurred

God’s anger and indignation and therefore death; and

with death, captivity under the power of him who holds

dominion over death, that is, the devil; and the whole

Adam, both as to body and soul, changed for the worse.

Canon 2 . Because of Adam’s sin, not only he but all

his descendants lost the sanctity and justice received

from God; and became subject to death and bodily pain,

and also to sin which is the death of the soul.

Canon 3 deals with the manner in which original

sin is transmitted from Adam to his posterity, and re-

moved through the redeeming and sanctifying work of

Christ. Canon 4 declares that Baptism is necessary

for the removal of original sin and entrance into the

Kingdom of God, even in the case of infants.

Canon 5. The grace conferred in Baptism remits the

guilt of original sin and takes away the true and peculiar

essence of sin. Those who are baptized put on the new

man and become innocent, pure, beloved of God, heirs

of God, co-heirs with Christ, and deserving of heaven.

They retain, however, concupiscence, or incitement to

sin, which torments, indeed, those who do not consent,

but is not effective against those who oppose it through

the grace of Christ Jesus. This concupiscence has never

been understood by the Catholic Church as a true and

proper sin in the baptized, but only as derived from sin

and inclining to sin.

9



10 Original Sin and Human Misery

In the Sixth Session, on Justification, the Council

made two pronouncements which have a direct bearing

upon original sin. Both deal with free will. Accord-

ing to the first, all men have, indeed, lost their inno-

cence through the sin of Adam, but their free will was

by no means destroyed, even though it became atten-

uated and bent in its powers .
3
The second declaration

condemns those who declare that after the sin of Adam,

free will was either lost or became extinct; or that it is

merely a fiction, brought into the Church by Satan .
4

In the foregoing paragraphs will be found, abbrevi-

ated but not mutilated or diminished, the substance of

all the doctrine laid down by the Council of Trent on

original sin. None of these declarations provides a

formal definition. None of them tells us precisely what

original sin is in its essence. For the most part, they

describe the effects of Adam’s sin, with important im-

plications concerning its nature. The main concern of

the Council was to refute the erroneous notions of the

Reformers and in that process to make clear the main

elements of the traditional doctrine.

Let us now examine and elucidate some of the more

critical and difficult phrases in the Council’s pronounce-

ments.

* Caput I. 4 Canon V.



CHAPTER 11

THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER AND ITS

FORFEITURE BY OUR FIRST PARENTS

Canon 1. “Adam lost the sanctity and justice in

which he had been established.” “Sanctity” means

“sanctifying grace.” “Justice” denotes the supernat-

ural order to which our First Parents had been ele-

vated. By the supernatural order is meant that condi-

tion of existence which places the human being above

the status belonging to him by reason of the intrinsic

forces of nature. In the supernatural order, man ob-

tains a dignity and a destiny which are beyond the

powers of a rational animal. God created a great

variety of beings: minerals, plants, animals, men,

angels. Each was formed according to its own type,

its own pattern, in the mind of God. The type, the

pattern, the constitution of man was that of a rational

animal; that is, a being composed of an animal body

and a rational soul. The angels were created as pure

spirits; the animals, as creatures having not only life

but also the faculty of sensation. Man is midway be-

tween these two types, a living entity possessing not

merely the power to feel, but also the ability to think.

This is his nature. This is all that he is, according

to the creative pattern which he exemplifies. When

he was elevated to the supernatural order, his condi-

tion and destiny became immeasurably higher than

what was due him according to his natural constitution.

He became a friend of God, a member of God’s house-

hold, an adopted child of God, a partaker of the Divine

11



12 Original Sin and Human Misery

Nature, an heir of God, a co-heir with Christ, and

qualified for the Beatific Vision; that is, destined to

“see God face to face.” His nature as a human being

did not enable him to aspire to this supernatural end;

he could only hope to possess God through his natural

faculties; that is, to know Him and love Him discur-

sively, not intuitively. By nature, man’s knowledge

and love of God in eternity would not differ in essence,

however much they might differ in degree, from that

knowledge and love which are within the reach of us

all here on earth.

In comparison with the natural order, the supernat-

ural may helpfully be likened to an elevated railroad.

The passengers on a surface railway may be moved

in the same direction as the occupants of a vehicle on

the elevated, but so long as the car which carries them

remains on rails laid upon the ground, it will not bring

them to the elevated station. Nor can the passengers

on the elevated train arrive at a station located on the

ground. They may, indeed, be shunted to a side-

track, but they do not descend to the rails of the sur-

face line. When persons in the supernatural order and

the state of grace commit mortal sin, they are diverted

to the sidetrack and turned away from God. They

cannot continue toward their eternal destiny, the Be-

atific Vision, until through forgiveness of their sins they

become once more friends of God. In the course of

this transformation, they are carried back from the

sidetrack to the main line and enabled to resume their

journey forward.

All the gifts and prerogatives of the supernatural

order were forfeited by Adam and Eve when they

sinned; with the exception of the Blessed Virgin Mary,



Original Sin and Human Misery 13

all their descendants are born under the same dis-

ability. Nevertheless, they are not returned to the

natural order. They are still destined for a supernat-

ural end, to see God face to face in eternity, as soon as

they are emancipated from original sin by the sacra-

ment of Baptism. Later on, we shall examine the

Catholic doctrine concerning the fate of infants who

die unbaptized .
5

Through the Incarnation and Redemption by Jesus

Christ, the Son of God, all the descendants of Adam are

eligible for membership in the supernatural order, for

a place in the elevated train. If they are baptized and

live to the age of reason, they will reach their proper

destination at the elevation station, i. e., the Beatific

5
Is there a place of natural happiness, or natural unhappiness, re-

served for adults who die without formal instruction in the truths

of Christian Revelation? For example, Chinese and Japanese pagans?

In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, several theo-

logical writers, mostly French, answered these qustions in the affirma-

tive. They were impressed by the difficulty of conceiving how the

multitude of pagans, including the hordes of recently discovered

American Indians, could make a profession of supernatural faith,

never having heard of Christianity or the supernatural. Hence,

these authors concluded that the natural order still exists and that

natural rewards and punishments in a future life are still available

to uninstructed pagan adults. However, this view seems to have

won the adherence of few, if any, theological writers after the end

of the eighteenth century. The overwhelming weight of theological

opinion has always accepted the doctrine that the natural order

and natural union with God in eternity have never existed for

adults since Adam and Eve were placed in the supernatural order.

Since the Fall and the promise of a Redeemer, all men are called to

supernatural salvation and will receive it if their lives are meri-

torious, even though the knowledge of Christian Revelation, re-

quired for a profession of Christian faith, can come to them only

through extraordinary illumination.

An excellent and comprehensive treatment of all the aspects of

this question is presented in Le Probleme du Salut des Inficttles, by

Louis Caperan; 2 Vols.; Paris, 1912.



14 Original Sin and Human Misery

Vision, provided that their souls are in the state of

grace when they are overtaken by death. If they are

shunted to a sidetrack through mortal sin and do not

get back to the main line through contrition, they will

never see God face to face.

What' Our First1 Parents Lost

Adam lost the sanctity and justice in which he had

been “established.” The Latin word is “constitutus,”

and it seems to have been deliberately chosen by the

Council in order to avoid endorsing either of two con-

flicting views prevalent among contemporary theolo-

gians. According to one opinion, Adam was created

in the supernatural order; according to the other, he

was elevated to that condition subsequently. The verb

used by the Council is consistent with either opinion.

However, the weight of theological opinion, both past

and present, affirms that Adam was established in the

supernatural order at the moment of creation .
6

This

accords with the general theological opinion that God

destined all mankind for existence in the supernatural

order; that the natural order was a type in the mind

of God, but never to be actualized .
7

The Council’s statement that by his sin, Adam in-

curred “God’s anger and indignation and, therefore,

death,” is based upon the account of the prohibition

imposed by God upon Adam and the latter’s disobedi-

ence, presented in Genesis ii. and iii. “Death” means

6 Since the fifteenth century, this opinion “has obtained all but

universal currency.” Pohle-Preuss, God: the Author of Nature and

the Supernatural, St. Louis, 1940, p. 200.

7 “Man’s whole natural endowment was intended merely as the

basis and groundwork of a higher and specifically different one; viz.,

that of supernatural grace.” Idem, p. 179.



Original Sin and Human Misery 15

physical death, the dissolution of the body and its

separation from the soul; it implies that before the Fall,

our First Parents possessed the preternatural gift of

immortality. Their other preternatural gifts were

freedom from ignorance, from concupiscence, and from

suffering. Taken together, they constituted the state

of “original justice,” “original integrity,” “the integrity

of nature.” They are called preternatural, because

they were higher than the purely natural properties

of man and lower than his supernatural endowments . 8

The gifts of immunity from concupiscence and from

death are either explicitly or implicitly asserted in the

decree of the Council of Trent on original sin. Free-

dom from ignorance and from suffering have not been

expressly affirmed by the Church; but they are re-

garded as “theologically certain,” upon the authority

of Genesis ii. and iii.

Concerning the precise scope of the latter two pre-

ternatural powers, there has been not a little specula-

tion by theologians. Some have held that freedom from

ignorance enabled Adam and Eve to know God in His

essence, to have a perfect knowledge of all created

nature, and to perceive without reasoning all the con-

8 “The Supernatural involves divine perfections, i. e., such as by

nature belong solely to God. The Preternatural communicates

only such perfections as, though belonging to a higher order, do

not transcend the creatural domain. Thus freedom from concu-

piscence is natural to an angel, because his nature demands it;

but it is not natural to man. If, therefore, God grants freedom

from concupiscence to a man, He gives him a real grace, i. e., some-

thing which is not due to his nature, and which is consequently

Supernatural. However, since such a Supernatural perfectioning of

man does not in principle transcend the creatural order, a grace of

the kind just mentioned is merely praeternaturale” Idem
, pp. 187-

188 .



16 Original Sin and Human Misery

elusions derivable from first principles. Had our First

Parents not .sinned, their descendants would have

maintained systems of political government, whose

regulations they would have obeyed spontaneously.

All persons would have married, and there would have

been as many males as females. Men and women would

have needed food, but they would not have used meat

nor milk nor eggs nor cooked victuals, nor intoxicating

liquor. These are merely samples of the fanciful spec-

ulations of individual theologians. There never was

unanimity nor even a dominant opinion among them

concerning the entire content and implications of the

preternatural endowments which constituted the state

of original justice, or integrity.
9

9
Cf. Pohle-Preuss, op. cit., pp. 200-216.



CHAPTER III

CAPTIVITY UNDER THE DEVIL

“Captivity, under the power of him, who holds do-

minion over death, that is, the devil,”—repeats the
words found in ii. 14-15, of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Inasmuch as all Adam’s descendants inherited original

sin and became subject to all its disabilities, they too

are born under the power of the devil. The words

quoted above may be compared with the following ex-

pressions in the Ritual of the sacrament of Baptism.

“Go out from him, unclean spirit, and give place to the

Holy Spirit, the Paraclete.” These words are used by

the priest almost at the beginning of the ceremony. A

little later, he prays God to “break all the bonds of

Satan” by which the person about to receive Baptism

“had been bound.” Presently the priest again ad-

dresses Satan in these words: “I exorcise thee, every

unclean spirit, in the name of God, the Almighty Fa-

ther, and in the name of Jesus Christ, His Son, our

Lord and Judge, and in the power of the Holy Spirit,

that thou go out from this creature of God, whom our

Lord has brought to the Holy Temple in order that he

may become the temple of the living God and that the

Holy Spirit may dwell in him.” And the person to be

baptized is required, through his sponsors if he is an

infant, to “renounce Satan and all his works and

pomps.”

What does all this mean? That the unbaptized

person is actually possessed of the devil? That his

soul is the devil’s chattel? Not at all. “Under the

i»



18 Original Sin and Human Misery

power of the devil,” does not mean subjection to the

devil’s will and disposal, or certain punishment with

him or under him. In the usage of the Church, this

phrase has a relative, precise, restricted signification.

It denotes exclusion from the supernatural order, in

which our First Parents were established and to which
%

all their descendants were and are called. Entrance to

this order is through the sacrament of Baptism, which

removes the guilt and stain of original sin. Until this

has taken place, the soul is without sanctifying grace,

averted from God, and deprived of the benefits of the

supernatural order, including its own final destiny, the

Beatific Vision .
10

10 At least six passages in the New Testament mention the power

or empire of the devil, and set it in opposition to the Divine do-

minion. Here are the texts, in the order of their appearance:

. . now will the prince of the world be cast out” (John xii.

31, 32) ;
“

. . . for the prince of the world is coming, and in me he

has nothing” (John xiv. 30) ;
“

. . . the god of this world has blinded

their unbelieving minds” (2 Cor. iv. 4) ;
“

. . . And they recover them-

selves from the snare of the devil, at whose pleasure they are held

captive” (2 Tim. ii. 26) ;
“

. . . that through death he might destroy

him who had the empire of death, that is, the devil. ...” (Hebrews

ii. 14) ; “For your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about

seeking someone to devour” (1 Peter v. 8, 9).

This diabolical empire over the children of Adam was described by

some of the Fathers in terms which tended greatly to expand its

boundaries. As Rev. Dr. J. Riviere remarks in his able work, The

Doctrine of the Atonement (translated from the French, St. Louis,

1909, vol. II, pp. 248, 249) : “Another result of sin was to put us in

the bondage of the devil; hence Salvation must consist in a redemp-

tion. This idea, which has been suggested by the Gospel and by St.

Paul, was to prove of extraordinary fertility and to undergo some

surprising deviations. Here fancy reigns, either in the place of, or side

by side with, the old mystical speculations. If we consider the devil

as God’s rival, who keeps in bondage sinful souls, then the Saviour,

to redeem us, will have to pay him a price, and this ransom can be

nothing else save His own self. This childish and brutal idea was

adopted by several of the Fathers. But soon the absurdity and bias-



Original Sin and Human Misery 19

Perhaps the best practical indication of the re-

stricted and limited scope of the phrase discussed in

the immediately preceding paragraph and of the kin-

dred phrases employed in the Ritual of Baptism, is

provided in the predominant opinion of the theologians

concerning the condition of infants who have died with-

out baptism. Although they are technically “under the

power of the devil,” they do not suffer pain of sense;

nor even pain of loss of the Beatific Vision, of which

they know nothing; moreover, they enjoy some degree

of natural happiness, which implies the power of know-

ing and loving God. Such infants remain practically,

if not technically, in the natural order. Although they

are called to the supernatural state, they never reach

it effectively. While alive, they are in it only poten-

tially; when they die, this potentiality vanishes. To

recur to the simile of the railroad lines: at birth they

enter the cars on the elevated, but they never move for-

ward because, without the sacrament of Baptism, the

cars lack the motive power of sanctifying grace .
11

phemy involved in the opinion came to be felt, and then it was re-

membered that Satan, far from being God’s partner, was but a dele-

gate, whose whole power was held on sufferance.”

Comparable with the phrases above quoted is that employed by

St. Paul in Ephesians ii. 3: “We . . . were by nature children of

wrath.” Cf. Colossians iii. 6. These expressions denote simply aver-

sion from God, as man’s supernatural end.

11 While the condition of natural happiness possessed by deceased

unbaptized infants is greatly and fundamentally inferior to that of

persons enjoying the Beatific Vision, it is not in itself deplorable.

It does not call for bewailing or lamentation. It does not justify the

friends of these infants in bemoaning them as virtually “lost.” God

could have left all mankind in the natural order, the final end of

which, even for adults, would be to know and love Him eternally

through exercise of the natural faculties of intellect and will. This

would be natural happiness. Surely it would have been good and

worthwhile. It is also good and worthwhile for infants.



CHAPTER IV

CORPORAL AND SPIRITUAL DETERIORATION

“Through his sin of disobedience, Adam was, in

body and soul, changed into something worse.” This

is the closing sentence of Canon 1 of Session V of the

Council of Trent. To which should be added, as sup-

plementary, the excerpts cited some pages back from

Session VI: “Through the sin of Adam, free will was

by no means destroyed, although it became attenuated

and bent down in its powers;” and “free will has

neither been lost nor extinguished.”

These declarations of the Council form the basis

of all the important differences among theologians con-

cerning the effects of original sin upon Adam’s de-

scendants. The effects are succinctly rendered by the

axiom first employed by Peter Lombard, “Master of

the Sentences,” (1555-1625) : “vulneratus quidem est in

naturalibus bonis, spoliatus vero gratuitis;” that is,

“wounded in natural goods, but despoiled of the gratui-

tous.” On the meaning of the latter phrase, there has

been substantial unanimity among theological writers:

man has been deprived of those goods that did not be-

long to human nature, namely, the endowments de-

scribed in the foregoing pages as supernatural and pre-

ternatural. “Wounded in his natural goods,” however,

has never been accepted in a uniform sense by all the

theologians. Their mutual disagreement turns upon the

question, whether these words should be taken in the

philosophical or in the historical sense : absolutely or re-

latively. According to the former interpretation, man’s

20



Original Sin and Human Misery 21

natural powers have been wounded or weakened in

themselves, either intrinsically or extrinsically; in the

latter view, the wound has been merely relative to man’s

supernatural and preternatural endowments. In other

words, man’s natural powers are weaker than they were

before the Fall, but not weaker than they would have

been in a state of pure nature. The wound is compara-

tive and historical, not independent and inherent.

In passing, it should be noted that, according to its

historian, Pallavicini, the Council of Trent refused to

employ language which would expressly support either

of these theological opinions. Describing the effects of

the Fall upon the will, the Council substituted for “vul-

neratum” (“wounded”) the words, “attenuatum et

inclinatum” (“attenuated and bent down”)—terms,
says Pallavicini, which “can be fairly adapted to all the

opinions of the Scholastics.”
12

Undoubtedly so; other-

wise, Catholic authorities could not continue to defend

the mutually opposing views.

The main argument offered by the Augustinians for

their opinion that the wound to nature is intrinsic, may

be thus summarized: since the preternatural goods of

Adam were no less gratuitous than those that were su-

pernatural, they are included under the second part of

the axiom, “gratuitis spoliatus”

;

therefore, “imineratus

in naturalibus” must denote definite injury to those

powers that are purely natural. This wounding is not,

indeed, absolute, but relative to that kind or grade of

pure nature which God would have created if He had

not intended to raise man to the supernatural order.

In this hypothetical grade of pure nature, the animal

part of man would have been constantly and com-

12 Quoted in Theologia Dogmatica by H. del Val, O.S.A., I, p. 621.



22 Original Sin and Human Misery

pletely subject to the dictates of reason. As it now

exists, however, human nature is of an inferior kind;

it represents “the lowest condition of pure nature.”

Hence, the wounding in man’s natural properties de-

scribes the descent from the higher hypothetical grade

(which never existed but which would have existed if

God had established only the purely natural order for

mankind) to this lowest possible level, on which we now

find ourselves .
13

This argument is not convincing. It seems to imply

that no grade of pure nature would be worthy of God’s

creative act which included possible rebellion of the

lower nature. Nevertheless, the constant subjection

of man’s animal nature to his spiritual nature seems to

be equivalent to immunity from concupiscence, a con-

dition which the Church holds to be preternatural;

therefore, it is not within the reach of any grade of

pure nature. Again, let us not forget that, even when

man was on the supernatural plane, he was capable

of sin: the sins of pride and disobedience committed in

the Garden of Eden. Why then should his animal na-

ture have to be made incapable of disobeying his rea-

son? Finally, the assumption that the present condi-

tion of human nature is the lowest grade of “pure

nature creatable by God,” is a pretty large assumption.

Can we not conceive of men provided with an average

Intelligence Quotient some fifteen or twenty per cent

lower than the average which they have exhibited

throughout history, and yet having sufficient intelli-

gence to comply with the requirements of “animal ra-

tionale”? How is it possible to prove that such a grade
of human nature would be unworthy of God?

13 Op. cit.y pp. 622, 623.



Original Sin and Human Misery 23

The question of the injury to man’s natural powers

is treated under another aspect by the theologians,

when they consider whether God could have created

man in a state of pure nature, in any condition or degree

of pure nature. What is called, “the opinion of the

Augustinians,” denies this possibility, because such a

creation would not be in harmony with God’s wisdom

and goodness. The arguments for this position are

feeble and unpersuasive. Least unpersuasive of them

is the following: men were created to enjoy God and

rest in Him as their final happiness; until they reach

that end, their hearts are restless; on the other hand,

the end of all creation is the glorification of God, but

this end would be less perfectly attained through the

life and activities of men in the natural order than in

the supernatural order. Hence, the supernatural order

is the only one that is congruous with the goodness and

wisdom of God .
14

Against this opinion, the argument from the papal

condemnation of the fifty-fifth proposition of Michael

Baius seems to be conclusive. This proposition reads:

“God could not from the beginning have created man

such as he is now born.” The authoritative and true

doctrine is expressed in the contradictory of this propo-

sition, namely, God could have created man from the

beginning in his present condition. Therefore, He

could have created man in a state of pure nature. This

is not only the overwhelmingly common opinion among

the theologians but is regarded by some of them as

“theologically certain.”

“Let us further bear in mind that God, without in-

jury to His justice or His goodness, could have created

14 Op . tit ., p. SS8.



24 Original Sin and Human Misery

man as he is today, for his state meets all the needs

of his nature, his condition and character, as a reason-

able being.”
15

Returning to the question of “vulneratus in bonis

naturalibus,” we note that all the theological writers

who hold the “wounding” to be merely relative and his-

torical agree that man’s natural powers have not been

injured intrinsically. Some prominent authors do, in-

deed, believe that our natural faculties have been weak-

ened extrinsically

,

through external obstacles which

would not have existed in the state of pure nature. On

the other hand, many theological authorities of first

rank maintain that the natural powers in the descend-

ants of Adam have not been harmed, even extrinsically,

and that the wound to his nature consisted merely in

the deprivation of his preternatural gifts. In the words

of Cardinal Bellarmine, fallen man differs from man as

he would have been in a state of pure nature only as

“spoliatus differt a nudo,” as a denuded man differs from

a nude man, as one deprived of his clothes from one

who never wore clothes. To Reverend Doctor A. Tan-

querey, S.S., this opinion seems “by far more probable”

than the other .
16

In a very well-known and able work, Reverend Doc-

tor J. A. Moehler contends that the opinion of Bellar-

15 Devivier-Messmer, Christian Apologetics

,

New York, 1903, p.
250.

“When God created man in the beginning, He could also have

formed another man from the slime of the earth whom He would

have left in the condition of his own nature, namely, so that he would

be mortal and passible and feeling the conflict of concupiscence with

reason; in this man there would be derogation from reason; because

his condition would be a consequence of the principles of nature”

(St. Thomas, in Sent . ii, 30, Q. I. A. /.).

16 Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae, Baltimore, 1896, I, p. 397.



Original Sin and Human Misery 25

mine is “unable to account for the wound of the spirit,

especially for the perversity of the will. Would the

spirit of man . .
. ,

as void of supernatural grace, and

as a bare finite being, be found in that attitude of oppo-

sition to God and all things holy, wherein man is now

born?”
17

Doctor Moehler’s position is that in a state

of pure nature, God could not, or would not, have made

the soul of man such a poor thing as it is now; that the

soul at present is affected by a “perversity of the will”

which is not due to concupiscence, but to something

defective in the soul itself, as compared with its powers

in a state of pure nature.

“Perversity of will” is neither precise nor scientific.

It is general, popular, and rhetorical. To be sure, the

will does rebel against the reason in many situations

which include no concupiscence; for example, in sins

of pride, hatred, and disobedience. According to Doc-

tor Moehler, these offenses can be explained only as

effects of original sin and the “wound” that it inflicted

upon the spirit. To which one might reply that the

rebellious angels committed a sin of the spirit, which

implied “perversity of the will” but which was not due

to the Fall. Moreover, our First Parents perpetrated a

sin of disobedience and, probably, of pride; these sins

of the spirit were not the effect of the Fall but its cause.

Hence, Adam and Eve exhibited a certain “perversity,

of the will” before they had suffered that “wound of

the spirit,” which Doctor Moehler attributes exclu-

sively to original sin. Is “man now born in an attitude

of opposition to God and all things holy?” This lan-

guage is even more inexact and exaggerated than “per-

versity of the will.” Doctor Moehler’s argument really

11 Symbolism, London, 1906, pp. S3, 54.



26 Original Sin and Human Misery

assumes that sins of the spirit, such as those noted

above, would be impossible in a state of pure nature.

What proof have we of this? It seems clear that no

effective attack on the opinion adopted by Doctor Tan-

querey can be based upon anything so indefinite as

“perversity of the will” in Adam’s descendants.

The conclusion of the matter is that the phrases

which we have been considering in the decrees of the

Council of Trent are entirely consonant with the

opinion that original sin has not caused the powers of

man to be injured or weakened, either intrinsically or

extrinsically. Being changed into “something worse

as to body and soul,” and having a will that is “attenu-

ated and bent down,” do not necessarily endorse the

contrary opinion nor impose it upon the conscience of

any Catholic.

The following extracts, freely translated from Dic-

tionnaire de Theologie Catholique, present the essence

of the two theological views concerning the relation be-

tween human nature since the Fall and the state of

pure nature. A good Catholic may lawfully hold either.

Given the immutable character of the constituent energies

of human nature, it is necessary to conclude logically to

the identity, ontologically, of the state of human nature

and the actual state of fallen nature. In the one case,

as in the other, there is the same essential constitution

of body and soul
;
in the intelligence, the same capacities

to reach the truth; in the will, the ability to do good

and in a certain measure avoid evil. The same limits and

the same infirmities exist in the other faculties; the in-

telligence turns from ignorance to lift itself gently toward

the truth; the will is fragile in the face of the assaults

of concupiscence and needs divine concurrence and help



Original Sin and Human Misery 27

in difficult situations, in order to be victorious morally

and to attain its real end, union with God; there is even

a vague desire to attain the Vision of God, even though

this is beyond the power of the forces of nature. In this

minimum which is common to both conditions there is

no indication of fallen nature; man remains man with the

principles and qualities demanded by his nature.

Morally speaking and in fact, however, the fallen state

cannot be identified at every point with the state of pure

nature. In the latter there is not a descent from a higher

condition in which man had been constituted; there is

merely absence of Grace, the conflict between concupis-

cence and spirit which is natural to man; there is no dis-

equilibrium, but a natural order, with an end which can be

attained and the means suitable to that end; there is the

spiritual infirmity of poor human nature with the essen-

tial needs of a spirit united to matter, but there is not a

nature which is in default and culpable.

That state of pure nature is not like fallen nature, a real

state, but a pure abstraction which does not exist and

never has existed in a separate condition; the man who

faces history, psychology or revelation, is not a man who

from the beginning was in a state of pure nature; in the

beginning Adam was in the state of elevated nature; since

the Fall, in a state of fallen nature. He has not been

returned to the natural order in which pure nature would

have been constituted. He remains destined for the sole

end to which God destined him, the supernatural; with-

out the Redemption he would not have the supernatural

means and forces which fit him for that end; hence he

remains in a state of disequilibrium and disorder. (Vol.

12, 1, Cols. 598, 599.)

One of the mildest expressions of the opinion that

some deterioration (extrinsic) affects human nature in



28 Original Sin and Human Misery

its present condition may be found in Pohle-Preuss,

op. cit., p. 229:

There is reason to doubt, however, whether the state of

pure nature, thus conceived, would in every detail be es-

sentially like the present state of original sin. Original

sin, with the consequences which it entails, impairs the

purity of nature to a considerable extent. It is not likely

that in the state of pure nature idolatry and bestiality

would have wrought such havoc as they actually did and

do in consequence of the Fall, especially if we consider

that original sin has immensely increased the ravages of

these two arch-enemies of humankind. Abstracting from

the guilt of sin and the punishment due to it, the state of

pure nature may consequently be conceived as somewhat

more perfect than the state of original sin.

When they think of the poorer condition of mankind

resulting from original sin, the majority of Catholics

probably do not compare it with the hypothetical state

of pure nature; they think of it only historically in rela-

tion to the happy state of our First Parents before the

Fall and in relation to the condition that would be ours

if they had not sinned. Of those Catholics who do

compare the present state of mankind with a condition

of pure nature, a considerable proportion probably

believe that both the intellects and the wills of Adam’s

posterity have been either intrinsically or extrinsically

weakened. This conclusion they derive from one or

more of several sources: contemplation of the miseries,

sins, and follies of men throughout history; pessimistic

and rhetorical expressions sometimes found in popular

books of devotion;
18

similar language employed in ser-

18 For example, in book IV, ch. 55 of The Following of Christ.



Original Sin and Human Misery 29

mons and instructions; finally, the descriptions of origi-

nal sin and its effects presented in certain catechetical

texts.

One widely used catechism declares that “we all

come into the world infected with sin.” To some read-

ers, this expression suggests substantial corruption of

the soul, which is heretical doctrine. Among the effects

of original sin, the same text includes “concupiscence

and inclination to evil.” The addition of “inclination

to evil” as a separate effect is easily conducive to ex-

aggerated notions. Another catechism speaks of human

nature as “tainted.” While this term is susceptible of a

correct interpretation, it can readily lead to misconcep-

tions. This text also declares that original sin has

“darkened the understanding and weakened the will.”

While this statement is correct relatively, the words

themselves, unless explained by the instructor, convey

on their face the idea that the powers of the soul have

been weakened as compared with what they would have

been in a normal state of nature. Still another text de-

clares that we are “all born enemies of God, because we

are deprived of the gifts of God granted to mankind.”

“Enemies of God” is, of course, Scriptural, but it re-

quires interpretation by a competent instructor to pro-

tect the pupil against misleading inferences. As a mat-

ter of fact, the authoritative explanation is that the

phrase merely means that we are “excluded from that

special friendship of God to which no creature has a

natural right.”
19

Before Baptism, the soul is in a state

19 Rev. Augustine F. Hewit, C.S.P., Problems of the Age, New
York, 1868, p. 247. Almost half a century has gone by since the

writer came upon this volume as a student in the St. Paul Seminary,

but his feeling of indebtedness to its discussion of original sin still

endures.



30 Original Sin and Human Misery

of “enmity” with God, because it is without sanctifying

grace; when this grace is received in Baptism, the soul

is in the condition of friendship with God. But the

average pupil in a catechism class which uses this par-

ticular text will not derive this meaning from these

words without specific interpretation by the instructor.

Fortunately, two of the most important recent texts

are free from these ambiguities. In Cardinal Gasparri’s

Catechismus Catholicus, the injuries descending from

Adam to his posterity are enumerated as “concupis-

cence, death, and the other pains of sin, and the sin it-

self, that is, the privation of justice and sanctity.”
20

Nothing is said about “infected nature” or “tainted na-

ture,” or “darkened understanding” or “weakened will”

or “enemies of God.”

A Catechism of Christian Doctrine, revised edition

of the Baltimore Catechism, contains this question:

“What are the chief punishments of Adam which we in-

herit through original sin?” Here is the answer: “The

chief punishments of Adam which we inherit through

original sin are: death, suffering, ignorance, and a

strong inclination to sin.”
21

Of course, “inclination to

sin” includes concupiscence; but “inclination to sin” is

not put down as an indefinite and additional disabilty,

a separate category whch might cover a great number

and variety of other evil propensities. As in Gasparri’s

Catechism, so here, there is no mention of the po-

tentally misleading terms occurring in the texts noted

above.

20 Vatican Press, 1930, p. 102.

Paterson, N. J., 1941, No. 2, p. 11.



CHAPTER V

NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN

Canon 2 teaches that not only Adam but all his de-

scendants lost the sanctity and justice which he had

received from God, and they inherited not only death

and bodily pain but also sin, which is the death of the

soul. In support of this position, this Canon quotes

the words of St. Paul : “ . . . by one man sin entered in

the world and through sin death, and thus death passed

into all men because all have sinned ...” (Rom. v. 12).

The central dogma of this Canon is that all man-

kind are born in original sin. On December 8, 1854,

Pope Pius IX, in an infallible pronouncement, con-

firmed the traditional doctrine of the Church that this

baneful inheritance did not fall upon the Blessed Virgin

Mary.

What is the nature or essence of original sin? While

the Church has not answered this question in terms of a

formal definition, all the elements of a satisfactory con-

cept are provided in the five Canons that we are con-

sidering. On this basis, Doctor Tanquerey offers the

following formula, whose terms are substantially the

same as those employed by all the other theologians:

“Original sin is the privation of sanctifying grace, by

which we are averted from God as our supernatural end,

and which is in some sense voluntary in us on account

of our connection with Adam.”
22

Canon 5 declares that original sin is “the death of

the soul.” This is another way of saying that through

22 Op. tit., p. 389.

31



32 Original Sin and Human Misery

this sin the soul is deprived of sanctifying grace. As

the latter is the life of the soul, so lack of it is the soul’s

death. Mortal sin is so called, because it is the death

of the soul; that is, the expulsion of sanctifying grace,

which is the principle of supernatural life. A person

who does not possess sanctifying grace is said to be

“averted” from God. When the aversion is brought

about by himself, his sin is called actual; when the aver-

sion is inherited, the sin is called original. In contradis-

tinction to actual sin, original sin is sometimes denomi-

nated “habitual” sin, that is, a sinful state in which the

unbaptized person is habitually averted from God as his

supernatural end. Since this habitual aversion is not

produced by the person who is averted, it does not de-

serve or receive personal punishment. This is clear

from the theological teaching concerning the fate of in-

fants who die unbaptized.23 A person habitually avert-

ed from God lacks sanctifying grace and, therefore, can-

not reach the supernatural end
;
but by nature, no per-

son has a moral claim to either of these benefits. In-

deed, a distinguishing characteristic of the supernatural

is gratuity or nonindebtedness. When Adam’s descend-

ants are said to be “punished for his sin,” it is always

implied that the punishment is restricted to the loss of

supernatural and undue benefits. The punishment de-

prives the individual of nothing which belongs to him.

Nevertheless, original sin is sin, and therefore im-

plies some participation, or contribution, by the will of

the sinner. One of the propositions of Michael Baius

(No. 46) condemned by the Church reads in part:

“Voluntariness does not belong to the essence and the

definition of sin.” Hence, the words in the last clause

28 Cf. Pohle-Preuss, op. cit., pp. 300-307.



Original Sin and Human Misery 33

of Tanquerey’s definition, “in some sense voluntary in

us.” How voluntary? Not by any act of ours. Not

by any participation of our wills. The final words of

Tanquerey’s definition give the explanation: “on ac-

count of our connection with Adam.” As the moral

head of the human race, Adam involved his descendants

as well as himself in his transgression and in its princi-

pal consequence, namely, the privation of sanctifying

grace. The unbaptized infant has willed this condition,

not by a personal act, but through the sinful act of the

head of the human race. As St. Paul expresses it, “by

the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners”

(Rom. v. 19). Their voluntariness is corporate, not in-

dividual; nor does it imply personal responsibility.
24

Original sin is not “voluntary in the strict sense of

the word. Considered precisely as voluntary, original

sin is only the shadow of sin properly so called. Ac-

cording to St. Thomas, it is not called ‘sin’ in the same

sense, but only in an analogous sense.”
25

“Original sin is, therefore, voluntary in a wide but

true sense, because it includes a relation to some will

that made a free and sinful choice; and that is what

the Church desires above all to signify when it insists

upon the word ‘sin.’
” 26

24 Op. cit., pp. 271-276.

25 Catholic Encyclopedia
,
vol. II, p. 315, col. 1.

26 Toner, Rev. Dr. P. J., Dissertatio Historico-Theologica de Lapsu

et Peccato Originally Dublin, 1904, p. 25. Dr. Toner wrote this ex-

cellent production while he was a colleague of mine in the St. Paul

Seminary, forty years ago.



CHAPTER VI

THE QUESTION OF CONCUPISCENCE

Canon 5 declares:

The grace conferred in baptism remits the guilt of

original sin and takes away the true and proper essence of

sin. Those who are baptized put on the new man, be-

coming innocent, pure, beloved of God, heirs of God, co-

heirs with Christ and deserving of heaven. They retain,

however, concupiscence or the sinful impulse. Although

the Apostle sometimes calls this concupiscence sin, the

Church has never understood it to be called truly and

properly a sin in those who are baptized, but only insofar

as it arises out of sin and inclines to sin.

The terms used by the Council to describe the effi-

cacy of baptism in the soul, are all taken from the New

Testament. They denote the principal effects of sancti-

fying grace and the essential endowments of the soul in

the supernatural order.

From the viewpoint of theological discussion and

popular conception, the most important word in this

canon is “concupiscence.” St. Augustine (d. 430)

seems to have held that concupiscence was at least the

principal constituent of original sin.
27

In more than one passage of his writings, how-

ever, he expressed the view that concupiscence was the

sin’s cause rather than its essence. For example: “The

very embrace which is honorable and permitted cannot

be effected without the ardor of concupiscence. . . .

Now from this concupiscence whatever comes into being

27 Ibid., p. 78.

34



Original Sin and Human Misery 35

by natural birth is tied and bound by original sin.”
28

In technical language, concupiscence is related to origi-

nal sin as instrumental cause. Similarly Peter Lom-

bard, the “Master of the Sentences” (d. 1164) said that

intercourse and conception involve the “ardor of con-

cupiscence” in the parents; “therefore, the body itself

which is conceived is polluted and corrupted by vicious

concupiscence; when the soul is infused into this body,

it contracts a stain by which it is polluted and becomes

guilty; this is the vice of concupiscence which is origi-

nal sin. . . . After baptism, concupiscence is no longer

imputed as a sin, but remains as the penalty of sin; be-

fore baptism, it is both a penalty and a moral fault.”

This was the prevailing opinion among the theologians

of the Middle Ages. Besides Peter Lombard, the most

prominent names are: St. Bernard (d. 1153), Petrus

Pictaviensis (d. 1205), Hugo of St. Victor (d. 1141),

with qualifications, Albertus Magnus (d. 1280) and

St. Bonaventure (d. 1274).

The sum of the matter is that during the eight cen-

turies immediately following the death of St. Augustine,

almost all the important theological writers defended

the theory that concupiscence was either the essence or

the instrumental cause of original sin, the only con-

spicuous exceptions being St. Anselm (d. 1109) and

Peter Abelard.
29

Passing by the latter, who reduced

original sin to a mere penalty rather than a real sin,

we note that Anselm took a diametrically opposite view

to that of Augustine. According to him, concupiscence

is not a sin in itself, nor can it constitute original sin.

The movements of the sense appetite which are called

28 Quoted by Pohle-Preuss, op. cit., p. 285.
29 Toner, op. cit., pp. 85-90.



36 Original Sin and Human Misery

concupiscence are in themselves neither good nor bad;

they become one or the other only through consent of

the will. The essence of original sin he placed in priva-

tion of original justice, although he did not identify the

latter with sanctifying grace.
30

Notwithstanding Anselm’s great ability and au-

thority, his views on the relation between concupiscence

and original sin remained almost unknown, certainly

unrecognized, until the middle of the thirteenth century.

The reaction from the Augustinian doctrine to that of

Anselm was begun by Alexander of Hales (d. 1245)

and carried well toward a victorious outcome by St.

Thomas Aquinas (d. 12 74).
31 The latter located the

essence of original sin “formally” in the privation of

original justice, but “materially” in concupiscence. In

Aristotelian language, the first was the “substantial

form,” the second, the “primary matter.” Sometimes

he described concupiscence in such terms as to make

it an effect of original sin in Adam rather than a con-

stituent element of it in his descendants. In the course

of time, his followers (the Dominicans) interpreted him

as using the word “matter” in a wide and improper

sense, as meaning “effect.” Duns Scotus and all the

Franciscans rejected entirely the theory of concu-

piscence as the essence of original sin. The Jesuits

have always taken the same position. Suarez, for

example, declared: “Properly speaking, this concu-

piscence in no way constitutes original sin, nor is it a

part of it, but an effect.”

Protestantism and Jansenism asserted that concu-

piscence is the formal, or essential, element in original

110
Ibid., pp. 79-82; 102, 103

S1 lbid.
t pp. 88-91.



Original Sin and Human Misery 37

sin. It was against the Protestant doctrine that the

five condemnatory canons of the Council of Trent were

directed.
32 The opinions of the various protagonists of

Jansenism (Baius, Jansenius, Quesnel) were stigma-

tized as heretical by Popes Pius V, Innocent X, Clem-

ent XI, and Pius VI (1567-1794).
33

Since these con-

demnations, no Catholic theologian has held that origi-

nal sin consists of, or is caused by, concupiscence.

Reference has been made above to popular con-

ceptions of the relation between concupiscence and

original sin. For the most part, these notions are not

consciously based upon any conception of identity. In

the main, they assume that concupiscence is an effect

of original sin, but such an abnormal and evil effect,

that original sin must have inflicted a grave wound

upon the normal forces and elements of nature itself.

In other words, this notion holds that original sin

“changed man into something worse,” not merely his-

torically, not merely as compared with his original en-

dowment of supernatural and preternatural gifts, but

in his natural properties and powers as a human being.

As we have seen on earlier pages, this is not the

predominant teaching of Catholic theological authori-

ties. What has been already said concerning the pos-

32 “As compared with the older pronouncements, those of the

Council of Trent, for the first time, denounced and disavowed as

erroneous that profound pessimism which was henceforth to impreg-

nate the theology and piety of orthodox Protestantism, and which

under another form would endeavor to thrust manifold infiltrations

into the intelligence and life of Catholic circles” (Dictionnaire de Th6-

ologie Catholique, vol. 12, 1, p. 527, col. 1). This article, by A.

Gaudel, is equivalent in compass to two large volumes. It is the most

fundamental and satisfactory treatise on original sin that has come

to the writer’s attention.

33 Pohle-Preuss, op. cit., pp. 221-225.



38 Original Sin and Human Misery

sibility of a state of pure nature is sufficient proof that

if a purely natural man had been created, his state

would have been “substantially identical with the state

in which man actually exists.” 84

So much for the question of man’s deterioration

in general. The popular notion that we are consider-

ing here does not take in the whole subject. For ex-

ample, it does not pay much attention to man’s alleged

“perversity of will” or his proneness to the sins of

pride, hatred, and disobedience, as compared with his

attitude and conduct in a hypothetical state of pure

nature. This popular notion places emphasis almost

entirely upon the fact of concupiscence, contending

that this force, or passion, or propensity, is so abnor-

mally powerful and troublesome that it could not have

been among man’s qualities as a normal and “un-

wounded” human being. To be sure, this opinion

seems to fall under the condemnation which Pope

Pius V visited upon the 79 Propositions of Michael

Baius, in 1567. Proposition 26 reads: “The integrity

of original creation was not an undue exaltation of

human nature, but its natural condition.” The term,

“integrity,” in the proposition means specifically ab-

sence of concupiscence. Therefore, the positive doc-

trine implied in this Papal condemnation is that concu-

piscence is a normal constituent of human nature.

To be sure, very few of the Catholics who accept

the exaggerated notion of concupiscence, noted above,

are aware that they may be adhering to heretical doc-

trine. Many, possibly most, of them do not intend to

deny utterly that concupiscence is a normal constitu-

84 Schell, Dogmatik, II, p. 293, quoted by Pohle-Preuss, op. cit.,

p. 229.



Original Sin and Human Misery 39

ent of human nature; they merely assume that the

force of concupiscence evident in the average person

today, and throughout recorded history, is consider-

ably more powerful (and more troublesome) than it

could have been, than God could have permitted it to

be, in a normal human being, in a state of pure nature.

This milder form of the popular notion deserves

objective examination. Let us start with some defini-

tions. “Desire of the lower appetite contrary to rea-

son.” “Inordinate desire.” “The inordinate move-

ments of the sense appetite toward satifaction.” “In-

clination of the senses toward sense goods, even against

the order of reason.” “Any excessive desire, the ob-

ject of which appeals to the senses.”

All these definitions come to essentially the same

thing. “Inordinate” and “excessive” are equivalent

to “against the order of reason.” Hence, concupiscence

indicates not merely a stretching or inclination of the

lower appetites toward sense goods, but denotes a de-

gree of such tendency which is contrary to reason, the

capacity of these appetites to go beyond the limit set

by reason. In passing, it should be noted that concu-

piscence inheres in all the sense appetites, not only in

that of sex: it impels to gluttony and inebriety, as well

as to violations of chastity.

In themselves, the sense appetites, e. g., sex and eat-

ing and drinking, are unrestrained and unregulated.

They seek their appropriate gratifications indefinitely.

Animals will sometimes gorge themselves with food;

men will sometimes drink intoxicating liquor to excess

and indulge their sex appetites to the limit of satiety .
35

85 According to St. Thomas, concupiscence is in a sense infinite.

Summa Theologica lma
,
2 ae. q. 30, a. 4.



40 Original Sin and Human Misery

In a physical sense, these excesses are not abnormal or

unnatural, since they arise out of the intrinsic consti-

tution of animal nature. In man, the sense faculties

naturally tend toward indefinite enjoyment of sense

goods, while the intellectual faculties naturally tend

toward indefinite possession of the goods of the mind

and spirit. Having no internal principle of restraint,

the sense appetites are sometimes impelled to embrace

goods which, in quantity or quality, are harmful to

health, incompatible with the pursuit of higher things,

and injurious to social order. Hence arises the consti-

tutional conflict between the two orders of goods which

is called concupiscence. It is no more abnormal than

the faculties themselves.

One of the best descriptions of this natural and in-

evitable conflict between the two parts of the animal

rationale is found in the excerpts herewith subjoined

from “A Manual of Catholic Theology” by Wilhelm

and Scanned .
86

It is thus evident that, by the very constitution of his

nature, man is liable to spontaneous motions in his sensi-

tive tendencies, over which the will has, at best, but

little control. In other words, concupiscence is an at-

tribute of human nature. In animals which have no

reason, concupiscence is the mainspring of activity; it is

in harmony with their nature, whereas in man it is a dis-

turbing element in the higher life of the soul. The sub-

jection to concupiscence in man belongs to the same order

as the possibility and necessity of death and of physical

pain, viz., to passibility and corruptibility in animal

life. . . .

36 London, 1890, I, pp. 420-423. , ,



Original Sin and Human Misery 41

The union with a passible and corruptible body entails

upon the spiritual soul a certain imperfection and weak-

ness, in consequence of which the soul’s own life is sub-

ject to gradual increase, and is dependent on external in-

fluences; and, unlike the life of pure spirits, is in many

ways hindered in its free and full devolopment. . . . The

imperfection of man’s spiritual life, arising from its de-

pendence on animal life, may fitly be styled an “animal

quality” of the spiritual life. . .

Intellectual knowledge, the noblest function of the soul,

is derived from and supported by the knowledge acquired

through the senses. ... In case of conflict, the lower

knowledge and the motions of concupiscence accompany-

ing it are apt to obscure and disturb the intellect. . . .

. . . Again, the lower reason, preceding the action of the

higher intellect and supported by the imagination, di-

rectly excites in the will affections and desires for sensible

goods, regardless of their moral value. . . . Thus the

passibility of the will, which results from the very fact of

its union with a corruptible body, establishes between the

higher and lower regions of mental life the same antagon-

ism which exists between the rational and the sensitive

appetitive faculties. . . .

Thus all the imperfections and defects to be found in the

animal part of man are not the result of the destruction

and perversion of man’s original state, but the necessary,

natural result of the constitution of human nature.

Anyone who feels inclined to question the forego-

ing statements and argument should be prepared to

present a contrary conception of the normal condi-

tion and consequences of a union of two such dissimilar

entities as an animal body and a spiritual soul. It



42 Original Sin and Human Misery

cannot be assumed that the latter would automatically

and necessarily keep the former under the constant and

continuous control of right reason, so that, for exam-

ple, men would be unable to commit fornication or

gluttony or theft. Possibly a normal degree of control

would imply reduction of the sins just mentioned and

all the other excesses of the senses to a general average

of one-tenth of the number that men now commit or

have committed in the centuries since the Fall. Pos-

sibly so; but the assumption is incapable of proof.

Given the union in one nature, one person, of the two

dissimilar and contrary elements, spirit and flesh, it

seems inevitable that the latter should tend to exceed

the bounds set by the former, and that this tendency

should pass into actuality, unless restrained by the

rational will. In other words, there is nothing in the

concept of a spiritual soul nor in the concept of an

animal body which indicates that, in a union of the two,

the former will necessarily and automatically exercise

complete domination over the latter. If this point be

conceded, there is no ground left upon which to build

an argument for the assumption that the degree of

control exercised by the spiritual element should nor-

mally be greater than it has been throughout history.



CHAPTER VII

GOD'S JUSTICE AND GOODNESS

One who accepts the conclusions arrived at in the

foregoing pages cannot find even a shadow of an argu-

ment for the proposition that the effects of original sin

raise doubts about either the justice or the goodness

of God. If we come into the world with all the powers

and qualities that belong to man in a state of pure

nature, if we differ from what we should have been in

that state, only as a man deprived of his clothes (the

supernatural and preternatural gifts) differs from a

man who has always been naked, then we cannot say

that God has deprived fallen man anything that He

has promised (divine justice) or withheld any degree

of His “gratuitous love which promotes the happiness

of others of sheer kindliness” (divine goodness or

benevolence). Even if we hold, with Father Pohle

that, “the state of pure nature may consequently be

conceived as somewhat more perfect than the state of

original sin,” we must still reject any censure drawn

therefrom upon either of these divine attributes; for a

human being on this slightly lower level would still

be worthy of God’s creative action. Had there been

no original sin, such a creature would still exemplify a

good creation and could attain a good end. Nay, more,

if men were born now with the lowest possible degree

of rationality, if, indeed, they were merely high grade

morons, it is difficult to see how one could prove that

life for them would not be worthwhile. At any rate,

their lives would be judged according to their powers

43



44 Original Sin and Human Misery

and capacities, and this is the test, the only test, of

God’s justice toward men. He would not punish them

for acts or omissions which were beyond the control

of their free wills. The logic of the doctrine that in-

fants who die without Baptism are punished neither

by the “pain of sense” nor the “pain of loss,” may be

effectively applied to any degree of the rational animal

which God sees fit to create. Every man will be judged

according to his powers, capacities, and responsible

actions. Hence, original sin and its effects do not com-

promise the wisdom, or goodness, or justice of God.

The goodness of God is minimized through another

notion, entertained more or less definitely by many

persons. It is that all the descendants of Adam would

have remained in an utterly deplorable and hopeless

condition if the Son of God had not died on the cross

for their Redemption. They would have languished in

a state of gravely impaired and deteriorated nature.

Implicit in this notion is another assumption—for the
most part unexpressed—that if God wished to make
anything worthwhile out of this miserable mass of

fallen men and women, he would have to immolate

Himself. Obviously, this notion fosters an exaggerated

conception of original sin and its effects.

A few of the Greek Fathers of the Church did, in-

deed, “so emphasize the fitness of Redemption as a

remedy for original sin as almost to make it appear the

sole and necessary means of rehabilitation. . . . That

view is now commonly rejected, as God was by no

means bound to rehabilitate fallen mankind. Even in

the event of God decreeing, out of his own free volition,

the rehabilitation of man, theologians point out other

means besides Redemption, e. g., divine condonation



Original Sin and Human Misery 45

pure and simple on the sole condition of man’s repent-

ance, or, if some measure of satisfaction was required,

the mediation of an exalted yet created interagent.”
37

No theory about the impaired condition of fallen

human nature can be based upon the assumption that

the Redemption was necessary, for the simple reason

that this assumption is unproved and unprovable. The

notion that fallen man is much lower than he would

have been in a state of pure nature cannot be supported

by assumptions about the Redemption.

Indeed, there is a whole school of theologians, the

followers of Duns Scotus, the Franciscan, to whom

must be added the eminent Jesuit, Francisco Suarez,

who maintain that even if Adam had not sinned, God

would have become man in order to make His creation

complete and perfect. This view has the merit not only

of discouraging exaggerated notions of the effects of

original sin, but of enhancing men’s conceptions of the

goodness of God.

According to the common opinion of the theologi-

ans, Adam possessed sanctifying grace and was in the

supernatural order from the first moment of his exist-

ence. This implies that in the design of the Creator,

man’s supernatural and gratuitous endowments were

to be a “normal” (not a necessary) complement of his

human nature. This is an obvious and powerful mani-

festation of God’s goodness. Finally, we have the cer-

tain and palpable proof of divine benevolence which is

exhibited in the Redemption of men and their re-estab-

lishment in the supernatural order.

37 Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. XII, p. 678, col. 1.



CHAPTER VIII

THE SAD CONDITION OF MANKIND—SUMMARY

AND. CONCLUSION

Nevertheless, the problem of evil and suffering in

the world remains. If they are not due to impairment

of man’s natural powers through original sin, how can

they be rationally explained? Is the problem a mys-

tery that is insoluble on this side of the grave? In a

well known and eloquent section of his Apologia
,
Car-

dinal Newman maintains that original sin provides the

only rational explanation:

Starting then with the being of a God (which, as I have

said, is as certain to me as the certainty of my own exist-

ence, though when I try to put the grounds of that cer-

tainty into logical shape I find a difficulty in doing so in

mood and figure to my satisfaction), I look out of my-

self into the world of men, and there I see a sight which

fills me with unspeakable distress. The world seems sim-

ply to give the lie to that great truth, of which my whole

being is so full; and the effect upon me is, in consequence,

' as a matter of necessity, as confusing as if it denied that

I am in existence myself. If I looked into a mirror, and

did not see my face, I should have the sort of feeling

which actually comes upon me, when I look into this liv-

ing busy world, and see no reflexion of its Creator. This

is, to me, one of those great difficulties of this absolute

primary truth, to which I referred just now. Were it not

for this voice, speaking so clearly in my conscience and

my heart, I should be an atheist, or a pantheist, or a poly-

theist when I looked into the world. I am speaking for

myself only; and I am far from denying the real force

46



Original Sin and Human Misery 47

of the arguments in proof of a God, drawn from the

general facts of human society and the course of history,

but these do not warm me or enlighten me; they do not

take away the winter of my desolation, or make the buds

unfold and the leaves grow within me, and my moral

being rejoice. The sight of the world is nothing else than

the prophet’s scroll, full of “lamentations, and mourn-

ing, and woe.”

To consider the world in its length and breadth, its vari-

ous history, the many races of man, their starts, their for-

tunes, their mutual alienation, their conflicts; and then

their ways, habits, governments, forms of worship; their

enterprises, their aimless courses, their random achieve-

ments and acquirements, the impotent conclusion of long-

standing facts, the tokens so faint and broken of a su-

perintending design, the blind evolution of what turn out

to be great powers or truths, the progress of things, as if

from unreasoning elements, not towards final causes, the

greatness and littleness of man, his far-reaching aims, his

short duration, the curtain hung over his futurity, the

disappointments of life, the defeat of good, the success

of evil, physical pain, mental anguish, the prevalence and

intensity of sin, the pervading idolatries, the corruptions,

the dreary hopeless irreligion, that condition of the whole

race, so fearfully yet exactly described in the Apostle’s

words, “having no hope and without God in the world,”

—all this is a vision to dizzy and appal; and inflicts upon
the mind the sense of a profound mystery, which is abso-

lutely beyond human solution.

What shall be said to this heart-piercing, reason-bewilder-

ing fact? I can only answer, that either there is no

Creator, or this living society of men is in a true sense

discarded from His presence. Did I see a boy of good

make and mind, with the tokens on him of a refined na-

ture, cast upon the world without provision, unable to say



48 Original Sin and Human Misery

whence he came, his birth-place or his family connections,

I should conclude that there was some mystery connected

with his history, and that he was one, of whom, from one

cause or other, his parents were ashamed. Thus only

should I be able to account for the contrast between the

promise and the condition of his being. And so I argue

about the world—if there be a God, since there is a God,
the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal

calamity. It is out of joint with the purposes of its

Creator. This is a fact, a fact as true as the fact of its

existence; and thus the doctrine of what is theologically

called original sin becomes to me almost as certain as that

the world exists, and as the existence of God (pp. 241-

243).

If the great English Cardinal were alive today, with

the awful conditions and events of the recent and pres-

ent day world before his memory and vision, he would

probably use even stronger and more eloquent descrip-

tive language, and would be even more firmly con-

vinced that the only solution of the distressing mystery

is to be found in “the doctrine of what is theologically

called original sin.”

Nevertheless, he would be out of harmony with the

dominant opinion of the theologians. In the article,

Peche Originel, in Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholi-

que, referred to above, we find these summary sen-

tences :

The theologians are almost unanimous today in recog-

nizing that the doctrine of original sin cannot be conclu-

sively deduced from the facts of experience. . . . The

Church, in declaring that God could have created man

such as he is born today, St. Thomas, in maintaining that

man’s physical infirmities are not necessarily penal, but



Original Sin and Human Misery 49

are explained by his constitution, that his moral feeble-

ness and his interior conflicts derive from the structure

of his nature, flesh and spirit,—prevent contemporary
theology from seeing an apodictive proof of the Fall in

the data of human experience (Cols. 581, 587).

On the other hand, the condition of the world that

Newman regarded as “a vision to dizzy and appal,”

still confronts us and still affects countless thousands

of men and women substantially as it affected the

author of the Apologia . The following paragraphs

were intended as at least a partial explanation of the

overwhelming prevalence of sin and suffering. They

are taken from the work cited in the immediately pre-

ceding paragraph (Cols. 583, 584)

:

God in his liberality has called man to a higher perfection

than that which he could attain by his intellectual nature.

Through sanctifying grace he can develop his nature ac-

cording to a plan which surpasses human requirements;

he can lift himself to a participation in the divine nature;

he can become fitted to contemplate the divine nature,

not only in the mirror of creation, but face to face.

To that first fundamental gift God has added another: to

complete the perfection of the state of innocence and to

facilitate the rise of man toward beatific vision, he has

corrected the defects which result necessarily from the

natural composition of man. By means of sanctifying

grace, or original sanctity, man submitted his soul and

will to God; by means of integrity or original justice he

was establishing himself in a marvelous interior unity.

Such is the supernatural perfection in which God estab-

lished primitive humanity by constituting it in the condi-

tion of sanctity and original justice.



so Original Sin and Human Misery

Since that perfection exceeded the requirements of na-

ture, it could be lost; it was not automatically incorpo-

rated in human nature but required, according to the di-

vine plan, a probation in order to be permanently assimi-

lated.

But how could a nature, endowed with such prerogatives,

established in such a state of goodness and rectitude, fail

and thus lose the privileges which it could have and ought

to have conserved? The reason is because it remained

a creative nature, a free nature. The possibility of de-

fect in created intellectual nature is imbedded in the very

bosom of the most magnificent, but most dreadful, gift,

of his nature: the free human will.

That liberty in primitive man had implied not only the

possibility, but the facility of attaining eternal beatitude;

it implied also the possibility of turning away from God,

of failing to realize his destiny. It left him with the

power to go forward or to default.

The solution offered in the two immediately pre-

ceding paragraphs is somewhat less than satisfactory.

To say that Adam had the power to sin because his

nature “remained a creative nature, a free nature,”

and that “the possibility of defeat in created intellec-

tual nature is imbedded in the very bosom ... of the

free human will,
—

” is to make statements that are

technically correct; but they suggest a misleading im-

plication. The power to sin is, indeed, involved in

the human will as actually created by God; but it is

not an essential element of free will. God could have

created man free, without giving him the power to

abuse his freedom. Man’s free will might have been

limited to choices between the good and the better.



Original Sin and Human Misery 51

Consider the doctrine of the Counsels. The man

who keeps the commandments but fails to pursue the

way of perfection does not commit sin. “Good master,

which good work shall I do to have eternal life?” a

certain man inquired of Jesus. The reply was: “If

thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.”

“All these I have kept; what is yet wanting to me?”

asked the young man. Jesus answered: “If thou wilt

be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor,

and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, fol-

low Me” (Matt. xix. 16-22). Had the young man

accepted this recommendation, he would have acquired

greater merit, would have laid up for himself “treasure

in heaven.” In choosing “the more perfect way,” he

would have exercised his free will quite as definitely as

he had exercised it when he chose merely to keep the

commandments and avoid sin. In other words, so long

as the will is able to choose between things commanded

and things counseled, between the good and the better,

it is free. The power to choose between the good and

the sinful is not essential to psychological freedom.
88

38
Is it essential to man, as a rational animal? Would inability of

the human free will to commit sin imply a preternatural endowment?

There is no question that God could have made man with free will

but without the power to abuse it, just as He placed the angels in

this position after the revolt of Lucifer. The question is whether

this “perfection of freedom” would be in accord with the constitu-

tion of human nature, or whether free will in a being composed of

body and spirit necessarily includes the power to make evil choices.

As stated above (pp. 21, 22), the Augustinian view maintains that in a

state of pure nature, “the animal part of man would have been con-

stantly and completely subject to the dictates of reason.” To be

sure, this opinion does not imply absolute inability to sin, but it

points in that direction. At any rate, the statement in the text above

remains true: “God could have created man free without giving him

the power to abuse his freedom.”



52 Original Sin and Human Misery

The problem of moral evil in the world is not

solved by reference to free will, as such. It is, indeed,

elucidated by reference to the kind of free will with

which man is endowed. But God could have so con-

stituted human nature as to withhold from free will the

ability to sin. As St. Thomas declares, this power is

a defect rather than a perfection of freedom .
89

Why did God create the human will with this de-

fect? This power to abuse its freedom? Only He

Himself has the answer. To human intelligence the

problem of evil in the world remains an impenetrable

mystery.

Summary and Conclusion

As compared with the condition of our First Parents

in Paradise, our human nature has been “in body and

soul changed for the worse.” While the Council of

Trent affirms this doctrine clearly and decisively, it does

not assert that man’s natural powers have been weak-

ened, either intrinsically or extrinsically. According

to the dominant and more authoritative theological

view today, men are born with substantially the same

powers and capacities as they would have had in a

state of pure nature. Consequently, the manifold mis-

eries of the world cannot be attributed to an impair-

ment of man’s natural powers. According to the op-

posing, and less “probable,” theological opinion, some

degree of deterioration has occurred in the qualities of

39 “The power of the free will to make various choices, while ob-

serving the right order, pertains to the perfection of its freedom; but

its power to choose something which is contrary to the right order,

that is, to sin, implies a defect of freedom. Hence free will is greater

in the angels who cannot sin than in us who can sin” (Summa Theo-

logica, lma
, q. 62, a. 8, ad 3).



Original Sin and Human Misery 53

fallen nature, possibly through the wrench which it

suffered when it was deprived of its supernatural and

preternatural endowments, possibly through external

obstacles which have arisen in the course of history;

but this view seems to make the impairment relatively

slight. Therefore, it has been far too mild to account

for the enormous amount of sin and suffering which

has existed, and still exists, in the world of men. Only

the Lutheran doctrine of the complete corruption, or

total depravity, of human nature through the Fall,

would be adequate to explain this vast volume of evil

in terms of deterioration.

When we consider the essential constitution of man

as a rational animal and the kind of world that he has

inhabited, we realize that pain and suffering were in-

evitable. When we reflect that his free will includes

the power to do wrong, we realize that the conversion of

this potency into actuality should not have been entirely

unexpected. Those who fall back upon the theory of a

decadent human nature to explain moral and physical

evil seem to picture as the normal condition of man-

kind, either that of our First Parents in Paradise, or

that of a perfect man in a perfect world. The former

condition was not natural at all, but supernatural and

preternatural; the latter does not describe the kind of

man or the kind of world that God actually made. In

either case, those persons take an improper standard by

which to measure deterioration.

The assertive title of the article cited at the begin-

ning of the Preface is true historically, but false in its

possible implications. Original sin explains the fact of

human misery, but it does not justify inferences about

the deterioration of human nature.



54 Original Sin and Human Misery

Even if the sin of Adam had compelled all his de-

scendants to come into the world maimed, feeble, and

incompetent, no unfavorable reflection could logically

be deduced therefrom upon either the justice or the

goodness of God. Man is a good creative work; life

on earth is worthwhile for all men; life beyond the

grave will be determined for each man on the basis of

his capacities, efforts, and achievements.

When I began this little production, I was hoping

to find answers to three questions: First, has original

sin caused an impairment in the natural powers of

Adam’s descendants?; second, has the impairment, if

any, been sufficiently grave to account for the physical

and moral evils of the world?; third, if these two ques-

tions are answered in the negative, how can the exist-

ence of these evils be explained?

No specific answer to the first of these three ques-

tions can be found in the defined doctrine of the

Church. A good Catholic may hold that the Fall has

impaired men’s powers, as compared with what they

would have been in a state of pure nature; or he may

assert that there has been no deterioration whatsoever;

or he may concede that there has occurred a slight ex-

trinsic impairment. However, the majority of the un-

official teachers of the Church, that is, the theologians,

now maintain either that there has been no injury done

to nature or that it has been relatively slight. Accord-

ing to the dominant theological opinion therefore, the

physical and moral evil in the world cannot be ade-

quately explained by an assumed deterioration of man’s

natural powers. These propositions have, I think, been

placed upon a sound basis in the preceding pages.

With regard to the third of the questions stated



Original Sin and Human Misery 55

above, all that I have done is to suggest that the physi-

cal evil and suffering of the world are explained by the

constitution of human nature and the conditions of its

physical environment, and that the moral evils derive

from man’s power to abuse his free will, even to the

commission of sin .
40 Why did God make human nature

subject to these physical and moral limitations? I do

not know. Why did not God create a richer and more

pleasant earth? I do not know. Why did God give

men the power to sin? I do not know. What I do

know is that God is infinitely just and infinitely merci-

ful, that He gives to everyone sufficient grace, that He

is fully aware of our limitations, weaknesses, and

temptations, and that He never demands from us any-

thing that is unreasonable. Let no one be misled, then,

into the attempt to find excuses for his wrong actions

in false assumptions about the deterioration of human

nature.

40
Cf. Article, “Evil,” in Catholic Encyclopedia

;

also article, “Evil

and Necessity,” by Rev. Joseph Rickaby, S.J., in The Month, Novem-

ber, 1898, and pamphlet by Rev. A. B. Sharpe, M.A., entitled “Evil:

Its Nature and Cause.” London: Sands & Co., 1906.



DISCUSSION CLUB OUTLINE

Chapter I

The Canons of the Council of Trent

1. What is an Ecumenical Council?

2. What is the difference between “justification”

and “salvation”?

3. How did Luther’s doctrine of justification follow

from his notion of original sin?

4. Describe the losses suffered by Adam and his de-

scendants on account of Adam’s sin.

5. Describe the effects of the grace conferred in

Baptism.

6. Show the importance of the Council’s pronounce-

ment on free will.

7. Does the Council give a formal definition of

Original Sin?

Chapter II

The Supernatural Order and Its Forfeiture by Our

First Parents

1. Describe the differences between the natural and

the supernatural order.

2. What is the constitution of man as a rational

animal?

3. In what ways is man elevated by membership in

the supernatural order?

4. What do you think of the “railroad” illustration

of the difference between the two orders?

56



Original Sin and Human Misery 57

5. Explain the Immaculate Conception.

6. Have the descendants of Adam become members

of the natural order?

7. Is there a natural end for persons who die with-

out formal instruction in the truths of Christian

Revelation?

8. Was Adam at any time in the natural order?

9. Enumerate and explain the preternatural gifts

possessed by our First Parents before the Fall.

10. Why are they so called?

11. Do we know much about “freedom from igno-

rance and from suffering”?

Chapter III

Captivity Under the Devil

1. How is this expressed in the Ritual of Baptism?

And in certain texts of Scripture?

2. Discuss each of these texts in its context.

3. What does it really mean?

4. Cite some exaggerations of the captivity doctrine

in the writings of some of the Fathers.

5. What becomes of infants who die without Bap-

tism?

Chapter IV

Corporal and Spiritual Deterioration

1. How does the Council describe this deteriora-
tion?



58 Original Sin and Human Misery

2. Cite the theological axiom which summarizes this

doctrine.

3. How do the theologians differ in their interpre-

tation of the axiom?

4. Does the language of the Council support either

of these views to the exclusion of the other?

5. Discuss the main argument for the Augustinian

opinion.

6. Discuss the question, whether God could have

created man in a state of “pure nature.”

7. Do you think that, since the Fall, man’s natural

powers have been weakened?

8. State the view of Bellarmine and of Tanquerey.

9. Discuss the opinion of Moehler.

10. Summarize the statements quoted from Die-

tionnaire and from Pohle-Preuss.

11. Enumerate the various reasons why many Catho-

lics believe that our intellects and wills have been

greatly weakened through original sin.

12. Quote the ambiguous expressions used in some

catechisms; and the more acceptable expressions

in others.

Chapter V

Nature of Original Sin

1. Give and discuss Dr. Tanquerey’s definition.

2. What is meant by the “death of the soul”?

3. Is original sin voluntary in the descendants of

Adam?



Original Sin and Human Misery 59

Chapter VI

The Question of Concupiscence

1. Does the Council identify Original Sin with con-

cupiscence?

2. What is the relation between them, according to

the following authorities: St. Augustine? Peter

Lombard? St. Anselm? St. Thomas Aquinas?

The Dominicans? The Franciscans? The Jesuits?

3. What is, or was, the Protestant view?

4. Compare some popular conceptions on this sub-

ject with the predominant teaching of Catholic

theologians.

5. Is concupiscence a normal constituent of human

nature?

6. What is the meaning of concupiscence?

7. Is it an abnormal thing in human nature?

7. Summarize the explanation quoted from “A

Manual of Catholic Theology.”

9. Is it possible to prove that the potential concu-

piscence existing in human beings is excessive

for a rational animal?

Chapter VII

God's Justice and Goodness

X. Do the effects of Original Sin raise a rational

doubt concerning the justice or goodness of God?

2. What is the supreme test of God's justice toward

men?



60 Original Sin and Human Misery

3. Was the Redemption necessary to restore man to

friendship with God?

4. In what sense is the supernatural order “normal”

to human nature?

Chapter VIM

The Sad Condition of Mankind—Summary
and Conclusion

1. How was the presence of evil in the world ex-

plained by Cardinal Newman?

2. Is his explanation supported by dominant theo-

logical opinion?

3. Summarize the solution offered in Dictionnaire.

4. Is the power to sin essential to free will?

5. What is the doctrine of the Counsels?

6. Is it essential to man as a rational animal?

7. Summarize the doctrine on the deterioration

caused by Original Sin.

8. Can this deterioration account for the vast

amount of sin and suffering in the world?

9. Did God make a perfect world?

10. Describe the freedom of opinion allowed to

Catholics concerning the effects of Original Sin.

11. Have we any adequate solution to the problem of

physical and moral evil?

12. Can we excuse our wrong actions on the assump-

tion of a grave impairment of human nature?



BIBLIOGRAPHY

i

Caperan, Louis: Le Probleme du Salut des Infideles, 2 Vol.,

Paris, 1912.

del Val, Rev. H., O.S.A.: Theologia Dogmatica

,

I.

Devivier-Messmer: Christian Apologetics

,

New York, 1903.

Gasparri, Peter Cardinal: Catechismus Catholicus

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Vatican

Press, 1930.

Hewit, Rev. Augustine F., C.S.P.: Problems of the Age, New

York, 1868.

a Kempis, Thomas: The Following of Christ

,

Book IV.

Moehler, Rev. Dr. J. A.: Symbolism: or Exposition of the

Doctrinal Differences Between the Catholics and Prot-

estants, London, 1906.

Newman, John Cardinal: Apologia Pro Vita Sua .

Pohle-Preuss: God: The Author of Nature and the Super-

natural, St. Louis, 1940.

Rickaby, Rev. Joseph, S.J.: “Evil and Necessity,” The

Month, November, 1898.

Sharpe, Rev. A. B., M.A.: Evil: Its Nature and Cause,

Sands, London, 1906.

Tanquerey, Rev. Dr. A., S.S.: Synopsis Theologiae Dog-

maticae, I, Baltimore, 1896.

Thomas Aquinas, Saint: Sententiae, ii.

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2ae.

Toner, Rev. Dr. P. J.: Dissertatio Historico-Theologica de

Lapsu et Peccato Originali, Dublin, 1904.

Wilhelm-Scannell: A Manual of Catholic Theology, I, Lon-

don, 1890.

Catechism of Christian Doctrine, A: Paterson, New Jersey,
1941.

Catholic Encyclopedia: Articles on “Evil,” “Original Sin,”

“Redemption.”

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Sessio VI, De Justification .

Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique: “Peche Originel.”

61



POSTSCRIPT

Since the foregoing was put into type, some com-

ments have been received from Rev. Dr. James W.

O’Brien, Rector of Mount St. Mary Seminary, Nor-

wood, Ohio. Following are his important paragraphs:

I have gone over your manuscript carefully and while

I do not agree with your main conclusion, I must confess

that both positions are fairly and accurately stated and

so far as I know there is nothing against Catholic doc-

trine.

It strikes me that the other view is more in conformity

with the decrees of the Councils, and there are many

theologians who hold it, at least with regard to exterior

vitiation. It seems that you make too much of the con-

demnation of Baius. God might indeed have created man

in the state of integral nature, i. e., neither in the state

of grace nor in the state of pure nature, but with the sen-

sitive appetite completely under the control of reason and

not so independent as it is today. In this case, the in-

tegrity of human nature would be natural, at least quoad

substantiam. Of course, this may be beside the point

since the whole question is with regard to the natura

pura. In any case, it seems to me that prop. 26 has to

do with a fact and not with conceivable conditions.

None of these states would exclude necessarily the ca-

pacity to commit sin entirely, but I should think that in

the status naturae integrae they would all be sins of ma-

lice; in pure nature there would be some sins of passion

and ignorance, and in fallen nature a great many more.

The amount of evil in the world today seems to me to

confirm the view that human nature has undergone some

early eruption that makes man a good deal worse than

we might expect him to be.

62



Original Sin and Human Misery 63

The opinion which Dr. O’Brien defends in the sec-

ond of these paragraphs is substantially identical with

the position of the Augustinians which is stated and dis-

cussed on pages 21, 22. When Dr. O’Brien says that

“the other view is more in conformity with the decrees

of the Councils ...” he means obviously those decrees

according to a certain interpretation. As pointed out

on page 52 of the text, this interpretation is contrary

“to the dominant and more authoritative theological

view today.”

Dr. O’Brien’s “integral nature” is entirely hypo-

thetical and, as he himself admits, it is not identical

with “pure nature.” It does not seem to be a very

serviceable concept, since it is merely a theory about

what God would have or might have done. Even those

who hold that fallen nature has been impaired or

wounded more or less, as compared with pure nature,

are thinking of man as a rational animal, including the

power of the flesh to rebel against the spirit. They are

not drawing the contrast between nature as it now is

and the “integral nature” as described by Dr. O’Brien.

The latter concept and its implications are character-

ized by a baffling amount of unreality.

In the last paragraph quoted above, Dr. O’Brien

says that the amount of evil in the world seems to him

“to confirm” the opinion that our fallen nature repre-

sents a very great deterioration from what we should

expect to be the normal type. It will be observed that

he uses the word “confirm,” not “prove.” Theologians

today are practically unanimous in rejecting the view

that the doctrine of original sin can be proved on the

basis of experience. To be sure, Dr. O’Brien’s general

view would go a long way toward explaining the amount



64 Original Sin and Human Misery

of evil in the world, but we must keep in mind that his

“integral nature” is only hypothetical; it is not normal

human nature. So far as I know, the theologians (ex-

cept those of the Augustinian School) who hold that

there has been some impairment in man’s intellect and

will do not think of it as great enough “to account for

the enormous amount of sin and suffering which has

existed, and still exists, in the world of men” {supra,

p. 53).