The

Making

of Peace

Some Principles

and their Practice

by the United Nations

Robert A. Graham, S. Ji.

AMERICA PRESS



Blueprint of Current Catholic Thought

in 6 Pamphletsfrom theAmerica Press

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UNITY OF HUMAN SOCIETY
Deals with Racism and Totalitarianism. Explains the Church’s

teaching and policy concerning the mutual relationship of races

and nations; asserts the right of families to the Christian edu-

cation of youth.

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Reconstruction of the Social Order

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condition of the working classes as expounded by Leo XIII in

his encyclical, Rerum Novarum. Applies these teachings to

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DEFEND THESE HUMAN RIGHTS
John Eppstein Offers a penetrating Christian analysis of current proposals in

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Encyclical of

Pope Pius XII

Encyclical of

Pope Pius XI

Benjamin L.

Masse, SJ.

ECONOMIC LIBERALISM
AND FREE ENTERPRISE

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Graham,

Lucey, Burke

OUR WAY TO PEACE
A precise, non-technical booklet explaining the meaning,
ideals, principles, machinery of the United Nations and analyz-

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REFUGEES ARE PEOPLE
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THE MAKING OF PEACE

Some Principles and their Practice

by the United Nations

ROBERT A. GRAHAM, SJ.

Institute of Social Order

AMERICA PRESS

1947

1



CONTENTS

I. The Meaning of International Peace 3

II. Targets for Statesmen 11

III. Problem Areas of Peace 16

IV. The Processes of Peace ( 1 ) 22

V. The Processes of Peace (2) 27

VI. Germany 38

VII. Other Issues 44

VIII. International Law, Criminal and Other 53

IX. How Catholics View the United Nations 62

2



CHAPTER I

The Meaning of International Peace

A Just World Order

If the human race has not thus far been brilliantly successful in

achieving peace for itself, perhaps the reason is simply that it does not

really know what to look for. Let us begin by clarifying in our own

minds a few basic notions about international peace.

The Inner Meaning of Peace

Most statesmen act on the implicit assumption that peace is simply

the absence of conflict, or the termination of disputes. The almost

irresistible tendency of political leaders is to relegate to a secondary

role the methods or procedures by which conflict is avoided or disputes

disposed of. If peace is, an end in itself, without moral connotations,

then it is really inconsequential what means are used to achieve peace.

History gives us many examples in which morality and justice were

subordinated to the material condition mistakenly called peace. Of the

Romans, their own historians said, ‘They lay lands desolate and call

it peace.’’ When great Powers meet together to settle their differences,

whether in 1815, 1919 or 1947, the negotiators are under the strong

temptation of confusing their mutual agreement with peace itself, irre-

spective of the terms of the peace. One would hardly call peace that

situation in which for abject fear a small nation submits to the threats

of a larger neighbor, even though not one shot is fired. A large* nation
can hardly allege that peace remains unbroken simply because its aggres-

sions have met with no violent opposition from the victims or caused

no undue disturbance of equilibrium among the great Powers.

If peace is to have any meaning to mankind it must connote justice

as its foundation. To separate the moral element from international

peace is to make peace a hollow shell. Justice is inseparable from real

peace.

3



Peace Not an Absolute

The real meaning of peace comes to the surface whenever war breaks

out. We then discover, somewhat belatedly, that what we really desire

is not freedom from violence, bloodshed and hardship, but justice. There

are things we are willing to fight for. Killing of our fellow men is

deplorable to every Christian but there is such a thing as a just war.

“Peace at any price” is really an immoral principle, since it means that

we may permit evil when it is in our power to prevent it, or that we must

submit to injustice. In other words, peace is not an absolute. Fiat

justitia, ruat coelum, said the ancients. “Justice be, though the heavens

fall.” Many political leaders make fundamentally the same mistake as

the pacifists in believing that the only thing desirable is avoidance of

violence, no matter what other moral compromises might be involved.

In either case they wrongly subordinate justice to material peace.

Peace is certainly desirable, but only as a measure and token of justice

and charity, not as a cloak of tyranny and aggression.

The people are sick of war. Rightly did the Holy Father say in

1944, “If ever a generation had to appreciate in the depths of its con-

science the call: War on War, it is certainly the present generation.”

He who can show the way to lasting peace among nations will be

reckoned the greatest benefactor of humanity. This present brief dis-

cussion of the elements that go into the making of a truly just peace

may serve somewhat to that end.

Fnemies of True Peace

There are three corrosive forces that undermine real international

peace, by eating away at the spiritual structure of a just world order.

These can operate for a long time without any discernible effect upon

the external structure of international relations. But if unchallenged

and unchecked they bring international society down in ruins.

The first is national selfishness. This is an enemy of charity, like all

selfishness. It may be described as the besetting moral failure of nations

and the one that in the long run conduces most to the outbreak of war.

This applies equally to the nations who feel aggrieved as well as to

those against whom the charges are made.

A second moral failing of nations is bad faith. This is chiefly evi-

4



denced in the breaking of pledges. International order and good will

is predicated on the good faith of nations. The life-blood of interna-

tional society is kept circulating only by good faith and sincerity in

carrying out mutual agreements, in letter and spirit. Call this a juridical

crime, if you will—a violation of pacta sunt servanda—but bad faith
not merely indicates a weak sense of justice but also a charity that has

gone cold. For it is the moral cement that binds the structure of inter-

national society.

The third congenital failing is expediency. In international politics

it boils down to the idea that “might makes right.*’ The mere possession

of power in almost any area of decision induces the subtle conviction

that because we can, we may. The effect of this doctrine is to blur the

distinction between right and wrong, whereas a primary condition of a

Christian program for international peace is the constant awareness of

the standards of morality. As the Holy Father said in his Lenten dis-

course in 1945: “It is the spirit of evil which wars against the spirit

of God and which would banish from the earth the Kingdom of Christ

and deify material force, in order to drive out of the lives of people

and still more to abolish from international relations, every essential

distinction between good and evil and between what is just and unjust.”

No elaborate philosophy is required. All that is necessary is the power

to do as we please. Self-deception will do the rest at the first opportune

moment.

Peace in the United Nations

What does the United Nations understand by peace? Does it look

upon peace as merely a material condition, or does it recognize also

the moral phase of the subject?

It is helpful to distinguish two elements in the United Nations.

One is the terms of the Charter; the other is the mentality and out-

look of the most influential members of the Organization. The differ-

ences are signalized in the original draft prepared by the Big Four (the

United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China) at Dum-

barton Oaks, as contrasted to the amendments later introduced into the

final Charter at San Francisco.

At Dumbarton Oaks the pre-occupation of the great Powers was

5



the prevention and suppression of threats to peace, or breaches of the

peace. The word “justice’’ was not mentioned in the length and breadth

of the draft, except in reference to creating an international court of

justice. The promotion of respect for human rights was mentioned in

a very subordinate place, as a possible function of a social council. In

other words, the Big Four thought that their only task was to prevent

violence. That was peace.

At the full San Francisco Conference this was changed, after remon-

strances by the other states. Justice was put into its proper place (Cf.

Chapter VIII). Promoting respect for and observance of human rights

was brought from the rear of the document to the very forefront and

made to constitute one of the purposes of the United Nations. The

smaller nations had a better grasp than the great powers that peace was

more than a process of preventing violence.

Ambiguity in the United Nations Objectives

It is highly probable that the major Powers continue to cultivate

that material conception of peace which came to light in the Dumbarton

Oaks proposals. Although the Charter itself places a greater premium

on the deeper causes of war and particularly upon justice and human

rights, the large role played by power-minded states will always tend to

create ambiguity in the meaning of peace as it is interpreted from day-

to-day in the decisions of the United Nations. It is too much to say that

the Organization as a whole entertains this mistaken conception of peace.

Its principles are more sound than many persons give them credit for

being (as will be seen in other chapters). But too many of the member

states, particularly those who play the most influential roles, tend to

ignore mankind’s passion for justice above all else. This condition

provoked the Holy Father to say on March 17, 1947, when receiving

the Ambassador from Lebanon, “It is high time that a peace based on

the mathematical calculations of the nations’ respective resources and

material force be replaced by one based on moral values.’’’

Shortcomings of the United Nations Objectives

If we were to assign a category to the United Nations we would say

that it is a strictly secular effort. This is not necessarily a reflection

on the Organization, but merely a statement of its relations to the prob-

6



lem of peace, as just defined. It cuts itself off from religion, in its

objectives as well as its administration and procedures. Atheism or anti-

clericalism do not exist in any way comparable to the situation under

the League, but the secularism remains. States combine with each other

to work for peace, and yet they consciously avoid rcognition of the power

and place of religion in the cause of peace.

Just how different the approach of the United Nations is from

that of the Holy Father may be judged from the fourfold foundation for

peace which the Pope has indicated. In his address to the world on the

last day of the war Pius XII put these words into the mouth of the war

dead, speaking as from a common grave:

‘‘Let there arise from the earth wherein we have been placed as

grains of wheat the molders and builders of a new and better

Europe, a new and better universe, founded

on the filial fear of God,

on fidelity to His Holy Commandments,

on respect for human dignity,

on the sacred principle of equality of the rights of

all peoples and all states, large and small, weak and strong!’^

The United Nations feels that the filial fear of God and fidelity to

His Holy Commandments are beyond its scope—and probably they are.
It is satisfied, at the maximum, to found its peace simply on human

dignity and the principle of equality. These are worthy, but inadequate.

This neglect of the rights of God by the United Nations may be

regarded in several ways. It may be considered as a basis for predicting

the inevitable failure of the Organization, as a human instrument built

upon sand. Or it might be regarded as an opportunity, by reason of de-

fault, for the Holy Father. By declining to give religion a role in its

peace efforts the United Nations has implicitly left a Court of Appeal

higher than itself standing vacant. To the Papacy, there is no doubt to

whom that vacancy belongs.

The Papacy and World Peace

The preceding remarks on the meaning of true peace lead us quite

naturally to consider what position the Catholic Church, or more specifi-

cally its visible head, occupies in respect to international peace. The

7



Popes have always felt that the words of Christ, “Blessed are the Peace-

makers,”^ applied especially to themselves. To prevent Christian princes

from fighting each other, to substitute peaceful procedures for trial by

arms, to act as arbiters of disputes, above all to provide instruction and

exhortation to all men of good will, have been for the Pontiffs among

their major responsibilities.

The constant effort of the Pope is to maintain a position of common

father of all nations, even at the moment when the rest of the world

has already taken sides. During the recent war it was reported that

the wife of Mr. Myron C. Taylor, personal representative of President

Roosevelt at the Vatican, said impetuously to Pius XII, “Your Holiness,

you must do something to show that you are on our side!’’ With the

best of intentions, she was asking him to abandon his position above

the conflict and to lose the strategic spiritual leadership he occupies as

Father of Christian nations. After the war was over he replied to

questions and demands that the Church intervene: “She is a mother.

You do not ask a mother to favor or to take the part of one rather

than another of her children.” (Christmas Allocution, 1946.)

The Pope’s mission of peace is not furthered by his taking sides

in a conflict of arms, or identifying the cause of Christ Himself with

the cause of any given alliance of nations, no matter how lofty their

proclaimed aims. If the Pope did not ally himself with the United

Nations against Hitler, neither did he ally himself with Hitler against

even atheist Russia in 1941, despite pressure put upon him by the Nazi

and Fascist governments.

The Pope and the United Nations

Will the Vatican ever join the United Nations Organization? It

is commonly acknowledged that the Vatican State is eligible for mem-

bership, since it is a sovereign state recognized as such by international

law. It is highly doubtful, however, that this will ever take place.

It is not that the Pope condemns any organized effort among the states

of the world for peace. As he himself has said of the United Nations,

“The whole of mankind follows the progress of this noble enterprise

with anxious interest.” It is not that his obligations under the Lateran

Treaty might seem to preclude application for membership. It is not

that the enemies of the Church are the moving spirits of the Organiza-

tion, as was often said to be the case of the League of Nations. It is

8



rather that the Pontiffs regard their mission of peace as on a higher

level than that of any political association of nations. To seek member-

ship in the United Nations might well seem to imply that the Church

does not already possess from Christ Himself adequate authority to act

as peacemaker among the nations. To be true to itself, the Holy See

cannot put itself on a level with purely political powers. The Papacy

is its own peace organization. At the same time the Pope does not regard

the United Nations as a usurper of his prerogatives. This is an agency

for the maintenance of international peace, through the use of armed

force wherever necessary. The Popes have always left such matters

to the secular authorities. Their weapons are moral and spiritual.

One practical reason that may suggest the improbability of the

Vatican ever becoming a Member of the United Nations is the political

compromises inevitable in the functioning of such an Organization.

But even in the case of the International Court of Justice where this

objection would not obtain, the aloofness of the Vatican may be ex-

pected. The Vicar of Christ is, if not judge, at least arbiter of nations

on the highest level, the spiritual. The world does not of course acknowl-

edge this today. That fact, however, is no reason for the Papacy not

to remain true to its spiritual mission.

However, the Holy Father has not kept entirely aloof from inter-

national bodies. The Vatican’s membership in Universal Postal Union

might be cited. And in the early days of the League of Nations the

Pope appealed to the Second Assembly on behalf of the relief needs of

the people of Russia. Representatives of the Vatican also took part in

discussions on the British mandate in Palestine' and on the Reform of

the Calendar, both being issues of direct concern to the Church.

Peace a Moral and Spiritual Process

Some day the governments of the world will come to realize what

the peoples already know, that the making of peace is a moral and

spiritual process arising from the motives of charity and justice. At

that point they must appeal to the common father for a way out of

their perplexities. The signs of such a change of thought are not very

much in evidence at this moment. But it will not be for the first time

that such a role may devolve upon the Vicar of Christ. When the

civilization of pagan Rome went to pieces under the pressure of the

9



barbarians from the North the Church knit together a new structure.

Once again the Church is called upon to rebuild by its teachings a world

whose own paganism threatens to destroy it. Unafraid for its survival,

unerring in its objectives, undisturbed by political urgencies however

great, Rome can wait, admonish, teach patiently. But meanwhile con-

fusion as to the real meaning of international peace persists among those

who refuse to hear the voice of the Vicar of Christ.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Is peace simply the absence of conflict? What additional element

enters into real peace?

2. When do we realize that justice is what we really seek im peace?

Illustrate.

3. What are three principal enemies of true peace? How do they

undermine the structure of peace?

4. What does the United Nations understand by peace? What two

ambiguous currents are at work in the United Nations?

5. In what respects does the United Nations exhibit shortcomings?

6. On what foundations should the new and better universe be founded ?

7. What is the role of the Catholic Church in promoting peace?

8. Will the Pope ever join the United Nations? Give your reasons.

9. Discuss the future role of the Pope for world peace.

10



CHAPTER II

Targets for Statesmen

Peace Goals of International Policy

Statesmen cannot work for peace as an abstract idea. They have

to have concrete goals. What are the goals of a nation sincerely devoted

to the maintenance of peace in the world ? This may seem like a superficial

question, but the objectives of a peace-minded statesman have varied

from age to age. For instance, in centuries gone by it was sufficient to

secure personal friendship between royal families. A suitable matrimony
would often solve a serious international quarrel. Civilization moves

on, however
;
unfortunately this technique no longer has the importance

it once had. Today international harmony rests on factors more im-

personal than royal matrimony.

1. Friendly Relations

The modern statesman is not a matchmaker but a public relations

expert. His first duty is to establish and maintain friendly relations

with other states. This means a consistent course of action to convince

other states that his own nation^s policy is directed to friendship on

terms of equality and mutual respect. This is not simply a question of’

verbal protestations or of personal relationships between kindred spirits.

The test is action.

The atmosphere of friendly relations is not heightened by the main-

tenance of large armaments, by one-sided foreign trade policies or by

unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of other nations. A
nation must show itself by its actions that its intentions are friendly.

This is axiomatic. In the long run the state of friendship is determined

by actions, although for a long time words may have to be taken at their

face value.

11



2. Peaceful Settlement

A second goal of statesmen is necessitated by possible breakdowns

or crises in the course of cultivating these friendly relations. Even

amongst friends disputes arise. A statesman's goal should be the peace-

ful settlement of these disputes. This also involves the duty of proferrkig

his good offices when he is himself not directly concerned.

Disputes can be settled by two means: by force or through negotia-

tion. In the cool abstraction of these pages the method of negotiation

seems the only rational way of going about it. History, however, has

given a different verdict. How many boundary disputes were settled

by the simple method of seizure! The fait accompli or accomplished fact

is one of the oldest forms of settling a dispute. Power politics, or the

use of force, can be either overt or covert; the threat of force can be

expressed by words, or implied by action. In any case it is a turning

aside from one of the main goals of a statesman who is really trying to

seek peace. A recognized principle of the United Nations is that all
Members shall ‘‘refrain in their international relations from the threat

or use of force’* against the territorial integrity or political independence

of any state, or in any other manner incompatible with the purposes of

the United Nations. But it is difficult to keep this goal in sight. A
great power is always tempted to use its material strength (political,

economic or military) to impose its will directly upon the weaker party,

in preference to appealing for a decision in a forum where such advan-

tages do not avail. One special performance of power politics of which

history informs us is the sacrificing of small countries in order to pre-

serve the balance of power among great states.

3. Common TVelfare of Nations

A third goal of statesmen who seek to promote lasting peace among
nations is joint action in promoting the common welfare of nations.

Here we begin to move into a broader field of vision transcending

national considerations. There are problems world-wide in significance

although sometimes only local in their manifestations.

This is especially true in those activities concerned with the living,

working and trading of human beings.- In social and economic matters

there can arise evils that cannot be solved except by joint action in

which the interests of all parties are collected, merged and adjusted.

12



Joint action means that the participating states have given up their

power to decide individually what should be done in relation to a given

problem. From the viewpoint of national interest, as we have known

it hitherto, this is a limitation on freedom of decision. Yet a statesman

who seeks peace must recognize that there are problems that are inter-

national in scope and that these should not be regarded or treated as

though they were purely national. World trade and protective tarilfs

may be instanced in this connection. The economic anarchy that pre-

ceded the political anarchy of the war showed convincingly that some

internal policies have a direct bearing on international peace. In economic

and social matters the statesman requires a broad vision to see his own

country as part of a greater whole.

4. Mobilization of International Community

A fourth goal is the mobilization of the international community
against its foes, both internal and external. It is significant to note

here again the widening of the scope of a real statesman. In the modern

age there is no longer question of live and let live, of individual nations

going their own ways, of peace conceived as the absence of conflict.

The nations have become aware of each other as forming together a

certain unity. They have also become aware that there can be and are

enemies to that unity. Against those enemies this unity must be mobi-

lized.^

* The nature of this international unity was expressed with amazing de-

tail by Francis Suarez three hundred years ago. “The human race, though

divided into no matter how many different peoples and nations, has for all

that a certain unity, a unity not merely physical, but also in a sense political

and moral. This is shown by the natural precept of mutual love and mercy,

which extends to foreigners of every way of thinking. Wherefore, though any

one state, republic or kingdom, be in itself a perfect community and constant

in its members, nevertheless each of the states is also a member, in a certain

manner, of the world, so far as the human race is concerned. For none of
these communities are ever sufficient unto themselves to such a degree that they

do not require some mutual help, society or communication, either to their

greater advantage, or from moral necessity and need, as is evident from

custom. For this reason they need some law whereby they may be directed and
rightly ruled in this kind of communication and society.’’ (De Legibus ac de
Deo Legislature, Lib. II, Cap. xix, 9). The American hierarchy in 1944 ex-
pressed this same thought succinctly as follows: “There is an international

community of nations. God himself has made the nations independent for their
life and growth. It is not therefore a question of creating an international

community, but of organizing it.”

13



There is something broader here than a partisan alliance of the

kind we were familiar with in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is rather

the appeal to our common interests, common ideals, common destiny

and values. There have been grand alliances in the past, with solemnly

avowed intentions of lofty purpose. In their constitution, their opera-

tion and their intention, these were nevertheless merely blocs of nations

against other blocs of nations. Their ultimate basis was to maintain

(or sometimes to alter) the political status quo. They were frankly

ex parte coalitions and made no pretense at representing the interna-

tional community of nations, whatever they may have alleged on behalf

of the righteousness of their own cause.

Dimly seen, hesitatingly approached, the world community is gradu-

ally getting its due. A real statesman will assist that community to
mobilize itself so that it can have a life of its own and above all be

able to defend itself from its foes.

5. International Protection of Human Rights

Parallel with the trend to ‘^one world” there must go the protection

of the human rights of individuals. This is at once the most appealing

objective of a true statesman and the most difficult. Perhaps both the

appeal and the difficulty come from the fact that it is the highest goal

of all. In the field of human rights the window opens upon all the

spiritual values that are the well-springs of human existence and that

give meaning to all else.

It is easy enough to mobilize international society against its external

foes or openly rebellious angels. But internal enemies are elusive, if

only because domestic foes are hard to identify or to stigmatize for

what they are. States will betray themselves by the way they treat

human beings within their own borders. As the international body

politic begins to include all nations it will find itself obliged more and

more to acquire norms and protections against domestic enemies who

are members officially in good standing. The way a government treats

its own people is a measure of its compatibility with the rest of the world.

World political unity profits nothing, if along with that there does

not develop a keen appreciation of the dignity of human personality and

a readiness to act in defense of human rights. This means an increasing

14



disposition to support social institutions, such as religion and the family,
•

which are a bulwark against statism. Of what profit is world govern-

ment or world federation if this institution is only a ready instrument

of tyranny? It is the statesman’s role to enhance this world-wide mobili-

zation on behalf of human values as opposed to statist values. Respect

for the sanctity of the individual must become second nature and firmly

established in the moral thinking and tradition of international in-

stitutions. (cf. John Eppstein’s Defend These Human Rights,)

Such are five main goals of international policy today. Handicaps

and counterforces stand forth to block the path. There are forces in

operation that have been strong enough, time and again, to bring frus-

tration to statesmen and disappointment and sorrow to the peoples of

the earth. There are pitfalls that have been the undoing of better men

than we know in this generation and bid fair to wreck the dreams of

those who have survived World War II. Let us see in what direction

these forces or problem areas are to be found.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. List five specific goals for international peace.

2. Discuss the effect of large armaments, trade rivalries and political

interference as detrimental to good relations. .

3. What two methods are possible in settling disputes? Describe their

character and operation. Which is preferable and why ?

4. Should the nations try to cooperate in advancing their common

welfare? Explain why nations frequently take a narrow view of the

international common good.

5. What is meant by the mobilization of the international community?

Would such mobilization apply even to the use of military power?

6. What is the connection between human rights and world peace?

15



CHAPTER III

Problem Areas of Peace

Getting Down to Realities

The forces at work to thwart statesmen need not always be bad

m themsdves. It is enough that they be bad in relation to the total

picture. Indeed, if the obstacles to peace were patently and demon-

strably evil, international order would be just a problem of detail. On

the contrary, some of the root obstacles if looked at only in themselves

have some plausible justification for their existence.

1. National Security and Independence

A conspicuous instance of this is found in the area of national
security and independence. The first care of a statesman is his own

country’s safety and freedom. This duty is the reason impelling him

initially to seek peace abroad. To assure this safety and freedom an

intelligent leader encourages and promotes world political and economic

stability. But at every stage he is prevented from devoting himself

whole-heartedly to the cause of international cooperation by the fear,

sometimes rational sometimes irrational, that in so doing he may fatally

compromise his country’s interests. Faint hearts falter at this juncture.

It is a common illusion for groups to imagine that they can live by

themselves and that it is better for them to do so. Political groups are

no exception. By ingrained habit, confirmed no doubt by sad experience,

the citizens of a country are convinced that their own well-being depends

on themselves alone. In fact, international law as well as the United

Nations is based on the juridical equality of all states, large and small.

This is implicit witness to the fact that in our present world system a

nation wants to live its independent life and is convinced it can do so

successfully, no matter how tiny its-territory or how feeble its resources.

Such jealousy for the prerogatives of independence works in conflict

with a program of peace based on a linking of the nations and a pooling

of interests and destiny.

16



This warning for national security nationally guaranteed is presented

most insistently by military men. ‘‘We cannot place our reliance upon

forms of collective security/^ they say; “the only sure guarantee of a

nation^s safety and rights is its own military strength.’^ From this

principle they derive the policy of secrecy, of rivalry in armaments,

the struggle for strategic positions, the unwillingness to trust the inten-

tions of others. Such an attitude is contradictory to the letter and spirit

of sworn pledges of international cooperation. Unfortunately it finds

strong support among many civilians and ends with the country simul-

taneously pursuing policies of trust and mistrust, of cooperation and

isolation. The anomaly of two policies being followed simultaneously

only highlights the unstable nature of a peace program. It helps to

explain too why neither policy has yet been able to guarantee peace.

2. International Commerce

World trade is a second problem area plaguing the efforts of peace-

makers. There is nothing more plausible than economic self-righteous-

ness. We are so much more aware of what is owing to us than we are of
what we owe others. One need not be a follower of Karl Marx to

acknowledge that the competition for world markets or for the sources

of raw materials has been the prelude to wars between great trading

or industrial states.

Nations strive to be economically self-sufficient with the same zeal

that they want to be politically independent. They want to sell more

than they buy, to invade foreign markets while setting up tariff barriers

to imports from those same countries. Control of the sources of raw

materials is greedily sought or jealously maintained through annexation,

spheres of influence or commercial concessions in undeveloped areas.

Is it too much to say that even today governments are prepared to fight

a total war in order to get the economic advantages they feel the nation’s

life requires ?

There are relatively few commonly accepted international standards

of economic ethics or ideals. The political conscience of the international

society, one must admit, has been highly developed. We do possess
norms of conduct, however much these may be honored in the breach.

But the economic conscience of mankind may be said to have been hardly

stirred. Until some such principles are formulated, commonly accepted.

17



and incorporated into practical programs the world will not be ade-

quately equipped to prevent war from growing out of economic malad-

justments.

The problem is all the more complicated by the fact that while a

government is pursuing one course politically, it can pursue quite

another economically. One can annul the other. The economic ramifi-

cations of national life are so broad and so hidden from public, even

from expert gaze that a country has often in the past embarked on an

economic program before it is conscious of it. It is said that of old

traders frequently went ahead of missionaries and diplomats. Today

traders still go ahead of diplomats and often are more influential.

The need for closer economic cooperation as well as political coop-

eration was recognized by Pius XI who wrote in the Encyclical **Quad-

ragesimo Anno” that ‘‘ . . . Since the various nations largely depend

on one another in economic matters and need one another's help, they

should strive with a united purpose and effort to promote, by wisely

conceived pacts and institutions, a prosperous and happy international

cooperation in economic life.”

3. The White Race and the Status Quo

A third problem area is the position of the dependent areas and
the non-self-governing peoples. Rudyard Kipling called it the ‘^White

Man’s Burden.” There is a “ruling race” whose dominion is currently

being undermined. The so-called North-South axis—a reminder that
for the most part the dependent peoples live below the equator and are

ruled by whites residing above the equator—is a problem whose magni-
tude is usually underestimated and which yet has potentiality for trouble

greater than some other issues with which the world is currently pre-

occupied.

The strength of the movement to shake off the tutelage of the white

race is discernible enough in India, which has achieved its independence.

It is also manifest in Indonesia where the natives have been granted a

constitution for a United States of Indonesia. The independence of

Burma has also been promised by Great Britain. In former French

Indo-China, the Republic of Viet Nam has taken its rise not without

serious clashes between the natives and French troops.

18



Now there is no suggestion at the moment that these teeming millions

of tutelary peoples will suddenly in a violent revolution throw off their

rulers and subject the white race in turn. A war between races is not

in prospect. But the situation arising out of the growing dissolution of

the great colonial empires of Great Britain, France and The Nether-

lands, offers grave portents for the future. The world as we know it

today is a complex equilibrium. A change in the relationships between
the dependent peoples and their former supervisors can upset that

equilibrium and produce disturbances elsewhere. The break-up of

colonial empires is fraught with great significance for all countries.

This is especially true in the case of Great Britain, whose withdrawal,

political and military, from its outposts of Empire, has already brought

on a visible world crisis.

4. Ideologies and Cultures

The fourth important problem area is in the intangible field of

ideas. ^‘Ideology” is the vague and unsatisfactory word that men have

come to use. We think of Russian ideology first off, but the problem is
not limited to communism alone. Can different and even opposing ideolo-

gies be the basis of a world united institutionally?

The problem arises most acutely in the minds of those who under-

stand the power of an idea, whether this has a philosophical, religious or

cultural character. Superficial politicians who are accustomed to take

into account only day-to-day political contacts and necessities may

minimize its importance. Yet back of political conflicts, back of eco-

nomic friction is the war of ideas. Must a uniform ideology or concept

of society be the indispensible minimum for a world at peace? Or at

least can we adjust these differences in practical ways? The history of

nationalism illustrates the impact of an idea.

Here we must think not only of Marxian ideology but, sad to say,

also with corruptions of Christianity which grow out of Christian culture

itself. This battle goes on everywhere; it knows no geographical limita-

tions. Corruptions of democracy exist where democracy flourishes. Even

in America, supposedly united in its conception of democracy, there

exist corruptions of democracy.

The struggle is at its highest where ideologies are sponsored by

governments. Here they possess a political arm to further their cause.

19



The problem then arises whether opposing ideologies represented by

governments can co-exist in one world politically organized. The answer

to this question can only be known for sure from trial and experience.

If peace is to be achieved one does not reach this by abolishing all non-

conformism, a dubious task at best, but in trying to establish a modus

vivendi mutually satisfactory until one or other of the conflicting camps

loses the vigor and impetus that constituted the original conflict. There

are ideologies which today live side by side in relative peace, but which

at one time appeared to have no other solution but the extermination of

one or the other by war and bloodshed.

Sometimes people assume unconsciously that the ideological problem,

particularly that regarding the Communist program, is a military prob-

lem. The inspiration for this belief probably is the example of Nazism

which finally had to be crushed by military means. The problem is

rather a social and philosophical one. The war of ideas is a peacetime

conflict. And it is in peacetime that the issue is really decided. The

outcome rests on the conviction of the propagandists, on the energy and

diligence of its supporters, as much as on the idea’s intrinsic worth or

pragmatic appeal to the spirit of the age.

5. National Solidarity at Home

A last problem area is at our own door step. This may be called the
problem of home opinion and national unity. A statesman who sets forth
on a true program of international cooperation must activate his own

people’s will to peace. The citizens must themselves want peace, not

as an abstract ideal but in relation to specific challenges involving deci-

sion and action. Foreign policy begins at home and no statesman can

take the risks of a broad policy of world cooperation until supported by

united conviction at home.

The process of achieving national unity is a precarious one. It should

not be forgotten that England’s period of ‘‘appeasement”^ was necessary

for the crystallization of public opinion. A divided and confused Britain
would have been the only result had Chamberlain attempted to invoke

the argument of war upon Hdtler at the time of the Munich crisis in

1938. In the aftermath of war this unity is even more difficult to reach,

on account of the natural reaction of war-weary peoples. Frequently

20



foreign policy is achieved only through demonstrable and tragic failures

that leave the ordinary citizen w'ith no more doubts or hesitation. This

process of reaching solidarity at home means, for a time at least, tolera-

tion of evils beyond the point of wisdom and prudence.

The unity spoken of here is of course not the unity of a monolithic

state, based upon terror and the liquidation of opposition, but the unity

of a free country and based ultimately on those judgments springing spon-

taneously from a free peoples' native conceptions of what is right and

decent.

The new foreign policy enunciated by President Truman in his

address to Congress on March 12, 1947 asking for substantial economic

and military aid to Greece and Turkey, was an effect of that slow

process so characteristic of a democracy's foreign policy. It was first

necessary for the whole people to be made aware of the threat to Ameri-

can ideals presented by communist infiltration into Europe. Only then

could the President launch a program that inaugurated a new foreign

policy. Six months earlier, such a speech would have touched off bitter

controversy and divided the country from top to bottom. The most

important problem area in international peace is the home front. Until

the American people were able to adjust their mutual differences (par-

ticularly that involving ‘‘foreign involvements") appeasement and vacil-

lation unworthy of a great and idealistic nation were inevitable.

Review Questions

1. Why is national security and independence one of the factors that
statesmen must contend with in working for peace?

2. Why do the intricacies and problems of international commercial life
offer additional obstacles to a program of international collabora-

tion?

3. What is happening to the “white man's burden?" What great crisis

does this problem bring to statesmen?

4. Discuss the role of dynamic ideologies in relation to international

unity.

5. Show how the threat to peace becomes greater when an ideology uses

the power of the state as its instrument.

6. Why must national solidarity be the first concern of a statesman
sincerely working for peace abroad?

21



Chapter IV

The Processes of Peace (1)

The United Nations at Work

It is generally agreed that international suspicion will remain at a

high level as long as all the nations candidly advertise their mistrust of

each other by the maintainance of large military forces. For this reason

the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms call for the reduction of

armaments.

DISARMAMENT

But for a long time the Big Three systematically passed over this

subject in their practical plans for the postwar world. There was no

general pledge to disarm such as was made after World War I. Germany

and Japan are disarmed; but the victors promised no one they would

themselves dissolve their forces. The official reason for this de-emphasis

of disarmament was that the major Powers have the high responsibility

of maintaining peace, by force if necessary. This explanation was partly

true and partly disingenuous. It was partly true insofar as the Members

of the new United Nations are obligated to make available to the organi-

zation “armed forces, facilities and other assistance’^ to enable the Se-

curity Council to carry out its function of maintaining peace. The

misleading part of the theme consists in the obvious fact that the United

States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union were not sure enough of

each other to embarrass themselves with a joint commitment to postwar

disarmament.

So disarmament was a dead issue until October 29, 1946 during the

meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. On this occasion

Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov proposed that all nations should

begin to disarm. In so doing he was following in the footsteps of his

own predecessor, Maxim Litvinov, former Soviet Foreign Commissar

who in 1928 proposed in the League of Nations general and complete

disarmament, including “the complete abolition of all armed forces on

land, on the sea and in the air.” Like Litvinov’s Molotov’^s proposal

caught the United Nations by surprise. But quickly recovering. Senator

Warren Austin on the following day promised full adherence to the

22



universal disarmament, in principle. After lengthy debate during the

course of that session of the Assembly it was finally agreed that pur-

suant to the United Nations Charter, there was recognized the necessity

of ‘‘an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and of

armed forces.’’

The obstacles to a successful program of armament reduction and

control are appalling. Between the two world wars disarmament pro-

posals often boiled down to a process by which one government sought

to disarm the other. Frequently, too, it was a maneuver to put a rival

country in a bad light before world opinion. There are some who suspect

that the Soviet initiative of October 29, .1946 was precisely of this

character. Molotov deprecated the importance of troops on home soil,

while stressing the menace to world peace presented by the atomic

bomb which the United States alone possessed. The chief task of this

disarmament commission, he said, would be the outlawing and destruc-

tion of all atomic weapons. For its part, the United States through

Senator Tom Connally emphasized that the number of troops on home

soil was as much a matter of international concern as those which by

invitation were on the soil of friendly states.

WHAT TO DO WITH THE ATOMIC BOMB?

This became a question as soon as the first brilliant mushroom-shaped

cloud began rising over stricken Hiroshima, in fact before that. The

scientists who had been working on the Manhattan Project, as it was

called, had urged that a demonstration first be made to the Japanese

rather than use it initially on a live target. But the bomb was dropped.

Whether it was right to do so is now an academic question, compared

to the problem of what to do with the bomb now. The Security Council

has been struggling, according to its instructions from the General

Assembly, to draw up international agreements for the prohibition of

atomic and other weapons of mass destruction. This includes the inter-

national control of atomic energy and other scientific discoveries adapt-

able to mass destruction to insure their use only for peaceful purposes.

Here we find the United States in one of its strongest moral positions

in international cooperation, as long as its motives are protected against

misinterpretation at home as well as abroad. Consider the position of the

three countries which had produced the bomb—particularly the United

23



States upon whose soil the major part of the enterprise was concentrated.

One of the allies in the great coalition against the Nazis, the Soviet

Union, was kept in ignorance of the process. To keep the secret of the

bomb, or share it with all—that was the question. To keep the secret
was to start in motion a current of suspicion and fear on the part of those

who were kept in the dark, along with frenzied research by those not in

on the secret to find out for themselves. On the other hand, to make the

knowledge of atomic energy development common property was equiva-

lent to permitting the secret to fall into the hands of those who might

misuse this knowledge.

After some hesitation, the ‘‘Atomic Powers’^ (the United States,

Great Britain and Canada), issued the Truman-Attlee-King statement

of November 15, 1945. Emphasizing the peril to peace if the new dis-

covery were not controlled, and the advantages for human welfare if

used properly (as a source of power), the three leaders proposed the

creation in the United Nations of a Commission to formulate plans:

1 ) to control atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes

;

2) to eliminate atomic weapons and other major weapons adaptable to

mass destruction from national armaments; 3) and lastly, but by no

means least, to provide for effective safeguards by way of inspection and

other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations

and evasions.

Thus far Moscow had not been consulted. At the Council of Foreign

Ministers in Moscow, a month later, the Soviet Union joined with the

United States and Great Britain in a program in essence the Truman-

Attlee-King statement. A month later the General Assembly in London
created the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, without alter-

ing a word of the original draft drawn up in Moscow. This body held

its first meeting at Hunter College in New York on June 14, 1946, at

which the American representative, Bernard M. Baruch, presented the

United States plan for an Atomic Development Authority.

In this way the United States, along with the other “atomic Powers*^’

answered the political problems raised by the development and exclusive

possession of the most destructive power known to man. The policy of

this country, as embraced in the T-A-K statement and in the Baruch

Report, as well as in the Acheson-Lillenthal Report, involves drastic

and revolutionary proposals. We ask for the creation of an Atomic

24



Development Authority which would have control of all matters relating

to atomic energy. The ADA would have 1) managerial control or
ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world

security, 2) the power to control, inspect and license all other atomic

activities, 3) charge of international development of the peacetime uses

of atomic energy, and 4) responsibility for research and development

which would equip it to comprehend and therefore to detect the misuse

of atomic energy. In the operation of this Authority, said Mr. Baruch

emphatically, ‘‘There must be no veto to protect those who violate their

solemn agreements.”

No international body with such wide powers in a field so jealously

guarded as armaments has ever been proposed by responsible officials.

So radical were the proposals that people were saying the United States

itself would never approve the ADA.

In defense of their apparently obstinate stand on the conditions

attached to the handing over of the bomb’s secret and all that pertained

thereto, the American representatives alleged that just to prohibit or out-

law the bomb on paper would not prevent misuse of the bomb. Our pre-

vious experience with outlawing poison gas (andwar itself, by the Kellog-

Briand Pact) ought to teach us this. In 1868 it was forbidden to use

projectiles weighing less than 400 grams which contained explosives. It

was traditionally unlawful to poison wells. In 1899 many states bound

themselves for five years to refrain from throwing projectiles and

explosives from balloons! In the case of this newly discovered nemesis,

such verbal precautions are pitifully insufficient and would not be

acceptable to those nations who developed the bomb.

Then also, if violators could by their veto as members of the Atomic

Development Authority impede the operation of the body, that would be

the end of the “effective safeguards” specified in all the directives of the

United Nations. Under such circumstances the Senate of the United

States would simply not approve any treaty presented to it for ratification.

Slow progress has marked the course of the international control of

atomic energy. Is the United States contributing anything to world

peace by its attitudes? These general judgments seem justified:

1. Our country took a generous initiative in offering to deliver the

secret of the atomic energy to an international body for the benefit of all

mankind.

25



2. We are entitled to insist, at the same time, that our action should
not be liable to abuse, through the inefficiency or impotence of the inter-

national organ.

3. The mere outlawing of the bomb by international agreement is

woefully short of this objective, even though highly desirable from the

moral point of view.

4. The broad powers given to the ADA amount to a radical applica-
tion of the principle that no country is entitled to be absolute sovereign

where the safety and security of the whole international community is

concerned.

The Pope has himself emphasized the urgency that prospective atomic

warfare has induced for the nations quickly to agree on an effective

international agreement to control these and other weapons of mass

destruction, even at the cost of an out-moded idea of national sovereignty.

On Christmas Eve in 1946 he said: ‘‘Recently a new factor has arisen

to stimulate the desire for peace and the determination to promote it

more effectively: the might of new instruments of destruction which

modern technique has developed and continues to develop to such an

extent that they appear to the terrified eyes of humanity infernal creations.

This factor has brought the problem of disarmament into the center of

international discussions under completely new aspects and provides an

incentive that was never felt before.’*’ In this clear reference to the

United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the Pontiff highlights both

the urgency of the program and the need for its effectiveness. The “com-

pletely new aspect” is the need to penetrate the hard shell of sovereignty

that has prevented a really effective system in the past.

Review Questions

1. Why is disarmament one of the most important ways of coming to

grips with the problem of peace?

2. When did disarmament become a live issue? What difficulties exist?

Why?

3. Explain why the United States is in a strong moral position in respect

to its proposals for the control of atomic energy? Give the history.

4. What is the nature of the United States proposals for an Atomic

Development Authority? Do you believe that this country is too

obstinate in insisting on iron-clad guarantees with regard to inspec-

tion and control?

5. What did the Pope say about the problem raised by atomic energy?

26



CHAPTER V

Processes of Peace (2)

The United Nations at Work (cont.)

Disarmament and atomic energy control are general problems not

identified with specific countries. But international life is lit up by local

conflagrations that call for quick action before the sparks fall elsewhere.

To air disputes, to get at the facts, to issue warnings, to take prompt and

vigorous measures, is the task of the Security Council of the United

Nations

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On January 19th, 1946 two days after the creation of the Security

Council and before that body had even settled upon its rules of pro-

cedure, the Iranian (or Persian) government protested formally that

‘‘owing to the interference of the Soviet Union, through the medium

of their officials and armed forces, in the international affairs of Iran, a

situation has arisen which may lead to international friction. The

Council was requested to investigate the situation and to recommend

appropriate terms of settlement. Two days further on the Soviet Union

asked the Council to investigate the presence of British troops in Greece,

as creating “extraordinary tension fraught with grave consequences both

for the Greek people and the maintenance of peace and security.” Simul-

taneously the Ukrainian SSR officially drew the attention of the Council

to a situation in Indonesia (Dutch East Indies) where British and

Dutch troops had been engaged in skirmishes with native forces at outs

with The Netherlands. This was, in the opinion of the delegate, a

threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. A few
days more, and Syria and Lebanon were jointly charging that the

presence of British and French troops on their soil was an infringe-

ment of their sovereignty.

27



These four charges, unloaded upon the unready Security Council in

rapid succession, illustrate the types of international friction, disputes

or situations that the Security Council was designed to meet. All chanced

to involve the presence of troops on alien soil, but each case presented a

different situation in terms of the Charter. The first involved a charge of

active interference in the internal affairs of a state through the presence

of the troops of another state
;
the second was a charge against one state

as creating a threat to the maintenance of international peace, through

the presence of its troops on the soil of a friendly country; the third

called attention to a situation likely* to endanger peace, but without a

specific accusation; the last was a simple protest of infringement of sov-

ereignty, In the first and last cases the item was raised by the aggrieved

parties themselves; in the others a third party not directly concerned

brought the matter before the Security Council.

The ensuing debates featured a kind of public discussion such as had

seldom been seen in the annals of diplomatic history, the chief performers

being the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ernest Bevin, and the Soviet

Vice Foreign Minister, Andrei Vyshinsky. While the technique was not

entirely new, since the League Council had set the precedent, this was the

first test of the stability and strength of the new United Nations. The

results of these debates should be sought not directly in the resolutions

arrived at but in the effects of the public airing of the facts.

It would save a lot of intellectual effort if the outcome of the debates

on these four issues, as well as the others which followed them, were in

the form of clear-cut decisions resulting in an outright acquittal or a

clear verdict of guilt, with attendant condemnations, ultimatums or

embargoes. Things happen that way only in highly developed societies

whose cohesion is already assured and when common standards, com-

monly pledged, co-exist with adequate powers of enforcement backed

in turn by public opinion and precedent. It would have been a political

miracle if the Security Council in the first weeks, even days, of its

existence, without experience, tradition or prestige, had been able to

deal with these four issues with all the vigor and assurance we have been

accustomed to witness in well-established governments. International

politics works in much more subtle ways than national politics. And it

is often a long time before the real effects of such procedures become

evident. Let us examine the status of these same four questions, twelve

months later

:

. 28



Syria and Lebanon, The French and British, of their own accord,

offered to withdraw their troops from Syria and Lebanon. To the great

surprise of the Syrians and Lebanese, who had often been made such

promises before, this pledge was fulfilled for Syria on April 15 following

(an event celebrated by a public holiday in Damascus), and for Lebanon

on September 1, the same year. This matter is now closed.

Indonesia, Here, a year later, the British Imperial Forces had been

withdrawn from Sumatra and Java, and the draft for a United States

of Indonesia had been agreed upon between the Indonesians and The

Netherlands.

Greece, British troops remained in this country upon the renewed

invitation of the Greek Government, but continuing unsettled condi-

tions, arising not out of the presence of British troops but out of border

disputes with nearby Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, had prompted

the dispatch of a commission of inquiry along the border on behalf of the

Security Council at the request of Greece.

Iran, The most significant denouement took place in the Iranian

case. This issue became even more acute in March 2, 1946 when Soviet

troops failed to evacuate the Iranian province of Azerbaijan at the time

specified by the original treaty permitting their entrance (to protect

the supply lines from the Persian gulf to the Soviet Union). A second
round of debates ensued, this time at Hunter College in New York, to

which the Council had moved. The start of this second series witnessed

the famous walk-out of the Soviet representative Andrei Gromyko, who

refused to participate in the discussions. The real motives of the Soviet

failure to withdraw from Azerbaijan, in flat violation of a clear

treaty engagement, never were quite clear. Soviet troops were eventually

evacuated, leaving behind them a puppet “autonomous” government of

Azerbaijan under Jaafar Pishevari, a Moscow-trained Iranian. To

make a long story short, the whole bizarre experiment came to an abrupt

end when the Central Government made a forcible entrance into this

province. Soviet support was not forthcoming to the puppet regime

and Pishevari on December 11, 1946 fled across the border to Russia

whence he had come.

The four cases do not follow identical patterns, but they do serve to

show the ways in which the Council can operate. The Russian fiasco in

29



Azerbaijan can be traced in part at least to the unjustifiable position

which the USSR was shown to occupy and which was hinted at by

Gromyko’s refusal to participate in the debate. The Russians hesitated

under this glare of publicity and the prospect of united opposition. They

withdrew their troops and finally withdrew even their moral support

from their puppet installation, writing the affair off as a total loss. The

British and the French saw the handwriting on the wall in Syria and

Lebanon and although they were under no compulsion by the Security

Council (thanks to a paradoxical veto employed by the Soviet delegate),

they saw that their position could not be justified before world opinion.

On the other hand, the grounds for the presence of British soldiers in

.Greece were aired enough to establish a bona fide right—at that par-
ticular juncture—for these troops being on Greek soil and the rejection
of the Soviet charge as unwarranted. The resulting position of Britain

in this respect was that much stronger.

Stabilizing and Equalizing Role of Council

It would be oversimplifying the matter to suggest that these results

ought to be attributed directly to the Security Council or that these cases

really represented a severe test. But of the stabilizing and equalizing

influence of the Council’s actions there can be no doubt. Would these

instances of international friction have been dealt with as adequately,

if at all, or settled so early, had no such body existed? The “normal

diplomatic channels” are devious and tedious; in addition they are

commonly conducted in secret and confined to the states directly con-

cerned. The fortunes of Iran were at a low ebb as long as it was

compelled to negotiate privately with the USSR. The very existence

of machinery to air disputes before a representative body is an advan-

tage. Small states are particularly appreciative of this.

THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

The fight for peace is not confined to the political level. One of

the miscalculations of the Covenant of the League of Nations was that

it gave too much importance to political remedies and overlooked the

social, economic and other non-political causes of war. The postwar

order has witnessed the creation of many independent inter-govern-

mental organizations with specialized tasks in the non-political field-

Their job is to do their own bit in the narrow sphere alloted to them.

30



These are the ‘'specialized agencies/’ as the United Nations Charter

calls them, that is, bodies established by inter-governmental agreement

and having wide international responsibilities as defined in their basic

instruments or constitutions. These agencies are designed to achieve

certain ends in the field of economic, social, educational, cultural and

humanitarian cooperation. Some of them are related to permanent

problems; others to only transitory situations. They are the “wisely

conceived pacts and institutions,” mentioned by Pope Pius XI in the

Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno.

ILO

One of the oldest of these specialized agencies and perhaps the

prototype of those launched by the United Nations, is the Interna-

tional Labor Organization. This body was created, as a result of a

provision of the Peace Treaties of 1919, to bring about world-wide

improvement in labor conditions and to be a guarantee of genuine pro-

tection for the worker against the hazards of his calling and the injustices

of his situation. It is independent and self-governing, although its con-

nections with the League of Nations were always close. It has its own

budget, contributed directly to it by the member governments.

There is no space here to give the structure of the ILO or its tech-

nique in reaching* its goals. What is of importance are two principles

that impelled the institution of the ILO and which apply, mutatis

mutandis, to other specialized agencies initiated for the postwar or still

in process of formation. The ILO took the position that: 1. International

peace can be established only if it is based on social justice; and that:

2. the failure of one nation to correct inhumane conditions of labor is

an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve condi-

tions in their home countries.

There in a nutshell is the policy justifying specialized agencies. On

the one hand there are causes contributing to lasting peace other than

merely political ones; on the other the cooperation of all nations is neces-

sary for a general improvement of conditions in each country. With

varying forms according to the type of human activity concerned, these

are the principles underlying all the specialized agencies.

The success of the ILO in a long quiet program of action encouraged

the drafters of the San Francisco Charter to act on the policy of stimu-

lating Other organizations for technical work in various fields of inter-

31



national intercourse. These organizations, although autonomous, are

brought into relationship with the United Nations through separate

agreements.

UNESCO

One of the most dynamic of these specialized agencies is the United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The role

of UNESCO was described in this way by William Benton, chairman
of the American delegation to the first conference of the Organization,

“UNTSCO is not conceived of as an international undertaking to pro-
mote education and science and culture as ends in themselves, but rather

through education, science and culture, to advance the peace of the

world.’’ It aims to work through the means of mass media, particularly

the radio, the creative arts, social sciences, libraries and museums. A pro-
gram of student interchange and improved methods of writing textbooks

are included in the activities. One highly important and tangible aim of

the Organization is to diminish the barriers on communication between

the countries, through changes in copyright laws, the high cost of cable

and wireless communication, and the distribution of films and printed

material which is often impeded by some countries. The rather ambitious

scope of UNESCO may be judged from the estimate of one and one-half
billion dollars that the U.S. National Commission (established by Act

of Congress to represent this country at UNESCO) has regarded as
not too high for the budget in the course of time.

BANK AND FUND

Economic warfare precedes armed warfare. The International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary

Fund are twin organizations Intended to meet financial and monetary

necessities that pre-war experiences had accentuated. The havoc caused

in international relations by currency instability prepared Europe for

war in 1939. “The currency and exchange difficulties of the 30’s,” says

an authoritative source, “are generally regarded as contributing to a

considerable extent to the outbreak of the war.”

Furthermore, the need for an international banking system which

could bear the weight of large loans for financing large scale projects in

devastated or undeveloped regions was also recognized in setting up the

Bank. The Bank is expected to fake the place of outright relief activities,

such as those engaged in by UNRRA. It will also encourage private

loans by guarantees.

32



ICAO

The International Civil Aviation Organization is another operative

agency coming out of the war. ICAO took its rise in June, 1945, as a

consequence of the rapid organization of a world network of airways.

When peace came again it was clear that rules for civil aviation must be

evolved and enforced by common consent. Otherwise postwar disorder

in the air detrimental to good relations among the nations would most

certainly ensue.

FAO

The Food and Agriculture Organization was instituted to promote

a very important freedom—Freedom from Want. In specific words:
‘‘To make good nutrition, good health, and good standards of living for

everyone the goal of world policies in food and agriculture, forestry

and fisheries.’’ This means an organized effort to improve the production

and distribution of food and food sources so that the whole human race

may be able to get food necessary for the health of the world. For the

first five years the budget of the FAO is set at $5,000,000 a year. This
is a small sum to pay for raising the level of food supplies for all the

world.

IRO

The International Refugee Organization was set up to repatriate,

or resettle in other lands, those unfortunate homeless persons whose

lives were uprooted by the events of the war. Many of these persons

come from zones now under Russian control. Whether the IRO should

forcibly return all displaced persons to their places of origin was a major

issue between the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellites, on the one hand,

and the other countries. The issue was decided when “resettlement” and

not only “repatriation” was established as the objective of the IRO.

This meant that those who would not voluntarily return to their home

countries, in which political changes had taken place since they were

driven out, would be resettled elsewhere. The IRO in other words,

recognizes the “right of asylum” and concedes that there are such things

as political refugees. This is to say that political opposition is not a

crime. To this proposition the Soviet Union never assented.

ITO

The proposed International Trade Organization contemplates a

very difficult task. Initiated by the United States it is based on the idea

that international peace rests to a great extent also on a coordinated pro-

33



gram of world trade policies. The effect of the work of the ITO if

successful would be an expanding world economy, the establishment and

maintenance in all countries of high levels of employment and real in-

come, and the creation of economic conditions conducive to world peace.

The long delay and exhaustive discussions that have gone into the prep-

arations for this specialized agency are signs that here is one of the most

difficult knots to be untied. One thing is certain, if the ITO or some

substitute is not brought into being, a world trade war and the stifling of

international commerce is in the making. Out of such a situation do

wars grow.

The above enumeration and all-too-brief description of specialized

agencies does not exhaust the list. It does offer samples of the idea

of the functional approach to international peace. The system of

specialized agencies, each concentrating on a well-defined and limited

area of friction or source of friction, may not seem to have any con-

siderable direct influence on the prevention of war. No one of them

alone or even all of them collectively could in the last analysis prevent

a war. Yet each in its own sphere is aimed at removing the conditions

out of which wars come. They form part of the process of peace. They

are the avenues opening on the road to peace. The ultimate success of

these programs cannot be foretold. But each of them is part of a general

assault upon those things that divide nations. Without their remedial

and preventive work, ordinary international political disputes will

assume unwonted virulence.

PEOPLES WHO DO NOT RULE THEMSELVES
Territorial aggrandizement is one of the oldest forms of power

politics. We are discussing here the processes of peace, or how to come
to grips with the . forces that cause war. That particular kind of

territorial aggrandizement known as imperialism consists in acquiring

control of primitive and undeveloped territories and administering

them without consulting the wishes of the inhabitants and in exploiting

the natural resources for the primary benefit of the master country.

The age of imperialism has really been over many years. Its effects

are still with us. Powerful forces are pulling each way, and all of them

have some claim for justice on their side. For Britain, Winston

Churchill said, ‘‘I have not become the King’s First Minister in order

to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.” Yet the Labor

34



Government a few months later was actively engaged in little less

than that. The pressures of the dependent peoples had become too

great to resist.

Liquidatinff Imperialism

How can the international society come to grips with this monstrous
challenge to the ingenuity of the political man? The United Nations

divided the regions involved into two parts: 1. Those colonial empires

of Great Britain, The Netherlands, Belgium, France and others which

have been administered as such by these countries for decades and cen-

turies; and, 2. those dependent regions which are expressly submitted

to a trusteeship system administered by the United Nations.

As for the first part of this task, it was left to the free choice

of the colonial Powers to decide the fate of their own colonies. But

at the same time, the United Nations binds them to a joint declaration

of colonial policy. This joint declaration at least provides the United

Nations with norms for criticism of the conduct of the colonial Powers,

if it does not give the Organization any direct powers of intervention.

It may seem that the imperial powers were let off easy by this

method employed by the United Nations Charter. The subsequent years

after the San Francisco Conference were to reveal, however, that these

countries, especially Great Britain, were prepared to go (and did go)

much farther on their own accord toward the self-government and

independence of their dependent territories.

Mandate and Trusteeship

Not the colonies, strictly so-called, but the mandates and trusteeship

territories cause the real problem for the United Nations. The Trustee-

ship Council of the United Nations was finally constituted on De-

cember 14, 1946. It was the last of the five principal organs of the

Organization. The delay experienced in its formation was a sufficient

sign of the difficulties involved in the issues. It was a full year before

even one of the former League mandates was submitted to the juris-

diction of the Council. Here was obviously a delicate matter involving

vested interests and a new kind of supervision. Why, in fact, should

the mandatory powers deliver to the United Nations the mandates

35



they had from the extinct League? They were under no obligation,

legally, to do so. It was not even surprising that one mandatory power,

the Union of South Africa, announced its desire and intention of an-

nexing its own mandate of Southwest Africa, a former German colony

which the Union had administered as a mandate since the end of World

War I. This proposal was rejected by the Assembly in 1946 and the

South Africans continued to administer the mandate according to its

original terms. Other mandatory states announced that unless the terms

of trusteeship were accepted in practically substantial form as presented,

their proposal would be withdrawn and the mandates would be admin-

istered as they had been under the League.

U. 5. Trusteeship in the Pacific

The old urge to the advantages, sometimes real, sometimes imaginary,

of control of territory affected even the United States, despite its

previous record of spurning all appearances of territorial aggrandize-

ment. This country announced during the General Assembly in late

1946 that it intended to submit trusteeship proposals for the Pacific

Islands, former German possessions, which Japan had received under

mandate from the League. Among these islands were some of the

most honored names in the annals of American heroism, Saipan, Tinian,

Eniwetok and Peleliu, as well as Bikini, site of the atomic bomb tests

of 1946. But the United States announced further that it intended to

place these islands under the “strategic area^^ provisions of the Charter,

Article 82. To express the meaning of this proposal in plain words,

the United States said that a million square miles of ocean would be

blocked off as a strategic zone, nominally under the United Nations

as trusteeship territory, but actually (on account of the provisions of

this Article) under the undivided and undisputed control of the ad-

ministering authority.

The justification for these wide claims by the United States was

that these islands had been wrested from the Japanese at the price of

blood and heroism. The security of this country required that never

again should it be necessary to regain these islands at a similar price.

In any case, on April 2, 1947 the Security Council approved U. S.

trusteeship of these islands under the terms proposed by the United

States.

Here, as in almost any issue in international policy, there is much

36



to be said for each point of view. But somewhere there is a just

solution, a compromise between legitimate needs of individual nations

and the international interest. Reaching this compromise is part of the

processes of peace to which this Chapter has been devoted. But a lasting

solution, a fair compromise will not be reached without liberal doses of

that Charity and Justice that are the starting point and the returning

point of all international relations.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What is the task of the Security Council?

2. Describe the four cases that were brought before the Council in

the first few days of its existence?

3. Twelve months later, what was the status of these issues?

4. How do these cases show the operation and area of influence of

the Council?

5. What is meant by saying that the Council has a stabilizing and

equalizing influence?

6. What are the specialized agencies ? What purpose do, they serve ?

In what fields do they operate? Enumerate some of them.

7. Do you believe that peace must be based on social justice? Explain

the purpose of the International Labor Organization.

8. Do you think that education and cultural influences have any

bearing on world peace? What is UNESCO?
9. What world economic conditions contributed to the outbreak of

the war? What are the Bank and the International Monetary

Fund?

10. In what fields are these specialized agencies intended to work:

ICAO, FAO, IRO and ITO?

11. Show how these agencies, working together, can remove the condi-

tions out of which war comes.

12. What is imperialism? How is it being liquidated?

13. What is the task of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations ?

14. Explain the United States policy towards the Japanese islands?'

Do you approve or disapprove?

37



CHAPTER VI

Germany

Against Renewal of Aggressive Policy^'

One special way of preventing war is to single out a prospective

disturber of the peace and deprive him, if we can, of his power to

make war. This is the task that the three major Powers, the United

States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, have assumed to themselves

with respect to Germany, Italy, Japan and the satellites of the Berlin-

Rome-Tokyo Axis. It is a course that raises almost as many problems

as it attempts to solve. Its effectiveness as a peace-making process

is not beyond question, although the results may be adequate within

a certain limited sphere.

United Nations By-passed

The winding up of World War II, particularly the terms of the

peace treaties, as well as the armistice terms, is not the task of the

United Nations Organization. The Big Three reserved to themselves

a free hand in what was to be done about the former enemy. Thus

at one stroke a very large and extremely important sphere of interna-

tional relations has been withdrawn temporarily at least from the

purview of the new peace organization. Article 107 of the Charter

expressly provides for this as follows: “Nothing in the present Charter

shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during

the second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the

present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the

Governments having responsibility for such action.’^ In other words,

the United States, Great Britain and the USSR retained complete say

in deciding the ultimate fate of the Axis members and all the prepara-

tions thereto during the occupation. This refers particularly to boun-

daries, reparations, de-militarization and de-nazification. The United

Nations is not authorized to intervene in this area.

38



This organic separation of the peace treaties from the peace organiza-

tion ^s one of the main differences between the League of Nations and

the United Nations. In 1919 the Treaty of Versailles included not

only the terms of peace with Germany and the other Central Powers,

but it included the League Covenant as an integral part. During the

recent war a different approach was decided upon. The United Nations

was pushed almost to completion before the war was over and was not

conditioned upon the peace treaties. The Charter was signed at San

Francisco on June 26, 1945, while Super-Fortresses were still raiding

Tokyo and while preparations were under way to drop the first atomic

bomb on Hiroshima.

The effect of this strategy was to bind the major Powers to an

important postwar system of international cooperation while their war-

time cooperation was still close. When the war ended and the victors

began to be aware of their differences among themselves the United

Nations was already an accomplished fact. It is not difficult to imagine

what kind of world order would exist today if we were still quarreling

over the peace organization as we did over the peace treaties.

The Rights of the Victors; Their Wrongs

But this very process of separating the United Nations from the

peace treaties created an anomalous situation. It carved out of Europe

and the Orient sizeable chunks of territory and their attendant prob-

lems, in effect leaving the Organization to perform secondary tasks

among new problems as they arose among the Members of the United

Nations or with neutral states. The major Powers had virtually a

free hand in disposing of the Axis.

In other words, the reconstruction and rehabilitation of our former

enemies was at the tender mercies of the victors who acknowledged

no opposition or restraint except their own interests, influenced in great

or less or no degree at all by considerations of justice. The most

direct effect of this situation was that the peace settlements were

influenced predominantly by the power thinking of the Big Three. The

decisions reached at the conferences at Yalta, Teheran and Potsdam,

as well as those of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, Paris

New York and Moscow, were inevitably those which were often the

outcome of a sheer power struggle, i. e., the relative negotiating ability

of the participants, which in turn was in direct proportion to the military

39



and political strength in each instance. Under circumstances so unpro-

pitious for moral considerations, it is almost a miracle that still greater

injustices were not done.

Of the right of the victors to punish the unjust aggressor there is

no doubt. As Victoria wrote three centuries ago, “Even after victory

has been won and redress obtained and peace and safety have been

secured, it is lawful to avenge the wrong received from the enemy and

to take measures against him and exact punishment from him far the

wrongs he has done.” And in fact a fairly plausible case could be made

for this broad assumption of authority by the Big Three to the exclusion

of the other countries and of the United Nations. Together, they had

won the military side of the war. Frankly, the peace settlement in the

heart of Europe was too important to be surrendered to a new untried

body manifestly unequal to the job. It was not cynicism necessarily

but solid realism to first make sure that the major Powers could find

suitable adjustment of their relationships in the new Europe. Until

the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, in the full flush

of victory, each inordinately conscious of its own contribution to the

war, had reached a stable modus vivendi in the Axis-minus world, it

would be illusory to hope that the infant Organization would get

anywhere, or that any treaty with the defeated enemy would be possible,

let alone permanent.

Potsdam

When the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of

Great Britain and Marshal Stalin met at Potsdam on July 17, 1945,

to decide among themselves what to do to Germany pending the peace

treaty, there was no audible protest from the other nations, although

subsequently France and Australia challenged some of the decisions.

It is disturbing to contemplate a few men deciding, without appeal,

what is to happen to a half-continent of seventy or eighty millions.

This is too much power for any small group to possess. But they had

it. For the moment the victors were all-powerful. Seldom in history

had a war ended so decisively. As the Holy Father said at Christmas

in 1946, “Seldom in the history of the world has the sword traced

such a clear line of division between the conquerors and the conquered.”

Thanks to the policy of “unconditional surrender” there was no obliga-

tion to the losers in the form of promises to the defeated country. The

40



Victors did not even have to deal with a government of Germany. The

will of the conquerors was supreme.

And what was the will of the conquerors? Primarily, to prevent

Germany from again becoming a threat to the world. On this the

Big Three were firmly united, whatever further private ideas and

aims they might entertain. Secondly, to punish those Nazis who had

been responsible for initiating the war. Thirdly, to exact reparations

for damage wrought. The means to make Germany unable to wage

war again were chiefly three-fold. 1. Demilitarization: To deprive

Germany for all time of those heavy industries which are the arsenal

of modern war; 2. De-cartelization: To break up the highly developed

system of cartels which had made international trade and commerce

ready instruments of political and military aggression
;
3. Democratiza-

tion : To break the power of those classes and groups, particularly the

military caste, which had been the brains and motivation of the aggressive

policy. This meant, speaking positively, educating ‘the Germans to

democratic habits of government.

Prevention, Wantonness and Human Dignity

If we accept the thesis that a given nation may be formally charged

with being a likely cause of war in the future, then the action taken

thus far in regard to Germany is quite justified. One way of achieving

peace is to take away from warlike nations the power to wage war.

It would be a hardy historian who would undertake to prove from the

past fifty years that Germany- was not peculiarly susceptible to the

blandishments of military adventurers. The Holy Father has implied

that the victors have the right to take the necessary safeguards to

prevent Germany from being the source of war. At Christmas in 1946

he said: ‘*No doubt such a disastrous war, unleashed by an unjust

aggression and continued beyond lawful limits when it was clear that

it was irreparably lost, could not be terminated simply in a peace which

did not include guarantees that similar acts would not be repeated.”

He went on to warn, however: ‘‘Nevertheless, all the measures of

repression and prevention should keep their character of means and

hence remain subordinate to the lofty and ultimate purpose of a true

peace which, providing the necessary guarantees, contemplates the

gradual cooperation of conquerors and conquered in the work of

reconstruction . . .”

41



As the Pontiff hints, the process of stripping Germany of the

industrial, political and military potential for war is open to abuses.

It is very hazardous to attempt to distinguish a peace of just retribu-

tion and prevention from a peace of vengeance and wantonness. With

no one to challenge them the great Powers can make and have made

serious moral and political errors in the occupied countries, detrimental

to the permanent interests of Europe and of the world as a whole.

For example, one would hesitate to defend the Allies for authorizing

the wholesale forced expulsion of large sections of the German populace

from Eastern Germany, taken over by Poland. It will never be certain

that the reparations provisions and the proposed long term of bondage

are warranted even in terms of good statesmanship. The long delay in

concluding the peace treaties with the Axis satellites and with Germany

is a circumstance contributing to the unrest, confusion and uncertainty

of all Europe, enemy and non-enemy alike. Meanwhile the moral

degradation and despair of many millions of people grew apace as

human dignity was overlooked in the quest for further means of making

a great nation impotent.

Fortunately, the actual experience of occupation did cool the

ferocity of the original Potsdam program. The so-called Morgenthau

plan, whatever may have been its original intent to reduce Germany to

an agricultural economy, has never been carried into effect. The first

emotional desire to crush out the last sparks of German nazism and

militarism has been moderated by experience, by a realization that in

peacetime these aims cannot be brought about in such a simple and

mechanistic fashion. But not before serious, perhaps permanent, damage

had been done and grave wrongs perpetrated.

Doctrine of Collective Guilt

One thought frequently expressed in the immediate postwar months

deserves some attention. This is the doctrine of ‘‘collective guilt.’*

The argument is that the German people willingly assented to or

supported the deeds of the Nazis, the assault upon Poland, the horrors

of the concentration camps, etc. Officially, this view was never spon-

sored by the United States. It was even repudiated by Stalin. On

November 21, 1945, at the opening of the War Crimes Tribunal in

Nuremberg, American Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson said: “We

want to make it clear^that we have no purpose to incriminate the whole

German people . . If the German people had willingly accepted

42



the Nazi program, he went on to say, there would have been no need

for the Storm Troops at the beginning, there would have been no need

of concentration camps or the Gestapo. The Pope, too, has said, ‘‘If

justice presumed to judge and punish not merely individuals but even

whole communities together, who could not see in such a procedure a

violation of the norms which guide every human trial

The idea of holding millions of persons individually responsible

for what the Nazis did is wanton hatred. Implicitly, however, the

theory of collective guilt runs through the actions, decisions and writings

on Germany. Indeed it serves as a convenient answer justifying what-

ever the Germans of any age, sex, political affiliation or wartime status

suffer from the hardships of occupation. This includes even the denial

of the inherent right of everyone to be treated as a human being.

Moral for Democracies

The theory of collective guilt is a very dangerous one for democratic

peoples to sponsor. For if ever a nation will really share the collective

guilt of an aggressive war it will be where the people have the largest

say in the policies of the state. In countries where governments are run

along totalitarian and dictatorial lines, the. role of the people (and

therefore the culpability) is slight. It is in free countries that the

citizens have the greatest obligation to be alert as to what is being

done in their name.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Is the United Nations given responsibility for the peace treaties?

Explain the organic separation of the treaties from the Charter.

2. Why were the peace conferences unpropitious for moral considera-

tions ?

3. What are the rights of the victors of World War II? What did

the Pope say about the completeness of the victory of the Allies?

4. What was the will of the conquerors, in respect to Germany?

What three steps were particularly emphasized to prevent Germany

from being the source of another war?

5. What did the Pope say about the policy of the Allies? What

warnings did he utter? Discuss the Pope^s statements.

6. What do you think of the doctrine of collective guilt?

I

43



CHAPTER VII

Other Issues

Stumbling Blocks, Shibboleths and Red Herrings

In a given period of international politics, certain special issues get

more prominence than others. One reason is their peculiar importance

at that time; another is the strange quirks of fancy or antipathy that

take hold of the public in world affairs just as much as in national life.

j

THE RUSSIAN QUESTION

No light, question is the Russian one. For many years after the

Russian Revolution the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was treated

as an outcast among the nations. The United States did not recognize

the USSR until 1933. The League of Nations finally admitted the

country to membership, only to expel it in 1939, at the time of the

attack on Finland. The dubious distinction of being the only country

thrown out of the League (Germany and Japan quit), as the climax of

a long history of exclusion and quarantine had its effect both on Soviet

susceptibilities and on the policy and thinking of the Western World.

A regime that espouses world revolution as its official ideology
should not have been surprised at the treatment it received from the

prospective victims. Added to this back-log of ostracism came the

Hitler-Stalin pact of August, 1939, which set the stage for the invasion

of Poland by the Wehrmacht a few weeks later. Subsequent events,

such as the Anglo-Soviet twenty year alliance, U. S. lend-lease to

Russia, the conferences of the Big Three at Teheran, Yalta and

Potsdam, were complete reversals of the previous situation. But

the skeletons in the closet continued to rattle.

It has been §aid that the problem of our day is the problem of Russia.

Just what the problem consists in is not usually understood. What

was to be done about the “bad boy’’ of international society? There

44



were four possibilities open to Great Britain and the United States

during the war:

1. Make a separate peace with Germany and then turn with

Hitler on Russia. It appears that at one stage of the war Stalin was

suspecting his Allies would do just that, although the idea was pre-

posterous on the face of it.

2. Destroy the Germans and then attack the Russians. In other

words, wage another war. No one ever seriously contemplated such a

move, although the Germans themselves hoped for something like that

to happen after their own defeat.

3. Finish off the Germans but then settle down to a state of siege,

an armed truce much like that between Hitler and Stalin until 1941.

This would leave Europe in a state of constant suspense and would

provide no hope of relief to the half of Europe occupied by the Red

Army,

4. Adopt a policy of permanent postwar cooperation with the

former outcasts on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

Under the circumstances the policy of cooperation was the only ra-

tional and legitimate course to adopt.

The Soviet problem was not whether the Western world should

try to cooperate with the Russians, but how far such cooperation could

be permitted to jeopardize the material, political and moral interests

of the Western world. Were there any grounds for assuming that

the Soviet world that took its rise on a materialistic, anti-religious

and revolutionary program could in practice live side-by-side with the

rest of the world? Would political fraternity with such a regime

put in jeopardy the values of Christian civilization? This is a question

that cannot be decided on a priori principles, although there is a strong

temptation to do so; it can only be answered by the test of actual

experience.

That very experience has been enough to convince a great many

minds of the impossibility of ever living at peace with the Soviet

Union as it is now constituted. Russia’s vast territorial acquisitions,

made in violation of the Atlantic Charter and at the expense of gallant

Allies and heroic victims of Nazi oppression, have more than jeopardized

45



the war-time unity of the East and West. Unfortunately, both the

United States and Great Britain bear some of the moral responsibility

for the tragedies that have befallen Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia

and other countries, whose only crime was their proximity to the

Soviet Union.

But in spite of this black record no responsible person can fail to

be reluctant to give up the effort to make Russia once again a respected

member of the international community. In all fairness, it must be

said that the United States never had any illusions concerning the

magnitude of the task of dealing with the USSR on terms of mutual

respect and confidence. Mistakes of policy and principle have been made,

recognized and repented. But the basic policy of seeking cooperation

with the Russians remains the same. The alternative is dead-lock in the

East, a division of the world into coalitions, a Europe perpetually torn

between two jealous power poles. To date no statesman has been

willing to take upon himself the responsibility for such a program.

‘‘UNANIMITY OF THE GREAT POWERS^’

For its part, the USSR has shown itself a very reluctant and

suspicious candidate to the society of nations. The “iron curtain’’

of censorship and restrictions that obtains has symbolized the traditional

isolation of Russia. That country has declined to join the major

specialized agencies, such as the ICAO, the Bank and Fund or

UNESCO. It further heightened its sense of isolation by its conduct

in the United Nations Security Council. This became notorious when

the Soviet Union began to employ its veto prerogatives in the Council

with wild abandon.

By the time the General Assembly convened the second time in

October 1946 many States had become so aroused that a clamor was

raised to abolish or moderate the veto powers of the great Powers.

Guillermo Belt, delegate of Cuba, called for the total abolition of the

veto through amendment of the Charter. Australia was more moderate

and simply asked the Assembly to go on record as considering that

in some instances the use and the threatened use of the veto power had

not been in keeping either with the general purposes and principles of

the Charter, or with the promises made by the great Powers themselves

at San Francisco. At that time the five permanent members of the

46



Council promised that their veto prerogatives would be used ‘‘sparingly.”

The reckless use of the veto by the Soviet delegate, whether

Vyshinsky or Gromyko, standing as every veto does, against the will of

the overwhelming majority has been a pointed reminder of the position

presently occupied by the USSR in the United Nations as in the world

generally. It is a country keenly conscious of its friendlessness and

determined to defend its interests with the boldness and drive character-

istic of a military campaign.

The defense offered by the Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov,

during this Assembly at Lake Success was that the veto rights of the

permanent members of the Council were nothing more than the ex-

pression of the principle of the “Unanimity of the Great Powers.” It

was imperative for world peace, he said, for the major countries to

act together in all matters. The transparent fact was known to all,

however, that in practice such unanimity meant the yielding of the

wishes of everyone else to the demands of the USSR. Secretary Byrnes

alluded to this in his report on the Paris Peace Conference of 1946

when he said, “Two states can quickly reach an understanding if one

is willing to yield to all demands. Every understanding requires the

reconciliation of differences and not a yielding by one state to the

arbitrary will of the other.” He was speaking as one who knew. In the

peace conferences as in the Council the Soviet Union had acted as

though the principle of unanimity meant that other nations had to agree

to their original unaltered and unamended position. When the other

countries long habituated to the processes of compromise refused to

accept this principle, the veto was brought forth.

It should not be overlooked, at the same time, that the United

States and Great Britain, along with France and China, have the same

veto prerogatives and are counting on using this right if and when

their vital interests so dictate. It is no wonder that during the debate

all the permanent members of the Council defended the veto provisions

of the Charter even though admitting the existence of abuses.

The unpredictability of international politics, particularly where

the Russians are concerned, showed itself in the weeks immediately

subsequent to the General Assmbly of late 1946. Without contest,

the Soviet representative gave in on issues he had uncompromisingly

47



defended. This took place in the Security Council when delegate

Gromyko agreed to an investigation into Greek border disputes (a

proposition he had previously vetoed), and by abstaining from voting

without claiming this constituted a veto (contrary to a proposition

steadfastly asserted only a few weeks earlier by his superior, Andrei

Vyshinsky.) The processes of peace and international politics do not

always follow a logical course!

INTERVENTION AND NON-INTERVENTION

A very important rule of the Charter prohibits intervention of
the United Nations in affairs which are essentially within the domestic

jurisdiction of any state.. This provision does not prejudice the possible

application of sanctions as provided in the Charter. Just what con-

stitutes intervention and non-intervention has been, is now, and is

destined for many years to remain a matter of political opinion. At

what point do the international as well as internal affairs of a nation

become the legitimate concern of the whole international community?

Or, to reverse the question: at what point in its peace-making efforts

does the United Nations become a busybody and a meddler? Two

extreme tendencies can be seen in any answers or attempted answers.

The principle of non-intervention can be so interpreted as to deny

the United Nations (or the international community) sufficient au-

thority to perform its work properly. On the other hand, it could be

expanded in a degree that would deprive national states of their legiti-

mate right to determine their own affairs and solve their own problems.

Here we have one of the most basic questions in the science of

international relations. The United Nations must have sufficient au-

thority; the states must be protected from illegitimate interference.

Where is the dividing line? What norms are there?

1. The Case of Franco Spain

Two interesting cases in this respect came before the General
Assembly in its session in late 1946. These were charges involving

the regime of Generalissimo Franco in Spain and the treatment of

Indians in the Union of South Africa.

Since the ver>^ beginning of the Organization, the Government of

Spain, of which Franco is the head, has been the bete noir of a great

48



many Members. During the war the sympathies of Spanish officials

had been extended to the Axis, although Spain itself remained neutral.

It was asserted that the Franco regime was Fascist in nature, origin

and purpose, imposed upon the Spanish people with the help of the

Axis, and to that extent a threat to peace and an affront to liberty-loving

peoples everywhere. Special prosecutors in this respect were the Soviet

Union, France, and many Latin American countries, especially Mexico.

The Polish delegate brought up the issue before the Security Council,

where it was fully debated (in the absence of Spain, however). No

action was taken however, on account of a paradoxical veto interposed

by Gromyko who said the resolution proposed ‘doesn’t go far enough/'

Later the charge was raised anew in the Assembly, along with

a demand that every country break off diplomatic relations with Spain.

Finally, the Assembly called upon those states haying diplomatic rela-

tions with Spain to withdraw the heads of the diplomatic mission, on

the grounds of the Fascist nature of the Franco regime. A few states
dissented from this decision, notably Argentina and El Salvador, for

the reason that such action by the Assembly constituted unwarranted

interference in Spain's internal affairs, sc. pressure applied from the

outside to compel a change in government. This they regarded as a

very dangerous precedent.

The furore aroused over the Spanish question was a highly arti-

ficial one instigated by the very active Spanish exiles, with the generous

help of the communists all over the world. Both Great Britain and

the United States certainly do not intend to give the Soviet Union

an ideological foothold in strategic Spain. Such a course would be

political folly. At the same time the political tenets of the government

of Francisco Franco are completely out of harmony with the traditions

of Britain and America. The policy of these two countries has been

to welcome a change in the government of Spain, but without inter-

fering with the legitimate freedom of choice of the Spanish people and

most of all without precipitating another civil war.

But the principle involved in the Assembly's decision is significant.

It implies that the kind of internal regime of a country is a matter of

concern for the international community. If that is the case then it

may be applied also to other countries as well as to Spain. The violations

of human rights within the borders of a country have a significance



that go beyond those borders. As the Bishops said in 1944: ‘'The

ideology of a nation in its internal life is a concern of the international

community. To reject this principle is tantamount to maintaining that

the violation of the innate rights of men in a country by its own govern-

ment has no relation to world peace.” Mankind is linked by these

bonds of human rights. International solidarity rests upon them.

2. Indians in South Africa

At the General Assembly the delegate of India, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi

Pandit, complained that Indians in the Union of South Africa were the

victims of discrimination and mistreatment. These persons were de-

scendents of Indians brought years ago to South Africa to labor and

whose status was settled in agreements or alleged treaties between

India and the Union. In rebuttal, Marshal Jan Christiaan Smuts

contended that the United Nations had no right to take any action

in this case since it concerned domestic legislation and the persons on

whose behalf the complaint was brought were legally nationals of

South Africa, even though racially Indians. As for the international

agreements which were offered as grounds for the intervention of the

United Nations, he challenged the contention of India on the score that

they were not and could not be treaties setting up international obliga-

tions between India and the Union. He then asked that the Interna-

tional Court of Justice be asked for an advisory opinion whether this

question was a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of

the Union of South Africa. He was confident that the Court would

find in his favor.

Evidence seems rather compelling that in South Africa there pre-

vails a degree of race discrimination hardly matched anywhere in the

world.

Should the amelioration of this internal situation, if it exists as

described, be left for the South Africans to bring about by themselves

in their own good time? Or should the United Nations take it upon

itself to rebuke one of its member nations for violating the spirit of the

Charter? After long and sometimes bitter debate a relatively innocuous

resolution was passed stating that the treatment of Indians should be

in conformity with the agreements and the Charter, and asking for a

further report on this issue at the next meeting of the Assembly. The

50



Indian delegation was exultant. The South Africans were furious and

resentful. In their opinion they had been denied the fundamental right

of access to the Court and had been implicitly condemned without being

told what specific agreements or provisions of the Charter the Union

had broken. But by a two-thirds majority the Assembly decided to take

jurisdiction in this case. It decided on the broad rather than the narrow

interpretation of its rights in the internal affairs of countries where

human rights were concerned.

SOVEREIGNTY

The subject of intervention is just one aspect of the whole problem

of sovereignty. What is sovereignty? The sovereignty of a state is

its immunity from any law above itself. According to the principles

of international law since the time of Bodin in the seventeenth century,

each nation is the final judge in its own case. This doctrine is more

commonly called the doctrine of ‘‘absolute sovereignty,’’ to emphasize

complete immunity from a superior law which is enforceable without

the consent of the state.

Such a conception of the rights of states is incompatible with the

notion of a world of law. Many persons have even gone so far as to say

that “world government” which completely extinguishes sovereignty

is the only road to a world order based on justice and law. Without

going that far it is certainly evident that there is no chance of effective

international law as long as every nation insists on its right to be final

judge in every case affecting itself.

Speaking technically, the United Nations actually has diminished

the scope of sovereignty as it had been understood in previous decades.

The Security Council possesses powers that in former days would have

been considered unwarranted derogations of the sovereignty of the mem-

bers against whom action is authorized. In addition the “principle of

unanimity” which prevailed in the League of Nations out of deference

to this principle of sovereignty has been abandoned. In the General

Assembly today decisions are by a two-thirds majority of those present

and voting.

But the whittling-down of sovereignty has not proceeded at fast

enough pace. One of the criticisms of the American proposals for the

international control of atomic energy has been that the proposed Author-

51



ity violates sovereignty. “I deem it necessary to emphasize/’ said Soviet

Delegate Andrei A. Gromyko to the Atomic Energy Commission of the

United Nations on March 5, “that granting broad rights and powers of

such a kind to 'the control organ is incompatible with the sovereignty

of the state. Therefore, such proposals are unacceptable and must be

rejected as unfounded.”

Now there is no doubt that the Baruch proposals contemplate in-

ternational action that flies in the face of sovereignty. Never before

had any proposal involved such international power over internal

matters. But as was sufficiently shown above when this program was

described, there is no other way of effectively meeting the problem

raised by the discovery of this unprecedented weapon of mass destruc-

tion. So strong, however, is the doctrine and practice of absolute

sovereignty imbedded in the structure of international society that not

even the fear of an atomic weapons race appears sufficient to shake it.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Discuss four possible attitudes or policies that were possible for

the Western Powers in respect to the USSR during the war.

What policy was eventually adopted?

2. Do you think it is possible to cooperate with Communist Russia

without jeopardizing Christian values?

3. What prospects or problems would face the Western World if it

decided to get along without Russia?

4. What is meant by the “unanimity of the Great Powers?” Give

the history and meaning of the veto in the Security Council.

5. Is it true to say that the United States also clings to the veto

power? Why?

6.. What is the “principle of non-intervention?” Why is this one of
the basic questions in the science of international relations?

7. Discuss this principle as applied to the cases of Franco Spain and

the Union of South Africa.

8. Is it desirable or not desirable for the United Nations to take

the broad interpretation of its rights to deal with the internal

affairs of nations? What issues are involved in each answer?

9. What is sovereignty? What is the principle of absolute sover-

eignty? Why is this principle incompatible with the rule of law?

10.

Discuss the application of the principle of sovereignty in relation

to atomic energy control.

52



CHAPTER VIII

International Law, Criminal and Other

Conspiring^ Initiating^ Waging a War of Aggression^^

One of the most serious criticisms of the United Nations Charter

is that it lays more stress on peace than on justice. It was as though

a peace not based on justice could be a real peace worthy of the name.

The belittling of justice was starkly evident in the original draft pre-

pared by the great powers at Dumbarton Oaks. It was said that

justice is a broad concept, lacking in clarity, whereas a threat to peace

among nations is a visible condition and more likely to obtain the

general concern of nations. National politics is tolerant of evils and

injustices in other lands until these begin to constitute a threat to

our own interests or security.

Changes at San Franciseo

There could be nothing more disastrous and mistaken than for

peoples and their governments to imagine that a lasting peace can be

built without regard to justice.

Fortunately good sense and the instinctive urge to justice found ex-

pression at San Francisco and the Charter emerged strengthened as a

juridical document. As the result of the representations of many dele-

gations, the purposes of the Charter are now “to bring about by

peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and

international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes

. . (Italics indicate clauses added.) In the article denoted to the

principles one pregnant phrase was introduced into the draft text:

“All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful

means in such a manner that international peace and security, and

justice, are not endangered.’* In the declaration of intent expressed

53



by the preamble the peoples of the United Nations are determined

“to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obli-

gations arising from treaties and other sources of international law

can be maintained. . . ^ Further, the San Francisco Conference added

to the Assembly’s assigned responsibilities that of making studies and

recommendations for the purpose of “encouraging the progressive

development of international law and its codification.” In these ways

the power-minded draft of the Big Three at Dumbarton Oaks became

at San Francisco a juridical instrument.

How to Get Justice

There has always been general agreement that justice is a founda-

tion of civil society, national as well as international. Law is a pro-

tection against the encroachment of might. Law has proved time and

again to be, in the end, more powerful than might. It administers

justice without regard to expediency or the accidents of politics.

There are several ways of getting justice done:

1. By having recourse to one’s private efforts to seize what is right-

fully ours. There are occasions when this can be defended as the only

way to get justice. But it is “taking the law into one’s hands” and is

wide open to abuse and self-deception.

2. By having recourse to politics, through the help of political power.

Many a true claim has been achieved through the control of the political

machinery, e.g., through electoral reforms, by pressure on the govern-

ment. The winning over of a political leader to one’s point of view

is a means of vindicating rights. But this method, too, can be abused

since politics is directed at reaching specific temporal ends which may

or may not be the right ends. At least governmental intervention is

prima facie evidence in our favor.

3. By having recourse to law- Here for the first time our claim

is examined on its merits and the achieving of our rights is not bound

up with our private power to take what is rightfully ours. In human

society we have not been able to discover a safer or more equitable

method of promoting justice among the citizens of this earth.

In the international field nations have relied heavily on their own

54



power to secure or to maintain what they claim is their's. And thereby

hangs a tale of power politics.

Therefore more and more the nations are trying to realize a

political vehicle to get what they want. They have felt the need of
.

an international forum for the discussion of their claims. Their desires

are clothed in the authoritative decisions of an international body.

Although this method involves compromise and negotiation and seldom

gets us all we think is ours by rights, it is an orderly and peaceful

procedure. Such decisions are prima facie evidence of the rectitude

of our claims.

A higher goal is necessary still. Until nations can rest their cause
upon justice without implicit reference to military power or political

influence there will always be lacking some of the perfection that civil

society within nations already has, sc, a system of law whose ultimate

efficacy rests upon the merits of the case and not on the actual poses-

sion of power.

Law ^^Inter-Nations*'

One may perhaps be tempted at this juncture to exclaim: ‘'There-

fore we need world government That would be jumping to con-

clusions. The development of international law does not consist of

a process reducing it to the same category as the domestic law of the

national states. It is by no means clear that justice between nations

can only be established by transforming international law into “muni-

cipal law,’’ as it is termed. International law is law fw/^r-nations. Its

development and codification consists in laying down legal norms in

precise language so that they may serve as practical norms for the

conduct of states and as common gauges of the rights and wrongs of

international policy. Enforceability, or the police power, is a secondary

‘matter. The prime necessity is an accepted legal code of conduct by

which the nations may be judged—by world opinion before they are
judged by the sword.

Codifying Nuremberg

On December 13, 1946 the General Assembly established a Com-

mission on the Development and Codification of International Law,

comprising seventeen members. This was not an original venture. A

55



commission of this kind had been at work under the League of Nations,

but without conspicuous success. But the attempt is being continued

with the conviction that the United Nations could hardly perform a

greater service to world order. One of the first . steps taken to his

end by the Assembly was to support and affirm the principles on which

the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials were conducted. The commission

will regard it as a matter of primary importance to formulate the

Nuremberg principles in a general codification of offenses against the

peace and security of mankind. It is the beginning of an International

Criminal Code. One of the most importaat and difficult parts—largely
neglected at Nuremberg—of this task is that of defining ‘^aggression.^’

What were the principles of international law recognized and em-

ployed by the International War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg?

Two revolutionary ones are of special importance:

1. That aggressive war is an international crime.

2. That individuals chiefly responsible may not plead immunity

from prosecution on the score that such actions were ‘‘acts of state” or

commands of superiors.

The Nuremberg indictment also charged the Nazis big-wigs with

violations of the laws of war. Chief interest, however, rests on the

two principles of criminality and of individual responsibility for aggres-

sive war itself.

Hasn’t aggressive war always been a crime? To say that such a

war is an international crime means that it is an offense, a) punishable,

b) in virtue of international law. That is to say, such a war is not

only morally wrong and also legally unjust, but in addition criminal.

Previously wars between states had always presumed, in law, the good

faith of the belligerents. A greedy monarch may have been morally
wrong in coveting his neighbor’s rich lands. That was no concern of

the international lawyer. Or his action could even be objectively illegal,

in violation of a clear treaty for which damages could be exacted by

the injured state. But it never entered the mind of international law

to call this a criminal offense, which would make the culprit an outlaw

from the world community. In short, no state could commit a crime,

much less could heads of states or their chief ministers be punished

for their criminal actions.

56



Therefore at Nuremberg, the Nazi defendants were being accused

of a crime which was not a crime at the time they initiated the war.

The criticism thereupon was made that Goering, Ribbentrop, etc., were

being tried on a ex post facto law or a law that was promulgated after

the fact.

Making the Punishment Fit the Crime

The situation at Nuremberg may be best understood by admitting

frankly that international law was at a crossroads. Here were culprits

who deserved the severest penalties. But on what procedures? Three

courses were possible:

1. Hang them under the penalties provided for the small war

crimes (murders, atrocities, etc.) which already existed in international

law. But that meant their guilt for the larger crime of launching an

aggressive war would go untried, unjudged and unpunished.

2. Hang them (or shoot them) summarily and extra-legally, while

appealing for the sanction of world opinion. But in that case inter-

national law would not even be considered.

3. Mobilize the full legal apparatus of law and make an experi-

ment in new procedures to face this unprecedented challenge to law

and order.

For some time in the early years of the war the Allies seemed to

favor the second course. There no apparent effort to decide by what

procedures this task was to be accomplished. But on August 8, 1945

an agreement was signed by the United States, Great Britain, the

Soviet Union and France, setting up an International War Crimes

Tribunal based on the policy that the whole weight of international

law should be brought to bear on the Nazi leaders for their chief

crime, sc, that of conspiring, initiating and waging aggressive war.

»

The Break with Juridical Positivism

The crisis faced at Nuremberg was not a crisis in law, precisely.

It was a crisis in legal philosophy. Here were men being tried indi-

vidually for a deed which at the time they performed it was neither

a crime according to the contemporary views of international law, nor

57



a deed for which they personally could be held responsible. In short,

was international society so irrationally constituted that it could . not

provide any juridical means for its own defense? Was the fact that

no written human law covering these offenses existed at the time to be

permitted to frustrate an injured world conscience?

If the answer was Yes, then legal positivism had run into a dead-

end. This theory recognizes no law except what is written in the

black and white of human enactments. It recognizes no law but that

laid down by governments. The decision reached and sentence

executed at Nuremberg implies a definite break from the philosophy

of legal positivism. Although many cogent arguments were brought

forward at Nuremberg, on the basis of existing positive law (such as

the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war, or the Geneva Protocol

—

which never came into force), the validity of the case at Nuremberg

rested finally in the appeal to that law that precedes all human laws.

As Father Edmund A. Walsh has written (AMERICA, November 9,

1946) : “As truth is not created by the mind but is apprehended, so

justice is sought by law, not created by it.’^’ He added, “The irrational

application of an axiom of municipal and constitutional law to the

unheard-of and undreamed-of enormities revealed at Nuremberg would

have been indeed a self-refutation of juridical positivism as well as an

insult to intelligence.’’ In the same issue the dilemma was put like this

by Gustav Gundlach, S.J. : “If, in the case in hand, we agree to be

led by juridical positivism to demand positive statutes as an absolute

necessity, we arrive at the following conclusion. On the one hand we

are confronted by the clearly established fact of crimes and their ines-

capable liability to punishment; on the other, by the absolute impos-

sibility of society’s taking any action for lack of any positive interna-

tional norms. . . . Such a situation is absurd and indicates the

self-refutation of juridical positivism.”

It is significant to note than in the General Assembly this thought

was recognized by an eminent jurist of international standing, J. M.

Yepes of Columbia, who, on December 11, 1946, told the delegates:

“The trial of war criminals at Nuremberg shows us the way to

follow, because this historic trial is a confirmation of the philosophic

doctrine according to which law is anterior to and superior to the

State. It was enough to invoke at Nuremberg the norms of objective

law and of the moral law to find immediately a law applicable to a

case which had not been foreseen by any positive legislation.”

58 •



The Crime of Genocide; Crimes Against Humanity

The United Nations has also taken steps to declare genocide an

international crime. What is genocide? Genocide has been defined

by Professor Raphael Lemkin as ‘‘the deliberate destruction of racial,

religious or national groups, through systematic means, co-ordinated

on a large scale against members of those groups, and resulting directly

in deprivation and prevention of life, physical debilitation, moral de-

basement or total obliteration of a culture or a religion.^’ Genocide

is not only a crime against human groups, not only the definite killing

of certain groups, but it may also take other forms such as compulsory

abortion, separation of wife and husband, in order to prevent the con-

tinued existence of the group. Such denial of the right of existence to

entire human groups is more than mere murder, more than mass

murder. It is not simply atrocity. The crime envisioned here was

brought to its highest perfection by the Nazis in their systematic

attempt to exterminate or fatally wound the Poles, Jews, Russians and

Gypsies as races. It has come into being with the rise of the all-powerful

totalitarian system which knows no moral scruples or political safe-

guards against the plans of the controlling clique. Such a crime, as the

General Assembly states, “shocks the conscience of mankind, results

in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contri-

butions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to the

moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations.’^ Of

course the mere declaration of the General Assembly does not suffice

to make genocide an international crime, much less preclude genocide

being perpetrated. But it is an essential first step.

The Nuremberg verdict reached other important decisions in con-

victing the Nazi leaders. Count Four in the charges against them

was crimes against humanity. This meant “murder, extermination,

enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts committed against

an entire population, before or during the war; or persecution on

political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection

with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether or

not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.’*

Crimes against humanity are crimes committed within the territory of

an aggressor state on its own population during a war of aggression.

These are crimes connected with the war. The underlying philosophy

is that a government waging aggressive war might endeavor to destroy

its potential opposition, from religious, political or intellectual circles,

through crimes. That happened in Nazi Germany. Crimes against

59



humanity are within a postwar jurisdiction organized by victorious

powers. It is important to note the difference between genocide and

crimes against humanity. Genocide can be committed in peace and

war; crimes against humanity only in war and by an aggressor state

against its own nationals. In the case of both the crime of genocide

and crimes against- humanity, the persecution of religious groups or

religious leaders looms large.

Shortcomings of the Trial

Aside from the complaint that the crimes charged to the defendents

(at least those referring to aggressive war) were ex post facto

^

one

particular criticism is heard. That arises from the fact that among

the judges sat the representative of the Soviet Union. A few years
earlier the USSR had embarked on an invasion of Finland that the

world roundly condemned as sheer aggression and for which Russia

was expelled from the League. And shortly afterwards Russia and

Germany joined in a pact to divide Poland. It is asked what kind of

justice is done when such a countty is allowed to sit judging aggressors?

The participation of that country seemed to make a mockery of the

triaL

The lawyers’ answer to such a complaint would be that one can

only judge those who have been indicted and that participation as

judge and accuser does not invalidate the court’s decision just because

the officials were themselves guilty of another crime of the same kind.

It was not the concern of the Nuremberg Tribunal that, for reasons

not touching the case in hand, the Soviet Union and its leaders had

not been indicted. What the criticism really amounts to is that at

Nuremberg justice had not been done adequately, that not all criminals

have yet been apprehended, nor all crimes avenged.

Therefore the pertinent question out of Nuremberg is not the

legitimacy of the trial or the completeness of its judgment, but the

good faith of the accusers. Are the victors-turned-judges willing to

have the same international law turned against themselves that was

applied for the first time to the Nazis? This is the real debate and

only the future will give the answer. The Allies will have to prove

their sincerity by adhering in the future to the standards they them-

selves have established for others, and by their efforts to see that all

criminals receive condign punishment. Coming years will enable thp

world to know how to judge the Nuremberg judges.

60



tvhat Profit Nuremberg?

The Nuremberg trials will not prevent war. Establishing the

beginnings of an international criminal code is not the* same thing as

creating an international police. An international police force is still

very far in the future. Nuremberg did not even define aggression.

But, totalling up, international law is now armed with sharper tools

to perform its functions. New principles and procedures have been

introduced into the legal thinking of the world. The effect of these

principles and procedures will be to better equip international law to

set up standards for world conduct. International law is not created

by method of legislation. It can grow only through development and

its most rapid growth takes place at the turning points of history. The

aggressions of World War II were one of those turning points. As

far as we can judge today international law is the better for Nurem-

berg. And with law comes justice. ‘‘The work of justice is peace.’*^

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What important changes were made in the Charter at San Fran-

cisco ?

2. Enumerate three ways of getting justice done.

3. Why is recourse to law the highest form of achieving our rights?
4. Does the perfection of international law necessarily lead to world

government ?

5. What were the principles of international law at Nuremberg?

6. What is meant by saying that aggressive war is an international

crime ?

7. What different ways were there of dealing with the Nazi war

criminals ?

8. What is legal positivism?

9. Why was the crisis at Nuremberg in effect a crisis in legal

philosophy ?

10. Discuss “genocide^’ and “crimes against humanity,** as treated

at Nuremberg.

11. In your opinion what were the defects of the Nuremberg War

Crimes Tribunal?

12. What positive and lasting good was accomplished at Nuremberg?

61



CHAPTER IX

How Catholics View the United Nations

Progress Towards the Ideal

The creation of the United Nations did not outmode the bi-lateral

diplomatic negotiations and agreements that have been customary be-

tween nations for centuries. Still less did it relieve each government

from the obligation of examining its foreign policy in the light of

justice and decency, even prior to any reference to the general organi-

zation. Nevertheless, more and more international life will converge

on the common agency established for the joint maintenance of inter-

national peace and security. The moral ideals of international life

must sooner or later find their focus in the United Nations. How does

the United Nations stand in the eyes of Catholics? Does it correspond

to the traditions of Christianity and to the full demands of a right and

moral world order?

The Natural International Society

It is general Catholic teaching, based especially on the spiritual

solidarity of the human race, that there exists a natural international

community quite independently of any adventitious agreements among

statesmen. As recently as February 2, 1947 a committee appointed by

the National Catholic Welfare Conference declared in their ‘^Bill of

Rights”: “The human family constitutes an organic unity or a world

society. The states of the world have the right and the duty to asso-

ciate and to organize in the international community for their common

welfare.”

62



Organizing This Society; Shortcomings

But between the general framework of the natural society of

nations and the particular terms of a charter there is a large gap.

It is no surprise therefore that there is much to criticize in the

San Francisco Charter. The striking critique of the American Bishops,

previously mentioned, which dealt at length with the defects of the

draft charter prepared by the Big Four at Dumbarton Oaks, is a

sample of the reservations entertained by Catholics. These same

Bishops, writing a year later in support of American ratification, said

that ‘‘the Charter which emerged from the San Francisco Conference,

while undoubtedly an improvement on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals,

does not provide for a sound, institutional organization of the inter-

national society.’’ Nevertheless, they went on to say, “our country

acted wisely in deciding to participate in this world organization.”

This position must be distinguished from two quite opposite view-

points current among some Americans. One of these schools of thought

believes that a strong world body is an unwarranted invasion of the

legitimate independence of states. In short, they are unsympathetic to

the very principle on which any world organization could be based.

The other group takes the approach that the United Nations should

not be criticized under any circumstances.

Constructive Criticism of U,N.

That explains why Catholic students of the United Nations while

fully in sympathy with the aims and spirit of the new Organization

and while ready at all times to further its interests, feel at liberty to

call attention to its shortcomings. With the Bishops, they feel that it

is still more like an alliance of nations or a pure “machine” for settling

disputes. In their opinion this is in effect a denial of an objective order

of justice which serves as the basis for true juridical obligations. As

proof of this suspicion they allege the veto prerogatives of the perma-

nent members of the Security Council. This seems to put the great

powers above the law and to undermine the conception of equal en-

forcement of the law. They believe, too, that the world court should

have more than purely advisory functions. They think that an inter-

national organization should consider the ideology of a nation as a

matter of international concern and that the cloak of sovereignty should

not be allowed to shield domestic tyrants from punishment. Until

63



these and other changes are made in the San Francisco Charter, the

full demands of Christian ethics will not be met.

It is of course obvious that no charter, operating in the political

field as every peace organization must, will ever really meet the rigid

requirements of all justice and charity. But out of these criticisms

have grown the desire to amend the Charter so as to transform it into

a more nearly perfect instrument of international cooperation based on

juridical principles. It is likely that a constitutional convention will

be called in 1955, ten years after the coming into force of the San

Francisco Charter. In the interim the real task is to see that the

United Nations adheres to the good principles it already professes.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. How does the United Nations stand in the eyes of Catholics?

2. What is the natural international society?

3. Is the United Nations the juridical organizing of this community?

Explain.

4. What are the shortcomings of this juridical organizing as compared

with the theoretical perfection of the international community?

5. What has been the attitude of the American hierarchy towards the

United Nations?

6. Is this statement correct: ‘^American Catholics are in full sym-

pathy with the United Nations, both in theory an<d in practice; but

they reserve the right also to criticize what they regard as its in-

trinsic moral shortcomings.*’ Discuss.

7. Distinguish the attitude of most Catholics from two other view-

points, each opposite to the other.

8. Enumerate a few of the major criticisms of the United Nations

Charter. What can be done about these defects?

64



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