DIPLOMATIC

RELATIONS

WITH THE

VATICAN

ROBERT A. GRAHAM, S. J

ROBERT C. HARTNETT, S.J

Edited by Charles Keenan, S. J.

AN AMERICA PRESS PUBLICATION



ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . .

.

0

Rev. Robert C. Hartnett, S.J., Editor-in-Chief of

America and the Catholic Mind, was formerly director

of the Department of Political Science at the University

of Detroit. He is author of the America Press booklets

Equal Rights for Children and Federal Aid to Education.

Rev. Robert A. Graham. S.J., contributing editor of

America, studied at the Institute of Higher Studies in

Geneva, where his special subject was the diplomatic

relations of the Holy See. He is author of The Rise of

the Double Diplomatic Corps in Rome. A Study in Inter-

national Practice (see bibliography).

Prof. Edward S. Corwin, emeritus McCormick pro-

fessor of jurisprudence at Princeton University, is the

author of many books on the U. S. Constitution and con-

stitutional law.

AMERICA, The National Catholic Weekly Review, is pub-
lished by The America Press, 70 East 45th Street, New York
17. For information or sample copies address Circulation

Manager.



DIPLOMATIC

RELATIONS

with the

VATICAN

by

ROBERT A. GRAHAM, S.J.

and

ROBERT C. HARTNETT, S.J.

Edited by Charles Keenan, S.J.

THE AMERICA PRESS

70 East 45th Street, New York 17, N. Y.



Nihil Obstat: John M. A. Fearns, S.T.D.,

Censor Librorum

Imprimcuur: ijp Francis Cardinal Spellman, B.D.

Archbishop of New York

January 15, 1952

The NikU Ohstat and Imprimatur are official declarations that a bodt

or pamphlet is free of doctrinal or moral error. No implication is

contained therein that those who have granted the Nihil Obstat and

Imprimatur agree with the contents, opinions or statements expressed.

(This formula is now in general use in the Archdiocese of New York)



CONTENTS

Part I: The Issues

By Robert C. Hartnett^ SJ.

1. The State of the Question 5

2. Advantages to the United States 12

Part II: The Vatican in the Diplomatic World

By Robert A. Graham, SJ.

3. The Experience of France 18

4. Protestant States: Prussia and Britain 23

5. The Failure of “Informal” Relations 29

6. Objections of the National Council of Churches 35

Appendix A. Statement of Prof. Edward S. Corwin .. .. 41

Appendix B. States Represented at the Vatican 44

Bibliography 46





1. The State of the Question

It is not the purpose of this booklet to “prove” that

the United States should have an Ambassador at the Vatican.

President Truman has said that he considers such an appoint-

ment “in the national interest” of the United States. He made

this statement on October 20, 1951, when submitting to the

Senate the name of Gen. Mark W. Clark as the proposed

Ambassador. Later, on January 13, 1952, when Mr. Truman

announced that General Clark’s name, at the General’s own

request, had been withdrawn from nomination, the President

added that he planned “to submit another nomination at a

later date.”

It is not the purpose of this booklet to “prove” that the

President is correct in his judgment that our “national inter-

est” requires the appointment of an Ambassador, or that the

Senate should confirm the person whom the President nomi-

nates in succession to General Clark. Much less does this

booklet propose to deal with the extraneous “political” reasons

Mr. Truman is charged with having had in making and timing

the appointment.

What then is the precise purpose of this booklet? It is an

essay in clarification of an important public issue. The Presi-

dent of the United States has made a proposal of no small

moment. That proposal deserves to be debated on its merits.

This booklet will attempt to set forth the chief issues involved

in such a debate. The present chapter sets forth the history

of the question and the line-up of proponents and opponents

of the proposed ambassadorship.

5



Here is the complete text of the President’s statement of

October 20, 1951:

The President has decided that it is in the national

interest for the United States to maintain diplomatic

representation at the Vatican.

He has therefore nominated General Mark W. Clark

to be Ambassador to the State of Vatican City.

During the war, the late President Roosevelt ap-

pointed Mr. Myron Taylor as the personal representa-

tive of the President to His Holiness the Pope.

During and after the war the Taylor mission per-

formed an extremely useful service not only in the

field of diplomacy but in the amelioration of human

suffering. That service is set forth in official corre-

spondence published from time to time.

The President feels that the purposes of diplomacy

and humanitarianism will be served by this appoint-

ment.

It is well known that the Vatican is vigorously en-

gaged in the struggle against communism. Direct

diplomatic relations will assist in coordinating the

effort to combat the Communist menace.

Thirty-seven other nations have for a great many

years maintained at the Vatican diplomatic representa-

tives.

The President was thus exercising an ordinary prerogative of

his office (“He . . . shall appoint Ambassadors . . .”). He

acted in pursuance of entirely proper, indeed, of momentous

purposes. He was proposing that the United States do what

is commonly done by nations active in the field of inter-

national diplomacy.

One could have expected considerable debate on this pro-

posal, however, not only because the United States has never

had a full Ambassador to the Vatican but because the “State

of Vatican City,” as the center of a universal religious organi-

zation, occupies a unique position in the diplomatic world.

It involves more than ordinary questions of diplomatic rep-

resentation.

6



On the other hand, one might naturally have expected that

this proposal would be debated on its merits. Is the Vatican

both de facto and de jure a “state”? Is it recognized as such

by most nations and by jurists? Is its influence, in the moral

crisis of our time, such that “direct diplomatic representa-

tion” at the Vatican would strengthen U. S. leadership of the

free world in the titanic struggle against materialistic totali-

tarianism? Are other means available by which the United

States could achieve the same ends?

For reasons which will be stated presently, the campaign

of opposition to the appointment has not undertaken to meet

the proposal on its merits. Protestants are determined that

the United States shall not accord what they call “preferential

treatment” to one religious body (the Catholic).

History of the Question

Chiefly for commercial reasons, the United States appointed

a citizen of Rome, Giovanni Battista Sartori, U. S. consul to

the Papal States as far back as 1797. We kept a consular agent

in Rome until 1870.

In 1848, under President Polk, we set up more formal rela-

tions with the Papal States by maintaining a Minister-Resident

there until 1868.

In 1870 the Pope was deprived of his temporal realm when

Italian troops occupied Rome. The Popes thereupon became

“prisoners of the Vatican” in protest. This de facto situation

remained until, under the Lateran Treaty of 1929, Italy recog-

nized the political sovereignty of the State of Vatican City.

This tiny state, with a population of about one thousand per-

sons, occupies an area of only 108.7 acres. The old Papal

States, with a population of 3 million, occupied 16,000 square

miles. Between 1870 and 1929 the problem of the exact juridical

position of the Holy See perplexed international lawyers, but

the Pope’s right of diplomatic representation was generally

recognized even during that period.

7



On December 23, 1939, President Roosevelt suggested to

Pope Pius XII that he would like to send ‘‘a personal repre-

sentative in order that our parallel endeavors for peace and

the alleviation of suffering may be assisted.” He thereupon

appointed Myron C. Taylor, an Episcopalian. Thus began

what Mr. Roosevelt called the “both special and temporary”

Taylor mission. It was continued under President Truman

from April, 1945 to August, 1950, when Mr. Taylor resigned

and was not replaced.

Protestant Opposition

Protestant opposition to diplomatic representation at the

Vatican dates chiefly from the Taylor mission. The Federal

Council of Churches, it is true, publicly announced its ap-

proval of the Taylor mission, but only as “strictly temporary,

unofiicial and centrally concerned with efforts for world peace.”

Mr. Roosevelt himself wrote the Council on March 14, 1940:

. . . There of course was not the slightest intention

to raise any question relating to the union of the func-

tions of Church and State, and it is difficult for me

to believe that anyone could take seriously a contrary

view.

However, Baptists, Lutherans and others called the Taylor

mission “un-American.”

Meetings looking to the formation of “Protestants and Other

Americans United for Separation of Church and State in

America” sprang from Mr. Taylor’s appointment. Spokesmen

for POAU, formally organized in 1948, have since waged a

campaign against it.

The major impetus to the opposition seems to have come

from Paul Blanshard’s American Freedom and Catholic Power

X1949) and Communism^ Democracy and Catholic Power

(1951), which picture the Catholic Church as a “threat” to

American democracy and even a blood brother of Soviet im-

perialism. Unfortunately, it has become increasingly difficult

to disentangle Protestant opposition to diplomatic relations

8



with the Vatican from the far-flung Blanshard-POAU-Southern

Masonic assault on the Catholic Church in general as more

akin to Communist totalitarianism than to democracy. Protes-

tant opponents of the former (representation) have taken no

positive steps to disassociate themselves from the latter (assault

on Catholicism as “un-American”). Many of them are identi-

fied with Blanshardism. As a result, opposition to diplomatic

relations has taken on the color of bitter sectarian prejudice.

In October, 1950, a prominent Protestant leader announced

that American Protestants planned a nation-wide campaign

of opposition to a representative to the Vatican. On “Reforma-

tion Sunday,” October 28, 1951, the radio waves quivered

with what sounded like very sectarian resentment of the Clark

appointment.

On October 31, 1951, the National Council of Churches, con-

sisting of eighty representatives of twenty-nine denominations,

issued a formal “Statement” opposing the appointment. It

revealed that NCCC leaders had exerted considerable pressure

upon the President, “over several years,” against renewing

the Taylor mission. Information Service (weekly bulletin of

NCCC) for December 1, however, very honestly suggested,

after consultation with constitutional authorities, that Protes-

tants drop their strictly constitutional objections, based on

“separation of Church and State” as derived from the First

Amendment, and discuss only the question of “public policy.”

Focusing on the issue of “public policy” involves the re-

sponsibility of canvassing the possible advantages of diplo-

matic representation and carefully analyzing the fears of “dis-

astrous” consequences conjured up even by NCCC. This book-

let aims to do both.

Support of the Proposal

Without having staged any campaign in favor of the ap-

pointment, the Catholic press has generally approved it.

9



Catholic editors think the President’s reasons for it are valid.

Although some secular newspapers have regarded the ap-

pointment as “too divisive,” an impressive array has lined up

in support of the President: the New York Timesj the Cleve-

land Plain Dealer^ the Detroit Free Press, the Boston Daily

Globe, the Louisville Courier-Journal (published by Mark

Etheridge, a diplomat of considerable experience) and Times,

the Jackson (Miss.) Daily Times and the Manchester (N. H.)

Union and Leader, and other dailies.

Only a few Catholic bishops have taken public stands in

favor of the appointment. Bishop Swint of Wheeling (W. Va.)

and Bishop Zuroweste of Bellville (111.) have cautioned their

flocks not to engage in bitter discussion. Bishop Noll of Fort

Wayne (Ind.) has declared that the issue never came up in

all the annual meetings of the American hierarchy he has

attended.

Two prominent non-Catholic diplomats have come out for

the appointment—Arthur Bliss Lane, former U. S. Ambas-

sador to Poland, and James G. McDonald, former U. S. Am-

bassador to Israel.

The Living Church, Episcopal Church weekly, editorialized

in its November 4 issue to the effect that the manner of the

appointment was “inept,” but that (in effect) the editors were

not impressed by the kind of reasoning employed in the NCCC

“Statement.” The editorial remarked that three non-Catholic

professors at Yale Divinit)^ School favored our having diplo-

matic relations with the Vatican. Here and there Protestant

ministers have condemned the outbursts of their colleagues.

(The Jews, though somewhat opposed, have formed no united

front)

.

Chances of Confirmation

Since the Protestant campaign of opposition will not be

offset by any countervailing Catholic campaign, it is quite

possible that whoever the President may nominate will not be

10



confirmed. Senator Tom Connally (D., Texas), chairman of

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has announced his

opposition to the appointment of an envoy and will doubtless

use his great power to stymie the confirmation. Senators from

all States, especially those predominantly Protestant in popu-

lation, will be subjected to extremely strong political pressure

to vote against confirmation.

What do the American people as a whole think of U. S.

diplomatic relations with the Vatican? A Gallup poll of August

11, 1950 favored renewal of the Taylor mission, 45 to 13 per

cent. The Minnesota poll of July 2, 1950 favored it 42 to 29

per cent. As a result of the Protestant campaign of opposi-

tion last fall, the Minnesota poll for December 9, 1951 ran

against sending an Ambassador to the Vatican, 46 to 32 per

cent, Protestant opposition having risen 20 per cent. Only one

per cent took advantage of the opportunity to give a “quali-

fied” reply by saying that they would approve a personal

representative but not an Ambassador, so that is hardly the

issue.

Rev. Robert A. Graham’s contributions to this booklet ap-

peared originally as articles in America, national Catholic

weekly review. Dr. Edward S. Corwin’s statement on the con-

stitutional issue, reprinted here with permission, first appeared

as a letter to the New York Times, November 12, 1951. Both

authors make a valuable contribution to the discussion of

the proposal to have formal U. S. diplomatic relations with

the Vatican as a question of “public policy,” without in any

way exaggerating the significance of the issue.

11



2. Advantages to the United States

DR. EDWARD S. CORWIN has said in his statement

on the constitutionality of our establishing diplomatic rela-

tions with the Vatican, this step is a ‘‘logical addendum” to

our postwar foreign policy (see p. 41, below).

To understand how this move fits in with our foreign policy

it is necessary to recall an observation Chancellor Bismarck,

the prince of realists, liked to repeat. In applying foreign policy

(he used to say) the “imponderables” are often more decisive

than gold or military power. Experience had taught the “Iron

Chancellor” that it was not enough to accumulate money, men

and materieL

American authorities have come to the same conclusion.

Paul G. Hoffman, American business leader who successfully

administered the Marshall Plan, wrote a book last year called

Peace Can Be Won. In it he inquired into the reasons why,

in spite of the political, economic and (somewhat belated)

military measures we have adopted since 1945, we have failed

to attain a secure peace. The first reason is that “it took most

of us too long to perceive” that the Soviet Union is bent on

world conquest “The second reason . . . lay in our inability

to grasp the magnitude of the program this [attaining a secure

peace] required.”

As a result of this costly lesson, Mr. Hoffman believes that

we must “wage the peace” on four, not three, fronts: the mili*

tary, economic, political and informational fronts. His ex-

perience with EGA in Europe impressed upon him how for-



midable an obstacle to U. S. policy is the skilful and expen-

sive propaganda campaign everywhere carried on by the Com-

mimists. The hesitancy of powerful groups in Europe to throw

their lot in with ours—a hesitancy which is revealed in news
dispatches every day—reinforces Mr. Hoffman’s conviction.
The series of six articles on this phase of our foreign policy,

contributed by Anthony Leviero to the New York Times, be-

ginning with the December 10, 1951 issue, leaves no doubt

about the alarming extent to which we have failed, not only to

win, but even to wage, the battle for men’s minds. Why have

we failed?

Suspicions of American Poucy

In the first place, too much of American propaganda has

glorified the materialistic side of American society. Boasting

about our telephones, automobiles and good food often causes

jealousy, resentment and disdain among peoples who cannot

afford the conveniences and luxuries we enjoy.

Moreover, the ^^underprivileged” peoples of the world, num-

bering far over a billion persons, naturally want assurances

that the future holds something better for them than the pov-

erty they have always known. But they do not want us to try to

Americanize their lives, even if we could. Even those who have,

to their regret, taken Communist propaganda at face value

were not dreaming of a future in the image of ‘Hhe American

way.” Marxism itself calls for great self-sacrifice. It does not

promise an easy life, but a better life. There is something

vaguely spiritual in what peoples everywhere are seeking: an

ordering of human society more in accordance with the dig-

nity of all of God’s children.

Communist propaganda, in fact, has scored great successes

by ridiculing the crudenesses of American life. They have

caused many millions of the world’s poor to jeer at the way

Hollywood idealizes cosmetics, hairdos, mink coats—and di-
vorce. The “little people” throughout this planet have much

13



more sense than to want to become tailpieces to this kind of kite.

Beyond wanting a better life for himself and his family,

what the ordinary European or Asiatic most hungers for are

peace and freedom.

In Western Europe, which has enjoyed the blessings of free-

dom for centuries and has had a comparatively high standard

of living, men want above all peace. The Communists have sue*

ceeded in causing serious doubts about whether the United

States really wants peace. When we overemphasize the military

side of our foreign policy, as we do by failing to keep rearma-

ment subordinated to the high moral purposes of our policies

in portraying our program to Europeans, we simply scare them

away. They doubt our desire for peace.

In Asia, the Middle East and Africa, where peoples have

for centuries been dominated by Western colonial Powers,

their great desire is for freedom and independence. Their

leaders keep blaming poverty on “foreign exploitation”—^the
exploitation of colored races by the “democratic” white race.

What such peoples need is proof that we respect them as equals

and will help them to achieve, preserve and strengthen their

freedom from outside domination. So far we have not succeeded

in persuading them that we share their aspirations and will

do whatever we can to see that such aspirations are realized.

Given these deeply rooted psychological attitudes on the

part of other peoples and our own bumbling attempts at propa-

ganda, it is easy to see how the Communists have been able to

caricature our intentions. We have not yet learned how to off-

set these caricatures.

Vatican Envoy as an Aid

The question whether we should establish formal diplomatic

relations with the Vatican should accordingly be judged in

view of the great problem it might help us to solve, that of

persuading the peoples of the world that our intentions are

what we sincerely believe them to be.

14



In regard to peace, Pope Pius XII, while certainly no paci-

fist, has let pass no occasion for warning the nations of their

solemn obligation to avoid the catastrophe of World War III.

True, in his 194f8 Christmas Message he condemned “neutral-

ism” in the face of ruthless aggression. But throughout the

whole world his voice is the voice of peace. Everyone knows

the Vatican has no military power and must rely entirely on

moral influence to achieve its spiritual purposes.

By establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican, the

United States would therefore go a long way towards proving

to the world that we respect the very institution in the West

which is everywhere identified with the tireless endeavor to

find peaceful solutions, based on morality and justice, to the

tensions which imperil peace. Unless we were interested in

cooperating with the Vatican, why should we want to have dip-

lomatic relations with it in the first place?

The effect of such a dramatic demonstration of our peaceful

intentions would be immense among the peoples of Europe, on

both sides of the Iron Curtain. The Vatican itself might run

the risk of being further exposed to Communist diatribes as-

sociating the Holy See with “Wall Street imperialists and war-

mongers.” But if, in the cause of peace, the Holy See is willing

to run that risk, its decision seems to offer us a great opportun-

ity to strengthen our foreign policy where it is weakest.

As for Asia and Africa, the Catholic Church is known for

the schools and health centers it has established. Catholic mis-

sionaries and scholars have, for generations, devoted their en-

tire lives to studying the history, culture and language (in-

cluding dialects) of the varied peoples in those regions. Mis-

sionaries have lived out their lives in remote villages, coming

to know the people and their ways as well as anyone ever can

enter into the innermost souls of remote folk. The Church’s

sole purpose has been to help, without thought of gain for

herself. The political, cultural and business leaders of Asiatic

peoples all know this. The United States can only profit in

15



prestige throughout those “continents of the future” by dip-

lomatic relations with a world-wide, nonpolitical institution

which has brought so many benefits to their peoples.

The “Listening Post”

Little need be said about the information value of a U. S.

embassy to the Vatican. The newspapers which support this

move (mentioned on p. 10) do so because, as experts in the

field of gathering information from all quarters of the globe,

they know from experience how valuable the Vatican is as a

“listening post.”

The Vatican has been in intimate contact with most of the

peoples of the world for centuries. It has been dealing with

the Arab world, for example, throughout most of the Christidn

era. It had missionaries in China and Japan centuries ago.

Name any people under the sun and you will find the Vati-

can “up” on its people, their history, their culture. Even from

behind the Iron Curtain information steadily trickles its way

to the Holy See. Frequently this information is what the United

States needs and cannot get

Isn’t it obvious that we can never have too much informa^

tion about all the peoples and areas on this planet? Should we

deny ourselves access to a prime source of information about

them?

Any Reasons Against It?

Objections on the score of “violation of Church and State”

and “undermining a sacred American tradition” seem to be

products of emotion and imagination rather than of reason.

The National Council of Churches admits that no constitutional

question is involved. We had a personal representative of the

President without any discernible loss in religious liberty here.

The argument that the United States would be giving “pref-

erential treatment” to one religious group seems to assume

that diplomatic relations with the Vatican will somehow bene-

16



fit American Catholics. No one has pointed out just how.

American Catholics are unaware of any such benefit.

Is the simple act of recognizing the Vatican for what it is

—as thirty-seven other nations have done, including nations
where Protestantism is the established religion—conferring
some kind of special favor? The Holy See is unique. As a safe-

guard for the independent exercise of its universal religious

mission, it enjoys a minimum but nevertheless real temporal

sovereignty. Nobody denies that. Protestants are determined

that we shall not take official cognizance of this fact. Yielding to

such religious prejudices and pressures seems to come much

closer to “preferential treatment” than sending an envoy,

which would not change the status of the Vatican one whit.

The Vatican is what it is, regardless of whether or not we

send an Ambassador.

There is just one argument that has some political import-

ance. Protestant spokesmen predict that sending an envoy will

“disrupt American unity.” This can mean only one thing: if

the Senate confirms a Presidential nomination, Protestants

will never cease making a bitter issue of it. This is like labor’s

protesting that if the Taft-Hartley Act were adopted, labor

would refuse to accept the democratic decision and never

cease to try to split the country wide open over the issue. Labor

seemed determined to do just that, but its opposition has finally

subsided.

In any case, can we conduct our foreign policy in this way,

backing away from actions that seem to be in the national

interest but which will, in view of threats from recalcitrant

pressure groups, be used to disrupt national unity? On a more

mature view, it seems unlikely that Protestant bodies will insist

on refusing to accept whatever the U. S. Senate decides to be

in the national interest. If this is true, there remains no good

reason why the Senate should not give the President a free

hand in the performance of what Dr. Corwin has well styled

“an act of state of the most commonplace sort.”

17



3. The Experience of France

Even a cursory review of the Ust of states now
represented at the Vatican reveak that a good proportion of

them incorporate at home the principle of separation of Church

and State. Yet in these countries no question is raised today

about the legitimacy or the utility of their respective embassies.

Perhaps the most conspicuous and significant instance is that

of France. In 1921 France managed to patch up her quarrel with

the Pope and to restore diplomatic relations with the Vatican

without compromising the separation so dear to the European

anti-clerical. The history of recent diplomatic relations with

the Holy See therefore proves that the existence of a system

of separation of Church and State in a given country is not

a great obstacle, if indeed it is an obstacle at all, to such a coun-

try’s entering into formal diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

No Paradox

Is that a paradox? It is not. These states have business to

transact with the Pope because the Papacy represents a unique

blend of temporal sovereignty with the much more important

religious and moral authority it possesses on the international

plane. They therefore deal with the Pope in his capacity of

moral authority, without that fact constituting, in their view,

any violation of the system of separation to which they are

committed. This was the decision taken by France in 1921,

a decision it has never had cause to regret Tlie international

18



community, in fact, understands ivell enough today that the

question of diplomatic relations is separate and distinct from

that of separation of Church and State. It is only in the United

States, relatively inexperienced in world affairs and as yet

little familiar with the international position of the Papacy,

that this question any longer causes diflSculty.

But at one time it was a stumbling block in France, too.

In 1904 a violent rupture of relations with the Holy See had

taken place, following papal protests over the visit of Presi-

dent Loubet to Rome. A few months afterwards, in 1905, anti-

clericals took advantage of the rupture to abolish the hun-

dred-year-old concordat and to establish the regime of separa-

tion. The first world war passed without any official relations

between France and the Holy See, although an unofficial

French agent did what he could to counteract the work of

the diplomats of the Central Powers.

The lessons of the war did not escape the attention of think-

ing Frenchmen. When a deputy named Lazare Weiller, Jewish

in origin, came out for re-establishment of diplomatic rela-

tions with the Holy See in a series of articles published in

the Journal des Debats in April, 1917, his proposals fell upon

fertile ground. Weiller’s efforts were seconded by the respected

diplomat and author Gabriel Hanotaux, who greatly helped

to carry the idea along. “Our absence from the Vatican,” the

deputy told his readers, speaking from his experience as the

representative of France in several foreign countries, “has,

during the last three years, been a source of undeniable weak-

ness for the Entente.” He warned that the end of the war

would bring problems that would not permit France to in-

dulge in the luxury of continued absence from the Vatican^

‘The great defect of our foreign policy,” he wrote, “has been

our absence from those points and centers where political

forces converge. We run the risk of paying an even higher
price if we persist in this course after the peace, when the

time comes to imdertake the long and difficult negotiations

19



that will be needed to restore equilibrium in a world turned

upside down.”

France’s Postwar Problems

The point was well taken. After Versailles as well as before

it, France had a multitude of delicate problems on her hands.

Her diflSculties were compounded by the political leadership

that the victory in war had forced upon her on the Continent.

She needed allies in Eastern Europe, for one thing. Modifica-

tions of the frontiers in the old Habsburg and Romanoff ter-

ritories raised an infinity of problems, some of which could

properly be resolved only by recourse to Rome. It was in-

tolerable for France’s ally, the new Czechoslovakia, for in-

stance, that a part of its subjects should be under the ecclesi-

astical jurisdiction of a bishop of another nationality, living

in another coimtry. It was imperative for France, in its own

interest, to lend its support to its friends.

In addition, the new situation in the Near East, in Syria,

Palestine and Constantinople, posed problems. France had

hitherto counted upon its traditional protectorate of the Chris-

tians as an instrument of its influence there. Alsace and Lor-

raine had just been regained after having been under German

sovereignty since 1870. The incorporation of these two prov-

inces into France involved delicate political decisions in which

the Vatican had its role to play, a role that Paris could ignore

only to its cost. And Germany had already by 1920 made

use of her restored rights to send strong diplomatic missions

everywhere, including the Vatican, where it accredited an

Ambassador. This had disquieting possibilities for France,

whose obvious first counter-measure was to make her own acte

de presence at the Vatican.

The above considerations were frankly laid out by the

French Government in its expose of the motives that com-

pelled the re-establishment of the old embassy at the Vatican

after fifteen and more years of absence. Their importance and

20



validity were not minimized by the deputies. But the great

question was, did the re-establishment of the embassy imply

any change in the existing law of separation of Church and

State, or in any way prepare the way for such a change? It

is certain that without assurances on this point the deputies

would never have sanctioned the re-creation of the post

No Conflict

The answer they received was clear and unequivocal. The

two questions, diplomatic relations and separation, were com-

pletely independent, declared the spokesman for the Foreign

Affairs Commission in his report submitted to the Chamber

on July 20, 1920.

What the Government proposes [he reported] is to

create diplomatic and not juridical relations between

the French State and the Vatican. No uncertainty is

possible on this point. There is no question of re-

establishing, or of laying the groundwork for re-es-

tablishing the concordat. It is a question of re-estab-

lishing an embassy. Diplomatic relations by no means

necessitate juridical relations. Many states are repre-

sented at the Vatican which live, like France, under

the regime of separation. . . . Nothing therefore justi-

fies the assertion that the re-establishment of the em-

bassy is a step having a confessional significance

likely to disturb in France the interests or hurt the

feelings of its non-Catholic citizens.

The history of subsequent relations of France with the Holy

See proves that, in fact, a country can with profit and dig-

nity enter into diplomatic relations with the Vatican without

in the least compromising the particular system of relations

of Church and State it has adopted for itself. In France, far

from causing a trend in the direction of undoing the work

of separation, the re-establishment of the Vatican embassy

created an atmosphere in which peace was finally achieved

between State and Church in France, on a basis of mutual

respect.

21



Anticlericausm Not For Export

The French anticlerical deputies, of whom there were very

many in the Chamber and the Senate at that time, were aided

in overcoming their doubts by the example of the arch-anti-

clerical Gambetta, whose famous dictum was that anticleri-

calism was “not an article of export,” and who in his own

time had fought on several occasions fpr the maintenance of

the Vatican embassy. As long as their treasured separation

was not jeopardized, they were as willing as Gambetta to deal

with the Pope on questions not concerning internal politics.

Their consent, once given, though reluctantly, was never with-

drawn, nor did they have cause to regret their act. They took

as their own the Government’s thesis of March 11, 1920:

“French diplomacy must be present wherever questions arise

that have an interest for France. She cannot any longer be

absent from the seat of a spiritual government where the

majority of states have seen fit to be represented.”

The analogy between France after the first world war and

the United States after the second is striking. Neither had

any intention of altering existing Church-State relations at

home. Both were faced with a multiplicity of foreign-policy

problems arising from disturbed postwar conditions through-

out the world and from a position of political leadership con-

sequent upon a war. France found that the Holy See con-

stituted one of those major world focal points which, in the

interests of her far-flung foreign-policy commitments, she

could not afford to ignore. It is to the credit of the French

deputies that they were able to perceive the correctness of

the program proposed to them by the Government, even though

they were far more impassioned over the question of separa-

tion than citizens in the United States have ever been. It will

be a curious reversal of roles if practical Americans fail a

test that impassioned French anticlericals were able to pass.

22



4. Protestant States: Prussia and

Britain

HAT ONE MIGHT CALL Protestant states are not con*

spicuous by their absence in the diplomatic corps accredited

at the Vatican, For almost a century and a half representa-

tives of such countries have been formally accredited to the

Holy See. At the present moment, Finland is represented by

a charge d’affaires. Before the war, two other Baltic states,

Latvia and Estonia, predominantly Lutheran, had envoys in

Rome. The Netherlands, traditionally considered Protestant,

is represented today by a Protestant Minister Plenipotentiary.

In Germany, at the time of this writing, the dispatch of an

Ambassador to the Vatican has been delayed by the Bonn

Government until domestic agreement can be reached as to

whether the nominee should be a Catholic or a Protestant,

the representative of the old State of Prussia having always

been a Protestant. The Protestant legation most in view today

in Rome, however, is that of Great Britain.

The mere fact that many states having a long tradition of

strong anti-Catholic sentiment have been oflScially represented

at the Vatican sufficiently proves that no theological connota-

tions are involved and that anti-Catholic feelings in pre-

dominantly Protestant nations are not allowed to counter-

balance the clear interest that these states have, or had, in

being diplomatically present there.

If theological controversies today play no role large enough

to prevent the sort of contact made possible by. diplomatic

relations, it was not always so. The story of the beginnings of

23



these relations between Protestant states and the Holy See is

a long one, studded with many false starts and curious maneu-

vers before it was tacitly agreed to leave religious differences

aside, at least in this case, in order to take care of the urgent

needs of both Church and State.

There was a long period after the Reformation during which

the Protestant rulers would not on principle enter jnto official

communication with the Holy See, to say nothing of sending

an envoy there. There were, indeed, during this period, a few

scattered instances of temporary missions, more or less secret

or unofficial, whose intent was religious reconciliation. But

no formal or permanent mission came to Rome avowedly rep-

resenting a Protestant monarch.

The ice was finally broken in 1805 when the Prussian savant

Wilhelm von Humboldt took his place in the diplomatic corps

at Rome as Minister-Resident of Prussia, and in the following

year as Minister Plenipotentiary. With the fall of Napoleon,

other non-Catholic princes of Germany sent diplomatic repre-

sentatives to Rome on permanent or temporary assignments.

Although the year 1805 marked the beginning of formal

relations between Prussia and the Holy See, unofficial rela-

tions had been set up much earlier. Backdoor negotiations had

been going on as far back as 1747, if not before, when Frederick

the Great named an agent in the Eternal City to take care

of Prussian business at the papal court. This agent (first an

Italian nobleman and after him an Italian priest) had no

diplomatic standing. The Prussian king hotly .insisted upon

this fact when his rivals in Vienna scoffed at hearing the news

that Prussia had accredited a man in Rome. ‘‘It is incompatible

with my principles and with my situation in respect to the

Court of Rome to have anyone formally accredited there. Such

a thing [he wrote to his envoy at the Habsburg capital] has

never entered my mind.”

The nomination of an official agent in Rome was the cul-

mination of a ridiculous situation in which both Rome and

24



Potsdam pretended to ignore each other, whereas they were

actually vitally concerned with the politico-religious problems

arising from Prussia’s acquisition of Catholic-populated terri-

tories in the east. It took sixty more years before the two

parties could bring themselves to recognize officially what

had been going on all the time. When this finally happened

it was with a minimum of fuss, so as not to shock the tra-

ditionalists in either capital. Cardinal Consalvi, one of the

great Cardinals Secretary of State, who took the step, did not

attempt in his memoirs to give any ideological explanation of

this break in papal tradition. “The times had too much

changed,” he remarked laconically. Obviously the King’s

ministers in Potsdam agreed with him.

Great Britain herself went through the same mental and

political struggle before coming around to accrediting an

envoy at the papal court. In 1814 Pius VII wrote to the Prince

Regent suggesting, among other things, an exchange of diplo-

matic representatives. Viscount Castlereagh, Britain’s Foreign

Secretary, ordered the matter looked into. The stumbling block

was a law dating back to the reign of Queen Elizabeth pro-

hibiting, under dire penalties, any sort of communication

between the British Government and Rome. This law cropped

up frequently in discussions during the succeeding decades.

In fact, the King’s law officers were virtually a century in

deciding that it was a dead letter.

In the interim, all sorts of curious devices were adopted to

get around the Elizabethan prohibition. In 1829, for instance,

in order to acknowledge the announcement made by Pius VIII

upon his accession. Lord Aberdeen availed himself of the

Minister of Hanover in London to have the Minister of Han-

over in Rome (another Protestant legation) explain that as

King of England His Majesty could not reply to the letter,

but as King of Hanover he took this means of conveying his

acknowledgment and thanks. As this seemed too far-fetched

a way of abiding by the law, from 1832 on Britain stationed

25



a semi-official agent in Rome. This functionary, who usually

had the standing of a clerk in the Foreign Office, reported to

the Foreign Secretary but had no diplomatic character. This

semi-official mission was closed in 1874.

In 1848 the character of business to be transacted, and the

unsatisfactory system that existed, prompted Lord John Rus-

sell to ask Parliament to repeal the law of Queen Elizabeth

and to authorize formal diplomatic relations. The reaction in

ultra anti-papal circles, as might have been expected, was

prompt and violent. But it was not more prompt or violent

than that of the Irish patriots, who detected in the motion one

more attempt to reduce Ireland to submission. At a mass meet-

ing organized by the patriots, the bill was denounced and the

Prime Minister was quoted as having said, apropos of his bill:

“We have tried to govern Ireland by coercion and have failed

;

we have tried to govern it by conciliation and have failed

also. No other means are now open to us except those we are

resolved upon using, namely, to govern Ireland through Rome.”

Whether or not Lord Russell actually used these words, they

reflect fairly accurately at least one of the background fac-

tors involved. The bill authorizing the sending of an envoy

to the Vatican passed, was never acted upon, and was repealed

in 1875.

Finally, the outbreak of war in 1914 gave Britain the occa-

sion to abandon a custom that had resulted only in making

the country look ridiculous, while actually working to its

disadvantage. The first envoy was Lord Howard, who, with

his immediate wartime successor. Count de Salis, was a

Catholic. The legation was put on a permanent footing by

Lloyd George after the war. In order to placate the more

rabid anti-papists in England, he determined that thereafter

the envoy would be a Protestant.

It is noteworthy that to date England has not agreed to

receive in exchange an Apostolic Nuncio, as the papal Am-

bassador is called. There is an Apostolic Delegate in London,

26



but, like the Apostolic Delegate in Washington, he has no

diplomatic character. Neither the State of Prussia nor, later,

the Reich, ever consented to receive an Apostolic Nuncio, or

even an Intemuncio, until after World War I. The first Nuncio

in Berlin was the future Pius XII, then Cardinal Pacelli. In

these cases, contrary to the usual practice, the relations were

not based on reciprocity. It was easier for a Protestant state

to send its envoy far away to Rome than to receive an eccle-

siastic as the Pope’s Ambassador on its own soil. It might

be added that the local hierarchy from time to time viewed

the coming of a Nuncio with little enthusiasm. In his own

time Cardinal Manning was strongly against it.

At Rome, too, prejudice and tradition were not completely

inoperative during all this time. At one period Rome sought

to have Catholics named as envoys of Protestant states. On

one occasion in the first half of the last century, it refused

its agreement to the nomination of the Austrian diplomat

Lebzeltern, on the score of his wife’s not being a Catholic.

The obligations of the wife of an Ambassador who in time

might be dean of the diplomatic corps (so Rome reasoned)

would not be easy for a non-Catholic to fulfill with ease and

decorum. On the other hand, to complete this survey, it should

be noted that in 1872 the Vatican refused to accept Cardinal

Hohenlohe as Ambassador of the Kaiser.

The precedents and experiences of the two great Protestant

Powers, Prussia and Great Britain, suggest that if the United

States does not in the near future establish formal diplomatic

relations with the Holy See, it will sooner or later find itself

engaged in behind-the-scenes negotiations and contacts ren-

dered necessary by events beyond the control of either Rome

or Washington. In some instances these negotiations, or the

formulas adopted to legitimize them, will be viewed by pos-

terity as ridiculous maneuvers that throw little credit upon a

great Power. On other occasions these contacts could be a

source of positive harm through being carried on outside the

27



framework of the ordinary administration of our foreign

policy.

If the United States turns its back upon the obvious demands

of its own interests, this can only be to the disadvantage of

the party which by its own free choice is unwilling to adopt

the normal and traditional means of entering into contact

with the Holy See. Today the temptation is strong to imagine

that the United States, having gotten along famously without

such relations with the Vatican for these many decades, can

continue to do so regardless of the ever-widening circle of our

foreign-policy commitments. The example of Prussia and Great

Britain points entirely in the opposite direction. In postpon-

ing the inevitable the opponents of relations with the Holy

See will only help magnify the importance of the decision

when it finally arrives. Present efforts to stymie the appoint-

ment of an American Ambassador to the Holy See will, in the

perspective of history, only serve to recall Edmund Burke’s

famous dictum that small minds ill suit great empires.

28



5. The Failure of “Informal”

Relations

More than one government in the past has wished
it could carry on its business with the Holy See in some other

way than through formal diplomatic relations. But all, one

after the other, came to the decision that there was no alterna-

tive. The more realistic of them arrived soon enough at the

very simple realization that the maintenance of even a modest

legation at Rome was a small price to pay in comparison

with the opportunities for influence that this move opened to

them. The others continued to pay a high price for their

voluntary abstention until forced to act by the sheer weight

of circumstances. It would not be an exaggeration to say that

virtually all of the non-Catholic states now represented diplo-

matically at the Vatican, and perhaps even some Catholic

states, gave serious consideration to the possibility of achiev-

ing their objectives by means short of formal relations, but

in the end concluded it would not work.

The Papacy A Sovereign Power

The reasons why these governments elected for full diplo-

matic relations are not hard to find. One of the cases that can

be cited is that of the Netherlands. In 1915, when Holland,

as a neutral in the first world war, found itself faced with

delicate political problems of vital concern, the Dutch Gov-

ernment proposed the dispatch of a Minister Plenipotentiary

to the Vatican. During the debates in the Second Chamber on

this occasion, a worried but sincere deputy asked why the

29



necessary transactions could not be carried on by a special

commission officially charged with the task but not clothed

with a diplomatic character. The answer of the head of the

Government, Cort van der Linden, was drawn from practical

considerations. ‘‘The Papacy,” he said on June 10,

whether we like it or not, belongs to the ranks of the

great Powers. The honorable deputy can be assured

that the doors of the Vatican do not open so easily

as he imagines. The commission envisaged by him

would be easily admitted to the Pope’s antechamber,

but he can be sure that it will not learn anything im-

portant for the purpose we have before us.

This reply expressed an elementary principle in the technique

of international intercourse and was evaluated as such by the

Dutch, who approved the resumption of relations, the first

time such relations existed on a reciprocal basis since 1872.

The idea that the doors of the Vatican “do not open easily”

may seem paradoxical to the literally thousands of Americans

of every occupation and religion who have seen and talked

with the present Pontiff, especially since the war. If there

ever was a sovereign accessible to the people it is Pope Pius

XII. But the Holy Father is far more accessible to people than

he is to their governments. Recent experiences of American

officials who wished to call upon the Pope in their official

capacity, subesquent to the resignation of Myron C. Taylor,

have served to impress upon the State Department that there

are certain elementary rules of courtesy that the Vatican feels

justified in insisting upon. It is very clear that the Holy See

today considers that if the United States has any official busi-

ness to transact, there are established and normal channels

through which this should be done.

That this is a perfectly legitimate point of view on the part

of the Vatican is recognized by any person having an average

comprehension of the ways of international contact. A few

months ago, in the Foreign Office of one of the European

30



states with long experience with the Vatican, an ofl&cial gave

the following reasons why states enter into full diplomatic

relations with the Holy See, rather than unofficial or semi-

official relations. “First of all,” he said, “as a diplomatic agent

you represent something and can speak with authority. Second,

you can therefore ask for more and get more. Third, other-

wise you are in a disadvantageous position vis-d-vis the repre-

sentatives of other countries.”

Handicaps Of “Unofficial” Status

These reasons almost speak for themselves. Is it not self-

evident, to take up the last-named consideration, that a rep-

resentative at the Vatican enjoying no official standing—and
“official” in this context can mean only diplomatic status

—

may at times find himself handicapped, when the interests he

is called upon to defend are not entirely conformable to the

interests of some other country which has taken the trouble

to be formally accredited? No matter how close an alliance

may exist, in war or in peace, between two countries, their

interests are sometimes in conflict. Governments would be

justified in complaining if the Holy See, or any other sovereign

entity, were to accord equal treatment to a country that had

not yet performed the initial and elementary courtesy of

accrediting a formal diplomatic representative. This has been

the lesson of the past for those countries that have hoped for

a time to be able to dispense with such formalities.

It is simple common sense that the unofficial envoy of the

United States cannot, everything else being equal, expect to

hold his own at the Vatican in the not impossible, and not

improbable, case of a conflict of views with even our closest

friends and allies, such as Great Britain and France, who have

been installed for a long time at the Vatican. And let Ameri-

can citizens not imagine that there are no questions in which

the point of view of the United States is not completely in

harmony with that of even our best friends. The interests

31



these countries must defend often enough have their repercus-

sions in matters falling within the legitimate sphere of action

of the Holy See. In such circumstances, the question is not

whether the Pope is or is not friendly to the United States,

but whether he can cooperate on friendly terms with the

Government of the United States when that Government has

failed to set up the machinery for friendly cooperation the

way other nations have.

It would not be correct to imply that a semi-ofl5cial repre-

sentative, of i\merica or any other state, would receive no

hearing at the Vatican. Tenacious of its own traditions, the

Secretariat of State of His Holiness remembers very well that

for many decades, in favor of a number of Powers, it con-

sented to deal with semi-oflScial agents living on permanent

station in Rome. At various times this was the practice of

Prussia, Czarist Russia and Great Britain, before these states

brought themselves around to accrediting formal representa-

tives.

But the status of such agents was irregular and unsatis-

factory. When really important crises arose in the relations

between their governments and the Holy See, other means of

intercourse had to be found, themselves hardly more useful.

The semi-official agent was employed for matters of only

secondary importance. Today, now that the international posi-

tion of the Holy See is recognized by the community of nations

generally, there is even less justification for such missions.

In any case, it is certain that to ask an individual, no matter

how personable, to carry on really significant work at the

Vatican, without giving him appropriate standing, is to bind

his hands so that he cannot really achieve the purpose of the

mission.

A French Example

An anecdote recounted by Denys Cochin, French Catholic

parliamentarian, may help to bring this last point honie. The

32



episode took place before the first world war, while relations

between France and the Holy See were in a state of rupture.

At that moment the French Government found itself in a

difficult position in Morocco, one of the complicating factors

being that the missionaries of Spanish Morocco continued to

exercise jurisdiction in French Morocco. One day, according

to Cochin, he was summoned by the Foreign Minister, whose

name he declined to betray. The following conversation ensued:

‘‘Do you want to perform an outstanding service to your

country?”

“By all means!”

“All you have to do is to take the train tomorrow and go

try to fix up that Morocco affair at the Vatican, They are sure

to listen to you.”

“I’ll go, without asking for an Ambassador’s uniform or an

Ambassador’s salary, but on one condition, that I can say I

come in your name.”

“Never!” cried the Foreign Minister, thinking in fright

what his fellow anticlericals would say.

“Well, then,” said the annoyed Cochin, “how do you expect

me to ask Rome for the withdrawal of rights enjoyed by

Spain since the days of Charles V, without being able to make

the slightest allusion to the gratification this would give to the

French Government, without being able to adduce any other

argument than that of my personal acquaintance? You should

not ask people to attempt tasks that can’t be fulfilled!”

International Discourtesy

Deputy Cochin thought he had at least a fighting chance

to accomplish something at Rome, even without diplomatic

standing. But he knew he stood no chance of success at all

if he could not speak in the name of the Foreign Minister.

The effrontery of a Minister’s asking a great favor from the

Pope, without even being prepared in advance to thank him

for the service, is evident in this anecdote. Yet this point of

33



view is sometimes assumed by other governments, which do

not realize the extent of their boldness. Those countries which,

like the United States, contemplate carrying on important

relations with the Holy See without taking the first steps to

put themselves in a position to ask for favors, are committing

a similar, if unconscious, act of arrogance.

“Backstairs” methods are deplored in American domestic

politics. It is somewhat surprising that they are now being

suggested, in effect, as a substitute for formal diplomatic rela-

tions with the Holy See.

To understand how incongruous the suggestion is, all one

has to do is to imagine the President of the United States

asking a personal friend of his, without any oflBcial standing,

to “run over to Europe and see what you can do about getting

faster action out of the Atlantic Pact countries.” Without

proper credentials, no one, not even a personal friend of the

President, can move into the world of international diplomacy

as an informal interloper and expect to be received on the

same footing as the official representatives of states. The Presi-

dent knows this much better than Protestant clergymen. That’s

why he has proposed an Ambassador rather than another

“personal representative.”

Whether American Protestants like it or not, the Holy See

is accepted by about forty states as a member of the diplo-

matic world, and will remain a member whether the United

States establishes formal relations with the Vatican or not.

Either the Holy See is an important enough factor in the in-

ternational scene for us to have formal relations with it, or we

should forget about the whole thing. Half-measures adopted

in order not to recognize the de facto prestige of the Vatican

(as a concession to Protestant sensibilities), while still attempt-

ing to get the acknowledged benefits of relations with the

Papacy, are diplomatically a rather useless fifth wheel. The

chief trouble with them is that they will not work.

34



6. Objections of the National

Council of Churches

j^MONG THE STATEMENTS issued in protest against the

nomination of General Mark Clark to be Ambassador at the

Vatican, probably the most authoritative is that put out on

October 31, 1951 by the General Board of the National Council

of the Churches of Christ in the United States. While repu-

diating prejudice against Catholics and deploring religious ten-

sion, this body took the position that the Truman appoint-

ment was “wrong in principle, useless in practice,” and could

have consequences “both far-reaching and disastrous” to the

unity of the American people. In sanctioning this statement

the General Board took measures for a program of education

based upon it. As we shall therefore undoubtedly hear more

from the authors of this statement, some observations on cer-

tain points they raised therein may serve to clarify the issues.

The document singles out three “major reasons” currently

being advanced in support of the President’s move, none of

which, it says, “bears scrutiny.” The first of these is that the

proposed diplomatic mission would provide the U. S. Govern-

ment with “access to a unique source of information, achieve

eflFective co-operation against communism and advance the

cause of peace.”

The Council shows itself unimpressed by these arguments.

In the first place, it points out, formal diplomatic relations

constitute “no binding agreement” for either party to reveal

any information except what it chooses to reveal. This point,

of course, is perfectly correct. One can go further and say

35



that diplomatic relations by themselves carry no obligations

whatever, beyond those of reciprocity. From all accounts we

propose asking the Pope to waive even this right. In other

words, in sending an Ambassador to the Pope, the United

States coinmits itself to nothing, not even to a continuation

of such relations beyond the point our American interests seem

to warrant. The juridical postion of the Government vis-d-vis

the Church in the United States, or vis-d-vis the Holy See

itself, remains absolutely unaltered by the presence of a U. S.

Ambassador in Rome. One wonders why such a fuss is made

over an act of the President which obliges the United States

to nothing while putting our Government in a position ad-

vantageous to our national interests.

“Considerations Of Protocol”

To the allegation of supporters of the appointment that

such relations would achieve effective cooperation against

communism, the NCCC replied that “eager allies” in a com-

mon cause are not frustrated in their common efforts by “con-

siderations of protocol or prestige.” It is at this precise point

that the Protestant church leaders choose to reaffirm that they,

too, are in effect eager allies in this common cause against

atheistic communism. Yet are not they themselves in the present

instance allowing “considerations of prestige or protocol” to

frustrate the common effort? For diplomatic relations, by their

nature, are essentially a form of protocol to which every

nation must conform in the name of elementary international

courtesy. If protocol should not stand in the way, why is the

NCCC making such an issue over it?

The suggestion that the American Ambassador to Italy could

serve as the medium of communication between the United

States and the Vatican betrays ignorance on the part of the

Council both of international usages and of the particular

situation in the Eternal City. For over eighty years the Holy

See has fought successfully to prevent the diplomatic corps

36



accredited to it from being merged with, or better, submerged

in, that accredited to Italy. Such a separation and distinction

has to be maintained to avoid confusing the Vatican and Italy,

separate and distinct entities in international relations. The

Holy See cannot be expected to relinquish its hard-won diplo-

matic independence just to accommodate the desires of a cer-

tain section of the American public.

The Old Mission And The New

The statement issued by the General Board does not chal-

lenge or question the utility that relations with the Pope could

have in the cause of international peace. But it rejects the

contention that there is a precedent for such relations with

the Pope on the diplomatic level. The former mission of 1848-

1867 to the Papal States, in their view, is quite different from

the one now proposed. Actually, it should not be difficult for

our State Department to demonstrate that on purely formal

grounds the Clark mission has a precedent Leaving aside the

theoretical question sometimes debated whether the present

State of Vatican City is the continuation of the old Papal

States or an entirely new entity arising out of the Lateran

Treaty of 1929, the fact is that in either case the Pope remains

the sovereign of a state. It was not without good reason that

General Clark was nominated to be Ambassador to the “State

of Vatican City.” The diplomatic basis is therefore the same

in both cases.

The proposed U. S. mission resembles the former one in

that this one also, we are certain, will be ordered to “care-

fully avoid even the appearance of interfering in ecclesiastical

questions,” at home or abroad. In short, if commercial and

purely political questions are now excluded from the sphere

of an American Ambassador at the Vatican, so also, as in 1848,

are purely ecclesiastical ones. What remains in between are

questions of international peace, international order and other

problems which the National Council itself, by its own

37



actions, concedes are legitimate matters of discussion between

church leaders and the Government and the United States.

Concordats And Nuncios

A third justification in favor of the new embassy which the

statement declares cannot “bear scrutiny” is that “other nations

send Ambassadors to the Vatican.” “Most” of the other gov-

ernments, the document asserts, give “special recognition and

status” to the Catholic Church. Just what this “special recog-

nition” may be is not defined, but it appears to run all the

way from formal conventions (called “concordats”) to the

ceremonial precedence of the Papal Nuncio in the diplomatic

corps. As far as the concordats are concerned, it may come as

a surprise to many that only a minority of the states now rep-

resented at the Holy See have entered into concordats. It would

therefore be erroneous to imagine, as some people do, that the

system of concordats constitutes the essential structure and

basis of such relations. In any case, what “most” countries

wish to do in these respects is their own affair and not par-

ticularly relevant. What is important is that those countries

which, like the United States, wish to practise at home and

abroad a conscientious abstention from purely ecclesiastical

affairs are not called upon to alter this practice or tradition

by the fact of entering into diplomatic relations with the Holy

See. France is such a country. And would it not be ridiculous

to suggest that Great Britain accords “special recognition,”

however vaguely defined, to the Catholic Church in England?

The deanship or ceremonial precedence that the Nuncio, as

the Pope’s own Ambassador, enjoys in many capitals appears

for some reason or other to exercise a peculiar fascination

upon some Protestant groups. This prerogative (of no political

importance) was confirmed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815

by the eight principal European Powers, four of which (Prussia,

Sweden, Russia and England) were not Catholic states. Far

many decades—since 1875, to be precise—our own American

38



envoys abroad have, as a matter of fact, been imder standing

instructions to abide by this practice.

It is strange that only at this late date has anyone found

in this “special recognition” something contrary to American

traditions. Is it to be supposed that contrary instructions must

now be sent out by the State Department by which our envoys

will be told to absent themselves from New Year’s receptions

or diplomatic dinners at which the Nuncio has precedence?

Even shoiJd a Nuncio be accepted for Washington, the ques-

tion of his place in the diplomatic corps would not be decided

by the United States but by the other diplomats themselves.

This we conclude from Hackworth’s Digest of International

Law, drawn up for the use of the State Department. To finish

this really inconsequential question, if the United States does

not wish to see a Nuncio acting as dean of the diplomatic

corps in Washington it need only do what Great Britain has

long done: refuse to receive a Nuncio at all.

Religious Impartiality

The General Board concludes its protests against the decision

of President Truman by arguing that, because the Pope is

the only religious authority possessing the capacity to receive

a diplomatic representative, the United States would be lacking

in due impartiality to other religious groups by sending such

an envoy.

But there are cases where equal treatment is equivalently

unequal treatment. Or, to express it more accurately, equal

treatment is not synonymous with identical treatment. The

World Council of Churches, to take an organization mentioned

in this connection, does not enjoy the right to receive diplo-

niatic representatives and, we are told, would not receive any

if it had such capacity. That is, of course, the World Council’s

own affair. In those circumstances the United States need only

give it the treatment its actual standing and its own desires

indicate for it. But that does not mean that the United States

39



is held to the same attitude towards another world church

group which has a difiEerent view of the matter and which

legitimately asks and expects to be dealt with on the diplo-

matic level.

It is not belittling the World Council of Churches to add

that the Holy See has over a long period of time acquired for

itself titles of respect conspicuously greater than those presently

enjoyed by the Council, and this at the hands of governments,

institutions and persons who owe it no religious allegiance.

A different attitude on the part of the United States would be

a conspicuous lack of courtesy which it may be doubted the

European members of the World Council themselves would

sanction.

The spokesmen of the Protestant Churches grouped in the

National Council of the Churches of Christ have felt it their

duty, precisely as church leaders, to voice their attitude to the

President of the United States in the name of our national

traditions and interests. It is not surprising that their views, as

Protestant church leaders, should differ widely from those of

the President of the United States, whose actions must be dic-

tated by the rules of the world of diplomacy, in which he holds

such an eminent ofiice.

4(3



Appendix A: \ .

i Statement of Prof. Edward S. Corwin

One does not have to be an all-out defender of the Admin-

istration’s foreign policy to realize that the President’s recent

action in nominating General Clark to be Ambassador to the

Vatican is a logical addendum to it. The nomination has been

attacked as violative of the principle of separation of Church

and State. But can it be said that this principle, when given its

proper constitutional setting, disables the country from form-

ing advantageous diplomatic relations? Thirty-seven other

Governments maintain diplomatic representatives at the Vati-

can, several among them being countries which, like Brazil,

Belgium and France, adhere to the separation principle in mat-

ters of internal legislation; and if they can, why may not we?

The Supreme Court has said that in the international field

“the right and power of the United States
* * * are equal to

the right and power of the other members of the international

family”; and that the lion’s share of this power is vested by

the Constitution in the President is not disputed. He alone

may receive the diplomatic representatives of other Govern-

ments; he alone may choose persons subject to the consent of

the Senate, to represent the United States abroad; he alone

may “recognize” foreign states and Governments.

Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall did not see eye to eye

in many things, but they did in this. “The transaction of busi-

ness with foreign nations is executive altogether,” said Jeffer-

son. “The President,” said Marshall, “is the sole organ of the

nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with

foreign nations.” This being the case, however, any act per-

formed by the President in the exercise of his diplomatic

powers is presumably within his constitutional discretion; and,

41



by the same token, it is entitled to be regarded, until the con-

trary is shown,, as having been done in good faith for the

benefit of the country.

As to the principle of separation of Church and State—so
far as it has constitutional basis it is a kind of “invisible

radiation” from Amendment I, which says that “Congress

shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”

But the nomination of an Ambassador is not lawmaking. Mr.

Truman has not attempted, in this instance, to usurp the legis-

lative power of Congress. No rule of conduct has been imposed

by the President upon the people of the United States touching

the relation of Church and State, or touching anything else.

He has performed an act of state of the most commonplace

sort.

Whatever thought of political advantage may have first sug-

gested the President’s action—and one or two have been sus-
pected—^there exist at least two sound reasons of a broader
nature which amply justify it as a timely move in the diplo-

matic game being presently played on the European chess-

board. The first of these is the necessity of securing Catholic

support for our cause on the Continent, since without it—and
especially is this true as regards Italy and France—our policy
promises to be dashed to bits against a combination of Com-

munists and Neutralists. Secondly, the strong line being taken

by the Papacy in the ideological war against communism is

a further circumstance fortifying the intrinsic reasonableness

of the President’s action.

It is true, to be sure, that this action furnishes American

Catholics an excuse to swell out their chests a bit, just as it

has afforded some American Protestants an excuse to assail

the Papacy as the foe of democracy. But these easily fore-

seeable repercussions do not affect the validity of the Presi-

dent’s course. If, as the Supreme Court has held, a state is

entitled to pay for the public transportation of children at-

tending parochial schools in order to assure their safety on

42



the highway, notwithstanding the fact that in doing so it aids

such schools, then certainly the President is entitled to bolster

our precarious European diplomacy by sending an Ambassa-

dor to the Vatican, notwithstanding the fact that the separa-

tion principle is not considered by some of our citizenry as

forbidding them to mix religion with their politics.

I have been asked, ‘‘By what procedure could the constitu-

tional question (raised by the President’s action) be brought

before the Supreme Court?” It is highly doubtful if there is

any procedure available for this purpose. Tlie President can-

not be compelled judicially to perform his constitutional duties

nor enjoined from exceeding his constitutional powers. The

payment of money out of the national Treasury for an allegedly

unconstitutional purpose cannot be forbidden judicially.

It is most questionable, moreover, if the court would recog-

nize anybody as having a suflGcient individual interest to entitle

him to a judicial hearing on the subject. But even should a

case raising the constitutional issue reach the court, through

some device or inadvertence, the court would almost certainly

refuse to pass on its merits, on the ground that it was “po-

litical” in character and hence not “justiciable.” The only

remedy in such a situation, as the court has pointed out more

than once, is for those who consider themselves aggrieved to

“resort to the polls and not to the courts.”

(The above statement first appeared as a letter

to the New York Times, November 12, 1951)

43



Appendix B: States having diplomatic re-

lations with the Vatican

After the name of each state are given 1) its representation at

the Vatican; 2) the representation (where reciprocity exists) of

the Vatican in the state; 3) constitutional provisions, if any, re-

garding Church and State; 4) legal agreements, if any, between

the Holy See and the state, e.g. concordat, modus vivendi, etc.

ARGENTINA: Embassy, since 1928. Nunciature. “Supports
Church.” AUSTRIA: Legation suppressed in 1938, restored in
1946. Internunciature. Concordat of 1933. BELGIUM: Embassy,
since 1921. Nunciature. Separation. BOLIVIA: Embassy. Nuncia-

ture. “Recognizes and upholds” Catholic religion. No state religion.

BRAZIL: Legation in 1826; embassy since 1919. Nunciature. Sepa-

ration. Art. 196 guarantees maintenance of Holy See mission.

CHINA: Minister Plenipotentiary named in 1942. Letters of cre-

dence in 1943. Internunciature. CHILE: Embassy, since 1920. Nun-

ciature. Separation. COLOMBIA: Embassy, since 1927. Concordat
of 1887. Nunciature. CUBA: Embassy. Relations renewed in 1935.

Nunciature. Separation.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Legation erected in 1919. Closed in 1951.

Nunciature (vacant). Modus vivendi. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:
Embassy. Relations re-established in 1930. Nunciature. State

Church. ECUADOR: Embassy. Relations re-established in 1937.
Nunciature. Modus vivendi of 1937. EGYPT: Legation erected

in 1947. Internunciature. EL SALVADOR: Legation erected in
1928. Nunciature. Separation. FINLAND: Legation erected in 1942.

FRANCE: Embassy since XVI century. Rupture of relations
1904-1921. Separation. Nunciature. GERMANY: Embassy since
1920. Distinct legations of Prussia and of Bavaria suppressed in

1934. Nunciature (Bonn) . Concordats with Prussia, Baden and Ger-

many. GREAT BRITAIN: Legation first provisionally established
in 1914, on permanent footing since 1921. No reciprocity.

GUATEMALA: Legation (vacant) erected in 1936. Separation.
Nunciature. HAITI: Embassy, since 1950. Relations since 1891,

with vacancy 1911-1921. Nunciature. Concordat of 1860. HON-
DURAS: Legation (vacant), created in 1929. Separation. Nuncia-
ture. HUNGARY: Legation (vacant) since 1920. Nunciature (va-

44



cant). INDIA: Legation, since 1949. Internunciature. INDO-

NESIA: Legation, since 1950. Internunciature. IRELAND: Em-

bassy. Relations since 1929. Nunciature. ITALY: Embassy erected

in 1929 after rupture dating from 1859. Concordat of 1929. Nun-

ciature. JAPAN: Legation established in 1942. Closed in 1945 on

order of Allied authorities in Japan. Negotiations in progress

(January, 1952) toward re-establishing diplomatic relations.

LEBANON: Legation erected in 1947. Nunciature. LIBERIA:
Legation erected in 1927. Charge d’affaires of Nunciature. LITH-

UANIA: Legation, since 1927. Concordat. Nunciature (vacant).

ORDER OF MALTA: Legation erected in 1930. No reciprocity.
MONACO: Legation. No reciprocity. THE NETHERLANDS: Le-
gation suppressed in 1872, revived on temporary basis in 1915,

permanent footing in 1915, suppressed in 1926, re-established in

1944. Internunciature. NICARAGUA: Legation. Nunciature. “No
ofi&cial religion.” PANAMA: Legation erected in 1929. Nunciature.
PARAGUAY: Legation. Nunciature. “State Religion.” PERU:
Embassy. Relations since 1919. Nunciature. Modus vivendi of 1874.

PHILIPPINES REPUBLIC: Embassy erected in 1951.

POLAND: Embassy. Relations established in 1919. Concordat.
Charge d’affaires of Nunciature ad interim (London). PORTU-

GAL: Embassy since XVI century. Suppressed in 1910. Legation

established in 1918. Nunciature. RUMANIA: Legation (vacant),
erected in 1920. Regency of Nunciature. Convention. SAN MA-
RINO: Legation erected in 1926. No reciprocity. SPAIN: Embassy,

since XVI century. Convention. Nunciature. URUGUAY: Legation
re-established in 1939. Nunciature. No official religion. VENE-
ZUELA: Embassy. Relations re-established in 1919. Charge d-’af
faires ad interim of Nunciature. YUGOSLAVIA: Legation (va-
cant), established in 1919. Regency of Nunciature.

Switzerland has not maintained a permanent mission in Rome,

but receives a Nuncio in Berne. Luxembourg likewise has accred-

ited to it the Nuncio in Brussels, since 1916. Russia maintained a

legation to the Holy See until 1922. Denmark, Sweden and Norway

have never maintained a diplomatic mission in Rome. Before the

second World War, Latvia and Estonia had ministers in Rome
accredited to the Holy See. The Holy See has not recognized the

present regime in Poland. Mexico has been in rupture with the

Holy See for many years. The British Minister acts as the repre-
sentative of the British Commonwealth, particularly for Canada,

Australia and New Zealand. Most Latin-American states had diplo-
matic relations with the Holy See at one time or another during

the nineteenth century.

45



BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following list of fairly accessible reading material in the

English language may be useful in the study of some historical and

juridical points connected with the question of diplomatic repre-

sentation to the Holy See.

Albion, Gordon, “England and the Holy See. A Survey of Diplo-

matic Relations,” The Month (London), CLXXHI, January,

1939, 74-78.

Baldwin, Simeon E., “The Mission of Governor Taft to the Vati-

can,” Yale Law Journal, XII, November, 1902, 1.

Benson, Oliver, E., Vatican Diplomatic Practice as Affected by the

Lateran Agreements, Liege: Thone, 1936.

Binchy, David, “The Vatican and International Diplomacy,” Inter

•

national Affairs, XXII, January, 1946, 47-56.

Eckhardt, Carl Conrad, The Papacy and World Affairs as Reflected

in the Secularization of Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1937.

Egan, Maurice Francis, Recollections of a Happy Life, New York:

Doran, 1924.

Ellis, John Tracy, Cardinal Consalvi and Anglo-Papal Relations,

1814-1824, Washington: Catholic University Press, 1942.

Farrell, John T., “Background of the 1902 Taft Mission to Rofne,”

Catholic Historical Review, XXXVI, April, 1950, 1-32.

Feiertag, Loretta Qare, American Public Opinion on the Diplo-

made Relations between the United States and the Papal States

(1847-1867)

,

Washington: Catholic University Press, 1933.

Fenwick, Charles G., International Law, 3 ed. New York: Appleton,

1948.

Gaselee, Sir Stephen, “British Diplomatic Relations with the Holy

See,” Dublin Review, CCIV, January, 1939, 1-19.

Goss, Edward F., “The Taft Commission to the Vatican, 1902,”

Records of the American Catholic Historical Society, XLVI, De-

cember 1935, 184-201.

46



Graham, Robert A., The Rise of the Double Diplomatic Corps in

Rome, A Study in International Practice^ 1870AS75, The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff, 1952.

Hayward, Fernand, A History of the Popes, New York: Dutton,

1931.

Hoare, Frederick Russell, The Papacy and the Modern State,

London: Bums, Oates, 1940.

Hughes, Philip, *^The International Action of the Papacy,” The

Tablet (London), CLXXVI, November 2, 9, 16, 23, 1940.

Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. New York:

Macmillan, 1948.

Hyde, Charles Cheney, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted

and Applied by the United States, 2 rev. ed., 3 vols. Boston:

Little, Brown, 1945.

Kirsch, J. P., “Nuncio,” Catholic Encyclopedia, XI, 160-163.

Koenig, Harry C. (ed.) Principles for Peace: Selections from Papal

Documents, Milwaukee: Bruce, 1944.

Lauterpacht, H., Recognition in International Law. Cambridge:

Macmillan, 1947.

Marraro, Howard R., “The Closing of the American Diplomatic

Mission to the Vatican and Efforts to Revive It,” Catholic His-

torical Review, XXXIII, January 1948, 423-447.

Moore, John Basset, International Law Digest, New York: Mac-

millan, 1906.

Morgan, Thomas B., The Listening Post, Eighteen Years on Vatican

Hill, New York: Putnam, 1944.

Mowat, R. B., Diplomacy and Peace, London; McBride, 1936.

Ojetti, Benedetto, “Secretariat of State of His Holiness,” Catholic

Encyclopedia, XIII, 152-153.

Oppenheim, L., International Law, A Treatise, (H. Lauterpacht,

ed.), 2 vols., 7 ed. New York: Longmans, 1948.

Pichon, Charles, The Vatican and Its Role in World Affairs, trans-

lated by Jean Misrahi. New York: Dutton, 1950.

47



Satow, Sir Ernest, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, 3 ecL London:

Longmans, 1932.

Sencourt, Robert, The Genius of the Vatican, London: Cape, 1935.

Sereni, Angelo Pietro, The Italian Conception of International Law.

New York: Columbia University Press, 1943.

Sforza, Ceirlo, Diplomatic Europe since the Treaty of Versailles,

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928.

Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins, New York: Harper,

1948.

Stock, Leo Francis (ed.), United States Ministers to the Papal

States. Instructions and Dispatches, 1848-1868. Washington:

Catholic University Press, 1933.

Stock, Leo Francis (ed.) Consular Relations between the United

States and the Papal States, Instruction's and Dispatches, Wash-

ington: Catholic University Press, 1945.

Stokes, Anson Phelps, Church and State in the United States,

3 vols. New York: Harper, 1950.

Taylor, Myron C. (ed.) Wartime Correspondence between Presi-

dent Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII, New York: Macmillan, 1947.

Toynbee (Arnold J.) and Boulter (V.M.), Survey of International

Affairs 1929, (Part V. “Relations between the Sovereign National

States and the Papacy”). London: Oxford Press, 1930.

Turnstall, Brian, “The Papacy and World Peace,” The Year Book

of World Affairs, 1951 (G. W. Keeton, ed.), 309-340. New

York: Frederick A. Praegner, 1951.

Wallace, Lillian Parker, The Papacy and European Diplomacy,

1869-1878, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948.

Wheildon, L. B., “Relations with the Vatican,” Editorial Research

Reports, Vol. I, No. 6, Feb. 12, 1947. Washington: Editorial

Research Reports, 1205 Nineteenth St., N.W.

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