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RELIGION

AND

AMERICAN

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YOUTH:

with Emphasis on

Catholic Adolescents

and Young Adults

by

Raymond H. Potvin

Dean R. Hoge

Hart M. Nelsen

The Boys Town Center for the

Study of Youth Development

The Catholic University of America

Washington, D.C.

Commissioned by

Office of Research, Policy and Program Development

Department of Education

United States Catholic Conference



Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2016

https://archive.org/details/religionamericanOOpotv



RELIGION AND

AMERICAN YOUTH

with Emphasis on Catholic

Adolescents and Young Adults

by

Raymond H. Potvin

Dean R. Hoge

Hart M. Nelsen

The Boys Town Center for the

Study of Youth Development

The Catholic University of America

Washington, D.C.

Commissioned by

Office of Research, Policy and Program Development

Department of Education

United States Catholic Conference

1976

Publications Office

UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE

1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005



Copyright® 1976. Publications Office, United States Catholic Conference



CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

PART I: Ages 13 to 18 3

Religious Belief and Behavior 3

Factors Related To Religiosity 8

Conclusion 21

PART II: Young Adults 18 to 29 22

Introduction 22

College Students’ Religion and Values 22

Catholic Students’ Religion and Values 33

The Pentecostal Movement and

Religious Cults Among Students 38

Explanations for the Changes 40

Non-College Young Adults 43

Age and Gender Differences 45

Acceptance of Ecclesiastical Authority

Among Catholics 47

Humanae Vitae and Social Climate 48

PART III: Projections 50

FOOTNOTES 53

REFERENCES 55

APPENDIX A. Guide in Interpreting Statistical Notation .... 62



TABLES

Table Page

1 Percent of Adolescents Reporting on Selected Religious Beliefs
and Practices 4

2 Percent of 13 to 16 Year Olds Reporting on Selected Behavior
Items: 1967, 1972, 1975 7

3 Mean Scores, Standard Deviation and Range on Religious
Indices by Age for Total Population and Catholics 10

4 Mean Scores and Standard Deviation on Religious Indices for
Catholics by Type of School and Religious Instruction 12

5 Mean Scores and Standard Deviations on Religious Indices by
Sex 14

6 Mean Scores and Standard Deviation on Religious Indices by
Social Class 15

7 Mean Scores and Standard Deviation on Religious Indices by
Size of Residence 17

8 Correlation Matrix of Selected Items and Religious Indices ... 19

9 Standardized Regression Coefficients (/3 ) between Selected

Variables and Religious Indices (N = 1121) 20
10 Percent of AM College Freshmen Agreeing with Value State-

ments 25

11 Percent of All College Freshmen Responding “Essential" or

“Very Important” to Selected Statements 26

12 Percent of All College Students Evaluating Personal Values as

“Very Important” 28

13 Percent of All College Students Believing Certain Activities to be

Morally Wrong 28

14 Percent of All College Students Welcoming Particular Social

Changes 29

15 Responses of Undergraduate Men at Dartmouth College and the
University of Michigan to Four Religious Items (in Percent) ... 30

16 Responses of Undergraduate Men at Williams College to Five

Items on Religion (in Percent) 31

17 Responses of Undergraduate Men at Williams College to Three

Items on Home Religious Teachings (in Percent) 32

18 Percent of Marquette University Undergraduates Saying Various

Actions are “All Right” To Do 34

19 Responses of Freshmen Women to Items in the 1975 Survey
of the American Council on Education: Saint Mary’s College,

All Catholic Colleges, and All Colleges (in Percent) 36

20 Percent of Population 18 to 29 Attending Religious Services in

Average Week by Religion, Education, and Year (Gallup Surveys) 44

21 Percent of Population 18 to 29 Believing in Life after Death by

Religion, Education, and Year (1957 and 1968 Gallup Surveys

and 1972 Survey Research Center, University of Michigan,

Study) 45

22 Percent of Catholics Attending Church Regularly on Sundays by

Sex and Education: 1971 46

23 Percent of Catholics Reporting that the 1968 Encyclical Has

Made Them Question More the Pope’s Authority (1971 Gallup

Catholic Data), by Sex and Education 48



Introduction

In the United States there are approximately 67 million adolescents

and young adults between the ages of 13 and 29. They constitute an

estimated 39 percent of the total population (Current Population

Reports, Series P-25, No. 601). In terms of sheer numbers, the youth

apostolate remains a major challenge for organized religion. But the

challenge is even larger and more complex than numbers alone suggest.

American society is experiencing rapid change, which implies an

increase in the complexity of value systems and behavior patterns often

leading to agonizing moral ambiguities. Catholics have not been ex-

empted from the impact. If religious teachers and/or institutional

resources are too few or unprepared to meet this challenge, the religious

development of youth may well be determined by other influences. The

data presented here suggest that organized religion should consider an

extended commitment of personnel and resources to the youth

apostolate.

This study was commissioned by the United States Catholic Con-

ference and carried out by the Boys Town Center for the Study of Youth

Development at the Catholic University of America. It profiles the current

religious attitudes of Catholic youth and young adults in the United

States. In addition, it clearly identifies areas in which further research

is needed. (In this connection, it should be noted that a study similar to

this one concerning the religious attitudes of children 6 to 13 is now

underway and will be published in the near future.)

The present study attempts to describe the religious situation of

adolescents and young adults in the United States, with emphasis on

Catholic youth. It outlines the parameters within which an apostolate to

youth must be carried on. It reviews the pertinent literature on religious

attitudes, beliefs and behavior of young people between the ages of

13 and 29, and supplements the results of previous studies with findings

from recent research by the Boys Town Center. 1 Sources are identified

briefly in the text and described more fully in the list of resources.

Whenever possible, attention is given to changing trends, to the

determinants of these characteristics of youth, and to their possible

development in the immediate future. The study focuses on two age

groups: adolescents between the ages of 13 and 18, mainly junior and

senior high school youth; and young adults between the ages of 18 and

29. There are considerable gaps in our knowledge about the religious

beliefs and behavior of youth. While much research has been conducted,

few samples have been national in scope and these few have been limited

1



to narrow areas of the religious spectrum. Nonetheless some valid

insights are possible. We base our generalizations on the best data

available.

Readers who are not familiar with statistics may wish to refer to

Appendix A, which includes a short guide for interpreting statistical

notation.

(Msgr.) WILFRID H. PARADIS

Associate Secretary

Office of Research, Policy and Program Development

Department of Education

2



RELIGION AND

AMERICAN YOUTH

with Emphasis on Catholic

Adolescents and Young Adults

Part I: Ages 13 to 18

There are approximately 25 million adolescents between the ages

of 13 and 18 years of age in the United States (Current Population

Reports Series P-25, No. 601). The great majority are in junior or senior

high schools. According to Keniston, a basic, conscious issue during

youth is the tension between self and society: the adolescent struggles

to define his or her identity and in so doing recognizes the possibility of

conflict between emerging selfhood and the social order; the result is

often a pervasive ambivalence toward both self and society (Keniston,

1970). Certainly such tension affects the adolescent’s orientation to

religion.

RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND BEHAVIOR

In 1975 about 70 percent of American youth aged 13 to 18

believed firmly in a personal God; 20 percent were doubtful but reported

belief in a higher power of some kind; and another 10 percent did not

believe or felt they would never know whether God or some higher power

exists (Boys Town Survey, 1975). Since the early 1950s doubt or non-

belief in a personal God has increased more than 10 percentage points,

most of the change having occurred during the last decade (see Table 1).

Furthermore, belief in divine retribution is becoming increasingly un-

popular. At present only 56 percent believe that God will punish people

who sin, while in the early 1960s as many as 76 percent reported that

they believed God would reward or punish them for what they did

(Bealerand Willets, 1967:439). The notion of divine punishment is least

acceptable to Jews and less acceptable to Catholics than to Protestants

(see Table 1).

The same trend is observable about belief in life after death. In

1961 about 78 percent indicated such a belief (Bealer and Willets,

3



PERCENT

OF

ADOLESCENTS

REPORTING

ON

SELECTED

RELIGIOUS

BELIEFS

AND

PRACTICES

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Gallup

and

Hill,

1961,

as

reported

in

Bealer

and

Willets,

1967.

Potvin,

1975:

percent

responding

“I

believe

in

a

life

after

death

but

I

don’t

know

what

it

will

be

like”,

or

“I

believe

that

I

will

exist

after

death

only

as

a

part

of

a

universal

spirit

or

form”,

or

“I

believe

in

a

personal

life

after

death

and

that

I

will

exist

as

an

individual.”

7

Remmers

and

Radler,

1957:

percent

responding

“Yes”

to

"The

first

writing

of

the

Bible

was

done

under

the

guidance

of

God.”

Potvin,

1975:

percent

responding

“Strongly

agree”

or

"Agree”

to

“The

Bible

is

God’s

word

and

must

be

obeyed.”



1967:439); in 1975 the percentage was 65, with more than half the
believers admitting they did not know wheher such a life meant
personal, individual existence or survival as part of a universal spirit.

Catholics reported slightly more disbelief and doubt than Protestants,
and Jews reported the most (see Table 1).

In 1951 the Purdue Opinion Poll of high school students showed

that 57 percent of young people agreed with the following statement:

“The first writing of the Bible was done under the guidance of God.”

At that time Catholics had a higher rate of agreement than Protestants,

64 percent compared to 56 percent. In 1975 the Boys Town Survey
reported that 67 percent of adolescents aged 13 to 18 agreed that “the
Bible is God’s word and must be obeyed”; 64 percent of the Catholics

agreed with the statement compared to 74 percent of the Protestants.

Since the questions were worded quite differently in the two surveys, it
is impossible to draw conclusions about any changes which might have
taken place from 1951 to 1975, but it is important to note the relative
shift in the percentage of agreement with each item when Catholics are
compared to Protestants.

A review of the survey literature over time generally indicates a
decline in traditional orthodoxy among American adolescents. Catholics
are not an exception. If anything, they have been affected more than

Protestants. Furthermore, this decline has been accompanied by a

decline in attendance at religious services. According to the Purdue

Opinion Polls of high school students in 1957 and 1962, almost 70
percent indicated they attended religious services once a week or more.
This represented 80 percent of the Catholics, about 70 percent of the
Protestants, and fewer than 40 percent of the Jews. In 1975 weekly
attendance had dropped to 44 percent among adolescents 13 to 18:
55 percent for Catholics, 43 percent for Protestants, and 10 percent
for Jews (see Table 1).*

Though frequency of attendance has declined considerably, only

13 percent never attend at all (Boys Town Survey, 1975). This indicates
some continuation of institutional contact by the large majority. Further-
more, slightly more than 60 percent of adolescents 13 to 18 believe that
in some way the church and religious authorities represent God in this
world, and 34 percent say they are fairly active in the youth activities
sponsored by their church or religious group. Catholics report the least

participation, only 24 percent claiming to be fairly active (Boys Town
Survey, 1975). While some young people seem to be moving away from
organized religion, others remain firmly committed.

The decline in attendance at religious services over the years does
not appear to reflect simply disenchantment with institutional forms of

5



worship. Among high school students the frequency of private prayer

remained fairly stable between 1951 and 1962, with at least 50 percent

reporting that they prayed every day. In 1975 this percentage dropped to

30. Among Catholics there occurred a decline of 44 percent, from 73

to 29, compared to a decline of 22 percent among Protestants and 15

percent among Jews. Again the issue is not one of total alienation from

prayer, since only 14 percent reported that prayer has little or no im-

portance in their lives. Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that prayer

is less important in the adolescent's life than it was 10 or so years ago.

The existence of a “religious revival” among Americans between 13

and 18 in the mid-1970s is simply not sustained by these data. In fact,

they tend to support the opposite. Moreover, Catholics appear to be

affected more than the other groups. The notion of a revival may stem

from a small minority’s concern with mystical experience and newer

forms of religious expression which have been widely publicized. Such

movements, however, are largely concentrated among older youth, often

university students or university drop-outs (Prince, 1974:263). Whether

one interprets these data as signs of an overall decline in religiousness

among youth depends to a great extent on how one defines religion.

Though there is increasing consensus that religion cannot be reduced to

official beliefs, practices, or traditional organizations (see, for example,

Geertz, 1966), it remains a fact that adolescent beliefs and behaviors are

changing.

Such a change is equally evident in some areas of moral judgment

and behavior. A Harris Poll conducted for Life (January 8, 1971) re-

ported that 45 percent of 15 to 21 year olds believed it was all right

for an unmarried couple to have sexual relations if they were formally

engaged. In 1975, 65 percent of 13 to 18 year olds agreed that in some

circumstances having sexual intercourse before marriage would not be

wrong (Boys Town Survey, 1975). Though the questions and age groups

were not identical in both surveys, the change toward a more permissive

view of sex appears evident. In 1972, 19 percent of adolescents 13 to 16

admitted using marijuana or drugs (Gold and Reimer, 1976); in 1975

the figure was approximately 25 percent (Boys Town Survey, 1975).

This figure increases to 30 percent among 13 to 18 year olds. Truancy,

running away from home, fraud and theft have increased over the years

(see Table 2). On the positive side, crimes of assault or against persons

have decreased by half among teenagers aged 13 to 16 since 1967.

6



TABLE

2

PERCENT

OF

13

TO

16

YEAR

OLDS

REPORTING

ON

SELECTED

BEHAVIOR

ITEMS:

1967i,

1972i,

1975

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to

get

something

by

lying

about

who

you

were

or

how

old

you

were”;

“Hurt

someone

badly

enough

to

need

bandages

or

a

doctor”

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someone

with

the

idea

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taking

his/her

life”;

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beer,

wine,

or

liquor

without

permission”;

“Used

marijuana”;

“Used

any

drugs

or

chemicals

to

get

high

or

for

kicks

except

marijuana”.

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are

for

those

between

ages

13

to

16

reporting

that

they

had

done

this

once

or

more

in

the

last

year.

M

=

Male;

F

=

Female



These and other data indicate a trend away from ascetic morality, less

concern with property rights and more sensitivity to personal rights. For

example, over 75 percent of 13 to 18 year olds now believe that treating

persons of other races or nationalities as inferiors is always wrong (Boys

Town Survey, 1975).

A Gilbert poll in 1974 conducted for the National Association of

Secondary School Principals discovered that the large majority of high

school youth are satisfied with their country, families, and school.

Nonetheless, over two-fifths say they would be “happier” living away

from their families and find it difficult to communicate with their parents.

Over half claim that school administrators do not understand them, and

a third feel their teachers do not take an interest in them (NASSP,

1974)

. This ambivalence or unease with the adult world may explain

the increasing number of run-aways cited previously and the surprisingly

large number of adolescents, 23 percent, who now believe that in some

circumstances it is not wrong to take one's own life (Boys Town Survey,

1975)

. Recent statistics show that this attitude toward suicide should

be taken seriously. It is estimated that adolescent suicides rose nearly

250 percent between 1954 to 1973. In the last decade the rate increased

from 4.9 to 10.9 per 100,000. Many experts believe the main cause is

an increasing feeling of isolation and loneliness. Others point to changing

attitudes toward sex, religion, politics, and social relationships as

important factors creating awesome pressures and responsibilities

which young people are not prepared to face alone. Adolescents seek

freedom but, according to Dr. Daniel Lettieri, a research psychologist,

suicide is sometimes an attempt to escape from that freedom (Washing-

ton Post
,
June 4, 1976:C1). Perhaps religion, by creating a sense of

community among believers, can help to relieve some of this tension.

In spite of these statistics, one major survey of high school youth

concludes: “They are determined, ambitious, and committed to their

own individual goals . . . they are down to earth and practical. They

realize the problems that lie ahead in their lives: completing their educa-

tion, getting a job, embarking on careers. And while this pragmatism

may not be described as ‘sparkling,’ ‘activist,’ or even ‘new,’ it is an

honest method of building futures” (NASSP, 1974:62-63). Adolescents

will continue to have strong interests in the pragmatic dimensions of

life.

FACTORS RELATED TO RELIGIOSITY

A considerable literature exists relating age to religiousness.

Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi have suggested that adolescence, which they

describe as the period between the ages of 12 to 18, “is a period of

8



religious awakening, during which time people either become converted

or decide to abandon their childhood faith, if they had one’' (1975:59).

Goldman has documented that age 13 or thereabout marks a radical

change in religious thinking, with a “tendency to see much of previous

teaching as ‘childish’ and to reject it at that level because the authori-

tarian literalism of the Junior [2nd to 6th grades] child is unacceptable

and no coherent alternative has been presented" (1964:240). There is

a suggestion in much of this research that an increase in religious doubt

is related to growth in understanding, to mental age, and that this con-

flict between faith and reason reaches a peak at about age 17 and is

generally resolved one way or the other by age 20 (Argyle and Beit-

Hallahmi, 1975:62-63). Newer studies indicate that this resolution of

conflict is now occurring at earlier ages.

The Boys Town Survey data of 1975 did not reveal any particular

age for the occurrence of such a crisis. Generally the data show a

progressive decline in traditional religious beliefs and practices as one

grows older. While the number of females who do not believe in or doubt

the existence of a personal God increased slightly with age, as many as

44 percent of males aged 16 to 18 doubt or do not believe in a personal

God, an increase of 15 percent over the 13 to 15 age category. This

change in belief is mirrored in religious practice. For example, 48

percent of 9th graders attend religious services every week, but only

27 percent of the 12th graders. The Purdue Polls of 1951 and 1962 as

well as the work of Fritsch and Hetzer (1928), Bose (1929), MacLean

(1930), and Hollingsworth (1933), document that this change over age

is not a recent phenomenon. However, the magnitude of the decline has

increased. Catholics have not been an exception, 63 percent attending

weekly at ages 13 to 15 but only 45 percent at ages 16 to 18. The age

differential in daily prayer is also evident, especially among Catholics,

with 34 percent praying daily or more often at ages 13 to 15 but only

22 percent doing so at ages 16 to 18. 3

The religious questions included in the Boys Town Survey of 1975

were reduced through factor analysis to three factors: 1) a personal-

experiential dimension defined by closeness of God, frequency of prayer,

and the importance of religion in one's own life; 2) a religious practice

dimension focusing on attendance at religious services and participation

in church activities; 4 and 3) a traditional or fundamentalist orthodoxy

dimension measuring agreement with the beliefs that God punishes

people who sin, that the Bible is God’s word and must be obeyed, that

the church or religious authorities represent God in this world, and that

God controls everything that happens. On the basis of another factor

analysis two scales on moral issues, named according to a distinction

made by Middleton and Putney (1962), were also constructed: 1) ascetic

morality, including items on whether getting drunk, smoking marijuana,

9



MEAN

SCORES,

STANDARD

DEVIATION

AND

RANGE

ON

RELIGIOUS

INDICES

BY

AGE

FOR

TOTAL

POPULATION

AND

CATHOLICS

10



having sexual intercourse before marriage are wrong; and 2) social

morality, including items on whether lying, stealing, taking one’s own

life, and treating persons of other races or nationalities as inferior are

wrong. Table 3 presents the mean scores, the range, the standard

deviations for the total population and for Catholics by age. The higher

the mean score for each scale, the more the group experiences personal-

experiential religion, participates in formal services or activities, is more

traditionally orthodox in belief, accepts an ascetic morality, or accepts

what we have defined as social morality.

The data of Table 3 confirm the impact of age on religious orienta-

tion and behavior. On every index except social morality there is a

significant decrease for the total population and for Catholic adolescents.

The personal-experiential dimension seems affected the least, indicating

that for some adolescents as they grow older communion with God is

not tied up with formal practice or traditional beliefs. There is no inherent

reason why increasing age should lead to loss of faith. Certainly exposure

to competing world-views and value systems increases, but religious

education can be adapted to mental age and to the market place of ideas.

In fact, Goldman believes that how adolescents are taught is as im-

portant as what they are taught, and that most adolescents “have

stopped thinking about religion long before they consciously reject it.

The cause of this is a tangle of boredom, the association of religion with

fairy tales, ‘science has proved religion isn’t true,’ its apparent remote-

ness from life . . . , and a confusion with much of the language and

thought used in the Bible” (1970:165). Some of these problems may be

remedied by sound teaching programs adapted to the mental age of the

developing adolescent, who often feels the need to question beliefs pre-

viously accepted, to discuss and to explore. If such personal confronta-

tion with religious truth is encouraged, the decline in religiousness as

the adolescent grows older may be arrested to some extent.

A not unrelated factor is that young people drop out of religion

courses. According to the Boys Town Survey of 1975, 90 percent of the

13 to 18 year olds have studied religion at some time or other in their

lives, but only 44 percent are now doing so. The same percentage applies

to Catholics. 5 Table 4 presents the mean scores on the religious scales

for Catholics: (1) in Catholic school, (2) in public school currently

attending CCD classes, and (3) in public schools having previously

studied religion but not doing so now. First we compared groups (1)

and (2). Catholic school youths score slightly higher than public school

youth now attending CCD classes on religious practice, the personal-

experiential, and social morality scales but slightly lower on the tradi-

tional orthodoxy and ascetic morality scales. None of these differences

is statistically significant. Controlling for age does not change these

findings substantially. Because of the national scope of the sample,

11



MEAN

SCORES

AND

STANDARD

DEVIATION

ON

RELIGIOUS

INDICES

FOR

CATHOLICS

BY

TYPE

OF

SCHOOL

AND

RELIGIOUS

INSTRUCTION

12

1

These

students

attended

CCD

in

the

past

but

have

dropped

out.

Only

4

percent

(N

=

12)

never

attended

and

are

not

included

in

the

table

because

of

the

small

N.



some numbers are small, but the same results were obtained in a North

East sample of 1,500 Catholic public and Catholic school students.

The important factor is whether adolescents continue studying

religion or not. On all the religious dimensions, except the index of

social morality, being enrolled in religion classes makes a significant

difference. However, it should not be concluded that religion classes

cause this difference, since the data may simply reflect the fact that the

adolescent who is “already more religious" for whatever reason tends

to enroll in religion classes or go to a Catholic school. Nonetheless the

data raise certain questions about the Greeley, McCready and McCourt

finding that “there is no evidence that the Confraternity of Christian

Doctrine discussion classes can function as an adequate substitute for

Catholic schools" (1976:218). Our data suggest they might so function

if the adolescent remains enrolled over his or her school years.

One reason for the discrepancy between the Greeley finding and

ours is that the samples are not comparable. We studied 13 to 18 year

olds; they studied adults 18 or over. It may well be that education in

Catholic elementary and secondary schools has a delayed effect which

manifests itself only in later years. Or it may be that these schools had

an effect years ago when today’s adults were in school, an effect which

no longer exists, at least to the same extent. 6 In any case, the relative

effect of Catholic school education and CCD classes remains an open

question, at least until panel data are collected.

It is generally asserted that women are more religious than men

(Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975:71-79). Some writers attribute this to

basic psychological differences between the sexes (Garai, 1970), others

to differences in upbringing (D'Andrade, 1967; Hutt, 1972), to women’s

greater deprivation or lack of status-rewards (Bourque and Back, 1968;

Campbell and Fukuyama, 1970) and to lack of work involvement (Luck-

mann, 1967). Unfortunately, much of gender theory in this area is

frankly speculative. The fact remains, however, that sex differences in

religiosity exist, not only among adults but among adolescents as well

(see, for example, Weigert and Thomas, 1970). In the Boys Town Survey

of 1975 females 13 to 18 scored significantly higher than males on the

personal-experiential dimension of religion, on religious practice, and

on social morality, but not on ascetic morality and traditional orthodoxy

(see Table 5). Whether because of temperament, upbringing, or depriva-

tion, adolescent females report greater closeness to God and frequency

of prayer than do males. Though less prone to anti-social acts against

persons and property, they are equally as anti-ascetic as males.

There is some evidence in the literature that social class influences

religious orientation (Demerath, 1965; Mueller and Johnson, 1975) but

the relationship is not always clear. Generally members of the lower

13



£5
(O

>-

m
to
LU

o
Q
Z

to

3
O
o
—I

LU

CCL

z
o
to

z
o

<

14



15



classes are less likely to attend church services. If they are church

members they tend to have fundamentalist religious beliefs. Their lower

religious participation is often explained by a general disinclination to

participate in all types of voluntary organizations (Lenski, 1963) and by

preferences in style of religious expression (Demerath, 1965) which in

turn are related to social deprivation (Campbell and Fukuyama, 1970).

When the adolescents of the Boys Town Survey were dichotomized into

lower and higher social class on the basis of their fathers' occupations,

significant differences were obtained on the personal-experiential dimen-

sion of religion and on traditional orthodoxy, with the lower class scoring

higher, but not on the religious practice, social morality or ascetic

morality indices (see Table 6). The hypothesis that social class affects

religious practice is not sustained for adolescents. Nor is the hypothesis

that moral values differ by class. However, lower class adolescents are

more traditionally orthodox or fundamentalist and tend to pray and

“experience God" more.

Whether or not size of the town or city in which one resides is a

factor in religious orientation is a matter of some dispute (Argyle and

Beit-Hallahmi, 1975). Nelsen et al. (1971) found little difference over

various dimensions except for the ideological. Small town residents

tended to be more conservative. On the other hand Lenski (1953) found

evidence of more church attendance in smaller communities. Back and

Bourque (1970) reported that residents of smaller communities admit

to more mystical experiences than residents of larger cities. Certainly

social-class differences account for some of these findings. Nonetheless

the adolescent sample from the Boys Town Survey showed that on all

dimensions except religious practice small town or city residents scored

significantly higher than residents of large cities, 50,000 and over (see

Table 7). Not only are residents of areas with less than 50,000 popula-

tion more traditionally orthodox or fundamentalist and more conservative

on moral issues, but they report more personal closeness to God and

frequency of prayer than their metropolitan counterparts.

A major factor which influences the religiousness of youth is their

parents' orientation to religion. Parental religious practice is an im-

portant index of parental commitment to socialize their children within

a particular religious tradition, and is related to adolescents’ beliefs and

behavior (Greeley and Rossi, 1966; Carrier, 1965; Allison, 1969; Argyle

and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975:30). Moreover, social scientists have noted

the importance of parent-child relationships and parental images in the

formation of God concepts (Potvin, 1976; Spilka et al., 1975; Deconchy,

1968) and of religious orientation (Weigert and Thomas, 1970;1972).

The implication in this literature is two-fold. Parents influence their

children's religion overtly by socialization and indirectly by the way they

relate to their children.

16



LU

O

17



Table 8 shows that parental religious practice 7 is strongly cor-

related with the adolescent's religious practice (r = .49) and moderately
correlated with the personal-experiential (r = .37) and the traditional
orthodoxy dimensions (r = .25). The impact is slightly less (r = .22)
on ascetic morality and negligible on social morality (r = .06). While
parental religious practice is related to whether the adolescent is cur-

rently studying religion (r = .38), when the latter is partialed out of the
relationship, the association between parental religious practice and

adolescent religion remains significant on all dimensions except social

morality. 8 Furthermore, the data of Table 8 indicate that parental impact

is not only through overt socialization. Adolescents with parents defined

as affectionate and supporting 9 score higher on most of the religious

dimensions, especially the morality scales and the personal-experiential

dimension. Adblescents with parents defined as controlling and non-

permissive 10 tend to score higher on the traditional orthodoxy dimension.

It is also known that loving parental images facilitate the develop-

ment of a personal God image in some adolescents (Potvin, 1976). This

may result from projection of parental love. But it may also mean that

affectionate parents are more effective in transmitting beliefs to their

children. Some evidence exists to support this interpretation (Martin,

1975:502). On the other hand, parental control and non-permissiveness

are related to an image of a punishing God, suggesting some projection

of parental images upon God (Potvin, 1976). The fact remains that

parents and parent-child relationships are important factors in the

religious orientation of adolescents. This suggests that religious instruc-

tion may increase in value if religious teachers can involve parents in

the process.

However, Loveless and Lodato (1967) discovered a convergence of

values in individuals from different religions during adolescence, reflect-

ing a decline in the influence of parents and a growing influence of the

peer group. Whitam (1968) performed a follow-up study on teenagers

who had “decided for Christ” and documented the importance of friends

in the retention of a religious commitment. The relevance of the peer

group in explaining values and behavior has been amply demonstrated

(see, for example, Elder, 1975; Kandel & Lesser, 1972). The correla-

tions of Table 8 indicate that adolescents with friends who are acceptable

to their parents score higher on most of the religious dimensions and

that those with friends who are not acceptable to parents score lower.

Again the data by themselves do not show causality but they point to a

relationship which is of some interest to religious educators.

Many of these variables which are related to religious orientation

are also related among themselves (see Table 8). Do they all predict

independently of each other? What is their relative importance? Table

18



CORRELATION

MATRIX

OF

SELECTED

ITEMS

AND

RELIGIOUS

INDICES

10 CD <T> CO CO rv LD CO Cv LD h- 00

A)j|eJow |Bjoo$
0 O O 0

1

0 rH O
1

i-H i-H CM CO

00 ID ID 00 CM 0 CO 0 CT> IV. O CO
Aihbjo in oijaosv

CM

1

O r-H

1

0
1

CM CM 0
1

CM CM CO

CO CM IV. IV. CO CO l\ LD O in
|B!iU3U3dX]-|BU0SJ9d

O
1

rH

1

0
1

CO 0 CO LD

1^ CO CO CM CT> CO in in i-H

sojiOBJd sno|3!|3H
r-H

1

r-H 0
1

O
1

0 LD

Axopoij)JO

•|BU0|)!PBJ1

-.15
.03

in

i-H

1

-.23

.25

O CM
rH .09 .31

uo|3!|3y
LD CO 00 00 in CsJ
i-H

1

0 O
1

0 CO 0 0 i-H
SujApnis mon

SPU3UJ JO

SAOJddv S)U3JBd

i-H

0 .07
-.02

00

0 .09 .27
CO
i-H

1

CD 0 CM 00
I0JJU03 |BJU3JBd

O
1

i-H O 0
1

0 i-H

1

poddns
CO CM cn

0 0 O q
-UOJJ03JJV |BlU3JBd r f \

33j;3BJd

rH 0 CM
0 q O q

sno;3j|3y iejusjed
l' r

10 r-H CO

UOjiBOnp] |BiU3JBd
0
r

q

rH CO

3ZJS Alio
0
f

q

r-H

X3S
0

l'

0
0 t

«/>

D
0 C

0 CL 03

2
CL

CL
3
CO

‘l.

Ll.

H-

c
0
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CD c

d3v
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TO

0

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0

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CD

>
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CD

cr

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0
-C

0
’+->

0

03

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CD

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a>

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LlI

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cc

"(0

CD

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c
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13

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0

CO c c c c: "c CO M 0 +» CO
V >> 03 03 CD CD CD £ T3 C/>

03

0
0S) CL) (5 to to TO <5 0 2 "cd a) V)

< CO b Q. CL CL CL Q. 2: 1- o: CL < 00

19



STANDARDIZED

REGRESSION

COEFFICIENTS

(/})

BETWEEN

SELECTED

VARIABLES

AND

RELIGIOUS

INDICES

(N

=

1121)

Social
Morality (3

* * *
* * * *
* * * * *
00 LO CO CO (/> W (/> 00 CM
O O O ^ 7 h Q h... .25 .06

Ascetic Morality 13

# * # * * *

O (/) CM h 00 CM CO ^ 00
CM -p- H !—1 »—1 i—1 -pr i—1 r—

1

1 1 1

.45 .21

Traditional

Orthodoxy

(3

*
* #

# # # ***##
»—i CO O LOCOi-hCOCOH 2 cm < O *—i O CM

1 1 1

.49 .22

Religious Practice /3

* * *
* * *

* * * * * # #
Oi-HLOIO 00 GO GO C"" O
>—i i-h O O 00 ^ Z O ^

i*

'

i r

.67 .43

Personal

Experiential (3

*
Ji jf. 4J. si. Jt

CO CO 00 O 00 CM cO CO LO2^0—1 CM H 2 2 CO
\ I

.55 .31

Age Sex City

Size

Parental

Education

Parental

Religious

Practice

Parental

Affection-Support

Parental

Control

Parents

Approve

friends

Now

Studying

Religion

II II

CM

cn cr

20

*

p
<

.001

**

p
<
.01

*#*

p
<
.05

NS

=

non-significant



9 presents the standardized regression coefficients (Beta’s) for each

variable which partial out the contribution of other variables related

to it. The R's in the table give the total association between the variables

and each measure of religiousness. The R 2 ’s give the percentage of

variance explained.

It is obvious from the data of Table 9 that the most important

predictors of religiosity as measured by these indices are parental

religious practice and whether or not the adolescent is currently studying

religion. Age is also a major factor in ascetic morality (the older the

youth, the less ascetic the orientation) and social class as measured by

parental education is important in predicting traditional orthodoxy (the

lower the parental education, the more traditionally orthodox is the

adolescent). Parental affection and support are the most important

factors related to social morality. Nonetheless there appears to be no

substitute for a religious home environment and for religious instruction

if adolescents are to remain committed to their religious heritage.

CONCLUSION

The problems of religion usually associated with college youth have

now become the problems of high school youth. Concern for basic values

of autonomy and independence has reached within their ranks and

affected their religious orientation. They appear less traditional than in

the past and a confrontation with faith appears to occur much earlier.

Religion seems more peripheral to their lives but the great majority are

not alienated from organized religion. They are children of the times who

will insist on religious dialogue and not simply religious indoctrination.

They are also confused by the very freedom they demand. Support

systems of the family and/or peer groups will be important factors in

how they react to this freedom. Organized religion, in union with these

support systems, can be a major force but today’s adolescent will assess

it more critically than in the past.

21



Part 1 1: Young Adults 18-29

INTRODUCTION

In this section we review information on college students who are

mostly 18 to 21 years of age and on young adults 18 to 29, with special

emphasis on the non-college population. In the middle-1970s college

students comprised about 46 percent of all persons in the U.S. popula-

tion 18 to 21 years old, 11 and 34 percent of the total population 18 to 29

were college students or graduates. 12

College students in the United States have changed in religious

beliefs and behavior more rapidly than virtually any other group; and

so this section stresses changes and trends. Campus ministers never

tire of saying to sociologists that data gathered two or three years ago

on campus are now totally out ofxdate due to the rapid shifts in mood.

While we should not rush to draw Conclusions about the significance of

these rapid movements, it is a fact that the phenomenon is more prevalent

among college students than among adults. Projections about the future

are, as we shall see, difficult with regard to college students' religion.

What follows is organized into five parts: (a) data on all college

students’ religion and values; (b) Catholic students’ religion and values;

(c) the Pentecostal Movement and the rise of religious cults among

students; (d) explanations for the changes; and (e) some comments on

non-college young adults.

COLLEGE STUDENTS’ RELIGION AND VALUES

There have been many studies of college students’ religion and

values. Two recent comprehensive reviews depict the basic findings. One,

by Feldman and Newcomb (1969), looks mostly at research on the impact

of college on students’ attitudes and values. In summary, it concludes

that college education usually has a liberalizing effect on students’

religious and political attitudes, though colleges vary in their impact.

The other review, by Hoge (1974), covers trend data and examines

possible explanations for the trends. Its overall conclusions about

trends among students are instructive for an understanding of the

situation today. 13

Hoge finds two distinct trends in 50 years of data on college

students’ religion and values. First is a single linear trend occurring

in the same direction over all five decades. It has three visible com-

ponents. (1) Increased individual freedom and personal autonomy of

students. College students have more freedom and more personal

22



responsibility today than ever before, and they are treated more like

adults today than ever before. (2) Changes in moral orientations, mostly

from detailed moral codes to more generalized and flexible moral

orientations relating to dominant values. The new moral views also

include greater tolerance regarding details of moral codes. (3) The rise

of a self-conscious youth culture. This occurred mostly after World

War II, though earlier indications of it were found in student life of the

1920s. The idea that youth are a distinctive portion of the population

and the years of youth form a distinctive segment of the life cycle is a

relatively new development, essentially a product of the 20th century.

The rise of a self-conscious culture growing out of this newly defined

portion of the life cycle is a product of the middle 20th century.

In addition to this linear trend visible over all five decades, Hoge

found a pattern of back-and-forth shifts in college students' religion

and values, in response to short-term events and pressures. In the area

of religion, traditional Christian commitment was relatively strong in the

middle 1920s, then weakened greatly to a low point in the middle or

late 1930s. Starting about 1938-41, there was a return to traditional

Christian commitment which continued until a highpoint in 1952-55.

Thereafter, with the demise of Cold War anxieties, the campus mood

shifted again toward individualism, with a weakening of traditional

commitments which has continued until the most recent research find-

ings. In the middle 1970s there were some new indications of a halt

to the downward trend, as we shall see below. But there has been no

over-all reversal of the weakening of orthodox beliefs and support for

the institutional church ever since the middle 1950s.

The reasons for the short-term changes must in themselves be

time specific. An analyst cannot explain five-year developments by citing

50-year trends. Hoge looked into a series of short-range factors which

might have caused the back-and-forth changes and found that when

traditional religious commitments were strong, other kinds of values

also tended to be strong, and vice versa.

Traditional religious orthodoxy is associated with fear of Com-

munism, with commitment to family life, with commitment to

military duty and patriotic war, and with commitment to dominant

social norms. The extent to which it is associated with other-

direction is not clear; our direct measures show little association,

but historical accounts and other research suggest an association

at least indirectly. We have also seen that religious unorthodoxy is

associated with political action toward radical social change

(1974:180).

It might be said that the middle 1920s and early 1950s were

conservative periods and the middle 1930s and late 1960s were

liberal periods. The concerns of college students in the middle

23



1920s and early 1950s were relatively personal and privatistic,

while in the middle 1930s and late 1960s they were more social

and political, oriented to achieving social change or national policy

change (1974:182).

Put in sociological terms, traditional religious commitments have

been strongest when other traditional commitments—to family, to nation,

and to the social status quo—have been strongest. When, for any

reason, these other traditional commitments weaken, religious commit-

ment is also bound to be affected. To understand religious change,

one must start with a view of the total system of values and commit-

ments held by an individual, not just of religious commitments and

beliefs by themselves. This is because religious commitments (and

especially church commitments) are only one component of a broader

structure of commitments, and pressures from various sides change

the total structure.

This theoretical conclusion reached by Hoge has two implications

which should be noted here. First, religious leaders should recognize

that the determinants of college students’ religious commitments are

much broader than just the clergy, the church, or the schools. Many

factors influence religious life, and many of them are beyond the control

of church leaders. Pervasive social forces in modern society are difficult

to perceive and identify precisely, but nevertheless their effect is strong.

Second, the overall pattern of commitments to family, community, and

nation are more important determinants of religious commitments in

any decade than the economic situation.

By comparing college students and the total adult population, Hoge

found that vacillations in students’ religious commitments were much

more pronounced than in the total population. Generally in the total

population, the younger, more affluent and more closely tied in with

national intellectual culture a person is, the more he or she is subject

to short-range changes in religious commitment.

In reviewing all available data through the end of the 1960s, Hoge

concluded in summary that religious commitments are closely related to

other important commitments in college students’ lives, and when social

changes take place, religious commitments will also change. In the past,

religious trends have been understandable in terms of broader social

commitments, and this will be true in the future also.

Research on changes in college students' values has improved in

the past decade. At the same time the campus climate has taken a new

turn, away from the activism of the late 1960s and toward a more tradi-

tional pattern. Some persons have asked if there is a "return to the

1950s.” Today we have three sets of data which depict college students’

values since the 1960s.

24



TABLE 10

PERCENT OF ALL COLLEGE FRESHMEN AGREEING

WITH VALUE STATEMENTS

1967 1968 1970 1974 1975

People should not obey laws which

violate their personal values. * * * 34 32

A couple should live together for some

time before deciding to get married. * * * 45 48

Parents should be discouraged from

having large families. 42 * * 60 57

If two people really like each other,

it’s all right for them to have sex

even if they've known each other

for only a very short time. * * * 46 50

Marijuana should be legalized. * 19 38 47 47

Realistically, an individual can do little

to bring about changes in our society. 33 32 39 44 48

Student publications should be cleared

by college officials. 52 56 43 33 34

College officials have the right to ban

persons with extreme views from

speaking on campus. 40 32 33 23 24

Students from disadvantaged social

backgrounds should be given

preferential treatment in college

admissions. 43 42 44 38 37

Current Religious Preference: None * 10 10 11 10

* Question was not asked.

Source: Astin, et a/. (1975:48).

The first set of data comes from the annual survey of freshmen

conducted in over 500 American colleges by the American Council on

Education (see Astin, et ai, 1975; Bayer and Dutton, 1976). This

information has been collected since 1966, and many items have been

repeated from year to year. See Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 presents a

selection of attitude statements used since 1967 or 1968. It shows

major increases in those agreeing that couples should be discouraged

from having large families and that marijuana should be legalized. The

percentage of students saying that college officials should regulate

25



student life decreased markedly from 1967 to 1975. Fervor for social

change weakened: more students in 1975 believed that an individual can

do little to bring about social change, and fewer supported preferential

treatment of disadvantaged persons by colleges.

TABLE 11

PERCENT OF ALL COLLEGE FRESHMEN RESPONDING “ESSENTIAL”

OR “VERY IMPORTANT” TO SELECTED STATEMENTS

1966 1969 1970 1974 1975

Becoming an authority in my field 66 * 67 62 70

Obtaining recognition from colleagues 43 * 40 39 43

Influencing social values
* 34 34 27 30

Raising a family
* 71 68 55 57

Having administrative responsibility

for the work of others 29 * 22 26 31

Being financially very well off 44 * 39 46 50

Helping others who are in difficulty 69 * 65 61 66

Writing original works 14 * 14 12 12

Creating artistic work 15 * 16 14 14

Being successful in a business of

my own 53 * 44 38 44

Developing a meaningful philosophy

of life
* * 76 61 64

Participating in a community action

program * * 29 28 30

Keeping up to date with political affairs 58 * 53 37 39

* Question was not asked.

Source: Astin, et a/. (1975:52).

Table 11 presents a series of items considered by freshmen as

“essential” or “very important” to them. The most noteworthy trends

are decreases in some traditional values—raising a family (down 14

points from 1969 to 1975), being successful in business (down 9 points

from 1966 to 1975), and keeping up to date with political affairs (down

19 points from 1966 to 1975). This table demonstrates the withdrawal

26



from political activism so often observed, starting about 1970 or 1971.

The table does not tell us very clearly, however, in what direction the

new commitments are moving while some traditional commitments

diminish.

The second set of data available on recent trends was gathered by

Daniel Yankelovich (1972;1974). From 1967 to 1973 he carried out

large nationwide surveys of college students, and some of the surveys

used identical items. His reports stress changes in values from the late

1960s to the early 1970s. With the cessation of the Vietnam War the

major energies impelling student protests waned, and campus values

reverted to more familiar patterns. The generation gap between students

and adults narrowed. At the same time some new, more permanent

value trends became visible:

The major value changes under this heading are (1) changes in

sexual morality in the direction of more liberal sexual mores; (2)

changes relating to the authority of institutions, such as the

authority of the law, the police, the government, the boss in a

work situation, etc., in the direction of what sociologists call

‘deauthorization’, i.e., a lessening of automatic obedience to, and

respect for, established authority; (3) changes in relation to the

church and organized religion as a source of guidance for moral

behavior; and (4) changes associated with traditional concepts of

patriotism and automatic allegiance to the idea of ‘my country

right or wrong’.

The second category of New Values relates to social values,

primarily to changing attitudes toward the work ethic, marriage

and family, and the role and importance of money in defining the

meaning of success.

The third category of New Values concerns the meaning of

the value concept of self-fulfillment. Self-fulfillment, is usually

defined by people today in opposition to concern with economic

security. At issue is the individual’s feeling that there must be

more to life than a slavish devotion to keeping one’s nose to the

grindstone. . . . Stress on the theme of self-fulfillment is the indi-

vidual’s way of saying that there must be something more to life

than making a living, struggling to make ends meet, and caring for

others. The self-fulfillment concept also implies a greater preoccu-

pation with self at the expense of sacrificing one’s self for family,

employer, and community. (1974:6)

Yankelovich argues that the political alienation of the 1960s was

a phenomenon specific to that decade, and the campus mood of the

1970s is a return to a more normal, less radical pattern. But the trends

in sexual morality, self-fulfillment orientation, distaste for authority,

religious individualism, and reduced patriotism are more basic to youth

today and probably more permanent characteristics of the 1970s.

27



TABLE 12

PERCENT OF ALL COLLEGE STUDENTS EVALUATING

PERSONAL VALUES AS “VERY IMPORTANT”

Percent Saying

“Very Important”

1969 1971 1973

Love 85 87 87

Privacy 61 64 71

Doing things for others 51 59 56

Living a clean, moral life 45 34 34

Religion 38 31 28

Money 18 18 20

Changing society 33 34 24

Patriotism 35 27 19

Source: Yankelovich (1974:66).

TABLE 13

PERCENT OF ALL COLLEGE STUDENTS BELIEVING

CERTAIN ACTIVITIES TO BE MORALLY WRONG

1969 1971 1973

Taking things without paying for them * 78 84

Extramarital sexual relations 77 57 60

Having an abortion 36 27 32

Relations between consenting homosexuals 42 26 25

Casual premarital sexual relations 34 25 22

* Question was not asked.

Source: Yankelovich (1974:67).

Tables 12, 13, and 14 depict value changes from 1969 to 1973.

In Table 12, “living a clean, moral life,” religion, changing society, and

patriotism have receded in importance. In Table 13 all areas related to

28



TABLE 14

PERCENT OF ALL COLLEGE STUDENTS

WELCOMING PARTICULAR SOCIAL CHANGES

1969 1971 1973

More emphasis on self-expression 84 80 83

More acceptance of sexual freedom 43 56 61

More emphasis on law and order 56 50 51

More emphasis on traditional family ties * 45 51

More respect for authority 59 45 48

Less emphasis on working hard 24 30 31

* Question was not asked.

Source: Yankelovich (1974:66).

sexual activities have lost their moral intensity. In Table 14 there is a

desire for greater sexual freedom, less obedience to “authority,” and

less emphasis on “working hard.” In summary, Yankelovich expects

recent trends in individualism, desire for autonomy, and emphasis on

personal fulfillment to continue in the years ahead. At the same time,

obedience to authority, personal sacrifice, and traditional sexual morality

will progressively weaken.

The third set of data is much smaller, made up of replication

studies at only three colleges done by Hoge and his associates (Hoge,

1976a; Hastings and Hoge, 1976). At Dartmouth College and the Uni-

versity of Michigan the same attitude items were used in identical surveys

in 1952, 1968-69, and 1974. At Williams College the same items were

asked in 1948, 1967, and 1974.

Table 15 depicts the trends in religious attitudes at Dartmouth and

Michigan. The percentage feeling the need for some religious faith or

philosophy fell from 1952 to 1974, and the percentage feeling that they

now have an adequate religious faith or philosophy rose (considerably

at Dartmouth, slightly at Michigan). The percentage with belief in a

Divine God, Creator of the Universe, fell at both colleges. Church attend-

ance fell sharply—church attendance monthly or more often fell 23

points at Dartmouth and 28 at Michigan from 1952 to 1974. Another

item (not shown in the table) asked for present religious preference. The

percentage saying “none” rose from the late 1960s to 1974: at Dart-

mouth from 24 percent to 35 percent; at Michigan from 33 percent to

39 percent.

29



TABLE 15

RESPONSES OF UNDERGRADUATE MEN AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

AND THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN TO FOUR RELIGIOUS ITEMS

(IN PERCENT)

Dartmouth Michigan

1952 1968 1974 1952 1969 1974

Feeling of need for some

religious faith or philosophy

Yes 77 70 61 81 72 66

Have adequate religious faith

or philosophy now

Yes 53 54 68 62 62 65

Ideas about the Deity3

Believe in a Divine God,

Creator of the Universe 35 26 25 47 30 31

Believe in a power

greater than myself 30 26 22 27 22 24

Other responses 35 48 53 27 47 45

Attendance at religious

services

Once a week or more 20 12 12 30 17 14

Once or twice a month 23 9 8 31 23 19

Less than monthly or never 57 79 81 39 59 67

a Responses are abbreviated here.

Source: Hoge (1976:159).

On the basis of a large number of items, Hoge concluded that the

1974 data showed, in most respects, not a “return to the 1950s” but

a continuation of trends in the 1960s. Church attendance and the felt

need for religion continued to drop, as did fear of Communism, support

for nationalism and the armed forces, and enthusiasm for collegiate

extracurricular activities. But there were a few reversals after the 1960s

—privatism gained in the early 1970s at the expense of political com-
mitments, educational goals turned away from liberal education to voca-

tional pursuits, and some attitudes about economics and government

became more conservative. The overall pattern in religion was an un-

changed level of traditional Christian beliefs but a continued dropoff in

church participation and support for organized religion.

The studies at Williams College agreed in most respects. In 1974

Hastings and Hoge found no change in religious beliefs since 1967,

but a continued drop in expressed support for the organized church.

30



TABLE 16

RESPONSES OF UNDERGRADUATE MEN AT WILLIAMS COLLEGE

TO FIVE ITEMS ON RELIGION (IN PERCENT)

1948 1967 1974

“The nature of the Deity” 3

Infinitely wise omnipotent Creator. 29 11 12

Infinitely intelligent and friendly Being. 27 24 23

Vast, impersonal spiritual source. 13 13 12

1 neither believe nor disbelieve in God. 18 13 15

The only power is natural law. 1 8 13

The universe is merely a machine. 1 1 2

None of these alternatives. 11 28 23

“Immortality” 3

Personal immortality. 38 17 22

Reincarnation. 3 2 1

Continued existence as part of a spiritual

principle. 9 11 15

Influence upon children and social institutions. 23 39 30

1 disbelieve in any of these senses. 2 7 7

None of these alternatives. 25 24 25

“Organized religion” 3

The church is the one sure and infallible

foundation of civilized life. 8 1 1

On the whole the church stands for the best

in human life. 56 41 30
There is certain doubt. Possibly the church

may do some harm. 12 19 20
The total influence may be on the whole

harmful. 3 11 20

Stronghold of much that is unwholesome and
dangerous to human welfare. 2 4 5

Insufficient familiarity. 5 7 11

A different attitude (written in). 14 18 14

During the past six months 1 have prayed:

Daily or fairly frequently (combined here) 39 24 16

Less often or never 61 76 84

During the past six months 1 have experienced

a feeling of reverence, devotion, or dependence

upon a Supreme Being:

Daily or frequently (combined here) 27 19 18

Less often or never 73 81 82

3 The responses in this item are abbreviations.

Source: Hastings and Hoge (1967).

See Table 16. It shows that belief in an omnipotent Creator decreased

from 1948 to 1967 but did not change from 1967 to 1974. Belief in

personal immortality fell sharply from 1948 to 1967 and then continued

31



unchanged to 1974. Positive attitudes toward the organized church fell

sharply from 1948 to 1967 and again from 1967 to 1974. Prayer life

dropped considerably, while feelings of reverence dropped slightly until

1967.

The authors also asked about home religious background and

present choice of traditions. The “holding power” of both Catholic and

Protestant home backgrounds weakened over the decades. In 1948, 93

percent of those from Catholic homes and 58 percent of those from

Protestant homes gave those traditions as their present choice. In 1967

the figures were 75 percent for the Catholics and 33 percent for the

Protestants. In 1974 the figures were somewhat lower.

TABLE 17

RESPONSES OF UNDERGRADUATE MEN AT WILLIAMS COLLEGE

TO THREE ITEMS ON HOME RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS (IN PERCENT)

1948 1967 1974

“If you were brought up under some religious

influence, has there been a period in which you

have reacted either partially or wholly against

the beliefs taught?”

Yes 57 72 79

(If so:) “When did the doubts start?”

(median age) 16.4 15.5 14.4

(If so:) “Would you say that at the present

time you:”

Are in substantial agreement with the beliefs

taught. 24 15 10

Are in partial agreement with them. 70 67 70

Wholly disagree with them. 6 18 21

Source: Hastings and Hoge (1976).

Table 17 shows three questions about religious development. From

1948 to 1974 the percentage who reported some reaction against the

beliefs taught them at home rose from 57 to 79 percent, and the median

age when the doubts started fell from 16.4 to 14.4 years. There was also

a decline in the respondents’ current agreement with beliefs which they

had learned as children. These data seem to indicate that the formative

period when religious commitments are formed and re-examined is

occurring earlier and earlier in the life cycle. As a crucial time for

religious development, college is giving way to high school.

32



In some respects the rate of development seems to be accelerating

for these middle-class American youth. Physiological research has found

the same acceleration. Measures of the age of onset of menses in

American girls show a fall of about one and a half years from 1920 to

1970 (Tanner, 1962; 1971). The trend for boys is similar but more

difficult to measure. Although definite proof is lacking, accelerated

physiological maturation is probably associated with accelerated emo-

tional development and perhaps also with cognitive development.

All of the research reviewed so far has included all college students,

not just Catholics. It was done mostly in secular colleges and universi-

ties, not Catholic colleges. It does, however, include some conclusions

specific to Catholics because many of the studies were large enough to

include reliable samples of Catholic students. In the studies summarized

by Hoge (1974:66ff), the Catholics changed most in beliefs between the

early 1950s and the late 1960s. The Jews changed least, and the

Protestants were between the other two groups. The direction of changes

in the three religious groups was usually the same. 14

CATHOLIC STUDENTS’ RELIGION AND VALUES

Information specifically on Catholic college students is available

from two sources: studies done at Catholic colleges, and large studies

which include large samples of Catholics identifiable as such. We shall

look first at several studies done at Catholic colleges.

The most interesting trend study was done at Marquette University

by Moberg and McEnery (1976). In 1961 and 1971 identical studies were

done of freshmen and seniors, including many items about religion and

many about the morality of various actions. See Table 18.

This table shows a series of items which ask whether specific

actions are morally “all right," “wrong," “very wrong," or “the worst

thing to do." The table shows the percentage responding “all right" to

each. On some of the items in the top half of the table the shifts are

very large, almost incredibly large. For example, on the first item the

shift in students saying it is “all right” to date non-Catholics with

marriage intentions is 75 percentage points! Such large changes over

ten years have been found in no other student research known to us. But

for Catholics the years 1961 to 1971 span the Vatican Council II and its

aftermath, and, as everyone knows, the impact has been immense. The

shift on the second item, about having serious doubts about religion was

34 points, In the third item, about missing Mass, the shift is 54 points.

And on the fourth item, about not saying prayers, it is 53 points.

All of the items in the table—those concerning religion and those

concerning other actions—received more “all rights” in 1971. This

shows that not only a religious change but also a loosening of specific

33



TABLE 18

PERCENT OF MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATES

SAYING VARIOUS ACTIONS ARE “ALL RIGHT” TO DO

1961 1971

Dating non-Catholics with marriage intentions 17 92

Having some serious doubts about religion 48 82

Not attending another Mass on Sunday when one misses

a major part by arriving late 1 55

Usually not saying evening prayers 17 70

Saying nothing about misinterpretation of Catholic

thought 4 18

Heavy necking with a steady date 6 75

Drinking heavily so as to become high 12 56

Reading an obscene magazine 2 38

Taking just easy courses to get through college 22 37

Wasting a class day doing nothing 11 32

Not returning extra $1 change received in store 7 17

Not contributing to any charity when able 8 15

Source: Moberg and McEnery (1976).

moral dicta in college students' lives took place between 1961 and 1971.

Among Protestants there have been shifts on these items during the

same ten years, as other research shows, but for Catholics the changes

have been much greater, and mostly in the areas specific to traditional

religious beliefs, commitments and practices.

Moberg and McEnery also asked about Mass attendance, and found

that weekly attendance had dropped from 95 percent to 45 percent.

Going to confession at least monthly had dropped from 67 to 4 percent, a

drop of 63 points. The declines in personal religious practices were

smaller—persons reporting daily prayer dropped 32 percent, spiritual

meditation occasionally or more often dropped 16 percentage points,

and those reading spiritual works at least occasionally also dropped 16

points. Moberg and McEnery tell us that beliefs about tenets of the

Catholic Church became less dogmatic, but they do not report figures.

In attempting to explain the meaning of the large changes they found,

the authors discovered that the backgrounds of students at Marquette

had not changed much since 1961, so that could not be a cause of the

shifts. Nor could the explanation be a “Protestantization,” since many of

34



the shifts are not toward moral positions espoused by Protestants. They

concluded that changing concepts of authority and rising individualism

are behind the shifts:

To be sure, an authority crisis has prevailed in the Church, as well

as in the family, politics, education, and other institutionalized

areas of social life. Houtart (1969) sees this as resulting from the

Church’s change toward an emphasis upon the internal dynamism

of the individual, with Vatican II as the turning point. Greater

respect for personal conscience, questioning the legitimacy of

pontifical authority, and legitimization of democratic in contrast

to former strictly hierarchical values have all made emphasis upon

individual conscience an increasingly accepted stance within

Catholicism. Therefore it is likely that our subjects reflect general

changes within Catholicism rather than something unique to their

(age group) (p. 59).

Analysts of Catholic college students need several more trend

studies similar to the Marquette study in order to check on its reliability

as a basis for generalization. But we know of no others spanning the

years of Vatican Council II in this way.

In 1970 Langman and his associates (1973) carried out a study

of undergraduates at Loyola University in Chicago, in an attempt to

understand defection from the church and current political attitudes on

campus. They found that in their sample 57 percent retained the parental

religion; 25 percent said they now have a “personal religion”; and 18

percent had rejected all religion and were agnostics or atheists. The

students in the sample were predominantly from Catholic homes. The

researchers inquired into home relationships to understand patterns of

religious defection.

In our primarily Catholic sample, the mother was central to the

transmission of religious values, while both parents transmit politi-

cal and social values. Conflict with the mother reduces the extent

of identification and contributes to later rejection of the mother’s

religious values. This interpretation is clearly in line with Kotre’s

(1971) findings that leaving the Church is strongly related to early

parent-child conflict, especially between mother and son (1973,

p. 527).

In early 1974 Saint Mary’s College in Notre Dame, Indiana, under-

took a self-study which included a student survey. Saint Mary’s is a

women's college with a close relationship to Notre Dame University. Out

of 540 questionnaires distributed, 232 were returned. Of the respond-

ents, 82 percent said their religious preference was Catholic, 4 percent

Protestant, 1 percent Jewish, 2 percent “other,” and 11 percent “no

preference.” (Among the freshmen 9 percent said “no preference,” and

among the seniors 19 percent.) There was much openness to religious

35



commitment. Seventy-eight percent agreed with the statement "I per-

sonally feel a need to believe in a religious faith,” and only 12 percent

agreed that “Faith is a poor substitute for assurance and knowledge.”

Saint Mary's College also took part in the American Council on

Education’s annual freshman survey and compared its freshmen with

all women freshmen at Catholic colleges and with all women freshmen at

all colleges. See Table 19. This table is remarkable mostly for the small

TABLE 19

RESPONSES OF FRESHMEN WOMEN TO ITEMS IN THE 1975

SURVEY OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION:

SAINT MARY'S COLLEGE, ALL CATHOLIC COLLEGES, AND

ALL COLLEGES (IN PERCENT)

“Indicate the Importance to You Personally of Each of the Following:”

Percent marking "Essential” or “Very Important.”

St. M.

College

All Cath.

Colleges

All

Colleges

Helping others who are in difficulty 80 77 80

Developing a meaningful philosophy of life 80 72 75

Becoming an authority in my field 72 68 67

Keeping up to date with political affairs 59 37 43

Participating in a community action program 42 38 40

Obtaining recognition from colleagues 42 40 40

Being successful in a business of my own 37 32 32

Being financially very well off 37 37 36

Influencing social values 37 34 36

Achieving in performing art or creative art 36 34 33

Having administrative responsibility for the

work of others 28 25 27

Influencing the political structure 19 12 13

Making theoretical contribution to a science 10 10 11

Source: Saint Mary's College Research Office.

differences between the middle and rightmost columns. On only one

item do the Catholic college women diverge more than 5 percentage

points from all college women—the fourth, where the Catholics show less

36



concern for political affairs. Otherwise the similarity is striking, indicat-

ing the amount of convergence which has taken place between Catholic

colleges and other colleges in America.

Catholic colleges and universities number about 250, largely inde-

pendent of each other and varying in many ways. About 30 percent of

the Catholics in colleges in the U.S. are in Catholic colleges and uni-

versities (Hassenger, 1970), and the percentage is gradually dropping.

Most Catholic colleges are small, with fewer than 750 students, and

the majority of students are women. All research on American colleges

has found that Catholic schools have students who are more conservative

in social and political attitudes than those in other colleges.

After Vatican II all of American Catholicism was lowering the

barriers between itself and the rest of American society. The same was

true of Catholic colleges. In the late 1960s many Catholic colleges

changed their governance structures to provide more lay trustees and

less hierarchical control. They also took steps to join mainstream

American academia, often at the expense of de-emphasizing their par-

ticular Catholic heritage. Their goals turned toward the liberal and

academic—scholarly achievement, freedom of thought and investigation,

and recruitment of faculty irrespective of Christian or indeed any reli-

gious commitment. The role of religion courses, liturgy and the nurturing

of a community of faith on campus were endlessly debated, but the main

trend was toward giving them decreased attention.

Inevitably the identity problem became central. Who are we? Are

we different? What does it mean to be a Catholic college or university?

As Langman (1973) noted, this was a recapitulation of the same identity

crises faced by Protestant colleges during the past half-century. If the

Protestant experience is any guide, we should expect a spectrum of

diverse resolutions of the problem in various Catholic colleges and

universities.

The downturn in financial support and enrollments in the 1970s

gave the identity problem more urgency, while adding new elements to

it. Who will support us? Will our institution survive? This has in general

slowed the changes of several years earlier and caused new attention

to be given to forging close ties with identifiable constituencies. The

specifically Catholic character of the colleges gained favor and some

colleges attempted a mild swing back in the opposite direction, but with

great variation from college to college.

Whether the Catholic college as such has an impact on student

values and behavior is still an open question. Data show that in terms

of church attendance, self-reported religiosity or indices of religious

knowledge and understanding, Catholic college graduates score higher

37



than graduates of non-Catholic colleges (Hassenger, 1970:187). How-

ever, as suggested by Westoff and Potvin (1967) some of these differ-

ences may well be due to differential selectivity, with “more religious”

students going to Catholic colleges in the first place. Greeley and Rossi

believe Catholic colleges provide “firmer ideological underpinning for

the religious practices and attitudes which were internalized in earlier

years” (1966:168). After reviewing the literature Hassenger concludes:

“There are a few indications that religiously affiliated colleges do not

change their students so much as they reinforce the formation which has

occurred in the home and to some extent in primary and secondary

school” (1970:193-194). Given the general decline in religiousness over

the college years, this reinforcement appears quite important.

Studies of Catholic students active in campus Newman Clubs

further reinforce this conclusion. For example, a study in two colleges

in 1965 found that the active members were from homes in which both

parents were active, practicing Catholics, and most had had formal

Catholic education on both the primary and secondary levels (Wagner

and Brown, 1965). A 1969 study at four colleges found that Newman

Club members were more conservative in religious and social attitudes

than other students and that the Newman Club seemed to have little

impact other than reinforcement on students’ beliefs and behavior.

Just as the college experience as a whole has little over-all influ-

ence, so do the campus religious groups themselves. Insofar as

they differ from the rest of the campus, it seems to be much more

a phenomenon of selective recruitment than cumulative influence

(Demerath and Lutterman, 1969:137).

It should be noted, however, that as in the case of the Catholic

college, reinforcement can help in the maintenance of values.

THE PENTECOSTAL MOVEMENT AND RELIGIOUS

CULTS AMONG STUDENTS

The Catholic Pentecostal Movement, also known as the Charismatic

Renewal of the Church, began on college campuses in 1967. Its initial

growth occurred at Duquesne, Notre Dame, and the University of Michi-

gan. By the middle 1970s there were many Pentecostal prayer groups

throughout the nation, some based on college campuses. A 1973

estimate held that there were about 1,250 groups, with a membership of

75,000 to 100,000 (Harrison, 1974:50). How many of these are com-

prised of college students is not known. The movement is slowly

becoming institutionalized; it now has regional and national leaders,

annual gatherings at Notre Dame, a Directory, and a monthly magazine,

New Covenant. A number of sociological studies have been made

38



already (e.g., Harrison, 1974, 1975; Bord and Faulkner, 1975; McGuire,

1974; Hollenweger, 1972; Samarin, 1972; Fichter, 1975).

The main identity of the movement centers on the experience of

the Baptism of the Holy Spirit and experience of new life in the Spirit.

The gifts of the Spirit, most notably glossolalia and healing, are central

to most of the leadership. Experiences of communal love and support,

arising from frequent intimate prayer meetings and sharing of experi-

ences, provide for strong group commitment by members. The Pente-

costal movement is not a social change movement or a radical move-

ment. It is not even a serious revolutionary movement within the

Catholic Church—though various interpreters disagree at this point. It

is basically a search for new forms of religious piety, identity, and experi-

ence within the confines of the Catholic Church. To understand it, one

must realize that it arose in social locations of unrest and anomie-

campuses and urban centers in the late 1960s.

The movement appears to have developed partly as an affirmation

of Catholic piety and loyalty in the face of the erosion of these

beliefs and forms of devotion during the upheavals that occurred

within and outside of the Church during the 1960s. Nevertheless,

the movement is not simply a revival of traditional devotionalism.

It also embodies the postconciliar search for new forms of religious

community and worship, especially through lay participation. The

movement also appears to reflect some disillusionment with politi-

cal action among college-age youth and a heightened quest for

fulfillment through religious and communal experimentation. . . .

The movement is especially attractive to people who have strong

prior commitments to personal religious devotion as a source of

guidance and are seeking religious community (Harrison,

1975:152).

All observers agree that the Pentecostal movement was triggered

by Vatican II and the general unrest of the 1960s. The movement is best

seen as a search for personal devotion and support in face of this unrest

—not as radical or revolutionary in its own right. Student participation

has been heaviest among those in the most nonsupportive social loca-

tions who have the fewest competing commitments: undergraduates are

more involved than graduate students, single than married students,

residents than commuter students (Harrison, 1974). Participation by

priests and nuns is very strong, and most of the groups make no

criticism of clergy or hierarchy.

It seems to us that the Pentecostal movement will become a rather

permanent form of Catholic life in most campus communities. Whether

it will wane numerically as the unrest of the 1960s and the shock of

Vatican II diminishes, remains to be seen. But undoubtedly it is becom-

ing routinized and institutionalized. “The movement seems to be devel-

39



oping into an option within the Catholic Church for loyal Catholics

seeking deeper expressions of personal piety and religious community”

(Harrison, 1975:159).

Media attention has been given to present-day religious cults, both

Christian and non-Christian. In 1976 much is written about the Unifica-

tion Church of Rev. Sun Myung Moon; a few years ago attention was

focused on the Jesus People and the Hare Krishna. These movements

attract thousands of followers, usually urban young people whose ties to

family and conventional culture are broken due to disillusionment and

trauma. One psychologist claims that every young devotee of these cults

has been through a serious failure of family life. They are recruited

through personal relationships on the basis of promises of love, com-

munity and meaning. Members of such cults are a small minority of

youth, and membership is not stable. Since they are based on young

people, not on lifelong family and kinship communities, these cults can

be expected to change every few years, with members entering and leav-

ing constantly. (See U.S. News and World Report, June 14, 1976).

EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CHANGES

We shall look first at explanations for religious changes by indi-

vidual students, then at explanations for overall trends in college stu-

dents' religion over the years.

Many researchers have sought crucial factors in individuals’ lives

which predispose them toward or away from church commitment. Hoge

(1974) extended this field and reviewed all available research. He found

that the most important factor determining religious attitudes of college

students was the amount of religious influence in the home. Closeness

to parents was always associated with students’ religion, in that the

students who were closer to their parents had more ties to traditional

religion and the church. Students who live at home and commute to col-

lege resemble their parents in religious attitudes more than do students

living on campus away from home. Kitay (1947) did an extensive study

of this relationship and concluded that to a large extent attitudes toward

the church are extensions of attitudes about the family. Where family

attitudes are supportive and positive, attitudes toward the church tend

to be positive, and vice versa.

Many other factors have also been studied in relation to college

students’ religion. Social class was found to be a weak factor at best.

Most studies find either no association between social class and religious

commitment, or a weak association between higher class and weaker

commitment. Some rural-urban differences exist. Also, whenever the re-

searcher measures “cosmopolitanism” versus “localism,” a religious

40



difference is found. Students with more cosmopolitan orientations (de-

fined as acquaintance, with and feeling acceptance of, a range of

different cultural settings) tend to be a bit weaker in church commit-

ment. The reason seems to be that church commitments are often of a

local, community or ethnic character, and when an individual transcends

these identities, the church loses some of its saliency for him or her

(see Roof, 1976 for a discussion of this). The theory which Harvey Cox

set forth in The Secular City (1965) has never been supported by

sociological research—urban life does not lead inevitably to relativization

and secularization of religious commitments. For some city dwellers

urban life has this effect, and for some others it does not. The crucial

factor is not urban living taken alone but rather the character of one's

associations with others and one’s networks of friends.

The impact of college experience on students’ religion seems to be

less today than it was 30 or 40 years ago. Research prior to World War

II tended to find that many students experienced a kind of "shock” when

they encountered atheistic professors and lived with students with differ-

ent religious beliefs. But recent research has found less indication of

any "shock.” The main impacts of secular intellectualism and experience

with different religious beliefs occur in high school more often today

than several decades ago. Some research has documented that the re-

ported age of first religious doubt has dropped an average of two years

since 1948 (see Table 17).

The most informative research on Catholic students done recently

is the study of 100 Catholic graduate students by Kotre (1971). He

interviewed 50 who considered themselves in the church and 50 who

considered themselves outside it, even though all had experienced Cath-

olic upbringing and graduated from Catholic colleges. He looked into

many factors which might have caused movement in one direction or the

other. He discovered that the most important causal factors which im-

pelled many to leave the Church were parents’ religion and home rela-

tionships. Those students within the Church (the "Ins”) tended more

often to have parents who both were practicing Catholics. Those outside

the church (the "Outs”) often had one or more parents who were in-

different, or whose attitudes toward the Church had changed. Mothers

had greater impact on children’s religion than fathers. The mothers of

the “Ins” were seen as more flexible, less rigid, than the mothers of the

"Outs.” Home ties of the "Ins” were stronger and warmer than of the

"Outs.” Kotre concluded that a-rational factors are primary, that the

church is perceived much differently by different persons, and that the

perceptions result from interpersonal and social factors more than from

intellectual factors. Identification with parents and adult leaders, or lack

of such identification, is the most crucial mechanism.

41



We turn now to possible explanations for recent trends in Catholic

students’ religious commitments. Such explanations are logical exten-

tions of the explanations for individual behavior just reviewed; but the

relative frequency and power of the various mechanisms are subject to

historical change, and such changes produce trends.

Many authors have discussed recent changes in American Catholi-

cism. Our explanations for changes among students are little different

from the main explanations these authors have set forth. The 1960s

were a very crucial period in American Catholicism, perhaps the most

consequential decade in American Catholic history (see Cogley, 1974).

A number of trends converged for almost revolutionary social effect. The

period of assimilation from immigrant status virtually came to an end.

Large-scale immigration halted in the 1920s, and after 40 more years

American Catholics have risen in social status to equal the Protestants.

Greeley et al. (1976) have shown how many Catholic groups—especially

the English, Irish, and German Catholics—rose to middle-class status in

the 1950s and 1960s. The election of John Kennedy as President in

1960 was a kind of symbolic affirmation of the full-fledged Americaniza-

tion of Catholics, and it had some effect on Catholic attitudes toward the

larger American society. And, of course, it had an effect on the lingering

anti-Catholicism which has characterized American Protestantism since

the 1830s.

Analysts of recent American Catholicism have spoken of the lifting

of the “siege mentality” which characterized Catholic leadership in past

decades. Today there is less fear of, and less defensiveness toward, the

larger American society. Catholic families more often send their children

to secular colleges, where they become firmly integrated into American

middle-class society. With movement from older ethnic city wards to

new religiously pluralistic suburbs, a major change in Catholicism was

inevitable.

An appreciation of such underlying social trends is needed if one

is to understand the rapid changes which followed Vatican II in America.

The effect can be likened to an earthquake—a rapid shift which results

from years of gradually-building, yet blocked, pressures invisible to the

naked eye. The very positive attitudes which Greeley found among Cath-

olics in 1974 toward the innovations of Vatican II clearly reflect these

growing pressures and the approval which the institutional shifts found

when they finally occurred.

To what have American Catholics been assimilating? To the main-

line Protestant-dominated middle-class culture. But the change is not

just a “Protestantization,” as Moberg and McEnery argued, for much of

the new situation is deplored by Protestant leaders as much as by Cath-

olics. The source of the changes is not the Protestant church but rather

42



a set of underlying, very strong social forces (discussed earlier) which

influence youth in America today. Neither the Protestant nor the Catholic

church can function as if these forces were not operating. Attempts to

dam them up create other problems and sometimes become counter-

productive. Churches have an obligation to speak on issues but they

should make an effort to recognize the forces at work and develop an

appropriate strategy to deal with them. It is well-established social-

psychological theory that if an institution sets itself up in opposition to

an existing social practice, a test of commitments ensues in which per-

sons must choose between the conflicting claims. Persons strongly com-

mitted to the social practice, for whatever reason, will very often reject

any institution which opposes it, in order to overcome painful cognitive

dissonance. Efforts to define principles of Christian behavior in new

social situations are sorely needed.

The changes in American Catholicism since Vatican II have been

especially great in Catholic colleges. The past 12 years have seen self-

study after self-study in the Catholic colleges, change after change in

policy and even governance. Today the identity of the Catholic college is

the subject of much reflection. In effect many of the leading Catholic

colleges and universities now aspire to join the vanguard in American

intellectual life. The future will see much more agonizing about the

identity of Catholic colleges and universities. As financial support sys-

tems change, some church-related colleges will not survive while others

will grow. Those which survive will adopt a variety of methods for com-

bining Catholic heritage and modern secular disciplines.

NON-COLLEGE YOUNG ADULTS

In this section the emphasis is on the religious orientations of

Catholic young adults between the ages of 18 and 29 with a high school

education or less. Data for this segment of the population are sparse.

While Andrew Greeley and his associates at NORC have written exten-

sively about the Catholic adult population, it is not always possible to

isolate information which applies specifically to the under-30 non-

college young adults. Yet they are known to differ, in important ways

from the college population previously described.

As Demerath has noted, “college students are not alone in experi-

encing doctrinal apostasy" (1974:20). Though it is generally believed

that a college education exerts a secularizing influence on religious prac-

tice and belief, the fact remains that among Catholics a college educa-

tion in the past has been positively related to greater orthodoxy and

religious practice. Tables 20 and 21 show that this continues to be true

for Catholics under 30. Fewer non-college youth attend Mass in an

average week and fewer believe in life after death than among college

43



youth. To some extent this relationship is a function of the significant

number of Catholic youth who attend Catholic colleges. Such attendance,

if not always generative of Catholic values, appears to help maintain

them (Westoff and Potvin, 1967). Whether this effect will continue in the

future is quite problematical. Saldahna et al. (1975) have reported dis-

turbingly large net apostasy rates for Catholic college youth under 30

in recent years. A somewhat lower rate is to be found among youth under

30 who did not attend college.

TABLE 20

PERCENT OF POPULATION 18 TO 29 ATTENDING RELIGIOUS

SERVICES IN AVERAGE WEEK BY RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND YEAR

(Gallup Surveys)

PROTESTANT CATHOLIC

YEAR High School

or Less

Some College

or More

High School

or Less

Some College

or More

% (Base) % (Base) % (Base) % (Base)

1957 39 49 74 100

(131) (37) (65) (15)

1968 31 36 51 66

(96) (55) (49) (38)

1974 29* 35 36* 53

(**) (**) (**)

* The category was simply labelled “High School”. "Grade school only”

are not included in the 1974 data reported here. See Religion in America

(1975:4).

** N's were not reported.

The data of Tables 20 and 21 also document the decline in church

attendance and belief in a life after death over the years. Among non-

college Catholic youth under 30 attendance at religious services in an

average week has dropped from a high of 74 percent in 1957 to a low

of 36 percent in 1974. Protestant and Catholic rates are converging.

Some decline also occurred among non-college Catholic youth in belief

in life after death, but not to the extent that it has among college youth.

The differential in orthodoxy between college and non-college youth

seems to be narrowing over the years, caused mainly by the increase

of doubt and disbelief among the college population. On the other hand,

the differential among Protestants seems to be increasing because of

an increase in doubt and disbelief among the non-college youth.

44



TABLE 21

PERCENT OF POPULATION 18 TO 29 BELIEVING IN

LIFE AFTER DEATH BY RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND YEAR

(1957 AND 1968 GALLUP SURVEYS AND 1972 SURVEY

RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, STUDY)

YEAR PROTESTANT CATHOLIC

High School

or Less

Some College

or More

High School

or Less

Some College

or More

1957 85 89 66 87

(131) (37) (65) (15)

1968 81 78 69 82

(96) (55) (49) (38)

1972 70 80 60 67

(221) (157) (100) (70)

In the area of moral values non-college youth tend to be more con-

servative than college youth, but the differences between them have

narrowed over the past few years (Yankelovich, 1974:23). Nonetheless

they have not disappeared. For example, in 1973 as many as 61 percent

of college youth would welcome acceptance of sexual freedom compared

to 47 percent of non-college youth; only 32 percent of the former con-

sider having an abortion as morally wrong compared to 48 percent of

the latter. Generally “living a clean moral life” is a more important value

to non-college than college youth (Yankelovich, 1974:25, 67).

The data suggest differences in religious orientation between col-

lege and non-college youth. While college youth attend religious serv-

ices more frequently and appear to be more orthodox in doctrinal mat-

ters, non-college youth are more traditional on moral issues. Further-

more, they pray to God more frequently (75 compared to 64 percent

reporting frequent prayer: 1971 Gallup Newsweek data) and more (42

percent compared to 28 percent) believe that religion is an important

value in life (Yankelovich, 1974:26, 66). Certainly, the lower rates of

church participation among non-college youth do not necessarily indi-

cate less religiousness or less interest in religion but a difference in

orientation. This difference, however, seems to have narrowed recently.

AGE AND GENDER DIFFERENCES

A summary of Gallup surveys over the years (Religion in America,

1975) shows that young adults under 30 and males are consistently less

likely than older adults and females to attend religious services in an

45



average week. The same age differential is not so clearly apparent in the

area of belief (Hertel and Nelsen, 1974). When one compares 1965

data presented by Marty et al. (1968) and 1968 data presented by

Alston (1972) on belief in life after death and in heaven and hell, the

suspicion arises that cohort factors are as important as age in determin-

ing the level of belief. Any association between age and religious practice

after adolescence must be interpreted with caution (see Wingrove and

Alston, 1974).

Studies of religious behavior over age categories have traditionally

indicated that there is a decline in religious activity between 18 and

about 30, followed by renewed activity. These studies relied upon cross-

sectional rather than longitudinal, panel data—that is, upon studies of

a population at a given time rather than on studies of the same indi-

viduals over time. The studies are briefly summarized by Bahr (1970)

who proposes that the data selectively suggest four models for the rela-

tionship between age and religious behavior and belief: stability (for

example, church attendance, based on patterns established early in life,

is subject to relatively little change—the faithful keep attending); decline

from 18 to 30 (as one leaves the family of orientation); change accord-

ing to one's place in the family life-cycle (people with young children

have renewed interest in religion); and disengagement as one grows old

(with decreasing church attendance following middle age). Concerning

church attendance, Bahr was forced to conclude from analysis of cross-

sectional and retrospective data that “little confidence can be placed in

TABLE 22

PERCENT OF CATHOLICS ATTENDING CHURCH* REGULARLY

ON SUNDAY BY SEX AND EDUCATION: 1971

AGE FEMALE MALE

High School

or Less

More Than

High School

High School

or Less

More Than

High School

Under 30 61 41 33 40

(94) (57) (58) (68)

30 plus 65 73 58 75

(283) (81) (191) (95)

* The item was: "About how often do you go to church?" The responses

were collapsed as follows: Never and occasionally, Regularly on Sundays

and Holy Days, and More often than regularly on Sundays and Holy Days.

In reporting the data to the analysis, the last two categories are combined

above. There were 4 individuals who did not respond to the item. Data on

education and age were not available for 23 additional individuals.

46



the extant generalizations about aging and church attendance until ex-

tensive retrospective or longitudinal research reveals the degree to which

variations now attributed to aging or stage of life-cycle are merely reflec-

tions of age-specific patterns of current attendance without direct coun-

terpart in the personal histories of older respondents.”

The association between age and religious behavior is further com-

plicated by gender and level of education. Table 22, based on secondary

analysis of 1971 Gallup data on Catholics collected for Newsweek (made

available by the Roper Public Opinion Research Center), presents these

multiple relationships for church attendance. The age difference is mini-

mal among non-college women. It is considerable among the college-

educated of both sexes. Females are more likely to attend church than

males if they have a high school education or less. This is especially

pronounced for young adults under 30. Among those in the college-

educated category, gender differences are minimal whether under 30 or

over 30 years of age. The implication of these findings is that age and

gender differences in religious orientation are often a function of other

factors such as education.

ACCEPTANCE OF ECCLESIASTICAL AUTHORITY

AMONG CATHOLICS

In Catholic Schools in a Declining Church Greeley and his co-

authors (1976:28-39) document a decline in religious devotion, moral

values and acceptance of the legitimacy of ecclasiastical authority. They

identified attitudes toward Humanae Vitae and papal authority as the

major factors in this decline, which was found to be most precipitous

among the younger generation and least precipitous among those who

attended Catholic schools (1976:170; 306). In 1974 nonetheless 60

percent of Catholics under 30 still had a “great deal” or “quite a lot”

of confidence in the church or organized religion. Another 38 percent

had “some” confidence (Religion in America, 1975:21). The impact of

Humanae Vitae on acceptance of papal authority was not evenly dis-

tributed among Catholic youth (see Table 23). For the age group under

30, college males were the most affected, non-college males the least.

Females reflected an intermediate degree of impact, with college females

reporting more questioning of the pope’s authority after Humanae Vitae

than non-college females.

Given such a differential impact of Humanae Vitae and the finding

by Greeley and his co-authors that the impact of Catholic education in

arresting the decline in religiousness is greatest (for those under 30, in

1974) when 10 or more years have been spent in Catholic schools, it

would be instructive to see two subtables showing scores separately for

47



TABLE 23

PERCENT OF CATHOLICS REPORTING THAT THE 1968 ENCYCLICAL

HAS MADE THEM QUESTION MORE THE POPE’S AUTHORITY*

(1971 Gallup Catholic Data), BY SEX AND EDUCATION

AGE FEMALE MALE

High School

or Less

More Than

High School

High School

or Less

More Than

High School

Under 30 35 47 25 68

(88) (57) (56) (66)

30 to 49 29 45 22 14

(141) (58) (69) (57)

50 and over 13 10 16 18

(115) (21) (101) (34)

* The item was: "How has the Pope's 1968 encyclical condemning birth

control pills as well as other forms of artificial contraception affected your

attitude toward papal authority— do you question it more, accept it
more, or hasn't your attitude changed?” The responses were Accept more;

Hasn't changed [my] attitude; Question it more. There were 72 individuals

who responded "don't know” or who did not respond. Data on education

and age were not available for 19 additional respondents.

those who have had a college education in Catholic schools and those

who have not. Since changes in doctrinal and moral orthodoxy have been

greatest among college youth, the conclusions by Greeley and his co-

authors on the impact of Catholic education might apply to Catholic

higher education more than to parochial or high school education.

HUMANAE VITAE AND SOCIAL CLIMATE

Reaction to Humanae Vitae as well as lessened religious belief and

observance among the young are also a function of the times. Fee

(Greeley et al., 1976:83) has noted the increase in the number of Ameri-

cans who express no religious affiliation and that “voters show a con-

sistent tendency to choose independency in political affiliation as well as

independency in religious affiliation.” With rising educational levels and

the increase in ideologues—people who have a consistent set of political

attitudes—a growing disenchantment with the political system has meant

an increase in the number of individuals who are "political independ-

ents.” Nie et al. (1976:231) report the increase in the number of politi-

cal “independents” among Catholics between 1952 and 1972, especially

among younger voters. The fact that these trends occur together over

time suggests that the increase in political independency is related to

48



the rise in religious independency and the decline in church attendance.

Along with such religious and political independency, from the mid-

1950s on polarization increased among the rest of the population on

religious issues (Hertel and Nelsen, 1974; see also Hoge, 1976b) as well

as political issues (Nie et al., 1976). The end result is a suggestion that

a general mentality of independency is linked to a declining and polariz-

ing church. The importance of the changing socio-political climate over

time lies in the fact that it has brought disillusionment generally, includ-

ing disillusionment with organized religion. The rise in independency set

the stage for rejection of Humanae Vitae. In other words, we relate the

effects of Humanae Vitae to change that took place more generally. This

is a hypothesis worth testing in greater detail.

49



Part 1 1 1: Projections

Any attempt at describing the future is risky business. We are es-

pecially wary of projections in an era of rapid social change. While recent

years have witnessed a decline in religiousness among youth on most

traditional measures of religiosity, we recognize that religion can not be

reduced to statistics. Nonetheless there has occurred a radical shift in

the religion of youth.

First, we do not expect the underlying changes in American society

which have occurred over the past five decades to be reversed. We fore-

see greater personal autonomy and individualism among youth. We fore-

see more tolerance of variation in culture and life style and less adher-

ence to detailed, specific codes of moral behavior. The changes brought

by the women’s liberation movement, which are by and large consistent

with these trends, will probably be permanent in American society. To

some extent religion will become more personal, more private, and its

communal dimension, its capacity to create a sense of intimacy and

belonging, will become more salient than its formal, institutional dimen-

sion. Unless some unforeseen social event such as a major war, depres-

sion or fundamental change in the political order occurs, these trends

will probably continue.

Second, the very rapid decline in religious practice and orthodoxy

among Catholics in the twelve years since Vatican II is probably over.

Recently Greeley and McCready (1973) have written: “The worst is over.

There are some signs that the rate of collapse is slowing.” We tend to

agree. We have likened the changes of Vatican II to an earthquake, a

kind of rapid resolution of pent-up forces. Earthquakes are violent, but

they do not last long. Future trends will be gradual, as were most past

trends since research began. Nonetheless, at present the picture is

mixed and the staff at NORC responsible for the best documentation

available on the Catholic scene cautions: “While there is not yet reason

to despair over the future of Catholicism in the United States, neither is

there reason for easy optimism” (Saldahna, et al., 1975:20).

Some of the effects of the past decade are still being felt among

adolescents. Moreover, the main impacts of secular intellectualism and

experience with different religious beliefs occur more often today in

high school than in college or upon entering the world of work. While

past research has documented the beginning of religious doubt at about

age 17 or 18, more recent research shows that the reported age of first

religious doubt has dropped an average of two years since 1948. We

expect this drop to continue. Even now some adolescents at 13 and 14

report problems with religious belief. The values of autonomy and inde-

50



pendence popularized by past generations of college students have in-

vaded the high schools. Furthermore, age 13 or thereabout marks a

radical change in religious thinking which sets the stage for conflict

between faith and reason. Instead of waiting until the age of 17 or 18

to resolve this conflict one way or the other, the adolescent is expected

to reach his decision much earlier and this trend will continue in the

years to come. Religious instruction at that age level will have to adapt

itself to serious questioning by the young, and authoritarian answers

will be the least acceptable to them. Authority will have to make “sense.”

Third, we do not foresee any collapse of the American family in

spite of current trends. Though the degree of estrangement between

youth and parents is higher than in the past, this is partly a function of

evolutionary changes in the family (Bronfenbrenner:1974). Parents re-

main the major influence on the religion and religiousness of youth. We

expect that this will continue, even though counter-forces will increase

in importance. It will be necessary for parents to grow in their under-

standing of their religion if they hope to maintain this influence. Re-

ligious instruction organized around family roles may be an effective

technique to cope with this problem.

Fourth, in spite of the media coverage of the Pentecostal Move-

ment in the Catholic church, the Jesus Movement among Protestants

and religious cults among youth in general, we do not foresee any signifi-

cant rise in traditional religious commitment. These groups encompass

a small minority. Most adherents are recruited through personal rela-

tionships on the basis of promises of love, community and meaning.

While these groups are not expected to disappear, they can be expected

to change every few years, with members entering and leaving con-

stantly. An increase in religious fervor, such as that found by Zanglein

and his co-authors (1975), will affect small minorities but is not ex-

pected to be widespread.

Fifth, we do not foresee any immediate rise in religious practice or

traditional orthodoxy among Catholics either. The American Catholic

Church is now an integral part of American society. While pockets of its

faithful will retain some ghetto-orientation, the majority of its youth will

be part and parcel of the world around them. Generally religion has not

been central in the lives of most people in modern societies, but instead

occupies the role of a resource to be tapped in times of need. While its

challenging and prophetic function is basic to its mission, the fullness

of religion’s vision usually has been a way of life for a few only. None-

theless its comforting and communal functions are essential and can

become the springboard for deeper and more extensive religious experi-

ence. We expect American Catholic youth to remain identified with the

church but in a less formal and traditional fashion. Weekly church

51



attendance will not be an imperative as in the past and a plurality of

beliefs will coexist. It will become increasingly important for the church

to define the basic core around which these plural beliefs can be

integrated.

Sixth, we do not believe that science, or modern philosophy, or

modern secular world views, seriously threaten the Christian faith if the

latter is understood as more than a set of formalisms. Intellectuals in

the Enlightenment tradition have been predicting the demise of the

church for about two centuries, basing their argument on the supposed

effect of modern science, philosophy, or new thought. But it has not

happened, and trends in church life are not at all related to these phe-

nomena. This view of human behavior is too cognitive, and we have tried

to avoid it in our discussion above. An adequate understanding of religion

must give more attention to its identity function, its belonging function,

its nonrational roots, and its group dynamics. Religion will not disappear,

and the church—in some form—will not disappear either. One piece of

supporting evidence is that provided by Hertel and Nelsen (1974) who

presented Gallup data on beliefs and attendance by age categories. They

indicate that level of belief remains relatively high over time and within

age catgories. Thus they challenged the prediction by Stark and Glock

(1968:204-224) that a demise of core Christian beliefs is occurring.

Stark and Glock had written (1968:210):

As matters now stand we can see little long-term future for the

church as we know it. A remnant church can be expected to last

for a long time if only to provide the psychic comforts which are

currently dispensed by orthodoxy. However, eventually substitutes

for even this function are likely to emerge leaving churches of the

present form with no effective rationale for existing.

We could not agree less with Glock and Stark. We have found some de-

cline in traditional forms of behavior and an increase in doubt or dis-

belief in some areas of orthodox doctrine among the youth. But the great

majority have not defected from the churches, even though their par-

ticipation is at times peripheral. They are there, awaiting a response from

the churches to the new forces and values which surround them.

Societies change and force change on religious institutions. Though

much has been taken away, much also has been given. If the churches

try to understand the new social context and discern how to be creative

within it, youth will remain faithful to their Christian heritage—perhaps

in ways different from the past, but nonetheless authentic.

52



Footnotes

* We are grateful to the following research assistants who helped with

the review of literature and processing of data: Theodore Barnard, Christina

Carton, Kathy Pearce, Joseph Shields, and Mary-Jeanne Verdieck.

1 The data are from a national probability sample of youth, young men

and women 13 to 18 years of age living in households in the continental

United States in April, 1975. The sample was selected and questionnaires

administered by the Gallup Organization for the Boys Town Center. The de-

tails of the sampling procedure are available from the authors.

2 These percentages are higher than the 29 percent regular attendance

reported by The Gilbert Youth Research Corp. survey of the high school

youth in the mid-’70s sponsored by the National Association of Secondary

School Principals. Since the exact sampling procedure was not explained in

the report, it is impossible to explain what bias may exist in the figures.

See “The Mood of American Youth:1974," published by the NASSP in 1974.

3
Zanglein, Vener, and Stewart have reported that religious orthodoxy did

not decline dramatically by age in 1973 though it did in 1970 (1975). Their

sample was very limited and non-representative of the nation as a whole.

In 1975 that decline is still evident in our data.

4 In the original factor analysis the item currently studying religion loaded

on this factor. It was dropped from the religious practice scale so as to be

able to compare other forms of religious practice by studying religion.

s This percentage is lower than that reported by Paradis and Thompson

(1976) but our sample does not include children below 13 who presumably

are more apt to attend or be sent to religion classes. Our data also show

that 4 percent only of Catholics, 13 to 18 years of age, have never studied

religion.

« In the Greeley and Rossi data of 1963 the “no Catholic school attend-

ance” category is not subdivided into those who are and are not attending

CCD classes; so this hypothesis cannot be tested. See Greeley and Rossi,

1966:185.

f This was measured by frequency of attendance at religious services.

s It should be noted that while parental religious practice remains signifi-

cant, the current study of religion also does and is in fact a stronger pre-

dictor of adolescent religiosity as measured by these scales.

’ Each parent, father and mother, was ranked on a five-point scale rang-

ing from very true to very untrue on the following: a) affection-support items:

"often is too busy to listen to me”; “always understands me”; “often gives

me a hug or pat on the shoulder”; “sometimes seems cold and distant to

me”; “listens to my opinions and thinking even when disagreeing”; and b)

control items: “expects me to make up my own mind in most things”;

“wants to know everything I do or think”; “lets me set my own rules when

and what I can do”; “seems to be always watching over me.” The father

affect and support score ranged from 0 to 20 with a mean of 11.67 and a

standard deviation of 4.43. The mother affect and support scores ranged

from 0 to 20 with a mean of 13.04 and a standard deviation of 4.21. The

53



father control scores ranged from 0 to 16 with a mean of 7.57 and a stand-

ard deviation of 3.09. The mother control scores ranged from 0 to 16 with

a mean of 7.88 and a standard deviation of 3.34. See Potvin and Suziedelis

(1969) for factor analytical details of the larger scales from which these

items were taken. The scores of both parents were summed to form the

parental scores.

10 See footnote 9.

11 The Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1975, p. 136.

1?
See Yankelovich (1974) for nationwide survey data comparing college

and non-college youth of comparable ages in 1969 and 1973. His main con-

clusion is that the gap between college and non-college youth has narrowed

during this period. Attitude trends are in the same direction in both groups.

13 Additional reviews of research have been done by Parker (1971) and

by Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975). The latter is a good comprehensive re-

view of research on religious attitudes and behavior in the U.S. and Europe.

14 For other studies producing trend data, mostly in agreement with our

summary statements, see Morris and Small, 1971; Gorsuch and Smith, 1972;

Goertzel, 1972; and Bell and Chaskes, 1970. The Foley College Poll has

done a series of college studies which are not widely known. It asked about

belief “in God or a Supreme Being" in annual surveys from 1968 to 1972,

and found a decrease from 85 percent to 76 percent saying “yes" during

that time. It also asked about church attendance during the past seven days

and found a four-year decline from 38 percent to 25 percent reporting at-

tendance (Foley and Foley, 1972).

54



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61



Appendix A

Guide In Interpreting Statistical Notation

1. Factor Analysis a statistical procedure for grouping items based on

2. mean

their inter-relationships, allowing one to identify a

smaller number of underlying dimensions or “factors."

The meanings and names of the various factors are

determined by considering the items with the highest

“loadings.” The loading is essentially the correlation

(see item 7 for “correlation") of the item with the

overall factor.

the arithmetic average or the total sum of the scores

divided by the number of respondents.

3. S. D. the standard deviation is a statistic which indicates

the degree to which the series of scores deviate from

the mean. If all of the scores were concentrated at the

mean there would be no dispersion and the S.D. would

equal 0. The greater the dispersion of scores, the

greater the standard deviation.

4. range a simple measure of dispersion which includes the

lowest score attained and the highest score attained.

For example, a range of 5-25 indicates that all of the

scores fell somewhere between 5 and 25.

5. F Ratio a statistic which indicates the extent to which any two

means differ from each other.

6. P (probability) an indication of the extent to which a statistical find-

ing, such as the F Ratio, could have occurred by

chance. When P is significant at the .01 level, it is

assumed that the finding could have occurred by

chance only 1 time in 100.

7. r the correlation coefficient is the degree of corre-

spondence or relationship between two variables. The

statistic can vary between +1.00 (a positive relation-

ship) to —1.00 (a negative or inverse relationship).
(For a positive relationship, the plus-sign is normally

not shown, but rather assumed). A correlation co-

efficient of 0 indicates no relationship between the two

variables in the table.

8. R the multiple correlation coefficient indicates the total

relationship between the independent (or predictor)

variables taken together and the dependent variable

(that variable being explained or predicted) in the

table.

9. Rz the square of the multiple correlation coefficient. This

statistic indicates the precentage of variance explained

in the dependent variable by all of the independent

variables taken together (for example, .46 would mean

46.0 percent of the variance is explained). Like R, R 2

has a range from 0 through 1.00.

62



10. /3 (Beta) the standardized regression coefficient is a statistic

which indicates the relative importance an independ-

ent variable has in predicting a dependent variable,

while simultaneously partialling out (removing) the

effects of other variables.



.

;