• reXLce-. Q j . S . J ^ y w y w T + t e - e cm\ G M a i O S . - I 
I ^ E > K V V O S 5 ^ ^ J S J ^ C J " ] J A M P H L E T N O , 

International Ethics 
Right Rev. John A. Ryan, D.D. 

and 
Ethics Committee 

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 

THE MORAL LAW IN RELATION TO STATES 

THE PRECEPT OP JUSTICE 

THE PRECEPT OP CHARITY 

T H E MORALITY OP WAR 

THE OBLIGATION OP PROMOTING PEACE 

A Report oi the Ethics Committee 

Fourth Edition (Revised), 1942 

PRICE 10 CENTS 

THE CATHOLIC ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 
1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D. C. 

COPYRIGHT, 1928 



r p H E publication of this revised edition 
of International Ethics, the basic re-

port of the Catholic Association for Inter-
national Peace, was sponsored by St. John's 
University, Collegeville, Minnesota, in its 
co-operation with efforts to help build "a 
new edifice of fraternal solidarity among 
the nations of the world, an edifice built 
upon new and stronger foundations, with 
fixed and stable guarantees, and with a high 
sense of moral sincerity which would re-
pudiate every double standard of morality 
and justice for the great and small or for 
the strong and the weak." (Pope Pius X I I , 
Easter Sunday Message, April 13, 1941.) 



INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

Right Rev. John A. Ryan, D.D. 

and 

The Committee on Ethics 

A R E P O R T O F T H E E T H I C S C O M M I T T E E 

T H E C A T H O L I C A S S O C I A T I O N F O R 

I N T E R N A T I O N A L P E A C E 

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WASHINGTON, D . C . 

T H E P A U L I S T P R E S S 

4 0 1 W E S T 5 9 T H STREET 

N E W Y O R K , N . Y . 



TH I S is a Report of the Committee on Ethics of the Catholic Association fo r Internat ional 
Peace and is being issued as a Study f r o m this 
Committee. I t was presented and discussed at the 
regular annual meeting of the organization. The 
Committee co-operated in the final fo rm of the Re-
port and it was presented to the Execut ive Council 
which ordered it published. The Committee co- ^ 
operated also in the revisions in the current edition. 
As the process indicates, this Report is not a state-
ment f r o m the whole Association. 

E T H I C S C 

Chairman, R I G H T R E V . 

REV. EDWARD F . ANGLXJIN, O . S . B . 

REV. J . C . BARTLEY, O . S . A . 

REV. HAROLD BOLTON, 

E M M A N U E L CHAPMAN 

R I G H T REV. ALCUIN DEUTSCH, O . S . B . 

REV. CYPRIAN EMANUEL, O . F . M . 

REV. GREGORY FEIGE 

REV. ADOLPH D . FRENAY, O . P . 

REV. LEO C . GAINOR, O . P . 

R I G H T REV. MSGR. MICHAEL GRUPA 

REV. L I N U S A . LILLY, S . J . 

M S G R . J O H N A . R Y A N 

REV. DONALD A . MACLEAN 

FRANCIS E . M C M A H O N 

VERY REV. JAMES H . MOYNIHAN 

KATHLEEN E . M U R P H Y 

REV. CARROLL J . NOONAN, S . S . 

REV. J . A . O ' B R I E N 

REV. WILFRID PARSONS, S . J . 

ROBERT POLLOCK 

M I R I A M T . ROONEY 

R E V . J O H N K , RYAN 

R I G H T REV. MSGR. FULTON J . S H E E N 

Desckfified 



International Ethics 

i 

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 

A S a science,1 international ethics investigates and estab-
lishes the principles and precepts of international mo-

rality; that is, those moral truths and rules which govern 
the dealings of states with one another. As a system of 
principles and rules it constitutes an international moral 
code. While this pamphlet exemplifies in some degree the 
former use of the term, its main object is to set forth a sys-
tem of ethical principles and rules applicable to the rela-
tions among states. 

International ethics differs on the one hand from the 
Law of Nations (Jus Gentium) and on the other hand from 
what men ordinarily have in mind when they pronounce the 
words "international law." In the usage of the Roman 
jurists and the Schoolmen, the Law of Nations comprises 
those secondary precepts, or universal applications, of the 
natural law which are recognized as such, or are rather 
generally adopted, in the legislation of particular states. 
While these ordinances apply in part to international af-
fairs, their main province is the relations among fellow citi-
zens and between a state and its own citizens. Since the 
precepts of the Law of Nations are based upon human na-
ture, they are the same for all peoples. They constitute a 
common code of world law, even though all nations may not 
interpret or apply them in exactly the same way. 

1 This brief preliminary statement of International Ethics was 
prepared by thé Committee on International Ethics of the Catholic 
Association for International Peace. It was presented at a national 
meeting of the Association and discussed during the whole session. 
In the light of the discussion the report was revised by the commit-
tee and presented to the executive committee, which accepted it 
with gratitude and ordered its publication. 

3 



4 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

International Law and International Ethics 
International law may be defined as the sum total of the 

duties and rights, customs and usages, by which states are 
bound together in their dealings with one another. Like 
the domestic laws of states, it contains two elements: nat-
ural and positive. The former comprises those principles 
and rules which are immediately drawn from the moral law 
of nature. The positive element consists mainly of treaties, 
customs and usages which the states have formally ac-
cepted or sanctioned. In so far as accepted international 
law does not include pertinent precepts of the natural law, 
that is, in so far as it fails to recognize all the duties and 
rights which it ought to recognize, it falls short of com-
pleteness; in so far as it contains articles contrary to the 
precepts of the natural law it loses all binding force and 
frustrates its own purpose. 

Indeed, the problem of creating an adequate interna-
tional code is for the most part the problem of incorporating 
the principles and conclusions of the natural law in a form 
applicable to the actual conditions of civilized nations. An 
ideal code of international law would contain the pertinent 
principles and rules of the natural law plus all those positive 
enactments which are necessary for right relations among 
states. We can, then, define international ethics as the 
sum total of those principles and rules and these positive 
enactments in so far as the latter have binding force. 

Among the ancient peoples the precepts of international 
ethics were not entirely unknown. To a very great extent 
indeed, these nations identified right with might and showed 
little respect for justice, charity or pity on the battlefield; 
nevertheless, they recognized some ethical principles in their 
relations with one another. Many of them respected the 
sanctity of treaties, especially when these had been con-
firmed by oaths. They distinguished between just and un-
just wars. Some of them even held that the conduct of 
war was subject to law. Aristotle, the Stoics, Cicero and 



5 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

Justinian had clear, even though inadequate, notions of in-
ternational morality. 

International Law and Christianity 
Being a supra-national religion, Christianity exercised a 

profound and extensive influence in making the nations con-
scious of their common membership in the family of hu-
manity. Although Christ and the Apostles formulated no 
system of international ethics, they enunciated doctrines 
and principles in which such a code was implicit. Accord-
ingly, we find St. Ambrose2 citing as a long established 
principle the obligation of states to exemplify love and 
justice toward their enemies in war, and St. Augustine8 

severely condemning warfare which originated in national 
selfishness and sought international domination. The 
Church effected a considerable measure of unity among the 
nations that she governed, while the Popes, with the sup-
port of the emperors, frequently acted as international arbi-
trators. 

Owing to the practical efficacy of these principles and 
personages, and to the fact that the political organization of 
the time was feudal, the formulation of a specific code of 
international right was for a long time delayed. The need 
for it became pressing only after the destruction of Christian 
unity by the Protestant Reformation and the formation of 
national states. 

Catholics Fathered International Law 
The first systematic work in creating a system of inter-

national ethics, or international law, was performed by the 
theologians, Francisco de Vitoria (d. 1S46) and Domingo 
Soto (d. 1560) and the jurist, Baltasar Ayala.4 These 
were followed by the Jesuits, Molina and Suarez. The first 

2 De Officiis, L. 1, C. 29. 
8 De Civitate Dei, L. 4, C. 6. 
4 See Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, II, 740, 741. Cf. Scott, The 

Spanish Origin of International Law, Washington, 1928. 



6 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

Protestant writers on the subject came considerably later 
than Vitoria and Soto. Gentili published his De Lega-
tionibus in 1583 and his De Jure Belli in 1589, The great 
work of Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pads, did not make its 
appearance until 1625. Hence, it is scarcely accurate to 
call Grotius the founder of international law. Most of the 
underlying principles had been laid down in the works of 
St. Thomas Aquinas, while the more specific principles were 
fairly well systematized in the writings of the theologians 
cited above. From these sources Grotius borrowed not a 
little of the doctrines which he set forth in De Jure Belli 
et Pacts.5 

Although many modern writers on the subject regard 
international law as a purely positive collection of treaties, 
customs and usages accepted by the nations, the classical 
Protestant authors, Grotius and Vattel, understood it as 
including principles and precepts of the natural law and as 
resting upon that foundation. The table of contents of the 
former's treatise is sufficient to show that the discussion is 
to a much greater extent natural than purely positive. Of 
course, the Catholic writers have always set forth and 
stressed the natural law as the more pervasive and more 
fundamental element. International ethics is, therefore, im-
portant not merely in relation to world peace but as a guide 
and norm for the nations in all their dealings with one 
another. 

5 Cathrein, op. cit., II, 742. 



I I 

THE MORAL LAW IN RELATION TO STATES 

T ^ H E most important principles of international ethics are 
those which concern the end of the state and its sov-

ereignty. If we regard the state as an end in itself we log-
ically declare it free from the moral law, in relation both to 
its own members and to foreign states and persons. The 
prevalence of this view in the nations of antiquity and the 
international immoralities which it inspired and sanctioned 
are among the commonplaces of history. The very con-
siderable influence which it has exercised in the policies of 
many modern states is likewise well known. The literature 
and the propaganda of the First World War made us famil-
iar with the names of Hegel, Von Hartmann, Lasson, Treit-
schke, as prominent protagonists of the doctrine that neither 
states nor the public acts of statesmen are subject to the 
ordinary rules of morality.6 Since the close of that conflict, 
we have witnessed the rise of at least three great Totalitarian 
states—Nazi Germany, Bolshevist Russia, and Fascist Italy. 
All three accept and, in varying degrees, exemplify the doc-
trine that the individual exists only for the state, and de-
rives all his rights from the state, and that the state itself it 
above the moral law as traditionally understood. 

A Government's Sovereignty Not Unlimited 
British and American writers in their teaching on 

sovereignty have pretty generally followed John Austin, 
who held that political sovereignty is legally or juridically 
unlimited. While this proposition explicitly declares noth-
ing more than that no sovereign state has a right to inter-
fere in the affairs of another sovereign state, and that 
there is no legal power within the state superior to the 
state, it easily lends itself to the inference that the power 

6 Cathrein, op. cit., II, 743, 744. 

7 



8 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

of the state is absolute. And this inference has been 
drawn by more than one adherent of the Austinian formula. 
Professor Burgess declares that the state is the best inter-
preter of the laws of God and of reason, that it is the human 
organ least likely to do wrong; therefore, we must hold to 
the principle that the state can do no wrong.7 In current 
controversies on the relations between church and state, 
the number of participants who assume that the good citi-
zen must obey every enactment of the state, indicates a 
very wide acceptance of the principle laid down by Professor 
Burgess. 

While the latter was speaking in the passage just sum-
marized of internal sovereignty, his principle is equally ap-
plicable to international affairs. If a state can do no wrong 
in its dealings with its own members it is likewise morally 
immune, or infallible, in its relations with other states. 
Speaking of political authority in general, another American 
writer says: "If in any case the limitations of the divine 
law are recognized, the State in the last analysis must be 
the interpreter of the divine will, so that in fact the restric-
tion is nothing but a self limitation. In other words, the 
principles of morality, of justice, of religion, etc., so far as 
they constitute limitations upon the sovereign, are simply 
what the consciousness of the State decides them to be, for 
there can be no other legal consciousness than that of the 
State." 8 

States Subject to Moral Law 
Against all theories which either expressly or by im-

plication assert that the state is independent of the moral 
law we set forth the Catholic position that states, like in-
dividuals, are subject to the moral precepts of both nature 
and Revelation. 

When two or more individuals unite to form a private 
society, such as a business partnership or a benevolent as-
sociation, they are obviously bound by the moral law in 

7 Political Science and Constitutional Law, II, 44-47. 
8 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, p. 2S4. 



9 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

their corporate acts. A moral or corporate person is subject 
to ethical rules quite as definitely and extensively as a 
physical or natural person. To deny this principle would 
be to authorize men to exempt themselves from the moral 
law in large spheres of conduct through the simple deyice 
of a formal association. In their corporate capacity they 
could lawfully do that which is forbidden them as indi-
viduals. This would be especially convenient in economic 
relations. The business corporation and the trade union 
could do no wrong. 

Since the state is a community of human beings it is 
as truly subject to the moral law as any private society. 
The fact that it is a necessary society does not affect its 
character as a moral person. Its acts aré the acts of an 
organized group of human beings.- Its international con-
duct affects other human beings. While its end is primarily 
the welfare of its own members, it must attain that end with 
due regard to the welfare of persons who are outside its 
jurisdiction, just as the acts of a family must be consistent 
with the rights and claims of other families. Hence, the 
state is bound by the precepts of justice, charity, veracity 
and all the other moral rules which govern human relations. 

To be sure, some provisions of the moral law do not 
apply to states in the same way as to individuals. When 
crime has been committed the state may deprive men of 
liberty, property and even life. The state has a right to 
wage war. On the other hand it may not subordinate itself 
or the welfare of its members to the interests of some other 
political community. Reservations and modifications of 
this sort, however, have to do with the manner not the fact 
of the subjection of the state to the moral law. 

From another point of view the same truth emerges. 
Man is bound by the moral law in all the circumstances of 
life, whether individual; social or civil. Nothing in the 
nature of the human person, either individually or socially 
considered, can be adduced as a logical basis for the suppo-
sition that he becomes exempt from the moral law in his 



10 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

political or international relations. In the words of Chan-
cellor Kent: "States or bodies politic are to be considered 
as moral persons having a public will, capable and free to 
do right and wrong, inasmuch as they are collections of 
individuals, each of whom carries with him into the service 
of the community the same binding law of morality and re-
ligion which ought to control his conduct in private life." 9 

Every international action of a state must be justified 
or condemned in the light of its effect upon the welfare of 
human beings; and the moral rights of all peoples are of 
equal intrinsic worth. Now, injury done by one state to 
another is injury done to human beings. Therefore, just as 
no state has a right to harm its own members, neither is it 
justified in causing damage to the members of other states. 

9 Commentaries, I, p. 2. 



I l l 

THE PRECEPT OF JUSTICE 
T>Y nature all states have equal rights, since all have the 

same end. The essential purpose of the state is to 
promote the welfare of its members as a whole, as united in 
families and as grouped in social classes. These objects are 
equally important in all political societies, because the con-
stituent groups are of equal worth as human beings. 

In current political treaties, the rights of states are dis-
cussed and defined in relation to the concept of sovereignty. 
While the term and the concept are not free from ambiguity, 
they are in such general use that they cannot be ignored in 
any fundamental discussion of the rights of nations. Briefly, 
the sovereignty of a state means its legal supremacy, or 
self sufficiency; that is, its legal independence of other states 
in the exercise of its functions. Of course, legal independ-
ence is not absolute. If it were the world could contain 
only one sovereign state. The root idea in sovereignty is 
that a state derives its governing authority from itself not 
from any other political organization. International law 
recognizes all sovereign states as equal and requires them 
to respect one another's sovereignty, both external and in-
ternal. Inasmuch as sovereignty can sometimes, without 
objection on the part of positive international law, be exer-
cised in ways that are not sanctioned by morality, it is not 
identical in meaning with moral authority. 

Political societies, whose legal power is limited by con-
stitutional subordination or waived by treaty, do not enjoy 
the full measure of political rights available in the natural 
law. Examples are the commonwealths of federal govern-
ments and countries subject to a protectorate which re-
stricts in some degree either their internal or their external 
sovereignty. Such political societies or states do not possess 
equal moral rights with completely sovereign states, for 

11 



12 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

they have surrendered or have never acquired the full au-
thority and rights of sovereign states. Outside the field 
enclosed by these positive limitations, such states possess 
equal moral rights with all other states. 

Rights of States 
The principal rights of states relate to self preservation 

and self development. Under the former is included the 
right to continue as an independent state, moral immunity 
from forcible subjection to another state. Hence it implies 
the right of self defense by all legitimate means. The state 
has a right to require its members to defend the common 
good against aggression. 

Protection of Lives and Property Abroad 
Self preservation may also include protection of the 

lives and property of nationals in foreign countries. That 
the natural law always requires states to perform this func-
tion may well be doubted. Conditions in a foreign territory 
might be so disturbed, the political authority might be so 
insecure, that sojourners or investors there would have no 
moral right to call upon their own governments for protec-
tion of either life or property. While existing international 
law recognizes this as a national right, it does not neces-
sarily make the exercise of this power legitimate in morals. 
While citizens have in general a valid claim to protection 
by their government, even where they have no right to ex-
pose their country and their fellow citizens to dispropor-
tionately grave inconvenience, travelers and investors in 
foreign lands have no right to expect as much protection 
from their governments as they would have obtained had 
they remained at home. The situation involves the wel-
fare of a small group of adventurous citizens versus the 
welfare of the community. In any case, armed interven-
tion on behalf of the former interests is never justified when 
they can be secured through peaceful means, such as nego-



13 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

tiation, arbitration, severing diplomatic relations, and put-
ting an embargo upon trade. 

"National Honor" 
More important than the foregoing right is that of being 

accorded due respect by other states. I t arises chiefly in re-
lation to the official representatives of a state in foreign 
lands. They have a right to be treated with that considera-
tion which natural law and international usage prescribe 
in the situation, and the state which they represent has a 
right to insist upon this degree of respect. As in the case 
of life and property, however, so here, the right need not 
be urged so far as to involve the use of armed force. "Na-
tional honor" has many times been utilized as a pretext for 
wars of aggression. 

The right of self-preservation implies also the right of a 
state to prevent by proportionately just means other states 
from fostering seditious doctrines and movements within 
its territory. All the moral presumptions, however, are 
against the use of armed force in such situations. 

Conquest 
The right of a state to self development must, of course, 

be exercised with due regard to the rights of other states. 
It does not justify conquest, nor making the flag follow 
either migration or trade, nor forcible annexation of terri-
tory which had once been subject to the state that thus 
seeks expansion. The welfare and preferences of the present 
inhabitants of the territory as well as the just interests of 
the state of which they now form a part, constitute much 
stronger ethical claims than any that can be derived from 
merely historical considerations. 

Colonies 
On the other hand, the right of self development may 

justify a state in occupying sparsely developed territory 



14 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

which lacks an organized government worthy of the name, 
or which might properly be regarded as a politically owner-
less area. God created the earth for all the children of men 
in general, in such a way that He did not set apart any por-
tion of it for the exclusive political or economic control of 
persons or races that fail to utilize it adequately. In exer-
cising this right of occupancy, however, the superior state 
must safeguard all the natural rights of the natives, includ-
ing that of property. It is also obliged to provide for their 
education, physical, mental and moral, and to develop their 
capacity for some measure of self government. Whether the 
dominating state should eventually withdraw from such a 
territory, leaving the inhabitants politically independent, is 
a question that cannot be answered except in the most gen-
eral terms. The welfare and rights of the occupying state 
must be given due consideration. For some peoples local 
autonomy, particularly as regards economic and social af-
fairs, is better than complete sovereignty. A protectorate 
may be advantageous to both the weaker and the stronger 
people. On the other hand, the fact that a people has for a 
long time and with practical unanimity desired self rule 
creates a strong presumption in favor of a right to political 
independence. The right becomes certain as soon as inde-
pendence becomes essential to the welfare of that people. 

Although the relation between a state and its subordinate 
national groups is not technically a question of international 
ethics, it seems to require some discussion in this place. 
Sometimes a state has a right to prevent the secession and 
independence of national minorities. In other words, the 
so-called "right of self determination" is not universally 
valid. After all, this right is not an intrinsic good; it is 
not an end in itself. It is merely a means to the welfare of 
the people or group on whose behalf it is asserted. More-
over, it must be exercised and applied with due regard to 
the rights and welfare of other national and political groups, 
including the one to which the aspiring group has heretofore 
been politically subject. If a status of sovereignty would 



17 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

do the subordinate national group more harm than good, 
or if concession of it would result in grave injury to the 
dominant state, the change could not be justified by any 
such abstract principle as "the right of self determination." 
The national minority might never have enjoyed political in-
dependence in its present territory, might be too small to 
maintain a separate government, or might be so intermin-
gled with other groups that it could not be politically de-
tached without grave injury to itself or to the state to which 
it now owes allegiance. On the other hand, the national 
group might occupy a distinct territory, might have an 
average capacity for self government, might have formerly 
enjoyed political independence, might cherish a strong and 
long continued desire for independence and might be in a 
position to exercise it without violating the rights of the 
state in which it is now incorporated. Such a group would 
undoubtedly possess a moral right to separation and self 
rule. Its claim thereto would be justified by the end of all 
government, namely, human welfare. 

Rights of Minorities 
In any case, national minorities have a right to main-

tain their language, customs, sense of unity and all their 
other national characteristics, so long as these possessions 
are not clearly and gravely detrimental to the welfare of the 
majority or of the state as a whole. If the national minority 
occupies a distinct area it should be allowed all the local 
self government that is enjoyed by the occupants of any 
similar provincial or municipal jurisdiction. Obviously most 
of the foregoing rights can be vindicated more certainly and 
generally with regard to national groups that have occupied 
a distinct region for centuries than as regards groups com-
posed of immigrants or the immediate descendants of im-
migrants. 

To harmonize the rights and welfare of any subordinate 
national group with the rights and welfare of the majority 
is one of the most delicate and difficult tasks that can face 



16 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

a government. The strength and value of national senti-
ment and claims can easily be underestimated and the na-
tional minority is prone to minimize its obligations of 
knowing and regarding sympathetically the opinions and 
feelings of the majority, of identifying itself with the po-
litical community of which it forms a part and of interest-
ing itself in the social, economic and political problems 
which concern the state as a whole. 

International Intercourse 
One of the most important means of national self de-

velopment is regular international intercourse. The indi-
vidual cannot live a normal life nor adequately develop his 
personality unless he exchanges goods, material, moral and 
intellectual, with his fellows. He needs their co-operation 
and they need his. In all but extremely exceptional cases, 
therefore, the individual is morally bound to maintain these 
relations. One of the most striking proofs of this obligation 
is derived from the common right of all persons to use and 
enjoy the bounty of nature. Men cannot exercise this right 
equitably unless they hold constant intercourse with one an-
other. They must make contracts concerning their private 
possessions and they must use them in such a way that all 
non-possessors will have due access to them. Similarly, 
states cannot promote the welfare of their members ade-
quately nor use the common bounty of nature equitably un-
less they hold intercourse with one another. 

Owing to the great variety of circumstances, it is not 
practicable to formulate a complete set of rules for inter-
national intercourse which can or should be applied uni-
versally. Probably the most powerful interferences are 
customs tariffs, export taxes and embargoes and restric-
tions upon immigration. Even though an import tariff 
system is in the long run injurious to the state which im-
poses it as well as to foreign peoples, it cannot as a rule be 
conclusively proved contrary to either justice or charity. 
Its effects are too complex. Its temporary and partial 



17 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

benefits, which are indisputable, might be sufficient to jus-
tify the counter-balancing inconveniences. On the other 
hand, embargoes or excessive taxes upon the export of raw 
materials can easily amount to international uncharity and 
international injustice against peoples that lack certain nec-
essary raw materials. To deprive a nation of such goods is 
generally a much greater injury than to reduce its opportu-
nity of marketing its products. 

Immigration 
Exclusion of immigrants is generally a violation of 

charity when maintained by a rich and powerful state over 
one that is weak and overpopulated. It would probably 
be difficult to show, however, that such a policy is against 
justice. Limitation of the number of immigrants, particu-
larly of undesirable persons, need not be contrary to either 
justice or charity. At the present time, immigration is a 
grave and urgent problem of international comity and inter-
national ethics. 

Treaty Obligations 
International intercourse normally implies the establish-

ment of international treaties. Generally speaking, states 
have both the right and the duty to form agreements of this 
character. The moral obligation of international treaties is 
obviously based upon the natural law. Human welfare de-
mands that just agreements should be observed whether 
among individuals or among those groups of individuals that 
we call states. To attempt to derive the sanctity of treaties 
from positive law, from some such formula as "international 
agreements must be kept," is utterly futile. Instead of 
establishing a moral obligation, it only pushes the difficulty 
further back; for it immediately raises the question, what 
is the moral basis of the principle itself, "agreements must 
be kept"? Unless we are to face an infinite series of postu-
lates, we must introduce the intrinsic principle of the nat-
ural law. 



18 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

The obligation of a state to observe a treaty which has 
been unjustly imposed upon it, is a very difficult ethical 
question. Among individuals such extortionate agreements 
can ordinarily be dissolved or modified in the civil courts. 
When there exists no competent and authoritative interna-
tional court, no such recourse is open to a state. Either the 
unjust treaty must be unquestioningly accepted or the ag-
grieved state must be morally authorized to decide for itself 
the question of observance. Inasmuch as it lacks valid con-
sent by one of the parties, an unjustly imposed treaty carries 
no more direct moral obligation than an unfair contract 
which has been forced upon a weaker individual; the state 
which has compelled another state to accept unjust com-
mitments has no valid right to their fulfillment, and the un-
justly coerced state does not directly owe fidelity to the 
offending state. 

But unjust treaties may involve indirect obligation. If 
individual states were left ethically free to decide whether 
an agreement was extortionate and whether it should be 
kept, would not a grave injury be done to international 
good faith? Might not the menace to the common welfare 
of the nations outweigh the burden inflicted upon particular 
states? Might not the common good require the unjustly 
treated state to observe treaty provisions which the offend-
ing state had no right to exact? 

According to the prevailing opinion of Catholic moral-
ists, these questions should be answered in the affirmative. 
Dr. Cronin accepts the common view with some qualifica-
tion. He declares that an extorted treaty is not morally 
binding, "if the conditions imposed are manifestly and flag-
rantly unjust, for instance, if they are such as to reduce a 
state to the condition of absolute and irretrievable penury 
and the duress is extreme."10 Some writers follow Grotius 
in the opinion that unjustly imposed treaties are binding 
when they are as solemn and important as those by which 

10 The Science of Ethics, II, 658. 



19 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

peace is made at the close of a war.11 If the contrary per-
suasion were generally held it would render all treaties of 
peace insecure, cause wars to be more devastating and more 
prolonged and constitute a continuous menace to interna-
tional stability. 

This argument is impressive but not universally con-
clusive. In opposition it might be urged that no state is 
obliged to promote the common good of the nations at the 
expense of vital rights and interests of its own members, and 
that if all unjust peace treaties were universally observed 
the stronger states would be more frequently and powerfully 
tempted to inflict unjust treaties upon the weaker. Possibly 
this is a reasonable position: unjustly imposed agreements 
which cover performances and conditions of secondary im-
portance are not always morally obligatory, but the provi-
sions of treaties which terminate wars are universally bind-
ing unless they have been made under extreme duress and 
inflict an extreme amount of injustice. In the latter case, 
the notoriety of the injustice would automatically free the 
coerced nation from the unjustly imposed conditions. 

international Obligations of New Governments 
Finally, the common welfare of the nations requires that 

a new form of government, whether or not it has been estab-
lished by a revolution, should respect and perform all the 
international obligations contracted by its predecessor. Un-
less states are recognized as continuous entities, as identical 
moral persons persevering despite governmental changes, 
international faith, security and welfare are vitally injured. 

1 1 Cf. Meyer, Institutiones Juris Naturalis, II, 770, 771. 



IV 

THE PRECEPT OF CHARITY 
71/TANY persons hold that the relations among states are 

governed by the precept of justice but exempt from 
that of charity. No logical believer in the universality of 
the moral law can accept this view. Since states are moral 
persons they are united by the same bonds of humanity as 
physical persons. Men do not cease to be brothers in the 
human family when they become grouped into states nor do 
they get rid of their obligations of universal charity when 
they take on the character of national citizens or national 
rulers. Like individuals, states are bound to love that which 
is worthy of love and all states are thus deserving, since all 
are composed of human beings. Charity is as necessary for 
human welfare among states as among individuals. States 
no less than individuals are benefited by mutual love and 
assistance. 

Duty to Curb Excessive Patriotism 
Two specific duties of international charity require par-

ticular emphasis in our time. The first is that of curbing 
nationalism and excessive patriotism. The obverse side of 
this duty is to develop and promote a reasonable and mod-
erate internationalism. In the words of M. Louis le Fur, 
"the conflict of nationalism and internationalism constitutes 
the gravest problem of international law, affecting its very 
existence."12 Nationalism is a modern phenomenon. Its 
distinguishing note is "a proud and boastful habit of mind 
about one's own nation, accompanied by a supercilious or 
hostile attitude toward other nations; it admits that indi-
vidual citizens of one's country may do wrong, but insists 
that one's own nationality or national state is always 

12 Le Probleme de la Vie Internationale, p. 227. Cf. Enquete sur le 
Nationalisme, Maurice Vaussard. 

20 



21 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

right."13 It is defined by Father Cathrein as "inordinate 
love of country." In his encyclical on "The Peace of 
Christ," Pope Pius XI refers to it in these items: "Patriot-
ism—the stimulus of so many virtues and of so many noble 
acts of heroism when kept within the bounds of the law of 
Christ—becomes merely an occasion, an added incentive, to 
grave injustice when true love of country is debased to the 
condition of an extreme nationalism, when we forget that 
all men are our brothers and we members of the same great 
human family, that other nations have an equal right with 
us both to life and to prosperity, that it is never lawful nor 
even wise to dissociate morality from the affairs of practical 
life, that, in the last analysis, it is 'justice which exalteth a 
nation: but sin maketh nations miserable' (Proverbs xiv. 
34)." 

It is the clear and urgent duty of contemporary states 
to repress this excessive patriotism, this nationalism, and to 
cultivate a sane internationalism. They are bound in char-
ity to exemplify and to spread the truth that all persons and 
peoples are equal in nature and intrinsic worth, and of equal 
importance in the sight of God. All the nations have claims 
upon one another both in justice and in charity. All have 
certain common interests. All will prosper best if they 
recognize these claims and interests both in theory and in 
practice. Sane internationalism does not involve the de-
struction or the diminution of reasonable patriotism, any 
more than good citizenship requires neglect of one's family. 

The harmony between national and international pa-
triotism was well stated by M. Eugene Duthoit at the 
Semaine Sociale held at Havre, August, 1926. "According 
to the Catholic view," he said, "national duty and inter-
national duty are two aspects of the same duty. . . . Just 
as the state requires the diversity of families, communes, 
corporations and provinces, so the harmony of states calls 
for the rich and varied diversity which is found among the 
nations. The Church, in order to preach the Gospel every-

13 Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, p. 27S. 



22 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

where, requires that the various nations be organized and 
united in a community of law. Thus the double obligation, 
national and international, proceeds from universal charity 
and from the common bond which unites all men to God 
their Father, which unites them to one another as brethren 
and which conducts all to their super-terrestrial destiny." 

Right of Intervention 
The other important duty of international charity which 

calls for present emphasis is that of intervention by one state 
in the affairs of another. Whether sanctioned or prohibited 
by international positive law, it is sometimes required by 
the law of natural morality and the law of Christianity. 
Among the conditions which justify and require it are grave 
and long continued oppression of one state by another, the 
revolt of a people or a nation against intolerable tyranny, 
the unsuccessful efforts of a state to put down a rebellion 
which injures national or international welfare, grossly im-
moral practices, such as cannibalism and human sacrifices 
under the guise of religion, and continued anarchy in a state 
that is for the present unable to maintain a tolerably compe-
tent government. Evils of this magnitude would justify an 
individual or a group of individuals in calling for the assist-
ance of other individuals or groups, and the latter would be 
morally bound to respond unless the inconvenience involved 
were disproportionately great. Consequently a similar obli-
gation rests upon states. 

Its Limits 
In order to justify intervention, the foregoing evils, or 

any of them, must be definite, certain and extreme. Hope 
must be wanting of any remedy from within. In particular, 
the existence or the assertion of anarchical conditions in a 
state must be carefully scrutinized and the motive of the 
nation which intervenes should be free from selfishness. If 
these conditions are fulfilled, intervention may be of great 



23 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

benefit to the assisted people, not only as regards peace and 
order, but also in education, and in the art of government. 
When these tasks have been performed, the foreign govern-
ment ought to withdraw, if such is the desire of the assisted 
people. Of course, a state has no right whatever to use 
armed force in the affairs of another so long as milder 
methods, even those of moral coercion, are sufficient. 

However difficult may be the application of these rules 
and however frequently intervention may have been under-
taken for selfish purposes, the general ethical principle is clear 
and incontrovertible. Just as individuals are bound to come 
to the assistance of their needy neighbors, so are the groups 
called states. Whenever intervention becomes a duty it 
necessarily implies the right to intervene. The pretentious 
assertion that no state ever has such a right is purely 
gratuitous and doctrinaire. It ignores the truth that gov-
ernments. exist for human welfare and that the right of 
political independence has neither logical nor ethical founda-
tion when it is urged on behalf of a state which instead of 
attaining frustrates this end. Unless we are willing to up-
hold the absurd contention that political independence is an 
end in itself, we must admit that it ceases or is suspended 
when it persistently and profoundly fails to safeguard the 
welfare of the state and its members. 

In the nineteenth century this absurdity was so widely 
preached by political writers and so-called liberals that it 
provoked a formal condemnation by Pope Pius IX. No. 62 in 
the Syllabus of condemned propositions runs thus: "The prin-
ciple styled 'non-intervention' is one to be proclaimed and 
put into practice." So glaring a contradiction of the moral 
precept of charity richly deserved the Papal denunciation. 



V 

THE MORALITY OF WAR 

A CCORDING to the pacifist, all employment of force 
among nations is immoral. This assumption finds no 

support in either the law of Revelation or the law of nature. 
Certain sayings of Christ which are cited on its behalf, such 
as the injunction to turn the other cheek and not to resist 
evil, have always been interpreted by the Catholic Church 
as counsels of perfection. They are not precepts. More-
over, they were addressed to individuals, not to states. 

As to the natural law, it clearly authorizes the individ-
ual to defend himself by force against unjust aggression. 
The unjust aggressor has forfeited his right to physical in-
tegrity. In some conditions, force is the only effective means 
of protecting goods which have been unjustly attacked or 
jeopardized. Were innocent and upright persons to refrain 
from defending their rights by physical means the amount 
of evil and suffering in the world would be increased instead 
of diminished, for unjust men are always willing to use that 
weapon and they would be able to exercise it more frequent-
ly and effectively. Righteousness would not be promoted 
if wicked men were permitted to have a monopoly of physi-
cal coercion. All the arguments that justify force in the 
vindication of individual rights are fully applicable to the 
political groups known as states. Moreover, the individual 
is sometimes morally free to forego violent self-defense in 
accordance with a counsel of perfection,14 whereas the obli-
gations of the state to its members forbid it to indulge in 
such self-denial. 

14 "One of the advisory declarations of Christ, by some held not 
to be absolutely binding, but to have been given as an aid in attain-
ing approximate moral perfection. The counsel of perfection (See 
Matthew xix. 21)" (Webster's Unabridged Dictionary); "A command-
ment is a matter of necessity, whereas a counsel is left to the free will 
of the person to whom it is proposed" (Moral Theology, Koch Preuss 
I, 237). 

24 



25 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

Conditions of a Just War 
Three conditions are usually set down by the moralists 

as essential to entrance by a state into war. They are:—• 
sovereign authority, a just cause and a right intention. Ob-
viously neither a private person or group nor a subordinate 
political division possesses this right. Equally obvious is a 
right intention:—even though engaged in justifiable warfare 
a state should not include wrongful ends among its objec-
tives. The second condition is sometimes formulated as "a 
just and necessary cause." But the first adjective implies 
the second, for no cause will justify war unless it is such as 
to render war necessary. 

What Is Necessary Self-Defense? 
Hence, the second condition may be properly and advan-

tageously converted into the phrase, "necessary self-defense." 
What facts, conditions, circumstances are implied in this 
formula? In the first place, it means that a state may 
make war only to safeguard its rights. These must be either 
actually violated or in certain and imminent danger. Hence 
a war is not morally justified which aims at extending na-
tional territory, enhancing national power and prestige, pro-
moting an international "balance of power" or forestalling 
some hypothetical or merely probable menace. Utterly in-
adequate are the formulations employed by some moral 
theologians, as "the good of the community," "public peace," 
"necessity" and similar general terms, which can be and 
have been used as pretexts for unnecessary wars. More-
over, legitimate defense of rights implies that the aggrieved 
state is not simultaneously violating the rights of the state 
against which it contemplates war. Otherwise, the two na-
tions would be at once the victims and perpetrators of mu-
tual injustice. Only that state which is less guilty could 
possibly have a right to begin war in these circumstances. 
Consequently the more guilty state would not be justified 
either in taking the offensive or in repelling an attack by the 



26 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

less guilty, so long as the latter sought nothing more than 
the vindication of its rights and was willing to refrain from 
unjust conduct. This is the pure theory of the situation. 
Practically speaking, not even the less guilty state would be 
justified in beginning hostilities until it had definitely and 
manifestly ceased to commit lesser, but real, acts of inter-
national injustice. Failure to do .so would clearly disclose 
the absence of a "right intention." 

The foregoing propositions have to do with the objec-
tive situation. They are predicated of actual facts, not of 
the notions existing in the minds of the war-making and 
war-contemplating authorities. This distinction brings us 
to the second implication of "necessary self-defense." It is 
that the violation of national rights must appear to the ag-
grieved state as morally certain. No degree of probability, 
not even a great preponderance of probability, is sufficient. 
Such seems to have been the clear teaching of St. Augustine, 
St. Thomas and all the theologians down to the beginning 
of the seventeenth century.18 According to Bannez, "The 
state that wishes to declare war must not entertain a single 
doubt; the justifying reasons must be clearer than day. A 
declaration of war is equivalent to a sentence of death; to 
pronounce the latter with a doubtful conscience is murder." 
With equal positiveness the same principle was asserted by 
Vasquez. But it was abandoned by Suarez. The latter 
would permit a ruler to make war who regarded his right to 
do so as more probable than his obligation to refrain, or who 
thought that the probabilities of justice favored his cause 
rather than that of the opposing state. In technical terms, 
Suarez applied to the question of war-making the principle 
of probabiliorism. His fellow countryman and fellow Jesuit, 
Vasquez, declared flatly that no degree of probability would 
suffice to justify the initiation of "the greatest evil in Chris-

16 Cf. Stratmann: Weltkirche und Weltfriede, pp. 85-89, Augs-
burg, 1924. This is one of the best works of modern times on the 
Catholic principles of peace and war. An English abbreviated trans-
lation has been published under the title, The Church and War (Sheed 
& Ward, 1929). 



27 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

tian society." Sylvius was of the same opinion. In prac-
tice, said St. Alphonsus, war involves such grave evils that it 
can almost never be justified on the basis of a probable opin-
ion. So great was the authority of Suarez, however, that his 
view came to be adopted by a considerable number of moral 
theologians in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 

Surely Suarez was wrong. Surely Bannez was right 
when he compared a declaration of war to a sentence of 
death. If a jury or a judge is morally forbidden to condemn 
a man to death unless they feel assured of his guilt beyond 
all reasonable doubt, how can a civil ruler be justified in 
virtually pronouncing the death sentence upon hundreds or 
thousands of men, without moral certainty that his coun-
try's rights are being violated? While realizing that the evi-
dence of present injustice generates merely a preponderant 
probability, he might, however, feel morally certain that if 
he failed to take belligerent action, the probable injustice 
would become actual. In other words, the ruler might re-
gard actual injustice as merely probable but future and con-
tingent injustice as morally certain. In similar circum-
stances, an individual would be justified in using extreme 
measures for self-defense. In both cases there would be 
moral certainty, not merely a high degree of probability, that 
one was confronted by a grave evil. 

Rule of Proportionate Evil 

Neither actual violation of national rights nor moral cer-
tainty about it, nor both combined, are sufficient to make 
war morally lawful. As in every other situation when an 
act is contemplated which will lead to both evil and good 
results, the rules of ethics require that the cause or reason 
must be in proportion to the magnitude of the $vil. War, 
particularly in modern times, inflicts so many, so various 
and such enormous injuries upon innocent and guilty alike 
that it cannot be justified except by very grave reasons, by 
the gravest known to human society. Causa gravissima is 



28 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

the phrase used by the distinguished moral theologian, Père 
Tanquerey.18 Hence the rights and interests that are un-
justly attacked or jeopardized must be of primary impor-
tance to the state and its members. Such minor evils as a 
slight or temporary offense against national honor or pres-
tige or comfort or property will not justify the production 
of the awful evils involved in devastating warfare. The 
welfare of the aggrieved state as well as that of the aggres-
sor state is better safeguarded through the toleration of rela-
tively small wrongs until such time as they can be repaired 
through peaceful processes. In the words of Suarez, "Not 
every cause is sufficient, but a grave cause, proportionate to 
the damage of war." 

Even though all three of the foregoing conditions are 
fulfilled, a declaration of war is not yet morally lawful. It 
is not yet a necessary means of self defense. Recourse to 
war is not justified until all peaceful methods have been 
tried and found inadequate. The principal pacific means 
and devices are:—direct negotiation, diplomatic pressure of 
various kinds, such as trade embargoes, boycotts and rup-
ture of normal international intercourse, and mediation and 
arbitration and judicial settlement. If all these should 
prove ineffectual, "the calm, deliberate judgment of the peo-
ple, rather than the aims of the ambitious few should de-
cide whether war be the only solution. Knowing that the 
burdens of war will fall most heavily on them, the people 
will be slower in taking aggressive measures, and, with an 
adequate sense of what charity and justice require, they 
will refuse to be led or driven into conflict by false report 
or specious argument. Reluctance of this sort is entirely 
consistent with firmness for right and zeal for national honor. 
If it were developed in every people, it would prove a more 
effectual restraint than any craft of diplomacy or economic 
prudence."*7 

Father Stratmann informs us that Cajetan and Vitoria 
16 De Virtute Justitiae, p. 152. 
17 Pastoral Letter of the American Hierarchy, pp. 69, 70. 



29 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

added another condition as essential to a legitimate declara-
tion of war.18 It is that the aggrieved nation should be 
morally certain of victory. Statesmen are not justified in 
making war if their country is likely to find itself in a worse 
condition at the end than at the beginning. However, it 
does not seem reasonable that the responsible persons should 
possess moral certainty of a successful outcome. In the 
nature of the case, that is frequently impossible. It would 
seem sufficient that the government should have solid rea-
sons, proportionate to the evil alternative of defeat, for ex-
pecting victory. 

There are then seven conditions necessary and sufficient 
to justify a state in entering upon war:—(1) some kind of 
declaration of war, either absolute or conditional, by the 
sovereign authority of the aggrieved state prior to the be-
ginning of actual hostilities; (2) a right intention, that is, 
the defensive activities should not be utilized for the attain-
ment of an immoral objective; (3) actual or certainly im-
minent violation of rights; (4) moral certainty that this is 
the situation; (S) a degree of evil in the injury proportion-
ate to the evils involved in war; (6) insufficiency of peace-
ful means; (7) and a well-grounded hope of bringing about 
better conditions. As distinguished from the entrance into, 
the conduct of the war should be free from methods or acts 
that are contrary to the moral law. 

In few, if any, modern wars have all these conditions 
been observed by the nations which initiated hostilities. In-
deed, an honest attempt by all states to observe all these 
conditions would make war practically impossible. 

To continue a war longer than is necessary for the pro-
tection or vindication of rights is quite as immoral as to be-
gin it unnecessarily. It is pretty generally realized now that 
all the belligerents in the late war would be in a better situa-
tion today if Pope Benedict's plan of peace had been ac-
cepted in August, 1917. 

In the course of a war justice may change sides, or it 
18 Loc. cit. 



30 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

may come to be disregarded by both combatants. The lat-
ter hypothesis was verified when the representatives of both 
groups refused to heed the plea of Pope Benedict.19 

Treaties of Peace 
The process of concluding peace is likewise subject to the 

moral law. Charity as well as justice must be exemplified 
by both parties. Victory does not give the unjust aggressor 
the right to impose burdens upon the vanquished. On the 
contrary, the former owes the latter full measure of restitu-
tion. If victory crowns the arms of the state whose cause 
was just, it confers no right to exact more than adequate 
reparations and indemnities, while charity may require these 
obligations to be postponed or reduced or entirely condoned 
and canceled. Inasmuch as both victors and vanquished al-
ways believe that they have been in the right, and inasmuch 
as no victorious nation can be trusted to treat the conquered 
nation with either justice or charity, it is desirable that peace 
treaties should be made under the supervision of some im-
partial tribunal. 

19 Cf. Cyprian Emanuel, O.F.M., and the Ethics Committee, The 
Ethics of War, C. A. I. P.; Catholic Principles of Politics, by Ryan 
and Boland, Macmillan; A Code of International Ethics, Catholic So-
cial Guild, Oxford. 



IV 

THE OBLIGATION OF PROMOTING PEACE 

JUSTICE requires a state to promote peace for the sake of its own members, while charity obliges it to pursue the 
same end for the welfare of both itself and other nations. 
These duties rest not only upon governments, but upon peo-
ples, particularly upon those persons and organizations which 
can exert influence upon public opinion and upon political 
rulers. 

Education in Peace 
The first and most generally obligatory means and ac-

tion is education. The people require instruction concern-
ing the universality of brotherhood and the possibility of 
permanent peace, while statesmen stand in particular need 
of becoming familiar with the principles of international 
ethics. 

Human brotherhood must be intensively and extensively 
preached to all groups and classes; in theological seminaries, 
in colleges and schools; in the pulpit and in catechetical 
instructions; in religious books and periodicals. The indi-
vidualmust be taught a right attitude of mind toward all 
foreigners. I t is not enough to declare that "every human 
being is my neighbor." The obligations which are implicit 
in this phrase must be made explicit. They must be set 
forth in detail with regard to foreign races and nations. 
Men must be reminded that "every human being" includes 
Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, Englishmen, Japanese, Chi-
nese, and all other divisions of the human family. "All men 
are one human family," said Pope Pius XI. And this doc-
trine should be repeated and reiterated. Effective teaching 
and adequate assimilation depend largely upon the simple 
process of repetition. 

31 



32 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

False Patriotism 
In the second place, the duties of patriotism must be 

expounded in a more restrained and balanced way than that 
which has been followed heretofore. Men must be taught 
that it is not "sweet and becoming to die for one's country" 
if one's country is fighting for that which is unjust. With-
out denying or weakening the sentiment of national patri-
otism, we can set forth that wider and higher patriotism 
which takes in all the peoples of the earth. A large part 
of our efforts in this field must be specifically, courageously 
and persistently directed against the spirit of exclusiveness 
and narrowness which characterizes that perversion of na-
tional sentiment now stigmatized as nationalism. "The na-
tional state through education in national school, national 
army and national journalism, through the social pressure 
of national patriotism, inculcates in its citizens the fancy 
that they are a world by themselves, sufficient unto them-
selves; it teaches them that they are a chosen people, a 
peculiar people, and that they should prize far more what is 
theirs as a nationality than what is theirs as human be-
ings."20 This fundamentally erroneous and un-Christian 
education has had a long start in every modern state. The 
task of arresting and counteracting it will be long and ardu-
ous. Until it is accomplished, however, no fundamental 
progress can be made in the prevention of war and the safe-
guarding of peace. 

Statesmen and a Just War 

Another urgent task is to bring about a profound shift-
ing of emphasis in formal statements of the conditions which 
justify war. Instead of laying stress upon the lawfulness 
of engaging in a war of self defense, we should clearly and 
fully and frequently set forth all the conditions which are 

20 Hayes, op. cit., p. 2S8. 



33 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

required according to the principles of morality. We should 
challenge disproof of the conclusion that all these condi-
tions have rarely been available to justify the outbreak of 
war. If it be objected that statesmen have assumed the 
presence of these conditions and, therefore, have made war 
in good faith, the reply is that statesmen have very rarely 
taken the trouble to ask themselves deliberately and con-
scientiously whether the justifying conditions were really 
present. They have seldom given the question an amount 
of honest consideration proportionate to the evils entailed 
by a declaration of war. Hence the obligation of examining 
into and observing all of the conditions should be urged in 
a special way upon the rulers of states. We should put 
particular emphasis upon the fourth condition, namely, the 
exploration of all pacific methods for avoiding a bloody con-
flict. 

Finally we should keep before men's minds the funda-
mental ethical truth that as a whole, as a two-sided per-
formance, war is always wrong. In the words of Rev. Theo-
dore Meyer, S.J.: Bellum nequit esse, objective loquendo, 
ex utraque parte jormaliter et materialiter justum.21 If 
one state is defending its rights the other is necessarily vio-
lating rights. Even the former is guilty of injustice if it has 
begun hostilities in disregard of any one of the other neces-
sary conditions. 

Peace Is Feasible 
The mental attitude of the people must be changed and 

reformed with regard to the possibility of establishing per-
manent peace. One of the greatest obstacles to peace has 
always been the lazy assumption that wars must come, that 
there will always be war while men are men. So long as 
this pessimism prevails, the majority of persons will not 
assert themselves in the cause of peace. World peace is 
largely, if not mainly, a matter of human faith. If the 
majority of people believe that peace can be established and 

21 Institutiones Juris Naturalis, II, p. 794. "Objectively speaking, 
war cannot be formally and materially just on both sides." 



34 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

secured, peace will be established and secured. We must 
persistently show that a reign of peace is feasible, until this 
idea and this faith become a dominating and effective ele-
ment in the habitual thinking of average men and women. 

Papal Peace Recommendations 
The second great duty in fulfilling our obligation of pro-

moting world peace is to consider fairly and to support, so 
far as our abilities and conscience permit, practical pro-
posals and arrangements for preventing war and making 
peace secure. In general terms these methods were all set 
forth by Pope Benedict XV. In fact he was the first to 
recommend them as a comprehensive and consistent scheme. 
In his letter to the belligerents, August, 1917, he proposed 
that:—moral right be substituted for the material force of 
arms in the reciprocal dealings of nations; the nations enter 
upon a just agreement for the simultaneous and reciprocal 
reduction of armaments; armed force be replaced by the 
noble and peaceful institution of arbitration, with the pro-
vision that penalties be imposed upon any state which should 
refuse either to submit a national question to such a tri-
bunal or to accept the arbitral decision. 

In his encyclical on "International Reconciliation," Pen-
tecost Sunday, 1920, the same Pontiff laid particular stress 
upon the association of the states in an international or-
ganization: "All states should put aside mutual suspicion 
and unite in one sole society or rather family of peoples, both 
to guarantee their own independence and safeguard order in 
the civil concert of the peoples. A special reason, not to 
mention others, for forming this society among the nations 
is the need generally recognized of reducing, if it is not 
possible to abolish entirely, the enormous military expendi-
ture which can no longer be borne by the state, in order that 
in this way murderous and disastrous wars may be prevented 
and to each people may be assured, within just confines, the 
independence and integrity of its own territory." 



35 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

Of the two foregoing pronouncements, one was issued in 
the midst of the First World War; the other more than a 
year and a half after the Armistice. Unfortunately neither 
of them was accepted as a guide by the dominant and re-
sponsible states. As a consequence, most of the important 
peoples of the earth are now engaged in a Second World 
War, which will probably become much more horrible and 
devastating than the First. 

Almost twenty years after the second of Pope Benedict's 
declarations was published, another Sovereign Pontiff gave 
to the world another program for peace. In his Christmas 
message for 1939, Pope Pius XII offered the following "Five 
Conditions for a Just Peace": 

We believe those who with watchful eyes consider 
these serious potentialities and the possibility of such an 
evolution of events will, notwithstanding war and its hor-
rible accompaniments, hold themselves wholly prepared 
to define clearly, so far as they themselves are concerned, 
the fundamental points of a just and honorable peace at 
the opportune moment; and that they would not flatly re-
ject opportunity for negotiations, whenever the occasion 
presents itself, with the necessary guarantees and security. 

First. A fundamental condition of a just and honor-
able peace is to assure the right to life and independence 
of all nations, large and small, strong and weak. One na-
tion's will to live must never be tantamount to a death 
sentence for another. When this equality of rights has 
been destroyed, injured or imperiled, the juridical order 
requires reparation whose measure and extent are not de-
termined by the sword or selfish, arbitrary judgment, but 
by the standards of justice and reciprocal equity. 

Second. That order, reestablished in such a manner, 
may be tranquil and durable—the cardinal principles of 
true peace—nations must be liberated from the heavy 
slavery of the race for armaments and from the danger 
that material force, instead of serving to protect rights, 
become the tyrannical violater of them. 

Conclusions of peace which failed to attribute funda-
mental importance to disarmament, mutually accepted, 



36 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

organic and progressive both in practice and spirit, and 
failed to carry out this disarmament loyally, would sooner 
or later reveal their inconsistency and lack of vitality. 

Third. In any reordering of international commu-
nity life, it would conform to the rules of human wisdom 
for all parties concerned to examine the consequences of 
the gaps and deficiencies of the past; and in creating or 
reconstituting the international institutions, which have so 
lofty a mission and at the same time one that is so diffi-
cult and full of the gravest responsibilities, they should 
keep present before them the experiences which poured 
from the inefficacy or defective operation of similar pre-
vious projects. 

And, since it is so difficult—one would be tempted to 
say almost impossible—for human weakness to foresee 
everything and assure everything at the time of the draft-
ing of treaties of peace—when it is difficult to be entirely 
free from passions and bitterness—the establishment of 
juridical institutions, which serve to guarantee the loyal 
and faithful fulfillment of terms and, in case of recog-
nized need, to revise and correct them, is of decisive im-
portance for an honorable acceptance of a peace treaty 
and to avoid arbitrary and unilateral ruptures and inter-
pretations of the terms of these treaties. 

Fourth. A point which should draw particular atten-
tion if better ordering of Europe is sought, concerns the 
real needs and just demands of nations and of peoples as 
well as of ethnical minorities: demands which, if not al-
ways sufficient to form a strict right when there are recog-
nized or confirmed treaties or other juridical titles which 
oppose them, deserve at all events benevolent examination 
to meet them in a peaceful way and, where it appears 
necessary, by means of equitable, wise, and harmonious 
revision of treaties. 

Once true equilibrium among nations is thus brought 
back and the basis of mutual trust is reestablished, many 
of the incentives to resort to violence would be removed. 

Fifth. But even better and more complete settle-
ments will be imperfect and condemned to ultimate fail-
ure, if those who guide the destinies of peoples, and the 
peoples themselves, do not allow themselves to be pene-



37 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

treated always more and more by that spirit from which 
alone can arise life, authority, and obligation for the dead 
letter of articles in international agreements—by that 
spirit, namely, of intimate, acute responsibility that meas-
ures and weighs human statutes according to the holy un-
shakable rules of Divine Law; by that hunger and thirst 
for justice which is proclaimed as a Beatitude in the Ser-
mon on the Mount, and which has, as a natural presup-
position, moral justice; by that universal love which is 
the compendium of and most comprehensive term for the 
Christian ideal, and therefore throws across also a bridge 
to those who have not the benefit of participating in our 
own Faith. 

In his address on Pentecost Sunday, June 1, 1941, in 
observation of the fiftieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum, 
the Holy Father expounded "three fundamental values" to 
be embodied in the post-war reconstruction. His exposi-
tion follows: 

Three fundamental values, which are closely con-
nected one with the other, mutually complementary and 
dependent are: the use of material goods, labor and the 
family. 
Use of material goods: 

The Encyclical Rerum Novarum, expounds on the 
question of property and man's sustenance, principles 
which have lost nothing of their inherent vigor with the 
passage of time and today, fifty years after, strike their 
roots deeper and retain their innate vitality. 

In Our Encyclical Sertum Laetitiae, directed to the 
bishops of the United States of America, We called the 
attention of all to the basic idea of these principles which 
consists, as We said, in the assertion of the unquestion-
able need "that the goods which were created by God for 
all men should flow equally to all, according to the prin-
ciples of justice and charity." 

Every man, as a living being gifted with reason, has in 
. fact from nature the fundamental right to make use of 
the material goods of the earth, while it is left to the will 
of man and to the juridical statutes of nations to regulate 



38 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

in greater detail the actuation of this right. This indi-
vidual right cannot in any way be suppressed even by 
other clear and undisputed rights over material goods. 
Undoubtedly the natural order, deriving from God, de-
mands also private property and the free reciprocal com-
merce of goods by interchange and gift, as well as the 
functioning of the State as a control over both these in-
stitutions. But all this remains subordinated to the nat-
ural scope of material goods and cannot emancipate it-
self from the first and fundamental right which concedes 
their use to all men; but it should rather serve to make 
possible the actuation of this right in conformity with 
its scope. Only thus can we and must we secure that pri-
vate property and the use of material goods which bring 
to society peace and prosperity and long life, and they no 
longer set up precarious conditions which will give rise to 
struggles and jealousies and which are left to the mercy 
and the blind interplay of force and weakness. 

U S E OF MATERIAL GOODS 

The native right to the use of material goods, inti-
mately linked as it is with the dignity and other rights of 
the human person, together with the statutes mentioned 
above, provides man with a secure, material basis of the 
highest import on which to rise to the fulfillment, with 
reasonable liberty, of his moral duties. The safeguard-
ing of this right will ensure the personal dignity of man 
and will facilitate for him the attention to and fulfillment 
of that sum of stable duties and decisions for which he is 
directly responsible to his Creator. 

Man has in truth the entirely personal duty to pre-
serve and order to perfection his material and spiritual 
life, so as to secure the religious and moral scope which 
God has assigned to all men and has given them as the 
supreme norm, obligatory always and everywhere, before 
all other duties. 

To safeguard the inviolable sphere of the rights of the 
human person and to facilitate the fulfillment of his duties 
should be the essential office of every public authority. 
Does not this flow from that genuine concept of the com-



39 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

mon good which the State is called upon to promote? 
Hence it follows that the care of such a common good 
does not supply a power so extensive over the members 
of the community that, in virtue of it, the public author-
ity can interfere with the evolution of that individual ac-
tivity which We have just described, decide on the begin-
ning or the ending of human life, determine at will the 
manner of man's physical, spiritual, religious and moral 
movements in opposition to the personal duties or rights 
of man, and, to this end, abolish or deprive of efficacy his 
natural rights to material goods. 

To deduce such extension of power from the care of 
the common good would be equivalent to overthrowing 
the very meaning of the words common good, and, falling 
into the error, that the proper scope of man on earth is 
society, that society is an end itself, that man has no other 
life which awaits him beyond that which ends here be-
low. The national economy, as it is the product of the 
men who work together in the community of the state, has 
no other end than to secure, without interruption, the 
material conditions in which the individual life of the 
citizens may fully develop. Where this is secured in a 
permanent way a people will be in a true sense econom-
ically rich because the general well-being and conse-
quently the personal right of all to the use of worldly 
goods is thus actuated in conformity with the purpose 
willed by the Creator. 

JUST DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS 

From this, beloved children, it will be easy for you 
to conclude that the economic riches for people do not 
properly consist in the abundance of goods measured ac-
cording to a purely and solely material calculation of 
their worth, but in the fact that such an abundance repre-
sents and offers really and effectively the material basis 
sufficient for the proper personal development of its mem-
bers. If such a just distribution of goods were not se-
cured, or were effected imperfectly, the real scope of na-
tional economy would not be attained; for although there 
were at hand a lucky abundance of goods to dispose of, 



40 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

the people, in not being called upon to share them, would 
not be economically rich, but poor. Suppose, on the other 
hand, that such a distribution is effected genuinely and 
permanently and you will see a people, even if it disposes 
of less goods, making itself economically sound. 

These fundamental concepts regarding the riches and 
poverty of peoples it seems to Us particularly opportune 
to set before you today when there is a tendency to meas-
ure and judge such riches and poverty by balance sheets 
and by purely quantitative criteria of the need or the 
abundance of goods. If, instead, the scope of the na-
tional economy is correctly considered then it will be-
come a guide for the efforts of statesmen and peoples and 
will enlighten them to walk spontaneously along a way 
which does not call for continual exaction in goods and 
blood but will give fruits of peace and general welfare. 

Labor: 

With the use of material goods you yourselves, dear 
children, see how labor is connected. The Rerum Nova-
rum teaches that there are two essential characteristics 
of human labor; it is personal and it is necessary. It is 
personal because it is achieved through the exercise of 
man's particular forces; it is necessary because without 
it one cannot secure what is indispensable to life; and 
man has a natural, grave, individual obligation to main-
tain life. To the personal duty to labor imposed by na-
ture corresponds and follows the natural right of each 
individual to make of labor the means to provide for his 
own life and that of his children; so profoundly is the 
empire of nature ordained for the preservation of man. 

But note that such a duty and the corresponding right 
to work is imposed on and conceded to the individual in 
the first instance by nature and not by society, as if man 
were nothing more than a mere slave or official of the com-
munity. From that it follows that the duty and the right 
to organize the labor of the people belongs above all to 
the people immediately interested: the employers and the 
workers. If they do not fulfill their functions, or cannot 
because of special extraordinary emergencies fulfill them, 



41 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

then it falls back on the state to intervene in the field of 
labor and in the division and distribution of work accord-
ing to the form and measure that the common good, prop-
erly understood, demands. 

In any case every legitimate and beneficial interfer-
ence of the state in the field of labor should be such as to 
safeguard and respect its personal character, both in the 
broad outlines and, as far as possible, in what concerns 
its execution. And this will happen if the norms of the 
state do not abolish or render impossible the exercise of 
other rights and duties equally personal; such as the right 
to give God His due worship; the right to marry; the 
right of husband and wife, of father and mother, to lead 
a married domestic life; the right to a reasonable liberty 
in the choice of a state of life and the fulfillment of a 
true vocation; a personal right, this last, if there éver 
was one, belonging to the spirit and sublime when the 
higher imprescriptible rights of God and of the Church 
meet as in the choice and fulfillment of the priestly and 
religious vocations. 

The family: 

According to the teaching of the Rerum Novarum 
nature itself has closely joined private property with the 
existence of human society and its true civilization and 
in a very special manner with the existence and develop-
ment of the family. Such a link appears more than ob-
vious. Should not private property secure for the father 
of a family the healthy liberty he needs in order to ful-
fill the duties assigned him by the Creator regarding the 
physical, spiritual and religious welfare of the family? 

In the family the nation finds the natural and fecund 
roots of its greatness and power. If private property has 
to conduce to the good of the family, all public stand-
ards, and specially those of the state which regulate its 
possession, must not only make possible and preserve such 
a function in the natural order under certain aspects supe-
rior to all others—but must also perfect it ever more. 

A so-called civil progress would in fact be unnatural 
which—either through the excessive burdens imposed or 



42 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

through exaggerated direct interference—were to render 
private property void of significance, practically taking 
from the family and its head the freedom to follow the 
scope set by God for the perfection of family life. 

Of all the goods that can be the object of private prop-
erty none is more conformable to nature, according to the 
teaching of the Rerum Novarum, than the land, the hold-
ing in which the family lives, and from the products of 
which it draws all or part of its subsistence. And it is in 
the spirit of the Rerum Novarum to state that, as a rule, 
only that stability which is rooted in one's own holding 
makes of the family the vital and most perfect and fecund 
cell of society, joining up, in a brilliant manner, in its 
progressive cohesion the present and future generations. 
If today the concept and the creation of vital spaces is 
at the center of social and political aims, should not one, 
before all else, think of the vital space of the family and 
free it of the fetters of conditions which do not permit 
even to formulate the idea of a homestead of one's own? 

RIGHT TO VITAL SPACE 

Our planet, with all its extent of oceans and seas and 
lakes, with mountains and plains covered with eternal 
snows and ice, with great deserts and tractless lands, is 
not, at the same time, without habitable regions and vital 
spaces now abandoned to wild natural vegetation and well 
suited to be cultivated by man to satisfy his needs and 
civil activities; and more than once, it is inevitable that 
some families migrating from one spot to another should 
go elsewhere in search of a new homeland. Then accord-
ing to the teaching of the Rerum Novarum the right of 
the family to a vital space is recognized. When this hap-
pens emigration attains its natural scope as experience 
often shows; We mean the more favorable distribution 
of men on the earth's surface suitable to colonies of agri-
cultural workers; that surface which God created and pre-
pared for the use of all. If the two parties, those who 
agree to leave their native land and those who agree to 
admit the newcomers, remain anxious to eliminate, as far 
as possible, all obstacles to the birth and growth of real 



43 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

confidence between the country of emigration and that of 
immigration, all those affected by such a transference of 
people and places will profit by the transaction: the fami-
lies will receive a plot of ground which will be native land 
for them in the true sense of the word: the thickly in-
habited countries will be relieved and their people will 
acquire new friends in foreign countries; and the states 
which receive the emigrants will acquire industrious citi-
zens. In this way the nations which give and those which 
receive will both contribute to the increased welfare of 
man and the progress of human culture. 

These are the principles, concepts and norms, beloved 
children, with which We should wish even now to share 
in the future organization of the new order which the 
world expects and hopes will arise from the seething fer-
ment of the present struggle to set the peoples at rest in 
peace and justice. 

These four Papal pronouncements provide, not only 
Catholics, but all men of good will, with a complete pro-
gram for a just and enduring peace. They comprise not 
only the necessary political and juridical elements but also 
those of an economic nature which are essential to a regime 
of social justice. No Catholic, no Christian, no believer in 
God, no lover of his kind, can refuse to accept wholehearted-
ly and with all his energies strive for the realization of these 
principles of a righteous and permanent peace. 



44 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

READING LIST 

"Primer of Peace and War." Plater, S.J. (Kenedy.) 

"Catholics and the Problems of Peace." Keating, S.J. (Catholic So-
cial Guild: Oxford.) 

"Christian Ethics." Ross, C.S.P. (Deyin-Adair.) 

"The Science of Ethics." Cronin. (Benziger.) 

Catholic Encyclopedia—articles on "International Law," "War," 
"Papal Arbitration," "Peace Congresses," etc. 

"The Ethics of War," Cyprian Emanuel, O.F.M., and the Ethics 
Committee. (Catholic Association for International Peace.) 

"The Morality of Conscientious Objection to War," Cyprian Emanuel, 
O.F.M., and the Ethics Committee. (Catholic Association for 
International Peace.) 

"History and Nature of International Relations." Walsh, S.J. (Ed.) 
(Macmillan.) 

"Encyclicals of Pius XI." James H. Ryan. (Herder.) 

"Vitoria and Suarez: The Founders of the Modern School of Inter-
national Law." Scott. (Georgetown School of Foreign Service.) 

"Syllabus on International Relations." Moon. (Macmillan.) 

"International Law." Charles G. Fenwick. (Century.) 

"Essays on Nationalism." Carlton J. H. Hayes. (Macmillan.) 

"Imperialism and World Politics." Moon. (Macmillan.) 

"Problems of a New World." Hobson. (Macmillan.) 

"American Foreign Policy." Latane. (Doubleday, Page.) 

"History of American Foreign Relations." Sears. (Crowell.) 

Files of America, Commonweal, Catholic World, Social Justice. 

"Moralphilosophie." Cathrein. 

"The Law, the State and the International Community." J. B. Scott. 
(Columbia University Press.) 

"The Catholic Conception of International Law." J . B. Scott. 
(Georgetown University Press.) 



INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 45 

"Catholic Principles of Politics." Ryan and Boland. (Macmillan.) 

"Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations." Eppstein. (Catholic 
Association for International Peace.) 

"Code of International Ethics." (Catholic Social Guild, Oxford.) 

"Patriotism, Nationalism and the Brotherhood of Man." Carlton J. 
H. Hayes and International Attitudes Committee. (Catholic Asso-
ciation for International Peace.) 

"Pius XII—Summi Pontificatus." (National Catholic Welfare Con-
ference.) 

"Pope Pius XII and Peace." .(National Catholic Welfare Conference.) 

"The Crisis of Christianity." Bishops of the United States. (Na-
tional Catholic Welfare Conference.) 

"La Patrie et La Paix." Yves de la Briere, S.J. (Desclee de 
Brouwer.) 

"The Pope Speaks." Rankin and O'Hara. (Harcourt, Brace.) 

"Church and War; a Catholic Study." Franziskus Stratmann. 
(Sheed.) 



46 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

N. C. W. C. STUDY CLUB OUTLINE ON INTERNATIONAL 
ETHICS 

{Printed by permission of the N. C. W. C. Study Club Committee) 

Lesson I 
GOVERNMENTS SUBJECT TO MORAL L A W (Parts I and II of the 

Report) 

SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION 

1. Relation between international law and international ethics. 
2. Christianity and international ethics. 
3. Origins of international law. 
4. Opponents of international morality. 
5. Subjection of governments to laws of right and wrong. 
6. Consequences of denying this. 

QUESTIONS 

1. What is international ethics? 
2. What is international law? 
3. Why is Christianity the inspiration of international peace? 
4. What special reasons were there that Spanish Catholics of the 

sixteenth century should have systematized international ethics and 
international law? 

5. Measure the motto, "Right or wrong, my country," against 
this section of the report. 

6. Why is a government bound by laws of right and wrong in 
its relations with other governments? 

PAPERS 

1. "Francis of Vitoria" (Catholic Encyclopedia; Scott). 
2. "The Work of the Catholic Association for International Peace" 

(Write the organization). 

Lesson II 

JUSTICE (Part III of the Report) 

SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION 

X. Equal moral rights of all states. 
2. Protection of lives and property of citizens abroad. 
3. Protection of national honor. 



47 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

4. Limitations on national development. 
5. Elements of international intercourse. 
6. Immigration and international peace. 

QUESTIONS 

1. What limitations are placed upon the right of a government 
to the protection of the life and property of its citizens abroad? 

2. Upon "National Honor"? 
3. Upon national development? 
4. Upon retention of peoples as colonies? 
5. Upon self-determination of peoples? 
6. Why are tariffs of importance in international relations? 

PAPERS 

A review of the sections dealing with the United States in Moon's 
"Imperialism and World Politics." 

Lesson III 

CHARITY. (WAR NOT ALWAYS WRONG. Part I V of the Report) (Part 
V, first two Paragraphs) 

SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION 

1. Charity as a duty of governments. 
2. Patriotism and nationalism. 
3. Intervention as sometimes a right and duty of international 

charity. 
4. Limitations upon it. 
5. Possibility of a just war. 

QUESTIONS 

1. Why is charity a duty of government? 
2. Wherein does excessive patriotism oppose Christian charity? 
3. What different forms of intervention are there? 
4. Why is war not essentially morally wrong? 
5. Discuss reasons why some persons hold war is always wrong. 

PAPERS 

1. Review of Hayes' "Essays on Nationalism," the work to be 
divided between two persons. 

2. Review of "Patriotism, Nationalism, the Brotherhood of 
Man," Hayes (Catholic Association for International Peace). 



48 INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 

Lesson IV 

W H E N IS WAS. JTJST? (Part V of the Report, Continued) 

SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION 

1. Safeguarding rights. 
2. Certainty of their violation. 
3. Proportionately grave cause. 
4. Necessity of recourse to peaceful means. 
5. Good reasons to hope for victory. 
6. Arbitrated peace treaties. 

QUESTIONS 

1. Why must the rights be actual rights? 
2. Why must a government be certain of its case? 
3. Why ought there be greater cause in the future than in the 

past to justify war? 
4. Why ought war to be the last resort? 
5. Why ought peace treaties be arbitrated rather than imposed or 

negotiated ? 
PAPERS 

1. A Review of "The Morality of Conscientious Objection to 
War" (Catholic Association for International Peace). 

2. "The American Citizen and Foreign Policy." 

Lesson V 

PROMOTING PEACE (Part VI of the Report) 

SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION 

1. Obligation of American citizens in our foreign policy. 
2. Education towards peace. 
3. Excessive patriotism in the United States. 
4. Catholic lay organizations and peace. 
5. The Catholic press and peace. 
6. The possibility of permanent peace. 
7. Pope Benedict's peace proposals. 
8. Pope Pius XII's Peace Program. 

PAPERS 

1. "Christ, the Prince of Peace" (Encyclicals Ubi Arcano and Quas 
Primus, Encyclicals of Pius XI) . 

2. Review of "The World Society" and "America's Peace Aims" 
(Catholic Association for International Peace). 



' T ' H E Catholic Association for International Peace is a 
membership organization. I ts object is to further , 

in accord with the teachings of the Church, the "Peace 
of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ," through the prepa-
ration and distribution of studies applying Christian 
teaching to international life. 

I t was organized in a series of meetings during 1926 
and 1927—the first held just following the Eucharistic 
Congress in Chicago, the second held in Cleveland that 
fall to form an organizing committee, and the third in 
Easter week, 1927, in Washington, when the permanent 
organization was established. 

The Association works through the preparation of 
committee reports. Following careful preparation, these 
are discussed both publicly and privately in order to se-
cure able revision. They are then published by the 
organization. Questions involving moral judgments are 
submitted to the Committee on Ethics. 

The Association solicits especially the membership 
and co-operation of those whose experience and studies 
are such that they can take part in the preparation of 
Committee reports. 

The junior branch of the Association has been com-
posed of students in International Relations Clubs in more 
than a hundred Catholic colleges and in Catholic clubs of 
secular universities. The separate clubs are united in 
geographical federations, e. g., New England, Lake Erie, 
Middle Atlantic, Capital, Ohio Valley, Mid-Western and 
Central. The clubs comprising these Student Peace Fed-
erations are becoming the nucleus of the International 
Relations Commission of the National Federation of Cath-
olic College Students. The N. F. C. C. S. together with 
the Newman Club Federations and Diocesan Councils con-
sti tutes the National Catholic Youth Council, which oper-
ates under the National Catholic Welfare Conference. 



PUBLICATIONS OF THE C.A.I.P. 
Pamphlet Series—(10c a copy; $1.00 a dozen) 

No. 1—International Ethics.* 
No. 2—Latin America and the United States* 
No. 3—Causes of War, and Security, Old and New * (out of pr int ) . 
No. A—Haiti, Past and Present (out of pr int ) . 
No. 5—Francis de Vitoria (out of pr int ) . 
No. 6—American Agriculture and Innternational Affairs.* 
No. 7—Puerto Rico and the United States (out of pr int) . 
No. 8—Europe and the United States—Elements in Their Rela-

tionship.* 
No. 9—The Ethics of War (out of pr int ) . 
No. 10—National Attitudes in Children. 
No. 11—Tariffs and World Peace.* 
No. 12—Manchuria—The Problem in the Far East.* 
No. 13—International Economic Life * (out of pr int ) . 
No. 14—The Church and Peace Efforts.* 
No. 15—War and Peace in St. Augustine's "De Civitate Dei." 
No. 16—Peace Education in Catholic Schools. 
No. 17—Peace Action of Benedict XV. 
No. 18—Relations Betweenn France and Italy. 
No. 19—Catholic Organization for Peace in Europe. 
No. 20—The United States and the Dominican Republic (out of pr int) . 
No. 21—An Introduction to Mexico.* 
No. 2 2 — A Papal Peace Mosaic. 
No. 23—Arbitration and the World Court.* 
No. 24—Agriculture and International Life.* 
No. 25—Patriotism, Nationalism, and the Brotherhood of Man.* 
No. 26—The Church and the Jews. 
No. 27—The Obligation of Catholics to Promote Peace, and The Rights 

of Peoples.* 
No. 28—America's Peace Aims. 
No. 29—The World Society.* 

No. 30—The Morality of Conscientious Objection to War.* 

MISCELLANEOUS SERIES 
Appeals for Peace of Pope Benedict XV and Pope Pius XI 10c 
Catholic Primer of Peace 25c 
Permanent Peace Program of Pope Benedict X V 10c 
Syllabus on International Relations 10c 
Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations, John Eppstein $2.50 
Monthly News Letter (Issued during school months) $1.00 

NATIONAL CATHOLIC WELFARE CONFERENCE 
PEACE PAMPHLETS 

Peace Statements of Recent Popes 10e 
The Christian Way to Peace * 10c 
Pius XII and Peace* 10c 
The Pope's Peace Program and the United States * 10c 
The Crisis of Christianity * 10c 

* Study Outline Appended. Ill