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A Group Discussion
by Catholic Educators

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CONSCRIPTION
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Discussion and Conclusions
By Eleven Members of the Faculty
of John Carroll University
Cleveland, Ohio



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Opinions expressed in this pamphlet are not to be taken as the official views of John Carroll University. They are merely the conclusions reached by the undersigned members of the Faculty Discussion Group.

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CONSCRIPTION IS NOT
THE AMERICAN WAY

The Conclusions
of a University Faculty Discussion



FOREWORD

TWICE in one generation the United States has demonstrated that its war potential is greater than that of any other country — if given time to mobilize. Yet, there are some who contend that "America has never been ready to meet the threat of war. She has fought each of her wars with unnecessary waste of blood and treasure, and after each of them she has refused to prepare herself for the next one" (Brigadier General John Palmer in "Notes on Universal Military Training"). Others, thinking of the role the United States hopes to play in the future world organization, have also drawn attention to what they call lack of preparedness. Permanent compulsory peacetime military training is the solution suggested for this lack.

Four words here demand concentrated attention: *permanent*, *peacetime*, *compulsory* and *military*. Let us set down these terms and place after each one the meaning attached to it in the pending bills and in the utterances of their chief supporters.

I. Permanent. Compulsory military training in the minds of the legislators is to become an enduring feature of our national life. True, by legislative enactment the whole program could at some future time be erased from the statute books, but thus far no advocate of the measure looks forward to such an eventuality. Conscription is not proposed for five years, say, as was the Selective Service Act of 1940. Nor is it an emergency measure, since the Selective Service Act can take care of present contingencies. It is envisaged as a permanent policy in peacetime.

2. Peacetime. This compulsory military training is not intended to meet the needs either of the present war or of the turbulent times following the cessation of hostilities. It is to be put into effect in the peace period after both. The words of General Marshall are clear on this point:

It is assumed that for some time after the defeat of the Axis Powers the United States will maintain such temporary military forces, in cooperation with its Allies, as may be necessary for a peaceful world order. The plans for a *permanent* peace establishment, referred to in this circular, relate to a *later period* when the future world order can be envisaged (Circular letter from General Marshall on compulsory military service, August 25, 1944. Italics supplied).

3. Compulsory. The obligation of spending a definite time in military training will rest on every male who has attained a specified age. The system will not be voluntary. Individual choice in the matter will be out of the question.

4. Military. The War Department insists that "non-essentials" should not be included in the training. "Effective training for combat must constitute the basis for the training schedules." On their face value these words mean that language and area studies, technical and scientific pursuits, will be excluded.

These four words taken singly and in their naked significance startle unthinking complacency. This country has never had a conscript army in peacetime, unless, perchance, the Selective Service Act of 1940 can be said to have constituted such. But even that Act was passed when we were already covered by the lengthening shadow of war, and it was passed for five years only. With such preparation for a pending war there can be no quarrel. The statement still holds true that in adopting a program of permanent, compulsory, peacetime military training Americans will be breaking with long tradition. This is a very grave issue, so grave, in fact, that the Faculty Discussion Group at John Carroll University considered it their moral obligation to study the question thoroughly for their own enlightenment and for the guidance of the young men committed to their care.

Accordingly, an outline discussion guide was prepared, many an article scanned and debated. The Group soon became aware that cur-

rent discussion on compulsory military training had worked itself into a confused snarl. This was evident in the following three respects:

First, the objective of the training. Many commentators speak or write about the educational, disciplinary, hygienic, moral, social and civic benefits of a year or more of army and navy life. The question naturally arises: Is the training to be purely military, or purely non-military, or a mixture of both?

Secondly, the Group found much confusing of end and of means to the end. Supposedly, the purpose of the whole compulsory military program is adequate defense of our country. To such a laudable purpose no citizen worthy of the name can object. Our country must at all times have sufficient forces for her adequate defense. This is a self-evident postulate of elementary patriotism. But sufficient forces for adequate defense are one thing; the method of obtaining these forces is quite another. Much of the popular argument would run thus: Our country must be adequately defended; therefore, we must have compulsory peacetime military training — a striking example of *non sequitur*. This kind of argument takes for granted that conscription in peacetime is the *only* method by which sufficient forces can be raised. But is it the *only* method? It is even the best method? The *method* is precisely the point to be highlighted in this discussion if conscription is to be a permanent policy and not an emergency measure.

Thirdly, although much confusion centers about the time when this program is to be put into operation, the statements of qualified spokesmen leave no doubt in the matter: conscription is for the period when national life will have returned to the normal tempo.

To clear away these confusions and to define sharply the real issues in compulsory military training, this Study Group finds it necessary to emphasize again and again that the bill is not being proposed as an emergency measure but as a peacetime policy. We discuss the issue solely on this ground. Arguments for and against the system as thus clearly stated were considered, and a body of conclusions drawn up. It will be seen, therefore, that quite beyond intention the

work fell into two parts: clarification of the issues and the conclusions arrived at. The fruits of this study are now offered to the public in the two sections in which it naturally evolved. The first, consisting of pertinent questions and of the arguments pro and con, can serve as a discussion guide. The second will constitute a strong indictment of compulsory military training as a permanent peacetime policy. In all honesty, the Faculty Discussion Group could come to no other conclusion on the question when formulated in terms as defined above. There is no close integration between the two parts. They are not interdependent. Anyone desiring arguments against permanent peacetime conscription may go immediately to the second part.

Therefore, to sum up, the Group's attitude on compulsory military training is this:

First: such new legislation is not necessary for any present emergencies.

Second: as a permanent policy for that "later period when future world order can be envisaged," it is futile, unnecessary, undemocratic, economically prohibitive and inimical to any system of collective security.

PART ONE

QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

1. What is meant by Compulsory Military Training? The following can be taken as a working definition:

Compulsory military training is the result of legislative enactment by which citizens of a definite age must spend a specific period of training in the armed services of the nation.

2. How many citizens would be affected by the program? If the program is universal and compulsory, all men within certain age-limits will be affected. If the age of induction is eighteen, then approximately 1,100,000 white and 130,000 non-white males will be conscripted each year. Of this number experts estimate that from twenty to forty per cent will be exempted for various reasons.

3. What is the issue? In order to determine the real issues involved in the proposals concerning compulsory military training, the following questions must be answered:

a. Does the program concern the military needs of the present war?

b. Does the program concern the military needs of the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities?

c. Does the program concern the military needs of national peace and security after both the present war and the pacification period are over?

4. Are the future peace and security of this country necessarily bound up with Compulsory Military Service? In answering this question, a clear distinction must be made between the objective and the method of attaining it. The objective of compulsory military training is the adequate defense of our country. The method of obtaining sufficient forces for this adequate defense would, in this case, be compulsory military training.

Regarding *method*, two further questions should be answered:

- 1) Is compulsory military training the only method?
- 2) Is it the best method?

5. Is Compulsory Service to be purely military in character, or are physical, educational and moral training to be included?

The leaders of the nation — both military and political — have not clearly answered this question. Thus, Secretary Stimson spoke on August 17, 1944:

The present war will not end wars . . . the only alternative to a large standing army, which is contrary to democratic conditions, is universal military training.

On August 18, 1944, President Roosevelt spoke to the following effect: one year of military training should be given to youths between the ages of 17 and 22 to "teach them discipline and how to live in harmony with others." He did not approve of the programs proposed by Stimson and the American Legion. On November 17 the President declined to answer questions as to what extent the training should be military.

On September 1, 1944, General Marshall gave voice to the following sentiments: he favors a small professional army supplemented by trained citizen reserves chosen by a selective system. A large standing army has "no place among institutions of a modern state." He proposed universal military training with a period of reserve service, the final decision as to the strength of the peacetime army to be determined after the political issues of the war have been solved.

6. Assuming that the program of compulsory training is purely military, what arguments can be given in its favor?

a. After this war we must maintain constant preparedness because: 1) it will be too late the next time to start training men after the act of aggression; 2) this country will be the first in the calculations of any future aggressor; 3) the next war will be real total war — there will be no non-combatants.

b. The present war could have been prevented, and future wars averted, if the United States had a peacetime conscript army. Thus Congressman Costello:

By calling for service every young man upon reaching the age of 18, we can maintain a force in training of more than a million men at all times. This force, when coupled with the men who will make a career of teaching these trainees and of providing the regular garrisons which will man our defense forces, we can present to the world as our "big stick" to preserve law and order . . . If we are to make sure that peace

will continue, we are going to have the means with which to back up the terms. You can do that only if you have an army ready to go into the field. We must have universal conscription for that purpose (*Town Meeting of the Air*, August 15, 1944).

c. Universal military training is in keeping with our democratic ideals. Thus George Washington in 1783:

It may be laid down as a primary proposition and the basis of our system that every citizen who enjoys the protection of free government owes not only a portion of his property but even of his personal services to the defense of it.

And Secretary Stimson:

Certainly all Americans should accept the principle that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes and should freely give his personal services to the defense of it. This means the system should be truly universal — all should be treated alike (August 15, 1944).

d. Only a universal compulsory military program will secure sufficient manpower. Mr. Hanson Baldwin, summarizing the issues in the *New York Times* on January 20, 1944, wrote as follows:

If the permanent peacetime strength of our army, navy and air forces is to be maintained at from 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 men, as present tentative plans indicate, most authorities believe that a force of such size could not be raised by voluntary recruiting.

Even if voluntary recruiting could provide a force of such size, it would be difficult — if not impossible — without selective service to build up and maintain a trained reserve force that could be quickly mobilized in time of emergency to augment the permanent peacetime forces.

e. Military training will strengthen the United States' position in a world peace organization. Mr. Henry L. Stimson had this to say on August 15, 1944:

If the American people should adopt the principle of universal military training, it would be the strongest possible assurance to the rest of the world that, in the future, America will not only be willing but able and ready to take its place with the peace-loving nations in resisting lawless aggression and in assuring peaceful world order.

7. Assuming that the program of compulsory training is purely military in character, what arguments can be advanced against it?

a. Compulsory military training is not the only method of assuring national security, nor is it the best.

A system that ensures one country's safety by threatening that of its neighbor is a system that breeds war and does not promote peace. History seems to prove that compulsory military training in peacetime is a major cause of war. In the present conflict, the aggression of Germany and Japan was a result of their militarism, not one of our unpreparedness. Nor would a trained citizen reserve in this country have essentially altered their plans. They would have merely taken this factor into their considerations.

Paul Mallon in his syndicated articles has said:

The proposed legislation to take 17-year-old youths into the army for a year would not provide an efficient, sufficient army . . . because most fighting lines today are highly skilled techniques which require constant practice by more mature persons . . . A year in the army at 17 can be little more than a physical-culture course and is not material to the raising or maintaining of a defensive army.

Hanson Baldwin on January 20, 1944, in the *New York Times* stated:

Nor can it [military training] be safely viewed as a peacetime measure; no nation that has had it has escaped war.

There are, moreover, alternative methods of obtaining men for military service, such as: 1) the extension of the R.O.T.C., 2) offering a sound and attractive program of voluntary recruitment, and 3) increasing the number of military and naval academies in the United States.

b. Compulsory military training will hinder rather than aid a world peace organization. If we now adopt universal military training as a permanent policy, do we not demonstrate to the world that we have lost confidence in the proposals for a general international organization and that we wish to continue in a state of isolationism?

c. Compulsory military training would undermine our democratic way of life. Military-training programs that are universal, compulsory and permanent tend to foster the growth of a military caste. Compulsion brings about regimentation and dictatorship. Such a system would delay and impede the indi-

vidual's free choice in the determination of his course of life.

d. Compulsory military training would injure our educational system with consequent damage to the professions and the technical services.

That such a program would interrupt the education of many youths is admitted by the War Department. It would over-emphasize those phases of science which apply to warfare and would tend to minimize the significance of non-military research. It is possible, moreover, that compulsory military training would be the first step toward Federal control of education.

e. Compulsory military training would not be to the best interests of labor. Such a program could be used to break strikes by conscripting the strikers and forcing them to work in plants where labor disputes are in progress. Such action did take place in France.

f. Compulsory military training would strain our fiscal system. The cost would be enormous. It would require appropriations not only for training, feeding, clothing and equipping the men, but also for war materials, war production and war research.

8. Should legislation for compulsory military training for that "later period when future world order can be envisaged" be enacted now? The arguments in favor of enacting legislation now are:

a. In the let-down after victory, people will not give the problem of national security its proper, realistic perspective. They will not realize the necessity of preserving order by armed force.

b. The adoption of compulsory military service now will strengthen this country's role in any world organization for the preservation of peace.

c. It will be a cushion of safety to fall back on, if any world peace organization fails.

The arguments against any decision *now* are:

a. A bill passed now would deprive those at present in the armed services of a voice in the matter.

b. The war will leave us with a vast reservoir of trained men sufficient for several years after the end of present hostilities.

c. Such a program is not in accord with our peace aims on disarmament as stated by former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, on March 21, 1944, when he said:

International cooperative action must include eventual adjustment of national armaments in such a manner that the rule of law cannot be successfully challenged, that the burden of armaments be reduced to a minimum.

Any decision regarding armaments and military manpower should wait until the United States has seen the operation of a world organization.

d. We cannot decide now what our needs will be when the period of pacification is over and peace established.

PART TWO

CONCLUSIONS OF THE FACULTY DISCUSSION GROUP ON PERMANENT, COMPULSORY, PEACETIME MILITARY TRAINING

BY WAY OF EXPLANATION

A WORD about the order and the method of treatment in this *Part* is in place. First, attention is again directed, even at the risk of repetition, to what debaters call "the state of the question." The conclusions of the Group are then presented, not as a compact body of close, consecutive reasoning but as answers to the more frequent arguments advanced in favor of compulsory military training. This method of "argument and answer" divides the conclusions clearly and makes for easy reading. The same method is used in dealing with the plus-values of a military program. After this, suggestions for obtaining a system of adequate defense by methods other than conscription are offered. The section closes with a declaration of the stand adopted by this Group.

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

The future position of the United States will undoubtedly call for some recasting of our former methods of national defense. Surely, no one can cavil with the *purpose* of such a change — the adequate defense of our country. That this homeland of ours must at all times be fully defended against aggressors is a primary postulate of patriotism. The point must be emphasized, however: it is the *method* to be used for securing this defense system that needs discussion. Is conscription the best method? Is it practical? Is it historically tested and found good? Is it fraught with serious implications? Is it a democratic method? Is it financially sound? Is it the only method?

Again, we must insist that this method of securing a defense system by compulsory military training is projected as a *permanent* policy in *peacetime*. Were the issue to be stated as a question for debate, it could be phrased as follows:

Should the United States adopt for normal peacetime a program of compulsory military training for all young men between, say, the ages of eighteen and twenty-two, the period of training to last one or more years, with reserve refresher training for a number of years thereafter?

The mind of this Group on the question as thus stated will be clear from the answers to the following arguments.

WE WERE UNPREPARED

Argument: "Failure to establish a sound system of compulsory military training after the last war left us in dire straits at the beginning of this war."

Reply: That our preparedness did not match that of the totalitarian nations which started this war may be readily granted. To have been on a par with them in military preparedness would have meant the adoption of their methods of harnessing the entire nation's effort in the service of war. This would have meant that our complete conversion to a war economy would have had to begin at least in 1935. Prime Minister Chamberlain recognized this when, in answer to criticism of security measures adopted by the British Government, he said in 1938: "I do not know whether you would like us to imitate Germany in the measures she has employed in regimenting her country for the production of armaments. We may have to. But we will not do it until we are convinced that nothing else will serve our purpose." The same thought was also expressed by William L. Stone, in an article "Economic Consequences of Rearmament," *Foreign Policy Reports* for October 1, 1938: "For democracies the ultimate cost of unlimited armament competition may be the loss of their free economies and the undermining of democracy itself."

But, you may say, we would not have had to go to that extreme. If we had had a sufficient number of trained men, we would have saved time and money, even lives, in our immediate preparation. This, too, may be granted, but it is no argument for compulsory service, for under the National Defense Act of 1920, had we chosen to follow its provisions, we would have had an armed force of approximately 750,000 instead of 150,000. The difference in these numbers was not due to lack of a compulsory training provision in the Act but to the

refusal of Congress to carry out an established policy. To explain this point more fully let us examine briefly our defense program from 1920 to 1935 to discover: 1) What were the specific provisions for defense of this country? 2) Were they adequate? 3) Were they enforced? Then let us glance at our policy from 1935 to 1940 to see what changes, if any, took place.

1) What were the specific provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920?

The Act of 1920 provided for a Regular Army of long-service professional troops organized into nine infantry and two cavalry divisions. The strength of the Regular Army was to be 280,000. The National Guard was to be kept up to approximately 450,000 and there was to be a body of organized reserves. Now the question arises, was our failure to maintain these quotas caused by lack of compulsory military training? *By no means.* These numbers were deliberately kept down by the legislation and appropriation acts of Congress. Between 1922 and 1926 the Regular Army was limited to 125,000, and from 1926 to 1935 to 118,000 men. The National Guard was maintained at about 190,000. As a result of this policy, the nine regular and the eighteen National Guard infantry divisions were allowed to fall so far below their intended strength that they could not be assembled for training. Many of these units existed only on paper. We cannot blame the lack of a compulsory-training clause in the Act of 1920 for this state of affairs. Even had there been one, it would in all likelihood never have been enforced. The "pinch penny" tactics of Congress would have still won out.

2) Were the provisions of the Act adequate for defense?

That the National Defense Act of 1920 was entirely adequate was admitted by General John Palmer in 1941 when he said: "Senator Wadsworth and his associates were greatly disappointed when they had to throw over universal military training in order to save their bill. But as it finally passed the Senate, it retained all the proposed machinery for peacetime organization of our traditional citizen army. Though the numbers trained under the voluntary system would be smaller than under the organized plan, there would be enough to give a respectable peace strength to all regiments of the National Guard and Organized Reserves." Congressman Wadsworth, himself, in 1940 testified to the merits of the Act when he said: "After surveying the successes of our

National Guard and Reserve training for the last twenty years, I am not now so convinced that universal training is a necessity."

If these same men now say that compulsory military training is "imperative," what has made them change their minds? Could it be that Germany and Japan are not going to be demilitarized, after all? Or must we plan a system of armament for World War III against one of our Allies? Just why is this peacetime compulsory military training "imperative"?

3) What of the enforcement of the provisions of the Act of 1920?

We have already noted that Congress began paring in 1922. By 1932 the reduction in the size of the army and the ever smaller appropriations induced General Douglas MacArthur to complain that "under the reduced appropriations of recent years the degree of preparedness that we have been able to attain does not approach in any particular that prescribed as necessary by Congress in 1920." The Act had failed in its purpose because of what MacArthur described as "limited and decreasing support of its provisions." Inadequate defense down to 1935, therefore, was caused *not by the omission* of compulsory training, but by the refusal to carry out the provisions of an Act which was deemed adequate by the military men themselves.

The year 1935 saw the beginning of a new phase of the armament race which led to the present war. By 1937 some 6,000,000 men were under arms in Europe as compared with about 3,000,000 in the early 1930's (*League of Nations Armament Year Book, 1930-40*). In spite of neutrality legislation "to keep this country out of war," we did not fail to attempt to keep pace with the European nations. Our naval expenditures went from \$297 million in 1932-33 to \$571 million in 1936-37, while the War Department figures rose from \$243 million to \$398 million in the same periods. In 1938 these amounts totaled \$992 million, the highest figure in the "peacetime" history of the United States. But even this much was far below the increases of France and England. And we considered them unprepared in the light of what happened in 1940! Would anything short of totalitarian preparedness have sufficed? What value in all this preparedness, this "peacetime" security? The British White Paper of 1935 remarked: "Conditions in the international field have deteriorated. Taking 'risks for peace' has not removed the dangers of war."

The fate of France is proof that a huge reserve of trained manpower is in itself no guarantee of preparedness. How often was it said prior to 1940 that France would not fall because she had the best trained army in Europe? Our lack of preparedness at the beginning of this war cannot be blamed upon our failure to adopt compulsory military service in 1920. Real preparation would have meant the adoption of totalitarian techniques and a complete mobilization of our national economy on a wartime basis. It would have implied more than compulsory service and it would have necessitated acknowledging the fact that such moves were deliberate preparation for war. (See "National Defense and Postwar Training" by Rev. Allan P. Farrell, S.J., *America*, issue of Jan. 20, 1945, from which most of the foregoing material was drawn.)

WE ARE PAYING FOR IT NOW

Argument: "If the reservoir of trained manpower created during World War I had been kept filled through compulsory military training, the present war probably could not have occurred."

Reply: This is a perfectly gratuitous assumption lacking in any supporting evidence, historical or otherwise. As we have pointed out in the reply to the previous Argument, Congress had no desire to keep up even the minimum provisions of the Defense Act of 1920. They could just as easily have killed compulsory service by lack of appropriations. Moreover, if peacetime conscription is a good peace policy, then Europe should be the most peaceful spot on earth since she has had this policy longer than anybody else. What history does show is that "for more than a century conscription has been the real cause of war and of a multitude of evils affecting society." It has created the condition known as "armed peace," which inevitably results in wars. A brief summary of the history of conscription will illustrate this:

The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge weapons and transport supplies; the women will make tents and clothes and serve in hospitals; the children will make up the old linen into lint; the old men will have themselves carried into the public square to rouse the courage of the fighting men . . .

The public buildings shall be turned into barracks, the public squares into munitions factories; the earthen floors of cellars shall be turned over to the troops: the interior shall be policed with shot-guns and cold steel.

All saddle horses shall be seized for the cavalry; all draft horses not employed in cultivation will draw the artillery and supply wagons.

Thus reads the law marking the end of the standing-army system of former days. This law, passed by the French National Convention on August 23, 1793, meant the beginning of the era of the "nation in arms." For the first time an entire nation was mobilizing every human being and every last resource in a national cause. "Total war" was to be the contribution of the French Revolution to modern times.

The mass army raised by universal conscription was intended by the French to be a defense for the Republic against its enemies. Napoleon, however, had other plans. While he protested that his rule of France meant peace for Europe, he developed the army to a point where Coignet, one of his officers, could say: "The army was now so numerous and so beautiful that it would have liked to fight all Europe." That was precisely what happened. Drawing upon such masses of men, Napoleon became more and more aggressive and, when war broke out again, he boasted to Metternich: "You cannot beat me; I spend thirty thousand men a month."

And what was the effect of this new military policy of France upon that of other countries? Prussia was the state which understood most clearly the implications of the mass army. Gneisenau in 1807 remarked that "the [French] Revolution has mobilized the whole national strength of the French people . . . the rest of the states . . . ought to open up and make use of the same resources." "Get us a national army," begged Blucher of those working out military reforms in Prussia from 1807 to 1813. "It is not as difficult as one thinks," he continued, "the foot-rule must be abandoned; no one in the world must be exempt, and it must become a shame not to have served except in the case of infirmities." Not until 1818, however, was it possible for Prussia to make conscription the law of the land. The *cadre* system, with a reserve mobilized in time of war and a long-term professional army, was borrowed from Austria and combined with a militia system. By this method reserves, when their training was completed, passed into a kind of local militia under elected officers.

Thus while other countries abandoned universal service after the Napoleonic Wars, Prussia laid the foundations of her future military efficiency upon the cornerstones of universal service and the organization of a fixed number of army corps regularly stationed in the terri-

tories from which they drew their reserves. The entire system was coordinated by an efficient general staff. This development, begun by Scharnhorst and perfected by Moltke, paid dividends in the attack upon Austria in 1866. Austria, determined not to be caught again, passed a universal-service act in 1868. Defeated by Prussia in 1871, France followed Austria's lead in imitating the Prussian system by passing a universal-service act. Again, the idea was not to be caught a second time. Russia acted in like manner in 1874, and Italy in 1875. The race was on! Commenting upon these developments, Bismarck in a letter to the Russian diplomat Prince Orlov in 1879, said: "The great Powers of our time are like travelers in a carriage. They watch each other and, when one of them puts his hand into his pocket, his neighbor gets ready his own revolver in order to be able to fire the first shot."

As a result of Prussia's success, the army was no longer to be considered as a police force to maintain order within the state; it had become the final arbiter in international disputes. The foundations of the "armed peace" had been laid. So convinced have the nations of the world been that a defense system founded upon the principle of universal military service would insure them against attack that, in spite of the experience of the first World War, thirty-six of forty-five have adopted this method of "security." Great Britain and the United States alone of the larger Powers have refused thus far to follow suit. What everyone has overlooked is that each country's defense had reached a point where it was an offense to its neighbors. "Security" was always to be determined by the ability to equal or surpass the number of effective troops of the potential enemy.

After 1871 each international crisis resulted in greater absorption by the various countries in preparation for war. It was always done, however, in the name of peace. Such measures as increasing the term of service of the conscripts or changes in army organization in turn led to diplomatic crises, thus completing the vicious circle. The "War Scare" of 1875 is a good case in point. More and more stress was laid upon the training and equipment of troops. Increased attention was given to the drafting of campaign plans "just in case." Rapidity of mobilization became the prime factor. Military plans of all countries came under the influence of the theories of the Prussian General Karl von Clausewitz, who had seen service during the Napoleonic Wars. For him war was merely the continuation of state policy. The cost of

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Why Compulsory Military Training Now?

By J. Hugh O'Donnell, C. S. C.

IN order to appreciate the full implications of the demand for compulsory military training one must realize at the outset that it is a peacetime, and not a wartime, proposal. It cannot be classified under the head of what we have come to call "emergency legislation." It has no connection with the Selective Service Act, nor has it any bearing on the policing of defeated Axis countries after the war. Basically, it proposes a complete and permanent reversal of the traditional American military policy and principle. Compulsory military training would bring about a fundamental change in the lives of millions of young Americans for generations to come.

Two bills providing for compulsory peacetime military training have been introduced in congress and are now before the house committee on military affairs. One is the Gurney-Wadsworth bill (H. R. 1806), and the other is the May bill (H. R. 3947). Both propose a full year of compulsory military training for all able-bodied male citizens residing in the United States. Both provide that after the year of training the trainees shall be enrolled as reservists in the army or navy for a period of four or eight years, and that they shall take such refresher courses as may from time to time be prescribed by law. The Gurney-Wadsworth bill puts the age of training at "eighteen years, or within three years thereafter," while the May bill puts the age at "seventeen years, or immediately upon the successful completion of the full course of an accredited high school or preparatory school, whichever first comes."

The real issues involved here have been obscured for a number of reasons. Not the least important cause of confused thinking is that we are being asked to consider, and to take action upon, this radical departure at a time when we are well into our fourth year of World War II, when we have been well indoctrinated with "wartime psychology," and therefore perhaps too much inclined to translate the problems of a very long tomorrow into terms of an instant and momentous today.

At first, to the sincere patriot who is concerned only with national security, and who has not taken time to think the matter through, opposition to compulsory military training in time of peace seems a tentative invitation to World War III, if it does not actually smack of treason. But as Albert G. Parker, Jr., president of Hanover College, has well said: "Opposition to taking a year from every boy's life for military training does not imply one to be a pacifist, an isolationist, or opposed to a strong military defense of our country, and a defense of the prin-

ciples of right and justice throughout the world. An honest, thoughtful, patriotic man can believe in a strong support of right and justice and still be opposed to any plan of compulsory military training."

Those who favor compulsory military training in time of peace argue that such a system will assure the United States sufficient military strength whenever needed. Of course, in the light of history such an assumption is difficult, if not impossible, to prove. Compulsory military training failed Germany, its foremost exponent, in World War I, just as it later failed France and Belgium in World War II. In the latter countries it actually contributed to their downfall because it lulled them into a sense of false security. But this is beside the point. Even if the assumption were tenable, the advocates of compulsory military training would still be guilty of the fallacy of ignoring alternatives. A compulsory system is not the *only* way of assuring the United States sufficient military strength in time of need, and assuredly it is not the best way. In fact, of all ways, it is the least American. It is the way that leads to the totalitarian regimentation which we are now fighting against in all quarters of the globe.

NO sensible person can deny that henceforth we must be a military nation. We will maintain a larger army and navy than ever before. We must not become a militaristic nation, which is a vastly different thing. That is, we do not want to adopt the European system, which would weaken our schools and undermine our family life. (Both institutions are already suffering from the impact of pernicious influences inimical to the Christian, and hence American, tradition.) We do not want to form a military caste. Far less do we want to become the victims of the pragmatic ideology characteristic of such a caste. Furthermore, we must be careful to protect the parent's right to determine the education of his child.

Above all, we must protect the rights of approximately 1,200,000 boys who become eighteen years of age each year in the United States, and who under the new order, by legislative fiat, would be compelled to spend one of the most formative years of their lives in a boot camp. And, as Father Edward V. Stanford, former president of Villanova College, writes in his able analysis, *The Case Against Peacetime Conscription*: "It only beclouds the issue to link up with peacetime conscription such matters as improving physical fitness, developing habits of character and discipline, indoctrinating in the

democratic way of life, removing illiteracy, etc. . . . It does violence to the meaning of words, whether in war or in peace, to call military conscription—the favorite tool of dictators for more than a hundred years—the *more democratic method* of raising armed forces.”

LET us make haste slowly. Why all the commotion now in regard to a matter that is so open to debate when we should be strongly united in the winning of the war? There is no need for headlong speed in enacting legislation that is so far-reaching in its effects, so permanent, and so completely at odds with the way we Americans have been doing things—and doing them pretty successfully—for the past one hundred and sixty-nine years. Common sense dictates that we explore other courses of action. It also demands that we wait until the war is over before we make our final decision. Our perspective will be better then. And also, after the war we can ask the opinion of the 10,000,000 men now in the armed forces. In justice they, of all Americans, have a right to be heard on a question that so vitally affects the future of their country and their children. The problem is difficult, but we should be able to work out a solution in the true American way that will best serve our country's interests.

As a means to the end we want, I suggest the encouragement of voluntary enlistments, a more intensive use of universities, colleges, and high schools as a training ground for the army and navy, and also a revival of the national guard, strengthened and adapted to the mechanism of modern warfare so that it will literally be a guard of the nation.

My proposal presumes a peacetime nation. It presumes what Father Stanford has referred to as “the forging of a just peace and the building of an international organization to protect it.” If we are merely to have another “armistice”—that is, a breathing spell that exhausted belligerents will use to get ready for another conflict—if the United States must prepare for another war, which God forbid, the complexion of the problem is entirely changed. Then, I suppose, the only course to follow is to apply the principles of the selective service act, but with this reservation, namely, that some serious thought be given to the nation's future leadership. The reason is that if we continue the present policy it will not be long until we will have lost most of our men who are capable of leadership in all branches of human endeavor. The fact is that we have already lost one complete college generation, and we are on the way to lose another. And the real tragedy is that the United States is practically the only nation in the world that has permitted higher education to be sacrificed on the altar of global war.

It has yet to be proved that an adequate standing army, even as large an army as we shall have after the war, cannot be raised on a voluntary basis. In the past, volunteers have been turned away because the enlisted personnel had reached the maximum fixed by law. In the future, large numbers of young men will enlist, provided there

are reasonable incentives to do so, because some men are attracted to the army life just as others are drawn to a variety of other pursuits. Let the army offer a pay scale comparable to that in other occupations, let it teach technical skills that will be useful in civil life, and the volunteers will not be long in taking advantage of their opportunities.

I referred to a “revival” of the national guard. “Revival” is not too strong a word, because this historic branch of the service has been permitted to lose something of its character and much of its identity. It should be restored to its proper place, and then effectively implemented and supported by public opinion. A strong national guard with an “accelerated program” would be an asset of inestimable value. There is some reason to believe that basic training such as the national guard could give—and give in the guardsman's home town under experienced officers—could be the equal of that given in time of war. The army, for example, has found that men can be trained for replacements in the battle line in from four to six months, and the navy is sending recruits into the fleet after only twelve weeks in boot camp.

I realize that the president of a university may be suspected of special pleading when he suggests a more intensive use of colleges, universities, and high schools as a training ground for the army and navy. The suspicion, however, is unwarranted. As a matter of record, the army and navy, in World War I and in World War II, turned to the colleges and universities as the institutions whose physical facilities were best suited to a training program for potential officer personnel. At the same time the V-12 program has demonstrated the navy's realization of the need of higher education as part of officer training, and that program has been administered well. Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that the programs which the schools have been able to carry on successfully in time of war could be satisfactorily adapted to times of peace.

FINALLY, it seems to me that in their haste to stress the “how” of military training, a great many persons are in danger of losing sight of the all-important “why” of military training. American colleges and universities have long since proved that they have the “know-how.” For generations they have been increasing specialized scientific knowledge and disseminating it where it is most useful. They have the research laboratories that the technics of modern warfare find essential.

What else have they to offer? The colleges and universities that have remained faithful to the American—and Christian—tradition of education, and perhaps they alone, have the “know-why” as well, and they do not confuse the means to an end with the end itself. They know, for example, the danger of defining “national security” too narrowly. They know that phrase to be little more than a semantic cipher if it does not denote constant vigilance against enemies from within who would destroy the substance of American democ-

racy while advocating armed preparedness against enemies from without.

Therefore, let us attack the problem of military training intelligently, sympathetically, but slowly. Let all Americans reflect on the implications involved before permitting congress to rush through legislation that means such a radical departure from our traditional way of life. We may need some form of military training in the post-war world, but we do not need compulsory military training *now*.

Miss Adelaide

By Charlotte M. Kelly

Chapter VI

HAVING thus decided that I would not go back to England at the end of the school year, I had to consider what I would do instead. I had no doubt that I could spend another year at St. Pierre's. But there were two months' vacation. What should I do during that time?

As I turned into the rue du Nord I remembered the night, ten months ago, that I had first trodden its uneven pavé. I had high hopes of my new life, and I was not disappointed. When I got to St. Pierre's I went straight to the *loge* where stout Jeanne spent her days sewing in the intervals of keeping a sharp eye on all visitors.

"I want to see Mère Françoise at once?" I said firmly.

Jeanne looked at me over her spectacles. "But, mees, I do not know—"

I slipped my arm through hers and drew her to her feet. "Go and find out when she will see me," I coaxed. "I will watch the door for you."

Jeanne shuffled reluctantly away and I took my seat at that long handle by which the old portress could open the big doors without moving from her seat. In ten minutes she came back. "Mère Françoise will see you in her room at four o'clock."

That was the hour at which Elise and I usually went for a walk but I felt that I had to get my future settled as soon as possible. So four o'clock found me knocking at the door of that small bare room in the exact center of the house, where, except when she was at meals or in the chapel, the Mistress General was usually to be found.

As I entered the calm eyes were raised to mine and the soft voice said: "Sit down, Miss Margaret."

The familiar sensation of awe that I always experienced in her presence made me stutter as I explained what I had done, and asked if I might return to St. Pierre's in the autumn.

She looked at me closely. "You have been happy here, Miss Margaret?"

"Very happy," I answered with truth.

"And you have found the demoiselles sympathetic?" Oh, wise Mère Françoise! She spoke only of the demoiselles and of them I replied:

"Yes, they have been so kind—and then there is Mlle. de Rolens."

Mère Françoise allowed a little warmth to

creep into her voice as she said: "Mlle. de Rolens is indeed charming."

Having gained time to think over my request she gave me her answer. "But yes, Miss Margaret, we shall be very pleased to have you with us next October—if Reverend Mother agrees, of course." But as we both knew, where the school was concerned Mère Françoise was responsible for all decisions. "And the vacation? Have you made any arrangements for that?"

I shook my head. "Perhaps I could go to some other convent?" I said doubtfully. The prospect did not attract me.

"Well, we shall see, we shall see." With a nod Mère Françoise dismissed me and went back to the work that was always waiting for her.

When I told Elise that I was coming back in the autumn she clasped her hands. "But Margaret, I am so glad, so glad!" Her face clouded. "I wish that I could take you home with me for the vacation but, you know, it is difficult—"

Some days after my interview with Mère Françoise, she sent for me. "Miss Margaret, I have arranged for you to take charge of two children during the vacation." Seeing the alarm on my face she added: "You know Angèle and Yvonne de Maur?"

I nodded. They were in my third English class, two subdued pale-faced little girls.

"Their mother is taking them to the sea and she wants someone to look after them and to talk English with them. I told her that you would suit her perfectly. It is all completed," finished Mère Françoise with an air of calm satisfaction that did not even consider the possibility of my not agreeing with her plans.

I walked down the winding stairs not quite sure whether I liked the prospect before me. But the Salle des Maitresses was solidly in favor of it. Angèle and Yvonne were *bonnes enfants*, and I would be enchanted with all the entertainment of a French *plage*. Even Miss Adelaide said amiably: "It will do you good to go to the seaside. Where exactly is it?"

"Mère Françoise did not say. But it is all the same to me," I answered.

THE last weeks of term were unbelievably long in spite of the repetitions and examinations with which they were filled. Each day was hotter and more exhausting than the preceding one and the only cool place in the town was beneath the plane trees that lined the canal. Two days before the end of term I got a little note from Madame de Maur. We were going to Landeville and I was to be ready to start directly the prize-giving was over.

"I'm going to a place called Landeville," I exclaimed to Miss Adelaide who was the only occupant of the Salle des Maitresses at the moment. "Do you know it?"

At first I thought that she could not have heard me, for she did not answer, and I was about to repeat my question when I saw that she was regarding me with a heavy frown.

"You are going to Landeville?" she said slowly.

"Yes. Is it a nice place?"

Instead of replying she said abruptly: "Margaret, will you come to the sea with me? I know delightful places in Brittany."

I looked at her in blank astonishment. What possessed her to make such a proposal at this late hour, when she knew that I had agreed to go with the de Maurs? "But I couldn't go with you. I'm going with Angèle and Yvonne. You know that."

She was about to speak, then evidently she changed her mind, and with a shrug, took up her book, leaving me considerably perplexed. But then there were many things about Miss Adelaide that perplexed me.

THE term ended in a blaze of glory, with Monseigneur presenting the prizes in the *grand salon*, which was filled to overflowing with white-clad children and admiring parents. When it was over there was time only for hasty farewells before I found myself hurrying to the station. There I met Madame de Maur, a plump, good-humored lady encumbered with a great deal of luggage. We had a carriage to ourselves and I discovered that Angèle and Yvonne were very different children out of school. They chattered like magpies about the delights of Landeville where they went each year. It was not a fashionable *plage*, Madame informed me. There were only two hotels, to which the English visitors went, but there were numerous villas most of which were rented by the same French families year after year. She herself had been going there since the children were babies.

As Madame had said, Landeville was a quiet little place. There was, it is true, a casino but a very small one; there were tennis courts attached to the hotels and even a nine-hole golf links; but it was predominantly a resort for family parties. Every morning the wide beach was dotted with red-and-white striped parasols beneath which gathered little groups; a black-bearded *papa*, a vivacious *maman*, lively children of all ages. No one did anything, or appeared to want to do anything but sit about on the golden sands, or bathe, returning to the villas at midday for *déjeuner* and a prolonged siesta.

In the evening when the children were in bed in charge of Louise, the servant, Madame and I went down to the casino. Unlike many of her compatriots who rarely entered its doors Madame de Maur loved a flutter at the tables, though her native shrewdness saw to it that she never risked more than the few francs that she could afford to lose. My ideas about casinos being drawn from violently colored pictures of Monte Carlo and its dangers, I accompanied Madame with some trepidation. I would not have been surprised, I think, had some desperate gambler shot himself before my very eyes. But the casino at Landeville was a very modest affair and the sums that passed across the tables correspondingly small. There was dancing every night in an inner room to the music of a local orchestra. Little tables surrounded the dance floor and from the roof hung garlands of paper flowers that to my unsophisticated gaze gave an air of great gaiety to the place.

A few weeks after our arrival at Landeville I was following Madame de Maur into the casino as usual one evening when I heard a voice behind me.

"Why, there's Margaret!"

I turned in surprise to see Ronnie Warren beaming at me. Behind him was his mother. "How did you get here?" Ronnie demanded. "I thought you had gone back to England."

"And how did you persuade Adelaide to come to Landeville?" Mrs. Warren added. "I've asked her again and again, but she has always refused. It would be such a change from Pierre's."

"I'm not with Miss Adelaide," I explained. "I am looking after two children from St. Pierre's. Their mother is over there," I nodded towards the *boule* table where Madame de Maur, who had not seen me stop, was already seated. "I had no idea I should meet you here."

Mrs. Warren raised her eyebrows. "But didn't Adelaide tell you that we came here every year? I don't know why we like it so much."

I shook my head, while a great light dawned upon me. Now I knew the reason of that belated invitation to Brittany. Miss Adelaide didn't want me to meet the Warrens. But why? She had been agreeable if not enthusiastic about our days spent together in Paris.

"Come along! We're wasting time." Ronnie as usual was bursting with energy. "Margaret, you don't want to gamble, do you? Wait till I get a place for mother and then we'll dance."

In a few minutes he was back and we went to the dance room, where his broad shoulders and sunburnt face made the French boys look ridiculously small and neat.

"Now, let's dance."

And we danced indefatigably, while the garlands above our heads swayed and murmured in the wafts of warm air and the perspiration rolled down the foreheads of the musicians.

"I must sit down," I pleaded at last and Ronnie agreed.

"Yes, it is hot. We'll go outside."

SEATED on the veranda overlooking the sea and sipping the cider that is to be had at every turn in that part of France, I asked the question that was in my mind all the evening.

"How are Jane and Hugh?"

"Jane's fine. She's in Switzerland with some friends. Of course Randall is still in America."

"America?"

"Oh, didn't you know? But of course you did not. We all went off in such a rush last Easter. And of course when we got home, dear old Uncle Charles had taken a turn for the better and has been like a two-year-old ever since. Just like the selfish old beggar to spoil our holidays! It was a good thing that you and Randall had that day at Versailles anyhow. You know, I think he was a bit peeved that you didn't tell him that you were leaving Paris so soon. For some weird reason your Miss Adelaide told my mother nothing about it, so when Hugh had seen us on our way he went along to the hotel and was told that you

A.M.D. G.

Littleton Oct 1-1944

Practise Description - { What is it? is it sound.
 What is proposed? only way
 Reasons advanced? democratic
 For -
 Against

{ Vital Concern - long range scrutiny permanent
 G.N. Bill 18 - or 3 yrs length
 May Bill 17 - finish - high prep school - 4 to 8 yrs reserve - further refresh sec. legem
 not concerned with Present War

Purpose - { a) future peace
 national security
 b) others - physical fitness - discipline - obedience
 c) Legion & other organizations - for Veterans - (had enough of it)

A) has virtue - two questions - is this only way } No
 but → is it American way }

negative side - { increase naval colleges etc R.O.T.C.
 attractive voluntary recruitment

Unamerican - contrary to long standing custom - even other war
 Threat to democratic way of life - damage to home front
 Germany - Japan - France -

NB - refreshes comes -

B) Make arguments - Let Uncle Sam - take over - weakness of Schools, Churches, Parents
 Worcester High School strike


C) National Service - 3 mos - (muddled thinking)

D) Unwise till War is over - stress & emotion - last war Prohibition
 12,000,000 men should have a say - express their convictions

General Marshall - standing Army
 Reserve - Japan 650,000 1 1/2 million - substantial increase ^{Army R}
 Japan 280,000 2 million

Experiment tried & found wanting as a guarantee of peace -
 Moral force & progressive disarmament - vigilance in our Gov.

Tactics
 T. Edman
 1920-29



victory did not matter, for he said that "he who uses forces unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain superiority if his adversary uses less vigor in its application." What can happen when two opponents apply equal vigor the modern world can judge.

Is it any wonder that mutual jealousy and suspicion engendered by such thinking should have culminated in the First World War? Nor is it surprising that the alliance system designed by Bismarck to maintain peace after 1871 degenerated into the state of affairs graphically described by Viscount Morely when he said: "Grey has more than once congratulated Europe on the existence of two great confederacies, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, as healthily preserving the balance of power. Balance! What a beautiful euphemism for the picture of two giant groups armed to the teeth, each in mortal terror of the other, both of them passing year after year in an incurable fever of jealousy and suspicion."

The prophetic utterance of Taine, the French scholar who wrote in 1891 that conscription "has propagated itself like a contagious disease . . . ; it has mastered all continental Europe and reigns there . . . with what promises of massacre and bankruptcy for the twentieth century, with what exasperation of international ill will and distrust, with what loss of wholesome effort, . . . we know all too well," was indeed true. If history has any lessons for us, one of them certainly is that the adoption of universal service by the United States would be merely the signal for other countries to shape their policies accordingly. It would be no deterrent to others; rather, it would be a goal to aim at.

BUT NEVER AGAIN

Argument: According to the views of the War Department, "America will probably be the initial objective of the aggressors in any next war, and the first engagements of that war will quite probably be fought in our homeland." As Milt D. Campbell of the American Legion puts it: "Weapons are complex machines today. They require experts to use them. It takes time to train men to use them. When the firing starts it will be too late to start that training."

Reply: Attention should be called first to the implications of this kind of reasoning. Either we are going to allow Germany and Japan to rearm, or we cannot trust our Allies. Our future aggressors could

come from only these two groups. Secondly, the foundation of such reasoning is the gloomiest kind of assumption that there is no future for the world except a series of wars followed by temporary cessations of hostilities. It is, of course, the duty of the military leader to be a professional pessimist. He must prepare his defense against any nation or group of nations strong enough to challenge his country. If our potential aggressors are totalitarian nations, would mere compulsory military training be sufficient? Have we not discovered in this war that our whole economy must be geared to wartime needs to win against a totalitarian state? Do those who speak of the suddenness of the next war face this issue? Should we not also ask ourselves what effect a continued wartime economy will have on our democratic institutions?

If we assume for the moment, for the sake of argument, that the next war will come as suddenly as predicted, then some nation or nations must have been prepared to the limit in order to start it. No nation would start a war it did not expect to win. How was this preparation made? With the consent of, and perhaps even the aid of, the others? Should not this preparation be nipped in the bud? Does not the Security Council of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals envision this? Would the force necessary for such police action require compulsory military service? When Hitler invaded the Rhineland shortly after his rise to power, it was estimated that a force of about 50,000 could have stopped him. That he was not stopped was not due to Germany's military strength at the time but to the refusal of the other powers to act and use the military superiority which they then had. (Even Hitler's generals admitted this superiority.)

The whole argument assumes that the nations would repeat their folly of allowing a potential aggressor to arm himself to the teeth while they sat idly by. If, on the contrary, such aggressors are to be found among our present Allies, then we could hardly consider any interim between wars as a period of peace. It would be merely a truce to give the belligerents time to catch their breath before they went at it again. If this were true, it would be fatal not to recognize the facts as such. In that case, we the people should not be asked if we want a system of peacetime military training. We should be asked the frank question: Do you choose to put the economy of this country on a wartime basis for a conflict that is certainly coming?

WE WILL TAKE CARE OF THAT

Argument: Peacetime military service is "imperative to our national safety." "The War Department indorses universal military training for the one and only reason that without such a program the continued security of our national life and institutions can no longer be assured."

Reply: This assertion is frankly based upon the most extreme kind of fatalism. It implies not only a lack of confidence in the general international organization yet to be established, but also complete "distrust of other nations who might doubt whether the United States in reality is a peace-loving nation, and who might, in turn, increase their own armaments" (Y.M.C.A. Public Affairs Committee, May 24, 1944). Three general observations may be made on the "imperative" nature of compulsory military service.

1) "Since the adoption of a permanent universal military training program involves a fundamental departure from our traditional policy, the burden of proof is upon those who claim it to be necessary. Such proof has not been presented, nor has it been shown that the United States' security against war lies in its strength alone" (Y.M.C.A. Public Affairs Committee, May 24, 1944).

2) Many who hold to the above belief do so because by "peacetime" they mean the period immediately after the cessation of hostilities. But this is to change the issue, for this is not the period referred to by the principal advocates of compulsory training. As we have already noted, General Marshall has made it clear that he does not mean the immediate postwar era. The preparedness of this period, as he himself implies, can be taken care of by maintaining whatever of our present strength may be necessary by extension of the Selective Service Act of 1940. The question we must discuss, therefore, is whether compulsory military training is necessary to "safeguard" the peace once it is established.

3) To say that compulsory military training is necessary is the equivalent of saying that we must begin immediate preparation for World War III. This implies answers to certain questions about our postwar foreign policy:

a) Against whom are we preparing for war? No one fights a non-existent foe.

b) We propose the complete disarmament of Germany and Japan. Are these countries to be allowed eventually to rearm and to be our future aggressors?

c) Is it intended that we arm now for World War III against one of our Allies?

d) If we are not arming against Germany, Japan or a present Ally, against whom are we arming?

If the answer to either or both *b* and *c* is "yes," then the issue is not one of peacetime conscription. It is preparation for war and should be frankly recognized as such. As we have said before, if such be our policy, then we should remain on a complete wartime basis. No less would be sufficient for a totalitarian foe.

To sum up, therefore: the argument that peacetime compulsory military service is "imperative" 1) *confuses* the period of "peace" with the period of "*pacification*," 2) requires answers not yet given to specific questions on our future foreign policy, and 3) places no faith whatsoever in an international organization.

MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT

Argument: Many make the mistake of comparing the type and purpose of the European system of conscription with the type and purpose of the system we intend to adopt. Ours will not have the admitted evils of the European system because we intend to use it for the purpose of maintaining peace.

Reply: The basic assumption upon which this argument rests is that General Marshall's plan of a small professional army backed by a huge citizen reserve differs essentially from the European system which he condemns "as having no place among the institutions of a democratic state." Marshall's chief criticism of the European system is that although "it produces highly efficient armies . . . it is open to serious political objections. In a nation maintaining such a system, intelligent opinion as to military policy (and the international political policy associated therewith) is concentrated in a special class. Under such a system, the people themselves are competent to exert only a limited intelligent influence on the issues of war and peace. Under such a system only the brawn of a people is prepared for war, there being no adequate provision for developing the latent military leadership and genius of the

people as a whole" (August 25, 1944, "A Military Policy for America").

Some observations upon this statement are in order:

1) Marshall admits elsewhere in this letter that the efficiency of any military system "depends primarily upon expert control." Will one year of military service make the average person a military "expert"? Would it not rather create a large number of "grand-stand managers"? How much influence does the ordinary soldier exert upon military policy?

2) Marshall's admission of the efficiency of the European system would imply that we could not be satisfied with a less efficient system. His major objection to the European system seems to be that the common man cannot enter the controlling professional caste. Broadening the base of this caste is not essentially changing the system.

3) To describe the European army as the large standing army is inaccurate. Prior to the war Germany had about 850,000 in the standing army and a 1,500,000 reserve; Japan, a standing army of about 300,000 and a 2,000,000 reserve; France in 1938 had about 750,000 under arms and a reserve of 5,000,000. Unofficial estimates have stated that under the peacetime compulsory training program we might have as many as 2,000,000 in the standing army. Where then is the difference between Marshall's plan and the European system?

4) All that is new in Marshall's plan is that our reserve would be much greater than ever before and that the professional caste could get recruits from the ranks. Essentially it is the European system whose efficiency he praises but whose lack of democracy he condemns.

Furthermore, can we guarantee that our preparedness, European style, will not be a contributing factor to future war? Some say that we can avoid this by requiring that, after the completion of the year of training, the youth would not be subject to service in time of peace unless Congress declared an emergency or state of war. But European countries found long ago that this was an inefficient method. Reserves must be kept trained in up-to-date methods. We must not forget that

"once initiated, conscription proved to be a monster whose appetite was never satisfied." Introduced into Europe with a term of one year, it was later extended to two and then to three years. Countries with falling birth rates were forced to extend the time of service in order to keep up with their potential enemies. Refresher courses were increased to keep the reserves trained in new methods. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal indicates the parallel for the United States when he says that "the weapons of the future may require more know-how and more training." (See the article, "Conscription: Neither Now nor Ever," by the Rev. Allan Farrell, S. J., in the November 11, 1944, issue of *America*. Also see the editorial, "A Citizen Army" in the January 13, 1945, number of *America*.)

WE WILL CARRY A BIG STICK AT THE PEACE-TABLE

Argument: While the delegates of the United Nations are at the peace table "it would be a healthy thing if all the world knows that such training is going on in America."

Reply: To think that fear of another nation's armed might is a guarantee of peace is to misread the history of the failures and successes of international cooperation. Where there has been good will among parties concerned, difficulties have been ironed out peacefully. Where suspicion, fear or hate entered the picture, the military force of another nation has never acted as a deterrent to war. A weaker nation which could not match another nation's superior might sought alliances which would enable it to accomplish in union with others what it could not do alone.

The issue is collective security in a world organization versus balance of power. It is true that each nation in a world organization promises its share of armament. That this would mean a reorientation of the defense system is admitted. That it necessarily implies compulsory service is denied.

Senator Claude Pepper saw this point very clearly when in November, 1944, he said:

I would not like to see us inaugurate compulsory military training after the war as a peace measure. Undoubtedly our goal after the war is to set up the kind of an international organization which will eliminate the necessity of constantly preparing for war. That does not mean that we are not going to keep an adequate force to

control our interests and do our part to restrain the "gangster" nations. But militarism breeds militarism, and I am quite sure that we can obtain, through volunteers, a force adequate to our needs . . . It is our job to do what has never been done before . . . Stop war — even the preparation and training for war as we now think of it . . . Let's hope we do our job so well that when we win the war we can make ours a peaceful world without constantly preparing for war.

As has been shown above, it was not the omission of compulsory service that weakened our defense, but the failure to adhere to the sound policy established in the Defense Act of 1920. What is important is a guarantee of prompt and certain action if aggression occurs. France failed to act against the German occupation of the Rhineland, and yet she had compulsory military service. Nor was any action taken against Japan in 1932, or Italy in 1935. Compulsory military training is of itself no guarantee "that this nation will play its part in the world picture." What is important is the creation of confidence among our Allies that we mean what we say when we support plans for a world organization and that we will carry out our obligations under the provisions. That this implies compulsory military service for the United States cannot be proved.

Therefore, on the basis of our general peace aims and our specific pledges to seek disarmament, the proposal to introduce conscription into the United States is ill considered, ill timed, and unworthy of the moral leadership which this nation should provide at this time. To be specific:

a) to a world wherein conscription stands for the theory of war as an instrument of national policy, such a course would do grave damage to international collaboration;

b) by introducing an institution whose ultimate suppression has been pledged, we lay ourselves open to the charge of bad faith;

c) the existence of a huge reserve force of over ten million men is in itself a threat to world peace and a temptation to aggression (Post War World Committee, C.A.I.P. December, 1944).

WHY NOT? IT'S THE AMERICAN WAY

Argument: Compulsory military training is the democratic way of raising an army for national defense.

Reply: What is contained in this argument is a false notion of equality which says that everybody in a democracy must do the same thing. No amount of ink spilled over the argument can efface the fact that the testimony of history connects conscription with the war-minded philosophies and power politics of the past century. The compulsory draft in peacetime is the theory of dictatorships, and the evils attendant on it were so well recognized by the end of World War I that Pope Benedict XV, through Cardinal Gasparri, suggested the "suppression, by common agreement, among civilized nations of compulsory service and the replacement by voluntary service" and "the imposition of a general boycott as a sanction against any nation that might attempt to re-establish obligatory service." Who can say how much good would have been accomplished had this suggestion been followed?

Compulsory service is anything but democratic. It is based on and maintained by an exaggerated nationalism. To say that "poor boy, rich boy" would sweat and sympathize together and that it would bolster the democratic spirit of this country is completely to ignore the fact that compulsory military training has done anything but this in the countries where it has been established. There is no democracy in army life. Barriers between enlisted men and officers and within each of these groups encourage rather than discourage class distinctions.

AND IT WILL COST LESS

Argument: "If our fathers had accepted all of Washington's political system, instead of but half of it (that is, if they had also adopted a plan of compulsory military training in peacetime), our burden of taxation would be much lighter than it is today" (Brigadier General John M. Palmer, *Saturday Evening Post*, January 27, 1945.)

Reply: This brings up the matter of financial outlay for a program of compulsory military training and its effect upon our American way of life.

No official estimate as to what such a program would cost has yet appeared. Nor have any figures been given on the number to be trained each year or on the size of the standing army. However, in a report to President Roosevelt on July 30, 1943, General Frederick H.

Osborn said: "The estimated cost of maintaining an enlisted man on active duty for one year, exclusive of ordnance and overhead, is approximately \$1,500." The United States Chamber of Commerce Committee on Negative Arguments estimated the cost of training 1,200,000 men each year to be no less than \$1,800,000,000. "But," continued the Committee report:

. . . an initial cost of nearly two billion dollars is not the whole story. Three months is all that is required for the basic training of a recruit. The balance of the year is to be spent in special training with planes, ordnance and tanks, and the \$1,500 per trainee does not cover the cost of ordnance and overhead. Nor does the figure of \$1,800,000,000 include the cost of calling trainees back to the colors for temporary training each year, and it is probable that universal military training will ultimately add to the budget of the United States not less than three and possibly four billion dollars per year.

Our expenditure for education at all levels, both public and private, comes to about \$3,200,000,000. We would certainly be following the European pattern in spending more in preparation for war than in the pursuits of peace. One of the purposes in fighting this war is to maintain the proper relation between the state and the individual. The question raised by a British journalist in the *New Statesman and Nation*, April 30, 1928, still has to be answered: "Can democracy arm for totalitarian war and survive in anything like its present form?" Would not such vast military expenditures create a bureaucracy that would find it necessary to resort to all sorts of expedients in order to justify its continued existence even if all threat of war had been removed? The point is put very clearly by William L. Stone in his article "Economic Consequences of Rearmament," *Foreign Policy Reports*, October 1, 1938, where he says: "The distinctive feature of the current rearmament race is the extent to which it has interfered with normal economic trends and has already begun to transform the structure of those states which have so far avoided the extreme forms of state control found under Fascism and Communism." Can we guarantee the outcome of such a program in the United States? Might not the financial cost be small compared to the effect upon our democratic institutions? And the final prospect — if, after years of such peacetime expenditures, we had to fight a war more extensive and terrible than the present holocaust, where would be the saving?

THE "PLUS-VALUES" OF MILITARY TRAINING

ANYONE desiring an interesting experience might try bringing up the topic of compulsory military training casually at luncheons, clubs, or any informal gatherings. The reasons advanced in favor will certainly be varied and, perhaps, a little startling. Mom and Dad want it because they see what a man the Army has made of their boy. Surely, military training is the greatest body-builder in the world! GI Joe likes it because it teaches the "kids" discipline. Many a public official with his eye on vacant jobs thinks "it's a fine thing." Here and there an educator sees how the program can be turned to the aid of his school. In fact, one wonders if such relatively superficial reasoning does not carry more weight with the "common man" than the serious arguments already set out in this report. Because the Committee fears that such may be the case, it has chosen to devote some space also to an analysis of these "plus-values" of conscription.

HOME AND SCHOOL HAVE BETRAYED YOUTH

Argument: "Both the home and the school have betrayed the boys and girls of the last two decades . . . A year of compulsory military training after high school will give us men who have stability of character" (New York *Times* Magazine, August 27, 1944).

Reply: If it is true that the home and the school have betrayed the youth of this country, a sound procedure would be to seek the cause for this and apply the remedies to the home and the school. It does not follow at all that a year of compulsory military training is the answer. It is no secret that the Army and Navy are more interested in morale than morals. The moral standards of military life are notoriously lower than those of the home and the church. "If," as the *Albany Evangelist* says,

American youth must shed the influence of the home, church and school just at the age when moral and religious ideals are taking firm root, to live according to the looser codes of military life and training-camp temptations, how long will the moral fiber of our nation retain even its present dubious strength?

Military discipline is a discipline for on-duty periods, but it is the self-discipline of the off-duty hours that makes for strong moral character. This latter is not the concern of the military forces, which are primarily interested in the prevention of disease rather than in

the development of self-restraint. Napoleon once said: "The worse the man, the better the soldier; if soldiers be not corrupt, they ought to be made so."

THE STATE, APPARENTLY, MUST ASSUME THE TASKS OF EDUCATION

Argument: Compulsory military training will provide needed education.

Reply: George Soule, in the *New Republic* for December 4, 1944, in an article in which he *advocated* compulsory military training for military security, rated the educational arguments for compulsory military service "at zero or below." He said:

Army life has changed since this writer experienced it, but 99 per cent of the GI Joes would probably agree with him that military discipline is good only for an army which has to fight, and for nothing else in the world. It trains men to accord the appearance of respect to all superiors in rank, and to render them instant and unquestioning obedience, regardless of personal feelings or judgment about the intrinsic merits of the superior or his commands. It insists on the performance of hundreds of trivial formalities in appearance, behavior and working routine. It contributes nothing whatever to the self-discipline which is of value in civil life . . .

There is virtually no such thing as education, in the proper sense of the word, in army training. The military word for it — and the entirely accurate word — is "indoctrination." This means a combination of cramming and learning by rote. You learn terms, definitions, the names of infinite numbers of parts of guns and machinery; you are taught specific operations as you might be taught on an assembly line. The purpose is to drill information into you, not to develop resourcefulness or general competence. Such skill as may come to you results either from your previous experience or from the opportunity to use in action what you have memorized. In peacetime training this opportunity is limited indeed. Not many can subsequently make any use of what the army has taught. From the educational point of view, military training is almost a complete waste of time.

AND OF THE HOME?

Argument: A year of military training will immeasurably advance the physical fitness of our youth.

Reply: This may be granted, but it is no argument for military training since such an objective can be achieved equally well, and probably better, by methods of physical education apart from any military

training. Moreover, to begin physical training at the age of eighteen would contribute little toward improving the nation's health. Any real physical training must begin at an early age in the home and in the grade school and be continued through life. Such a program has no necessary relation to military training. In fact, there are military men who, from the point of view of physical fitness, regard military training as not nearly as effective as a well-organized and well-regulated schedule of gymnastic and physical-education routines. Therefore, the by-products of health and physical fitness are insufficient arguments for peacetime compulsory military service.

Lawrence K. Frank, author of *Human Conservation*, is the Chairman of the Society for Research in Child Development. This society has been reviewing the reasons for rejections of selectees for the army and for discharges from the army. In a statement in the *Parents' Magazine* for November, 1944, Mr. Frank said:

The largest single cause for rejections was defective teeth, then poor eyesight and a number of other handicaps not easily remedied or even preventable by present-day knowledge. Of the other defects, most were of long standing and should have been treated years before the men were of military age. The most serious group of rejectees were the neuro-psychiatric cases; youth suffering from various neurological disorders and personality disturbances, ranging from the so-called psychoneuroses and emotional instability to the psychoses or mental diseases. As is generally recognized, most of these cases begin in early childhood and become progressively worse as the individual grows older . . . The most fruitful time for promoting health and sanity is in the years before military age. *If we are genuinely concerned about the welfare of youth and earnestly desire to protect them, the proposed program of compulsory military training offers little possibility for any effective efforts in this direction.* In fact, as the records show, it is extremely hazardous for many immature youths who can't "take it."

When the armed forces build physically-fit specimens of manhood out of our 4F's, the health argument will be more impressive.

TEACH THEM TO BE GOOD CITIZENS

Argument: A year of military training will teach the youth of our nation "how to live in harmony with others" and will make them more conscious of their civic responsibilities.

Reply: Military and social discipline are poles apart. Military life is anything but democratic, and the history of compulsory military training shows that it does not produce better citizens but rather more

rabid nationalists. General Marshall recognizes this when he says that the European system "has no place among the institutions of a modern democratic state." We have already noted that we cannot guarantee that the U. S. version of conscription would differ essentially from the European system which "produces highly efficient armies." efficient armies."

Dr. Holmes of the Community Church in New York City, expressing his views in the *Parents' Magazine*, said:

I am opposed to compulsory military training, or conscription in peacetime, as a system hostile to that whole spirit of democracy which is vital to America . . . The training of the army is a training for serfdom and not for liberty. Its basic principle is the subjection of the individual to the state, of the free citizen to a dictatorial government. Military service, imposed by authority of law, is the first long step toward tyranny. Democracy has more than once accepted conscription for military training, but no democracy has ever survived it. Compulsory training means militarism. Militarism, sooner or later, means totalitarianism.

AND PROVIDE JOBS FOR ALL

Argument: Compulsory military training for all youth would provide a cushion for unemployment in the postwar period.

Reply: This argument is hardly worth recognition as an argument for compulsory military service. The dictators tried to solve their unemployment problem by this method and ended by putting their entire country on a wartime economy and plunging the entire world into war. Half-measures are no solution to anything. No argument could be a greater admission of failure to solve our modern economic and social problems.

There are many more arguments of this type that could be given, but all of them have this in common, namely, they seek objectives which, although they may be by-products of military training, have no necessary connection with it and may be achieved more effectively by other methods. For the most part these arguments are rationalizations that are used to put over the idea of compulsory service with certain groups, or they are the admissions of failure on the part of educators and others who seek to shift their problems to the state. Military necessity is the only valid reason for compulsory service and this necessity has not been proved.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF PROVIDING FOR ADEQUATE DEFENSE

THE history of the National Defense Act of 1920 shows clearly that at the end of the last war we had drawn up what military experts even now agree was an adequate measure of defense. The fact that our defense was inadequate at the outbreak of the present war was not due to any inherent defect of this bill (such as the omission of compulsory military training) but to the "pinch-penny" tactics of Congress in so paring down the appropriations in postwar years that the number of men provided for under the act could not be maintained. The lesson to be learned from our past experience is clear: we must have the determination to carry through established policies.

Moreover, Senator Edwin C. Johnson calls attention to the fact that, whatever our policy, it must do more than provide basic training for a large number of men, when he says:

Basic training represents the least of our military problems; there is always time after a war starts to arrange for it if we have a good organization from which to begin . . . A gigantic reserve of foot soldiers, half trained and half spoiled, will not provide national security. It will fool us but not protect us. We must not again neglect the science of war in its really scientific aspects. Research laboratories testing and constructing new lethal instruments of war and destruction are a "must," if we are to develop a national defense capable of coping with any contingency . . . good national defense must envision far more than manpower. Future wars will be won by marching science and marching resources directed by skilled technicians and not by a huge army of marching men.

Therefore, this Study Group feels that the following basic measures would provide adequate national security:

1) As to the needs of the *period between the end of hostilities and the establishment of world order* that would permit an international organization to work, the present Selective Service Act can be extended and amended as necessary. *No new legislation is needed.* This would recognize conscription as an *emergency measure*, not as a *permanent policy*.

2) In the period when "world order can be envisaged," as an alternative to peacetime compulsory military service we should expand our armed forces on the basis of voluntary

recruitment in such a way as to make the services attractive enough from the educational and professional point of view to attract sufficient volunteers. This expansion should not be limited to gathering men alone for a time interval; rather it should proceed along three lines and should be purely professional in character: a) research and development of all the modern tools of war; b) staff training on the higher levels; c) professional military training and education. If these services are made attractive enough by pay, allowances and educational advantages, there will be no lack of recruits. At the same time the number of strictly military and naval colleges could be increased and the R.O.T.C. could be expanded. This is the democratic method.

The inadequacy of a volunteer system of reserve recruiting should be obvious before the United States consents to bring in the European institution of conscription with all its concomitant evils. To oppose the volunteer system on the ground that "the notion that anyone of military age can decide for himself whether he shall go to the defense of his nation and the preservation of the peace of the world or remain at his desk or bench or on his farm belongs to a generation that has passed" is to adopt the philosophy of the dictator.


In no sense, however, is our opposition to peacetime compulsory service and the advocacy of the volunteer method to be interpreted to mean that the United States should not have a strong armed force either for self-defense or for participation in a world organization for world peace. Our main concern is with the method by which such a force will be provided. To resort to a method that has been proved a failure would be the height of folly.

TO THIS WE STAND COMMITTED

Finally, the following statement of the Educational Policies Commission of the National Educational Association reflects the true mind of this Group:

In our judgment it is unwise to commit the nation at this time to a year of universal military service. No one can foresee the international situation which will exist when Germany and Japan are defeated. Neither the international political nor the

international military situation can be calculated while the war is still in progress. We, along with the great body of Americans, will support a year of compulsory military service when we are convinced that the safety of the nation requires it. We are unreservedly for adequate preparedness, but we see great dangers in any unnecessary break with our tested democratic tradition respecting compulsory military service in times of peace.



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