


American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese aggression
Shall America.....? ADV 8739

**SHALL
AMERICA
STOP ARMING
JAPAN**

?



AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR

Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression

8 WEST 40th STREET

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Please send me, postpaid, to the address below:

- **Shall America Stop Arming Japan?** \$.....
single copy, 15c; 8 copies, \$1.00
(New booklet. Illustrated. 1940)
- **China Faces Japan — and America** \$.....
100 copies, \$1.00 (Illustrated)
- **America Supports Japanese Aggression** \$.....
30 copies, 50c; 75 copies, \$1.00
- **Japan's Partner: the U. S. A.** \$.....
400 copies, \$1.00 (Flier)
- **What One Person Can Do** \$.....
200 copies, \$1.00
- **Christian Hands of America** \$.....
30 copies, 50c; 75 copies, \$1.00

- **Hon. Henry L. Stimson's Letter, Jan. 11, 1940,** \$.....
to the New York Times (Reprint)
30 copies, 50c; 75 copies, \$1.00
- **Sample Kit of Above Literature, 25c** \$.....

Quantity Rates on Request

As my contribution toward the effort to end American
economic aid to Japan for war purposes, I enclose \$.....

Total enclosed \$.....

Name

Address

Make checks payable to American Committee N. P. J. A.

**SHALL
AMERICA
STOP ARMING
JAPAN
?**

PRICE: FIFTEEN CENTS; EIGHT COPIES, ONE DOLLAR, POSTPAID.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Foreword	3
The Story of Japanese Expansion	5
The Invasion of China	7
Japan's Objective: A Vast Military Empire	9
A Century of American Policy	11
Cornerstone of American Policy: The Nine Power Treaty	15
Japan Seeks a "New Order" by Violence	17
Japan's Army in China's Morass	19
America Holds the Key	21
America's Moral Responsibility	25
America's Stake: Political	27
America's Stake: Economic	29
Some Questions	31
An Affirmative Policy	37
For an Enduring Peace	38

THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE
FOR NON-PARTICIPATION IN JAPANESE AGGRESSION
8 WEST FORTIETH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.

PRINTED IN U.S.A.
APRIL 15, 1940
APRIL 25, 1940

"The storm center of the world has shifted to China. Whoever understands that mighty Empire—socially, politically, economically, religiously—has the key to world politics for the next five centuries."


—JOHN HAY, U.S. Secretary of State,
enunciator of the Open Door Policy

FOREWORD

1940 is a year of crisis in the Pacific. The independence of China is at stake. The struggle for political dominance among the billion awakening people of Asia—half the world's population—is approaching a decisive stage. The outcome will determine whether there shall be one ascendant and prevailing militaristic power, or a balance of power, in Asia and the Western Pacific. The security of rich and strategic islands, with their supply of raw materials essential to the United States, is involved. The developing crisis of this year will profoundly affect the future security and well-being of all nations that border the Pacific.

In the evenly matched conflict now raging across fifteen hundred miles in China, a decisive role will be played by the United States of America. It is inescapable. For if we "do nothing," our great economic resources and strength will continue, as now, overwhelmingly on the side of Japan. If we withdraw that aid, China will almost certainly emerge a free nation. America holds the balance in the Pacific today. After careful consideration of all factors, a choice must be made. What will it be?

HOW JAPAN'S "CONTROLLED AREA" HAS EXPANDED



JAPAN: SOME LANDMARKS

- 1894-5 Fights China
- 1904-5 Fights Russia
- 1910 Annexes Korea
- 1915 Serves Twenty-One Demands on China
- 1919 Acquires Southern Pacific Mandates
- 1922 Signs Nine Power Treaty agreeing to respect China's integrity
- 1928 Signs Kellogg-Briand Pact
- 1931 Invades Manchuria
- 1932 Makes first attack on Shanghai
- 1933 Annexes Jehol
- 1935 Annexes southern Chahar
- 1936 Invades Suiyuan
- 1937 Begins major war at Marco Polo Bridge
Occupies Tientsin, Peking, Shanghai, Nanking
- 1938 Occupies Canton, Hankow
- 1939 Occupies Hainan, Spratly Islands
Faces denunciation of U. S.-Japanese commercial treaty
Meets military reverse at Changsha
- 1940 Attempts to induct puppet government for China

THE STORY OF JAPANESE EXPANSION

For forty-five years Japan has been following an opportunistic policy of expansion by force. Before 1937, the area under her control had grown from 147,000 to 858,000 square miles. It is as if an Atlantic power the size of Montana were gradually to conquer the West Indies, New England, the Middle Atlantic States, all territory westward to the Mississippi, and North and South Carolina. Roughly 60,000,000 alien people were thus brought under the domination of Japan's military leaders.

The steps in this expansion are well known. War with China in 1894-5 gave Japan control, southward, of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands; it also led to the "independence" of Korea.

War with Russia in 1904-5 extended her sway northward to the lower half of Sakhalin Island, and to a leasehold on the Kwantung peninsula in Manchuria. Korea was formally annexed in 1910.


In 1915, with Europe at war, Japan served upon China the now famous Twenty-One Demands which, if accepted, would have undermined Chinese sovereignty. The more flagrant of these Demands were rejected, due in part to strong protest from the United States. Japan's strategic position in the Pacific, however, was notably enhanced, after the World War, by the award to her, as a mandate, of former German dependencies in the South Pacific—the Caroline, Marianas, Marshall, and Palau Islands. The Japanese now regard these islands as part of the "Empire."

In 1929 the celebrated Tanaka Memorandum to the Emperor was published. Although this document was repudiated by the Japanese Government, the faithfulness with which subsequent invasions have followed its text lends validity to the presumption of its authenticity.

The rich and vast territory of Manchuria was invaded in 1931. Despite world-wide condemnation, this conquest was extended, in 1933, to include the strategically important province, Jehol; in 1935, Chahar was likewise invaded, and in 1936, Suiyuan.

Still the appetite for power of Japan's military caste showed no signs of being appeased. And in 1937, the greatest adventure of all was undertaken: the conquest of China—with an area roughly equivalent to that of the United States, and a population more than three times as large.





Map showing position of Japanese armies and Chinese guerrilla forces in occupied China.

THE INVASION OF CHINA

The invasion was well timed. European powers were absorbed with the perils of the Spanish conflict. America seemed safely removed, with a new neutrality law. China, meanwhile, was developing steadily in every aspect of national life. Japan's military leaders decided that the moment had come to begin their most far-reaching and ambitious venture. It was then or never!


Many of Japan's civilian leaders regarded such a course with grave apprehension. On March 1, 1937, Mr. Seiji Yoshida, Chairman of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Shanghai, reported, "China's political and economic progress in recent years has been rapid, and the Chinese people have been earnest in working out their destiny", and he stated that the present was an opportune moment to "rectify" the erroneous China policy hitherto employed. He saw the possibilities of friendly economic cooperation between Japan and China. But Japan's militarists, witnessing the growing unity and strength of China, saw otherwise.


The invasion of China proper began, near Peking, with the Lukouchiao incident of July 7, 1937. On August 13, fighting broke out in Shanghai. After two and one-half years of conflict, China's defense is still vigorous. Although Japan is employing a million men in the struggle, her problems have multiplied. Lengthening lines have increased the difficulties of supply. Ruthless treatment of the civilian populace has only stiffened the Chinese will to resist at any cost. Guerrilla tactics on the part of the Chinese have finally brought the Japanese military machine to a virtual standstill. And economic strains upon the home economy are steadily mounting.

Yet the situation remains extremely dangerous from China's standpoint. Japanese troops now control practically her entire coast, most of her railway lines, the Yangtze River as far as Hankow, and most of her larger cities. Forty million civilians have been driven from their homes into the greatest war migration in history. Resistance to economic penetration in "conquered" areas is increasingly difficult. There is a limit to human endurance, and Japan, fortified by American economic assistance, which is probably greater than Germany can expect from Russia, may yet succeed in producing, all over China, the chaos that now exists where Japanese armies have penetrated.

JAPAN'S AIMS IN THE ORIENT

 NOW CONTROLS

 DESIRES CONTROL



JAPAN'S OBJECTIVE: A VAST MILITARY EMPIRE

What underlying force has given Japanese expansion such consistency and dogged perseverance in the face of mounting obstacles abroad and deprivations at home? It is more than economic necessity, for Japan's real economic problems could far better have been solved by a policy of cooperation and trade with China and the West. It is more than a mere "dream of Empire".

To understand Japanese military mentality today, it is necessary to glance back into centuries of feudalism. Each warlord had then his following of *samurai*, or warriors, whom he placed in a class above all others, with power even of life and death over the artisans and peasants of the lord's estate. Among these *samurai* was cultivated a code of honor involving utter loyalty to the lord and scorn of hardship. Developed also was a passionate belief in the Emperor as a direct descendant of the Goddess of Heaven, whose line was destined to rule the world, and in the Japanese people as a heaven-sent race, above the rest of mankind. The standards and beliefs of the *samurai* permeated the mass of the people.

Only recently has Japan emerged from military feudalism. There has come quick industrialization along some lines. There has been a rapid adoption of modern military implements and methods. But there has been no real liberal movement in Japan, no elevation and freeing of the individual. The hold of military leaders over all classes, and over every channel of education and information has remained dominant. The people—pleasant, courteous, beauty-loving—are still, for the most part, in mental thralldom to the Emperor and to those who work for his "Manifest Destiny".

Modern warlords and *samurai* direct Japan's course today. They are hard-headed, calculating, and determined. Their ambitions are well known: the conquest and domination of China, and the elimination of Western influence there; through use of China's untapped resources and huge manpower, the building up of immense and unassailable military and naval strength; expanding control of the Western and Southern Pacific; an increasing invasion of world markets with low-priced manufactures; and finally, the rise of Japan to world dominance.

Japanese who possess the wisdom and courage to question this program are not yet strong enough to challenge it.

A CENTURY OF AMERICAN POLICY

A hundred years ago, European influence and power were extending around the world to eastern Asia, and Americans were beginning to look across the Pacific. Merchants of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States were seeking ever-widening markets for products of the Industrial Revolution. Asia, especially China, offered a rich prize, made more accessible by the advent of ocean steamships.

Great Britain signed the first treaty with China in 1842. Other nations, including the United States, quickly followed. "Treaty ports" were opened in China and Japan, sometimes by force or by a show of force. A system of external controls began to develop, including conventional tariffs, concessions, extraterritoriality, and the stationing of defense forces. Japan, smaller and more unified, promptly resisted these limitations of her sovereignty and began to adopt Western industrial and military techniques, but China, vast and decentralized in villages and families, became a semi-colonial nation.

While America benefited from these arrangements, it can be truthfully said that her influence was consistently on the side of restraint, and of friendship for China. In 1858, a new treaty with China provided that "if any other nation should act unjustly or oppressively, the United States will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement of the question, thus showing their friendly feeling".

The struggle for "spheres of influence" in China—with Japan and Russia now actively participating—became more intense toward the end of the century. There was talk of "partitioning" China, and the Boxer rebellion broke loose. It was at this time, in 1899, that John Hay, U.S. Secretary of State, took the lead in enunciating the "Open Door" doctrine, providing that all nations should have equal opportunity in trade with China—a farsighted move which preserved China's independence and perhaps averted a first world war.

When Japan, with Europe at war in 1915, submitted her far-reaching Twenty-One Demands to China, the United States refused to recognize any agreement or undertaking which impaired the political or territorial integrity of China, or the "Open Door" policy.

When the United States went to war with Germany in 1917, the American Government invited China to follow suit. Relying upon America's friendship, she abandoned her careful neutrality and joined the Allies.

STATEMENTS OF AMERICA'S POSITION

"The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace in China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." (JOHN HAY, *U. S. Secretary of State, July 1900*)

"The American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto*, nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open Door Policy. . . ." (HENRY L. STIMSON, *U. S. Secretary of State, January 1932*)

"The Nine Power Treaty represents a carefully developed and matured international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interests in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence. . . ." (HENRY L. STIMSON, *U. S. Secretary of State, in letter to Senator Borah, February 1932*)

"In the light of unfolding developments in the Far East, the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations, and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928." (CORDELL HULL, *U. S. Secretary of State, October 1937*)

"In short, the American people, from all the thoroughly reliable evidence that comes to them, have good reason to believe that an effort is being made to establish control, in Japan's own interest, of large areas on the continent of Asia, and to impose upon those areas a system of closed economy. It is this thought, added to the effect of the bombings, the indignities, and the manifold interference with American rights, that accounts for the attitude of the American people toward Japan today." (JOSEPH C. GREW, *U. S. Ambassador to Japan, October 1939*)

A CENTURY OF AMERICAN POLICY (continued)

When China declared war against Germany, the American Minister, Paul S. Reinsch, sent the following message to the Chinese Foreign Office: "My government is pleased to take this opportunity to give to the Chinese government the assurance of its solidarity, of its friendship, of its support. It will do all that depends upon it in order that China may have the benefit in her international relations of the situation and the regards due to a great country." Despite this positive assurance, President Wilson was constrained to compromise with Japan, and with allies who had made secret agreements with her, in order to secure their consent to the League of Nations. At the Versailles Conference, part of Shantung province which had been leased to Germany, and which had been seized by Japan when she declared war on Germany, was not restored to China but given to Japan. The compromise was unsatisfactory and impermanent.

Possibly because of an uneasy feeling that we had misled China, our Government initiated, at the Washington Conference on Naval Limitation, discussions which dealt with the Far Eastern situation. The result was the Nine Power Treaty which gave legal form and added significance to the doctrine of the Open Door, with clauses safeguarding China's sovereignty.

Under protection of this treaty, China began to set her house in order, and enjoyed a decade free from foreign molestation. After an initial period of upheaval, Chiang Kai-shek came into power and gathered around him, in 1927, as the dominant leaders in Chinese life, a group of younger men largely trained in American institutions and imbued with American ideals. China began to make extraordinary progress in every aspect of national reconstruction.

When Japan initiated her invasion of Manchuria, the American Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, on January 7, 1932, formally stated that the American Government "cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto* . . . which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open Door Policy."

Thus the United States has, during the last century, followed in the main a policy of justice and friendship for China, with the conviction that the independence of that nation is indispensable to an enduring peace in the Orient, and to security for this hemisphere.

THE NINE POWER TREATY

Treaty between the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal, Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922.

ARTICLE I.

The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

ARTICLE II.

The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I.

ARTICLE III.

With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Contracting Powers, other than China, agree that they will not seek, nor support their respective nationals in seeking—

(a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China;

(b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category or public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.


CORNERSTONE OF AMERICAN POLICY: THE NINE POWER TREATY

The clearest statement of American policy in the Pacific is contained in the Nine Power Treaty, signed at Washington on February 6, 1922, by both the United States and Japan. It has been called, by Henry L. Stimson, "one of the most admirable and far-sighted treaties in the history of modern civilization". Prominent in the negotiations, on behalf of the United States, were Charles Evans Hughes, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., and Oscar W. Underwood. For Japan, Baron K. Shidehara showed high qualities of statesmanship.

The Nine Power Treaty furnished a new legal foundation for international relations in the Pacific area. Its most important provisions are contained in Article I, reproduced on the opposite page. Here we find reaffirmed, in unmistakable terms, the obligation of every signatory to respect the independence of China. This was recognized as right in itself, and also as a necessary condition for maintenance of the "Open Door" principle. There was nothing to hinder Japan from benefiting by natural geographical propinquity to China's purchasable resources and developing markets, or by her own ability to manufacture inexpensive commodities for sale throughout Asia.

Time has vindicated the wisdom of the statesmen who wrought this Treaty. Implicit in their calculations was faith in the ability of the Chinese to work out their problems of internal stability and external cooperation. This faith was well justified during the fifteen years that followed. It is now clear that without the assurance of China's independence, it is impossible to prevent the disastrous intensification of political and commercial rivalries there. And it becomes increasingly clear that only with an independent and developing China can there be maintained peace and stability in Asia, and security for all nations that border the Pacific. It is not by the timid abandonment of these principles and truths, but by their clear and effective reaffirmation, that the United States can take its responsible part in the restoration of peace.

SPRING PLOWING



Courtesy of the News, New York's Picture Newspaper

JAPAN SEEKS A "NEW ORDER" BY VIOLENCE


For a decade after the Washington Conference and the signing of the Nine Power Treaty, international cooperation and friendly trade developed in the Pacific area. Then suddenly, in 1931, Japan launched her assault upon Manchuria. By this action, she upset the whole post-war peace structure and initiated a world-wide chain of aggression which has continued to the present time. Defying world-wide condemnation, Japan has since continued and extended, in open violation of international agreements, her program of ruthless conquest.

The result has been termed the "New Disorder" in Eastern Asia. Admiral H. E. Yarnell, Commander-in-Chief, until his recent retirement, of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, has said: "It is estimated that 40,000,000 Chinese have been driven from their homes to far distant areas, and of this number, from 5 to 10,000,000 have died of disease and privation. Cities far distant from the battle areas have been bombed and hundreds of thousands of non-combatants have been killed and wounded. The 'Rules for the Conduct of War' approved at The Hague many years ago, which provided for humane treatment of prisoners and non-combatants, have been discarded. . . . Inhumane and barbarous conduct against prisoners and non-combatants can be strictly controlled in any disciplined army, and the manner in which this war has been waged has profoundly shocked the civilized world."

Less apparent, but no less significant, have been the methods by which the invaders have sought to obtain control over the economic life of the Chinese people in "conquered" areas. Techniques developed in Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria are applied with a practiced hand. They involve a wresting of control and ownership of the means of production from the Chinese themselves, and the reducing of the entire population to a condition of dependence and serfdom. Absent are the features of any "enlightened" colonial policy; exploitation is direct and ruthless, with no compensating rise in the well-being of the conquered. Famine and desperate poverty are widespread. Schools are closed. Narcotics are systematically used both for revenue and demoralization. Every sign of opposition invites fearful retribution upon the civilian population. These facts are attested by many reliable American witnesses.

The prolonging of such oppression can only breed violent revolutionary forces in the most populous nation on earth. The irony of it all is that it could not go on without the extensive help which Japan receives steadily from "the land of the free, and the home of the brave."

FURTHER AND DEEPER



David Low, by special permission

JAPAN'S ARMY IN CHINA'S MORASS


The first fifteen months of Japan's invasion of China were marked by spectacular victories. Despite stubborn and courageous resistance, the superior equipment and training of Japan's military forces enabled them to conquer most of China's coast and to penetrate along the important lines of communication. One by one, Tientsin, Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Canton, and Hankow fell into their hands.

But during the next sixteen months their difficulties mounted, and the military situation approached a stalemate, despite enormous suffering on the part of the Chinese people. Long lines of communication were constantly harassed by guerrilla bands. Military and political control of the countryside were frustrated in many areas. The economic fruits of victory were elusive. Attempts to enlist the cooperation of respected Chinese leaders proved abortive. And the enormous costs of war and occupation produced increasing strains upon the home economy, with consequent murmurings of discontent.

Economic and political strains increased in China also. But traditional local self-sufficiency proved an asset; adjustments were made after the loss of industrial cities; Chinese morale remained unimpaired. Subtle opposition and non-cooperation were practiced in "conquered" areas despite the terroristic methods employed by the conquerors. "Political education" among the people of "free China" advanced rapidly. Military strategy improved, with increased emphasis upon training and upon the use of decentralized, mobile units, elusive to frontal attack by forces with superior armaments.

These facts have led some observers to feel that it would be only a matter of time until Japan would have to withdraw her forces from China. But it must be remembered that much has been staked upon the China policy, and that the Japanese are capable of determination and sacrifice. It is certain that a tenacious effort will be made to consolidate control over what has been taken by force. Whether or not this attempt succeeds during 1940 may hinge largely upon the continued cooperation of American industry and trade.

JAPAN'S TOTAL IMPORTS OF ESSENTIAL WAR SUPPLIES AND THE EXTENT OF HER DEPENDENCE UPON THE UNITED STATES



UNITED STATES TRADE WITH JAPAN, 1928 AND 1939 (thousands of dollars)

ILLUSTRATING RISE IN WAR TRADE, FALL IN PEACE TRADE

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS

	1928	1939
<i>Total exports</i>	258,548	231,405
Raw Cotton	109,399	42,488
Wood and manufactures	15,636	2,858
Grains and preparations	12,202	(a)
Potassic fertilizer materials	6,025	2,137
Tobacco and manufactures	4,953	(a)
Petroleum and products	21,717	45,290
Iron and steel scrap	3,090	32,593
Copper	2,358	27,567
Metal-working machinery, power-driven	862	24,578
Autos and parts	6,118	6,420

PRINCIPAL IMPORTS

<i>Total imports</i>	431,873	161,196
Raw silk	356,122	106,936
Silk fabrics	8,686	1,989
Cotton manufactures	3,156	4,235
Tea	5,152	3,304
Crabmeat, sauce and paste	5,030	3,765
China and porcelain, earthen and stoneware	5,335	3,040
Furs, undressed	4,217	984

(a) Unlisted among Principal Exports

Source: United States Department of Commerce

AMERICA HOLDS THE KEY

American sympathies favor China. By diplomatic pronouncements, we have condemned the lawlessness and inhumanity of Japan's assault upon the Chinese people. But our economic strength, which counts in war, has been overwhelmingly on the side of Japan. For nearly three years, we have furnished the bulk of Japan's military supplies from abroad—supplies which she cannot, for the most part, obtain at home. For nearly three years, also, we have allowed to Japan an unrestricted American market for the sale of her goods, thus enabling her to secure the funds necessary for the purchase of further war supplies. The outbreak of war in Europe, by cutting off other sources of materials and other markets, has greatly accentuated Japan's economic dependence upon this country.

It is mainly for this reason that America holds the key in the Pacific today. Detailed figures are not yet available, but by conservative estimate Japan is now obtaining at least three-fourths of her essential imports of war materials from the United States. Many of these materials she cannot get in anything approaching sufficient quantities from other countries. Take, for example, high-grade steel, copper, and ferro-alloys, scrap iron, automotive equipment, munitions machinery, machine tools, machine parts, high-grade gasoline and lubricating oils, and especially aviation fuel for which Japan is now almost wholly dependent upon this country. All of these materials are essential to the balanced ration which a modern military machine requires. Without them, the Japanese Juggernaut would soon begin to stall. The chief advantage over the Chinese forces—superior mechanization—would be rapidly impaired.

It is true that Japan has taken pains to accumulate reserves of some of these essential war materials. But it is also true that shortages would be acutely felt as soon as sources of supply were cut off; for to use up reserves which could not be replenished would make Japan completely vulnerable.

If the United States, therefore, should withhold from export her own resources now being used to inflict incalculable suffering and devastation in China, Japan's military position there would become increasingly untenable. She would soon have to seek a way out, involving abandonment of her far-reaching effort to subjugate the Chinese people.

Of equal importance, perhaps, is Japan's dependence upon the United States for foreign exchange. Her gold supply is approaching exhaustion. Only as she sells abroad can she buy materials to carry on the war.

HOW JAPAN FINANCES WAR PURCHASES

In 1938

Japan exported to the U.S. \$131,820,000. Silk exports alone (\$83,750,000) furnished funds sufficient for the purchase of:



SILK EXPORTS
\$83,750,000



PIG IRON, IRON &
STEEL SCRAP
\$26,921,000



COPPER
\$22,146,000



METAL WORKING MACH-
INERY, POWER-DRIVEN
\$23,614,000



AIRCRAFT
& PARTS
\$11,069,000

The balance of Japan's exports to the U.S. —
\$48,070,000 — practically paid for
purchases of:



CRUDE
PETROLEUM
\$29,956,000



GASOLINE
\$7,713,000



LUBRICATING
OIL
\$2,614,000



AUTOS, TRUCKS,
PARTS, ETC.
\$10,142,000


And her great market is the United States of America. A partial or complete ban upon imports from Japan would reduce radically her purchasing power in all foreign countries. This would immediately affect Japan's capacity to continue the conflict, for imports which do not directly contribute to the conduct of the war have already been largely eliminated. A substantial reduction in foreign exchange would mean drastic curtailment in Japan's imports of war supplies.

A further factor in the position of the United States is her possession of large capital resources. Two loans, on a commercial basis, have already been extended to China for use in the restoration and maintenance of her economic life. Such credits to a friendly nation are normal, especially when previous loans are not in default. (China has already paid back over \$2,200,000 of the first \$25,000,000 credit extended to her.) Their moral effect is, in this case, as important as the relatively small material benefit which they have conferred upon an economy under the severe strain of war.

Because other nations with influence in the Pacific are now absorbed in the European conflict, only the United States is left with the power of initiative. That power carries with it enormous responsibility. For American policy during 1940 may well determine whether there shall emerge, across the Pacific, a long period of chaos and violence, or a great militaristic Japanese Empire, or an independent, friendly China advancing toward democracy.

The ending of our crucial support to Japan's program of conquest would not only mark a turning point in the Far Eastern conflict; it would contribute to the first great reverse, after a tragic decade, to the expanding forces of lawlessness and aggression. Mr. Henry L. Stimson has pointed out that "the influence of such action by our government would transcend even the great crisis in Asia. Throughout the broken, warring world of today it would show that this nation recognizes its responsibility for making efforts toward the restoration of law and order, and that wherever its peaceful influence can effectively be thrown it will be thrown on the side of independence and freedom and against militarized aggression."

"The plea of a tortured conscience"



By special permission, Hutton © The Philadelphia Inquirer

AMERICA'S MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

America is not responsible for policing the world. But she is responsible for her own conduct and influence in the world. Never was that responsibility greater than it is today.

Millions of Americans can think only with shame and dismay of American-motored aeroplanes, fueled with American gasoline, dropping American metals to be blown into the bodies of Chinese men, women, and children who have traditionally regarded America as their best friend. And there is mounting indignation at the thought that we, who love freedom, should furnish such decisive help for its destruction elsewhere, and for the expanding sway of tyrannous force in the world.

Those who counsel against any move to restrict our war trade with Japan apparently ignore the fact that we are today Japan's great armorer, furnishing roughly three-fourths of the "sinews of war" which she must have from abroad in order to continue the effort to "beat China to her knees". We are "involved" up to the hilt, on the side of Japan.

The United States and Japan are, at the same time, obligated by specific treaty to respect China's sovereignty and independence. Are we to continue giving extensive assistance for the overt violation of that pledge?

There are those who maintain that the United States should remain on friendly terms with Japan. Certainly every honorable effort should be made to do so. But does friendship necessitate complicity in crime? Does friendship with Japan mean that we must support with our resources the brutal attempt to subjugate China, also a friendly nation? Is it a requirement of friendship that we must give up the right to regulate our own conduct, and in doing so violate every humane and decent instinct?

There are those who fear that the stoppage of war supplies to Japan might lead her to war against us. They never explain how Japan, exhausted by nearly three years of warfare against China, and dependent upon the United States for supplies and markets in order to carry on that conflict, could possibly wage war against us, or what she would hope to gain from it except disaster. Certainly the risks involved would be much less than those of continuing to bolster Japanese aggression. Even if there are risks, will it be said that because of fear we continued to support Japanese militarism and the destruction of China?

If Japan's military leaders are offended by America's refusal any longer to condone their policies, it will be our task to convince them that our good will is not of a quality to be controlled by threats and bribes; that it does, at the same time, make us ready, and indeed eager, to help in the restoration of a just peace, and in the positive task of reconstruction that lies ahead for both China and Japan.



Reprinted by special permission of COLLIER'S, the National Weekly

A 1919 FORECAST

On Oct. 15, 1919 the Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, then senior Senator from Massachusetts, made the following statement in the United States Senate:

"Such has been the course of Japan, steady, relentless, aiming to get ultimate control of the vast population and great territory of China. . . . Japan is steeped in German ideas and regards war as an industry because from war she has secured all the extensions of her empire. . . . She means to exploit China and build herself up until she becomes a power formidable to all the world. It is not merely that she will close the markets of China and obtain enormous commercial and economic advantages. She will use ultimately the practically unlimited man power of China for military purposes just as Germany and Austria used in their armies the man power of the 26,000,000 Slavs who were utterly opposed to German domination, to promote their schemes of conquest. . . . It seems incredible . . . that we should be so shortsighted as actually to leave Japan to become a peril to America. . . ."

AMERICA'S STAKE: POLITICAL

It is not easy to appreciate the magnitude of the struggle taking place in Asia today, or to estimate its full significance even for our own country. But since we are playing an important, even a decisive, role in the conflict, it behooves us, from the standpoint of our own national security, to consider the possible consequences of our action or inaction.


If we continue to support Japan with the war supplies which she needs, she may be able to prolong the struggle indefinitely, holding with superior equipment and mobility a large part of what she has won. This would mean a long period of chaos in China, with progressive impoverishment for both countries. Violent revolutionary forces, the products of oppression, would gain in force and dimensions.

If we continue to furnish our markets and resources to Japan, she may, with this help, be able to consolidate her present position in China, and to gather strength for the next move. Should Japan ultimately gain political and economic dominance in China, defending that hold with an increasingly powerful navy built with American metals and machinery, her Empire would still be far from the military self-sufficiency dear to the hearts of totalitarian rulers. The security of the Philippine Islands, and of the East Indian regions from which we draw indispensable supplies of rubber and tin and other valuable products, would be endangered. The United States would face increasing problems in connection with South America, North Pacific fisheries, Hawaii and Panama defenses, and our own markets. Our naval appropriations would soar. War, and a very grave war, would then threaten.

If we continue to arm Japan, China, in desperation, might turn increasingly, albeit reluctantly, toward Russia as an only friend, accepting help on Russia's terms. Japan's invasion, if long continued, will only strengthen, and not weaken, the forces in that direction. Asia might then be swung into the orbit of European conflict and alignments, with unpredictable consequences.

If, on the other hand, our government musters the decision and courage to stop arming Japan, the scales will turn heavily in China's favor. This would tend to discredit Japan's military rulers at home. Even more important, it would make increasingly sure the emergence of an independent China, and the restoration of a far more stable balance of power in Asia. The world's greatest open market for freedom—China—would have been preserved. The democratic trend of that great nation could then continue, and its cooperation, as an active force, in the building of a saner, more secure, and more cooperative world would be ensured.

CHINA'S PROGRESS BEFORE THE INVASION




AMERICA'S STAKE: ECONOMIC

Our export trade to Japan is increasingly of a destructive character. In 1939 more than 71 cents of every dollar's worth of materials purchased by Japan, and more than 90 cents of every dollar's worth bought by "Manchoukuo", went for war supplies. It was a bitter lesson of the World War that such a trade is unhealthy; that, instead of building prosperity and future purchasing power, it breeds depression. Valuable American resources are now entering into this transient and destructive trade. The immediate profits secured from this commerce are more than offset by losses in our peace-time trade with the Far East in raw cotton, industrial equipment, lumber, kerosene, paper, passenger automobiles, and the like. The longer the war continues, with American support, the greater the impoverishment and decline in purchasing power of both Japan and China, who have heretofore furnished us a trade comparable to that with all of South America combined. The best way to restore the prosperity and buying power of both nations is not by helping to prolong the war, but by helping to end it and to initiate a new era of reconstruction and healthy commerce in the Pacific area.

During the decade before 1937, China, despite the loss of Manchuria, her richest area, was making remarkable strides in every aspect of her national life. The present conflict has brought a new unity and a new awakening. The potentialities of trade, beneficial to every nation, with a free post-war China are incalculable. Thousands of miles of railway lines, tens of thousands of miles in new roads, tens or hundreds of thousands of automobiles, vessels for a coast-wise merchant marine, expansion of national airways and of communication systems, and the reestablishment of industries destroyed by the war and their extension throughout the interior provinces—all these are within the scope of probability once reconstruction in an independent, peaceful, and unified China gets under way. Such developments will contribute directly to the purchasing power of China's 400,000,000 and more people. This is the world's greatest potential market, wherein good will toward America is strong, from which we are now helping to exclude ourselves by supporting economically Japan's monopolistic aims. In doing so, we are helping also to set up a competitor that, through expropriation of resources and utilization of almost unlimited subsistence labor, may in time produce a mounting tide of cheap manufactures with which American industry, at American wage levels, could scarcely compete.


Furthermore, as we arm Japan with one hand, with the other we tax ourselves billions for naval armaments in defense against her. For each cent of profit, a dollar's loss! It hardly makes sense.

The Open Door



Courtesy of The Washington Post

Embarrassments of Finger Pointing



Courtesy of The Christian Science Monitor



Courtesy of Lincoln Newspaper Features, Inc.
Chinese Puzzle—American Style



Courtesy of The New York Times
"Some Act"

SOME QUESTIONS

Thoughtful consideration of the problem of ending America's participation in Japanese aggression raises some further questions. The purpose of this section is not to deal with these questions exhaustively, but to suggest conclusions which seem reasonable, after careful study, in the light of recent history and of the facts now at our disposal.

How much has already been accomplished toward stopping America's war trade with Japan?

The "moral embargo" upon aeroplanes and equipment for the bombing of civilian populations has cut off less than 5 per cent of our total exports of essential war supplies to Japan. Denunciation of the commercial treaty with Japan cleared the way for further restrictions upon this trade. To date, however, Japan continues to enjoy practically full access to American supplies and markets.

Can the "moral embargo" be extended to include other materials?

It can be extended to other materials, such as aviation gasoline, employed in the bombing of civilian populations. It is questionable whether the State Department will wish to go further than this without legislative authorization.

How much can be done through voluntary action on the part of manufacturers and merchants?

A few firms have declined Japanese orders for war supplies rather than to aid and abet, economically, in the invasion of China. On moral grounds, they have relinquished the profits from such commerce. Others have defended the continuation of this trade on grounds that the question is one for government decision, and that for individual firms to give it up voluntarily would mean simply a transfer of orders to less scrupulous producers and exporters. For effective curtailment, government action is necessary.

Upon what basis could the United States embargo war supplies to Japan?

Upon the basis of America's obligation and right under the Nine Power Treaty. The obligation is to refrain from furnishing large and indispensable help for the violent assault upon China's sovereignty and independence, which we are pledged by treaty to respect. The right is a position for our nationals in China equal to that of nationals from all other countries.

Would such an embargo be applied all at once?

This depends upon whether legislation is discretionary or mandatory; there are several advantages in the former. Its moral effect in Japan would be great, even before the act was specifically applied. If allowed some discretion in applying the law, the State Department could take into account such important matters as timing, the

attitude of other countries, and the probable effect of particular restrictions upon both Japan and the United States. At the same time, a mandatory law, applied all at once, would be much preferable to continuing to arm Japan.

Upon what ground could increased duties be levied upon imports from Japan?

Upon the ground of constant violations of American trading rights, despite careful enumerations and repeated protests by our government. Increased American duties can be levied by Executive action.

Would such restrictions upon imports from Japan injure her working people rather than her militarists?

The greatest burden of the entire Japanese people today is the war against China. Nothing can contribute so much to a relief of that burden as an end of the war. The stopping of American assistance which tends only to prolong the conflict is one way in which real relief for the Japanese people can be realized. The funds now obtained through exports to the United States are used almost exclusively for the purchase of supplies with which to prosecute the war against China, and not for the real benefit of the Japanese people. Furthermore, the vastly greater suffering of the Chinese people, magnified directly by our war trade with Japan, should not be forgotten; they are the real victims of our present policy.

Would restrictions upon American war trade with Japan really be an effective means toward ending the conflict?

Except for a few commodities such as crude oil, Japan would have great difficulty in securing from other sources even a substantial portion of the war supplies which she now gets from the United States; many essential commodities—such as high-grade steel and ferro-alloys, copper, aviation gasoline and high-grade lubricating oil, automobiles and parts, munitions machinery and parts, and machine tools—she would be practically powerless to obtain except in very small quantities elsewhere. A reduction of our imports from Japan would immediately restrict her ability to buy war materials in any market. When the overwhelming disadvantage in materials and equipment is removed, China may be expected to regain her sovereignty and freedom. The key to peace, and to China's independence, lies not in words, but in action to withhold America's positive help from Japan's militarists.

Would the Japanese regard such action as unfriendly?

There is evidence that an increasing number among the Japanese people would welcome any influence which helped to bring an end to the war. Such American action would doubtless be resented by Japan's military leaders and many of their followers even though it would be clearly based upon a treaty to which their country had voluntarily assented. With much greater reason, however, could the Chinese regard as "unfriendly" our continued extensive support to the military power which is devastating their country.

What about the risk of war?

The statement that "embargoes mean war" is frequently made by opponents of such action in relation to Japan. But when asked for historical illustrations, they

are nonplussed. Actually, long before the European conflict began, Russia, France, and even Australia, New Zealand and Indo-China had extensive restrictions upon their war trade with Japan; in no case did this lead to war. Russia, a traditional enemy, has given Japan far more serious provocation, yet Japan did not go to war against her.

Indeed, how could Japan, in her present state of exhaustion, after nearly three years of inconclusive warfare in China, and with her present dependence upon American markets and supplies, contemplate a war with a nation so powerful and so rich in resources as the United States of America? She can hardly carry on against China with American help; how could she fight both China and America without American help? Already she is suffering from shortages in labor, fuel, and foreign exchange. Even with a large fleet, where would she get the materials and money for a war against America? For Japan's military leaders to provoke such a conflict would only be to invite economic ruin at home and to precipitate their own fall as rulers of the nation. *If we continue to sustain Japan, however, the situation may become very much more dangerous in the near future.*

Of course no human situation is wholly predictable, and whatever degree of risk is involved should be faced. Threats and even incidents might conceivably follow such action. The temporary withdrawal of Americans from parts of occupied China might become necessary. The Japanese might possibly blockade ports of entry for China. It is believed, however, that the American people would then demonstrate the common sense, confidence, and restraint that such a transitional period might require. It is hardly conceivable that the relatively small risks in this case would prevent the American government from doing what an overwhelming majority of the people believed to be right, especially when the risks of inaction are much greater.

It may be expected that Japan's reaction to a just and firm policy will, as in the past, be more constructive than her response to a timid policy of mere words, interpreted by her military leaders as a sign of weakness and fear.

Would Japan attack the Dutch East Indies?

Possession of these islands, "the treasure house of the Pacific", has long been a factor in Japanese calculations. The question of an attempted occupation is probably one of timing, not in relation to American trade policies, but in relation to Japan's total strategic situation. If Holland becomes involved in Europe, the security of these islands will be jeopardized. The stronger Japan feels in China, and the more she believes that other nations are too afraid or too occupied elsewhere to object, the more likely will an attempt to appropriate the islands become. American economic support to Japan now only increases this likelihood. At present, the risks of involvement, the heavy cost of such an undertaking, and the precarious situation in China are deterring factors for Japan.

Would Japan make an alliance with Soviet Russia?

Such an alliance at the expense of China is improbable. Traditional disputes—over boundaries, fisheries, timber and oil in Northern Sakhalin—have never been resolved. More important, the Russians know that one of Japan's chief motives for attacking North China was to cut communications between Russia and China and to obtain a route through Mongolia by which she could be in a position to strike at the strategic Lake Baikal region and thus sever communications between European Russia and eastern Siberia. Russia would hardly care to make concessions to Japan in North China now, especially when Japan's forces, weakened by the China war,

offer no real threat to themselves. The Japanese, on the other hand, could scarcely be expected to withdraw from their present position in North China simply for the sake of a Russian pact, nor do they wish to see Russia grow stronger in Vladivostok and the rest of eastern Siberia. The Japanese might use the threat of a Russian alliance as a means of exacting concessions from Britain and France, but there appears to be no real foundation for a genuine rapprochement between Japan and Russia now. This conclusion is reinforced by the failure of recent conversations between the two countries. At the same time, there is evidence that substantial Soviet aid to China is being continued.

Would Great Britain and France "sell out" China?

Hardly to the extent of supporting Japan. How far, during the European conflict, these powers may yield to Japanese pressure, at China's expense, may depend largely upon the United States. Their position will be progressively weakened if, as the European conflict continues, Japan, with continued American help, succeeds in strengthening her present insecure position in China, and in restoring her economic equilibrium at home. American influence, so decisive in this situation, cannot be evaded by simply shifting all responsibility to others. If the situation is not to grow steadily worse, our peaceful influence needs to be transferred from the side of aggression to that of treaty observance and a restoration of China's independence, with full recognition of the great stabilizing effect that this would have upon relations in Asia and in the whole Pacific area. The British and French, with public opinion opposed to Japan, with their strong desire to retain American good will, and with their own Far Eastern interests at stake, would not be likely to adopt measures in opposition to such an affirmative American policy.

Would it be safer for America simply to "sit tight" and "do nothing"?

It is usually easier to weigh the risks of action than it is to weigh the risks of inaction. Yet the history of the last decade furnishes repeated illustrations of the truth that timid inaction, instead of "appeasing" aggression, may actually encourage it. When fires are spreading, "sitting tight" may not be the safest course.

In the case of Japan, an American policy of firm words but little affirmative action would not be so serious if we were actually "doing nothing". But the fact is that our economic strength, which really counts in war, is still overwhelmingly on the side of Japan, despite all of our popular sympathies and diplomatic pronouncements. Drift and indecision mean a steady continuation of this dangerous situation.

And why is it dangerous? Because with continued American help, Japan may succeed in consolidating another great step toward her ambition to dominate Asia and the Western Pacific. Continued support to Japan may mean the loss of a friendly, developing, independent China as a great factor in world peace and in the security of all nations around the Pacific. The more America follows a timid policy, as far as economic action is concerned, the more other nations, involved in a life and death struggle in Europe, will be tempted to abandon their own efforts to resist Japan's far-reaching program of conquest.

Firmness, courage, and a sense of justice in determining our own conduct may prove far less hazardous in the end than a frightened policy of immediate expediency. Those who insist, rightly, that the possible consequences of any action should be weighed, should face also the necessity of weighing the far more serious consequences that may result from inaction—from a lack of the moral stamina required to remove ourselves from the role of "Japan's partner".

Should we run the risk of offending our third best customer?

There is no darker blemish upon America's good name today than the fact that, for profit, we are supporting economically Japan's ruthless assault upon the people of China. The "dirty money" thus received should rest heavily upon the consciences of those who accept it.

There is also, however, an economic answer to this question that is becoming increasingly clear to business men. The difficulties of international trade today are due in considerable measure to the very lawlessness, military aggressiveness, and ultra-nationalistic trade practices that have characterized Japan's foreign policy and that of a few other nations during recent years. Only as confidence and morality between nations are restored can our own foreign trade be reestablished on sure foundations. The worst that we can do in our own interest now is to continue supporting economically the very policies that are destroying the fabric of international order and cooperation. Furthermore, Japan's capacity to purchase American goods is shrinking, and will continue to shrink so long as the present conflict is prolonged—with American help. The way to restore Japan's market, and China's, is not by helping to extend the war, but by helping to end it. Then, with reconstruction ahead, a healthy, peaceful trade with both countries can develop, to the benefit of all concerned. And the enormous burden of armaments can be reduced.

Would an embargo on war supplies to Japan injure our cotton export trade?

Pending legislation for the curbing of war exports to Japan exempts agricultural products, including cotton, from such restrictions. In a sense, we have already injured our cotton trade by helping to prolong a war that has cut our cotton exports to Japan and China by more than half. Further declines are inevitable as the war continues. Moreover, it is the avowed aim of Japan to develop in China the culture of "American" grades of cotton in order to become independent of American supplies. A sound basis for an upswing in cotton exports to the Far East will come with the restoration of a free China and, in both countries, relief from the burdens of war and a gradual rise again in living standards and purchasing power.

Will there be a "way out" for Japan, if she fails in China?

There will be, as soon as she shows that her aggressive, militaristic policies have been abandoned. During the last world war, Japan made notable gains in domestic production and peaceful foreign trade; the opportunity to do so again should facilitate the difficult transition from a war-time to a peace-time economy. The advantages of mutually beneficial trade with China will be available again as soon as China is assured of respect as an equal. Once it becomes clear that the Japanese have abandoned military aggression as an instrument of national policy, the American people would almost certainly be ready to help with the difficult problems of reconstruction faced by the people of Japan, as well as with those faced by the people of China.

Public Opinion

Do you think our government should forbid the sale of arms, airplanes, gasoline and other war materials to Japan?

Yes—75%

No—25%

(Nation-wide Gallup Poll, February 1940)

FROM THE PRESS OF THE NATION

Unless we curb our exports of strategic commodities to Japan, we shall remain in the preposterous situation of having condemned Japanese aggression and yet continued to cooperate fully with Japan's war by supplying over half her imported war requirements. This is an undignified, immoral, and short-sighted role, and we ought to bring it to an end. (*Cincinnati Enquirer*, Jan. 1940)

When it seems so very certain that the victory of Japanese arms in China will lead swiftly to a war in the Pacific that will cost us many billions, it also seems absurd that this country should go on supplying that army with most of the gasoline that makes its bombings possible and keeps its tanks, armored cars, trucks and motorized artillery in action, most of the metals that go into its ammunition, most of the machine tools that turn out shells and guns, a lot of the leather on which the Japanese soldiery marches and repair parts for all kinds of engine machines. (*New York Herald Tribune*, Dec. 1939)

Why, it is being asked on every side, without a satisfactory answer, should American industries continue to supply the Japanese with scrap iron and steel, with copper, oil, gasoline and other materials equally essential to waging one of the most atrociously uncivilized wars in all history? Is it not past time to put a stop to this unspeakably horrible traffic? (*Philadelphia Inquirer*, Jan. 1940)

If Japan persists in her crime in China the United States should give Tokyo to understand that we will have no part in it. It is unquestionably to our interest to break the stranglehold that Japan has on the Orient by every practical, pacific, economic and financial means within our power. (*Salt Lake City Desert News*, Feb. 1940)

From a selfish American point of view, the ultimate value of a free Chinese

market offers far greater advantages than trade prospects with the Japanese. (*Indianapolis Star*, Mar. 1940)

The best way to implement our diplomacy just now would be to clamp a war materials embargo on Japan, as a means of squeezing the already weakened Japanese military caste out of China and maybe off the backs of the Japanese people. (*New York Daily News*, Mar. 1940)

Had we refused to supply Japan with a virtually unlimited amount of scrap metal, it is almost certain that that country could not have prosecuted its ruthless campaign in China. We have, under the cloak of neutrality, not only made it possible for "our next probable enemy" to obtain essential materials for war against one of our friends but have at the same time cut seriously into our own supply of materials that would be urgently needed if we were confronted with a sudden emergency. (*Washington, D. C., Post*, Feb. 1939)

It is the moral duty of our Government to institute an embargo against Japan insofar as war materials are concerned. We believe this should have been done long ago. (*Charleston, S. C., Gazette*, Jan. 1939)

The shipment of scrap iron for replenishment of Japanese armaments is repugnant to the conscience of our people. (*Seattle Post Intelligencer*, Mar. 1939)

It is time to take ourselves out of the role of accessory to crime. (*The New York Times*, July 1939)

Americans are not only increasingly indignant over affronts to their rights in China; they are increasingly aware of the American stake in an orderly world. (*Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 1940)

The above excerpts are only samples of American editorial comment, selected from among hundreds of forceful statements which might equally well have been chosen. A recent study of editorials from nearly 500 representative U.S. newspapers revealed between 70 and 80 per cent as favoring governmental action to curb U.S. war trade with Japan.

AN AFFIRMATIVE POLICY

There are two principal methods by which the United States can check the extensive aid now being furnished by this country to Japan's military program.

1. Through legislation. Bills for this purpose have already been introduced by Senators Pittman and Schwollenbach, members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and by Congressmen Eaton (N. J.), Wallgren (Wash.), Izac (Cal.), Coffee (Wash.), and Allen (Pa.).

The Pittman bill (S.J. Res. 123) provides that whenever the President shall find that any foreign state which is a party to the Nine Power Pact, is endangering the lives of citizens of the United States, or depriving such citizens of their legal rights and privileges in violation of the express provisions and guaranties in said treaty, the President is authorized to restrict or prohibit the export to such foreign state of arms, ammunition, implements of war, iron, steel, oil, gasoline, scrap-iron, scrap-steel, and scrap-metal.

The Schwollenbach bill (S.J. Res. 143) provides that there shall be denied export to all merchandise, munitions, etc. (except agricultural products) which there is reason to believe will be used in violation of the sovereignty and independence of any nation whose sovereignty and independence the United States is obligated by treaty to respect; that the President shall issue proclamations specifying the articles and materials to be denied export whereupon it shall become unlawful to export or attempt to export such articles or materials.

It will be noted that these bills are based upon American rights and obligations under the Nine Power Treaty, and that they would apply to other nations equally insofar as the terms of this treaty are concerned.

2. Through Executive action. The President is empowered, under the Tariff Act, to place additional duties upon, or to prohibit, any or all imports, and to levy increased dues upon shipping, from a nation which sets up illegal discriminatory restrictions upon American trade. The nature and extent of such restrictions employed by Japan have been set forth in official communications to the Japanese government, without apparent effect. Under these circumstances, the President can bring into effect the above tariff provisions. Denunciation of the commercial treaty between the United States and Japan has paved the way for such action.

Such a course, followed during a transitional period, would rest on solid grounds of justice under law, and of America's own best interests. It would leave China free to achieve her own independence, which she doubtless can and will do against an unaided Japan. No outcome could contribute more to the peace and well-being of all Pacific nations.

FOR AN ENDURING PEACE

Never have Americans looked beyond the seas with deeper concern than today. For a decade we have witnessed the breakdown of treaties, the invasion of weaker nations, the ominous increase of armaments. Now two continents are locked in conflict, and we see, more than ever before, the mobilization of whole peoples, with the submergence of their ordinary life—their activities, thought, freedoms, and aspirations—to the grim requirements of nations engaged in a life and death struggle.

With this picture has come the disquieting thought that if forces of lawlessness gain the ascendancy elsewhere, there will be little on which to build a future peace. Indifference on our part would be impossible. Facing a world of hostile camps, we would impose upon ourselves a much more staggering burden of armaments which of themselves would reduce our prosperity and shorten the spaces that now divide us from the areas of conflict. We too would experience the restraints, and the losses of freedom, incurred by nations that are girding seriously for possible combat in the world of today. Is there nothing that we can do now, while keeping the peace ourselves, to prevent the coming of such a day?

Americans have never thought more realistically or more honestly about the problems of peace than now. There is a growing and disturbing realization that if we had done our part better, heretofore, in the building of peace, the world might not be where it is today. Many persons are asking whether there is any way, even now, in which America can exert its peaceful influence more effectively on the side of law and freedom and cooperation, and against ruthless military aggression.

In the Pacific, American influence and responsibility are now paramount. There exists an opportunity, which may not come again, to help terminate the present stalemate in China, and to cooperate then in the building of a more equitable and enduring peace in "half the world". What are the necessary foundations for such a peace? They may be variously stated; by thoughtful study and negotiation, their details can be delineated. Four basic elements are believed to be essential.

1. **The ending of Japanese aggression.** This can become a reality when American help to Japan is stopped. We may not feel—with good reason—that it is our responsibility to stop Japan. But we cannot escape the responsibility that is now ours for arming Japan, and for thus preventing China from resisting more decisively Japan's military aggression.

2. **The restoration of an independent China.** It has been well said that China can regain her independence against Japan alone, but that she may not be able to do so against a Japan backed by the economic

resources of the United States of America. A free and friendly China, progressing internally and disposed to cooperate with other peace-loving nations, is a factor of inestimable importance in the restoration of security, and in the reestablishment of international relations in the Pacific area.

3. A new and better machinery for peace. This presents difficult problems, but the alternative is a return to international anarchy. Much has been learned during the last twenty-five years. It is clear that an imposed or vengeful peace, unfair to any nation concerned, is impermanent; that effective safeguards against future aggression are necessary; that channels for the equitable settlement of disputes are essential; and that means must be provided for overdue or urgently needed changes by peaceful methods. Most of all, there needs to be a restoration of confidence, and good will, and friendly economic and cultural intercourse between the nations concerned. The essential problems of eastern Asia and the Pacific are not as difficult or involved as those of Europe. The United States, in a spirit not of exploitation but of cooperation among equals, has an unexcelled opportunity to extend the Good Neighbor policy toward other great nations of the Pacific area.

4. The development of economic cooperation. Political peace without economic peace is illusory. With the end of war, both China and Japan will face exceedingly difficult problems. They must be helped in making adjustments involved in shifting to a peace economy, and in initiating broad efforts toward reconstruction. They must be assured of access to resources needed for their economic life, and to markets essential to the development of their industries and trade. The United States can help through public and private credits (utilizing, perhaps, some of our enormous gold stocks for this purpose), through new commercial treaties with both countries providing for mutually beneficial trade relations, and through the encouragement of like treaties between China and Japan, and between both nations and other Pacific powers. By whatever specific methods may be deemed best, the United States will have the opportunity, once the war is ended, to contribute its responsible and significant share toward the increasing prosperity and well-being of Asia and the Americas.

But for this it is essential that we take the first step of making it possible for China to end the war and to bring about the first great check to aggression in a decade, by ourselves foregoing the sordid profits from our war trade with Japan. Only then can there emerge the necessary foundations for a just and lasting peace in the Pacific.

THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR NON-PARTICIPATION IN JAPANESE AGGRESSION

8 WEST 40TH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.

OFFICERS

Honorary Chairman
HON. HENRY L. STIMSON

Honorary Vice-Chairmen
HENRY I. HARRIMAN
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL
ROBERT E. SPEER
WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE
H. E. YARNELL

Chairman
ROGER S. GREENE

Vice-Chairmen
B. A. GARSIDE
JOSEPHINE SCHAIN

Treasurer
MRS. SIDNEY D. GAMBLE

Corresponding Secretary
MRS. GROVER CLARK

Executive Secretary
HARRY B. PRICE

NATIONAL BOARD

MISS ELLEN AUCHINCLOSS
MR. T. A. BISSON
MRS. ARTHUR O. CHOATE
DR. CHARLES G. FENWICK
MISS MARGARET FORSYTH
MR. LOUIS D. FROELICK
MRS. SIDNEY D. GAMBLE
DR. B. A. GARSIDE
MR. ROGER S. GREENE
MR. E. SNELL HALL

MR. A. MERLE HOOPER
MR. WILLIAM STUART HOWE
DR. EDWARD H. HUME
MR. PHILIP J. JAFFE
MR. ELIOT JANEWAY
MR. ORRIN G. JUDD
DR. WALTER H. JUDD
MR. CHASE KIMBALL
REV. DR. E. W. LUCOCK
MR. FREDERICK C. MCKEE

DR. FRANK L. MELENEY
DR. REINHOLD NIEBUHR
MR. EDGAR H. RUE
MISS JOSEPHINE SCHAIN
MR. CHESTER A. SMITH
MRS. PHILIP E. SMITH
MR. MAXWELL STEWART
DR. HENRY PITT VAN DUSEN
MR. OLIN D. WANNAMAHER

SPONSORS

MRS. GROSVENOR ALLEN
DR. HENRY A. ATKINSON
DR. WALLACE W. ATWOOD
DR. ALBERT W. BEAVEN
PROF. GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE
REV. W. RUSSELL BOWIE
MR. VAN WYCK BROOKS
PROF. J. STEWART BURGESS
MRS. CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT
MRS. SAMUEL MCCREA CAVERT
MR. WILLIAM M. CHADBOURNE
MR. HENRY P. CHANDLER
MR. EVANS CLARK
DR. SAMUEL COCHRAN
DR. DONALD J. COWLING
MRS. W. MURRAY CRANE
MR. PAUL D. CRAVATH
MR. CARL CROW
MR. JONATHAN W. DANIELS
PROF. PAUL H. DOUGLAS
DR. BREWER EDDY
DR. CHARLES K. EDMUNDS
MR. CLARK M. EICHELBERGER
MR. VICTOR ELTING
MRS. JOHN H. FINLEY
MRS. GEORGE A. FITCH
DR. HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK
MR. C. H. FRENCH

DR. HARRY A. GARFIELD
PROF. L. CARRINGTON GOODRICH
DR. FRANK P. GRAHAM
JUDGE EDWIN F. HAHN
MISS HELEN HALL
REV. FREDERICK BROWN HARRIS
MR. L. NEWTON HAYES
DR. EMILY HICKMAN
DR. WALTER G. HILTNER
PROF. ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
DR. HARVEY J. HOWARD
DR. E. STANLEY JONES
MISS HELEN KELLER
PROF. E. W. KEMMERER
MR. ROCKWELL KENT
PROF. WILLIAM H. KILPATRICK
DR. ARTHUR LEE KINSOLVING
DR. ROBERT D. LEIGH
DR. HENRY SMITH LEIPER
PROF. EDUARD C. LINDEMAN
MISS ALVES LONG
DR. ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY
DR. MILDRED A. MCAFEE
MR. GEORGE W. MARSTON
DR. WILLIAM PIERSON MERRILL
PROF. R. A. MILLIKAN
BISHOP A. J. MOORE
MR. LEWIS MUMFORD
DR. WILLIAM ALLAN NEILSON

THE RT. REV. G. ASHTON OLDHAM
MRS. EDGERTON PARSONS
REV. STEPHEN C. PEABODY
MRS. GEORGE W. PERKINS
MR. LELAND R. ROBINSON
DR. JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS
REV. JOHN A. RYAN
MR. ALEXANDER SACHS
RT. REV. WILLIAM SCARLETT
MISS ROSE SCHNEIDERMAN
MR. VINCENT SHEEAN
BISHOP HENRY K. SHERRILL
MRS. F. LOUIS SLADE
MR. DONALD OGDEN STEWART
MRS. DONALD OGDEN STEWART
RT. REV. ANSON P. STOKES
HON. WILLIAM E. SWEET
MR. HORACE D. TAFT
PROF. HOWARD THURMAN
DR. FREDERICK J. TOOKER
RABBI JACOB WEINSTEIN
BISHOP HERBERT WELCH
DR. ERNEST H. WILKINS
DR. MAURICE WILLIAM
DR. STEPHEN S. WISE
DR. MARY E. WOOLLEY
DR. QUINCY WRIGHT
DR. JAMES M. YARD

THE question—"Shall America Stop Arming Japan?"—is one for the American people to decide. No issue is more important, or more urgent, in our foreign relations today. The government will act when the people demand it in unmistakable terms.

Here are concrete suggestions for the individual who is prepared to do his part in a nation-wide democratic movement to end America's support to Japanese aggression. Every genuine action counts. Help make your own democracy work.

What One Person Can Do

Toward Ending America's Arming of Japan

1. Order and distribute widely copies of this booklet and other literature designed to make the facts known.
2. Write your own views, frankly and clearly, to the President, the Secretary of State, your two Senators, and your Congressman. (Address each: Hon.
Washington, D. C. Correct names can be secured by a telephone call to your local Board of Elections.)
3. Bring the question to the attention of your friends, and invite them to write also.
4. Cooperate with others, through existing civic, business, religious, and social organizations or a special committee, in seeing that the question is brought before public gatherings, local radio audiences, and the readers of your own newspapers.
5. Contribute to the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, which invites the cooperation of all and which depends entirely upon voluntary gifts for the effective conduct of its nation-wide program of education and publicity. Funds are urgently needed for the extension of this work. Full information, including suggestions for further cooperation, will be furnished gladly upon request.

