

# TOWARD NEW TOWNS IN THE PHILIPPINES

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## ABSTRACT

Growing interest in new towns has not been matched by local research on planning and development. We have therefore conducted surveys and case studies focused on selected large community projects in Metro Manila.

From the information that we have gathered so far, it would appear that many local governments in Metro Manila are not well prepared to plan for or regulate urban growth, including residential projects within their jurisdictions.

For their own part, a few of the private firms engaged in real estate development seem capable of designing and constructing projects that meet at least some of the major features of new towns such as large individual size. However, whether separated or jointly supported by private and government agencies, large projects are not necessarily free of serious handicaps, such as having to assemble sufficiently large sites.

Aside from inhibiting good planning and development practices, such handicaps tend to increase costs and prices in residential projects. Private projects thus tend to cater to people who can afford such prices, while "cheap" government-subsidized projects are addressed to poorer people.

The deeper ramifications and wider implications of these tentative impressions will be probed further in the final stages and year of this investigation.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Essentially the study aims to help improve knowledge, policy and practice in the planning, development, and admin-

istration of large urban community projects in metropolitan regions like Manila. It seeks to describe, analyze and evaluate the role of new towns as a concept in housing resettlement, and related programs and projects; the key processes and problems involved in community development projects of private and government agencies; and the social and cultural as well as economic aspects of life in new communities. The study hopes also to identify the major issues raised by new towns for government, private enterprise, and citizens in the communities concerned.

## II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

While interest in new towns has been sustained abroad, comparatively few studies have been devoted to the subject in the Philippines. The most recent studies of interest have been those devoted to the development of Makati as a residential, industrial, and business center in the immediate suburbs of Manila. 1944.

On the other hand, there seems to be a growing interest in planned large-scale housing, urban development, and resettlement projects in the Manila region. As a result of our initial efforts for this research, we have published an exploratory report on the trend signalled by these projects<sup>1</sup>. The accumulation of local literature in the general area of housing and urban development may also be seen in the bibliography compiled for this study<sup>4</sup>. An important part of this literature is the work that has been done on resettlement efforts in Metro Manila and by studies, reports, and plans regarding the development of the metropolitan area. Of particular importance for the present research are the reports and recommendations of the Manila Bay Region Strategic Plan group and the Task Force on Human Settlements<sup>2</sup>.

Taken together, the existing local literature on housing, urban, and metropolitan development constitutes a rich source of materials for this study, and we shall glean from this source in the course of this and subsequent reports. However, few of the studies that we are aware of have been

done from the specific standpoint of new town development. Those so oriented are often in the form of "planning studies" or proposals for projects that are yet to be completed or actually built.

### III. METHODS

As part of the study, we have conducted surveys of trends and problems in Metro Manila and of government and private capabilities for meeting the requirements of urban growth. Starting with a profile of Metro Manila, we proceeded to make a questionnaire survey of local planning and regulatory practices in the area. We have also conducted case studies of three projects which would have the size and other features of new towns and represent a significant range of institutional arrangements: one is a subdivision and housing project of a private firm, another is a similar private project supported by government housing agencies, and the third is the government resettlement project located in Carmona, Cavite. The survey of private capabilities has yet to be completed, while the case studies will be presently focused on the impact of the selected projects on their residents and on surrounding communities.

### IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

*Metropolitan Problems and New Towns.* This study was prompted by problems arising from the growth and expansion of Metro Manila. Previously defined as comprising eight core cities and towns, the perimeter of this area has been extended by the National Census and Statistics (NCSO) to include 19 more localities. Other agencies, notably the Task Force on Human Settlements and Manila Bay Region (MBR) planning groups, have delineated a much wider region of eight provinces and a metropolitan core of 33 to 40 cities and towns. For some of our own purposes, we have added 10 more fringe towns to the NCSO definition for a total of 37 localities.

Metro Manila retains the bulk (4.6 million in 1970) of

a regional population that has grown much faster than the rest of the nation due to the natural increase and continuing inflow of people and activities. But the heart of the metropolis has shown signs of congestion, including housing deficiencies, traffic snarls, breakdowns in public services, and environmental pollution. Taking their heaviest tolls on the people huddled in the slums and "squatter" colonies, these problems have spilled over into a suburbs and fringe areas as people leave or avoid the central cities. By 1970, 232,000 of the 472,000 households in Metro Manila had settled in 29 localities outside its core. There were then only a total of 720,000 dwelling-units, and 18,500 of these were *barong-barong* while 11,800 were in buildings not intended primarily for residential use.

According to the 1975 report of MBR planning group, the housing deficits already evident in 1970 will probably assume massive proportions (573,000 short!) by the year 2000, when the metropolitan population will have more than doubled and "housing demand" will have reached 1,387,000 (see Table IV). Meanwhile, metropolitan expansion has taken place in a piecemeal and haphazard fashion, resulting in indiscriminate mixtures of land uses, "ribbon" developments along highways, and patches of subdivisions in outlying areas. In a word, the process has produced urban sprawl, which implies serious strains, inefficiencies and disparities in public and private facilities due to the fragmented growth and extension of settlements in outlying areas.

To solve similar problems, many countries have built new towns, following the example set by the British in 1946. Such new towns are typically large, though their sizes may vary from 20,000 to 400,000 people on sites of about 400 to 10,000 hectares. Each has sufficient local facilities so that residents do not have to make long trips to work, shopping, school, recreation, and other activities outside. While "self-contained," however, the new towns are planned in some relation to larger communities. They are typically located as satellites to metropolitan centers, but some have been built or proposed in isolated places and there have been "new towns in town."

New towns afford opportunities for improving community planning and design, using new and faster methods of land development and building construction, and conserving open spaces or natural areas. From a broader perspective, they could also serve as focal elements in increasing the efficiency of the structure, processes, and functions of metropolitan and larger areas. For their own residents and for others, new towns hold out the promise of a better environment, improved welfare, and more harmonious relationships.

As a comprehensive "planned settlement and integrated coordinated development meeting physical, economic, social and cultural needs," a new town is demanding in its requirements. The necessary technical, institutional and economic resources must exist to bring it into being. For example, it requires a great deal of capital for land, infrastructure, community and residential facilities, and at least part of the initial as well as operating expenditures for a new town must eventually be borne by its inhabitants. Even if some people can afford new towns, a great many others can not. This suggests a number of issues that the study seeks to raise.

*Philippine Experience with New Towns.* The new town idea is not entirely new here or abroad. Whole urban settlements, utopian communities, and capital cities in different countries have been established before the British adopted their policy. Philip II promulgated a grand urban design for founding his empire's colonial towns shortly after Spanish Manila was given its royal charter. We can also point to Baguio City, Quezon City, and Makati as more recent examples.

Despite a postwar national plan recommendation, the government has not actually adopted an explicit policy like that of the British new towns or of the American "new communities." Postwar urban expansion may still be largely attributed to piecemeal accretions and small subdivision projects with limited provisions (if any) for community facilities. In recent years, however, these projects have grown in individual size and number and the new town idea appears to

have gained some popularity.

This trend has been given impetus by government measures. The national government, which has raised its four-year housing targets to 240,847 units (1974-1977), has stressed projects rather than individual dwellings. Its housing agencies have developed or financed more and larger projects, especially in Metro Manila. The GSIS, SSS, and other agencies have encouraged greater participation by private developer through such means as provision of short-term loans for land development and construction, NHC-fabricated dwelling components, the long-term housing loans for groups of housebuyers. But some private firms have also embarked on subdivision and housing projects on their own account.

Some of these projects have been designed as or called new towns. These include the PHHC's Tala New Town, which would ultimately have 20,000 families on a 600-hectare site in Caloocan City. The SSS has prepared plans for its own New Town for 21,000 families or 300 hectares of Montalban land. The resettlement projects have likewise been conceived along the lines of new town ideas. The private Manila New Town Development Corporation has a "satellite" project for 7,000 families on a 460,000-hectare site in San Jose, Bulacan.

These projects would have town centers and residential neighborhoods, and commercial, recreational, and other community facilities and basic utilities. The government new towns have provisions for local industry; this would provide 16,000 jobs in the case of the SSS new town. No such provisions appear to have been made in the private New Town and other large private projects, a significant difference somewhat offset by their emphasis on shopping, recreational, and environmental amenities.

In addition, government bodies (notably the MBR and Human Resettlements planning groups) have formulated among other things, regional plans that would designate areas for several new urban communities, cities, and urban growth "poles" in Metro Manila or its immediate hinterland. One of these, a proposed city of 300,000 residents (daytime

population: 500,000) is being started with the reclamation of 1,600 to 3,000 hectares of Manila Bay land just south of Manila. This is being undertaken by a private firm for the national government spin-offs of road, floodway, and other projects located 15 to 25 kilometers from Manila.

All this might suggest the existence of capabilities for sustaining the apparent trend toward new towns. This would partly be true if the government actually invested the P4 billion earmarked for its current four-year housing program, thus, substantially boosting its share (20%) during the 1980's of all housing investments. But a great deal of these funds would still go into individual rather than project or "group" housing, and apart from the land and infrastructure requirements entailed by large projects; other non-material resources must exist to support new town projects.

Without government support of various kinds, the private sector generally seems to be in a poor position to undertake new towns. Most private firms engaged in real estate and construction remain small. This is suggested by the fact that more than 75% of all real estate establishments (or 767 of 949) covered by the 1972 Economic Census had less than 10 employees each (see Table VIII). A great many are single proprietorship rather than corporations. Most enterprises engaged in residential development undertake subdivision projects on a piece-meal, and often "one-shot" basis, and few build dwellings as well as develop home sites and lots.

A few private firms such as BF Homes, Inc. have attained sufficient size to be able to undertake several subdivision projects, and some have embarked on fair-sized community projects that include housing construction as well as land development. A strong basis is indicated on occasion by the existence of interlocking "sister companies" and the integration of certain functions that a firm might have earlier subcontracted or would normally let out to other firms. This development has been carried to its logical conclusion by the Land and Housing Development Corporation, a consortium formed in 1968 by a group of landowners, bankers, contractors, suppliers, and design professionals.

Even these firms, however, do not operate without

serious handicaps. These include prevailing economic conditions in general and the structure of demand and supply in the real estate market in particular. Inflation has taken a heavy toll on construction. Moreover, the resources that might have gone into suburban development projects presumably have been diverted by the rash of high-rise condominium and hotel projects in Metro Manila's center. Even in the suburbs, developers are inclined to serve only those who can afford their prices, and frequently, they rather go into the resort, golf course, or memorial park business than into residential projects.

Other related constraints exist for those intent on community-building projects. These and some of their consequences may be gleaned from the projects that we have selected for closer analysis. These projects are not among the so-called new towns mentioned above, most of which were still on the drawing boards when we made our selection. Rather, these projects represent a middle ground between the traditional subdivision and the full-blown new town. We choose them partly because they had been started and because their developers were willing to have them scrutinized.

Before going down to cases, we will present a summary of the main results of a related survey covering local governments in Metro Manila. Some of our remarks in this connection, however, are derived from our case findings thus far.

*Survey of Local Government Planning and Regulation.* Adequate government support of various kinds is especially necessary for projects like new towns including purely private ventures. Areawide plans must exist to indicate the availability of sites and public facilities, for example. However, if the regional plans that have been formulated provide better rhyme and reason for the location of projects, something they hardly had before, they still need an institutional framework that can decide and act on them. The conversion of the Task Force on Human Settlements into a Commission may reduce complaints about having to deal with a multitude of agencies concerned with housing. But that



body would in turn have to be reconciled with the metropolitan machinery approved in the last referendum for the Manila Area.

An equally important, and in a sense more pressing need, is the development of local government capabilities for planning and regulating urban growth. As part of the study, we sent out a survey questionnaire to executive and technical officials of 32 local governments in Metro Manila in August-September 1973. The secretary and engineer of each local government were also interviewed. The survey elicited replies from 55 respondents from five cities and municipalities (only one respondent each replied from three towns). Most of the respondents (49%) were city or municipal secretaries, while 40% were engineers and building inspectors. We have retabulated the results to reflect the number of local governments as well as the individual respondents (Table V, VII to IX).

From this survey, it would appear that many local governments in Metro Manila were poorly equipped to cope with urban expansion in their jurisdictions. Of the 29 surveyed, only 14 had some kind of planning office, 13 had none, and the respondents from two towns could not even agree on whether they had such an office (27 respondents said Yes; 25, No; 3 did not reply). As a matter of fact, fewer still had a distinct planning unit; the respondents cited various offices — including the engineering department or division, the mayor's office, the board or council, or some other regular unit or official as responsible for the planning and regulatory devices that were in existence.

Most of the local governments apparently had building (28) and subdivision (25) ordinances, but only 11 had zoning regulations (14 said No). Respondents from 14 claimed to have a land use map (12 said No; 3 sent in conflicting replies) while development plans were even rarer (respondents from 7 said Yes; 16; No; 4; no response; and 2 had conflicting replies). The existing ordinances and maps or plans are of varying vintage. A few respondents indicated that these were "under study" or were being prepared. From another source, we learned that one fast-growing town hired a consultant to prepare or update its zoning regulations, but no results have

been in sight.

There seems to be no consistent correlations between the replies from the local jurisdictions and their conditions. Core localities like Manila and Pasay City, which should be old enough to have set up planning offices were among those which had none. Perhaps it was precisely because they were too old and built-up (if one made assumption that they had no major urban renewal or redevelopment problems that require such an office). On the other hand, some of those which had room for the attention of growth and planning and claimed to have a planning office, were among those which had no development plan — i.e., Quezon City, Cainta, Taytay, Taguig, Pateros, Marikina, and San Pedro. A structure need not imply a function, and vice versa.

The individual respondents also have varying views about the developments taking place in their jurisdictions and the role that they should assume. They generally observed that the trend in their localities was toward commercial and industrial uses and the development of raw vacant lands. About half of the respondents said that residential projects were only a moderate force in this trend, and only 10% said that their local governments were encouraging such projects. Most of them said that their governments should encourage (64%) and finance (91%) housing projects, but they probably expressed concern when they cited the ramifications of such projects in terms of local population, public services, and economic resources.

As noted above, however, most of the local governments surveyed did not have the institutional and technical facilities for affirmatively influencing the growth of their jurisdictions. Most of the respondents felt that their regulatory devices would serve the purpose and tended to facilitate the applications of developers. Very few (4%), however, mentioned site selection for housing projects as a local government function. And while a third claimed that no variances from regulations were allowed, most felt the need to strengthen their enforcement (e.g., through the performance bond, which 22% of the respondents said did not exist in their jurisdictions), to supervise projects, and to extend services to them, especially in the

light of numerous complaints and problems among their buyers or residents.

It is doubtful whether regulation or control without affirmative planning and administration could be sufficient to guide or direct the growth of local jurisdictions toward satisfactory outcomes. This is especially so for large residential projects like new towns, which require planning and regulatory framework that would positively influence the course of individual projects and at the same time permit or encourage innovations in their design and development — something that traditional building, subdivision, and zoning ordinances cannot do very well. Without affirmative jurisdiction-wide plans and programs, projects would be mediocre and costly.

## V. THE CASE STUDIES

Three projects were chosen for the case studies — Parañaque BF Homes, a private housing and subdivision project, Moonwalk Housing Project, a government-financed private development project, and Carmona Resettlement Project, a government project. The private projects are in the adjoining municipalities of Parañaque, Las Piñas, and Bacoor, which have been experiencing a great deal of urban growth in the past 10 years. Carmona gained substantial population in the last intercensal decade. BF Homes and Moonwalk are located 10 and 20 kilometers south of Manila, respectively, while the resettlement project is 38 kilometers farther south.

The local authorities in these towns could not probably take all the credit for their growth, nor could they prepare to deal equally with rapid growth and its consequences. Parañaque and Las Piñas adopted subdivision and building ordinances in the early 1960's; in addition, the former had a zoning ordinance and a land use map. Neither, however, has prepared a development plan, in spite of the fact that both have been the location of a growing number of subdivision and housing projects which are taking up large chunks of their total land areas. On the other hand, the resettlement project in Carmona has been governed by

national legislation, plans and regulations.

These projects were selected after a survey of candidate projects in 1973. Data about these candidates were gathered from housing agencies, advertisements of private firms, and our questionnaire survey of private developers. Apart from being partly developed and occupied, and representing major types of institutional arrangements, the case projects were chosen for their size, location, range of facilities and the kinds of groups for which these projects were intended for. Parañaque BF Homes is one of the several subdivision-*cum*-housing projects in Metro Manila of BF Homes Inc., a private development firm. From an initial site of 96 hectares, the Project has grown to six phases with a total area of 425 hectares as of April 1975. Capable of accommodating 7,830 family units (or a population of 39,150 assuming five members for each family) the Project was occupied by 1,900 families (or roughly 9,500 persons). In addition to the 1,900 dwellings already occupied, 270 more have been built and 291 more are under construction (or a total of 2,170). All but 10% of these dwellings have been built by BF Homes or its subcontractors.

Although it has no provision for local industry, Parañaque BF Homes was conceived as a "complete, self-contained community" for "middle income families." Basic utilities found within the Project include concrete roads with underground drainage and sewerage systems, a water supply system, electric power service provided by Meralco, and telephone service by the PLDT. Added to these are the community facilities provided by BF Homes which include playgrounds and parks, a community center, a chapel, an elementary school, basketball, tennis and pelota courts, and a shopping complex with a theatre.

Prospective homeowners of Parañaque BF Homes have a choice from a wide variety of two-and-three bedroom house models with lots ranging from 180 to 534 square meters. Lot prices which were about P 64 per square meter in 1970 have risen to P 180-195; while house prices, which were as low as P 25,000 in 1973, now range from P 40,000 (for a twin unit) to P 140,000 (for a 3-bedroom house with a terrace).

Moonwalk Housing Project, began in 1970, was intended for 20,000 dwelling units on a projected area of 400 hectares of lands stretching over municipalities of Las Piñas and Bacoor. SSS and GSIS, whose members would be beneficiaries of the Project, have approved land development and construction loans amounting to P 173 million for the 197-hectare site already acquired. Thus far, only the Las Piñas portion (59 hectares) has been developed, but the developer has acquired and will acquire its ultimate targets. About 860 families (or a population of 4,950) — 637 from GSIS and 233 from SSS — have moved into the Project. All in all, 1,921 units have been built (all but 12 by the developer). Only 441 of these are for SSS members, although ultimately three-fourths of the proposed site will be built for this group.

According to its developer, Moonwalk Development and Housing Corporation, the Project was designed according to the “new town” concept to become “one of the most modern communities available for workers and low income employees.” It would have various commercial, school, health, and recreational facilities, including a 15-hectare open space. The developed portion, however, has not reached the range and scale of community facilities envisioned. The basic amenities available in the Project include concrete and asphalted roads with a central drainage system, water supply system powered by two deepwells, and electric power service provided by Meralco. The prices of the lots and dwelling units already built — most of them 2-bedroom single detached units — have also tended to rise, from P 22,800 in 1972 to P 30,000 the following year, a trend followed by the recent SSS decision to raise its housing loan ceiling to P 50,000.

The Carmona Resettlement Project is on a 411-hectare site acquired in 1961 by the PHHC. This agency has also served as its physical planner, but a host of other government and private agencies, notably the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Resettlement Agency (PHRA), have been engaged in this project. The bulk of the site is strung out along the 9-kilometer main road connecting the two barrios of Carmona, namely, San Jose and San Gabriel, which

are 670 meters apart. The site plan includes a town center, an industrial site making up 10% of the area, residential neighborhoods, and other land uses. Of the 7,886 lots available, 6,793 units have been occupied. These lots average 144 square meters in size and are sold at subsidized prices repayable over a period of 30 years. All but a few hundred small core houses were built or rebuilt by the relocatees themselves.

At present, the public utilities found in the Resettlement Project include a water supply drawn from artesian wells and a few deep wells; an electric service which is provided by the First Cavite Electric Cooperative, Inc. in all but two of the eleven sub-areas of Carmona; health services delivered by a newly-opened hospital and by rural health units; and the provision of educational facilities for students in Carmona. Numerous *sari-sari* stores, larger general stores, and *talipapa* stalls have sprouted over the Resettlement Project to serve residents.

Carmona has been viewed by some of its planners as a potential new town which would serve as "counter-magnet" to attract new as well as old migrants to the central cities. An important provision in Carmona is the supply of local cottage and industrial jobs, which now employ about 1,761 workers. However, these economic opportunities have remained seriously short. Of the 10,000 families relocated to Carmona since 1968, only about half (4,671) had remained as of June 1974. A telling indication of what this rate of abandonment implied was the fact that the government extended a commuter train service to the site. This measure was taken so that those of its inhabitants who had or could find jobs in the central cities or towns of Metro Manila could commute at less cost than by bus.

Although our investigations are by no means complete, we may hazard some exploratory generalizations on the basis of our tentative analysis of the cases. The experiences of Carmona may be indicative of serious shortcomings. It would be premature to say the same of two other projects, but they seem to have their share of shortfalls of significant consequence. The fact that they have not reached their ultimate

size may be attributed simply to the years that it usually takes to complete a new town or large community project. Nonetheless, the developers of such projects must aspire for an ability to build "instant communities" if they are to become successful in the varied senses of this word.

This ability was in fact claimed by the private developers as a major selling point. BF Homes has developed or used improved construction methods as well as standard dwelling designs to accelerate development. Moonwalk has been likewise assisted by the technology developed by the National Housing Corporation for prefabricating dwelling components. In short, the techniques exist for faster rates of development, though they may still leave something to be desired such as on-site prefabrication method.

One problem, however, appears to have impeded not only the development process but also planning and design. This is the need to acquire sufficiently large sites. The Carmona site was acquired as one big but irregular piece from another government agency. The sites of the two other projects have been acquired piecemeal from many owners of individual parcels, which need not be contiguous. One of the private developers views this as a matter of discreetly buying up strategic parcels first so that owners of intervening parcels will be forced to sell or persuaded to contribute their lands as joint ventures with the developers. By contrast, the other developer fears that owners of intervening parcels may hold out.

At any rate, piecemeal site assembly means that comprehensive project planning is difficult, imprecise, and secretive at best. A firm may not be able to design its intended project far beyond the first few "phases" that it has acquired. The project may be developed and expanded in patches depending on which parcels can be bought or otherwise acquired. As a result, it may grow with less than the range of facilities expected of large projects, without much of a real center, unity and order.

Moreover, prospective homebuyers and residents may not know precisely what would happen next with the expansion of a project developed in this manner. Planning is sup-

posed to provide some assurance that the developer will keep his promises. But if made at all, these promises could be fragile when a large community project is planned and officially approved on a phase by phase basis, unlike several small subdivisions. Thus, developers could add such important things as a hotel complex or a memorial park, modifications which may be unwelcome to residents of the developed portions of the project.

Another far-reaching consequence of "price-gouging" is the increase in land acquisition cost, although we do not know yet just how much difference this has made. Land development and construction costs, of course, would also weigh heavily in price determination, just as demand conditions would. As of December 1969, when it had developed only 46 hectares, BF Parañaque had entailed about P12.4 million including cost of land and the development of the area. The Las Piñas portion of Moonwalk had incurred P183.5 million in expenditures for site acquisition, survey and development, utilities, building construction, maintenance, and promotions. Of the many agencies engaged in Carmona, the PHHC and PHRA alone had spent P 2.9 million and P 3.1 million in the project as of March 1973 and June 1974, respectively. These are just general indications of financial costs. We will need more complete and specific figures than these ones to relate costs to prices and, ultimately to benefits.

Institutional factors and demand conditions combine with costs to determine prices, which in turn determine the kinds of people who settle in these projects, the way they relate to each other, and the way they interrelate with people outside. We may presume that BF Parañaque was motivated mainly by private profit; Moonwalk had mixed motives, while Carmona had broader interests which justified government subsidy. The internal and wider consequences of these differences are not difficult to foresee, though we have yet to investigate them more fully.

Thus, BF Parañaque was explicitly "middle class" in its market target families which earn "P 1,500 a month, a level now raised to P 2,000-P 2,500 or more." According to BF Homes, its homebuyers liked the very sameness of the



houses and standard of living that the project had to offer. Moreover, the developer has found them to have very much in common besides income. The dwellers easily get along and identify with their neighbors, and are cooperative and active in local group activities, such as the activities of the homeowners association whose functions comprise the operation of certain maintenance services and management built at the core. This was the impression given by their provisions for dwellings, which have been few and far between.

On the one hand, private development projects are aimed at people who are economically much better off, although usually classified as "middle income" group; on the other hand, government-financed private projects, are presumably intended for lower income group. We can hardly blame private developers for their socio-economic targets, under which circumstances, dictate that they either gain or lose. But the wider consequences of their tendency to cater only to higher income groups, including dollar-laden tourists, may have had some reinforcement from government economic housing programs whose benefits are reserved for those who have the necessary income, job, organizational, and group membership qualifications. When these programs and their eligibility criteria assume the form of projects, their implications, together with those of purely private projects, for the social as well as physical landscape of an area may be readily imagined.

The tendencies just cited are traceable to the difficulties that may be encountered in new town planning and development — difficulties that probably add substantially to the already large costs that must be entailed in embarking on and implementing projects of such magnitude and complexity. Local governments, unfortunately, seem too ill-equipped to ease such burdens; if anything, those with very crude planning and regulatory mechanisms might serve only as additional sources of cost. However, local governments cannot take all the blame. There are more basic constraints involved, just as there are wider ramifications entailed.

From a strictly economic or financial standpoint, it is

easier to see that costs help explain the social and cultural orientations of private projects. But from a broader standpoint, the costs of resettlement and other government-sided projects may be no less than those of some facilities in the project. An active and "cohesive community" has thus been formed in BF Parañaque, although the introduction of a hotel and tourist complex there may be introduced more as transient elements.

Moonwalk Housing Project consists mainly of government and private employees who are GSIS and SSS members. The family income of these groups range from P700 to P900 a month. A significant aim of the housing policies of these agencies should contain at least some dwellings for low-income people as well as for those belonging to the middle-income bracket. But such "income mix," an extremely important thrust of new town ideas appears to have been difficult to realize. According to Moonwalk Development and Housing Corporation, costs tend to rule out really low-cost housing, and in any event, home buyers do not like to live in such mixed company so that low and middle-income dwellings have had to be developed in separate sections of the project.

The Carmona Resettlement Project has been surveyed and researched by others before us, but we intend to do more intensive field work there. At the moment, it appears to be a case where the development of a community can hardly take place at all because of the high rates of attrition that it has experienced. The hardier souls who have not pulled up stakes may have grown roots there. Nonetheless, there would seem to have remained the problem of substantially improving their material well-being which, in turn, would significantly affect their social and cultural development, though in just what way, we still have to find out.

## VI. CONCLUSION

We may briefly conclude this report by reflecting on the cases of new towns in general in wider metropolitan and social context. What the cases, taken together, dramatize at this point is a matter of comparison and relation. The wider consequences might be that, because of their handicaps —

large scale projects might succeed only too well in forming sharply distinct local communities. From a wider perspective, these communities, whether formed by government or private enterprise, may become so "differentiated" as to make them difficult to integrate socially and culturally (as well as functionally) with their neighbors and with the larger society.

Such issues will be identified and further explored in subsequent phases of this investigation. We intend to conclude our research by taking another look at the new town projects mentioned at the earlier part of this paper. At the moment, however, our concern is to move into a more intensive and systematic analysis of the case projects. Each of these is big enough as a separate research project, and dynamic enough to be considered "moving targets" that challenge the primary task of description.

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Table I. Population, Area and Density of Metro Manila  
Localities: 1970 Census

	1970 Pop- ulation	%Pop. Change 1960-1970	Area in Hectares	Persons per Hectare	Number of Households 1970
<b>Core Area</b>					
1. Manila	1,330,788	16.9%	3,828	348	215,213
2. Navotas	83,245	69.0	260	320	13,205
3. Caloocan	274,453	88.6	5,581	49	45,754
4. Quezon City	754,452	89.6	16,616	45	118,787
5. San Juan	104,559	83.9	1,038	101	16,668
6. Mandaluyong	149,407	108.6	2,596	58	23,262
7. Makati	264,918	131.3	2,986	89	42,529
8. Pasay City	206,283	55.5	1,397	148	34,746
Subtotal	3,168,105	50.4%	34,301	92	510,164
<b>BCS [NCSO] Additional Areas</b>					
9. Malabon	141,514	85.1	2,337	61	23,657
10. Valenzuela	98,456	137.4	4,700	21	16,600
11. Meycauayan	50,977	58.1	2,150	24	8,785
12. Marikina	113,400	180.3	3,894	29	18,636
13. Pasig	156,492	151.9	1,297	121	25,828
14. Cainta	20,714	204.5	1,016	20	3,353
15. Taytay	46,717	114.8	3,883	12	7,250
16. Pateros	25,468	93.3	1,038	25	4,099
17. Taguig	55,257	152.8	3,371	16	8,778
18. Muntinglupa	65,057	197.2	4,673	14	8,941
19. San Pedro	32,991	134.3	2,265	15	5,474
20. Binan	58,290	75.0	4,348	13	9,289

21.	Paranaque	97,214	57.1	3,832	25	16,030
22.	Las Pinas	45,732	184.2	4,154	11	6,803
23.	Bacoor	48,440	77.7	2,500	19	7,898
24.	Kawit	28,447	47.0	1,338	21	4,886
25.	Noveleta	10,560	50.2	563	19	1,756
26.	Cavite City	75,739	38.0	1,183	64	13,180
27.	Rosario	23,817	46.8	364	65	3,827
	Subtotal	1,195,282	103.2	48,906	24.4	195,070
	BSC [NCISO] Total	4,363,387		83,207		205,234
	Fringe Towns					
28.	Obando	27,176	45.1	5,209	5	4,382
29.	San Jose	18,704	100.5	22,750	0.82	3,133
30.	Montalban	20,882	116.4	31,283	0.67	3,428
31.	San Mateo	29,183	142.3	6,490	4	4,777
32.	Antipolo	26,506	22.7	30,613	0.87	4,417
33.	Angono	12,127	71.0	2,596	5	1,916
34.	Teresa	9,381	90.4	1,861	5	1,546
35.	Sta. Rosa	41,335	55.5	3,906	11	6,661
36.	Carmona	20,123	146.0	4,024	5	3,284
37.	Dasmariñas	17,948	52.8	8,228	2	2,987
	Subtotal	223,365		116,960	1.9	36,531
	Grand Total	4,586,752		206,167		741,765

SOURCE:

National Census and Statistics Office [NCISO], 1970 Census of Population and Housing, Final Reports [for Manila, Rizal, Bulacan, Cavite, and Laguna], [Manila: NCISO, Nov. 1972], Vol I; Bureau of Census and Statistics [BCS], "Manila Metropolitan Area," Journal of Philippine Statistics, v. 24, n. 3 [Third Quarter 1973], Table 2, pp. xvii - xix; and BCS, 1960 Census of Agriculture [for Rizal and Cavite]

Table II . Number of Households and Dwelling Units  
by Type of Building in Metro Manila: 1970

		Number of Dwelling Units					
		No. of	Total,	Type of Building			
Areas	House- holds	House- holds	Occupied and Un- occupied	Single	Dueplex Apart./ Accessoria	Barong- Barong	Commercial, Industrial, etc.
I	Core	510,164	491,141	273,852	196,033	12,328	8,928
II	Additional	195,070	192,800	151,345	34,121	4,730	2,604
III	Fringe	36,531	36,245	32,785	1,733	1,481	246
Total		741,765	720,186	457,982	231,887	18,539	11,778

SOURCE: NCSO, 1970 Census of Population and Housing, Final Reports [for Manila, Rizal, Bulacan, Cavite, and Laguna],  
Manila: NCSO, Nov. 1972], Vol. 1

Table III . Number of Dwelling Units in Metro Manila  
by Status of Occupancy and Tenure: 1970

Areas	Status		Tenure of Oppcupied Dwelling Units			
	Unoccupied	Occupied	Units that are wholly or partly:			
			Owner-occupied	Rented	Occupied rent-free	
I Core	14,230	476,911	195,222	259,715	21,974	
II Additional	3,752	189,048	129,456	51,408	8,174	
III Fringe	380	35,865	31,910	2,314	1,641	
Total	18,362	701,824	356,588	313,437	31,789	

SOURCE: NCSO, 1970 Census of Population and Housing, Final Reports [for Manila, Rizal, Bulacan, Cavite, and Laguna] [Manila: NCSO, Nov. 1972], Vol. I

Table IV. MBR Estimates of Housing and Land Requirements  
Of Metro Manila Area\*: 1970-2000

Year	Housing demand	Housing stock	Housing deficit	Land Requirements (hectares)
1970	727,167	662,502	64,665	29,087
1980	897,333	720,699	176,634	35,893
1980	1,115,500	759,277	356,223	44,620
2000	1,386,667	814,052	572,615	55,467

\*BCS definition. See Table I.

SOURCE: Planning and Project Development Office, Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, Manila Bay Metropolitan Region Strategic Plan (Manila: PPDO, Jan. 1975), Tables 2.7 and 2.8' p. 41.

Table V. Existence of a Planning Office

	Yes	No.	No response & conflicting	Total
By individual respondent	27	25	3	55
By city or municipality	14	13	2*	29

\*Conflicting replies from respondents of 2 localities.



Table VI. Offices Responsible for Planning and Regulation

Local Official/ Office	Preparation of development plan	Enforcement of	
		zoning regulations	subdivision regulations
<b>By respondent:</b>			
Engineer	4	14	19
Mayor	5	6	12
Board/council	6	8	17
Other officials	7	3	2
No plan/ordinance	30	24	5
No reply	3	—	—
<b>Total</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>By city/municipality:</b>			
Engineer	—	5	7
Mayor	2	2	4
Board/council	4	4	9
Other officials	3	2	1
No plan/ordinance	15	12	3
Conflicting replies	1	4	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>29</b>

Table VII. Availability of Plan Documents

	Development Plan			Total
	Yes	No	No reply/conflicting replies	
By individual respondent	15	29	11	55
By City or municipality	7	16	6*	29

\*Conflicting replies from 2 localities.

	Land Use map			Total
	Yes	No	No reply/ conflicting replies	
By individual respondent	28	27	—	55
By city or municipality	14	12	3*	29

\*Conflicting replies of 3 localities.

Table VIII . Number of Real Estate Establishments by Number of Employees in the Philippines: 1967 and 1972

Number of persons Engaged	Kinds of Establishments					Total
	Subdividers & developers	Real estate agents, brokers, managers & appraisers	Lessons of real property	Operators of dwellings, apartments & non residential properties*		
9 or less						
1967*	*				**	767
1972	461	254	52			
10-19						
1967	26	35	D	6		68
1972	73	34	2			109
20-49						
1967	42	15	D	5		62
1972	31	10	2			43

50-99							
1967	8		D	6	—	14	
1972	12		3	2	—	17	
100-199							
1967	3		D	1	—	4	
1972	5		1	3	—	4	
200-499							
1967			D	2	—	2	
1972	3		—	1	—	4	
500 or more							
1967	1		D	—	—	1	
1972	—		—	—	—	—	
Total							
1967	80		D	59	11	151*	
1972	585		60	304	—	949	

\*The 1967 survey report did not include the number of establishments with less than 10 employees.

\*\*This category of real estate establishments was not included in the 1972 survey.

SOURCE: *Economic Census of the Philippines 1967*. Vol. VI Part B.

Bureau of Census and Statistics, Manila.

1972: Economic Census Division, National Census and Statistics Office, Manila.

Table IX . Availability of Regulatory Ordinances

	Zoning Ordinance			Total
	Yes	No	No reply/con- flicting replies	
By individual respondent	24	27	4	55
By city or municipality	11	14	4*	29

\*Conflicting replies from 2 localities

	Subdivision Ordinance			Total
	Yes	No	No reply/con- flicting replies	
By individual respondent	48	6	1	55
By city or municipality	25	3	1*	29

\*Conflicting replies.

	Building Ordinance			Total
	Yes	No	No reply/con- flicting replies	
By individual respondent	48	6	1	55
By city or municipality	25	3	1*	29

\*Conflicting replies.

	Building Ordinance			Total
	Yes	No.	No reply/con- flicting replies	
By individual respondent	53	—	2	55
By city or municipality	28	—	1	29

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