Research purpose: The aim of this study is to determine the relationship between actual versus desired compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. This is in line with research that focuses on how to promote business innovation, rather than merely research whether innovation is desirable for businesses or not.

Motivation for the study: Recognising that entrepreneurial actions are the bedrock of intrapreneurial behaviour and that these behaviours may be critical to the long-term vitality of a firm and economy, it is important to facilitate the empirical study of them in an under-researched, emerging market environment. Moreover, compensation such as reward preferences and variable pay schemes remain controversial in terms of their costs versus contributions, and these constructs deserve more empirical research.

Research approach, design and method: The study employed a quantitative research design, using a cross-sectional and empirical approach with primary data sources. A structured web-based instrument rendered a sample of 209 respondents from a diverse set of businesses. Canonical correlational analysis was carried out to test the hypotheses.

Main findings: The results reveal that a gap exists between an employee’s perception of desired compensation practices and the actual compensation practices. The results further highlight that non-outcome-based measures like pay risk, job risk and expectations of success play a role in determining whether employees decide to be intrapreneurial or not.

Practical/managerial implications: Due to the potential impact rewards have on intrapreneurial behaviour, it is necessary to design relevant compensation systems as part of organisational architecture in order to foster intrapreneurship.

Contribution: In response to calls to unveil innovation practices in developing countries and in acknowledging a contingency relationship between compensation practices and intrapreneurship, this article is one of the first studies to test the relationship between actual versus desired compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial behaviour in an emerging market context.

Past research finds that encouraging risk-taking and innovative behaviours must be consistent with individualised performance assessment and compensation (Berber et al. 2012; Ellis, Henry & Shockley 2010) particularly as HRM practices can affect intrapreneurship in varied ways. Attitudes towards opportunity exploitation and innovative behaviour are significant only when individuals perceive both positive subjective norms and being in high control (De Jong 2013). Management support and compensation practices promote commitment to innovate on the part of employees (Grandori, Giordani & Hayton 2011). Moreover, compensation practices can either be used as a tool to increase innovative activity or they can discourage innovative activity by rewarding other behaviours.

Recognising that entrepreneurial actions are the bedrock of entrepreneurial processes and behaviour, and that these behaviours may be critical to the long-term vitality of a firm and economy (Stevenson 1983; Urban & Barreria 2010), it is important to facilitate the empirical study of them in an under researched, emerging market environment. Moreover, compensation such as reward preferences and variable pay schemes remain controversial in terms of their costs versus contributions, and these constructs deserve more empirical research (Moore & Bussin 2012; Ncube, Bussin & De Swardt 2013).

In response to the call to unveil innovation and technology management practices in developing countries (Cetindamar & Pretorius 2012), and in acknowledging a contingency relationship between compensation practices and intrapreneurship, this article is one of the first studies to test the relationship between actual versus desired compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial behaviour in an emerging market context.

There are various ways to classify innovations (Miller & Miller 2012); one way to revive innovativeness and create a dynamic dominant logic is to make intrapreneurship the basis upon which the organisation is conceptualised (Morris, Kuratko & Covin 2008; Sharma & Chrisman 1999). Innovation is a multidimensional phenomenon and the development of an innovation is frequently modelled as a process. Thus, the process of the development of innovation needs to be managed diligently in order to increase performance. If firms devote substantial resources to the innovation process, but are unable to turn them into innovative offerings, resources are squandered and firm performance suffers. Moreover, innovation has to address market needs, and requires entrepreneurship if it is to achieve commercial success (Morris et al. 2008). Entrepreneurship and innovation are positively related to each other and interact to help an organisation to flourish. Likewise, intrapreneurship and innovation are complementary, and a combination of the two is vital to organisational success and sustainability in today’s dynamic and changing environment. Additionally, entrepreneurship and innovation are not confined to the initial stages of a new venture; rather, they are dynamic and holistic processes in intrapreneurial and innovative organisations affecting the development of entrepreneurial and innovation behaviour in an organisation (Antoncic & Hisrich 2001; Urban 2008). For the purpose of this study, the term intrapreneurship is used since longstanding literature has conceptualised intrapreneurship as a multidimensional phenomenon that incorporates the behaviour and interactions of the individual, organisational, and environmental elements within organisations (Antoncic & Hisrich 2001; Covin & Miles 2007).

Previous research has found that preferred compensation practices related to both the internal venture’s performance and individual performance (outcome-based compensation practices) are best aligned with intrapreneurship initiatives (Lerner et al. 2009). Consistent with agency theory, outcome-based compensation practices align the preferences of agents and principals because the rewards for both parties depend on the same actions. In contrast, other researchers (Monsen, Patzelt & Saxton 2009) report that getting employees to participate in corporate venturing is not just a matter of financial utility maximisation, but that the other non-outcome-based measures like pay risk, job risk and expectations of success play an important role in determining employee participation. This means that contingent compensation is important in most high-performance work systems and includes aspects of gain sharing, profit sharing, stock ownership, pay for skill or various forms of individual or team incentives (Lerner et al. 2009; Wood & De Menezes 2011).

By drawing on these different theoretical perspectives, hypotheses are formulated in which actual and desired compensation practices are related to increased levels of intrapreneurial behaviour, which then builds on the premise that there is a contingency relationship between compensation practices that support corporate venturing. At the same time this relationship is moderated by the degree of risk or uncertainty associated with intrapreneurial behaviour (Hayton 2005; Monsen, Saxton & Patzelt 2007).

Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between actual compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial behaviour.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between desired compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial behaviour.
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between actual and desired compensation practices and elevated levels of intrapreneurial behaviour is moderated by the perceptions of risk control in the organisation.

The following sample characteristics emerged from this procedure: over half (56%) of the respondents were men, 62% were in the 26–40 year age group, almost all (89%) were in the entry level to managerial level group of employees, approximately three-quarters (78%) had spent five years or fewer in their current organisation, approximately two-thirds (68%) were in industries other than manufacturing, information technology and telecommunications (some of these other industries included banking, finance, mining and retail) and approximately two-thirds (69%) were in firms with 150 or more employees. Based on the relative heterogeneity of the different industry sectors sampled, the generalisability of the study is strengthened (Davidsson 2004).

Existing instruments were scrutinised for suitability and the following scales were used in this study:

• Items previously used by Miller and Friesen (1983) to measure risk-taking or aversion propensity; the original overall scale was found to possess an acceptable degree of reliability (α = 0.63).
• Items originally used by Block and Ornati (1987) to measure actual and desired incentives for improved venture manager’s performance, based on the satisfactory reliability when used in the Intrapreneurship Assessment Instrument (CEAI) (α = 0.73) (Hornsby, Kuratko & Zahra 2002).
• Items originally used by Pearce, Kramer and Robbins (1997) to measure entrepreneurial behaviour by managers, as based on satisfactory reliability when used in the Intrapreneurship Assessment Instrument (CEAI) (α = 0.89) (Hornsby et al. 2002).

Following the literature review, the study variables were operationalised as follows in terms of independent, dependent or moderator variables:

• Actual compensation practices (ACP) and desired compensation practices (DCP) = independent variables (IV). Examples of these questions included items such as: (1) variable bonuses based on return on investment of new venture formed from the intrapreneur’s idea, (2) fixed bonuses for milestone achievement and (3) options in parent company equity.
• Elevated intrapreneurial behaviour (EIB) = dependent variable (DV). Examples of these questions included items such as: (1) I would get proposed actions through bureaucratic red tape and into practice efficiently and (2) I would display an enthusiasm for acquiring skills.
• Risk control (RC) = moderator or interaction variable. Examples of these questions included items such as: (1) In general, my department have a strong proclivity for low-risk projects, with normal and certain rates of return and (2) In general, my department fosters and encourages a lesser level of business, financial and personal risk-taking.

Collectively, 44 items were used in a structured questionnaire in which responses were collected using a five-point Likert scale: 1 = ‘strongly disagree’ with the statement, whilst 5 = ‘strongly agree’. Common method response bias was controlled for to some degree by safeguarding respondent anonymity, as well as ensuring that the questions relating to the dependent variables were located away from the independent and moderator variables in the instrument.

Prior to testing the study hypotheses, the scales were tested for reliability and validity. In order to ensure the instrument had face and content validity, a preliminary analysis via a pilot test was undertaken. This process allowed the researcher to refine the questionnaire design to maximise responses. Moreover, this procedure ensured that the respondents had no difficulties in answering the questions and there was no problem in recording the data. Having established content validity, a closer look at the instruments revealed that they were not actually dimensions measuring a construct; rather, they were instruments with a set of different compensation practices. Consequently, only instrument reliability was tested; a Cronbach’s alpha value above 0.7 was considered adequate for internal consistency (Cooper & Schindler 2008). The different sections revealed the following values: actual compensation practices scale (α = 0.89), desired compensation practices scale (α = 0.89), elevated intrapreneurial behaviour scale (α = 0.89) and risk control scale (α = 0.79).

Data collection was conducted over a four-week period; 266 responses were received of which 57 were discarded because of incompleteness. This resulted in a final sample of 209 employees and a response rate of 31.15%. To test for non-response bias (Armstrong & Overton 1977), firm size, age and sales growth of responding firms were compared with non-responding firms, using secondary data obtained from a similar Technology Top 100 survey (Financial Mail 2010). Results of t-tests comparing the mean scores of the responding and non-responding firms revealed no differences (p > 0.10), suggesting that the sample appears to be representative of the population from which it was drawn.

Ethical issues were taken into consideration by ensuring that the instrument used posed no risk or danger to respondents. The study purpose and benefits to the sample population as well as the participant’s rights and protection was made explicit and explained to the respondents at the start of the data collection process. Moreover, full and open information (informed consent) was made available to respondents, to ensure that no form of deception and misrepresentation was used to extract information from the respondents and their privacy and confidentiality was respected at all times.

Canonical correlational analysis was carried out to test the hypotheses. This method is often used when researchers need to relate one set of variables to other sets of variables or when it is necessary to represent a large data set by several, easy-to-interpret variables (Lerner et al. 2009). With this method, the effects of key variables in one data set on all or several of the variables in the other sets can be easily identified. Several types of multivariate analyses exist and in the case of two or more data sets, canonical correlation analysis has been successfully used in previous research (Tishler et al. 1996). Canonical correlation analysis allows multiple measures to be summarised into variants or linear combinations of variables with weighting optimised, extracting maximum variance from the original measures (Hair et al. 2010).

To make further sense of the descriptive statistics, a t-test for dependent or related groups was performed to check for differences between actual and desired compensation practices. Table 1 reveals that there is a significant difference in all types of compensation practices when comparing mean scores of actual and desired compensation items. This suggests that these employees believe that there is a large gap between actual and desired compensation practices. For instance, the item ‘incidence of options in new venture equity’ was low in terms of actual practice (mean = 1.81), in contrast with its perceived desirability (mean = 4.00).

Additionally, canonical analysis included calculating the factor structures, which are referred to as canonical loadings or structure coefficients. For ACP nine items had low loadings on the first canonical factor, ranging from 0.02 to 0.26, whilst eight items had negative loadings, which means they had a very low correlation with this factor. The other seven ACP items revealed low loadings on the first canonical factor, ranging from 0.04 to 0.18, whilst 11 items had negative loadings, indicating a very low correlation with that factor. The first canonical root extracted an average of 4.00% of the variance from the ACP items and an average of 3.00% of the variance from the EIB items. Based on the set of EIB items, the first canonical root accounted for about 1.00% of the variance in the ACP items (redundancy). Based on the set of ACP items, the first canonical root accounted for about 0.90% of the variance in the EIB items. This set of results suggests that the set of ACP items were not predicting the set of EIB items; thus, Hypothesis 1 cannot be supported by the empirical evidence.

To examine Hypothesis 2 in terms of the relationship between DCP and EIB, the same procedure in terms of canonical analysis was carried out. The results are shown in Table 3. The overall canonical R (0.70) was quite substantial (StatSoft 2011) and highly significant (p < 0.001). All of the 17 extracted canonical roots extracted 100% of the variance from the left set (17 DCP items) and 97.00% of the variance in the right set (EIB items). The total redundancy for the DCP items was 21.08%, whilst that of the EIB items was 25.07%. This means that, based on all canonical roots and given the EIB items, 21.08% of the variance in the DCP was accounted for, whilst given the DCP items, 25.07% of the variance in the EIB was accounted for. These results reveal a poor but significant latent root and suggest a weak overall relationship between items in the two sets of variables.

In terms of factor structures, only the first canonical root was significant, and further examined. The items for EIB ranged from 0.10 to 0.79. The 12 items with the highest loadings ranged from 0.51 to 0.79. Of these 12 items, 11 were items measuring innovation and proactivity whilst one item measured risk. Therefore, innovation and proactivity are highly representative of EIB. The items for DCP had loadings ranging from 0.15 to 0.71. The seven items with the highest loadings were praise and recognition, motivation-based compensation, flexible work hours, job enrichment, variable bonuses for milestone achievement, accelerated promotion and opportunity for growth. These seven items correlated highly with the one factor. Of these seven items, six were all non-monetary compensation practices, suggesting that non-monetary compensation practices are the best predictors of the 11 items measuring innovation and proactivity, in terms of EIB. The first canonical root extracted an average of 20% of the variance from the DCP items and an average of 32% of the variance from the EIB items. These results translate into a significant canonical correlation (0.70) between the items in terms of DCP and EIB (based on the first canonical root). The set of items in the DCP variable that best predicted the 11 EIB items on innovation and proactivity were the non-monetary compensation practices. Thus, Hypothesis 2 cannot be fully supported due to a lack of empirical evidence.

In terms of Hypothesis 3, to examine the potential moderating effect of risk control on the DCP-EIB relationship, a multiple regression procedure was executed incorporating the interaction term of ‘Risk x DCP’. The first canonical roots of DCP served as the independent variable whilst the first canonical root of EIB served as the dependent variable. An interaction term was created for each respondent by multiplying the averages of the responses on the risk control scale with the corresponding first canonical roots of the DCP items. The following values were obtained based on this procedure: R = 0.71, R² = 0.50, adjusted R = 0.49(p < 0.000), standard error of estimate = 0.71 and F (2196) = 99.36. Additionally, the summary results are shown in Table 4. These values indicate that 50.34% of the variation in the dependent variable (EIB) is attributable to variation across the desired compensation practices items. However, the moderation effect of risk control was not statistically significant when risk control was used as a moderator. The p-value for the regression model was not statistically significant at t (196) = -1.7093 (p > 0.050), and suggest that it can be removed from the model. This means that risk control did moderate the DCP-EIB relationship. Consequently, Hypothesis 3 cannot be supported in terms of the empirical evidence.

The findings emanating from this study resonate with similar research which showed that intrapreneurs prefer compensation practices that relate to the performance of the organisation as well as their individual performance (i.e. outcome-based compensation practices). This is an important finding considering that outcome-based compensation practices are necessary to promote the bearing of uncertainty and reduction of opportunism (Lerner et al. 2009). Consistent with agency theory, outcome-based compensation practices align the preferences of agents and principals because the rewards for both parties depend on the same actions. Moreover, the results of this study signify that employees prefer non-monetary compensation practices as well, which could be due to the organisations that were surveyed not having the means, ability or desire to compensate employees in a direct outcome-based compensation manner. It is also plausible that most organisations reserve outcome-based compensation practices for directors and executives who, for personal gains, might not be willing to share such benefits with lower level employees.

The results highlight that non-outcome-based measures like pay risk, job risk and expectations of success play a role in determining whether employees decide to be innovative or not. This finding resonates with Monsen et al.’s (2009) research which found that employees are reported to participate in intrapreneurial behaviour as a result of job risk and pay risk, and that employee’s expectations are an important moderator. In other words, it is important for job risk and pay risk to be low when using profit sharing bonused to motivate employees to participate in intrapreneurial behaviour.

The results confirm that opportunity for growth and job enrichment are strong predictors of elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. This finding is reflected in past studies that show that opportunity for growth and job enrichment are best fostered through on-the-job training to elevate intrapreneurial behaviour. Higher levels of internal knowledge sharing relate to stronger intrapreneurial behaviour, and such knowledge sharing in turn results from higher levels of trust and goal congruence (De Clercq, Dimov & Thongpapanl 2013). At the same time however, risk control has a strong positive moderating effect on the relationship between organisational boundaries and innovation performance, and a strong negative moderating effect on the relationship between time availability and innovation performance. The implication of this moderating effect is that desired compensation practices are perhaps only one of the many organisational antecedents that can elevate intrapreneurial behaviour. Other organisational antecedents like organisational support, organisational boundaries and time availability are equally important to consider in stimulating intrapreneurial behaviour.

In summary, even though the empirical evidence emanating from this study did not support the hypotheses, the results are nonetheless revealing. Principally the findings indicate that implementing an intrapreneurship strategy in an organisation is quite challenging due to the failure to appreciate how risk control and other control variables work in conjunction with compensation and other organisational antecedents to facilitate elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. Compensation practices need to be connected to strategic objectives by formulating an appropriate mix of compensation types, whilst at the same time mitigating the degree of risk or uncertainty associated with intrapreneurial behaviour.

Relevant to emerging economies is that recent research finds that intrapreneurship and independent entrepreneurship seem to be substitutes at the macro level. Large firms in high-income countries tend to display more entrepreneurial behaviour than large firms in low-income countries do (Bosma et al. 2010). Indeed a tentative positive correlation between intrapreneurship and GDP per capita is possible. Thus, it appears that entrepreneurial activities by employees are, as predicted by theory, more prevalent as a country moves towards the more advanced phases of economic development. There is a need for further theorisation and empirical analysis of how different contexts may influence intrapreneurial behaviour.

Considering that there has been a call for a considerable shift toward a more effective applied research agenda (Kenworthy & McMullan 2013), a multifaceted understanding of compensation practices in the intrapreneurship context is important not only for academic purposes but also because the subject has salience for practitioners and policy-makers. These implications relate to the profitability and competitiveness of the firm as well as to the overall economic performance of industry and the national economy. Businesses that incorporate innovation into their vision by relying on entrepreneurial strategies and actions understand that innovation is at the core of an entrepreneurial organisation. It is around this core that other elements of the organisation, such as strategy, management style and structure, are built.

The study also provides guidance to innovation specialists and company leaders interested in incentivising their employees to undertake intrapreneurial practices. Compensation practices can either be used as a tool to increase innovative activity or it can discourage innovative activity by rewarding non-salient behaviours. Due to the potential impact rewards have on intrapreneurial behaviour, it is necessary to design relevant compensation systems as part of organisational architecture in order to foster intrapreneurship. Additionally, the results provide direction to employees seeking to engage in intrapreneurship and provide them with a fair indication of what compensation practices they could expect, whilst considering commensurate risks. Considering that intrapreneurship is contingent upon individual members undertaking innovative activities (Hornsby et al. 2009), management must design incentive contracts that consider both the desired compensation practices and actual deterrents prohibiting intrapreneurial behaviour.

Much corporate entrepreneurship (CE) research focuses on large corporations yet small and medium enterprises may also involve scope for significant CE; future research could link compensation practices of these firms to intrapreneurial behaviour. Additionally, future research could try to unpack not only the nature of rewards but also how compensation systems need to be configured according to the industry life-cycle stage. Similarly, by focusing on specific contexts, differences in compensation practices may be revealed according to different sector types. For instance the high technology sector may require unique compensation practices, which could be identified as distinct for that particular sector. There is a need for further theorisation and empirical analysis of different types of organisations and sectors, as well as understanding how different contexts influence intrapreneurial behaviour through compensation practices. Similar organisations with similar compensation practices can have different effects in different contexts. Consequently, a need exists for a more subtle way to analyse how contextual variables differ in emerging economies and to what degree they shape intrapreneurial behaviours.

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