

## Book Reviews

**Owen, John, 2010. *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-2010*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 320 Pages. ISBN 978-0691142395 Paper (\$32.50); 978-069114238 Cloth (\$78.50)**

John Owen's *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics* is a timely and fascinating book. Readers should know, though, that there are really two books here. One is about "regime change" or "forcible regime promotion." Think the US in Iraq since 2003; though Owen also includes France's attempt at regime change in Scotland in 1559, Prussia's intervention in the Netherlands in 1787, and an almost staggering range of others reaching back to 1510. The other book is about transnational ideological conflict. Think secularism vs. Islamism today; though Owen speaks also of the conflict between Catholicism vs. Protestantism in the sixteenth century as well as communism vs. capitalism in the mid-twentieth century. Each of these books merits serious attention in itself. But the analytic strand that weaves the two stories together is particularly worthy of close consideration.

Owen defines "forcible regime promotion" as an attempt "by any state to use direct force with the object of constructing, preserving, or altering one or more political institutions in another state" (272). With this definition, Owen unearths two-hundred and nine cases (according to my count) from 1510 A.D. to 2010 A.D. Plotting these over time, Owen also finds clusters or "waves" of regime promotion, identified by their heightened frequency (though not necessarily their amplitude). He finds three waves in particular: one from 1520 to 1650, another from 1770 to 1850, and the third from 1917 to the present. In between these waves are lulls, when there is less action in terms of regime promotion. Within each are discernible patterns. In the first wave, Catholic or Protestant rulers tried to promote their own regime type in faraway lands (such as attempts by Elizabeth I of England to fight for Protestantism in Scotland in 1559, or efforts by Spain's Philip II to install Catholicism in Cologne from 1583 to 1589). In the second wave, rulers tried to promote republican, constitutional-monarchical or absolute-monarchical regimes (such as Napoleon's myriad of efforts from 1799-1815 to promote republicanism, or attempts by absolute monarchies in Austria or Russia to overthrow republicanism). In the third and most recent wave, governments tried to promote liberal democracies, fascist regimes or communist states.

The data collected for the analysis is original. I have not seen anything like it. And it offers a new way to think about international politics over a long swath of history. Yet this story is not interesting only in itself. The acts of regime promotion relate to, and indeed manifest, something else entirely: large-scale ideological struggles in the world-system.

Enter the other book that is embedded in this work: transnational ideological contests. Looking at the diverse cases of regime promotion over time, Owen finds that they were not merely, if ever or only, about material interests. Rulers did not promote regimes in foreign lands in order to win spoils (arguably, that was what imperialism and colonization was for). Rather, rulers promoted particular regimes on behalf of, or in the interest of, specific ideologies. Regime promotion has been part and parcel of "ideological polarization." Hence the different character to the waves: the first was about Protestantism vs. Catholicism, the second about monarchy vs. republicanism, and the third was about communism, liberalism, and fascism. The conditions leading to regime promotion were also partly about ideology (though not only). Owen finds that states "tend to impose regimes in regions of the world where there is already deep disagreement

as to the best form of government” and they tend to do so in periods when “elites across societies in the target’s region are sharply divided along ideological lines” (4). There are other conditions leading to regime promotion too (one is that it tends to happen when the promoting state sees its own security as tied to the fate of the target state). But to ideological factors, Owen bestows paramount importance. How else to make sense of the fact that, in nearly all of these cases, the promoting state imposed *its* own ideology upon the target state? The U.S. did not promote Communism in Vietnam in the 1960s any more than Philip II of Spain promoted Protestantism in France in the 1590s.

Owen concludes the book with a fascinating set of observations about regime promotion and ideological contests in more recent times. Here the story gets even better. As Owen evinces, potential transnational ideological contests today are brewing around ideologies of Bolivarism (represented by Hugo Chávez), authoritarian capitalism (exemplified by China and Russia), and Islamism and secularism (or rather fundamentalism and secularism). Here, in these concluding stretches of the work, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics* does what some of the very best studies in macro-level social science aim for. It puts present day processes into a longer historical perspective, persuasively showing us that the seemingly large and overwhelming events of today are actually small when put into their proper historical place. Bolivarism, authoritarian capitalism, and Islamism are part of a longer history stretching all the way back to the sixteenth century – not in terms of content, but rather form and function. Thanks to Owen, we can see that they are merely the most recent forms of long-standing transnational ideological contests that have shaped regime promotion since the sixteenth century.

In this sense, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics* is more than a story of regime promotion in the past and present. It is a veritable re-reading of world history. Owen himself asserts at the beginning that *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics* is “in effect, an alternative history of the past centuries of international relations” (7). And it is a riveting one at that, capturing transnational ideational structures and conflicts over centuries with a breadth and depth missing from other such works (such as crude versions of “the clash of civilizations”).

If some readers will be disappointed in the book, it will be those seeking an understanding of history outside Europe. While the concluding part of the book covers global ideological contests, the discussion of regime promotions begins with the European world and hovers around there for most of the time. Apparently, even in the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, regime promotion only happened in and by Europe states. Readers interested in whether or how polities in Asia or Africa may have conducted their own brand of regime promotion will remain in the dark. It may very well be that regime promotion did not happen outside of, or by, the non-Western world. But we cannot tell for sure from this book.

This limitation of the work is dictated by the very definition of regime promotion itself. Regime promotion, as Owen defines it, occurs when one state seeks to support or alter the regime of another “state”, i.e. a sovereign state defined as “sovereign” by the terms of the Western-based Westphalia system; more precisely, “Westphalian sovereignty and international-legal sovereignty” (273). Colonies are excluded, because they did not retain their sovereignty after the intervention. And presumably polities outside Europe are excluded as potential regime promoters (or as possible targets) until they enter the world of states as defined by the Western-based Westphalian system. But why restrict the definition of regime promotion to this? Owen remarks that it is not because of lack of data. Rather it is because such “cases are most relevant to IR theory” (273). Most of the world is thus excluded because it is analytically irrelevant to the categories of theories known as “realist” or “constructivist.” For some readers, especially

conventional IR scholars, this will be easy to swallow. It may even go unnoticed. But for everyone else, it will be puzzling if not disappointing. In either case, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics* is not actually about “world” politics. A properly global history of regime promotion, unfettered by the categories of conventional IR theory, awaits.

Still, this critique is not immanent. *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics* remains true to its categories and task. Taken on its own terms, it fares well. Anyone interested in either regime promotion or transnational ideological conflict (even those not worried about whether realist theorists or constructivists win the most points), will have to engage this novel work of impressive analytic scope.

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**Dale, John G. 2011. *Free Burma: Transnational Legal Activism and Corporate Accountability*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 296 Pages, ISBN 978-0816646470 Paper (\$25.00); 978-0816646463 Cloth (\$75.00)**

By the early 1990s, many foreign observers had concluded that Myanmar’s junta<sup>1</sup> had consolidated its hold over domestic political power (e.g., Callahan 2009). The military had crushed prodemocracy protests, arrested opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and signed ceasefire agreements with most of the ethnic insurgent groups. However, in *Free Burma: Transnational Legal Activism and Corporate Accountability*, Professor John G. Dale points out that the prodemocracy movement simply went transnational. The Free Burma campaign used transnational legal action as a means to pursue political change from abroad. Dale’s account also shows that, even in an era of globalization, civil society can challenge neoliberalism by utilizing transnational mechanisms in order to hold corporations accountable.

Dale uses the Free Burma campaign for his extended case study because of its innovative use of transnational legal action. With political opportunities in Myanmar closed off, the Free Burma campaign shifted its focus to targeting American corporations that conducted business in the country. The immediate goal was to hold corporations accountable for human rights violations committed by the Myanmar military, which was impossible to do from within the country. Moreover, the campaign hoped that forcing American companies to withdraw from Myanmar would put economic pressure on the regime, which in the early 1990s had low reserves of foreign exchange. Dale demonstrates the variety of options available to activists in the “transnational legal space” by addressing how the Free Burma campaign pursued legislative, executive, and judicial remedies to pursue their agenda.

The first chapter summarizes modern Burmese history and the democracy movement before 1988. Dale emphasizes the role of ethnic insurgencies and geopolitical rivalries between China and the United States in destabilizing Burma’s postwar civilian government. In March 1962, General Ne Win launched a coup and implemented the “Burmese Way to Socialism.” Dale then recounts the history of student movements against first British colonialism and then the Ne

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<sup>1</sup> In this review, I adopt the same convention as Dale regarding the name of the country. I use “Burma” when discussing events before 1990 or the “Free Burma” campaign, while I use “Myanmar” when referring to the government (xiii-xv).

Win regime. The chapter concludes with the critical 1988 mass protests, in which hundreds of thousands of students, monks, workers, and even government officials took to the streets, as well as the military's subsequent crackdown on the protests. This lesson in Burmese history serves to emphasize the ineffectiveness of domestic social movements and the severity of the state's response—both necessary to understanding why the movement went transnational.

The second chapter introduces the transnational dimensions of Burma's prodemocracy movement. Although Myanmar's military dominated state institutions after 1988, the Free Burma movement mobilized transnational networks in order to continue the campaign from abroad. Dale's analysis challenges the state-centered "political process theory" by showing that activists were not limited by the political opportunities available within Myanmar. The Free Burma movement enabled Burmese to exploit political opportunities *outside their home countries*, particularly in the United States, in order to pursue change within their home country. While Dale acknowledges that the Free Burma movement has not succeeded in effectuating regime change, he blames the international community's unwillingness to enact strict economic sanctions rather than the limited scope of domestic political opportunities (93-96).

In Part II of *Free Burma*, Dale discusses the legislative, executive, and judicial remedies that the Free Burma campaign pursued. The third chapter covers the Massachusetts selective purchasing law, which prohibited companies that conduct business with the state government from also conducting business in Myanmar. U.S. companies challenged the law in court, alleging that the state government overstepped its constitutional authority by creating its own foreign policy. In 1999, the Supreme Court ruled the law unconstitutional, but not simply on the grounds that a state law was directed at a foreign country. Rather, the court found that the Massachusetts measure conflicted with a 1997 federal law, which banned new investment in Myanmar but did not adopt impose purchasing restrictions. According to the justices, the Massachusetts law would have restricted the president's freedom to negotiate with the regime for concessions. Despite the setback, Dale argues that the court's reasoning affirms the possibility of using selective purchasing measures, when doing so does not conflict with federal law.

The fourth chapter covers a petition asking the California attorney general to revoke the UNOCAL Oil Corporation's charter. In 1992, UNOCAL had signed an agreement with the Myanmar government to construct the Yadana pipeline in order to export natural gas. However, human rights NGOs received credible reports that the military employed forced labor during the construction of infrastructure around the pipeline. Dale situates the UNOCAL Charter Revocation Campaign within the broader history of corporate charters in the United States. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, citizens and politicians took a more active role in approving or revoking corporate charters. As corporations demanded more rights as constitutional "persons", charter revocation fell into desuetude. Ultimately, the California attorney general's office rejected the petition to revoke UNOCAL's charter, claiming that it lacked jurisdiction to investigate human rights abuses abroad. Here, again, Dale contends that the petition helped demonstrate that the government had the means, but not the will, to act against UNOCAL.

The fifth chapter covers the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) litigation against UNOCAL. ATCA gives federal district courts jurisdiction over suits by foreign citizens for torts committed in violation of the "law of nations." During the late 1970s, human rights' lawyers interpreted "law of nations" to include human rights violations. In 1996, EarthRights International and a coalition of NGOs used ATCA to sue UNOCAL on behalf of a dozen Burmese peasants who were victims of forced labor. *Doe v. UNOCAL* represented the first time ATCA was used to sue a U.S. corporation for abuses committed abroad. During trial, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

appeared skeptical of UNOCAL's claims that the incidents of forced labor were unconnected to construction of the pipeline. In December 2004, UNOCAL settled with the plaintiffs for \$7.2 million. Dale emphasizes that transnational litigation not only generated significant publicity for the Free Burma campaign, but also forced corporations to acknowledge the human costs of conducting business in Myanmar.

Dale's analysis provides a fascinating alternative narrative to the standard theories about state-society relations. The Free Burma movement attempted to utilize political opportunities in one country to challenge human rights violations in another country. While suppressed at home, the Free Burma movement remained active in the U.S. during the late 1990s and 2000s. At the very least, the book reminds sociologists and political scientists to look beyond a country's borders when assessing the options available to social movements. *Free Burma* also challenges the widespread fear that globalization only brings free trade and greater corporate power, reducing the power of states to hold corporations accountable for their actions. The Free Burma campaign uncovered legislative, administrative, and judicial mechanisms that gave state governments the power, if not the will, to challenge corporations. Moreover, the campaign helped popularize the norm that American corporations are responsible for their actions abroad.

One topic not adequately covered in *Free Burma* is who actually participated in the Free Burma campaign. During the early 2000s I participated at the margins of the campaign, so I am familiar with the key individuals and NGOs. However, even I had some remaining questions after reading *Free Burma*. How active were Burmese based in Burma?<sup>2</sup> What was the relationship between Americans and Burmese expatriates? For all of the emphasis on *transnational* legal networks, Dale never unravels their supposedly transnational nature. Indeed, in a chart of key organizations supporting the Free Burma campaign (146-47), all but a handful are American NGOs. Dale does mention Zarni, perhaps the most famous Burmese expatriate and the founder of the Free Burma Coalition, but a deeper discussion of the individuals involved would have helped readers assess his claim that the U.S.-based Free Burma campaign was the heir of the 1988 protests.

*Free Burma* also leaves doubt regarding the effectiveness of transnational legal action. Both the Massachusetts legislation and the UNOCAL Charter Revocation Campaign ultimately failed. Dale is careful to show why the Supreme Court's decision might not undermine selective purchasing laws more broadly, but he provides no evidence that charter revocation remains a viable tactic. Even ATCA has been scaled back since *Doe v. UNOCAL*. In 2004, in *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, the Supreme Court limited ATCA claims to international norms that are as "specific, universal, and obligatory" as anti-piracy and diplomatic immunity during the 18<sup>th</sup> century (although Dale points out that forced labor/slavery would have satisfied this test (189-191). More recently, the circuit courts have split regarding corporate liability under ATCA. The Supreme Court is expected to clarify the law in this area when it issues a decision in *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.*, currently on appeal from the Second Circuit.<sup>3</sup>

The question of effectiveness extends not just to tactics but also strategy. In *Free Burma*, Dale contends that the campaign failed to displace Myanmar's government in part because the international community did not impose rigorous sanctions. He claims the selective purchasing law would have had more "teeth" than the 1997 federal ban on new investment (123, 139-140).

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<sup>2</sup> While Dale does mention that he conducted over one hundred interviews in Burma (xvi), he understandably cannot jeopardize the safety of his informants by revealing their names or information about them. Hopefully, now that Myanmar is undergoing political liberalization, perhaps he could mine those interviews in future work.

<sup>3</sup> As of January 2013, the Supreme Court has not issued its decision.

However, Dale does not mention the subsequent Burma legislation Congress passed in 2003 and 2008, which enacted a general ban on imports from Myanmar and visa bans against senior government officials (Congress did continue to grandfather UNOCAL's investments). For its part, the military junta insulated itself with revenue from natural resource exports and improved relations with its neighbors. China has given Myanmar over \$2 billion in military aid and exercised its veto at the United Nations Security Council to shield Myanmar (Steinberg 2013). The junta transferred formal governing authority to a civilian government in February 2011, but this move appears to have been motivated more by the desire of Senior General Than Shwe to retire in peace than it was by economic sanctions, which had already been in place for years.<sup>4</sup>

Of course, it would be unfair to ask Dale to establish the effectiveness of transnational legal action by proving a counterfactual. It is impossible to know if Myanmar would have democratized sooner had the international community adopted tougher sanctions in the early 1990s. Unfortunately, while the *Free Burma* case study effectively demonstrates the variety of transnational legal remedies available, it seems poorly suited to evaluating their effectiveness. As such, it would be useful to compare the experience of the Free Burma campaign with that of other social movements that have attempted to use transnational legal action. Have other movements used selective purchasing laws or ATCA litigation in order to effectuate political change abroad? Were differences in outcomes the result of differences in campaign tactics or in the movement's goals? At the least, an additional chapter discussing other transnational social movements might have allowed readers to better evaluate the potential of transnational legal action.

Future scholars could also assess when and for what ends transnational legal action remains a viable option. In the *Free Burma* example, one could argue that regime change was out of the campaign's reach, but that it did at least hold some corporations accountable for rights abuses. However, would either corporate accountability or regime change alone been a sufficient goal to mobilize both Burmese and American activists? On the one hand, many members of the Burmese expatriate community participated in the Free Burma campaign because they believed their actions would help "free Burma" from military rule. On the other hand, Dale notes that many key American participants, including Simon Billenness, then a senior analyst at the Franklin Research and Development Corporation, and EarthRights International, came to the movement initially more interested in questions of corporate accountability. In order to disaggregate these distinct motivations, future research might focus on cases in which social movements pursue only corporate accountability or only regime change.

*Free Burma* is a promising start to a new research agenda about transnational social movements. Dale simultaneously challenges the "political-process theory" of social movements and neoliberal narratives about globalization. It serves as a reminder that social movements have a broad range of options beyond protests and violence. As somebody who participated in the Free Burma campaign, I found Dale's recounting of the campaign to be both informative and insightful. Dale's writing is always smooth and engaging. Indeed, at times readers might forget that they are reading a work of academic scholarship as they become engrossed in the story of Myanmar and the Free Burma campaign.

Recommended for students of social movements, legal activism, or Burmese politics.

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<sup>4</sup> For more discussion about possible motives behind Myanmar's recent liberalization, see Nardi (2012) or Steinberg (2013).

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[http://www.lsa.umich.edu/polisci/people/graduatestudents/ci.nardidominic\\_ci.detail](http://www.lsa.umich.edu/polisci/people/graduatestudents/ci.nardidominic_ci.detail)

**Thomas D. Hall and James V. Fenelon. 2009. *Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: Resistance and Revitalization*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm. 208 Pages, ISBN 978-1594516580 Paper (\$33.95); 978-1594516573 Cloth (\$104.00)**

In this book, Hall and Fenelon develop a comparative analysis of a variety of indigenous movements that confront and challenge neoliberal globalization. This is an ambitious task, particularly for a relatively short book, but the authors' intimate familiarity with many of these indigenous groups and their effort to create a unifying framework to examine these struggles give readers a much richer understanding of these conflicts.

The structure of the book combines a focus on theory-building via comparisons in the introductory and concluding chapters with historical examinations of several indigenous groups from various areas in the middle chapters. The theoretically focused introductory chapters advance important claims regarding indigenous groups and their roles in world-systemic history. Most fundamentally, the authors argue that "indigenous peoples who struggle to preserve much, or some, of their noncapitalist roots—for example, communally held property rights—constitute, by virtue of their continuing existence, a form of anticapitalist resistance to incorporation into the world-system, and a challenge to the assumption of the state as the basic political unit of human social organization. Their claims for autonomy are a challenge to those globalizers who argue that 'there is no alternative' (14). The efforts of indigenous groups to assert their rights to survival and autonomy thus challenge not just the inevitability of capitalist globalization but also the inescapable organization of social life via the structure of states; in other words, there are many very different types of social organization, some of which long predate capitalism.

In order to understand historical and contemporary cases of indigenous groups that have challenged capitalist globalization, the authors argue that four elements of these groups must be examined:

1. "Global historical context;
2. Cultural traditions built around community, usually with consensus-driven forms of governance by a collectivity;

3. Holistic, undifferentiated spiritual values that tend to embody generosity of group and reciprocity rather than competition and accumulation; and
4. Worldviews that positively interact with the earth's environment and land, rather than destroying it through extensive, privatized natural resource exploitation" (21).

The empirical chapters in the book use a variety of historical cases to examine these elements, and this comparative analysis lead Hall and Fenelon to advance four key points that they feel differentiate the social organization of indigenous groups that are resisting capitalist globalization from that of the capitalist world-economy today: "1. Economic relationships are redistributive, partially or wholly; 2. Political relations of 'cultural sovereignty' and 'community autonomy' predominate; 3. Environmental relationships tend to be symbiotic, with less destruction to animal and plant life than in capitalist societies; and 4. Communities value inclusive relationships that tend toward common goals" (24-25).

The main chapters of the book provide introductions to the historical experiences of a variety of indigenous groups in different regions of the world and the challenges they have faced in their efforts to survive over the long term. The authors have made extensive efforts to learn about and then analyze the experiences of these groups in both theoretical and comparative terms.

The first empirically focused chapter compares the Maori of New Zealand and the Adevasi of India, alongside briefer comparisons of Australian Aboriginals and Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders. The chapter emphasizes that struggles for indigenous survival are not solely a product of European colonialism, but instead are part of a far older type of conflict between states and nonstate peoples that has been taking place for thousands of years.

The second empirical chapter focuses on the indigenous peoples of Mexico and makes comparisons with other cases in Latin America, arguing that the concept of indigeneity and definitions of who is indigenous are highly contentious and historicized. In Latin America generally and particularly in Mexico, the concept of indigenous peoples began after the Conquest as part of a stylized and at least somewhat permeable classification system placing those born in Europe at the top of the social hierarchy and the indigenous at the bottom. Efforts to build a Mexican national identity later subsumed indigeneity into an essential element of Mexican identity, ignoring the fact that, as was typically the case in Latin America, members of different indigenous groups did not see themselves as members of the same category, but instead saw each indigenous group as having its own separate historical and cultural identity. Moreover, those groups that have survived the five centuries since the Conquest view their struggles for survival and autonomy today as the continuation of struggles that began 500 years ago, rather than as something "new" that emerged in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

The third empirical chapter examines Native Americans in the United States, highlighting the experiences of the Wampanoag, Lakota, Navajo and California Indians as examples of indigenous groups seeking to preserve and revitalize their cultural and political traditions, despite significant variations in the histories and changing natures of these groups' relations with the U.S. government. These experiences demonstrate that indigenous survival and resistance are both extremely localized and specific processes and heavily shaped by broader national and global processes. Moreover, Hall and Fenelon emphasize that simplistic accounts of indigenous survival and resistance largely ignore the historical bases and trajectories of these processes, even though these histories are tremendously important to the indigenous groups themselves.

The two concluding theoretically and comparatively focused chapters build on the empirical chapters in an effort to begin formulating a historically informed, world-systemic



theory of global indigenous survival and resistance. The authors argue that “survival of indigenous groups, and hence movements intended to promote their survival, are inherently antisystemic because they promote the legitimate right of groups of humans to organize and live their lives in ways other than those permitted or favored by neoliberal capitalism” (121-122). This initial theory-building effort includes the creation of a typology of indigenous survival modalities that derives from the varied experiences of the indigenous groups examined in the book; this typology is incorporated into a comparative world-systemic summary presentation.

Although written to be accessible to students and general readers, the book makes several significant contributions to world-systems analysis. First, it explicitly extends world-systems theory to the study of indigenous groups around the world, an area that world-systems theory has not adequately addressed. Analyses that examine individual indigenous groups in isolation or that focus on indigenous groups within one state do not adequately consider the broader world-systemic processes shaping the challenges and opportunities that have faced indigenous groups over the last five centuries or, more generally, nonstate peoples over the last five millennia. Efforts to consider today’s growing internationally linked indigenous movements that are challenging state power, including those discussed in this book but many others as well, as New Social Movements are inadequate as well because of a similar lack of historical perspective. The authors argue that “indigenous peoples and many other analysts, including ourselves, do not see indigenous movements as a subcategory of some larger set of movements. Rather, they are much older and more complex, though they are related, especially to the new social movements, in important ways” (64). Hall and Fenelon’s book is a vital starting point for developing a more theoretically and historically informed understanding of these indigenous movements.

Second, there is an extensive engagement with world-systems theory in the book to provide a coherent framework for examining these very diverse movements in different regions of the world. Hall and Fenelon then seek to build a framework for examining the experiences of a diverse set of indigenous groups from a world-systems perspective. Although their theoretical model is only partial and somewhat disconnected, this model provides a valuable initial formulation that they intend to build upon in their future work.

Given the growing variety and diversity of challenges to neoliberal globalization, the book adds a great deal to our understanding of one very important type of challenge from below. Hall and Fenelon provide an excellent foundation for future comparative analysis of these indigenous movements with other types of social movements active in the early twenty-first century. Further, the goals and strategies of these indigenous movements could also provide valuable practical lessons to other social movements, given the frequent complementarity of goals and strategies that bring together issues of social and economic justice, local control over decision making, and protection of the natural environment.

The first main weakness of the book is inadequate theoretical development. The characterizations presented in the two concluding chapters are intriguing, but cannot be considered a fully-fledged theory of indigenous survival and resistance. Similarly, the argument that indigenous groups’ struggles can be analytically divided into three types of conflict (over sovereignty, over autonomy, and over minority group status) seems well-founded, but it is not really integrated with the theoretical models presented earlier in the book. In short, the authors do not provide a cohesive, integrated framework, although I suspect that both would have a great deal to say about how to develop such a framework. One step in this process would be building a fuller explanation of the schematic models included in the book, such as Figure 2.2 on “Four Modes of Indigenous Resistance and Revitalization”; the empirical chapters move in this

direction by providing focused discussions of some dimensions of these models, but a stronger theoretical model would lay out the characteristics and relationships in greater detail.

Second, more extensive and more explicit comparisons between the fascinating cases presented would have been very interesting and useful. I would really like to know what the authors would have to say about the comparisons and contrasts that could be drawn between these divergent and important cases of indigenous resistance to neoliberal globalization.

Third, emerging evidence about the massive environmental transformations that some indigenous groups have undertaken in Latin America in areas such as the Amazon, the Beni, and the Central American rainforest makes it essential for the authors to consider the relationship between indigenous groups and the natural environment more extensively in any future edition of the book. Are these large-scale environmental changes the product of the social organization of these indigenous groups into states, as was the case in the Maya region of Central America? Or is the society-nature relationship more varied across indigenous groups than the theoretical model advanced in the book suggests?

Overall, the book serves as an overview and introduction to the central issues confronting indigenous peoples around the world and raises issues for other world-systems analysts to investigate. The book should be very useful for graduate and undergraduate courses in sociology, anthropology, global studies, and Native American studies that examine social change, globalization, social movements, or indigenous groups. The authors argue that “There Are Thousands of Alternatives” to the seemingly inevitable march of capitalist globalization, and many of these alternatives are or could be rooted in the long history of indigenous groups’ survival and resistance. This book is a very interesting first step to bringing some of these alternatives into view.

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**Ben Selwyn. 2012. *Workers, State and Development in Brazil: Powers of Labour, Chains of Value*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. 208 Pages, ISBN 978-0719085314 Cloth (£65.00)**

In her widely cited 2005 article, “Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains,” sociologist Jennifer Bair brought attention to the shift in commodity chains analysis away from its original use in world-systems scholarship as an analytical construct to understand the reproduction of the global hierarchy of wealth, and towards new sectoral analyses focused primarily on the ability of lead firms to shape the industrial upgrading possibilities of suppliers, and the developmental prospects of states in the global south. In a nutshell, Bair argues that these newer meso-level insights made by “Global Commodity Chains” (GCC) and “Global Value Chains” (GVC) scholars can and should be *reintegrated* into the broader macro-structural focus of the past, and that promising new areas of research can be found by examining the social processes of inclusion/exclusion that constitute chain dynamics and the central role of workers as chain participants.

Ben Selwyn’s *Workers, State and Development in Brazil* is a powerful response to Bair’s call for a labor-based GCC approach and is certain to push this entire research agenda forward. He does some of the theoretical heavy-lifting by offering a conceptual framework aimed at centering GCC studies on worker struggles and processes of class formation. He also provides us

with a rich and timely empirical case study of the central role workers played in the development of table grape production for export in the São Francisco Valley region of northeastern Brazil that is a useful blueprint for further research.

The introduction of the book essentially lays out Selwyn's argument for a labor-centered commodity chains analysis. He begins by arguing that the "upgrading bias" of contemporary GCC scholarship is rooted in a Schumpeterian understanding of value creation that relegates workers as a "residual category" impacted by, but not significantly impacting, the chain as a whole. He argues that incorporation of the São Francisco Valley into the grape commodity chain demonstrates that local grape workers were not simply victims of the global retail revolution and the race to the bottom dynamic that it engenders. Instead they actively resisted their exploitation by exporters and therefore "co-determined" through their dialectical relationship with capital the conditions of their incorporation into the chain.

The first chapter is perhaps Selwyn's most polemical. In it he traces the GCC's Schumpeterian roots back to Wallerstein's early conceptualization of capitalism as a "system of production for profit in the world market" rather than as a "system of generalized commodity production" defined by the extraction of surplus value from workers. Rather than side wholeheartedly with Brenner (1977) in his critique of neo-Smithian world-systems analysis, however, Selwyn acknowledges that the modalities of surplus extraction vary significantly across time and space. The trick of re-incorporating labor back into the GCC framework therefore lies in investigating exactly how specific groups of workers become dependent upon the market for their livelihoods and how market dependence is itself mediated by state institutions. In particular, Selwyn argues that this dependence is shaped by three key factors: commodity specialism (the specific labor process required for production), class conflicts between labor and capital (including the balance of class power and its institutionalization), and the developmental politics of states as ultimate guarantors of capital accumulation.

Selwyn begins his empirical analysis in chapter 2 with a fairly traditional GCC approach. He contextualizes the case of grape exports in the São Francisco Valley, showing how it is part and parcel of the global retail supermarket revolution wherein Latin America has emerged as a primary exporter of a wide range of fresh fruits and vegetables to meet burgeoning global and domestic demand. Like other buyer-driven chains, retailers subject Brazil's grape-producing suppliers to an increasing number of demands, including larger and more reliable yields, increasingly stringent quality standards, and greater consistency of price, quality and conditions of production. He then discusses the key role the Brazilian state played in transforming the São Francisco valley from a relative economic backwater composed of cattle ranching, small-scale riverside and flood-plain agriculture, and artisan fishing in the 1960s into a capitalist agricultural center composed of large and small-scale production systems and large-scale irrigation systems. Perhaps most interesting is his analysis of the way locally-based public and private organizations, including the Japanese-Brazilian Agricultural Cooperative of Cotia (COTIA), its successor the Agricultural Cooperative of Juazeiro (CAJ), and the Brazilian Agricultural Research Agency (EMBRAPA), emerged to assist landless peasants and small farmers in the region but over time ended up creating the institutional incentives underlying their depeasantisation and subsequent incorporation into the circuits of capital as commercial farmers and proletarianised workers.

The meat and potatoes of Selwyn's argument about the central role of labor and class conflicts in shaping the overall developmental trajectory of the region is hashed out in the remaining four chapters of the book. In chapter 3, he uses Erik Olin Wright's distinction (later

developed by Beverly Silver) between the structural and associational power of workers to investigate the ways that the region's grape workers were able to win concessions from their employers and therefore steer development in a more worker-friendly way. Most interesting here is Selwyn's argument that the "quality-driven" nature of the grape commodity chain forced local employers to continuously upgrade and rationalize their production systems in ways that provided workers with greater leverage vis-à-vis capital. The ability of workers to transform this structural form of power into associational power embodied in the powerful *Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais* (STR), however, was rooted in the labor and agrarian struggles that emerged in the 1960s in response to the "conservative modernization" developmental policies of Brazil's military regime and that later blossomed into the heyday of union radicalism under the leadership of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT) and the *Central Unica dos Trabalhadores* (CUT) in the 1980s.

Chapters 4 through 6 make extensive use of Selwyn's multiple visits to the region between 2002 and 2008, where he conducted interviews with workers, government officials and employers. Chapter 4 examines the gendered division of labor in the region's grape industry (women workers comprise roughly 40 to 50 percent of the permanent labor force) and the gender politics of the STR. In sharp contrast to the generalized sexism characterizing the garment industry, for example, he finds that women grape workers have been actively involved in all levels of the STR, that the union has won a number of important gender-specific concessions, that women have been overwhelmingly proud of their status as workers, and that this status has positively impacted their relations with their husbands and families. Chapter 5 describes employer efforts over the past two decades to undermine the marketplace bargaining power of workers by restructuring the local labor market, adopting temporary fixed-term contracts, patronage-based labor recruitment and retention strategies, and human resource departments to counter the influence of the STR. Chapter 6 examines how these strategies, in combination with the rise of the PT party to national prominence, have been effective in de-radicalizing the STR and channeling its energies to more institutionalized forms of bargaining. Selwyn is quick to note, however, that this contemporary situation of "class compromise" has not necessarily led to a significant loss of worker gains due to the labor-politics of the PT government and the structural and associational power that local grape workers maintain.

Like all good research, *Workers, States and Development in Brazil* has a few blind spots. First, Selwyn's decision to focus on "class conflicts" at the point of production largely ignores the widely-held argument that class *reproduction* occurs at the level of the household, where various members of a household pool their incomes and subsistence activities in order to survive. If this is true, then class conflicts, the gendered division of labor, and the state's role in perpetuating each should be understood in terms that extend beyond the workplace. Selwyn's analysis could certainly benefit from a reading of Bair and Werner's special issue of *Environment and Planning A* on "commodity chains and disarticulations" (2011), which provides a theoretical framework sensitive to the ways that the incorporation of a place into a chain creates new boundaries of inclusion and exclusion from access to the wealth generated at the point of production.

Second, Selwyn's shift of analysis away from the trans-spatial dynamics of chains characterizing mainstream GCC analysis and towards the particularities of the Sao Francisco Valley leaves one wondering what impact, if any, did local dynamics have "upwards" onto the rest of the fresh fruits and vegetable commodity chain? Did the rise of the STR and the institutionalization of class conflicts affect the overall distribution of value created along the

chain? Did it have any influence on the governance structure of the chain or the labor regime dynamics scattered across other supply nodes of the chain? These questions are not altogether unreasonable to ask because he himself argues for a GCC framework that places worker agency at the heart of the analysis. In this sense, I think Selwyn could have benefitted from a reading of, say, John Talbot's *Grounds for Agreement* (2004), which provides an interesting case study of the systemic nature of struggles over the overall distribution of wealth and power characterizing the global coffee commodity chain.

Third, and relatedly, Selwyn continuously cites Beverly Silver's *Forces of Labor* (2003) when discussing the structural and associational power of labor in the region. However, he does not systematically engage with any of her core arguments and findings about the global patterning of labor unrest, the strengths and weaknesses of spatial and other fixes of capital to rising labor demands, and the central role of geopolitics and interstate conflict in the shaping of developmental prospects for states and workers. For example, Silver finds there to be an overall weakening of labor's workplace bargaining power over the past quarter century due to both global transformations in the organization of production (of the type Selwyn identified for the fresh fruits and vegetables chain) as well as major transformations in the "world of politics and war" which have minimized the ability of workers to gain concessions from their states as soldiers or simply supporters of domestic political regimes. Minimally, one wonders to what degree the fact that the Sao Fernando Valley grape industry exists in Brazil – an emergent global economic and political powerhouse, rather than, say, Honduras, has any bearing on the ability of workers to leverage gains from their employers and respective states.

Finally, Selwyn's conceptualization of development itself is pretty thin. He draws loosely from Amartya Sen in describing it as a "process leading increasingly to freedom from want and the ability to participate in public life based on rising levels of collective and individual prosperity." However, in practice he seems to fluctuate in his use of the term, sometimes associating development with the growth and consolidation of capitalist production relations in the valley, other times associating it with the labor concessions that the STR won from their employers. What Selwyn does not describe as development, however, is the subsistence agricultural systems that pre-existed the growth of the grape sector. This developmentalist orientation is not necessarily problematic in itself. However, he does not provide us with any comparative analysis of the "freedom from want" or the "ability to participate in public life" experienced by São Fernando residents before they were dispossessed of the means of subsistence and forced into proletarianised conditions of work. You might then say Selwyn's orientation towards development is decidedly proletarian-centered and point of production-centered—post-modernists and peasant studies scholars be warned!

Be this as it may, *Workers, State, and Development in Brazil* is certainly a masterful analysis that tackles a timely and important question about how and to what extent workers have the ability to shape the conditions of their incorporation into the global economy. It is an important contribution to the commodity chains literature, and a must-read for scholars and students of labor movements, gender, development, and global political economy.

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**Rachel Schurman and William A. Munro. 2010. *Fighting for the Future of Food: Activists Versus Agribusiness in the Struggle over Biotechnology*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 262 pages, ISBN 978-0816647613 Paper (\$22.50)**

Will the struggles of the 1990s over genetically modified organisms (GMOs)—involving “Frankenfoods,” hormone-free milk, and the like—be remembered as a blip or as a formative moment in the evolution of the world agro-food system? According to Rachel Schurman and William Munro’s insightful and well-written book, the answer is, in effect, “both.” On one hand, anti-GMO campaigns in the U.S. failed to block governmental approval of genetically modified crops, to undercut the power of Monsanto and other companies that aggressively developed these crops, or to generate robust, widespread consumer rejection of GMOs in the food supply. On the other hand, in Europe, anti-GMO campaigns and broader concerns about biotechnology led to a widespread rejection of GMOs, with major food retailers committing to avoid GMOs and governments ultimately restricting the approval of GM crops. This scrutiny and closure of European markets also had ripple effects on export-oriented agriculture in other parts of the world, although not so much as to displace GM crops that had already gained a foothold. Furthermore, even while the U.S.-based movement against biotechnology failed to change national policy and markets, it did influence the emerging international regulatory order.

Overall, although their analysis clarifies the power of corporate and government investments in privately owned genetically modified crop species, their conclusion about the power of social movements is also striking: “In early 2010, the box of potential solutions to the challenges of agricultural productivity and sustainable development in the twenty-first century looks far more open than it did ten years ago” (183).

Schurman and Munro take on two major tasks—to explain the varied outcomes of anti-biotechnology movements and to make sense of the dramatically different views of biotechnology in activist and agri-business circles. Part of their explanation of differential social movement influences focuses on differences in opportunities arising from the organization of agro-food commodity chains. In Western Europe, the concentration of the food retail sector, combined with its emphasis on high-quality store-brands, consumer preferences for quality over price, and growing public concern about biotechnology, allowed anti-GMO activists to effectively push retailers to lock GMOs out of the market. In this case, activists were able to

pressure the retail end of the commodity chain to change practices among farmers and seed companies. But the commodity chain was structured differently in the United States, where there was little concentration among grocery stores, leaving activists with many small targets instead of a few big ones, and where stores competed more on price than on quality, making it harder for activists to mobilize consumer demand for non-GMO food. In addition, seed companies had built strong relationships with farmers, making this end of the commodity chain difficult to penetrate.

They also argue that corporate cultures in the agribusiness industry also created some opportunities for activism. In particular, the aggressiveness and arrogance of Monsanto's corporate culture led to a hasty and ill-fated attempt to push GM crops in the European market and made it a perfect target for activists there.

While their explanation of the U.S.-Europe difference rests largely on these factors, they also highlight ways in which the global character—or more importantly, the cross-national character—of the agribusiness industry allowed activists to have an influence in other parts of the world. Because GM crops had to be approved country-by-country, the transnational movement was able to slow the growth of GM crops in some African countries. In a chapter on Africa, Schurman and Munro show how even in a GM-enthusiast country like South Africa, the regulatory regime was not entirely closed to activist influence.

More in the foreground of the book is its argument that divergent views of biotech should be understood in terms of the distinctive “lifeworlds” of the staunch critics and avid supporters of GM technology. More than just having different ideologies, interests, or frames, these actors have coherent but incommensurable assumptions about technology and society. Whereas managers and scientists within industry circles had an abiding faith in “good technologies,” anti-biotech activists viewed technology as uncertain in its outcomes and tightly linked to the political-economic context, which in this case meant commodification and privatization of property rights. Rather than treating either set of actors as stooges or as hyper-strategic in their views, Schurman and Munro argue that scholars need to attend to the development of everyday lifeworlds that generate and support competing sets of “true believers.”

There is a great deal to like about this book. It uses interview evidence to draw vivid portraits not only of activists and movement intellectuals but also of scientists and managers who see widespread environmental benefits in GM crops (because they require fewer pesticides), among other perceived benefits. It provides insight into the strategies of agribusiness firms, the strategic maneuvers of the movement, and the architecture of global GMO regulation. Schurman and Munro's focus on the US, Europe, and (to a lesser extent) Africa gives the book not only analytical punch but also a broad substantive scope.

The book also provides a compelling explanation of the varied influences of the anti-biotech movement, which very nicely highlights conditions under which targeting particular links in a global commodity chain can be powerful. While the book is linked to Schurman and Munro's other published work, it goes well beyond their articles on anti-GMO campaigns. Both newcomers to their work and those already familiar with it should read this book.

The writing is extraordinarily clear and effectively draws the reader into the debates, strategies, and effects of the struggle over GMOs. This also means that it would be a good book for graduate or undergraduate teaching, particularly in a course on social movements or on global food and agriculture (where it might be productively coupled with Micha Peled's recent film, *Bitter Seeds*).

The weaknesses of the book primarily stem not from the tasks that Schurman and Munro take on but rather from the tasks that they decline to take on. Most importantly, the book discusses but does not really engage with a number of questions about the actual risks and benefits of transgenic agriculture. The problem is not just that Schurman and Munro remain agnostic, though they sometimes give an impression of being frustrated with activists' blanket rejection of biotechnology even as they are highly sympathetic to their concerns about ownership rights and the political-economy of this technology. The problem is that they do not actually delve into the merits of arguments and evidence about the environmental, health, and social consequences of GMOs. Readers who are already versed in these issues may not need it, but I found myself wanting a much clearer sense of what is now known about the risks and benefits in different settings. Ultimately, making sense of the consequences of this movement requires us to understand the consequences of the practices the movement is opposing.

Second, there is more to say about how commodity chain structures, consumer tastes, and cross-national variation in these factors shape the influence of social movements, but Schurman and Munro stay very close to their case. This is unfortunate, not only because it misses a chance to speak powerfully to other movements that target global commodity chains, but because other cases that might be on readers' minds—the anti-sweatshop movement or campaigns against destructive logging, for instance—may be different in their ability to shape markets and consumer preferences. These movements have not had the influence of anti-GMO campaigns in Europe, perhaps in part because it is easier to mobilize consumer concern over products that are ingested and perceived as carrying health risks for the consumer or his/her children. This raises broader questions about whether food is a special case for social movements, an issue that might have been productively addressed in this book's conclusion.

Third, there is both a danger and a set of unanswered questions in using “lifeworlds” to explain social movements and their oppositions. The danger is that the concept lends itself to an uncritical reading of the claims on either side or of the interests that may support those claims (which are more recognized by terms like “ideology” and “frame”). Schurman and Munro are certainly not guilty of that, but in other hands, the concept may not produce as astute an analysis. An emphasis on lifeworlds does have its benefits, most notably in directing attention to unstated background assumptions and styles of everyday life, not just publicly articulated frames. But this raises questions about what kinds of data and methodologies are necessary to tap into lifeworlds—an issue for which Schurman and Munro provide little guidance.

In spite of these concerns, *Fighting for the Future of Food* is a truly outstanding book that deserves to be read by students and scholars of social movements and of agriculture and development. Schurman and Munro have succeeded in writing a book that is rich in substance and analytical insight, accessible, and may help in rethinking global agribusiness.

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**Luc Fransen. 2012. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Global Labor Standards: Firms and Activists in the Making of Private Regulation*. New York: Routledge. 236 pages, ISBN 978-0415808279 Cloth (\$135.00)**

Based on Fransen's PhD thesis at the Amsterdam Institute for International Development and the University of Amsterdam, this book draws on extensive fieldwork, including 70 interviews and a



survey of 178 European corporations, in its examination of so-called private regulation. Within the field of private regulation, Fransen focuses on labor standards in global production chains that are intended to improve working conditions and protect the rights of workers laboring in the manufacturing links of these chains.

More specifically, Fransen studies global supply chains for apparel that are coordinated by European companies (mostly clothing retailers and brands). He reviews the academic debate that has arisen in recent years over the scope, significance, effectiveness, and desirability of private labor regulation, which encompasses both the *codes of conducts* by which buyers collectively commit to have their goods produced in factories that observe core labor standards, and the factory *certification schemes* guaranteeing the compliance of suppliers with these standards. Rather than siding with what he qualifies as either left-wing or right-wing positions in this debate, Fransen adopts a “pragmatic” perspective to address three core issues, respectively dealing with (1) differences in terms of stringency between the main private regulatory approaches developed in this field; (2) the determinants of firms’ choices to adhere to one or another of these private initiatives; and (3) the patterns of cooperation, competition or conflict that developed overtime between the main organizations promoting private labor regulation.

First, the stringency of regulation is measured by the level of labor standards, the detail and scope of implementation guidelines, and the forms of monitoring adopted by eight major organizations: the Fair Labor Association (FLA), Workers’ Rights Consortium (WRC), Social Accountability International (SAI), Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), Fair Wear Foundation (FWF), Initiative Clause Sociale (ICS), Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), and Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI). The comparison reveals that regulation produced by multi-stakeholder organizations giving a strong role to labor activists, and/or established in the earlier phase of field development, such as FWF and WRC, tend to be more stringent—that is, promote higher standards, offer stronger guidelines, and/or use more inclusive or participatory forms of monitoring rather than purely private-sector or firm-based auditing. By contrast, business-led organizations such as WRAP, ICS or BSCI exhibit lower levels of stringency in labor regulation, while intermediate levels characterize more mixed multi-stakeholder groups, such as SAI or ETI.

Fransen addresses the second issue via a statistical analysis of the industrial, national and societal characteristics of a sample of European firms and their choice of private labor regulation. The results are consistent with the salient characteristics of corporate membership in the various organizations under study. In terms of industrial position, firms competing in a higher-priced niche of the market are more likely to choose more stringent forms of private regulation. Firm type also plays a role, with retail firms being more inclined than brand firms to adopt less stringent forms of labor regulation. A broad geographical distinction appears between higher stringency choices made by firms in Northern Europe versus lower ones made in Southern Europe. Finally, having been the target of activist campaigns and/or having frequent contacts with activists strongly correlate with firms’ choice for higher stringency options.

This statistical examination provides some quantitative background for a more qualitative approach to the third issue that Fransen tackles in the book: the nature of relationships developed overtime among organizations favoring different approaches to private regulation. Here the author offers an original and well-documented analysis pointing to a lack of convergence and persisting divide between labor activist-oriented and business-oriented organizations, the former typically applying to niche markets for higher price, branded products (or collegiate-licensed apparel in the case of WRC), while the latter dominates at the retail end of the chain, especially

for the kinds of products sold as mass discount chains. Fransen succeeds in deciphering the historical path of this field's formation and in showing the influence of past choices made by firms and activists. He traces the well-known division of the U.S. landscape between the brand-oriented FLA and the labor-oriented WRC to initial conflicts in the broadly inclusive Apparel Partnership Initiative established by President Clinton in 1996, but also identifies a lesser-known link between the massive growth of the retail-dominated BSCI in Europe and the failed attempts of European labor activists to spread their FWF multi-stakeholder model beyond the Netherlands to countries such as France, Germany, Sweden or Switzerland.

Fransen further decrypts the complex evolution of the field in terms of the stringency of private regulation since the mid- to late-1990s. An upward evolution is observed, as a result of activist criticisms, notably in the level of labor standards adopted by large business-oriented organizations such as BSCI or the more recent Global Social Compliance Program (GSCP), or in some monitoring procedures such as those developed over time by the FLA. A simultaneous ratcheting down can be seen in the growing leniency of organizations that allow delays in firms' compliance with labor standards, together with the growing strength of business-controlled groups (e.g. BSCI and GSCP), and a blurring of market signals due to the multiplication of private regulatory forms and standards. The book ends by outlining and assessing several possible scenarios that may result from the choices that are being (and will be made) by a variety of actors and organizations such as developing-country suppliers, governments, retailers, consumers, and international organizations.

Fransen's rendering of the historical evolution of the field and the interactions between regulatory organizations sheds light on the complexity of private labor regulation in the European landscape. This is significant because most research on private regulation to date focuses on the United States and addresses the content of instruments such as codes of conduct rather than the political and institutional processes by which coalitions were formed and alliances or rivalries developed among organizations. The book conveys a nuanced assessment of the often-ambivalent positions adopted by various actors including firms, NGOs, national and international labor unions, and governments. It makes a valuable contribution to an emerging, although fast growing field of research making use of a global production/commodity chain or network perspective to situate the various actors involved in private forms of regulation and to analyze the power relations therein.

However, the book tends at times to promise more than it delivers. Fransen qualifies his research approach as inductive, but often shows little of the empirical material informing the analysis. For instance, no detailed information is provided on the content of the codes and standards that he is rating and comparing in terms of their stringency. Stringency also remains an abstract notion in the statistical analysis of corporate choices of private regulatory forms, with no information provided on the specific organizations that these firms have chosen to join. Some methodological choices are unclear, particularly regarding sampling. For instance, a number of business-led organizations such as the GSCP, formed by major global retailers, or the U.K.-based SEDEX, are not included in the sample for stringency measures, while an organization such as ICS, which is marginal in the field, is included. Finally, the histories of various regulatory organizations, and the role played by stakeholders in and around them, are not presented systematically and comprehensively but rather briefly summarized or alluded to in the course of Fransen's discussion of particular issues. This makes it difficult for the reader to develop an in-depth understanding of the phenomena under study.

In terms of theoretical contributions, the book engages with a rich variety of institutional perspectives and adopts a multi-level analytical framework aimed at grasping the interplay between the agentic role of individuals and the influence of the broader economic and institutional contexts in shaping regulatory outcomes. At the same time, because Fransen's analysis of private regulation has quite distinct implications for these different streams of literature, the descriptive position adopted by Fransen in his attempt to "cover a middle ground between liberal CSR enthusiasm and critical political economy cynicism" (41) is a difficult one to reconcile with substantive theory building. Perhaps for this very reason, the notion of private labor regulation remains loosely defined throughout the book, notwithstanding the fact that the term is unevenly used both among the variety of actors involved within the field and in the relevant academic literature. The concept of regulation as the use of (binding, enforceable and public) law to address inequalities among social actors is not reconciled nor convincingly articulated with the concept of *private* regulation as a self-defined, self-applied voluntary mechanism. Admittedly, this problem is not specific to Fransen's book, but rather applies to the broader literature mobilizing this non-neutral notion to imply that codes of conduct or other forms of private governance are functionally equivalent or even comparable to public regulation.

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**Martin, William G., ed. 2008. *Making Waves: Worldwide Social Movements, 1750-2005*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. 226 Pages, ISBN 978-1594514807 Cloth (\$106.25); 978-1-594514814 Paper (\$40.76)**

Scholars of transnational movements are familiar with calls for situating their understanding within world-historical context. Few have heeded this advice on a scale comparable to William G. Martin and his colleagues at the Fernand Braudel Center's Research Working Group on Waves of Antisystemic Movements. Their book, *Making Waves*, impressively maps the past 250 years of antisystemic movement activity throughout the world. Immanuel Wallerstein, in the Foreword, explains that this volume is the first of "...a three-part investigation of what we think are the three pillars of the existing world-system – the systems of production, the knowledge systems, and the antisystemic movements," and claims that this volume is "...the first attempt to look globally at social movements of all types since approximately 1750, to see their interconnections, strong points and strong moments, and the forces they confronted" (vii).

But what is an antisystemic movement? The concept is not often deployed outside of world-systems discourse, and few world-systems theorists have made it the subject of serious empirical investigation. Martin, the coordinator of the project and author of the introduction and conclusion, defines "antisystemic movements" as contentious collective action (organized or momentary, normative or disruptive, institutionalized or non-institutionalized) that specifically "...engage[s] and oppose[s] dominant capitalist forces and processes" (7). He admits from the outset that most contemporary movement scholars would find this conception of "movement" to be overly broad, conflating not only a good deal of collective action but also collective behavior with movement activity; and that many contemporary *transnational* movement scholars will discover that the objectives of their movements of interest do not qualify. This is a book by, and

to a large extent for, world-systems theorists. The revolution will not be televised. And reform-oriented movements will not be promoted in this book. Ironically, this book even tells the story of how anti-systemic movements unwittingly have *strengthened* the world system (178), possibly leading some readers to wonder if anti-systemic movements are devoid of agency – or if world-systems theorists are overly structuralist in their approach to understanding the constraints imposed by the world system, and/or teleological in their historicization of it. Despite this lesson of the *longue durée*, readers may be surprised to discover that *Making Waves* finds reasons to remain hopeful that “another world is possible”; that contemporary “alterglobalization” movement activity focused on social and economic justice may succeed in constructing alternative postliberal and postcapitalist modes of social life (176-179). This book also provides a trenchant critique of some dominant assumptions in social movement theory, as well as valuable insights for mining alternative transnational imaginaries, both “from above” and “from below.” In short, *Making Waves* is important reading for all scholars of contemporary transnational movements.

Each of the four substantive chapters of the book, the work of different authors within the Working Group, focuses chronologically on a separate time period (1750-1850, 1848-1917, 1917-1968, and 1968-2005) intended to loosely correlate with “a well-known outbreak of movement activity and by transitions in the [consolidating] world-economy and interstate system” (8). Drawing primarily upon historical records and survey data by country and continent, they explore their leading hypothesis: “significant clusters of movement activity existed across [core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral] zones of the world-economy from at least the eighteenth century” (9). This is a richly historical work, and attempting to highlight only “big events” would not do the book justice. Suffice it to say, the world tour is worth the price of the ticket (certainly in paperback).

In the conclusion, Martin confirms the book’s main hypothesis and “most fundamental finding of this project” (168): “world movement moments” – typically one to two decades in duration – clearly punctuate the past 250 years of global history. From this historical evidence, Martin derives several points that contemporary scholars of transnational movements must confront. First, and least contentiously, he claims that these world movement moments starkly challenge arguments that transnational movement activity appears only under conditions of late twentieth century globalization. Martin is hardly the first historical observer to make this claim, but few can marshal the volume of evidence that *Making Waves* has to support it.

Secondly, and more originally, he asserts that this evidence “...rebutts the dominant derivation of movement activity from national inequalities and conflicts, state-formation, nation-building, long-term global cycles of accumulation, or episodes of hegemonic rivalry and war” (168). This amounts to a full frontal attack on not only the state-centeredness but also the core modernization thesis of political process theory developed by Charles Tilly to identify the birth of the national social movement, elaborated by Sidney Tarrow, and extended and re-tooled for studying transnational advocacy networks by Keck and Sikkink. Indeed, this modernization thesis has become so taken-for-granted in social movement theory that, even when scholars challenge many of the tenets of the broader political process theory, they tend to reproduce it. Martin does sharpen and qualify this point, first contrasting the “surprising, if often short-lived, worldwide outbursts of antisystemic action” with “claims that locate protest and social movements by isolated locations and times, disconnected from each other” (168); and then, suggesting that the local movements clustered within world movement moments were not necessarily connected, either by organizational ties or even indirect, informal contacts.

But this concession only sets up his third point: restricting ourselves to these common conditions and traditional, linear (and even comparative) historical narratives, limits our ability "...to perceive simultaneous protests set within similar conditions, with similar hopes and dreams, and even with similar enemies. Such parallel phenomena in very disparate locations across the world-economy have been charted in each of our epochs..." (169).

Finally, Martin explains that the evidence does more than identify worldwide movement moments and disconnected parallel phenomena across the zones of the world-economy. It also reveals significant transcontinental linkages (long prior to contemporary globalization or anti-globalization movements) between corresponding organizations of abolitionist and revolutionary movements, between formal (black, labor, as well as socialist) internationals, and among "coordinated antiwar, anticolonial and student movements at different world movement moments" (169). Global flows of migration created and sustained informal networks of movement communication, and transoceanic diasporas throughout the entire period of study. Yet, as Martin explains, these networks and exchanges did not always produce greater cooperation. They were often conduits of irresolvable racial, gender, and class conflict among and within movements of all kinds and in each epoch. Thus, scholars of contemporary transnational movements, who often emphasize how formal and informal networks (including transnational advocacy networks) enhance movement power vis-à-vis external actors, should remember to consider how these same networks also may, over time, constrain and ultimately demobilize movements from within.

*Making Waves* also draws upon these insights and outcomes of past movement waves to offer three scenarios for the future. The first draws upon the findings presented in Fouad Kalouche and Eric Mielants' "Chapter 4: Transformations of the World System and Antisystemic Movements: 1968-2005," in which 1968 is identified as the beginning of the decline of traditional anti-systemic movements and the rise of identity movements. Combined with the advance of financial and speculative capital (as well as neoliberalism), and the concomitant and—after the fall of the Berlin Wall—rapid implosion of socialism, internationalism became a hollow discourse of rights, at the expense of justice and economic equity. Drawing upon Cornelius Castoriadis' classic work on social imaginaries, they describe this period as one in which "capitalist social imaginaries" come to dominate cultural aspects of the world-system, the "means of subjectivization," and alternative social imaginaries (148). If today's antiglobalization movement (not to mention international terrorism and a wide range of new identity movements) seem to be able to contest dominant capitalist imaginaries, Scenario 1 sees them too fragmented, largely conservative and even prosystemic, and generally "unable to mount a long-term institutionalized challenge to a rampant, postliberal, capitalist world" (176).

Scenario 2 is more optimistic, suggesting the possibility that "the fragmentation of past movements and the search for new, transnational social imaginaries becomes an indicator of fundamental, anticapitalist challenges to come..." (177). But this future, according to Martin, hinges on the possibility of avoiding exclusively state-centered politics while forging "an alternative social and political existence through world political alliances" (177).

Martin refers to Scenario 3 as the "postliberal world regime" possibility (178). As transnational modes of challenging both capital and states continue playing a key role in developing and legitimizing a post-nation-state and postliberal institutional arrangement of power that is suitable to continued global capitalist accumulation, antisystemic movements will have to address "the demise of liberalism's promise of wealth and equality, the demise of the legitimacy of the interstate system, and the absence of development and social welfare polices"

(178). As a parallel development to the emerging global structures of governance operating with less democratic accountability and above and below the increasingly hollowed-out nation-state, Martin points to the noir possibility that we are constructing “a networked mode of political control above and below the putative democratic liberal state” in which transnational movements and networks of civil society organizations become “institutional partners of newly legitimized international institutions” (178). In short, it may be possible that movements for an alternative democratic globalization are playing into the hands of an undemocratic postliberal globalization, helping to prepare the next wave of capitalist expansion.

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