DIALECTICAL ISLAMIC AND CONFUCIAN TRADITIONSWITHIN ASEAN TO HINDER THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATION

Saefur Rochmat[8]

Abstract

In the globalization era the clash of civilizations becomes our concern due to culture being the only aspect of human living not affected by globalization. But all aspects of human living are substantially related to culture for their meaning as well as the identity of certain groups differing from others. The clash of civilization discourses was ignited by Samuel P. Huntington who perceives the unification of Islamic Civilization and Confucian Civilization as the greatest threat to America. Inevitably the US has tried to attract the Confucian Civilization as its ally, leaving its former allies, the ASEAN countries, with their strong Islamic influence. However the ASEAN members have strong internal cohesion so they are able to manage the challenge and increase their bargaining power. Then ASEAN is able to moderate the clash of civilization.This essay tries to analye ASEAN's success in protecting its Moslem members from the clash of civilization, such as interventions and pre-emptive strikes imposed by the US. This is due to the ASEAN's model of security community which enabled dialogue amongst civilizations possible, especially Confucian and Islamic ones. ASEAN provides the opportunity for its Moslem members to have better bargaining power, such as in the case of Indonesia which has relatively strong power in the ASEAN to direct the courses of the organization. As result the US's realist approach in the form of security regime had been modified to suit the Indonesian case. Indeed the US should develop dialogue with Moslem in formulating terrorism policies in Indonesia n order to have effective policies that do not endanger human security.

Keywords: Dialectical, Islamic and Confucian traditions, Clash of Civilization

[8]Faculty of Social Sciences Yogyakarta State University. Email: Saefur_Rochmat@uny.ac.id

A. Introduction

Terror is as old a phenomenon as the history of human beings. Terror as a means to frighten, threaten, do violence, attack or kill someone to create great fear is an inherent tactic for power struggles already known long before it was identified as terror or terrorism. This word of terror entered political vocabularies at the time of the French Revolution. In the early of 19th century and in the 20th century terror became a technique for revolution. For example, Stalin's regime in 1930s was often categorized as a terror regime. In the Cold War era, terror was related to the nuclear weapon threat (Hardiman, 2003: 10).

Terrorism falls into political violence, but it is not always political. Terrorism has a political dimension and consequently it tends to be defined subjectively. The following phrases explain the problem that one's person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. That is why it is impossible to formulate an objective definition based on actor's identity or actor's reason but on the quality of the action. If it is based on the actor's identity it tends to be stigmatization; meanwhile based on actor's reason it tends to multi-interpretation. From the quality of the action we are able to measure it objectively. By doing so the connection between the casualty and the terrorists' target can be cut because the casualty whoever it is, is not a matter of interest for them. The casualty just represents the symbolical technique for their reasons. All terrorist actions manifest into violence actions or violence threats which are quite often accompanied by explicit demands. The terror is directed to those who are engaging in resistance and its aim is political and its execution is to have optimally public

attention. The actions are carried out systematically following the principles of political struggles (Hardiman, 2003: 11).

Based on scale of the action and its organization we can divide terrorism into national terrorism and international terrorism. The national terrorism limits its organization and its scale of action to certain territorial states. Meanwhile international terrorism has certain characteristics such as:

a. It is directed at foreigners and foreign assets.
b. It is to influence a foreign government's policies.
c. It has global networking for preparing global revolution which will result in new world order (Hardiman, 2003: 12).

In the Cold War era, international terrorism was associated with the ideology of communism which pretends to change the new world order according to the doctrines of communism. Terrorists have tried to follow the revolutionary movement of the state model of the former USSR. They created the communist party, besides the Bolshevik model of the military cell to guard the revolution. The former USSR and then the People's Republic of China (PRC) tried to spread and support communism movements around the world. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (2000: 307-8) argued that transnational terrorism has fallen significantly in the post-cold war era due to reduced state sponsorship and the demise of many leftist groups.

After the ending of the Cold War, the Western Blocs, especially the USA tried to identify other subsequent threats for their own interest. They mistrust their former allies, theMoslems, who had fought against the former USSR in Afghanistan. Indeed both had reached agreement based on the fragile foundation of their shared enemy. As a result

they began to fight each other just after the enemy collapse of the USSR following the failure of both to develop constructive dialogues and find common interests for cooperation. Despite an imbalance of power the US feel threatened by the possession of weaponry by their Moslem former allies.

The above kind of alliance based on the realist approach is not strong enough to stop another clash of civilizations and it is just a matter of time. We have witnessed in modern history the failures of this kind of alliance between the former USSR and the Western Bloc, and between the Western Bloc, especially the US, and Islamic Civilization. We will witness problems the current US alliance with Confucian Civilization if both do not develop dialogue amongst civilizations considering that civilization is the only aspect of life not transformed into globalization. This essay tries to analyse ASEAN's success in protecting its Moslem members from the clash of civilization, such as intervention and pre-emptive strikes imposed by the US. It is due to the ASEAN model of security community which makes dialogue amongst civilizations possible. ASEAN is very useful for its Moslem members to have better bargaining power such as in the case of Indonesia which also has strong power in the ASEAN to direct the courses of the organization. As result the US's realist approach of security regimes is modified to suit the Indonesian case. Indonesia tries to scrutinize the US war policies on international terrorism in order to have positive responses from other countries, especially Moslem countries.

B. US Global Politics and International Terrorism

As the US believes that the economic globalization can not be separated from the political order or the guarantee of security as explained by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1995: 90), ex-Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs who argued that power politics is still relevant in the post-Cold War era for international economic systems resting upon international political order. That is why the US wants to develop both economy and military powers. Despite the end of Cold War, it appears that the US wants to maintain its superpower position and consequently wants to develop its first class military technology. Michael Mastanduno (2003: 144) assesses its superpower status as a hegemony that is 'the ability to control important international outcomes; it is associated not just with material power but with social purposes'. He evaluates correctly that the US is playing a role of partial hegemony because by the ending of the Cold War the US, as the only superpower, is reluctantly involved in all matters of world affairs which do not suit well with its national interests.

However the US had difficulties in materializing its unilateral approach; besides its member allies do not want to support it, due to lack of ideological justification. Politically, the demise of Marxism-Leninism leaves the US without any powerful transnational ideological competition to social mobilization, willingness to bear high costs for strategic rivalry, and incentives for alliance between countries. Richard K Betts argues correctly that ideology is an element of power rather than just a matter of values and it can be used to justify US hegemonic roles. The only candidate to replace Marxism-Leninism as a competing global ideology is radical Islam (Betts, 1994: 42-43).

The September 11, 2001 terrorists' attack on the World Trade Centre in New York

and the Pentagon, Washington DC is the turning point in creating a common threat as the justification for US unilateralism. For first time since the dawn of the Cold War, a new grand strategy is taking shape in Washington. It was advanced by President Bush Jr., whose administration most directly as a response to terrorism, but it is also constitutes broader views about how the US should wield power and organize world order. Considering the US has tried to arrange this new system of unilateralism soon after the end of the Cold War, it can be seen the onset of the concept of human security. Although this concept is offered to the United Nations, we know that this concept can not be materialized without the help of the US. By adopting this concept the United Nations has justification to make humanitarian interventions into states which threaten human security. I agree with this concept but it should be applied very carefully for it risks more human security if the intervention causes intense conflict with the ruler, which of course has impact on society as a whole.

Furthermore the US's materialization of human security has political bias, using this concept to arrange a new world system order which will guarantee the US security or the US hegemonic role (Lone, 2004). Of course this one sided interpretation of human security endangers other parties and consequently endangers human security which should be materialized fairly without discriminating political ideas. This is the case in the US support for military regimes in Moslem countries to take over Islamic governments, such as in Sudan and Algeria. This discriminating policy costs human security in the Moslem countries and risks causing terrorism (Wright, 2004).

The US makes use of the September 11 terrorist attack to arrange a new inter-state relationship comparable to that of the Cold War era. However this newly created system is not a political bloc anymore but one system of national and global security to counter terrorist attacks, in which the US places itself as the head of this new world system. According to this new paradigm, the US is to be less bound to its partners and to global rules and institutions while it steps forward to play a more unilateral and anticipatory role in attacking terrorist threats using pre-emptive strikes and confronting rogue states seeking WMD. The US will use its unrivalled military power to manage the global order (Ikkebery, 2002: 324).

September 11 terrorist attack gives more justification for the US to intervene in other states, especially in the Moslem countries perceived to endanger the US's hegemonic role. The US makes inappropriate responses to pursue terrorists into other national jurisdictions and, further, tries to overthrow the regimes considered as the supporters of terrorist actions (Munir, 2003: 5). Afghanistan and Iraq have become casualties to the US assuming its role of hegemonic power. Further threats have been directed to other Islamic countries such as Syria and Iran, but these threats have not materialized because the US has been facing terrible responses from certain Iraqi people who do not want to deal with Americans.

The political stigma of terrorism is maintained by the US to create some instruments for countering political Islam. The most important instrument is law and its apparatus to deter subversive cells and to justify extra action by the governing regimes. Responses to terrorism have created a new kind of global political conflict and caused the

restructuring phenomenon of national political systems in most countries. To pursue the US ambition to arrange a global security system has resulted in some wars as well as authoritarian regimes which all belittle world peace, besides the establishment of law regulations to limit civil liberties in most democratic regimes.

C. The US Clash of Civilization Policies toward ASEAN

1. The Clash of Civilization

The demise of the USSR makes globalization develop more rapidly especially in terms of the economy (that is world economy) and politics (that is international nation state system), but it has not influenced culture or civilization. We have a world system in politics and economics but it is not a holistic world civilization. Furthermore unification of the world by means of technology has created a global structure which causes the shrinking of the globe, but it is not followed automatically by a monolithic world view within itself. For the above reasons Bassam Tibi (2000: 9) argues that globalization as structural achievement is not followed by the globalization of civilization.

It can be inferred that world peace can be obtained by accommodation amongst civilizations based on equality, respect for each other, and recognizing the existence of the other. It is better to offer equality amongst civilizations, as a model which is better than hegemony by anyone (Tibi, 2000: 5). This trend of thinking is a kind of postmodernism, that herewith views the world as a 'plurality of heterogeneous spaces and temporalities' and rejects the hegemony of modernity (Heller and Feher, 1988: 1).

Huntington replaces Islam as the enemy of the West, which might be true along with human history, but we should consider also the causes of the unrest and conflict between these civilizations. Both fight each other to pursue an ultimate claim of truth by negating each other. This tendency roots in their personal characteristics of God so that they often fail to reach compromises (Amstrong, 202: 264). Both develop personal religion as opposed to impersonal religion represented by Eastern Civilization. For them, God's personal actions can be manifested into man's actions so that man often acts in the name of the God. On the one hand this personal God has contributed to the Western civilization's formulation of liberal humanism, but on the other hand it creates big problems if God manifests into an idol serving our needs or as the projector of our personal images of limited needs, fears, and willing; and in the name of God people often act cruelly. Moreover, both have big potential conflicts due to their global mission so that they will compete with each other to serve their global mission (religion).

The clash of civilization has become our concern recently because civilization is the only aspect of human living not effected by globalization. Moreover all aspects of human living are substantially related to culture in order to have their meaning. Culture also has the function of being the identity of the group, which is different from the others (Ross, 1999: 42). It is not surprising that civilization is the last aspect of human life to be transformed into globalization because civilization is the core of all aspects of human being. Indeed it is difficult to see the domain of culture becoming the main factor of radical development or revolution because culture itself is multifaceted, has no single appearance of it. Instead, the culture becomes a framework for such radical development of revolution.

It is not appropriate to view Islam as the enemy because the latter is not ideology in modern terms, like communism, which has a means to encourage revolution. Like other religion, Islam can be seen from multi-dimensions such as politics and culture. Most Moslems perceive Islam as civilization which, within itself, develops some culture representing an Islamic worldview.

2. The US belittles the ASEAN and favours China

Samuel P. Huntington (1997: 185) in his provocative book of The Clash of Civilization and Remarking the World Order analyzes the changing of world politics. Considering the ending of the Cold War, Huntington evaluates that the greatest danger for America is the unification of Islamic Civilization and Confucian Civilization. Consequently the US should try to attract the Confucian Civilization into being its ally and leave its former allies, the ASEAN countries, with their strong Islamic influence.

Table 1. Population of Moslem in Southeast Asia (2000-01)

Country	Population (mil.)	Pop. Growth rate (%)	Moslem share of pop. (%)	Moslem pop. (mil.)
Brunei	0.3	2.4	67	0.2
Indonesia	210.4	1.6	87	183.0
Malaysia	23.3	2.4	53	12.3
Philippines	75.6	1.9	5	3.8
Singapore	4.0	1.7	16	0.6
Thailand	60.7	0.8	4	2.4

Source: R.W. Hefner *Islam and Asian Security*, p. 374.

The above table shows that Moslems constitute the majority of the population in the original ASEAN members (202.3 of the total population), and Islam has strong followers amongst the non-Moslem ASEAN members, constituting the majority in some of their provinces. On the other hand, Islamic countries are pluralistic societies with relatively strong influence from the Confucian tradition. Non-Moslems consist of 87%, 67% and 53% in Indonesia, Brunei and Malaysia respectively, although Malaysia and Brunei formally apply modern Islamic states, while Indonesia as the largest Moslem country in the world, is assumed to be neither an Islamic nor secular state. The above socio-geographical figures show that the Islamic and Confucian traditions live together in peace in Southeast Asia.

Inevitably the US is developing closer ties with China and may be recently values as less important its relationship with the ASEAN countries, considering a half of the ASEAN people are Moslems who are a majority in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Actually the US policy towards Islam is not an overarching goal and its fundamental reason is economical. As the developed country, the USA wants to seek the cheapest labor and the USA, of course, finds this in China (Edgington, 2004b: 3). China becomes more attractive due to its large market compared with ASEAN which consists of just only one-third of this. Moreover China has better educated people than ASEAN as the driving forces for the development of modern industries.

Third, it is culturally easier to reach an agreement with the Confucian Civilization than the Islamic Civilization. The Western Civilization based on the Christian tradition had long histories of fighting the Islamic civilization in the Crusades, apart from the fact that both came from the same root of the

Semite tradition. However, the theological claims to truth fostered them as members of the the same family fighting each other for inheritance, instead of cooperating amongst themselves for the common benefit in the future. Ironically the shared personal character of the religion causes them difficulties in cooperation because this personal character often does not tolerate others claiming the truth of religion; on the contrary, they compete with each other in serving their global mission. That is why it is easy for the USA to cooperate with Confucian Civilization because the latter has, differently, an impersonal character which tolerates and absorbs other civilizations (Amstrong, 2002: 264).

The USA has been developing its relationship with China since the introduction of Ping Pong Diplomacy in 1971, and then in 1979 the US tied a formal diplomatic relationship with China. Having experienced a limited long relationship with China, the US was able to make a decisive decision after the ending of the Cold War in 1989. The US Clinton administration, then, changed its foreign policy to the region by developing a closer relationship with China than that of Japan as its major ally in the region.

However, the US changing policy toward Japan is a more economical and long term policy. The US wanted to develop its economic power in China because the former was frustrated in having a trade relationship with Japan because of non-tariff barriers, besides its insistence on Japan's need to pay more of the shared security burden as the result of Japan's economic recovery. After these US short term objectives concluded, both countries managed to build a strong alliance because they shared common interest

in global security which will guarantee the US's superpower position. Its strong alliance with Japan is very useful to deter the rising power of China.

There were three developments which caused the relationship between the ASEAN and the USA to worsen. The first was in the mid-1990s when the US promoted the agenda of trade liberalization within APEC, but the U.S.A., then, promoted the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) outside APEC, which were perceived to create trade and investment diversions from Asia. The USA took this policy due to the rise of regionalism in Europe which established the European Union (EU). The second was at the time of the Asian financial crisis: the USA and International Monetary Fund (IMF), its tool of international economic policy, exacerbated the hardship of the countries hit by the crisis, besides the fact that the US hedge funds substantially profited from the massive selling of Asian currencies. Last but not least came in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 which caused the US to pay little attention to the ASEAN economies, besides the US inclination towards unilateralism –not just in the field of security but also in such policy areas as trade or environment (Munakata, 2003: 9-10).

D. ASEAN's Bargaining Power

1. ASEAN's Efforts for Bargaining Power

Although both the US and ASEAN have changed their attitudes toward communism since the end of the Cold War, but substantially both have a different approach to it. The US bases its foreign policy on the realist belief that within 50 years China's

military forces will not become a threat to the US. Based on this stand President Clinton tied the close relationship with China as one of the US strategies towards Japan which, in the view of the US, was not playing fair in their relationship, both politically and economically. Recently after Japan revised its attitudes toward the US, both developed a close relationship, as far as in security matters, to develop technology which will guarantee the US hegemonic power.

The US policy towards ASEAN is based on the security regimes approach which is defined as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge'(Krahmann, 2003: 7). Security regimes foster stability because states value peace and cooperation despite the fact that their legitimacy becomes disputable concerning the US tendency to maximize its hegemonic power unilaterally. Considerably some call it the US incomplete hegemony for its lack of concern toward world affairs outside its national interests and for ignoring persuasive approaches to solve the problem.

Meanwhile ASEAN attitudes toward communism are based on the security community approach, and the ASEAN countries have experienced living together peacefully despite their prevailing different political systems. A pluralistic security community is defined as a region of states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Security communities are facilitated by three factors which build upon one another: (1) precipitating conditions, such as changes in technology, demography, economics, the new interpretation of social relations and external threats; (2) factors conducive to mutual trust and the development of a collective identity, such as transactions, organizations and social learning; and (3) necessary conditions, such as mutual trust and a collective identity (Krahmann, 2003: 8).

On other hand ASEAN tries to manage itself to counter undesired impacts from the development of the relationship between the US and China. The ASEAN members have a strong identity so that they are able to manage the challenge. ASEAN has functioned well in: (1) alleviation of regional conflict within Southeast Asia; (2) economic cooperation by fostering intra-ASEAN trade; (3) a common foreign policy with external countries; (4) cooperative defence arrangements (Edgington, 2004a: 2).

For mediating the impacts of the US clash of civilizations, ASEAN has introduced some strategies as follows. The first was to enlarge its membership to other Southeast Asian countries which were previously subordinated either to former USSR or China namely Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In the view of ASEAN, these states may create instability in the region if their economic development lags behind by diverting their internal decline into external power seeking because it is impossible for them to invade China (Shambaugh, 1994: 44). From an economic point of view, having received new members will enlarge the ASEAN market. On other hand, these states also want to join with ASEAN although they have been developing good ties with China because they just do not want to be dependent on the regional power of China; besides some of them have border conflicts with the regional power.

The second was to introduce the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) in 1991 in order to create the ASEAN Economic

Community (AEC) in 2010 as a further step of ASEAN's joint production (Edgington, 2004a: 3), although some argue that the introduction of AFTA was due to the growing threat of regional arrangements in the rest of the world, such as NAFTA and the EU (Edgington, 2004c: 7). By doing so the ASEAN will be able to compete with China and the US and at the same time it becomes a way to increase its bargaining power. ASEAN knows well that amongst major powers in the region are different, if not conflicting, ideas about the security issues, so that it tries to materialize its role in the regional political power by managing its own power and playing the roles as mediator amongst the major regional powers.

Soon after its introduction of AFTA, in 1994 ASEAN established the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which has become the principal forum for security in Asia. It draws together 23 countries which have a bearing on the security of the Asia Pacific region (Simon, 2002: 9). Another bargaining power was obtained in 1997 when PM Mahathir Muhammad held the ASEAN-China meeting (The ASEAN+1). This meeting encouraged Japan to join based on its perception that ASEAN is the most important partner to play with in regional power because Japan did not want China to assume the leadership of the regional power. Consequently, still in the same year, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South Korea) was established (Naber, 2003: 120).

2. China is approaching ASEAN

In contrast to the U.S., China paid more attention towards ASEAN due to its proximity such that the instability in ASEAN could influence the stability in China. Moreover China has also political reasons to tie agreements with ASEAN for the purpose of bringing added security as counter strategy to its relationship with the stronger power of the US which may cause hazard impacts to its sovereignty and core national interests (Naber, 2003: 45-47). China views ASEAN as geopolitically very important to pursue its ambition to be regional power, so that China becomes sensitive to the fact that its economic development was at the cost of ASEAN which previously enjoyed the US's economic support.

China took careful steps to tie up a closer relationship with ASEAN so that it was very often that the initiatives were at first introduced by its counterparts in ASEAN. I think it is due to its political culture and national historical experiences which constitute the larger milieu in which a nation's specific security calculations are made. That is why it is very important to know about these matters in the case of China for assessing the nature of the rising power of China as a threat or not to the security of ASEAN. China's most urgent concern is national security because it is difficult to feed its large population and to run the country. China is most concerned to develop its economy because it perceives strong power as outgrowth of a strong economy. China's leaders take first into account its national security, and its regional roles develop in parallel with the level of its economic growth (Banlaoi, 2003: 98).

For that purpose China tries to develop its bilateral relationship with each member of the ASEAN. China was very sceptical of the multilateral approach, such as ASEAN and ARF (The ASEAN Regional Forum), because its influence will be less sound. Just after China is able to build a good relationship with each separate member of the ASEAN, the former feels reluctant to join

into multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN and ARF. Both China and the members of ASEAN have reached agreement of the Treaty of Conduct to solve the problems.

China has been developing close ties with previous members of the communist bloc, namely Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, besides Singapore and Malaysia, many of whose citizens are overseas Chinese people. The relationship between the ASEAN and China has developed very fast, especially after the Asian crisis starting from 1997, following China's commitment not to devaluate its currency.

Furthermore following its economic growth, China has become more active to promote economic regionalism through its proposal to ASEAN in November 2000 to create ASEAN-China FTA. This trend is evidence of China's ability to challenge dependency theory by developing the concept of Greater China which develops economic ties between Taiwan, Hong Kong and mainland China despite political differences (Edgington, 2004d: 1). Of course, it is due to China's success in opening market policy which benefits its ASEAN neighbours. In October 2001, China and ASEAN completed the joint feasibility study for an FTA, and in November 2001, both agreed to establish an ASEAN-China FTA within ten years (Krawitz, 2002: 2). In November 2002, the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Economic Cooperation (ACEC) was signed that would establish a free trade area by 2010 for the older ASEAN members and 2015 for the newer members. In order for this FTA to sound more attractive to the ASEAN, in October 2003, beginning with Thailand, China started to implement the so-called early harvest measures to eliminate tariffs on some fruits and vegetables. Last but not least, PM Zhu Rongji proposed five tasks for the ASEAN Plus Three countries to implement and six points for Sino-ASEAN cooperation (Thayer, 2002: 6-7).

E. Bargaining Power ASEAN Member of Indonesia

I would like to scrutinize this clash of civilization in order to measure the scale and the extent of it. Political Islam might be viewed by the West as an enemy in spite of its minority adherents, however it is very dangerous to overwhelm its threat and consequently result in unwisely supporting military regimes, such as the cases in Sudan and Algeria, just to prevent political Islam from gaining power in Moslems countries, although it is done by election as a means of democratic processes. It, of course, endangers human security and peace and might be also the cause of terrorists.

We can undermine political Islam because it is not monolithic. Furthermore it does not constitute military forces which should be faced by arms forces. It is a political issue which should be deterred by counter issues. Political Islam also does not have a model state such as the USSR's perceived role at the Cold War era. If we consider Pan-Islamism as a political agenda, then which state will support this utopia? 'Islamic states' such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait do not want to give financial aids to this movement because it might create instability for them. 'Islamic states' in the Middle East give financial aids to other Moslem countries or to Moslem minorities in a certain state primarily based on religious purposes. Similarly they promote fundamentalism, just like Christian fundamentalism in America in the 19th

century, with its some negative characteristics. The most clear feature of Islamic fundamentalism is to apply Shari'a (Islamic laws). Shari'a does not need an Islamic government regime such as perceived by Zachary Abuza (2003: 322) Shari'a can be applied at different levels namely personal, social, or in autonomous groups such as in the case of the Indonesian government's offer to the separatist movement in Aceh. Fundamentalist movements can be divided into non-political fundamentalists and political fundamentalists. Political fundamentalists pretend to apply Shari'a at different levels up to state level. We tolerate political fundamentalists as long as they pursue their goals by means of democratic ways. We should deter political fundamentalists manifesting into Pan-Islamic movements such as done by Al-Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiyah.

Mostly, Islam in Indonesia is tolerance, moderation, and pluralism, and most Moslems support the secular state of the Republic of Indonesia. This mainstream Islam is supported by the two biggest Islamic organizations of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Both represent themselves as civil society, although they have a political interest in making sure that Indonesia is ruled by regulations which do not contradict the principles of Islamic doctrines. They do not want to implement Islamic law (Shari'a) formally.

Zachary Abuza (2003: 322) argues that only a small minority advocates the establishment of Islamic regimes governed by shariah (Islamic law) and their political activities are mainly focused on their own domestic agenda, not as an international threat. It is misleading to judge Shari'a (Islamic law) as monolithic. As I have mentioned above, we are really to focus our biggest worry on pan-Islamism. This category is useful for noticing the differences between religious fundamentalism (Salafism) and political fundamentalism (pan-Islamism). Research done by Sidney Jones (2003) of the International Crisis Group, claimed as the first comprehensive analysis of Salafism, concludes that the Salafism movements characterized by a puritanical form of Islam, often identified with Saudi funding, do not have any relationship with terrorism activities. Furthermore she says that if there is any tendency toward violence on the part of the religious activists, it is rooted in the ambition to dictate, control and correct individual behaviour, and takes the form of punitive actions against individuals or groups regarded as `bad Muslims` (Jones, 2003: 1).

Based on Sidney Jones's finding, the US should notice this division of groups to hinder counter responses from some Moslem groups in Indonesia. It is not appropriate to stop all the flow of financial aids from Middle East because these aids are very useful to develop human resources. By doing so it will disseminate the birth of radical Moslems who are worried about Moslems' converting into Christianity as a result of the US allows the inflow of donations by Christian missionaries.

The US's efforts to register into United Nation's lists of terrorism groups all the Islamic organizations or foundations which receive financial aids from Middle East is objected by most Indonesian. These Islamic organizations do not have any relationship with terrorism activities. For example, Haramain foundation headed by Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, head of MPR (People's Supreme Consultative Council). It is also the case of

LIPIA, an Indonesian branch of Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh, in which one of its graduates Ulil Abshar Abdalla become the founder of the Liberal Islamic Networks, in some ways the antithesis of the Salafist movement (Jones, 2003: 8). It is due to Indonesia culture or situation and condition contribute to the development of intellectual life for the Salafists.

Political fundamentalist or Salafist jihadist are the extreme fringe of the Salafist movement, determined to attack Western targets in retaliation for perceived aggression by the West, or what Indonesians more frequently term a "Christian-Zionist conspiracy", against Muslims around the world. ICG correctly argues that this radical wing of the international salafi movement emerged as a product of the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and it is no coincidence that the top JI leaders are Afghan veterans (Jones, 2003: 1).

Following US war policies on international terrorism, Indonesia public debates on the matter develop quite ambivalent. The devastating bomb blast on the Sari Nightclub in Bali, in which some 183 people were killed, was a wakeup call to government in denial and sceptics about terrorism in the region. The October 12, 2002 attack was Al Qaeda's second most deadly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Indonesia's two largest Moslem organizations urged the government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri to crack down on Islamic militants suspected of violent activities. Both urged to propose even more draconian measures. As a result some human rights groups have warned that the new anti-terrorist measures could be abused and mark a return to the autocratic practices of former President Soeharto. But more moderate Moslem figures said these fears are overstated (Sipress, 2002).

The government issued Acts of Lieu No 1 and 2 2002 on Criminal Crimes of Terrorism. This acts give a great authority to BIN (Indonesian Intelligent Bureau) to take some measures to arrest or catch some people identified as members of terrorist groups. Another measure makes worried the human rights groups is to give BIN and TNI (Indonesian Army Forces) authority to enforce law. Moreover these both institutions have rights to apply pre-emptive actions to detect an early potential threat (Sipress, 2002).

Indeed the acts give both institutions a great authority and these acts could be used to suppress civil liberties and could damage to democratization process. Without effective control to these both institutions in materializing their function against terrorism they might become new terror mechanisms which create serious threat to civil societies (Munir, 2003: 7). However up to now both institutions are very careful to execute their rights because the military is no more the only political power.

Conclusion

Strict exclusion of Islamic Civilization is very dangerous for maintaining world order because the US can develop cooperation with moderate Moslem to deter the spreading of terrorism in the Islamic countries. The US should be careful for classifying fundamentalist of terrorist. As argued correctly by Zachary Abuza (2003: 322) that only a small minority of Indonesian fall into fundamentalist which advocates the establishment of Islamic regimes governed by Shari'a (Islamic law) and their political

activities mainly focused on their own domestic agenda, not as international threat. Sidney Jones (2003) reaffirm that the fundamentalist movements characterized by puritanical form of Islam often identified with Saudi funding do not have any relationship with terrorism activities. If there is any tendency toward violence on the part of the religious activists, it is rooted in the ambition to dictate, control and correct individual behaviour, and takes the form of occasional punitive actions against individuals or groups regarded as `bad Muslims'. It is misleading to judge fundamentalism or Shari'a (Islamic law) as monolithic and we should notice the differences between religious fundamentalist (Salafism) and political fundamentalist (pan-Islamism).

The US should develop dialogue with Moslem in formulating terrorism policies in Indonesia n order to have effective policies and does not endanger human security. The US is unwisely to enlist some organizations as terrorist group in the United Nation lists just because of receiving donation from the Middle East without developing dialogues with other countries. By means of ASEAN Indonesia has stronger bargaining power to the US so that it moderates the US clash of civilization approach into Indonesia. The US revises its policy concerning Indonesian organizations receiving donation from the Middle East while the US are not able to guarantee the same donation of Christian missionaries flow into Indonesia and become cause of terrorists which are worried about converters.

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