

A Game on Policy Implementation among Women Representation in Jember District during the 2014 Election

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ABSTRACT

The 30% quota policy is implemented by political parties by recruiting women as legislative candidates in a certain election area and number. Like a game, that effort is a political party strategy when faced with other opposing political parties. The incumbent candidate will choose non-cooperation and move to the opposing political party if the strategy of the political party is not profitable. Instead, new candidates choose cooperatively with political parties.

Keywords: 30% quota policy, political party, women candidates

ABSTRAK

Kebijakan kuota 30% diimplementasikan oleh aktor (partai politik) dan dengan merekrut perempuan sebagai caleg, menempatkan pada suatu daerah pemilihan dan nomor tertentu. Ibarat suatu permainan, upaya tersebut adalah strategi partai politik ketika menghadapi strategi partai politik lain yang menjadi lawan. Caleg *incumbent* akan memilih non kooperatif dan pindah pada partai politik lawan, bila strategi partai politik tidak memberi keuntungan. Sebaliknya caleg baru memilih kooperatif dengan partai politik. Kata Kunci: kebijakan kuota 30%, partai politik, bakal caleg perempuan

INTRODUCTION

An agenda resulted from the conduct of CEDAW Convention and the platform of Beijingin 1995 is to equal the position of men and women by implementing the affirmative action policy. This policy can be manifested in some ways, by determining a quota through a constitution or laws, and through political parties. The quota determined by the constitution has been realized in the form of “*reserved seats*” in eleven countries of Latin America, France, Belgium, and Italy which decided 10% - 40% of the total seats available. Meanwhile, the quota determined by political parties is implemented in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. These three countries are well known for having relatively higher level of women representation than other countries ([Rahmatunisa, 2016: 92](#)).

Indonesia has implemented the second model, which is the quota of the political party that was manifested through Law of Election. This is a policy implemented in three periods of election; in 2004, 2009 and 2014. The implementation of women representation policy in the District of Jember, particularly, as a former part of the Residency of Besukiin East Java, brings about a compelling phenomenon. During the implementation of Election Law No. 12/2003 in the election of 2004, and Election Law No 10/2008 in the 2009 elections, some data occur that not all political parties reach the target of the policy implementation.

In the election of 2004, only 41% or ten (10) out of twenty-four (24) political parties reached the quota of 30%. On the other hand, during the election of 2009, the number of political parties fulfilling the 30% quota declined and fell at only 34% or about fifteen political parties out of fourth-four (44) which participated in the general election. In fact, during the election of 2014, all political parties showed their success in achieving the target of policy, as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1. THE POLITICAL PARTIES FULFILLING THE 30% TARGET OF WOMEN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE DISTRICT OF JEMBER

Period of Election	The Political Party was success	%
2004	10 dari 24	41
2009	15 dari 44	34
2014	12 dari 12	100

Source: Processed secondary data

The party which is most interested in the result of the policy implementation is the political party, primarily because it is related with the chances for obtaining the available legislative seats during the election. Therefore, when implementing the policy, any political parties positioned in the target groups made the utmost preparation. It can be observed from the data of the 2014 election, that the percentage of the achievement of the 30% quota in every participating political party exceeded 30%, as seen in Table 2.

TABLE 2. WOMEN REPRESENTATION IN THE 2014 ELECTION IN JEMBER DISTRICT

No	Name of Political Party	The Total of Fixed Representatives		Total	Capaian%
		Female	Male		
1.	Nasdem	17	33	50	34
2.	PKB	16	30	49	35
3.	PKS	19	30	49	39
4.	PDIP	15	26	41	36,5
5.	Golkar	19	31	50	38
6.	Gerindra	17	33	50	34
7.	Demokrat	22	28	50	44
8.	PAN	18	31	49	37
9.	PPP	18	30	48	37,5
10.	Hanura	18	32	50	36
11.	PBB	17	32	49	34,7
12.	PKPI	16	26	42	38,1
Total		212	362	574	36,69

Source: Regional General Election Commission of Jember, 2014.

In 2014, the government put limitations on the number of registered representatives, that from 120%, only 100% of representatives applicable in the two previous elections could be registered. Such regulation, implies that there is a minimum chance available for women to be registered as candidates or

representatives, resulted in the increasing number of women representatives. This very achievement could be the success of the participating political parties in implementing the policy despite the strongly competitive atmosphere, making the policy implementation process a battle field for all parties. The present article, therefore, presents the argument that the success in implementing the women representation policy was not a result of a cooperative game among political parties.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Implementation of Women Representation Policy

Previous studies on the implementation of women representation policy mentioned that the culture as a hindering variable ([Purwanti, 2015](#); [Hillman, 2017](#)). Besides, other contributing factors are mentioned as well, such as institutional, organizational and structural barriers – such as masculine cultures and male – dominated political parties – limit women’s abilities to exercise their talents and qualifications ([O’Brien and Piscopo, 2017](#)). Therefore, understanding the political landscape in which social and political actors operate as a constantly shifting field of action both contextually and temporally is very important in aligning particular strategies, tactics and actors to produce politically meaningful gain ([Cromwell, 2017](#)).

However, the political perception depends on the implementation of policies – thus substantive representation is not descriptive representation – and that men and women are a very large extent appreciative of the same policies ([Guariso, 2017](#)). Despite all the aforementioned arguments, the policy implementation is dependent on: (1) clear and distinct regulations; (2) the role of political party as the “main gate keepers of democracy” to consistently apply the affirmative action policy, coupled with the intensive political education activities and recruitment processes which strengthen the capacity of women representatives; (3) sustainable women empowerment to reinforce their claim in accessing their rights of obtaining available seats in po-

litical institutions or bureaucracy; (4) the conduct of political campaign via media or woman movement networking to gain more support in the importance of women involvement in politics; (5) political education for all layers of society which focuses on the attempt to eliminate any ideological and cultural values believed for women to be actively involved in public ([Rahma-tunisa, 2016](#)).

Hereby, the women representation policy in the present context is an instrument for ensuring women's political interests while protecting their political roles. Adoption of quota system is a qualitative jump into the policy of exact goals of the representation ([Jabeen & Awan, 2017](#)). Even if the quota policy is fully implemented, it threatens the existing rules, practices and norms of political life, long premised upon women's exclusion ([Krook, 2016](#)).

The urgency of assessing the implementation of women representation policy in the perspective of game theory

A study of policy implementation is a study conducted following a policy formulation. It includes studies on the implementation process which involve two or more actors or doers; making substantially focuses on the interaction between these actors ([Hermans, 2014](#); [Bressers, 2007](#)). Further, the analysis of the policy implementation, which involve multiple actors, would be more appropriate if game theory perspective is applied ([Hermans, 2014:17](#)).

Meanwhile, the use of game theory perspective as a method of policy analysis initially (classically) only focused on the study of actors' behavior implementing a certain policy. Yet, in its development in the modern era, the game theory perspective has been used by emphasizing the rules of the game, preferences and other functions. The use of the game theory perspective could be identified as urgent for some reasons; first, there is an unsatisfactory achievement in the implementation of policy despite the actors' expertise; second, the target of the policy imple-

mentation is highly reachable whereas the actor is in a situation of high conflict of interest.

According to the above description, the analysis of implementation of women representation policy in Indonesia focusing in Jember regency during the election of 2014 refers to this citation. Hermans assert that the game theory perspective has six (6) components, namely players, action and strategies, outcomes, preferences, and payoff and rules ([Hermans, 2014:13](#)). First, players are the actors implementing the policy which may include *people, governments, organizations*. We will also use “actors” as synonym for “players.” Players in the context of game theory are large in quantity and bring their own interests. The question is, if the government becomes one of the implementing actors, would it be possible that its role can be neutral? Would not the government also have an interest? Hermans, therefore, did not include the government as an actor. This point of Hermans seems to require a more intensive review because this finding indicates the authority in implementing the women representation policy within the bureaucracy of actor or implementers and all relating networks who play a role as intermediaries when interacting with the target groups of policy.

Players or actors ([Hermans, 2014](#)) or implementers/intermediaries and the target groups ([Bressers, 2000, 2001, 2007 & 2013](#); [Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980:47](#)) have different interests and strategies to reach the target. Meanwhile, these players/actors tend to be treated as equal by Hermans. The equal position will facilitate other parties to mediate as done by the Provincial Consultative Bodies. The players/actors, according to Hermans, are willing to play a “cooperative game because all players agree on the importance of safety as the main interest. They do not agree on the additional values, such as those related to recreation/tourism, nature and dune preservation” ([Hermans, 2014:5](#)).

With the aforementioned strategy, the achievement of outcome may be realized because the role of the Provincial Con-

sultative Bodies which are capable to bridge the differences between each strategy brought by each actor until they agree on the same objective. Unlike Hermans, the theory proposed by Bressers is quite different in a sense that the interaction between implementers and the target groups aims to “not only about achieving implementation, but also about attempts to prevent implementation or to change the character of what is implemented”. This attempt is manifested in three patterns of interaction, namely: cooperation (active, passive, or forced), op-position, and joint learning ([Bressers, 2001:12](#)).

The three patterns of interactions between the implementers and the target groups in the theory of Bressers are true, according to the context of the study findings. The findings, however, indicate something different, which is that the interaction between the implementers and the target groups happens not to change the existing characters of the policy but simply to achieve the target of the policy.

The pattern of interaction between the implementers/intermediaries and the target groups is built on the pattern of cooperative game which aims at not only achieved the policy target (30% quota) but to achieve the peace election. This finding also indicates that the target of the 30% quota of women candidates is achieve through the interaction between the target groups and the candidates of legislative members, using the strategy of negotiate-compromise and instructive-cooperative.

Besides outcomes, Hermans also mention other components of game theory, namely preference and payoffs which are described as follows: “Players have different preferences among the possible outcomes. Payoffs are often used to represent the value of these outcomes to different players.” According to Her-mans, these preferences and payoffs relate to the policy objec-tives to be achieved by each actor. The result of the implemen-tation process is reward (payoff), which is obtained upon the achievement of the outcomes.

The last component of game theory is the rules that govern

the course of the game. As it appears in the description of Hermans: “games are governed by rules that prescribe actions and strategies that are permitted, required or prohibited”. Rules contain regulations that may and may not be allowed throughout the game. Rule of the game is divided into two, the rules are formal and informal. Formal rules include the constitution and the rule of law established by the government. While informal rules include codes of conduct, norms that develop in society etc. ([North, 1990: 36](#)).

The existence of the applicable rules is vital because it regulates what to do by the actors, implementer, and the target groups while they are attempting to achieve the target of policy. In this case, Hermans describes only one applicable rule, which only regulates the interaction between actors. While in this study, it is found that the regulations appear in more than one, and they stratified by the hierarchy. The implementer sends down the Election Law No 8/2012 to be PKPU No 7/2013 that is intended for the target groups. The Election Law No. 8/2012 and PKPU no 7/2013 are descended as a new regulation which are applicable only within the internal environment of the target groups.

On the other hand, although the game theory is composed of six components, it appears that Hermans’ focus is on the interaction between actors, each of which has his own strategy when implementing a policy. The policy implementation process that is likened to the game can be described in two ways, soft and hard models. Hard models are based on mathematical calculations. While the soft model analyzes the interaction between actors when implementing the policy ([Hermans, 2014:16](#)).

TABEL 3. RESEARCH TAXONOMY ON WOMEN REPRESENTATION POLICY

No	Authors	Research Focus	Unit of Analysis	Research Findings
1.	Purwanti (2015)	The barriers of the implementation of women representation policy in Indonesia	The law of General Election	The implementation of women representation policy is hindered by the societal culture.
2.	Hilman (2017)	The Limits of Gender Quotas Women's Parliamentary Representation In Indonesia	The Indonesian Women Representation Policy	The policy implementation is constrained by the patriarchy culture.
3.	O'Brien and Piscopo (2017)	Views of members of political parties to determine the implementation process of women representation policy	The perception of the board of political parties	Institutional, organizational and structural barriers – such as masculine cultures and male – dominated political parties – limit women's abilities to exercise their talents and qualifications
4.	Cromwell (2017)	The effort to understand social and political context attempted by the actors determine the policy implementation	The social and political understanding of actor which implementing the policy	Understanding the political landscape in which social and political actors operate as a constantly shifting field of action both contextually and temporally is very important. In which critical junctures aligning particular strategies, tactics and actors can occur to produce politically meaningful gain
5.	Guariso (2017)	Perceptions of implementing actors in determining the implementation of women representation policy	The perception of actor	But the perception of political depends on the implementation of policies – thus substantive representation not descriptive representation – and that men and women are a very large extent appreciative of the same policies
6.	MudiatiRahmattunnisa (2016)	"Affirmative Action and Reinforcement of Women Political Participation in Indonesia"	The affirmative action and the Indonesian women political parties	The success of the policy implementation is dependent on not only clear regulation, political education, women empowerment, public campaign through media, mobilization of women movement networks and political education aiming to eliminate the ideological and cultural constraints for women to be actively involved in the public
7.	Jabeen & Awan (2017)	The women representation policy as become a vital instrument implemented around the world to improve women participation in politics	The implementation of women representation policy in practice in country members of the UN	The women representation policy in the present context, is an instrument for ensuring women's political interests with protecting their political roles. Adoption of quota system is a qualitative jump into the policy of exact goals of the representation
8.	Krook (2016)	The women representation policy implemented may influence the norm of political life thus cause fear of the authorities when implemented	The gender quota	If the quota policy is fully implemented, its threaten the reigning rules, practices and norms of political life, long premised upon women is exclusion

Source: Secondary data

From the descriptions displayed in Table 3, the successful implementation of women representation policy depends on the political parties as an implementation actor, coupled with the distinct regulation, although such policy implementation may frighten the patriarchal authorities because it changes the political norms. Therefore, this policy was successfully implemented in Indonesia in the 2014 elections. Hence, it is interesting to analyze the game played in the implementation.

METHODS

This is a qualitative study with the implementers of women representation policy in the 2014 elections, including political parties, women representatives and the Regional General Election Commission of Jember. Furthermore, in determining the setting of the study, the researcher took the criteria of the number of political parties which are successful to obtain the available seats of a district as the fundamental. The underlying assumption for this is that the political parties which have successfully won the available seats for women representatives, surely have implemented certain processes of policy implementation. Thus they could achieve not only the 30% quota in every constituency but also win the election, which is the ultimate goal. Therefore, it is assumed that the more political parties winning the seats, the more varied the process of the policy implementation.

Meanwhile, from the website of the Regional General Election Commission of ex-member areas of Besuki Residency, the researcher obtained the data of political parties that have won the seats for women representatives in the 2014 election. In the district of Situbondo, the website displays five (5) political parties that obtain the seats, namely PPP, PKS, PDIP, Golkar, PKB and Gerindra with the total obtained seats of nine (9) seats. Meanwhile, in the district of Bondowoso, only two (2) political parties obtained the seats, namely PDIP and Golkar. Further, the website of the election commission of Lumajang, shows that the seven parties - PKS, PAN, Gerindra, PKB, Partai Demokrat, Nasdem and Hanura - obtained a total of nine (9) seats. On the other hand, in Jember, seven (7) political parties obtained 10 seats for women representatives: Nasdem, PKB, PDIP, Demokrat, PAN, and Hanura. With this consideration, the researcher chose the district of Jember as the research setting. Although the number of political parties succeeding to obtain the seats between Jember and Lumajang are equal; seven (7) political parties, Jember still outnumbered the obtained seats.

The number of the obtained seats for women is based on the assumption aforementioned previously in this chapter, reflects the quality strategy of the political parties in implementing the policy.

FINDINGS

Networking Pattern of Candidates of Legislatives

In addition to the formal regulations as written in the Law of Election No. 8/2012 and PKPU No. 7/2013, political parties still apply other requirements which are commonly determined by the central board or DPP and generally about the descriptions of the ideology, vision and mission of the party. Yet, as a contestant in the election competition, each of the participating political party has the interest to win the seats in the legislative. To reach this, other requirements are applied by the political parties, including (1) popularity (voters' familiarity to the candidate of representative); (2) electability (willing of voters to vote); (3) integrity (behavior appropriacy of candidates of representatives with the applicable societal norms and honesty); (4) campaign funding (financial ability of candidates of representatives to mobilize voters' support); (5) experience/history/achievement/capability of performing legislative functions (legislation, budgeting, and supervisory), (6) services to the party; political ability and the successive team of candidate of representatives (organizational support and supporting teams to mobilize voters' support (*Kompas*, 31 January 2013, p 2). Nevertheless, women as leaders of political parties may not exist. Even worse, the target of 30% quota may be harder to achieve when the requirements apply. Therefore, political parties also build an agreement among members of the board regarding other criteria, should the general and specific criteria are missed. Several political parties put down such agreement until policy tools. These policy tools may be different in every political party, since they have different targets to achieve. Besides, they have different procedures and variations in selecting the candidates of representa-

tives. In other words, they employ varied strategies in deciding on the selected representatives. Despite their differences, they share the main focus of the representatives in common, which is the cadre element. Should the cadre is not fulfilled, the political parties will choose the candidates or representatives from non-cadres or sympathizer. The percentage of how many candidates of representatives taken from cadres may also differ from one party to another. One may determine the candidates should all come from the cadres, and another determines 10% out of the total number of the candidates are from the non-cadres.

The networking process of candidates of representatives involves the board of the party and the victory board of election (Bappilu). Additionally, some parties mandate the board of *syariah/syuro*. Besides, it is not uncommon that every member of the board of the parties is involved in the network of the candidates. Table 4 presents the networking pattern of candidates as decided in every political party.

TABLE 4. NETWORKING PATTERN OF CANDIDATES OF LEGISLATIVES

Political Party	Networking of Candidates	Selection of Candidates
Nasdem	Cadre and sympathizer	Members of the board
PKB	Cadre of NU, popular and professional figure	Cadre and selected by the board (Board of Syuro)
PKS	90% of party cadres	Board of Syuro and party functionaries (after internal selection)
PDIP	Candidates of representatives are from cadres and non-cadres with scoring of the former are greater than the other. The decision over who will be selected as representatives will be done by the Chief	Scoring and instruction of the chief
Golkar	95% of party cadres	Stratified decision, starting from the chief, general secretary and the election winning board
Gerindra	Cadres and sympathizer	The board
Demokrat	Cadres and candidates of cadres brought in by the cadres by considering the educational background	Applicable formal mechanism, but actually performed and decided by the Chief and General Secretary
PAN	Networking of cadres and non-cadres	Determined through the board meeting in every strata of party, DPP until branch of party
PPP	Criteria and scoring applied for cadres and non-cadres	Final selection is performed by the Nine Team (no female involved)
Hanura	Cadres and sympathizer	The board
PBB	Cadres and sympathizer	The board
PKPI	Cadres and sympathizer	The board

Based on Table 4, every political party has several specific criteria applied specifically for selecting the candidates for representatives. A candidate for representative getting the highest rank is one with adequate funding and popularity, the second rank is for one having not adequate funding but with acceptable popularity, while the third rank is for one who neither has adequate funding and popularity. Commonly, political parties assign this particular task to the election winning team who will work hard to win the party. At this period, the election winning team may do the mapping of candidates of representatives.

Women’s Wing Organization in Political Parties

Meanwhile, the main source of the candidates of representatives is cadres. Cadres are from wing organizations which become *undertow* of the political parties. Below are listed names of women’s wing organizations of every political party.

TABLE 5. WOMEN’S WINGS ORGANIZATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES

No	Name of Political Party	Name of Party Wing Organization
1.	Nasdem	Garda Wanita (Granita) Malahayati
2.	PKB	PergerakanPerempuanPartaiKebangkitanBangsa (PP-PKB)
3.	PKS	WanitaKeadilan
4.	PDIP	BidangKesehatan, PemberdayaanPerempuandanAnak
5.	Golkar	KesatuanPerempuanPartaiGolkar (KPPG)
6.	Gerindra	Perempuan Indonesia Raya
7.	Demokrat	PerempuanDemokratRepublik Indonesia (PDRI)
8.	PAN	PerempuanAmanatNasional (PUAN)
9.	PPP	WanitaPersatuan Pembangunan (WPP)
10.	Hanura	SrikandiHanura
11.	PBB	-
12.	PKPI	BarisanPerempuan PKPI

Source: Processed secondary data.

Although formally almost all political parties have women’s wing organizations such as data in Table 5, in fact not all of them are active. An informant who was the head of the PKS Women’s Bureau with the initials Y explained that: “Women’s field activities are designed up to the lowest level. But when the elections end, these women wing is weakened and ultimately no

activities are done “(Interview, July 15, 2015). This informant’s description seems to represent a general picture of the actual conditions of the women’s wing organization in all political parties. This means that the formation of political parties against female cadres is not done routinely (www.wydlll.org) accessed on 24/8/2017). This data is reinforced by informant I who often makes observations of the movement of political parties at the village level:

“Normatively every political party has a cadre program. Structure of political party exists up to the village. But if we asked who are the party members in the village? Political parties will be difficult to answer.” (Interview, October 6, 2016).

Presumably, the information received from informant I represents the general description of the political party. The political party does have a cadre of party members but this member does not always exist until the village level. It is even less likely that political parties should coach women cadres. Even if the informant Y stated that the women’s wing organization in his party (PKS) performs the activity, the activity is not done routinely.

Meanwhile, although PKB is an organization not different from other political parties that do not have routine activity to develop cadre of woman, but as an organization founded by NU, PKB benefits from Muslimat and or Fatayat which routinely held activities. Therefore, PKB gets the supply of women candidates from Muslimat and Fatayat. An informant, initialed A, who was recruited by PKB became legislative candidate, gave an explanation: “Women candidates in PKB are recruited from active cadres in Muslimat and Fatayat”.

Other implementing actors who have similarities with PKB are PAN. PAN women’s wing organization is PAN Women (PUAN). But as PPKB, PUAN also does not have routine activities. Therefore, access to the candidate of PAN women is from

Aisyah and Naswiatul Aisyiah affiliated to Muhammadiyah. PAN founder is Amien Rais who was once chairman of Muhammadiyah. That is why the Muhammadiyah autonomous organization is affiliated with PAN and a source of major candidates for PAN.

While it is undeniable, the implementation actors are also electoral contestants and being an electoral contestant then a political party becomes an implementation actor. So in implementing the policy, the position of the actor is the electoral contestant. The potential for internal conflict among actors is greater.

Meanwhile, the incumbent obtrudes their interest to the party. If their interest is not fulfilled, they will pull themselves out of the party.

Therefore, candidates are very valuable assets of the political parties. Unfortunately, according to informant R, in charge of providing technical guidance in the Election Commission of Jember Regency and became a commissioner in the period 2004-2009 and 2009-2014: "The cadres of political parties are mostly in the city. This will be difficult for the political party to arrange the constituency" (Interview, July 15, 2017).

Presumably, the scarcity of women candidates is not because there are no female cadres but because their domiciles are located in the city, thus refuse to be placed outside their domiciles. This reason is true, because they are only familiar with their environment. This situation will result in difficulties during the election because it would be harder for them to obtain more votes. Therefore, as the target groups, the political parties overcome the scarcity of women candidates by approaching families and relatives of administrators.

Candidates of the family elements of political party officials are included in the category of cadres. They understand the ideology of the party directly. Therefore, they are the become cadres of the board directly.

From the exposure in this sub-chapter, it can be concluded

that the cadre of actors implementation is divided into two, namely the first circle coming from women's wing organization or community organization (CSO) affiliated with political party. The second circle comes from the family members of the board from the level of DPD / DPC to Branch / the Lowest Branch.

In addition to recruitment model conducted directly by the board, there is also a political party, namely PKS involving the board as well as the participation of all members. The mechanism is regulated through internal elections. In each autonomous organization elected representatives who will follow the selection of candidates. In addition, in each branch is also held elections with the same purpose that is to select a representative who will participate in the selection at the regional level.

PKS is the only political party that implements internal election policy. This aspect makes the policy implementation process in PKS very inclusive. This differentiates PKS from other political parties whose process of fulfilling the policy implementation targets is fully determined by the board.

If the 30% candidate quota has not been reached then there is no other option for political parties except to seek additional. Political parties seek to meet the shortcomings of these candidates differently. Some political parties hand over the shortcomings of these candidates to the nearest branch manager with the candidate list of candidates not yet fulfilling.

Therefore, although not from the cadre elements, PDIP candidates will be recruited by the branch manager is a person who is known close. Therefore, although not a cadre, these candidates can be categorized as PDI-P sympathizers. Another way that political parties are taking is approaching women activists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as other professional organizations directly conducted by party officials.

But approaching women activists is not an easy task. Many activists refuse to be candidates. Rejected by women activists does not make the political parties despair. Other efforts are made by approaching individuals who become community nodes. How-

ever, the treatment of the political party to certain individuals does not require an understanding of ideology, vision and mission that indicate their identity. This is intentional for political parties to get potential candidates. One of the political parties that adopted this strategy was PAN.

This opportunity is used by the incumbent PKS initial LN and incumbent initial LS from the Democratic Party. They both moved from their respective parties and joined PAN.

PAN certainly benefited from the movement of LN. The background of LN originating from Muhammadiyah, has made LN not awkward to be in the Muhammadiyah community that became the base of PAN. The move of LN to PAN is followed by LN mass. PAN also accepted the move of LS who had previously become a cadre of the Democratic Party (Surya On Line, July 23, 2013).

The determination of the constituency and numbers for LN and LS has satisfied both. What PAN is taking is a winning strategy. A somewhat similar strategy was pursued by nationalist political parties. One of the political parties among the seven political parties with the nationalist ideology of Nasdem Party is recruiting women from the background of Nahdlatul Ulama.

In 2014, it was the first time for Nasdem Party to become an election participant. Despite being a new party, Nasdem is well known to the public. The massive promotion done by the central board through the mass media made Nasdem known to the public at large. This facilitates Nasdem in approaching the community as evidenced by the recruitment of two prominent community *Nyai* JW and IW.

The non-cadre target is not only limited to the people who are in the network of managers but can be more broadly covering the community node that is ideologically different from the ideology of the political party. According to informants, political parties will be able to strengthen the ideology of these candidates by including them in the debriefing event.

From this explanation it is clear that each of the political

party seeks the recruitment of candidates based on their respective criteria. The strong efforts made by the political parties in recruiting candidates will show that administrators of the political parties want to qualify as election participants. The attempted measure is by recruiting candidates who become the community node, although they may be from an organization that is ideologically different. Even the political party facilitates the cadres of a different party to move to their party, despite their different ideology. It seems that ideological differences are not problems for the political party because candidates of different ideological candidates will gain an understanding of the ideology of political parties during the debriefing session.

Furthermore, the placement of constituencies and serial numbers for candidates who have been recruited also with strategic considerations. This policy is not in accordance with the expectations of candidates. If the candidate feels that his interests are not accommodated by a political party then the candidate chooses to be uncooperative.

This phenomenon occurs in LS and LN who retreat from membership of each political party because they were not satisfied with the policy of political parties. LS was originally a member of the Demokrat Party. But LS was certainly disappointed with the party's decision. LS did not protest frontally, because her position was weak. LS was not a board member, which according to internal rules must accept whatever party decisions. But LS was an incumbent that has mass support, so bargaining position was strong enough. LS dare to choose to resign quietly. If she was to stay in the party, LS will not get votes because the base was in the constituency 1. While the first one with the same number was already occupied by the chairman of the Democratic Party. Therefore, moving to another party that gives hope is an alternative option.

This is different from the attitude of the new candidates who were first recruited by political parties. They have relatively no mass and generally have no experience and even some of them were just

a complement to the political party to reach the quota of 30%. They wanted to be placed in any constituency because they did not know or care about potential election that may exist to them. The acceptance of new candidates for all decisions of political parties is the strategy they choose because they do not have a bargaining position. There are even political parties who socialize to their candidates that the party is a preaching party and the selection process is not on the will of the candidates including the placement of serial numbers and elections. Candidates choose a cooperative strategy against party policy.

Meanwhile, there are also decisions of political parties that are addressed by new legislative candidates cooperatively. An example is *Nyai JW* who because of her personality was approached by the Nasdem Party. *Nyai JW* was a local ulama who was the caretaker of Miftahul Ulum islamic boarding school in Ledokombo, Jember regency. Besides *Nyai JW* had been the head of PKB Women, PKB wing organization. This fact shows the strong position of *Nyai JW* as a community knot. But before accepting Nasdem Party's proposal, *Nyai JW* asked first to those closest to them whether they provided support: So *Nyai JW* cooperative attitude that became a new legislative background by the guarantee of certainty will get support from the people closest. But the candidates who become party administrators, have the right to vote dapil and serial number. They deeply understand the implications of the placement of constituencies and the provision of serial numbers. Therefore, they usually negotiate to the winning team to be placed in the electoral area and the order number as expected..

In addition to what has been done by *Nasdem*, other political parties approach people outside the board. Such target may expand. Some parties even approach new comers who have no idea about politics. Their ignorance causes them to follow any decision made by the party. Almost all new comers represented by political parties made no denial to policies applied by the parties.

This may be different from the strategy employed by the candidates of representatives who have been familiar with the ins and outs of representation. The incumbent candidates can be assured to have their own mass, making their bargaining position a lot stronger. Such position will make them dare to negotiate with the board so that they are placed in the constituency and number of their wishes.

Even though the request of the candidates sounds a bit demanding, the political parties generally will never mind this, because during the voting time, the political parties will take the advantage of these candidates. The strategies of the political parties and candidates of representatives are as follows:

TABLE 6. STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES OF REPRESENTATIVES

Status of candidates of representatives	Strategies of candidates of representatives	Strategies of political parties
Board	Negotiation	Compromising
Cadres (incumbent)	Negotiation	Compromising
Cadres	Cooperative	Authoritative
Non Cadres (Incumbent)	Negotiation	Compromising
Non Cadres (node in society)	Negotiation	Compromising
Non Cadres (new candidates of representatives)	Cooperative	Authoritative

Source: Processed secondary data

The candidates of representatives who are members of the board, incumbent cadres, incumbent non-cadres, and non-cadres who are nodes of the society will tend to negotiate with the parties. Their strong bargaining position will influence the decision of the party. For the incumbent non cadres, the political parties compromise their request. Meanwhile, they will tend to be authoritative to the new candidates of representatives or those bound by an agreement with them.

DISCUSSION

The implementation process of women representation policy can be illustrated as a game with twelve players of political parties. Each of the party brings its own vision and mission.

On the other hand, all of them are after the same target, which are women from cadres and non-cadres. Despite this common target, each applies different criteria in selecting the candidates.

Besides, the candidates have different interests, while some have strong bargaining position and the others have the weak one. To deal with the differences of candidates, the political parties employ three strategies.

First, if the bargaining position of the political party is strong, and the bargaining position of the candidate is weak because it is new, the political party determines the placement of the constituency and the serial number. Candidates will give cooperative attitude. *Second*, if the bargaining position of the political party is strong, because of their being incumbent, the political party is powerless in regulating the candidate. If the policy of determining the serial number and the constituency is considered unprofitable to this incumbent candidate, the candidate will respond with uncooperative attitude and move to another accommodative political party. *Third*, the political party facilitates its board members who are delegated as candidates to receive special rights that is to be allowed to choose their own serial numbers and constituencies. This right will make the board members of the political party have a strong bargaining position, thus they may influence the decisions of the party. The political party will grant the request of the serial number and constituency of their members who become candidates. This climate tends to open to high conflict potentials and risks of their moving to other parties. Yet, since the right to choose a constituency and number has been granted, no matter what risks are coming towards the political parties, they will take them.


The three aforementioned strategies have been proven to help achieve the target of 30% quota in every constituency, even the percentage of women representatives improved. This achievement indicates that the three strategies that have been established by the board members of the party are the most ap-

appropriate model for this phenomenon. Such finding confirms that of Guariso, saying that the implementation model is established by the board of the political party ([Guiarso, 2017](#)). However, such data contradicts with that of [Purwanti \(2015\)](#), [Rahmatunnisaa \(2016\)](#), [Hilman \(2017\)](#), [O'Brien \(2017\)](#) and [Jabeen & Awan \(2017\)](#) that among the patriarchy culture, the political participation of women would find obstruction. Yet, the success of the participating political parties in increasing the number of women representatives recruited becomes an indicator of the appropriate implementation of the policy inside the setting of the present study.

Administratively, the implementation of women representation policy in Jember had involved twelve political parties from the corresponding district. Based the applicable regulation, the board of the political parties should be domiciled in the respective district. Therefore, they are expected to be familiar with the landscape of social and politics where the policy is to be implemented. This way, the board members of the political parties need not to learn again the landscape of social and politics; instead, they have to teach personages of every constituency to whom the local people would respect. The data obtained in the present study show that in making a list of women candidates in every constituency, the political party would consider the social aspects owned by each of the candidate. In other words, the present study has shown the attempt to argue the findings of Cromwell, stating that it is vital for an actor of policy implementation to learn the landscape of the social and politics of certain groups of society ([Cromwell, 2017](#)).

Furthermore, it is important to understand that the final result of women representation policy implementation is women being elected as candidates. Moreover, the women candidates delegated by the political parties does not directly influence those in authority. The women candidates would be influential only if they are elected. Therefore, the finding of the study would contradict that of Krook, saying to that if

the women representation policy is implemented optimally, it would be a threat to the authorities (Krook: 2016). The implementation model employed by the political parties can be illustrated in the following:



The end of the policy implementation game of women representation policy is determined by the decision drawn by the political parties. If the political parties consider their candidates to bring more benefits to their interest, the negotiating strategy performed by the candidates will be granted. On the other hand, the candidates with weak bargaining position will be treated to the possible advantage of the parties, not that of the candidates. Nonetheless, because these candidates have not gained adequate experience, they have no other choices but to accept without reserve. Such game may contribute to the successful achievement of the target of 30% quota.

CONCLUSION

The success of political parties in achieving beyond the target determined in the ElectionLawNo. 8/2012 is not an easy attempt because the political parties have not enough cadres. Therefore, to achieve the target, political parties created an internal policy/selection prior to the election, which is actually the expansion of the Election Law No.8/2012 and PKPU

No.7/2013. This internal policy is also suited with the political party's vision and missions.

Furthermore, based on the applicable internal policy as determined by the Central Board of the political parties, recruitment of the candidates of representatives is performed from cadres and non-cadres/sympathizers elements. Each of the political parties has their own strategies in implementing the policy, categorized into the pattern of strategy of negotiating - compromising and cooperating - instructing. The candidates of representatives with their strong bargaining position which include *incumbent*, nodes in the society, members of the board of the political parties, perform the negotiating strategy by proposing the request of being placed in the constituencies and number which are thought to have the winning potential. These candidates do have the mass support, therefore the political parties will tend to perform the compromising strategy and grant their wishes. On the contrary, the new candidates and those relatively having limited experience do not have the strong bargaining position. This position allows the political parties to arrange their constituencies and numbers, and the candidates will accept the decision without reserve. Additionally, some parties also socialize that the selection of constituency and numbers for the candidates is a prerogative right of the board, thus the policy will be accepted without reserve.

Therefore, the implementation of women representation policy in the election of 2014 could have been optimal if the policy were implemented along with its sanctions, technical guidance, and distinct verification, as well as supported by the strategy of negotiating - compromising and instructive - cooperative.

Even though so, the concept proposed by Hermans could not be wholly explains the phenomenon under study. The policy in Hermans is top down by nature. At this point, there is something in common between the phenomenon under study and the concept of Hermans. The women representation policy, as

described in the Law of Election No. 8/2012, has been extracted to the operational policy as written in PKPU No. 7/2013. Yet, the conflicting phenomenon is still found in the findings. The findings of the present study indicate that during the process of policy implementation, no conflicts occurred among political parties, but inside the parties themselves. However, the conflict does not fail the policy to be implemented. The candidates of representatives that have strong bargaining position are the incumbent, nodes in the society, and members of the board; they practice the negotiating strategy. The aim is to be placed in the constituencies and number with winning potentials. These incumbent candidates have their mass, making their pressure capacity to the parties stronger to compromise and fulfill their request. On the contrary, the cooperative strategy will be used by the parties to the new candidates who relatively have limited experience and weak bargaining position. These candidates accept the decision made on the basis of instructive strategy related to the arrangement of constituency and number for them. Besides, some parties also socialize that the selection of constituency and numbers for the candidates is a prerogative right of the board, thus the policy will be accepted without reserve as well.

RECOMENDATION

The present study found that achieving the 30% quota is not undemanding. The difficulties in its implementation are under several considerations, such as the inexperienced political parties and the inadequate amount of capable cadres. Therefore, what every political party should prepare beforehand is to keep forming new cadres regardless the time of election; thus they would have enough ones when the election has come. However, the forming of cadres should also be quality-oriented, not only after the quantity. This way the process of cadre forming would include developing or training cadres to produce highly capable cadres as future representatives of the political party. Besides, the political party should understand that the role of the

political party is very strategic, especially that it would become a provider of human resources as the future leaders of the nation, therefore the recruitment process of candidates has to be carefully prepared, not merely as demanded by the administrative requirements.

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