Asymmetric Election: Political Decentralization as A Lesson Learnt from Indonesia 2019 Simultaneous Election Problems

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... ABSTRACT:

Asymmetric election has been discussed as an alternative for Indonesia modelof election considering the massive problems of current simultaneous election. Having a large population, huge number of voters, disparities of islandgeographic obstacles along with strong decentralization of government endorsement then political decentralization must run side by side to support each other for social accountability and public services. Starfish's concept of decentralization model could be best describing the necessity of having asymmetric elections where local voices matter. All politics is local is an important issue at the national level where the way of electoral system must be coherent. The paper argues that elections at the national level must be separatedfrom DPR and DPD and Presidential election alone to put respect at the national leader as well as a call for public attention in their candidacy. Focusing on the Presidential election alone ignoring DPR, DPD and DPRD only resultnot only degradation of democracy but also morality. At the local level an election should be held for DPRD members and the Head of Region election. This could emphasize local issues where local people need to think and putmore attention on their representatives who are going to voice their interests on local regulations.

Keywords: asymmetric election, political decentralization, simultaneously election

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ABSTRAK:

Pemilihan asimetris telah dibahas sebagai salah satu alternatif model pemilihan di Indonesia mengingat masifnya permasalahan pemilu serentak saat ini. Dengan jumlah penduduk yang besar, jumlah pemilih yang besar, disparitas hambatan geografis pulau disertai desentralisasi yang kuat dari dukungan pemerintah maka desentralisasi politik harus berjalan beriringan untuk saling mendukung untuk akuntabilitas sosial dan pelayanan publik. Konsep model desentralisasi Starfish paling tepat menggambarkan perlunya pemilihan asimetris di mana suara lokal penting. Semua politik lokal merupakan isu penting di tingkat nasional di mana cara sistem pemilu harus koheren. Makalah ini berpendapat bahwa pemilihan di tingkat nasional harus dipisahkan dari DPR dan DPD dan pemilihan Presiden saja untuk menghormati pemimpin nasional serta meminta perhatian publik dalam pencalonannya. Fokus pada Pilpres saja mengabaikan DPR, DPD dan DPRD hanya mengakibatkan tidak hanya degradasi demokrasi tetapi juga moralitas. Di tingkat daerah harus diadakan pemilihan anggota DPRD dan pemilihan Kepala Daerah. Hal ini dapat menekankan isu-isu lokal di mana masyarakat lokal perlu berpikir dan lebih memperhatikan perwakilan mereka yang akan menyuarakan kepentingan mereka pada peraturan daerah.

Kata kunci: pemilu asimetris, desentralisasi politik, pemilu serentak

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia just passed the simultaneous General Elec-tion on April 17, 2019, which was the first election to elect a President, The House of Representative (DPR), Regional Representative Council (DPD), District House of Representatives (Lay, 2001). The decision to set up a simultaneous electoral system is based on a variety of fac tors. Quoting IDEA 2016 on the option of an electoral system in a country, it is a decision to modify or retain an electoral system where two dominant conditions are affecting 1) political actorsdo not have basic knowledge and information so that various system choices and consequences-different electoral systems are not fully understood; and, 2) on the contrary, political actors are not fully understood (Tauda, 2018).

The alternative of a parallel election system is the judicial re- view of Effendi Ghazali, along with the Group Coalition for Concurrent Elections, which sued Law No. 42/2008 on Presi-dential Elections to the Constitutional Court (MK) (Sahbani, 2014). The explanation given is that simultaneous elections aremore effective in terms of both time and expense, based on theestimates of the members of the KPU at the time, Ferry KurniaRizkiyansyah, which they quoted in the application, holding a simultaneous election could save the budget from Rp 5 to Rp 10 trillion (Fajri, 2016). Based on the calculations of the DPR Members of the F-PDIP Arif Wibowo, a simultaneous election would save around Rp 150 trillion in funds or one-tenth of the na- tional budget and the regional budget. Continuing the simulta-neous regional election argument according to the ConstitutionalCourt was to reduce waste of time and reduce horizontal con-flict or friction in the community (Saputra, 2019).

The fact of the simultaneous elections April 17 2019 is thatthe Indonesian people elect the Vice President, Member of the Republic of Indonesia Parliament, Provincial DPRD Members, Regency / City DPRD Members, DPD Members, followed by 2 presidential and vice presidential candidates; 16 political parties; 4 local Aceh political parties; four new political parties (Indone- sian Solidarity Party (PSI), Indonesian Unity Party (Perindo), Working Party, and Indonesia (Garuda) Change Movement Party;575 members of the Indonesian Parliament; 136 DPD members; 2,207 Provincial DPR members and 17,610 members City / Re- gency DPRD with 185,732,093 Permanent Voters List (DPT) totaling 92,802,671 male voters and 92,929,422 female voters (Yudhistira, 2019). They came at polling stations totaling 805,075. The total funds were Rp. 25.59 trillion. Indonesian elections were the largest, third in the world after India and the United States, following Brazil and Russia, but these countries with a large number of voters have applied minimal technology, fastcounting machines and not manual counting (Saputra, 2019).

The number of voters and 5 (five) options among the manynames on the ballot makes it difficult for the voters to know exactly who will be chosen. According to data from the Central Bureau of Statistics in 2018, the illiterate population was 3,387,035 or 2,07 percent of the total population of Indonesia aged 15-59 years, in which some citizens had the right to vote with or parents who could no longer read more encountered uncertainty to decide who the candidate will be selected. Not to mention in this referendum, mad people still have the same right to vote as ordinary people (Bayhaqi, 2018).

While the fundamen-tal concept of democracy is that people have the right to selectthe leaders, they think with common sense to represent their interests in public policymaking, people recognize who will be lected and accountable for representing their lives in the form of policy alignments in legislation or regional legislation. Public interest in legislative candidates is very limited since the people's energy and interest is concentrated exclusively on the figure of the presidential candidate pair. While legislative representatives are very effective in shaping people's policies, both in central and regional governments. This agency is the counterpart of the President in the development of human welfare legislation. In the same way, at the provincial and district/city level, the DPRD becomes a joint partner of the regional head in formulating lo- cal regulations for the local community (Dick-Sagoe, 2020).

Simultaneous selection not only rejected the concept of de-\scentralization of government, which had been reinforced three times during the reform era since 1999, 2004, and 2014 but also overlooked the distinctive character of each region of Indonesia and the varied geographical conditions of the largest archipelago in the world. Simultaneous elections were the fatalities of de- mocracy that killed the KPPS, who were fatigued from counting five ballots depending on their tasks (Medistiara, 2019).

These election victims arise because the simultaneous election submissions are not accompanied by appropriate studies on the size of the area and large manual counting, pressures, and demands of electioncontestants, the reactions of witnesses and observers, and data inputs that are still very susceptible to manipulation

As of Tues-day, April 22, 2019, KPPS officers who died 119 and 548 who were ill were spread in 19 provinces due to exhaustion and the duty to oversee the counting of ballots (Ryan, 2019).

Finally, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court acknowledged that he was guilty of agreeing to the simultaneous General Election, which created huge and huge complexity (Rahmad, 2019). The question of the transparency of the election managers and the lack of honest and equal values felt by the community with the number of ballot boxes burned, thousands of ballots found in wrong locations, and thousands of votes cast to win candidates, including KPPS officers who cast illegal ballots, were part of the fact that the simultaneous elections in 2017 were being held (Almunanda, 2019).

Various problems of simultaneous elections lead to thoughts and evaluations to produce representative, accountable, honest, and fair elections. Such thinking is usually based on how the electoral system converts votes to seats won by parties and candidates. In addition to the variable formulation of elections used (i.e., whether a plurality/majority system, proportional, mixed, or other systems are used, and what mathematical formulation is used to calculate seat allocation), the voting structure (i.e. the voter chooses a candidate or a party and whether the voter makes a single choice or reveals a series of preferences) and the size of the electoral district (not how many voters live in an electoral district, but how many representatives.) Somehow, the decentralization process of government, which led to political decentralization is to distinguish the domains of the central govern-

ment and local governments' election. The concept of Asymmetric Election is elections that distinguish between regions depending on the specificity of the area.

LITERATURE REVIEW ASYMMETRIC ELECTION AND POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION

Elections are one of the conditions of a democratic country where citizens have the right to decide the leader, whether to maintain the regime or change the regime, to nominate their representative representatives at the state, regional, and district levels (Salahudin et al., 2020). The nature of good governance in the theory of democracy is the presence of a leader of integrity, openness, and integrity in all policies adopted (Ulfa et al., 2020). It is therefore very important to devise an electoral framework that takes people closer to their leaders not only once every five years, but a mechanism that is capable of sustaining and sticking leadership policies to people's needs. In the government's decentralization regime, democratic decentralization has an asymmetric election model where the electoral system does not have to be the same as the national system. In other words, the election of national leaders is differentiated by the election of local leaders (Rahmat & Purnomo, 2020).

Indonesia has acknowledged asymmetrical elections, in which elections take place differently in a country according to the complexity and complexity of the region (Nurdin, 2012). Four regions in Indonesia accept asymmetrical elections based on variations in the characteristics of government, community, political, and socio-economic conditions. The four provinces with asymmetric decentralization are Jakarta as the capital of Indonesia, Jogyakarta as kingdom heritage, Papua as economic development delayed and Aceh as political reason. Since the decentralization of government was strongly expressed in 1999, three years later, after constitutional decentralization, Papua accepted the asymmetrical form of elections using the Noken scheme (Law No. 21

of 2001 Otsus Papua) (Wahidin et al., 2020). Voting in Papua, the absence of a gubernatorial election in the Special Province of Yogyakarta, no election of the City District took place in Jakarta (2007) as well as the presence of local political parties in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD, Law No. 11 the Year 2006) (Zahra et al., 2020). This asymmetrical model takes place in an asymmetrical democracy that is known by the world.

Decentralization of government that has been arranged in such a way that local communities can determine their own regional leaders must be in line with political decentralization. The legal basis for asymmetric elections has been stated in the amendments to the 1945 Constitution Article 18A paragraph (1), Article 18B paragraph (1) and (2) of the 1945 Constitution. In Article 18A paragraph (1) mandated that "Relations of authority between the central government and provincial government, regencies and cities, regulated by law by taking into account the specificity and diversity of regions." Furthermore, in Article 18B paragraphs (1) and (2) it is stipulated that (1) the State recognizes and respects special or special regional government units regulated in law. (2) The State recognizes and respects the customary law community units along with their traditional rights insofar as they are still alive and in accordance with the development of society and the principles of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, which are regulated in the Constitution. At least political decentralization has continued by politically asymmetric elections in Aceh and Papua that has three similarities, first, the authority to form local political parties; second, governance arrangements through special local regulations and thirdly, leadership arrangements must be indegenous people from both provinces (Tauda, 2018).

Political decentralization is intended to bring local people closer to their regional leaders, not only regional heads but also Regional People's Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia (RPRC RI) /Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Republik Indonesia (DPRD RI) members (<u>Dick-Sagoe</u>, 2020). So far, attention has only been given to the regional head as a

single leader and forgetting the roles of the DPRD as a counterpart to have a balance of power in order local government could produce asymmetric policies that are typically regional. Asymmetric elections are a way to bring the elected representatives closer together and strengthen election control by the people (Aylott & Bolin, 2019). National conflicts do not affect local life, including policies that only benefit national political interests and harm local communities. For example, the import policy of rice, maize, and agricultural products decided by the central government ultimately harmed the farming community, and should be balanced by the decision of the regional head and the DPRD to protect the agricultural products of its citizens.

Then, what about 30 other provinces in Indonesia that do not have asymmetrical decentralization, if asymmetrical elections can still be held? If the concept of well-being and the needs of the local community are the concern of democracy holders, an election mechanism that can keep the voice of the people relevant for the good of the people should be an important option. The democratic paradigm cannot be allowed to disregard the voices of the people on an ongoing basis and to spend a very large amount of money only to occupy people who are not responsible for the people who chose them (Haryanto, 2016).

The removal of the Mandaling Natal Regent, Mr. Dahlan, because of his dissatisfaction that his local group did not prefer Jokowi or did not succeed in winning Jokowi in his territory, became a "shame warning" showing how our election did not put local leaders closer to their communities (Wismabrata, 2019). Community leaders should concentrate on fulfilling the vision of the campaign and the mission goals that have made the people vote for them in the District Head of Elections. Two very critical things happen, 1) the misunderstanding of the people's right to vote for the President (one person one vote) and not relevant to the Regent, 2) the disregard of the people's vote to be taken by the Regent leader simply because he focuses on national leadership, not the citizens who voted for him (Oscar, 2019). Attention

to national elections alienates the regional cultures that elected representatives have expressed in their areas. The electoral system must be evaluated to strengthen local and national democracy to realize the objectives of substantive democracy, not procedural.

In fact, the idea of an Asymmetrical Election discussed at the 5th Constitutional Law Conference in November 2018 has provided a factual argument that took place in the community because it denied the diversity that exists in the country (Fajri, 2016). Direct and forced regional elections will produce horizontal conflicts that hinder development due to the politicization of the bureaucracy and the politicization of the budget which tends to make the implementation of regional elections not neutral and full of money politics.

The reason for the simultaneous election to save costs turned out to be unfounded. The simultaneous election costs of 2019 are 25.59 Trillion (T) rupiah. Based on data from the Ministry of Finance in 2014 and 2019, the costs of simultaneous elections in 2019 for the delivery of only Rp. 25.59 T (Rosadi, 2019). This fee does not include supervision fees (IDR 4.85 T) and security (IDR 3.29T) so the total cost is IDR 33.73 T. The budget allocation for security and supervision in the 2019 elections also increased wherein the 2014 election funds for security only amounting to 1.7 trillion then in 2019 it rose to 3.29 trillion. Ballot boxes that cause problems in various places also increase transportation costs in the area due to the difficulty of terrain through rivers or waters in the territory of Indonesia. In addition, funds for supervision rose by 1.18 trillion, from 3.67 trillion to 4.38 trillion based on data from the election commission planning data bureau (Sucipto, 2019). Unfortunately, this additional funding is still spinning conventional elections without a solution to using fast counting technology like in the Philippines. They don't need a quick count, because the ballot counting machine works thousands of ballots in minutes. While the 2014 elections which were preceded by legislative elections (People's Representative

Council (DPR), Regional Representative Council (DPD), Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) and the Presidential election spent the state budget of Rp. 24.1T. Comparison of Rp. 24.1 T in 2014 and Rp.33.73 T in 2019 shows that simultaneous election was cheaper not to be proven.

ASYMMETRIC ELECTIONS AND DECENTRALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT

The centralization of politics and the decentralization of government have taken different directions. Decentralization of the government as a model for the division of power in the United States seeks to make the people prosperous and to listen to the voices of the people in any policy-making process (Palermo, 2020). The desire to offer services to the population so that decentralization can be welcomed with joy. Unfortunately, the target would be stagnant without being followed by democratic decentralization. Asymmetric elections are a model of democratic decentralization elections. Asymmetrical elections are on two sides, first as a price and respect of locality that differs from other places, this can be seen as an opportunity to have local people's voices heard; second as a way out to be more focused in two layers of election, national levels and local level. In addition, political parties as agents of reform, with prospective representatives in both the executive and legislative regions concentrating mostly on working for their constituents will have more space and policy's endorsement based on local needs.

Political decentralization through the division of national elections, DPR dan DPD that are separate from the election of prepresidents and local elections (provincial, regency/city DPRDs, and municipal leaders) would shift the political constellation to make it more relevant to the people. At least three elements, namely Individuals, Policy and Resources, will be decentralized and will no longer be a central monopoly (Dick-Sagoe, 2020). The effect of lack of democratic decentralization can be seen in the practice of democratic centralization, through the predomi-

nance of the role of political party elites in deciding the country's regional leaders and national leaders. Leaders of regional elections (DPRD and province/district leaders) and national elections (presidential, DPR dan DPD elections) are expected to accelerate the welfare of the people as expected by the Reformation in 1998 (Nurdin, 2012). This is compounded by the holding of simultaneous elections, which draw the attention of fragmented regions to top-level elections.

The centralization of politics was strengthened with simultaneous elections so that political decentralization as the entrance door for Person, Policy and Money had not yet occurred. One of the causes of the stagnant goal of government decentralization for welfare is the still-centralized political stagnation of power, the dominant party that imposes the will on regional heads, and regional heads who tend to only obey the orders of party leaders and ignore the voices of the people.

ASYMMETRIC ELECTIONS PREVENT CENTRALIZATION OF POLITICS

Asymmetrical elections can at least prevent political centralization carried out by political parties if human resources, policies, and money are still monopolized by the management of political parties at the central level and not handed over to the region or the Branch Management Board (DPC) (Nurdin, 2012). "All politics local"embedded in asymmetric elections because local voices would be heard strongly, political parties must have local preference instead of national elites' along with policy and decision making processes that are supposedly closer to local people. Further, the attention of the community will be more focused on the electability of regional heads and members of the DPRD. This condition will encourage the strengthening of political party management at the regional level. Asymmetric elections will certainly be in line with political decentralization because there is a transfer of responsibility for planning and management affairs in increasing allocation and resources from the center to the re-

gion. While the implementation of simultaneous elections will only encourage the centralization of politics where people's attention is no longer focused on the electability of their regional leaders who influence the livelihoods of local communities (Khamdan & Wiharyani, 2018).

METHOD

The research used a qualitative method with a descriptive approach. The qualitative descriptive approach uses non-quantitative data collection and interpretation, which attempts to analyze social interactions, processes, or incidents by presenting context information on the topic in question. In this case, this article discusses the relationship between the simultaneous selection and the outcome of the simultaneous election. Using the idea of decentralized starfish in the selection process shows that selection with an asymmetric model is important so the public will learn more about their future leader (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2008). The monitoring of the democratic standard of the electoral process carried out by the group will get to know more closely and better understand the character of their representatives. Data from primary and secondary sources, while the first is obtained from data from the KPU, Bawaslu, election guard, and website as well as secondary data from books, journals, and mass media articles related to the topics discussed. Data analysis uses thematic analysis which emphasizes the position of ideas in the material under study.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL

Local concerns must not only color local policies but also national policies in governments that have made decentralization a reality. For example, food imports by the central government (rice, onions, fruit) could result in regional heads being rejected by the DPRD if farmers in their area have to lose because their harvests would be disrupted by sales. The DPR must convey this at the national level since they are also elected to represent the people at the level of the central government (Nurdin, 2012). Unfortunately, this is far from reality. Not only because our election always focuses on selecting candidates, but also on overlooking the legitimacy of the people's representatives and leaders to listen to their people. Political parties as agents of reform are often degraded only by the centralized role of political recruitment. Indonesian political parties have shown a tendency to be centralized and hierarchical as a consequence of the once-powerful position of the central government.

Democracy should preserve the spirit of the interests of the local community, as articulated by the national elite, in the Indonesian party policy-making structure. "All the politics are local". Ideally, whatever decisions are made at the central level, the interests of the electorate in the electoral district are the basis for those decisions (Gelman, 2011). "All politics is local " is about democratic decentralization, which seeks to give voters or their representatives the power to make policy decisions in their electoral districts. In the case of Obama's HealthCare Reform, some members of the Congress of the Democratic Party opposed the program, their rationale was, "I am elected by my constituent, not by the President" meaning that members of the Congress of the Party holding the President will oppose the policy (policy) of the President if his constituency rejects it (Nurdin, 2012).

Asymmetrical elections at least avoid the centralization of political parties that can shape and undermine government if they are determined only by the central players in the entire process of an individual, policy, and resources (<u>Laver & Shepsle</u>, 1996). The position of political parties should not be at the national level, but also at the local level (DPD, DPC). This indicates that there is a framework for alternatives to mitigate the inefficiency of political parties through the decentralization of the administrative structure of the state. His statement focuses on two aspects of the party system: 1) the distribution of partisan allegiance between central and regional governments, and 2) the

propensity of local officials to express local interests (Haryantoet al., 2019). The asymmetry election enabled the voices of local people to be heard in the elections. People will be able to get to know their representatives more closely and to make the DPRD more transparent and modern in policy-making so that people at the same time know what is being debated at the local government level for the good of the local community.

THE CONCEPT OF STARFISH AND SPIDER WEB ORGANIZING ASYMMETRICAL ELECTIONS

Asymmetrical elections offer opportunities for local populations to select more carefully on the basis of their background and knowledge of their candidate representatives. This is in line with political decentralization, which seeks to increase the different competencies of the mechanism, namely to build possibilities or possibilities for the selection of independent candidates who are able to demonstrate their capacity to lead and develop local electoral skills in order to boost the standard of local policymaking.

This asymmetrical election analysis can be comparable to offering regions and their populations the opportunity to consider their leaders more closely through the authority to have the opportunity to select differently from central-level leaders. The definition of Starfish by Ori Brafman and Rod Backstrom or Starfish is an analogy that can be used that focuses on regional problems provided to regions to promote problem-solving in regions rather than centrally controlled, including the holding of simultaneous elections (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2008). This conduct of the animal is rather autonomous as a living organization. If one arm is removed, a new arm can develop without a central system command, since the nervous system is very powerful up to five (or more) arms. Although having the election at the same time is similar to a spider if the head is injured, it will die be-cause the nervous system is concentrated and there is no powerin other parts of the body to solve the issue. This decentralized

starfish model has also been used in military structures that are considered to be very hierarchical. In order to improve the implementation of the regional government, the asymmetric election model offers a range of advantages, such as the idea of starfish models:

- The issue of representation of candidates for DPRD members, regional heads, policies and budgets can be handled more quickly at the local level rather than waiting for central orders. A decentralized organizing organization tends to be more open
- 2. When the Person, policy and Money are the responsibility of the whole level of government not only in the center but also in the region (including the DPC or DPD party administrators), the level of intelligence in solving problems becomes fast because there is no central system or problem solving Governments or political parties that only have a centralized system of brain / intelligence / intelligence, it will be difficult to find a quick solution because the thoughts and decisions are far from the root of the problem. If there is a rejection of the candidate pair chosen and approved by the Chairperson and the central Management, then the regional administrators are better able to see the causes of rejection and solutions rather than waiting for central thoughts and policies.
- 3. If political parties or the government are decentralized, local administrators (DPCs or DPDs) or Local Governments can respond more quickly because each member has access to knowledge and ability to directly utilize their resources (person, policy and money). If there is an error in the policy, the open and decentralized system changes and fixes it faster. Decentralization facilitates environmental decision-making and adaptation, there is no power in the hands of one person but all parties are responsible.
- 4. The main principle in starfish is that this open system makes all parts of society want to contribute to the system. This is democracy, if people want prosperity, then the contribution

of citizens is important to support development programs that come from citizen participation in economic policy making for example. This asymmetrical model encourages citizens to be more enthusiastic about contributing either as volunteers or party donors because of a sense of belonging.

Conversely, the simultaneous election model appears to neglect local issues such as the liability of the KPU and Bawaslu, which are so great that they are vulnerable to seeing the whole problem, the distribution of votes dispersed in other regions; the handling of slow electoral disputes, election monitoring, the availability of witnesses, monetary policy, the allocation of funds, etc. Like a spider conducting an election simultaneously enough to undermine the KPU (command/nerve center) and its server, it can quickly turn off the entire electoral mechanism. Organizing a spider-like entity is enough to destroy the head and the network at a lower level will not be motivated. This is due to three properties that are possessed, namely: the nature of hierarchy, the command and centralization system that is owned so that if the nerve center dies or does not function, then the whole system in the organization's body dies. Meanwhile, the nature of starfish, headless, even severed arms can still grow new starfish. This is due to the 6 properties possessed, namely: the leader is only a catalyst; there is no chain of command; decentralization, open systems, divided responsibilities; and the interest and enthusiasm. The asymmetric electoral system in the starfish concept can be interpreted as:

- 1. Solid circle in one unit of EMB organization
- 2. As a catalyst center, the center is only a rule provider to run to the lower levels,
- 3. The center as a source of ideology to be implemented at the lower level,
- 4. Networking under existing conditions
- 5. Champion, meaning asymmetric elections have the purpose of winning the hearts of the people.

Since the asymmetric electoral system is in line with decentralization to ensure that people's voices are closer to people's policymaking, it is very important to calculate the indicators of asymmetric elections in order to avoid the birth of small kings in the administration of elections that can only lead to weak governance and local oligarchy in the political parties (Dishnica, 2015). For example, law enforcement in the political party system must be assumed to be equal, and anybody joining the regional government and managing the political parties at the regional level does not form a new system but is subject to negotiated rules and application. These indicators can be seen in three joints: financial decentralization (central, local, regional) including openness to revenue and expenditure; acceptance of decentralization; and division of political divisions (Thomas, 2008).

ELECTION SOLUTIONS BASED ON POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION

Asymmetrical elections based on the principle of decentralization of government actually divide representatives at national and local levels. This model clearly rejects the electoral system simultaneously because it distracts from local issues and makes local leaders listen more to the direction of the Center than the votes of the people who vote. The decreasing public confidence in the implementation of simultaneous elections that have just been held has resulted in a lack of public confidence in the election and elected government, not to mention the election costs which apparently did not save as the initial assumptions. The fall of the helpless KPPS victims, whether they are victims of life or illness or become an instrument for politicians. Asymmetric elections will force political party officials to be more qualified and have integrity in determining regional head candidates and DPRD members. Of course, the transfer of resources from the center to the local has consequences for the national party. Political parties are increasingly becoming a challenge in this system. The effect of asymmetric elections depends on political and economic

incentives in public services, in other words, Person, Policy and Money are determinants of success (<u>Frendreis & Gitelson, 1994</u>). However, maintaining simultaneous elections could be due to the need for patronage of political parties that function to maintain active organizations, political party cohesion, attract voters and support, finance parties and candidates and create party discipline in policy making.

It's just that this situation seems paradoxical for a culture that is increasingly transparent and calls for democratic transparency. Government and political parties, and the holding of elections that are concentrated without public correction, would give birth to a government that only represents itself. Not to mention the extent of conducting elections that are still very manual without moving to technology that further ensures integrity and speed of counting in elections. If Indonesia adopts a developing political system in the world, then at least two main dimensions that fundamentally influence the distribution of power in a society, namely democracy and decentralization. Political decentralization requires constitutional or legislative reforms, the development of multiple political parties, legislative strengthening, the creation of local political units, and effective public interest groups.

One solution to political decentralization is by conducting multilevel asymmetric elections, in regional governments to elect Regional Heads, Provincial DPRDs and Regency / City DPRDs as well as the central government level, namely the election of DPR and DPD members with attention to presidential elections after the DPR and DPD elections. The president is a symbol of the State that represents the State as well as giving awards to government power holders who are responsible for 250 million people according to the constitution and avoiding problems related to priority imbalances or broken people's concentration between choosing the executive in this case the president and the legislature, both institutions are truly born of the best choices of the people.

CONCLUSION 238

Asymmetric elections are the choice for the Indonesian government which continues to strengthen the decentralization of government. Without political decentralization whose model with the holding of separate elections, national and central levels, would certainly be a paradox in building democracy for prosperity; where decentralization aims to bring community service (bottom up policy) closer to the government but on the other hand the holding of elections simultaneously alienates local issues and finally political party policies remain in the top down policy where the policies of the ruling elite political parties are very dominant. All politics is local and has not become a principle in simultaneous elections. Asymmetric elections as a political party decentralization model is a necessity to accelerate people's welfare to be in line with the government's decentralization goals.

The solution to the problem of simultaneous elections is the need for political decentralization and the use of fast-paced technology with election models that bring people closer to their local governments, as well as to increase accountability and responsiveness. The implementation of decentralized governance must be in line with political decentralization. At least the regional administrators were given space for different attitudes and choices because they had to follow the dynamics of the local politics of their citizens. This can only be realized through a change in the Political Law which gives an opportunity to elected regional heads to carry out development programs and community welfare without having to be burdened with paying debts due to the high cost of elections or dowry fees in representation. On the other hand, giving special attention to the election of the President and members of the DPR and DPD will certainly increase the critical level and attention of the community because after all in a unitary state, the central government's decision is hierarchy to the regional government. Election implementation must implement the policy of All Politics is local where asymmetrical elections are expected to encourage the formation of

political infrastructure for the integration and mobilization of citizens, articulation and aggregation of interests of citizens, political policy formulation based on the interests of citizens, recruitment of political leaders based on merit not money. Asymmetric electoral management is no longer the dominance of the central government but in which the regional government becomes a nerve system. Asymmetric elections can also encourage parties to no longer belong to the elite of political parties but the people so that the political party managers who sit in the political parties function to raise such political parties including finding the best cadres and promoting them to the people. The theoretical concept of Starfish in Indonesian style should be applied to the Indonesian electoral system model. This Public Trust is the main capital of development. Law Enforcement is the main requirement that can be realized with the indicator of the occurrence of financial decentralization (Central, Provincial, Regency / City), transparency in income and expenditure, recognition of decentralization and clear division of political party and governmental duties.

Starfish in asymmetric elections is needed so that the DPC / DPD has authority in the area to heal itself. In order for the democratization process to be able to prosper the people, the decentralization of political parties (asymmetric elections) and decentralization of government must co-exist with characteristics: guarantee free and fair elections, decentralize power and resources for local communities appropriately, protect judicial independence and access to justice, guarantee apparatuses' functions effectively and is not used as a political machine, ensuring the separation of power between political parties as a political infrastructure is not a superstructure of government, protects access to information and media independence, protects human rights, business freedom, in pursuing a democratic economic policy.

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