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(³ Doctor Program of Law Department, Postgraduate Program Universitas Kristen Indonesia, Indonesia)*

(⁴ Faculty of Sociology - Social Work - Southeast Asian Studies, Ho Chi Minh City Open University, Vietnam)

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(^{3,4} Department of Government Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Muhammadiyah Makassar, Indonesia)

Strengthening Pancasila in Religious Life: Pioneering a New Form of Relations between Islam and Pancasila

Ma'mun Murod^{1*}, Ali Noer Zaman², Djoni Gunanto³, Usni⁴

^{1,2,3,4} Political Science Department, Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta, Indonesia

*Email Correspondence: mamun.murod@umj.ac.id

ABSTRACT

This article has the main discussion on the relationship between Islam and Pancasila. This article aims to find out more about the opinions of Islamic mass organizations leaders about the relationship between Islam and Pancasila. In addition, this article aims to map the views and thoughts of religious leaders about Pancasila in religious life. This article uses explorative interpretive quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative data was collected by surveying 40 Muhammadiyah figures, 40 NU figures, and 20 other Islamic mass organizations. The survey was conducted randomly on the figures of Islamic organizations with a random selection of respondents at the national and provincial levels. This survey uses purposive random sampling. This study describes and explains a phenomenon that occurs by using an interpretive understanding approach to reality or the object of research. Through this study it was found that as many as 21% of respondents strongly agree and 79% agree that Pancasila is the basis of the state. Although support for Pancasila as the state ideology is very high, in the related survey there are inconsistencies, namely as many as 33% still crave the presence of the Jakarta Charter in the constitution, while 67% reject related matters. In general, this article argues that the relationship between Islam and Pancasila today is better than before because the majority of Muslims have accepted Pancasila as the basis of the state constitution. It was found that as many as 21% of respondents strongly agree and 79% agree that Pancasila is the basis of the state.

Keywords: Constitution, Islam, Pancasila

ABSTRAK

Artikel ini memiliki pembahasan utama tentang hubungan antara Islam dan Pancasila. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui lebih jauh tentang pendapat para tokoh ormas Islam tentang hubungan Islam dan Pancasila. Selain itu, artikel ini bertujuan untuk memetakan pandangan dan pemikiran para pemuka agama tentang Pancasila dalam kehidupan beragama. Artikel ini menggunakan metode kuantitatif dan kualitatif interpretatif eksploratif. Data kuantitatif dikumpulkan dengan mensurvei 40 tokoh Muhammadiyah, 40 tokoh NU, dan 20 tokoh ormas Islam lainnya. Survei dilakukan secara acak terhadap tokoh-tokoh ormas Islam dengan pemilihan responden secara acak di tingkat nasional dan provinsi. Survei ini menggunakan purposive random sampling. Penelitian ini mendeskripsikan dan menjelaskan suatu fenomena yang terjadi dengan menggunakan pendekatan pemahaman interpretatif terhadap realitas atau objek penelitian. Melalui penelitian ini ditemukan bahwa sebanyak 21% responden sangat setuju dan 79% setuju bahwa Pancasila adalah dasar negara. Meski dukungan terhadap Pancasila sebagai ideologi negara sangat tinggi, dalam survei terdapat inkonsistensi, yakni sebanyak 33% masih mendambakan kehadiran Piagam Jakarta dalam konstitusi, sedangkan 67% menolak hal terkait. Secara umum, artikel ini berpendapat bahwa hubungan Islam dan Pancasila saat ini lebih baik dari sebelumnya karena mayoritas umat Islam telah menerima Pancasila sebagai dasar konstitusi negara. Ditemukan bahwa sebanyak 21% responden sangat setuju dan 79% setuju bahwa Pancasila adalah dasar negara.

Kata Kunci: Konstitusi, Islam, Pancasila

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INTRODUCTION

Since last year, the people of the archipelago have embraced religious beliefs and practices, such as: animism, dynamism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Confucianism, and Christianity as well as various local beliefs (Saksono, 1995, pp. 115-153). This plurality of life is harmonious, where historical artifacts can be traced in the form of folklore such as T tutur Tinular, Leaf Lontar, various ancient books, and several monumental historical buildings left by our ancestors. These artifacts illustrate that in this archipelago there has been a plurality of peaceful life in Diversity.

This co-existential harmony finds almost no equivalent in other parts of the world. Indonesia, after this name became a political and national nomenclature, is a fusion of various cultures and influences from major religions and civilizations that come from various continents. Indonesia's strategic geographical location supports the meeting of these diverse civilizations in the archipelago. Therefore, the Indonesian people have historical experiences that are able to live, respect each other, support each other and strengthen each other in the principles of independence and mutual cooperation.

Since the Reformation Era, the experience and practice of harmonious religious life began to face challenges. Political changes also disrupt the harmony and cohesion of social and religious life in Indonesia. Intra and interreligious conflicts and violence, intolerance, radicalism, and terrorism have torn the history of peace and religious pluralism. The reforms, which were expected to present a dialogical, open and commensurate religious public space, were instead filled with ideas that threatened diversity and the foundation of the life of the nation and state.

In addition, the discourse of Islam and the state has also entered a new phase. Whereas in the previous era, political Islam groups were the "main targets" for deradicalization and depoliticization of Islam, in the post-Soeharto era, it was marked by the "revival of political Islam" – both in the form of parties and socio-religious movements. The revival was followed by a struggle to realize their ideopolitics, namely to present a "sharia state" (Jurdi, 2008, p. 493). This effort can be seen as seriousness to reclaim Pancasila as the state ideology. This view is based on quantitative reasoning that Muslims are the majority in Indonesia, so the application of Islamic law is considered a necessity.

This reason emphasizes the empiricism of pluralistic Indonesian society where coexistence, ethnicity, race and class is a living phenomenon. In addition, within the body of Muslims themselves, this Islamic political quantitative reasoning is also impartial: the majority of Muslims (Muhammadiyah and NU) agree to live under the umbrella of the Pancasila state. In responding to discourses related to state ideology, Muhammadiyah and NU took the opposite position with political Islam groups, which were open to the views of Muhammadiyah and the NU elite. Syafii Maarif, at that time the head of the PP. Muhammadiyah, for example, has on various occasions expressed its disapproval to

various parties who want to make Islam the state ideology (Maarif, 2001, pp. 42–44). In fact, said Syafii, those who want to rely on the implementation of Islamic law in the country reflect their powerlessness. In Syafii's view, the formalization of Islamic law through a state that is so partial actually assesses the position of Islam as a religion which is essentially *rahmatan li al-âlamîna* (Maarif, 2001). Hasyim Muzadi, Chairman of PBNU at the time, also objected to the struggle for the formalization of Islam. Hasyim emphasized that PBNU did not participate in movements that carried out the formalization of Islamic law and the Jakarta Charter (Muzadi, 2001, p. 427). Therefore, apart from destroying the integrity of the nation, what is more important is capturing the essence of the message of Islamic teachings with its formal label (Muzadi, 2001).

This is also confirmed by the organization's official statement. The decision of Muhammadiyah and NU mass organizations also confirms the same thing with the elite statement. Muhammadiyah issued Circular Letter 10/EDR/I.0/I/2002 dated August 16, 2002 which reaffirmed Muhammadiyah's political stance on its rejection of the formalization of Islam and reinserted the Jakarta Charter into the Preamble and Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution (Tempo, 2006). Meanwhile, NU through the Alim Ulama National Conference on 27-28 July 2006 in Surabaya issued a declaration of Allegiance to the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila. NU, like Endang Turmudzi, Secretary General of PBNU, firmly rejects an Islamic state, as some Islamic groups want. The reason is that the formation of an Islamic state is feared to divide Indonesia (Tempo, 2006).

Empirically, research conducted by the Center for Islamic and Political Studies (PSIP) FISIP UMJ in early December 2019 confirmed and strengthened the support of mass organizations and local elites of the two mass organizations. This study aims to discuss the views and thoughts of local Islamic elites about Pancasila in religious life; provide ideas in order to strengthen Pancasila, especially those related to religious life; provide another perspective, namely Islam in terms of strengthening the pillars of nationality; and encourage the active participation of local Islamic elites in strengthening Pancasila in socio-religious life. Quantitative research with qualitative research conducted in September 2019. This survey targets religious elite groups because it is believed that the religious attitudes of most people in Indonesia still tend to be paternalistic, that is, what is understood and done by religious leaders will usually be followed by the congregation concerned. In addition, this survey also aims to confirm the validity of similar studies.

Based on the results of the research above, this paper aims to find out more about the opinion of the elite of Islamic organizations on the relationship between Islam and Pancasila; mapping the views and thoughts of Islamic leaders about Pancasila in religious life; provide ideas in order to strengthen the understanding and practice of Pancasila, particularly related to religious life with an Islamic perspective, as well as encourage the active participation of Islamic leaders in strengthening the understanding and practice of Pancasila values in socio-religious life.

RESEARCH METHOD

The method used in this study is the Mixed Method which combines 2 data collection techniques, namely, quantitative data collected by surveys involving 100 respondents at the provincial level, consisting of 40% Muhammadiyah administrators, 40% NU, 1% FPI, 1% HTI, MUI 17%, and GPII 1%. The survey was conducted randomly on the figures of Islamic organizations with a random selection of respondents at the national and provincial levels. This survey is an elite survey with pre-determined respondents (purposed random sampling).

In this study, the results of the description include the views of local elites about the role of Pancasila in religious life, perceptions of Pancasila and other pillars of the nation, and its contribution to the strengthening of Pancasila in the lives of religious people in Indonesia. Qualitative data collection was carried out by holding FGDs with a questionnaire guide to 40 local NU figures, 40 local Muhammadiyah leaders, 20 other local religious leaders, and 10 national-level religious leaders. Data collection also uses observation techniques, in-depth interviews and documentation.

DISCUSSION, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS

The Relationship between Islam and Pancasila in Indonesia

Since independence until the end of the New Order, the position of the relationship between Islam and Pancasila is often encountered as facing each other and canceling each other out. This understanding usually refers to considerations and discussions related to state ideology (Noer, 1987). In this case, two political poles emerged, represented by two main forces, namely the Islamic nationalist group who wanted an Islamic state and the nationalist group that wanted the Pancasila state. In fact, Islam and Pancasila should not be met dichotomously and face each other. Islam and Pancasila can be understood in terms of “interdependence” and “complementary”, where Pancasila requires Islamic support and vice versa.

If we critically examine the Incident of June 22, 1945, when the founding fathers of the nation succeeded in reaching an agreement by establishing Pancasila as the basis of the state within the framework of the Jakarta Charter, it is actually a fact that Islam and Pancasila can “meet” and “need each other”. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that the Jakarta Charter is also known as the gentleman agreement (Maarif, 1996, pp. 108-110; Memorial Committee, 1982). The Jakarta Charter witnessed the meeting of Islamic political camps and secular political camps. Meanwhile, on August 18, 1945 there was a change in the Jakarta Charter where the editorial which reads “God with the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents” was changed to “Belief in One Supreme God” which must still be understood within the framework of Islam and Pancasila, which can meet and even complement each other.

Changes in the contents of the Jakarta Charter can still be reached within the framework of harmony, where for the greater interest of the Indonesian nation, Islamic political camps with awareness of the nation and state are willing to “give up” by accepting these changes. in the contents of the Jakarta Charter only “Belief in One Supreme God”, of course. with an interpretation whose spirit is in line with Tawhid in Islam (AL-BARBASY, 2016).

Independence Debate

A few months before the news that Japan surrendered unconditionally to the allies, Japan had committed to give independence to Indonesia. The promise was marked by the establishment of the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Investigative Agency (BPUPKI). This agency was formed by Japan, April 29, 1945 as the defeat of Japan in the Pacific War. This agency was formed in an effort to gain sympathy and support from the Indonesian people with the promise that Japan would assist the process of Indonesian independence. With this promise, Japan hoped that the Allied troops would be welcomed by the Indonesian people as enemies. As proof of his promise, on March 1, 1945 the leadership of the Japanese military in Java, General Kumakichi Harada announced the formation of BPUPKI (Ma'mun Murod Al-Barbasy, 2018a).

BPUPKI consists of 67 people, chaired by KRT Radjiman Wedyodiningrat with Deputy Chairs Ichibangase Yosio (Japan) and Raden Pandji Soeroso. In addition to being a young chairman, Raden Pandji Soeroso was also appointed as the head of the administrative section of BPUPKI (a type of secretariat) assisted by Masuda Toyohiko and Abdoel Gafar Pringgodigdo (Pour, 2009). Among the 67 BPUPKI, 60 of them are active members consisting of the main figures of the Indonesian national movement from all regions and sects, as well as 7 special members from the Japanese representatives, but the representatives from Japan do not have voting rights. , in other words its membership, its presence in BPUPKI sessions is only as an observer (Pour, 2009).

BPUPKI is noted to have held two official sessions and other informal sessions, including from May 29 to June 1, 1945, which succeeded in agreeing on the form of the state: the Unitary State. The trial also heard oration from three figures related to the state's foundation. Moh. Yamin provides principles that convey his ideas about the five foundations of the state: Nationality; Humanity; God; Citizenship; and People's Welfare. On May 31, 1945, Soepomo cast a vote conveying the idea of five basic principles of the state, which are named: “Basics of an Independent Indonesian State”: Unity; Kinship; Consensus and Democracy; Discussion; and Social Justice. And on June 1, 1945, Soekarno gave a speech that conveyed the idea of the formulation of the five basic principles of the state, called “Pancasila”: Indonesian Nationality; Internationalism and Humanity; Consensus or Democracy; Social welfare; and God Almighty.

Soekarno stated that if necessary his ideas on Pancasila could be squeezed into the Trisila, namely: 1. Socionationalism; 2. Social-democracy; and 3. Cultured Divinity. According to Soekarno, if he wanted to blackmail Trisila, he would call Ekasila, namely "Gotong-Royong". Soekarno tried to explain that the idea of the basic formulation of the state that he conveyed was a complete form that could not be separated from one another.

After the first session, a "Committee of Nine" was formed, consisting of nine people and chaired by Soekarno. The nine members of the Committee of Nine are Soekarno (chairman); Mohammad Hatta (vice chairman); Achmad Soebardjo Djojoadisoeerjo (member); Mohammad Yamin (member); KH. Wahid Hasyim (member); Abdoel Kahar Moezakir (member); Raden Abikusno Tjokrosoejoso (member); Haji Agus Salim (member); A A. Maramis (member). They have to work on various inputs that have been put forward by members of BPUPKI. Referring to the political approach offered by Herbert Feith, the Committee of Nine is a very good combination of the two political forces of the secular political camp represented by Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, Achmad Soebardjo Djojoadisoeerjo, and Mohammad Yamin; and the Islamic political stronghold represented by KH. Abdul Wahid Hashim, Abdul Kahar Muzakir, Raden Abikusno Tjokrosoejoso, and Haji Agus Salim. While one other person is AA. Maramis (Feith, 1988).

After the disbandment of BPUPKI on August 7, 1945, the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) was formed whose main tasks included preparing the Preamble and the Body of the 1945 Constitution; continue the work of BPUPKI; preparing the power of the Japanese military to the Indonesian people; and prepare everything related to constitutional issues for an independent Indonesia (Wahid, 2019). PPKI members presented 21 people, which reflected the ethnic representation in the Dutch East Indies. 12 people from Java, 3 people from Sumatra, 2 people from Sulawesi, 1 person from Kalimantan, 1 person from Sunda Kecil (Nusa Tenggara), 1 person from Maluku, 1 person from ethnic Chinese. The PPKI was chaired by Soekarno and his deputy Hatta. In its development PPKI members experienced the addition of six people, namely Wiranatakoesoema, Ki Hadjar Dewantara, Kasman Singodimedjo, Mohamad Ibnu Sayuti Melik, Iwa Koesoemasoemantri, and Raden Achmad Soebardjo Djojoadisoeerjo. The PPKI was symbolically inaugurated by General Terauchi on August 9, 1945 by inviting Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta and KRT Radjiman Wedyodiningrat to Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam) (Boland, 1985).

Following the establishment of the PPKI, various events occurred that affected the Indonesian independence process. On August 14, 1945 Japan surrendered to the Allies. On the same day Sjahrir urged independence to proclaim independence. The goal was that when the Allies re-entered Indonesian territory, they would not label Indonesia's independence as a "gift" from Japan. However, Soekarno did not state and stated with PPKI he was chaired and felt the need to ask for information from the Gunseikanbu regarding the news in Japan (AH Nasution, 1977, p. 203).

Seeing Sukarno to proclaim independence, a group of youths led by Chaerul Saleh met Soekarno and Hatta, urging them to immediately proclaim independence. Soekarno still refused, even willing to be killed if the youths continued without his will. On August 16, 1945 the youths were forced to “kidnap” Soekarno and Hatta to Rengasdengklok with the intention of keeping them away from Japanese influence (Ritaudin, 2020). Meanwhile, on the same day, it took place at the residence of Laksmana Maeida and was witnessed by Sukirman, Sudiro, and BM. Diah, three movement figures Soekarno, Hatta, and Achmad Subardjo discussed the formulation of the text of the proclamation. The next day at 10.00 on August 17, 1945 coincided with the 17th of Ramadan 1367 H., Soekarno accompanied by Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia in Pegangsaan Timur 56 Jakarta.

As usual for countries that want independence, the necessary conditions, including a constitution. PPKI has drafted a draft law that was previously agreed by BPUKI. The PPKI meeting was held on 18 August 1945 to establish the constitution, elect the president and vice president, and elect governors for all provinces. The basic formulation of the state contained in the Jakarta Charter which was originally accepted by acclamation, especially the first principle, underwent changes. This change occurred as reported by Nishijama which was received by Hatta on August 17, 1945 which contained a message from Eastern Indonesian figures that their reason was with the words of the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution: “With the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents.”

For these complaints, a meeting was held between Hatta and several Islamic figures, such as Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Kasman Singodimejo, Teuku Muhammad Hasan, and KH. Wahid Hasyim, which results in a “quasi-compromise” which fundamentally changes the contents of the Jakarta Charter from “God with the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents” to only “Belief in One Supreme God” (Maarif, 1996; Commemoration Committee, 1982). The Jakarta Charter, which is often referred to as the gentleman’s agreement, has disappeared from circulation.

Ki Bagus Hadikusumo is known to be very persistent in defending the Jakarta Charter. To the extent that Mohammad Hatta and Teuku M. Hasan failed to persuade and hope that Ki Bagus would praise the Jakarta Charter (PP. Muhammadiyah, 1995, p. 22). Ki Bagus only approved the amendment to the Jakarta Charter after Kasman Singodimejo said that the abolition of the Jakarta Charter was only a strategy so that the Indonesian people remained united in the face of Japanese and Allied forces (Singodimedjo, 1978, p. 26). Kasman was also encouraged that the struggle to reinsert the Jakarta Charter was still wide open because the existing 1945 Constitution was still in its infancy. Although he finally agreed to delete some of the contents of the Jakarta Charter, Ki Bagus offered to add the First Precept the word “Belief” “The Almighty”, so that it reads in full: “Belief in the One Supreme God” (Syaifullah, 1997, pp. 118–126). The word “God” is essentially

considered a compensation for the Jakarta Charter. With the acceptance of Ki Bagus's proposal, the PPKI Session on August 18, 1945 ratified the 1945 Constitution minus the Jakarta Charter (Maarif, 1996).

Unfinished State Ideology Debate

On November 10, 1956, Sukarno inaugurated the Constituent Assembly. In this inauguration, Soekarno conveyed several things, including those relating to the provisional 1945 Constitution. Soekarno's speech became a justification for the Islamic political camp to demand a discussion of the basis of the state again. When the Constituent Assembly was formed, Indonesia had three constitutions, namely the 1945 Constitution, the 1949 United States Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and the 1950 Provisional Constitution (AB Nasution, 1995, p. 260). In state-based discussions, there is another clash between the Islamic political camps and the secular political camps. Sukarno himself asked that the Constituent Assembly be released on March 26, 1960. Some understood this request as a warning to Sukarno who wanted full. After the 1955 general election, Soekarno's power was practically only ceremonial, while the real power was in the hands of the Prime Minister. The emergence of this view is not too wrong, especially if it is seen from the strengthening of the military's "political passion".

This view was proven correct when Soekarno issued a Decree of 5 July 1959. Even though at that time the Constituent Assembly had already made an agenda to decide on the form of the state, the system of government, and its principles. country. Compromise that remained 10 percent finally no longer attempted. Meanwhile, the Seven Words that Soekarno offered as a compromise step, also could not be a solution. The political Islam camp was chosen for the 1945 Constitution, but with a note to re-enter the Jakarta Charter in the Preamble and Article 29, as stated in the decision dated June 22, 1945 at BPUPKI. At the suggestion of the Islamic political camp, the secular political camp closed its ranks, which accepted the 1945 Constitution without any changes.

Voting is an alternative solution. The first ballot, May 29, 1959, stated whether or not the 1945 Constitution agreed with the amendments proposed by the Islamic political camp. Of the 470 members who attended, 201 agreed, 265 did not, and four abstained. Because the pro-amendment votes did not reach 2/3 of the total votes present, and even lost votes, in the end the amendment proposal was cancelled. A similar fate was experienced by the Pancasila camp which supported the 1945 Constitution without any changes. For three days for three voting times, the results were not enough to fulfill 2/3 of the vote. On May 30, 1959, 269 votes in favor of 199 votes. On June 1, 1959, 264 agreed and 204 refused. On the 2 June 1959 ballot, 263 agreed and 203 rejected. The trial that ultimately determined the fate of the 1945 Constitution was closed on June 2, 1959 at 12:21. In the trial the day before the recess, there are actually two opportunities to vote.

However, considering the results of the previous vote, the Constituent Chairwoman Wilopo decided to start the trial. Wilopo offered a compromise, negotiated with the government to review the Constituent Assembly in drafting a new Constitution, including the Government's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution. All members agreed and Wilopo closed the session. This was the last time the Constituent Assembly worked hard for two years and six months and two days to harmonize the views of this nation on the basis of its country. there are actually two opportunities to choose. However, considering the results of the previous vote, the Constituent Chairwoman Wilopo decided to start the trial. Wilopo offered a compromise, negotiated with the government to review the Constituent Assembly in drafting a new constitution, including the Government's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution. All members agreed and Wilopo closed the session. This was the last time the Constituent Assembly worked hard for two years and six months and two days to harmonize the views of this nation on the basis of its country. there are actually two opportunities to choose. However, considering the results of the previous vote, the Constituent Chairwoman Wilopo decided to start the trial. Wilopo offered a compromise, negotiated with the government to review the Constituent Assembly in drafting a new Constitution, including the Government's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution. All members agreed and Wilopo closed the session. This was the last time the Constituent Assembly worked hard for two years and six months and two days to harmonize the views of this nation on the basis of its country, including the Government's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution. All members agreed and Wilopo closed the session. This was the last time the Constituent Assembly worked hard for two years and six months and two days to harmonize the views of this nation on the basis of its country, including the Government's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution. All members agreed and Wilopo closed the session. This was the last time the Constituent Assembly worked hard for two years and six months and two days to harmonize the views of this nation on the basis of its country. including the Government's proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution. All members agreed and Wilopo closed the session. This was the last time the Constituent Assembly worked hard for two years and six months and two days to harmonize the views of this nation on the basis of its country (AB Nasution, 1995).

There are three reasons Islamic nationalists demand the basis of an Islamic state. First, the question of the basis of Islam is an issue that was promoted during the campaign. The theme of the Islamic party generally shows how to carry out Islamic teachings in the state and society. Second, Islamic nationalist groups see the Constituent Assembly as a place to express the basics and ideals of each political party. The principle of an Islamic party or Islamic nationalist group is that the wishes of Muslims have been conveyed, regardless of whether the forum accepts it or not. Third, the MPR is also seen as a *da'wah* forum to convey to MPR members about the nature of Islam related to social, state and political life (Noer, 1987, p. 266).

Secular nationalist groups also have reasons to defend Pancasila as the basis of the state. Secular nationalists – most of whom are also Muslim – agree in principle with an Islamic state, but the question is, should Islamic law be applied in an Islamic state as well? Meanwhile in Indonesia, adherents of other religions also take root, even though they are minorities (Ritaudin, 2020). In the view of the secular nationalist camp, it is not obligatory to apply Islamic sharia in an Islamic country. If it is true that Islam in Indonesia is the majority, Muslims will automatically dominate in everything, including the positions of president, vice president, ministers, ambassadors, and so on (Boland, 1985, pp. 26–37). This view at least comes from Soekarno (Soekarno, 2001).

The Castrated Pancasila and Indoctrination

After the Constituent Assembly was deemed to have failed to formulate the basis of the state, Sukarno with military support under the leadership of AH Nasution, issued a Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959. When this decree was issued, the Constituent Assembly was in recess. The decree contained three things, first, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly which was deemed “failed” to implement it. Second, return to the 1945 Constitution and follow-up to the 1950 Constitution, and third, the formation of the MPRS and DPAS. Through this decree, Sukarno succeeded in dissolving the Constituent Assembly and reinstating the 1945 Constitution. Since then, a new political era began, known as Guided Democracy. There were several events that led to the issuance of the decree. First, the success of the Constituent Assembly in ratifying the Constitution. Second, September 29, 1955 (elections for DPR members) and December 15, 1955 (elections for the Constituent Assembly) did not overcome political instability. Third, the members of the DPR consisting of dozens of representatives from political parties are divided into various ideologies that are difficult to unite. Fourth, regardless of being mobilized or not, the facts in society are at least illustrated by demonstrations demanding the enactment of the 1945 Constitution. Members of the DPR, consisting of dozens of representatives from political parties, are divided into various ideologies that are difficult to put together. Fourth, regardless of being mobilized or not, the facts in society are at least illustrated by demonstrations demanding the enactment of the 1945 Constitution. Members of the DPR, consisting of dozens of representatives from political parties, are divided into various ideologies that are difficult to put together. Fourth, regardless of being mobilized or not, DPR members consisting of dozens of representatives of political parties are divided into various ideologies that are difficult to unite. Fourth, regardless of being mobilized or not, the facts in society are at least illustrated by demonstrations demanding the enactment of the 1945 Constitution. Members of the DPR, consisting of dozens of representatives from political parties, are divided into various ideologies that are difficult to put together. Fourth, regardless of being mobilized or not, the facts in society are at least illustrated by

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With this Presidential Decree, Soekarno began to rule by offering his concept of democracy which he called Guided Democracy. Guided Democracy has become the most crucial turning point in the practice of democracy since Indonesia's independence. By decree, Sukarno was repeatedly made into the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 Constitution as a justification for Soekarno's absolute power and strengthened his grip on power, because the 1945 Constitution with all its emergencies was too big to be distorted (Hidayat, 2016).

Entering the New Order era, the political atmosphere changed. At first there was a new political hope that the New Order regime would be kind to Islamic groups. However, the New Order's attitude was much tougher than the Old Order's. Islamic groups are under tremendous political pressure. Control over religious leaders is not only done through institutionalization, but also through models of social repression and shock therapy. The New Order regime has always stated that the aspirations of Muslims that are not in line with the Government's agenda are a form of fundamentalism or fundamentalist Islam, a term that is politically-ideologically frightening (Muzakki, 2004, p. 14). The New

Order considered the power of Islam as a threat or Harold Crouch called it an anti-Islamic regime (Crouch, 1986, pp. 130–137). In the context of ideology, Pancasila is very ideological. In practice, Pancasila was also nothing more than a tool to legitimize the New Order.

Polemics related to state ideology have also resurfaced. The thing that distinguishes it, apart from the power of Islam that wants Islam as the state ideology, there are also other transformations in the body of Muslims who are trying to find arguments to synergize Islam and Pancasila. However, because it was put forward during the New Order era, there has been speculation that this view is nothing more than justification for the authoritarianism carried out by the New Order regime.

During the New Order era, there were at least three models of the relationship between Islam and the state. First, the antagonistic model between Islam and the New Order regime, which lasted from the beginning of Suharto's rule until the passing of five packages of political laws, two of which required political parties and mass organizations to be based on Pancasila (early 1970s to mid-1970s, and 1980s).

This antagonistic model can be described in three ways. First, political arrangements before the end of Sukarno's rule. In an effort to suppress and crush the Indonesian Communist Party, Islamic forces emerged as the military's main partner. Almost all of the action leadership units at that time were held by Islamic figures. The military desperately needed Islamic power to pressure Sukarno to step down from power. The military could not expect much from non-Islamic forces to confront Sukarno. Anti-Soekarno forces driven by the military, Islamic political forces, and action units finally succeeded in forcing Sukarno to step down from power. Given the large role of Islamic political power, it is understandable to demand an important political role during the New Order era. However, the demands of Islamic power are responded to differently.

Second, the conflict between Islamic forces and the New Order. In general, it can be categorized into two groups, namely partisan political conflicts, such as those related to the non-acceptance of some Islamic political forces at that time, such as the rehabilitation of Masjumi, permission of the Muslim Congress, the founding of the Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party, and competition between Golkar and Islamic parties in the 1971, 1977, and 1982 elections, and disagreements over public policy issues, such as the 1973 Marriage Bill, P4 and the inclusion of Streams of Belief into the GBHN (SU MPR 1978), Porkas/SDSB, and the prohibition of school holidays in the month of Ramadan (Liddle, 1992; Rusli, 1983; Sjamsuddin, 1993, pp. 106–108; Thaba, 1996).

Third, the New Order's efforts to create a more stable political order, one of which was carried out by engineering political simplification policies, as well as efforts to corporatize Islamic politics through the Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia). Indonesia) (Ma'mun Murod Al-Barbasy, 2012). If we read the political realities

at the time of the establishment of the MUI, it is difficult to say that the establishment of the MUI was nothing more than part of the New Order's efforts to "conquer" the power of Islam. Therefore, it is part of the hegemony effort, even though he is already at MUI, his attitude is different from the wishes of the New Order, which can be taken for restrictive actions, as illustrated by the resignation of Buya Hamka as general chairman MUI.

After more than two decades of antagonistic relations between Islam and the state, entering the mid-1980s, the relationship began to undergo a change, which Abdul Aziz Thaba called critical reciprocity, in which there was a slow decline. Start "greeting to each other" between the forces of Islam and the New Order (Taba, 1996). Although the power of Islam is close to the state, they still view it critically.

Entering the mid-1980s to 1990s, the state began to develop political accommodation. The state makes several policies that are considered beneficial for Islam. These changes and developments experienced a high escalation, especially in the early 1990s. These locations were marked by the New Order's policies on education and religion as well as the conditions and political tendencies of Muslims themselves which were considered to be in line with Islamic interests (Taba, 1996). The New Order realized that Muslims were a potential political force, so the New Order chose to be accommodative to Islam. Because if the New Order continues to position him as a rival and reacts in an antagonistic manner, it is certain that something will happen that will never end, which will have an impact on the development of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

Pancasila in The Reformation Era

Since the beginning of his reign, the New Order has slowly and systematically wanted to separate Islam as a religion, along with the system and beliefs of its adherents, from Islam as an ideology. The state separates the political structure from the religious structure, so as not to place religion as an alternative ideology for the state. It is not surprising that the New Order state did not allow ideas that deviate from Pancasila, the Jakarta Charter, although it has been denied its validity, has not disappeared from the minds of some Indonesians. Muslim figures and people even live in the souls and minds of their supporters.

After the fall of President Suharto, May 21, 1998, the reform era gave freedom to fight for the aspirations of various groups of people, as long as it was in accordance with the constitution and was carried out constitutionally. Most people reject everything related to the New Order, including placing the single principle of Pancasila. No wonder if in the Reformation Era, Pancasila was questioned by a number of the nation's children and made a scapegoat as the cause of adversity in almost all areas of life. People try to try Pancasila and forget about it.

Until now, there has been no real effort to realize these values Pancasila. On the other hand, the temptation to start it as a state ideology did not subside, although it was not very overt. The temptation to look for other ideologies, coupled with the lack of seriousness in realizing it, makes the position of Pancasila as the state's foundation not to be taken seriously.

Azyumardi Azra agrees with the abandonment of Pancasila. According to him, there are three things that cause Pancasila to remain marginalized. First, in the general memory of many people, Pancasila is still considered tainted because of the Suharto regime's policy of using Pancasila as a political tool to maintain the status quo of power and dominate the meaning of Pancasila which was indoctrinated through P4 upgrading. Second, the political liberalization carried out by President Habibie has provided opportunities for the development of other ideologies, especially those based on religion. Third, decentralization (regional autonomy) has more or less strengthened regionalism, encouraging nationalism which overlaps with ethno-nationalism and even with religious sentiments (Azra, 2006, pp. 9-11).

But despite all that, organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU did not necessarily abandon Pancasila. They no longer even consider Islam as the basis of the state. Borrowing Syafii Maarif's term, Muslims have matured and realized that Islam should not be used as a political flag. Islam is better served as a way of life that provides an ethical basis for every political activity undertaken. Re-arguing and contradicting Pancasila and Islam will only be a waste of time and will bring back the past. The most important thing is to find the values of Pancasila and continue to seek them with Islam. Thus, Pancasila can become a pillar of the nation state where religious people can carry out their religious teachings consistently (Maarif, 2012).

The emergence of the idea to return to the Jakarta Charter in the Reformation Era by a fundamental change in the field of Indonesian constitutional politics. The hegemonic party system turned into a democratic party system. As a new era, the Reformation Era gave rise to a lot of diversity both sociologically and politically, along with the opening of the "tap" of democratization (Bazzi et al., 2019). As a result, we face many challenges when we reposition and reread Pancasila. According to Suratno, there is an irony in the Reformation era, namely in a democracy that gives citizens greater freedom, there is an obsession in a group of people who want Pancasila as the basis of the Indonesian state, through various variations of thought. and the ideals that it develops (Suratno, 2008). These variants include the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, the establishment of an Islamic state, the application of Islamic law and so on (Suratno, 2008). Moreover, the fall of the New Order was also accompanied by problems in the form of a widespread multidimensional crisis, whether social, political, economic and so on, so that these conditions increased the obsession to replace Pancasila. Pancasila which is interpreted

singly and castrated to function as an ideology of tolerance and a common foundation is considered to have failed to bring this country to a better direction. Therefore, they regard Islam in all its forms as a solution to all existing problems. Therefore, their slogans are clear, for example al-Islamu huwa al-halu (Islam is the solution), al-Islamu huwa al-dinu wa al-dawlah (Islam is both a religion and a state).

The irony above has indeed been the final problem and challenge facing Pancasila since its introduction and debate on June 1, 1945, during the 1957 Constituent Assembly, the early days of the Suharto regime, until the Reformation Era, although the subjects and actors were different and changed. NU and Muhammadiyah are two very real and tangible examples of radical transformations in their attitudes and views towards Pancasila, from the most critical and skeptical group of Pancasila in raising them in the Constituent Assembly in 1957 to being very accommodating and moderate groups in accepting Pancasila in 1957. at that time. The New Order and the Reformation Era now. This means that NU and Muhammadiyah are no longer part of the irony.

Results

This study targets the local Islamic elite. This study involved 100 respondents at the provincial level, consisting of 40% Muhammadiyah, 40% NU, 1% FPI, 1% HTI, 17% MUI, and 1% GPII. To strengthen the survey results, in-depth interviews were conducted involving 10 figures from NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, DDII, HTI, FPI, MUI, and IJABI. Judging from the education level of the respondents, they consist of 50% undergraduate graduates, 28% masters, and 22% doctoral graduates.

The results of this survey are encouraging in order to strengthen Pancasila as the state ideology. As many as 21% of respondents strongly agree and 79% agree that Pancasila is the basis of the state. These findings indicate an interesting development. At the beginning of the Reformation, many movements wanted to implement Islamic law or re-apply Jakarta Jakarta, but in fact they were still in the minority and did not have a strong mass base. They do not penetrate the views of the majority of Muslims. The strength of Pancasila as the state ideology with the view that Islamic values do not conflict with Pancasila as many as 95% of respondents. Only 5% stated that Islam and Pancasila contradict each other. This finding confirms the fact that Pancasila is indeed extracted from the social, cultural, and religious values of the Indonesian people.

Although support for Pancasila as the state ideology is very high, this survey found inconsistencies, namely as many as 33% still crave the presence of the Jakarta Charter in the constitution. While those who refused were 67%. This view can be interpreted that the Muslim elite still harbors past imaginations about the Jakarta Charter. However, most of the respondents in this survey realized that this wish could not be realized given the political constellation in parliament that did not want it. As many as 95% of respondents

agreed that Islamic organizations should be involved in the socialization of Pancasila. While rejecting 4%, and abstention 1%. Respondents with a total of 18% also strongly agree, and 72% of respondents agree that Pancasila is part of the cadre material for Islamic organizations.

Regarding Islam as the basis of national life, 68% of respondents agree and 32% reject it. At first glance, this respondent's attitude is ambiguous, because on the one hand he wants Pancasila as the basis of the state, but on the other hand he also wants a big role for Islam in the life of the state. The attitude of this respondent can be interpreted that there is great hope that Islam has a normative role and is a source of social, cultural, and political values. In the context of democracy, of course it is natural that values dominate in the context of state life. They do not want Islam to be marginalized, only a matter of worship and personal moral-spiritual guidance. They do not intend to make Islam the basis of the state, they want Islamic values to dominate in the life of the state.

Regarding the existence of transnational organizations such as ISIS and HTI that want the presence of an Islamic state/Khilafah in Indonesia, 94% of respondents disagreed and only 4% agreed, and 1% abstained. This finding shows that the pro-state/caliphate movement is a minority in the eyes of the Muslim elite. Regarding the future of this transnational organization, 88% agree that the state should take certain actions. Regarding the state's obligation to implement Islamic law for all Muslims, 51% of respondents stated that the state must implement Islamic law, while 47% disagreed and 2% abstained.

This question is related to the emergence of new Islamic mass organizations at the local level that demand the enforcement of Islamic law. The need for the state to implement Islamic law was answered by 50% of respondents who agreed with the application of Islamic law in several areas. Meanwhile, 44% disagreed and 6% abstained.

Observing this survey, it can be said that there is optimism towards Pancasila as the basis of the state. In the context of Islamic organizations, it can be said that the current position of Pancasila is much stronger than before. It is likely that this survey was conducted in the first half of the 1940s to the mid-1980s and is believed to be different. At that time the ideological polarization was so strong. This can be seen in the basic state discussion sessions at BPUPKI, PPKI, the Committee of Nine, and the Constituent Assembly. When state policies have an ideological pattern, regarding the Marriage Bill, Beliefs, and the single principle of Pancasila, there is always extreme polarization between Islamic forces and secular forces.

A New Form of Relations between Islam and Pancasila

On various occasions, Soekarno said that in the development of the nation and state, religious values must be fully involved, not half-heartedly or partially. His presence is unquestionable. In terms of strengthening Pancasila, these religious values are the subject

of the full force involved. Referring to Soekarno's view, it is clear that religion must be given space to contribute without becoming the basis of the state. Referrals do not have to be done legally and/or formally, because the most important thing is the received Islamic moral message, which is able to provide signs about what the state should and should not do for the realization of the common good. good (maslahati al-ammah).

Islam should not be used as a competitor to Pancasila. Muslims claim that Pancasila is the elaboration of Islamic values. The clash of Pancasila and Islam is an extreme act and a misunderstanding in understanding Islam and Pancasila. Comparing Islam with Pancasila is equal to the dignity of Islam because it equates Islam with Pancasila. While religion is a "product of the gods", Pancasila is a "product of humans".

This study supports the finding that Pancasila has a strong position as the basis of the state. It is inappropriate to compare Islam with Pancasila. On the other hand, Islam must be used as a reference value to regulate the life of the nation and state better. In this context, it is necessary to offer a new format related to the relationship between Islam and Pancasila. This new format must carry the spirit of reconciliation, by placing each role in its place, in contrast to the differences between Islamic politics and secular politics, which occurred before independence and during the session in the Constituent Assembly. The debate between the two groups was actually born out of a lack of awareness that Pancasila and Islam are two entities whose presence cannot be avoided in the Indonesian context.

With the spirit of reconciliation, Islamic values and Pancasila need to be grounded in the real life of the nation and state, so that they have strong roots. Islamic values and Pancasila need to be transformed into a force that solves social and state problems. Between the two does not need to be contradicted, because each has a different position. Islam was born in a religious context, Pancasila was born in a national context. With this awareness, a Muslim must become a nationalist with Pancasila as the state ideology, without having to become a dual personality.

Within the framework of grounding Islamic and Pancasila values into operational values, the practice of Pancasila by a Muslim cannot be based on one precept alone. The five precepts of Pancasila are an inseparable unity. Moreover, within the framework of practicing Islam and Pancasila, Muslims find it difficult to think and act on concrete issues that are directly related to social problems.

From the results of this survey, not many people support the establishment of an Islamic state and an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia. This shows that Muslims in particular and Indonesian society in general need a clearer and more concrete offer of political programs related to their daily needs. The association of Islamic countries or khilafah is something luxurious and very interesting as a discourse at a certain elite level, but it often ends in a deadlock when targeting issues that require proper resolution.

To avoid the endless polemic of Islam and Pancasila and also as a solution, as a wise nation, this nation needs to give a “special” gift to Muslims. This special treatment is not by reinserting the formulation of the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 Constitution, but in the form of a state political stance that accommodates the socio-religious interests of Muslims. This is also part of local wisdom. This gift is important, because the goodness it brings will also have an impact on the interests of the wider community.

However, what is known as local wisdom must still be conveyed by taking into account the precepts of Pancasila. If we consider the existence of sharia regulations, for example as an expression of local wisdom, the sharia regulations must be prepared not only by considering the implementation of the first precepts, but also other precepts. The sharia regulations issued must not have the nuances of particularist selfishness that only applies to one type, but sharia regulations that have an archipelago perspective and are unified in diversity.

Through this new relational format of Islam and Pancasila, which is based on the concrete needs of the Indonesian nation and local wisdom, the conflict between Islam and Pancasila must end. It is time for this society and nation not to focus on things that end up in discourse without a proper solution. Moreover, until now the Indonesian people are still faced with problems that are far more complex than just dealing with ideological issues.

In addition, the policy offer that was deliberately tried and the position of Pancasila as the state ideology must be ended. In the future, there should be no discourse or policy offers that do not educate the nation and instead only create a public commotion, such as discourses regarding the abolition of the religious column or the “prayer in school” lawsuit (Ma’mun Murod Al-Barbasy, 2018b). This policy discourse will not only reflect the ruler’s understanding of Indonesia’s Pancasila ideology, but will also revive the old pattern of antagonistic relations between Islam and Pancasila.

The task of the state should be to strengthen the position of Pancasila as an ideology, and not the other way around. Along the way, several elite groups tried to put Pancasila as the state ideology. The two examples of policy proposals above are a tangible manifestation of the state’s efforts to place the position of Pancasila. It should be understood that Pancasila is a “centric ideology”, which was founded that Pancasila is a state or a secular state. However, the Pancasila state is a religious state that places religion in an important position.

The abolition of the “religious column” and the lawsuit for “prayer at school” are examples accepted by Muslims as the state’s efforts to determine the position of Pancasila as the state ideology. The state seeks Pancasila in a more secular direction by trying to intervene and reduce religious values which incidentally are the hallmarks of Indonesia with the Pancasila ideology, and distinguish it from theocratic and secular ones.

CONCLUSION

Indonesia is not a religious state, nor is it a secular state. Indonesia is a country based on Pancasila, the substance of which is taken from religious values, in addition to customs, cultural traditions, and noble values that grow in society. Therefore, Pancasila is also in line with religious teachings, namely Islam. The attitude of Muslims in Indonesia who accept and approve of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution can be fully contested. It can be said that rejecting Pancasila is the same as rejecting Islam. This is not a debate between Islam and Pancasila. Wise and wise attitude, as religious people as well as Indonesian citizens, when filling the development of the Pancasila state, so that problems that arise can be overcome together.

The relationship between Islam and Pancasila is now better than before. Currently, Muslims accept Pancasila as the basis of the state. They can put Islam and Pancasila in their respective portions. They realize that being a good Muslim can also be a good Indonesian citizen. However, the revitalization of Pancasila is the main task and urgent agenda for all of us. Revitalization is not only reviving the memory of its values, but also institutionalizing these values into everyday life at various levels of life. Pancasila is no longer just a big jargon, it is a systemic system device that can be realized for welfare, prosperity, but the intelligence of the people, nation and state.

It is very important to revitalize Pancasila as a correction to the various challenges of the nation that are currently occurring and have not been resolved. Religious radicalism, socio-economic conflicts, and economic-political crises are some examples of major national problems that basically deviate from the values of Pancasila. Pancasila, the values of Diversity, Tolerance, and Mutual Respect, must be re-actualized. The revitalization of Pancasila in stemming religious radicalism also requires the state to ensure the independence of its citizens in carrying out their religious beliefs. Pancasila values concerning just and civilized humanity must also be revitalized and implemented in daily life as an alternative to resolving communal conflicts and the ongoing political-economic crisis.

Human values must also be juxtaposed with the principle of justice so that the Indonesian people become citizens who do not pursue their own interests or their groups without caring about the fate of others. There needs to be a balance between progress and freedom with a focus on seeking and justice. Therefore, we must study, truly revitalize, and truly ground the values of Pancasila in the practice of people's lives, both in the field of education, religious organizations, political parties, markets, and state institutions.

The precepts of Pancasila expressly the values of divinity, humanity, unity, deliberation, and justice, are basically big capital for the nation to move forward. We must use the great capital that has been created and inherited by the founding fathers as a guideline to advance the Indonesian nation in this global era. Muslims must stand at

the forefront with other elements of the nation so that the Indonesian nation is able to compete and be at the forefront of other nations. Equally important, Muslims along with other elements of society must work hand in hand and work hand in hand to ground the values of Pancasila in the practice of life so that this nation is truly able to provide prosperity, prosperity, and justice for all Indonesian people.

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