Journal of Evolutionary Studies in Business JESB

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Francisco Betancourt Castillo
Universidad Bernardo O'Higgins, Centro de Estudios Históricos (Chile)

Defending the Nation and Searching for Wealth: Merchants and Privateers of Chile, 1817-1820

Abstract

Permanent warfare marked the Independence process in Hispanic America, and was evident on the high seas between the newly formed States and forces loyal to the Spanish Crown. Faced with persistent maritime threats, some independent governments encouraged privateering to help the newly formed national navies secure the seas and harass the enemy. This also helped make international merchandise trade safer, which was vital for the good progress of internal markets and the public treasuries: in short, for the "national" economy.

Privateering brought about new and unique business opportunities for many traders established in Chile to intervene in and boost merchandise trade, and, by its very nature, encouraged diversification. Moreover, it involved traditional inter-regional or terrestrial trade and "peaceful" shipping activities, as well as, in some cases, contracts with the State. Corsairs were able to obtain unexpected revenues by attacking their "Spanish" competitors trading with the Peninsula. Using documents from the Chilean Ministry of the Navy, case-studies will show how this type of business developed in the years of its apogee and its implications on the consolidation of Independence and the subsequent construction of the Republican State.

Keywords: Independence of Chile; Privateers; Merchants; Colonial trade; Navigation

Defender la nación y buscar riqueza: comerciantes y corsarios de Chile, 1817-1820

Resumen

La guerra permanente marcó el proceso de Independencia en Hispanoamérica, lo que fue evidente en alta mar, entre los nuevos Estados y las fuerzas leales a la Corona española. Enfrentados a persistentes amenazas marítimas, algunos gobiernos independientes promovieron el corso para ayudar a las nuevas armadas nacionales a proteger los mares y expulsar al enemigo. Este proceso contribuyó a hacer más seguro el comercio de mercancías, algo vital para el buen avance de los mercados internos y los tesoros públicos: en definitiva, para la economía "nacional".

La actividad corsaria, por su propia naturaleza, promovió la diversificación y aportó nuevas y extraordinarias oportunidades de negocio a muchos comerciantes establecidos en Chile, que intervenieron así en, e impulsaron, el comercio de mercancías. Además, esta actividad involucró al comercio tradicional tanto interregional como terrestre y a iniciativas de navegación "pacíficas", así como en algunos casos conllevó contratos con el Estado. Los corsarios fueron capaces de obtener inesperados ingresos al atacar a sus competidores "españoles" en el comercio con la Península. Utilizando documentos del Ministerio de Marina chileno, los estudios de caso muestran cómo este tipo de negocio se desarrolló en los años de su apogeo, y sus implicaciones en la consolidación de la Independencia y la construcción del Estado republicano.

Palabras clave: Independencia de Chile; corsarios; comerciantes; comercio colonial; navegación

Defensar la nació i buscar riquesa: comerciants i corsaris de Xile, 1817-1820

Resum

La guerra permanent va marcar el procés d'Independència a Hispanoamèrica, el que va ser evident a alta mar, entre els nous Estats i les forces lleials a la Corona espanyola. Enfrontats a amenaces marítimes persistents, alguns governs independents van promoure el cors per ajudar les noves armades nacionals a protegir els mars i expulsar-ne l'enemic. Aquest procés va contribuir a fer més segur el comerç de mercaderies, que era vital per al bon desenvolupament dels mercats interns i els tresors públics: en definitiva, per a l'economia "nacional".

L'activitat corsària, per la seva pròpia naturalesa, va promoure la diversificació i va aportar noves i extraordinàries oportunitats de negoci a molts comerciants establerts a Xile, que d'aquesta manera van intervenir a, i impulsar, el negoci de mercaderies. A més, aquesta activitat va involucrar el comerç tradicional tant interregional com terrestre, així com les iniciatives de navegació "pacífiques", fet que en alguns casos va comportar contractes amb l'Estat. Els corsaris van ser capaços d'obtenir ingressos inesperats en atacar els seus competidors "espanyols" en el comerç amb la Península. Fent servir documents del Ministeri de Marina xilè, els estudis de cas mostren com aquesta mena de negoci es va desenvolupar en els anys del seu apogeu, i les seves implicacions en la consolidació de la Independència i la construcció de l'Estat republicà.

Paraules clau: Independència de Xile; corsaris; comerciants; comerç colonial; navegació

Corresponding author: e-mail: efejotabetancourt@gmail.com

Received 12 March 2021 - Accepted 18 May 2021

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No Derivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-comercial re-use and distribution, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered or transformed in any way.

Journal of Evolutionary Studies in Business JESB
Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

1. Introduction

Historical analyses of the political Independence processes in Hispanic America usually focus on a series of military events seen as consequences of dramatic incidents that transcend the times under examination. In other words, the Independence processes have been understood firstly as *revolutions*; secondly as *political events* from which different types of violence sprang; and, finally, as a *generalized global war* that ended up crumbling the presumed union of American societies, which were the stage of the conflict.

A relatively well-explored dimension – though more work needs to be done – is that of economic undercurrents of Independence (Ramírez 1959; Villalobos 1968; Stein and Stein 1970; Bonilla 1980, 13-46; Prados and Amaral 1993; Marichal 2014). In the short term, wars constituted an unprecedented context for local societies, which shaped a difficult material horizon for the new states. In the long term, these wars implied the consecration of long-engineered economic interests, in some cases of ancient origins, which reflected, above all, the power projection of the Spanish-Creole wealthy ruling classes. Independence from Spain, reached through war, allowed these classes to achieve a crucial position, sanctioned by the new context, and privateering activities and the business opportunities that they entailed strengthened such position.

Another important aspect relative to the economic dimension of the Wars of Independence arises when distinguishing some fundamental historiographic questions, namely the historical problem of the short-term and long-term causes behind the desire for political emancipation; and that of the consequences unleashed by the separation from the Catholic Monarchy. The phenomenon of the Independence Wars as scenarios of new business possibilities and potential changes – in other words, as platforms for business and windows of opportunity for old and new interests – remains understudied, because the focus has been on political and sociocultural

Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

causes and consequences. The historiography on the Chilean Independence process has also suffered from this particular myopia, especially when focusing on its maritime projection: trade and naval warfare (López 1971; Arancibia, Jara and Novoa 2005). The lack of such historiographic studies – either descriptive or analytical – is even more remarkable when focusing on the emergence of corsair activities, which are poorly studied in economic terms.

2. Privateering in Chile at the time of Independence Revolutions

Privateering was not an unusual phenomenon on the Chilean coasts, since it traces back to the Spanish foundation of the first population centers in the territory. However, the war to defend *junta* autonomies (later motivated by the desire for Independence) represented a stimulating context for such activity (Gámez 2004, 262-265). Inspired by an ideal of republican and liberal virtue, the new governments, which led to new republics theoretically formed by "soldier-citizens", called for the defense of the new system, i.e., the *Patria*, which was sprouting from the struggle against the old regime (Fernández Abara 2004; Pinto and Valdivia 2009, 243). Citizens in a position to participate in corsair activities – either by joining the crews going to sea, or, above all, by investing capital in a vessel to be fitted for war – were urged to do so. This had been previously done in the North American Thirteen Colonies (Patton 2008, 15), which were a source of inspiration for Independence leaders.

In addition to nationalist inspirations, the recourse to privateers resulted from pragmatic reasons. The new Hispanic American governments took advantage of this resource, in the same way in which the Spanish monarchy used to employ privateers to support Royal Navy services (Ortíz 2015, 305-314). In both situations, the cause was shortage in public monies which ruled out the organic financing of regular naval forces' implementation, in addition to the "fiscal indigence" suffered by the region's nascent states during several years (Alegría 2013, 136-137; Moutoukias and T'Hart 2021, 285-288). In Chile, privateering activity was also developed in

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

the middle of a long-lasting economic process; the commercial competition between the Peruvian port of Callao and the Chilean port of Valparaíso (Cavieres 1996, 77-100; Ortiz 2001, 198).

The state's necessity to wage war in the neighboring sea went beyond the minimal function of ships guarding the coasts it sought to control. Like other requirements of the Chilean "patriot" governments, such needs had induced the political authorities to seek permanent collaboration with the main businessmen of the day. Entrepreneurs and traders of some importance, who can be identified after February 1817 (that is, when a new, independent, "patriot" government was installed in central Chile), were individuals of different origins who were, of course, aligned with the new political authorities. They thus replaced the former colonial traders, who like most of their counterparts in other places in Hispanic America (Brading 1975, 149-151) had mostly come from the Basque provinces (Zaldívar, Vial and Refingo 1998) and a region called La Montaña – today Burgos and Cantabria, Spain (Cavieres 2003, 102-108). This new multinational group of entrepreneurs came to dominate the most relevant sectors, such as merchandise trade and the general financial market. They naturally became the social group that could best serve as financiers of the State under construction.

In addition, at least in Chile, the Argentine Provinces, and Peru, this same social group tended to concentrate import-export trade and government loans as well as formal contractual relations with the State. Several needs of the State, especially the need to develop the capacity to engage in maritime warfare, depended on the support of these entrepreneurs. They were virtually the only ones holding enough capital to make naval warfare possible. This was also due, among other reasons, to their presence in the import-export maritime trade. Such trade focused mainly on the Peruvian coasts, an activity that had involved, in practice, the formation of a large and

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

scattered "merchant navy" in private hands.[1] The largest traders and importers were also the main stakeholders interested in securing the continuation of overseas trade. Such trade was threatened by forces loyal to the king as well as by contracted vessels based in the Viceroyalties of Peru and New Spain (that included the Capitanía General de Cuba) which allowed them to involve almost the entire American continent and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Using this capacity, they tried to block Valparaíso (Uribe 1910, 55; Ortiz 2015, 344-350).

Why is knowledge of such details relevant to understanding the historical period of the Independence Wars? In Chile's particular case, the evolution of corsair activity shows the extent to which many of the most active traders took advantage of the new circumstances arising from war against the monarchy. They increased and consolidated their business by resorting to naval engagements as a stable basis for these lucrative affairs. At the same time, they used privateering to harm their commercial competitors in the importation business of manufactures of Atlantic origin on the south Pacific coast. As will be shown, Peninsular merchants and, above all, Creole merchants from Peru, were the group most affected by the Chilean-flagged privateers' activities. The Peruvians were linked, through commercial agents and credit intermediaries, with Spain, as well as with the northern coasts of the Viceroyalty and Central American Pacific.

The peak of Chilean privateering analyzed here was but a brief period of adjustment or transition between the colonial past and the independent government's first steps. This is also significant. Many initiatives of privateers took place between 1817 and 1819 – at most until 1820 – when the newly installed government of Bernardo O'Higgins was being institutionally

[1] Merchants established in Chile, especially those in ports such as Valparaíso and Talcahuano, acquired ships for commercial purposes, many of which were being built in the country itself, especially at the mouth of the Maule River, in the town of Nueva Bilbao de Gardoqui, present-day Constitución. In the early nineteenth century, the Chilean mercantile cluster was longer dependent on Peruvian shipping companies.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

set up and trying to administer the country and consolidate its power with great difficulties. The State was weak, and in certain administrative sectors even somewhat uncertain or only partially structured. In this sense, the merchant-privateers' brief apogee was a consequence of the slow and incremental nature of the construction of a new independent State. It was stopped once the new State had a formally established navy and the expected workings of a new economic base (a new economy), with stable rules that it controlled and/or supervised, filling the initial vacuum that had allowed for the activities of Chile's privateers.

3. The improvised beginning of patriot privateering

In the few Chilean studies on naval history (Uribe 1910; Arancibia, Jara and Novoa 2005; Woods 2016, 87-97) it has always been affirmed that some businessmen's first impulse to participate in the naval war was motivated by the action of two foreigners: William Mackay and James Budge. On October 23rd, after the independence triumph in Chacabuco and the subsequent occupation of Chile's central area, Mackay and Budge – two British seamen based at the time in the port of Valparaíso – captured the Spanish frigate *Minerva* in Arica, which was unloading crates of goods shipped from Cádiz as part of a larger convoy. They had received information of the *Minerva*'s arrival and had carefully planned this action for at least a month, preparing a schooner that they fitted for corsair war with a license from the Chilean government: the *Death or Glory*, also called *Nuestra Señora de Mercedes*, alias *La Fortuna*. Budge and Mackay's crew stealthily assaulted the Spanish ship, boarded it, and, after a brief battle seized it along with its valuable cargo, and immediately placed the *Minerva* – a larger and much better equipped vessel than the poor "barge" *La Fortuna* – in service. Continuing on their way to Callao, they looted another Spanish merchant, the *Santa María*. Finally, this group of seamen – a mixed crew of British and Chileans – returned to Valparaíso, sold the *Minerva* to the

Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

government, which intended to use it as a cargo ship, and sold the prize cargo "at a good price" (Uribe 1910, 58-59).

Although these Britons' journey encouraged many fellow traders – and also, it must be said, adventurers in search of material fortune – to invest in fitting privateers, the truth is that their raids were not the first in this period. Neither was their request the first made to the Chilean government for a patent. Despite the war, Spanish trade in the Pacific, linked to Peruvian markets, was as vital as ever, and caught the attention of entrepreneurs who saw this situation as an opportunity for direct profit (Alfonso 2014, 501). As early as September 1817, Manuel Antonio Boza along with "*otros vecinos*" of Valparaíso asked the independent government for a letter of marque for a ship owned by the group and named *Nuestra Señora del Carmen*, alias *El Furioso.* This ship was described as a small "*lancha vieja*" (old boat), which had belonged to the State. Evidently, the group of prominent residents had invested some capital in repairing the ship, which had originally been in a poor condition. With this boat, they planned to harass the Peruvian coasts, combining their profit-making interests with patriotic motivations. They also requested help in equipping the ship with specific arms: one cannon to be mounted on the boat and more than 15 muskets for the small crew, with 1,000 cartridges.[2]

The project to fit Boza and associates' small ship in the port of Valparaíso may have been influenced by the precedent of another privateer, already active under the Chilean flag for several months, which had actually started such activities before Mackay and Budge had seized the *Minerva* in Arica. In October, these seamen – crewmembers of the armed brigantine called *El Águila* – legalized their position. Although they formally belonged to the Army of the Andes, the Navy did not yet exist, and thus they had embarked on operations at sea while they were

[2] Archivo Nacional Histórico de Chile (hereafter ANCH), Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, ff. 4-6 and 21.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

not waiting for orders. Commanded by Irishman Raymond Morris, the documentation shows that these improvised navigators privately distributed their first capture as a prize of corsair war among the crew. The booty in question was the Spanish frigate *Perla* and its cargo, captured after its boarding by seven members, all Chilean, of *El Águila*.[3]

4. Privateer traders in action

These early examples were soon followed by the efforts of a major Santiago de Chile merchant, Felipe Santiago del Solar. When the British set sail in search of the *Minerva* – but had not yet captured it – Solar applied to the authorities for a permit to act as a privateer with a brigantine he had procured, which he named *El Chileno*. Within a few days of his request, on November 20th, 1817, he received a letter of marque. The vessel, 232 tons, had previously sailed under the French flag and the name *Adeline.* As an indication of the comparatively large size of the ship, it can be pointed out that Solar had equipped it with 12 artillery pieces – which he, however, believed insufficient to the scope – and engaged a crew of 90 men, and appointed a Chilean captain, Enrique Santiago, as commander. This type of investment, representing a strong initial outlay, required an amount of capital in cash that merchants often did not have. This is why Solar had to borrow from Paulino Campbell, a Briton who was by then doing business in the country's capital.[4]

Manifesting his political commitment and profit expectations, the plan Solar illustrated to the Chilean authorities conformed to the patriotism of this historical context: to plunder the "Enemies of America", and to burn, destroy or seize all the ships of such adversaries. Solar seemed to believe that he needed further support from the State to carry out his intent, namely

[3] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, f. 7.
[4] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, ff. 12-14.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

additional material and human resources: 12 artillery pieces, 15 pairs of pistols, 20 spears, 30 quintals of gunpowder, as well as 20 veteran soldiers.[5]

Profits expected from *El Chileno* activities were not regulated by current laws on prizes, but actually by the clauses of a private contract. In this instance, moreover, the documents made no reference to the rules on privateering established in the *Recopilación de Leyes de Indias*, the legal instrument in force until the promulgation of the first Chilean *Reglamento provisional de Corso*, which was published precisely at the end of November 1817, just after the delivery of the license to Solar (Alegría 2013, 137). In his application, approved by the government, together with the concession of the patent, it was established that booty would be distributed in accordance with the agreement Solar had made with the commander and crew of the brigantine – which soon produced high profits for Solar. Less than two months after receiving the patent, *El Chileno* captured the brigantine *Saeta* on the southern Peruvian coast. This was a merchantman carrying a large shipment of distinct tropical produce: 400 bags of cocoa, 300 quintals of rice, 100 quintals of lentils, 400 hats, 200 coconuts, 4 bottles of tamarind liqueur, various crates of chocolate, and unrecorded amounts of cloth, blankets and silver utensils. Affected by this capture were Tomás and Juan Antonio Lopategui, father and son, who were both ship owners and merchandise traders from Callao. They were the owners of the *Saeta* and of all the goods that it carried from Guayaquil to the coast of Tacna, with the exception of 80 bags of cocoa belonging to a Guayaquil merchant.[6] The goods were sent to Valparaíso in the seized ship itself, this being the usual Chilean privateers' *modus operandi* after seizures.

Felipe Santiago del Solar made large profits thanks to the fact that his privateer *El Chileno* sailed far north, in Central American waters, near Sonsonate (Acajutla, El Salvador). On

[5] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, ff. 12-14.
[6] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, f. 12v.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

February 6th, 1818, it seized the *San Ignacio de Loyola*, alias *El Diamante*, a 50-ton Spanish packet boat transporting goods from Guayaquil. Before sending their prey to Valparaíso, Solar's privateers were forced to spend several days resupplying on one of the Galápagos Islands because they were running out of drinking water, and there they met several British whalers with whom they hoped to trade. The *San Ignacio* arrived at its final destination only on May 10, as reported in the *Gazeta Ministerial de Chile* of May 16th, 1818.[7] On this occasion, the booty included various European goods (tin boxes, crates of steel, Flemish knives, utensils, hats, European wines), as well as 502 bags of cocoa and other local products. In the *San Ignacio* case, the identity of the injured merchants is also provided: José del Pozo y Tejada, the seller who shipped the goods from Guayaquil and who at the time of the capture was traveling aboard the *San Ignacio* with his wife and a servant; and the buyers who were waiting for the cargo in Sonsonate, the Basque merchants Juan Bautista Marticorena, Manuel María Cambronero, and Juan Emeterio de Echeverría.[8]

The *El Chileno* continued its hunt. At the end of February 1818, it captured a brigantine named *Mercedes*, of which, unfortunately, further information is lacking. In April, at the mouth of the Tumbes River, the Chilean corsairs seized another frigate, the *Inspector*, formerly owned by the British but Spanish property at the time of the capture – the only known fact about it. *El Chileno* crossed paths twice with a Spanish warship: a vessel described as a "frigate" carrying 22 cannons. The first meeting took place in front of the port of Callao and the second near the

[7] *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins*. Vol. 11. Santiago de Chile: Archivo Nacional, Imprenta Universitaria, 1952, 24-25.

[8] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, unnumbered.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

mouth of the Guayaquil River.[9] In both cases, the privateer preferred to flee, going straight on his way and thus avoiding engagement (Cárdenas 1984, 56-59).

After the last of the aforementioned seizures, *El Chileno* made its way back to Valparaíso for repairs. On the way, in early December, in front of Huanchaco (Peru), it crossed paths with the brigantine *San Antonio* and took the opportunity to seize it. The extent of the private interests affected is undetermined, although it is known that part of the cargo taken by the privateer's *armador*, Felipe Santiago del Solar, included rice, wheat, beans and chickpeas in unspecified quantities. These goods, indeed, certainly arrived in Valparaíso.

The presence of the *El Chileno* privateer in Pacific waters ended with a last expedition northward some time later. Between May and June 1819 its crew captured the frigate *Cazadora*, anchored in the bay of Acapulco. The *Cazadora*'s crew was preparing to transport "*frutos, efectos y caudales*" (local produce, bills and specie) from that coast to Lima and Guayaquil. The stolen goods belonged to Pedro Juan de Olasagarre and José Cristóbal y Ramos, the merchants who awaited the cargo in the ports to which it was being shipped.[10] According to a letter sent by the governor of Valparaíso, Luis de la Cruz in June 1819 to the Chilean Minister of State, Joaquín de Echeverría, the cargo stolen from the *Cazadora* consisted of undetermined quantities of tallow, timber and leather.[11]

Although the exact number of prizes the *El Chileno* privateer was able to capture is unknown – and therefore the exact amount of the value, which, in good part, enriched the merchant Felipe Santiago del Solar – Bernardo O'Higgins himself, then Chile's supreme ruler, believed that this

[9] *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins*. Vol. 11. Santiago de Chile: Archivo Nacional, Imprenta Universitaria, 1952, 25.

[10] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, unnumbered.

[11] *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins*. Vol. 12. Santiago de Chile: Archivo Nacional, Imprenta Universitaria, 1953, 250.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

private vessel's activities had been considerable. In a letter to José de San Martín of June 3, 1819, he claimed that the privateer had seized or destroyed more than ten ships.[12]

5. Rise

Around 1818 there was a real explosion of the privateering phenomenon. We have seen the activities of men such as William Mackay, the Valparaíso *vecinos* group – with Manuel Antonio Boza at its head – and Santiago merchant Felipe Santiago del Solar. The previous years had seen very few letters of marque granted, and among them, the most significant were those issued on December 4, 1817, for two ships – one of which was the schooner *Congreso* – both owned by Buenos Aires citizen Juan Pedro de Aguirre, represented in Chile by merchant Tomás Rosales, a relative of Felipe Santiago del Solar. Like Aguirre, Rosales was from Buenos Aires, though he had settled in Valparaíso. These traders sought to bring the war northward, on the route to Panama used by Peruvian traders. They claimed that Lima royalists now naturally avoided the trip around Cape Horn, preferring to send their goods and capital by this other way. As a result, in early July 1818, the brigantine *El Empecinado,* carrying 479 bottles of pisco brandy, was seized in the city of Pisco by the *Congreso*.[13]

On January 27th, 1818, shortly after *El Chileno* had made its first capture, the Buenos Aires merchant Estanislao Lynch, the Argentine grandson of an Irishman, arrived in Chile with the independence troops. Being on good terms with San Martín, he requested 6 privateering patents for 6 different vessels, expecting to obtain, as collateral for the investment in such licenses, the right to import privateering booty duty-free in all ports of the country.[14] But despite his relevant position in maritime trade of the time — later he would be one of the lenders to the nascent

[12] *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins*. Vol. 8. Santiago de Chile: Archivo Nacional de Chile, Imprenta Universitaria, 1951, 111-112.

[13] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, ff. 39 and 41.

[14] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, f. 16.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Peruvian State (Mazzeo 2011, 249) — Lynch was not able to realize his project of having his own small privateering fleet. However, his request shows a very clear commitment to participate in the sector and thus to extend his business interests.[15]

The leading presence and participation in the privateering business of several foreigners, especially British traders with some maritime experience, continued in 1818. This year was characterized by a clear increase in privateering activities based in Valparaíso. Charles Higginson and "Diego" O'Brien, two British merchants in the port, took over as *apoderados* (legal representatives) for a new corsair ship called *Mercedes de la Fortuna*, a schooner bought by William Mackay – one of the owners of the aforementioned *Death or Glory*, renamed *Nuestra Señora de Mercedes*, alias *La Fortuna* – in association with John Hurrell, who had already served as commander of Mackay's former privateer. The *Mercedes de la Fortuna*, formerly the *Catalina*, was purchased from another British merchant installed in Valparaíso: Samuel Haigh. Hurrel paid Haigh about 18,000 pesos in cash for the vessel, leaving him as a guarantee half of the cargo which the first privateer, *La Fortuna*, had seized from the frigate *Minerva* (Haigh 1829, 186-189).

Corsair activity in Chile went beyond Valparaíso. In May 1818 in the port of Coquimbo, located next to La Serena, in the north-central region of the country, Gregorio Cordovés applied for a license to equip a brigantine of his property, the *Santiago Bueras*. The latter was a 200-ton vessel on which 18 cannons could be conveniently mounted. Cordovés named the ship after grenadier colonel Santiago Bueras Avaria (1786–1818), a patriotic combatant who had recently

[15] Estanislao Lynch remained linked to naval warfare, and above all, to the economic profits generated by the conflict. In July 1819, Lynch, together with merchant Ignacio Izquierdo, was denounced by a group of sailors from the newly established Chilean National Squadron, members of the ships' crews who participated in the capture of the Spanish warship *María Isabel* (action of 29 October 1818). Lynch and Izquierdo were the crews' *apoderados* – representatives appointed by the ship captains to the government-constituted prize court. In that capacity, they had kept for themselves thousands of pesos that were due to the complaining sailors, who had excelled in combat. See: ANCH Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 26, ff. 209-209v.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

perished in a famous cavalry charge on the battlefield of Maipú (April 5, 1818).[16] This would not be the only Chilean privateer that paid homage to the victory of the independence forces at Maipú.

Cordovés provided the *Santiago Bueras* with 10 cannons, hoping to contract 70 men. He also financed the ammunitions for each man of the crew. In a similar vein to other private ship owners, this *vecino* of Coquimbo and local trader asked the government for 2 others cannons, gunpowder, and ammunitions for the 12 artillery pieces that he would have, in addition to 40 muskets, 40 pairs of pistols, 40 sabers, and 40 *chuzos* (a kind of shiv). He mentioned as precedent the permission and help Felipe del Solar's *El Chileno* of had obtained from the government. Gregorio Cordovés also hoped for help with qualified personnel. Namely, he asked that the government appoint an officer named John Browne as commander of his brigantine, along with 4 assistants. The entrepreneur also intended to complete his privateer's crew by hiring 30 seamen from Buenos Aires. The government authorities, however, decided that this time the path should be different and, in an early stage, established the first restrictions on privateers' activity. On August 5th, 1818, Manuel Blanco Encalada, commander of Valparaíso, ordered that the crew of the *Santiago Bueras* be completed in the port of Coquimbo itself, adding that Cordovés should not contract more than twelve seamen from Valparaíso.[17]

Eventually, the *Santiago Bueras* made at least two preys from which the entrepreneur and *armador* was able to obtain a good part of the riches seized. The first capture took place in November, when the crew burned and looted the schooner *Los Ángeles*, on the coast of southern

[16] Today there is in Santiago de Chile metro station named Santiago Bueras.
[17] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, ff. 22-22v., 38v.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Peru. The other was on December 2nd, in the same area. This time the privateer's crew seized the Spanish brigantine *Resolution* (Cárdenas 1984, 62).

The relevance of the merchant Gregorio Cordovés in La Serena and the port of Coquimbo is considerable. On the same day in which he applied for the patent for the *Santiago Bueras,* he presented a petition for another letter of marque, in his own name and on behalf of his partners, who were "*vecinos*" of the region, for the corvette *Nuestra Señora del Carmen* alias *Coquimbo*. This was "*el primer Buque Corsario qe. arma la Venemerita Prova. de Coquimbo*",[18] and was characterized by its outstanding size and power: it was a 450-ton vessel built especially for the war. Cordovés was the main shareholder in this collective company. Naturally, he was the direct *armador* of the boat and its representative and agent before the authorities at the moment of claiming and sharing prizes. In the *Coquimbo* case, the traders and investors committed themselves to assisting the government by transporting infantry equipment (rations, weapons, and ammunitions), troops, and collaborating with a possible military expedition to Callao. In return, as in all the other cases we know, they expected from the State the assurance of obtaining tax benefits at customs, in particular for the cargo that their privateer obtained as a result of its war actions.[19] In this sense, as in any business activity of the time involving the State, investors in privateering expected permanent preferential treatment from public institutions. Collaboration with the government was understood in this opportunistic way: a service provided for which some kind of payment was due.

However, economic opportunism was apparently threaded with patriotic fervor, as shown by other references to the independence forces' triumph in the plains of Maipú in corsair activity.

[18] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, ff. 24-24v. "The first privateer equipped by the Province of Coquimbo".

[19] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, ff. 24-24v.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Journal of Evolutionary Studies in Business JESB
Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

José María Manterola, a resident of Valparaíso, owned a schooner he named *Maipú Lanza Fuego* (also called *El Diamante),* with which, in July 1818, he intended – for a period of only 6 months – to sail the Pacific harassing the "Enemies of America".[20] We know that Manterola contracted Juan Lafaya as the ship's captain but no further information on Lafaya is available. The schooner – under that combative name – was forced to postpone the beginning of its activities for several months. It was at sea only from the end of that year and during the first months of 1819. On the Ecuadorian coast, in December 1818, it seized the brigantine *San Antonio*, which carried a composite cargo owned by Guayaquil merchant Simón Vega.[21] The following month, in front of Pacasmayo (Peru), it seized the brigantine *Providencia*, owned by "*Limeño*" Paulo Torre. Within days, on their way back to Valparaíso, the crew of the *Maipú Lanza Fuego* captured a third "royalist" vessel: the frigate *Buena Esperanza,* anchored in the port of Callao.

Another brigantine *Maipú* – sometimes registered as *Maipo* – was ready to sail at the time. Its property was collective. It was waiting to weigh anchor from Coquimbo, where some Chileans and Britons had participated in purchasing and financing it. One Patrick Brown was appointed as its captain. Thomas R. Claredge acted as the representative of such a "company" before the government. During the months of June and July 1818, he requested the necessary privateering patent, in addition to the usual material and human resources needed to equip the vessel: 20 armed infantry personnel (one corporal, one sergeant, and eighteen troop soldiers), 50 muskets

[20] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, unnumbered.

[21] The *San Antonio* carried the following cargo: 136 sugar loaves, 5 candy boxes, 4 balls with 4 cots, 2 chests of cigars, 3 boxes with id., 13 rolls of cotton wool, 2 bags of anise, 1 Pisco earthenware box, 1 sack of agave hats, 2 balls of cordovan leather, 32 pieces of cordovan leather, 6 ordinary cotton quilts, 4 cowhides, 110 Panamá coconuts, 35 cocoa sacks, 1 sack of saltpeter, 7 wine bottles, plus minor items. The detailed list is dated Valparaíso, 8 January 1819. This reveals that the ship had been captured many days earlier. Ricardo Lindsay, in charge of the seized ship, pointed out that the brigantine flew the Spanish flag, had not encountered any combat, and that his ship's capture had taken place at the mouth of the Guayaquil River. See: ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, unnumbered.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

for the crew, 200 cartridges, 500 flints, 500 cannonballs of different calibers, and 20 quintals of gunpowder.[22]

6. Decline

Almost all of the privateers entering the scene in 1817 and 1818 – whom we may define as commercial entrepreneurs of theft and looting – ceased to go to sea from 1819 onward, from the very moment in which the Chilean Navy was entering into operations. There were, however, a few exceptions. Felipe Santiago del Solar's brigantine *El Chileno* was at mid-year still making incursions into the waters of Acapulco. The aforementioned *Maipú Lanza Fuego* continued harassing trade on the Peruvian coast during the first months of 1819. Another exception was that of the schooner *Terrible*, owned by merchants José Manuel Cea and Francisco Javier Urmeneta, who in addition were financiers and contractors in the Chilean State's service (Betancourt 2020). During 1820, it conducted corsair attacks against the Spaniards, with modest results. In fact, the *Terrible* was active until at least 1826 (unfortunately, however, no details of its further incursions are known). That year, Cea and Urmeneta decided to move the *Terrible* to the coast of Manila, in order to trade goods and with the complementary idea of having it continue to harass Spanish ships there.[23]

As we can see, the decay in privateering did not signify the immediate cessation of corsair activity, which in 1818 had had such a boom. The case of a "mixed" company under the wings of the State, no less, emerges from documentation. In March 1819, the merchant Antonio Arcos, an Andalusian liberal who had served as an officer of engineers in the Liberation Army of the Andes (Betancourt 2019), submitted a request to the government to fit privateers. Arcos intended to obtain the letter of marque in association with a partner, the British William

[22] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, ff. 31-37.

[23] Documents on the *Terrible* Schooner: ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, unnumbered.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Henderson, who had served Lord Thomas Cochrane as his private agent (Rector 1976, 252-253). The partners requested the patent based on the precedent of Felipe Santiago del Solar and the favorable conditions he had obtained. Namely, they sought to introduce the goods they seized duty-free (Letelier 1886, 398). The Senate, which evaluated the request, denied the privilege at the time, although it later changed its policy.

The vessel used by the associates was a 400-ton corvette of British manufacture and flag, the *Rose*, named *Los Andes* in Chile. Months earlier, Henderson had sold it to the United Army of the Andes. The government had decided to put it to sea as a corsair vessel but army officers bought an insufficient number of shares, and it was necessary for private investors to equip it. Arcos and Henderson saved the situation by acquiring more than half of the shares, becoming the privateer's *armadores*, representatives for the crew and agents of the privateer's shareholder officers (Uribe 1910, 77). Arcos and Henderson furnished the weaponry, salaries, equipment and food necessary for the men onboard (including about 58 convicts provided by the government).[24] The British John Illingsworth Hunt was contracted as the corvette's captain, together with a whole set of British officers (Gámez 2004, 129). In addition, they hired an accountant and a secretary, who were Chilean, as were most of the seamen and armed troops (Uribe 1910, 65-67).

Profits derived from the *Los Andes*' privateer activities were significant. After the traders had requested some further weaponry, it finally set sail on April 24th, 1819. On May 4, the privateer captured the merchant *Los Tres Hermanos* (alias *La Vascongada*) coming from the Spanish port of Santander, off the coast of Tarapacá. Both the ship and cargo belonged to a few merchants from Bilbao whose names do not appear in the documents. Its shipment consisted of

[24] ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6, f. 43.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

the usual European manufactures imported from Spain at the time: clothing, fabrics, earthenware, Iberian wines, glassware and hardware.[25] This first capture was soon followed by others, which the privateer was able to effect in the seas of Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and even Panama, during 1819 and early 1820. *Los Andes*' corsairs also undertook military actions against the Spanish presence on these coasts: the takeover of some coastal defenses and of a village in royalist hands in the region of Iscuandé, present-day Colombia.[26] Frustrated attempts did occur: the capture of the large Spanish war frigate *Piedad* (Uribe 1910, 68-73). Details of the corvette *Los Andes*' captures, as well as of all the other seizures made by Chilean privateers analyzed here, are outlined in the following table, which accounts for 26 capture episodes of at least 28 ships:

TABLE 1. Preys made by Chilean privateers

Privateer vessel (Name)	**Class**	**Shipowner**	**Prey (place and date of capture)**
Death or Glory, *Nuestra Señora de Mercedes* (a) *La Fortuna*	*lanchón* or schooner	William Mackay, Jame, Budge and Co.	frigate *Minerva* (Arica, Perú, 11/24/1817); brigantine *Santa María de Jesús* (Tarapacá, 11/29/1817); *El Mercurio* (Arica, date unknow)
El Chileno	brigantine	Felipe Santiago del Solar Osorio	brigantine *Saeta* (Puertos Intermedios, 01/07/1818); brigantine *Mercedes* (Perú, 02/27/1818); frigate *Inspector* (Río Tumbes, Perú, 04/08/1818); packet-boat *San Ignacio de Loyola* (a) *El Diamante* (Sonsonate?, El Salvador, 06/?/1818); brigantine *San Antonio* (a) *El Bolero* (Huanchaco, Perú, 12/?/1818); frigate *Cazadora* (Acapulco, México, 06/?/1819)
Congreso	schooner	Tomás Rosales (Juan Pedro Aguirre)	brigantine *El Empecinado* (Pisco, Perú, 06/?/1818)
Águila	war brig	---	frigate *La Perla* (no information)
Nuestra Señora del Carmen (a) *El Furioso*	schooner	Manuel Antonio Boza and other residents of Valparaíso	frigate *Nuestra Señora de Dolores* (Perú?, 03/1818); brigantine *Machete* (Perú?, 03/1818)

[25] *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins*. Vol. 12. Santiago de Chile: Archivo Nacional, Imprenta Universitaria, 1953, 235-236; ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 26, ff. 42-47, 69 and 121.

[26] *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins*. Vol. 13. Santiago de Chile: Instituto Geográfico Militar de Chile, 1955, 285-287.

Creative Commons License 4.0

Journal of Evolutionary Studies in Business JESB
Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Privateer vessel (Name)	Class	Shipowner	Prey (place and date of capture)
Merced de la fortuna or *Catalina*	"boat"	Carlos Higginson and Diego O'Brien	packet-boat *Pensamiento* (Pacocha, Ilo, Perú, 02/15/1818); brigantine *El Gran Poder*, packet-boat *Pensamiento* and schooner *Rosario* (Golfo de Panamá, 06/21/1818) (in addition to a dozen looted and burned ships between Peru, Ecuador y Panama).
Santiago Bueras	brigantine	Gregorio Cordovés	looting and burning of schooner *Los Ángeles* (Intermedios, Perú, 11/?/1818); brigantine *Resolución* (Intermedios, Perú, 12/02/1818)
Maipú Lanza-Fuego (a) *El Diamante*	schooner	José María Manterola	schooner or brigantine *San Antonio* (Guayaquil, Ecuador, 12/?/1818); brigantine *Providencia* (Pacasmayo, Perú, 01/?/1819); frigate *Buena Esperanza* (Callao, Perú, 01/?/1819)
Rosa o *Los Andes*, *Rosa de los Andes*	frigate	Antonio Arcos and Guillermo Henderson	frigate *Los Tres Hermanos* (a) la *Vascongada* (Tarapacá, Chile, 05/04/1819); schooner *Sophia* (Ecuador, 06/?/1819); brigantine *Cantón* (Panamá, 07-09?/?/1819); brigantine *Resolución* (Bahía de Caraquéz, Ecuador, 10/31/1819); "*dos mercantes españoles*" (Iscuandé, Colombia, 03/02/1820)
Terrible (a) *La Sociedad*	schooner	Francisco Javier Urmeneta and José Manuel Cea	brigantine *Carmen* (no information)

Source: Compiled by author using the Ministry of the Navy papers (requests, marquees and reports): ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6.

In addition to corsair activity engaged in by *Los Andes,* Arcos also invested in peaceful shipping activities. Arcos needed to do business with Peru, notwithstanding the insecurity derived from the presence of Spanish forces at the port of Callao. In August 1819, he associated with Charles Renard, a Napoleonic soldier in the service of Chile's patriotic army (Puigmal 2013, 234-236; Berguño 2015, 329). With Renard, Arcos bought a small boat for the journey between Valparaíso and Constitución, and started embarking timber, to be shipped northward (Letelier 1887, 209-210). In a patent register for commercial navigation covering the period 1817-1823, Arcos registered at least one vessel as his property: the brigantine *Cornelius,* also called *Aquiles* (Cárdenas 1984, 55; Betancourt 2019, 24). Moreover, in 1820 Arcos undertook a similar initiative with Francisco Ramón Vicuña, a member of the well-known Chilean family that was

Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

tremendously influential in both the political and the economic sphere. The idea was to use one or two neutral ships loaded with country produce and European goods destined for re-exportation, with a value recharged at the customs office of Valparaíso, all to be shipped to Peru bypassing the port of Callao (Betancourt 2019, 24). In exchange for this permission, Arcos offered the government a 200% customs duty on the estimated value of the local products he intended to export.[27] Arcos and Vicuña applied for six licenses, which were granted on the condition that they provide some service to the planned expedition to Peru (Letelier 1887, 254). The government reserved the type of service requested from the merchant according to the type of merchandise that the ships transported, clearly distinguishing between national production or imported merchandise.

TABLE 2. Trade navigation patents. Chile, 1817-1823

Vessel (name)	Class / Tonnage	Shipowner	Patent (date)	Other information
Mercedes de la Fortuna or *Minerva*	Frigate	Francisco Ramírez	06/26/1818	
San Antonio	schooner	Andrés Blest	03/02/1819	Previously captured by *Maipú Lanza-Fuego*
Congreso	schooner	Pedro Dautant	04/14/1819	
Carmen	brigantine	José Matías López	05/17/1819	
Mercurio Americano	frigate / 260	Felipe Santiago del Solar	05/27/1819	
Emprendedora	frigate	José Joaquín Larraín	07/14/1819	
Carmelo	brigantine	Antonio Arcos	07/22/1819	
Dolores	frigate / 300	José Antonio Echavarría	07/27/1819	
Cazadora	frigate	Felipe Santiago del Solar	08/05/1819	
Santiago Bueras	brigantine	Gregorio Cordovés	09/04/1819	Privateer ship
Carmen or *Compañera*	frigate	Agustín Eyzaguirre	09/22/1819	
Carlota o *Mackenna*	frigate	Francisco Ramón Vicuña y Cía.	10/04/1819	
Maipú Lanza-Fuego	schooner	Pedro Adams	10/18/1819	Formerly a privateer ship
Constancia	schooner	Tomás Rosales	11/08/1819	

[27] ANCH, Archivo de la Capitanía General, Vol. 1050, *pieza* 117, f. 463.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Journal of Evolutionary Studies in Business JESB
Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Vessel (name)	Class / Tonnage	Shipowner	Patent (date)	Other information
Concordia	brigantine	Felipe Santiago del Solar	12/09/1819	
Buenaventura	brigantine	Carlos Wooster and Pablo Garriga	03/27/1820	Previously captured by a privateer. Formerly called *Rosita*
Rosa del Pacífico	brigantine	Carlos Wooster	04/25/1820	Previously captured by *Los Andes*. Formerly called *Resolución*
Terrible (1)	schooner	José Joaquín Larraín	06/06/1820	
Pacífico	brigantine / 170	Carlos Higginson and W. Taylor	09/22/1820	Previously captured by a privateer. Formerly called *Trinidad*
Betsy	schooner / 84	Carlos Wooster	11/03/1820	
El Rosario	brigantine	Juan de Dios Castro y Cía.	02/21/1821	
Huerta alias *La San Ignacio*	frigate	José Ignacio Izquierdo	03/28/1821	
Minerva alias *La Gertrudis* (1)	*buque* / 300	Gertrudis Rosales	05/01/1821	
Perpetua alias *La Rosario*	schooner / 60	José Vicente Ovalle	05/18/1821	
Perla	frigate / 280	Felipe Santiago del Solar	05/25/1821	
Jerezana	frigate / 300	Felipe Santiago del Solar	05/25/1821	
Gaditana	frigate / 250	Felipe Santiago del Solar	05/25/1821	
Terrible (2)	schooner	José Joaquín Larraín	06/06/1821	
nd	*buque*	Agustín Eyzaguirre	10/10/1821	
Juana Candelaria	brigantine	Ramón Allende	07/20/1821	
Hermosa chilena or *Nuestra. Señora del Carmen*	frigate / 360	Diego Portales y Cía.	08/16/1821	
Preciosa	sloop / 36	Pedro González de Cándamo	10/11/1821	
Ceres	frigate	Felipe Santiago del Solar	12/11/1821	
Tomás	brigantine	Manuele Sousa Duarte	12/11/1821	Formerly British flag
Mercedes	frigate	Juan Nepomuceno Boza	01/25/1822	
Océano	frigate	José Manuel Cea	04/03/1822	Formerly US-flaged. Cea was represented by Felipe Santiago del Solar
Misisipi	sloop / 120	Onofre Bunster	04/09/1822	Colombian-flagged. Ship built in Guayaquil

Creative Commons License 4.0

Journal of Evolutionary Studies in Business JESB
Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Vessel (name)	Class / Tonnage	Shipowner	Patent (date)	Other information
Queche alias *Todos los Santos de Coquimbo*	brigantine / 150	José Antonio Subercaseaux	04/19/1822	Anchored in the port of Coquimbo
Esmeralda alias *Bergantín Goleta*	brigantine	Estanislao Lynch	04/23/1822	Bought in Peru. Shipowner represented by Olof Liljevalch
La María	boat / 15	José Domingo Otaegui	04/23/1822	Ship built in Maule. Shipowner added: "I wish to send it to Pisco and Callao with a small cargo of country products the exportation of which is not prohibited"
Orion	schooner / 100	Manuel Valledor	05/14/1822	Prepared to travel to Huasco "with effects and productions of the country"
nd	sloop / 60	Pablo Garriga	05/18/1822	Pablo Garriga, merchant of Coquimbo. Represented by Francisco Ramón Vicuña. The sloop had a one single mast
nd		Archibald Erskine Robson	05/21/1822	Blank patent. Robson did not yet own a ship but hoped to purchase one
Resolución	frigate	Ramón Errázuriz	06/22/1822	Previously captured in the port of Callao by Lord Thomas Cochrane
San Francisco de Paula	brigantine	Carlos Ovalle	07/30/1822	Boat which had belonged to José Vicente Ovalle, father of Carlos, but it had been bought by the latter in Callao
Aurora	frigate	Juan José Mira	07/30/1822	
Republicana	schooner / 45	José Domingo Otaegui y Cía.	08/07/1822	
La Hibernia	boat	José Domingo Otaegui	08/07/1822	
Pez Volador	frigate	Enrique Trece	08/22/1822	Represented by Felipe S. del Solar
Serpiente del Mar	schooner	Casto Sáenz Valiente and Julián Gómez	09/?/1822	Represented by Felipe S. del Solar
Minerva alias *La Gertrudis* (2)	*buque* / 300	Gertrudis Rosales	09/13/1822	She applied for a new patent because she lost the old one
Heros	*buquecito* / 50	Pablo Garriga	11/06/1822	Represented by Pedro Nolasco Mena. Anchored in the port of Coquimbo
Sttanmore	frigate	Agustín Eyzaguirre	12/10/1822	Eyzaguirre appeared also on behalf of "the

Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Vessel (name)	Class / Tonnage	Shipowner	Patent (date)	Other information
				Compañía de Calcuta's other partners." He pointed out that he had already received a patent for the *Sttanmore* the previous year. As this patent only lasted for a year, he needed to renew it
nd	schooner / 30	Roberto Henson	01/?/1823	"having built the *goleta* in this port [Valparaíso]"
Carolina	schooner		02/04/1823	Represented by José Joaquín Larraín

Source: compiled by author using papers from the Ministry of the Navy: ANCH, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 11, ff. 1-87v.

Table 2 shows 55 commercial navigation patents issued during Bernardo O'Higgins' government. Trader-privateer Antonio Arcos' presence at sea, with his merchant brigantine *Carmelo*, was no exception among the merchants installed in Chile during those years, whether they were nationals or foreigners. Other businessmen who invested in privateering also stood out among those who had the means to establish a regular carrying trade in the South Pacific. It emerges clearly that the possibilities opened by the maritime war allowed the Chilean commercial conglomerate to create a stronger merchant navy, which consolidated Chile's local commercial and geostrategic hegemony. As shown in the table, the case of Antonio Arcos parallels that of the merchant Felipe Santiago del Solar, owner of the *El Chileno* privateer and important shipping entrepreneur of the period as well. These merchants not only purchased ships from foreign owners and ordered ships to be built in Chilean shipyards, such as Coquimbo or Nueva Bilbao de Gardoqui (Constitución). A significant part of their commercial fleet had been seized from enemies during corsair activity. Privateer raids had thus allowed the increase of traders' naval and commercial capacity. In addition, privateering allowed Chilean maritime dominance over the entire region by eroding the shipping capacity of the great merchants active

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

or based in Peru, the natural competitors of Chilean entrepreneurs in the traffic of goods imported from the Atlantic.

7. Conclusions

Two essential trends about Chilean privateering between 1817 and 1820 transpire in the data shown above. First, the timing of Chilean privateering activity is intimately related to particular historical circumstances related to the Chilean State's construction. Its beginning dates back to shortly after the arrival of the patriotic forces in central Chile in February 1817, and an expansive phase continued during the military consolidation of the independence forces, to the detriment of royalist forces in that territory, up to the moment in which the new Chilean State's Navy started its activities. This sealed the end of the glorious age of Chilean privateering. And although this did not imply the absolute disappearance of Chilean-flagged corsair vessels – as evidenced by the *Terrible* case – and not even the end of the phenomenon in the South Pacific, it did mark, however, the end of its apogee and its importance in maritime trade and war.

Secondly, we have brought to light the imprint this activity left in this historical parenthesis. Chilean-flagged privateering allowed a small but important group of entrepreneurs and traders to consolidate their own commercial space. This space was increasingly "exclusive" in the American South Pacific, and although they did not fully establish a commercial monopoly, they definitely obtained commercial hegemony in the region. The main victims of Chilean privateering were Peruvian merchants of Lima-Callao, who were dominant on southern Peru's coasts – the natural exit-port by sea for the high-Peruvian riches. Merchants from other important markets in the north of the Viceroyalty (such as Guayaquil) were injured as well, and in general, the royalist trade in Colombian or Central American waters. In short, through maritime warfare, traders based in Chile were able to gain an advantage over their Spanish-American competitors during a relatively brief yet crucial conjuncture.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Finally, some domestic aspects can be observed, especially those related to the Chilean economy in the Independence period. The small group of entrepreneurs who participated in privateering, chiefly by financing it, was likewise able to dominate the South American Pacific's circuit of import-export trade, thanks to their ownership of commercial vessels a significant part of this ownership also derived from privateer activity. They were therefore able to contribute to the construction of a national merchant navy that was no longer dependent on external investors. Finally, the business trajectory of some of the privateers' owners reveals their politically strategic intervention as the first financiers and contractors of the nascent Chilean State. In other words, they were a driving force of its economic construction. Therefore, the activities of the Chilean privateers between 1817 and 1820 – the moment in which this type of business could prosper – had consequences that, in the long term, went beyond the events that made up the Independence process.

References

Alegría Miranda, Carla. 2013. "El Gibraltar de las costas americanas. Marinería chilena y extranjera: Valparaíso, 1811-1840." Master Thesis, Universidad de Chile.

Alfonso Mola, Marina. 2014. "El tráfico comercial hispano en el Pacífico en tiempos de las independencias." In *El Mar del Sur en la historia. Ciencia, expansión, representación y poder en el Pacífico*, edited by Rafael Sagredo Baeza and Rodrigo Moreno Jeria, 493-554. Santiago de Chile: DIBAM, Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana.

Arancibia Clavel, Patricia, Isabel Jara Hinojosa, and Andrea Novoa Mackenna. 2005. *La Marina en la historia de Chile*. *Siglo XIX*. Santiago de Chile: Sudamericana.

Berguño Hurtado, Fernando. 2015. *Los soldados de Napoleón en la independencia de Chile (1817-1830)*. Santiago de Chile: RIL editores.

Betancourt Castillo, Francisco. 2019. "Negocios e influencias informales. La red de poder en el gobierno de Bernardo O'Higgins, 1817-1823." *Diálogo Andino* 60: 21-33. doi:10.4067/S0719-26812019000300021.

Betancourt Castillo, Francisco. 2020. "Negocios y política en la construcción de la República de Chile. Comerciantes, contratistas y financistas del Estado en una época de transición, 1795-1831." PhD diss., Universidad de Chile.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Bonilla, Heraclio. 1980. *Un siglo a la deriva: ensayos sobre el Perú, Bolivia y la guerra*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Brading, David A. 1975. *Mineros y comerciantes en el México borbónico, (1763-1810)*. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Cárdenas Gueudinot, Mario. 1984. "Corso y Guerra Marítima en Chile, 1797-1824." Master Thesis, Universidad de Chile.

Cavieres Figueroa, Eduardo. 1996. *El comercio chileno en la economía-mundo colonial*. Valparaíso: Ediciones Universitarias de Valparaíso.

Cavieres Figueroa, Eduardo. 2003. *Servir al soberano sin detrimento del vasallo*. Valparaíso: Ediciones Universitarias de Valparaíso, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso.

Fernández Abara, Joaquín. 2004. "Los orígenes de la Guardia Nacional y la construcción del ciudadano-soldado (Chile: 1823-1833)." *Mapocho. Revista de Humanidades* 56: 313-327.

Gámez Duarte, Feliciano. 2004. "El desafío insurgente: análisis del corso hispanoamericano desde una perspectiva peninsular, 1812-1828." PhD diss., Universidad de Cádiz.

Letelier, Valentín, comp. 1886. *Sesiones de los Cuerpos Lejislativos de la República de Chile. 1811 a 1845, Tomo II (Senado Conservador 1818-1819)*. Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Cervantes.

Letelier, Valentín, comp. 1887. *Sesiones de los Cuerpos Lejislativos de la República de Chile. 1811 a 1845, Tomo III (Senado Conservador 1819-1820)*. Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Cervantes.

López Urrutia, Carlos. 1971. *La escuadra chilena en México: 1822*. Buenos Aires-Santiago de Chile: Editorial Francisco de Aguirre.

Marichal, Carlos. 2014. *Historia mínima de la deuda externa de Latinoamérica*. Mexico City: El Colegio de México.

Mazzeo de Vivó, Cristina. 2011. "Comerciantes en conflicto. La Independencia en el Perú y la transformación de la elite mercantil 1780-1830." *Anuario del Instituto de Historia Argentina* 11: 243-258.

Moutoukias, Zacarias, and Marjolein 'T Hart. 2021. "Fiscal crisis, forced loans and unintended institutional consequences in wartime Buenos Aires, 1800-1820." *Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History* 39(2): 265-296. doi:10.1017/S021261092000004X.

Ortiz Sotelo, Jorge. 2001. "El Pacífico sudamericano, punto de encuentros y desencuentros." In *Perú: el legado de la Historia*, edited by Luis Millones and José Villa Rodríguez, 207-219. Seville: PromPerú, Universidad de Sevilla, Fundación El Monte.

Ortiz Sotelo, Jorge. 2015. *La Real Armada en el Pacífico Sur. El Apostadero Naval del Callao 1746-1824*. Mexico City: Bonilla Artigas Editores, UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas.

Creative Commons License 4.0

Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Patton, Robert H. 2008. *Patriot Pirates. The Privateer War for Freedom and Fortune in the American Revolution*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Pinto Vallejos, Julio and Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate. 2009. *¿Chilenos todos? La construcción social de la nación (1810-1840)*. Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones.

Prados de la Escosura, Leandro, and Samuel Amaral, eds. 1993. *La independencia americana: consecuencias económicas*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Puigmal, Patrick, comp. 2013. *Diccionario de los militares napoleónicos durante la independencia. Argentina, Chile y Perú*. Santiago de Chile: Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana.

Ramírez Necochea, Hernán. 1959. *Antecedentes económicos de la independencia de Chile*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria.

Rector, John. 1976. "Merchants, trade, and commercial policy in Chile: 1810-1840." PhD diss., Indiana University.

Stein, Stanley J., and Barbara H. Stein. 1970. *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Uribe Orrego, Luis. 1910. *Nuestra Marina Militar. Su organización y campañas durante la guerra de la Independencia*. Valparaíso: Talleres Tipográficos de la Armada.

Villalobos Rivera, Sergio. 1968. *El comercio y la crisis colonial: un mito de la independencia*. Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Chile.

Woods, David J. 2016. *Destino: ¡Valparaíso! Pioneros europeos en la costa oeste de Sudamérica*. Santiago de Chile: Librería y Editorial Ricaaventura.

Zaldívar, Trinidad, María José Vial, and Francisca Rengifo. 1998. *Los vascos en Chile: 1680-1820*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Los Andes.

Printed Sources

1951. *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins*. Vol. 8. Santiago de Chile: Archivo Nacional de Chile, Imprenta Universitaria.

1952. *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins*. Vol. 11. Santiago de Chile: Archivo Nacional, Imprenta Universitaria.

1953. *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins*. Vol. 12. Santiago de Chile: Archivo Nacional, Imprenta Universitaria.

1955. *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins*. Vol. 13. Santiago de Chile: Instituto Geográfico Militar de Chile.

Haigh, Samuel. 1829. *Sketches of Buenos Ayres and Chile*. London: James Carpenter and Son.

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0

Journal of Evolutionary Studies in Business JESB
Volume 8, Number 1, 152-180, January-June 2023 https://doi.org/10.1344/10.1344/jesb2023.8.1.34142

Archives consulted

Archivo Nacional Histórico de Chile, Archivo de la Capitanía General, Vol. 1050, pieza 117.

Archivo Nacional Histórico de Chile, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 6.

Archivo Nacional Histórico de Chile, Archivo del Ministerio de Marina, Vol. 11.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No Derivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-comercial re-use and distribution, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered or transformed in any way.

Online ISSN: 2385-7137
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB

COPE Committee on Publication Ethics
Creative Commons License 4.0