

From the Editors

This issue on analogical reasoning is the first such special issue of *Informal Logic* devoted to a particular topic. The papers are evenly divided between the first three papers which are problem centred and the last three which are more historical in inspiration.

In "By Parity of Reasoning," John Woods and Brent Hudak argue that arguments from analogy are arguments by parity of reasoning. They are arguments about arguments and hence meta-arguments which occur in what Woods and Hudak refer to as a stand-off. It follows from their analysis that the analogy relationship defined over arguments is symmetrical, which differentiates analogical arguments from other forms of analogical reasoning, e.g. analogical predication.

Govier's paper, "Analogies and Missing Premises," was originally delivered at the Third International Symposium on Informal Logic (June 1989). In it she argues, following John Wisdom, that analogy is a distinct type of argument. Govier accepts Wisdom's and Stephen Barker's category of the inductive analogy and goes on to focus on the *a priori* or logical analogy. She tests her position on a series of examples and situates her account vis-a-vis others who have written on this matter.

Fred Johnson's paper, "Analogical Arguing and Explainings," defends the thesis that many analogical arguments have a valid deductive structure which is not well-accounted for by inductive (Mill), abductive [Peirce] or eductive (W.E. Johnson) formulations. For him the essential structure of analogical arguments contains a hidden conditional, and this mode of analysis is superior to that of the inductive analysis of analogies.

In "Two Traditions of Analogy," William Brown examines the traditions of the predictive analogy and the proportional analogy. Brown discusses how these two types of analogy have been used in various ways, and eventually links the predictive analogy to empiricism and the proportional analogy to idealism.

Stephen Barker's paper, "Reasoning by Analogy in Hume's Dialogues," argues that Hume's work relies heavily on two different types of analogical reasoning, one of which is the non-inductive type of analogy first so called by Wisdom and discussed by Govier in her article. Barker agrees with Woods and Hudak that analogical arguments are meta-arguments.

In "Beardsley's Theory of Analogy," Evelyn Barker investigates Monroe Beardsley's position on reasoning by analogy, claiming that his theory exemplifies over-formalization in reducing diverse kinds of analogy arguments to a single form and then assessing them all as fallacious because of the logical characteristics of that form. This results in a "denaturalized epistemology" of analogical arguments, one with inappropriate concepts of knowledge, unrelated to reasoning techniques successfully employed in a range of actual situations.

Looking ahead

We remind readers that we have also announced a call for papers for an upcoming special issue on the Nicholas Rescher's contribution to informal logic and argumentation. The deadline for submissions is January 5, 1991.

The first number of Volume XII (1990) will follow at the end of August. All the papers for Volume XII have been accepted, so if subscription renewals arrive in time to permit us to pay our bills, we will publish XII.2 and XII.3 in the fall, and (we can scarcely believe it ourselves) at long last be up to date. During this catch-up period, we have been asking you, dear readers, to pay for more than one volume per calendar year. That is because you have been getting more than one volume per calendar year. Since current expenses must be paid out of current income, would you help us expedite the appearance of Volume XII by sending in your subscription now? Forms are enclosed. Thank you.