

FROM THE EDITORS

Readers will notice a new look in this edition of the journal. We've gone desktop! That should help us to save costs and keep the journal in a solid financial position. We are most grateful to our Managing Editor, Mark Letteri, for countless hours spent helping us to convert to DTP; and we also wish to express our gratitude to Associate Editor Bob Pinto for the many, many hours he gave to help this conversion come about. We hope you like the new look but more important still the content.

"Analyzing Conversational Reasoning" by Merrilee H. Salmon and Colleen M. Zeitz discusses an empirical study of reasoning as it occurs in conversations, with particular reference to co-constructed arguments. The eventual goal of this research program is to compare co-constructed arguments with those developed by a single source, with the aim of seeing whether the quality of one differs from that of the other.

"Aristotelian Dialectic" by H. Hamner Hill and Michael Kagan is a dialogue between two persons focusing on Aristotle's views on the nature of dialectic and rhetoric, and also on the role of dialectic and rhetoric in modern education. The party who advocates for the Aristotelian ideals argues that they are as important today as they were in the past and in the process uses in the dialogue many of the techniques which he ascribes to Aristotle.

"Slippery Slopes, Moral Slides and Human Nature" by Gary Colwell targets recent discussions of the slippery slope fallacy. Specifically, Colwell is investigating one particular form of the slippery slope—the moral causal slope argument which he argues is not always fallacious. Colwell claims that those who assess it as fallacious are missing its potential strengths. This happens either because they overlook factors in human nature that support this form of argument, or because they underestimate their influence.

"The Case of the Missing Premise" by Don S. Levi argues that the flaw in the enthymematic approach to missing premises is the notion that argument can be restated as a premise-conclusion sequence. Levi starts by arguing that there are problems with the enthymematic approach and suggests that these are due to the failure of logicians to appreciate the importance of the rhetorical context of argument.

"The Domain Constraint on Analogy and Analogical Argument" by William R. Brown investigates the commonplace that analogues in an argument from analogy be from the same domain. Brown argues that domain constraints cannot be exported to informal logic, where the relevance of properties, not their number, is the appropriate and prior criterion for evaluating analogical arguments.

We also feature in this issue a Review Article by Paul K. Moser and J.D. Trout: "What is Feminist Epistemology?", in which they discuss Lorraine Code's *What Can She Know?* (1991), Sandra Harding's *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?* (1991) and Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt's *A Mind of One's Own* (1993). We also present a Critical Study of Douglas Walton's *The Place of Emotion in Argument* (1992) by John Deigh.