FROM THE EDITORS

To begin, we want to apologize for and explain the very late publication of 18.2&3. Due to the resignation of our former assistant, a delay in securing his replacement, and considerable disorder in the operation, we have only recently begun to get on top of the journal's business. We deeply regret that the process of disseminating the work sent to the journal has been slowed. We plan to publish 19.1 in the summer, and another double issue, 19.2&3, in the fall, dating that volume 1999. (Subscriptions,by Volume, not year, will not be affected.)

Thanks to Mr. Pierre Boulos for his services from June 1997 through July 1998, and welcome to Dr. Marcello Guarini, our new assistant. Marcello has been a great help in restoring orderly operations, ably assisted by three students: Janice Perera, Daniel Gunaratnam and Bill Snowden. Thanks also to our colleague Kate Parr for help in preparing this issue.

The contents of this double issue range widely over the principal areas of interest to readers of this journal—informal logic, argumentation theory and critical thinking.

In "Logic, Art and Argument," Leo Groarke argues that pictures, paintings and cartoons all may carry persuasive force and hence can be construed as argument, to be appraised with the procedures and criteria used on verbal arguments.

In "Philosophical Dialogue Theories," David Moore and Dave Hobbes, from a background in computer studies, review various dialogical models for argumentation, argue that Mackenzie's DC model has great potential, discuss empirical tests for its suitability, and inquire into the tractability of the system for computer-based applications.

Most theorists agree that critical thinking requires dispositions as well as skills, but no account of the dispositional component is generally accepted. In "Critical Thinking Dispositions," Robert Ennis presents a new approach, specifying a set of criteria for judging dispositional accounts. His critique of Perkins, Jay and Tischman leads to his own proposal. He concludes with some reflections on the task of assessing dispositions.

In "Attributed Favourable Relevance and Argument Evaluation" Derek Allen argues there are problems with George Bowles's account (see INFORMAL LOGIC, 18.1) of the role of attributions of favourable relevance in deciding what constitutes a good argument, but argues that such attributions are relevant for the evaluation of an argument.

In "What is an Infinite Regress Argument?" Claude Gratton examines a mode of argument much used but little studied, introducing a basic vocabulary for discussing such arguments and developing an hypothesis to explain why the claimed regress sometimes fails. He illustrates a common mistake in deriving the infinite regress and examines how the infinite regress functions as a premise.

In "Does Scientific Realism Beg the Question," after reviewing four different ways of understanding the fallacy of begging the question, Geoffrey Gorham concludes that, contrary to Fine, in none of them can it be claimed that scientific realism is guilty of begging the question.

"The Argument of the Beard" is part of Douglas Walton's ongoing research into the individual fallacies. He proposes that the so-called argument of the beard, depending on the allegation of vagueness, is related to both the heap argument, and also to slippery slope. He classifies these three types or argument and discusses issues they raise for informal logic research.

Besides these articles, there is a note from John Follman *et al.* on resources for research in critical thinking assessment, critical reviews of Johnson's *The Rise of Informal Logic* (by David Hitchcock) and Walton's *Plausible Reasoning* (by James Freeman), and five book reviews.

Contributors please note the new specifications for manuscripts in **Editorial Information**.