Such a substantive notion of the web of belief begins in Toulmin with the distinction between warrant and backing and the essential role of rebuttal. But those deep structural affinities remain disconnected from their natural arena of employment (disciplined inquiry) because of the enormous difficulty of articulating the relationships within the web and especially how the weighting of nodes changes as a function of disturbances across the network. My intuition is that such a model can be available working from clear instances, and requires a return to metamathematical formulations in places of informal descriptions. On such a view, the "constitutive rules" of disciplinary practice are rules for settling cases more than they are indications of cases settled. They don't give us acceptable premises as much as acceptable modes for exploring hypotheses. Falliblism in the disciplines is no mere epistemological posture; it constructs the very tissue of dialectical growth and it is the engine of epistemic adequacy over time. But that is a story for another place.

MARK WEINSTEIN   *Montclair State University*

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*COOPERATIVE ARGUMENTATION: A MODEL FOR DELIBERATIVE
    COMMUNITY.* By JOSINA M. MAKAU AND DEBIAN L. MARTY. Prospect
    Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 2001. Pp. xiii, 1-295. ISBN:1-57766-139-7.
    US$19.95

All information, we are told in the first chapter of *Cooperative Argumentation,* is partial and derives from a specific perspective, indeed, often from an intentional desire to promote that very perspective. Objectivity is not something we can depend on, especially when we are trying to assess information or understand a position. *"Every perspective is necessarily partial,"* appears in italics on page 11, followed by the dictum that understanding viewpoints alternative to our own expands our sense of knowing the full story. Thus these two ideas, being critically aware of unintended and intended bias, and seeking to expand our understanding of issues in an open and critical way form the pillars that underlie this interesting book. The emphasis is that being critical involves operating within a community, and that doing so requires both cooperative values and specific skills.

This book is not a traditional book on Informal Logic. The description of fallacies takes roughly 15 pages, and the entire chapter, "Evaluating Arguments," is the final one in the book and uses about 40 pages. The book is largely concerned with articulating the following premiss (italics and bold in original): Dialogue is *"a process of communicating **with** (rather than at, to or for) others and the sharing of a mutual commitment to hear and be heard"* (46). There is a fair bit in this statement to give pause to a philosopher: how do we distinguish the four types of talking? how can we know when someone is "heard"? One must persist in the authors' explication to understand the approach. Emotions, for example, play a significant role. So-called "critical emotions," *viz.,* empathy and compassion, allow us to better understand a position, though not necessarily accept it. Even anger plays a role in signaling intensity of feeling and potential problems within a relationship.

In order to undertake cooperative argument one needs certain skills. The first is a concept of dialogic interaction that emphasizes the idea of interdependence and skilled listening. The latter is the kind of listening that permits one to understand the content *and* import of a given position. When listening with empathy and for content is achieved then one is doing "critical listening." Similarly, cooperative argument is a form of communication in which one systematically avoids the right/ wrong, true/false dilemmas in favour of understanding someone's position and why it differs from one's own. Competitive argumentation is about winning, while cooperative arguing permits viewing *"those who disagree with us as resources rather than rivals* (88, italics in original)." This, in turn, can only happen if we, the arguers, are willing to take risks and allow that our views can change and include some of those of our argument partners.

It is in Chapter 4, "Elements of Argumentation," that the structural discussion of argument components begins. The prior chapters have established the nature and value of cooperative communication as one in which all voices are welcomed and heard, and competition is set aside in favour of building a consensus that utilizes all available resources. The first major element introduced is reasonableness, which is, not surprisingly, given a vague definition. Reasonableness involves logic and a taste for coherent, linear arguing, but also critical emotions and moral imagination. These last, when mixed in with the more traditional ways of evaluating arguments in Informal Logic add the humanistic values, the elements of reasonableness that keep us from being overrun by mere cold logic. They go on to discuss a variety of elements such as claims, issues (i.e., the controversy to which the claim is related,) commonplaces (points of agreement between the discussion partners,) and other notions.

The remainder of the text details a combination of active techniques for proper advocacy, deliberation and argument evaluation. The emphasis, as in the earlier chapters, is on creating a community of discussants who have the goal of agreeing to investigate, deliberate, and utilize all the resources available to arrive at an intelligent and humane decision. This means involving all the partners to the discussion, and avoiding being misled by any extreme – logical as well as emotional. When a consensus built upon the resources that all the participants bring to the discussion is created, then it will be strong, worthwhile and compelling. This will naturally be so because it includes the goals, needs and desires of those involved, and has encouraged active participation involvement allowing all parties to feel heard and included.

This is a very interesting book that can provide the instructor of an Informal Logic course with interesting insights and ideas. There are concrete plans for downplaying competitiveness and increasing cooperation that students in a traditional Critical Reasoning course will find beneficial. As I have argued (Gilbert, 1995), there is a great danger in creating arguers who see their task as one of finding fault and beating down opponents. This text certainly speaks against those tendencies in explicit terms. Makau and Marty use resources deriving from the fields of communication, mediation and social psychology far more than the literature of Argumentation Theory or Informal Logic. As a result, most instructors, while finding the book interesting and valuable, would not be likely to choose it as a core text. There are just too many issues one expects to cover that are not given sufficient space from the Informal Logic point of view. There is, for example, no demonstration

of argument diagramming, and though the square of opposition is mentioned, it is barely explicated. Fallacies are covered, but quickly, and not as a central tool for critical reasoning.

These comments should not be taken as indicating shortcomings. Rather, the text is not intended for courses which now use texts such as Johnson and Blair (*Logical Self-Defense*), Govier (*A Practical Study of Argument*), or Groarke and Tindale (*Good Reasoning Matters*). The material on which they rely, and there are a great number of references, demonstrate that the fields are different. I would have preferred if more of the work done in Argumentation Theory had been included, but perhaps limitations had to be set. In any case, as a secondary or ancillary text, *Cooperative Argumentation* would serve as an interesting and nicely thought out resource for a course in critical reasoning.

Reference

Gilbert, Michael A. 1995. "Arguments and Arguers". *Teaching Philosophy.* 18: 2: 125-138.

MIICHAEL A. GILBERT   *York University*

ABDUCTIVE REASONING. By DOUGLAS N. WALTON. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2004. Pp. xvi, 1-304. ISBN -0817314415, US$40 cloth.

Once upon a time there was a philosopher with a bag of beans. The philosopher was Charles Sanders Peirce, and he used the beans to cultivate a seminal distinction between three types of reasoning: deduction, induction, and abduction. The story goes as follows. Suppose we know as a fact that all the beans in a bag are white and that a handful of beans have been taken from such bag: then we can safely infer that all these beans are white—and we do so by *deduction*. Now imagine instead we have seen a number of beans being drawn from the bag, and all of them were white: even if we are not sure that every bean in that bag is white, we can reasonably infer such general rule from the statistical correlation we observed, reasoning by *induction*. Finally, let us say that again we know that all the beans in the bag are white, and then we notice a handful of white beans on a table nearby: under these circumstances, it seems reasonable to presume that those beans were drawn from that particular bag—and this is *abduction*.

More than a century later, the notion of abduction is still controversial in philosophy, linguistics, law, psychology, and computer science. Walton's *Abductive Reasoning* is one of the most recent attempts to struggle with this fascinating problem, and one of the most remarkable in its interdisciplinary breadth and scholarly erudition. Walton conceives abduction as *inference to the best explanation*, and in this book he endeavours to provide a detailed account of what exactly is meant by 'best explanation'. His main contribution is to outline a *dialogical model of explanation*, and apply it to the analysis of abductive reasoning. This also reveals the connections between abduction and argumentation, since Walton's model of