

The “Religious Secularism” of Lebanon and the United States: A Discussion between Lebanon’s Secular Debate and Madison’s “Principles of Pluralism”

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Abstract

Within the current discussions of Islam and democracy, the issue of secularism has now become one of the most important themes. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the main premise put forward by Islamic scholars in various forms has been that secularism is atheistic and, therefore, incompatible with Islam. This article investigates one Islamic debate on the issue of secularism in order to find the root elements of the Muslim argument. In looking at the 1976-77 secularism debate in Lebanon we argue that, like Lebanon, most Muslim scholars use the French Revolution and its Jacobist views as the standard for understanding secularism. Rather, the Lebanese context is better suited to the eighteenth-century American context and its development of a “religious secularism.” The conclusion here is that Lebanon would be better off using eighteenth-century American rhetoric in its social political discourse for a vision of its own future, and that Muslim minority communities (primarily in the United States) can recover the issues involved in the American secular debates that saw secularism as “freedom for religion” in multi-communal states rather than the enemy of religion.

The rise of political Islam within the past 30 years has produced evocative Islamist criticisms of western systems of government. Much of the critical

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energy has been directed toward the nation-state system based upon various western secularist models. Islamist responses to the current world order are varied. Some Islamists reject the contemporary political international nation-state system as *jahiliyah*.¹ Others take a more moderate approach to concepts of democracy and pluralism by arguing that *shura* and the Shari'ah are Islamic concepts that encompass and redefine many of the modern western models of government.² However, the rejection of such western secular nation-state structures come not only from radicals, those who seek to overturn the status quo through violence, but also from moderate Muslim thinkers working within existing governmental structures. The antisecular discourse is not limited to Islamist positions, but is prevalent even among "progressive or liberal Muslims."³

Recently, such scholars as Esposito and Tamimi,⁴ Tibi,⁵ and Zebiri⁶ have explored Muslim responses to secularism and the organization of the modern secular nation-state system. Although responses to the western secular notion of separation of Church and State vary widely, these authors show that most contemporary Islamic scholars repudiate the notion of secularism as being anti-Islamic. "Because of its western and perhaps Christian associations, the word 'secularism' is a substantial obstacle for Muslims."⁷ It is generally agreed that secularism is a western sociopolitical concept created to solve particular western-Christian sociopolitical problems. The fact that God is formally removed from any political structure becomes anathema.

In contrast, Muslim scholars have proposed alternate methods of organization for Muslim nations by exploring such classical terms as *hall al-islami*, *hukumah islamiyah*, *al-nizam al-islami*, and the Shari'ah.⁸ The issue involves both implementing an Islamic state and redefining the Islamic community in a secularized society or a postmodern world. This paper looks at one moderate Arab-Muslim response to secularism: the 1975-76 Lebanese secularism debate.

In the summer of 1975, as the civil war began to heat up, the Sunni community became embroiled in a controversy regarding the call for establishing a secular state. This call began a political and religious dispute over the society's organization and foundation. The Sunni Mufti of Lebanon, Hasan Khalid, responded to the debate by declaring that secularism would lead only to "confusion and anarchy" as well as apostasy.⁹ Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, vice president of the Supreme Shi'ah Islamic Council, publicly declared that secularism was a human innovation (*bid'ah*) deserving of God's curse.¹⁰

In a confessionally complicated society, and in a government organized along the old Ottoman *millet* system, the idea of a civil government and a state structure organized upon secular (atheistic) lines was (and still is) considered anathema by most Muslim leaders. The main issues raised in the 1975-76 debate cut right to the legitimacy of the Lebanese state: Was Lebanon a society of individual citizens loyal to the state and its nonreligious civil laws? Or, was Lebanon a conglomeration of different confessional groups beholden to their own religious-communal laws and freedom to follow those laws based upon the principle of religious freedom and organized as a confederation?

This paper highlights a traditional Muslim response to secularism through the 1975-76 Lebanese secularism debate: secularism is a western Christian innovation and therefore anti-Islamic. In so doing, it provides a unique historical context to such antiseccular discourses as reviewed by Esposito and Tamimi, Tibi, and Zebiri. The Lebanese context provides a concrete example of how Muslim understandings and perceptions of secularism are often limited and selective. The traditional Lebanese Muslim argument against secularism is shown to be a response to the French Revolution's particular historical claims and the Jacobist view of citizenship, rather than the social concept of the secularization of society in its many forms.¹¹

It also is argued that the issues of late twentieth-century Lebanon are much more akin to the eighteenth-century American secular debate than to the French experience. Given the confessional nature of the Lebanese state and its structures, a secular model based upon multiplicity, as outlined by the eighteenth-century American statesman and president James Madison, might be a helpful model and vision for Muslim communities living in pluralistic societies.

The French experience is a natural starting point for the Lebanese in defining the secular nation-state system, given the important historical relation of France with Lebanon. Under the French Mandate, the Lebanese experienced the attempt to introduce secular civil law, which would overturn each confession's personal status laws. However, the development of the idea of secularization as a sociological process in multicommunal states was neglected in Lebanon's 1975-76 discourse and in contemporary Muslim discourse about secularism.¹² What of the separation of Church and State in Muslim-minority states? Can the process of secularization, that is the removal of a specific religious authority from political power, be a positive and freeing experience for Muslims in pluralistic contexts?¹³ The American debate is very germane here.

Likewise, the Lebanese experience can be a fruitful addition to the American Muslim discussion of secularism and its search for identity as a minority in a secular state. Here we hold up William Shepard's definition of religious secularism as a model that might be acceptable to Muslim-minority communities.¹⁴ The Lebanese experience might be a helpful avenue in the continuing development of American Muslim self-identity. Can the American Muslim community look at the Lebanese Muslim context and find a kernel of precedent for developing the identity of a specific American Muslim Ummah?

Up to this point, secularism in multicomunal states has been a neglected part of the Muslim conversation. It is not a category that fits into either classical or medieval Islam, or even into the reform period (when there was still an Islamic empire and caliph, even if in name only). We hope to show that certain secular theories may give Muslim communities the freedom to follow particular communal laws. By reviewing the Lebanese secular debate of 1975-76, we argue that Lebanese Muslims had a limited vision of secularism (that is, they understood secularism in only one form) and that Lebanese society is *de facto* a secularist state as envisioned by the theories put forward by Madison. By accepting Madison's concept of competing communal interests, Lebanese society might actually be able to conceive of itself as a "religious secular" state.¹⁵ This, I would argue, would be a more realistic approach and vision for the Lebanese context and a helpful model for other Muslim minority communities living in secularized societies, primarily in the United States.

The Lebanese Political System

Lebanon's sociopolitical organization must be reviewed in order to appreciate the important dilemma faced by its political leaders, specifically the ulama, in responding to the call for secularism. Lebanon is a unique patchwork of communities whose participation in the state structure was an issue for the Lebanese ulama in the 1975 debate. Thus, it is important to grasp the communal representation in the state's apparatus to put the secularist debate into context.

Lebanon has long been a refuge for confessional groups seeking solitude or freedom from the domination of one religious body or another. The Druze, Maronites, Shi'ah, and Armenians have sought refuge within Lebanon's geographical or social structure for either religious or political reasons. Since there are 17 formally recognized confessional groups inhabit-

ing a relatively small area, the possibility for social instability has produced communal compromises for the purpose of coexistence.¹⁶ As various religious bodies cohabitated in villages next to one another, or in some cases were mixed together in the same villages, interconfessional relations became a necessity for the sake of economic and social well-being. However, Lebanese politics is not just a matter of interconfessional politics, but one of intraconfessional politics as well. Philip Khoury shows that Lebanese politics is a mixture of familial, village, and economic issues. He argues that confessional leaders derive their authority from religious bodies and also from geographic, familial, and economic factors.¹⁷ This stems from the fact that Lebanese society has traditionally been feudal in nature. Confessional leaders (*za'im*) dominated because they held landed property, and local inhabitants, regardless of confession, were at the local feudal lords' mercy.

Under the early Ottoman system, local chieftains (Christian, Druze, and Muslim) vied for the position of the local Ottoman pasha, which would enable them to collect taxes and administer justice.¹⁸ (Given these roots of Lebanese society, the common description of the most recent civil war as a Muslim-Christian conflict is erroneous, for it reduces confessional, social, political, and economic issues to a simplistic label of interreligious war.)

By the nineteenth century, however, this feudal nature began to change at least the access to positions of power, held by traditional landholding families. In 1832, Ibrahim Pasha, son of the Egyptian ruler Muhammad 'Ali, invaded Lebanon and began a series of administrative reforms to control the complex sociopolitical system effectively. He organized a *meclis* (council) "consisting of government officials, notables, merchants, and other representatives from all the communities, Muslim and non-Muslim alike."¹⁹ The original purpose was to undercut traditional feudal lords by including more leaders (communal, economic, and religious) in the decision-making process. In essence, the *meclis* had less power because of the many people who threatened the feudal lords' traditional authority. This *meclis* system became a bedrock of sociopolitical organization that has remained, in various forms, to the present day.

By 1840, Ibrahim was chased from Syria and the Ottomans sought to retake control. Due to Maronite-Druze conflicts in 1840-41, the Ottomans separated these two confessions administratively. Mount Lebanon was organized into two districts (*qa'im maqamiyah*). Each district was ruled by an amir of the dominant confessional group: a Maronite amir in the north and a Druze amir in the south. Both confessional rulers were beholden to the

local Ottoman pasha residing in Sidon. This system was flawed, however, as each district included a sizable minority without formal representation or protection. Further unrest in the districts in 1845 led further modifications to include more communal leaders. This time, a 12-member council comprised of representatives from each major confession was organized to advise each amir. Confessional representation in the government structures now became a mainstay of the Lebanese sociopolitical organization.²⁰

In 1860, a Maronite peasant revolt in the northern district again sparked off Maronite-Druze fighting. Five western powers (Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia), all vying with the Ottoman Empire for control of its territories, saw a golden opportunity to gain some control within Ottoman communities and force a dramatic change in Mount Lebanon's political organization. After lengthy and complicated negotiations, the Muslim Ottoman pasha's power and authority were replaced by a Christian *muta`arrif* (governor), who was to be a non-Maronite Ottoman citizen directly responsible to the Porte and not beholden to any local pasha.

Confessional representation on some form of council was continued in the *mutasarrifiyah*, as two institutions were established to serve as advisory boards to the *mutasarrif*. According to the international agreement accepted by the Ottoman Empire and the western powers, an Administrative Council and a Higher Judicial Council would consist of members of the largest confessional groups: Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Maronite, Shi'ah, and Sunni.²¹ Each confessional representative or judge was chosen by his respective community. By allowing each confession's various civic institutions to take part in electing their councils' representatives, the traditional *zūama'* as well as the strong Maronite church remained involved in the decision-making process. It seems that combining a strong central governor, responsible directly to Istanbul, with confessional representatives provided an agreeable governmental structure. There was some protest, however, for the Maronites opposed equal confessional representation and demanded proportional representation according to a census of Mount Lebanon. Being the largest confessional community within the Mount, they pressured France for a larger share of the interconfessional power structure.

In 1864, France proposed a revision to the system according to Maronite demands over "proportional representation." There was disagreement, however, among the powers as to how the proportion would be set up. Again, a difficult period of negotiation followed and each western power and the Porte offered different schemes. Ultimately, it was agreed to continue with the 12-member council and assign seats to proportional rep-

resentation within the whole of Mount Lebanon. Under the final version, the Maronites had four seats, the Druze three, the Greek Orthodox two, and the Greek Catholic, Sunni, and Shi'ah one each.²² This system lasted from 1860 until the First World War, when the Ottomans abolished civil structures and proclaimed martial law. Throughout this 50-year period, Mount Lebanon was one of the Ottoman Empire's most efficient provinces.²³

Under the Ottoman *millet* system, each religious or ethnic community retained its own religious law and communal structure. According to this system, an individual was legally recognized by the Empire through his or her belonging to a particular confessional group, not because he or she was an individual citizen of the Empire. One became politically active by being identified with a particular confessional group. The chief religious leader of each community became that community's legally recognized head and represented it to the caliph in Istanbul. For example, the Maronite Patriarch was the officially recognized leader of the Maronite community. As a result of this strong communal structure, the attempt to introduce individual citizenship into Lebanon's political and social realms has been most difficult.²⁴ The nature of Lebanese politics is a matter of sharing access to state power through confessional representation rather than individual access to its resources.

Even after the fall of the Empire, this confessional structure continued under the French Mandate (1921-46). It even held up to several French attempts to introduce secular civil law that would have done away with confessional laws. These attempts were thwarted by the ulama, the *zu'ama'*, and particular confessional lawyers.

The government of Mandatory Lebanon, as determined by the 1926 constitution, was made up of representatives from the various confessions who came together to work as the civil powers (*al-sultan al-'ammah*). However, the ultimate authority was no longer the sultan in Istanbul, but the French high commissioner in Beirut. When the Mandate ended, the high commissioner's authority was transferred to the president of Lebanon. In independent Lebanon, the Lebanese government – its president, cabinet, and chamber of deputies – determined the course of national and international policy. These individuals were a mixture of representatives from all 17 confessions.

Alongside the central government, each confession continued to have jurisdiction over its own community. Separate confessional courts governed by their own personal status laws (*qawanin al-ahwal al-shakhsiyah*) existed alongside the central governmental organization. The Sunni Mufti

of the Republic, the Shi'ah President of the Supreme Shi'ah Council, the Druze Sheikh al-Akl, and the Maronite Patriarch, for example, all stood before the civil powers as the formal heads of their individual confessions. However, representatives from each confession were elected to serve in the Chamber of Deputies as part of the civil powers.

Thus, while the religious leaders represent their respective confessions to the civil powers, it is the individuals elected from those confessions who form the civil structure. However, they do not act as formal representatives of their particular community. Lebanon always has been a strange mixture of civil and religious authority, confessional and national power. Its 1926 constitution was, in some ways, an attempt to form a modern nation-state by combining individual citizenship and the *millet* system. This ambiguity has never fully clarified the foundation of Lebanese political organization.

Article 7 states: "All Lebanese are equal under the law. They enjoy equal civil and political rights and are equally subjected to the public charges and duties, without distinction."²⁵ This is contradicted to a degree, however, by Article 95, which states: "*As a provisional measure ... the sects shall be equitably represented in public employment*" [emphasis mine].

By preserving confessional parity in public employment, individual merit was subjected to fair communal representation according to a percentage of the general population. Affirmative action in government appointments was necessary to ensure confessional equality. As long as Article 95's provisional nature remains intact, however, Article 7 is *de facto* nullified. Article 7 sets the legal boundaries for a modern nation-state based upon the individual's rights and responsibilities, whereas Article 95 recognizes the confessional nature of Lebanese society. Article 95's provisional nature was intended to help develop a sense of individual citizenship in the hope that Lebanese society would move from confessional republicanism to a state in which political parties represented the individual. This did not happen. Thus, removing Article 95's provisional nature remains problematic.²⁶

The Secular Debate

In 1945, secularizing the political structure became a prominent issue. The impetus for the debate centered upon the Maronite Patriarch, who was being accused of interfering in civil politics.²⁷ This was not the first time the Maronite Patriarch had interfered with the civil power structures of Lebanon. In fact, there is a long history and tradition associated with the political activity of the Maronite Patriarchate in both confessional and national politics.²⁸

It is important to recognize that Muslim criticisms of the Patriarch's interference in Maronite politics were guided by their knowledge of the French Jacobist experience of secularism. Muslims saw his political activity as the unnatural imposition of Christian ecclesiastical authority on mundane matters. Their frame of reference was eighteenth-century France. According to the Muslim view, Jesus' injunction that the Church was not an earthly institution (John 18:36), or at least an institution not to be involved with political matters (Luke 20:25, Matthew 22:21), was proof that the Church's ecclesiastical leaders had overstepped their religious authority. Thus, controversy over the Maronite Patriarch's involvement in politics colored their understanding of secularization. For the ulama, secularism meant reducing religious authority in the communal and legal realms, as opposed to secularizing civil society, which granted freedom of religious forms and values.

The ulama also had to respond to the growth of nonconfessional political parties. Secular political parties began gaining ground during the 1940s and 1950s. Socialists or communists saw the confessional system as detrimental to the nation's development, and religion as divisive to the formation of a Lebanese identity. The Lebanese Ba'ath Party, formally organized in 1956, denounced the confessional system,²⁹ while the Lebanese Communist Party interpreted the 1958 conflict as the need for the "establishment of a democratic, parliamentary, bourgeois system in which public liberties are guaranteed."³⁰ Other organizations, like the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Popular Nasserite Organization, followed the Arab nationalist trend of the time by arguing that Islam was primarily an Arab social and cultural identity that supported the Arab nation (*ummah `arabiyah*).³¹ An important Lebanese political leader who toed this secularist trend was Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and opponent of confessional electoral laws. Jumblatt would ultimately spearhead the charge for a secular government during 1975-76 to guarantee public liberties and to create space within a new National Pact for the Druze. This secured his rise to political power.

Within the political context of growing socialist organizations, the Sunni community was pressed into the secularism debate in 1975 as a possible answer to problems of the confessional organization of Lebanese government and society. In April 1975, civil war erupted as Maronites and Palestinian commandos clashed. At first the war focused upon the problems of Palestinian militia activity in Lebanon. Arab nationalist organizations rallied to the support of the Palestinians under the banner of

Arab nationalism. They began to challenge the confessional system, which kept the presidency of Lebanon in Maronite hands. Within a matter of months, the war's main issues centered upon the republic's organization. On the one hand, nationalists, Marxists, and minority confessions began to criticize the system that kept the Sunnis and Maronites in key governmental positions. The Maronites, on the other hand, already had expressed their willingness to create some form of a secular system primarily because they argued that Christianity was not a political religion.³²

This put the Sunni community in a bind, for they originally had supported the Palestinians as representatives of the Muslim Ummah. Yet, as the conflict developed and the confessional system which kept the Maronites in power was attacked, the Sunnis recognized that the system that kept them in power was being attacked as well. The conflict revealed that the Sunnis, who once had been one of Lebanon's dominant parties, actually had little power to back up their claims. Thus, the full-blown national secularism debate began as an intra-Sunni issue.

The Lebanese Sunnis traditionally identified themselves as part of the Islamic Ummah's cultural center under the Sunni caliphate's authority. But now, in the modern Lebanese state, they were merely one *millet* among others with the highest office belonging to a Lebanese Maronite. Were their loyalties part of the larger Islamic Ummah? Were they to identify themselves as Sunnis over and against the distinct identity of the Lebanese Shi'ah and Druze? Or were they Lebanese who owed loyalty to the multi-confessional state with a Christian president?³³ Both international and domestic issues forced them to rethink their identity within a Lebanese state that they had been instrumental in founding.

Husayn al-Qawatli, director general of Dar al-Ifta', fired the debate's first volley. In response to the beginning of the civil war and questions about the state's foundations, he stated in August 1975:

The position of Islam is very clear on one point, namely that the true Muslim cannot take a disinterested position vis-a-vis the state. As a result, his position with regard to ruler and rule cannot be an indecisive one which is content with half-solutions. Either the ruler is Muslim and the rule Islamic, then he will be content with the state and support it; or the ruler is non-Muslim and the rule non-Islamic, then he rejects it, opposes it and works to abolish it, gently or forcibly, openly or secretly.³⁴

The Islamic Association of Maqassed Graduates, the most prominent and well-respected Sunni social organization, responded with its historic declaration on November 21, which outlined its proposed reforms. The first

one was to fix firmly in place the rule of equality among all Lebanese in rights and duties so that the rights of the Lebanese citizen would be complete, without any deficiency deriving from confessional affiliation.

All Lebanese are equal in rights and duties. Consequent on this, it is the right of every Lebanese citizen to occupy any post in the Lebanese state including those of the President of the Republic, President of the Chamber and President of the Government.³⁵

The statement argued on behalf of a strict interpretation of articles 12 and 95, which we outlined above. According to the association, Article 95 was originally a provisional article intended to be repealed. A strict interpretation, then, would mean a definite timetable for ending communal representation. The association understood Lebanese democracy to be based upon individual citizenship, as opposed to representation through confessional affiliation, and thus was calling for a confessionally free state.

In response to this statement, the Council of Ulama published its own position. The ulama lamented the fact that the Association of Islamic Maqassed Graduates had been "dragged along behind the propagandists of secularization."³⁶ They stated that secularism originated in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, where the Church held influence and power over European states. The development of rational philosophy (i.e., Positivism) assailed many Christian doctrines and began to break the Church's hold on power and authority. The encouragement of individual rational thought by Enlightenment philosophy subjected traditional Christian authority to scrutiny. Positivistic philosophers began to see religion as a hindrance to society's development. Under the direction of Feuerbach and Lenin, secularism ultimately "established an historical materialism which aimed at destroying religion."³⁷ According to the ulama, European imperialists and Orientalists intended to impose secularism upon Muslim lands to undermine Muslim unity "no matter what their nationality," isolate Muslims from their Islamic heritage, and force Turkish secularism upon Muslims.³⁸ In other words, the colonial powers introduced secular systems to pacify the Muslim community. Knowing that secular philosophy had destroyed the Church's power in Europe, it could also destroy Islamic civilization.

The premise of the council's antiseccular statement is worth underlining. Contrary to al-Quwatli's words, the council statement argues that Islam concerns itself with "religious duties" (*ibadat*) and not government policy. In fact, Islam in Lebanon deals with "rules of personal status" and "Muslims are completely content with the application of Islamic rules in personal sta-

tus.”³⁹ Thus, the ulama viewed the call for complete secularization, which they understood as adopting civil law in the areas of personal status, as an attempt to destroy Islamic values and the religious courts’ authority.

Jumblatt responded to the council by issuing his Socialist Party’s manifesto in May 1976. Defending his position on secularism, he asserted that:

Secularism attempts to do away with dual allegiance (to confessional community first, and to nation second) to make room for establishing allegiance – allegiance to the nation only ... it is also the operation of transforming the culture of the society, moving it towards a culture built on reason and science.⁴⁰

In August 1976, Hasan Khalid, mufti of the republic, finally responded to the ongoing debate. In a letter to his Sunni constituency at the beginning of Ramadan, Khalid pointed out that, in the spirit of Ramadan, the current conflict was not a religious dispute but a political dispute based upon political interests. He opposed the calls of some parties advocating secularism as a way forward for the nation, stating: “Islam is neither Left nor Right in politics.” In other words, Islam is not about particular political platforms; rather, it is religion that develops “mercy and compassion” between members of a society, not the eradication of religion in society.⁴¹

In an interview with the newspaper *al-Safir* on November 14, 1976, Khalid claimed that there was no need to address the perceived problem of religion, because the war was not a religious war. In fact, he stated, revealed religion is a strong bond between devoted Christians and Muslims, especially Christian and Muslim Arabs, for it develops “love of country and cooperation.”⁴² It is the answer, not the problem. In another interview in May 1978, he argued that secularism poses a problem to the expression of religious freedom for Muslims. Thus, the confessional order (*al-nizam al-ta’ifi*) is necessary for the continued education and teaching of Islamic principles in matters of personal status.⁴³ He said that secularism, as a political theory, does not work. It does not agree with the religious ethos or, more specifically, with the Muslim need to abide by religious communal dictates. A secular civil law would not allow such a freedom.

According to Khalid, secularism originated in western Aristotelian thought. Although this philosophical system developed the respect of individual freedom, it led to “anarchy and confusion” in society. The development of secularism in post-revolutionary France was the result of the intrusion of “the authority of the Church in the government, administration, and education.”⁴⁴ In the United States, the development of secularism meant “absolute [individual] freedom in all matters,” including ethical and moral

issues. Interestingly, according to Khalid, this left a moral void in the public sphere that has led to the appearance of "Jewish authority," what American politics calls the "Jewish lobby." In communist countries, secularism simply opposed religion and religious believers.

Khalid would later state, in response to the meeting of Lebanese political leaders in Lausanne in 1984, that:

The problem in Lebanon ... is not a matter of Islam or Christianity interfering in politics, as the Church had done in Europe before the Renaissance, but of Lebanese politicians meddling in religious affairs.⁴⁵

Contrary to the arguments put forward by Islamists in the mid-1980s, who also decried the secular proposition, Khalid argued that maintaining Lebanon's multiconfessional system was not only the just and fair way through the current conflict, but also that it was consistent with Islamic precepts. Quoting the Qur'an (18:29), he underlined the freedom of individual belief within Islam: "Say: 'The Truth is from your Lord.' Let him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject (it)."

The Islamic organization of society cannot be forced or imposed. Khalid saw the adoption of Islamic principles and precepts guided by the Shari'ah as the basis of personal piety leading to communal organization, not as the blueprint for a government structure:

This piety, in the view of Islam, yields perfect knowledge in belief and the principles of the Shari'ah is unparalleled in lifting to God devotion ... [and] is committed to ensure with charity and knowledge and good understanding among people, to human coexistence ... which leads them to God the Almighty.⁴⁶

Each confession should be free to operate under its own communal laws, provided that they do not interfere with state security. Khalid saw his exposition of Islamic principles within the realm of personal status laws as the answer to other options put forward by secularists, Maronites, and Islamists.⁴⁷ Thus, his view of Islam anathematized a completely secular state for its failure to allow Muslims to follow their faith, which was based upon their particular communal laws. It also shied away from any political Islam, arguing that the Shari'ah establishes the parameters for personal piety, and that the community is built upon the principles of individual piety.

Subhi Salih, deputy of the Supreme Islamic Shari'ah Council and the Legislative Council, contributed to the debate in a May 1976 article entitled: "Secularism: A Philosophical Concept or an Intellectual Revolution?"⁴⁸ The

article had two aims: to define secularism in its past and present historical context (its roots in western society and its current hold on Lebanon's political landscape) and to defend the concept of national unity under a democratic system that recognizes religion's authority.

Like Khalid, Salih understood that western secular philosophers were responding to the Church's power and authority, which had crept into politics during the Middle Ages. He argued that politics did not concern the Church in the first place. According to traditional Muslim thought, Christian scripture itself provided for the separation of Church and State. Jesus stated: "Give therefore to the emperor the things that are the emperor's, and to God the things that are God's."⁴⁹ Thus, secularism developed because of the clergy's interference in politics – areas that were outside their jurisdiction. Their assertive power upset the balance of society. In contrast, western philosophers never adopted a negative attitude toward the message of Islam, which they saw as synchronizing the spiritual with the temporal, and corporal realities with spiritual needs. Enlightenment thinkers viewed Islam as a rational religion that could meet the needs of the modern period, for it dispensed with Church, clericalism, and clergy, and also prevented controlling people in the name of religion.⁵⁰

Two important implications result from Salih's argument. First, there is no need for a separate religious institution within the state to enforce Islamic precepts, because such matters do not pertain to state institutions. Second, Islam has a great deal to say about social organization, but not necessarily political structures. Whereas the western Christian world functioned within two realms (Church and State), Islam provided principles by which society lived. Like Khalid, he does not seem to be concerned about the limits of the Sunni legists' jurisdiction within personal status law. These ulama functioned as a body to advise the Sunni community in matters of communal laws, not of political power. However, Salih does not address the inevitable problem of conflicting principles between confession and state.

He goes on to say that once the French state had overthrown the authority of the Church and the clergy, it was free to pursue an "objective rationalism." Salih reports that the secularists argued that once they were free from Church authority, they would be able to provide structures and ideas based upon human reason and rationality, and thus completely neutral toward religion. Once the corrupt Church was removed from any vestige of civil power, society could develop freely, no longer afraid of excommunication. In fact, Salih stated that such a belief was a "hypocritical notion of 'neutralism.'" Philosophers attacked religion rather than drew from it. In

the end, their main concern was not to develop a sound philosophical structure, but to attack the Church and remove its authority. The reality of the secularists' attempt to remove the Church from power was the main impetus for this philosophy's development.

Salih uses this historical example as a lesson from which Lebanon could learn. In the contemporary period, one cannot "pretend" to remain neutral to religion, especially in a sectarian country like Lebanon. Therefore, the answer to secularism and a state religious law is by:

... abolishing political sectarianism and establishing a modern democratic state on firm foundations of science, intellect, respect for the value of the individual and the dignity of Man, justice, equality, full rights and liberties and a country of sects, tribes and factions into a country with one united people.⁵¹

By arguing for such a democratic state, Salih believed that individuals would be free to practice their faith within the confines of their confession. This concept could work in a multiconfessional state as long as all religious laws or beliefs were confined to the status of communal or personal rights and were not enacted as civil law. However, his conclusion was actually no different from the arguments put forward by the secularist philosophers he denounced. The Enlightenment philosophers argued that reducing religion to the private sector would help one become more moral and rational, and that this would establish "a democratic state on firm foundations of science, intellect, respect for the value of the individual and the dignity of man."

Salih desired the same type of (moral and rational) state, but used a contrary method. He disregarded the secular approach, because he believed its ulterior motive was to destroy religion's power, not to free the individual from the shackles of a corrupt religious institution. That the Enlightenment's philosophical foundations began as a conspiracy to undermine the Church is anachronistic. It certainly did affect the Church's political power, but that is merely one of the results of the total philosophical worldview produced by the Enlightenment. It was not the cause, only one effect.

According to Salih, only individuals practicing their faith and respecting others' faiths, and not a secularist system, will allow a multiconfessional state to survive. Instituting a secular state would lead to subjugating the individual or religious community to another tyrannical institution: the state. The difference for Salih was that individual Muslim piety naturally involved communal organization and social laws: "We cling to the practical import of secularism [that is, the freedom to pursue religion] and reject its formal label

[that is, its anti-religious origin].⁵² Again, however, he does not address the inevitable issue of conflicting religious principles between confessions.

Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, vice president of the Supreme Islamic Shi`ah Council, provided the most detailed scholarly response to the secularism controversy. In February 1977, he published several articles in *al-Safir* that were collected and expanded upon in a later work entitled *`Almaniyah*. Like Salih's article, the book attempted to show secularism's roots in the West and within Arab society, but in a much more detailed manner. His ultimate goal was to advocate a method of rebuilding Lebanese society based on the confessional framework (*al-nizam al-ta'ifi*). On the contrary, secularism is a human innovation [*bid'ah*] that deserves God's curse.⁵³

The first part of *`Almaniyah*, a review of secularism's western and Christian origins, reveals many assumptions about the relationship between western governments and Christian authority. Both concepts are used synonymously, and there is no exploration or mention of specific Christian political theories or negative Christian responses toward the secular state. This demonstrates a faulty grasp of the complex relationship between religious societies and individual western states – especially the United States. What is ironic is that such complexities are themselves an important part of the Lebanese social-civil system.

Shams al-Din juxtaposes Church–State relations with answers put forward by Islam on the issue of religion and political power. In contrast to the French Revolution, which was a struggle between the priesthood and secular statesmen, Shams al-Din argues that Muslim scholars are not separate from the political powers – they just provide a different “function” (*majal al-wazifah*), not a separate order. Whereas the priesthood stood for the old order and the status quo of power, which the secular state replaced, the *fuqaha* stand for “the cause of the people's general interest and their rights.”⁵⁴ This is a prominent Shi`ah clerical viewpoint, for the Shi`ah clerical establishment had long prided itself on remaining untainted by corrupt politics.

The book's most pertinent section deals with Shams al-Din's opposition to a Lebanese secular state. He writes that a secular state derives its authority directly from individual citizens and does not recognize the role of religion in society. He states that the Lebanese political system, on the one hand, recognizes no official religion but, on the other hand, is made up of various sects deriving their authority from religious laws. As Lebanon is a “state of believers” (*dawlat al-mu'minin*),⁵⁵ its government consists of representatives

reflecting different confessional beliefs. Shams al-Din elicits constitutional support for his ideas by stating that Article 9, which guarantees "absolute liberty of conscience," has its origins in the *Hatti Humayun* of 1858⁵⁶:

Liberty of conscience is absolute. By rendering homage to the Almighty, the state respects all creeds and guarantees and protects their free exercise as long as they do not interfere with public order. It also guarantees to individuals, whatever their religious allegiance, respect of their personal status and religious interests.⁵⁷

Shams al-Din asserts that contrary to the secular state, which does not recognize religion's authority, the Lebanese citizen's loyalty rests upon confessional laws that function as personal (or, more appropriately, communal) status laws. Thus, the basis of citizenship is an individual's participation within his or her confession. Here, Shams al-Din accepts the Islamic categorization of individuals within the state as understood through the *millet* system. Whereas secularism infringes upon the human desire for religion, the Lebanese system leads to a "path of cooperation" among the various religions.⁵⁸ Citing the constitution again, Shams al-Din states that articles 9 and 12 provide for the protection and equal participation of all citizens regardless of confessional affiliation. Thus their freedom to pursue religion is protected. The constitution defends the maintenance of religious personal status laws as opposed to secular civil laws.

What stands out in Shams al-Din's work is his drive to maintain the Lebanese government's confessional structure and to rationalize the necessity of personal status laws "which do not possess political or economic connotations."⁵⁹ According to him, Sunni personal status law does not, by nature, affect the country's macro-development. Fully implementing the Lebanese constitution to the letter of the law would affirm and guarantee confessional parity and individual rights, not only between Christians and Muslims but between Sunnis and Shi'ahs as well. Like Salih, however, he does not address the issue of competing communal claims.

The 1975-76 secularism debate was never completely resolved. President Franjiyya's resignation and Elias Sarkis' election, and more importantly the Syrian invasion in the summer of 1976, ended the possibility of any real radical ideological reorganization of the state. In addition, Kamal Jumblatt's assassination in 1977 was a severe blow to the socialist political platform. Following Jumblatt's death, most of the socialist-based political groups and militias began to lose their power and authority in the war due to the absence of a central leader and attrition. Eventually they fizzled out as major players. It would not be until after the 1979 Iranian

Revolution and the 1982 Israeli invasion that another radical ideological system for the state, the Islamist perspective, would be posited. In the end, even the Islamist platforms of Hizballah and Islamic Amal would be swallowed up by the confessional system.

The fact that the secular debate was never settled fully, even after the 1989 Ta'if Accord, and in light of a reconstructed Lebanon, shows a dichotomy between confessionalism and secularization, between the desire for confessional and national identity, and between confessional personal status laws and the "secularization of state and society."⁶⁰ This ambivalence has been noted in several sociological studies both during and after the civil war.⁶¹ I would contend that such a view is the result of focusing exclusively upon secularism, in the Jacobist sense of eradicating all vestiges of religion in the public realm, rather than secularizing society and removing any particular religious power from all aspects of the state.

It is important to note in the responses to the secularist controversy, that Khalid, Salih, and Shams al-Din offered no developed arguments for an Islamist position of the state. They argued, on one hand, that secularism as a western concept is irrelevant to the Islamic context because Islam has no clergy. On the other hand, they showed the inclination to develop ideas of maintaining a religious state in areas of personal status rather than developing ideas of an Islamic state. It was not until after the 1982 Israeli invasion and the Islamist response (i.e., Hizballah and Islamic Jihad) advocating an Islamic state that they addressed the issues of an Islamic state. After 1982, Shams al-Din rereleased *Almaniyah* with a section developing the concept of *shura* (consultation). This response to the Islamist perspective argued that the concept of consultation forbids the forced implementation of one form of government, even if it is an Islamic one. Following the second round of national reconciliation talks in Lausanne in 1984, Shams al-Din offered an idea of a democratic society built upon the:

balance among the communities and groups ... based on proper one-man one-vote democracy, not on the democracy of sects ... popular democracy, based on the equality of individual citizens, an equality both of rights and obligations.⁶²

In 1985, he published a pamphlet entitled "The System of Democratic Pluralism Based on the Principle of Consultation" (*Nizam al-Dimuqratiyah al-'Adadiyah al-Qa'imah 'ala Mabda' al-Shura*), in which he argued that the "country's political community is composed not of individual citizens but of sects. It is the sect through which a citizen exercises his rights."⁶³ He

also published a second edition of *Dirasah wa Mawqif fi al-Din wa al-Siyasah wa al-Mujtama'* in 1990, introducing the concept of *'adadiyah* [pluralism] after models of an Islamic state were posited.⁶⁴ We now turn to this concept of pluralism.

The Lebanese scholars reviewed here rejected secularism because they understood it in its Jacobist sense – the complete eradication of all religion from the public sphere. These ulama, like other contemporary Muslim scholars, see secularism in this narrow definition. However, what has been overlooked in the Lebanese context is the practical application of “religious secularism,” which allows for religion in the public sphere but prohibits the domination of one confession by another within state institutions.

I argue that the Lebanese pluralistic context can benefit by looking into the eighteenth-century American secularist debates. Likewise, the American Muslim community can use the Lebanese experience as a model in its struggle for identity in a secular state. The Lebanese pluralist experience of “religious secularism” can provide authenticity to the contemporary American pluralist experience. Madison’s concept of the secular state provides a more appropriate interpretation of the Lebanese context and a blueprint for Lebanese Muslims than the French models, as well as for other Muslim minority communities, particularly Muslims in the United States. The development of American secular political thought in the eighteenth century has a great deal to offer Lebanon’s continuing struggle to respond to secularism. Likewise, the Lebanese experience and debate can shed light on the contemporary American Muslim experience of trying to develop an identity in a secular state. In order to understand this relationship, we first need to look carefully at the discussions leading up to the establishment of the American civil state enshrined in the constitution’s first amendment.

James Madison’s “Disestablishment Clause”

The American constitution’s “Establishment Clause,” cited in the First Amendment, is the foundation for contemporary secular arguments regarding the separation of Church and State. It declares: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...”

In contemporary American discourse, this clause is seen as the genius of the western secular nation-state system. However, its origins are more akin to the Lebanese context than to the French philosophical school that led to the French Revolution and a completely laicized modern nation-state system. Eighteenth-century American political thought struggled to develop a repub-

lican system of government but did not seek to remove religion or religious belief from its worldview. As Stephen Carter states: “The Establishment Clause by its terms forbids the imposition of religious belief by the state, not statements of religious belief in the course of public dialogue.”⁶⁵

In response to his visit to America in 1835, the French philosopher Alex de Tocqueville stated that:

The Americans show by their practice that they feel the high necessity of imparting morality to democratic communities by means of religion. What they think of themselves in this respect is a truth of which every democratic nation ought to be thoroughly persuaded.⁶⁶

Tocqueville saw religion as providing a moral foundation for society. The commonality between twentieth-century Lebanese society and eighteenth-century American society was the assumption that religion provided the moral and ethical basis for civil society, and ultimately for communal laws. (Hasan Khalid made a similar argument about Lebanon in 1976.) However, the question in American society has never been whether elected officials are religious individuals or not, but in what way does the state advance or “establish” the specific religious laws of those elected officials. In the American system, representatives are elected not as confessional representatives but as civil representatives, whereas in Lebanon representatives are elected because of their confessional affiliation.

Thus Lebanese religious leaders and representatives are free to converse in civil society according to their religious beliefs for they represent a specific community’s beliefs to the civil government. What is at issue in the Establishment Clause, however, is prohibiting the state’s endorsement of a particular denomination that might be advanced by a particular representative. Certainly the waters become murky once an elected official begins to argue for a particular public policy based upon a confessional perspective. This is the same ambiguity faced in Lebanon, where the civil powers are representatives of confessional bodies. Tocqueville was correct in his observations of American public officials when he stated:

If it be easy to see that it is more particularly important in democratic ages that spiritual opinions should prevail, it is not easy to say by what means those who govern democratic nations may make them predominate.⁶⁷

Here, Madison’s thought is essential to understanding American political philosophy, for he originated the idea of the Establishment Clause. Contrary to the French experience, which sought to remove religious authority from all vestiges of civil society, Madison attempted to make pro-

visos for the free participation of various denominational perspectives. According to him, only by preserving multiple denominational views could one party or community be prevented from dominating the others.

In 1789, while the First Amendment was being drafted, Madison submitted the following original draft of the clause:

The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or under any pretext infringed.⁶⁸

Madison's intent was to legalize the acceptance and place of multiple religious denominations within the American public sphere. Most importantly, he wanted to ensure that no denomination would be established as the national religion, receive government support, tax, and champion its specific confessional laws to a nation of individual citizens granted their natural right to religious freedom. Although his draft was reworked and edited throughout the legal process, leaving the current Establishment Clause as stated above, his philosophy of disestablishing any one religious denomination from the center of power won the day. According to Madison, the state should be a government of representatives from various civil, social, and religious communities all committed to the state with no one view dominating.

These arguments are fully developed in his *Federalist Papers*, specifically numbers 10 (1787) and 51 (1788). In the first one, Madison describes a society made up of various parties and interests, all of which politically balance each other.

The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the small number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens⁶⁹

Madison seems to be describing both eighteenth-century America and nineteenth-century Lebanon. From the inaugural establishment of Ibrahim Pasha's *meclis* system to the Ottoman Regelement of 1845, through the *mutasarrifiyah* of 1860 to the promulgation of Article 95, there has been a concerted effort to ensure the greater inclusion of the various confessions within the governmental structure. This was not necessarily in order to

ensure each confession's representation and democratic voice, but rather to create "a greater variety of parties" that resulted in compromise. We see this even today in Lebanon's electoral laws, for citizens elect representatives not only from their own confessions but also from other confessions in their district. This ensures that candidates are acceptable to their own constituency and to members of other confessions, and also weeds out radical voices. However, it also breeds compromise to the extent of reducing the government's effectiveness.

Madison further developed this sense of "greater variety" in what he ultimately called the "multiplicity of sects" in the "Federalist, no. 51":

It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority – that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole improbable, if not impracticable ...

Whilst all authority in it [the republic] will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests and in the other in the multiplicity of sects.⁷⁰

In contemporary America, the multiplicity of interests has shifted away from the influence of religious confessions toward corporate business and special interest groups. Lebanese society, however, remains based upon the confessions' multiple interests. Shams al-Din's description of Lebanon as a *dawlat al-mu'minin* (a state of believers) is correct. We see the same line of reasoning within Madison's framework. Madison's concepts of pluralism within a secular state (that is, a state with no established denomination but one responsive to the multiplicity of interests) may be a more helpful model and vision for the Lebanese Muslim experience. Such a concept or vision also may provide a method for understanding an Islamic system (*al-nizam al-islami*) for specific Muslim minority communities whose host states may either respect their communal laws or negotiate them within a civil struc-

ture. Shepard has this in mind when he describes both "religious secularism" and "moderate secularism," which "is by no means inconsistent with an appreciation of Islam as cultural heritage."⁷¹

Conclusion

Lebanon's ulama responded to the 1975-76 secularist debate by decrying the possibility of society's secular organization on the grounds that it would destroy the Muslim community's foundations. Their arguments were rooted in the French secular experience. Yet the makeup of Lebanese society is more analogous to the eighteenth-century American context than the French experience. Given that there is already a discourse of identity present in Lebanese society, developing Madison's ideas of a "multiplicity of sects" would be a helpful foundation and vision for any future Lebanese society. Rather than seeing secularism as destroying religion, it could be seen as religion's protector. The Lebanese system already is set up for such a concept – it only needs to be defended and further defined by a different rhetoric.

A Lebanese Muslim discussion on religious secularism would be a fruitful one for Muslim communities seeking identity in multiconfessional states. It would be especially beneficial in the United States, where the Muslim community might be able to develop its own indigenous American Muslim identity as a full participant in the American civil forum. The next step would be for the Muslim community to start discussing how personal status law might fit into existing civil law, or how civil law might recognize specific communal laws under certain circumstances, as it has done for other minority religious and social groups. Perhaps revisiting the initial debate regarding religious communities in eighteenth-century America might be a helpful place to begin.

Notes

1. The classic examples of the use of *jahiliyah* come from Abu al-A`la al-Mawdudi in "Bayna al-Hadaratayn al-Gharbiyah wa al-Islamiyah," *Al-Muslimun* 8 (1963), and Sayyid Qutb in *Ma`alim fi al-`Sariq* (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1981). See also Youssef M. Choureiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (London: Pinter, 1997), 91-122.
2. See Muhammad `Abduh in Rashid Rida, *Ta`rikh al-Ustadh al-Imam al-Shaykh Muhammad `Abduh*, 2d ed. (Cairo: 1948). Also see Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 130-60; and Malcom Kerr, *Muhammad `Abduh and Rashid Rida* (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins, 1958).

3. Kate Zebiri, "Muslim Anti-Secular Discourse in the Context of Muslim-Christian Relations," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 9, no. 1 (1998): 47.
4. John Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (eds.), *Islam and Secularism* (New York: New York University Press, 2000).
5. Bassam Tibi, "Major Themes in the Arabic Political Literature of Islamic Revivalism: 1970-1985, Parts I & II," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 3, no. 2 (1992): 181-210, and 4, no. 1 (1993): 83-99.
6. Zebiri, "Muslim Anti-Secular Discourse," 47-64.
7. *Ibid.*, 61.
8. See Tibi, "Major Themes," Part II: 83-99.
9. Hasan Khalid, *Al-Muslimun fi Lubnan* (Beirut: Dar al-Nahdah al-`Arabiyah, 1978), 454.
10. Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, *Almaniyah*, 3d ed. (Beirut: al-Mu`assasah al-Dawliyah, al-Dirasah, wa al-Nashr, 1996), 8.
11. For a good review of the French Revolution's Jacobinism, see Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 28-29.
12. S. Parvez Manzoor touches on this subject in his article "Desacralising Secularism" when he describes secularism "either humbly, as a rejection of ecclesiastical authority, a model for pluralism, a theory of society, a doctrine of governance; or augustly, as a philosophy of history, a creed of atheism, an epistemology of humanism; or even more grandiosely, as a metaphysics of immanence that corresponds to the ultimate scheme of things" (Esposito: 81). Manzoor's observations of the social issues involving the "division of labour" and structures of power and authority of both the state and the 'ulama are correct (Esposito: 89-92).
13. See also Hanf, *Coexistence*, 7-41.
14. William E. Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19 (1987).
15. *Ibid.*, 309.
16. See Hanf, *Coexistence*, 48ff.
17. Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
18. Hanf, *Coexistence*, 55.
19. Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 90. Including the various confessions in the *meclis* did not introduce a sense of democratic equality. A disproportionate number of Christians were included. But, as non-Muslims, they still held limited power within the council. Under the Ottoman organization, the Sunnis and Sunni law still dominated. Regardless, these changes were vitally important and served as stepping stones for later Ottoman provincial governmental organization.
20. See Samir Khalaf, "Communal Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Lebanon," in Braude and Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Holms & Meier, 1982), 2:107-34, and Hanf, *Coexistence*, 59.

21. John P. Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1914* (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1977): 85.
22. *Ibid.*, 85ff.
23. See Engin Deniz Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920* (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies), 1993 and Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon*.
24. Edmund Rabbath, in *La Formation Historique du Liban Politique et Constitutionnel* (Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1973), 555. He states: "The Lebanese state is not, in effect, a modern state because it has been incapable until today of assuring all the Lebanese, without distinction of religion and in all domains, equality before the law." Rabbath argues that until the provisional nature of Article 95 is abrogated, Lebanon will not be able to support the claim to proper democracy.
25. *Ibid.*, 89.
26. Regarding the discussion around removal of the provisional nature of Article 95 in the 1989 Ta'if Accord, see Sami A. Ofeish, "Lebanon's Second Republic: Secular Talk, Sectarian Application," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (1999): 97-116.
27. *Al-Nahar*, 2 June 1945, as cited in Pierre Rondot, *Les Institutions Politiques Du Liban* (Paris: Institut d'Etudes de l'Orient Contemporain, 1947), 118. Rondot's work was written following the secularist debates of 1945 and is an excellent resource for understanding the issues surrounding personal and communal status laws.
28. See Iliya Harik, "The Maronite Church and Political Change in Lebanon," in Leonard Binder, *Politics in Lebanon* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1966), 31-56.
29. Michael Suleiman, *Political Parties in Lebanon* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), 124.
30. *Ibid.*, 81.
31. See Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, rev. ed. (London: Pinter, 1997), 49-62.
32. For a Christian Lebanese perspective of secularism's philosophical basis, see P. Etienne Sacre, *Recueil I* (Beirut: Libano-Allemande pour la Promotion de la Culture, 1983).
33. For an excellent historical review of this Sunni identity crisis, see Najla Wadih Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis Towards the State of Lebanon" (Ph.D. diss., London University, 1973).
34. Husayn al-Quwatli, "Islam, the State, and Secularism," in *Religion, State, and Ideology*, CENAM Reports, vol. 3 (Beirut: Dar al-Mashreq, 1976), 175. For a discussion of al-Quwatli's position, see Ahmed Beydoun, *Identité Confessionnelle et Temps Social chez les Historiens Libanais Contemporains* (Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1984), 323-29.
35. *Al-Nahar*, 21 November 1975, p. 3; *Religion, State, and Ideology*, 84-85. For more on the Islamic Association of Maqassed Graduates, see Michael Johnson,

- “Factional Politics in Lebanon: The Case of the ‘Islamic Society of Benevolent Intentions’ (*Al-Maḡasid*),” *Middle Eastern Studies* 9 (1973): 56-75.
36. “Declaration of the Council of Ulama in Lebanon on Secularism,” *Al-Anwar* 25 March 1975: 3, as in *Islamic Law and Changes in Arab Society: 1975* (Beirut: Dar al-Mashreq, 1976): 36. See also the review of the ulama’s meeting in *al-Safir*, 25 March 1976.
 37. *Ibid.*, 88.
 38. *Ibid.*, 88-89.
 39. *Ibid.*, 89, 91. See Fuad Khuri’s “Secularization and ‘Ulama’ Networks,” in “Secularization and ‘Ulama’ Networks among Sunni and Shi’a Religious Officials,” in *Toward a Viable Lebanon*, ed. Halim Barakat (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 71. He argues that Sunni Islam has always adapted itself to the ideology of “state structures, centralized authorities and ruling regimes.” The Sunni law schools “have provided, and will continue to provide, ways for both states and citizens to follow the dictates of divine law while seeking to serve political interests” (Khuri: 73). See also Khuri, *Imams and Emirs* (London: Saqi Books, 1990).
 40. Hanf, *Coexistence*, 135-36. Hanf reviews this issue extensively, but his organization of the material listed above is unclear and out of historical order.
 41. *L’Orient L’Jour*, 26 August 1976: 4.
 42. *Ibid.*, 327.
 43. *Ibid.*, 453.
 44. *Ibid.*, 454
 45. *Monday Morning* (26 Mar.-1 Apr. 1984): 38.
 46. Khalid, *Mawqif al-Islam min al-Wataniyah wa al-Yahudiyah wa al-Nasraniyah* (Beirut: Ma’had al-’Inma’ al-’Arabi, 1986): 491.
 47. *Ibid.*, 8.
 48. *Monday Morning* (26 Apr.-2 May 1976): 8-9.
 49. Matthew 22:21. See also Mark 12:17 and Luke 20:25.
 50. *Monday Morning*, 9. See Fuad Khuri’s comments against this argument in “Secularization and ‘Ulama Networks,” 71.
 51. *Monday Morning*, 9.
 52. *Ibid.*
 53. Shams al-Din, *Almaniyah*.
 54. *Ibid.*, 165.
 55. *Ibid.*, 186, 201.
 56. *Ibid.*, 188.
 57. *Ibid.*, 193.
 58. *Ibid.*, 171.
 59. *Ibid.*, 213.
 60. Hanf, *Coexistence*, 135-36. Hanf’s sociological surveys of 1981, 1984, 1986, and 1987 form the basis of his book. His findings show that although most respondents from each confession agree that “one should not mix religion and

- politics," not all agreed that this meant a "completely Secular state and society" (p. 513). "In all communities support was significantly greater for the 'Secularization of state and society' than for a 'Secular community.' The explanation may lie in the formulation. The description of the Secular community is far more concrete, elaborating on what Secularization of state and society could entail: persons would have the right to withdraw from their religious community, that is, contract civil marriages and seek non-communal political representation. The more concrete the Secularization, the fewer the Secularists" (p. 515). See also Ofeish, "Lebanon's Second Republic," 97-116.
61. Hilal Khashan, "The Lebanese State: Lebanese Unity and the Sunni Muslim Position," *International Sociology* 7, no. 1 (1992): 85-97; Khashan, "The Political Values of Lebanese Maronite College Students," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34, no. 4 (1990): 723-44; and *Le rôle de l'évêque dans la vie publique au Liban* (Beirut: Centre de Sociologie Religieuse, 1974).
 62. *Monday Morning* (19-24 March 1984): 45.
 63. Pamphlet privately published by Shams al-Din in 1985. See Chibli Mallat, *Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1988), 4; and *Monday Morning* (18-24 Jan. 1988): 17.
 64. Shams al-Din, *Almaniyah*, 246ff; and *Dirasat*, 2:339-51.
 65. Stephen L. Carter, *The Culture of Disbelief* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 112.
 66. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (London: Wadsworth, 1998), 243.
 67. *Ibid.*, 246.
 68. John T. Noonan, Jr., *The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious Freedom* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 79.
 69. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist* (New York: The Modern Library, 1941): 60-61.
 70. *Ibid.*, 339-40.
 71. Shepard, "Islam and Ideology," 310.