

AFRICAN HUMAN MOBILITY REVIEW

Volume 2 Number 3 September – December 2016

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47, Commercial St, 8001 Cape Town – South Africa
Tel. 0027 021 461 4741, Email: editor@sihma.org.za

African Human Mobility Review

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From the Director:* A Reflection on South Africa's Migration Policy

Albeit geographically distant, Europe and South Africa have a great deal of similarities in their management of migratory flows. As many countries in Europe, South Africa is a migration hub attracting numerous migrants, including refugees, seasonal workers, students, cross-border traders and entrepreneurs from both the rest of Africa and Asia. South Africa is also considered, like European states, a country with a generous welfare system, where over 10 million people are living below the poverty threshold and are relying on social grants as a main source of income. Moreover, because of its strong social and economic contradictions, South Africa is not immune to divisive populist politics and xenophobic reactions. Although up to now no nationalist anti-immigration party has emerged in the political arena, immigrant workers (*amakwerekwere*¹) are often accused of stealing jobs and being a burden on the country's economy. On many occasions, the discontent of poor and disenfranchised black communities has raised tensions and led to violent clashes between locals and foreign nationals.

Since 1994, the post-apartheid government has implemented, on one side, a benevolent policy towards African refugees fleeing conflicts and persecutions and, on the other side, approved overly restrictive immigration policies. This is evidenced by a variety of procedures and measures across the social, political and legislative frameworks. Such restrictive measures in the immigration regime, coupled with the lack of legal avenues for unskilled and semi-skilled migrants from the SADC region to enter the local job-market, have resulted in large numbers of migrants turning to the country's asylum system as a means to temporarily regularise their stay. This fact has contributed to a toxic culture of suspicion amongst politicians and bureaucrats who perceive the liberal refugee framework as a 'loophole' that undocumented and unskilled migrants exploit to legalise their stay. During a Portfolio Committee

*Sergio Carciotto director of the Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA) Email: director@sihma.org.za.

¹ This is a term used by Black South Africa to refer to foreign Africans.

Meeting held on 11 October 2016², the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs went even further stating that that “the country could not allow undocumented or bogus asylum-seekers to have rights. For them to claim rights, asylum-seekers ought to possess, at least, immigration visa and immigration visa could not be applied for while staying in the country.” In this regard, I emphasise that irregular migrants possess the same basic human rights (e.g. the right to fair trial, the right to security and the right to receive medical health care) possessed by all individuals including citizens, legal residents, tourists and temporary visitors.

Furthermore, some of the negative attitudes and preconceptions towards asylum seekers are reflected in the proposed 2015 Refugee Amendment Bill which seeks to restrict, as a deterrent measure, the possibility for asylum seekers to work while in South Africa. This proposal raises several concerns with regards to its actual implementation, due to the many administrative challenges and rampant corruption within the Department of Home Affairs, and it is my view that the deprivation of the freedom to work may threaten to degrade asylum seekers in South Africa. The limitation of the right to work might, in fact, deprive asylum seekers of the only means to support themselves while their applications for asylum are pending and represents a violation of the constitutional right to dignity.

Beside the Refugee Amendment Bill and other piece-meal legislative amendments, in June 2016, the South African government released a Green Paper on International Migration initiating a process that is going to lead to comprehensive overhaul of legislation. The Green Paper focuses on several areas (e.g. the management of residency and naturalisation; the management of international migrants with critical skills and capital and the management of international migration in the African context, amongst others) but despite presenting some commendable proposals, it was disappointing in terms of certain expectations. For instance, it has raised numerous concerns regarding

² Government Printing Works & IEC audit outcomes: AGSA briefing; Refugees Amendment Bill: Deputy Minister & Department briefing, 11 October 2016. Available at: <http://bit.ly/2fH8s35>.

the intention of delinking permanent residency from the length of stay in the country by not allowing long-term temporary residents, including recognised refugees, to apply for permanent residency. I believe this proposal to be morally unjust as it contravenes the ethical principle that “the longer people stay in a society, the stronger they are morally entitled to the same civil, economic, and social rights as citizens, whether they acquire formal citizenship status or not.”³ Temporary workers, both skilled and unskilled, who have spent at least five years in the country participating in the domestic market and civil society, develop a moral claim to membership through their participation in the receiving society’s market and are not a threat to the collective. I argue that, for such immigrants, the claim to membership is an inalienable right and should not be restricted. I further believe that the length of stay in the country should be the guiding moral principle and the cornerstone of a full socio-economic integration and promotion of social cohesion.

In this regard, the Green Paper is silent on how robust and effective integration policies should be enforced. If it is, on one side, the responsibility of immigrants to integrate themselves in the local communities, receiving states need to ensure that they can offer immigrants concrete opportunities to learn the national language and the country’s basic social and civic norms. As stated by the European Commission, “the integration of migrants is a two-way process involving adaptation on the part of both the immigrant and of the host society⁴.” The Commission has further called on receiving states to: fight discrimination and xenophobia; integrate immigrants into the labour market; grant civic and political rights to longer-term immigrant residents; and to establish a civic citizenship; measures directed at women and families from immigrant backgrounds; a welcoming society (the responsibility of national political leaders); specific integration programmes at national, regional and local levels; and long-term, comprehensive integration programmes

³ See, Joseph H. Carens, “The Ethics of Immigration” (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 89.

⁴ See, “Integration of third-country migrants”, Background Paper, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, (2007), available at: <http://bit.ly/2dyGBFB>.

developed through partnerships involving national, regional and local authorities and civil society. None of these issues have been sufficiently addressed by the Green Paper and integration still remains a great challenge to the governance of migration. I concur that human mobility in South Africa is largely characterised by temporary circular migration by individuals who are not in search of permanent integration, but the country is also home to tens of thousands of asylum seekers and refugees who do not want, or simply are unable, to return to their countries of origin.

My concern is that the new migration policy intends to facilitate forms of temporary labour migration that might resemble exploitative and old fashion *Gastarbeiter* systems of immigration, depriving undesirable migrants such as low-skilled/unskilled workers, refugees and their families from the right to reside permanently.

Sergio Carciotto
Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA)
Cape Town

Responsibility Sharing: Towards a Unified Refugee Protection Framework in Africa

Ncumisa Willie* and Popo Mfubu**

Abstract

In most African countries, refugees are not welcomed with the sense of regional solidarity that surrounded the promulgation of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Instead, African states have increasingly followed the lead of European states by closing their borders, deporting those who have made it into their territories or restricting them to camps. Even in those countries where refugees are admitted, their treatment does not meet the Convention's standards and obligations. Despite South Africa having enacted legislation, the Refugees Act, which is hailed as one of the most liberal domestic refugee protection frameworks in Africa, it has regressed in its refugee protection policy.

Continued conflict in the Horn of Africa, environmental disasters and struggling economies have resulted in a migratory flow of people to South Africa. This paper will argue that due to the fragmented manner in which African states approach refugee protection, countries such as South Africa, that have liberal and progressive refugee protection frameworks, will continue to experience higher migration flows and thus shoulder a greater responsibility.

In response to this migratory pressure, this paper will demonstrate how the South African government has begun to intentionally and unlawfully violate the Refugees Act as well as regional obligations, and will demonstrate how South Africa has adopted policies and practices aimed at hindering, discouraging and restricting access to asylum. This paper will propose that African states should adopt a unified regional approach to refugee protection in order to share the responsibility of refugee protection.

* Refugee Rights Unit, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Email: ncumisa.willie@uct.ac.za.

** Refugee Rights Unit, University of Cape Town, South Africa. Email: popo.mfubu@uct.ac.za.

Keywords Refugee protection, Africa, coordinated approach, responsibility sharing, burden sharing.

Introduction

At the end of 2014, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2015c: 4) reported that there were 59.5 million people globally who had been displaced by conflict, persecution, violations of human rights and generalised violence. Of the fifteen conflicts throughout the world that have erupted or reignited, over fifty percent of them have taken place in Africa, specifically in Côte d'Ivoire, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, the north eastern parts of Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and more recently Burundi (UNHCR, 2015a). By mid-2015, the conflict in Somalia resulted in 1.1 million people fleeing the country as refugees, the third highest number of people seeking refuge in Africa. Somalia is closely followed by South Sudan (744,100), Sudan (640,900), the Democratic Republic of Congo (535,300) and the Central African Republic (470,600) (UNHCR, 2015b: 6). Sub-Saharan Africa alone accounts for more than 4.1 million refugees, which is the largest proportion of the world's total refugees hosted by a single region, with more than half of the top ten refugee producing countries located in sub-Saharan Africa.

The above figures reveal the magnitude of the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and with so many people in need of urgent protection, the next logical question is who must shoulder the responsibility of providing protection to the ever growing number of refugees in Africa? Importantly, given the inordinate pressure placed on some domestic states and not others, how must the responsibility be shared amongst African states in an equitable manner informed by a human rights approach in accordance with international refugee protection law?

Without a well-coordinated and uniform approach to refugee protection, many asylum seekers and refugees are left to the mercy of unilateral domestic refugee legislation and policies that are often restrictive and not in line with the principles, ethos and obligations of either the 1951 United Nations Convention and the subsequent Protocol of 1967 Relating to the Status of Refugees (herein after the "1951 UN Convention") or the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (herein after the "1969 OAU Refugee Convention").

This paper will critically examine African states' fragmented approach to refugee protection, with most adopting policies, legislation and other measures in response to the growing numbers of refugees in order to shirk or shift their international responsibility towards refugees, ultimately contributing to the uneven distribution of refugees on the continent. Furthering this argument, we focus on South Africa as one of the examples of a worrying trend throughout the region that indicates an absence of solidarity and responsibility sharing in relation to refugee protection. We conclude this paper with some recommendations on how African states need to approach the African refugee problem in a coherent and unified manner.

Methodology

From a research methodology perspective, this paper will primarily draw on the authors' own experiences as practising refugee law attorneys in South Africa. The discussions will also stem from an analysis of international and regional refugee protection instruments, including domestic refugee legislation from various African states, reports and statistical data from refugee protection agencies such as the UNHCR and secondary sources such as discussion papers and research papers from distinguished migration and refugee scholars.

Brief Overview of International Refugee Protection Instruments

After the Second World War, when the world witnessed some of the gravest human rights violations and atrocities in history, it became clear that international mechanisms to protect and uphold human rights were needed. In 1948, at a sitting in Paris, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Apart from fostering domestic respect for human rights among member states, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights envisioned that there would be times, as history had proven, when people's lives or human rights would be at risk and they would need to seek asylum in other countries. Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that: "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries, asylum from persecution." The right to seek asylum would later be echoed on a regional level by Article 12(2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (1981).

In essence, Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided the foundation for later discussions that led to the formulation and adoption of the 1951 UN Convention which gave life and meaning to the right

to seek asylum in Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 1951 UN Convention was initially aimed at affording protection to people who were forced to flee their countries as a result of the conflicts in Europe at the end of the Second World War. Therefore, the 1951 UN Convention was initially limited in its application to those fleeing Europe before 1 January 1951. However, the 1951 UN Convention was amended by the 1967 Protocol which broadened the scope of its geographic limitation to include the rest of the world and to also include those who fled their countries before 1 January 1951. The 1951 UN Convention defines a refugee as a person who is outside of their country of origin and, due to a well-founded fear of persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, membership to a particular social group, or political opinion, is unable and unwilling to return to their country of origin (1951 UN Convention, Article 1(2)). This definition of a refugee focuses on the refugee as an individual and assesses the basis of their individual fears. The determination of refugee status is thus predicated on an adjudication of their claim on an individual basis.

The 1951 UN Convention and its definition of a refugee did not adequately cater for refugees fleeing war or generalised violence, a phenomenon which has and continues to plague African states. The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention was adopted in 1969 and formally came into force in 1974. The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention was specifically adopted to fill the gaps in international refugee protection that were not covered by the 1951 UN Convention and the Protocol of 1967 Relating to the Status of Refugees (George Okoth-Obbo, 2001: 87).

The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention expanded the definition of a refugee and catered to refugee situations that were, at the time, unique to Africa. The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention was intended to provide mechanisms to protect and assist the masses of people displaced by ongoing conflict and to provide durable solutions to the refugee problem in Africa. The definition introduced by the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, whilst incorporating the 1951 UN Convention, includes people who are forced to flee their countries of origin and seek refuge in another country due to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination and events seriously disturbing public order (1969 OAU Refugee Convention, Article I(2)). This expanded definition focused on the context in which refugees find themselves in their countries of origin. This definition was particularly cognisant of the need to cater for people who flee in large groups (mass influx) during conflicts, thus making it impractical to determine refugee status on an individual basis.

The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention promotes the recognition of prima facie refugee status, especially during times of mass influx precipitated by conflict. Here, the reasons for seeking asylum are not directly linked to individual circumstances. This approach involves the recognition of refugee status based on objective evidence and information about events in the country of origin, all of which advance a finding that a group of people from a particular country or area qualify for refugee status on a prima facie basis (UNHCR, 2005). For example, and as advanced in our daily work, Somalis fleeing parts of Mogadishu where the Al-Shabaab militia rebels have a stronghold are regarded as prima facie refugees because the conflict is recognised as pervasive and ongoing and because large numbers of people are fleeing ongoing violence caused by the civil war. The same can be said for parts of South Sudan and the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention was welcomed at the time, as an African solution to a largely African problem however, as will become clear in the next part of this paper, the implementation of the 1969 Refugee Convention has been largely disappointing throughout most of Africa.

The State of Refugee Protection in Africa

There has been a gradual but serious erosion of hospitality towards asylum seekers and refugees in Africa. The increased emphasis among African states is one geared towards tightening borders or containing refugees as opposed to protecting them. This approach is influenced by political, economic and security considerations instead of the humanitarian approach articulated in the preamble of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention. These sentiments were also echoed by George Okoth-Obbo (2001), Assistant High Commissioner for Operations at UNHCR in 1999 who lamented:

Not surprisingly, there has been strong impetus in some African countries to emulate [the restrictive approach being pursued in other regions]. Instances in which borders were closed in the face of refugees fleeing real danger have already been witnessed. Mistreatment of refugees and asylum-seekers as deliberate State policy has also taken place. On the whole however, the negative creep has been relatively contained. The moral effect of the Convention in Africa itself has a lot to do with the restraint. The fact that the Convention is so highly regarded particularly among its African stakeholders has definitely encouraged political adherence to its principles. Indeed, had there been no OAU Convention in Africa when the more restrictive tendencies

emerged the whole system of asylum and refugee protection would by now have collapsed.

The adoption of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention came at a time of great African solidarity. Many African countries, bound together in their mutual desire to be free and independent from colonial control, supported each other on a regional level in their struggle for autonomy. Therefore, African states welcomed refugees with 'open arms' (Rutinwa, 1999: 7). Unfortunately, not long after many of these countries had finally attained independence from their colonial oppressors, many of them soon erupted in civil war which, as time has shown, has been difficult to quell.

Sudan is but one of the many examples of this. In 1956, Sudan attained independence from colonial rule and shortly thereafter, in 1958 General Ibrahim Abboud led a military coup against the civilian government elected earlier in the year. By 1962, a full civil war besieged the south, led by the Anya Nya movement, a civil war that has taken on a different dimension today but still rages on (Fahmi, 2013). In explaining these tragic events, Douglas Johnson (2003) explains that "Sudanese independence was thrust upon the Sudan by a colonial power eager to extricate itself from its residual responsibilities; it was not achieved by national consensus expressed through constitutional means." This has been the destructive cocktail that has plagued most of Africa; governance attained by liberation movements is by itself an illegitimate means to secure power. The disturbing trend has shown that not soon after independence is attained, this illegitimate attainment of power is challenged and is itself overthrown.

Although in some circumstances conflicts in Africa have erupted as a result of external influences, many are a result of internal factors, the majority of which are ethnic and religious tensions and political differences. These civil wars have resulted in many people being internally displaced and those that flee remain in protracted refugee situations, such as those in refugee camps in Kenya which have served Somali populations for more than 20 years.

The exodus of people feeling conflict situations within Africa has largely not been met with an eagerness to receive them and to provide them with protection. In the 1990s, the Democratic Republic of Congo (then, Zaire) and Tanzania closed their borders at a time when the Rwandan Patriotic Front's rebel soldiers had started a civil war that claimed many lives (d'Orsi, 2008: 1062). With few alternative routes to escape, it is likely that many Rwandans, prevented from crossing into the Democratic Republic of Congo or Tanzania,

were victims of the conflict and were therefore in desperate need of aid and assistance. Many writers, though critical of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania's decision to close their borders during a time of great humanitarian need, argued that it was an understandable and practical response to the seemingly unending flow of Rwandans that sought refuge in the two countries. This could have been seen as a desperate act of frustration in the face of large numbers of refugees entering the countries. In March 1995, when the government of Tanzania closed its borders with Rwanda and Burundi at the height of the genocide in Rwanda, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared: "We are saying enough is enough. Let us tell the refugees that the time has come for them to return home and no more should come" (The Guardian, 1995; Rutinwa, 1999: 295).

The actions of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania in closing their borders in order to prevent asylum seekers from entering their territories and therefore preventing them from seeking asylum, was in direct violation of arguably the most important principle in refugee law contained in the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention (of which both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania were signatories and which both had ratified). This is the prohibition against the refusal to allow asylum seekers to enter a state territory or the expulsion of such an asylum seeker if they face risk of harm in their country of origin. This principle is referred to as *non-refoulement* and is considered the cornerstone of refugee protection. It is contained in Article II of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention which provides:

No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article I, paragraphs 1 and 2.

The prohibition against *non-refoulement* in the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention is without qualification, a significant departure from the 1951 UN Convention. The 1951 UN Convention provides an exception to the prohibition of *non-refoulement* and provides that *non-refoulement* will not apply in times where a refugee may be "[...] a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. The above exception in the 1951 UN Convention has been invoked (arguably without merit and as a devious guise to avoid responsibility for refugees) by countries such as Turkey and Germany during the Syrian refugee crisis. This is the

difficulty faced by countries that experience mass influxes of refugees. Apart from the sometimes insufficient assistance they receive from UNHCR, they are left to solely carry the ever growing responsibility of affording protection to refugees, protection that comes at a great cost to the national fiscus. In these difficult times, other African states do not respond with solidarity or assistance which further exacerbates the unwillingness of affected nation states to extend protection to those seeking refuge in their territories.

In 2001, the Namibian government ordered its national defence forces to 'shoot to kill' anyone trying to cross the Kavango bank – these were Angolan refugees trying to flee UNITAS soldiers. In 1999, Zambia forcibly deported large numbers of refugees and nationals from the Democratic Republic of Congo when they began to put a strain on Zambia's local economy (d'Orsi, 2008). On July 14 and 15 2010, Ugandan police rounded up more than 1,700 Rwandans, including recognised refugees, in the Nakivale and Kyaka camps and forcibly sent them back to Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 2010). In August 2015, Cameroon forcibly returned over 15,000 refugees from Nigeria who had fled the civil war waged by Boko Haram in the north, a war that is still ongoing.


In 2000, close to 1000 Sudanese refugees living in Ugandan refugee camps were forced to return home even though at the time, Sudan's seventeen-year civil war still raged on, with bombings of civilian targets and humanitarian aid projects by government planes, slave raids by pro-government militia, the collapse of a two-year ceasefire in a key province and a reluctant decision by eleven international aid agencies to stop their operations in southern Sudan (Reliefweb, 2000). Media reports confirm that Kenya will begin construction of a 700 kilometre-long security wall along the north-eastern border with Somalia as part of a broader national security plan to curb cross-border terror attacks by Somali terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, a move the UNHCR has criticised as an attempt to curb the flow of Somali refugees into Kenya (AllAfrica, 2015).

Preventing asylum seekers and refugees from entering a country's territory is not the only tactic employed by some African states. Some neglect to provide sufficient assistance to refugees or asylum seekers who are within their territories, leaving them in such deplorable conditions that they opt to leave on their own.

Even in countries such as South Africa that have liberal and progressive refugee protection legislation, the implementation of the legislation and the

asylum application process is, in our experience, arduous for asylum seekers. This is largely because the attitude and unspoken policy of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) is to find ways to reject applications for asylum rather than to genuinely evaluate them on a case by case basis (Amit, 2012).

Figure 1: Monthly asylum approval rates for 2015.



Source: Department of Home Affairs, 2016.

The figure above indicates that in 2015, the rejection rate for asylum applications in South Africa was over 95% (Department of Home Affairs, 2016). Mr Mandla Madumisa, Acting Chief Director of Asylum Seeker Management for the DHA presented these figures in parliament before the Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs on 8 March 2016 with great pride as though rejecting applications for asylum is the main task of the DHA. In our experience, even when the merits of an asylum application warrant the granting of refugee status in terms of section 3 of the Refugees Act, they are still rejected regardless. More than 90% of the clients we assist at the UCT Refugee Rights Clinic are asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected and, of those, 80% have genuine refugee claims.

A policy of leaning towards the rejection of applications for asylum has resulted in many applications bottle-necking with the Refugee Appeal Board, which is charged with adjudicating appeals from asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected as unfounded. The current backlog faced by the Refugee Appeal is, according to the DHA, approximately 12,361 applications. Applications also bottle-neck with the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs,

which is charged with reviewing decisions to reject asylum applications as manifestly unfounded or those that the DHA deems to be abusive or fraudulent. The current backlog faced by the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs is 44,048 (Department of Home Affairs, 2016). There is such a significant backlog of applications that some asylum seekers have been waiting for the resolution of their applications for more than 10 years.

In our experience, the lines at Refugee Reception Offices in South Africa are often so long that asylum seekers have reported to us that it often takes several days, if not weeks, for an asylum seeker to finally make their way inside the Refugee Reception Office in order for them to lodge an application for asylum. It has been the experience of the authors that asylum seekers often give up and remain undocumented. South Africa has the largest number of pending and unresolved asylum applications in the world (UNHCR, 2015b:13). Undocumented asylum seekers are unable to access social services and are exposed to the risk of arrest and deportation. A study in September 2007 estimated that approximately 470 asylum seekers were being “turned away” every day at the five Refugee Reception Offices (Human Rights Watch, 2008). When these undocumented asylum seekers are eventually detained by the police or immigration officials they are often sent to the Lindela Repatriation Centre, which is South Africa’s main deportation and repatriation holding facility. Some of those detained and awaiting deportation at the Lindela Repatriation Centre are in fact asylum seekers, which is in clear violation of South Africa’s Refugees Act and both the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention and the 1951 UN Convention. A report by the South African Human Rights Commission released in 2000 about the conditions at the Lindela Repatriation Centre found that “[...] people at Lindela who claimed that they were asylum seekers were not given the opportunity to apply for asylum, as was the policy.” Detaining and deporting asylum seekers whose claims have not been adjudicated is in violation of both domestic and international refugee law and often leads to refoulement. It is almost chilling to imagine how accurately the Office of the UNHCR predicted the future state of refugee protection in Africa (Okoth-Obbo, 2001: 87) when it stated that:

[...] in this relationship between African refugee law, policy and practice on the one hand, and global trends on the other lies the most serious likelihood of a further lowering of the thresholds of refugee protection in Africa. As has often been remarked, with the end of the Cold War, the political and ideological value attaching to refugees has waned. The attachment to upholding refugees’ rights which may have previously characterized the approach to asylum is in

fierce competition with tendencies towards the most restrictive and minimalist legal regimes, policies and practices... It is difficult to expect that these trends will not be observed in Africa, where the underlying social and economic constraints are even more compelling. Indeed, the tendency to emulate these trends is said by some already to be in evidence.

The only solace to the poor implementation of South Africa's refugee legislation has been a strong and vigilant civil society that has largely been the gatekeeper of the rights of refugees and has on many occasions litigated against the state in order to vindicate the rights of refugees where the state has failed to implement legislation. However, the space for civil society to engage and challenge the government has begun to shrink and will continue to do so with the introduction of amendments to refugee legislation. The South African Government is currently attempting to introduce the Refugees Amendment Bill.

Our view is that that the changes proposed in the Refugees Amendment Bill are by and large an attempt to narrow the scope of refugee protection in South Africa and in some respects to limit the rights afforded to asylum seekers and refugees. The proposed amendments introduce additional administrative hurdles which may have the effect of causing further delays in processing applications for asylum. The asylum application system is already fraught with huge backlogs, a lack of human capacity and corruption, but regrettably the new proposed changes do not deal with any of these systemic issues.

One of the more alarming amendments proposed by the Refugees Amendment Bill is the removal of the right to seek and attain employment which is currently afforded to asylum seekers. In removing this right to seek and attain employment, the Refugees Amendment Bill fails to deal with how asylum seekers will be able to obtain food, shelter, clothing and other basic necessities for themselves and for their families. Both the right to engage in work and self-employment have already been adjudicated by our courts and the courts have held that the freedom to engage in productive work is an important component of human dignity and our view is that the lacunae created by the Refugees Amendment Bill will lead to the gross violation of human rights. An approach which aims to roll back on the progressive approach to refugee protection is also echoed in South Africa's Green Paper on International Migration (herein after the "Green Paper"), which is a policy paper that seeks to overhaul the country's migration and refugee protection policy. The Green Paper proposes the establishment of "Asylum Seeker Processing Centres"

which will aim to house asylum seekers and restrict their movement while their applications are being processed. This will be in conflict with South Africa's urban refugee policy which includes free movement. The Green Paper is silent on who will provide food and basic services to asylum seekers housed in these processing centres. The proposed removal of the right to work and the introduction of quasi camp like centres is an attempt to make South Africa less of a desirable asylum destination and to curtail what the state refers to as "pull factors" that draw asylum seekers and especially migrants to South Africa.

Additionally, the South African government is proposing a Border Management Bill which is also in line with this worrying trend towards the securitisation of South Africa's borders. The Border Management Bill proposes the establishment of a Border Management Agency (BMA). The new agency will assume full control of ports of entry and borderline functions and will, once it is operational, take over responsibility for all ports of entry into South Africa. Its purpose is to exercise border law enforcement functions, manage legitimate movement of persons and goods across borderlines and at ports of entry, co-ordinate with "other organs of state, through the principles of co-operative governance" (Border Management Agency Bill, 2015:13) the functions performed by them in border management and provide "an enabling environment to facilitate legitimate trade" (Border Management Agency Bill, 2015:13). The draft bill also envisages the creation of a border guard which ties in with a December 2014 statement by Minister in the Presidency, Jeff Radebe, that both a border and coast guard will come into being as part of the BMA. There is currently no indication of whether the border guard will be staffed by soldiers currently in the South African National Defence Force or whether new recruits, who have to be trained and equipped, will be sought.

In summary, South Africa appears to have moved away from its national, regional and international obligations which require a humanitarian approach to refugee protection and towards an approach which holds securitisation and deportation as paramount considerations. As will be demonstrated in the latter part of this paper, this trend is unfortunately not unique to South Africa.

The above overview of the refugee situation in Africa paints a grim and depressing picture of the manner in which many African states have fallen so far below the standards envisioned by the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention or the 1951 UN Convention. A toxic combination of a lack of cooperation amongst African states and a focus on self-preservation and deliberate political isolation have largely led to this failure to provide protection to refugees in a

meaningful manner. As will be argued in the next section, establishing solidarity mechanisms during times of mass influxes of refugees is very much like an insurance scheme. If a state comes to the aid of another state which is experiencing an influx of a large number of refugees, certainly the affected state would reciprocate such aid.

Responsibility/Burden Sharing in Africa

It is worth noting that the term ‘responsibility sharing’ in relation to the protection of refugees is used in the title of this paper and is referred to in the introductory sections, as opposed to the term ‘burden sharing’ which is used in the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention and the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees. The term ‘responsibility sharing’ is preferred because it emphasises a commitment to the principle of human rights and solidarity which form the underlying premise for refugee protection. This differs from the potentially negative connotations that ‘burden’ may have on African countries’ understandings of their obligations towards the reception of asylum seekers and the protection of refugees. However, for completeness and to avoid confusion the term ‘burden sharing’ will be used.

The concept of burden sharing only appears in the preamble of the 1951 Convention on Refugees:

[...]considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation.

The 1951 Convention contains no further provisions or direction as to how this “co-operation” is to take place or how it is meant to be implemented in practical terms. The 1951 Convention creates no obligation on member states to cooperate or to share the burden of refugee protection but merely creates a context in which the Convention should be interpreted.

The 1969 OAU Convention Refugee Convention in Article II (4), though also unsatisfactory, goes a bit further and provides that:

Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States and through the OAU, and such other Member States shall in the spirit of African solidarity and international co-operation take appropriate measures to lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum.

There has been no example in the history of refugee protection in Africa since the adoption of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention where this provision has successfully been invoked and has resulted co-operation which has caused a 'lightening of the burden' on a host country.

People who flee from their countries of origin on account of war or persecution often flee to neighbouring countries or to countries that appear politically stable and economically viable. African states that find themselves neighbours to refugee producing countries or those that appear to be prosperous in relative terms, tend to, due to their proximity, shoulder the greatest responsibility of refugees fleeing from neighbouring countries. The distribution of refugees is thus, as Hathaway & Neve (1997) put it, an "accident of geography." Of the 616,220 South Sudanese refugees at the end of 2015, Ethiopia hosted 275,400 of them followed by Sudan which hosted 190,700 and Uganda which hosted 179,600. These three countries, due to their proximity, host the largest populations of South Sudanese refugees (UNHCR, 2015b: 6). Geographic proximity is an imbalanced way of sharing the responsibility of refugees on the continent. It is for this reason that many African countries who border refugee producing countries opt to restrict refugees to camps or find ways to prevent or discourage them from arriving in their territories. Where refugees do manage to cross into neighbouring countries, they are soon returned or forced to return to their countries of origin.

Other African states that are not neighbours to refugee producing countries have become a preferable choice for asylum seekers due to the perceived liberal refugee protection mechanisms provided in those countries. When African asylum seekers or refugees decide where to seek asylum, they are generally faced with only two options: being restricted to a camp and spending years in deplorable conditions or being able to live in an urban setting and with the opportunity to seek employment. Faced with these two options, the choice of where to seek asylum arguably becomes an easy one. In pursuit of a place of safety where they can live with some semblance of dignity and normality, asylum seekers will often travel across the continent of Africa to seek asylum.

Therefore, African states with more liberal and progressive refugee protection laws and policies and better economic prospects see higher refugee numbers. One such example is South Africa. South Africa's Refugees Act 180 of 1998, that includes an urban refugee framework and affords broad access to the same socio-economic rights as citizens, makes the country an attractive place of refuge. As of December 2015, South Africa hosted 912,592 asylum seekers and

refugees (UNHCR, 2015b: 6). Even though South Africa is in the southernmost point of Africa, it draws asylum seekers from as far as the eastern and western parts of Africa. In 2015 alone, South Africa received 71,914 new asylum applications, 9,322 of which came from as far as Ethiopia and 6,554 were from Nigeria (Department of Home Affairs, 2016). Asylum seekers from these two countries skipped Tanzania, Zambia, Namibia and Botswana and opted to apply for asylum in South Africa because it is perceived as an ideal place to seek protection.

However, over the past 10 years there has been a decrease in the number of registered asylum seekers in South Africa. In 2010, there were 222,324 asylum applications in South Africa as compared to 71,914 applications in 2015 (Department of Home Affairs, 2016).

Figure 2: Cumulative registered asylum seekers, 2006-2015.



Source: Department of Home Affairs, 2016.

The decrease in new asylum applications is not as a result of more peaceful times in Africa, in fact conflict has been on the increase; with the escalating violence being waged by armed forces such as Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and Mai Mai rebels in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo who continue to force more people to flee from their countries. We postulate that the decrease in asylum applications in South Africa is due to the implementation of new policies and amendments to legislation which South

Africa has adopted to make the country a less desirable place to seek asylum. These include heightened border restrictions and security, an increased focus on deportation and, importantly, an effort to make the application process for asylum so laborious that it becomes discouraging.

It is arguably no surprise that invoking the principle of burden sharing in Africa has been unsuccessful because there is no clear or concrete administrative or enforcement mechanisms. As Peter (1982: 280) argues "legal and administrative machineries for burden sharing must be constructed and implemented."

Recommendation Eight adopted at the Recommendations from the Pan-African Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa, Arusha (Tanzania) (1986), also advocates for this initiative, stating that it:

Recognizes that the effective implementation in Africa of the principles relating to asylum will be further advanced by the strengthening and development of institutional arrangements for "burden sharing" adopted within the framework of African solidarity and international co-operation, defined in paragraph 8 of the Preamble and Article II, paragraph 4 of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention.

The solidarity and co-operation envisioned by the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention remains but an elusive dream in the 21st century. In 1999, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Addis Ababa and Geneva, Dr Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU, and Mrs. Sadako Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, noted the following in a joint statement:

[...] thirty years after the adoption of the OAU Convention, the continent is still afflicted by the plight of over four million refugees on the continent and several times that number of displaced people inside their countries caused by socio-economic and political factors including, in particular, conflicts, political violence and instability. This situation is unhealthy and unacceptable. Such a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons poses a heavy burden on OAU Member States already saddled with tremendous security, social and economic hardships. We are concerned with evident compassion fatigue within and outside the continent which is undermining the very principle which guided the founding fathers in framing the OAU Refugee Convention (George Okoth-Obbo, 2001: 90).

What has become increasingly clear is that not even Europe has formulated an effective policy framework for burden sharing. The recent Syrian refugee crisis has exposed the inherent weaknesses in the Dublin System which is Europe's system of burden sharing. In theory it was meant to ensure that asylum claims are adjudicated expeditiously in the first European Union country an asylum seeker enters. Its key weakness is that it places the greatest burden on the country of first asylum as the primary actor responsible for refugee status determination. This is the first country that an asylum seeker enters. In relation to the Syrian refugee crisis, the countries of first asylum in Europe, due to geography, have been Greece and Italy. With a small stream of people seeking asylum the Dublin System holds, but as soon as the numbers of people seeking asylum increase, as we have seen in the Syrian refugee crisis, it completely collapses. The Dublin System shelters countries that are furthest from refugee producing countries. In 2015 alone, 850,000 people entered Greece with another 200,000 arriving in Italy. Without assistance, asylum determination at the rate required is nearly impossible. With little or no assistance from the rest of the European Union, the Syrian crisis started to turn into Greece and Italy's sole problem. What Greece and Italy began doing was to simply allow Syrian refugees to pass through their territories without processing them so that they became the problem of whichever country the eventually ended up in. This is often referred to as 'burden shifting.'

One of the only relatively successful burden sharing frameworks was the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees that was adopted in 1989 to respond to the many thousands of people fleeing Vietnam and Laos in the 1980s. The Comprehensive Action Plan was established as a framework for international cooperation at a time when asylum in South-East Asia was in crisis. It created a system of refugee status determination (screening) in the countries of first asylum that allowed those who met the criteria to be resettled, but those who did not qualify were swiftly returned to their countries of origin. While it restored asylum in the region, there were many problems with the Comprehensive Action Plan that led to concerns that it was merely an example of political expediency (Towle, 2006).

The 'every man for himself' approach to refugee protection has neither worked in Europe nor in Africa. Without a clear commitment to address the refugee problem in a coherent and coordinated manner that ensures that all states pitch in and contribute their collective resources regardless of geographic proximity, the refugee problem in both regions will continue to spiral out of control.

Towards a Unified Refugee Protection and Burden Sharing Framework in Africa

The following section provides broad recommendations on how African states should approach refugee protection in Africa in a coordinated manner that is consistent with the notion of a humanitarian approach as envisioned by the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention.

1. Ratification and Domestication of International and Regional Instruments

The most obvious starting point is to encourage African states that have not already signed and ratified both the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention to do so urgently. This would provide, at the very least, a level of international and regional accountability.

The next step would be to encourage African states to promulgate domestic legislation that gives effect to obligations in both the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention. The enactment of domestic legislation should however be coupled with the political will to implement the legislation fully. Countries like South Africa have progressive legislation but the implementation of that legislation falls short. Countries must be willing to employ their resources in order to appropriately provide protection to refugees and asylum seekers in times of need. To this end, Article I(1) of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention encourages states to “use their best endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality.” This disjuncture between legislation and its implementation was also cited by UNHCR as a challenge to refugee protection in Africa in UNHCR’s Special Issue of the International Journal of Refugee Law (Office of the UNHCR; 1995: 69-70) when it noted:

While the elaboration of legal standards is an important function in devising the framework for refugee protection, the optimal realization of these standards lies in essentially non-legal considerations of an institutional, resource-based, logistic and material nature. In other words, the elaboration of the appropriate legal regime for refugee protection must be underpinned by the consolidation of technical know-how and resources, logistic and other infrastructures and other material resources.

Domestic refugee legislation also provides recourse through domestic courts to asylum seekers and refugees in times where the state violates their rights or is in breach of its obligations. In this regard, Civil Society Organisations in South Africa has been very vigilant in times where the South African Government has violated the rights of asylum seekers and has used domestic legislation to champion the rights of asylum seekers and refugees. But for this to be possible, the legal and institutional refugee protection apparatus must be available.

2. A Uniform Approach to Accepting and Processing Refugees During Times of Mass Influx

The 1951 Convention or the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention do not provide a framework on how to receive and process refugees. In 2003, UNHCR published Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination which provides a guiding framework on how to receive and process asylum seekers.

This is perhaps the most onerous aspect of refugee protection in Africa, or anywhere in the world for that matter. How does a receiving state manage sometimes thousands of asylum seekers that have been displaced? African states have to date dealt with asylum seekers in times of mass influx on an ad hoc basis often with the assistance of the UNHCR. There is no uniform approach in terms of how African states deal with large numbers of refugees. Often when camps are set up it is with no involvement from the receiving government and the UNHCR bears the responsibility of documenting refugees and providing them with assistance, as in the case of the of the nearly 330,000 Somali refugees currently living in four refugee camps in Kenya. It is often unclear as to where the UNHCR's responsibility begins and ends, and what involvement the host country has. In South Africa for example, there are no camps due to South Africa's urban and integrated refugee policy, and asylum seekers and refugees enjoy access to basic services. The responsibility in this case rests with the South African Government. There need to be clear and predictable standards and approaches to dealing with refugees during times of mass influx. This can be developed as protocol in the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention and can take various regional forms to take into account conditions specific to that region.

3. Harmonisation of treatment and rights afforded to asylum seekers and refugees

As it has been argued earlier in this paper, the unequal treatment of refugees throughout the continent manifests in an unequal distribution of refugees throughout the continent. The 1951 UN Convention sets out broad rights that should be afforded to asylum seekers and refugees such as access to wage-earning employment and self-employment, housing, public education, identity documents and most importantly the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely. It is interesting to note that the right to free movement which is in Article 26 of the 1951 Convention has the most reservations by African countries. The reservations of the right to free movement indicate the preoccupation by African states with encampment. Most camps provide a method for African states to shirk their responsibility of caring for refugees and places emphasis on donor or UNHCR assistance. However, encampment creates dependency upon the state or the UNHCR to provide constant assistance for all of the needs of a refugee.

The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention is completely silent on what fundamental core rights should be afforded to refugees. It missed an opportunity to address and codify questions around humanitarian standards for the treatment of refugees such as free movement versus encampment of refugees, access to social services, safety and access to food. It is recommended that at the very least African states should afford refugees with access to the same social welfare services that are afforded to citizens as is required by Article 23 of the 1951 UN Convention which provides that “[...] Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is accorded to their nationals.”

The authors are, however, cognisant of the real financial challenge experienced by many African states which are themselves developing nations. Many struggle to provide basic services for their own citizens especially in times of economic hardship brought on by floods and drought. However, with the combined assistance of the UNHCR and other African states, it can be argued that they should at the very least provide assistance at a level equal to that of their citizens.

There is also predominantly no freedom of movement afforded to refugees by many African states. Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe’s refugee legislations require refugees to reside in designated areas. As stated before, South Africa

has an urban refugee framework but Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique's refugee legislations are silent in this regard.

Article 17 which affords refugees with the right to employment has the second most reservations entered by African states. South Africa and Mozambique afford refugees and even asylum seekers with the automatic right to employment. South Africa is, however, reviewing the right for asylum seekers to work and plans to amend its Refugees Act to narrow this right through a Bill. Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana require refugees to obtain work permits before they can work.

It is recommended that at a regional level African states determine minimum core standards for the treatment of refugees within domestic jurisdictions. A useful point of departure would be to revisit the recommendations of the Final Report on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problems (1967) which provides a useful roadmap of minimum standards that should be afforded to refugees. It is unfortunate that these standards did not make it into the final 1969 OAU Refugee Convention.

4. Harmonisation of Durable Solutions to Refugees

Local integration and naturalisation of refugees remains a thorny issue and a bone of contention amongst African states. Many African states are reluctant to provide the right to naturalise to refugees. Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa create the possibility for a refugee to naturalise if certain conditions are met. In South Africa, a refugee can apply for permanent residence if they have lived in South Africa for a period of five years as a refugee and where it appears that they will remain refugees for the foreseeable future. Malawi, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe's legislation is silent on the question of naturalisation. Tanzania used to naturalise refugees as a matter of policy but no longer does so. It is recommended that African states develop common approaches that allow for the integration and naturalisation of refugees especially those that have been residing in host countries for many years with a particular focus on second and third generation refugees.

5. Establishment of an Institutional Regional Body to Coordinate Refugee Protection

The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention only empowers the Organisation for African Unity (now the African Union) to resolve disputes and to collect statistical data from member states and to compile reports. A regional body such as the African Union together with the technical assistance of the UNHCR

could provide an operational, coordinating, monitoring and supervisory role in relation to refugee protection in Africa. The UNHCR was instrumental as the coordinating body during the South-East Asia refugee crisis.

6. Contributions to a Refugee Protection Fiscal Fund or Scheme

Hathaway and Neve (1997) advocate for states to contribute to a burden sharing 'insurance' scheme of sorts. The reality of refugee protection is that it requires financial and other resources. Hosting refugees not only comes at a social and political cost but has a fiscal strain on host countries in times of mass influx of refugees. Often expenditures arise from the national budget that have not been planned or provisioned for. Unless refugees are on a member state's territory they do not regard themselves obligated to assist. The UNHCR is often also unable to provide sufficient relief and aid for extended periods. In this regard, Hathaway and Neve (1997) note:

[The] distribution of the responsibility [...] is not offset by any mechanism to ensure adequate compensation to those governments that take on a disproportionate share of protective responsibilities. To the contrary, any fiscal assistance received from other countries or the UNHCR is a matter of charity, not of obligation, and is not distributed solely on the basis of relative need.

Where a financial resource scheme exists, it minimises the fiscal risk or exposure of refugee hosting countries when the need arises. An equitable system could be developed to determine contributions from member states which is based on ability and capacity. A method could also be developed to determine how refugee hosting countries draw on the fund when the need arises.

Conclusion and recommendations

As conflicts in Africa continue to rage on with no apparent end in sight, African states have begun to retreat in their approach to refugee protection which has moved from what Bonaventura Rutinwa (1999: 30) described as the "open door" policy to one of self-interest and self-preservation. This has been caused by a lack of capacity to host refugees in the face of ever increasing flows and the impact of refugees on host countries, a lack of a coordinated approach and an unwillingness to share the responsibility for refugees.

It is important to note that refugee protection and burden sharing in Africa should always be complemented with efforts to address the situations in

countries of origin that force people to flee in the first place. The UNHCR and many refugee law academics such as James Hathaway have written extensively on the need to address what is typically referred to as the 'root cause' of refugees or the conditions in their countries of origin that compel people to flee. Together with refugee protection, states must work to resolve the situations in home countries that force people to flee. The authors strongly agree with that argument and have not preoccupied themselves with that discussion in this paper because it has been dealt with at great lengths by other authors.

The implementation of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention has been fragmented and inadequate amongst African states. This has been largely due to a lack of resources, capacity and a shortage of political will to do so. Refugee protection is made more complex and difficult in the African context due to the fact that the majority of refugees often seek asylum in some of the world's poorest countries who are struggling to cater for their own citizens. However, with greater coordination of efforts, harmonisation of domestic policies and legislation, Africa can begin to share the financial and physical responsibility of refugee protection.

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Internal Migration, Remittances and Welfare Impacts: A Case Study in Dormaa Municipality, Ghana

Collins Yeboah*

Abstract

Though international migration and its related remittance flows have attracted considerable attention in recent years, internal migration has been the focus of academic and policy discourse for a much longer period. Studies have shown that both internal and intra-regional migration are far more significant in terms of the numbers of people involved and the quantum of remittances involved than international migration. However, despite increasing internal migration with its associated remittances, their linkages with welfare impacts are complex and mixed. As such, the actual welfare impacts of this phenomenon have been a source of debate in the literature.

Using mixed methods, this paper examines the relationship between internal migration, remittances and welfare impacts in Dormaa Municipality in Ghana. The study draws upon 202 migrant households on a sample of 358 households screened. The study investigates migration patterns and remittance flows, uses and impacts among migrant households in the municipality. The study suggests that many of the migrants moved to another town or village in Ghana for work-related reasons, notably job transfers, work or to seek work/better work. The study also shows that there have been substantial inflows of migrant remittances to households in Dormaa Municipality. These remittances have contributed significantly to improving migrant household's access to health services and education, and have also become an important source of income for consumption smoothing. The study recommends that government should make efforts to monitor remittance flows in Ghana and also increase awareness about the importance of remittances for both national and household economies. Further, there is the need to scale up education on social attitudes and discourses about internal migration and policy initiatives in Ghana.

Keywords Internal migration, remittances, welfare, households, education, health, food.

* Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana. Email: collinsybh@yahoo.com.

Introduction

Globally, migration and remittance flows have attracted considerable attention of scholars in recent years. Several studies (de Haas, 2007; UNDP, 2009; European Commission, 2012; World Bank, 2014; Randazzo and Pirancha, 2014; Dinbabo and Nyasulu, 2015) indicate that developing countries generate a huge amount of remittances and have shown optimism in the contemporary development discourse regarding poverty reduction at the household level. Migrant remittances are a source of income to most developing countries (European Commission, 2012) and have the potential to increase economic development of migrants' home countries (de Haas, 2007). Remittances are a crucial vehicle for poverty reduction in developing countries (World Bank, 2013), an important source of disposable funds for families of migrants and a potential source by which to finance development (European Commission, 2012: 8; de Haas, 2007: 1). Analysts indicate that remittances are twice the amount of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) and ten times more than the net private capital transfers to developing countries (Kapur and McHale, 2003).

Though international migration and its related remittance flows have attracted considerable attention in recent years, internal migration has been the focus of academic and policy discourse for a much longer period (see Lewis, 1954 and Todaro, 1969). According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2009), both internal and intra-regional migration are far more significant in terms of the numbers of people involved and the quantum of remittances involved. It is estimated that internal migrants outnumber international migrants by a ratio of roughly four to one (UNDP, 2009). Despite increasing internal migration with its associated remittances, the linkages between internal migration and welfare impacts are complex and mixed (Adepoju, 2005; Awumbila et al, 2014).

In Ghana, internal migration and remittances have received significant scholarship (Songsore, 2003; Opare, 2003; Awumbila, 2007; Boakye-Yiadom, 2008; Ackah and Medvedev, 2010; Awumbila et al, 2014; Awumbila et al, 2015). According to Quartey (2006: 6), migrant remittances serve as a source of income smoothing and better welfare for migrant households in Ghana. These remittances are used for both consumption and investment purposes that, in turn, have both direct and indirect effects on household welfare (Quartey, 2006: 6). Despite its significance, the relationship between internal migration and poverty outcomes has received little attention in both academic

and policy circles in terms of creating a national picture of the impacts of migrants' remittances (Dinbabo & Nyasulu, 2015; Twumasi-Ankrah, 1995; Srivastava, 2005). While some argue that this could be as a result of the paucity of data in the field (Boakye-Yaidom, 2008), others argue that the actual welfare impacts of migration are still unknown, which has been a source of debate in the literature (Awumbila et al, 2014). To Quartey (2006: 7), the relationship between migrant remittances and household welfare in Ghana has not been empirically investigated. As such, the actual developmental and welfare impacts of remittances have been a source of debate in the migration literature (Twumasi-Ankrah, 1995; Murrugarra et al, 2011).

Ghana's population is characterised by high mobility with more than 43% of all households in 2005/06 having at least one migrant (Ackah and Medvedev, 2010). Evidence from the Ghana Living Standards Survey 5 (GLSS 5) indicated that internal migration is the major form of migration in Ghana. By 2010, the proportion of the population living in urban areas was 50.9%, an increase from 43.8% in 2000 (GSS, 2012), and is projected to increase to 63% by 2025. Also, the population census indicates that about 35% of the population in Ghana are migrants or people living outside their places of birth. The recent GLSS 6 data notes that 48.6% of Ghana's population aged seven years and above were migrants (see GSS, 2014). It is worth noting that in 2005/06, 51.6% of the corresponding population were migrants, with the shares of males and females who were migrants being 49.8% and 53.2%, respectively (GSS, 2008). Thus, in comparison with the data from 2005/06, there is a slight drop in the population's share of migrants over the seven-year period from 2005/06 to 2012/13. Caldwell (1968) explained that internal migration, especially to areas where opportunities exist has become a livelihood strategy for most Ghanaians. According to Awumbila et al. (2014), rural-urban migration is a livelihood strategy adopted by many to move out of poverty in Ghana. Migrants send home remittances to their families left behind, yet the actual impacts on their welfare are not known. This article examines the relationships between internal migration, remittances and welfare impacts using a case study in Dormaa Municipality, Ghana. Structurally, this article is divided into four sections. The first section explains the theoretical framework and conceptual discussions regarding internal migration, remittances and welfare impacts. The second section reviews the appropriate literature on internal migration, remittances and welfare impacts, describing and analysing the relevant views and models that have been put across and highlighting gaps in the literature. The third section presents the methodological approaches

employed in the study and the fourth section discusses the results and provides the conclusion.

Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Discussions

The Push-Pull Theory

The push-pull theory of migration was postulated by Ravenstein (1889) in his work, 'The Laws of Migration.' The theory combined individual rational choice theory, Newtonian physics and other rural-urban and developmental perspectives to draw empirical generalisations on the flow of human beings between places (Dinbabo and Nyasulu, 2015: 33). de Haas (cited in Dinbabo and Nyasulu, 2015: 33) provides a summary of these seven laws as follows: "(1) most migration occurs within a short distance; (2) the majority of migration movements are from agricultural to industrial regions; (3) expansion of most bigger town centres is as a result of migration rather than natural growth; (4) migration develops in tandem with industrial, commercial and transportation expansion; (5) every migration flow produces a counter-flow; (6) most women undertake short distance migration while the majority of men indulge in international migration; (7) economic causes are at the centre of most migration flows."

This theory has been applied to the study of migration based on what 'pushes' migrants from the place of origin and what attracts or 'pulls' them to their place of destination. This theory postulates that the decision to move results based on these two opposing forces. According to King, 2012 (cited in Dinbabo and Nyasulu, 2015: 33), economic and socio-political factors present in both the source and destination countries explain the push-pull migration theory. Thus, factors such as "poverty, unemployment, political repression, poverty, etc... drive out ('push') people out of their home [source] countries". As pointed out by Awumbila et al. (2008: 20), "unfavourable conditions in one place 'push' people out and favourable conditions in an external location 'pull' them in." Critics of the theory argue that the push-pull theory is "barely a theory, it is more a grouping of factors affecting migration, without considering the exact causal mechanisms" (Hagen-Zanker, 2008: 9). Samers (2010: 55-56) describes these factors as "economically deterministic," "methodologically individualist" and "dreadfully antiquated." In addition, they do more or less address internal migration rather than international migration.

New Economics of Labour of Migration Theory (NELM)

The NELM connotes two main perspectives. First is the recognition “that migration decisions (who goes, where to go, for how long, to do what, etc...) are not individual decisions but joint decisions taken within the ambit of the household, and for different members of the household.” Thus, de Haas (2010: 16) regards the “family or the household as the most appropriate decision-making unit.” The basic assumption here is that the households or the family members together with the individuals collectively make decisions regarding migration. According to Massey et al. (1998: 21) the scale of the decision-making unit, sometimes, moves beyond the micro-environment into the meso scale of extended families and wider communal groups. The second part, according to King (2012: 23) is “that rational-choice decision-making is not only about wage and income maximisation but is also about income diversification and risk aversion.” Taking the two perspectives into consideration, the theory brings in the new idea that remittances serve as a major motivating factor for migration. That is, the families and household members are in “an appropriate position to control risks to their economic well-being by diversifying their income-earning and livelihood resources into a ‘portfolio’ of different activities, spreading their labour resources over space and time” (King, 2012: 23).

Conceptualising Migration, Remittances and Welfare

Migration, remittances and welfare are complex and context-specific. Therefore, it is crucial to explain the relevant terms used in this study to give insight to the readers regarding the specific concepts discussed. It is also paramount that measurements of the three concepts are clearly defined to allow for the analysis of the study.

Migration

Migration may be defined as a change in the usual place of residence that entails the crossing of an administrative boundary. The study adopts Awumbila et al.’s (2014: 8) definition of a migrant as “someone who has moved and settled in an area for at least six months.”

Remittances


In the literature, remittances are variously defined. However, in this study, Tewolde’s (2005 cited in Oluwafemi and Ayandibu, 2014: 312) definition is adopted, which states that “remittances are financial and non-financial

materials that migrants receive while working overseas and sent back to their households in their countries of origin.”

Measurement of welfare

In this study, welfare is defined based on an individual’s subjective well-being, that is, the condition of faring or doing well (Sumner, 1996). By this definition, welfare impacts of remittances will be measured by the subjective well-being of migrant households. Thus, households’ subjective well-being due to remittance impacts will be analysed by finding out whether they have improved access to education, health and consumption (food) after the migration of a household member. When a household responds that based on the remittances they receive, they have an improved access to either education, health or consumption (food), then remittances are considered to have positive impacts on households, and vice versa. The following figure shows the proposed model for testing the aforementioned relationship.

Figure 1: Hypothetical model: the relationship between migration, remittances and welfare.



Source: Author’s own compilation

From the above, it is assumed that migrants’ remittances sent to their household members left behind are used to care for the educational needs of their wards, to seek/pay for healthcare and to use for consumption purposes, particularly to purchase food. It is assumed that remittances used for these purposes will result in improved well-being.

Overview of Existing Literature on Internal Migration, Remittances and Welfare Impacts

Migration and Remittances

Though difficult to estimate as large amounts of remittances are channelled informally, migrant remittances represent the largest positive impact of migration on migrants' sending communities (Taylor, 1999: 67). Micro-level studies indicate that informal transfers of remittances are substantial. However, empirical evidence of the impact of remittance on poverty/welfare seems inconclusive. Although some studies have argued that remittances are used for consumption expenditure (Adams, 2005; Quartey, 2006), evidence from other studies suggests that remittances are used for human capital building (Adams, 2006; World Bank, 2013). Also, remittance flows are crucial for both migrants and the household members left behind, as research has indicated that remittance flows are "part of familial inter temporal contracts between the migrant and the remittance receivers (see Guzman et al, 2007: 126). This assertion is in line with the NELM theory that postulates that migration is a decision taken by both the migrant and the household and that migrant remittances are sent to families left behind.

Studies have found that migrants have different preferences with regards to how remittances are put to use. In Mexico, de la Cruz's (1995) study found that the remittances of male migrants are geared towards personal investments in land, housing, agricultural production and cattle. In a similar study, the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2007), found that a substantial number of women in Moldova remit funds to pay for education, health, furniture and loans whereas male migrants prefer to direct their remittances to investment in housing, cars and consumer durables.

Studies in Mali have shown that remittances are used to cover basic food and cash needs and pay for irrigation in agriculture (Findley and Sow, 1993). Households receiving remittances in Ethiopia and Sri Lanka invest more heavily in child education than non-remittance receiving households (Seife and Susan, 2005). A cross-country comparison of six sub-Saharan African nations shows a strong and positive correlation between the average number of household members with a secondary education and receipt of international remittances from outside of the continent (World Bank, 2013).

In Senegal, Randazzo and Pirancha (2014) found productive use of remittances among those receiving international remittances. The study found

that those receiving international remittances spend, on average, less on food and more on durables goods, education and investments, signalling a productive use of remittances. In four selected West African countries – Cameroon, Cape Verde, Nigeria and Senegal – Adarkwa (2015) found that inflow of remittances to Senegal and Nigeria impact positively on these countries' gross domestic product, but impact negatively on the GDP of Cape Verde and Cameroon. Also, using data from 1980 to 2013 to analyse the determinants of remittances to Nigeria, Laniran and Adeniyi (2015) found remittance flows to Nigeria as pro-cyclical in nature rather than countercyclical.

Through the review of literature on international migration and remittances, Adams (2011) observed that the impact of international migration on health and education in developing countries is mixed. He observed that while most studies find that international migration and remittances improve infant mortality and child health, by raising household incomes and increasing the health knowledge of mothers, others find the impact of migration and remittances on school enrolment and achievement to be more controversial. On the one hand, international remittances raise school retention rates. On the other hand, studies find that international migration has a negative effect on school attendance rates for teenage boys and girls because of the absence of parents due to migration. Other reviews by Siddique (2012) found that contrary to the popular belief that migrant families spend disproportionate amounts of remittances on daily consumption, findings show that education and health receive very high priority. For instance, various studies showed that remittances from international migration are disproportionately spent on education and health, rather than on everyday consumption.

In Ghana, remittances are spent on household consumption, education, debt repayment, financing of projects and investment in small-businesses (Quartey and Blankson, 2004). Both Quartey (2006) and Owiafe's (2008) respective studies on remittances and household welfare in Ghana found that remittance flows are counter-cyclical in nature; in that they increase in times of economic distress and work as a consumption smoothing mechanism and an informal stabilisation fund. Analysing remittance use using GLSS 4, Guzman et al. (2007) found that female-headed households receiving remittances from within Ghana have larger expenditure shares for health and education, while those receiving remittances from abroad have higher expenditure shares for health and spend significantly less on food and more on consumer and durable goods and housing.

Migration and Welfare Impacts

The world over, migration is increasingly recognised as enhancing the well-being of migrants and their households. Balbo and Marconi (2005) explain that as a result of increasing economic and social inequalities, migrating is becoming an integral component of family and community strategies to improve the living conditions of those who migrate as well as those who remain. According to Awumbila et al. (2014), parents encourage the migration of their sons and daughters to the cities in order to enhance the financial situation of the family at the origin through remittances. In this way, it can be said that the young migrants serve as insurers for their households (Siddiqui, 2012). Internal remittances received play a very crucial role in improving welfare and reducing poverty in Ghana (Castaldo et al, 2012). Kwankye and Anarfi (2011) also explain that the remittances sent home by migrants can help minimise the effects of economic shocks on household welfare.

However, studies on internal migration are mixed in terms of welfare impacts in Ghana. For example, Beals et al (1976) and Caldwell (1968), found a negative effect of origin locality's income on rural urban migration but a positive effect of a household's own income on the probability to migrate (see references in Ackah and Medvedev, 2010). Litchfield and Waddington (2003), also using GLSS rounds 3 and 4, found that migrant households have statistically significantly higher standards of living than non-migrant households in terms of consumption expenditure. However, in terms of non-monetary welfare indicators, the difference was not statistically significant. In another study, Ackah and Medvedev (2010) found that internal migration turns out to only be beneficial for a subset of Ghanaian households who send migrants to urban rather than rural areas. Despite this, the study found evidence that households with migrants tend to be better off than similar households without migrants. Ackah and Medvedev's (2010) study relied mostly on quantitative data without examining the subjective assessment by the migrants themselves. This study overcomes this shortfall by allowing for subjective assessment by the migrants themselves.


In other situations, migration does not increase welfare gains when compared with non-migrant households. Research by Awumbila et al (2015) in five regions of Ghana examining the relationships between internal/intraregional migration and poverty outcomes found no difference between the income or wealth status of non-migrant-sending households and migrant-sending households, which contradicts the general view that poor households are less

likely to migrate than wealthy households. However, the authors admitted in their work that the study results reflect a weakness in their data in capturing income and assets at the time of migration.

Research Methodology

The study employed mixed methods combining both qualitative and quantitative methods to gain deeper understanding of internal migration and remittances. The study predominantly targeted migrant households in the study area. The study adopted a two-staged stratified sampling technique. A screener survey was used to select households with and without migrants. In all, 358 households were screened. At the second stage, a random sampling technique was used to select 202 households that constituted the main respondents for the survey. Household heads were interviewed using both a semi-structured questionnaire and in-depth interviews. The quantitative data was analysed using STATA, whereas the qualitative data was recorded electronically, transcribed and uploaded onto NVIVO for analysis.

Figure 2: Map of Dormaa Municipality



Source: Centre for Remote Sensing and Geographical Information System, Legon (2016).

Results and Discussions

Factors Determining Migration in Dormaa Municipality

The economic theories on migration posit that, generally, migration (aside from forced migration) is an economic phenomenon; that is wage differentials, economic disparities, and unemployment differentials (Hannan, 1970; Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970). Others maintain that migration potential and migration decisions are dependent on push and pull factors. The rudimentary idea of the push-pull analysis is that “certain adverse factors (inherent in areas of origin) tend to ‘push’ people away, whilst other favourable factors (associated with areas of destination) tend to ‘pull’ potential migrants from their areas of origin to the destination regions” (Boakye-Yiadom, 2008: 77). In this regard, unemployment and lack of infrastructure, among other factors, are deemed unfavourable and push local dwellers from their communities. On the other hand, incentives for moving to the destination areas may be better employment opportunities, easier access to social services or adequate infrastructure (Boakye-Yiadom, 2008). The study findings show the relevance of push-pull factors in explaining migration. The survey results revealed that the main reason why people migrate is to seek work or better jobs (71.2%). That is, lack of jobs in the Dormaa Municipality ‘pushed’ the majority of the migrants to other areas. This is consistent with other studies (Awumbila et al, 2014; DMA, 2013; Twumasi-Ankrah, 1995) and explains the factors leading to out-migration. Every three out of four male migrants travelled to look for a new or better job compared to about 65.1% of their female counterparts. About 18.3% of the migrants also travelled as a result of job transfer, whereas 10.4% travelled to further their education. Relatively, many more female migrants travelled as a result of a job transfer (22.1%) or to pursue higher education (12.8%) compared to their male counterparts (15.5% and 8.6%, respectively). These findings show that the propensity to migrate in Dormaa Municipality, as in other areas, is a result of the search for perceived or real opportunities in the cities (Ajaero and Onokala, 2013).

Decision to Migrate in Dormaa Municipality


Until recently, migration literature has traditionally treated migration as an individual decision that is motivated by mainly economic considerations. However, this unitary view has been consistently challenged. It is now

assumed that the decision to migrate is a collective decision taken by the entire household (Boakye-Yiadom, 2008: 78). Migration has become a livelihood mechanism for diversifying income and to insure the entire household (including the migrants) against risks and uncertainty (Awumbila et al, 2014; Ackah and Medvedev, 2010; Boakye-Yiadom, 2008). The study revealed that the migrants themselves were the main people who made the decisions to migrate (55%). Respondents cite other people such as spouses (27.2%), parents and siblings (7.4% each), and guardians (3%) to have been involved in the migration decision-making process, lending support to the collective decision making within households. As expected, many more male migrants (57.8%) made decisions concerning their migration than female migrants (51.2%). This may be explained by patriarchal norms in traditional Ghanaian societies that see men as superior to women (Nukunya, 2003). On the other hand, husbands and parents influenced the migration decisions of female relatives more (30.2% and 10.5%) than their male relatives (25% and 5.2%) respectively.

Migrant Destination Communities

Migrants are rational economic agents moving to areas that maximise their incomes and overall well-being (Harris and Todaro, 1970). According to DMA (2013), the main destination areas for out-migrants in the municipality are overseas, Accra, Kumasi, Sunyani and the cocoa growing areas of Sefwi. In order to know where these migrants move to other than overseas, the respondents were asked to indicate where their household members are. The respondents indicated that their household members (migrants) have moved to other regions including the Brong Ahafo Region within Ghana (46%), different districts within the Brong Ahafo Region (41.1%) and other communities within the same district (12.9%). Over half of the male migrants had a migration destination outside of their region of origin (52.6%), compared to 37.2% of the female migrants. The greatest proportion of the female migrants, on the other hand, moved to other districts within the same region (46.5%), compared to 37.1% of the male migrants (see Figure 6). The survey results also show that young migrants tend to move more to other communities within the district – 20-29 years (28.6%), 30-39 years (9.9%), and 40-49 years (9.3%) – whilst none of those aged 50 years and above migrated to a different community within the same district. However, older migrants moved to other districts within the same region and other regions in Ghana.

Figure 3: Destination of migrants by gender



Source: Author, fieldwork, 2015

Migrants Economic Activities in Destination Areas

Migrants are engaged in a variety of activities in their destination areas, particularly in the informal sector. Ratha et al (2011) explain that most poor internal and international migrants move to the urban centres to work in the informal sector. Awumbila et al (2014) found that in Ghana, migrants living in slum areas in Accra are involved in income generating activities that are highly gendered.

Table 1: Main economic activity of migrants at destination

Economic Activity	Male		Female		Overall	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Paid labour	19	16.4	10	11.6	29	14.4
Service worker	13	11.2	12	14	25	12.4
Own business	18	15.5	6	7	24	11.9
Technician and professionals	13	11.2	10	11.6	23	11.4
Sales worker	16	13.8	7	8.1	23	11.4
Own farm worker	6	5.2	17	19.8	23	11.4
Domestic worker	8	6.9	15	17.4	23	11.4
Transport operator	16	13.8	3	3.5	19	9.4
Skilled construction worker	2	1.7	5	5.8	7	3.5

Manager	5	4.3	1	1.2	6	3
Total	116	100	86	100	202	100

Source: Author, fieldwork, 2015

Thus, while women were mainly working as petty traders, food venders, catering (chop bar) assistants, shop assistants, hairdressers, head portage (Kayayei) or plaiting hair, men were working as artisans, labourers in the construction sector, operators of motorbikes as taxis (okada) and other trades (Awumbila et al, 2014: 23). As shown in Table 1 above and in consonance with Awumbila et al (2014), this study found that in general, each of the migrants had a gendered economic activity that he/she was performing.

Migration and Remittance Flow in Dormaa Municipality

Studies have found that a significant proportion of migrants, both internal and international, send remittances or transfers back to their families at their places of origin, either in the form of cash or goods (Castaldo et al, 2012: 16). In studying remittances, both financial and non-financial remittances are important to the development of Ghana (Quartey, 2006). Remittances are important in that they are associated with greater human development outcomes on health, education and gender equality (World Bank, 2013) and contribute to poverty reduction in home countries because of heavy cash flows (UN, 2002). Remittances sent by migrants to their families and relatives in their originating communities are an important means to maintain ties with family members (Akyeampong, 2000).

The survey revealed that about 63.9% of the households received money from migrants. A slightly higher proportion of the female migrants (65.1%) sent money to their households than the male migrants (62.9%). This finding is not surprising as Abdul-Korah (2011) examined the gendered patterns of remitting by Dagaaba migrants using an historical lens and found that female migrants send money home more regularly and for longer periods of time than male migrants.

In terms of receiving remittances, the analysis revealed that many more male respondents (69.2%) received remittances in the form of cash than female respondents (58.2%). In the literature, issues of receiving remittances based on gender are mixed. Whereas some studies found females perceived as more trustworthy to receive money, others see males as those to whom money should be entrusted for the purposes of effecting projects. When a male

respondent was asked why his sister always sends money to him but not to his other female siblings, this was his response:

“For me, men can monitor projects. If you ask a woman to build a house, these masons will dupe them. But they dare not try this on men” (TP, 2015).

The study further revealed that the minimum amount of money received through remittances was GH¢90 whereas the maximum was GH¢2,500. The mean amount received was GH¢631.86 with a standard deviation of 522.39. Female migrants remitted higher amounts of money than male migrants: GH¢643.57 with a standard deviation of 482.60 and 622.88 with a standard deviation of GH¢554.10, respectively. Most migrants remit money to households upon request (55.8%) whilst a significant proportion also remitted money to their households on a regular basis each month (36.4%).

Very few studies have paid attention to remittance flows from internal migrants. This, according to the World Bank (2011), is a result of not being able to capture domestic transactions in the balance of payments by the central banks. Also, it could be as a result of the informal channels used to send remittances, which make it difficult to capture them in official estimates. The study revealed that the dominant method migrants used to send money to their households was through mobile money (50.8%). Other informal channels such as migrants bringing the money home themselves (21.9%), friends or other persons returning home with the money (14.1%) and informal money transfers (8.6%) were also prevalent. Western Union Money Transfer (4.7%) was also amongst the means migrants used to send money to their households. These findings indicate that despite the fact that most migrants send remittances, very few of them use formal channels. As such, internal remittance flows are difficult to capture in official government records.

Other Forms of Remittances in Dormaa Municipality

As noted by Quartey (2006), migrants send non-financial remittances such as food, clothing and mobile phones to their households in Ghana. According to Primavera (2005), non-financial remittances could come in the form of foodstuffs for consumption or items that can be sold or used by relations at the place of origin. In relation to this, the study found that apart from money transfers, other non-cash items were received by some of the households. Nearly 63.4% received food and other goods from migrants. Also, two-thirds of the female migrants sent food and other goods to their households

compared to about 61.2% of the male migrants. The main items that the households received from migrants in the last 12 months as indicated in Figure 3 below are clothing (20.3%), mobile phones (12.5%), household utensils (10.9%), food (10.2%) and jewellery (9.4%). Some differences were observed between items sent by male migrants and their female counterparts. Clothing was the most dominant item sent by both sexes, male (22.5%) and female (17.5%). However, female migrants were much more likely to send mobile phones (15.8%) and food items (12.3%) to their households than the male migrants (9.9% and 8.5%, respectively).


Another interesting finding is that people who migrated farther away from their households were less likely to send food and other goods to the household than those who were nearer. About 69.2% of those who migrated to other communities within the same district sent food and other goods to the household, compared to 66.3% and 60.4% of people who migrated to other districts within the same region and other regions in Ghana, respectively. This is not surprising, as perishable food items cannot be sent over a long distance.

About 27.7% of all households in the survey did not receive either cash or non-cash items. This finding could be the result of migrants being students. The households rather send money to the migrants as explained by one respondent when asked why they did not receive remittances from their migrants:

“Oh she is a student. You know students don’t work. She is there to study. We rather send her money and food every two months” (MK, 2015).

However, the study found that nearly 55.9% received both cash and non-cash items as remittances. This is an indication that remittances are sent in both cash and goods in Ghana (Quartey, 2006).

Figure 4: Items received by households from migrants by gender



Source: Author, fieldwork, 2015

Remittances and Welfare Impacts in Dormaa Municipality


The positive association between migration and improvement in welfare has largely been conceived through the concept of remittances (Awumbila et al, 2014: 29). It is generally assumed that remittances can contribute positively to poverty reduction by “providing migrant-sending households the resources to smoothen consumption and invest in productive ventures” (Awumbila et al, 2014: 29). It is also crucial to avert future eventualities, particularly financial losses. As explained by Hulme et al. (2001) cited in Quartey and Blankson (2004: 10), remittances when properly managed could serve as a form of premium payment for future risks to reduce vulnerability to financial shocks and to gain access to entitlements such as education and health that contribute to livelihood security and sustainability. Remittances are put to various uses. According to Quartey and Blankson (2004), remittances are mostly invested

in consumption, health care, education and housing. This part of the analysis examines migrant households' access to health, education and food as a result of having a migrant.

Remittances and Access to Health Services

Remittances are crucial and can serve as an insurance policy against risks. As a form of insurance, the study revealed that overall about 57.5% of the households which received remittances indicated that they were much better able to afford to pay for health services.

Figure 5: Households' improvement in ability to pay for health services after migration



Source: Author, fieldwork, 2015

This is not surprising as studies have shown that migrant remittances can contribute to better health outcomes by allowing household members to access health care services and enabling them to increase information about health practices. As shown in Figure 4 above, the analysis further observed a slight difference between male and female respondents with respect to improvement in their conditions regarding the affordability of health services (88.9% and 87.7%, respectively).


At a significant level of 5%, a chi-square test shows that there is no statistically significant association between households' improvement in ability to pay for health services after migration of household member by sex of the respondent ($p = 0.924$). That is, in general, the respondents, irrespective of their sexes, see improvement in their ability to pay for health services.

Though migrants' remittances are critical for health care services, improved access to healthcare as indicated by the household could also be an indication of the importance respondents attach to the National Health Insurance Scheme, a social intervention programme aimed at helping the poor and rich have equal access to quality health care in Ghana (Yeboah, 2013).

Remittances and Access to Consumption (Food)

The study revealed that every two out of three male respondents were much better regarding their ability to afford to buy food in their household after a household member migrated and sent remittances home. A relatively lower proportion of female respondents found their household in this situation (55.4%). However, overall, more households of female respondents had a general improvement in their ability to afford food after a household member migrated than households of male respondents (92.3% and 88.9%, respectively), as indicated in Figure 5 below.

Furthermore, about 91.7% of households who had children of migrants living with them reported a general improvement in the affordability of food compared to 86.5% of households that had no child of the migrant living with them. This is an indication that migrants tend to send remittances for consumption purposes if they have children left behind with relatives. However, a chi-square test of significance indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in household improvement in ability to pay for food after migration according to the sex of the respondent ($p=0.143$). The findings above resonate with findings by Quartey and Blankson (2004), Quartey (2006) and Castaldo et al (2012) that remittances in Ghana helped smooth the household consumption.


Figure 6: Households' improvement in ability to pay for food after migration

Source: Author, fieldwork, 2015

Remittances and Access to Education

While some studies have argued that remittances are used for consumption expenditure (Adams, 2005; Quartey, 2006), evidence from other studies suggests that remittances are used for human capital building (Adams, 2006). Thus, remittances may be used to finance schooling of children, which could lead to the reduction of child labour and school drop-outs. Nevertheless, paucity of household survey data on remittances and educational outcome means little is known about the empirical evidence of the impact of remittances on educational outcomes in Ghana and Dormaa in particular. However, studies indicate that remittance-receiving households in Ghana invest more in education than other households (Quartey, 2008). The findings from this study, as indicated in Figure 6 below, show that the proportion of households with female migrants (64.6%) who reported a much better improvement in their ability to pay for education outnumbered those with male migrants (55.6%). These findings give an idea about the gendered patterns of remittance use among migrant households in Ghana. Also, this is the only indicator where respondents noted a worse experience in their ability to pay for education.

Figure 7: Households' improvement in ability to pay for education after migration



Source: Author, fieldwork, 2015

Despite the fact that more females reported improvement in their ability to pay for school than males, a chi-square test of significance did not reveal any statistically significant differences in one's ability to pay for education than the other at a p-value of 0.722. Only households who lived with children of migrants reported a worse position in their ability to pay for education (1.8%). In these cases, the reason for this is that the migrant rarely sends money home to pay for fees:

“For 2 years now I haven't heard from him. He doesn't call, he doesn't visit us neither does he sends money to us. I personally pay for his children's school fees. In fact it's becoming difficult for me” (TL, 2015).

Despite such cases, the general picture indicates positive associations between having a migrant and access to education in Dormaa Municipality. Thus, remittances received by migrant households make a direct contribution to increasing household members' abilities to pay for education.

Summary and Conclusion

The foremost contribution of the study to knowledge was ascertaining how remittances derived from internal migration could impact or improve welfare of the migrant households receiving remittances in Dormaa Municipality, Ghana. Using welfare indicators such as education, health and consumption (food), the study interrogated the impact of migrants' remittances on their households' welfare and also addressed their policy implications.

The findings from the study indicate that migration is an enduring aspect of life in Dormaa Municipality. The propensity to migrate emanates from push-pull factors. Thus, lack of jobs and unreliable agriculture, amongst other factors, push migrants away from the municipality to other areas. The availability of jobs and other life-enhancing activities pulls migrants into these areas. However, the decision to migrate is taken by the migrants and their immediate households as an 'insurance' received in the form of remittances. Again, it is essential to emphasise that the results of both the quantitative and qualitative analysis indicate that remittances improve households' access to health, consumption and education. The study findings are consistent with other studies that show that internal remittances do have a positive impact on receiving households in terms of repayment of debts, improved access to consumption, better education and investment in enterprise (Afsar, 2003; Dayal and Karan, 2003; Ellis, 2003). The analysis further elaborates on the fact that even if not reducing poverty, migration is an important coping strategy and remittances smooth incomes (Mosse et al, 2002 cited in Castaldo et al, 2012: 20). Migrants' remittances play a crucial role in improving the well-being of migrant households left behind. As King (2012: 2) points out and as found in the study, remittances from migrants are used to hedge against other activities failing, to cover the basic costs of everyday life (food, clothing, education and health), or to invest in some new project such as a house, land or small business.

Recommendations

This study's findings raise a number of policy issues related to internal migration, remittances and welfare in Ghana.

The need for policies to address challenges faced by internal migrants: First, the findings show that many of the people who move out of the municipality are driven by lack of jobs, which is a result of spatial inequalities in development in Ghana (Songsore, 2009). The implication of this is that current

policies and programs aimed at discouraging internal migration, particularly to the urban centres, are bound to fail unless spatial inequalities in development are addressed (Awumbila et al, 2014). Therefore, it is imperative for the government to look at the potential that internal migration presents for the majority of the rural migrants to move out of poverty and fashion out policies that will minimise the risks faced by these migrants.

The need for migrants' remittance management: The study findings also highlight the need for remittance management in Ghana for national development. The development of migrant sending areas can generally be achieved through remittances and investments by migrants when remittances are properly managed. As Ajaero and Onokala (2013) argue, migrants' remittances and the income multipliers they create are critical resources for the sustenance strategies of receiving households as well as agents of regional and national development. The study findings indicate that a greater share of remittances is sent through informal channels, which implies that people engaging in this practice evade taxes. It is imperative for Ghana Revenue Authorities to devise strategies to check and formalise the operations of informal money transfer agents in order to be able to tax them so that Dormaa Municipality in particular and Ghana as a whole will benefit fully from remittances.

The need for remittances policy: The findings again highlight the need to initiate policies on remittance management in Ghana through collaboration with banks and other private agencies. This could be achieved by introducing new schemes for migrant workers and family members by banks and other financial institutions, by building strong partnerships between money transfer operators/banks/micro-finance institutions on the sending side and the receiving side. This will create opportunities for both remitters/senders and receivers to be banked. This requires the establishment of a remittance management wing in different banks under the supervision and guidance of the Bank of Ghana.

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Migration and HIV/AIDS in Rural South Africa: A dual-phase intergenerational, gendered chain migration

Alexandra Plowright*, Gillian Hundt** and Maria Stuttaford***

Abstract

Migration is a complex process that is fundamental in understanding the complexity of societies across the world. In South Africa, there are high levels of migration associated with HIV and AIDS, and the process is intrinsically linked with issues associated with population health. Research conducted in KwaZulu-Natal Province, and in the wider country, has reported on a circular migratory flow of women to and from the province. However, this paper presents findings suggesting that the gendered migration occurring in this area is actually an intergenerational process of chain migration that involves women of different generations moving to South Africa from households in other southern African countries. Younger women are initially motivated to move by various push and pull factors, such as economic or environmental instability. Despite enthusiasm to move and motivation to succeed in South Africa, their experiences of migration to South Africa are mostly characterised by negativity. Often exposed to unsafe conditions coupled with a lack of opportunities for meaningful work, many are left vulnerable to HIV contraction. Older women then migrate to follow their daughters in response to requests for support, forming the second phase of this process of intergenerational chain migration. As a result of this process, which is strongly influenced by HIV, there are emerging communities of younger women who require access to services for HIV, and older women who are in need of primary care services associated with ageing while they are providing assistance to their kin and new host communities.

Keywords Migration, HIV, AIDS, South Africa, Health, Gender, Women, Southern Africa.

* Research Fellow, University of Warwick's Medical School, Centre for Applied Health Research and Delivery. Email: A.S.Plowright@warwick.ac.uk.

** Emeritus Professor, Warwick Medical School, University of Warwick. Email: Gillian.Hundt@warwick.ac.uk.

*** Honorary Research Fellow, Cardiff Law School, University of Cardiff. Email: StuttafordM@cardiff.ac.uk.

Background and Review of Literature

Migration refers to the flow of people between and within regions and countries that takes place globally (Haour-Knipe, 2009). Migration can occur between as well as within regions and countries, as people from different backgrounds, generations and origins migrate in response to a range of push and pull factors. These factors can include forced displacement owing to conflict or famine, physical or economic insecurity and historical migration patterns. However, this paper is concerned with an emerging pattern of interregional migration. Interregional migration refers to the movement of people between countries, but within a geographical region. In this case, the region is sub-Saharan Africa. Interregional migrants often hold the view, and the hope, that the new host country will provide improved living conditions, such as security, migrant community engagement and opportunities for employment (Kok, 2006).

Migration is particularly evident throughout South Africa (Camlin et al, 2014) and has been influenced by the socio-political context of the Apartheid era. During Apartheid, historically disadvantaged, black South African men were systematically located to areas where labour was needed in order to reinforce the historically advantaged position of white South Africans (Posel, 2010). During this period, government policy sought to prevent the movement of black South African women away from rural areas (Ngcobo, 1990). This containment of women in rural areas sought to reinforce the control the Apartheid government had over the movement of black South Africans. Despite these movement restrictions, women have been successfully migrating to, from and within South Africa since the early 19th century, mostly as migratory leaders, in search of income-generating opportunities (IOM, 2010). Furthermore, Neves and Du Toit (2008) understand that the current structure and dynamics of households in South Africa can be attributed to these historical-political migratory movements.

The gendered nature of South African migration is increasingly being recognised and a number of studies have identified that migration in South Africa is disproportionately becoming feminised: it is a process that women participate in. Muhwava and colleagues (2010) reported increasing numbers of women participating in migration in KwaZulu-Natal Province (KZN), whilst Collinson et al (2006) identified that women aged 15-25 years are the most mobile population category in the country.

The migration dynamics within KZN, particularly, are a pertinent issue that have the potential to impact social cohesion, service provision and demography in the province. KZN is easily accessible for African regional migrants as it is located in close proximity to international borders with Mozambique and Swaziland. The province also has a number of large scale farming areas and popular tourist destinations that are perceived to offer employment opportunities. These factors, when combined with the lifting of restrictions on the movement of black Africans since the end of Apartheid in 1994, have meant that large numbers of economically active people of working age and ability have migrated to rural farming areas in KZN in search of employment in agriculture and tourism.

Migration in KwaZulu-Natal Province has been described as increasingly gendered (Camlin et al, 2014), and has been reported as such in research from the Northern Coastal Region of KwaZulu-Natal Province (Camlin et al, 2014; Bennett et al, 2014). Using data from the Africa Centre Demographic Surveillance Site (DSS), Camlin and colleagues (2014) report that 50.4% of women, as opposed to 35.3% of men, participated in migration to rural areas between 2001 and 2006. Similarly, Bennett and colleagues (2014) identified increasing mobility of women, particularly parents. Research from the Africa Centre DSS that documents the “extraordinarily high levels of mobility” of adults on the north coast of KwaZulu-Natal, also claims that these high levels and increasingly gendered migratory patterns are cyclical or circular, consisting mainly of local, rural-to-rural migratory movements of predominantly black South African women (Camlin et al, 2014). The authors found in 2001 that participants in migration of this sort were predominantly female (108 per 1000 female, as opposed to 86 per 1000 male) aged 2-24 years, with black South African women seen as participating more than men in a local short-term circulatory migratory flow, and predominating in a rural-to-rural flow of people.

In contrast, the findings presented in this paper suggest that the gendered migration occurring in these northern, coastal rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal involves a more complex flow of women. Women participate in an intergenerational process of chain migration, whereby older women move as migratory followers of younger women from their original households. These households of origin are most likely located in other Southern African countries, meaning that migration is interregional. The women leave in response to push and pull factors. One of these is HIV, which has been long

identified as being a major source of household instability, particularly in northern KwaZulu-Natal (Hosegood, 2009).

HIV has for three generations been the major public health challenge faced by South Africa. There are an estimated 7,000,000 people living with HIV in South Africa (UNAIDS, 2015), with the most vulnerable demographic sector being young women and girls aged 10-24 (UNAIDS and The African Union 2015). KwaZulu-Natal Province is disproportionately affected by the HIV pandemic, and has the highest proportion of people living with HIV in the country (28% of all adults) (HSRC, 2014).

As such, it is not surprising that HIV has been identified as an agent promoting the movement of household members to and from KwaZulu-Natal Province, especially women and children (Hosegood et al, 2004; Hosegood et al, 2007). However, the movement of people discussed in the studies above relates mainly to vulnerable, black *South African* women of reproductive age and not, as argued in this paper, different generations of migrant women originating from the same households from across the *Southern African* region.

This paper presents findings from fieldwork conducted in 2011 and 2012 in a rural location in KwaZulu-Natal Province that describe the migratory flow of women to this Northern Coastal area of the province. The findings indicate that there is a newly emerging intergenerational movement of women, which is different from previously identified patterns of migration. It is argued that the findings are relevant to the development of policy related to the provision of primary health services for women in rural areas of South Africa.

Methodology

Data collection took place in 2011 and 2012 in one large community comprising four village areas on the north coast of KwaZulu-Natal Province. The community, villages and participants are all anonymised. The research methods used during the ethnographic fieldwork were: non-participant observation and semi-structured interviews with younger women (30 years and younger) and older women (31 years and older). A basic community mapping exercise was also incorporated into the fieldwork.

Through non-participant observation, the researcher was able to become familiar with the different places and spaces, and was able to meet members of different social and community groups, as well as potential host organisations for accessing large numbers of the population of the villages. The researcher spent time observing popular places within the community,

talking to local people and making notes. Initially the researcher was based at a crèche and community project, which was selected as it was located in the centre of the commercial area and was easily accessible. However, as informal discussion with participants identified additional hubs less visible to an outsider, these were included in the sampled sites for non-participation observation too. These hubs included a central trading store that sold alcohol and groceries, where hawkers and informal traders gathered at month-end to sell home-grown vegetables and second hand clothing. The researcher was also directed to an '*uwashé*' which is an easily accessible area of the river, where women meet to wash clothes and chat, as well as other crèches located around the village areas. These crèches were mostly run by older women, *gogos* (grandmothers). Some time was also spent in *shebeens* (taverns without liquor licenses), talking to men and learning about gender relations in the community areas.

This non-participant observation facilitated the development of not only an understanding of the local socio-cultural context, but also the extent of the complex socio-spatial relationships between ethnicity, origin, migratory status and location, as people who originated from different countries in Southern Africa and other South African regions generally lived in different village.

Meeting people, women in particular, and engaging in informal conversation led to the identification of participants for the semi-structured interviews. Additional participants were identified using a snowball sampling method, which led to the final interview sample size of 64 women and 8 men. Men were included in some family group interviews, but not interviewed individually. All participants were provided with information sheets in the predominant local language, isiZulu, and gave their verbal informed consent before participation in the study. Whilst all participants were given the option to refuse to participate or to withdraw at any point without penalty, there were no refusals. Dr Alexandra Plowright conducted semi-structured interviews about women's experiences of migration, or migrants living in their communities. Some participants were interviewed not only individually, but also with their peers or families in natural group interviews. Women of all ages were included in the sample, with the only selection criteria being their willingness to participate. Men were not excluded from the sample, but were not actively sought. Therefore, the only men included in the sample were those who were present at the time of interviews with (a) female participant(s), where they chose to contribute to the discussion.

The interviews were conducted in a combination of isiZulu, SiSwati, English and uChope, depending on the language of the participant, and all interviews took place in a location of the participants' choosing.

Interview participants discussed their own experiences of migration, which were strongly rooted in their backgrounds: older migrant women spoke in depth about their own experiences and, their understandings of the experiences of others. Local, South African women of all ages were enthusiastic and eager to talk about their lives and experiences. During individual interviews women divulged personal information, and discussed sensitive topics, such as their views on the HIV pandemic, attitudes of others and sometimes their own HIV status. Group interviews were usually conducted later, either in peer or family groups. Peer groups provided a platform whereby women of similar ages could discuss issues pertinent to their generation, whereas family groups sometimes included men and, as such, provided insight into the gender dynamics within the household as well as socio-cultural norms within the village.

Selected women from different generations were invited to participate in a basic, modified participatory mapping exercise. Participants involved in this were those whose interviews referred to and relied heavily on visual representations of their village. The mapping exercise involved the participant and the researcher walking together through the village with a very basic map, containing a diagram of the river, the two main roads and a cross that indicated the starting location (usually the woman's home). As the journey progressed, the participant identified the places of interest to them and marked them on the map. This methodology led to the telling of detailed, complex stories about their lives in the local area, their experiences, their feelings and their personal history and links with the community and the village where they lived. Data were analysed thematically by Dr Alexandra Plowright using NVivo 9 software. The analysis was inductive, and data from different sources were triangulated to ensure rigour.

Results and discussion

Results from this research have demonstrated that migration to the study area located on the north coast of KwaZulu-Natal Province has led to the gradual development of a visually segregated space, divided into village areas that are distinguished according to the migratory origin of residents.

At first glance, the area seemed to be a generic, typically South African, isiZulu-speaking community that was small in size. However, the true extent of diversity was revealed through both observation and interviews with residents from different backgrounds: the larger community area was segregated and segmented. Specific spaces had developed for non-migrants and others for migrants. The latter included South African internal migrants and international migrants who were mostly from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Swaziland.

The wider area was clearly divided into four highly distinct sections, with characteristics that set them apart as separate villages. These different village areas are referred to as villages A, B, C and D. Village A comprised of low-cost housing built as part of the government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which focuses on providing housing and infrastructure for previously disadvantaged, low income, identification-holding South Africans (Tangri, 2008). These houses were relatively well constructed, using concrete blocks and tiled roofs, and had communal water supplies.

In contrast, Village B consisted of homes made of natural materials – mainly rocks, sticks and branches – and all had tin roofs. These houses were informally constructed and appeared unstable. Residents from Village B were mostly South Africans who were unregistered; they did not have an identification book, which is needed to apply for RDP housing.

Village C was the final area inhabited by South African residents and houses were built in the style of modern Western style bungalows, and were large in size. Each had a garden and most had an indoor bathroom with running water. An emerging middle class of black South Africans lived here.

Village D consisted of overcrowded, poor quality houses, many of which were owned by sugarcane farmers and, historically, had been used to house migrant farm labourers. Empty buildings were occupied by unemployed migrants and all dwellings were overcrowded, of poor quality and without access to sanitation and water supplies.

These four village areas looked very different as they were each characterised by a different style of building. They represented an underlying disparity in income as well as a poor quality of life that is often associated with spaces occupied by many migrants and non-migrants.

Women and men of different ages, backgrounds and migratory origins lived in each of the four village areas. Some lived with their families, some alone, and

some in shared rooms utilising communal facilities. Both younger and older women shared their experiences of migration.

Younger women

Younger participants in this study indicated that they had most commonly been the first family member to move to South Africa. Many had been inspired to move by the experience of friends or neighbours from their home community, as well as their own perception that migrating provided access to wealth, better living conditions, modern clothing and commercial items. Other younger women described feelings of disillusionment with their circumstances, opportunities and prospects in their home communities. In particular, participants from Zimbabwe associated these feelings with political or environmental instability and described how these feelings and experiences pushed them to migrate. Most indicated that they had incurred negative experiences of both the journey and their arrival in rural KwaZulu-Natal. These had resulted in the younger women migrants often adopting high-risk livelihood strategies in order to ensure their survival. These strategies often posed a risk to their own health and their children's health that was sometimes further heightened by reluctance to access primary care services.

The possibility of earning salaries in South African Rands (ZAR) and sending money back to their homes were both major pull factors that inspired the migration of younger migrant women. Some described how they had observed neighbours in their home communities receiving remittances from family members who had previously moved to South Africa and seen the effect the extra income had on the material circumstances of neighbours and returning migrants. One participant explained how this affected the dynamic in her home community:

I used to see women buying the newest stuff for their kids, new clothes from the expensive shops. Neighbours used to try and do better than each other... build bigger and better, with brighter colours, that sort of thing... Every month, this one family used to go to town and buy cows or a tractor. Then the next month their neighbours would come back with a plough, some goats or a new bicycle, just to prove who had more money (Precious, 22, Mozambique).

The situation described by Precious, above, and the access to sought-after material items appeared to motivate young, female migrants to move to South Africa. As Menenhle explained:

Me, I wanted nice things. I could only get that if I moved away (Menenhle, 18, Mozambique).

Other younger women explained that they had become disillusioned with life in their home communities. Princess described how a lack of income made her want to move away:

I didn't like my home because we were poor...I was cold, hungry and by myself much of the time (Princess, 24, Zimbabwe).

Often, younger women wanted to move in order to experience more of life as there were few opportunities for personal growth and no prospects in their home communities:

I moved because I wanted to see this, to have more of an experience of life that is not just my small village, where there is nothing you can do (Thabsile, 33, Swaziland).

Some women reminisced about how they felt unhappy with their position as women in what were regularly described as strongly patriarchal, gendered home communities. For some younger participants, like Princess, this was a major factor in their decisions to move to South Africa:

I was living at home and had to do all the jobs, I was expected to be married to someone horrible because his family had money and my family had none. I had no choice... I knew I was having to get away (Princess, 24, Zimbabwe).

A number of younger participants, like Princess, originated from Zimbabwe. They moved from unstable home environments where they felt unsafe and lived in fear of hunger, drought, civil war or political unrest. They lived without income and were worried for their survival. The women saw their migration to South Africa, not as a luxury or a long awaited goal in their life trajectory, but as a necessary move to ensure more secure futures for themselves and their children if they had any. As Thembeke explained:

South Africa, at least it was better than sitting at home dying slowly like we did in Zim...No food, so much stress about the children, the life there, where are we going to live, our houses...I don't know how to stay there; the problems with the politics and it is all making it impossible to eat (Thembeke, 24, Zimbabwe).

Some younger migrant women indicated that they had often made choices before their move that focused on facilitating their future migration. Some, like Dinance, decided to delay being in a relationship or having children:

I didn't want a boyfriend, didn't want to get pregnant and have to stay behind. I wanted to move to South Africa for a new start. I didn't want the stress of getting in a relationship and then leaving (Dinance, 30, Mozambique).

Others explained how they lessened their emotional ties to their home communities and households as they were focusing on their impending move to South Africa, which they wanted to be as emotionally easy as possible. Princess said:

[She] didn't want to have a boyfriend, have a family in that place or make friends, because there was no point, [she] was moving away... (Princess, 24, Zimbabwe).

Many younger generation migrant women wanted to move to South Africa for a safer, improved life. Yet they often described negative experiences of their eventual journeys to South Africa that were characterised by extreme vulnerability:

I didn't know where I was, I had no knowledge about the safety of the area. I would put my money and my cell phone in my bra, and wrap myself up in layers of clothing. I would sleep very lightly and wake up at the smallest sound... I was also worried about malaria... Usually you are sleeping inside at night, you are safe... I was very, very scared (Menenhle, 18, Mozambique).

Some, like Thembeke, described experiencing rape or abuse:

A drunk man fell over me and put his face next to mine, he was breathing all over me, it was disgusting, then a sex worker took a customer to the table next to mine, and there were people taking drugs all over the place, walking around with that funny look... I felt so scared, and worried they would rape me or steal from me (Thembeke, 24, Zimbabwe).

Yet most, like Zinhle, were afraid of being alone:

I was so alone. I missed my family, my sisters, my friends. I had no job... I didn't even know how I would find a job in the morning. I wished I could have gone back home (Zinhle, 22, Swaziland).

The reality of what was available to them as migrant women was often far from the perceived improved economic and social life they had hoped for. Jobs were described as being hard to find and poorly paid. Accommodation was either expensive or associated with exacting manual labour on sugar or banana farms. Tilly explained:

I looked for a job for many days, then got one but it was hard work... [I] had sores on [my] arms, legs, feet, burns from chemicals on [my] legs... [I] was exhausted, and worked sixteen hour days... [I] only got paid R30 per day. It was the only work [I] could get, and if [I] left [I] would lose [my] room (Tilly, 23, Mozambique).

Often the income earned was a small amount of money, so women found that they were unable to afford to provide for their basic needs let alone send money home. Many resorted to multiple livelihood strategies in order to improve their living conditions and increase their income. However, these strategies were often high risk and made the women vulnerable to abuse and HIV. Livelihood strategies identified by participants included transactional sex, pregnancy for the child support grant through the use of 'grantmakers' who are informal, illegal brokers. Alternatively, they turned to 'sugar daddies,' older boyfriends who often gave valuable gifts like mobile phone airtime, food or cash. Princess described how she resorted to additional income generation methods in order to survive:

I couldn't afford to live, I needed to send money home, so I started having sex [with an older man] for airtime, mealie meal, clothes. It meant I could send money back home... I got pregnant and I used a grantmaker for the [child support] grant payment (Princess, 24, Zimbabwe).

As a result of relying on livelihood strategies of this kind, many younger migrant women reported health problems associated with pregnancy, tuberculosis, HIV, untreated reproductive health conditions, skin complaints and sexually transmitted infections, that often were untreated. Thabsile described how her actions and choices resulted in her concerns about her health:

I am in a relationship with a man, he is not like I thought he would be. He drinks, he smokes, and he smokes dagga [marijuana] every day. He doesn't work, but he expects me to. At the end of the month he steals my money and uses it on sex, so I worry all the time about my health. He refuses to use condoms when he sleeps with me, and we already have three children... It makes me stressed that the children are from this horrible man (Thabsile, 33, Swaziland).

Younger women who had children after their migration to KwaZulu-Natal revealed how their own decisions and choices also negatively impacted on the health of their children through HIV-related complications. These complications were mostly the result of not having access to Post Mother to Child Transmission Therapy (PMTCT) whilst pregnant, Thembi explained:

I didn't take the medicine when I was pregnant, now I am sick, I have HIV. I have children who are sick, they have HIV. I have a boyfriend who is sick, he has HIV. We are all sick... When you have HIV and you do not have the medicine, then you get more sick, you can't breathe, you throw up, you can't work, you can't get food, you eat badly, you throw up more (Thembi, 22, Swaziland).

It appears that these health problems were exacerbated due to the difficulties experienced and the reluctance felt by these younger, migrant women in accessing primary healthcare services. In Thabsile's opinion, she was not alone in her concern over accessing state-run primary care services:

There is a church person who can give me medicine, but they don't give me the HIV medicine... I don't go to the clinic, I am scared that they will take my children away. I don't take my children to the clinic, because they might send them away... There is no medicine. We all feel this way (Thabsile, 33, Swaziland).

As a direct result of their experiences of migration to South Africa, coupled with concerns and barriers to accessing primary care facilities, it was not uncommon for younger, female participants in this research to describe how gradually, over a number of years, their health deteriorated and many eventually felt unable to care for their children. Some, like Thabsile, described being made homeless, as she became unable to work and had to move into overcrowded, expensive, poor quality accommodation.

I felt sick... I couldn't move... I thought I was dying and then I was told to get out of my room. I had nowhere to go, so I had to pay to live in a

shared room, with other sick people... It is bad, really bad (Thabsile, 33, Swaziland).

Many younger women, like Pretty, described feeling despair, sorrow and sadness at their situations and described complex emotions about their situations:

Some days, I wake up and I just want to give up. I can't go home, I can't stay here. I have nothing... My children have nothing... What is there left? (Pretty, South Africa).

In response to their experiences of poverty, vulnerability, poor housing, chronic disease, deteriorating health and food insecurity, a number of younger women described how they called for help from their mothers. This call for help acted as a pull factor for the older generation of women, working in combination with previously existing push factors such as poverty, instability, environmental or political insecurity and poor living conditions. In combination, these factors acted as triggers for the migration of older women to South Africa.

As a result, there is now an emerging group of older women who are secondary migrants – migratory followers of their daughters – who have moved to rural KwaZulu-Natal ostensibly to help the younger generation of women from their families, but also in response to negative conditions in their home communities. This flow of older women to rural KwaZulu-Natal forms the second phase of this intergenerational dual phase migratory process.

Older women

Older women were mainly migratory followers of their daughters. They were generally willing and eager to tell their stories. They described their home communities, experiences of their journeys to KwaZulu-Natal, their experiences of arrival in the area and their shock and disappointment when they realised the conditions that their daughters, and in some cases grandchildren, were exposed to. They described feelings of sadness and despair at the progressive degeneration of the health of their daughters after their arrival. In contrast with the younger women, older female migrants tended to share stories of their home communities that were associated with positive experiences and memories. Rebecca reminisced at length about her home community in Mozambique:

Home...the green coconut trees, and the sparkling ocean... There it is beautiful (Rebecca, 60, Mozambique).

Nancy, a migrant also from Mozambique, often discussed her home country and her community. She compared it to how she perceived South Africa:

Mozambique is a country full of sunshine, colour and beauty. South Africa? South Africa to me is a dull colour, maybe one time it was a bright yellow, but today it has dulled to brown. There is no joy in this place, no happiness. Not even the white man who I see with all his money and his huge farms, they have no happiness in their soul, they are full of sadness, greed and the anger. Anger is in all South Africans. Tell me, how can a country be rebuilt on a foundation of anger? (Nancy, 60, Mozambique).

Women like Rebecca and Nancy often expressed longing and sadness when speaking about their previous lives. They regularly described scenes of husbands, friends and children; living in extended family homesteads; growing food in '*mashamba*' (vegetable gardens) and enjoying the abundance of fresh fish:

We had a large family, we would all work together, grow our food, the men would catch fish. Nobody was hungry and nobody was sick, it was a beautiful home (Rebecca, 60, Mozambique).

Many women, however, also admitted to experiencing negative factors, such as insecure living and poor quality infrastructure and services including inadequate healthcare provision. In addition, they spoke of challenging environmental factors that included monsoon rains and drought at different times of year.

We had the civil war... I remember not having food, having people get sick a bit with cholera... sometimes there were landmines (Rebecca, 60, Mozambique).

These experiences, when combined with the pull of their daughters' need for help, resulted in the migration of older women to rural KwaZulu-Natal.

Similar to the women from younger generations, older migrant women also described uncomfortable and unsafe journeys from their home communities to South Africa. Duma's journey to South Africa from Zimbabwe, highlighted the dangers of women travelling on their own:

I was travelling in the dark and I had to cross the border at Limpopo. It is dangerous, there are men with guns and a lot of people shouting at us... There are a lot of migrants... I managed to get the last place on a taxi, but it was crowded and someone stole food from me (Duma, 40, Zimbabwe).

Even for those already living in South Africa, the arrival in KwaZulu-Natal after a long journey was also unsafe. Zodwa described her experience:

I arrived very late, and there was no one around really, just a shebeen [unlicensed bar]. I was lucky though, because I found a place where I could rent a room for a night. It was expensive but it is not safe to just sit around. Any tsotsi [criminal] can hurt you (Zodwa, around 50, Trust, South Africa).

However, and perhaps due to the respect that is present in Southern African contexts for older women and men, older migrant women did not discuss experiencing any form of abuse when travelling to South Africa. Rather, their main source of negativity was caused by the emotional trauma of seeing their family members living in poverty. Zodwa described her experience and her feelings:

Eventually, after three days, I found [my family]. They were living in a room made out of plastic. Horrible bad place, right near by the sugar cane. I had to ask a lot of people to find them... Their house wasn't a house. They had moved from a beautiful house at home, made of bricks, even with a proper, indoor bathroom... This was horrible... This wasn't a real house. I sat and cried before I had the courage to enter (Zodwa, around 50, Trust, South Africa).

Some older women had been expecting to find their daughters living in perhaps cramped conditions, or maybe without enough clothes or space for their children. However, many described being extremely shocked by the reality of the conditions they found their family members living in:

I knew there was a problem, because [they] wouldn't have called otherwise... I thought maybe there was no money, I thought maybe there was no food sometimes... [But] there was a big, big, big problem, it was a bad situation, very bad...[they] were all so sick, there was nothing... it was terrible (Nelly, 45, Mozambique).

Most alarming for many older women was the noticeable and gradual degeneration of the health of their daughters. Whilst many had travelled to South Africa fully expecting that their daughters would need a substantial amount of help, none had quite imagined the extent to which they were unwell, often incapable of looking after their children and themselves. This was experienced by one participant, Ember, who travelled from Zimbabwe to South Africa, where her daughter and her children were living:

I came here to look after them, but when I got here... my daughter... she couldn't do anything, then she died... My grandchildren, the one, he is dying... it is my job to try and care for them, to make the one better (Ember, 55, Zimbabwe).

In response to the situations in which they found their daughters and themselves living, alongside their shock and grief, older women drew on great strength. They demonstrated resilience and resourcefulness, and they developed friendship groups for support. Elise explained how her friends helped her make a new life in South Africa:

I am better now, I have my friends, and we have a small income that comes in, which means that we can help the children [grandchildren]... we live close to each other and we help each other... It is not like when I first got here and I knew nobody. Then it was very difficult... Too hard (Elise, 40, Mozambique).

Through their friendship groups, the older migrant women joined together to help each other. Subsequently, support networks were formed that consisted of women from similar backgrounds who were experiencing similar situations.

Older women also tended to adopt positive livelihood strategies informed by their life experiences in order to address problems and resolve issues found in their new lives, such as vegetable gardening, working in crèches, looking after children and others, caring and informal trading. Jabu described how she came about starting a vegetable garden:

I didn't have money to buy food, but I had my skills, so I looked for a chance to use them and found one [making a vegetable garden]. Now we have food for our whole house, and money when there is extra to sell (Jabu, 42, Mozambique).

In many circumstances, the daughters of these older women eventually passed away, dying from complications associated with their HIV status or the later stages of AIDS. When this happened, the older women described being left to care for their extended families, or others from their community, which often included young grandchildren or children of other women. For example, Dudu started an informal crèche looking after the children of sick women in the community. She described her feelings:

I can't help myself, so I need, now, to help others... My daughter, I came here for her and then she died... Many, many have died and left poor children behind. I can't go home, I don't have the money and I will not have the money – now I definitely will not have the money, because I have so many children – and so rather than sitting here in this place, I need to help the people that need it. Those people are children. I am committed now, to dying in this place... My friends are committed now to dying in this place. We are needed here to help (Dudu, 45, Swaziland).

A community of older, proactive female migrants, therefore, has been formed in a rural area on the north coast of KwaZulu-Natal. The community is a source of support, help and friendship to members, and many share or trade food, clothing and school uniform or medicines for themselves or their grandchildren. Most of these older migrant women feel that rather than being absorbed by negativity in their new-found situations, it was important to concentrate on the positive. Most were prepared to stay, living positively in KwaZulu-Natal, mostly for the benefit of their grandchildren. As Jabu explained:

I was sad, yes, when I first came, but as I made friends and created a job for myself, things got better. Now I have good friends, an income and I have my grandchildren... My grandchildren need me here, not in Mozambique. I am not unhappy that I will stay here forever... Yes, I sometimes miss home, but there are also things that I am glad to be away from (Jabu, 45, Mozambique).

The majority of these older generation women portrayed a positive attitude towards both their own and their grandchildren's health, unlike their daughters before them who had experienced concern about accessing state healthcare and other facilities. Duma described her experiences asking for help at the local clinic:

I am old, I do not care what people think of me, I go and ask for medicine if my child is sick, they must give me... it is their job. I do not care what they think of me, coming from Zimbabwe when my child needs medicine (Duma, 40, Zimbabwe).

As a result of the attitude of grandmothers like Duma towards the health of their grandchildren, many children are now attending school as well as receiving health care. Despite the proactive nature of the older women in terms of their grandchildren's health requirements, it should still be acknowledged that there are complex primary care requirements specific to this growing community of ageing migrant women in relatively good health. As Jabu explained:

I go all the time to the clinic for my grandchildren... I am selling the vegetables to get the money to travel with them on the taxi... the [grandchildren] then do not have to walk to get their medicine... I think they get everything they need... When I go to the clinic with [my grandchildren] I also ask for myself, sometimes I am feeling dizzy, sometimes I am getting [bashes her chest where her heart is] and a bit of pain here, I find it difficult to walk sometimes and breathe but there is nothing they can do to me, just send me to some hospital (Jabu, 45, Mozambique).

Whilst older migrant women like Jabu experienced positive care at primary healthcare clinics for their grandchildren, the services provided were related to HIV and basic primary care. However, there is a clear difficulty in accessing primary care services that catered for their own health needs, which were concerned with women's health requirements in later stages of life.

Conclusions and recommendations

This study identified a shift in migratory patterns in a rural area of Northern, coastal KwaZulu-Natal Province in South Africa. The data demonstrate that there is gendered dual phase intergenerational migration, in which younger women migrate and are then followed by related older women. These older women are generally their mothers. The pattern of migration identified here is single direction, and interregional. Previous research from the Africa Centre DSS identified that migration to this area is a cyclical process associated with women from younger generations, from different areas of South Africa, who move for labour purposes and then return home regularly for visits out of season (Camlin et al, 2014; Bennett et al, 2014). However, this study identified

that, rather, there is a dual phase, interregional and intergenerational process of migration that affects both younger and older women. Younger women were likely to move to the rural, farming area from neighbouring Southern African countries in order to find work and improve their own lives. These women can be described as migratory leaders. However, the women's experienced reality of their participation in this gendered migratory flow was not always as they had hoped and expected. In order to cope with negative experiences, younger women resorted to the adoption of multiple and risky livelihood strategies in order to stay alive and make a small income. However, these livelihood strategies often made them vulnerable to HIV infection and, as a result, many contracted HIV and were often unable to care for their children. As a direct result, their older mothers moved to the area and, in turn, adopted positive strategies to survive and demonstrated resilience when coping with their new-found life circumstances. These older women can be described as migratory followers.

It can also be ascertained that the construction and development of households in this area of KwaZulu-Natal Province can be directly attributed to this pattern of migration. This finding is not dissimilar to that identified in the Eastern Cape by Neves and Du Toit (2008). However, Neves and Du Toit understand that historical-political nuances in South Africa impact household construction, whereas this is an emerging migratory pattern rather than one that is historically and socio-politically grounded.

As a direct result of this shift in migratory patterns, there is an expanding group of older, migrant women who are affected by the repercussions of the HIV status of their family members. These older women are living in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal Province. These women require assistance in terms of financial support, primary care for degenerative disease, as well as recognition for the support they provide to their kin and members of their communities. Further research could explore the extent to which this is or can be provided by rural, primary healthcare clinics and what improvements could be made in this respect.

We would further argue that this gendered intergenerational international dual phased process of chain migration might not be specific to the study location or even, the KwaZulu-Natal Province. This trend may be occurring more widely in other areas of urban and rural South Africa. Inclusion of a relevant question in national level household surveys such as the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) or the Human Sciences Research

Council (HSRC) Household Survey detailing migratory origin and behaviour of respondents could extend understandings of the generalisability of these findings. These findings raise further issues concerning health care provision and support for both younger and older women.

Acknowledgements

With thanks to the Africa Centre for Population Health for assisting with affiliation and supporting the ethical approval process and the University of Warwick for facilitating access to funding for the PhD research on which this paper is based.

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Nowhere to Run: A Review of the Political Economy of Migration, Identity and Xenophobic Violence in Zambia

Phineas Bbaala* and Njekwa Mate**

Abstract

Zambia is one of the Southern African countries that have not witnessed any serious bloody conflicts either in their post-independence eras or the periods hitherto. Consequently, the country has, over the years, provided refuge to many victims of ethnic and racial conflicts from other African countries, especially within the Sub-Saharan African region. However, Zambia faces the daunting challenge of sustaining interregional, interethnic and interracial harmony among its own indigenous groups and those identified as foreign immigrants. The April 2016 xenophobic looting of shops belonging to other African nationals by residents of Lusaka highlighted the intensification of ethnic and racial conflict in the country. Amid these identity conflicts, some commentators from different intellectual and other persuasions have tried to explain ethnic and racial identity problems in relation to primordial, constructive and instrumental theoretical underpinnings. This article goes further to draw a relationship between economic downturn and identity and xenophobic violence. The article draws arguments from a review of existing literature and empirical data.

Keywords Migration, identity, ethnicity, racism, regionalism, xenophobia.

Introduction

This article attempts to interrogate the deepening ethnic and racial divide in Zambia. Until recently, most scholarly works on Zambia have exclusively focused on ethnic conflicts among the country's major tribal groups. However, the occasion of the April xenophobic attacks by Zambians, mainly involving the looting of shops belonging to Rwandan and Congolese immigrants, necessitated this article. From the onset, one must state that international law obliges Zambia to provide shelter to refugees and other people of concern who are forcibly displaced from their home countries. The major pieces of international law that require Zambia to fulfil this obligation include the 1991 United Nations Convention, the 1967 United Nations Protocol and the 1979 Organisation of African Unity Conversion (UNHCR, 1991:4). Forcibly displaced

* Department of Political and Administrative Studies, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, the University of Zambia. Email: pbbaala@gmail.com.

** Lecturer at the University of Zambia.

people, although usually referred to as 'refugees,' can be further classified in accordance with their specific migration status and the nature of help they are seeking in the host country. According to the UNHCR (2009), these include asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returned refugees and returned internally displaced persons, among others. Collectively, all forcibly displaced people who require help of one kind or another in other countries are collectively referred to as people or populations of concern.

In order to proceed systematically, after this introduction this paper attempts to theorise and historicise the challenges of migration, identity and xenophobic violence in Zambia. While the background section highlights some of the elicited moments in the fomentation of ethnic and racial hatred in the country, the section on theoretical review evaluates the efficacy of some of the key conceptual arguments in explaining the causes of growing ethnic violence and xenophobia in Zambia. Thereafter, a synoptic trend of the migration situation in Sub-Saharan Africa in general and Zambia in particular is given. This is followed by a discussion of Zambia's identity conflict within the country's political economy. Within this, an account of the April 2016 xenophobic violence is given. The article discusses the political economy of identity in Zambia with the argument that the heightening ethnic and racial hatred in the country is a result of deliberate politicisation and economisation of construed social differentiation by a small but powerful rent-seeking politico-economic elite class. Then, the article concludes and recommends measures for fostering ethnic and racial harmony in Zambia.

Migration has occurred throughout human history as people move from one place to another in search of a better life. A migrant is a person who changes his usual place of residence by crossing an administrative boundary and residing or intending to stay in a new area for a period of not less than six months (CSO, 2013: 1). The movements of people internally and externally have been influenced by a number of factors some of which are presented here in no order of their importance. Firstly, individuals are sometimes driven out of their countries because of high costs of living and poor or declining economies that prevent them from living a decent life. In such a situation, the migrant targets a country that they perceive will provide an improved quality of life for themselves and/or their families. Secondly, people may be forced out of their countries for political reasons. Experiences of political violence or any related threats may influence some people to flee their countries for their own safety and/or that of their family members. Thirdly, others may be forced to flee their countries on religious grounds. Today, religious conflict has led to

some people being attacked or killed, thereby triggering the movement of the oppressed to regions or countries in which they feel they will be able to freely practice their religion without any or much victimisation. Fourthly, ethnic divisions have in many occasions throughout the world led to some people migrating to safe havens. This has occurred when one group dominates the other(s) in some aspects of life (i.e. political, economic or social), thus leading to the exclusion of the dominated group, which consequently triggers identity conflict.

Another related concept discussed in this paper is identity. Identity is the mechanism through which we locate ourselves in relation to the social world. Identity links the self with its social context. Identity exists in many forms, that is, cultural, national and ethnic, among others. Following Stuart Hall, Baldacchino (2011) considers identity as an impossibility born out of the psychic and discursive suturing processes of identification. Ethnicity, as a category of identity, cannot be viewed as existing in any sense, or as a substitute of culture for that matter. Ethnicity is composed of an interaction between the self and the other, intra-psychically just as much as inter-subjectivity.

This paper, therefore, is an effort towards a plausible explanation of how political, economic and social rent-seeking in the destination country could adversely affect the safety of immigrants. It presents widely drawn examples while focusing on Zambia

Background

The Republic of Zambia, born on 24 October 1964 when it gained independence from Britain, has gone through many politico-economic and social junctures. Most noticeable among these was the period prior to the arrival of the British South Africa (BSA) Company and the one leading up to independence. Before Cecil Rhodes' commercial interests pushed the BSA Company into mineral exploration ventures deep in the interior of the territory north of the Zambezi River (now called Zambia), there existed human communities defined and organised largely around their biological, tribal, language and other associations of blood and soil. Most importantly, nearly all of the tribal groups that inhabited the territory were either immigrants escaping from other hostile groups or wanderers into new territories in search of new opportunities that nature could offer. For this reason, most of Zambia's major ethnic groups that include the Lozi, Nyanja, Bemba and Tonga, are immigrants. For instance, the Lozi and Bemba came from the Luba-Lunda

Kingdom, while the Nyanja group escaped Shaka Zulu's wars of dispersal in modern day South Africa. Although the Lozi and Tonga, and the Ngoni (a part of the Nyanja group) and Bemba once fought during their migration between the 17th and 19th centuries, these groups eventually established their own ethnic nations existing side by side in relative peace. In fact, the former nemeses later introduced a system of inter-ethnic cousinship in which they jokingly tease one other without taking offense. This type of cousinship exists between the Lozi and Tonga, and Nyanja and Bemba groups (Bbaala and Momba, 2015:2).

Notwithstanding the fact that inter-ethnic cousinship has catalysed inter-ethnic harmony among former ethnic rivals, it has, itself, become a new source of identity conflicts as groups that play ethnic cousinship have tended to identify more with each other than with other ethnic groups. Over the years, Zambia has witnessed the clustering together of those of similar language and culture, and the emergence of ethnic stereotypes (Gluckman, 1960:55-70; Mitchell, 1956 cited in Dresang, 1974:1605-1617). As argued later in this article, cleavages of identity that are xenophobic in nature have evolved over a very long period spanning from the pre-colonial era to the post-independence era, and they affect social and political participation (Bates, 1970:546-561).

Although ethnic cleavage and conflict existed in the pre-colonial Zambian society, xenophobic identity and conflict are mainly associated with the penetration of white settlers into the territory. The entry of the Europeans into the territory north of the Zambezi, as was the case in most other African lands, was met with resistance by the local people. Dehumanising practices emanating from slave trade, colonialism and the proclamation of white supremacy over Africans led to the resistance of the Europeans' penetration into the territory. The failure by the white settlers to appreciate the indigenous political, social and economic institutions, and their imposition of European institutions they regarded as superior, stirred racial identity and conflict. For instance, the Livingstone Mail, the first colonial newspaper ever published north of the Zambezi, was on many occasions, as observed by Kasoma (1986:21), used to spearhead hate against the indigenous Blacks. The paper once carried a story that read: "The races can never mix, they are divided as East is from the West," and that Blacks were dirty people from whom the Whites were to keep away (Livingstone Mail, 1949 cited in Kasoma, 1986:21). Even those Africans who had eventually begun to adopt the European way of life were not spared from racial segregation. In Livingstone, one of the earliest

growing urban centres that also served as the Headquarters of North-western Rhodesia, some Africans had started working as shop-keepers. However, the introduction of an industrial Colour Bar by the white settlers ensured that Africans were relegated to those jobs that the whites disliked for being dirty, hard or dangerous (Gann, 1958:60-62).

There were many other legal and structural mechanisms in which the white settlers segregated against the Africans, including the operation of a social, economic and political system orchestrated to promote white dominance over other races. The treatment of people according to the colour of their skin was an institutionalised public policy under white rule. Consequently, different Rhodesian racial groups such as the Africans (or the Bantu as referred to by Gann), the minority Indians, Arabs and coloureds (or as they were otherwise called, the half-caste), were treated differently under the obtaining public policy and regulations at the time. As Gann (1958:175-191) points out, this social stratification system was dehumanising, especially to the Africans, and was designed to serve the interests of the minority white settlers in Northern Rhodesia. Particularly, as argued by Rodney (1976:250), colonial powers sometimes saw the value of stimulating tribal [and other identity] jealousies so as to keep the colonised from dealing with their principal contradiction with the European overloads. It is also worth noting that the colonialists did not only create social strata based on the major racial groups found in Northern Rhodesia. They also stratified the major local indigenous groups based on certain stereotypes. Additionally, they treated each regional-ethnic group according to the stereotype they had given it. For example, the Nyanja were viewed as methodical and clerical, the Tonga as rural and conservative, the Bemba as tough and hardworking, and the Lozi as proud and intelligent (Dresang, 1974:1605-1617). Although such identity tags were beneficial to the colonialists, they effectively sowed the seed of ethnic and racial hatred, the repercussions of which were to transcend the colonial period.

With increased political awakening owing to the activities of the African liberation movement in Northern Rhodesia – which was initially led solely by the African National Congress (ANC), and later jointly with the United National Independence Party (UNIP) – Europeans started conceding some rights to Africans. For instance, some constitutional amendments between 1948 and 1958 brought in a clause that ostensibly stipulated that the interest of one race of the community could not be subordinated to those of any other race (Mulenga, 2011:4). Notwithstanding this, inter alia, some isolated incidents of violence against the white minority were recorded in some parts of Northern

Rhodesia, especially during what Mulenga terms “The Violent Sixties.” Specifically, he refers to three important events in the period of 1960-1961. One of these events was the violent attack and murder of Mrs. Lily Burton by a group of drunken UNIP youths returning from a party meeting outside Ndola. Details were that the car in which Mrs. Burton and her two daughters were travelling was attacked using a petrol bomb. Mrs. Burton managed to save her children but not herself and died from her wounds days later (Mulenga, 2011: 6).

However, the period leading up to independence unequivocally revealed that as much as colonial rule remained the common enemy, the African was his own enemy given the emerging tribal identity conflicts among leaders in the African nationalist movement. Disagreements within the Africans nationalist movement, the ANC, led to a split among the nationalist leaders that culminated in the formation of another big nationalist party, the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC), in October 1958. The ZANC was later renamed the UNIP. This followed consultations among the young radicals of the party who felt that the ANC leader, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, was not determined enough to fight for independence (Sardanis, 2014:89). However, much of the literature on this subject fails to mention that this split of the nationalist movement was actually an act of ethnic repositioning among the nationalist leaders. This argument is supported by the fact that most of those who went to found or join the UNIP, including Kenneth David Kaunda, could easily be identified with the Bemba ethnic group and the north-eastern region, while those who remained in the ANC, including Nkumbula, were mainly associated with the Tonga ethnic group and the north-western region.

Ironically, as evidenced by most of the major elections before and after independence, ethno-regional identity, as an electoral factor, has seemingly taken precedence over more important characteristics in choosing national leaders. Undoubtedly, this has been detrimental to the development of the country, especially in the post-independence period. Each of the key African political parties has tended to perform well in regions associated with the ethnicity of its key leaders and has recorded poor results in regions dominated by other ethnic groups. Specific incidents of ethnic-based identity and conflict are discussed later.

Theoretical Review of Identity and Xenophobia

Although ethnicity as an academic subject has received deserved attention global scholarship over the decades, it remains of growing interest owing to

the new twists that it keeps assuming in changing political environments in different countries. In a nutshell, one can say that ethnicity is like a tree with many roots and branches, where the roots are the multiple causes and forms of ethnicity while the branches are the ethnic identities (or cleavages) as reflected by different ethnic groups.

When theorising ethnicity, one should underscore the primacy of 'identity.' All ethnicity problems are identity problems. Consequently, any good investigation into ethnicity tries to analyse the variables that define it. But what is identity? An individual's referent group, region, language, tribe, race, colour, religion, profession, lifestyle, inter alia, constitute his or her identity. Osaghae and Suberu (2005), view identity as any group attribute that provides recognition or definition, reference, affinity, coherence and meaning for individual members of the group, acting individually or collectively. By the same token, ethnic identity becomes a basis of ethnic hatred and xenophobia against those with whom one does not identify. Any study of ethnicity requires an in-depth analysis of its various patterns, precipitants and purposes. At this point, the paper examines the various patterns of ethnic identity and xenophobia.

Some scholars like Norris and Mattes (2003:8) view ethnicity as an enveloping term for many different forms of identity. In their view, ethnicity is an encompassing concept that one cannot define by any single demographic variable in a society. They contend that in some societies, ethnic identity may signify blood relations among members of an extended family or kinship based in a particular region. In other societies, ethnic identity may be an expression of common soil, faith, community affiliation or ancestry. Thus, individuals hailing from the same sub-territory of the country may identify themselves with a particular ethno-regional-lingual group. Joireman (2003:9), defines ethnicity by outlining features characteristic of an ethnic group, namely: i) proper name, ii) myth, true or false, of a common ancestry, iii) shared historical memories, iv) common culture defined by language, customs or religion, v) link to a geographical homeland and vi) sense of solidarity toward fellow members of the group. The preceding definitions clearly depict regionalism as a subset or a pattern of ethnicity. As stated in the preceding arguments, regional solidarity may also exist among members of different tribal groups who share a geographical homeland.

In debating ethnicity, other scholars such as Edward Shils, Clifford Geertz, Harold Isaacs and Walker Connor have presented arguments based on a

theory called primordialism. Geertz (1963) cited in Bacova (1998:29-43), credited as founder of the theory, defines primordial attachment [or identity] as stemming from the “givens” or, more precisely, the assumed “givens” of social existence of humans. Geertz (1963) cited in Bacova (1998:29-43) further argues that:

‘givenness’ is immediate contiguity and kin connection but also being born into a particular community, religion, culture, then it is the mother tongue, and sharing the same social practices. [He] states that the congruities of blood, speech, beliefs, attitudes [and] customs are perceived by people as inexpressible and at the same time overpowering per se. One is bound to one’s kinship, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow believer, ipso facto, as the result not only of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or obligation, but in great part by virtue of some absolute importance attributed to the very tie itself.

These natural and deep characteristics that imbue primordial identity entail an intense bondage between a member and their ethnic group. Cleavage to the group values and shared interests is thus likely to be as strong as the need to stand against external dilution. It also means that members of a given ethnic group are naturally divided from those belonging to other groups, meaning that interethnic group conflict is a naturally occurring phenomenon, especially since a person usually does not choose their blood relations and the other key ethnic neighbourhood elements at birth.

Critics of the primordial theory have often looked elsewhere for plausible explanations for the nature and causes of ethnic conflicts in countries. Consequently, other theories thought to underpin and explain ethnic conflicts have been espoused. The most important of these are the theories of constructivism and instrumentalism. Although the use of constructivist methods can be traced back to the works of philosopher Socrates, it is the Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget (1896-1980) who is accredited with the invention of this theory in his attempt to explain how people know what they know. Other scholars who have been popularly identified as constructivist include Michael Hechter, Charles Tily, Ernest Gellner, Donald Horowitz, and for some unknown reasons, most feminist authors on ethnicity. Under the constructivist interpretation of ethnic identity, an individuals’ cleavages or identities are constructed (and reconstructed), flexible, mutable and a product of society (Yang, 2000:39-60 cited in Boon, 2015:8). A constructivist sees social reality as a product of human socialisation, or at times, compromise.

Social institutions such as the media, churches, mosques, traditional initiation ceremonies, formal educational institutions, political parties, inter alia and opinion leaders play an important role in the construction of what one believes as social reality. For this reason, Samuels (2013:153 cited in Boon, 2015:8) and other scholars believe that political [or ethnic] identities are acquired and variable.

Wendt (1994:72) believes that an individual's identity and reality are constituted by the ideational or cognitive structures that humans as social actors are exposed to, meaning that certain characteristics exhibited by individuals would be absent in the void of these institutions. Ethnic identity or behaviour is, therefore, a product of the structures within or to which an individual is socialised. Based on this perspective, it could be said that primordial characteristics are typical of a primitive society in which its members have little or no interaction with an external world or languish in cognitive deprivation and backwardness. This means that with time and more exposure to new external social constructs of reality, a person is bound to learn new ideals and shift their beliefs about reality and identity.

Another theory that has been used to contextualise and explain ethnicity is instrumentalism. Unlike in the primordial and constructivist paradigms where ethnic identity is natural and constructed, respectively, instrumentalists argue that an individual's social identity and conflict is a result of struggle for power by some elite elements in society. Power is sought not as an end in itself but as an effective means to material ends. Bacova (1998:29-43) rightly observes that, in instrumental attachments, individuals' affiliations are stimulated by their desire to gain advantages (mostly economic and political). An important argument by the instrumentalists is the rejection of the primordial assertion that variations in ethnic attributes are the root causes of ethnic identity and conflict in society. To them, the cause of ethnic identity and conflict is rather the question of who gets what, when and how? Societies experiencing a higher incidence of inequality are, therefore, more prone to an instrumental type of ethnic identity and conflict than those considered more egalitarian. This view is shared by Stein (2011) who further acknowledges that although identities such as religion [or ethnicity] can play a part in violent conflict, they are merely "opium of the warriors" – a tool used by self-interested elites to mobilise support and fighting power for conflict. Stein sees instrumentalism as an agent-principal based approach in which power-seeking elites pursuing economic and political ambitions instrumentalise identity, [through ethnic

consciousness], to manipulate and mobilise the masses in order to enhance the chances of attaining or defending class advantages.

Review of Identity and Xenophobia Trends

Over the years, the world has continued to witness increased displacement of people from the places they call home. By the end of 2015, 65.3 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide due to persecution, conflict, generalised violence and human rights violations. This reflects an increase in absolute terms of 5.8 million people over 2014, and represents the greatest level of forced displacement ever recorded (IOM, 2016: 5-20)

By the end of 2013, more than 232 million people globally were estimated to be migrants, of which 19 million were estimated to be in Africa. At the same time, some 42.5 million people worldwide were considered as displaced due to conflicts (36% refugees, 62% internally displaced persons (IDPs) and around 2% of individuals whose asylum applications remain to be adjudicated). Of these, nearly 2.7 million refugees were in Africa, constituting roughly 25% of the world's refugee population (UNHCR, 2016). Indeed, Africa remains a continent with complex migration dynamics. The continent is generally characterised by dynamic migratory patterns and has a long history of intra-regional as well as inter-regional migration flows. Conflict, income inequalities and environmental change can result in very low levels of human security that act as push factors for migration (IOM, 2014: 6-7).

The Southern African region experiences all types of movements including mixed and irregular migration, labour migration and displacement due to conflict and natural disasters. By virtue of its relative stability and economic opportunities, Southern Africa experiences a high volume of migration due to work opportunities in the mining, manufacturing and agricultural industries. The industrial development in some countries in the region – especially in South Africa, Botswana and Zambia – and the oil wealth of Angola, have been magnets for both skilled and unskilled labour migrants from within the region and elsewhere, notably from the Horn of Africa and West Africa. Southern Africa is also a springboard often used as the staging ground for regular and irregular migration to Europe and the Americas (IOM, 2014: 6-7). In 2013, the Southern African region recorded over four million migrants, excluding irregular migrants, of which 44% were female and 20% were under 19 years of age. By far, the largest number of migrants is found in South Africa (2.4 million, including some 1.5 million from Zimbabwe) followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (447,000). Among the 4 million migrants

are approximately 200,000 registered refugees primarily in the DRC and South Africa (IOM, 2014: 6-7). In May 2008, a wave of xenophobic attacks spread all over South Africa. More than 60 people, mainly citizens of Somalia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, were killed by mob violence. Despite a subsequent solidarity campaign, the image of the South African rainbow nation was profoundly damaged and made the world, once again, aware of the growing inner-African sentiments against so-called foreigners (Kersting, 2009: 1). In his seminal work, Horowitz (2001 as cited by Kersting, 2009) analyses hundreds of lethal ethnic riots and related forms of xenophobia. He distinguishes between four reasons for such outbursts: firstly, an "ethnic" or "national" antagonism; secondly, a "reasonable" justification of violence; thirdly, a response to a certain event; and fourthly, aggression in a situation where the mob does not face any, or faces only a small risk of punishment.

A new dimension of globalisation has emerged with regards to migration. As a result of globalisation, the nation-state is said to be of diminishing relevance today. The global economic order, with its new information and communication technologies as well as its new transport systems, has greatly enhanced the mobility of capital and labour. Peter Vale, as cited by Desai (2008), has argued how in post-apartheid South Africa people's movement across borders has mutated "from local issue, to international and then, to security threat." The response from political leaders in response to allegations regarding xenophobia has often been denialism. This has triggered international migration on an unprecedented scale. On the other hand, national identities and local cultures are being reinvigorated. Strong nationalism may enhance in-group solidarity, but under certain conditions, it may also strengthen out-group hostility. Nationalism in sub-Saharan Africa was often regarded as another form of anti-colonial protest. Territorial nationalism, however, was often considered inauthentic because African states were delimited along 'artificial' (meaning: colonially imposed) boundaries, which fenced in multiple ethnic groups, and created territorial entities characterised by strong cultural heterogeneity. Jackson, as cited in Kersting (2009:6), points out that in the last couple of decades, the laws regulating citizenship and nationality have become more restrictive in African countries. Migrants have more frequently become victims of national campaigns and xenophobia and these "travellers in permanent transit" were demonised in Cameroon, Mozambique and Ghana as 'Zombies' (Nyamnjoh, 2006 cited in Kersting, 2009). In fact, most of the xenophobia in Africa is Afro-phobia. Although minorities, such as Chinese and Indians, face some forms of

xenophobic discrimination such as the use derogatory terms such as “Chocholis” and “Bamwenye”, respectively, most of the victims of xenophobia have been fellow Africans, particularly migrants from East African countries.

Migration Situation in Zambia: A Synoptic Account

Human mobility has always been a matter of global, regional and national interest. Migration, both in happy and sad moments, has social-cultural, political and economic consequences in both the departure and host countries. It is for this reason that most countries use their population policies as development tools. However, a country’s population policy is prone to unplanned human mobility caused by unforeseen events within that country or other countries. Such occurrences as wars, persecution, social and economic crises, inter alia, are important catapults of human mobility in the world. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2015) reports that at the end of 2014, there were 59.5 million forcibly displaced people in the world. Of these, 10 million were stateless while the rest were either refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returned refugees, returned internally displaced persons or those classified as ‘others.’ The UNHCR (2015) further states that 42,500 people are forced to flee their homes every day because of conflict and persecution. The UNHCR statistics also show that 53% of the global refugee population comes from three countries namely Somalia (1.11 million), Afghanistan (2.59 million) and Syria (3.88 million). The leading refugee host countries in the world are Turkey (1.59 million) and Pakistan (1.51 million).

In Southern Africa, Zambia is one of the countries with a big refugee population. No sooner than it obtained independence did Zambia became host to the first influx of refugees. The United States (US) Department of State (2014) shows that as early as 1966, Zambia had started hosting Angolan refugees fleeing the armed conflict between the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In 2010, the UNHCR put the number of persons of concern in Zambia at 51,856. These are distributed as follows: Refugees (25,578), asylum-seekers (2,186), returnees (1,640) and others (22,452) (UNHCR, 2016). In order to cater for the population of forced immigrants, Zambia, with the help of the UNHCR, operates six major camps and settlements. Each of these was strategically established to cater for the refugees originating from specific hot spots. For instance, Ukwimi in Eastern Province, established between 1987 and 1989 (UNHCR, 1991: 5), was a reaction to the influx of refugees escaping

the bloody clashes between the rival fighters belonging to the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). Maheba, situated in North-Western Zambia overlooks Angola, which has witnessed one of the longest armed conflicts in the region. Other camps and centres are the Mayukwayukwa and Nangweshi in the Western Province, Kala in Luapula Province and Mwanze in the Northern Province. Both Kala and Mwanze have mainly serviced refugee inflows from the DRC.

In its five decades of existence as an independent country, Zambia is one of the very few Southern African countries that has maintained peace internally among its more than seventy-two tribes and externally with its eight neighbouring countries, most of which are epicentres of armed conflicts. Consequently, Zambia has been home to a refugee population from neighbouring countries. Some of Zambia's neighbours that have witnessed armed conflicts are Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique. Other countries such as Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia, which are geographically in East Africa, have been among the leading contributors to the refugee population in Zambia over the last two decades or so. Migration statistics show that over the last two decades, the population of refugees in Zambia has been considerably reducing from 45,632 in the period 1996-2000 to 25,578 in the period 2011-2015. This reduction is mainly due to the return of relative peace in some of the countries such as Angola, Rwanda and the DRC. Table 1 below shows Zambia's refugee population between 1996 and 2015.

Table 1. Refugee Population in Zambia, 1996-2015

<i>Period</i>	<i>No. of Refugees</i>	<i>Change</i>
1996-2000	45,632	-
2001-2005	25,653	-19,979
2006-2010	23,594	-2,059
2011-2015	25,578	1,984

Source: Drawn based on World Bank Development Indicators.

The changes in the stock of refugees over the years could be attributed to the repatriation exercises that the Zambian government and the UNHCR have conducted over the period under review, following improvements in security situations of some of the refugees' home countries as earlier observed. For

instance, in 2009, the UNHCR assisted a total of 19,200 refugees to be repatriated to either their countries of origin or to a third country where they had chosen to live. Through this exercise, 17,000 Congolese (from the DRC) and 2,200 Angolans were among those repatriated to their countries of origin. In the same year, 137 refugees were helped to resettle in third countries of their choice. The UNHCR also conducted a verification exercise to establish the number of refugees from the DRC who were living in Zambian communities outside of refugee camps, specifically in Luapula Province. A total of 6,535 refugees of Congolese origin were found to live in these communities (UNHCR, 2009: 89).

According to the UNHCR (2009), the population of persons of concern in Zambia by country of origin is as shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2- Persons of Concern Distribution by Country of Origin

<i>Country of Origin</i>	<i>Total</i>
Angola	25,300
DRC	22,000
Rwanda	5,100
Burundi	3,014
Somalia	1,900
Various	330

Source: Drawn based on data from the UNHCR Global Report (2009)

Migration and the Political Economy of Identity in Zambia

Over the last couple of years, Zambia has witnessed a flaring up of hate and rejection based on identity. Although, as shown in the background section, Zambia has witnessed isolated incidents of inter-racial hatred and conflict in the period before independence, the most expressed form of hatred has been that based on one's language or tribe. However, events in the recent past seem to suggest an increase in the complexity of ethnic hatred in Zambia. Another dimension to the new form of ethnic hatred is the role of national politics in heightening ethnic consciousness in the population. The anti-Chinese rhetoric that formed the opposition leader, Michael Chilufya Sata's populist

mobilisation in the 2006, 2008 and 2011 elections psyched most of the urban youths into believing that that socio-economic woes were a direct result of foreigners living in the country. As a result, from the standpoint of the authors, the constructivist-instrumentalist theoretical framework seems to explain the problem of ethnicity and violence in Zambia.

The Chinese investors, on their part, have not done much to help their own situation given the number of reports relating to abuse of Zambian workers in Chinese owned firms and construction projects. For instance, the 2005 explosion at a munitions factory serving Chambishi, which killed 46 Zambian workers (Alden, 2007: 74), reinforced the conspiracy theories including the claim that the Chinese 'bosses' had deliberately trapped the Zambian workers, a claim inflamed by the fact that not a single Chinese worker was harmed in the accident. In his paper presented to the Harvard University Committee on Human Rights Studies, Sata (2007) accused the Zambian government of failure to attract genuine investors and of favouring "rogue Chinese investors" that had no regard for the welfare of those that were unfortunate enough to work for them. He also accused China of seeking relations with Africa in order to, inter alia, perpetuate its abuses of the ethnic minorities in Tibet and Taiwan. Unsurprisingly, the ascendance to power by Michael Sata and the Patriotic Front in September 2011 was greeted by frequent protests by Zambian workers in Chinese owned firms and construction projects. One of these protests occurred at the Chinese Collum Coal Mine (CCM) in Southern Zambia, where the Chinese reacted by shooting 13 of the protesting miners (Sautman and Hairong, 2014: 1073-1092).

Although there were generally no reports of fatal incidents connected to ethnic or racial hatred until much recently, an official statement by the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia, Council of Churches and the Zambia Episcopal Conference to commemorate the World Refugee Day on 20 June 2005 warned of rising xenophobia in Zambia:

One does not have to look far for evidence of the fact that refugees are increasingly unwelcome in Zambia. We have seen a disturbing rise in the verbal abuse, harassment, arbitrary detention, and physical violence that refugees suffer in Zambia. The church regrets the fact that people with genuine protection concerns have been forcibly returned from Zambia to countries where their lives or freedom are in jeopardy. Needless to say, this practice violates the human rights of refugees and does not reflect well on Zambia's international image (Darwin, 2009:6).

April 2016 Xenophobic Riots

On April 7, 2016 riots broke out in Zingalume, a slum area of Zambia's capital city, Lusaka, after a dead body was discovered early that morning. The people accused the police of not doing anything to protect them at night. They also argued that they were not happy with the (ritual) killings that were happening in the area (Nkonde, 2016:4). The riots, which were xenophobic in nature, targeted shops owned by foreigners over allegations that they were the ones behind the string of ritual killings that had occurred in Lusaka. The riots were, however, quenched by the police. Later, on April 18, 2016 residents of Zingalume Township ran amok and looted some shops run by Rwandans after word went around that suspected ritual murderers had been cornered in possession of human body parts (Mwenya & Mwale, 2016:1-3). By this time at least seven people were discovered murdered in George, Lilanda and Zingalume townships, with body parts such as ears, hearts and sexual organs (now widely known as 'sets') removed (Zimba, 2016:2-4). All of the victims were male. It was alleged that the killings were committed by a named Rwandan national whose shop was later looted for groceries and fridges. The rioters later moved on to another shop owned by a Rwandan in Zingalume, where they escaped with various merchandise, such as plasma television sets, generator sets and radio players, before regrouping again around other shops run by Rwandans in other townships.

The riots then spread to the neighbouring Chunga Township (Mwenya & Mwale, 2016:1-3). By the following day, April 19, 2016, the riots and looting had spread to other townships in Lusaka such as George, Garden, Chawama, Kuku, Bauleni, Mtendere, Garden House, Matero and Kanyama. During the riots, two local people, wrongly suspected of being Rwandan nationals were burnt to death and more than 60 shops and houses owned by foreign nationals were looted with rioters taking cash, food, drinks, refrigerators and other electrical appliances (Dawood, 2016). In the Garden House area, all shops belonging to Burundian and Rwandan nationals were broken into and looted, with fridges that were pulled from the shops lying in the nearby vicinity (Mukuka, 2016:4). In reaction to the riots, the Minister of Home Affairs, Davies Mwila, assured foreigners that the government was ready to integrate most foreign nationals who originally came in as refugees as soon as they got their passports from their countries of origin (Mvula, 2016:1-3). It was not clarified as to how foreigners who ran away from being killed in their own countries would go back and get passports. As a result of these riots, two foreign nationals, whose nationalities have not been confirmed, were burnt to death

on 18 April, 2016. The Zambia Police Service fought running battles with residents and later removed merchandise from foreign owned shops for safe-keeping.

Some residents that were interviewed called on President Edgar Lungu to speak out against the xenophobic attacks that were also affecting local businesses. One resident argued:

We want President Edgar Lungu to come out from wherever he is hiding. He is the President, his word is more powerful than what his ministers can say. Let him speak out against these evil happenings, let him condemn the attacks on the foreigners and give the country proper direction (Mukuka, 2016:4).

Later, on April 21, 2016, President Edgar Lungu assured internally displaced Rwandans and other foreigners that his administration would not abandon them but would protect them against persecution by criminals. He said this when he visited over 400 Rwandans who sought refuge at Kalemba Hall at St. Ignatius Catholic Church in Lusaka's Rhodes Park area, a low-density township (Chulu, 2016:1). A number of reasons can be advanced in trying to identify, explain and understand the root causes of the xenophobic riots of April 2016 in Lusaka. As noted above, Kersting (2009), citing Horowitz (2001), analyses hundreds of lethal ethnic riots and related forms of xenophobia and identifies four reasons for such outbursts. To recap, these are: firstly; 'ethnic' or 'national' antagonism; secondly, a 'reasonable' justification of violence; thirdly, a response to a certain event; and fourthly, aggression in a situation where the mob does not face any, or only a small, risk of punishment. These can be used to explain the "xenophobic" attacks that took place in April 2016 in Lusaka, Zambia.

Firstly, the April 2016 xenophobic riots might have been indirectly psychéd by the competing political elite who have been increasingly electioneering on ethnic lines after the general election of 2001. All the major elections that have taken place in Zambia since 2001 have expressed the country's ethnic divide more than anything else. This is evidenced by the trend where the country's political parties have tended to garner more votes from regions with which their key leaders identify. In the process, two 'hostile' ethno-political blocs have emerged, the North-Western and North-Eastern regions. Results of the 2001, 2006, 2008, 2011 and 2015 elections clearly support this argument (ECZ Results Sheets, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2011 & 2015). Additionally, the periods preceding the 2015 Presidential by-election, and leading up to the 2016

general elections have witnessed several hate speeches by some politicians, some of which have resulted in bloody conflicts.

An example is the Mulobezi Constituency parliamentary by-election where two supporters of the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND), Mbangi Mbangi and Sakubita Namushi, and one supporter of the governing Patriotic Front (PF) by the name of Simanga Siboli, were allegedly shot (Mwale, 2015: 1 & 2) during a political fracas that ensued following an ethnically provocative statement by PF's Secretary General, Davis Chama. Chama stated that the Southern Province of the country would never produce a head of state in one hundred years unless their men used their polygamous nature to bear more children. Ironically, reports alleged that the gun used in the shooting belonged to Chama. After widespread condemnation, Chama said that ... he would not apologise for his remarks that Tonga should use their polygamous traits to have more children to stand a chance of producing a president in 100 years' time because it was a fact (The Post, 2015).

Such statements, and the impunity with which they are made, have arguably contributed to the rising ethnic tensions in Zambia in the recent past. His refusal to apologise and the support he received from the other leaders in his party did not show any state resolve to embrace multi-ethnicity and racial harmony in the country and could have only added to the ethnocentric psyching of the population.

With regard to national antagonism, it is positive to note that, generally, Zambians have lived in harmony with many nationals from foreign countries since independence in 1964. In fact, Zambia helped liberate a number of Southern African countries, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, by hosting freedom fighters during the liberation movements of the 1970s and 1980s. However, as shown earlier in this article, Michael Sata's nationalist-populist campaigns based on anti-Chinese, anti-Indians and anti-Lebanese traders should surely have sown a seed of racial consciousness in the Zambian population, especially among the poor and those who live in squalor in the country's major slums in Lusaka. Most of the poor urban dwellers seem to associate their poverty with foreigners who they accuse of taking away some of their business lines. Alden (2007: 49), citing Dobler (2008) brings this into perspective when he cites the former trade minister of Zambia, Dipak Patel, who once said: "Does Zambia need Chinese investors who sell shoes, clothes, food, and chickens in our markets when the indigenous people can?" The looting of shops owned by Africans hailing from neighbouring countries

during the April 2016 xenophobic violence seemed premised on this argument.

Secondly, one can argue that the April 2016 riots were caused by some Zambians who were reasonably justified in their violence. The residents of the affected townships (Zingalume, George, Kanyama and Matero) in Lusaka justified their violence based on the assumption that the police had failed to prevent the ritual killings and had not arrested any suspects following the spate of murders within a short period of time. The locals also believed that some of the ritual killers were foreigners, especially Rwandan businessmen and women, who lived in the same townships and used charms from body parts of murdered victims to enhance their businesses. These assumptions seem to have contributed to the violent riots and looting of foreign owned shops. The fact that Zambian police later apprehended and charged four Zambians for the ritual killings may, however, discount these assumptions because no foreign or Rwandan shop owner had been arrested or charged with ritual murder at the time of this publication.

Thirdly, residents in the affected townships rioted and attacked foreigners and looted their shops as a response to the ritual killings that had taken place. The feelings of helplessness with little or no protection from the police against the murderers may have fuelled the violence. In addition, it can be argued that the riots and looting may have been influenced by other factors such as the high cost of living and harsh economic situations that Zambians were facing. Zambia's economic outlook has deteriorated ever since the PF took over power from the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) in 2011. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) argued that the xenophobic attacks in Lusaka reflected how the challenges of an economic backdrop could fuel social tensions and weaken security. The EIU posited that high inflation and a subdued economic outlook would further heighten the social tension and escalate the unrest. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), in 2015, Zambia was ranked among the hungriest countries on the Global Hunger Index (GHI), with the 'most hungry' being the Central African Republic and Chad. Although the 2016 riots appeared to have been triggered by the suspected ritual killings, socio-economic factors such as high youth unemployment and the rapidly rising cost of living have increased frustration and tension among many Zambians, especially the youths. Many foreign nationals were running thriving businesses around Lusaka while the majority of the citizens were not, thereby increasing the hostility towards foreigners (EIU, 2016).

Further, according to the World Bank (2016):

Zambia's economy grew at an average annual rate of 7 percent between 2010 and 2014. However, global headwinds and domestic pressures have strained the Zambian economy. Consequently, growth in 2015 fell to an estimated 3 percent (compared to 4.9 per cent in 2014) following a six-year low in copper prices, increasing power outages, and El Nino-related poor harvests. Growth is expected to remain around 3 percent in 2016, subject to the 2016 harvest, the mining industry's reaction to softer copper prices, and stabilisation of the power situation. The benefits of gross domestic product (GDP) growth have accrued mainly to the richer segments of the population in urban areas. Zambia has a very unequal income distribution (Gini coefficient = 55.6). The falling copper prices, exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) have weakened the economy. Copper prices declined by almost a third from their peak in February 2011 to \$4,595/ton in February 2016 (LME) and are forecast to remain soft until 2018 as global supply currently exceeds demand. The mine closures in 2015 led to the loss of over 7,700 jobs. Sixty percent of the population lives below the poverty line and 42 percent are considered to be in extreme poverty. Moreover, the absolute number of poor has increased from about six million in 1991 to 7.9 million in 2010, primarily due to a rapidly growing population.

The kwacha has depreciated considerably (the kwacha tends to depreciate as the copper price falls and appreciate as it rises). However, during this same period, global headwinds have combined with domestic pressures and ebbing confidence in the economy, resulting in huge shifts and market turbulence. While the strength of the US dollar, fused with worsening current account and fiscal imbalances, has propagated depreciation in most resource dependent currencies, the kwacha's decline stands out. There have been three distinct phases to the kwacha to US dollar exchange rate between January and November 2015. There was the gradual depreciation between January and mid-August, where the kwacha depreciated by 21% over 30 weeks, moving from ZMW 6.4 to ZMW 7.9 per US\$. What followed next was huge volatility and a steep decline in the exchange rate. In the 10 weeks to end-October, the kwacha depreciated by 69% to ZMW 12.5 per US\$. By November 11, 2015, the exchange rate reached ZMW 14.2 per US\$, but by the end of that month had recovered to ZMW 10.3 per US\$, an appreciation of 27% in 19 days. The net effect is that the kwacha depreciated by 61% over the 11 months to end-November, 2015. Put differently, the kwacha lost 38% of its value (World Bank, 2015).

Furthermore, between January 2012 and September 2015, inflation remained stable at an average rate of 7.2%. Low inflation was attributed to low oil prices, a stable currency, and prudent monetary policy by the Bank of Zambia (BoZ). In 2015, inflation fell consecutively during the first and second quarters. However, since mid-2015, inflationary pressures began building up due to the depreciating kwacha. However, October inflation (year-on-year) jumped to 14.3% and November inflation to 19.5%, a shift driven by food inflation that increased to 16.2% in October and 23.4% in November, from 8.1% in August 2015. The basket of food measured includes both domestically produced foods, where price is largely dependent on the quality of the harvest, and imported foods where prices are impacted by the depreciation of the kwacha. Non-food inflation also rose to 15.5% in November from just 7.3% in September, on the back of increased transport costs as vehicles and car parts became more costly to import (World Bank, 2015).

The April 2016 riots may be similar to the 1991 situation when people could not contend with the rising economic problems any longer, resulting in food riots across the country and the death of 30 people. However, due to the fact that the economy was mainly state controlled in 1991, rioters mostly looted state owned shops. In addition, there was an attempted coup d'état. The Kaunda government arrested union leaders, among them Fredrick Chiluba. Eventually, due to mounting domestic pressure, Kaunda was forced to re-introduce multiparty politics and/democracy, which was abandoned in 1972. Thus, on 31st October 1991, elections were held and Kaunda was defeated by 80% to 20% by Frederick Chiluba of the MMD.

By the time the MMD was defeated by PF in September 2011, inflation was at 8.8% and it has now risen to 21.8% as of April 2016 (CSO, 2011; CSO, 2016). In addition, the price of the staple commodity, mealie-meal, which was at 35 kwacha in 2011 has sky rocketed to an average of 100 kwacha in most places in Lusaka. Though the 1991 riots were caused by the harsh economic environment that created food shortages, the April 2016 riots could have been similarly caused by high prices of food (i.e. mealie-meal) and other essentials, which were available but unaffordable.

Fourthly, aggression against foreigners in April 2016 may have been caused by the mobs', rioters' or looters' perception that they would face no or little risk of punishment; hence they looted and attacked foreigners with impunity. Forthwith, the police moved in but failed to quench the riots that quickly

spread throughout Lusaka. Could it be that the police supported the riots and looting of foreigners, as claimed by some circles?

Furthermore, the spontaneous riots of April 2016 appeared to be a reaction to the police's failure to publicise the identities of the suspected ritual killers who were in custody for possession of human body organs and parts. Most people in the high density residential areas of Lusaka strongly believed that the ritual killers were all foreigners. Thus, foreigners, mostly from Rwanda, were targeted, especially when a rumour spread that body parts were found in a deep freezer at a shop owned by a Rwandan national in one area of Lusaka. Many of the Rwandan nationals, who have lived undisturbed in Zambia as refugees after escaping the 1994 Rwandan genocide, were once again under threat of being lynched by rioters and looters and had to seek refuge at police stations. Within two days, the riots spread quickly to several other densely populated residential areas in Lusaka. The rioters not only destroyed property belonging to foreigners worth thousands of kwacha, but they also looted their shops and houses, and burnt a police station.

To curb the situation, the government deployed police officers in the affected areas who subsequently failed to control the situation. Therefore, the government had no option but to call upon the Zambia Army to move in and stop the riots and looting which were almost engulfing the whole of Lusaka (Nkonde, 2016: 1-4). Consequently, the 400 military personnel deployed managed to quell the riots and looting and continued patrols in the high density areas of Lusaka for about two weeks thereafter. Later, the military was withdrawn and a special paramilitary police unit took over the patrols and was still doing so as of 30 May 2016.

For 22 years, some 6,000 Rwandans have lived in Zambia without being harassed. They lived freely in many townships in Lusaka like Zingalume, George, Kanyama and Matero, which are by no means up-market addresses, and set up little shops to trade and survive. The locals, however, lived in abject poverty in a harsh economic environment. They had no jobs and owned nothing compared to the Rwandans. As a result of the riots and looting, about 700 Rwandans were internally displaced in Lusaka and found themselves seeking shelter in police stations and churches. The government moved in to protect them and transported some to a refugee camp in the western part of the country where they expressed concerns about security and lack of basic sanitary conditions. The lives of the Rwandans who sort refuge in Zambia after the 1994 Rwandan genocide are once more under threat.

Conclusion

The arguments raised in this article generally show that as much as identity and xenophobic conflicts can be psyched by rent-seekers, they can also arise from declining socioeconomic situations and be cemented by a feeling that migrants are economic competitors. The deteriorating state of the Zambian economy has been linked to the poor people's increased dislike of the foreigners, especially those who are seen as conducting businesses traditionally thought to be reserved for the indigenous Zambians. This could explain why it is the immigrants from Eastern and Southern African regions who are increasingly coming under threat. An attempt has also been made to show that the country's identity consciousness is not only historical, but a result of various episodes and events that have tended to create both ethnic cleavage and hatred. The country's political leaders have been highlighted as among those who have been responsible for fuelling hate based on tribal or racial identity as a strategy for mass mobilisation. Further, the failure by the Zambian authorities to punish those who commit crimes relating ethnic hatred has been identified as a guarantee of impunity for the perpetrators of such offences.

Recommendations

Notwithstanding the penetrating nature of ethnic consciousness once it is absorbed, the Zambian authorities can nevertheless promulgate and enforce laws that criminalise the expression of hate in any form by a Zambian or foreigner living in Zambia. Further, there is clearly a need to promote the creation of new socialisation institutions that should promote a sense of '*ubuntu*' (humanity) among Africans. The African Union can take a leading role in promoting ethnic harmony among Africans within and beyond their countries. New school curricula can be developed to include the teaching and learning of African languages in the same way that many Africans are currently learning other major languages such as French, English, Chinese, inter alia. Deliberate educational exchange programmes among African universities ought to be promoted in order to encourage cultural exchange among the African people. African cultural institutions on the model of the Confucius Institute, Alliance Française and the British Council, could be established by African countries to serve as conduits of cultural exchange and appreciation. African governments could also do well to economically empower themselves with capital and technical know-how so as to foster the growth of successful African entrepreneurs able to compete and survive in a growing global village.

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