key: cord-0980641-jrncyotg authors: Bandarin, Francesco; Ciciotti, Enrico; Cremaschi, Marco; Madera, Giovanna; Perulli, Paolo; Shendrikova, Diana title: After Covid-19: A survey on the prospects for cities date: 2021-06-30 journal: City, Culture and Society DOI: 10.1016/j.ccs.2021.100400 sha: 17dab13bd7ff6ac2e240ad364637666834b811df doc_id: 980641 cord_uid: jrncyotg nan The COVID-19 crisis has had a significant impact on the lives and prospects of millions of people. Fear of the apocalypse and denial of the problem are equally present in press comments, official statements and public opinion. COVID represented an abrupt coming-down-to-earth for many neo-liberal myths that fostered a narrative of entrepreneurialism and individual profit-maximizing. In the same years, the world has become increasingly urban and by 2050 two-thirds of the total population will be living in cities. Such considerations have significant blind-spots, as they ignore the local particularities both of cities and local economies. The COVID-19 crisis made it clear that the ongoing institutional and material transformations were renewing the ties between the economy and local areas. However, the question remains open whether COVID-19 is an occasional setback or, on the contrary, a complete reversal of current trends towards globalization. Starting from these premises, the authors launched a Delphi survey in mid-2020. 1 For this international survey, 20 cities were selected, distributed between the world's North and South and altogether representing 4% of the global urban population (World Population Review, 2021) and characterized by a faster average growth rate (1,20%) than the world average (0,96%). Although COVID suddenly and dramatically changed our daily life, the survey concludes that only some of these changes will be permanent and that "cities are the answer, not the problem" (FEEM, 2020), thus diverging from many of the positions expressed since the beginning of the crisis (Krugman, 2020) . The respondents were cautious in their assessments concerning radical changes or significant social or structural innovations. For instance, they indicated that the crisis will not trigger a steady transition from consumerism to frugality and that a massive out-migration from cities and an increase of deregulation processes will be unlikely. However, respondents share opinions on some emerging trends (FEEM, 2020) : the world is becoming more 'regional', production chains will be shorter, tourism will rediscover nearby places, and cities will take up a more significant coordinating role. This paper reviews the survey's main conclusions in order to compare approaches with the findings of leading International Organizations (IOs) on migration and urbanization, and urban density. First, the paper assesses the lessons learnt from short-term reactions to the crisis, particularly on urban inequalities, culture and social interaction, multilevel governance and community involvement. Second, it compares the Delphi findings and the current economic processes (regionalization, reorganization of production systems, digitalization of services and infrastructures), providing some critical evaluations. The conclusions offer suggestions on policies and urban planning priorities in the coming years, pointing to the risk of placing too much stress on transformations and innovation in an often cumbersome, slow process. This review aims to identify the main impacts and trends of the COVID pandemic on the urban environment, urbanization trends, economic situation, viral spread, commerce, tourism, culture and governance. 2 There is no consensus on the effects of COVID on the environment, although the improvement in air quality registered in various parts of the world during lockdowns resulting from the decline of economic activities will probably be a temporary effect. Conversely, several studies observed a possible correlation between the spread of the pandemic and the high level of air pollution already present in different areas of the world (Su et al., 2019; European Public Health Alliance, 2020) , explaining some of the outbreaks in industrial areas and cities. In general, however, the discussion remains open, and there is no shared opinion on the connection between COVID-19 and environmental factors. Regarding the future of cities, scientific studies and reports confirm that cities will remain attractive as hubs of social and technological innovation (FEEM 2020); as history shows, no pandemic, natural disaster, or war has ever managed to stifle cities' growth and pre-eminence over the long term. Scientists and international organizations agree on the fact that the current urbanization trends will continue. Current data on population changes show that dense cities have lost some residents, albeit the trend is not yet clear as to where residents are relocating and whether this will be a permanent move. The general patterns of urbanization and 'youthification' (Moos, 2016) of cities will remain unchanged, as the pandemic only accelerated existing trends: young people will continue to come to cities in search of opportunities and social and professional networks, while a part of the older and more affluent population will flee from the cities for a quieter and more comfortable life. However, experts (FEEM 2020) do not foresee significant out-migration of families or businesses from the urban centres, nor do they envisage significant changes in car use for commuting. Nevertheless, changes in human behaviour, work organization, and consequently in cities' structure and infrastructure will occur, and the duration of the pandemic will affect their scale and long-term impacts (Florida et al., 2020) . Unlike social scientists, IOs have mainly concentrated on the current situation and the short-term outcomes. In June 2020, when the first pandemic peak was over, IOs started to look at the recovery process and largely limited their negative impact forecasts to 2020. Longer-term and more pessimistic forecasts emerged later when it became clear that the pandemic and its impacts would last beyond 2020. For example, according to the latest World Bank Group Report, even after the recovery gets underway, a protracted period of low global output is forecast, with substantial per capita income losses. In this baseline scenario, global output in 2025 would be about 5% below the pre-pandemic levels, and there would be a cumulative output loss during 2020-25 equivalent to 36% of 2019 global GDP (World Bank Group, 2021). The International Monetary Fund gives a less pessimistic forecast, suggesting that after an estimated 3.5% contraction in 2020, the global economy will grow by 5.5% in 2021 and 4.2% in 2022 (International Monetary Fund, 2021 . One thing is sure: recovery of global and local economies alike will be slow, as GDP losses are estimated at around 10% nationally (OECD), and investments and consumption are lagging due to the crisis (Stiglitz, 2020) . As for the dynamics of the viral spread, recent studies argue that the main drivers have been proximity at work, social connections and overcrowding, rather than density per se (Hamidi et al., 2020) . IOs and experts agree that the pandemic exacerbated existing problems, affecting the most vulnerable categories most brutally. ILO, UN, OECD, IOM concentrated their efforts on examining the worsening of the situation of vulnerable groups: home violence and significant job losses, primarily affecting women; the worldwide increase in poverty among wage workers; the existing poor sanitary conditions with limited or no access to healthcare; and the exposure to COVID-19 of migrants, native populations and slum dwellers (ILO, 2021 , UN, 2020 , OECD, 2020 . In general, cities suffered significant job losses (estimated at 5% on average) due to the COVID-19 crisis, but with substantial sector variations: sectors linked to tourism have been more affected than the average. According to the ILO, the culture and hospitality sector and local trade and personal services are estimated to lose up to 40% of jobs and over 100 million units worldwide (ILO, 2021) . The Economist predicts a faster recovery for tourist destinations (seaside and countryside) than for cities, underlying the fact that safety and hygiene will become essential factors in the future tourism recovery processes. These factors may further increase inequalities between rich and emerging countries (The Economist, 2021). After the short-term small business crisis, there will be still enough market space for traditional and neighbourhood shops. Increasingly, the idea is that to make the city more resilient it is necessary to reinforce commercial and public services at the neighbourhood level. This innovative perspective will require specific policies to revitalize such contexts, undermined by retail delivery (logistics) and public service organizations in recent years. The well-known "15-min neighbourhood" proposal in Paris is an indicator of a new trend for a "city within the city" approach. The tourism and culture sectors have been impacted similarly by the COVID crisis due to the link between the motivation to travel and attraction for the diversity of cultures and traditions (UN Policy Brief, COVID19 and transforming tourism, 2021): 90% of world heritage sites have been closed, while 93% of museums have increased or started online services during the pandemic with various degrees of success (UNESCO, 2020a,b,c,d) . The consequences are dire, particularly for tourism-dependent economies, like SIDS (Small Island Developing States). According to a survey of the World Economic Forum on media consumption, a larger proportion of people are now willing to pay for a subscription to online cultural platforms than before the pandemic. For example, 53% of French internet users placed the consumption of cultural goods at the top of their list of essential activities during the time of isolation (UNESCO, 2020d). All this indicates that COVID accelerated the digital shift in the cultural sector. These activities cannot substitute live performances and direct experience, and experts have pleaded for significant government and private subsidies for the creative and cultural sectors. A UNESCO policy guide (UNESCO, 2021) invites governments to address the "unprecedented challenges" facing the creative sector and proposes an update of the UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the Status of Artist (1980). Scholars and experts (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020) also suggested a different meaning of "culture" and pointed to a strict correlation between cultural behaviours and the pandemic impact mitigation.Culture matters in terms of how people respond to government measures and the outcome of these responses: East-Asians wore masks in a disciplined manner while some US and European citizens challenged the obligation. Trust in government is vital for culture to connect with policy and bring desirable results. There is an ongoing discussion among experts and scientists (Harari, 2 To contextualise the Delphi survey, we analysed in depth 36 reports of IOs, issued during and after the first COVID-19 outbreak, their further updates, and recent scholarly articles and papers. For a comprehensive review and all the references see FEEM 2020. 2021), regarding the lack of effective collaboration between world leaders during the crisis and the failure of multilateral institutions in managing it, which culminated in forms of "vaccine nationalism". Governments marginalized the World Health Organization, whose mandate, in any case, exceeds its operational capacities (Patrick, 2020) . Member states have assigned to WHO more and more tasks while limiting its independence and resources, setting up a recipe for failure as shown by the lack of concerted action between the G-7, the G-20, and the UN Security Council (Patrick, 2020) , where China blocked any resolution on the pandemic arguing that public health matters fall outside the Council's "geopolitical" mandate. However, the Ebola outbreak led to the adoption of a similar resolution in 2014. The limits of existing governance systems, and the global health crisis, in particular, suggest the need to rethink the prevention model: some aspects of the health system are better managed at a national level, although some decentralized systems have proven their effectiveness (as in the Federal Republic of Germany). The approach based on the 'leviathan' logics (the state protects and therefore obliges its subjects) has given mixed results. China and other authoritarian regimes are based on this logic: confinement, individual and social control. However, in other contexts, approaches have been based on more voluntary coordination and rules of conduct. More decentralized countries have shown a greater capacity to coordinate context-specific responses: the cases of Berlin, Buenos Aires, Vienna, and Zurich show that cooperation between different government levels is crucial. On the other hand, decentralization allowed a sort of damage control in countries like the US, Brazil and India, where national leadership was in active denial (De Losada, 2020) . It is widely believed that populism and nationalism jeopardised multilateral cooperation (Harari, 2021; De Losada, 2020) , bowing before authoritarian urging. This Delphi survey (FEEM, 2020) dealt with topics such as increasing inequalities and job restructuring. The COVID-19 crisis has already produced visible short-term impacts: as already mentioned, the weight of path dependency and structural constraints; the acceleration of some current trends, strengthening global market actors' impacts or further weakening local welfare systems; the significant geographical and spatial variability of "local" impacts of the pandemic. Informal workers, the most fragile and marginalized social and economic groups, the unemployed, and the poor are certainly harshly affected, particularly in the Global South. No conclusive arguments emerged from the comparisons of the advantages and disadvantages of living in the suburbs in a pandemic. Indeed, the risk of repeated lockdowns makes suburbs more attractive and may contribute to sustainable urban sprawl. However, this process is far from being neutral, as it requires (and has historically received) substantial public investment in infrastructures (for example, highways and urban ring-roads, or regional trains). COVID-19 has multiplied social interaction on the internet, while the main concern for urban dwellers is the reduction of public events. The wealthiest cities, able to quickly increase online activities, may benefit from this situation, further widening the gap with smaller and less affluent ones. So far, the failure of tracing processes in Europe (they have worked better in Korea, Australia and New Zealand) increases the public mistrust in control systems. However, social networks have been used innovatively by civic solidarity initiatives, both informal or promoted by existing associations (Johannesburg, London, Rome). The issue of social inequality is paramount and represents a primary global concern. It is strikingly evident and unanimously acknowledged that informal workers have been significantly affected by the crisis, as they operate in densely populated, poorly sanitized places, usually in the streets and derelict areas. To make things even worse, it is hard to maintain physical distance in the slums in the global South or workingclass neighbourhoods in the global North, often inhabited by large families in overcrowded houses. The increasing social polarization between wealthy and underprivileged neighbourhoods in world cities leads to a less obvious consequence: the North's most impoverished urban areas increasingly perform like the cities in the Global South. A low-income mother working two jobs as a caregiver, living in rental housing in a marginal neighbourhood in a US city is likely to share the same insecurities as a daily wage domestic helper living in a low-income settlement in an Indian, Latin American or African city, or a migrant worker in a Chinese city. The pandemic has worsened an already significant housing crisis, putting cities' budgets and social welfare under intense pressure. Paradoxically, the collapse of tourism may lead housing units used by platforms like Airbnb to re-enter the market, competing with households. Private spaces and housing have been seriously affected by teleworking and lockdowns; the repercussions will be permanent for those who have a home, with severe consequences for the underprivileged with no access to the web. Technological networks and infrastructure, urban logistics and communication already exploit some artificial intelligence systems but will be increasingly affected. As far as the economy is concerned, the respondents expressed a unanimous opinion (FEEM 2020): the world is becoming more 'regional'. In particular, production chains will be shorter, the economies will rediscover proximity and nearby places, and local governance will take a more significant role. These processes are already taking place, and a partial reshoring of production is underway. A recent example is the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement signed by 54 states and launched in 2021 (Africa Renewal UN, 2021). Given the need to produce quickly and coordinate hundreds of enterprises' production efforts along the value chain, some enterprises have reduced delocalization. Primary groups are now thinking about geographical zones, seeking low-cost regional areas within them (Foundation Robert Schuman, 2020). European countries and the United States are already announcing measures to re-localize some production chains. However, China's attempt to maintain its primacy in production and export will continue in the coming years, even though this trend might be gradually evolving. The Boston Consulting Group estimates that a standard Chinese factory's total production costs are almost equivalent to those of its Polish counterpart, not to mention other countries in Asia or Africa. Global governance will be multipolar, and competition among continental states (America, Europe, Asia, Africa) will increase. Therefore, cities and regions will probably have an even more significant coordinating role to play. There is a general agreement among the experts regarding telework, confirmed by data from different parts of the world and especially from developed countries. According to respondents, telework will rise to 40% of total non-manual jobs (from 4%). This is consistent with the University of Chicago's estimates, claiming that 37% of US jobs could be performed entirely at home (Montgomery County Government, 2020). Telework will bring benefits in better choices for workers and a more balanced work-life relationship, reduce commuting time, and have positive environmental impacts. On the other hand, there is the risk of increasing the marginalization of remotely based workers and worsening their contractual relationships and wage levels. Survey respondents agree that online shopping will not wholly replace traditional shopping for various reasons, as people still value human interactions, perhaps even more after the lockdown. In many cities in the global South, online transactions are still rare due to the lack of infrastructure and mistrust. Local markets still represent the centre of commercial life, and people pay more attention to what they consume, prioritizing local products. During the last decade, patterns of consumption had already changed: while previously people moved towards goods and services (restaurants and grocery stores, museums and cinemas, schools and hospitals), a new trend is emerging, with goods and services moving to people (delivery, online retail and services, remote control and digital twinning). The pandemic has accelerated these transformations. The importance of online channels and e-commerce will grow at an unprecedented pace (from single digits just a few years ago to over 20% in the coming years globally). Concerning tourism, the survey and the literature review pointed to several critical factors, even though most of the studies agree that normality will gradually return: -international tourism will undergo a global crisis, and air travel will be more expensive and affordable only for the upper-middle classes; -extensive infrastructure and service investments already planned may be postponed or abandoned, as shown by the recent cancellation of the new Paris CDG Airport terminal; -losses will mainly affect less developed countries, often highly dependent on the tourism sector. As a consequence, a geographical divide in the tourism sector will likely be observed worldwide: -In the cities of the Global North and some major countries, like India and China, domestic tourism could, to a certain extent, replace international travellers. -In cities in the Global South, where efforts to promote domestic tourism have failed and where GDP is highly dependent on the tourism sector, reduced travel could bring the entire sector into a long-term crisis. The survey indicates that, in general terms, cultural industries, museums and the heritage sector will recover in the medium and long term. The crisis boosted virtual visits and performances, though "real" cultural events will return gradually with an increased use of open spaces. Experts are divided between a return to direct museum visits, a cultural experience in itself, and the inclusion of online tours of museums, galleries, oceanariums, zoos and planetariums into public education programs. Cultural industries and the arts and crafts sector have been severely hit as consumption shrank and tourism numbers fell. This situation requires new forms of support from public institutions at every level, from local governments to IOs. Many cultural enterprises are already subsidized or government-owned and only need to be compensated for their income losses. Still, in many cases, government support for the arts, art institutions and artists of all kinds will be necessary. Given the persistent fiscal crisis and competition for government support from higher priority sectors, recovery will also depend on increased financial contributions from the broader public and local private corporations, some of which already play an essential role in supporting cultural activities. In the cultural sphere, the lockdown has marked a global shiftfrom people moving toward the cultural experience to experience coming to people through technology-although this will not substitute live performances and personal experience forever: as cultural events are an essential part of social and street life, a complete shift towards virtual fruition is hard to foresee. The governance issue has been paramount during 2020, at supranational, national and local levels. States control borders and taxes, while cities mobilize local knowledge and develop increasingly ambitious strategies and projects. Both cities and states showed a limited capacity to manage pandemic prevention and control: national governments struggled to provide forecasting and monitoring, despite their means and resources, while cities failed to introduce preventive measures, lacking appropriate tools and powers. National governments and decision-makers have taken a central place and gained prominence during the crisis, being in charge of health, and mobilizing additional resources for welfare assistance, labour protection policies, research, and vaccines administration. The mismatch between governance systems and the pandemic crisis is even more worrisome since experts foresee that normality will not return for 2-3 years and that the pandemic's impacts will last even longer. In conclusion, cities have been at the forefront of the implementation of lockdowns and first aid policies. In the absence of adequate support by the central governments, informal local actions initiated a shift, often backed by local charities, towards additional welfare measures, thus fostering competition between central and local governments. Resources were moved from the national to the local level and the latter managed assistance and medical aid. In a long-term outlook, cities may become more powerful and potentially more efficient if they manage to take advantage of this shift. This scenario is more realistic for global or medium-sized cities, which can become protagonists of the political scene and affect social equality in a yet unforeseeable way depending on political strategies, establishing reliable welfare and promoting the balance between central and local welfare institutions. Even though public interventions and policies are fundamental in crisis management, the survey's respondents express caution: the crisis is not triggering a virtuous transition itself, and neither dirigisme nor liberalization are inevitable options. Notwithstanding the fears that surfaced during the crisis, cities will not decline, and the local combination of actors and policy actions will shape each one's path. The anticipations of IOs and Delphi survey findings converge significantly: Covid-19 has shown that cities are at the forefront of epidemics but do not control prevention, monitoring, and response mechanisms, which are in the sphere of governments and multinational corporations. Besides, IOs have not played any significant role in coordination, control, and command, which calls for deep reforms and changes. However, a new world geography has already emerged, stemming from globalization's impacts and distortions (excessive length of global value chains, unequal distribution of opportunities and balance of power). In this context, trade, international flows, and tourism are likely to decrease due to growing tensions in international relations and the push towards decoupling and reshoring. This long-term impact will affect current globalization patterns, as chaotic market behaviour has led to marked social impacts: the development of economic integration, communication and networking on a global scale has not resulted in peaceful coexistence processes. The "regionalization" of production and distribution systems is a likely direction in which the society will move, while permanent changes in individual behaviour and urban organization will be necessary. We can generalize by pointing to the fact that, for cities to recover entirely, it is necessary to rethink the whole globalization process and promote alternative "world views". Our first working hypothesis is that the pandemic will lead to a few side effects in the next ten to thirty years: -the strengthening of regional-continental (European, African, American, Asian) coordination and national strategic research and production (starting from health, medical technologies, vaccines) to avoid or reduce systemic risks (environmental, financial and social). This scenario requires a greater reliance on local firms and the possible re-shoring of production. In order to increase domestic control in strategic industrial sectors, production chains will have to become shorter, with logistics, food and services delivery combining new (online) and traditional (on-site) models; -the enforcement of a state-driven economy as opposed to market logic, both at national and continental levels. The state already accounts for most of the economy in some developing countries; in the USA and Europe, direct public investments are bound to increase (Biden's relief plan in the USA amounts to 1.9 trillion dollars (Tooze, 2021) ). The pandemic will expand the state's role in the global North, mitigating job and income losses, and avoiding widespread social disruption. This will require new public institutional arrangements and investments in health, digital infrastructures, social services, housing, transport, and energy; -a stronger orientation toward internal demand is likely to emerge, focusing on citizens' needs in vital sectors like housing, culture, health, energy, sustainable mobility and urban logistics, digitalization, and urban renewal (Cappellin et al., 2020; Ciciotti, 2020) . Why have some countries performed better than others? Rules, coordination, control, execution have performed best in some (primarily East-Asian and Northern European) countries than in others (primarily American and Southern European) countries. The better ability of the former to coordinate 3 people and rules and obtain social commitment is due to governance, cultural and structural factors. Our second hypothesis concerns the virtue of coordination instead of the increasing tug-of-war between states and cities that had already appeared during the recent globalization phase. It is vital to manage cities' transition and invest in building robustness and redundancy. More specifically: -both states and cities require increased supranational coordination on the scale of continental federations in America, Europe, Asia and Africa; -local governance will become crucial. City administrations have tried to respond to the crisis in a voluntary manner, often finding themselves going beyond their roles and responsibilities, responding to social needs with insufficient resources (human, material, technological and financial) and in many cases benefiting from the commitment, creativity and innovative capacity of the population; -decentralized governance apparatuses and systems need more clarity about their respective competencies. They should be provided with adequate resources and involved in a multilevel dialogue; -new forms of urban and regional autonomy and place-based policymaking within federations and states will probably be needed, keeping in mind that cities' international coordination through networks of resilient cities, like the C40 or UN-Habitat, have not been able to devise adequate policy responses to the new crisis. Based upon the two hypotheses above, we can suggest the three most likely trends affecting the future of cities. -Cities as places for working and consumption. New forms of remote working and schooling will increase IT demand and lower office and school spaces. Mobility flows and routes will change; some will decrease, affecting cities' budgets and programmes. Therefore, new forms of Keynesian welfare will become a priority for all. Moreover, cybersecurity should become a priority as online work expands. The increase in telework and working from home is paramount and will severely impact peoples' homes, transforming them into homeoffices (with consequences for cities in the Global South, where the population density is high, and the quality of housing is low). In particular, it is necessary to rethink the time and space allocated to working and learning. The main drawback will be a further polarization between online and offline workers, with a possible impact on their income levels. Artificial intelligence will increasingly affect urban logistics and communication networks that already operate some techno-infrastructural systems. Public spaces will also be involved in this transformation. At the same time, there will be a coexistence of new and old models of consumption. -Cities as social transmission organisms. Cities will no longer be static but will become agile, mobile and highly adaptable, responding to customers' needs, and satisfying different types of consumers, smoothly shifting from one type to another if the need arises. Cities may be imagined as "pop-up stores" with the transformation of shopping malls and hypermarkets into storage and distribution facilities. IT will transform the housing environment, along with logistics and commercial distribution. These developments are still uncertain and contradictory. Therefore, it will prove necessary to organize this transition and invest in the system's resilience. In this context, cities will possibly work towards a new alliance between territory and networks, hardware (the urban environment) and software (the people), urban space and underground infrastructures. -City layout. The priority task of physical planning (Baganz et al., 2020) will be to prevent both crowding and isolation. Any increase in density should avoid overcrowding in the public space. Public transport also needs to be tackled by changing the modal split between transport types or reducing commuting by moving jobs in or near housing. In general, cities and the surrounding regions have to rethink the impact of increased urbanization and land consumption: the concern for preserving the ecosystem should give new impetus to an integrated regional planning approach. Another long-term trend is the integration of digital infrastructure and spatial organization. Digital technology has been providing new infrastructures in private and public spaces for a long time, affecting the time balance between home and the public domain. Increasing isolation should be compensated by improved and redesigned public space. Sensors will probably help control crowds. Eventually, cities will have to adjust regulations, allowing larger balconies, terraces and backyards, and recycle underused buildings. New ways of working will impact the demand for office-space and travel and, consequently, cities' budgets. This paper has compared findings from IOs, scholarly literature and a Delphi Survey extrapolating a few convergent findings and main trends. There is significant agreement that short term impacts are significant but will not determine a radical breakdown. However, in the long run, inevitable consequences may unfold related to global governance, regional restructuring of production systems, and urban reorganization. We suggest that the policy options under discussion for cities should reflect the three main lessons taught by the COVID-19 crisis. First, global issues, such as pandemic protection, require global solutions (global players) due to the negative externalities they produce. The pandemic is a case of negative externality so that if no action is taken globally, the problem itself will not be solved. In fact, to avoid the risk of contamination, always possible due to the population's mobility, it will not be enough to vaccinate all the inhabitants of a city or a town. Therefore, the solution to this problem must be global while not following the market logic implicit in globalization. Leaving the solution of the vaccine problem to the market has made its limits evident: only a few large pharmaceutical multinationals have been able to ensure the production of vaccines, and their distribution has followed a commercial logic, generating disparities not only between rich and emerging countries but also among rich countries themselves, forcing them to compete to secure vaccines. IOs have proved to be ineffective in terms of the correct analysis of the problem and the possible solutions (e.g. the EU could have established consortia like Airbus for the production of vaccines). Furthermore, the solutions proposed by some countries to establish vaccine passports are a symptom of the failure of a global approach and effectively sanction the establishment of real "gated communities" at the 3 Coordination, as opposed to centralization, is a voluntary agreement among citizens and their governments giving rise to common rules of conduct, including respecting lockdown rules when necessary. Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan in the East and Norway, Finland, Denmark, Ireland in the West have been able to cope with the pandemic based on such schemes of coordination. level of cities or nations. Second, the effects of the pandemic on cities conversely require local solutions (local players), framed in general strategies to exploit possible positive externalities. In all cities, the pandemic has produced similar effects on the sectors and areas affected, albeit with some different characteristics in quantitative and qualitative terms: therefore, even when facing a general problem, the solutions must necessarily be local. The solution of these problems must follow a bottom-up approach referred to as the "quadruple helix" (Arnkil et al., 2010) in which local actors (citizens, public authorities, businesses and universities) take charge of the identification and quantification of problems, and integrated strategic planning leads to the development of better solutions aimed at solving the new needs of the citizens themselves. The effects of the pandemic have worsened already existing problems whose solution still required such an approach. Cities must therefore be the main actor of a bottom-up development oriented towards sustainability and social inclusion. This bottom-up approach can be usefully framed in a higher-level territorial scheme (regional, national or supranational) to integrate local resources and exploit projects' external economies in individual cities. While it is true that the failure to solve problems in one city does not affect the well-being of the others, the opposite is also true: the improvement of the entire urban structure of a country improves its capacity and the possibility of starting a process of sustainable development. Policies for regional/national development centred on cities may set in motion a virtuous circle starting from the demand and supply of the innovations necessary for the new needs of citizens: improvement of the quality of life -more significant external economies -greater urban competitiveness -innovation and attraction of investmentsdevelopment of new sectors on a local-national scale (new industrial economy). Third, cities can adopt local policies that invert the pandemic's negative impacts. 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