key: cord-0892587-qejhtl6i
authors: Kumasaki, Mieko; King, Malcom
title: Three cases in Japan occurred by natural hazards and lessons for Natech disaster management
date: 2020-09-09
journal: Int J Disaster Risk Reduct
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101855
sha: eeb6f23254c35a771acdeb5b9e9fcdcdb01948e1
doc_id: 892587
cord_uid: qejhtl6i

Due to recent climate change, highly-connected society, and the centralization of hazardous materials, Natech is a matter of the growing concern. As Natech disasters occur with low frequency, those in charge of facilities should learn lessons from past cases to prepare for situations in the future in which they may have to respond to a potentially catastrophic event for the first time. This paper describes three Natech cases triggered by the heavy rainfall in Japan in 2018. One resulted in violent explosions, one showed consequences half a year later, and the other managed to avoid a catastrophic situation by preparation based on prior analysis of possible damage. The lessons which can be learnt are as follows: Undertake measures based on the hazardous conditions of materials and possible reactions; Avoid normalcy bias for improved decision-making; Identify slow developing and lagging Natech consequences; Prepare and intensify safeguards to avoid possible damage based on risk analysis; Consider employees’ safety in returning to their homes; Collect micro information and aggregate it; Provide current information about the situation to stakeholders; Plan resources required for recovery activities. As for extrapolations of these lessons, Natech under pandemic is discussed.

The growing international concern over Natech has let many researchers to study this field. 23 These studies can be categorised into three domains: Natech risk management, quantitative 24 risk assessment, and case studies. 25 Successful Natech risk management is a high priority since Natech disasters have different 26 features from conventional disasters because of the coupling of the technological aspects with 27 a natural disaster. The effects can occur in many areas simultaneously and limited resources 28 may hinder the emergency responses. The combination of initial damage due to a natural 29 disaster and secondary damage due to industrial emergencies can overwhelm the emergency 30 response. The time to the recommencement of normal public life and industrial activity can be 31 lengthy and the recovery phase can be slow and protracted, particularly when infrastructure is 32 damaged or hazardous substances pollute the affected area. Careful planning and preparation 33 J o u r n a l P r e -p r o o f In Japan, intense precipitation can cause floods and landslides [20] which have sometimes 23 resulted in fatalities. Japan suffers from heavy rainfall caused by the Baiu front which appears 24 in early summer most years and gives a typical rain band around Japan [21] . Typhoons are also 25 a source of extreme precipitation. Tsuguti and Kato investigated 386 heavy rainfall events that 26 occurred between 1995 and 2009 in Japan and found that more than 75% of these heavy 27 rainfall events occurred between July and September [22] . In those months, facilities in Japan 28 are supposed to prepare themselves for this type of event in order to avoid any disaster. 29 Nevertheless, disasters have still happened as are described in this paper which indicates that 30 Natech risk management still needs development and should be taken more seriously in 31 industries. This paper aims to review the three cases and suggest lessons for establishing 32 better Natech risk management, from the standpoint of local factory operators rather than 33 J o u r n a l P r e -p r o o f 6 from a national or regional level. 1) The date means that the Chugoku Electric Power fully resumed power supply in its 6 business coverage. 7 2) the date means that Kansai Electric Power fully resumed power supply in its business 8 coverage.

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3) Data of Kurashiki which is a adjacent municipality to Soja since data of Soja was not 10 available. Other adjacent municipalities are 10 July (Ibara city), 11 July (Yakage town), 15 11 July (Takahashi city). The water outage was due to break of water pipe, or flood damage of 12 water treatment plant or water source. neighbouring houses. Fortunately there were no fatalities but many people were injured and 21 many residents had to be evacuated. Since the explosion was the result of serious flooding 22 following very heavy rainfall this can be considered a Natech disaster and is worth examining 23 in detail. This rainfall was later named the "Heavy rain of July 2018 (Heisei 30)". Across the 24 whole of Japan this event resulted in 237 fatalities, 8 missing people, and 432 injured [25] , so 25 J o u r n a l P r e -p r o o f it was a serious national natural disaster. 1 The factory that exploded belonged to an aluminium recycling company, Asahi-Arumi 2 Sangyo (Arumi means Aluminium in Japanese) located in Soja, Okayama prefecture. The 3 company collected used aluminium and recycled it by smelting and refining it. Normally, the 4 factory operates 24 hours a day so molten aluminium was being processed as usual on 6 th July. 5 However, late the previous evening (at 23 14 The aluminium smelting factory in question was located between two rivers, the Takahashi 15 and the Shimpon. The Takahashi is a major river with its banks close to the factory and the 16 Shimpon is a tributary of the Takahashi, but only about 50m away from factory. This location 17 poses a risk of flooding to the factory; indeed the premises had experienced a flood in 2011,

but there was no serious damage then and so no steps were taken to mitigate a future flood. 19 On the morning of 6 th July 2018 the company continued producing aluminium, but, when one 20 of their employees discovered how swollen the rivers were and reported it, they decided to 21 stop the process and remove the molten aluminium from the smelting chamber. However, this On 13 February 2019 two men entered a tank in a factory in Osaka and were overcome by 6 toxic fumes [29] . The men were brought out by emergency rescuers with breathing apparatus 7 but were declared dead on arrival at hospital. Since the factory is located in a residential area 8 including nurseries and schools, a warning was issued to advise people to shelter from the 9 toxic gas which had escaped from the tank. Airport and the shore[30]. This ship had been anchored 2 km south of the airport on the day 20 before the typhoon arrived. However, the strong winds associated with the typhoon blew the 21 tanker away from its moorings and then caused it to crash into the bridge. As a result about 22 8000 people were stranded at the airport because the connecting bridge was damaged. 23 In one area of Osaka the strong winds of the typhoon caused an electricity power cut for 70 24 hours affecting many homes, businesses and factories. One business affected was a 25 manufacturer of material for car mats, company A, which is located in that area. As part of 26 one of their processes company A produces an adhesive in a large tank, 2.7m in diameter and 27 5.4m high. The cut in the electricity power supply stopped the stirring of the substance inside 28 this tank so the material in the tank was ruined. 29 The ruined and now useless material was left in the tank for about half a year and then the 30 company decided to clean it out. Two men were scheduled to clean the tank on 13 th February 31 2019. One man entered via a manhole and was overcome by the fumes and the second 32 attempted to rescue him but was also overcome. The toxic fumes inside the tank were 33 hydrogen sulphide gas, H 2 S, which had been created by the deterioration of the adhesive substance and then accumulated inside the tank up to a lethal level. Once the tank had been 1 opened this toxic gas spread to the area surrounding the tank. On 6 th July 2018 another factory was affected by heavy rainfall in the "Heavy Rain Event of 5 July 2018". This factory is located 150 km away from the Asahi-arumi factory described in 6 case 1 and manufactures and sells explosives so stores and processes dangerous materials. 7 However, in this case the heavy rainfall natural disaster did not lead to a technological disaster 8 because mitigation steps had been taken. Thus, this is a case study of how a Natech was 9 avoided by appropriate mitigation. 10 The factory, which belongs to the Chugokukayaku Co., Ltd. company and which guidelines and an emergency response plan in case of an approaching typhoon. The plan 20 includes moving items to higher level ground, hanging protective covers over windows to 21 avoid them being broken by flying objects, placing sandbags at the entrance to buildings to 22 avoid water ingress and so on, when weather forecasts or warnings issued by the 23 meteorological observatory indicate an imminent risk. In their company guidelines, on a day 24 when a big typhoon is expected to hit their island, they stop factory operations and give the 25 staff a day off, because they would have difficulty getting to work. This is because many staff 26 travel to the island for their work and so need to commute by ferries, which will be cancelled, 27 or come over bridges which will be closed.

In addition to the risks of a typhoon, this area is also at risk of Nankai megathrust 29 earthquakes which are predicted to be likely in the near future and could result in a tsunami. 30 The company has prepared a specific emergency response plan for such an earthquake. This cause severe damage if they collapsed, had been reinforced with mortar. 7 As the factory is on a small island, some workers commute by train and then by a company was not raining significantly. 19 After the rain turned quite severe, at 19:49, an emergency alarm system was activated in an At this point, water ingress was found in some other storage sheds, however, no explosion or 4 hazardous events occurred as the stored explosives were not reactive to water and had not 5 been exposed to dangerous mechanical stimuli such as compression. At that time, only the 6 explosive manufacturing plant was in operation, but it was built on elevated ground and was 7 unaffected by the landslides and flood. The company started to shut down this process from 8 21:00 because some nightshift workers could not get to the factory, and the process was 9 completely shut down by 3:30 the next morning. 14 The weather forecast emergency warning for this region was issued at 19:40 on the 6 th and 15 lifted at 10:50 the next day. In the town, shovels were sold out on the day after the heavy 16 rainfall, and a home centre limited the number of shovels each customer could purchase.

Chugokukayaku Co., Ltd. started recovery work at its factory on 9 th July aware of possible 18 secondary landslides. They had to remove the sediment manually in the hot weather after the 19 heavy rain had passed, and so they carefully managed workers' loads to avoid any heat 20 exhaustion. As they cleared up no damage was found in the production process, but the lack 21 of water prevented the factory from resuming operations for 10 days. The water supply over 22 the whole island was cut off because the main pipeline had been damaged by landslides and 23 the production of explosives cannot be undertaken without having an emergency water 24 sprinkling system available. Many Natech disasters start with the destruction of a storage facility or a production facility 10 as a result of the physical effects of some natural hazard. This then leads to the leakage of 11 chemicals. Physical effects, such as vibration [32] , are the features of a natural hazard that can 12 influence the function of a technological system, 13 The Natech disaster at Soja was triggered by floodwater from a nearby river. Floods are well that the main destruction was caused by the generation of a shockwave rather than a simple 19 phase transition, or the conversion of water to steam. It also concluded that it was unlikely 20 that the chemical reaction of the steel with the water increased the explosive pressure. 21 Although this phenomenon is simple to understand and seems easy to prevent, accidents due windows facing potential explosion sites with 0.975 m 2 of the area of a window [40] . 3 The Soja case highlights the risk of handling materials in hazardous conditions. The 4 phase-change of floodwater caused by the temperature difference resulted in a vigorous 5 explosion while most Natech events due to flood water resulted in transfer of objects due to 6 buoyancy, or ground failure, or dampness which causes corrosion of electrical products, or 7 submersion resulting in damaged materials. Some materials are stable in their standard 8 condition, but usually can also be stored, handled, or transferred in a factory in a hazardous 9 condition, such as at high temperature. However, the hazardous condition can cause severe 10 problems in the event containment being lost. Therefore, when a natural disaster is forecast in an area that is considered vulnerable to flooding. However, an awareness of these factors 4 did not lead management to take the safe option in the decision-making process in July 2018.

Such decision-making is often influenced by production pressures and normalcy biases. 6 Production pressures have been discussed in the field of safety at work because they can lead 7 frontline workers to engage in unsafe behaviour and pose a threat to safety. Safe working 8 practices can be neglected when workers feel the need to perform their tasks quickly [42] . 9 From the point of view of management, the concern is often over the economic consequences 10 and their relations with external stakeholders. These pressures are not so much for quick 11 performance, but more for continuing operations despite the risk of damage with thoughts 12 such as "other areas might be subject to damage, but perhaps we won't," "we had no damage 13 on the previous occasions, so should be OK this time", or "the situation won't become any 14 worse". Such normalcy biases deter erring on the safety side in decision-making and delay 15 activation of an emergency plan. 16 The decision can be particularly difficult when the demand for production is high. To substances. An electricity supply, in particular, is also essential to manage processes by 31 monitoring or changing the condition of each unit in terms of temperature, pressure, level, and 32 flow. An electricity supply is also essential for the safe shutdown of operations. Since the lack of an electricity supply can be catastrophic for production and safety, many chemical plants . 7 The Osaka case highlights the finding that the full impact of a natural disaster is not always 8 immediately obvious. In response to a natural disaster, facilities may be shut down or 9 operations partially suspended in a way that can hide a malfunction or the development of 10 hazardous scenarios. In such cases, the full resumption of operations can be a dangerous 11 process and needs to be done carefully. In addition to immediate consequences, latent, Since natural disasters are difficult to avoid, it is an essential safeguard to take measures 19 which reduce the damage that might be caused. Since some safeguarding measures take time 20 and resources to be implemented, they should be arranged well before any disaster arises. In 21 this case, the reinforcement of embankments with mortar was a safeguard against possible 22 landslides and the raising of the production facility was a safeguard against possible flooding.

Although the severity of the disaster may have been greater than expected, the mitigation 24 activities they had undertaken were prioritised in the order of the severity of any loss, 

In the Etajima case, however, the severe local impact of the heavy precipitation was evident 19 shortly after the release of the emergency warning by the meteorological observatory. The 20 localised impacts of disasters might sometimes be at variance with the centralised official 21 warnings, especially in terms of their timings. In such cases, a company might find it useful to 22 collect local information provided by employees. Nowadays almost all employees have 23 smartphones and can gather information on their own by SNS and from other sources.

Although false information may be circulated and the accuracy needs to be checked, 25 information specific to a local area is helpful to clarify the situation. However, decisions Provide current information about the situation to stakeholders 32 The factory management informed the relevant local government authority about the on-going situation so that the authority could post the information on their website reporting:

1 the damage to the factory; the avoidance of an explosion; and details of the recovery plan. It is important to consider various possible scenarios and prior to any disasters prepare more 20 than one option to distribute information.

Plan resources required for recovery activities 23 During the recovery phase of a disaster, clearing damaged premises often requires heavy 24 plant and machinery to remove debris, fallen trees, sediment or rocks. If the affected area is 25 widespread, the machinery and equipment required for recovery tasks will be in high demand. 26 The resources that may be required in the likely recovery activities should be carefully 27 considered beforehand.

Compared to an industrial accident in a facility, a natural disaster often affects a widespread 29 area, so many facilities and residents may require similar tools and machinery at the same 30 time for remedial activities. In particular, in the affected area there may be limited availability 31 of contractors who can operate the heavy equipment required to undertake the recovery 32 activities and so the contractors may be spread thinly over many affected places. Since these resources may be restricted or unavailable, their possible limitations should be incorporated 1 into the recovery plan. and recovery [46] . As well as for natural disaster management these phases are also used for 16 other types of emergency such as a terrorist attack. In the rest of this paper the term 17 "preparedness" will be referred to as "preparation" as that gives a more active sense. In 18 disaster management, preparation is defined as the activity of preparing to handle an 19 emergency. Mitigation refers to steps taken to minimise the effects of a possible disaster. 20 Response refers to the activities to be taken in reaction to an emergency and recovery refers to 21 the actions taken to return an affected situation to a normal or an even safer situation after a 22 disaster. 23 For Natech risk management, many researchers have explored key principles and essential 24 features to facilitate better approaches to managing the risks. Since the characteristics of 25 Natech risk include multiple occurrences across a wide area with limited resources to cope 26 with the situation these pose many problems so suitable frameworks have been repeatedly Table 4 Comparison among lessons in this study, phases in disaster management, and Lesson (e) Consider employees' safety in returning to their homes may be too specific. 29 However, this aspect may have been neglected in some management frameworks focusing on Lesson (h) Plan resources required for recovery activities. 20 The contagious character of a pandemic makes it difficult for personnel to work together 21 closely. Since recovery activity is sometimes conducted without an energy source due to the 22 damage of infrastructure, it sometimes relies on human power as in Case 3, in which workers 23 had to remove the sediment manually. Management is required to avoid making the activity a 24 breeding place of disease and, as well as ensuring employees are socially distant, they may 25 need to provide regular supplies of protective equipment. Business closures due to the 26 pandemic may limit the supply of these resources for the recovery activities.

Lesson (e) Consider employees' safety in returning to their homes. 29 This lesson relates to the situation where employees' safety is threatened by the onset of 30 natural hazards, particularly when workers need to leave their facility. For ensuring workers' 31 safety when a natural disaster is coming, workers may travel as a team in case of 32 contingencies. On the other hand, close contact must be avoided during a pandemic so although the onset is less sudden the problem with public or shared transport is more acute. information will be variable because each cultural group or country has different attitudes to 11 personal information. However, if it is available, local information relating to the natural 12 hazard can be posted and browsed on the internet helping the public to know how to respond. 13 The lack of such local information has hampered the efforts of some local authorities recently. Three cases of manufacturing factories experiencing natural disasters were described and 28 lessons were drawn. In the first case at Soja in Okayama, the key decision to start cooling 29 down the molten aluminium was taken too late and an explosion occurred. The second case in 30 Osaka was less affected by the heavy rain, but part processed materials left idle in a tank 31 slowly generated toxic gas with lethal effects and caused disruption in the surrounding area. 32 The third factory in Etajima in Hiroshima managed to avoid any catastrophic results by a thorough system of safeguards. 1 The cases in this article indicate the sort of events that can be triggered by natural disasters The authors are thankful to the president and members of Chugokukayaku, Ltd., and a few 13 anonymous informants at Soja and Osaka for all their input.

14 This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, 15 commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. 

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