key: cord-0813485-tdsyengw
authors: Dzigbede, Komla; Gehl, Sarah Beth; Willoughby, Katherine
title: Disaster resiliency of U.S. local governments: Insights to strengthen local response and recovery from the COVID‐19 pandemic
date: 2020-05-30
journal: Public Adm Rev
DOI: 10.1111/puar.13249
sha: 2d97db1351ef868ed4d816603910c8f151b0fe69
doc_id: 813485
cord_uid: tdsyengw

This research presents implications of the global pandemic on local government resiliency in the United States. We explore insights from local government officials and managers at the frontlines of response and recovery efforts to the biological natural disaster. Also, findings from the latest nationwide survey of U.S. local governments regarding their preparedness for weather‐related natural disasters informs responses to the current crisis. Results indicate that local governments are innovating and taking strategic actions to fight the virus. This, even though COVID‐19 has exposed social inequities exacerbated as the virus spreads. Survey findings of disaster readiness of local governments to weather‐related disasters shows that small, resource poor governments will not be able to respond well, and social inequities will grow. Policy strategies at all levels of government must recognize and account for these inequities as threat of this virus subsides, to support stronger, more effective readiness for the next biological catastrophe. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

strategic vision to support continued provision of essential services for their residents, even as the public health crisis intensifies and spreads. In New York City, for example, local government managers worked to put 6,000 homeless individuals, some COVID-19 positive, into local hotels to mitigate the crisis in homeless shelters (Connelly 2020) . In Baltimore, Maryland, the city established a diaper delivery service to distribute 500,000 diapers to nearly 10,000 vulnerable young children over a two-month period (City of Baltimore 2020). In Albany, Georgia, city officials held daily press briefings to inform the public about progress regarding COVID-19 and initiated a grassroots effort, #maskupAlbany, to encourage face masks, even before the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) adopted the recommendation (WALB News Team 2020). Tulsa, Oklahoma and Dallas, Texas are also notable examples of local governments that are providing soft loans to local businesses and cash assistance to families to mitigate the impact of the crisis in their communities (City of Tulsa 2020; City of Dallas 2020).

The COVID-19 pandemic has tested government emergency preparedness efforts around the world and at all levels, and perhaps most especially, at the local government level. Many local governments have become adept at managing natural weather-related disasters, as severe winter weather, hurricane season, or flooding become more frequent occurrences that instigate a network of emergency response and recovery efforts. In the case of these types of disasters, the intergovernmental system approach in the United States is federal support, state coordination, and local response in the aftermath of an event. As disasters occur, savvy local officials communicate up the chain-to the governor, Congressional representatives and senators-to garner a presidential declaration of disaster in order to be able to apply for and receive federal recovery funding.

Importantly, localities must tally losses after disaster abates and account for such losses to federal and state governments before relief is forthcoming. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

With COVID-19, however, local governments have been hit by a catastrophe that does not square easily within the framework of weather-related natural disasters. In the case of a weatherrelated catastrophe, the event occurs and ends, first responders engage, damages are surveyed, and then clean up advances the recovery phase. While these types of disasters can occur across a wide swath of territory, covering multiple jurisdictions, the damage sites are visible and, once the event concludes, have borders. Thomas Reeves, Community and Media Relations Officer of Modesto, California explained why a pandemic is different from other natural disasters his community is familiar with, such as wildfires:

We will face two or more crises at the same time by this summer [2020] . With a fire, you know where it is and you can stay away from it, you can watch boundaries move, but for most people, the fire is avoidable, usually fast moving and short lived and you can see where it is.

With this situation [pandemic] , it is invisible and slow-moving, and we are all at risk, no one is immune, and it is everywhere (Alliance for Innovation 2020).

A pandemic can strike across borders, at any time, and is unseen-in the case of and without universal testing, carriers of the virus may exhibit no symptoms, adhere to preventive guidelines, but still spread it to others. Viral hot spots may loosen stay-at-home restrictions as confirmed cases and deaths diminish, only to experience a resurgence in its spread later. The CDC warning of a second wave of the novel coronavirus in conjunction with the start of the flu season in late fall, 2020, attests to the insidious nature of this biological natural disaster (Sun 2020) .

Another distinction between these types of natural disasters regards the movement of government fiscal support, how it is secured, and where it lands. In the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been an exceptional flow of funds coming from the federal government with declarations of need after the fact or not necessary at all. The purpose of the funds was to support the front lines of health care-so that hospitals and health care workers can treat those physically affected by the virus. But also, federal funding sent to individuals, made available to private businesses and for all sorts of government functions like transportation and housing was meant to keep the economy going, if limply. Local officials' reactions to the no (or few) strings attached money went both ways.

Gwinnett County, Georgia Grants Manager, Sharon Candler, explained that the county received $163 million in federal dollars that must be spent by the end of the year. Along with funding a cornucopia of social needs (food, housing, and childcare), the money will be used for programs that have not been high priority in the past-reducing homelessness and food insecurity. According to Candler, these federal funds provide -the flexibility to address what we need to address.‖ Neighboring Cobb County, Georgia Commission Chair, Mike Boyce, however, expressed dismay that the federal government has left choice to local governments. -When you do that, you open it up to the political process and then it gets kind of noisy‖ (Estep and Lutz 2020) . At the other end of the spectrum, local governments with under 500,000 in population have been dependent on the generosity of governors to shift federal CARES Act funds downward. Alternatively, as noted earlier, in the case of weatherrelated disasters, local governments must account to the federal government, their state and insurance providers regarding damages and their costs first before the monetary aid arrives.

This research explores insights from local government officials and managers currently at the frontlines of response and recovery efforts to the biological natural disaster. We also study results from the latest nationwide survey of U.S. local governments regarding their preparedness for weather-related natural disasters. Findings indicate that local governments are innovating and taking strategic actions to fight the virus. Examples abound of public officials and managers engaging and steering proactive, nimble actions espoused by New Public Management in conjunction with collaborative efforts promoted by New Public Service (Denhardt and Denhardt 2000) . In fact, this crisis has nudged governments not only to generate -new packages of routines and processes‖ characteristic of agile governance, but to do so by breaking up and reforming traditional work groups and structures (Mergel, Ganapati and Whitford 2020, 1) . Such actions are occurring, in light of or in spite of the fact that COVID-19 has exposed social inequities that have been exacerbated as the virus spreads and takes hold of localities (Duhigg 2020; Jacobson 2020; Nania 2020) .

On the other hand, survey findings of disaster readiness of local governments to weatherrelated disasters show that small and resource poor governments will not be able to respond well, if at all, and social inequities will grow. Management and policy strategies at all levels of government need to recognize and account for these inequities, keeping the public value of social equity at the forefront of actions to support stronger, more effective readiness for the next biological catastrophe.

The article concludes with action strategies that can be engaged by local governments to navigate more effectively during and following the biological natural disaster that is COVID-19.

We have been conducting exploratory research over the last two years regarding U.S. local government fiscal resiliency in the event of a natural, weather-related disaster. The research assesses local governments' past experiences and current preparation efforts for these types of disasters through surveys, interviews, government document searches and academic research, thus far. In September 2019, we partnered with the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) to conduct a survey of the natural disaster preparedness capacity of U.S. local governments, given the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) recommended best practices on natural disaster preparedness. Survey questions included those regarding the adequacy of financial resources to support response and recovery efforts, familiarity with protocols for obtaining state and federal disaster relief resources, existence of mutual aid agreements to share services, support agreements with nearby governments and other entities, and the disaster-related services and technologies in existence, such as emergency operations facilities and geographic information tracking systems.

With the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, our work pivoted to examine how localities are managing through a biological disaster. We first went back to the U.S. federal government's national disaster response system and plan, to understand if plans vary for different types of disasters. Tables 1 and 2 present these plans. Within a broader system of national disaster response (Table 1) is embedded a robust system for responding to pandemics ( Table 2 ). The national disaster response system, generally, is designed to be bottom-up, from local to state governments and the federal government, but in the case of a pandemic, the response system more closely ascribes to a top-down approach.

After assessing these plans, we began to solicit insights from local government managers currently dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic who have previously managed weather-related natural disasters. Thus far, we have received comments by email or telephone from local government managers in Albany, Georgia; Athens, Georgia; Bay County, Florida; and, Huntsville, Alabama. In addition to this ongoing study effort, we have collected an assortment of webinars and online conferences that include interviews of or presentations by local government managers provided by professional groups such as the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), the International City/County Managers Association (ICMA), and the United States Conference of Mayors. The research also includes exploration of multiple media outlets, including newspapers, newscast interviews, and podcasts to understand how local government managers are conducting their work given COVID-19. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Our extant data indicates that the COVID-19 pandemic is like other disasters in pushing local governments to both rescue and recover, as well as continue with business as usual. According to Dayton, Ohio Mayor Nan Whaley, in a discussion about the current crisis and other types of disasters:

[In 2019], our city was rocked by a series of completely unexpected events-a KKK rally, a series of mass tornadoes, and a mass shooting that claimed nine lives… Now while 2019 in Dayton was certainly an anomaly, it can also serve as a microcosm of what nearly every city in the country is going through today. Mayors must both try to lead their community through difficult and sometimes tragic times while also making sure there are sufficient resources to do the basic business of local government-picking up the trash, responding to medical emergencies, and keeping the economy moving (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2020).

Also, while actions to manage a weather-related disaster may not be exactly the same as those necessary for a pandemic, building capacity and learning from experience squares with both. City Manager Sharon Subadan, of Albany, Georgia, an early hot spot of the COVID-19 pandemic in the state, told us that her government -had four presidentially-declared disasters (not including the pandemic) since 2017. We are practically experts at responding to tornadoes, straight-line winds, and hurricanes. The most significant difference [from the pandemic] is that there is an established ‗playbook' for those responses.‖ Still, past disaster management efforts can provide support to local officials in certain ways. For example, having relationships with regional, state, and federal agencies, cooperative agreements, and communications frameworks across jurisdictions can save time when any type of disaster hits. The City Administrator of Huntsville, Alabama, John Hamilton, explained to us the importance of groundwork necessary for effective disaster management: -If you are meeting your regional partners or state and federal partners for the first time after disaster strikes, you are too late. Spend time developing relationships and partnerships throughout your region as a matter of regular routine so you are ready when the event strikes.‖ Managers throughout government must be ready to act quickly and decisively-to reorganize, This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Jacobson's work was successful in -flattening the curve,‖ producing guidance in partnership with CDC, finding PPE for childcare facilities, creating a small business grant program, and making additional funding proposals for federal funds. Yet, he explained that the social inequities of the crisis cannot be overlooked as its spread -disproportionately impacts low-income communities of color as well as indigenous, immigrant and refugee populations‖ (Jacobson 2020). Jacobson (2020) determined much of the success of the Command's actions to be attributable to the fact that -in King County, social equity has been an important tenet of many of our decisions for responding to this pandemic.‖ His Command's efforts going forward include assessing working conditions physically in terms of what work can remain online and what must be conducted face-to-face, examining work spaces for changes to accommodate social distancing for service delivery, considering new services and programs needed, budgetary limitations, and contemplating silver linings. Silver linings are those changes made in response to COVID-19 that worked, including a reduced jail population, increased homeless housing and motel occupancy, rapid acceptance of telemedicine, a normalizing of teleworking, and an uptick in online service delivery that can be maintained and even grown (American Society for Public Administration 2020).

Reeves of Modesto echoed Jacobson's call for managers to lead, be decisive, and take instant actions, describing the role of public information officer as rising to the top and grabbing firm rein to manage frequent communications from multiple sources in a pandemic:

It is absolutely critical that any city's or county's public information officer is tied to the hip to the city manager because in this crisis the lead communicator has to hear first-hand what the jurisdiction is doing…. The mayor's message should be of hope and encouragement while the manager can detail what is being done and what to do…. There's always going to be a place for a media source to simply give out the bad news-here are the number of cases, Online capacity came to Athens/Clarke County, Georgia through -unplanned‖ innovation.

Chief Financial Officer, David Boyd, told us:

A couple of years ago, not really planning for any sort of disaster, we saw where technology was going, and instead of replacing desktop computers, we replaced with laptops and docking stations. This was so that when our employees went out and gave presentations or met with people, they had access to all the same information through their laptop. It just so happens that this worked out for us-we have VOIP and VPNs and are prepared for any distant work that has allowed a shift from in-office to home working. So, we haven't missed a beat in that regard. Now, there are things that must be done manually, so some folks have to be in the office, but we can deposit funds, conduct accounting and budgeting, and many of our functions, in-office or not. We sort of planned ahead without really planning ahead.

Carrie Mathes, Procurement Manager for Orange County, Florida served as chorus to the public servants above. She talked about developing and implementing a telework program over a weekend, deployed March 23, 2020, and impacting 27 of 34 staff, transitioning processes into a completely electronic environment. Her team converted a paper procurement system into a virtual one seemingly overnight, with all solicitations, bid openings and selection of vendors conducted online-a first virtual public opening was conducted April 29, 2020. Mathes noted that her department had been contemplating online procurement processes, but the crisis pressed practically instant conversion and the department will not be returning to a paper process (American Society for Public Administration 2020).

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Early revenue collection data and revenue loss estimates illustrate the depth of fiscal shock that is possible from COVID-19. A survey of local governments conducted in early April, 2020, showed uncertainty around the fiscal effects from COVID-19, but widespread expectations of budget shortfalls (Maher, Hoang and Hindery 2020) . The depth of fiscal shock became ever more apparent short term budget options that every manager considers-across the board cuts, deferred maintenance, hiring freeze, and three months wait for things to cool down. But the COVID-19 pandemic has put government actions on steroids. Vetter discussed the requirement to rethink core services and contemplate if services stopped during the crisis that were not adding value are worth bringing back. She emphasized that change in her District spans employee reassignments to building This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Accepted Article restructuring to accommodate social distancing for employees and the public (International City/County Managers Association 2020).

Through interviews we learned from Albany Manager Subadan that the most considerable difference to finances in a pandemic -is that our expenses associated with the COVID-19 crisis are much less than a natural disaster, but our revenue losses are much higher. And our revenue losses are not reimbursable.‖ Also, County Manager of Bay County, Florida, Bob Majka, claimed -midterm and long-term revenue sources should run the same impact and recovery timeline, 12 to 36 months or more, as a hurricane. The variables that will impact the timeline are dependent on the amount of dislocation of businesses and residents, and the pace of infrastructure restoration and reconstruction.‖ City Administrator of Baraboo, Wisconsin Kennie Downing, discussed pivots by small cities during the crisis to support economic recovery. This City tapped into tax improvement district funds and undesignated economic development funds, creating a $250,000 small business emergency loan program targeted to for-profit businesses with 25 employees or less. They are making $5,000 loans available to businesses to use for mortgages, leases, payroll, whatever is needed to stay afloat.

Businesses must be current with all city bills and not in bankruptcy, and those securing loans will not be charged interest, with notes due, July 2021. Since the program started, the City has received 15 applications and approved 14, with all transactions online. Downing explained that they are working on a similar plan for nonprofits (International City/County Managers Association 2020). As businesses and restaurants reopen in the State of Florida, City Manager Norton Bonaparte of Sanford, pressed economic development by reviewing local ordinances of public spaces, specifically lifting limits on how far restaurants can leech into these spaces to accommodate returning customers and offer social distancing at the same time (American Society for Public Administration 2020). This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

In the end, the ability of local governments to continue to pay for regular services will be more challenging than paying for pandemic response. The U.S. Conference of Mayors (2020) has a -Fiscal Pain‖ tracker to compile revenue and budget effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on cities.

The tracker captures immediate and projected revenue losses and budgetary reactions including, furloughs, hiring freezes, deferment of capital projects and service restrictions. Examples are stark, with cities evidencing vast reductions in public safety and emergency services, among others taking a hit. The federal government provided funds to reimburse local governments for pandemic costs, but did not provide funds to counter revenue losses, at least in the first rounds of stimulus. Thus, the disaster costs should not cripple local governments, but the long-term revenue fallout from the pandemic coupled with the need to fund regular, ongoing services will be a primary, perhaps overwhelming strain.

Local governments have innovated, repurposed, and applied lessons from past disasters; however, the ability of local governments to undertake those efforts varies significantly. This research highlights the management strategies above for the purpose of learning as the COVID-19 pandemic continues, but we fully recognize that learnings without capacity cannot spread. Capacity takes two paths here-underlying resource capacity of a local government and pandemic-impacted capacity.

For example, one local government may be resource-poor prior to the pandemic and struggle to respond given the underlying resource constraints. Another local government may be resource-rich prior to the pandemic, but then be particularly hard-hit by the pandemic based on the local economy.

Some communities may fall into both capacity gaps-resource-poor before the pandemic and particularly damaged due to the pandemic. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

This section examines key findings from the latest national survey on weather-related natural disaster preparedness to inform policy strategies that could help spur agility and innovation across local governments during the COVID-19 pandemic. The survey, conducted in partnership with ICMA and distributed by email to chief administrative officials in a sample of 4,932 local governments, realized a response rate of 18 percent (901 responses). Weather-related natural disaster preparedness, emergency response, and subsequent economic recovery requires that local governments have critical mechanisms in place before a disastrous event. Preparations include adequate financial resources available to support relief and recovery efforts, an up-to-date disaster plan that lays out roles and responsibilities of government employees and other external stakeholders, familiarity with protocols for securing state and federal disaster relief resources, mutual aid agreements to share services and lend support with neighboring jurisdictions, and specific services and technologies like emergency having financial resources available that support relief and recovery efforts (general fund reserves or This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Accepted Article unrestricted funds, insurance, departmental funds, or contingency/emergency funds). At least twothirds have services and technologies for disaster recovery efforts (backed up data storage for key records, emergency operations center, detailed GIS map of community assets, or offsite information systems). These governments are likely to have a number of plans and agreements in place to account for a disastrous event-hazard mitigation plan, continuity of operations plan, or standalone disaster recovery plan, pre-disaster contracts for emergency management and debris removal and public safety and public works mutual aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions. Further testament to groundwork relationship building, more than half have established formal partnerships with local nonprofit, community, and/or religious organizations to be activated post-disaster. A majority (at least 54 percent) have conducted a capital asset vulnerability assessment. Alternatively, 61 percent of local governments have not implemented any disaster training exercises to prepare for disaster.

To understand variation across governments, we analyzed survey responses using item response theory (IRT). IRT modeling uses a collection of items or questions in a survey to measure an unobservable latent trait and analyzes how each individual item, or group of items, relates to the latent trait (Birnbaum, 1968; de Ayala, 2009) . We are able to characterize survey respondents given where they fall on the latent trait. The results yield a measure of natural disaster preparedness as a latent trait; this trait is comprised of seven items from the survey (Tables 3 and 4) and is scaled on a continuum from 0 to 7. The analysis differentiates local governments based on their latent trait measure across other variables such as fiscal capacity.

Our major finding from the IRT modeling is that local governments with less fiscal capacity tend to be less ready for disasters. Local governments of stronger fiscal capacity (annual budget exceeding $100 million) achieve a higher score (4.8 out of 7) on the disaster preparedness scale whereas local governments of smaller fiscal capacity (annual budget less than $100 million) achieve a lower score (3.1 out of 7) on the disaster preparedness scale. This speaks to the social inequity implications of these types of disasters-major natural disasters make the poorer, poorer, if not the rich, richer. In addition to less readiness, poor communities often suffer most heavily from disasters for several reasons-they do not have the capacity to apply for aid, are not prepared with the data needed that costs out property inventory and assets lost, or even if they do have the data, tallied costs do not reach federal minimal levels to be funded. For example, Murray County, Georgia, suffered damages from a tornado in April, 2020, but FEMA explained no support would be forthcoming.

Approximately 254 homes were affected by the tornado, and 62 were destroyed, comprised mostly of mobile homes. According to County Commissioner Greg Hogan, -the dollar amount [of damages] just didn't add up.‖ FEMA advised the government that -the value of the damaged property in the county did not reach the minimal $7 million to qualify for federal relief funds‖ (Oliver 2020) . While these findings about emergency preparedness are specific to weather-related events, the findings can also provide policy insights for dealing with the current biological disaster, the coronavirus pandemic.

That is, localities must prepare because there is no reliable calvary. In talking of small local governments being left behind, Assistant City Manager Good from Lone Tree bemoaned:

[Your city will] get lost in the shuffle if you are small, less than 25,000 people. The smaller you are, the harder it is to get that money. Rattle your saber and make a lot of noise [to get federal relief funds]. The reality for the time being, there is no one coming to save us. We have to figure it out. A community our size is struggling (International City/County Managers Association 2020).

Importantly, -the coronavirus pandemic has taught cities that bigger bureaucracies are not all that reliable‖ [to help] (Beyer 2020) . Pittsburg, Pennsylvania Mayor Bill Peduto portends a bleak future for these governments:

If we don't invest in [the economically vulnerable regions], it is putting the final nail in the coffin. It is saying to an area of America that we don't have the capacity to help you. Stress is always like this. Areas that are vulnerable will break (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2020).

The fiscal fallout from disasters is mind-boggling. Natural, biological, and man-made disasters (like a train wreck or ransomware attack) are costly and can quickly overwhelm local governments' ability and capacity to function. Globally, direct economic losses from just natural disasters alone from 1998 to 2017 amounted to $3 trillion (U.S. dollars), with the United States suffering the greatest economic losses of any other country, at $945 billion (Wallemacq, Below and McLean 2018) . According to a recent estimate by the Asian Development Bank, the economic cost from the COVID-19 pandemic may top $4 trillion (Alegado 2020). The U.S. economy is estimated to take a hit reaching almost a quarter of the $4 trillion total at $973 billion (Perryman 2020).

Local governments have met these challenges with leadership and tenacity, learning from each other and from past disasters. Our survey research with ICMA points to learning on the part of local governments that have managed through prior disasters and robust preparedness on a number of fronts for weather-related disasters. Vital in this current crisis, leaders and staff of these governments exhibit the values of agile governing that require strongest attention to people over process;

operational digitized systems over antiquated paper trails; collaborative, not adversarial problemsolving across sectors; and nimbleness of response in the face of faulty, inadequate, old or no plans This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Accepted Article (Mergel, Ganipati and Whitford 2020) . Ultimately, agile governing calls for the celebration of small wins gained from action rather than avoidance of failure from inaction. COVID-19 has pushed local officials to engage an agile-adaptive approach to management that requires decisiveness and relatively quick actions that have led to greater efficiencies of operations, more participation by employees and the public in determining and conducting necessary work, and improved government transparency (Moon 2020) .

This research also highlights the critical need for officials in governments of least capacity, most especially, to become expert in initiating and perpetuating collaborations, especially those that enhance community benefits or CCB (Min, Lee and Yang 2020) . Our findings indicate that local officials in these communities are up to the task-by virtue of their agile actions evidenced and given recognition of the social inequities that COVID-19 and responses to it have exposed. CCB requires boundary spanning and inclusiveness-carrying out public purposes by engaging a wide net of participants-public, private and nonprofit. Such collaboration is not only mutually beneficial to contributing parties but supports the public good (Min, Lee and Yang 2020) . Given problems created by the current crisis and with the inevitability of future ones to come, small town government officials must push actions that foster a mindset that extends such a -whole of community‖ benefit approach.

Nonetheless, even in the face of local governments' rather extraordinary actions to date to combat effects of COVID-19, these governments, and particularly those with limited capacity, require substantial assistance from state and federal governments when confronted with disasters of this scale. Even prior to the pandemic, local governments across the nation faced dire threats from more frequent and severe weather-related disasters. The pandemic has unearthed real social inequities that exist and can be exacerbated with each subsequent disaster experienced. Policymakers must devise a fiscal support system that recognizes these social inequities that prevent preparation, mitigation, and recovery capacity and are intensified with every disaster. Additionally, going forward, the policy arena needs fiscal thinkers to be in climate change and disaster-related conversations-bringing the full cost to bear of these events on communities and making the case for greater intervention to prevent such catastrophes. In sum, this research highlights points of evidence for practice necessary to strengthen local government response and recovery from the coronavirus pandemic:

 Government managers must continue with agile governing actions-to lead and motivate, communicate clearly and effectively, collect intelligence, act decisively, and keep adapting and innovating.

 Local governments must collaborate for community benefits-by creating, maintaining, and expanding networks and shared learning with neighboring jurisdictions to strengthen partnerships that advance whole of community response and recovery.

 Federal and state fiscal support to local governments should consider and address fiscal disparities and social inequities across these governments-special attention should be given to small local governments of limited capacity. Core instruments and frameworks for national emergency response (a) The National Incident Management System (i) It outlines a common approach to managing incidents or emergencies regardless of their size, scope, complexity, or cause. (ii) It provides a standardized but flexible incident management structure that emphasizes command and coordination among all stakeholders, as well as resource management and communication and information management.

(b) National Response Framework (i) It provides the core emergency management guidance on how the Nation should respond to all types of incidents. (ii) It defines roles, responsibilities, and actions for federal departments and agencies to coordinate support for state and local governments. (iii) It also gives structures and procedures on how governments at all levels should work in unity with the non-profit and private sectors in response to emergencies. (iv) The key components of the response framework are: -engaged partnership, tiered response, scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities, unity of effort through unified command, and readiness to act.‖ (Department of Homeland Security 2019, 5) Core instruments for pandemic response under the national emergency response framework (a) The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (i) It is designed to enhance the nation's ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond to public health emergencies and to provide effective assistance to state and local governments in the event of a public health emergency. (ii) The federal government will undertake surveillance and monitoring of the progress of the pandemic on a national and international scale, and support and sponsor the development and production of medical interventions. (iii) It will also support the response and mitigation efforts of state and local governments in a variety of ways, including deployment of personnel and expertise, and provision of material and equipment, diagnostic services and testing, and funding for related response activities.

(b) State and local governments (i) State and local governments are primarily responsible for detecting and responding to pandemics and implementing countermeasures to mitigate the human, social, and economic consequences of the pandemic. (ii) They will coordinate their response efforts with federal departments and agencies, and when needed, request for and distribute emergency supplies and medical interventions from national stockpiles to areas of need within their communities. (iii) They will work to enhance communication between their public health departments and private sector partners engaged in the response to a pandemic.

(c) Nonprofit and private sectors (i) The nonprofit and private sectors will be an integral part of the national response to a pandemic. (ii) They will leverage their resources and expertise in multiple areas, including public health (e.g., health care facilities and clinical laboratories), economic development, and community planning to support local, state, and national efforts to mitigate the pandemic. (iii) Businesses, corporations, and community and religious organizations will continue with the essential functions and services needed to sustain lifeline community needs.

(d) Individuals and families (i) Individuals and families will support state and local government efforts to contain the pandemic, including stay at home orders, social distancing protocols, self-isolation procedures, and travel. (ii) Individuals will also support community response efforts through volunteerism and performance of civic and humanitarian duties. 

Alliance for Innovation. 2020. Innovator's Journey: Thomas Reeves and Crisis Communications

Global Cost of Coronavirus May Reach $4.1 Trillion, ADB Says.‖ Bloomberg Economics

COVID-19-Doing the Public Good in a Time of Crisis: Perspectives from the Front Lines. Keeping Current Webinar Series

Why Local Governments Should Do Their Own Disaster Prep.‖ Governing

Some Latent Trait Models and Their Use in Inferring an Examinee's Ability

Pandemic-Driven Industry Cutbacks and Closures: Georgia Sales Tax Revenue Impacts

Mayor Bernard C. -Jack‖ Young, Health Department Partner with ShareBaby to Distribute 500

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved

Accepted Article City of Dallas. 2020. Dallas City Council Provides COVID-19 Relief. Press Release

Resilience and Recovery Fund

Council of State Governments. 2020. COVID-19 Resources for State Leaders

NYC Isolating 6,000 Homeless People in Hotels to Slow Coronavirus Spread.‖ The New York Post

The Theory and Practice of Item Response Theory

The New Public Service: Serving Rather Than Steering

County Leaders Warn of Epic Revenue Losses from COVID-19.‖ Governing

Seattle's Leaders Let Scientists Take the Lead. New York's Did Not.‖ The New Yorker

Metro Counties Begin Fraught Task of Spending Federal Coronavirus Aid

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved

Accepted Article Federal Emergency Management Agency

International City/County Managers Association (ICMA). 2020. Fiscal and Organizational Strategies during Pandemic. Webinar

Social Equity Considerations: An Imperative in a Time of Pandemic.‖ Governing

Fiscal Responses to COVID-19: Evidence from Local Governments and Nonprofits

Implications of the Coronavirus on Sales Tax Revenue and Local Government Fiscal Health

Agile: A New Way of Governing

Multidimensional Publicness and Collaboration for Community Benefits: The Case of U.S. Hospitals

Fighting COVIC-19 with Agility, Transparency, and Participation: Wicked Policy Problems and New Governance Challenges

Accepted Article Nania, Rachel. 2020. -Blacks, Hispanics Hit Harder by the Coronavirus, Early U.S. Data Show.‖ AARP: Health Conditions & Treatments

National Conference of State Legislatures. 2020. State Action on Coronavirus (COVID-19)

New Sales Tax Data Reinforce Troubling Findings of COVID-19 Economic Impact Report. Press Release

Federal Government Denies Disaster Aid to Murray County.‖ Daily Citizen-News

COVID-19 Pandemic Could Cost the US Economy $973 Billion.‖ The Dallas Morning News

Baltimore City Revenues Could Drop by Nearly $170 Million.‖ Baltimore Brew

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved

The US States Uniting to Combat Coronavirus Amid Leadership Vacuum.‖ The Guardian

CDC Director Warns Second Wave of Coronavirus is Likely to be Even More Devastating.‖ The Washington Post

Conference of Mayors. 2020. Webinar

Updated Preparedness and Response Framework for Influenza Pandemics

Secretary Azar Declares Public Health Emergency for United States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus. Press Release

National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Implementation Plan

National Response Framework. Fourth Edition

Department of the Treasury. 2020. The CARES Act Works for All Americans

WALB News Team. 2020. -City Officials Encouraging Albany to ‗Mask Up'.‖ WALB News 10. Last modified

Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR)

Estimates of State and Local Government Revenue Losses from Pandemic Mitigation. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

How Does the National Guard Keep People Safe During a Pandemic? By Cleaning, Sewing and Packing.‖ CNN