key: cord-0802861-tx3m4gu4 authors: Wan, Kin-Man; Ka-ki Ho, Lawrence; WM Wong, Natalie; Chiu, Andy title: Fighting COVID-19 in Hong Kong: The effects of community and social mobilization date: 2020-06-25 journal: World Dev DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105055 sha: e6d02abc8756a353057975ee34cee08c2abfad55 doc_id: 802861 cord_uid: tx3m4gu4 The globalized world economy has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic since early February 2020. In the midst of this global public health crisis, a prompt review of the counterinsurgencies that have occurred in different jurisdictions is helpful. This article examines the experience of Hong Kong (HKSAR), which successfully limited its number of confirmed cases to approximately 1100 until early June 2020. Considering the limited actions that the government has taken against the pandemic, we emphasize the prominent role of Hong Kong’s civil society through highlighting the strong and spontaneous mobilization of its local communities originating from their experiences during the SARS outbreak in 2003 and the social unrest in 2019, as well as their doubts regarding the pandemic assessments and recommendations of the HKSAR and WHO authorities. This article suggests that the influence of civil society should not be overlooked in the context of pandemic management. (147 words) its number of confirmed cases to approximately 1100 until mid-June 2020. Considering the limited actions that the government has taken against the pandemic, (Wang, Ng, and Brook 2000) . However, it is worth studying the roles of public personnel in the COVID-19 situation and the ways in which society responds to this pandemic. In this article, we examine the experience of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) to explain the importance of civil society and social mobilization as decisive elements of the fight against the pandemic. In the time between the outbreak of COVID-19 in mainland China during the month of January to mid-June, there have been approximately 1100 confirmed cases of the virus in Hong Kong, which is densely populated with over 8 million people ( Fig. 1) . In addition to the government's efforts to limit the spread of the virus, 1 the role of civil society is prominent to combat the surge of infection. Paradoxically, the strong and spontaneous mobilization observed in Hong Kong was a consequence of the population's devastating memories of the SARS outbreak in 2003 and the social unrest in 2019, as well as of their skepticism of the pandemic figures, assessments and recommendations given by the authorities of HKSAR, mainland China, and the World Health Organization (WHO). The lesson that can be learned from Hong Kong is that of an alternative approach to ensuring the effectiveness of pandemic management. 1 For details regarding the measures taken by the HKSAR government, please refer to Appendix A. The advent of COVID-19 (also known as SARS2 by HKU and the public) reminded the public of their experience during the SARS outbreak in 2003, which led to 1755 cases and 299 deaths as well as economic depression in Hong Kong. As a result of this experience, the public learned the importance of social distancing, personal hygiene, and the use of surgical masks in the context of SARS-like pandemics (Lau et al., 2010) . Among their Asian neighbors, Hong Kong citizens were the first to react to the pandemic. Using Apple mobility trend data, Fig. 2 shows that Hong Kong citizens rapidly reduced their frequency of walking out of their homes by over 40% (from 100 to approximately 50) after the first reported case in Hong Kong on Jan 23. 2 This trend continued even during the Lunar New Year public holiday occurring days after. 3 2 A survey also found that approximately 61.3% respondents avoiding going to crowded places (Cowling et at. 2020), which is highly consistent with the Apple mobility trend data. 3 Driving data from Apple also exhibits a similar trend as does the walking data. For these similar results using data drawn from the Google community mobility report, please see Appendix B. Extant works have suggested the crucial role of the state in the context of a pandemic; however, its effectiveness is dependent on the public's perception of the legitimacy of the government (Wallner, 2008; Gibson, Caldeira and Spence, 2005) . Initially, the public demand for preventive measures from the government was high, and these measures included a full closure of the border between Hong Kong and Mainland China and a sustainable supply of surgical masks. However, the HKSAR government was reluctant to act proactively and thus exacerbated the tension and distrust that had already been deeply established during the Anti-Extradition Bill movement of 2019. Indeed, the prominent dissatisfaction of Hong Kong citizens is accompanied by declining trust towards the government. In Fig. 4 , we can observe a dramatic decline in the government trust from June 2019, when the Anti-extradition Bill movement began. In the early stages of the pandemic (January to March), the rate of support for the Chief Executive was also recorded below 20 over 100, and less than 30% of the population trusted the government and were satisfied with the police force (Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, 2020d; Ho, 2020). It was argued that this attitude towards the police force has become a major divide between the citizens of Hong Kong and the HKSAR government (Chau and Wan, 2020). These attitudes have led to considerable public doubts about the measures that the government has taken and the policies that it has implemented in response to COVID-19. For instance, the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance, which prohibits all public gatherings of more than eight people, is perceived as a double standard, as police officers cited the ordinance for crowd control purposes in March 4 but the government permitted the reopening of amusement parks and the Hong Kong Book Fair 2020 in June. 4 This gathering is a monthly event held to commemorate certain protesters being attacked by riot police at a metro station. Over half (55%) of the people of Hong Kong believe that the social distancing rule is a means for political suppression rather than for fighting against the pandemic (Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, 2020a). The HKSAR government's reluctance to fully shut down its border and the deeply rooted distrust between society and the government have raised questions regarding the rationale and priorities behind the government's policy-making process. Some believe that the government has placed national interest and pride over public safety and local interest, which resulted in the following actions and responses from society. district councilors from January to early February. 5 Over 40% of the District Councilors held at least one sharing activity in January, and this number increased to 65% and 82% in early and late February, respectively. These mask distributions were prioritized to serve the disadvantaged and groups with a high level of exposure risk 6 , as these groups are the most vulnerable to COVID-19 (Jordan, Adab, and Cheng 2020). It is argued that the pro-democratic councilors, as a proxy representing a higher level of government distrust, were the first to act. Fig. 7 shows that the density of mask sharing in these pro-democratic districts is considerably higher than that of the pro-Beijing districts before March. 7 This implies that the higher the distrust towards the government is in a district, the faster the response of this district was. In addition to PPE sharing, this distrust of the government also led to more progressive actions against government measures. In late January, the Hospital Authority Employees Alliance (HKEA), a union formed by medical professionals, organized a strike to demand a complete border shutdown after the Chief Executive refused to shut down the high-speed railway to China and restricted incoming travelers from Wubei. Over 60% of the public consistently supported this strike, and the government eventually announced that it would be partially shutting down the high-speed railway to China in early February (Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, 2020a). Thus, the strike of HKEA prevented a potential large-scale outbreak caused by travelers from infected regions. Furthermore, the public distrust and social unrest occurring since the summer of 7 The pro-Beijing councilors are much more resourceful than the pro-democratic (Wong 2015) . We also provide more supportive evidence and placebo test in appendix, please refer to Tables A2 to A5, and shown how to test unqualified PPE, and taught how to make cloth masks and hand sanitizers at home. A real-time dashboard, which included details regarding the cases, high-risk areas, questionable pharmacies, etc. 9 , was established far before the government official dashboard was established. These platforms provided publicfriendly access to COVID-19-related information; this was essential in the fight against COVID-19, since unequal access to information due to differences in socioeconomic status would impede the effectiveness of the society's response to this public health crisis (Lin et al., 2014) . A social and community-based network formed by these self-help models has promoted the protection of the public, especially that of disadvantaged groups and high-risk workers. The fast and transparent circulation of information has enabled citizens to overcome the collective challenges that have faced them (Putman 1993). An important discussion regarding successful pandemic management centers on governance capacity, including information transparency and timely responses to potential threats. Taiwan and Hong Kong are identified as outstanding cases regarding the containment of the deadly COVID-19 virus due to the low number of confirmed cases and deaths in these places. While Taiwan's success was identified as a model of high governance capacity, this article presented Hong Kong's success as a case supported by civic society and social mobilization. Existing studies have suggested that trust between society and the government is crucial in responding to epidemics (Blair et al., 2017) , and it is possible that the public gained a higher approval of leadership and a higher sense of national unity during this crisis, as the "rally-round the flag" concept suggested (Mueller 1970; Baum 2002) . In this article, we demonstrated that public distrust of the government may not necessarily lead to a failure of pandemic control. In contrast, skepticism of ineffective policies and the presence of a strong civic society driven by state society tensions may contribute positively to pandemic management. The case of Hong Kong exhibits a sharp deviation from the mainstream discourse that places a dual emphasis on capacity and accountability in effective crisis management. However, it should be made clear that our findings should not be interpreted to undermine the important role of the state in pandemic management. 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Lawrence Ka-Ki Ho: Conceptualization, Writing-Original draft, Writing-Reviewing and Editing. Natalie W. M. Wong: Conceptualization, Writing-Original draft, Writing-Reviewing and Editing Writing-Original draft, Writing-Reviewing and Editing