key: cord-0791428-qkxn1a3x authors: Love, Peter E.D.; Ika, Lavagnon; Matthews, Jane; Fang, Weili title: Shared leadership, value and risks in large scale transport projects: Re-calibrating procurement policy for post COVID-19 date: 2021-12-31 journal: Research in Transportation Economics DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2020.100999 sha: 65e8400453b6443275d34ff5d04ea580dd86782e doc_id: 791428 cord_uid: qkxn1a3x Before the 2019 Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak, the Australian Commonwealth and State Governments invested significantly in the upgrade and construction of large-scale transport infrastructure projects (>AU$500 million). However, two trends prevail in Australia. Concessionaires/contractors face a requirement for fixed-price contracts, high levels of risk, and low margins. Concomitantly, an increasing number of projects have experienced significant cost blowouts, with adverse impacts on both the public and private sectors. Calls for the public sector to engage with collaborative procurement approaches to deliver large-scale transport projects, however, have gone unheeded. In this paper, we critically review existing policies and practices used to procure large-scale transport projects and examine the challenges they pose in a post-COVID-19 world. We suggest that the public and private sectors need to work in unison to overcome the significant economic hurdles that COVID-19 presents to the nation's infrastructure demands. We then proffer that governments need to re-calibrate their procurement policies to future-proof their large-scale transport infrastructure projects. To facilitate the process of re-calibration, we develop a theoretical procurement framework for consideration based on the concepts of shared leadership, value creation, and risks. It is envisaged that our procurement framework will provide a platform for engendering economic value and accounting for all-important societal costs and benefits in a world post pandemic. "The secret of change is to focus all of your energy, not on fighting the old, but on building the new."-Socrates. Over the last several decades, many governments throughout the world have invested significantly in the upgrade and construction of large-scale transport infrastructure projects to improve the economic and social well-being of their economies. Concomitantly, many projects have experienced significant cost blowouts, with adverse impacts on both the public and private sectors. Australia, the geographical focus of this paper, is no exception. In 2019, the Australian Commonwealth Government announced in its "budget to invest $100 billion over 10 years from 2019 to 20 in transport infrastructure, which includes an additional $23 billion for new projects and initiatives". The goal was to address congestion, better connect regional areas, and improve the safety of roads and the quality of the freight network (Commonwealth of Roads Western Australia, 2019: p.2). This funding from the Commonwealth generally comes in addition to that of the State governments in support of projects. Examples of significant transport projects underway include Sydney's West-Connex ($16 billion), Melbourne's West Gate Tunnel ($6.8 billion), Brisbane's Cross River Rail ($5.4 billion) and Perth's Metronet ($1.84 billion) to name a few. Despite such investment and the infrastructure boom, the headline of a Global Construction Review article claims that major contractors are close to insolvency and that the whole construction industry in Australia is "teetering on the brink of collapse" (CIOB, 2020a) . Alas, several Tier one contractors have been experiencing high levels of turnover and lower profit margins, if not financial losses, after delivering significant large-scale transport projects (>AU$500 million). This situation rings alarm bells and begs the question: Why is this the case? In this paper, we argue there has been a proclivity for Australian State governments to adopt procurement approaches that place too much risk on contractors and have them subsequently accommodate unforeseen costs not included in their accepted bid. This is the case of mega-projects over AU$1 billion, which tend to be highly uncertain and/or complex and reliant on Private Participation in Infrastructure 1 (PPI) approaches for their delivery (e.g., Canberra, Gold Coast and Sydney Light Rail). Markedly, the prevailing procurement practices, except perhaps for alliancing, may appear like a 'windshield' whereby risk is deflected onto Tier one contractors, which places a financial burden on them. We hasten to acknowledge, however, that when a contractor wins a bid, they agree to deliver a project for a specific price and would have accordingly considered the inherent risks. Therefore, rather than accepting high levels of risk, contractors should not bid and accept a low margin; instead, they should withdraw from the bidding process if possible. This situation occurred during the construction of Melbourne's West Gate Tunnel. The joint venture contractors withdrew from their contract citing force majeure, as they discovered the cost to remove and dispose of contaminated soil was $675 million, an unacceptable and unforseen risk that, in their view, had not been accommodated in their bid (CIOB, 2020b) . In light of low-profit margins, we need to add to this mix the Corona Virus Disease of 2019 , which is having a cataclysmic impact on the economic and social well-being of Australia and countries throughout the world. The likelihood of being able to effectively deliver the much-needed transport networks and systems in the short-term is now questionable, especially where there is a need for PPI. With the devastating influence of COVID-19 on the delivery of existing and its potential detrimental impact on future transport projects, we believe there is now a motivation for the Australian public sector to re-calibrate the way it approaches risk. This motivation is crucial as there is a need for both the public and the private sectors to 'work together as one' to overcome the fallout of this unprecedented pandemic and stimulate much-needed economic growth. Governments cannot afford to miss this window of opportunity to rethink their approach to transport infrastructure procurement. Notwithstanding this immediate need, for several years, the Australian Contractors Association (ACA, 2017) has been calling for changes to procurement practices to take place but to no avail. The ACA (2017) has lit the beacons to move forward with the adoption of an adaptive and responsive procurement strategy that focuses on "stakeholder engagement, cultural environment and project leadership" (ACA, 2017, p. 4) . However, the inertia that has stereotypically resided within governments up until now juxtaposed with their fixation on risk avoidance has hindered their ability to embrace the change needed to deliver and future-proof 2 large-scale transport assets. Even though each State government has an explicit policy that promotes value-for-money, 3 it has been given lip service, as the focus steadily remains on the lowest cost and public accountability (Regan et al., 2015) . The lowest bid from contractors/consortiums to deliver transport projects remains almost always triumphant and, in some instances, governments may be guilty of institutionalising the 'winner's curse' 4 (Signor et al., 2020) . In this paper, we critically review existing policies and practices used to procure large-scale transport projects and examine the challenges they pose in a post-COVID-19 world. Indeed, the pandemic may worsen "pre-existing conditions" and the government's ability to future-proof its transport infrastructure. For example, "secular stagnation" -the combination of low productivity, lack of private investment returns, and near deflation will weaken demand, innovation, and access to finance (Posen, 2020) . Furthermore, the pandemic may lead to permanent shifts in political and economic power in many developed economies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, which will require the re-design of supply chains to make them resilient, adaptable, and self-reliant (Stiglitz, 2020; Tooze, 2020) . To this end, we suggest that the approach taken to procure largescale transport infrastructure projects after the pandemic will need to be more resilient, should accommodate uncertainty, and focus more on the digitization and automation of work. Responding to these needs will require governments and industry to work together and engender and enact shared leadership, value creation and risks in their projects to ensure they are future-proofed. We provide policy-makers with a new theoretical procurement framework that can be used as a frame of reference to kick-start their journey to address the difficulties that confront the delivery of their future large-scale transport projects in a post-COVID-19 world. We commence our paper by describing our underpinning research approach. Review papers can take several forms such as traditional or narrative, bibliometric, systematic, and scoping. Each type of review has its advantages and disadvantages, is dependent on the nature of the research and the question to be addressed (Grant and Booth, 2009 ). While 'systematic' and 'traditional' types of literature reviews (Grant and Booth, 2009) prevail in the transport literature (Van Wee & Banister, 2016), we deliberately settle for a traditional review considering the novelty of the COVID-19 context surrounding our research area, which has received scant attention and where there is not a dedicated body of work (Thoma & Eaves, 2016) . Indeed, there have been no review papers that have critically examined the procurement of large-scale transport projects and identified the gaps needed to adapt and respond to COVID-19 notably in Australia. Though limiting, such an absence of a direct literature thwarts the potential of bias inherent within the search of relevant sources of literature (e.g., electronic databases) in any traditional review. To fill this void, however, the theoretical procurement framework that we develop in our paper is based on a critique of the cognate normative academic and grey literature. To this end, we naturally rely on our experience and knowledge of the project procurement challenges to synthesise the literature through qualitative analysis (Thoma & Eaves, 2016) . Furthermore, the projects we specifically refer to in our paper have received widespread media attention due to their mis-performance (e.g., deviations in cost and schedule). We, therefore, reference these projects to reinforce the need for re-calibrating the prevailing procurement policy. We now review the procurement and risk nexus, as this has been a topic of predilection within the transport literature. 1 Refers to any modality of private investment and/or private management of infrastructure such as Public Private Partnerships and variants thereof, such as Design-Build-Operate-Maintenance. 2 'The process of making provision for future developments, needs or events that impact on particular infrastructure through its current planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance processes' (Masood et al., 2016: p. 29) . 3 The optimal use of taxpayer resources to achieve the intended procurement objectives (Government of South Australia, 2018). 4 In an auction, the winner's curse arises when a bidder immediately accepts an irresponsible bid (offer) and fails to obtain the expected deal. The winner is then said to be cursed in one of two ways (Thaler, 1988, p. 192) : (1) "the winning bid exceeds the value of the tract, so the firm loses money; or (2) the value of the tract is less than the expert's estimate, so the winning firm is disappointed". The winner's curse phenomenon often plays out in construction when a contractor offers too low a bid to deliver a project. Economic (e.g., productivity levels), social (e.g., population growth), political (e.g., change in governments), and environmental (e.g., climate change) uncertainties surround the delivery of large-scale infrastructure projects. Thus, there is a need to embrace, not reduce uncertainty as often is the case in practice, which requires flexibility and adaptation and out-of-the-box thinking for a successful project delivery (ACA, 2017) . Uncertainties ("unknown-unknowns") and risks ("known-unknowns") are inherent features of transport infrastructure procurement. They can both significantly affect the final cost of a project, but risks can be foreseen. Hence, the focus of this paper rests squarely on risks. With the need for larger and more extensive transport systems and networks that will support new technologies (e.g., autonomous and electric vehicles, trackless tram, and smart freeways) a myriad of risks come to the fore. Such risks need to be identified and managed, but determining who will be responsible for them poses a challenge. The allocation of risk occurs in any situation where more than one party (e. g., government agency and contractor/consortium) is responsible for executing a project (Hartman, 2000) . This is a key aspect of Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) . Fundamentally, the risk management goals of a public sector agency can be achieved through the selection of a procurement method, which can motivate a contractor/consortium to deliver a transport project (Love et al., 2012) . We use Contract Theory here and draw on its innate features to briefly examine how issues such as information asymmetry, adverse selection, opportunistic behaviour and moral hazards materialise during the procurement of transport projects and result in adverse outcomes (e.g., Hart & Holmström, 1987; Hart & Moore, 1988) . Information asymmetry 5 , for example, tends to prevail during the tendering process as contract documentation provided to contractors/consortiums is seldom complete (Love et al., 2011; Forsythe et al., 2015) . In this case, the expectation is that the contractor/consortium accommodates the missing information and accordingly prices for it and accepts the risks. This situation can result in adverse selection 6 and opportunistic behaviour 7 manifesting. As we have mentioned above, public agencies have traditionally tried to avoid risk and thus they allocate them to their contractor/consortiums (Gransberg & Ellicot, 1997) . However, we have seen several public sector agencies in Australia, for example, increasingly using alliances to deliver complex heavy rail (e.g., Level Crossing Removal Project, Melbourne) and non-toll roads projects (e.g., Perth's Metropolitan Road Improvement Alliance), where there has been a willingness to share design and construction risks (VAGO2017; Main Roads Western Australia, 2019). The most popular procurement methods used to deliver large-scale transport infrastructure projects in Australia have fallen under the banner of PPIs (Regan et al., 2017) . Conventional procurement methods such as alliances and design and construct (D&C) or turnkey forms, have also been used to deliver government-funded projects where there has been no requirement for a user-pay service (Hayman, 2018) . When considering the allocation of risk to parties in a contract, two questions need to be answered (OECD, 2008) : (1) who is best to prevent the risk event? and (2) in the case where no party can prevent its occurrence, who is best to manage its adverse consequences and how should it be realised? Risks can be classified as being exogenous and endogenous to a project (Reside, 2009; Roumboutsos & Pantelias, 2015) . Higher degrees of risk are incurred with PPP than conventional procurement due to the sheer number of stakeholders, the significant sums of investment and the lengthy concession periods (Carbonara et al., 2015; Roumboutsos & Pantelias, 2015) . Yet, the best way to allocate risks in a transport PPP project equitably has been a bone of contention within the literature and continues to be debated (e.g., Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; Medda, 2007; Siemiatycki & Farooqi, 2012; Carbonara et al., 2014a; Roumboutsos & Pantelias, 2015; Liu et al., 2019) . In the main, there is no consensus on what and how risks should be allocated within transport PPP projects. In theory, there is universal agreement on how they should be shared. In practice, however, this has not been the case, at least in Australia. Considerable angst has been felt by concessionaires and their contractors over the cost uncertainties and risks they have experienced in their projects. What is more, several megaprojects delivered through PPPs have suffered significant cost blowouts during their construction and revenue shortfalls during their operation (Regan et al., 2017) . However, political, legal, and archaeological risks are generally allocated to the public sector (Reside, 2009; Roumboutsos & Pantelias, 2015) . Contrastingly, the private sector is usually allocated risks associated with a project's design (including technical risk due to engineering and design failures), construction, finance, and operation. The risks that are often shared tend to be of a macro-economic, natural, or social nature (Roumboutsos & Pantelias, 2015) . In this instance, COVID-19 could be categorised as being a natural event; therefore, its adverse consequences would be shared between the private and public sectors. However, it would be aberrant for a government to expect the private sector in this instance to bear the front of the costs for this unprecedented catastrophic global event. In the case of D&C contracts, a contractor is allocated risks associated with design and construction. In comparison, an alliance takes a "collective approach to risk"; here the public sector assumes a "de facto position as a designer and constructor participant" (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015a). If the alliance experiences difficulties and incurs a cost increase beyond an agreed cap, then the public sector client will typically assume the design and construction risks. There is a general perception that risks are shared in an alliancethis is not the case. Risks are rather "borne equitably (as opposed to equally)" (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015a). Risks are jointly managed in accordance with an alliance agreement but financial outcomes are rarely shared equally between the Owner and the Non-Owner Participants (NOP) (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015a). The Productivity Commission (2014) during its inquiry into ways to encourage private financing and funding for major infrastructure projects, including issues related to high costs and long lead times noted: "Alliances may work well in some circumstances but recent practice has been increasingly wary of the model due to uncertainty about the overall cost of construction and potential to put off rather than deal with risk issues early (chapter 12). Alliances may nevertheless still have their place. In particular, they may offer value in specific circumstances where projects must proceed out of necessity, but where substantial risk cannot be clearly allocated to one party. For example, because risks are difficult to identify and quantify or there is disagreement over the price (p.122)". Fig. 1 illustrates a risk and reward model typically adopted by alliances. While there is potential for an owner to acquire cost savings, there is no guarantee that an alliance will deliver a project at a lower cost than 5 Information asymmetry exists when there is an imbalance between two negotiating parties in their knowledge of relevant factors and details. The imbalance occurs when a party with more (or complete) information enjoys a competitive advantage over the other. 6 Adverse selection refers to a situation whereby the buyer has information that sellers do not have, or vice versa, about an aspect of product quality; that is, in the case where asymmetric information is exploited. 7 Opportunistic behaviour occurs where a party takes advantage of their superior knowledge to further their interests, by failing to disclose the information to the other party. would have been the case with the use of a traditional approach (i.e., design-bid-construct). The public sector should "undertake a thorough risk analysis of the alliance project at the pre-tender stage to gain a better understanding of the risks they face" (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015a). The successful allocation of risk burdens "requires analysis of all of them and the design of contractual arrangements prior to competitive tendering" (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, p. 111) . We question the appropriateness of competitive tendering and the non-involvement of concessionaires and/or contractors to assist with the identification of design and construction risks as well as the anticipated risks that might materialise during the procurement of large-scale transport projects. Immediately, this raises issues surrounding the selection of a concessionaire/contractor, but we will address this matter in Section 5.3 below. In the meantime, however, by excluding the concessionaires and/or contractors from the risk identification process, the public sector puts itself in a position of: (1) placing too much risk on parties, which often occurs in the case of PPP projects; and (2) accepting risks that it does not fully understand and is unable to manage, which happens with alliances. In Fig. 2 , we show how design and construction risks are generally allocated for the procurement methods used to deliver large-scale transport projects in Australia. It is widely acknowledged that PPPs can provide the public sector with value-for-money. Still, they have also been criticised for being opportunistic entities and failing to meet a project's contractual needs and requirements. The concept of value-for-money "requires equitable allocation of risk between the public and private sector partners" (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, p. 109) . The term 'partnership' is supposed to be more than a contractual arrangement for sharing risks. It should, as cogently pointed out by Castellucci (2013) drive collaboration between the public and private sectors, whereby parties acknowledge and accept each other's capabilities and respective needs and constraints as well as work together to provide better quality services to citizens. Often there exists an inherent tension between the public sector's requirement to demonstrate value-for-money versus the private sector's imperative to generate robust revenue streams to support its financing arrangements (Grimsey & Graham, 1997; Matinheikki et al., 2019) . It is these very tensions that form the basis for moral hazards 8 to develop, which have partially contributed to the failure of several PPPs due to inaccurate traffic forecasts. Germane examples include Brisbane's CLEM 7 and Sydney's Cross Harbour and Lane Cove Tunnels (O 'Sullivan, 2013; Sullivan, 2018) . In these projects, forecasted demand and revenues were significantly higher than those that transpired, which eroded their financial viability and placed them in a receivership situation with crippling debts. The customary explanations for underestimation in demand forecasts are optimism bias and/or strategic misrepresentation (i.e., lying) (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Jones & Euske, 1991; Naess et al., 2015) . Evidently, proving that a lie has taken place in the context of traffic demand forecasts is problematic. As pointed out by Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (2018) "a lie is a false statement that is deliberately created by someone to intentionally deceive others; deception requires justification. There needs to be a motivation to enact a lie" (p:365). The Sydney Cross Harbour and Lane Cove Tunnels demand forecasts had been suspected to have both succumbed to optimism bias (Robbins, 2008; Tatnell, 2010) ; but in the case of Brisbane CLEM-7 9 Tunnel strategic misrepresentation was found to have occurred as a result of a class action lawsuit. Within the first month the CLEM-7 opening it was forecasted to acquire an annual average traffic (total) of 60451 but the actual average daily traffic was 59109. Within 18 months it was expected to be 100284, but the actual traffic volume diminished to be 22781. The plaintiff who raised the class action was successful and acquired compensation for shortfalls in revenues. The public sector often disproportionately offloads risks onto the private sector. The public sector uses a PPP as a contract for acquiring private sector investment and allocating risks between parties, but the partnership aspect is often disregarded (Castellucci, 2013) . Affirming this view, the Productivity Commission (2014), referring to a submission to its inquiry by the University of New South Wales, states "PPPs are partnerships in name only and that a risk-transfer culture often results in the inappropriate transfer of risk. This results in higher costs and increased likelihood of project failure as risks are passed down the contract chain to subcontractors that cannot manage them" (p.133). The hallmarks of collaboration, gain-share/pain-share regime, cooperation, commitment to no disputes, best-for-project decisionmaking, no-fault-no-blame culture, transparency and joint leadership/ management epitomise alliance-based procurement (MacDonald et al., 2013; Lloyd-Walker, 2015,2020) . While alliances provide a mechanism to genuinely foster partnerships in projects, they are only appropriate for procuring transport assets funded by taxes (i.e., the government pays) rather than user charges. Despite the pervasive benefits of alliances (Cheng et al., 2004; Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2015) , they have been heavily criticised for not being able to provide value-for-money (Davis, 2007; Hayman, 2018) . Putting aside this criticism, alliances have proven to be a great success for delivering transport projects in Australia, for example, the $705 million New Bunbury-Perth faith' or has provided misleading information about its assets, liabilities, or credit capacity. Also, it can refer to a party that has an incentive to take unusual risks in an attempt to earn a profit before a contract is settled. 9 Maurice Blackburn representing The Hopkins Superannuation Fund (2014: p.9-12). The Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales Registry, General Division, No: NSD757/2012. High delivered under budget (ACAA, 2010), to name one of a few. This project has been heralded as being 'best practice due to its (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015a): •well-informed and engaged stakeholders who were actively involved in the project's planning and development; •early contractor involvement that ensured commitment to the project from outset; and •the involvement of a material supplier as a member of the alliance rather than a traditional subcontractor. The inclusion of a material supplier meant there was increased certainty regarding the value and supply of raw materials. The practices adopted and implemented in the New Bunbury-Perth Highway project demonstrate that the public sector can work with the private sector collaboratively and embrace innovation to achieve successful project outcomes. By and large, this has been the case with alliance-based projects used to deliver transport projects in Australia. Notwithstanding, the perceived stigma surrounding the inability of alliances to provide value-for-money has brought the public sector to "bemoan their price uncertainty" (Hayman, 2018, p. 29) . A case in point is the Northside Storage Tunnel project in Sydney that failed to deliver value-for-money (New South Wales Auditor General, 2003) . Furthermore, alliances represent an inappropriate procurement model if a public sector agency aims to "raise finance on a project finance basis, i.e. where the financiers may only look to the cash flows and assets of the project to secure repayment, and not to the balance sheet of the owner [the public sector agency]" (Hayman, 2018, p. 27 ). However, this requirement goes to the heart of the problem with PPI types of procurement, as financiers have typically required the borrower to transfer the design and construction risks (e.g., cost overruns, completion delays, and quality) to a contractor by means of a traditional lump-sum contract (Hayman, 2018) . We need to acknowledge that there is a no-size-fits-all-approach to procuring transport infrastructure projects (Love et al., 2012) . Still, the need for shared risks is a consistent insight that resonates throughout the transport procurement literature, one that emerges from best-practice cases and is being called for by Tier one contractors. Again, risks cannot be legitimately shared without shared leadership, and value cannot be optimally generated if there is a contrasted focus on the lowest cost by government and maximising profit by concessionaires/contractors. A sticking point for government, however, is they are "often regulated in a way that makes shared value more difficult to achieve" (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 5) . In the case of concessionaires/contractors, they need to look beyond their "pure economic interest" (Matinheikki et al., 2017, p. 583) . Implicitly, both the public and private sectors assume "that the other is an obstacle to pursuing its goals" (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 5) . Being able to reconcile the differences in goals between the public and private sectors will necessitate fundamental changes to their underlying value propositions. We now turn our attention to examining the issues of shared leadership and value creation, which we believe will form an integral part of a new value proposition model for procuring large-scale transport projects. Leadership in large-scale transport projects has "traditionally focused on the behaviour of an appointed/elected leader" (Serban & Roberts, 2016, p. 181) . Here project leadership is centralised, and there is a single point of responsibility that tends to focus on task completion within given constraints (ACA, 2017; Müller et al., 2018; Pearce & Conger, 2003) . While this narrow conception of leadership pervades practice in organisations and teams, the literature is, however, replete with studies questioning its effectiveness (e.g. (2017) suggests a centralised project leader in large-scale projects is not a viable option as "there are just too many variables and interfaces. Their role needs to change to one of enabling leadership rather than acting as the choke point for decisions" (p.25). Most conventional leadership styles (e.g., charismatic, transformational or transactional) consider leadership to be unidirectional and a top-down influencing process (Pearce & Conger, 2003; Tams, 2018) . Under the umbrella of traditional leadership styles, we construe a leader as an active subject, the doer, and the person "who envisions the future, defines and communicates strategy, inspires and motivates followers, assigns roles, evaluates and rewards performance" (Tams, 2018) . The upshot is that leaders influence followers by using their personality traits, charisma or through contingent reinforcement 10 . Questions, however, have surrounded the effectiveness of the vertical influence process of leadership to initiate and sustain a change management program and harness a project team's creativity, knowledge, and expertise and ensure positive outcomes (Müller et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2018) . We often read and hear that the challenges of change management for leaders is persuading employees that there is a need for change. In the main, change is often pushed onto employees, as they become the implementers. When a change is not going as directed, it is often convenient for leaders to suggest that employees are reluctant to engage with new work practice, as they are complacent with the status quo (Garvin and Roberto, 2005) . Put differently, there is a belief that people are incapable of committing to change. This belief directs leaders to lecture and motivate followers to do so. Naturally, if people feel they do not have a 'voice' (i.e., being able to 'speak-up' and challenge the status quo without fear of retribution or humiliation) and an input into the change process, then they will become disengaged and disinclined, particularly if "an organisation has had a succession of leaders", to embrace proposed new ways of working (Garvin and Roberto, 2005: p.106). There is general agreement that contingent reinforcement by leaders can adversely influence divergent thinking (Amabile et al., 1986; Eisenberger et al., 1999; Wu et al., 2018) . The absence of divergent thinking and the inability of project leaders in construction organisations to provide their employees and subcontractors with a voice has stymied their ability to learn and innovate . Repeatedly, construction organisations make the same mistakes time and time again in their projects . While lessons learned are regularly undertaken when a project is completed, seldom, are changes to practice and improvements made. Thus, a cycle of repeated mistakes befalls. Stopping this regrettable cycle is akin to breaking bad habits. Changes in behaviour are required to break bad habits. In the case of a construction organisation, attention should focus on leadership at the corporate and project levels to ensure modifications to practice are ensued (Love, 2020) . A single appointed leader is unlikely to bring about the necessary change within a construction organisation where decentralised teams are temporarily formed to deliver a project. Thus, an organisation needs to draw on the leadership, skills, knowledge, and expertise of its business units and teams to drive the change in the projects they are tasked to deliver. Equally, the public sector is confronted with a leadership choice in the context of the procurement of a large-scale transport asset, as a series of agencies need to form a project team (e.g., planning, finance, 10 The American Psychology Association dictionary of psychology defines contingent reinforcement as "the process or circumstances in which the delivery of positive stimulus events (e.g., material goods, verbal praise) and, more rarely, the elimination of negative stimulus events (e.g., penalties) depend on the performance of desired behaviour. In leadership and management, the term is applied to any approach in which a leader relies on rewards and penalties to motivate his or her followers" (see https://dictionary.apa.org/contingent-rein forcement). and environment). This team, or parts thereof, should work in collaboration with the selected concessionaire/contractor. Again, a single appointed project leader for the public sector may bureaucratize and frustrate timely decision-making. Shared leadership (also referred to as distributed or collective leadership) is an appealing perspective to apply to decentralised structures such as large-scale transport projects where interfaces abound (Müller et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2018) . Bergman et al. (2012) reveal that "shared leadership occurs when two members or more engage in the leadership team in an effort to influence and direct fellowship members to maximise team effectiveness" (p.18). As an influencing process, shared leadership is "multidirectional, dynamic, simultaneous and on-going" (Bergman et al., 2012, p. 18) . Shared leadership is also characterised by "serial emergence" (Peloza & Falkenberg, 2009: p.18) whereby two members or more interact with one another to become multiple leaders that influence a project team over its life (Denis et al., 2012) . At this point, we hasten to note that there is a need to make clear the difference between shared and team leadership. In essence, shared leadership occurs when a group of individuals lead each other to achieve successful outcomes rather than the concept of a team that relies on the influence of a specific leader (Carson et al., 2007) . In Fig. 3 we present the building blocks required to create a collective team environment for procuring large-scale transport projects. We suggest a number of external factors influence the procurement of largescale infrastructure projects, which include: •political, regulatory and legal (e.g., finance/credit, budget deficit, and procurement policy); •environmental (e.g., climate change, COVID-19, contamination, and pollution); •socio-economic (e.g., productivity, congestion, and population growth); and •technological (e.g., electric cars, smart freeways, and 5G) To effectively address these influences through a shared leadership environment requires the following cornerstones to be in place (Carson et al., 2007) : •Shared purpose -team members understand the aim and objectives of the project and collectively strive to achieve them; •Social supportteam members provide emotional support to each other by recognising the contributions of individuals and providing encouragement; and •Voiceteam members feel accepted and respected and are encouraged to 'speak out' as their contribution is valued. Putting in place an environment for shared leadership to thrive does not mean that vertical leadership is discarded as someone needs to be ultimately accountable within a project (Hoch & Dulebohn, 2013) . Thus, we suggest that leaders within both public and private sectors need to foster an environment of cohesiveness within their teams and between themselves, understand the project's goals and be supportive of one another before fostering shared leadership. Shared leadership has been empirically demonstrated to improve team and organisational outcomes in a range of different settings in the presence of other forms of leadership (Carson et al., 2007; Ensley et al., 2006; Hoch & Dulebohn, 2013; Müller et al., 2018) . Large-scale transport projects are composed of skilled and knowledgeable people whose tasks are complex and interdependent. Such people are required to engage in a high level of coordination and integrate and share their knowledge and expertise. Structural supports such as resources, rewards, and assignment of formal positions need to be in place to enable shared leadership to flourish. People assigned to formal positions should display visionary and empowering behaviours (Hoch & Dulebohn, 2013; Müller et al., 2018) . Leadership behaviours that are required to support shared leadership are honesty, transparency (Hoch & Dulebohn, 2013) and boundary spanning (i.e., "being able to influence how a team must operate within its organisational context to be effective") (Bergman et al., 2012, p. 19) . In light of these supports, we are immediately drawn to authentic leadership, which has been identified by Lloyd- Walker and Walker (2011) as being an influential leadership style to support the establishment of trust and commitment needed to manage projects in the 21st century. Within an alliance, for example, a dedicated alliance leadership team (ALT) is established, which forms part of its governance structure. The ALT is responsible for the delivery of the project and provides a forum for accountability, decision-making, dispute resolution, and information dissemination. The ALT's responsibilities include ensuring the alliance's priorities are understood and aligned with a project's deliverables, bolstering innovative thinking, reviewing project progress, sharing lessons learnt and resolving emerging problems. Beneath the ALT sits the alliance manager (AM) and their team who are charged with delivering the project and ensuring the ALT's decisions are effectively executed. According to Lloyd-Walker and Walker (2011), authentic leadership is pivotal for ensuring the success of a project and for engendering a culture that influences "shared leadership ideals" at all levels within an alliance (p.386). Echoing this view, Love et al. (2015) observed in their study of rework mitigation in projects that an ALT's authentic leadership style can provide a platform to engender collaborative decision-making, enact the sharing of responsibility for outcomes, and enable a collective learning environment to form. In this collective learning environment, an attitude towards embracing not reducing uncertainty can prevail (ACA, 2017), requisite imagination 11 can prosper with an effective anticipation of what might go wrong, collective learning from failure and success can happen, and thus the alliance can better adapt and respond to unwelcomed challenges (Love & Matthews, 2020) . Fig. 3 . Building-blocks for a collective project team 11 "The ability to imagine key aspects of the future we are planning (Westrum, 1991: p.195 ). The strategic decision-making and actions of both the public and private sectors can harm the performance of transport projects and the wider community, particularly when an asset's quality and its environmental impact comes into question. Profit generation has been the sole driver for many contractors. Consequently, with this mode of behaviour, which is underpinned by free-market capitalism (i.e., through tendering where the forces of supply and demand create price signals), we have witnessed winners and losers. That is, some firms make significant margins from projects. In contrast, others struggle to stay afloat or even become insolvent as a result of submitting low bids and having an insufficient cash flow to sustain their business. As we have mentioned, Tier one contractors involved with constructing large-scale transport assets have been suffering financially as a result of bearing too much risk. Explicitly, the procurement strategy, which has been adopted by public agencies, in some Australian states, has been ineffective for PPI projects. If strides are to be made to remedy the procurement process, then both the public and private sectors need to re-calibrate their mindsets away from pure fiscal drivers to one where the "creation of shared value" manifests (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 4) . Here the creation of economic value will not only directly benefit the public and private sectors but also "society by addressing its needs challenges" (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 4 ). The creation of such a mindset "requires profound changes in the dominant profit-centric business logic" of organisations (Matinheikki et al., 2017: p.S83) . In this case, the private sector organisation should transform its business into a self-resourcing value creation model designed to solve social challenges that materialise during the procurement of the transport asset itself rather than relying on the government. By the same token, the public sector should also adopt a shared value perspective. It can enable and promote shared value policies and principles by forming private sector partnerships. In doing so, the public sector needs to re-examine their regulatory frameworks and therefore de-risk the processes that can thwart partnership formation. The public sector can use levers, such as regulatory reforms and tax reliefs as incentives for the private sector to address societal issues (Porter & Kramer, 2011) . However, the private sector generates wealth, whereas the public re-distributes it to its citizens. Beyond the use of shared value being used as a tool by the public sector, it can help them understand and re-define its role in the delivery of large-scale transport infrastructure assets. Particularly at a time where there exists a great deal of scepticism surrounding the integrity and trustworthiness of politicians' decisions about which projects are constructed. By taking a shared value perspective in the context of large-scale transport projects, economic value can be created by the private sector in three distinct ways (Porter & Kramer, 2011): 1. Reconceiving products, services and markets to serve societal needs. For example, sustainable building materials, prefabrication to minimise waste, energy-efficient solutions (e.g., solar), rainwater harvesting and using new technologies to manage and operate networks and systems and to keep the community abreast with an asset's functioning. 2. Redefining productivity in the value chain to serve society by accessing and using resources, energy, suppliers, logistics and employees differently and productively. For example, digital technologies, particularly those built on a bedrock of artificial intelligence, can be used to automate payments to subcontractors and suppliers using blockchain. Building information modelling (BIM) is changing the way information is created, shared and managed in transport projects. Efficiencies in design, construction, operations and maintenance are being realised (Love & Matthews, 2019) . As a result of COVID-19, the workforce is adapting to new modes of working (i.e., virtually from home). Naturally, levels of congestion and pollution have significantly declined. Perhaps, will the modes of working adopted in response to COVID-19 become the 'new normal' in the future? 3. Enabling local cluster development where there resides a focus on improving the local operating environment by supporting skill development and capacity building to become sustainable. The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the sheer vulnerability of the global supply chain. Many companies, once reliant on raw materials and parts from Asia to make their own products, are finding it difficult to cope with supply chain constraints. The productivity of a contractor is highly dependent on its subcontracted workforce, its supply chain and relations with the broader community. Examples of enabling cluster development can be found in construction. Within alliances, for instance, employing local subcontractors and sourcing local materials often form part of their remit (Department of Infrastructure & Transport, 2012; Love et al., 2015; Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2015) . The public sector has a role to play in stimulating economic value by requiring their contractors, as part of a contractual requirement, to build capacity within a geographical region. The benefits of shared value include self-sustaining purpose and profitability, resilience against external threats (i.e. risks and uncertainties), higher advocacy, and retention and productivity among employees and credibility. The creation of shared value requires profound inter-organisational collaboration between the public and private sectors (Peloza and Falkneburg, 2009; Porter & Kramer, 2011) . In the case of a PPI project, which may be in operation up to 25 or 30 years, the concessionaire would have the responsibility to align itself, with input from the public sector, to ensure that not only "advances in its own economic well-being but also creates value to the community" (Matinheikki et al., 2017: p. S85) . Here, we need to be cognisant that "social context matters for collective action" and that it plays a key role in creating a social vision (Rudd, 2000, p. 132 ). Social relationships not only "constitute resources that individuals can appropriate to assist them in increasing their well-being" but also the "development of norms of trust and reciprocity that have spill-over effectspositive social externalities" -for project's immediate stakeholders and the wider community (Rudd, 2000, p. 132) . We suggest that shared leadership can foster the collective action needed to inhibit short-term "self-interested behaviour via a self-reinforcing cycle of trust and reciprocity" from manifesting in projects (Rudd, 2000, p. 133) . It then follows that supporting a social vision with shared leadership enables individuals and their teams to create a reputation due to the norms of trust and reciprocity, which in turn can reduce transaction costs associated with situations where information asymmetry occurs in projects (Ostrom, 1998) . The importance of understanding a project's social structure and making sense of its organizing process and how actions can reshape old configurations and create new ones has received ubiquitous attention (Söderlund et al., 2017; Aaltonen & Turkulainen, 2018; Matinheikki et al., 2019) . Indeed, the difficulties associated with begetting coordination and collaboration in large-scale projects are not only attributable to their structural complexity but also their socio-political complexity including "institutional differences such as the divergent perceptions regarding the legitimate means and ends of a project" (Matinheikki et al., 2019, p. 299) . To accommodate these difficulties requires a balance between formal contractual and relational and social mechanisms when procuring projects (Benítez-Ávila et al., 2018; Matinheikki et al., 2019; Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2015) . Institutional tensions often arise during the delivery of large-scale transport projects as they "must comply with the operating logics of government bureaucracies and business firms and achieve legitimacy in the eyes of diverse stakeholders" (Matinheikki et al., 2019, p. 299) . In the context of large-scale transport infrastructure, different procurement strategies can be used to respond to the multiple logics and risks that prevail in projects. As we noted in Fig. 2 , various organisational forms of PPI (e.g. PPPs) and alliances can be adopted to synergise multiple and often competing logics. The choice of organisational form, however, will be dependent on whether the asset to deliver will be a user-pay service or not. In response to the appeal from the Australian Contractors Association (ACA, 2017) and the burgeoning adverse impact of COVID-19, we suggest that the public and private sectors should collectively modify their actions and behaviours to future-proof transport assets. In doing so, the public sector needs to vigorously engage with the private sector to jointly focus on engendering and enacting shared leadership, value creation and risks in its project; that is, the creation of a collective procurement environment. Alliances are a robust procurement approach that has been widely used by the public sector for risky or uncertain projects or those with uncertain or changing scope. However, price certainty and cost overrun risks represent the 'Achilles Heel' of the public sector. When the private sector is tasked to do work for a fixed price as a result of engaging in a competitive bidding process, problems can arise as it is "financially motivated to minimise the cost of performing its obligations, in order to maximise its profit margin" (Peloza & Falkenberg, 2009: p.2) . Governments have already had to intervene and provide significant financial assistance to businesses and individuals in response to the coronavirus outbreak. In the aftermath of COVID-19, the public sector will without doubt be confronted with fiscal constraints and no longer be able to absorb the risks of cost blowouts on its large-scale transport projects. Instead, it needs to step up its investment in transport infrastructure to stimulate the economy's recovery post-COVID-19. Something, such as a budget contingency, therefore, must be put in place to mitigate the burden of cost blowouts having to be borne by the public sector. The financial and payment structure of alliances, therefore, may well need to be reevaluated to accommodate a changed risk profile. Organisations within the construction sector have had to lay off and/or furlough staff due to falling revenues. We, therefore, anticipate that contractors will no longer be in a position to guarantee fixed-price contracts. By inculcating the necessity of shared value and embedding it into the process of procurement, we turn on its head neoclassical economic thinking, which has been the mainstay of the private sector (Porter & Kramer, 2011) . Providing social and environmental benefits should no longer be considered a constraint and cost for contractors but instead an opportunity to create differentiation, redefine and expand their markets. We have identified in Section 4.2 how social and economic benefits can be simultaneously obtained. We have proposed that a collective environment should underpin the basis for procuring large-scale transport projects. We assume that the public and private sectors have integrated shared value into their strategy. Our collective approach can be readily integrated within an alliance structure. In the case where there is a need for a PPI, we propose an innovative procurement approach that caters to the benefits of alliances. We present our theoretical framework for a hybrid alliance-PPI with user-charge assets in Fig. 4 . We note that there has been a paucity of studies that have examined the integration of alliances within PPI initiatives, though it has been acknowledged that service outcomes can be improved through their integration (Clifton & Duffield, 2006; Walker & Jacobsson, 2014) . The integration of these concepts can provide a "flexible structure for the management of change" and a "mechanism for managing long-term outcomes while maintaining the original commercial intent" (Clifton & Duffield, 2006, p. 582) . Financiers have generally been reluctant to accept the risk profile of a full alliance regime (Clifton & Duffield, 2006; Hayman, 2018) . Traditionally, project financiers have required a project owner/borrower to "transfer the risk of cost increases, delays, and quality shortfalls to a creditworthy head contractor via a conventional fixed price, fixed time contract" (Hayford, 2018: p. 27) . Obtaining project finance is a challenge when integrating an alliance within PPI projects. But, with a focus on shared value and generating both economic and societal benefits, financiers are likely to see healthier returns as we will see "whole new avenues of revenue open-up" (Porter & Kramer, 2011, p. 7) . Governments are striving to improve relations with the business sector, and they expect them to show leadership and help solve social issues. They are investing considerable effort into forming partnerships to deliver services (Kearney, 2019) . As a result, the public sector may have to look at ways of conducting their business differently to create economic value. Normally, a cost-benefit analysis is used to determine the economic benefits of projects, with social and environmental cost and benefits treated as secondary considerations, despite their central value to citizens and the community as a whole (Dobes et al., 2016) . Thus, in line with our shared value thinking, we suggest treating equally social and environmental costs and benefits along with those of an economic nature, an approach which we call 'Social Cost Benefit Analysis Writ Large'. Decision-makers within the public sector are fully aware of the difficulty of monetising social and environmental impacts so to ensure likefor-like comparison with economic consequences. However, such an analysis could be undertaken in collaboration with potential concessionaires/contractors once the need for a project is identified. In this instance, concessionaires/contractors can work with the public sector to define project objectives, requirements and specifications, and propose solutions to ensure not only service outcomes and economic benefits can be met but also those of a societal nature. By governments including the private sector into the investment justification process, a more realistic picture of project costs and benefits can be attained, and optimism bias minimised, particularly when a process of requisite imagination is enacted. Yet, existing procurement policies are not working, as there have been countless numbers of transport projects whose costs have been significantly higher than projected or promised benefits did not materialise. However, this trend is economically unsustainable as governments will need to focus on servicing the debt created by having propped up the economy due to COVID-19. Cognisant of the negative impact that COVID-19 will have on the private's sector ability to source project finance (e.g., commercial banks, institutional investors, multilateral agencies, and capital markets), we propose a bi-partisan approach toward funding a project in a context where interest rates are at an all-time low. It is outside the scope of this paper to examine the topic of project finance. However, financiers may require that equity investors in the special purpose vehicle (SPV) provide equity upfront (Hayman, 2018) . In our theoretical model, we suggest that the public sector forms part of the SPV and thus would be able to provide the upfront equity. Equally, insurance policies (e.g., professional indemnity) should be tailored to meet the 'no blame, no dispute' regime embedded within an alliance's sphere of activity (Hayman, 2018) . Policies tailored for alliances will no doubt be expensive and their cost will be dependent on the complexity and size of the project and the insurers' risk assessment (Clifton & Duffield, 2006; Hayman, 2018) . Seeking the input of the private sector during the cost and social benefit analysis would provide a realistic assessment of the project's feasibility. Solutions to stimulate social and economic benefits as well as an estimate of project costs should be sought from the private sector. In this instance, not only would a representative estimate of the project's likely costs based on market conditions be provided but also innovative solutions to deliver societal benefits. A differentiating factor that could be used as part of the selection process of a concessionaire/contractor would be the innovations proposed to produce societal benefits over the life of the project and beyond. At this point, we suggest a fee to be paid to the losing bidder for the services it provided. Noteworthy, the unsuccessful bidder would be assured that their intellectual property would not be used. Soliciting bids for a large-scale transport project is a costly exercise for the concessionaires/contractors, especially as losing bidders are likely to receive no fee for their submission. For projects over $500 million, the cost to submit a bid can range from 3% to 5% of a project's value, which represents a significant cash investment for the chance of winning a project (Productivity Commission, 2014, p. 452) . A substantial change in PPP policy has occurred in the treatment of bid costs, which in the past was a marketing cost borne by bidders. For example, in 2013, the Victorian Government foreshadowed part or full reimbursement of bid costs for future PPP projects, albeit for losing syndicates responding to invitations for a request for tender. Similarly, the New South Wales Government (NSW) for projects over $100 million will consider contributing eligible unsuccessful bidders of up to 50% of the expected bid cost (NSW New South Wales Treasury, 2018). Irrespective of the level of contribution to bidding costs, unsuccessful concessionaires/contractors not only lose money, but it also puts a strain on resources. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the successful bidder can provide value-for-money. In the case of large-scale transport projects, we, therefore, recommend that the public-sector eschew competitive tenderingit is a wasteful process in our view. There is only a handful of contractors in the Australian marketplace who have the experience and expertise to deliver large-scale transport projects. In fact, the shortlists of contractors for large projects tend to include the same Tier ones and an international organisation (or consortium) (Productivity Commission, 2014, p. 423). Proponents of neoclassical thinking will no doubt argue that such a non-competitive market can lead to an unbalanced allocation of goods and services contracts and result in a Pareto inefficiency (Kaufman, 2011) . The formed partnership between the public and private sectors should commence early in the project's life with underlying principles of the alliance used to develop norms of trust and reciprocity. The early involvement of a concessionaire/contractor into the design process can enable a project's scope to be fully developed and issues surrounding constructability resolved. Once the design is completed, the cost of construction is re-examined, profit agreed and then re-evaluated by a third party. Risks would not be jointly managed but rather shared; that is, design and construction costs. If there are cost savings at the end of construction, then these would be split 50:50. Performance management can help align the collective team, resources and systems to meet the project's strategic objectives. We can use a performance management dashboard to unearth potential problems and thus enable managers to make the necessary adjustments as a result of regular performance-review cadences. There has however been a propensity for PPI projects to only monitor time, cost, quality and safety up until construction is completed (Liu et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2019) . We therefore suggest that there is a need to establish a series of Key Result Areas juxtaposed with whole metrics (i.e. to ensure the performance required is realistic, transparent and meaningful), which cascades down to daily activities for those who are operating at the coalface of construction. With shared leadership in place, managers can use performance management to ensure everyone is pulling in the same direction throughout the project's entire life. Incentives are seldom provided to subcontractors. If, however, shared value is to be genuinely practised and promoted, then incentives should be provided to subcontractors, and their performance managed, particularly when there is a drive to future-proof transport assets through learning and innovation. Uncertainty and unprecedented challenges face Australia and the global economy in the quest to adapt and respond to the impact of COVID-19. Before COVID-19, Australia was in the midst of a transport infrastructure boom spurred by population growth, increasing levels of pollution, and low productivity. Unemployment levels hovered around the 5% level, but gross domestic product (GDP) 12 was waning. While investment in infrastructure was intended to boost productivity, stimulate growth in GDP and innovation, it paradoxically had the opposite of the desired effect. The demands on concessionaires/contractors for fixed-price contractors placed undue risk upon them. As a result, many who were capable of delivering large-scale transport projects fell on the verge of insolvency. Also, cost blowouts had become a pervasive challenge and thus adversely impacted the productivity of both the public and private sectors. Drawing on the wise words of Socrates presented at the commencement of our paper, we call for out-of-the-box-thinking to move transport infrastructure procurement policy forward and challenge the prevailing neoclassical thinking that underpins the selection of those organisations capable of delivering projects. By taking on this challenge, we proffer that the public and private sectors should work together to ensure that much-needed transport infrastructure can create economic value throughout society. We have therefore suggested that a collective environment centred on shared leadership, value creation and risks is needed to transition to a new procurement paradigm that goes beyond producing economic benefits but also includes those of a social and environmental nature. Our collective approach can be used for both user and non-user charge transport projects. In the context of PPI, we propose a hybrid model of procurement that can exacerbate the collective's resolve to generate economic, social and environmental value. Our model remains theoretical, and only future work in direct liaison with the public and private sectors will determine its viability. We remain steadfast in our opinion that at a time of complexity and uncertainty, we must challenge existing practices and develop creative solutions to be able to produce and future-proof large-scale infrastructure assets. 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