key: cord-0072007-dvinxy2y
authors: Lavallée, Chantal
title: The European Union’s two-fold multilateralism in crisis mode: Towards a global response to COVID-19
date: 2021-02-12
journal: Int J
DOI: 10.1177/0020702020987858
sha: ab8eb41fdf56be0fe89f2623753fb5ef96666b09
doc_id: 72007
cord_uid: dvinxy2y

The European Union (EU) has been strongly criticized from the outset for its alleged mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic which began early in 2020. Several observers even predicted the end of European integration. This article examines how the EU has been managing the crisis, with a focus on how this has impacted its external relations, notably with Canada. It will argue that this crisis, as most crises the EU has gone through, has brought to light existing ambiguities in European governance, but that it has not led to fundamental questions about the EU’s and its member states’ overall commitment to Europe’s “two-fold multilateralism” (i.e., internal and external collaboration). EU representatives have re-emphasized this principle when reiterating the need for both European coordinated actions as well as a global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, working closely with their partners, including Canada. Therefore, amid the evolving and serious health-related and economy-related challenges, the crisis offers an occasion for the EU to strengthen and deepen both its integration and its global role.

Introduction enough to render EU responses unsuccessful. Second, the article analyzes the extent to which the EU's international relations have been used to promote global collaboration, including with Canada.

The EU's internal response to the COVID-19 pandemic

The spread of COVID-19 has affected all EU member states, albeit with variation in the outbreak's timing and momentum, the governments' strategic responses, and the responsiveness and resilience of the national health systems. However, the evolving turbulence and grave consequences have caught all European governments by surprise, triggering, initially, an almost embarrassing withdrawal from EU principles (such as the sudden limitation of free movement of people, goods, and services across borders). Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orba´n instrumentalized the pandemic for a further power grab and extension of his already excessive authority. 4 Chancellor Sebastian Kurz closed Austria's borders to its southern neighbours, reportedly with the additional intention to prevent more refugees from the Western Balkans from coming into the Alpenrepublik. 5 Similar to the peak in Mediterranean migration in 2015, with a million war refugees moving from Syria towards Europe, a substantial number of EU leaders showed again that they see salvation and relief in times of crises less in EU-wide cooperation, but in strictly independent (and often uncoordinated) national measures.

The roots of the EU's difficulties in coordinating national actions in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic lie in the EU governance structure, where some sectors, such as public health, remain primarily in the hands of member states. 6 Given the progress the EU has made in other policy areas, such as agriculture or trade, Sven Biscop observed that, ironically, the EU "is better placed to deal with swine flu than with any human flu." 7 To understand this apparent paradox, it is important to have an understanding of the division of powers between the EU institutions and the member states. 4 . Peter Kreko, "The world must not let Viktor Orba´n get away with his pandemic power-grab," The Guardian, 1 April 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/01/viktor-orbanpandemic-power-grab-hungary (accessed 1 April 2020). 5. Markus Sebestyen and Stephan Schild, "Corona bremst auch die Einreise von Flu¨chtlingen," Kleine Zeitung, 7 September 2020, https://www.kleinezeitung.at/kaernten/5862682/Zahlen-gehen-zurueck_ Corona-bremst-auch-die-Einreise-von-Fluechtlingen (accessed 26 September 2020). 6. Barth el emy Gaillard, "Covid-19: ce que l'Union europ eenne peut faire ( However, given the prominence of "national interests" in these meetings, a consensual approach to realizing progress at the European level was almost impossible to achieve in the initial months of the crisis. In contrast, national representatives rarely hesitated, even in the most pro-European countries, to discredit the European Commission (or, how it is often portrayed, "Brussels" or "the EU as such," since it is the most powerful supranational institution that can propose and later impose policies on EU member states, albeit only after a lengthy legislative process involving the European Parliament and the Council of the EU 8 ). In times of crisis and uncertainty, the EU is a particularly welcomed scapegoat that is easy to blame for apparent failures, 9 an actor both omnipresent in the daily lives of Europeans and distant from them, and wielding considerable but often diffuse power. With the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU, as a fuzzy but influential actor, became once again the catalyst for a number of anxieties and frustrations. Even European intellectuals have started accusing the European Commission of showing poor leadership in coordinating efforts-obviously disregarding the fact that the European Commission has the exclusive right to trigger initiatives in many sectors-but not in health. 10 In the area of health, the European Commission can only encourage cooperation and policy coordination. In the case of COVID-19, it additionally worked to ensure that anti-COVID-19 measures taken by individual member states did not disproportionately impact basic (and guaranteed) EU rights and principles. The dispute between Poland and Germany over the intolerable tie-up of trucks after the rigorous border closure between both countries could be resolved in this spirit, for instance. Despite its limited room for manoeuvre in the health sector, the European Commission quickly activated the alert system "ARGUS" for crisis 8. Council of the European Union, "The ordinary legislative procedure," 8 October 2020, https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/ordinary-legislative-procedure/ (accessed 4 December 2020). coordination and created a coordinating response team at the political level. 11 It mobilized financial support to member states for the purchase of medical equipment and for initiating counterstrategies against rising unemployment and economic hardships. In this respect, it proposed a first-response package at the beginning of April 2020 for "Temporary Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency" (SURE), 12 which the Council of the EU adopted a month later. In May, the European Commission hosted a donor conference to fund vaccine research, during which e7.4 billion were raised for "global solidarity," supporting fair distribution of the potential vaccine around the world. 13 Not least, it proposed, with the President of the European Council, a road map to ease the lockdown across Europe in a coherent manner after the first wave of infections. 14 In response to these measures, Josep Borrell, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, rightly stated that "in the rest of the world, health has become a security issue, but in Europe it is a matter of integration." 15 In his eyes, the COVID-19 pandemic is "an existential moment" for the EU, arguing that the way it will be managed would affect not only the stability of every member state but also the conditions for future European integration. 16 Europeans who shared this view, such as Guy Verhofstadt, former Belgian Prime Minister (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) and leader of the liberal Renew Europe group in the European Parliament, went a step further and called for necessary progress in EU integration. Specifically, they argued for the creation of a "European Health Agency," that could be invested with more powers to aid the European Commission in effectively managing the pandemic. 17 Similarly, veteran French diplomat Yves Aubin de La Messuzi ere proposed the initiation of an EU pandemic policy, 18 Threats" 20 and an affiliated regulation proposal, 21 sketching ways to move forward in this endeavour and to improve EU coordination in the health sector without any complicated treaty changes.

After their initial uncoordinated responses, several member states, including heavily affected Spain and Italy, were quick to return to European multilateral actions, notably calling for a genuine European "Marshall Plan" for economic recovery. In addition to the already ongoing economic cooperation, French President Macron called for European solidarity and the relaunch of the EU as "a political project" in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 22 Regarding economic measures, the European Council formally mandated the European Commission to develop a recovery plan in its April 2020 summit, which von der Leyen indeed proposed a month later. 23 All this happened while the EU's forthcoming multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027 was negotiated and in the process of adoption. This momentum certainly helped speed discussions and facilitate the overall management of the economic consequences of COVID-19. In its recovery plan, the European Commission proposed to provide in the budget for a temporary emergency recovery instrument called "Next Generation EU," comprising e500 billion in grants and e250 billion in loans for affected member states. 24 This plan, promoted especially by France and Germany, offered several initiatives in various domestic sectors but also demanded a leading position for the EU in the global response.

Nevertheless, national representatives have on many occasions expressed differing views on the measures to be adopted. economic crisis exacerbated old and recurrent debates between two main EU dynamics: intergovernmental cooperation-with the member states remaining in the driving seat-versus supranational integration-with more powers delegated to Brussels. The underlying questions of power and sovereignty, which found their infamous peak in the (often irrationally held) debates about Brexit (the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on 31 January 2020), seem to remain a red line for some governments. Besides political doubts, the richer countries in the north show considerable hesitation when asked to help countries in financial difficulties (mostly in the south or the east of the EU) when requested reforms are insufficiently implemented by their governments.

The Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark were especially reluctant over the financial support foreseen in the European Commission's recovery plan. In late July 2020, after extremely difficult negotiations, almost the EU's longest marathon negotiations at the EU summit, the recovery package of e750 billion was finally adopted with "a grand bargain" that the financial support will be provided as grants (e390 billion) and (e360 billion) loans. 25 So, as has often happened in the EU's trajectory, after very tough discussions a satisfying deal became possible. A number of observers attested that, with this agreement, Europe had once again "managed to turn a crisis into the spur for major institutional change." 26 EU officials, national representatives, and political analysts equally assessed the final agreement as "historical" because, for the first time, "the Commission will be authorized to borrow funds on behalf of the Union on the capital markets" and offer them as grants to member states mostly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. 27 Irrespective of such solemn assessments, doubts over its realization persist. Especially after the second wave of COVID-19 started hitting Europe, again very harshly, fears of another division of the EU returned to the fore. 28 The implementation of the plan has become the major task of the Council presidencies, held by Germany until the end of 2020 and Portugal for the first half of 2021. In November 2020, the Council and the European Parliament reached a political agreement on the next multiannual financial framework and on a key component of the recovery plan, namely "REACT-EU," as part of "Next Generation EU." 29 25. Joanna Gill and Lauren Chadwick, "EU summit: Leaders reach landmark e1.82 trillion COVID-19 recovery deal and budget," Euronews, 21 July 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/21/eusummit-deadlock-see-talks-stretch-into-sunday (accessed 22 July 2020 

In the end, intra-European cooperation not only triumphed over nationalist approaches in the EU's internal response to COVID-19, its "two-fold multilateralism" has also been confirmed on the international scene. Trump's repeated attacks on NATO or the EU itself further fuelled this impression, not to mention United States withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) amid the pandemic. For Canada, closer relations with the EU are lucrative as part of its strategy to diversify its economic relations and reduce its dependency on the United States. 37 The COVID-19 crisis has now confirmed again the common understanding that both partners have of the situation, reiterating their commitment to multilateralism and the global response. This includes the continuation of a functioning NATO, which is not only active in military defence but also in combatting disinformation about COVID-19. 38 As well, an EU-Canada partnership can help to strengthen broader and deeper transatlantic cooperation. Thus, functioning transatlantic relations lie at the heart of Canada's and the EU's interests. For that reason, on 14 April 2020, still at an early stage of the outbreak when speculations predicted that the EU would potentially break up from this ultimate crisis, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franc¸ois-Philippe Champagne adopted with Josep Borrell a "[j]oint statement regarding the international collaboration in addressing COVID-19," in which they reiterated their "shared values and commitment to multilateralism [. . .] to address the significant consular, public health and economic challenges of the COVID-19 crisis." 39 They agreed on mechanisms to repatriate their citizens from around the globe and get them home safely, to collaborate in COVID-19-related research, to ensure the flow of vital supplies across borders, to counter disinformation through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and to strengthen global efforts in containing the virus. In the last commitment of their statement, both sides more than ever pushed for multilateral cooperation in international organizations, especially the WHO and, more generally, the United Nations (UN). 40 This happened in full compliance with their first series of commitments related to their joint declaration "Canada-EU relations and the rule-based international order," agreed upon at the 2019 Canada-EU Summit where the SPA was presented as "a platform for cooperation on issues of common interest." 41 In May 2020, Canadian Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion, and International Trade Mary Ng evaluated with Phil Hogan, then EU Commissioner for Trade, how Canada and the EU could support businesses and workers better during the COVID-19 crisis. They repeated the need "for strong international coordination through the G20 and the World Trade Organization." 42 On that point, in her "State of the Union Address," Ursula von der Leyen explained "because this was a global crisis we need to learn the global lessons," and suggested a Global Health Summit in the G20 framework in 2021 under the Italian presidency. 43 On 29 October 2020, Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met for the first time Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen in a joint virtual meeting. They reiterated their commitment to work together to fight the COVID-19 pandemic in international fora, such as the G20 (in which the EU is a full member), the G7 (in which the EU is a "non-enumerated member"), and the UN. 44 

The CETA is seen as an important overarching tool for post-COVID-19 economic recovery between Canada and the EU, but some important transatlantic challenges remain. Only provisionally in effect since September 2017, the CETA still needs to be ratified by a little less than half of the EU member states, and even very local issues, such as the trademark protection of Cypriot goat cheese, halloumi, can mean its eventual failure. 45 Such uncertainties about the future of the CETA are enriched by Brexit and the eventual future relations between the EU and the United Kingdom, with all the reverberations that this will bring to Canada. As of early December 2020, the exact terms of EU-United Kingdom relations from 1 January 2021 onwards are still not agreed upon. Consequently, much is still unclear in the future economic cooperation between Canada and the United Kingdom. Both sides agreed, in November 2020, on a transitional post-Brexit deal, but the real negotiations between Canada and the United Kingdom on their definite trade terms will happen only in 2021. 46 However these will look, they will most probably not challenge Canada's overall relations with the EU, which will become more robust and promising once the CETA is fully operational.

On the national level, COVID-19 has revealed surprising facets of the "loose federal systems" in both Canada and the EU. 47 Ottawa, like Brussels, was mainly entrusted with financial support and coordination for the crisis, while the Canadian provinces and EU states have wielded full authority for managing the health emergency on the ground. The EU's fundamental principle of "subsidiarity" clarifies the division of competences between the member states and the EU. It briefly states that affairs should be dealt with at the lowest administrative level possible, meaning that, in areas where competences are not exclusive to the EU, EU action is legitimate only if it brings added value. The handling of the COVID-19 crisis showed that the federal trajectory of the European integration is not a "pipe dream" 48 anymore and might take shape earlier than some expected. Hence, both entities, the EU and Canada, might mutually learn from their respective experiences in the management of the crisis, irrespective of the fact that both belong to different models of federation-namely "coming together" among sovereign states in the EU compared to "holding together" the various provinces in Canada. Still, on the internal dimension of their crisis management, "lessons may be difficult to draw between them." 49 If some have criticized the EU for its apparent lack of coordination among member states, the same has been highlighted between Ottawa and the provinces, where provincial prime ministers have shown great autonomy in their individual crisis management responses without apparent coordination among provinces. Some argue that this situation is not in itself problematic because complementary pan-Canadian measures can be considered irrespective of the Canadian federalism. 50 This is similar to what the European Commission's communication and regulation proposed for cross-border cooperation against health threats within the EU.

Based on a long-lasting partnership, representatives from both sides confirmed on several occasions their common understanding of international issues, especially reiterating their shared commitment to multilateralism for an effective global response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 46 

The COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting challenges for politics, economies, and societies has revealed some obvious governance deficiencies within the EU, especially in the early phases of the health crisis. The early responses to the virus confirmed that internal struggles exist between EU member states based on their general attitudes towards the EU integration process. Such differences tend to become particularly obvious in crisis times, such as the 2008 financial crisis, the 2015 migration crisis, or, now, the COVID-19 crisis. However, the EU has proven again that those differences are not insurmountable and that it offers the appropriate framework. In the end, member states overwhelmingly remain committed to European multilateralism for managing the COVID-19 crisis, and unprecedented EU assets and steps towards a European Health Union have been initiated. This article has shown how the rapid spread of the COVID-19 virus in early 2020 caught many European governments by surprise, triggering a cacophony of national initiatives in the beginning. While this early reaction of turning inwards and acting alone could be seen across the world, calls for European solidarity quickly made headlines again, such as when French, Italian, and Dutch COVID-19 patients were transported to German hospitals for intensive care treatment from late March 2020 onwards, 51 a gesture that has been repeated during the second wave of infections in fall 2020 that by far outgrew the numbers from spring. 52 Beyond such punctual efforts, EU representatives gradually succeeded in overcoming the internal struggles with a series of initiatives that eventually found the support of member states. Initial reactions on the national level questioned neither the EU's role as such, nor its global prominence, nor its general commitment to its two-fold multilateralism-internally as an underlying understanding of European togetherness and externally as promotion of joint endeavours to counter the COVID-19 crisis. The EU's eventual striving for a global response to COVID-19 has indeed shown the way to achieve multilateral actions, as well as increased bilateral actions with core partners. Canada has been a prime collaborator in both. Given its extremely dynamic development, it remains to be seen how exactly the second and even third waves of COVID-19 will sweep through the world and how effective recovery plans will be. Yet, if the negative effects of this crisis become unexpectedly bad, a strong and resilient EU would be even better news for Canada and the future of EU-Canadian relations. 51. Jessica Bateman, "'Solidarity knows no border': Germany treating dozens of coronavirus patients from Italy and France," The Independent, 1 April 2020, https://www.independent.co.uk (accessed 23 September 2020). 52. Michael Birnbaum and Loveday Morris, "With coronavirus exploding in Europe, hospitals calculate how long until they hit capacity," Washington Post, 2 November 2020, https://www.wash ingtonpost.com/ (accessed 7 December 2020).

Le manque de solidarit e est un 'danger mortel' pour l'Europe, selon Jacques Delors [Lack of solidarity is a 'mortal danger' for Europe

A quoi sert l'Union europ eenne par rapport a`la crise?

Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy

Office of the Prime Minister

Readout: Minister Ng Meets with European Union Commissioner for Trade Phil Hogan

State of the Union Address

Joint press release: EU-Canada leaders' virtual meeting," press release

Could Europe's Cyprus halloumi dispute derail CETA? Maybe, but solution likely

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.