key: cord-0065004-l6m6n9yw
authors: Petit, Gillian; Tedds, Lindsay M.
title: The Effect of Differences in Treatment of the Canada Emergency Response Benefit across Provincial and Territorial Income Assistance Programs
date: 2020-07-01
journal: nan
DOI: 10.3138/cpp.2020-054
sha: c530142b30f1632525717a822434a6cc9ed58710
doc_id: 65004
cord_uid: l6m6n9yw

The Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) is a temporary cash transfer program for workers who have reduced earnings due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Some workers receiving the CERB also receive provincial or territorial income assistance. A lack of clear objectives and definitions related to the CERB has led to the CERB being treated very differently by provincial and territorial income assistance (IA) programs. We look at how these different treatments of CERB under provincial income assistance programs affect IA clients across jurisdictions. We consider arguments for why the CERB should have been fully exempted from IA benefits.

The web of income and social support programs across Canada is complex. Along with federal income support programs that are available nationally, each province and territory offers its own income assistance (IA) programs (sometimes referred to as "welfare" or "funders of last resort"), each with different rules and eligibility requirements. On top of this web of programs, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government made available the Canada Emergency Response Benefi t (CERB), a temporary cash benefi t of $2,000/month, to workers whose earnings were reduced to below $1,000/month due to the pandemic. Each province and territory has chosen to treat the CERB differently for the purposes of their IA programs. Some jurisdictions have completely exempted the CERB and will allow their IA clients to pocket the entire amount of the CERB while maintaining their provincial/territorial IA benefi t levels. Other jurisdictions have chosen not to exempt the CERB, meaning that IA clients who receive the CERB will no longer receive IA benefi ts. Finally, some jurisdictions have taken a middle route and chosen to partially exempt the CERB, implying that IA clients may be able to keep some of the IA benefi ts.

In this paper, we look at how these different treatments of CERB under provincial income assistance programs affect IA clients across jurisdictions. We focus, in our have a lower monthly total income while collecting CERB than before This difference in how various IA programs are treating the CERB stems from a lack of clear objectives and defi nition of the CERB. The CERB could be seen as akin to EI, which provides employment insurance to workers and is paid out of deferred earnings. In this case, an IA program would deduct CERB one for one from IA benefi ts. Or CERB could be viewed as a direct replacement for earned income and thus be treated by IA programs in the same manner in which earned income is treated-with a partial exemption. Finally, the CERB could be viewed akin to a tax benefi t program such as the Canada Child Benefi t or the Canada Workers Benefi t. In this case, the CERB would be fully exempted and not impact IA benefi ts. While the CERB was rushed through in order to be responsive to economic conditions, it is important to note that the federal Employment Minister Carla Qualtrough asked the provinces not to claw back the CERB ( Stapleton 2020 ) . Given that there was clear thought at the federal level about the treatment of the temporary CERB by provincial IA programs, the federal government still opted not to clarify the objectives of CERB to ensure the outcome that they appear to have preferred. As a result, this paper provides clear lessons to be learned related to the design and administration of future emergency benefi t programs such as the CERB.

There are good arguments as to why jurisdictions should fully exempt the CERB, particularly because the CERB is a temporary benefi t in response to severe economic circumstances. First, the cost of living has increased for low-income households during COVID-19 due to the closing of public services such as food banks, public libraries, and other NGOs that provide vital services. Fully exempting the CERB provides IA clients with additional income to help cover these costs, given that before COVID-19, their IA benefi ts were lower than the MBM, leaving them with little money saved after spending on day-to-day necessities. Second, fully exempting the CERB reduces income volatility and would provide IA clients with the temporary opportunity to save and create a stable fi nancial foundation, potentially reducing IA caseloads and recidivism rates. Finally, jurisdictions that are not fully exempting the CERB are penalizing work for IA clients who have met the expectations of their IA programs and have put in the effort to fi nd work. IA programs tend to have complex and punitive clawback rates on employment income. By further reducing IA benefi ts for those who receive the CERB, this adds another disincentive to fi nding work in the fi rst place. IA programs should consider these incentives carefully.

The CERB is one part of a bigger COVID-19 economic response plan: it is a temporary income support program examples, particularly on IA benefi ts of single adults, as single adults represent the vast majority of IA clients ( Falvo 2015 ; Petit and Tedds 2020 ) . It is important to note that single adult IA clients universally receive the lowest IA benefi ts of any family type. This means that our results also show the worst possible outcome related to the treatment of CERB for IA clients. First, we fi nd that for IA clients who receive the CERB, their IA benefi ts plus CERB benefi ts exceed the market basket measure (MBM) of income poverty regardless of how the provincial or territorial IA program treats the CERB. Although this is good news, we argue that it is temporary: without the CERB, which is currently intended to be a temporary measure, all IA clients (with the exception of AISH clients in Alberta) receive IA benefi ts below the MBM. Second, we fi nd that IA clients in jurisdictions that have fully exempted the CERB attain a higher level of the MBM than IA clients in jurisdictions that have partially exempted or not exempted the CERB. For jurisdictions that are partially exempting the CERB for IA clients, we fi nd that, regardless of the partial exemption, many IA clients in these jurisdictions will not receive IA benefi ts: the partial exemption leaves a large portion of the CERB non-exempt, and, when this is deducted from the IA benefi t amount, it drives IA benefi ts to zero. IA clients in the jurisdictions that have partially exempted the CERB have their IA benefi ts reduced to zero the same way as in jurisdictions that have not exempted the CERB. Finally, we fi nd that some IA clients who receive the CERB may have a lower total monthly income than before COVID-19 began (e.g., when they were employed) if their loss of earnings plus their loss of IA benefi ts exceeds $2,000 (the amount of the CERB). This is true for clients in IA programs that are relatively more generous, such as AISH in Alberta, Disability Assistance in British Columbia, and SAID in Saskatchewan. 1 This occurs due to the interaction between the program design and treatment of CERB, highlighting the importance of understanding interactions between programs.

The different treatment of the CERB across jurisdictions for IA clients, combined with the diverse program designs of IA programs across jurisdictions, means that IA clients who receive the temporary CERB are treated asymmetrically during the COVID-19 pandemic dependent on where they live. For example, IA clients living in Golden, BC who receive the CERB will receive both their entire IA benefi t and the full amount of the CERB, and only those who had earned over $2,000/month prior to the pandemic will see a decline in their total monthly income while receiving the CERB. However, persons living in Canmore, AB, less than an hour away from Golden, BC, will see their IA benefi ts decrease if they receive the CERB, potentially going down to zero in the months when they are collecting the CERB. Further, persons receiving Alberta's Assured Income for the Severely Handicapped (AISH) and who were earning at least $725/month will adjudicated. This allows the CRA/Service Canada to process the application and provide a payment within 10 days of the application. When eligibility is assessed, those who were not eligible but received a payment will have to pay back what they erroneously received; however, under the current rules, there will be no penalty (e.g., interest charged). 3

To understand how the CERB is being treated by IA programs, it is fi rst informative to understand how income is treated for the purpose of IA programs and how IA benefi ts are calculated. In all jurisdictions, to determine the IA benefi t level (B), fi rst, the maximum benefi t (Max (B) ) is determined, based on factors such as family type, family size, and ability to work. Next, non-exempted income (NE) is deducted from that maximum benefi t amount. Equation 1 shows this as a simple equation:

( 1 ) NE is found by taking income from any source ( Y ) and deducting from Y all exempted income ( E ). In other words,

Y can be further disaggregated into (a) gross earned income ( Y e ) and (b) gross income from other sources ( Y o ). Y o can include anything from dividend and interest/ investment income to court settlements to spousal and child supports to tax refunds/other benefi ts to rental income and so on. In other words,

E includes both deductions and exemptions. Earnings deductions ( D e ) are subtracted from Y e and include mandatory earnings deductions deducted at source such as Canada Pension Plan (CPP) contributions and employment insurance (EI) contributions. What is included in D e differs by jurisdiction. Other deductions ( D o ) are subtracted from Y o and can include income tax deducted at source from employment insurance benefi ts and essential operating costs of renting self-contained units. What is included in D o also differs by jurisdiction. Finally, also included in E are exempted earnings ( E e ) and other exemptions ( E o ). E e is subtracted from Y e . E e is calculated by fi rst determining the earnings exemptions threshold (which differs by province). 4 Any earnings below that threshold are exempted and any earnings above that threshold may be exempted, depending on the "phase-out" rate. For example, in Alberta, Alberta Works clients who are single and are expected to work have an earnings exemption threshold of $230/month plus 25 percent of earnings over $230/month; the phase-out rate is for workers who have signifi cantly reduced employment earnings due to COVID-19. It was announced on 18 March 2020 by the Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, and legislation was passed on 23 March 2020. Details regarding what the CERB would look like were released with an amendment on 15 April 2020 that shored up some gaps that had been identifi ed. Applications for the CERB were accepted beginning 6 April 2020 for the previous month.

The following details the CERB as of 10 June 2020 (the time of writing this). 2 To be eligible for the CERB, a person must meet the following conditions:

1. He, she, or they must be a worker :

• at least 15 years of age; and • a resident of Canada; and • for 2019 or in the 12 month period preceding application for the CERB, have had a total income of at least $5,000 from employment, self-employment, EI benefi ts, or other payments related to pregnancy, newborn children, or adoption.

• they cease working for reasons related to COVID-19 for at least 14 consecutive days within the four-week period for which they are applying for the benefi t; and • they have not ceased work voluntarily; and • they do not receive more than $1,000 of employment or self-employment income within those same four weeks; and • they do not receive any EI benefi ts or other benefi ts related to pregnancy, newborn children, or adoption.

Those who apply for the CERB receive $2,000 for each four-week period, regardless of their total annual income. The benefi t is a fl at amount, meaning that regardless of any person's individual or family circumstances, so long as he, she, or they meet the CERB conditions, he, she, or they receive $2,000 each four-week period. The maximum number of weeks the CERB can be claimed for is 16 weeks. An eligible person must reapply every four weeks to receive the monthly installment of CERB. Under these rules, a person could receive up to $8,000 in CERB benefi ts by applying every four weeks. The CERB is a taxable benefi t; however, the tax on the CERB is not deducted at the source (unlike EI), meaning that taxes on the CERB will be assessed upon completion of a 2020 tax return.

To deliver payments to Canadians in a fast and simple manner, the CERB is being jointly delivered by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and Service Canada (through the EI program). The application is online and is short and simple: no supporting documents to prove eligibility are required. At the time of application, eligibility is not being ( E o = 0), so that NE = $2,000: for these provinces, the CERB is not exempt.

Finally, some jurisdictions have partially exempted the CERB. Alberta has elected to treat CERB income as "passive business income" ( Y o = $2,000) for AISH clients and will partially exempt $725/month ( E o = $725) of the $2,000 monthly CERB payment, leaving $1,275 from the CERB as non-exempt income (NE = $1,275). Ontario, Manitoba, Quebec, and Alberta Works in Alberta have elected to treat CERB income as earned income ( Y e = $2,000) subject to the earnings exemption ( E e > 0). For example, IA clients in Manitoba will have $740 of the CERB payment exempt ( E e = $740). This leaves $1,260 of the $2,000 CERB payment as non-exempt (NE = $1,260).

The classifi cation of the CERB has an impact on IA benefi ts. Table 2 provides details on the maximum IA benefi t a single adult IA client may receive (e.g., one who has no other income) and the maximum IA benefi t a single adult IA client receiving the CERB (and no other income) may receive by jurisdiction and program. Also included in Table 2 is a comparison of the maximum monthly benefi ts of single adult IA clients relative to the market basket measure (MBM) threshold of income poverty in months in which single adult IA clients receive the CERB and in months when they receive only the usual (maximum) IA benefi t and no CERB. If the ratio of benefi ts to MBM is equal to one, the benefi ts are exactly equal to the MBM. If the ratio is greater than one, this indicates that the benefi ts are greater than the MBM. If the ratio is less than one, this indicates that the benefi ts are less than the MBM. Since the MBM is regional (as opposed to provincial), in each province, we use the MBM threshold for the largest city by population. 5 The 2018 MBM threshold is used. Figure 1 provides a visual of the monthly IA benefi ts plus CERB 75 percent. A client making $300/month ( Y e ) would have E e = $230 + ($300-$230) × 0.25 = $247.50.

Last, E o is subtracted from Y o . E o is generally comprised of a lot of different sources of income. What precisely is included in E o differs by jurisdiction, but it can include things such as tax refunds, the Canada Child Benefi t (CCB), and child support payments.

Expanding Equation (2), we see that NE income is calculated as

We now turn to how this matters for the CERB. Different jurisdictions have included the CERB in different parts of Equation (4). Ultimately, what type of income the CERB is determined by the various jurisdictions, and whether or not it is exempt impacts the IA benefi t amount in Equation (1) Notes: All numbers presented here are for single adults who own/rent their place of residence. The fi rst program presented for each province is transitional/temporary assistance for those expected to work. The second program presented for each province is for persons with disabilities. Since the MBM is regional, we use the MBM for the largest city by population in each province. The 2018 MBM is used. The MBM is not available for the Territories.

a Information on the MBM thresholds was collected from Statistics Canada (2020c ).

a single adult IA client may receive during months they receive the CERB relative to the monthly MBM. From Table 2 and Figure 1 , we see that since British Columbia, the Yukon, and the Northwest Territories have fully exempted the CERB, IA clients in these jurisdictions receive the full amount of their IA benefi ts in the months when they receive the CERB, along with the CERB. BC IA clients who receive the CERB receive over 1.5 times the MBM threshold.

From Table 2 and Figure 1 , we also see that IA clients in jurisdictions that have not exempted the CERB will see their IA benefi ts drop to zero. This includes clients in Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland. This is because the CERB, which is $2,000/month and non-exempt, exceeds the maximum IA benefi t in all of these provinces. Recalling Equation (1), this implies that the IA benefi t would be negative; thus these clients are no longer eligible for IA. Further, in these provinces, the ratio of the CERB plus IA to the MBM is, on the average, 1.28. This is lower than the MBM ratio in British Columbia. Table 2 , we see that single adult IA clients in jurisdictions that have partially exempted the CERB have an outcome similar to that for clients in provinces that have not exempted the CERB. For IA clients in Alberta (Alberta Works), Manitoba, Ontario (Ontario Works) , and Quebec, although these provincial IA programs have partially exempted the CERB by treating it as earned income minus exempted earnings, IA clients in these programs will receive no IA benefi ts in the months where they collect the CERB. This is because the exemption is not large enough: the non-exempt CERB exceeds the maximum IA benefi ts, so that Equation (1) results in a negative benefi t amount, causing persons collecting the CERB to receive no IA benefi ts. In these provinces, the ratio of the CERB plus IA to the MBM is, on the average, 1.29-very similar to the ratio in the jurisdictions that have not exempted the CERB and again lower than the ratio in British Columbia.

Last, in Table 2 , the fi fth column reports the ratio of the maximum IA benefi ts to the MBM of income poverty. In every jurisdiction and program, with the exception of AISH in Alberta, this ratio is less than one. This indicates earnings exemption threshold who made $936/month or more, if he, she, or they lose employment and receive the CERB, total monthly income will be lower with the CERB than with employment. This lower total monthly income in BC DA, Alberta AISH, and Saskatchewan SAID is partially a result of program design and should actually be commended. All of these programs have higher levels of benefi ts and/or more generous earning exemption thresholds than other jurisdictions. Clients of these programs are not cut off of IA benefi ts as quickly when they gain employment, a point we will come back to.

However, because of these more generous program designs, the loss of earnings plus the loss of IA benefi ts can result in a net loss of monthly income even with the gain of the CERB benefi t compared to less generous program designs where, although there may be a loss of earnings and a loss of IA benefi ts, there is a net gain in monthly income because of the CERB. The more generous a program is, the more there is to lose and the less that the CERB can make up for that loss.

The next question to look at is how many provincial IA clients may actually be eligible for the CERB, and how many IA clients may be no longer eligible for IA benefi ts. To answer this question, we use data from the Social Policy Simulation Database (SPSD) from Statistics Canada. In May 2020, a COVID-19 version of the SPSD was released that allowed users to investigate federal income support benefi ts announced in Canada's COVID-19 Economic Response Plan and its effects on Canadians.

The SPSD is a non-confi dential, statistically representative database of Canadian individuals. It includes suffi cient information on each individual to estimate his or her taxes paid and cash transfers received from the government ( Statistics Canada n.d. ). The underlying data upon which the representative data are largely based is the Consumer Income Survey conducted by Statistics Canada. These data are not available for the territories, nor does the SPSD provide an adequate indicator of disability status. Table 3 provides summary statistics on the number of individuals (ages 15-64) in each province who receive provincial IA and the number of income recipients (ages 15-64) who potentially qualify for the CERB. From Table  3 , we see that 4.77 percent of the Canadian population receive provincial IA, and, of those, nearly 20 percent are potentially eligible for the CERB (e.g., they were working and met the income requirements for CERB). This varies across provinces. British Columbia has the highest proportion of IA recipients potentially eligible for the CERB, at 28.44 percent ,and Newfoundland has the lowest proportion of IA recipients eligible for CERB, at 4.42 percent. It is interesting to note that the provinces with the largest proportion of IA clients potentially eligible for CERB are that nearly every IA program provides benefi ts that are less than the MBM measure of poverty. Although the ratio of the CERB plus IA benefi ts to the MBM seems large (e.g., larger than one), the CERB is temporary: this will not last. When it ends, IA clients will return to receiving IA benefi ts below the MBM. Further, prior to COVID-19, IA clients were receiving IA benefi ts less than the MBM, which may have impacted how much savings they had during COVID-19 to help cover rising costs of living. This is a point we will return to in the discussion. Table 2 and Figure 1 do not tell the whole story: they only show us what the fi nal IA benefi t plus the CERB benefit will be for single adults. They do not tell us whether that amount is greater or less than the monthly income of a single adult IA client before COVID-19. In a few cases, some IA clients will have a lower monthly income when they have no employment and are collecting CERB than when they had employment and were not collecting CERB. This is true of provincial/territorial IA programs with high levels of benefi ts and high levels of exempt earnings.

As a thought experiment, consider a single adult IA client who is working in March 2020. In April 2020, he, she, or they lose the job for reasons related to COVID-19 and apply for the CERB. Comparing March to April, he, she, or they lose earned income and gains CERB income. Dependent on the jurisdiction in which he, she, or they reside, he, she, or they may or may not lose IA benefi ts. If the loss of earnings plus loss of IA is greater than the gain from the CERB, monthly income in April may be lower than in March.

There are three programs in which an IA client may have a lower monthly income when collecting CERB than when employed. First, under BC Disability Assistance (DA), although CERB is fully exempted, the earnings exemption and benefi t level are suffi ciently high so that DA clients earning over $2,000 may receive DA, although this is dependent on accumulated earnings. DA clients who were earning over $2,000/month and then were fi red/laid off when COVID-19 hit so that they collected the CERB may have a lower total monthly income than before COVID-19. This is generally true for all recipients of CERB.

More problematically, for AISH clients in Alberta and SAID clients in Saskatchewan, total monthly income may be lower when collecting the CERB after only minimal earnings loss. For AISH clients who were earning over $725/month, the loss of earnings plus the loss of AISH benefi ts is greater than the CERB payment, making the change in total income negative. Likewise, for clients of SAID in Saskatchewan, the loss of earnings plus the loss of SAID may be larger than the gain in CERB benefi ts, dependent on a SAID's client's past level of earnings (as the earnings exemption is annual). For example, a SAID client with accumulated earnings below the $6,000 annual the same provinces we identifi ed above as having more generous program designs: British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan.

From Table 3 , about 5.9 percent of all IA clients who are potentially eligible for the CERB live in provinces that have not exempted the CERB. That is, 5.9 percent of all IA clients may not receive IA in the months when the CERB is available. Further, 76.5 percent of all IA clients who are potentially eligible for the CERB live in provinces that have partially exempted the CERB. As we saw in Table 2 , there is the potential that these IA clients will no longer receive IA. Only 17.6 percent of all IA clients who are potentially eligible for the CERB live in provinces that have fully exempted the CERB, and thus only these clients are guaranteed to continue receiving IA benefi ts while receiving the CERB.

Unfortunately, the SPSDM does not adequately model provincial IA benefi ts, nor does it provide suffi cient information to estimate provincial IA amounts. Further, the COVID-19 SPSDM model does not model how provincial IA benefi ts are affected by receipt of the CERB. Due to these limitations, we are unable to estimate the actual magnitude of the effect of the CERB on provincial IA recipients. To do so would require access to IA administrative data linked to tax fi ler data, at a minimum; however, such data are only available in the Statistics Canada Research Data Centers (RDC), which are currently closed due to the pandemic, and are only available currently for the provinces of Ontario and British Columbia. When the RDCs reopen and the data are available, we plan to revisit this analysis to measure the impact these differing provincial treatments of the CERB had on IA clients.

Prior to COVID-19, it was well documented that provincial IA programs were inadequate: in all provinces and across all programs, IA benefi ts leave low-income households below the income poverty line ( Tweddle and Aldridge 2019 ) . We also show this above in Table 2 : the ratio of the maximum IA benefi t for single adults to the MBM poverty measure is less than one in all programs except for AISH in Alberta. IA clients who work are trying to better their fi nancial situation, and often have to overcome barriers (e.g., disabilities including mobility and access issues, addictions, metal health issues, employer bias). Usher in COVID-19 and these same IA clients are now thrown an additional curve ball: COVID-19 has resulted in the loss of jobs for many low-income workers. In March and April, persons making less than $24.04/hour had a 38.1 percent job loss compared with a decline of 12.7 percent for all other employees ( Statistics Canada 2020a ).

For IA clients who have lost their employment, not only do their barriers remain, but they have increased, and their costs of living have also increased. Prior to COVID-19, many low-income households used basic services to live day to day. Food banks and school lunch programs provided food to those with food insecurity, public libraries provided computers and internet access to those with limited access to technology, and social service offi ces, legal clinics, and NGOs provided aid with fi lling out application forms for various benefi ts and other necessary paperwork. COVID-19 has cut off or reduced access to all of these services, forcing low-income households either to go without or to purchase these items ( Loopstra, Dachner, and Tarasuk 2015 ; McIntyre, Dutton, et al. 2016 ; McIntyre, Patterson, et al. 2016 ) . Further, prices on day-to-day grocery items have increased ( Statistics Canada 2020b ).

There are good arguments as to why the CERB should be fully exempted by all jurisdictions, particularly because it is intended to be a temporary program. First, fully exempting the CERB for IA clients will help them cover the increasing costs of living due to COVID-19. Given that for all IA clients, the ratio of MBM to the monthly maximum IA benefi t without CERB is less than one, it is highly likely that IA clients do not have accumulated savings suffi cient to cover unexpected expenses. In general, Rothwell and Robson (2018 ) estimate that 54 percent of Canadians do not have enough savings to maintain their households at 50 percent of the median income for three months, and this increases to 70 percent to those with less than high school education. Allowing IA clients to retain their IA benefi ts plus the CERB would help them fi ll in for their likely lack of savings. Further, making up for the lack of saving to cover the increasing costs of living is particularly important during a pandemic because, if IA clients cannot cover costs such as rent, they may be forced to move. 6 Moving during a pandemic increases risk of transmission of the virus, particularly if those moving cannot afford safety measures. Second, fully exempting the CERB would allow IA clients to have a consistent and predictable stream of income during the period when the CERB is delivered: there would be no interruption in the stream of IA benefi ts, thus reducing (negative) income volatility. Income volatility in low-income households has been shown to lead to adverse consequences such as increased food insecurity ( Bania and Leete 2007 ) , worse emotional health ( Gennetian and Shafi r 2015 ) , adverse schooling outcomes for children Yeung, Linver, and Brooks-Gunn 2002 ) , increased material hardship and diffi culty paying bills, including rent ( Schneider and Harknett 2017 ) , and increased fi nancial vulnerability/lower ability to cope with an unexpected expense ( Schneider and Harknett 2017 ) . Further, even if IA clients do have a higher monthly income because of CERB, providing low-income households with a temporary opportunity to build a solid fi nancial foundation (through the accumulation of fi nancial assets) ensures that a household has more resources at its disposal to meet its needs, increasing the likelihood of well-being and security, and can lead to greater stability, greater mobility, and the promotion of welfare exit ( Robson 2008 ) .

Third, fully exempting the CERB would avoid penalizing IA clients for working. IA clients who were working prior to COVID-19 were meeting (and potentially exceeding) the expectations of their IA programs. Not only does clawing back the CERB penalize IA clients who were trying to better themselves, but also it creates additional disincentives for IA clients to work (on top of other disincentives already baked into most IA programs).

Some writers have argued that it would not be fair to allow IA clients to retain both their full IA benefi ts and the CERB when low-income households who are not IA clients will only receive the CERB (see for example Boessenkool 2020 ). However, this positions the argument as a race to the bottom instead of considering how those on the bottom can be pulled up during unprecedented economic conditions. Policy-makers in several jurisdictions have, in fact, provided additional aid to low-income households who are not IA clients yet face the same barriers and rising costs of living as IA clients. This includes the federal government, which has provided one-time top-ups to the GST/ HST credit, to the CCB, and to OAS and GIS recipients.

Finally, the different treatment of the CERB across provincial/territorial IA programs is problematic. There is no explanation as to why an AISH recipient living in Canmore, AB should be treated differently than a Disability Assistance recipient living in Golden, BC, less than an hour away. But they are treated differently. At the national level, Canada recognizes that key income benefi t programs should be provided consistently across Canada. For example, all Canadians face the same eligibility requirements and program parameters for the Canada Child Benefi t (CCB), OAS/GIS, the Working Income Tax Benefi t/Canada Workers Benefi t (CWB), and employment insurance (EI). Further, all of these programs are treated in the same manner by provincial IA programs. CERB, particularly because it is temporary, should be no different.

This raises the question of why IA programs are treating the CERB differently. One explanation may be that, because of the swiftness with which the CERB was put into place, there was very little technical guidance as to what the CERB was. Is it like EI, which is an employment insurance program meant to insure workers and paid out of deferred earnings, and thus should it be non-exempt for the purposes of IA, as EI is? Or is it a replacement for employment income, and thus should it be treated as employment income for the purposes of IA? Or is it a tax benefi t program, paid out of general revenue to supplement low income, like the CCB or CWB, and thus should it be fully exempt for the purposes of IA?

Some writers have argued that CERB should be treated as earned income (and partially exempted) because it temporarily replaces lost employment income (see for example Boessenkool 2020 ) . But it may not be this simple. Although this is indeed what the Canada Emergency Response Benefi t Act purports, this is not refl ected in the way the CERB is designed. If CERB were to replace lost employment income, recipients would receive a benefi t amount equal to the amount of their low employment income. This is not the case. The CERB differs in one way or another from all other programs in Canada. This highlights the importance of the federal government concisely defi ning a program and its objectives to minimize differential treatment of programs across jurisdictions.

All of the complexity discussed in this paper demonstrates how different IA programs across Canada are, and how their interactions with federal IA programs matter. It also demonstrates how important it is to clearly and consciously defi ne IA programs, and consider their effects on all sociodemographic groups. Although there was not time to conduct this in-depth analysis with the CERB, future federal programs can learn from the CERB experience. 

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Market Basket Measure (MBM) Thresholds for the Reference Family by Market Basket Measure Region, Component and Base Year

Welfare in Canada

2020 . Canada Emergency Response Benefi t (CERB) Interactions with Provincial and Territorial Social Assistance and Subsidized Housing Programs and Youth Aging Out of Care

How Money Matters for Young Children's Development: Parental Investment and Family Process

Income Assistance Regulations

Employment Support and IA Regulations

Ontario Disability Support Program-Income Support

Ontario Disability Support Program-Social Assistance Policy Directives: Income Support

Social Assistance Policy Directives: Ontario Works

Programs-Based Overview of Income and Social Support Programs for Working-age Persons in British Columbia

CERB to Be Extended by 8 Weeks, Trudeau Announces

Social Assistance Act Regulations

Individual and Family Assistance Regulation

Wealth, Low-Wage Work, and Welfare: The Unintended Costs of Provincial Needs Tests

The Prevalence and Composition of Asset Poverty in Canada

The Saskatchewan Assistance Regulations, RRS c S-8 Reg 12

We gratefully acknowledge funding from the Government of British Columbia (spcs46008190052) that helped support this research. We would like to thank Molly Harrington, Assistant Deputy Minister, Research, Innovation, and Policy Division, Social Development and Poverty Reduction, Government of British Columbia; Robert Bruce, Executive Director, Research Branch, Research, Innovation, and Policy Division, Social Development and Poverty Reduction, Government of British Columbia; and John Stapleton, Open Policy Ontario, for their helpful comments and information as we were preparing this paper. We would also like to thank Robin Shaban, Robin Shaban Consulting for her help with the SPSD/M, and an anonymous guest editor for helpful comments.

Notes: Net earnings = wages/salary -allowable deductions such as CPP/EI premiums, union dues, etc.; Gross earnings = wages/salary before deductions. All of these assume the recipient rents his or her place of residence (e.g., is not living in a long-term care facility or other shared/ accommodated living situation) and is boarding with a non-relative. None of these amounts include possible supplements such as disability/ community/caregiver supports, home/vehicle modifi cation, or health-related supplements.