key: cord-0059233-qwp604hs
authors: Magu, Stephen M.
title: Between BRICs’ Promise and Past Western Trauma: Whither, Africa?
date: 2021-01-03
journal: Explaining Foreign Policy in Post-Colonial Africa
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-62930-4_8
sha: b25877bafb727d5705e326b5042691a2443a6d38
doc_id: 59233
cord_uid: qwp604hs

This chapter examines OAU/AU relations with BRICs: primarily, Brazil, Russia, India and China. Given the power changes that occurred after the Cold War, these countries have provided an alternative approach to economic development and world order, challenging a US-led global order. China, rapidly emerging as the US’ major challenger, and once the subject of experiences similar to those of African and Asian nations by western powers, has increased its engagement and infrastructure funding, making state-centric economic development seem viable. Focusing on China because of its extensive relations with the AU and bilaterally with African countries and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and its summits every three years, the chapter also examines how other BRICs have addressed AU relations. Brazil’s engagement is sporadic, driven by its history with Portugal and Portugal’s colonialism in Africa, and lacking a state-level forum. Russia’s first forum was held in 2018; Russia’s challenges dealing with Africa are myriad, given a lack of shared history, geography or direct interactions. India began convening the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), but its internal issues (e.g., a sixth of its population living under the poverty line) and the history of India-Africa relations especially during colonization, the chapter assesses both the opportunities for collaboration but also the areas of differences in these relationships.

The 1960s presented Africa with opportunities borne of liberation, but also persistent challenges. Europe had faded into the arena of US-USSR competition, everything was Washington and the Kremlin, African nations were peripheral. Cold War arms races made even European tiffs against Egypt pale. New players were rising and contending for global influence; China was shedding shadows of empire, warlords, Japanese occupation and increasing its influence and socialist future. Whereas Russia was still the USSR and China its client state, and all BRICs could potentially have risen to global contenders, it was China that distinguished itself. It received Soviet aid during its civil war, had exerted military muscle in Korea and Vietnam, and portended a new path to success for African countries. Rather interestingly, China and India were catching great powers' bug, with intrastate and interstate conflicts.

The USSR broke up on Christmas day in 1991; Rossiyskaya Federatsiya (Russia) assumed USSR's debts, privileges and immunities. It started dealing with 'divorce' issues: allocating military bases, and other equipment, nuclear missiles, Baikonur Cosmodrome and other separation issues. In the west, the EU was progressively watering down states' central raison d'être-critical functions like border control, immigration and common Euro currency through the EU and EMU. China grew rapidly despite many ill-advised social and economic programs that led States" 15 while managing Brazil's abolitionist movement. Dom Pedro's efforts ran into opposition by powerful republican property owners who favored the continuation of slavery.

Brazil's path to independence from the Portuguese Kingdom was long: despite Dom Pedro I's famous oratory: "Brazilians, Independence or death," 16 he abdicated in favor of his son in 1831. 17 Dom Pedro II's daughter, Princess Isabella signed the emancipation decree 18 and the Brazilian Empire and Dom Pedro II's reign ended in 1889 19 ; but its version of caudillismo was afoot. 20 Dom Pedro desired that "Brazil should develop as a European country and enjoy European standards of civilization." 21 He presided over "political stability and economic growth through railroad, telegraph and trade developments [which] allowed Brazil to emerge as a hemispheric power, as did success in wars against Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay." 22 Through the nineteenth century, its plantation, slave-fueled economy would soon recalibrate, but the question of former slaves lingered. The latter's "bondage so crippled Afro-Brazilians as a social group" 23 that integration into Brazilian society was not achieved. Further, Brazilian "military governments also built on a traditional notion of gradenza […] proclaiming the goal of transforming Brazil into a great power of imperial dimensions." 24 Its growing influence was regional and rarely directed at Africa. 25 Brazil recognized its 'new relationship with Africa' was predicated on negotiating its relationship with Portugal. Gibson Barboza, a former Brazilian foreign minister, stated that he "immediately confronted the tremendous obstacle that the Portuguese colonial problem presented […] as an Atlantic country, Brazil will have interests and responsibilities on the other side of the ocean that bathes our shores." 26 He aimed to "eliminate the climate of mistrust, coldness and even veiled hostility toward Brazil that could take root in Africa because of the position we have traditionally taken on the problem of Portugal's territories." 27 Portugal finally gave up its African colonies in 1975, potentially improving relations with Africa; yet its support for and providing weapons to apartheid South Africa, then locked in a conflict with an independenceseeking Namibia all but assured that Brazil was not out of the woods yet.

Brazil desired greater global influence through the Non-Aligned Movement. From 1961, it shifted "its traditional alignment with the United States and the Western world [and] gave primacy to its place in, and relations with, the non-Western world, especially the countries of Africa and Asia." 28 Jânio Quadros' rule saw an 'independent foreign policy'; diplomatic overtures toward Africa, government scholarships and a mini-Student Airlift of African students to Brazilian universities occurred, but was terminated by Quadros' resignation 7 months later and his successor's (João Goulart) overthrow in 1964. Brazil's foreign policy 'reset,' realigning with Portugal, and declining to participate in a 'multilateral peace force' to Namibia. 29 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's presidency favored better relations with Africa. Brazil sought membership in a restructured UN Security Council and aimed to enlist Africa's 54 countries to neutralize Argentina or Mexico's chances. Lula's increased contact with Africa included 11 official visits (25 countries), doubling embassies and increasing trade especially with resource-rich African countries. 30 Lula began a "Brazil-Africa Forum on Politics, Cooperation, and Trade" 31 initiative and was involved in convening the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India-Brazil-South Africa Dialog Forum), 'deepening ties' with the community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), ECOWAS, NEPAD and AU. 32 Brazil was granted AU observer status in 2005 (together with Mexico and Argentina), signed a technical cooperation framework in 2007, and was represented at the 2010 ECOWAS Summit. 33 Brazil convened a conference on Africans and Africans in the Diaspora that attracted 6 African heads of states, OAU Chair and several other delegations. 34 Brazil has not held a formal forum in the tradition of FOCAC; the Brazil-Africa forum mostly featured scholars. Brazil's~US$2 trillion GDP (nominal) ranks it 9th, its GDP (PPP) per capita just US$16,000 but Brazil faces issues like poverty, COVID-19 infections, economic stagnation and other issues that constrain its ability to influence global politics.

The history of Russia/USSR/Russia again is replete with missed (in)actions in Africa, giving rise to suspicions of no sound strategy. This is not exceptional: the US didn't have one until 1958. Most of Soviet actions in Africa were primarily a Cold War strategy-to thwart the US and its allies' influence in a decolonizing Africa. Russia shows 30 Samuel Bodman, Julia Sweig and James Wolfensohn, Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations (New York: CFR, 2011) neither interest in, nor strategy for African countries beyond weapons sales. Russia's distance from Africa is considerable (although Cuba and Venezuela are too), but proximity, geography, ethnicity and ideology make the distance greater. Russia was always a limited power in Europe, Asia and its ambitions were directed at Eurasia. Its interest and intervention in Africa were more opportunistic than purposeful, the highest goal being to thwart the US and European powers, peeling support from them on account of colonialism.

Unlike the US and Europe, Russia's geographic location denies it a direct line of sight. Its closest point, Egypt, is smack amid Arabian societies; the historical interactions between the Christian Orthodox religion, Constantinople's capture by the Ottoman Empire in 1453, and the see-saw of control of the region made recovering Constantinople Russia's most important goal together with recognition by Europe. 35 Russia's first bilateral relations in Africa were with Ethiopia, the first diplomatic exchange occurring in 1897. Relations remained robust until World War I, though its importance progressively declined. 36 After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Ethiopia "allied with the entente [and] refused to accept representatives from Soviet Russia." 37 Diplomatic relations were restored in 1924, but Russia's attempt to control some territories liberated from Italy would challenge relations. 38 In the post-colonial period, Soviet interactions in Africa were haphazard, besides the grand strategy of weakening the US due to its failure to denounce colonization, and allies, the colonial powers. The paradox of democracy vs. colonialism gave the USSR unlimited ammunition, while its centrally planned economic models were attractive to Africa. 39 Some African leaders professed socialism, based on African concepts of communitarianism infused with nationalism. The US and its allies often failed to grasp that most African leaders were nationalist and desperate more than they were socialist, that to unshackle their people from colonialism, they asked for help everywhere and the USSR helped. Soviet leaders exploited this, including awarding Lenin Peace Prizes to Nkrumah, Modibo Keita and Sékou Touré. 40 Early in the 1960s, the USSR backed its support by deploying 'technical experts,' 41 although their true purpose was contested, and some suggested they were there to exploit them. 42 The aid was tangible, utilitarian and beneficial: "the Soviet airline Aeroflot provided technical assistance and equipment to get the airline [Société Nationale Air Mali or Air Mali] underway." 43 That Soviets were making inroads into Africa led to founding the Peace Corps, although Jim Crow laws in the US' south only complicated the narrative for the west.

Soviet support of decolonization was part of Cold War global strategy. "Soviet-African relations in the 1970s reflect a willingness in Moscow to back a wide range of causes and regimes which have little in common apart from their need for external support and their readiness to accept Soviet support if no other source is available." 44 Some countries were selected for strategic regions, some for political reasons but also because liberation implied defeat for the US and its allies. 45 The USSR aided the African National Congress (ANC) in its Zambian offices, as a counterweight to the US-South Africa alliance and assisted Joshua Nkomo's (socialist) ZAPU against Mugabe's ZANU in Zimbabwe. 46 46 Westad, The Global Cold War, 2007. 1960 s a perfect example. 47 Soon, other regions were of greater import, including Afghanistan, the Middle East (Egypt) and Afghanistan.

The collapse of the USSR bequeathed the Russian Federation to global order. Russia is a large country that occupies 12.5 percent of earth's inhabited area and spans 11 time zones. Its first decade involved 'self-care' before engaging with the world. As Russia assumed debts and responsibilities of the former USSR, as capitalism thrived, deficits increased, taxes remained uncollected, corruption, mismanagement and suspicion of political instability persisted, a "too nuclear to fail" 48 Russia appeared highly unstable. As Yugoslavia disintegrated, Somalia failed and the Rwanda genocide started, Russia was quiet, unable to effectively address emerging global events given its own circumstances. When engaged, Russia addressed issues territorially proximate to Asia such as Kosovar Albanians' repression in the newly constituted Serbia and the situation in Bosnia. 49 Interestingly, some Somalis fleeing the 1990 collapse resettled in Russia. 50 Russia began previewing its future strategy and took unusual positions regarding Africa; in Rwanda, as the magnitude of the genocide became clear and fearing American overreach, Russia and China opposed deploying a peacekeeping force more effective than the Roméo Dallaireled UNAMIR, or accept RoE change to allow the protection of civilians. 51 Russia and the US opposed military intervention despite death tolls rising by the hour. 52 Finally, a force of 2500 was urged, against US, 47 France and Russia's 500-1000 troops' figure and UNAMIR's proposed 'necessary force' of between 5500 and 8000. 53 The past 20 years have seen Russia's drive to recover empire and remain relevant, in part, given the global order, the US' 'unipolar moment,' NATO's expansion, expanding Europe and a rising China. The US' war on terror, troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, drones in Syria, Libya, Somalia, West Africa and involvement in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia have challenged Russia's ability to influence world order. Vladimir Putin's rise to power epitomized a 'new' Russia, recalling that "first and foremost it is worth acknowledging that the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. As for the Russian people, it became a genuine tragedy." 54 Putin is considered to be rebuilding the now-defunct Soviet empire with most its actions directed at countries in the region. Invasion of Georgia in 2006, Ukraine in 2014 and its longterm involvement in Syria and backing Iran do preview Russia's dreams of empire.

A few areas define recent Russia-Africa interactions. As one of two BRICs on the UNSC, it joined forces with the EU's Operation ATALANTA, considered Libya's outcomes in shaping its response to the Arab Spring and in October 2019, held the first Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum in Sochi. Russia and Africa have some related experiences: swiftly after USSR's collapse, Somalia followed suit. Instability, conflict and warlords soon led to piracy off Somalia. A raft of UNSC resolutions led to the 2008 establishment of the European Union's Naval Force ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR). This allowed the EU to implement "a coordination unit with the task of supporting the surveillance and protection activities carried out by some member States of the European Union off the coast of Somalia, and the ongoing planning process towards a possible European Union naval operation, as well as other international or national initiatives taken with a view to implementing resolutions 1814 (2008) and 1816 (2008) ." 55 Within the EU, Operation ATALANTA was authorized by EU Council Joint Action 851; it set the goals of ATALANTA as protecting of WFP ships, AMISOM mission, preventing armed robbery and piracy, monitoring fishing off Somalia's coast and increasing EU and other IGOs capacity to working in the region, focusing on maritime security and capacity. 56 Russia did not contribute to ATALANTA, or the 33-nation Combined Maritime Forces (150, 151 and 152) but it has often taken part in anti-piracy activities with Japan, India and China, under the "Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism" where naval anti-piracy operations were underway. 57 Russia was able to rescue one of its vessels and arrest the suspected pirates, later releasing them.

Russia's re/actions to Libya's Arab Spring protests are intriguing. Russia abstained on the vote for UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011) establishing the No-Fly Zone. It established "a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians and […] to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed." 58 The resolution set conditions for civilian protection, enforcing an arms embargo, a ban on Libyan aircraft and flights, an asset freeze and travel restrictions on Libyan government and high-ranking officials, and allowed the UNSG to create a 'Panel of Experts' to implement the resolution. Ten countries including US, UK and France voted in favor, none opposed and five (China and Russia inclusive), abstained. Libya's No-Fly Zone was the first major test on the use of R2P, where the 'principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.' 55 UNSC, "Resolution 1838 (2008) Suspicions abound about Libya: that Europe was pre-empting the fallout of a failed state within sailing distance and millions of Libyans and African refugees pouring into Europe; after all, Rwandan genocide was worse, easier to resolve but far from Europe. The no-fly zone execution was a successful failure: it succeeded in confirming Russia's suspicion that NATO was a hostile, expansionist, conflictual and untrustworthy partner, its (US) puppet master's goal was regime change in Libya, perhaps as payback for the Berlin nightclub bombing and deaths of American servicemen, and the downing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie. But enforcing a No-Fly Zone without eliminating Libya's offensive weapons was risky. Still, nothing did more to negatively impact future R2P actions than Libya. Russia, China and South Africa believed "NATO was exceeding the mandate approved in Resolution 1973 and had crossed the line between civilian protection and regime change. The resolution only provided for limited strikes to prevent violence against innocent civilians." 59 Beyond Russia's 'aggressor' rhetoric, it saw Libya as a continuation Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia (USSR and after) and Libya had shared commercial and historically close relations. Libya was a weapons importer from the USSR and its proxy power in Africa; Russia was also building a railway line from Sirte to Benghazi. 60 To the east, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Vladimir Putin signed deals for the purchase of Russian military hardware. 61 Regarding the Arab Spring, Russia's responses to events in Libya oscillated. First, it opposed sanctions, then agreed to support them, then opposed a no-fly zone by abstaining in Resolution 1973, and then critiqued NATO's implementation of the no-fly zone. It then offered to mediate between rebels and the government, encouraged Gaddafi to step down while opposing regime change, 62 to revisit the no-fly zone and curtail NATO's mandate grew. 63 Gaddafi's death and two rival rebel governments in Tripoli and Benghazi validated Russia's fears; Iraq, Afghanistan and now Libya were good examples good intentions gone rogue. 64 Russia convened its first Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in 2019. 65 While the outcomes of the summit were unclear, Russia discussed increasing its investments in Africa in future. Russia's economic footprint in Africa faint and only in arms sales, mostly to Algeria, with one of largest ever Russian arms sales post-Cold War era going to Algeria at US$7.5 billion. 66 One might be forgiven for proposing that Russia's trade with Africa is more harmful than helpful. Russia-Africa future relations are still indeterminate. Greater regional integration in Africa and the newly inaugurated African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) portend major opportunities for Russia. On the other hand, it may be the start of a new rivalry with its southern neighbor, India, as India seeks greater engagement with the African continent.

By virtue of colonization, African countries' experiences more closely mirrored those of India than any of the other BRICs. Brazil's path to BRIC was different, but that of India is even more unlikely. Granted, at US$2.72 trillion, India has the world's 7th largest economy in the world as measured by nominal GDP (Brazil's US$1.87 trillion ranks it 9th) but the population tells a different story: Brazil's population is 15 percent of India's. Its GDP (PPP) is US$2104.20, HDI score of 0.65 (ranking 118) while 18 percent of its population, larger than Brazil's entire population, lives in poverty. India's membership of BRICs and its great-power politics is confounding, considering the proposition that it could do 'rising' or 'great power' politics things. A revisit and potential improvement of relations between India and Africa is necessary, almost overdue even if such relations are not necessarily based on what India can do for Africa.

Historical and trade relations between Africa and India date back to 740 AD. Contacts were facilitated by Arabs who traveled to Sofala, Madagascar to India and Ceylon. 67 Coastal Swahili people and Arabs served as trade intermediaries. 68 "The Zanzibaris used Indian currency, issued and used by Arab and Indian representatives of Indian finance houses in Bombay and elsewhere." 69 The British found Indians' knowledge of the oceans, currents, harbors invaluable; "the laboual sheetrs of officers of the Indian Navy have been the chief means of bringing the Somali coast of Africa to our knowledge." 70 The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw Indians migrate to Africa for many: as pliant agents of British colonial expansion, as rail and port workers and businessmen.

Initially, Indian labor was used to plant sugarcane by the 150,000 laborers sent to South Africa in the 1860s. Deemed insufficiently hardworking, they were divvied up between Durban and the north coast, taking jobs "on the railway and in the municipal Government." 71 They were in diverse occupations besides plantations. "Indians were employed in various sectors, such as the railways, the dockyards, coal mines, municipal services, and domestic service." 72 The numerical increase was reflected by suspicion they were opportunistic colonial collaborators. "The Indians who acted largely as customs officers, bankers, moneylenders and money-changers were the object of resentment, evident in 67 Mary Gunn the stereotypes of the time." 73 Indians were universally unpopular: they "were described by European observers as opportunistic 'birds of passage' who would go back to India after making a profit […] the bureaucrats may have looked down on Indians, but could not really do without them if the colonization of East Africa was to bring profits." 74 Where they settled in numbers, "Natal's Legislative Council argued that Indians should also be barred from consuming or acquiring liquor as this would serve to halt the sale of liquor to Africans." 75 Outflows continued; 32,000 Indians worked as indentured laborers building the Kenya-Uganda railway. Almost 7000 settled in Mombasa and 1000 were in Nairobi by 1905. 76 Transitioning from laborers to dukawallahs, colonialism and need for administrators meant the British could recruit Indians (1500), pay them less than Europeans for similar work, and keep them out of areas Europeans dominated, such as commercial agriculture. 77 Over time, they took part in politics: Jeevanjee was appointed to Kenya's LegCo. Discrimination was rife: during Nairobi's 1908 plague outbreak "the colonial state stepped in, restricting 'lower class Indians and the African natives' to specific quarters for residence and small trading." 78 Indians chafed at this treatment; in South Africa, passes were required, precipitating Mahatma Gandhi's 1908 protest by 3000 who burnt their passes. 79 In East Africa they objected to 'an inferior status,' denial of participation, segregation and limits on where they could own land. 

Across Africa, despite treatment as 2nd-class persons, conflict between Africans and Indians was rife, e.g., in South Africa in 1949. 81 "As successful settlers in East Africa, the South Asian community composed the middle stratum that created a cushion between the ruling British and the subjugated Africans." 82 The divisions were discernible, "Africans generally accusing the Asians of non-integration" 83 although Africans were accused of adopting 'pseudo-European values.' Indians' retention of cultural heterogeneity and culture rarely allowed 'others' in, especially Africans. 84 As independence approached, it was unclear how African governments would address the 'Indian question' with over 360,000 Indians in the Diaspora. 85 Nehru envoy, Apa Pant "reminded the Asians of East Africa that they were 'visitors' in this African land" 86 despite participation in Legislative Councils (LegCo) as stakeholders. Some rose to prominence, e.g., Pio Gama Pinto, a close ally of Kenya's first president Jomo Kenyatta.

Responses to the Indian question varied across the continent. In Kenya, "in spite of his harsh treatment by the British, Kenyatta favoured reconciliation; whites who decided to stay on after independence were fairly treated provided they took Kenyan citizenship." 87 He inaugurated "democratic African socialism" 88 and retained the status quo (capitalism) although a "majority of the former settlers in this country […] when they learned that this country was to achieve independence they went away because they were not prepared to come under the leadership of 81 Anthony Lemon, "The political position of Indians in South Africa." In Colin Clarke, Ceri Peach and Steven Vertovec, Eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 our President, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta." 89 Piecemeal, there was friction, expulsion and deportation. In 1967, "Moi declared seven Indians and five Europeans to be prohibited immigrants, giving them twenty-four hours to leave Kenya" for "adopting a 'racist attitude,' 90 " insulting and referring to Kenya as a 'terrorist government,' aiding the Shifta, calling KANU youth as 'dogs,' being 'anti-African and not maintaining racial harmony.'

Idi Amin's decree in 1972, mandating that all Asians depart Uganda within 60 days, is more widely known. Without addressing its merits or validity, it alleged 'Africanization' actions to fix Europeans and Asians taking advantage of Africans during colonization. Appropriation of land from White farmers in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s and South Africa's land redistribution are pertinent, especially given the racial protests across the world in 2020. The count ranges from 23,000 citizens and 60,000 non-citizens, other stats show 13,000 citizens and 40,000-49,000 noncitizens; figures of 50,000 91 and a final tally of "40 per cent of the total 60,000." 92 Amin's justification appealed to a need to rebalance economic affluence. After rebuilding the railway and becoming dukawallahs, they started running cotton ginneries (100/155 in 1925) and investing in the coffee business. Europeans dominated government and the economy was split between Europeans and Asians, totaling to 2 percent of the population. 93 Amin's solution did not Africanize businesses; rather, it brought about significant upheavals and sowed doubts in the rule of law. 94 Despite OAU's begrudging objections to Amin's actions, Uganda hosted the 89 Republic of Kenya, Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) June 1-July 30, 1965 , Vol. V . (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965 , 1642. 90 Aiyar, Indians in Kenya, 2015, 273. 91 Mike Bristow, Bert N. Adams and Cecil Pereira, "Ugandan Asians in Britain, Canada, and India: Some characteristics and resources." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (1975): 155. 92 Vali Jamal, "Asians in Uganda, 1880 -1972 : Inequality and Expulsion." The Economic History Review, New Series, vol. 29, no. 4 (November, 1976 : 602. https://www.jstor. org/stable/2595346. 93 Jamal, "Asians in Uganda", 1976, 604. 94 Mahmood Mamdani, "The Uganda Asian Expulsion Twenty Years After." Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 28, no. 3/4 (January 16-23, 1993) : 94. https://www.jstor. org/stable/4399301. 12th Annual OAU Summit in 1975, 95 burnishing Amin's credentials, although elsewhere, Britain was an ardent advocate for the expulsion of Uganda from The Commonwealth, whose meetings which Amin avoided attending. 96 In 1983, Obote invited Ugandan Asians to return and help rebuild 97 ; in 1986, Yoweri Museveni repeated the call, with assurances that 1972 was history.

Predictably, reaction to Amin's actions accused Nyerere of plotting with Obote to stage an invasion of Uganda from Tanzania in 1972 with "British intervention in Uganda to protect the Asian community who were being expelled." 98 In response, Amin requested help from Nigeria, Guinea, Egypt to shore up Uganda and Libya, which actually sent troops (from the PLO). At the OAU, Nyerere voiced opposition to Uganda's actions but was condemned by some OAU members for attempting to interfere in Uganda's internal matters, contrary to the OAU Charter 99 ; the OAU "was responsible for blocking a vote at the United Nations on the 'moral issues raised by Amin's' expulsion of Uganda's Asian population in 1972." 100 India appointed Government boards to resettle more than 10,000 returnees but took no further actions. Majority of those expelled (29,000) were British passport holders who settled in Britain. 101 Britain's role in colonizing Uganda and creating the socioeconomic conditions robbed it of standing to raise much ruckus. Over time, relations between India and most of the other African countries stabilized, although internal dynamics and relations between Asians and Africans are akin to armed peace, including conflict borne of "the experience of Africans working for Asian employers as housemaids and those who work in Asian-owned businesses 95 Amii Omara-Otunnu, Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890 -1985 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987 [who] complain of underpayment and poor conditions of service." 102 The new India-African engagement efforts might yet produce positive outcomes for both societies.

The India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) convened for the first time in New Delhi, India, in 2008, one of a flurry of attempts at engagement by countries seeking to burnish their global influence; others included FOCAC and Korea-Africa Summit. 103 The first IAFS was different; India did not want to appear to be replicating TICAD, or FOCAC. "Its invitation list is symbolic: fourteen heads of state and the heads of all eight regional groups," 104 with anticipated cooperation in the areas of human resources, technology, industrialization, SMEs, minerals, health, ICT, security and judicial reforms. 105 IAFS goals are ambitious and illuminate potential South-South partnerships; another goal of IAFS has been the improvement of relations between India and African countries. India also committed "to providing 50,000 scholarships for Africans to study in the country." 106 India's investments in Africa are increasing; its "total commerce with Africa grew rapidly from $25 billion in 2007 to $70 billion in 2015" 107 and aims to provide a US$5.4 billion credit facility to Africa, provide preferential market access for 34 LDCs in Africa, while inking a deal with SACU. The numbers and rising trade conceal that South Africa spoke for US$7.5 billion of the total US$7.7 billion trade value. 108 Kenya and India inked an Indo-Kenyan Trade Agreement bestowing reciprocal MFN status in 1981; Indo-Africa trade exceeded US$1.2 billion in 2008. 109 In an age of globalization and COVID-19, insularity can progress constrain. Tiffs between African and Indian populations in Africa and India often dampen prospects for cooperation. India's ability to project power and repatriate 13,000 citizens from Libya during the Arab Spring is to be lauded, 110 although its support for a no-fly zone contradicted AU's position. Much common ground exists, IAFS can nurture it, and cooperation can be achieved in agriculture, trade, industry and investment, peace and security, good governance, civil society and ICT.

China's increased engagement and relations with Africa especially blossomed early in the twenty-first century, although they predate Zheng He's voyages with fleets of up to~28,000 sailors on 63 ships, early in the 1400s. Although the scale of these voyages dwarfed those of Europeans-Columbus, for instance, with his 3 ships and 270 men, China looked inward during the Ming and Qing empires. Its return to Africa resumed after World War II, engaging with Zambia, Tanzania and Angola. Building up its economy and manufacturing base, in the 1990s, it became the 'factory of the world'. China declined from its eighteenth century global dominance to grave humiliations, end of Qing Empire and the warlords' era, invasion by Japan between 1915 and 1945, post-World War II civil war, to supporting communist allies (Korea, Vietnam). Khrushchev's 1956 speech denigrating Stalin and denial of nuclear technology pointed to new paths, greater assertiveness and potential opportunities. Most importantly, coming out of a century of decadence and humiliations by the west through Opium Wars and unequal treaties, trade expansion might yet bring glory. China's relations with Africa then were 115 China's investments in infrastructure development projects-airports in Ethiopia and Kenya and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA)have had notable impact. 116 But even before the newest trajectory of capital-intensive projects, during the Cold War, China sympathized with Africa's colonization and attendant consequences, supported liberation-from Bandung to Bangkok, advocated at the UN, engaged with especially socialist-leaning African countries and even as the US sent Peace Corps Volunteers, the UK sent VSOs and the USSR sent 'technical experts' to Africa, China sent 'barefoot doctors' and agricultural technicians to Africa, supported freedom fighters through training and weapons, and availed grants and low-interest loans. 117 Granted, China has always denied any global ambitions, but in recreating institutions such as assisting newly independent countries with development assistance or technical expertise suggested that China was becoming assertive, and perhaps shedding its isolationist mantle.

Colonialism and subsequent independence produced a flurry of interesting scenarios. They offered especially independent African nations the chance to pursue independence in their policy-making, separate from the colonial powers. Not that the colonial powers were eager to let go; indeed, nations that picked fights with former colonizers and their machinations, such as Guinea, fell out or pursued similar policies benefitted from China's largesse and projects, beloved because they offered a new development approach that helped them and validated China as a rising power. They included Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 118 By 1990, China was soaring on decades of sustained economic growth and was challenging the US regionally. Its resurgence was almost inevitable: for 5000 years it ebbed and flowed, a center of technological and economic prosperity. Its new engagement was circumspect, allowing computer imports and banning music videos, investing in human capital and education in the west even as accusations of intellectual property appropriation persist.

China's major competitor in Africa is a reticent US, its approach mostly 'problematization' and support for powers and positions opposed by Africa-supporting NATO ally Portugal and its continued colonization, apartheid South Africa, stoking and supporting conflicts in Congo and the Horn of Africa. Its 1992 Somalia debacle marked abandonment of its new world order (human rights, democracy) and stood by in Rwanda. Here, China reverted to its purported helplessness and non-intervention, but pursued "resource intensive" investments, mining and oil extraction. 119 China's exploitation of long-dormant natural resources was critiqued, though a continent sitting on wealth but dying of hunger defied logic. China's attention shifted from its Cold War-focus on socialist-leaning states. In 2015, Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia and South Africa were the top five recipients of China's investments. 120 At US$70 billion, China led in Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) to Africa from 2014 to 2018 although it supported fewer projects than the US, UK or France. China's FDI led to 137,000 jobs, twice the second 118 Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa, 2013. 119 David Dollar, China's Engagement with Africa: From Natural Resources to Human Resources (DC: Brookings, 2016) . highest investor. 121 China's FDI addressed job-creation and infrastructure, whose neglect, posited against Africa's youth bulge can positively impact the continent. China's activities reflect priority areas, such as transport and energy (66 percent 124 During the 2014 FOCAC Summit, China proposed to "connect up Africa via regional roads and aviation, and high speed rail networks." 125 The proposals are followed by investment in necessary infrastructure-the Road and Bridge Initiative (RBI), the 'Growing Together Fund' with ADB, and a China-Africa Infrastructure Cooperation Plan after the 2018 FOCAC Summit. 126 Chinese largesse benefits AU's programs: US$1.8 million support to AU's AMIS peacekeeping mission, 127 AU Peace Fund, UN-peace activities in Africa, 128 and generally supporting other AU institutional priorities. 129 China is vocal about sovereignty, non-interference and pursues neutrality (except regarding Libya). "The Chinese stay out of African affairs and do not present themselves as saviors of desperate African souls." 130 It abstained in UNSC Resolution 1593 on Somalia/Darfur (deploying UN peacekeepers to Darfur), supported UNSC Resolution 1679 (strengthening the AU Mission in Sudan, AMIS)-according to China, "our political support for the AU." 131 When Libya's Arab Spring protests turned into war, China "broke its traditional reticence to vote for UN sanctions against the Gaddafi regime, although Beijing reverted to its policy of abstention by refraining from the vote for military action against Libya," 132 fearing reputational costs. 133 It kept tabs on AU and Arab League positions regarding UNSC Resolution 1970 on the No-Fly Zone and abstained from UNSC Resolution 1973 implementation resolution. 134 China was vocal on NATO violations, meeting rebel leaders "in an effort to safeguard Chinese investments in Libya." 135 China-Africa relations show endless potential-non-tariff access, opening domestic markets to African countries and debt forgiveness for African LDCs and HIPCs. 136 It is helping the AU set up a rapid response force and one expects these kinds of interactions to increase.

Even in Africa, apprehensions about China's intentions abound. From its TV and radio broadcasts in local languages to the proliferation of Confucius Institutes, China is accused of neo-colonial tendencies and stealing Africa's resources, mass-producing goods, flooding local markets, involvement in agricultural sector economic activities, competing against SMEs and replacing locals in markets. Yet in poverty-stricken countries such as South Sudan, China's activities are improving lives. Many Africanists question China's benevolence or whether it is propagating neo-colonialism. Its treatment of especially minorities, the Uyghurs, Tibetans and dissenters, dismal human rights record and 'ask-no-questions' stance, while funding oppressive African governments. Conversely, discussions better suited to other forums might show that China's investment in Africa is likely to undermine government non-responsiveness, producing a most unintended consequence-now that African citizens have an idea of the possibilities of government, political participation might increase and therewith, potentially lead to democratic norms. China readily concedes its interest in Africa, but notes that, unlike its western competitors, it has not colonized anyone. It is quick to highlight the hypocrisies of the western world: on the one hand, they advocate for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of other countries but on the other, they readily do so in places such as Libya and Somalia and elsewhere. China also casts itself as Africa's economic development partner, unlike the US and its western allies' actions during six decades of colonialism. China is also quick to point out that concern expressed by former colonial powers conveniently ignores slavery and colonialism, decidedly black eyes in their righteous crusades. True, China might prop dictators-but…but Saudi Arabia, South Vietnam, Philippines and the Congo. That 70 percent of Africans surveyed across different countries have a positive view of China and its role in building infrastructure and facilities to access hospitals, travel better and more efficiently is difficult to dispute. It is helping African governments meet citizens' needs; on this score, China is winning most of the arguments.

Global order changes, sometimes significantly. Nations rise and fall, coalitions are born and broken, and new challengers to the status quo manifest. For the current global realities, BRICs are seen as the next, perhaps major global compact. This is borne as much out of hope as it is the reality, and a search for alternative social, political and economic paths. BRICs have been heralded as a new way to think about global order, yet a careful examination points to both the promise but also challenges. One does not expect India to invest in assisting Kenya build housing for its estimated 100,000 to 800,00 residents of the Kibera slum, while neglecting the estimated 1 million in Dharavi's Mumbai slums, or Brazil rushing to do the same despite that 1.5 million live in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. But perhaps this reflects the notion that relations between developing and BRIC countries are about how one group helps the other, as opposed to confronting the dilemmas of common interests and common aversions in a way that brings about relative, rather than absolute gains. Yet to the extent that BRICs seek to have some influence in other parts of the world, none have shown a more impressive effort than China. It is likely that some, such as Russia, are confounded by Geography, but also the meager history of interactions between the USSR, its successor Russia and Africa. For both Brazil and India, their march to global power seems to have been interrupted, and COVID-19 is a clear example.

Many questions remain unanswered-some about the US and its role in the world, and others about China and what it is doing in Africawhether the overall involvement of China in Africa is a net positive, negative or has no impact. As it continues to swing from one possibility to the other, depending on its interests, the region, and time period, these questions are still to be answered, its role in the world and especially in Asia resolved. China is here, it is invested in Africa, it is investing in Africa and its actions have transformed Africa significantly. Its internal structure appears to be more than a little troubling as a model for governance, but there is a corresponding withdrawal of the US from global affairs-at least as of 2020-and while this might change, much remains unclear. The devastation that has been, and will continue to be caused by COVID-19 may take time to determine, and all of these further complicate efforts to discern the future. China appears to play the long-game; it has an 'African policy' that supports continental-level initiatives, bilateral and regional engagements in pursuit of its Africa policy.

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