This project examines the electoral and policy impacts of public financing on representation in American state legislatures. I argue that potential candidates are more likely to undertake a run for office with the help of public funding; particularly, I believe candidates from historically underrepresented groups who face additional barriers to running a campaign are the greatest beneficiaries. Without a reliance on big donors and only constituent votes to answer to, I anticipate an ideological shift among publicly funded legislatures as well. To analyze these relationships, I use legislature and candidate data spanning from 1976 to 2020, as well as interviews with legislators in Arizona, Connecticut, and Hawaii. Results show that, not only does public financing increase electoral competition, but candidates and officeholders from historically underrepresented groups are uplifted in particular, and publicly financed legislatures experience a leftward ideological shift. When taking into account the differences in quality of public financing offered across states, I find that stronger programs see an even greater increase in electoral competition. Together, these results imply that campaign finance presents a key piece in the representational puzzle at the state level.