This thesis will explore the institutional and intellectual origins of Chicago law and economics and examine how these factors played a crucial role in the rise of Chicago law and economics. Furthermore, the role of the principal benefactors, such as the Volker Fund, will be assessed. Chapter one explores the institutional and intellectual origins of Chicago economics and hence Chicago law economics, showing inextricable links, arguing that both were part of an international initiative to reformulate the classical liberal doctrine to create a neoliberal doctrine, and demonstrating that the Volker Fund played a crucial, hands-on role. Chapter two examines the reformulation of the classical liberal doctrine in the context of the Volker-funded Free Market Study Project (1946-1952) and the vital role of Aaron Director. It illustrates the fundamental changes of the liberal doctrine regarding monopoly and corporations' providing necessary assumptions for the further development of Chicago law and economics. Chapter three demonstrates the further reconstitution of the classical liberal doctrine in the field of antitrust law by focusing on the Volker-funded Antitrust Project (1953-1957); it shows how the neoliberal premises regarding monopoly and corporations from the Free Market Study influenced the Project's analysis of antitrust law. Chapter four focuses on the development of Chicago law and economics in the field of antitrust law in the 1960s and 1970s. It shows how Robert Bork, an Antitrust Project member, depended on and departed from the neoliberal developments of the Free Market Study and the Antitrust Project. Chapter 5 examines three levels of analysis that must be considered to explain the success of Chicago law and economics. For two levels, it critiques and extends two existing explanations of the success of Chicago law and economics. On the other level, this chapter explores the paradoxical, but mutually beneficial relationship between Chicago law and economics and Public Choice, illustrating that an explanation for the success of Chicago law and economics must grapple with this knotty intellectual relationship.