This dissertation brings into dialogue two traditions that have developed largely independently of each other, namely, pragmatism and critical realism, and brings insights from this dialogue to bear on questions of action and cultural change central to sociological theory. After the introduction, the first chapter, "Peircean Realism: A Primer," explicates the realism about causation presupposed in the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce's, concept of abduction as the mode of inference critical for scientific progress. The second chapter, "Continuities between Peircean Realism and Critical Realism: On Causation, Ontology, and Truth," argues that Peirce's realism about causation anticipated contemporary neo-Aristotelian approaches to causation, of which critical realism is a major representative, and highlights additional points of continuity between Peirce's thought and critical realism with respect to ontology and truth. The third chapter, "Revisiting the Peircean Foundations for Theorizing Action and Personal Cultural Change," thematizes the concept of potentiality, integral to Peirce's realism and critical realism alike, as central to Peirce's theories of action and inquiry, while reading the latter as together implying a theory of personal cultural change. The conclusion is preceded by a coda, in which I offer a preliminary response to the question of conceptualizing social mechanisms the dissertation raises for future work.