While several studies have questioned the integrity of public policies produced during periods of divided government, this analysis will examine the potentially positive effects of divided partisan control on distributive federal spending policies. It suggests that an increase in veto players through political parties will reduce the discretionary authority of the political branches, especially the Executive through the decrease in non-formulaic monies thereby facilitating more formulaic spending and hence greater genuine checks and balances between the branches. During divided government, there will also be more bi-partisan deliberation and negotiation regarding substantive policy making and hence less partisanship and particularistic tendencies that are typical of unified government. As a result, under divided government there will be more effective institutional veto players positioned against each other and thus more of a need for significant deliberation between these players to accommodate differing policy perspectives. Furthermore the allocation of the majority of federal grants is possibly more proportional during divided government due to the greater potential for such institutional veto points. Thus, when national government is controlled by multiple parties serving as effective veto players, consensual policymaking is more prevalent and congressional formulas generally favor broad, non-competitive patterns of distribution with minimal political influences by way of presidential objectives or committee/sub-committee assignments for example. Alternatively, under unified government, fewer veto players are positioned against each other-a condition which enhances the ability to create congressional formulas that support less formulaic distributive patterns. Instead such formulas favor much more targeted and competitive disbursements which are also more partisan and particularistic and less proportional. In sum, divided government with more unaligned institutional veto players tends to generate less targeted, less competitive, less non-formulaic disbursements of federal grants than unified government and such distributive patterns are inclined to be less partisan and particularistic and hence less conciliatory to the presidential agenda. Furthermore divided government necessitates greater negotiating and consensual policymaking as more interests need to be accommodated thus expanding the policymaking process rather than facilitating exclusive, particularistic politics.