id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
cn69m328q6j	Claudia Vanessa Maldonado Trujillo	The Political Economy of Conditional Cash Transfers in Mexico and Brazil 1997-2006	2012		.txt	text/plain	332	10	15	I develop an original theoretical model of choice for program implementation in two dimensions (rules vs. discretion and centralization vs. decentralization), and posit that the choice for the implementation model of direct transfers for the poor –as a choice between clientelism and rules-based implementation- results from the electoral calculus of the federal government, which is a function of the relative brokerage capacity (partisan territorial presence) of the governing party in the regions where the poor are overrepresented. In the case of Brazil, I find a similar trajectory towards program depoliticisation that warrants, however, a different explanation: the relative brokerage capacity of the federal government in deprived regions also provided for incentives for depoliticisation (with a decentralized implementation model), but not directly as a function PTs territorial presence, but the territorial implications of the governing coalition of Lulaå«s first administration.	cache/cn69m328q6j.txt	txt/cn69m328q6j.txt