id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
1j92g734z12	Paul Blaschko	Theoretical Deliberation as Intentional Belief Formation: An Essay on the Voluntarist Grounds of Epistemic Responsibility	1904		.txt	text/plain	229	7	38	Secondly, however, I argue that locating such control in the doxastic case is far from straightforward: we do not have direct voluntary control over our belief formation, and the kinds of indirect voluntary control we most obviously have is unsuited to the task of grounding epistemic responsibility. In giving an account of these processes, then, we explain the possibility of epistemic responsibility by accounting for its grounds, and greatly clarify a number of issues regarding the role of the will in cognition and its evaluation.	cache/1j92g734z12.txt	txt/1j92g734z12.txt