Ownership


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THE SOCIAL QUESTION—II

OWNERSHIP
By

Dom Virgil Michel, O.S.B., Ph.D.
St, John's Abbey, Collegeville, Minn .

1935

Wanderer Printing Co.

St. Paul, Minn.







All Rights Reserved

Imprimi potest: Hh Alcuin Deutsch, O.S.B., Abbot

Nihil obstat: Alexius Hoffmann, O.S.B., Cens. Dep.

Imprimatur .* 4* Joseph F. Busch, Bishop of St, Cloud

March 15, 1935



THE SOCIAL QUESTION

Series Two

OWNERSHIP
By

Dom Virgil Michel, O.S.B., Ph.D.
<Sf. John's Abbey , Collegeville, Mmn .

OUR SUNDAY VISITOR LIBRARY

HUNTINGTON, INDIANA

1935

Wanderer Printing Company—St. Paul, Minnesota



CONTENTS
Page

1 . General Notions ________ 5

2. Some Distinctions 9

3. Man's Right to the Goods of Earth ____ 13

4. Ownership and the Fundamental Prin-

ciple _ ____ 1

7

5. The Argument for Private Ownership 21

6. Private Ownership and the Fundamen-

tal Principle _ 25

7. Ownership and the Division of Goods 29

8. Theories of Ownership 33

9. The Christian Theory of Ownership 37

10.

Some Titles to Ownership 41



L General Notions

The seventh commandment tells us that we
must respect the right of ownership. Even a child
in its youngest years—as soon as it gets to have
some understanding of the difference between
“mine” and “thine”—acquires also some under-
standing of the right of ownership as applied to

different persons. We have grown up with this
understanding and have taken for granted the
justice of the institution of private ownership.

In fact, our civilization was built upon it as on
a firm foundation. But since it is our very civili-
zation that is being questioned and threatened
in these days of storm and stress, we cannot
feel surprised that one of the chief points of

threat and attack is the institution of private
ownership.

For the sake of clearness we shall use the
term property here for anything that is or can be

owned or possessed. By the right of ownership
we mean the right to use, use up, or dispose of
property. Ownership of a thing accordingly gives
the owner the right to dispose of the thing as
he sees fit, or to keep it as his own and so ex-
clude others from its use or possession.

In the mind of the average man of today this
means that if anyone can rightly call a thing
his own he can do with it whatever he pleases.
That is, the right of ownership in the minds

5



of many includes the right to misuse one's things
in many ways. After the World War American
tourists in France used French paper money,
which was very cheap in relation to the dollar
of the time, for lighting fires, cigars, etc. When
the French became angry at such use of their
money, the Americans only laughed, and noth-
ing was done to them for misusing the French
money that was theirs. Another example on a
much larger scale is the wilful destruction of
carloads of potatoes, vegetables, and the like,
for the mere sake of raising the price of remain-

ing carloads of eatables and deriving a higher
profit with less handling and work. Such things
are done by the owners because they believe they
may use their property in any way they wish,
especially if they are thereby serving their own
interests. Does not ownership of a thing give a
man the right to use the thing for his own in-
terest or pleasure as he sees fit?

Many persons today will go a good deal far-
ther than merely deny this question. All those

who believe fully in Socialism will say that in-
dividual men have no right to ownership of
capital, that is, of any property that is used in

the production of more goods. Socialists deny
the right of individual ownership over the means

of industrial production. They therefore advo-
cate that all such ownership should be abolished.

The real Communist goes much farther. He de-
nies all right to private ownership of anything,

if he is true to his ideals. Far from conceding

6



that individuals have any right to own property,
he condemns all private ownership as unjust
and immoral.

Some advocates of Socialism and Communism
claim the history of primitive man shows us that
originally there was no private ownership at all
and that therefore the institution of private own-
ership is but the result of the exploitation of the

weak by the strong. There is no doubt that
among all primitive peoples much more property
was owned in common by group or community
than in our civilization today. But it is also
true that there was always a sense of mine and
thine among men, and that some form of private
ownership has existed universally, even if it was
only the ownership of a house or bed, or a tool

or weapon.

In the civilizations of ancient history, includ-

ing those of Greece and Rome, the right of own-
ership included much more than today. It then
included absolute ownership of human beings
by their so-called masters. Ownership of a slave
only too often meant the right to do with him
what one pleased, even the right to kill him
off. It took many centuries of Christian thought
to do away entirely with the institution of slav-
ery. Today it is generally accepted that no man
has the right of ownership over any other man.

During the Middle Ages common ownership
of property was more prevalent than today,
while some persons in turn could not acquire a

7



strict legal right to private ownership of land
at all.

It is our own modern age, that is, the last four
centuries or thereabouts, that has seen the maxi-
mum development and realization of the insti-
tution of private ownership. Today no human
beings are in theory denied the right to own
property of any kind. And the development of
our civilization, at least up to the last decade or
so, has also seen the maximum growth of pri-
vate ownership of goods. The whole fabric and
structure of modern society is built up on the
institution of private ownership. This is so
much a fact that many persons think our entire
civilization and culture is threatened in all its
essentials the moment anyone attacks the insti-
tution of private ownership as it has developed

and as it functions in our time.
So intimately is our life today bound up with

the institution of private ownership that the new
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences could quote

a definition of society as “a joint-stock com-
pany established in the interest of property own-
ers/' The relation between society and private
ownership is really so close that no attempt to
discuss the social question thoroughly can suc-

ceed, unless one makes a thorough investiga-

tion of the institution of private ownership, its

true meaning, justification, limitation, etc.

The following articles, which form our sec-
ond series on the Social Question , will be de-
voted to such an investigation, insofar as this is

feasible within the limits of popular discussion.

8



2. Some Distinctions

We have seen that in many ancient civiliza-
tions the right of ownership was considered so
absolute as to include the right even over the

lives of human beings. Our present civilization
developed hand in hand with the theory of
laissez-faire . Strictly this theory stands for the

non-interference of government in the economic
activities of its citizens. Insofar as our civiliza-

tion is built up on the institution of private
property, the laissez-faire theory in fact meant
non-interference of government with activities
of its citizens in the accumulation of wealth or

of property. Consequently no limits were set or
acknowledged to the right of ownership; no
one ‘could legitimately interfere with a man who
went on indefinitely acquiring more and more
wealth.

In general our laissez-faire civilization can be

said to have sponsored the following rights in

regard to property: 1) The right of every man
without exception to be or become an owner of
property. 2) The right of any man to accumu-
late and own all he can acquire. 3) The right
to do with one's own as one pleases.

There are those who claim that our position
in regard to ownership has become quite un-
Christian. What Christianity did for the right
of ownership was first of all to extend it to all



human beings; but then also to limit that right
in terms of the general moral law, A true Chris-
tian definition of the right of ownership would
be as follows: “The right to use, use up, or
dispose of things in accordance with the moral

law/'

Is this definition of ownership opposed to the

threefold right of laissez-faire described above?

Many so-called capitalists will deny such oppo-
sition with indignation. Another class of per-
sons, which for centuries remained silent on the
matter, today proclaims loud and widely that

there is downright opposition between the lais-
sez-faire theory and true Christian principles.

No answer to this problem can be found off-
hand. No one should attempt to answer at all
without a thorough search into the basis and

purposes of ownership.

Such a study must at once make distinctions
between notions that are allied but not identical.
Failure to do so spells confusion. Since the jus-
tice of private ownership is attacked by some
today, one question to be investigated is that

of the morality of private ownership. Is it mor-
ally justifiable or not? But even if private own-
ership is accepted beyond all doubt as morally
justified, a further question will arise: Should
the institution of private ownership be developed

as much as possible or should some definite limits
be set to it? In regard to this question one can

ask in turn: Is this a question of what is morally
right or wrong, or merely a question of what
is expedient for mankind?

10



We have used the term private ownership a
number of times. It is now necessary to make
the proper distinction between different kinds of

ownership. We speak of individual ownership
when the right to own property is vested in a
single person, so that no other person has such
right over the object in question. When several
persons together own a thing, they are said to
hold the thing in common. We then speak of
common ownership, or collective ownership.
The only basis of distinction here is whether
the owner is one or is several.

Private ownership is the right to own and
use a thing according to one’s own private in-
terest. It is evident at once that individual own-
ership is also private, even when a person opens
up his land to public use without transferring
his title of ownership to the public. It is also
evident at once that common ownership may
be private, as when a group of persons acquire
hunting rights in common over a certain piece
of territory so that they may exclude all others
from hunting there.

We have public ownership whenever a thing
serves the interests of a community at large to
the exclusion of no one, and when the right of
ownership is vested in the people and adminis-
tered by their official representatives for the pur-
pose of such public service. Public ownership is
always governmental ownership, whether it be
municipal, state, or federal. Not all common or
collective ownership is therefore public. This is

11



self-evident but often left out of mind in con-
temporary discussions of the social question.

Again a distinction must be made between
the right to own and the right to use a thing.
The right to own ordinarily includes the right
to use. But the owner of a thing may give over
to another the right to use that thing by loaning
or renting it out. In that case the borrower or

renter often gets the strict right to the use of

such an object to the exclusion of all others

even though he does not acquire ownership.

From both the right to own and the right
to use a thing must be distinguished the right
to acquire ownership. The general right to own
implies the right to acquire ownership; yet where
moral or legal restrictions are set to the amount
a single person may own, such a person may
have the full right to own all he possesses, but
not the right to acquire more. Or when a young
son is morally obliged to support his parents,

he may have the right to acquire goods, but not
the moral right to keep them as his own to the
exclusion of his parents.

From both the general right to own and the
right to acquire ownership we must also distin-
guish the specific titles by which a person ac-
quires or owns a thing. All of these distinctions
will find their proper application in later dis-

cussions.

12



3. Man's Right to the Goods of Earth

In this article I shall discuss what seems to
me the most fundamental principle there is re-
garding the question of man's ownership of the

goods of this earth. By the goods of this earth
is here meant everything on this earth that man
can use for his purposes. This includes not only
the purely material things like water, air, soil,

minerals, and the like, but also the plants and
the animals. It includes all the so-called king-

doms, the animal, the vegetable, the mineral.

The fundamental principle in regard to
these things reads as follows: The goods of this
earth are there for the me and enjoyment of
man . This seems to be so general and trite a
statement that it is hardly worth making. But
it is fundamental, and in times of crisis and
dispute nothing fundamental is useless or not
worth emphasizing. Stated in other words the
principle says that the purpose of the goods

of this earth is to serve the needs and pleasure
of man. And since needs come before pleasure,
when pleasure is considered as something over
and above essential needs, our principle says pri-
marily that the purpose of the goods of earth
is to serve the needs of man.

This principle is so universally acknowledged
that one might consider any effort to analyze

13



it further as wasted energy. Yet on account of
the supreme importance of the principle, it will
be necessary to discuss it in greater detail.

What is the basis of this principle? There
are two main facts on which it rests. First of
all man needs the goods of earth for fulfilling
his obligations as man. Secondly, man of all
creatures on earth is alone capable, almost to an
unlimited extent, of making use of these goods
for his needs and pleasure.

Man needs the goods of this earth. We have
seen in previous articles that man has the moral
duty of developing his character here on earth.
He has consequently the right to all that he
needs for fulfilling this moral obligation, and
that means, first of all, the strict right to all

he needs for the proper support of his life. This
is but another way of saying that man has the
strict right both to such goods of this earth

as he needs for the support of his life as well

as to such goods over and above as are necessary
for him to live decently as a human being.

On the other hand, man alone of all creatures
on earth is fully capable of making use of the
goods of this earth. Man has been set high above
the other animals by his endowments as a ra-
tional being. Man alone is capable of calling
things his own and of looking upon them as
means or instruments to serve his needs and
purposes. Man alone is capable of directing his
actions according to purposes he holds conscious-

ly in mind, of foreseeing future needs, of deter-

14



mining the best ways to answer these needs, of
setting to work to provide for future needs and
contingencies—in other words, of exercising and
developing personality. This includes the su-
preme ability of improving upon the ways of
nature by inventions and of bringing all the
forces and materials of nature under his control
to an ever larger extent.

From these two considerations taken to-
gether therefore, the general principle regarding

the purpose of the goods of earth follows nat-

urally. Nor is there any need of further elabora-
tion of the argument; our interest lies rather

in a development of all that is implied in the

principle.

Today it might not be unnatural to ask the
following question: "You say the purpose of
material good is to subserve the needs of men.
Please tell me which men those are?" The only
answer to that is: "All men. The goods of earth
have the purpose of serving the needs of all

mankind without exception." The fundamental
principle, like the other basic principles of the

moral law, makes no distinction between per-
sons. It is binding for all men. Just as the moral
law obliges all men without exception to strive
for their moral perfection, so it also demands
that all men without exception have access to
the necessary means of fulfilling their moral
obligation in life, hence that all men have ade-
quate access to the amount of goods necessary
for supporting their life.

15



We can at once go a step farther. Insofar as
the moral law is obligatory on all men, all
men also have the strict moral right to the
necessaries of life. Hence we can state our funda-
mental principle regarding the purpose of the

goods of earth in the following words: All

men have a strict moral right to the goods of
this earth; that is, at least to as much of the
goods of this earth as they need for the support

of their lives and for living in such a way that
they can be faithful to the basic demands of the
moral law.

It is not necessary to point out again that the

phrase “all men” means strictly all men without
exception; it means every man insofar as he is a
man and just because he is a man. Such is the
full meaning of our fundamental principle in
regard to the goods of earth. It is indeed all-

important, but by itself it does not yet settle
any problems of the social question. On the
contrary it serves rather to open a whole array
of further questions.

16



4. Ownership and the Fundamental
Principle

In the last article we discussed the funda-
mental principle regarding the purposes of the

goods of this earth. Formulated in terms of

these goods it reads: The things on earth are
there to serve the use of mankind. Formulated
in terms of man it reads: All men have a moral
right to the goods on earth necessary for a de-
cent living. A denial of this principle would be
equivalent to a denial of all moral law and
human right and leads logically to an avowal
of the immoral principle that might is right.

But there is no real denial of this fundamental
principle by men. On the contrary it is accepted
or implied by all the different social theories
that have been practiced in the past or are being

advocated at present. The old systems of slavery
and serfdom accepted the principle in practice,
even if in the case of slavery there was a denial
of strict human rights for slaves. The theories
of Socialism and Communism not only accept
the principle, but either implicitly or explicitly

make it the basic argument for their entire
programs.

Since some of these theories deny the right
to private ownership, a question arises: What
is the relation of our fundamental principle to
the institution of ownership? Does the principle

17



demand that there be private ownership in the
strict sense of the term as distinguished from the
right to the use of goods, or is the principle

satisfied by a condition in which all men are
given the full right to use such goods as they

need while the strict right to own goods is
denied? The two rights, that of use and that
of ownership, often come to the same point,
since the use of the necessaries of life generally

means consuming them or using them up. Yet
the two rights are distinct, and there is a world
of difference between two social theories one of
which denies the right to private ownership ac-
knowledged by the other.

Therefore: Does the general principle imply
(a) the right to individual use of goods only;

of also (b) the right to individual ownership

of goods? When the question is put as directly
as this, there can be only one answer for the

Christian: The general principle is sufficiently
upheld by the right to personal use of whatever
goods one needs. As far as the principle itself
goes, it says nothing about the private or the

common ownership of all goods. The early
Christians held all their goods in common, and
to each one was given according to his needs
(Acts 2, 44-5). Again, throughout the history

of Christianity there have been communities of

men and of women who followed the practice
of the early Christians. Their members volun-
tarily gave up whatever rights to personal own-
ership were accorded them by social custom or
moral law; but they insisted all the more strong-

18



ly on the distribution of goods to each one
according to his needs, that is, always accord-

ing to the essential needs of life at the very least.

There is nothing in the nature of the goods
of earth that demands their being owned pri-
vately by man. And there is nothing in our
fundamental principle that says man must have
private ownership over goods. If there were,

then the early Christians and their monastic
followers would have opposed a fundamental
moral law; they should have to be considered

as immoral rather than as ideals of Christian
perfection.

From the above it is evident that a clear dis-
tinction must always be made between the gen-
eral principle and what we have called the in-
stitution of private ownership. The general prin-
ciple is a fundamental law of life and nature
that has always been true and will always hold.
The institution of private ownership is a con-
vention of human reason; that is, it has been
established by rational man for very definite
reasons.

The fact that private ownership is a conven-
tion of human reason explains why there have
been so many changes among men in the course
of history in the institution of private owner-
ship. All the great social changes that have

marked the succession of cultures and civiliza-
tions have also been changes in the institution

of private ownership. The history of Christian-
ity itself has witnessed several such major

19



changes: slavery, serfdom, laissez-faire

,

for ex-

ample. This fact alone should help us to see
and accept the view that there cannot be any-
thing sacrosanct about the way in which the
institution of private ownership has been con-

stituted in any particular part of the Christian
era.

However, to accept this view is still a far cry
from holding that no cogent reasons exist for
the institution of private ownership, or that

men may tamper with the latter at will or
whim. The very fact that there has always been
some kind of private ownership among men
from the most primitive times on, should be
an indication for caution in this matter. Surely

there must be some sound reasons why this in-
stitution has continued to exist, even though in
varying forms, throughout the history of man-
kind with its vastly different types of culture
and civilization. We shall next take up the gen-
eral arguments advanced in Christian times for

the institution of private property and then con-
tinue our discussion of ownership in the light

of the fundamental principle that we have been
elaborating.

20



5 /The Argument for Private Ownership

A sound argument for private ownership
cannot be based merely on the fact that men
need material goods for the support of their life.

We have seen that this need of man for the nec-
essaries of life can be amply supplied, as far as
the demands of logic go, by according to all men
the right to use a sufficient amount of goods.
Nor is this a bit of logical hairsplitting, since
communities actually exist and flourish on the
basis of this distinction.

Any argument for the institution of private
ownership among men must show that the mere
right to the use of a sufficiency of needed goods

is for the generality of mankind not adequate
for a proper social and individual life. Hence
the argument must show that man has the right
to call a thing his own to such an extent that
even the society of which he is a member must
respect and defend that right; and it must show
the inadequacy of a social life in which society
retains the right of ownership over all goods
even while the individuals are given the use of

what they need. Unless we keep this in mind
there will be confusion. As soon as we concede
to society a higher right of ownership over an
individual's necessary goods, we have already
given up in principle the institution of private
ownership as it is conceived today.

21



The general basis for the institution of pri-
vate ownership is the capacity and need of man
as a human person. The aptitudes and capacities
of man as a self-determining individual are best
exercised by means of the individual ownership
of goods. Unless man can determine for himself,
within the moral law, how he is to exercise his
abilities and can choose for himself how he is to
develop them, he has no freedom of personality
at all. And if he cannot call his own those
things that he has produced by his own labor
and that he needs for the support of his life, for
his development, and for providing against fu-
ture insecurity, he must needs lose all sense of
self-reliance and self-respect. In that case he be-
comes as dependent on others for the basic neces-
sities of life as is the domestic animal. In prac-

tice he has little more freedom than the horse
that is daily harnessed up for work and fed and
sheltered. For an animal the existence may be
ideal; for rational man it is a practical denial
of the minimum freedom of self-determination
that he needs to retain his self-respect.

Any further reasons for the existence of pri-
vate ownership are little more than elaborations
of the above ideas. Without some degree of pri-
vate ownership as a result of human labor, of
the exercise of human abilities, there would be
little stimulus for a man to work, little incentive
to put forth one's energies in accordance with

one's abilities. The majority of men will put
forth their best efforts at their work only if there
is some assurance that the fruits of their efforts

22



will be at their own free disposal and that others
are excluded from appropriating these fruits
for themselves without further ado.

Again, private ownership is necessary for the

proper preservation of social order together with

personal freedom. If the individual has not a

strict right to the fruits of his efforts in ac-

cordance with his abilities and the energy he

puts forth, there is no true freedom of human
life and there will be no social progress. In place
of human initiative there will be abject de-
pendence on social authority. Instead of plan-
ning in advance for themselves, individuals will

tend to do as little as possible.

The experience of the Soviet Union is a strik-
ing confirmation of this statement. In our own
day, after a generation of Russian youths had
been brought up exclusively on Communistic
ideals, the Soviet has found it necessary to adopt
the principle of giving out different rewards for

different kinds and amounts of labor, and es-
pecially of giving out larger rewards for what
according to their ideals is a higher type of

service. This is the basic principle of private
ownership, to which all human history points as
indispensable for social progress, for averting the

disorder that necessarily follows social stagna-

tion in our type of civilization.

A healthy social life depends on family sta-
bility. For a normal family life it is necessary
that the family be free to manage its internal
affairs in its own way. It should be free to pro-

23



vide for the growth and for the future of its
children, and for this it must have the exclusive
rights to the family dwelling, to a sufficiency

of goods and clothing, and to the means of
leading a cultural life suitable to the ideals of

its members. The family cannot provide these
unless it is secure in the possession of sufficient

property. If the children must look altogether
away from the family to the state for the at-
tainment of the necessaries of life and the means
of cultural growth and development, the family
bonds must needs break down quite completely
and family solidarity disappear.

The argument for private ownership devel-
oped in these paragraphs rests upon human
nature as history and experience show this na-
ture to be. Abstractly speaking, it is possible for

human nature to be so perfect that it needs no
incentive of personal return for putting forth

its highest efforts in any work. But history has
never known a nation of men to exist of such
an ideal type. Until such men do exist in great
majority, that is, until human nature changes
considerably from what it has always been,
some type of private property will be necessary
among men.

24



6. Private Ownership and the Funda-
mental Principle

FROM what has been said in the previous ar-
ticles it is evident that the institution of private

ownership is not as deeply rooted in the moral

law as is the fundamental principle of the com-

mon right of mankind to the use of the goods
of this earth. The principle itself is as absolute
as is the duty of man to live and to develop his
moral character. The institution of private own-
ership is only a means for the better realization
of this principle. Consequently not only private

ownership as such, but any particular system of
private ownership, must be judged by the degree
in which it helps to realize this principle in a
manner suitable to human nature.

It is therefore the principle itself that is basic

in the determination of any system of private
ownership, and not the idea of private owner-
ship that is basic and to be taken as t*he starting
point for any discussion. There is no debate pos-
sible about the general principle since there can
be no two sides to the question of the general
relation of the goods of earth to mankind. There
is much debate possible about any particular sys-
tem of private ownership, and the starting point
for such debate is always the general principle.

That a clash of some kind may easily arise
between private ownership and the fundamen-

25



tal principle is evident from the fact that the
private ownership of any goods by anyone
immediately excludes others from using those
goods except at the will of the owner. Unless it

does that, there is no true meaning to private
ownership. Again, if the right of private owner-

ship is both absolute and unlimited, so that
there is no end to the amount of goods which
an individual may own, we may readily have
a condition in which some persons cannot with
the best of will obtain the goods they need for

the support of their lives. In such a state of pri-

vate ownership, many persons are entirely de-
pendent on the mere good will of others for the
necessaries of life. Certainly, such an extreme

kind of private ownership in its practical results

would contradict our fundamental principle.

Since a system of private ownership is noth-
ing but a human way of determining the appli-
cation of the fundamental principle, there can
be no doubt that any system of private owner-
ship may change and sometimes should be made
to change in order to suit itself to the changing

conditions of social and individual life. There is
nothing absolute about any system of private
ownership; it must always be judged by the way
in which it realizes the fundamental principle
and the way in which it answers to the needs of
human personality, self-determination, etc.

Yet since private ownership as such is rooted
in human nature, in the imperfections of human
nature that have always been with us, there is

26



no moral justification for forcing men to give
up altogether their right to ownership, even

though persons may voluntarily give up this
right, and even though force may have to be used
to change a system of private ownership that has

come to work against the fundamental principle.

In any discussion of such issues it is very ne-

cessary to distinguish between the right of pri-

vate ownership as such and any particular sys-

tem of ownership that claims to be based on
this right; and again between the right of owner-

ship and the right to unlimited and absolute
ownership.

The argument for the justice and necessity of
private ownership does not say by any means
that all goods of the earth must be individually
or privately owned. It only says that all indi-
viduals have the strict right to call some things
their own—which is quite a different thing. In
fact, the argumentation on which the individual
right to ownership is based points out at the
same time that there must be some limitation to
the amount of goods legitimately owned, since
the earth does not contain enough goods for all
persons to be able to own an unlimited amount.

All the arguments for private ownership also
point to the fact that ownership should be dis-
tributed among as large a number of individuals
as possible, that there should, if possible, be no
individuals who do not own the minimum of
goods that is necessary for the support of their
lives.

27



If any system of private ownership arrives at
a point where property is concentrated in the
hands of a few, while a majority or even a large
number of persons own nothing, then that sys-
tem defeats the very principle on which it is
ultimately based and by which it must finally be
justified or condemned.

Finally, the failure of any particular system
of private ownership to realize the demands of
the fundamental principle by no means implies
the failure of the institution of private owner-
ship as such. The right to individual owner-
ship does not stand or fall with the way in
which any particular system of private owner-
ship happens to work out for good or for evil.

This is forgotten only too often today. Many
attacks on the particular system of private own-
ership that has been in vogue for the last cen-
turies are made as if they implied the condemna-
tion of all private ownership. And again many
persons try to answer the attacks made on our
particular system of private ownership by put-
ting forth general arguments that merely estab-
lish the right to some kind or degree of individ-
ual ownership. To repeat, the institution of pri-
vate ownership as such does not stand or fall
with any particular system of ownership in
vogue at any one time.

28



7. Ownership and the Division of Goods

The right of ownership has in many past
centuries practically meant the right to own an
unlimited amount of the goods of earth. Today
there is much discussion of practical ways of
limiting this ownership where vast wealth is

owned by individuals. Concrete proposals put
forth for such limitation include a higher in-

heritance tax and a higher income tax. I shall
not attempt to discuss the merits of these pro-

posals here. Before that can be done, it is neces-

sary to attain more clarity on general principles.
Discussions of income and inheritance taxes
usually arise today from the fact that govern-
ments need more income to balance their bud-
gets. Ordinarily they do not touch the question
of the justice or the injustice of unlimited own-
ership by individuals.

Neither will the present article concern itself

directly with this question; it aims merely to
furnish a basis for applying the principle that

any system of private ownership must be judged
or adjusted in terms of the general right of all

mankind to the goods of this earth. In doing
this I shall adhere closely to the Christian tradi-

tion that leads back to the great thinkers of the
later Middle Ages, St. Thomas in particular.

In treating of the accumulation of wealth by
individuals we may roughly divide the amount

29



of goods or property into three classes. First of
all there is the amount of goods that is strictly
necessary for the support of life. These goods
we may call the bare necessaries of life. Insofar
as a man has dependents whom he must sup-
port, wife and children, aged parents, other sick
relatives, and the like, the bare necessaries of life
must include a sufficiency of goods for the sup-
port also of these dependents.

It is evident from our fundamental principle
regarding the purpose of the goods of earth,

that every man has the strict moral right to own
this amount of goods for himself, or the strict
right to acquire them for himself. Nor does a
man forfeit this right through inability to find
work by which to support himself and his de-
pendents. Only when a man refuses to do his
part to supply his wants, when for instance
he refuses to look for work or to work when
the opportunity presents itself, does he forfeit

his right to the bare necessaries of life.

In all other cases the personal right of such

a person to the bare necessaries of life always

entitles him to as much goods as is necessary
to keep him and his dependents from absolute
destitution and starvation. That is why Chris-
tian tradition has ever held it lawful for a starv-

ing man to take for himself from wherever he
can what he needs to keep him from starving,
provided always that he has exhausted all ordi-

nary means for relieving his acute situation. The
need for this minimum degree of goods we shall
term “primary need/'

30



A second degree of property is the amount of
goods that a man needs for a decent or com-
fortable living; that is, for living like a human
person and not like a domestic animal. Every
man has the right to live in accordance with the
dignity of human personality. Insofar as a man
who is in possession only of the bare necessaries
of life is ever facing an uncertain future, he has

a right to more than these bare necessaries. He
cannot live in proper self-respect unless he can

feel reasonably secure against the essential phy-
sical wants of the next day or week. Only the
man who is free from the acuter kinds of eco-
nomic worry can live truly as a human person.
Only he is free to occupy his thoughts with
higher things in life than the problem of where
the next day's bread is to come from.

Every man has the right to a reasonable
amount of cultural life and development, to suf-
ficient leisure for occupying himself with social,
political, moral, religious questions and duties.
He has the right to at least as much of comfort
and leisure as is proportionate to the social serv-
ice he renders by his profession in life. The right
of all men to proportionate comfort and decent
living is second only to the right of all to the

bare necessaries of life. It must yield only when
it actually clashes or interferes with the latter
primary right. The need for a comfortable and
decent living we shall call “secondary need."

The third degree of property is any amount
that is over and beyond the other two degrees.

31



It has rightly been called luxury, since it is

really superfluous, since it is an amount over
and above what a man needs for the support
of his life and that of his dependents and for
their decent and comfortable living. Even
though the owner of such wealth does not need
it in any way for himself, it still falls under
the general principle that the goods of this earth

must subserve the needs of mankind. Hence the
Christian thinkers were very insistent on the
duty of using this wealth for the subvention of

human needs as long as men existed who with-
out their own fault were not in possession of
the first or the second degree of goods.

The mere mention of these three divisions or
degrees of earthly possessions shows how neces-
sary they are for any concrete application of
our fundamental principle. Yet it is also evident
at once that no exact mathematical rule can be
given by which to decide just when one's goods
fall into the first, or the second or third class.

It is only when the differences between the prop-
erties of persons are considerable that a fair

judgment can be passed. In our own day the
evident maldistribution of wealth is one of the

chief factors that gave rise to the social question.

32



8. Theories of Ownership

The theory of ownership that has been dom-
inant in our civilization for some time is strictly
individualistic. It is impossible to determine

just when this theory came to be generally ac-
cepted by men. In the Middle Ages Christianity
held fast to the social duty of wealth, that is,

to the view that all superfluous wealth had to be
used in accordance with the fundamental prin-

ciple of material goods, that the rich conse-

quently had the duty of using their superfluous
wealth for the needs of the poor.

In the later Middle Ages we see the effect of
a revival of Roman law in various phases of
life. This law upheld the absolute rights of in-
dividuals, at least of the privileged individuals

of Roman society, and again the absolute rights
of the State. Appeal was made to this law in
order to defend the absolute rights of nations

at a time when nations were becoming very
conscious of themselves and breaking away from
the common unity of the Holy Roman Empire.
In effect the absolute right of nationalities meant
the freedom of nations from Christian law and
ultimately from the laws of morality, at least
when interests of State demanded such freedom.

In the same way the absolute right of indi-
viduals came to mean absolute right of individ-
uals in the economic field, especially their free-

33



dom from State interference in the pursuit of
property. In practice it also meant the freedom
of economic activities from the moral law itself.
Hence the rise of the economic individualism of
the laisser faire era when property right came to
be considered as absolute, unlimited, unassailable

by any power of State or Church. The right to
individual ownership included not only the right

to exclusive use of all one could acquire and pos-
sess but also the right to destroy or to misuse at

will as long as one was not trampling on the
accepted legal rights of other individuals.

A reaction to such rugged individualism be-
came more emphatic in the middle of the past
century. Criticisms began to make themselves
heard to the effect that our current economic

system benefited only the favored few, that far

from satisfying the wants of men it rather con-
tinued to create ever new wants among the gen-
erality of men in order thereby to accumulate
ever more profit for the few. Thus arose the
collectivistic theory of ownership, which in its
extreme form gave rise to Communism and in
somewhat modified form to Socialism.

A collectivistic theory of ownership ordinar-
ily holds that at least all the means of produc-
tion, also all land, should be owned by society
as such, that is, by the State, and that individ-
uals have no right to ownership of these. Indi-
viduals have a right to own only insofar as
such right is granted them freely by the State.
The State is omnipotent and absolute in its

34



power; it creates or restricts at will the rights

of its members and is perfectly justified in doing
so. The might of the State, in fact, is the only
basis of human right.

In this theory ownership remains as absolute

and unlimited as in the individualistic theory.

There is only a change of owners from favored
individuals to the State. In each theory the

owner is free from all restrictions of moral law
as to the manner in which he exercises his right
of ownership.

Unfortunately there have been not a few
Christians in our age who have sponsored the
individualistic theory in the name of Christian-
ity. They speak of the sacred character of the
right of individual ownership, and from that
as a starting point they defend the individual-

istic theory as it has been commonly accepted
in the last centuries. These Christian defenders
forget that while sacredness here means inviol-
ability it does not mean absoluteness by any
means. Furthermore, part of the sacredness of

the right of ownership consists in the social
aspect and duty of all ownership and property
rights. As we have seen, all ownership must
ultimately justify itself by using property in
accordance with the purpose it has of subserving
the needs of mankind.

Again, some Christians, especially since the
World War, have gone so far in their reaction
against the individualistic theory as to play

into the hands of State collectivism. Indignant

35



at the injustices arising out of absolute individ-

ualism, they call upon the State not only to
regulate conditions but to attempt the work of
creating an entirely new order of things. Un-
fortunately their zeal causes them to speak in
terms of the same absolute State power that is
sponsored by the collectivist theory. Insofar as
such absolute power of State denies all basic in-
dividual rights, it is incompatible with Chris-
tian principles. Christianity has always defended

the fundamental rights of individuals as based

absolutely on the moral law and as inviolable
within the limits and the demands set by that
same law.

Neither the individualistic nor the collectivis-

tic theory in its true form can be called Chris-
tian; both are fundamentally anti-Christian.

Any Christian theory must accept at the same
time the fundamental individual value of human
personality and its social nature. Yet it would
not be right to consider the Christian theory of

ownership as a golden mean or a compromise
between the two extremes of absolute individ-
ualism and absolute collectivism. In the Chris-
tian theory there can be no absoluteness of own-
ership in the sense that property right is prior

and basic to all other human rights.

36



9. The Christian Theory of Ownership

A Christian theory of ownership must be a
harmonious part of the general scheme of hu-

man rights and values. It must therefore be
based on the principle that not all rights of
whatever kind are on an equal plane, but that
there is a scale of human rights as determined by
the moral law. Each right is inviolable in rela-
tion to other rights on its own level; but there
are different levels of rights, and those on a
lower level are subordinate to those on a higher
level and must at times yield to them.

Thus the highest natural right of man is the
right to existence. And the right to existence of
the poorest man is on the same level as that of
the richest. Both are equally inviolable, and nei-
ther can be made absolute at the expense of the
other.

Again the right to existence and to human
dignity is higher than the mere property right of

any man. Hence the right to ownership is sub-
ordinate to the right to existence and to human
personality.

The Christian conception of man is basically
that of an individual who is at the same time
a member of human society—a human person
who is both individual and social by nature. Far
from being mutually exclusive, these two as-
pects of man are integral and inclusive, both

37



together making up the whole human person.
Hence the two aspects must complement each
other; each aspect must limit the other to the
extent necessary for making a harmonious uni-
tary being.

Insofar as all goods must subserve the needs
of mankind, there is always also a social aspect
to the purpose of property as such. Consequent-
ly, as long as any goods are more than sufficient
to serve the primary and secondary needs of any
one man and there are other men whose primary
or secondary needs are not served, these goods

must be put to such service. This is a duty based
in the moral law. Hence there can be no abso-
lute right of ownership in the individualistic

sense of excluding superfluous goods from serv-
ing the needs of persons in want.

Yet Christianity has always upheld the light
of individual ownership; it must do so since its
whole doctrine rests on the personal responsibil-
ity of each human individual. Man is by nature
rational, self-directive, responsible and the fam-
ily is by nature a solidary, self-enclosed social
unit. Hence man and family have the natural
right to acquire the means of decent livelihood
by personal direction of effort and labor.

However, individual or common ownership
of goods is always given and held in trust. It
is entrusted to man by God, the Author of the
natural law, for the general purposes of God as
made manifest by the same natural moral law.
Its use must always be subject to the fundamen-

38



tal demands of the moral law. The Christian
right of ownership is therefore the right of man
over the goods of earth as based in, and at the

same time limited by, the individual and social

rights of man and mankind.
It may be good to formulate more definitely

some consequences that follow from the two
principles underlying the Christian concept of

the right of ownership, namely that the right
is grounded in the personal nature of man and
that man hold his property in trust.

Since the right of ownership is based in hu-

man personality, any theory that tries to abolish
all right of individual ownership is contrary to

the natural law. If abuses arise out of any sys-
tem of private ownership, the remedy is not to
try to abolish all such ownership but to correct

the system insofar as it has given rise to the

abuses.

While nature points to the right of individual
ownership, nature herself makes no division of
property. Such divisions are made by human
convention, which devises its systems of private
ownership in order to fulfil the purposes of na-
ture. Where these systems or divisions go against
the purposes of nature, they are wrong. And it
is the systems that must then be examined and
readjusted in accordance with the demands of
the moral law.

Secondly, property is always held in trust.
There is no absolute ownership; the latter is
always limited by the purposes of the moral

39



law. Yet this does not minimize the true right
that the owner of property has over against his
fellowmen. The property is truly his own to
administer in accordance with the moral law.

So much is based in the responsibility that is
essential to moral beings, for without that re-
sponsibility man ceases to be a moral person.
Hence the theft of one man's property by an-
other, or the extortion of undue returns for the
use of one's property, is always a breach of the

moral law. In the very right of individual own-
ership is included the principle of justice—to
each one his own—and the general principle of
the moral inviolability of rights. Just insofar
as individual ownership is justified by the moral
law, the violation of this right will ordinarily

also be a breach of that same moral law.

So far we have been discussing the right of
individual ownership. We shall now proceed
to another side of the general question of own-
ership. How is property lawfully acquired? In
other words, what is a legitimate title to owner-
ship of goods? The right to own implies the
right to acquire ownership, provided there are

lawful means of such acquisition. The next arti-
cle shall take up the question of the customary
titles to ownership.

40



10 . Some Titles to Ownership

If some adventurers should discover a new is-
land hitherto unoccupied by man, how would
they go about acquiring ownership of its land?

There is no problem here. They would simply
take possession of whatever part they want and
mark it off in some way. They would occupy
it. They would be entitled to own their property
by occupation.

Occupation is usually considered the primary

or basic title of ownership. It is the taking pos-

session by some person of property that has no
individual or common owner. Since the property
has so far belonged to no one, there is no right
violated by occupying it as one's own. Naturally
the occupation must be for the purpose of using
the property in accordance with the fundamental
principle of ownership of goods. Else it has no
moral justification.

If large tracts of land were still wholly un-
occupied, the question of occupation as a title of

ownership would even now be a vital one. One
could then well ask whether there is any limit
to the amount of land a single person may thus
rightfully occupy; whether, for instance, the

man who claimed land first as his own could
take as much as he wanted, even if this neces-
sarily excluded others from getting what land
they wanted or needed, or again, whether a

41



man could thus occupy much more land than
he could properly use for himself or his de-

pendents.

Undoubtedly the title of occupation was a
live issue at one time, when much of the surface
of the globe was not yet inhabited. Today there
is little opportunity to make use of the title of
occupation, except in regard to property that has

been definitely abandoned by its owners, or in
regard to the finding of lost articles whose right-
ful owner cannot be discovered.

Another title to ownership is that of inher-
itance. By this title property changes ownership,
usually at the death of the former owner, ac-

cording to his will as indicated by him in a legal
testament. The title of inheritance is based on
the right of ownership itself. One of the reasons
for the right of individual ownership is that

ownership enables one to provide properly for

the future and especially also for the future
of one's dependents. If the right of private own-
ership is to be allowed at all as demanded by
the moral law, it would seem that some kind
of inheritance must also be considered legitimate.

Yet the justness of the hereditary transfer of
property has been attacked in our day. This may
be so partly because of the customary view of

ownership which has considered property right
absolute and unlimited in regard both to actual

possession as well as to transfer by inheritance.
There are at least two considerations in the way
of accepting the right of inheritance as absolute

42



and unlimited. On the one hand we may ask
properly why any one person should be able to
inherit an amount of property that he has done
nothing at all to earn and that enables him to
live a life of luxury and idleness. And if the
practice of inheritance as it is exercised today

works against the proper distribution of goods,
or prevents those not favored by accidental cir-
cumstances from acquiring needed property,
some limitation of it would be not only morally
justified but demanded. The right of inheritance,
just like the right to property, is justified only

insofar as it helps to realize the fundamental

purpose of material goods.

Moreover, if there is any truth at all in the
view that the amount of property any individual
accumulates is the result not only of his own in-
dividual effort but also of social conditions out-

side himself, then society or mankind likewise
has some claim to an inheritance, at least where
the amount of property exceeds what can be
used for the satisfaction of both the primary
and the secondary needs of the owner or his heir.

A third title to ownership that we shall dis-
cuss here is that of accession. Ownership by ac-
cession occurs when some kind of addition ac-
crues to an object already owned. A simple ex-
ample is that of the fruit produced by a tree, or
the young that are born to animals. The fruits
of trees naturally belong to the owner of the
trees, as do the offspring of animals. Even the
eggs one's chickens lay on a neighbor's field be-

43



long not to the neighbor but to the owner of
the chickens.

The general principle of such accession was
in older days put in the form of an adage: Res
fructiRcat domino

,

a thing bears fruit unto its
owner. It is this principle that is appealed to for

the justification of interest on money. Money
is considered fertile and therefore productive of
more money and the increase is said naturally
to belong to the original owner of the money.
This is only mentioned in passing without tak-
ing sides for the present on the very live issue
of its moral justice.

Accession in general is divided into three

kinds: Natural, industrial, and mixed. The fer-
tility of trees and animals comes under natural
accession. In industrial accession the increased

value of a thing is due wholly to the human
labor expended on the thing. In mixed accession
there is a combination of human labor and the
fertility of nature. With the mention of indus-
trial and mixed accession another factor has en-
tered into our discussion, that of human labor.
This is one of the liveliest aspects of the social
question, and will be taken up for discussion in
our next series of articles.

44



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