I s N o t The American Way A Group D i s c u s s i o n by C a t h o l i c Educators A N A M E R I C A P R E S S P U B L I C A T I O N All Papal Pronouncements Published As They Appear Digest size but not a digest . . . The Catholic Mind does not condense. It reprints outstanding speeches, radio addresses, sermons and Pastoral Letters from world-wide sources and all new Encyclicals. The outstanding Catholic writers and thinkers, both clerical and lay, are represented in its pages every month. The Catholic Mind is a publication of contemporary and traditional significance and becomes a ready ref- erence file of the best Catholic thought both at home and abroad. Annual Subscription $2.00 THE CATHOLIC MIND 70 EAST 45TH STREET NEW YORK 17. N. Y. Imprimi Potest: J A M E S M. S W E E N E Y , S J . Provincial: New York Province Nihil Obstat: A R T H U B J. S C A N L A N , S.T.D. Censor Librorum Imprimatur: F R A N C I S J. S P E L L M A N D.D. Archbishop of New York P r i c e : 2 0 c Copyright, 1945, by The America Press DsgefcjfJfecf C O N S C R I P T I O N IS N O T T H E A M E R I C A N WAY Discussion and Conclusions By Eleven Members of the Faculty of John Carroll University Cleveland, Ohio if T H E A M E R I C A P R E S S 70 EAST 45th STREET N E W YORK 17, N . Y. Opinions expressed in this pamphlet are not to be taken as the official views of John Carroll University. They are merely the conclusions reached by the undersigned members of the Faculty Discussion Group. Mr. Frank D. Burke; B.S. in Ch.E., C h . E C h e m i s t r y Dr. Oscar L. Dustheimer; A.N., M.S., Ph.D.; Mathematics Dr. Rene Fabien; Ph.D.; Modern Languages Mr. Donald P. Gavin; A.M.; History Dr. Hugh Graham; A.M., Ph.D.; Education Rev. Joseph A. Kiefer, S.J.; A.M.; Classical Languages Mr. Arthur J. Noetzel; M.B.A.; Business Administration; Secretary Mr. Eugene G. Oberst; B.C.S., A.M.; Political Science Mr. John A. Seliskar; M.B.A.; Business Administration Dr. d'Alte A. Welch, A.M., Ph.D.; Biology Rev. Frederick E. Welfle, S.J.; A.M., Ph.D.; History; Chairman CONSCRIPTION I S N O T T H E A M E R I C A N W A Y The Conclusions of a University Faculty Discussion F O R E W O R D TWICE in one generation the United States has demonstrated that its war potential is greater than that of any other country — if given time to mobilize. Yet, there are some who contend that "America has never been ready to meet the threat of war. She has fought each of her wars with unnecessary waste of blood and treasure, and after each of them she has refused to prepare herself for the next one" (Briga- dier General John Palmer in "Notes on Universal Military Training"). Others, thinking of the role the United States hopes to play in the future world organization, have also drawn attention to what they call lack of preparedness. Permanent compulsory peacetime military train- ing is the solution suggested for this lack. Four words here demand concentrated attention: permanent, peacetime, compulsory and military. Let us set down these terms and place after each one the meaning attached to it in the pending bills and in the utterances of their chief supporters. 1. P e r m a n e n t . Compulsory military training in the minds of the legislators is to become an enduring feature of our national life. True, by legislative enactment the whole program could at some future time be erased from the statute books, but thus far no advocate of the measure looks forward to such an eventuality. Conscription is not proposed for five years, say, as was the Selective Service Act of 1940. Nor is it an emergency measure, since the Selective Service Act can take care of present contingencies. It is envisaged as a permanent policy in peacetime. 6 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT 2 . Peacetime. This compulsory military training is not intended to meet the needs either of the present war or of the turbulent times following the cessation of hostilities. It is to be put into effect in the peace period after both. The words of General Marshall are clear on this point: It is assumed that for some time after the defeat of the Axis Powers the United States will maintain such temporary mili- tary forces, in cooperation with its Allies, as may be necessary for a peaceful world order. The plans for a permanent peace establishment, referred to in this circular, relate to a later period when the future world order can be envisaged (Circu- lar letter from General Marshall on compulsory military serv- ice, August 25, 1944. Italics supplied). 3 . Compulsory. The obligation of spending a definite time in military training will rest on every male who has attained a specified age. The system will not be voluntary. Individual choice in the matter will be out of the question. 4 . Military. The War Department insists that "non-essentials" should not be included in the training. "Effective training for combat must constitute the basis for the training schedules," On their face value these words mean that language and area studies, technical and scien- tific pursuits, will be excluded. These four words taken singly and in their naked significance startle unthinking complacency. This country has never had a conscript army in peacetime, unless, perchance, the Selective Service Act of 1940 can. be said to have constituted such. But even that Act was passed when we were already covered by the lengthening shadow of war, and it was passed for five years only. With such preparation for a pending war there can be no quarrel. The statement still holds true that in adopting a program of permanent, compulsory, peacetime military training Americans will be breaking with long tradition. This is a very grave issue, so grave, in fact, that the Faculty Discussion Group at John Carroll University considered it their moral obligation to study the question thoroughly for their own enlightenment and for the guidance of the young men committed to their care. Accordingly, an outline discussion guide was prepared, many an article scanned and debated. The Group soon became aware that cur- THE AMERICAN WAY 7 rent discussion on compulsory military training had worked itself into a confused snarl. This was evident in the following three respects: First, the objective of the training. Many commentators speak or write about the educational, disciplinary, hygienic, moral, social and civic benefits of a year or more of army and navy life. The question naturally arises: Is the training to be purely military, or purely non-military, or a mixture of both? Secondly, the Group found much confusing of end and of means to the end. Supposedly, the purpose of the whole compulsory military program is adequate defense of our country. To such a laudable purpose no citizen worthy of the name can object. Our country must at all times have sufficient forces for her adequate defense. This is a self-evident postulate of elementary patriotism. But sufficient forces for adequate defense are one thing; the method of obtaining these forces is quite another. Much of the popular argument would run thus: Our country must be adequately defended; therefore, we must have compulsory peacetime military training — a striking ex- ample of non sequitur. This kind of argument takes for granted that conscription in peacetime is the only method by which sufficient forces can be raised. But is it the only method? It is even the best method? The method is precisly the point to be highlighted in this discussion if conscription is to be a perma- nent policy and not an emergency measure. Thirdly, although much confusion centers about the time when this program is to be put into operation, the statements of qualified spokesmen leave no doubt in the matter: con- scription is for the period when national life will have returned to the normal tempo. To clear away these confusions and to define sharply the real issues in compulsory military training, this Study Group finds it necessary to emphasize again and again that the bill is not being pro- posed as an emergency measure but as a peacetime policy. We discuss the issue solely on this ground. Arguments for and against the system as thus clearly stated were considered, and a body of conclusions drawn up. It will be seen, therefore, that quite beyond intention the 8 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT work fell into two parts: clarification of the issues and the conclusions arrived at. The fruits of this study are now offered to the public in the two sections in which it naturally evolved. The first, consisting of per- tinent questions and of the arguments pro and con, can serve as a discussion guide. The second will constitute a strong indictment of compulsory military training as a permanent peacetime policy. In all honesty, the Faculty Discussion Group could come to no other con- clusion on the question when formulated in terms as defined above. There is no close integration between the two parts. They are not in- terdependent Anyone desiring arguments against permanent peace- time conscription may go immediately to the second part. Therefore, to sum up, the Group's attitude on compulsory military training is this: First: such new legislation is not necessary for any present emergencies. Second: as a permanent policy for that "later period when future world order can be envisaged," it is futile, unnec- essary, undemocratic, economically prohibitive and inimical to any system of collective security. THE AMERICAN WAY 9 P A R T O N E Q U E S T I O N S A N D A R G U M E N T S 1. What i s meant by Compulsory Military Training? The fol- lowing can be taken as a working definition: Compulsory military training is the result of legislative enactment by which citizens of a definite age must spend a specific period of training in the armed services of the nation. 2 . H o w many citizens would b e affected by the p r o g r a m ? If the program is universal and compulsory, all men within certain age-limits will be affected. If the age of induction is eighteen, then approximately 1,100,000 white and 130,000 non-white males will be conscripted each year. Of this number experts estimate that from twenty to forty per cent will be exempted for various reasons. 3 . What is the issue? In order to determine the real issues in- volved in the proposals concerning compulsory military training, the following questions must be answered: a. Does the program concern the military needs of the present war? b. Does the program concern the military needs of the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities? c. Does the program concern the military needs of national peace and security after both the present war and the pacification period are over? 4 . Are the f u t u r e peace and security of this country neces- sarily b o u n d u p with Compulsory Military Service? In answering this question, a clear distinction must be made between the objective and the method of attaining it. The objective of compulsory military training is the adequate defense of our country. The method of ob- taining sufficient forces f o r this adequate defense would, in this case, be compulsory military training. Regarding method, two further questions should be answered: 1) Is compulsory military training the only method? 2) Is it the best method? 10 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT 5 . Is Compulsory Service to b e purely military in character, o r are physical, educational and moral training to be included? The leaders of the nation — both military and political — have not clearly answered this question. Thus, Secretary Stimson spoke on August 17, 1944: The present war will not end wars . . . the only alternative to a large standing army, which is contrary to democratic conditions, is universal military training. On August 18, 1944, President Roosevelt spoke to the following ef- fect: one year of military training should be given to youths between the ages of 17 and 22 to "teach them discipline and how to live in harmony with others." He did not approve of the programs proposed by Stimson and the American Legion. On November 17 the President declined to answer questions as to what extent the training should be military. On September 1, 1944, General Marshall gave voice to the follow- ing sentiments: he favors a small professional army supplemented by trained citizen reserves chosen by a selective system. A large standing army has "no place among institutions of a modern state." He pro- posed universal military training with a period of reserve service, the final decision as to the strength of the peacetime army to be deter- mined after the political issues of the war have been solved. 6 . Assuming that the program of compulsory training is pure- ly military, what arguments can be given in its favor? a. After this war we must maintain constant preparedness because: 1) it will be too late the next time to start training men after the act of aggression; 2) this country will be the first in the calculations of any future aggressor; 3) the next war will be real total war — there will be no non-combatants. b. The present war could have been prevented, and fu- ture wars averted, if the United States had a peacetime con- script army. Thus Congressman Costello: By calling for service every young man upon reaching the age of 18, we can maintain a force in training of more than a million men at all times. This force, when coupled with the men who will make a career of teaching these trainees and of providing the regular garrisons which will man our defense forces, we can present to the world as our "big stick" to preserve law and order . . . If we are to make sure that peace THE AMERICAN WAY 11 will continue, we are going to have the means with which to back up the terms. You can do that only if you have an army ready to go into the field. We must have universal con- scription for that purpose (Town Meeting of the Air, August 15, 1944). c. Universal military training is in keeping with our democratic ideals. Thus George Washington in 1783: It may be laid down as a primary proposition and the basis of our system that every citizen who enjoys the protection of free government owes not only a portion of his property but even of his personal services to the defense of it. And Secretary Stimson: Certainly all Americans should accept the principle that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes and should freely give his personal services to the defense of it. This means the system should be truly universal — all should be treated alike (August 15, 1944). d. Only a universal compulsory military program will secure sufficient manpower. Mr. Hanson Baldwin, summarizing the issues in the New York Times on January 20, 1944, wrote as follows: If the permanent peacetime strength of our army, navy and air forces is to be maintained at from 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 men, as present tentative plans indicate, most authorities believe that a force of such size could not be raised by vol- untary recruiting. Even if voluntary recruiting could provide a force of such size, it would be difficult — if not impossible — without selective service to build up and maintain a trained reserve force that could be quickly mobilized in time of emergency to augment the permanent peacetime forces. e. Military training will strengthen the United States' po- sition in a world peace organization. Mr. Henry L. Stimson had this to say on August 15, 1944: If the American people should adopt the principle of universal military training, it would be the strongest possible assurance to the rest of the world that, in the future, America will not only be willing but able and ready to take its place with the peace-loving nations in resisting lawless aggression and in assur- ing peaceful world order. 7 . Assuming that the program of c o m p u l s o r y training is pure- ly military in character, what arguments can b e advanced against i t ? 12 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT a. Compulsory military training is not the only method of assuring national security, nor is it the best. A system that ensures one country's safety by threaten- ing that of its neighbor is a system that breeds war and does not promote peace. History seems to prove that compulsory military training in peacetime is a major cause of war. In the present conflict, the aggression of Germany and Japan was a result of their militarism, not one of our unpreparedness. Nor would a trained citizen reserve in this country have essentially altered their plans. They would have merely taken this factor into their considerations. Paul Mallon in his syndicated articles has said: The proposed legislation to take 17-year-old youths into the army for a year would not provide an efficient, sufficient army . . . because most fighting lines today are highly skilled tech- niques which require constant practice by more mature per- sons . . . A year in the army at 17 can be little more than a physical-culture course and is not material to the raising or maintaining of a defensive army. Hanson Baldwin on January 20, 1944, in the New York Times stated: Nor can it [military training] be safely viewed as a peacetime measure; no nation that has had it has escaped war. There are, moreover, alternative methods of obtaining men for military service, such as: 1) the extension of the R.O.T.C., 2) offering a sound and attractive program of vol- untary recruitment, and 3) increasing the number of military and naval academies in the United States. b. Compulsory military training will hinder rather than aid a world peace organization. If we now adopt universal mil- itary training as a permanent policy, do we not demonstrate to the world that we have lost confidence in the proposals for a general international organization and that we wish to continue in a state of isolationism? c. Compulsory military training would undermine our democratic way of life. Military-training programs that are universal, compulsory and permanent tend to foster the growth of a military caste. Compulsion brings about regimentation and dictatorship. Such a system would delay and impede the indi- THE AMERICAN WAY 13 vidual's free choice in the determination of his course of life. d. Compulsory military training would injure our educa- tional system with consequent damage to the professions and the technical services. That such a program would interrupt the education of many youths is admitted by the War Department. It would over-emphasize those phases of science which apply to war- fare and would tend to minimize the significance of non-military research. It is possible, moreover, that compulsory military training would be the first step toward Federal control of edu- cation. e. Compulsory military training would not be to the best interests of labor. Such a program could be used to break strikes by conscripting the strikers and forcing them to work in plants where labor disputes are in progress. Such action did take place in France. /. Compulsory military training would strain our fiscal system. The cost would be enormous. It would require appro- priations not only for training, feeding, clothing and equip- ping the men, but also for war materials, war production and war research. 8 . Should legislation f o r compulsory military training f o r that "later period when future world order can b e envisaged" b e enacted n o w ? The arguments in favor of enacting legislation now are: a. In the let-down after victory, people will not give the problem of national security its proper, realistic perspective. They will not realize the necessity of preserving order by armed force. b. The adoption of compulsofy military service now will strengthen this country's role in any world organization for the preservation of peace. c. It will be a cushion of safety to fall back on, if any world peace organization fails. The arguments against any decision now are: a. A bill passed now would deprive those at present in the armed services of a voice in the matter. 14 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT b. The war will leave us with a vast reservoir of trained men sufficient for several years after the end of present hostilities. c. Such a program is not in accord with our peace aims on disarmament as stated by former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, on March 21, 1944, when he said: International cooperative action must include eventual ad- justment of national armaments in such a manner that the rule of law cannot be successfully challenged, that the burden of armaments be reduced to a minimum. Any decision regarding armaments and military manpower should wait until the United States has seen the operation of a world organization. d. We cannot decide now what our needs will be when the period of pacification is over and peace established. THE AMERICAN WAY 15 P A R T T W O C O N C L U S I O N S O F T H E F A C U L T Y D I S C U S S I O N G R O U P O N P E R M A N E N T , C O M P U L S O R Y , P E A C E T I M E M I L I T A R Y T R A I N I N G B Y W A Y O F EXPLANATION A WORD about the order and the method of treatment in this Part is in place. First, attention is again directed, even at the risk of repe- tition, to what debaters call "the state of the question." The conclu- sions of the Group are then presented, not as a compact body of close, consecutive reasoning but as answers to the more frequent ar- guments advanced in favor of compulsory military training. This method of "argument and answer" divides the conclusions clearly and makes for easy reading. The same method is used in dealing with the plus-values of a military program. After this, suggestions for obtaining a system of adequate defense by methods other than conscription are offered. The section closes with a declaration of the stand adopted by this Croup. T H E S T A T E O F T H E QUESTION The future position of the United States will undoubtedly call for some recasting of our former methods of national defense. Surely, no one can cavil with the purpose of such a change — the adequate defense of our country. That this homeland of ours must at all times be fully defended against aggressors is a primary postulate of patri- otism. The point must be emphasized, however: it is the method to be used for securing this defense system that needs discussion. Is conscrip- tion the best method? Is it practical? Is it historically tested and found good? Is it fraught with serious implications? Is it a democratic method? Is it financially sound? Is it die only method? Again, we must insist that this method of securing a defense system by compulsory military training is projected as a permanent policy in peacetime. Were the issue to be stated as a question for debate, it could be phrased as follows: 16 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT Should the United States adopt for normal peacetime a program of compulsory military training for all young men between, say, the ages of eighteen and twenty-two, the period of training to last one or more years, with reserve refresher training for a number of years thereafter? The mind of this Group on the question as thus stated will be clear from the answers to the following arguments. W E W E R E U N P R E P A R E D A r g u m e n t : "Failure to establish a sound system of compulsory military training after the last war left us in dire straits at the begin- ning of this war." R e p l y : That our preparedness did not match that of the totalitarian nations which started this war may be readily granted. To have been on a par with them in military preparedness would have meant the adoption of their methods of harnessing the entire nation's effort in the service of war. This would have meant that our complete con- version to a war economy would have had to begin at least in 1935. Prime Minister Chamberlain recognized this when, in-answer to criti- cism of security measures adopted by the British Government, he said in 1938: "I do not know whether you would like us to imitate Ger- many in the measures she has employed in regimenting her country for the production of armaments. We may have to. But we will not do it until we are convinced that nothing else will serve our purpose." The same thought was also expressed by William L. Stone, in an ar- ticle "Economic Consequences of Rearmament," Foreign Policy Re- ports for October 1, 1938: "For democracies the ultimate cost of un- limited armament competition may be the loss of their free economies and the undermining of democracy itself." But, you may say, we would not have had to go to that extreme. If we had had a sufficient number of trained men, we would have saved time and money, even lives, in our immediate preparation. This, too, may be granted, but it is no argument for compulsory service, for under the National Defense Act of 1920, had we chosen to follow its provisions, we would have had an armed force of approximately 750,000 instead of 150,000. The difference in these numbers was not due to lack of a compulsory training provision in the Act but to the THE AMERICAN WAY 17 refusal of Congress to carry out an established policy. To explain this point more fully let us examine briefly our defense program from 1920 to 1935 to discover: 1) What were the specific provisions for defense of this country? 2) Were they adequate? 3) Were they enforced? Then let us glance at our policy from 1935 to 1940 to see what changes, if any, took place. 1) What were the specific provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920? The Act of 1920 provided for a Regular Army of long-service professional troops organized into nine infantry and two cavalry divi- sions. The strength of the Regular Army was to be 280,000. The Nation- al Guard was to be kept up to approximately 450,000 and there was to be a body of organized reserves. Now the question arises, was our failure to maintain these quotas caused by lack of compulsory military train- ing? By no means. These numbers were deliberately kept down by the legislation and appropriation acts of Congress. Between 1922 and 1926 the Regular Army was limited to 125,000, and from 1926 to 1935 to 118,000 men. The National Guard was maintained at about 190,000. As a result of this policy, the nine regular and the eighteen National Guard infantry divisions were allowed to fall so far below their in- tended strength that they could not be assembled for training. Many of these units existed only on paper. We cannot blame the lack of a com- pulsory-training clause in the Act of 1920 for this state of affairs. Even had there been one, it would in all liklihood never have been enforced. The "pinch penny" tactics of Congress would have still won out. 2) Were the provisions of the Act adequate for defense? That the National Defense Act of 1920 was entirely adequate was admitted by General John Palmer in 1941 when he said: "Senator Wadsworth and his associates were greatly disappointed when they had to throw over universal military training in order to save their bill. But as it finally passed the Senate, it retained all the proposed machinery for peacetime organization of our traditional citizen army. Though the numbers trained under the voluntary system would be smaller than under the organized plan, there would be enough to give a respectable peace strength to all regiments of the National Guard and Organized Reserves." Congressman Wadsworth, himself, in 1940 testified to the merits of the Act when he said: "After surveying the successes of our 18 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT National Guard and Reserve training for the last twenty years, I am not now so convinced that universal training is a necessity." If these same men now say that compulsory military training is "imperative," what has made them change their minds? Could it be that Germany and Japan are not going to be demilitarized, after all? Or must we plan a system of armament for World War III against one of our Allies? Just why is this peacetime compulsory military training "imperative"? 3) What of the enforcement of the provisions of the Act of 1920? We have already noted that Congress began paring in 1922. By 1932 the reduction in the size of the army and the ever smaller ap- propriations induced General Douglas MacArthur to complain that "under the reduced appropriations of recent years the degree of pre- paredness that we have been able to attain does not approach in any particular that prescribed as necessary by Congress in 1920." The Act had failed in its purpose because of what MacArthur described as "limited and decreasing support of its provisions." Inadequate de- fense down to 1935, therefore, was caused not by the omission of com- pulsory training, but by the refusal to carry out the provisions of an Act which was deemed adequate by the military men themselves. The year 1935 saw the beginning of a new phase of the arma- ment race which led to the present war. By 1937 some 6,000,000 men were under arms in Europe as compared with about 3,000,000 in the early 1930's (League of Nations Armament Year Book, 1930-40). In spite of neutrality legislation "to keep this country out of war," we did not fail to attempt to keep pace with the European nations. Our naval expenditures went from $297 million in 1932-33 to $571 million in 1936-37, while the War Department figures rose from $243 million to $398 million in the same periods. In 1938 these amounts totaled $992 million, the highest figure in the "peacetime" history of the United States. But even this much was far below the increases of France and England. And we considered them unprepared in the light of what happened in 1940! Would anything short of totalitarian preparedness have sufficed? What value in all this preparedness, this "peacetime" security? The British White Paper of 1935 remarked: "Conditions in the international field have deteriorated. Taking 'risks for peace' has not removed the dangers of war." THE AMERICAN WAY 19 The fate of France is proof that a huge reserve of trained man- power is in itself no guarantee of preparedness. How often was it said prior to 1940 that France would not fall because she had the best trained army in Europe? Our lack of preparedness at the beginning of this war cannot be blamed upon our failure to adopt compulsory military service in 1920. Real preparation would have meant the adoption of totalitarian techniques and a complete mobilization of our national economy on a wartime basis. It would have implied more than compulsory service and it would have necessitated acknowledging the fact that such moves were deliberate preparation for war. (See "National Defense and Postwar Training" by Rev. Allan P. Farrell, S.J., America, issue of Jan. 20, 1945, from which most of the fore- going material was drawn.) W E A R E PAYING FOR I T N O W A r g u m e n t : "If the reservoir of trained manpower created during World War I had been kept filled through compulsory military train- ing, the present war probably could not have occurred." R e p l y : This is a perfectly gratuitous assumption lacking in any sup- porting evidence, historical or otherwise. As we have pointed out in the reply to the previous Argument, Congress had no desire to keep up even die minimum provisions of the Defense Act of 1920. They could just as easily have killed compulsory service by lack of appropriations. Moreover, if peacetime conscription is a good peace policy, then Europe should be the most peaceful spot on earth since she has had this policy longer than anybody else. What history does show is that "for more than a century conscription has been the real cause of war and of a multitude of evils affecting society." It has created the condi- tion known as "armed peace," which inevitably results in wars. A brief summary of the history of conscription will illustrate this: The young men shail fight; the married men shall forge weapons and transport supplies; the women will make tents and clothes and serve in hospitals; the children will make up the old linen into lint; the old men will have themselves carried into the public square to rouse the courage of the fighting men . . . The public buildings shall be turned into barracks, the public squares into munitions factories; the earthen floors of cellars shall be turned over to the troops: the interior shall be policed with shot-guns and cold steel. 20 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT All saddle horses shall be seized for the cavalry; all draft horses not employed in cultivation will draw the artillery and supply wagons. Thus reads the law marking the end of the standing-army system of former days. This law, passed by the French National Convention on August 23,1793, meant the beginning of the era of the "nation in arms." For the first time an entire nation was mobilizing every human being and every last resource in a national cause. "Total war" was to be the contribution of the French Revolution to modern times. The mass army raised by universal conscription was intended by the French to be a defense for the Republic against its enemies. Nap- oleon, however, had other plans. While he protested that his rule of France meant peace for Europe, he developed the army to a point where Coignet, one of his officers, could say: "The army was now so numerous and so beautiful that it would have liked to fight all Europe." That was precisely what happened. Drawing upon such masses of men, Napoleon became more and more aggressive and, when war broke out again, he boasted to Metternich: "You cannot beat me; I spend thirty thousand men a month." And what was the effect of this new military policy of France upon that of other countries? Prussia was the state which understood most clearly the implications of the mass army. Gneisenau in 1807 re- marked that "the [French] Revolution has mobilized the whole nation- al strength of the French people . . . the rest of the states . . . ought to open up and make use of the same resources." "Get us a national army," begged Blucher of those working out military reforms in Prus- sia from 1807 to 1813. "It is not as difficult as one thinks," he con- tinued, "the foot-rule must be abandoned; no one in the world must be exempt, and it must become a shame not to have served except in the case of infirmities." Not until 1818, however, was it possible for Prussia to make conscription the law of the land. The cadre system, with a reserve mobilized in time of war and a long-term professional army, was borrowed from Austria and combined with a militia system. By this method reserves, when their training was completed, passed into a kind of local militia under elected officers. Thus while other countries abandoned universal service after the Napoleonic Wars, Prussia laid the foundations of her future military efficiency upon the cornerstones of universal service and the organiza- tion of a fixed number of army corps regularly stationed in the terri- THE AMERICAN WAY 21 tories from which they drew their reserves. The entire system was coordinated by an efficient general staff. This development, begun by Scharnhorst and perfected by Moltke, paid dividends in the attack upon Austria in 1866. Austria, determined not to be caught again, passed a universal-service act in 1868. Defeated by Prussia in 1871, France followed Austria's lead in imitating the Prussian system by pass- ing a universal-service act. Again, the idea was not to be caught a sec- ond time. Russia acted in like manner in 1874, and Italy in 1875. The race was on! Commenting upon these developments, Bismarck in a letter to the Russian diplomat Prince Orlov in 1879, said: "The great Powers of our time are like travelers in a carriage. They watch each other and, when one of them puts his hand into his pocket, his neighbor gets ready his own revolver in order to be able to fire the first shot." As a result of Prussia's success, the army was no longer to be considered as a police force to maintain order within the state; it had become the final arbiter in international disputes. The foundations of the "armed peace" had been laid. So convinced have the nations of the world been that a defense system founded upon the principle of uni- versal military service would insure them against attack that, in spite of the experience of the first World War, thirty-six of forty-five have adopted this method of "security." Great Britain and the United States alone of the larger Powers have refused thus far to follow suit. What everyone has overlooked is that each country's defense had reached a point where it was an offense to its neighbors. "Security" was always to be determined by the ability to equal or surpass the number of effective troops of the potential enemy. After 1871 each international crisis resulted in greater absorption by the various countries in preparation for war. It was always done, however, in the name of peace. Such measures as increasing the term of service of the conscripts or changes in army organization in turn led to diplomatic crises, thus completing the vicious circle. The "War Scare" of 1875 is a good case in point. More and more stress was laid upon the training and equipment of troops. Increased attention was given to the drafting of campaign plans "just in case." Rapidity of mobilization became the prime factor. Military plans of all countries came under the influence of the theories of the Prussian General Karl von Clausewitz, who had seen service during the Napoleonic Wars. For him war was merely the continuation of state policy. The cost of February 10, 194,5 85 W h y Compulsory Military Training N o w ? By J. Hugh O'Donnell, C. S. C TN order to appreciate the full implications of the demand for ] compulsory military training one must realize at the outset that it is a peace- time, and not a wartime, proposal. It cannot be classified under the head of what we have come to cali "emergency legislation." I t has no con- nection with the Selective Service Act, nor has it any bearing on the policing of defeated Axis countries a f t e r the war'. Basically, it proposes a complete and permanent reversal of the tradi- tional American military policy and principle. Compulsory military training would bring about a fundamental change in the lives of millions of young Americans for generations to come. Two bills providing for compulsory peacetime military training have been introduced in con- gress and are now before the house committee on military affairs. One is the Gurney-Wadsworth bill (H. R. 1806) , and the other is the May bill (If. R. 3947). Both propose a full year of com- pulsory military training f o r all able-bodied male citizens residing in the United States. Both pro- vide that a f t e r the year of training the trainees shall be enrolled as reservists in the army or navy f o r a period of four or eight years, and t h a t they shall take such refresher courses as may from time to time be prescribed by law. The Gurney-Wadsworth bill puts the age of train- ing at "eighteen years, or within three years thereafter," while the May bill puts the age at "seventeen years, or immediately upon the suc- cessful completion of the full course,of an accred- ited high school or preparatory school, whichever first comes." The real issues involved here have been ob- scured f o r a number of reasons. Not the least^ important cause of confused thinking is t h a t we are being asked to consider, and to take action upon, this radical departure at a time when we are well into our fourth year of World War II, when we have been well indoctrinated with "war- time psychology," and therefore perhaps too much inclined to translate the problems of a very long tomorrow into terms of an instant and momentous today. At first, to the sincere patriot who is « l - . . , ¿fjf^S^ i - * . ^ . « ^ J T ^ S ÉL**» w s ^ - t ^ t » e ^ - i c i i - s , " b u ^ t ) -TT»- > 22 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT victory did not matter, for he said that "he who uses forces unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain superiority if his adversary uses less vigor in its application." What can happen when two opponents apply equal vigor the modern world can judge. Is it any wonder that mutual jealousy and suspicion engendered by such thinking should have culminated in the First World War? Nor is it surprising that the alliance system designed by Bismarck to main- tain peace after 1871 degenerated into the state of affairs graphically described by Viscount Morely when he said: "Grey has more than once congratulated Europe on the existence of two great confederacies, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, as healthily preserving the balance of power. Balance! What a beautiful euphemism for the picture of two giant groups armed to the teeth, each in mortal terror of the other, both of them passing year after year in an incurable fever of jealousy and suspicion." The prophetic utterance of Taine, the French scholar who wrote in 1891 that conscription "has propagated itself like a contagious dis- ease . . . ; it has mastered all continental Europe and reigns there . . . with what promises of massacre and bankruptcy for the twentieth century, with what exasperation of international ill will and distrust, with what loss of wholesome effort, . . . we know all too well," was indeed true. If history has any lessons for us, one of them certainly is that the adoption of universal service by the United States would be merely the signal for other countries to shape their policies accordingly. It would be no deterrent to others; rather, it would be a goal to aim at. B U T N E V E R AGAIN A r g u m e n t : According to the views of the War Department, "America will probably be the initial objective of the aggressors in any next war, and the first engagements of that war will quite probably be fought in our homeland." As Milt D. Campbell of the American Legion puts it: "Weapons are complex machines today. They require experts to use them. It takes time to train men to use them. When the firing starts it will be too late to start that training." Reply: Attention should be called first to the implications of this kind of reasoning. Either we are going to allow Germany and Japan to rearm, or we cannot trust our Allies. Our future aggressors could THE AMERICAN WAY 23 come from only these two groups. Secondly, the foundation of such reasoning is the gloomiest kind of assumption that there is no future for the world except a series of wars followed by temporary cessations of hostilities. It is, of course, the duty of the military leader to be a professional pessimist. He must prepare his defense against any nation or group of nations strong enough to challenge his country. If our potential aggressors are totalitarian nations, would mere compulsory military training be sufficient? Have we not discovered in this war that our whole economy must be geared to wartime needs to win against a totalitarian state? Do those who speak of the suddenness of the next war face this issue? Should we not also ask ourselves what effect a continued wartime economy will have on our democratic in- stitutions? If we assume for the moment, for the sake of argument, that the next war will come as suddenly as predicted, then some nation or nations must have been prepared to the limit in order to start it. No nation would start a war it did not expect to win. How was this preparation made? With the consent of, and perhaps even the aid of, the others? Should not this preparation be nipped in the bud? Does not the Security Council of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals envision this? Would the force necessary for such police action require compulsory military service? When Hitler invaded the Rhineland shortly after his rise to power, it was estimated that a force of about 50,000 could have stopped him. That he was not stopped was not due to Germany's mil- itary strength at the time but to the refusal of the other powers to act and use the military superiority which they then had. (Even Hitler's generals admitted this superiority.) The whole argument assumes that the nations would repeat their folly of allowing a potential aggressor to arm himself to the teeth while they sat idly by. If, on the contrary, such aggressors are to be found among our present Allies, then we could hardly consider any interim between wars as a period of peace. It would be merely a truce to give the belligerents time to catch their breath before they went at it again. If this were true, it would be fatal not to recognize the facts as such. In that case, we the people should not be asked if we want a system of peacetime military training. We should be asked the frank question: Do you choose to put the economy of this country on a wartime basis for a conflict that is certainly coming? 24 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT W E W I L L T A K E CARE O F T H A T A r g u m e n t : Peacetime military service is "imperative to our national safety." "The War Department indorses universal military training for the one and only reason that without such a program the continued security of our national life and institutions can no longer be assured." Reply: This assertion is frankly based upon the most extreme kind of fatalism. It implies not only a lack of confidence in the general in- ternational organization yet to be established, but also complete "dis- trust of other nations who might doubt whether the United States in reality is a peace-loving nation, and who might, in turn, increase their own armaments" (Y.M.C.A. Public Affairs Committee, May 24, 1944). Three general observations may be made on the "imperative" nature of compulsory military service. 1) "Since the adoption of a permanent universal military training program involves a fundamental departure from our traditional policy, the burden of proof is upon those who claim it to be necessary. Such proof has not been presented, nor has it been shown that the United States' security against war lies in its strength alone" (Y.M.C.A. Pub- lic Affairs Committee, May 24, 1944). 2) Many who hold to the above belief do so because by "peace- time" they mean the period immediately after the cessation of hos- tilities. But this is to change the issue, for this is not the period referred to by the principal advocates of compulsory training. As we have al- ready noted, General Marshall has made it clear that he does not mean the immediate postwar era. The preparedness of this period, as he himself implies, can be taken care of by maintaining whatever of our present strength may be necessary by extension of the Selective Service Act of 1940. The question we must discuss, therefore, is whether compulsory military training is necessary to "safeguard" the peace once it is established. 3) To say that compulsory military training is necessary is the equivalent of saying that we must begin immediate preparation for World War III. This implies answers to certain questions about our postwar foreign policy: a) Against whom are we preparing for war? No one fights a non-existent foe. THE AMERICAN WAY 25 b) We propose the complete disarmament of Germany and Japan. Are these countries to be allowed eventually to rearm and to be our future aggressors? c) Is it intended that we arm now for World War III against one of our Allies? d) If we are not arming against Germany, Japan or a present Ally, against whom are we arming? If the answer to either or both b and c is "yes," then the issue is not one of peacetime conscription. It is preparation for war and should be frankly recognized as such. As we have said before, if such be our policy, then we should remain on a complete wartime basis. No less would be sufficient for a totalitarian foe. To sum up, therefore: the argument that peacetime compulsory military service is "imperative" 1) confuses the period of "peace" with the period of "pacification," 2) requires answers not yet given to specific questions on our future foreign policy, and 3) places no faith whatsoever in an international organization. M A K E N O MISTAKE A B O U T I T Argument: Many make the mistake of comparing the type and purpose of the European system of conscription with the type and purpose of the system we intend to adopt. Ours will not have the admit- ted evils of the European system because we intend to use it for the pur- pose of maintaining peace. Reply: The basic assumption upon which this argument rests is that General Marshall's plan of a small professional army backed by a huge citizen reserve differs essentially from the European system which he condemns "as having no place among the institutions of a democratic state." Marshall's chief criticism of the European system is that although "it produces highly efficient armies . . . it is open to serious political objections. In a nation maintaining such a system, intelligent opinion as to military policy (and the international political policy associated therewith) is concentrated in a special class. Under such a system, the people themselves are competent to exert only a limited intelligent in- fluence on the issues of war and peace. Under such a system only the brawn of a people is prepared for war, there being no adequate pro- vision f o r developing the latent military leadership and genius of the 26 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT people as a whole" (August 25, 1944, "A Military Policy for America"). Some observations upon this statement are in order: 1) Marshall admits elsewhere in this letter that the effi- ciency of any military system "depends primarily upon ex- pert control." Will one year of military service make the average person a military "expert"? Would it not rather create a large number of "grand-stand managers"? How much influ- ence does the ordinary soldier exert upon military policy? 2) Marshall's admission of the efficiency of the Euro- pean system would imply that we could not be satisfied with a less efficient system. His major objection to the European system seems to be that the common man cannot enter the controlling professional caste. Broadening the base of this caste is not essentially changing the system. 3) To describe the European army as the large standing army is inaccurate. Prior to the war Germany had about 850,000 in the standing army and a 1,500,000 reserve 5 Japan, a standing army of about 300,000 and a 2,000,000 reserve; France in 1938 had about 750,000 under arms and a reserve of 5,000,000. Unofficial estimates have stated that under the peacetime compulsory training program we might have as many as 2,000,000 in the standing army. Where then is the difference between Marshall's plan and the European system ? 4) All that is new in Marshall's plan is that our reserve would be much greater than ever before and that the profes- sional caste could get recruits from the ranks. Essentially it is the European system whose efficiency he praises but whose lack of democracy he condemns. Furthermore, can we guarantee that our preparedness, European style, will not be a contributing factor to future war? Some say that we can avoid this by requiring that, after the completion of the year of training, the youth would not be subject to service in time of peace unless Congress declared an emergency or state of war. But European countries found long ago that this was an inefficient method. Reserves must be kept trained in up-to-date methods. We must not forget that THE AMERICAN WAY 27 "once initiated, conscription proved to be a monster whose appetite was never satisfied." Introduced into Europe with a term of one year, it was later extended to two and then to three years. Countries with falling birth rates were forced to extend the time of service in order to keep up with their potential enemies. Refresher courses were in- creased to keep the reserves trained in new methods. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal indicates the parallel for the United States when he says that "the weapons of the future may require more know-how and more training." (See the article, "Conscription: Neither Now nor Ever," by the Rev. Allan Farrell, S. J., in the November 11, 1944, issue of America. Also see the editorial, "A Citizen Army" in the January 13, 1945, number of America.) W E W I L L CARRY A BIG S T I C K A T T H E P E A C E - T A B L E A r g u m e n t : While the delegates of the United Nations are at the peace table "it would be a healthy thing if all the world knows that such training is going on in America." R e p l y : To think that fear of another nation's armed might is a guarantee of peace is to misread the history of the failures and successes of international cooperation. Where there has been good will among parties concerned, difficulties have been ironed out peace- fully. Where suspicion, fear or hate entered the picture, the military force of another nation has never acted as a deterrent to war. A weaker nation which could not match another nation's superior might sought alliances which would enable it to accomplish in union with others what it could not do alone. The issue is collective security in a world organization versus bal- ance of power. It is true that each nation in a world organization promises its share of armament. That this would mean a reorientation of the defense system is admitted. That it necessarily implies com- pulsory service is denied. Senator Claude Pepper saw this point very clearly when in November, 1944, he said: I would not like to see us inaugurate compulsory military training alter the war as a peace measure. Undoubtedly our goal after the war is to set up the kind of an international organization wlucti will eliminate the necessity of constantly preparing for war That does not mean that we are not going to keep an adequate force to 28 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT control our interests and do our part to restrain the "gangster" nations. But militarism breeds militarism, and I am quite sure that we can obtain, through volunteers, a force adequate to our needs . . . It is our job to do what has never been done before . . . Stop war •§§ even the preparation and training for war as we now think of it . . . Let's hope we do our job so well that when we win the war we can make ours a peaceful world without constantly preparing for war. As has been shown above, it was not the omission of compulsory service that weakened our defense, but the failure to adhere to the sound policy established in the Defense Act of 1920. What is important is a guarantee of prompt and certain action if aggression occurs. France failed to act against the German occupation of the Rhineland, and yet she had compulsory military service. Nor was any action taken against Japan in 1932, or Italy in 1935. Compulsory military training is of itself no guarantee "that this nation will play its part in the world picture." What is important is the creation of confidence among our Allies that we mean what we say when we support plans for a world organization and that we will carry out our obligations under the provisions. That this implies compulsory military service for the United States cannot be proved. Therefore, on the basis of our general peace aims and our specific pledges to seek disarmament, the proposal to introduce conscription into the United States is ill considered, ill timed, and unworthy of the moral leadership which this nation should provide at this time. To be specific: a) to a world wherein conscription stands for the theory of war as an instrument of national policy, such a course would do grave damage to international collaboration • b) by introducing an institution whose ultimate suppres- sion has been pledged, we lay ourselves open to the charge of bad faith; c) the existence of a huge reserve force of over ten mil- lion men is in itself a threat to world peace and a temptation to aggression (Post War World Committee, C.A.I.P. Decem- ber, 1944). W H Y N O T ? I T ' S T H E AMERICAN W A Y Argument: Compulsory military training is the democratic way of raising an army for national defense. THE AMERICAN WAY 29 R e p l y : What is contained in this argument is a false notion of equality which says that everybody in a democracy must do the same thing. No amount of ink spilled over the argument can efface the fact that the testimony of history connects conscription with the war- mrnded philosophies and power politics of the past century. The com- pulsory draft in peacetime is the theory of dictatorships, and the evils attendant on it were so well recognized by the end of World War I that Pope Benedict XV, through Cardinal Gasparri, suggested the supression, by common agreement, among civilized nations of com- pulsory service and the replacement by voluntary service" and "the imposition of a general boycott as a sanction against any nation that might attempt to re-establish obligatory service." Who can say how much good would have been accomplished had this suggestion been followed? Compulsory service is anything but democratic. It is based on and maintained by an exaggerated nationalism. To say that "poor boy, rich boy" would sweat and sympathize together and that it would bolster the democratic spirit of this country is completely to ignore the fact that compulsory military training has done anything but this in the countries where it has been established. There is no democracy in army life. Barriers between enlisted men and officers and within each of these groups encourage rather than discourage class distinctions. A N D I T W I L L COST LESS Argument: "If our fathers had accepted all of Washington's political system, instead of but half of it (that is, if they had also adopted a plan of compulsory military training in peacetime), our burden of taxation would be much lighter than it is today" (Brigadier General John M. Palmer, Saturday Evening Post, January 27, 1945.) Reply: This brings up the matter of financial outlay for a program of compulsory military training and its effect upon our American way of life. No official estimate as to what such a program would cost has yet appeared. Nor have any figures been given on the number to be trained each year or on the size of the standing army. However, in a report to President Roosevelt on July 30, 1943, General Frederick H. 30 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT Osborn said: "The estimated cost of maintaining an enlisted man on active duty for one year, exclusive of ordnance and overhead, is approximately $1,500." The United States Chamber of Commerce Committee on Negative Arguments estimated the cost of training 1,200,000 men each year to be no less than $1,800,000,000. "But," continued the Committee report: . . . an initial cost of nearly two billion dollars is not the whole story. Three months is all that is required for the basic training of a recruit. The balance of the year is to be spent in special training with planes, ordnance and tanks, and the $1,500 per trainee does not cover the cost of ordnance and overhead. Nor does the figure of $1,800,000,000 include the cost of calling trainees back to the colors for temporary training each year, and it is probable that universal military training will ultimately add to the budget of the United States not less than three and possibly four billion dollars per year. Our expenditure for education at all levels, both public and pri- vate, comes to about $3,200,000,000. We would certainly be following the European pattern in spending more in preparation for war than in the pursuits of peace. One of the purposes in fighting this war is to maintain the proper relation between the state and the individual. The question raised by a British journalist in the New Statesman and Nation, April 30, 1928, still has to be answered: "Can democracy arm for totalitarian war and survive in anything like its present form?" Would not such vast military expenditures create a bureaucracy that would find it necessary to resort to all sorts of expedients in order to justify its continued existence even if all threat of war had been re- moved? The point is put very clearly by William L. Stone in his article "Economic Consequences of Rearmament," Foreign Policy Reports, October 1, 1938, where he says: "The distinctive feature of the current rearmament race is the extent to which it has interfered with normal economic trends and has already begun to transform the structure of those states which have so far avoided the extreme forms of state control found under Fascism and Communism." Can we guar- antee the outcome of such a program in the United States? Might not the financial cost be small compared to the effect upon our democratic institutions? And the final prospect — if, after years of such peace- time expenditures, we had to fight a war more extensive and terrible than the present holocaust, where would be the saving? THE AMERICAN WAY 31 T H E " P L U S - V A L U E S " O F M I L I T A R Y T R A I N I N G ANYONE desiring an interesting experience might try bringing up the topic of compulsory military training casually at luncheons, clubs, or any informal gatherings. The reasons advanced in favor will certain- ly be varied and, perhaps, a little startling. Mom and Dad want it because they see what a man the Army has made of their boy. Surely, military training is the greatest body-builder in the world! GI Joe likes it because it teaches the "kids" discipline. Many a public official with his eye on vacant jobs thinks "it's a fine thing." Here and there an educator sees how the program can be turned to the aid of his school. In fact, one wonders if such relatively superficial reasoning does not carry more weight with the "common man" than the serious argu- ments already set out in this report. Because the Committee fears that such may be the case, it has chosen to devote some space also to an analysis of these "plus-values" of conscription. H O M E A N D SCHOOL H A V E BETRAYED YOUTH A r g u m e n t : "Both the home and the school have betrayed the boys and girls of the last two decades . . . A year of compulsory military training after high school will give us men who have stability of character" (New York Times Magazine, August 27, 1944). Reply: If it is true that the home and the school have betrayed the youth of this country, a sound procedure would be to seek the cause for this and apply the remedies to the home and the school. It does not follow at all that a year of compulsory military training is the answer. It is no secret that the Army and Navy are more interested in morale than morals. The moral standards of military life are notoriously lower than those of the home and the church. " I f , " as the Albany Evangelist says, American youth must shed the influence of the home, church and school just at the age when moral and religious ideals are taking firm root to live according to the looser codes of military life and training-camp temptations, how long will the moral fiber of our nation retain even its present dubious strength? Military discipline is a discipline for on-duty periods, but it is the self-discipline of the off-duty hours that makes for strong moral character. This latter is not the concern of the military forces, which are primarily interested in the prevention of disease rather than in 32 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT the development of self-restraint. Napoleon once said: "The worse the man, the better the soldier; if soldiers be not corrupt, they ought to be made so." T H E S T A T E , A P P A R E N T L Y , M U S T ASSUME T H E TASKS O F EDUCATION A r g u m e n t : Compulsory military training will provide needed edu- cation. R e p l y : George Soule, in the New Republic for December 4, 1944, in an article in which he advocated compulsory military training for military security, rated the educational arguments for compulsory military service "at zero or below." He said: Army life has changed since this writer experienced it, but 99 per cent of the GI Joes would probably agree with him that military discipline is good only for an army which has to fight, and for nothing else in the world. It trains men to accord the appearance of respect to all superiors in rank, and to render them instant and unquestioning obedience, re- gardless of personal feelings or judgment about the intrinsic merits of the superior or his commands. It insists on the performance of hun- dreds of trivial formalities in appearance, behavior and working routine. It contributes nothing whatever to the self-discipline which is of value in civil life . . . There is virtually no such thing as education, in the proper sense of the word, in army training. The military word for it — and the entirely accurate word — is "indoctrination." This means a combination of cramming and learning by rote. You learn terms, definitions, the names of infinite numbers of parts of guns and machinery; you are taught specific operations as you might be taught on an assembly line. The purpose is to drill information into you, not to develop resourcefulness or general competence. Such skill as may come to you results either from your previous experience or from the opportunity to use in action what you have memorized. In peacetime training this opportunity is limited indeed. Not many can subsequently make any use of what the army has taught. From the educational point of view, military training is almost a complete waste of time. A N D O F T H E H O M E ? A r g u m e n t : A year of military training will immeasureably advance the physical fitness of our youth. R e p l y : This may be granted, but it is no argument for military train- ing since such an objective can be achieved equally well, and probably better, by methods of physical education apart from any military THE AMERICAN WAY 33 training. Moreover, to begin physical training at the age of eighteen would contribute little toward improving the nation's health. Any real physical training must begin at an early age in the home and in the grade school and be continued through life. Such a program has no necessary relation to military training. In fact, there are miltary men who, from the point of view of physical fitness, Tegard military train- ing as not nearly as effective as a well-organized and well-regulated schedule of gymnastic and physical-education routines. Therefore, the by-products of health and physical fitness are insufficient argu- ments f o r peacetime compulsory military service. Lawrence K. Frank, author of Human Conservation, is the Chair- man of the Society for Research in Child Development. This society has been reviewing the reasons for rejections of selectees for the army and for discharges from the army. In a statement in the Parents' Magazine for November, 1944, Mr. Frank said: The largest single cause for rejections was defective teeth, then poor eyesight and a number of other handicaps not easily remedied or even preventable by present-day knowledge. Of the other defects, most were of long standing and should have been treated years before the men were of military age. The most serious group of rejectees were the neuro-psychiatric cases; youth suffering from various neurological dis- orders and personality disturbances, ranging from the so-called psycho- neuroses and emotional instability to the psychoses or mental diseases. As is generally recognized, most of these cases begin in early childhood and become progressively worse as the individual grows older . . . The most fruitful time for promoting health and sanity is in the years before military age. If we are genuinely concerned about the welfare of youth and earnestly desire to protect them, the proposed program of com- pulsory military training offers little possibility for any effective efforts m this direction. In fact, as the records show, it is extremely hazardous for many immature youths who can't "take it." When the armed forces build physically-fit specimens of manhood out of our 4F's, the health argument will be more impressive. TEACH T H E M T o B E GOOD CITIZENS A r g u m e n t : A year of military training will teach the youth of our nation "how to live in harmony with others" and will make them more conscious of their civic responsibilities. Reply: Military and social discipline are poles apart. Military life is anything but democratic, and the history of compulsory military training shows that it does not produce better citizens but rather more 34 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT rabid nationalists. General Marshall recognizes this when he says that the European system "has no place among the institutions of a modern democratic state." We have already noted that we cannot guarantee that the U. S. version of conscription would differ essentially from the European system which "produces highly efficient armies." efficient armies." Dr. Holmes of the Community Church in New York City, ex- pressing his views in the Parents' Magazine, said: said: I am opposed to compulsory military training, or conscription in peace- time, as a system hostile to that whole spirit of democracy which is vital to America . . . The training of the army is a training for serfdom and not for liberty. Its basic principle is the subjection of the individual to the state, of the free citizen to a dictatorial government. Military serv- ice, imposed by authority of law, is the first long step toward tyranny. Democracy has more than once accepted conscription for military train- ing, but no democracy has ever survived it. Compulsory training means militarism. Militarism, sooner or later, means totalitarianism. A N D PROVIDE JOBS FOR A L L A r g u m e n t : Compulsory military training for all youth would pro- vide a cushion for unemployment in the postwar period. R e p l y S This argument is hardly worth recognition as an argument for compulsory military service. The dictators tried to solve their unem- ployment problem by this method and ended by putting their entire country on a wartime economy and plunging the entire world into war. Half-measures are no solution to anything. No argument could be a greater admission of failure to solve our modern economic and social problems. There are many more arguments of this type that could be given, but all of them have this in common, namely, they seek objectives which, although they may be by-products of military training, have no necessary connection with it and may be achieved more effectively by other methods. For the most part these arguments are rationaliza- tions that are used to put over the idea of compulsory service with certain groups, or they are the admissions of failure on the part of educators and others who seek to shift their problems to the state. Military necessity is the only valid reason for compulsory service and this necessity has not been proved. THE AMERICAN WAY 35 A L T E R N A T I V E M E T H O D S O F P R O V I D I N G F O R A D E Q U A T E D E F E N S E THE history of the National Defense Act of 1920 shows clearly that at the end of the last war we had drawn up what military experts even now agree was an adequate measure of defense. The fact that our de- fense was inadequate at the outbreak of the present war was not due to any inherent defect of this bill (such as the omission of compulsory military training) but to the "pinch-penny" tactics of Congress in so paring down the appropriations in postwar years that the number of men provided for under the act could not be maintained. The lesson to be learned from our past experience is clear: we must have the determination to carry through established policies. Moreover, Senator Edwin C. Johnson calls attention to the fact that, whatever our policy, it must do more than provide basic train- ing for a large number of men, when he says: Basic training represents the least of our military problems; there is always time after a war starts to arrange for it if we have a good organization from which to begin . . . A gigantic reserve of foot soldiers, halt trained and half spoiled, will not provide national security It will u s ? u t n o i , P r o t ? c t us- We must not again neglect the science of war in its really scientific aspects. Research laboratories testing and constructing new lethal instruments of war and destruction are a "must" it we are to develop a national defense capable of coping with any con- t i n g e n c y . . . good national defense must envision far more than man- power. Future wars will be won by marching science and marching resources directed by skilled technicians and not by a huge armv of marching men. Therefore, this Study Group feels that the following basic meas- ures would provide adequate national security: 1) As to the needs of the period between the end of hostilities and the establishment of world order that would permit an international organization to work, the present Selective Service Act can be extended and amended as neces- sary. No new legislation is needed. This would recognize conscription as an emergency measure, not as a permanent policy. 2) In the period when "world order can be envisaged," as an alternative to peacetime compulsory military service we should expand our armed forces on the basis of voluntary 36 CONSCRIPTION IS NOT recruitment in such a way as to make the services attractive enough from the educational and professional point of view to attract sufficient volunteers. This expansion should not be limited to gathering men alone for a time interval; rather it should proceed along three lines and should be purely pro- fessional in character: a) research and development of all the modern tools of war; b) staff training on the higher levels; c) professional military training and education. If these services are made attractive enough by pay, allowances and educational advantages, there will be no lack of recruits. At the same time the number of strictly military and naval colleges could be in- creased and the R.O.T.C. could be expanded. This is the demo- cratic method. The inadequacy of a volunteer system of reserve recruiting should be obvious before the United States consents to bring in the European institution of conscription with all its concomitant evils. To oppose the volunteer system on the ground that "the notion that anyone of military age can decide for himself whether he shall go to the defense of his nation and the preservation of the peace of the world or remain at his desk or bench or on his farm belongs to a generation that has passed" is to adopt the philosophy of the dictator. In no sense, however, is our opposition to peacetime compulsory service and the advocacy of the volunteer method to be interpreted to mean that the United States should not have a strong armed force either for self-defense or for participation in a world organization for world peace. Our main concern is with the method by which such a force will be provided. To resort to a method that has been proved a failure would be the height of folly. T o T H I S W E STAND COMMITTED Finally, the following statement of the Educational Policies Com- mission of the National Educational Association reflects the true mind of this Group: In our judgment it is unwise to commit the nation at this time to a year of universal military service. No one can foresee the international situation which will exist when Germany and Japan are defeated. Neither the international political nor the THE AMERICAN WAY 37 international military situation can be calculated while the war is still in progress. We, along with the great body of Ameri- cans, will support a year of compulsory military service when we are convinced that the safety of the nation requires it. We are unreservedly for adequate preparedness, but we see great dangers in any unnecessary break with our tested democratic tradition respecting compulsory military service in times of peace. List of Contents 1. T h e Historical Background 2. T h e M e n 3. T h e T r a i n i n g of t h e Men. T h e Spiritual Exercises 4. H e r o i c A g e 5. T h e New O r d e r a n d I t s Constitutions 6. E a r l y P r o g r e s s 7. T r i u m p h s and T r i a l s 8. Rolling Back t h e P r o t e s t a n t T i d e 9. Education a n d L e a r n i n g 10. T h e Foreign Mission Field 11. Steady S t r e a m s a n d Cross C u r r e n t s 12. Gathering S t o r m s 13. Catastrophe 14. I n t e r i m a n d Restoration 15. European Revival 16. Overseas Expansion 17. M o d e r n Schools and M o d e r n Scholars The Jesuits In History by M A R T I N P . H A R N E Y , S . J . An American Jesuit tells the story of his order in the most fascinating period of history — from the Renaissance to our own times . . . The only up-to-date, complete, one-volume History of the Jesuits in English . . . "The fast-moving narrative so holds the attention that one is unconscious of its vast scholarship." . . . 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THE PRESENT POSITION OF CATHOLICS Author's dedication. Author's preface. Foreword by James J. Daly, S.J. Editor's Apologia. Text: 310 pp. Editor's notes: 42pp. The three books in a set $5.00 The Idea of a University $2.00 Apologia and Present Position are for sale only in the set AMERICA PRESS PUBLICATIONS THE SCOTT PAMPHLETS Fundamental doctrines explained and proven. Objections and difficulties answered. HAVE YOU A GOD? (Proofs of His Existence) PROVE THERE'S A SOUL (The Doctrine of Immortality) MATTHEW, MARK, LUKE, JOHN (The New Testament is Divinely Inspired) THEY SAID HE BLASPHEMED (The Divinity of Christ) HUNDREDS OF CHURCHES (Only One True Church Founded by Christ) SCIENCE HELPS THE CHURCH (Difficulties: From Galileo to Determinism) NO POPE CAN BE WRONG (The Church Teaches Infallibly) THIS IS MY BODY (The Eucharist: Sacrifice and Sacrament) GOD FORGIVES SIN (Penance: The Sacrament; Confession) DIVORCE IS A DISEASE (Matrimony: Sacrament, Laws, Graces) Single copy by mail: 12c Set of Ten: $1.00 Each title in bulk order: $7.00 per hundred THE AMERICA PRESS 70 East 45th Street New Yorh 17, N. Y. Why Intelligent Catholic Readers Need AMERICA A Catholic Review of the Week Because each issue contains • . . 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