The Panama Canal and social justice


Variant D.Wildi,iditor



Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2016

https://archive.org/details/panamacanalsociaOOwild



TIIF

PANAMA
CANAL
AND

SOCIAL
JUSTICE

Margoret D. Wilde, editor.

October 1976
Office of International Justice and Peace

United States Catholic Conference
1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005



DescMffled



CONTENTS
page

INTRODUCTION 4

CHAPTERS
1. The Current State of the Question 5

The Rev. ]. Bryan Hehir

2. The Panama Canal: A Test Case 8
The Most Rev. Marcos G. McGrath, C.S.C.

3. Yankee Doodle Over There (a one-act play) 12
James R. Jennings

4. The U.S. National Interest: Highlights of the Debate 18
James R. Jennings

5. A Challenge to North American Churches (study guide) 20
Margaret D. Wilde

APPENDICES

A. A Summary of Past and Present Treaties 24

B. Interim Agreements 26

C. Panama-U.S. Relations 28

Administrative Board

U.S. Catholic Conference 28

D. A Declaration 29

Panamanian Bishops Conference 29

E. A Statement 30

Delegation of the National Council of Churches 30

BIBLIOGRAPHY/RESOURCES 32



INTRODUCTION

Do Christians have a valid contribution to make in
the realm of national and international policymaking,
not as political and economic experts but as Chris-
tians?

This book is addressed to those who believe we do.
The burden of proof is on us, in a world of increasing
technical specialization and deference to expertise. In
order to merit respect for an informed, prophetic
Christian viewpoint on political and social issues, we
must show ourselves capable of considering the facts
—some of which are unclear and the subject of per-
sistent debate among experts— in the light of Scripture
and the Christian faith, and suggesting practical, real-
istic courses of action.

We propose to take the Panama Canal issue as a
test case: to study the facts set forth on both sides,
and to see whether it is possible to arrive at a position
that does justice to the legitimate interests of all con-

cerned, according to our Christian interpretation of,

justice.

This booklet is designed as a resource for group dis-
cussion. "A Challenge to U.S. Christians,” chapter 5,
suggests guidelines for that process. It is based on the
belief that the church, as community of faith, by
bringing a diversity of interpretations and experience
to the issue at hand, can reflect the light of Scripture

and Christian ethics more faithfully than can any
individual Christian.

It is hoped that most readers will come to this book-
let as members of a community of faith, that is, as a
group that shares basic principles of Christian ethics,

and that within that community each one's perceptions
of the situation described here will be enriched and dis-

tilled into a Christian perspective on the issue.
The Panama Canal and Social Justice is published

by the U.S. Catholic Conference, which has adopted

a position on the Panama Canal issue: The position
supports neither the extreme of Panamanian national-

ism nor that of full U.S. sovereignty over the Canal

Zone, but recommends a new treaty involving major
concessions of control to Panama. That position is

reproduced in Appendix C. Other appendices include
statements by the Panamanian bishops and the Na-
tional Council of Churches of Christ which represent

many U.S. Protestant churches. It is significant that all
three groups, despite differences in nationality and

creed, have independently reached essentially the same

position after long study and discussion of the issue.

This booklet has been compiled from that view-

point; it does not claim to take a wholly impartial

view. We have, however—J. Bryan Hehir and James R.
Jennings who contributed interpretive materials, and I
as editor— tried to reflect both sides fully and faithfully.

Margaret D. Wilde

4



CHAPTER

1
THE CURRENT STATE

OF THE
QUESTION

The Rev. J. Rryon Hehir

The basic problem: to renegotiate the current treaty
over the Panama Canal or to let it stand as it is. The
author, ]. Bryan Hehir, is Associate Secretary of the

Office of International Justice and Peace of the U.5.
Catholic Conference. He outlines the moral reasons
why Catholic leaders in this country have come out in
favor of renegotiation and foresees tragic conse-

quences if it is not done.

Background of the Issue

The renegotiation of the 1903 Treaty between the
United States and Panama has become an issue of
domestic politics in the United States, with substantial

opposition expressed in Congress and in some sectors
of public opinion.

The Hay/Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, revised in
1936 and 1955, granted the United States the right to
build, operate and defend a canal across the Isthmus
of Panama and to exercise "in perpetuity," the power
and authority "which the United States would possess
and exercise if it were sovereign" in a strip of land ten
miles wide along the Canal route. (See Appendix A.)
The purpose of a new treaty would be to abrogate

the "in perpetuity" clause and to establish a new basis
of cooperation between the United States and Panama,
in which the Panamanian exercise of sovereignty in the
Canal Zone would be clear in theory and practice. The
treaty would cover a defined period, at the end of
which Panama would take over the maintenance and
operation of the Canal.

The United States indicated a willingness, in princi-
ple, to renegotiate the treaty through President Lyndon
B. Johnson in 1964; in 1967, treaty drafts were drawn
up but never acted on by either country. New negotia-
tions were begun in June 1970, and produced a joint
statement of principles signed by U.S. Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger and Panama's Foreign Min-
ister Juan Antonio Tack on February 7, 1974. (See

Appendix B.) Briefly stated, the principles call for the
following elements in a new treaty:

• Elimination of the "in perpetuity" provision;

• Termination of U.S. exercise of sovereignty and

jurisdiction in the Canal Zone, with the United

States granted rights, facilities and territory as
needed to operate and defend the Canal during the

life of the treaty;

• Increasing Panamanian participation in opera-
tion and defense of the Canal with eventual re-

version of operation and control of the Canal to

Panama at the end of the treaty;

• A just and equitable share of the economic bene-
fits from the Canal to be accorded to Panama.

As described by U.S. negotiator. Ambassador Ells-
worth Bunker, the negotiation process envisioned a

three-step movement: 1) the determination of princi-
ples, which was achieved in the Kissinger-Tack agree-
ment; 2) discussion of conceptual issues grouped un-

der the principles; and 3) determination of treaty

language.^ The discussion of conceptual issues has
proceeded from 1974 to the present. Two authoritative
but incomplete accounts have been made public re-
garding the status of the discussion of conceptual

issues:

1) Ambassador Bunker stated on September 15,
1975, that conceptual agreement had been reached on
"Panamanian participation in the operation of the
Canal, defense of the Canal, and certain aspects of

jurisdiction." Conceptual agreement has yet to be

reached on economic benefits, the land and waterways
needed by the United States for defense and operation
of the Canal, the option to expand the Canal or build

a new sea-level canal, and the duration of the treaty.^
The Ambassador was careful to note that details of the
agreed upon issues still remain undefined and modifi-
cations are possible.

5



2) The Panamanian Negotiating Commission re-
leased a report on September 20, 1975 (see Appendix
B), which listed areas of agreement on jurisdiction,
administration and defense.^ The Commission also
listed a much wider range of disputed issues: a) the
duration of the treaty, b) defense sites, c) land and
waterways, d) compensation, e) the status of Canal
Zone residents, f) expansion and/or new works, g)
neutrality, and h) the hydrographic basin for water
supply/

Why This Issue?
The decision of the U.S. Catholic Conference to se-

lect and highlight the Panama Canal issue is based on
two factors. First, the nature of the issue as a question
of international social justice: It is a highly visible

test case of how a large and a small nation can relate
in an interdependent world. Second, the churches in

Panama and the United States are in a position to fa-
cilitate reasoned debate within each country and civil
dialogue between the two countries on a significant
political issue having substantial moral content.

The issue presents unique opportunities for local
churches in each place to act as a bridge on a highly
sensitive political question. On biblical, moral, legal
and political grounds, the local churches have both a
legitimate right and an excellent opportunity to play
a mediating role.

In 1974, the Administrative Board of the U.S. Cath-

olic Conference issued a statement supporting a new
treaty. (See Appendix C.) The key topics which sur-
face for discussion are: 1) Panama's exercise of sover-

eign rights and 2) the impact on Panamanian political
and socio-economic life of the present situation.
The sovereignty issue has been at the heart of the

Panama question since 1903. Both the conditions un-
der which Panama submitted to the treaty and the
continuing intrusions on Panamanian sovereignty
which the treaty legitimizes call for moral examination.
In a still decentralized world, sovereignty is the means
by which a nation preserves its identity and marshals
its resources to defend its interests and protect its
rights.

Panama is severely hampered in all these respects

6



because the heartland of the nation and its principal

resource are beyond its control and influence. The con-
tinual stress in the teaching of Pope John XXIII and
Pope Paul VI—that nations should be the principal
agents of their own development—makes the Church
particularly sensitive to this limitation on Panama's
right to pursue a responsible and free role in an inter-

dependent world.

The political issue of sovereignty also has socio-
economic implications for the development of Panama.
As indicated in the 1974 statement, the Treaty of 1903
not only limits Panama's political identity but deprives

the country of much of its most valuable land and re-
source development.

The issues at stake are those which the Synod of
Bishops described in their document Justice in the
World as issues of international social justice: that is,
issues in which the relationships among nations direct-
ly affect the domestic development of a country.® Both
the sovereignty question and its socio-economic impact
are problems of international social justice; on both
counts the Treaty of 1903 can be called into question.

In the past and present, considerations such as the
legitimate right of sovereignty and the requirements of
social justice have been subordinated to be a pure test

of power among nations. Two of the significant moral
challenges facing the Church today are to identify the
issues of justice and to stand against any pure power
dynamic which would disregard the claims of justice.

What Is at Stake?

The significance of the current negotiations between
the United States and Panama can be understood at
two levels. The first involves, primarily, the two na-
tions themselves: Panamanians see their case as an
issue of simple, elemental justice which should be ac-
corded to any nation-state. The justice claim is difficult
to refute: the original treaty was never signed by Pan-
amian delegates; its terms were exceedingly one-sided
in favor of the United States; in a changing world the
United States has first refused, then half-heartedly
agreed to consider bringing the treaty into line with

modern reality.
If the United States simply disregards the claim to

justice and seeks through sheer size, influence and
power to maintain a diplomatic anachronism, the cer-
tainty of political-legal conflict, and the high possibility
of military conflict, are evident. Such an outcome,
when a reasonable alternative is available, could only
be labeled a diplomatic tragedy for both parties.

The second level affects the whole of U.S. relations
with Latin America and the rest of the world. Support
for the Panamanian position from other Latin Ameri-
can nations has been demonstrated in the United Na-
tions, the Organization of American States, and bilat-
eral statements. This issue is a test case for U.S.-

Latin American relations in the immediate future: to
succeed here will not guarantee success on other
fronts, but to fail here will prevent progress on other
issues.

As a test case, the Canal issue takes on all the sym-
bolic overtones associated with North-South issues in
international relations today. These issues bear as
much upon political dignity and independence as on
economic benefits. The test of the Panama case is how
large and small nations can relate to each other with
mutual respect, in a new, non-colonial, international
context.

Footnotes

Remarks by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to the Canal Zone
Civic Organization, September 15, 1975. Available from the Panama
Canal Information Office, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

^Ibid. A similar account is provided in "Panama Canal Treaty
Negotiations," Current Policy, #9, November 1975. Available from
the Department of State, Washington, D.C.

The position of the U.S. Department of Defense was expressed
by General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in September 1975: "The Joint Chiefs and the Department of De-
fense are committed to working out a new treaty; we fully support
Ambassador Bunker's negotiating efforts."
For additional analysis of the state of negotiations see: a) "A

New Panama Canal Treaty: A Latin America Imperative," author-
ized by the House of Representatives Committee on International
Relations, 1976, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., b) S. Rosenfeld, "The Panamanian Negotiations—A Close-
Run Thing," Foreign Affairs, October 1975, pp. 1-13, c) T. Franck
and E. Weisband, "Panama Paralysis," Foreign Policy, #21, 1975,
pp. 168-187.

Ill Roman Synod of Bishops, Justice in the World, 1971. Avail-
able from the Publications Office, U.S. Catholic Conference, Wash-
ington, D.C.

7



THE PANAMA CANAL;
A TEST CASE

CHAPTER

2

The Most Rev. Marcos G. McGrath, C.S.C.

Marcos McGrath, Archbishop of Panama, is known
for his advocacy of national autonomy and social jus-
tice, his admiration for U.5. historical principles, and
his even-handed, sensitive criticism when we depart
from those principles.

In this text, adapted from a 1974 speech to the Car-
negie Endowment for International Peace, Archbishop
McGrath places the Panama Canal issue in the context
of a longstanding imbalance of economic and political
power between the United States and Latin America.
He shows how that imbalance is manifested in the

Panama Canal. Panama's principal natural resource is
its geographic position between the Atlantic and Pacif-
ic Oceans. However, the United States, not Panama,
derives most of the benefit from that resource. Based
on a treaty never signed by Panamanians, the Canal

not only subsidizes U.S. commerce but also provides
land, at a cheap price, for fourteen military installa-

tions. These installations are concerned more with
training Latin American military leaders than with de-

fending the Canal.

The full text of Archbishop McGrath's speech is
available from the U.S. Catholic Conference, and in-
cludes a large portion of his earlier article, "Ariel or

Caliban?" published in Foreign Affairs, October 1973.

Religious spokesmen must address human, spiritual,
and moral issues. They must do so honestly, in pur-
suit of peace, through justice and understanding. To-
day, it is urgently necessary that those who hold for
high moral principles, for justice and peace among all
peoples, join hands in each land and across all fron-
tiers, in this world without borders in which we now
live.

The Canal issue is a test case. I speak as a Pana-
manian interested in the welfare of his country, and as
a man concerned with inter-American and international
justice and understanding, but above all as a Christian
given a task of leadership in the Church, convinced
that there is here a clear-cut issue of justice.

Injustice, National and International

There is a double state of injustice and extortion
affecting the bulk of our peasant, Indian and worker
population in Latin America. The first is inner op-
pression: that of the few in our countries who in no
small measure still live off the many, or who, living
better, simply forget about a structure which favors
them and holds others down. Within our borders, the
rich will justify their lives and their actions and cite all
they do for the poor—whose plight, in this version, is
the result of their own laziness and general ineptitude.
Then there is the other oppression of our peoples

which is due to international, especially inter-American,
structures which oppress. In this case, it is the United
States which, benefiting from this structure, main-
tains it; all the while, it seems to be public opinion in
the United States that their country is generously as-

sisting the southern nations, whose sorry plight and
ingratitude are the fruit of their own dishonesty, or
laziness, or communism, or something similar.

Experts on inter-American relations know the facts.
But the people of the United States do not. History, in
U.S. schools, concentrates on the United States and its
origins in northern Europe. Latin America is but a
vague shadow cast by the yet black legend of Spain.
North Americans have a strong conviction that their
government has given huge sums of money to our na-
tions; that this money has been lost by corrupt and
ineffective governments; that our people are un-

grateful for this largesse; that this foreign aid had best
stop so that we learn to sink or swim by ourselves.

It is a stark reality that 25 percent of the world's

population are now consuming 75 percent of the
world's goods. The United States with 6 percent of
the world's population consumes over 30 percent of
the world's goods. There is blatant waste in the face of

cruel want—within nations, and among nations and
hemispheres.

The underlying world economic structure continues
to be colonialist: that is, the developed nations export

manufactured goods and import usually unprocessed

8



prime materials, placing tariff restrictions upon the im-
portation of processed or manufactured goods from

the less developed nations. The efforts of the prime
producers— for instance, of crude oil— to exact a higher

price from buyers to the north have roused pious

cries of protest: "Extortion!” Suddenly northerners

fear that they may have to depend on foreign produc-
ers. Do they ignore the extortion and economic de-
pendence they exercise upon the poorer lands?

Objective economic reports establish an annual defi- -

cit for Latin America, in its trade with the United

States, of approximately three quarters of a billion

dollars. How can this be balanced by the bare $300
million assigned annually by the United States for aid?
The bulk of this is loan money, given at near com-
mercial interest, which so heightens Latin American

foreign indebtedness that some nations are hard
pressed to cover their debts, even with new loans.
A former director of the U.S. Agency for Interna-

tional Development (AID) has pointed out that very
little money is turned over in cash by AID. More than
80 percent is spent on its own personnel, on U.S. tech-
nical advisors, and on materials bought in the United
States and shipped in U.S. bottoms. Even development
loans at 2 percent interest can become exorbitantly ex-
pensive when the borrower must spend a large part
of the monies on "services" which refund the monies
into the U.S. economy.

Multilateral aid agencies should be free of these

trammels, but they are not. The Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank, for example, determines its aid—mostly
loans, most of them at semi-commercial rates—by vote.
The United States has 40 percent of the voting power,
a fact painfully felt by nations whose requests were
turned down because they had nationalized previously
U.S.-controlled interests.

This reflects the post-colonial issue of a nation's

right to control its natural resources, a right affirmed

by the United Nations and in papal encyclicals. The
United States manifests concern at the small capital

control exercised within its own frontiers by foreign
investors. But it finds it hard to understand the resent-

ment, leading to government takeovers, toward U.S.
or other foreign control in some of our nations of the
bulk of industry and commerce, including that based
upon prime natural resources.
One could go on and on: The growing power of the

multinational corporations, with annual budgets often
larger than those of the countries in which they oper-
ate; tariff barriers; the arbitrary determination of world
monies by the richer nations, with virtually no consul-
tation with the poor; the yearly increase in the gross

national product of the United States—usually greater
than the entire GNP of India, a nation of 550 million
people. The gap truly widens. How can this make for
conditions of international peace?

The Case of Panama

The U.S. people and their leaders have certainly,
time and again, proven their generosity in coming to

the aid of suffering peoples around the world. What is
more, by its origin, spirit and many declarations, the
United States is committed to international justice and

the elimination of colonialism in Africa, Asia and

around the world.

But this same people and their leaders, in large
measure, ignore many of the facts about Latin Amer-
ica, and specifically about Panama. An aging "Teddy"
Roosevelt proudly proclaimed, "I took Panama," and

thus created a mood which still persists. "We built
the Canal and it's ours." "We bought the Canal Zone
and we won't cede an inch." "We could no more give
back the Canal Zone than Alaska or Hawaii!" "Those
people in Panama never had it so good. All they have
we've given them!" "Why not turn them back to
Colombia?" "Give up any part of the Canal Zone
or the Canal and the whole continent will go over to

the Communists."
How terribly unjust that the U.S. people and some

of its leaders are so badly informed: unjust to them
and unworthy of the good will they have and profess
for world justice; unjust for the people of Panama,

unfortunate and difficult now that we are trying to
work for a new and more just Canal treaty.
What are some of the relevant and evident facts of

the case? First of all, the independence of Panama is
not an artificial creation of President Theodore Roose-
velt. The Herran-Hay Treaty, proposed by the United
States and rejected by Colombia, was the occasion; the
presence of the U.S. Navy impeding the Colombian
forces was the means by which the independence
group in Panama was able to assert itself. But increas-
ingly over half a century, the leadership in what was
then the Colombian department of Panama desired
independence and had made unsuccessful attempts to
obtain it. These leaders desired self-government to bet-
ter the situation of Panama in education, commerce
and other ways, complaining rightly that the central
Bogota government was severely neglecting Panama.

It is well to recall, too, a bit of the nineteenth century

history about an isthmian canal—a history contained

in a series of international agreements. In these, the

United States sought to ward off any kind of inter-
national control.

Secondly, the Treaty of 1903 which still governs
the Canal was drawn up and signed without the par-
ticipation of any Panamanian. This must be one of the
greatest anomalies of its kind in the history of inter-

national law. Philippe Bunau-Varilla, himself a French

citizen, represented the old French canal company. He
was anxious to get the new canal treaty so as to sal-
vage for his operation what the United States would
pay the old French company for rights and materials.
He lobbied for the canal in the United States when the
treaty with Colombia was rejected as unfavorable to
Colombian interests.

Bunau-Varilla offered his services to the indepen-

dentist group in Panama, which appointed him am-
bassador plenipotentiary to Washington to obtain
recognition of Panamanian independence, but with

9



strict instructions regarding the elements of a treaty.

By the time the Panamanian delegates, empowered to
sign a treaty, arrived in Washington, the treaty had
been drawn up by Bunau-Varilla and offered to Secre-
tary Hay, who found it so favorable that he immedi-
ately accepted it, had it approved by the Senate with-
out any change, signed by himself and Bunau-Varilla.
The treaty startled many: it not only gave the

United States all it had requested, and had been denied
by Colombia, but much more. U.S. statesmen and oth-
ers, such as the British ambassador in Washington,
remarked publicly on the severe imposition this treaty
wrought on Panama. The Panamanian delegates, on
discovering the treaty already signed, objected, but to

no avail. The new ruling junta in Panama protested,
but to no avail. It was clear that they would accept
the treaty or risk losing U.S. recognition and their
newly found independence.

Who Benefits?
There is no denying that the presence of the Canal

has brought economic and social benefits to Panama.
Personally, I am aware of the many social and charit-
able services provided to our people by persons and in-
stitutions in the Canal Zone. But the benefits to the
United States have been considerable, apparently far
greater; and what is more, they have been unilaterally
determined by the United States. Here are a few facts:

• The savings to the United States Military Forces
in the use of the Canal in the sixty years since its in-
auguration are calculated in excess of $11 billion.

• Toll fees on the Canal were frozen at the 1914
level on the principle that the Canal should be non-
profit, after repayment of the initial investment made
by the United States. Since 70 percent of the goods
that transit the Canal come from or go to U.S. ports,
the present non-commercial fees represent a $700 mil-
lion annual saving to U.S. commerce; Panama is sub-
sidizing the richest nation of the world and world com-
merce in general.

• The toll fees also subsidize many educational and
other social services for Canal Zone employees, though
these pay federal taxes for that purpose, as well as for
U.S. military personnel in the Canal Zone.

• The 500 square miles of the Canal Zone represent
the heartland, the most valuable economic resource, of
Panama. Much of it is wasted. Sixty-eight percent of
the land is reserved for military purposes, most of it
not used at all; 3.6 percent for Canal installations; 3.2

percent for miscellaneous uses; 25 percent is not used.

For this territory, including fourteen military bases, the

United States has paid an annual $1.9 million, com-
pared to $20 million annually which it pays for three
bases in Spain.

• Neither Panama City nor Colon has adequate
port facilities at its disposal; nor does Panama pos-
sess trans-isthmian oil pipelines or railroads. It is now
contemplating huge expenditures for ports and a pipe-
line, even though these facilities already exist in the

Canal Zone and are only partially employed.
• According to testimony presented to the U.S.

House of Representatives September 22-23, 1971, the
military investment in the Canal Zone ($4.8 billion)
more than doubles the total civilian investment ($2.2
billion). This military expense goes far beyond any
notion of the defense of the Canal; the U.S. Southern
Command located there is a training center for military
from all over Latin America and a nerve center of mili-
tary contact throughout the continent. Military bases

established within a narion should be the object of ne-

gotiation. Panama quite naturally objects to the large
military establishment functioning within its borders

without adequate information, negotiation or com-
pensation.

• Approximately 20 percent of Panama's gross na-
tional income derives from the Canal Zone economy,
principally in indirect forms such as salaries and sales.
The rise and fall of this income, according to changes
in building and other operations within the Canal
Zone, has a strongly distorting effect on the Pana-
manian economy simply because these changes are en-
tirely out of Panamanian control.

• Land, income, etc. in the Canal Zone are exoner-
ated from all Panamanian taxes; thus the national
government cannot extract revenues from the main
natural resource of the nation. What little the govern-
ment has been able to accomplish in the development
of economic infrastructure and socio-economic devel-
opment has been financed largely by foreign capital,
most of it from U.S. sources. This has not only built
up a large foreign debt, but also limits the freedom of
Panama in negotiating on the Canal.

A Question of Values

I would like to close with a few observations on the

human and social values involved, from the Panamani-
an viewpoint.

Panama, whose principal natural resource is its posi-
tion bridging the oceans, has no adequate harbor or

port facilities, no trans-isthmian train or oil pipeline,

though they exist in the Canal Zone and are only part-

ly used.

The growth of Panama's two major cities, Panama
City on the Pacific and Colon on the Atlantic, is

blocked by the Canal Zone. Teeming tenements face

open fields or virgin jungles—space unused, reserved,

denied. Panama City has had to grow unnaturally
along the coast five miles and then cut inland because

of the Canal Zone, creating a clumsy triangle, bottling

traffic, and testing the patience of every city planner

and citizen.
Panamanians, to go from one part of their country

to the other, must cross an area that looks like a for-

eign land, though legally it is not: that land has its

own police, courts, post office, stores, across the very
waist and heart of the nation. Are those things just or

fair? Are they necessary to Canal operations or its de-

fense? 1 think not.

The real danger is that the new treaty will be blocked

10



not by opposition, but by omission. It is not, appar-
ently, the most vital or urgent issue before the U.S.
Congress and the U.S. people. In the shuffle of more
pressing affairs, the votes could easily follow a few
persistent and contrary voices and condemn the treaty
without ever hearing its case.

It is in this regard that communications media of the
United States do us in Latin America a great harm. Not
so much in what they report, but rather because they
hardly report at all about our countries. We fear that
the facts on the Canal issue will not reach the people
of the United States, because their own media do not
consider the issue sufficiently important.

It may not seem important now. Neither did the in-
troduction of the first U.S. military adviser into the

battles of Viet Nam, nor the first news about political
espionage in Watergate. But what torrents have

poured through those slight fissures in the wall!

This fissure which is the Canal could be the same.
Ignore it, or oppose it through neglect of the facts,
and you might well unloose similar torrents in the
hemisphere.

Almost 200 years ago, the United States proclaimed
the principle of national dignity and independence; it
has fought two world wars to free other nations from
political servitude, without any territorial aims for it-
self; it declared the Philippines independent, and after
World War II led the cause of independence for old
European colonies.
Now let the United States recognize Panama's claim

to genuine and complete national independence. In so
doing, it will find its interests in the Canal sufficiently

guaranteed, and its respect in the world, especially
in this New World of the Americas, refurbished.

11



CHAPTER

3
YANKEE DOODLE

OVER THERE

James R. Jennings

This play is based on serious research, though it is

written as a fantasy and requires of the reader both
imagination and a sense of humor.

The author, James R. Jennings, is Political Advisor
in the Office of International Justice and Peace of the
U.S. Catholic Conference.

The historical basis for the discussion between the
two main characters, Mr. Dandee and the Doctor, is
documented in footnotes. The positions attributed to
Grover Cleveland and John L. O'Sullivan are consis-

tent with the attitudes of the two men as reflected in
nineteenth century historical events, but they are taken

largely from the current debate on the issue. The posi-
tions are identified in Chapter 4, "Highlights of the

Debate."

Your study group may want to stage the play as an
informal reading to stimulate discussion/reflection.

Cast of Players

Y. D. Dandee: An associate of Captain Gooding, re-
puted to have been popular with the ladies. Also

known as "Gringo,” "Doughboy," "G.I. Joe," and,
more recently, "Grunt." While trying to be a good sol-
dier, he preferred by many accounts (remember Catch-
227) to stay alive and to do the right thing.

Doctor: A wise, prudent and dispassionate observer.
Dedicated to helping people, and to keeping himself
physically strong, mentally awake and morally
straight. In a word, a good scout.

John L. O'Sullivan: An editor of a mid-nineteenth
century periodical. Reported to have coined the
phrase, "manifest destiny."' He was followed by
such illustrious Americans as James Polk, Alfred Ma-
han, William McKinley and Henry Luce, whose fame
far outstripped him and whose policies converted the
phrase into an American way of life.

Grover Cleveland: A President of the United States
late in the nineteenth century. He tended to suspect

strong nations of designs against weaker ones, detect-
ed jingoism and imperialism, and was easily the least
imperialistic of American Presidents.^

Props

Two small tables and two chairs, one each for Dan-
dee and the Doctor; a large book placed on the Doc-
tor's table; a large table with two chairs, for Cleveland
and O'Sullivan, forming a triangle with the smaller
tables. Beside the large table is an easel, with two post-
er boards; one is blank, and one has a large map
(which you can sketch) of Panama, with the Canal
Zone clearly marked.

Script

(As the play begins, Dandee and the Doctor are seated
at small tables. A large book lies open on the table
before the Doctor.)

DANDEE I'm not sure why I'm here. I'm not even
sure where I am. (Pause) But it's even worse than
that. (Longer pause) I know I have to do some-
thing, but I don't know what to do.

DOCTOR I know; it's here in this book.
DANDEE What's in the book. Doctor?
DOCTOR A lot of things about you and what
you've done.

DANDEE Well, maybe that's why I'm here. To find
out what happened.

DOCTOR Don't you know what happened, Mr.
Dandee?

DANDEE I'm not sure. Sometimes I think 1 do.
Other times I think it was just a dream.

DOCTOR What do you remember?
DANDEE About the dream?
DOCTOR Yes.
DANDEE (Pause) Well, in one of them 1 remember

I was sitting in a large theater filled with people-
thousands of people. On the stage, a little man in
a giant yellow hat was singing. When he finished,
he bowed to the audience, and I stood up and be-
gan to clap. A second later, I realized that I was

12



the only person in the theater who was clapping.
1 was the only person making a sound. My clap-
ping made a hollow clacking sound. I stopped
clapping and I closed my eyes. In a flash I opened
them, and everyone in the theater was staring at
me. I stood there paralyzed.

DOCTOR What did you do then?
DANDEE Nothing.
DOCTOR What do you want to do now?
DANDEE I don't know. I know that I don't want
much. A job. A roof over my head. A chance for
my kids to go to school. If there is anything left
over, Td like to be able to load the family in the
car on Sunday and take them to church and go for
a drive in the country.^

DOCTOR What else do you want to do?
DANDEE (Pause) I'm not sure. I know I shouldn't

get too involved with other people, especially

foreigners. They always seem to be getting into
fights. I don't think I should get messed up in
their squabbles.

DOCTOR What do you think you should do?
DANDEE I think I should lead an active, vigorous

life. To be a man you have to be where the action
is. You have to be strong and brave and be able
to fight. If the time comes, a man should be will-
ing to serve his country.

^

DOCTOR Have you served your country?
DANDEE Of course. I've served. I've served 'em all.

General Lafayette, Grant and Lee. Marshall and
Westmoreland. I've been everywhere. In every

clime and place where we could take a gun. At
Lexington and Shiloh. Havana and Belleau Wood.
Anzio and Hiroshima. Manila and Matamoros.
Seoul and Saigon.

DOCTOR Matamoros? What happened there?
DANDEE (Pause) It's not clear to me what did hap-
pen there. Matamoros was a small Mexican town
across the Rio Grande. We were there under the
command of Captain Thornton in the spring of
1846. Mexico had warned us that if any Ameri-
cans were caught on Mexican soil, they'd be shot.
One day, Thornton sent us out on a scouting par-
ty and we were ambushed. About twelve of the
men were killed; some were captured and the rest
of us escaped.

DOCTOR One soldier at the time wrote in his
diary: "We have no right to be here ... It looks
like the government sent a small force here on
purpose to bring on a war, so we can have a pre-
text for taking California and whatever else we
choose."*

DANDEE Maybe so. I never heard that before.
DOCTOR The Matamoros incident is what started

the Mexican War.’’
DANDEE Is that so?
DOCTOR When Taylor heard what happened, he

notified Washington and President Polk asked for
a declaration of war on Mexico.

DANDEE We really went to it. More than 100,000

of us poured into Mexico. The whole thing was
over in about two years.

DOCTOR It wasn't a very popular war in the Unit-
ed States.

DANDEE Why not? We never lost a battle. We got
California, Nevada, Utah, and parts of New Mex-
ico, Arizona, and Colorado out of it—and only
lost about 12,000 men.

DOCTOR Five months before the war ended. Con-
gress passed a resolution condemning the war as
unnecessary and unconstitutional.®

DANDEE I don't remember anything about that.
(Pause) All I remember is the Monroe Doctrine
and Manifest Destiny. Conestoga wagons and
prairie schooners. Sailing ships and sealing wax.
The China Sea and Tokyo Bay.

DOCTOR Those were great times. But what were
you doing in Tokyo Bay?

DANDEE (Pause) I'm not sure. Alls 1 know is in
July 1853, we steamed into Tokyo Bay with four
Navy ships as big as life.^ When we docked and
marched on to the pier— there were about 300 of
us—we were all armed with muskets and side
arms. We were all big men; Commodore Perry
selected us for our size and military appearance.

We overwhelmed the small Japanese soldiers who
crowded around us even though there were more
than 5,000 of them armed with swords and
spears. Then the Commodore landed. He handed
President Filmore's letter to the chief Japanese

representative.

DOCTOR What did the letter say?
DANDEE Told them to change their laws. Open

their ports for trade with the United States. Told

the Japanese to take their time to decide and we'd

be back in the spring for their answer.

DOCTOR What did the Japanese do?
DANDEE They said, "Maybe."
DOCTOR Then what happened?
DANDEE Nothing.
DOCTOR What do you mean, "nothing?"
DANDEE Nothing! The place went dead silent.
Nobody said anything. Finally, the Japanese asked
if the four U.S. ships would return. Perry said,
"No, there would probably be more than four
ships in the next time." The guns of our ships in
the Bay were aimed at the crowds on the dock and
the people on the shore.

DOCTOR Were you scared?
DANDEE I guess so! We figured, if anything

broke loose, it would be a fight to the death.
DOCTOR What happened?
DANDEE The Japanese said, "You will leave now,

at once." And so we left. But we came back in the
spring.

DOCTOR Yes, and the Japanese signed their first
treaty with a foreign country without a shot being

fired; a whole new era was opened between the
Western nations and Japan. You were lucky.

DANDEE I don't know anything about that. I do

13



know that after that we went everywhere. We
were in and out of China, South America, the

Caribbean, Mexico, Hawaii.

DOCTOR What were you doing in these places?
DANDEE Protecting American interests from attack

and helping to restore order. We landed in Pan-
ama five times in a period of 50 years, even before
we ever dug the Canal.

DOCTOR What was happening in Panama?
DANDEE The last time—before we built the Canal—
we went in back in 1903. I was aboard the Nash-
ville, under Commander John Hubbard, docked in
Kingston, Jamaica, when we got orders to go to
Panama. We had often been ordered there for
standby duty during uprisings. It was lousy duty
and six of our crewmen went AWOL as soon as
word got around that we were headed back to
Panama. When we docked at Colon on the Atlan-
tic side of the isthmus, everything was quiet in
town; we didn't even post a street patrol. The
night we docked, a Colombian gunboat came
along side and put several hundred troops ashore.

The following day, Torres, the Colombian Com-
mander, demanded rail transportation of his
troops across the isthmus to Panama City to put
down a rebellion. When Hubbard told him he
couldn't use the railroad, Torres threatened to

kill every American in town.
DOCTOR I thought the United States supported
Colombia in its efforts to put down revolution
in Panama?

DANDEE So did I, Doctor. But this time I guess it
was different.*"' We took up our battle position
in the railroad station, and we waited. About an
hour later, Torres surrendered. Nothing hap-

pened. Not a shot was fired.
DOCTOR Who won?
DANDEE I don't know.*^

(Cleveland enters and walks to his chair and sits down.
O'Sullivan enters carrying two large poster boards.
Places them on the easel, the blank one covering the

map of Panama. Walks to his chair and sits down.
Dandee and Doctor sit in silence until O'Sullivan and
Cleveland are seated.)

DOCTOR What happened after that?
DANDEE It's all hazy. I don't remember too clearly.

(Pause) I just know that I have to do something,
but 1 don't know what I'm supposed to do.

DOCTOR What else do you remember?
DANDEE I remember the Gold Rush and the Gold

Standard. The Yellow Peril and Green Berets.
O'SULLIVAN Excuse me. Doctor?
DANDEE I remember Uncle Tom's cabin. Cabin in

the Sky. Pie in the sky. American apple pie. Amer-
ica's favorite game. Three strikes and you're out.
Three Men on a Horse. Manila paper and Panama
hats. Banana republics and banana splits.

CLEVELAND Excuse me. Doctor?
DOCTOR Do you remember anything else?

O'SULLIVAN Excuse me. Doctor? Could I say a
word?

DOCTOR (Doctor finally looks at O'Sullivan) Yes,
what is it?

O'SULLIVAN May I say something?

(Doctor and O'Sullivan continue to look at each other
while Dandee speaks)

DANDEE I remember, I was walking along a coun-
try road just outside a small town. I could hear

threshing machines in the field beside the road
and the farm hands were laughing and calling to
one another. Some of them waved to me. The sun
was bright and birds filled the air. Across the
road was an old farm house and on the front
porch a small boy playing with a dog. As I walked
by, I could hear loud scuffing sounds coming
from behind the house like men wrestling and
pulling at each other.

DOCTOR (Speaking to Cleveland and O'Sullivan)
Are you gentlemen here to help Mr. Dandee?

CLEVELAND I think so.
O'SULLIVAN Absolutely! Dandee has been intim-

idated. Perhaps even lied to. Over the years he
has made a great contribution to this country and
to the rest of the world. And now his courageous
actions are being turned against him and people
are falsely accusing him of being an imperialist.
Panama is a test case. He is being told that he
should give away the Panama Canal.

CLEVELAND 1 must say that I disagree with every-
thing O'Sullivan has said, with the exception that

I also think Panama is a test case for Mr. Dandee.
DOCTOR (Turning to Dandee) Shall we proceed,
Mr. Dandee?

DANDEE I don't know what they're talking about.
(Pause) I stopped in front of the farm house and
then I noticed a man with a large box camera
mounted on a tripod was standing in the front
yard. Suddenly, another man—an Indian in full
dress, feathers and all—came running from behind
the house and raced toward the road. Another
man, wearing a cowboy hat, was chasing him.

DOCTOR I think it's all quite simple, Mr. Dandee.
It's all here in this book. After more than 70 years
the people of Panama want a new treaty which
will give them more direct control over the Panama
Canal and the Canal Zone. But not everyone in

the United States is agreed. Four questions seem
to be raised by the debate. Do you know what
they are, Mr. Dandee?

DANDEE I still don't know what you're all talking
about. (Pause) I remember in the excitement the
little dog began barking and ran after the Indian.
The cowboy stopped, aimed his gun at the Indian
and fired. The bullet hit the dog in the back of
the head and sent him flying into the air. The boy
ran to the bleeding animal, knelt down beside it
and began to cry. I closed my eyes and continued
to walk down the road. And immediately, the

14



sound of the boy's sobbing stopped. But I could
hear the birds and the farmhands singing.

DOCTOR The first question is sovereignty over the
Canal Zone.

O'SULLIVAN That's ridiculous, Doctor. Sovereign-
ty is not an issue. The record is absolutely clear.
The United States bought and paid for the Canal.

(O'Sullivan rises, walks to easel, removes the first

poster board. Second poster board is a map of Panama.
He points to Canal Zone on the map of Panama.)

O'SULLIVAN No part of the Canal is situated on
Panamanian territory. We bought it. We've paid
for it. It's ours.

(O'Sullivan turns to walk back to his chair. When
Dandee begins to talk O'Sullivan stops, stands still,
waits for Dandee to finish. Then returns to his chair.)

DANDEE As I walked down the road, my mouth
became very dry—dry as cotton. I began to cough
and I coughed so hard that my chest ached and it
felt like it was going to explode. When I opened
my eyes I saw that I was in the middle of great
clouds of dust—like a giant dust storm. I could
hardly see my hand in front of my face. As I con-
tinued to walk, I noticed that other men were in
the dust storm with me, but they weren't cough-
ing. They just had their eyes straight ahead and
they walked; it was more like they were marching.
And I was caught up in their marching rhythm.
And as 1 did, my coughing stopped. We were still
in heavy dust clouds, but I wasn't coughing any-
more.

(O'Sullivan takes his seat)

CLEVELAND Doctor, no wonder Mr. Dandee is
paralyzed, if he's being fed this kind of nonsense
by Mr. O'Sullivan. The facts are quite the oppo-
site. The United States does not own the Panama
Canal Zone. Since 1904, the U.S. government has
consistently recognized the Canal Zone as Pana-
manian territory, not U.S. soil. The original Treaty
is quite clear about this. We were granted the use
of the Zone in Panamanian territory and the rights
to exercise authority over the region as if the Unit-
ed States had sovereignty.

O'SULLIVAN It's the commercial value of the Canal
to the United States that is an important issue.
Seventy percent of the Canal's traffic either starts
or ends in the United States. About twenty per-
cent of the U.S. trade goes through the Canal. If
the United States lost control of the Canal, it
would be a deep concern to us as well as to impor-
tant American shipping interests.

CLEVELAND That's really old hat. The Canal, in
fact, is not vital to America's commercial inter-
ests.

O'SULLIVAN It's damned convenient.
CLEVELAND No question about that. But "vital,"

that's something else. The Canal accounts for less

than one percent of the U.S. GNP. If the Canal
were to close, the effect on U.S. commerce would
be inconsequential.

DOCTOR Perhaps in those terms, it's more vital to
the people of Panama.

CLEVELAND Of course. The Canal's traffic con-
tributes 30 percent of Panama's GNP and 40 per-
cent of its foreign exchange earnings. Besides in
relative commercial terms, the operation of the
Canal is much more vital to Nicaragua, El Salvador
or Ecuador than it is to the United States.

DOCTOR Are you getting any of this, Mr. Dandee?
DANDEE As we walked down the road surrounded
by great billows of dust, I looked up and saw a
large clear blue patch of sky. An airplane—one of
those sky writers— flew through the blue patch
and behind the plane in little white puffs of smoke
was written the words; "If you must choose right-
eousness or peace, choose righteousness." Then I
could hear and feel a strong breeze blowing across
my face and the blue patch in the sky was covered
again with the billowing clouds of dust.

O'SULLIVAN The really critical issue. Doctor, is
U.S. national security. The Canal is the jugular
vein of the Americas. In the current struggle for

world domination, the Canal has become a focal
point. As part of the coastal line of the United
States, its defense is just as important as the pro-

tection of the Chesapeake Bay. We must have the
capability of moving naval forces and commercial
supply ships from one ocean to the other. The
Panama Canal figures prominently in these plans.

CLEVELAND Of course, the Canal is important to
ship movement. But conditions are changing. The
newest ships are much larger than the older ones.
More than 3,000 of the newer, larger ships can't
pass through the present Canal. Rail traffic across

the continent to ocean ports can make a big differ-
ence. If the Canal had not been available during
the Vietnam War, alternative shipping routes
would have had no adverse effect on our efforts
in Indochina. The Canal has declining value as
a military asset.

DANDEE Finally, we came to a large bandstand in
the middle of the road. Three old men and a boy
were playing, "My country 'tis of thee." In front
of the band stood a tall man with a beard who
looked like Lincoln. As we trooped by the stand,
he said over and over again, "We are the world's
last great hope." As we were passing by, quick as
a flash, Lincoln disappeared and a short muscular
man with a flag tattooed on his chest shouted at
us, "I am not a bumbling giant. I am not!" We
walked by with our heads down and I could still
hear the band music.

DOCTOR (Addressing Cleveland and O'Sullivan) I
read where Gen. George Brown, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the U.S. Depart-

ment of Defense was committed to working out
a new treaty with Panama.

15



CLEVELAND That's correct.
O'SULLIVAN You're both talking nonsense. You
sound like you think we can sign over the Canal
to the Panamanians and expect that they can op-
erate the Canal and that they will allow us to use
it. Surrender U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone
and violence will probably be the order of the day.
I know the kind of people the Panamanians are.
Let's be realistic. In the past, Panama has been a
land of endless intrigue and turmoil. During the
last seventy years Panama has had 59 presidents.

CLEVELAND I'm delighted that Mr. O'Sullivan
wants to talk about reality. The fact is the Panama
Canal is no longer considered to be defensible. It
could be closed for extended periods of time by the
use of relatively simple weapons. To minimize the
Canal's vulnerability, it is essential that there be

a friendly local environment. In other words, Pan-

amanians must see that they have a stake in the
Canal's continued, uninterrupted operation.

O'SULLIVAN That's blackmail; it's nonsense.
CLEVELAND No, it's common sense.
DANDEE Up ahead, beyond the clouds of dust, I

could hear people shouting and screaming. I

couldn't make out whether it was a riot or a cele-
bration. I could hear sounds like pistol shots or

maybe firecrackers. I couldn't tell what was hap-
pening. Suddenly a man came running out of the
dust clouds—running right at me and shouting.
He stopped, pointed a gun at me and fired, point
blank. The man walking next to me spun around
and fell on his face—dead.

DOCTOR (Addressing Dundee) Well, I guess that's
it. Either a new treaty with Panama and a peaceful
Canal, or go with what you've got . . . and take
your chances. Which will it be, Mr. Dandee?

DANDEE Are those my choices?
DOCTOR I think so.
DANDEE What about the dead man in the road?
O'SULLIVAN That's only a dream.
CLEVELAND I don't know anything about him.
DOCTOR What are you going to do?
DANDEE No, that's not the question. The ques-

tion is, what are you all going to do? I'm going
to a funeral. The rest of it is for you all to decide.

The play ends. Discussion might begin.

16



Footnotes

'Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, Quadrangle Books, Chi-
cago, 1963, p. 111.

'On Cleveland's suspicions of strong nations: Samuel Flagg Be-
mis, ed.. The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy,
Vol. VIII, Cooper Square Publishers, N.Y., 1963, p. 301. On jingo-
ism and imperialism: Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland, Dodd Mead
and Co., New York, 1966, p. 404. On his lack of imperialism:
Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy, W. W. Norton, New York,
1969, p. 362.

'From a description of what "the average fellow in the world"
wants, in the remarks of President Lyndon B. Johnson to American
and Korean servicemen at Camp Stanley, Korea, November 1, 1966.
•"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or

a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent con-
troversies, the courses of which are essentially foreign to our con-
cerns. . . . Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part
of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of Euro-
pean ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true
policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the
foreign world. . . . "—from George Washington's Farewell Address,
1793.

'"The good man should be both a strong and a brave man; that
is, he should be able to fight, he should be able to serve his country

as a soldier, if the need arises. . . . The question must not be merely,
is there to be peace or war? The question must be, is the right to
prevail? . . . And the answer from a strong and virile people must be
'yes,' whatever the cost."—Theodore Roosevelt, History as Litera-
ture, David M. Kenniket Press Corp., Port Washington, N.Y., 1913,
pp. 144-148.

'David M. Pletcher, Diplomacy by Annexation: Texas, Oregon
and the Mexican War, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Mis-
souri, 1973, p. 376.

•'"Americans may as well admit that in 1846-1848 they fought a
war of aggression against Mexico. . . . President Polk touched off
the war when he ordered General Taylor to the line of the Rio
Grande. He hoped to provoke the Mexicans and managed to do it.
The war was an act of aggression by the United States for the pur-
pose of conquering territory from a helpless neighbor. . . . The war
against Mexico was not a just war."— Robert H. Ferrell, American
Diplomacy, W. W. Norton, New York, 1969, pp. 216-217.
'Freshman Congressman Abraham Lincoln proposed, in Decem-

ber 1847, that the Polk Administration demonstrate that the Thorn-
ton ambush had actually occurred on American soil, since Polk jus-
tified the declaration of war on this basis. The outcome of the House
debate was passage in 1849 (85 to 81) of a resolution introduced
by Congressman John Quincy Adams declaring the war to be un-
necessary and unconstitutional.— Karl Jack Bauer, The Mexican War,
1846-1848, Macmillan Co., Riverside, New Jersey, 1974.
'Edward M. Barrows, The Great Commodore, Bobbs-Merril,

New York, 1935.
'“"As a consequence, both of settlement on the western coast

and the high drama of the clipper ship era, Americans looked to-
ward Asia in the middle of the [nineteenth] century as they would
not again until its close. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, pro-
jected the idea that our commerce with Asia, having brought the
Ancient Continent near us, 'created necessities for a new position—
perhaps connections or colonies there.' Commodore Perry shared
these imperialistic views and his epochal voyages to Japan first
raised the question of possible overseas expansion. In his dis-

patches to the State Department, Perry also urged American an-
nexation of what were then called the Liuchiu Islands— the princi-
pal one now is called Okinawa—which were under Chinese sover-
eignty."—Foster Rhea Dulles, "American Interest in China," in Wil-
liam A. Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy, Rand Mc-
Nally, New York, 1970.

•‘"Perry's orders [from President Fillmore] forbade him to use
force, except as a last resort; but the Kanagawa Shogun who then
ruled Japan was so impressed by the display [of U.S. ships] that, con-
trary to precedent, he consented to transmit the President's letter

to the Emperor. . . . Conferences were held at the little village of

Yokohama where gifts were exchanged: lacquers and bronzes, por-
celain and brocades, for a set of telegraph instruments, a quarter-
size steam locomotive complete with track and cars, Audubon's Birds
and Quadrupeds of America, an assortment of farming implements
and firearms, a barrel of whisky, and several cases of champagne.
Thus old Japan first tasted the blessings of western civilization.
Japanese progressives who wished to end isolation persuaded the
Emporer to sign an agreement allowing the United States to estab-
lish a consulate. . . . "—Samuel Eliot Morrison, The Oxford History
of the American People, Oxford University Press, New York, 1965,
pp. 579-80.

•'"I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house
of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. 1 helped make Mexico and especial-
ly Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1916. I brought light
to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916.
I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City
[Bank] boys to collect revenue in. I helped in the rape of half a
dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. . . .
The Spanish-American War was a high point in my life when I went
to it at the age of sixteen to defend my home in Pennsylvania against
the Spaniards in Cuba. "—General Smedly D. Butler, twice a recipient
of the Congressional Medal of Honor, address at the American Le-
gion Convention, 1931.

"Hubbard's orders: "Maintain free and uninterrupted transit
[of the railroad]. If interruption is threatened by armed force,
occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force
with hostile intent, either Government or insurgent. . . . "—W.
Storrs Lee, The Strength to Move a Mountain, G.P. Putnams Sons,
New York, 1958, p.33.

‘•Insurgent Panamanians in Panama City captured the Colom-
bian generals, placed them under arrest, and declared Panama free
and independent from Colombia. The Republic of Panama was
born.—/bid., pp. 45-63.

"Three days after the revolt, the U.S. extended official recognition

to the new Republic of Panama—before many residents of Panama
knew they were citizens of an independent nation, before Colombia
had any clear conception of what had transpired. ... A reporter
cabled. The people here are frantic with delight at the United
States' recognition of the de facto Government of the Republic of
Panama. All during the day fireworks were everywhere ex-
ploded . . ."—Ibid., p. 61.

See also G. A. Mellander, The United States in Panamanian Poli-
tics, the Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., Danville, Illinois,

1971, pp. 25-35.

"The reasons for the precipitous recognition of Panama by the
United States were given by Theodore Roosevelt: "First, our treaty
rights; second, our national interest and safety; and third, in the

interest of collective civilization. ... We policed the Isthmus in the
interest of its inhabitants and of our own national needs and for
the good of the entire civilized world." Doris Graber, Crisis in Di-
plomacy, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1958.

17



"7 THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST:
*

HIGHLIGHTS OF
THE HEEATE

James R. Jennings

The following selection of arguments supporting
and opposing a new treaty was prepared by James R.
Jennings in his research for the one-act play, "Yankee
Doodle Over There." Independently of the play, how-
ever, it provides a useful summary of opinions on both
sides of the argument, from the viewpoint of U.S. na-

tional interest.

The following four questions are raised in the de-
bate over the Panama Canal Zone in the Congressional
Record, October 7, 1974, HR 9720.

1. Will the new treaty mean a surrender of U.S. sover-
ereignty over the Canal?

Yes

"The record is absolutely clear. The United States
bought and paid for the Panama Canal. It is our prop-
erty. It belongs to the people of this country. . . . We
bought it; we have paid for it. It is ours. Neither the
President nor the State Department has the authority
to dispose of this property except by an act of Con-
gress."

Senator Strom Thurmond, Congressional
Record, March 29, 1974, S4733.

"No part of the Canal is situated on the Panamanian
territory. If that were indeed the case, then there might
be some question of injustices involved in renegotia-
tion of the treaty and the elimination of the concept of
perpetuity; however, that is emphatically not the

case."

Ibid, S4730.

No

"Since 1904 the U.S. government has consistently
recognized that the Canal Zone is Panamanian, not
United States territory. The United States was granted
use of this zone of Panamanian territory and rights to

exercise authority which the United States would
possess and exercise as if it were the sovereign. The
clear meaning of these words is that the United States
is not the sovereign. Rather, it has jurisdiction over a

portion of territory which remains Panamanian. In-
deed, this was recognized by both governments in
Article 3 of the 1936 Treaty where the Zone is de-
scribed as territory of the Republic of Panama under
the jurisdiction of the USA.

John Blacken, First Secretary of the U.S. Em-
bassy in Panama, Congressional Record, May
22, 1975, S9068.

2. Will the new treaty adversely affect U.S. commer-
cial interests?

Yes

"Some 15,000 vessels from 55 nations transit the
Canal annually and 70% of its traffic either starts or
terminates in the U.S. While 16.8% of U.S. trade goes
through the Canal, it handles 37% of the trade of
Chile, 32% for Colombia, 27% for Costa Rica, 51% for
Ecuador, 66% for El Salvador, 30% for Guatemala, 76%
for Nicaragua, 41% for Peru, and 29% for Panama.
Important shipping interests have expressed their deep

concern over loss of control over the Canal Zone by
the United States and oppose its surrender. Similar
opposition can be expected from other maritime na-

tions, including those of Latin America that have
the most to lose."

Congressman Daniel Flood, Congressional
Record, October 7, 1974, HR9720.

No

"The adjective most frequently applied to the Canal
by some Americans is 'vital.' In terms of U.S. trade,
however, the numbers would justify more modest de-

scription. Convenient. Useful. The Canal is econom-
ically vital to Panama (30% of Panama's GNP and

18



40% of its foreign exchange earnings are directly or in-
directly attributed to the Canal and related installa-

tions), perhaps to Nicaragua and a few Latin Ameri-

can countries, but not the United States. Foreign trade

accounts for less than 10% of U.S. GNP, the Canal
affects less than 1% of the U.S. GNP. By volume, less
than 5% of the total world trade transits the Canal.
By value, the proportion would be little more than

1%; an increasing percentage of more expensive cargo

is being transported by air— e.g., 10% of U.S. foreign
trade. The fact is the countries most likely to be ad-
versely affected by increased toll rates if Panama were
to so decide— that is, Latin Americans—have unani-
mously endorsed Panama's call for greater sovereignty

over the Canal. Latin Americans have never before

been as united and outspoken in support of Panama's

grievances against the United States. (Most countries

which use the Canal are interested mainly in efficient

operation and reasonable tolls.)"

Robert Cox, "Choices for Partnership or

Bloodshed in Panama," The Americas in a
Changing World, (Linowitz Commission Re-
port.) Quadrangle, 1975, pp. 132-155.

3. Will the new treaty prejudice our national secur-
ity?

Yes

"The Panama Canal is the jugular vein of the
Americas. In the current struggle for world domina-

tion, the Panama Canal, as a crucial element in Ameri-
can seapower . . . has become a focal point. ... As a
part of the coast line of the United States its defense

is just as important as the protection of the Chesa-

peake Bay. The real issue involved is not U.S. control
vs. Panamanian, but continued U.S. sovereign control

vs. USSR domination. As to its physical vulnerability,
the Armed Forces of the United States successfully
protected it during two world wars as well as during

the Korean and Vietnam wars."
Congressman Flood, Congressional Record,
October 7, 1974, HR9720.

No

"The Canal remains a prime consideration in the
planning for and accomplishment of the safe and

timely movement of naval units between the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans. . . . However, in 1970, there were

about 1300 ships afloat, under construction or on or-
der which could not enter the Panama Canal locks.
There were approximately 1750 more ships that could
not pass through the Canal fully laden because of
draft limitations due to seasonal low water level. . . .
The denial of the Canal to both defense and commer-
cial shipping for two years could have a serious ad-
verse effect on the national defense. ... A former serv-
ice officer of the U.S. Budget Bureau Military Division
estimates that alternative models of shipment would
have had no adverse effect on the Vietnam war effort
and that additional costs would have been negligible.

A ranking State Department expert in Panamanian
affairs now terms the Canal a military asset of declin-
ing value. Residual utility will remain for some time,
largely because of the constraints of U.S. West Coast
port facilities, particularly in munitions-handling."

Robert Cox, cited, pp. 138-140.

4. Will the new treaty weaken the U.S. position by
exposing the Canal to political instability and vio-
lence?

Yes

"This U.S. territory has long served as an area of
stability in a land of endless political turmoil. Surren-

der of U.S. sovereignty over the zone will not improve
but worsen the situation, probably extending violence
to the lock walls of the Canal. I know the kind of
people the Panamanians are."

Congressman Flood, Congressional Record,
September 24, 1975, H9052.

"During the last seventy years they have had 59
presidents in a land of endless intrigue and turmoil."

Congressman Flood, Congressional Record,
April 24, 1974, S6205.

"Other Zonians rejected that ('This government is
Communist') as a description of Panamanian strong-
man Omar Torrijos, but agreed that he is a dictator
whose rule is capricious and unstable. Several cited
arrests of specific Panamanian friends or relatives.
. . . None of the stories can be officially corroborated,
but Torrijos' exile of 13 dissidents last January and his
speedy trial of an alleged terrorist last month did
nothing to allay Zonians' fears."

Joanne Omang, "Defensive Zonians," Wash-
ington Post, June 6, 1976.

No

"If Americans have a national interest in protecting
a distant enterprise that is marginally useful in their

defense and affects less than 1% of their GNP, the
Panamanians might have even greater interest to pro-
tect the Canal. It is on their territory, provides about a
third of their GNP, and constitutes their primary na-
tional resource."

Robert Cox, cited, p. 152.

19



CHAPTER

5
A CHALLENGE

TO U.S. CHRISTIANS
(Study Guide)

Morgoret D. Wilde

“There are two important resources for Christian

decision-making," a professor of mine used to tell his

students: “the Bible and the daily newspaper." But

after he handed out the semester's reading list, the stu-

dents knew that to understand the Bible and the daily
newspaper, we would have to spend a lot of time read-
ing theology, economics and politics.

Even that is not sufficient, because it is an individu-

al effort. A better way to discern God's will is in com-
munity, that is, in a group willing to share their per-

spectives on contemporary reality and their Scriptural
insights.

This chapter is a guide for that sharing process.

What position to adopt regarding the Panama Canal
treaty, what action to take, is up to the readers. There
is no pre-packaged set of recommendations here; there

are suggested questions, and Biblical themes to start

you on a collective search for the light of Scripture on

those questions.

A Word About Process

Ideally, your discussion will serve as preparation for
action. But whether or not you decide to take action,
the discussion can be important in and of itself— if it
leads to a better understanding of the process by which
ethical decisions are made.

So you will want to take time, at the beginning and
throughout the discussion, to talk about that process.
Given a particular set of choices— for instance, whether
or not to renegotiate the Panama Canal treaty—how do
Christian citizens discern God's will? What questions
do Christians ask that might not occur to other citi-
zens?

If yours is a newly formed group, one that has not
worked together before, you will also want to be aware
of your own process. Some groups are comfortable
with a "group dynamics" style of discussion, in which
leadership is shared and the members openly discuss
how their evolving relationships affect their perspec-

tive on the debate. If you choose this approach, a brief
evaluation at the end of each session can be helpful.
Other groups may prefer to adopt some sort of

parliamentary procedure. In either case, it helps to

agree beforehand on the process and on the degree of
commitment expected of each member (meeting times,
preparation, outside research).

The two focal points in this study guide are the
political issues and the Bible. The process should be a
movement back and forth between Scripture and con-
temporary reality, between "the Bible and the daily
newspaper." The Bible was written, God's word was
spoken, between twenty and thirty centuries ago, to a
people who never heard of the Panama Canal. But the
Bible was written, God's word was spoken, for all
times; its lessons are applicable here and now, and can
help us to understand what is happening in our time,
in this particular situation.

How your group makes this back-and-forth move-
ment between the Bible on the one hand, and econom-
ics and politics on the other, will depend on the way
you are used to thinking. People who like to have
things neatly lined up in categories— the secular con-
siderations in one box and the spiritual considerations
in another—will want to divide the sessions according-
ly. You will have a problem deciding which to take
first, but you can make it work if you try.

Probably a more effective way—but more difficult—
is to tackle both groups of questions together. It's

harder to maintain an orderly discussion that way,
since group discussions have a way of wandering off
into irrelevant topics; but there is a strong chance

that the more free-wheeling discussion style will lead
to insights—both on the issue and on the process—
that would not otherwise have occurred.

Asking the Questions

The right answer to the wrong question can still be
a wrong answer—as anyone knows who has had to
undergo cross-examination by an unsympathetic law-

20



yer. An important focus in the search for justice is to
ask the right questions.

As you read this book and study outside resources,
your first task is to decide on the validity of the ques-
tions that are being asked. Look again, as a group, at

the chapter entitled “The U.S. National Interest: High-
lights of the Debate.” Four questions are asked there:

• Will the new treaty mean a surrender of U.S. sov-
ereignty over the Canal?

• Will the new treaty adversely affect U.S. com- -

mercial interests?

• Will the new treaty prejudice our national secur-
ity?

• Will the new treaty weaken the U.S. position by
exposing the Canal to political instability and vi-

olence? (The mirror image of this question is:

Would the absence of a new treaty weaken the
U.S. position by exposing the Canal to political
instability and violence?)

These have been the main questions raised in the
U.S. debate on the Canal treaty; they are important
questions. From the point of view of U.S. citizens,
they may be the most important questions; they are
clearly concerned with the three basic rights of the

Declaration of Independence—life, liberty and the

pursuit of happiness—as well as with property rights,

also highly respected in our society. But the quest for

justice requires us to consider the issue from a broader

viewpoint as well.

Now look at the one-act play, "Yankee Doodle Over
There," which is based in part on those questions. In
the play, it is the Doctor who asks questions from a
different perspective: "What were you doing in those
places (China, South America, the Caribbean, Mexico,

Hawaii)?" "What was happening in Panama?" "Who
won?"
They sound like the questions a parent might ask

his or her children when they come in from an after-
noon in the park—whether it's a fight or a football
game they're reporting. Since Christians see them-
selves as God's children, it's a useful comparison. So
let us add a few more questions to the first set:

• What were we doing in Panama? Why were we
there?

• What was happening there, among the local
people?

• Who won? What did we—and they—gain or lose?
There are other questions that God might ask his

children about Panama:

• Did you play fair?

• Did you learn anything from the experience, that
might help the United States improve its relations
with Panama and other countries in the future?

So far we have identified four questions from a U.S.
perspective, and five from a broader point of view. Are
there other questions that should be asked? Should the
wording of these questions be changed for the purpos-

es of your group, to shift emphasis or clarify the

meaning? Make your own list of questions on news-
print or poster boards for use at each meeting, leaving

plenty of space in between to add subquestions or
new ones.

Reflecting on the Scriptures

Once your group has decided on the basic questions
that seem to frame the issue most appropriately, the
next step is to seek the light of Scripture on those
questions. "Not as the Pharisees do," using the Bible
merely to prove a point or support a particular posi-

tion. Throughout the process, it is important to keep
in mind the role of Scripture in forming moral judg-
ment. As James M. Gustafson notes:

The Christian community judges the actions of
persons and groups to be morally wrong, or at least
deficient, on the basis of reflective discourse about
present events in the light of appeals to this variety

of material as well as to other principles and experi-
ences. Scripture is one of the informing sources for

moral judgments, but it is not sufficient in itself

to make any particular judgment authoritative.

Theology and Christian Ethics
(Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1974, p.l34)

In a spirit of humility and openness to the possibil-

ity that there may be things in God's word to surprise
us, what light can Scripture shed on the issues in-
volved in the Panama Canal? Three scriptural themes
are suggested here for review and reflection; if you
think of others, they should be introduced as well.

1. Dominion over the earth: One of the principal
issues has been the question of sovereignty. Who
owns, who has the right of control over the Canal
Zone?

In the creation story, in the Book of Genesis, God
gave his children dominion over every moving thing,
and over all the plants. With that dominion, or sover-
eignty, went a certain responsibility: they were to take
care of the land and use it well. When they did not use
it according to his instructions—when they ate of the
forbidden fruit—it became very clear that their "owner-

ship" of the land lasted as long as God was pleased by
the way they used it, and no longer.
Read the first three chapters of Genesis, with the

following questions in mind:

• What does sovereignty mean? What are the rights
and obligations involved in control over the land?

• What do we know about the way in which the
United States has used the Canal Zone? In what
way has U.S. use of the Zone benefitted people-
in this country and in others, in economic, polit-

ical and military terms? Has it been harmful to
anyone, and if so, how? If the government of
Panama regained control over the Canal Zone,
how would that situation change?

• How would God judge the U.S. claim to sover-
eignty over the Canal Zone, based on the argu-

21



merits that (a) we bought it, and (b) we helped
Panama separate from Colombia? How would He
judge Panama's claim, based on the arguments
that (a) they depend on the land and the Canal as
a principal national resource, and (b) the Ameri-

cans are foreigners and don't belong there?

• Who, in the last analysis, is really sovereign in
the Panama Canal Zone?

2. The uses of power: The Old Testament is essen-
tially about the struggle of God's people to win the
land he had promised them, and to keep it in the face
of incursions by neighboring peoples. From Moses on,
through periods of exile, captivity and warfare, God's
power went with the people of Israel, or seemed to
abandon them, depending on whether or not he was
pleased with their behavior.

1 Samuel, chapter 17, tells of one time when the
power of God was with the Israelites against the Phil-
istines. The Israelites were outnumbered and cowering
—until a boy named David, who had no business
being there where grown men were fighting, stepped
forward to accept the challenge of Goliath, the Philis-

tine leader.

The boy won, and went on to become a powerful
king. But he did not always use his power wisely; in
one case he used it to usurp the property (for a wife
was property) of a powerless man named Uriah, one
of his soldiers. 11 Samuel, chapters 11 and 12, tells
what happened. God sent a prophet named Nathan to
rebuke him; Nathan told him about a rich man who
took a poor man's property—in this case, a lamb. "For

God's sake," exclaimed King David, "the man should
be executed—or at least pay it back, four times over."
Nathan answered; "You are the man."
The real point of the story is not about property

ownership but about the use and abuse of power.
There can be no clear assumption that the United
States has usurped foreign property, as there was
when David took Uriah's wife; that question must be
discussed separately. Here we are talking about the
power relationships between the United States and
Panama.

Read the stories of David, with the following ques-
tions in mind;

• Many Americans are worried that if we give in to
Panama, the United States will appear on the
world scene as a bumbling giant, easily intimi-
dated by little bullies. Did Goliath lose because
he was a bumbling giant? Or were there other
reasons? If so, what were they?

• In the years between young David's heroic mo-
ment, and King David's shame, how had he
changed? How had his power affected him?

• How has the United States used its power in the
Canal Zone?

3. Social Justice:

The spirit of the Lord is upon me;
therefore he has anointed me.

He has sent me to bring the glad tidings to the poor,
to proclaim liberty to the captives.

Recovery of sight to the blind
and release to prisoners,
to announce a year of favor from the Lord.

(Luke 4;18,19)

Early in his ministry, Jesus used this quotation from
the prophet Isaiah to describe his own ministry; "To-
day this scripture passage is fulfilled in your hearing."
(Luke 4;21)

Mary knew, even before he was born, that this was
what he was about. She was quoting Scripture too—
the Song of Hannah and several Psalms—when she
marveled;

He has shown might with his arm;
he has confused the proud in their inmost
thoughts.

He has deposed the mighty from their thrones and
raised the lowly to high places.

The hungry he has given every good thing,
while the rich he has sent away empty.

(Luke l;51-53)

It would be an oversimplification to think of God's
justice as a great leveler, designed to take power and
wealth from those who have it, to give to those who
lack it. The story of the talents (Matthew 25; 14-30)
contradicts that view; there the enterprising servant

was rewarded, and the one who buried his coin to pro-
tect it was punished; "For to everyone who has will
be given more. ..."

Indeed, in most of the Bible the amount of a per-
son's possessions does not seem to be the measure of
justice, although Jesus does warn about excessive at-
tachment to possessions (see Matthew 6; 24; 19;23f;
1 Timothy 6;10). The measure seems rather to be
whether or not people have what they need to live full
lives; and whether they have more than they need, de-
priving others of the basic necessities (James 2;15f;

I John 3;17). This is the sense of Isaiah 65, where the
prophet describes the "new heavens and a new earth"
that God wills for his people;

No longer shall there be in it
an infant who lives but a few days,
or an old man who does not round out his full
lifetime . . .

They shall live in the houses they build,
and eat the fruit of the vineyards they plant;

They shall not build houses for others to live in,
or plant for others to eat.

As the years of a tree, so the years of my people;
and my chosen ones shall long enjoy the produce
of their hands.

In the prophets and in the Gospel, "knowing the
Lord" and "doing justice" were very close to meaning

one and the same thing. Jeremiah, speaking for the
Lord, said, "The days are coming . . . when I will make
a new convenant with the House of Israel .... No
longer will they need to teach their friends and kins-

22



men how to know the Lord. All from least to greatest
shall know me . . . (Jeremiah 31:3lf). Jesus saw him-
self, and Paul later saw him, as the embodiment of the
new convenant of which Jeremiah spoke (Luke 22:20;
I Cor. 11:25; II Cor. 3:6).

In the time of the new covenant, that is during the
Christian era, all will come to know the Lord. But what
does that mean? Jeremiah tells us: “The Lord says, 'He
did what was right and just, and it went well with
him.' Because he dispensed justice to the weak and
poor, it went well with him. Is this not true knowledge
of me?" (Jeremiah 22:15f).
And then we have the word of the prophet Micah,

with great finality:

You have been told, O man, what is good,
and what the Lord requires of you:

Only to do the right and to love goodness,
and to walk humbly with your God.

(Micah 6:8)

Read these passages and ask:

• To what extent has the United States been
“proud of heart" in our dealings with Panama?

• Supposing the negotiations on a new treaty
break down altogether, to what extent might Pan-
ama claim Cod's justice on their side for open
rebellion against U.S. domination of the Canal
Zone?

• Is there a valid comparison to be made between
Panama's economic and political dependence on

the United States, and the image of building a

house for another to inhabit? If many Panaman-
ians do not have the basic necessities for a full

life, to what extent is the United States—and our
support of the existing class structure in Pan-

ama-responsible?

• What does it mean to be a Christian, a minister
of the new covenant? What does it mean to know
the Lord? Is justice a hallmark of the new cove-
nant people, and if so, what does justice mean in
this situation?

A Final Word

Centuries ago, our civilization developed an under-

standing that there were two subjects that polite peo-

ple should not bring into conversation: religion and

politics, because either one could lead to conflict. Your
group is undertaking to talk about religion and poli-

tics; there's no way you're going to avoid conflict. In-
deed, if there is no conflict, the chances are that every-
one in the group shares the same pre-conceived no-
tions— for or against a new treaty, and about what a
new treaty should include—and you'd better examine
those assumptions.

So be prepared for conflict, and if possible, estab-
lish an understanding about the right and wrong way
to express disagreement. This, too, is part of the proc-

ess of understanding God's will; speaking the truth in

love, Christians should find that it is possible to dis-

cuss religion and politics.

Aerial view of Catun locks on Atlantic side of Panama Canal.

23



Appendix A A SUMMARY OF PAST AND PRESENT TREATIES

The following list of U.S. and Panamanian rights in the

Canal Zone, as they have evolved through three major treat-

ies, was prepared by EPICA (the Ecumenical Program for
Inter-American Communication and Action) and appears in

The People's Primer: Uniting Panama (EPICA, 1500 Farra-

gut Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20011; updated version,

1976).

Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, 1903

Rights Received

1) In perpetuity, to a zone of land and land under water

10 miles in width and extending 3 miles into the Caribbean

and 3 miles into the Pacific Ocean, plus certain small islands

in the Bay of Panama, for the maintenance, operation, sani-

tation, and protection of a canal across the Isthmus of Pan-

ama.

2) In perpetuity, the use, occupation, and control of any

other lands and waters outside of the Zone which may be
necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance,

operation, sanitation, and protection of the Canal.

3) All the power and authority within the Zone and within

the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters which the United

States would possess and exercise if it were sovereign, to the

entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama

of any such sovereign rights, power, or authority.

4) All the rights of the New Panama Canal Company and
the Panama Railroad upon purchase of the Company's

rights, privileges, properties, and concessions.

5) At all times and at its discretion to use its police and its

land and naval forces or to establish fortifications for the

safety or protection of the Canal, or of the ships that transit

it, or the railways and auxiliary works.

6) To use the rivers, streams, lakes, and other bodies of
water in the Republic of Panama for navigation, the supply

of water, or water power or other purposes as may be neces-
sary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, op-

eration, sanitation, and protection of the Canal.

7) A monopoly in perpetuity for the construction, main-
tenance, and operation of any system of communication by

means of canal or railroad connecting the Caribbean Sea and

the Pacific Ocean across Panamanian territory.

8) To acquire in the cities of Panama and Colon, by pur-
chase or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, any

lands, buildings, water rights, or other properties necessary

and convenient for the construction, maintenance, opera-

tion, and protection of the Canal and of any works of sani-

tation, such as the collection and disposition of sewage and

the distribution of water in the said cities of Panama and

Colon, at the discretion of the United States.

9) To impose and collect water rates and sewerage rates
which shall be sufficient to provide for the payment of in-

terest and the amortization of the principal of the cost of

such works within a period of 50 years, upon which time
the system of sewers and water works shall revert to and
become the properties of the cities of Panama and Colon.

10) To enforce in perpetuity sanitary ordinances pre-
scribed by the United States in the cities of Panama 'and Col-
on and the territories and harbors adjacent thereto in case

the Republic of Panama should not be, in the judgment of

the United States, able to maintain such order.

11) In perpetuity, to maintain public order in the cities

of Panama and Colon and the territories and harbors adja-
cent thereto in case the Republic of Panama should not be,
in the judgment of the United States, able to maintain such

order.

12) To make use of the towns and harbors of Panama and
Colon as places of anchorage, and for making repairs, for

loading, unloading, deposition, or transshipping cargoes

either in transit or destined for the service of the Canal and

for other works pertaining to the Canal.

13) Freedom from taxation upon the Canal, the railways
and auxiliary works, tugs, and other vessels employed in the
service of the Canal, shorehouses, workshops, offices, quar-

ters for laborers, factories of all kinds, warehouses, wharves,

machinery and other works, property, and effects appertain-

ing to the Canal or railroad and auxiliary works, or their of-

ficers or employees, situated within the cities of Panama

and Colon, and freedom from taxation upon officers, em-

ployees, laborers, and other individuals in the service of the

Canal and railroad and auxiliary works.

14) To import at any time into the Zone and auxiliary
lands, free of customs duties, imposts, taxes, or other charg-

es, and without any restrictions, all materials necessary and

convenient in the construction, maintenance, operation,

sanitation, and protection of the Canal and all provisions

necessary and convenient for employees in the service of

the United States and their families.

15) The right to purchase or lease lands adequate and

necessary for naval or coaling stations on the Pacific coast

and on the western Caribbean coast of the Republic of Pan-

ama at certain points to be agreed upon.

Concessions

1) Guaranteed the independence of the Republic of Pan-

ama.

2) Granted the right to have official dispatches of the

Government of Panama transmitted over any telegraph and

telephone lines established for Canal purposes and used for

public and private business at rates not higher than those

required from officials in the service of the United States.

3) $10 million in gold coin of the United States and an

annual payment of $250,000, beginning nine years after the

date of the exchange of ratifications.

4) Granted the Republic of Panama the right to transport

24



over the Canal its vessels and its troops and munitions of

war at all times without paying charges of any kind. The ex-
emption is extended to the auxiliary railway for the trans-

portation of persons in the service of the Republic of Pana-

ma, or of the police force charged with the preservation of

public order outside of the Zone, as well as to their baggage,

munitions of war, and supplies.

5) United States assumes the costs of damages caused to

owners of private property of any kind by reason of the

grants contained in the treaty or by reason of the opera- -

tions of the United States, its agents or employees, or by

reason of the construction, maintenance, operation, sanita-

tion, and protection provided for in the treaty.

6) After 50 years, the system of sewers and waterworks

constructed and maintained by the United States shall revert

to and become the properties of the cities of Panama and

Colon.

Treaty of 1936
Rights Received

1) Jurisdiction of a corridor from Madden Dam to the
Canal Zone.

2) Unimpeded transit across the Colon corridor (provided

for in the treaty) at any point, and of travel along the cor-

ridor, and to such use of the corridor as would be involved

in the construction of connecting or intersecting highways

or railroads, overhead and underground power, telephone,

telegraph and pipe lines, and additional drainage channels.

Concessions

1) Renounces the guarantee of Panamanian independence.

2) Renounces the right to expropriate without restriction

additional land for Canal use. Henceforth, in the event of

some unforeseen contingency, should the utilization of lands

or waters additional to those already employed be necessary

for the maintenance, sanitation, or efficient operation of the

Canal, or for its effective protection, the two governments

will agree upon such measures as may be necessary to take.

3) Renounces right of "eminant domain" in cities of Pan-

ama and Colon.

4) Renounces right to intervene to maintain public order

in the cities of Panama and Colon.

5) Renounces unlimited right to defend Canal. In the event

that the security of the Republic of Panama or the Canal is
threatened, the matter will be the subject of consultation

between the two governments.

6) Increases annuity from $250,000 to $430,000.

7) Persons not connected with the operation or adminis-

tration of the Canal are not to rent dwellings in the Canal

Zone belonging to the Government of the United States or to
reside in the Zone.

8) Sale of goods imported into the Zone or purchased, pro-
duced, or manufactured there by the Government of the
United States is limited to persons employed by the United

States in the Canal Zone and members of the Armed Forces
of the United States, and their families. Contractors operat-

ing in the Zone and their employees and persons engaged in
religious, welfare, charitable, educational, recreational, and

scientific work may purchase such items only when they ac-
tually reside in the Zone.

9) All private business enterprises in the Zone, with the

exception of concerns having a direct relation to the opera-

tion, maintenance, sanitation, or protection of the Canal,

other than those existing at the time of the signature of the

treaty, are prohibited.

10) United States extends to merchants residing in Panama
full opportunity for making sales to vessels at terminal ports
of the Canal or transiting the Canal.

11) United States will permit vessels entering at or clearing

from ports of the Canal Zone to use and enjoy the dockage
and other facilities of the ports for the purpose of loading

or unloading cargoes and receiving or disembarking pas-

sengers to or from territory under the jurisdiction of the

Republic of Panama.

12) Republic of Panama is given right to collect tolls from

merchant ships in the ports of Panama City and Colon, even
though they later pass through the Canal.

13) United States will furnish to the Republic of Panama

free of charge the necessary sites for the establishment of

customhouses in the ports of the Canal Zone for the collec-

tion of duties on imports destined to the Republic and for

the examination of merchandise and passengers consigned to

or bound for the Republic of Panama. Panama is given ex-

clusive jurisdiction to enforce the immigration or customs

laws of the Republic of Panama within the sites so provided.

14) Republic of Panama is given the right to determine
what persons or classes of persons arriving at ports of the

Canal Zone shall be admitted or excluded from its jurisdic-

tion.

Treaty of 1955

Rights Received

1) Exclusive use without cost, for a period of at least 15

years, of a military training and maneuver area (approxi-

mately 19,000 acres) in the Rio Hato region.

2) Panama waives the right, under article XIX of the

1903 convention, to free transportation over the Panama

Railroad of persons in the service of the Republic of

Panama, or of the police force charged with the preserva-

tion of public order outside of the Canal Zone, as well as to

their baggage, munitions of war, and supplies.

3) Panama waives certain treaty rights in order to enable

the United States to prohibit or restrict the use of a contem-

plated new strategic highway within the Canal Zone by com-
mercial transisthmian traffic.

4) Panama waives certain treaty provisions in order to en-

able the United States to extend limited post exchange privi-

leges to military personnel of friendly foreign countries visit-

ing the Canal Zone under U.S. auspices.

5) A lease for a period of 99 years without cost to two par-
cels of land contiguous to the U.S. Embassy residence site

in the city of Panama.

6) Panama will reserve permanently as a park area certain

land in front of the U.S. Embassy office building site in Pan-

ama City.

7) A reduction of 75 percent in the import duty on alco-
holic beverages which are sold in Panama for importation

into the Canal Zone.

25



Concessions

1) The annuity is increased from $430,000 to $1,930,000.

2) Subject to certain general conditions, Panama is enabled

to levy income taxes on the following categories of person-

nel employed by Canal Zone agencies; (1) Panamanian citi-

zens irrespective of their place of residence and (2) citizens

of third countries who reside in territory under the jurisdic-
tion of Panama.

3) Renounces monopoly with respect to the construction,

maintenance, and operation of transisthmian railroads and

highways, with the provision that no system of interoceanic

communication by railroad or highway within territory un-

der Panamanian jurisdiction may be financed, constructed,
maintained, or operated directly or indirectly by a third coun-

try or nationals thereof unless in the opinion of both parties

such action would not affect the security of the Canal.

4) Renounces treaty right to prescribe and enforce sani-

tary measures in the cities of Panama and Colon.

5) Certain lands, with improvements thereon, previously

acquired for Canal purposes (including Paitilla Point and the

Panama Railroad yard and station in the city of Panama) but

no longer needed for such purposes, are to be transferred to

Panama and there is to be a gradual transfer to Panama of

the New Cristobal, Colon Beach, and Fort de Lesseps areas
in Colon.

6) Canal Zone commissary and import privileges of non-

U.S. citizen employees of Canal Zone agencies, except mem-
bers of the Armed Forces of the United States, who do not
reside in the Zone are withdrawn.

7) The U.S. Congress will be requested to enact legislation
authorizing establishment of a single basic wage scale for all
U.S. and Panamanian employees of the U.S. Government in

the Canal Zone and providing for uniform application of the
Civil Service Retirement Act to citizens of the United States

and citizens of Panama employed by the U.S. Government in
the Canal Zone.

8) The United States will afford equality of opportunity
to citizens. of Panama for employment in all U.S. Govern-

ment positions in the Canal Zone for which they are quali-

fied and in which the employment of U.S. citizens is not re-

quired, in the judgment of the United States, for security

reasons.

9) Citizens of Panama will be afforded opportunity to par-

ticipate in such training programs as may be conducted for
employees by U.S. agencies in the Canal Zone.

10) Articles, materials, and supplies that are mined, pro-

duced, or manufactured in the Republic of Panama, when
purchased for use in the Canal Zone, will be exempted from

the provisions of the Buy American Act.

11) The U.S. Congress will be requested to enact the neces-
sary legislation for the construction across the canal at Bal-

boa of a bridge.

Appendix B INTERIM AGREEMENTS

As early as 1974, it became evident that public opinion in

the United States would balk at any major revision of the ex-

isting treaty, and that the issue would involve party politics
—thus making final agreement unlikely until after the
1976 elections.

In an effort to establish the progress already made, and

to reassure both sides, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kis-

singer and Panamanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Juan

Antonio Tack issued an "Agreement on Principles" dated

February 7, 1974. That statement is reproduced in full in

this section.

It is followed by a September 1975 report by the Pana-

manian Negotiating Commission on the present status of
the negotiations. Reproduced here is an unofficial transla-

tion, taken from the Star and Herald, English-language news-

paper of the Canal Zone.

Agreement on Principles

(February 7
, 1974)

The Republic of Panama and the United States of America
have been engaged in negotiations to conclude an entirely

new treaty respecting the Panama Canal, negotiations which
were made possible by the Joint Declaration between the two

countries on April 3, 1964, agreed to under the auspices of

the Permanent Council of the Organization of American

States acting provisionally as the Organ of Consultation.

The new treaty would abrogate the Treaty existing since
1903 and its subsequent amendments, establishing the neces-

sary conditions for a modern relationship between the two

countries based on the most profound mutual respect.

Since the end of last November, the authorized representa-

tives of the two governments have been holding important

conversations which have permitted agreement to be reached

on a set of fundamental principles that will serve to guide

the negotiators in the effort to conclude a just and equitable

treaty eliminating, once and for all, the causes of conflict

between the two countries.

The principles to which we have agreed, on behalf of our
respective governments, are as follows:

1) The Treaty of 1903 and its amendments will be abro-
gated by the conclusion of an entirely new interoceanic canal

treaty.

2) The concept of perpetuity will be eliminated. The new

treaty concerning the lock canal shall have a fixed termina-

tion date.

3) Termination of U.S. jurisdiction over Panamanian ter-

ritory shall take place promptly in accordance with terms

specified in the treaty.

26



4) The Panamanian territory in which the Canal is situated
shall be returned to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Pan-

ama. The Republic of Panama, in its capacity as territorial

sovereign, shall grant to the United States of America, for

the duration of the new interoceanic canal treaty and in ac-
cordance with what that treaty states, the right to use the

lands, waters and airspace which may be necessary for the
operation, maintenance, protection and defense of the Canal

and the transit of ships.

5) The Republic of Panama shall have a just and equitable

share of the benefits derived from the operation of the Canal

in its territory. It is recognized that the geographic position

of its territory constitutes the principal resource of the Re-

public of Panama.

6) The Republic of Panama shall participate in the admin-

istration of the Canal, in accordance with a procedure to be

agreed upon in the treaty. The treaty shall also provide that

Panama will assume total responsibility for the operation of

the Canal upon the termination of the treaty. The Republic

of Panama shall grant to the United States of America the

rights necessary to regulate the transit of ships through the

Canal and operate, maintain, protect and defend the Canal,

and to undertake any other specific activity related to those

ends, as may be agreed upon in the treaty.

7) The Republic of Panama shall participate with the
United States of America in the protection and defense of the

Canal in accordance with what is agreed upon in the new
treaty.

8) The Republic of Panama and the United States of
America, recognizing the important services rendered by the

interoceanic Panama Canal to international maritime traffic,

and bearing in mind the possibility that the present Canal

could become inadequate for said traffic, shall agree bilater-

ally on provisions for new projects which will enlarge Canal
capacity. Such provisions will be incorporated in the new
treaty in accord with the concepts established in principal 2.

Henry A. Kissinger

Secretary of State of

The United States of America

Juan Antonio Tack,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of

The Republic of Panama

Report By The Panamanian Negotiating
Commission on the Present Status of the

Negotiations

Points of Agreement

On the Subject of Jurisdiction: It has been agreed that,
three years after approval of the new treaty, the Canal Zone
disappears and Panama assumes jurisdiction over that ter-
ritory. Specifically, the following has been agreed upon:

a) There will be no Canal Zone Government. The Gov-
ernor and the administrative apparatus will disappear.

b) There will be no North American Police because the

National Guard will assume those functions.

c) There will be no North American laws, courts or judges.

Only the Panamanian law will be enforced.

d) Fire-fighting, license and plate issuance and postal serv-

ices will be provided by Panama exclusively.

e) There will be no boundaries nor any map of the Isthmus
of Panama will be drawn in which the designation “Canal

Zone" appears.

On the Subject of Administration:
a) The Panama Canal Company disappears and an entity

will be created in which both countries will be represented.

b) Panamanian workers may be promoted to all positions
relating to the operation, maintenance, sanitation and admin-

istration of the Canal.

c) The employment of Panamanians in the administration
of the Canal will be carried out in an increasing manner, so

that upon the termination of the Treaty, the Canal will be
operated exclusively by Panamanians.

On the Subject of Defense:
a) The defense of the Canal will be carried out jointly by

both countries. In the event of an armed attack by third pow-

ers, the United States will have primary right of defense only

while the Treaty is in force.

b) Panama's military participation will be on an increasing

scale and that of the United States on a decreasing scale.

c) Under no pretext will there be nuclear arms on the ter-

ritory of the Isthmus nor will such territory be used for any

acts of aggression.

d) The concept of the neutrality of the Canal is incorpor-
ated.

Points of Disagreement

Duration of the Treaty: Panama proposes a period of
duration for the treaty that will not be extended beyond the

end of this century. The United States, in its latest proposal,
accepts a period of 25 years as duration for the Canal treaty,

but one of 50 years for the defense of the waterway. Further

the United States insists that after 50 years, the United States

will have the right to continue defending the Canal for an in-

definite time, which is tantamount to perpetuity.

Panama has emphatically rejected this proposal.
Defense Sites: The United States proposes that the exist-

ing 14 military bases be maintained. As a negotiating posi-
tion, Panama proposes the existence of up to three defense

sites provided that such sites will not be close to the cities of

Panama and Colon and that they come under a schedule of
dismantling during the period of duration of the treaty.

Land and Waters: Panama proposes, for purposes of ad-

ministration of the Canal, a strip bordering on the Canal

(also subject to Panamanian jurisdiction) for warehouses,

maintenance shops, etc. This strip is equivalent to 10 per-

cent, approximately, of the land which at present constitutes

the Canal Zone. The United States proposes, for purposes

of administration and defense, a section of lands and waters

that is equivalent to 85 percent of the present Canal Zone.

Panama has rejected this proposal.

Panama proposes that the ports of Balboa and Cristobal

come under Panamanian jurisdiction, the participation of

the Entity that administers the Canal being permitted for

purposes of the operation of the Canal and the transit of

27



ships. The United States proposes that the administration

entity of the Canal retain control over those ports.

Panama has rejected this proposal.

Compensation or Annuity: The United States proposes a

system of annuity based on tonnage which amounts approx-

imately to 35 million Balboas annually. Panama has rejected

this proposal and insists that this subject will be discussed

only after what is agreed on jurisdiction and defense.

Status of Zonians: The United States proposes systems

aimed at maintaining the privileges of Zonians and exclud-

ing them from Panamanian jurisdiction. Panama has rejected

this proposal and has set forth the alternative that the pres-

ence of those citizens disappear gradually, while retaining

certain guarantees for their jobs but without detriment to

Panamanian jurisdiction.

Expansion or New Works: In the eight-point Tack-Kiss-
inger declaration, it was agreed that both countries would

agree in the new treaty on the expansion of the present

Canal or on New Works (Sea Level Canal). However, in its

latest presentation, the United States proposes as its unilat-

eral right the carrying out of the expansion of the present

Canal of New Works.
Panama has rejected this proposal.
Neutrality: Panama has proposed that the neutrality of

the Canal must be effective and must be guaranteed by all
countries through the United Nations. The United States
had accepted this Panamanian proposal, but has changed

that position in its latest proposal and now proposes to
maintain what it understands as neutrality in relation to the

exclusive interests of the United States.

Panama has rejected this proposal.
Hydrographic Basin: Panama has conducted, on its own

account, a study of the Hydrographic Basin which provides

water for the Panama Canal. The purpose is to reforest that
basin with trees and sufficient vegetation in order to main-

tain the volume of the rivers, so that when the Canal passes
into Panama's hands it will not be in disuse for lack of a

sufficient volume of water.

Appendix C PANAMA-U.S. RELATIONS

In February 1975, the Administrative Board of the U.S.

Catholic Conference released the following statement. The

Administrative Board, composed of 48 members (three car-

dinals, eight archbishops and the rest bishops) is chaired by

the President of the U.S. Catholic Conference, Archbishop

Joseph L. Bernardin of Cincinnati.

Statement by the Administrative Board
United States Catholic Conference

The United States and the Republic of Panama are cur-

rently engaged in active negotiations regarding a treaty in-

volving the Panama Canal. It is a moral imperative—a matter

of elemental social justice— that a new and a more just treaty

be negotiated.

The history of these negotiations spans a 70-year period,

beginning with the original Treaty of 1903 by which the

United States assumed virtually sovereign and perpetual

control over the heartland of the Panamanian Isthmus. More

recently, in February 1974, the two nations signed the Kis-

singer-Tack Agreement on Principles, which provides a sig-

nificant basis for a new treaty.

Why is a new treaty imperative? In the first place, the
1903 Treaty is, in itself, of dubious moral validity, drafted

as it was when international affairs were frequently deter-
mined by precepts of power. Since that time, and despite the

70 years that have passed in this century in which other peo-

ples have achieved their independence or have established

functional control over their territory, this Treaty has re-

mained essentially unchanged at the insistence of the more

powerful of the two parties.

In the second place, a more fundamental issue is the right

of every nation to utilize its natural resources for the devel-

opment of its people. In his 1963 encyclical Pacem in Terris,
Pope John XXIII emphasized this basic principle of interna-
tional justice which had been strongly affirmed in the pre-
vious year's declaration of the U.N. General Assembly (Res-
olution 1803, XXVII, December 14, 1962). Nations, the Holy
Father stressed, "have the right to play the leading part in
the process of their own development" and "no country may
unjustly oppress others or unduly meddle in their affairs."

The principal natural resource of Panama is and always
has been its geographic location and its configuration. The
Treaty of 1903 established a monopoly, "in perpetuity," in
favor of another government over the principal natural re-
source of the Republic of Panama.

The question, therefore, lies in whether or not we accept
the fact that Panama is a free and independent nation. As
such, her claims over the Canal area are a simple conse-

quence of her basic right. In other words, if we accept the
rights of Panama over her territory, then instead of Panama
negotiating with the United States to obtain for herself

some compensation for the use of the Canal and the Canal
Zone, it might be reasoned that negotiations should be the

other way around. The main benefits from the Canal should
accrue to Panama, as a nation with principal control over its

natural resources, and a fair compensation should accrue

to the United States for its investment in Panama.

Besides the political, social and cultural consequences of

the 1903 Treaty that argue strongly for a fundamental re-

vision of U.S.-Panamanian relations, economic considera-

tions are also considerable. It is worth reviewing, in this

regard, some of the main benefits that accrue to each side as

recently cited by the Archbishop of Panama, Marcos Mc-
Grath, C.S.C.:

28



• The Canal Zone, which measures roughly 10 by 50
miles in area, is the heartland, the most valuable economic

area of Panama. Present use represents a significant waste

of this natural resource: only 3.6 percent of the land is oc-

cupied by Canal installations; some 25 percent is not utilized
at all, and 68 percent is designated for military use. For this

entire territory, including 14 military bases established with-

out any negotiations with Panama as to their location, the
United States pays an annual $1.9 million, as contrasted, for

example, to $20 million paid annually for three bases in

Spain.

• Since 70 percent of the goods that transit the Canal

come from or go to U.S. ports, the non-commercial fees,
frozen until this year at the 1914 level, have represented an

annual saving to U.S. commerce of $700 million. In this
way, Panama, a poor nation, is subsidizing the richest nation

of the world and world commerce in general.
• The savings to the U.S. Armed Forces in the use of the

Canal in the 60 years since its inauguration are calculated

in excess of $11 billion.

• The U.S. military investment in the Canal Zone is more
than double the total civil investment, an expense that goes

far beyond any notion of mere defense of the Canal. In fact,

the U.S. Southern Command, located in the Canal Zone, is
a training center for military from all over Latin America

and a nerve center of military contact throughout the conti-

nent. Surely, military bases established within a nation

should be the object of negotiation.

• Nearly 20 percent of the gross national income of the

Republic of Panama derives from the Canal Zone economy,
mostly in indirect form, through salaries and sales. The rise
and fall of this income according to fluctuations in building

and other operations within the Canal Zone, factors beyond

the control of the Republic, has a strongly distorting effect

upon the Panamanian economy.
• Since property and income in the Canal Zone are ex-

empted from Panamanian taxes, the government of Panama
is denied a major source of revenue. As a result, it has not
been fully able to undertake programs of economic infra-

structures and socio-economic development, particularly for

the impoverished rural areas.

While these observations do not attempt to treat all ques-

tions relating to the Panama Canal issue, they do serve to
place the question within an overall context of international

social justice.

For peace in the world, which can come only with justice
in the world, it is essential that we citizens of the United
States, including our elected representatives, approach the

Panama Canal issue with the same moral sensitivity we
would apply to issues of justice within our own society.
Our national response to the new treaty will be a signifi-

cant test of that sensitivity. Not only the rest of the Amer-
icas, but the whole world will be watching. The fundamental
rights of the people of Panama, as well as the high ideals and

long-range interests of the United States, require a new and
just treaty. It can become a sign of and a significant con-
tribution toward world peace based upon justice and frater-
nity between peoples.

Appendix D A DECLARATION

The Catholic Bishops of Panama, meeting in August

1975, issued the following statement on the negotiations to-

ward a new treaty. The members of the Panamanian Bishops
Conference are the six local Ordinaries of the six ecclesiasti-

cal territories of the Republic of Panama, and the Auxiliary

Bishop of Panama City.

Panamanian Bishops Conference

Since the birth of our country, the Panama Canal and ev-
erything related to it has influenced the life and decisions of

Panamanians. The existence of the Canal has undoubtedly
been the occasion of remarkable improvement in the lives of

Panamanians, especially in the cities of Panama and Colon,
in matters of health and material welfare.

At the same time, and from the beginning, the leaders of
our country have expressed their profound dissatisfaction

with the way the 1903 Treaty was negotiated, without the
conscious and free participation of Panamanian representa-

tives, and furthermore, with the manner in which its clauses
have been unilaterally interpreted by the authorities of the
United States of America, both in Washington and in the
Canal Zone.

It must be pointed out that the relations between the peo-

ples of Panama and the United States have been generally
friendly and positive throughout this period. However, the

growing self-awareness of the people of Panama as citizens
of a free and sovereign country has, as was to be expected,

awakened an ever-increasing impatience when faced with the
anachronistic situation imposed upon this country by the
1903 Treaty.

There was a time when the fact that international relations
were governed by force rather than reason, although ques-

tioned by many, was taken for granted. This was a period

when European powers colonized Asia and Africa and when
the United States Armed Forces intervened a number of times
in several Caribbean countries. But times have changed and a

new international morality has emerged, based on the funda-
mental principles of the U.N. Charter which upholds respect

for the territorial integrity of each nation-state, the right of

the self-determination of peoples and the sovereign right of

states over their natural resources.

The modern idea of the sovereign state, born in Europe
after the Renaissance, was implemented in the United States

in the 18th century. Somewhat later, it was adopted by the

29



other American nations, and has become increasingly mean-

ingful to different countries throughout the world, including

all of the former colonies which have now become free. Doc-
uments which enjoy moral authority, such as papal encycli-

cals and U.N. Resolutions, have urged that each country be

recognized as free to exercise its right to self-determination.

It was to this concept that the U.S. Secretary of State re-

ferred on the occasion of the signing of the eight basic points

for a new treaty (February 8, 1974), when he mentioned that

power politics at the international level was no longer viable

and the time had come for a politics of consensus based on

mutual respect.

From the beginning, the Catholic Church in Panama has

affirmed the independence and sovereignty of this nation

by not establishing the Canal Zone as a separate ecclesiasti-

cal entity. This principle has always been followed. The

Zone has always been considered a part of what used to be

the only diocese of Panama which was coterminous with the

country's boundaries. Throughout the different periods of

crisis and conflict, the Catholic Church of Panama has been

present with both prayer and support, seeking justice in

an atmosphere of harmony and peace. This was true, espec-

ially, during the 1964 incidents when it not only stood by
those who suffered physical wounds and spiritual grief, but
made every effort to channel national feeling towards a just

settlement by means of massive demonstrations, known as
"Meetings with God and Country," which took place in
Panama and David.

Lately, the Panamanian Bishops Conference and the Arch-

bishop of Panama, by means of speeches and declarations,

have attempted to stress the need for an equitable new treaty
which will recognize effective Panamanian sovereignty over

all its territory and which will assure a just solution to all

parties. These efforts have led to similar declarations not

only in Panama but also by the Administrative Board of the

U.S. Catholic Conference and other religious groups in both

countries. This is eloquent testimony. It points to the justice

of the case and underscores the importance of a reasonable

and equitable negotiation which can serve as a model and in-

centive to settle so many other matters of justice between
North and Latin America and throughout the world.

The strong national endorsement and the unanimous sup-

port of the Latin American countries in favor of a new treaty

as a priority question regarding relations with the United

States at this time confirm the importance and far-reaching

implications of the case. It seems to us that the coming days

are very important if this whole issue is to become a corner-
stone for international justice and not a stumbling block for

the nations. We, Panamanians, must learn to hold con-
sciously to the sovereign rights of our country. We must do
this by means which lead to justice and peace and which evi-
dence a mature awareness of our affirming our national

sovereignty, while neither ignoring nor neglecting our inter-

national duties.

In fact, in our day, even the youngest countries are con-

scious that their great problems converge on an international
plane, and it is here that they can be solved.

The Canal is a service rendered to all nations. All its users,
by supporting Panamanian sovereignty, implicitly trust
that our country will continue to guarantee them the con-

stant, efficient and indiscriminate use of the Canal on the

basis of reasonable tolls and neutrality.

A serious obstacle to the successful negotiation of a new
treaty is the lack of information and of historical vision of

some persons—including some highly-placed legislators—in

the United States. In this regard, we believe that the truth
speaks for itself. As the U.S. Catholic Bishops have ob-
served, efforts to inform the U.S. public are highly desirable

so that all persons of good will can see the justice of the

case. We are of one mind with them that a new and just
treaty will be good for both nations and for their peoples,

and that it will serve as an example of understanding and

equity which will contribute significantly to world peace.

It is necessary that we, in Panama, continue to be truly

united in spirit on matters which so fundamentally affect

the future of our country. We ought to listen to one another
as we freely discuss the practical problems involved. It must
not be said that the treaty was not widely discussed by the

Panamanian people. On the other hand, let us seek the best
way to negotiate, not based on partisan political considera-
tions, but on the clear precepts of national and international

justice.

At the same time that we insist on the justice of our case
at the international level, we must expect that the appropri-
ate measures be taken to assure all Panamanians of an equit-

able share in the economic and other benefits of the new
treaty.

In conclusion, we urge all the faithful to pray persevering-
ly so that the current negotiations will result in a convincing

example of justice and peace before all nations.

Appendix E A STATEMENT

A fifteen-member delegation of the National Council of
Churches (NCC), an organization formed by 31 Protestant

and Orthodox communions, returned from a visit to Panama

in April 1976, and issued the following statement. They had

met with a wide variety of church groups in Panama, and

with representatives of the U.S. and Panamanian govern-

ments; some also met with Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd_

and members of the commission working toward the new

treaty.

One member of the team— Eugene Stockwell, head of the

NCC Division of Overseas Ministries and son of a Metho-
dist missionary in Latin America—summarized the dilemma

30



this way: “What would it be like for us if France still held a
five-mile strip each side of the Mississippi River from the

Gulf of Mexico to Canada: It's a similar situation.”

Delegation of the National

Council of Churches

—The 1903 Treaty under which the United States as-
sumed the right to build, administer and defend the Canal

through the Isthmus of Panama, and as it has been amended

and implemented by the U.S. Government, represents a seri-

ous injustice to the Republic of Panama and its people. For

example, no Panamanian signed the original Treaty. The
Republic of Panama was forced to relinquish effective sov-

ereignty over a ten-mile wide strip of territory that cut Pan-

ama in half. The United States established military and
training bases in the Canal Zone totally unrelated to the de-

fense of the Panama Canal without treaty authorization or

the consent of the Republic of Panama.

—The present Treaty is a hindrance to the improvement
of U.S. relations with Latin America and other nations of the

world.

—The existence of a Canal Zone in Panama governed by a
foreign power is a colonial situation. Therefore, the struggle

of the Republic of Panama and its people to assert sover-

eignty is a struggle against colonialism and its inherent

racist oppression.

—We support the negotiation of a new treaty that will
clearly affirm the effective sovereignty of the Republic of

Panama over its entire territory and its right to derive greatly

increased benefits from the operation of the Canal.

—It is in the long-term interest of the United States as well

as the Republic of Panama that a new relation be developed
which leads to Panamanian control of the Canal. Therefore,

complete transfer to Panama of Canal administration should
take place as soon as possible and certainly by the year
2000.

—Some U.S. citizens resident in the Canal Zone have been
major contributors to hostility in the United States toward
new treaty negotiations. This influence on U.S. public opin-
ion by the U.S. employees in the zone is excessive and large-
ly motivated by personal concerns which do not take into ac-
count the greater issues of justice for the Panamanian peo-
ple.

—The existence of the Canal Zone deprives the Republic
of Panama of the benefit of its principal natural resource, its
unique geography and strategic location, and therefore hin-
ders the development of the nation.

—The political and military use of the Canal Zone by the
United States, for example, the training of Latin American
military personnel, the support of intervention in other Latin
American countries, etc., is a deterrent to the liberation and
self-determination of other nations of Latin America.

—In treaty negotiations, the United States should not im-
pose on Panama its military priorities, requiring concessions
not related to the defense of the Canal.

—Military bases and military training installations deemed
by the Panamanian government to be unrelated to and un-
necessary for the defense of the Canal should be closed down
immediately.

—We perceive that the great majority of Panamanians,
regardless of other differences, fully support the negotiations

for a new treaty as a necessary step toward the liberation
and self-determination of Panama.

—U.S. churches have a responsibility to inform and edu-
cate their constituencies about the facts concerning U.S. in-
volvement in Panama so that they may take appropriate
actions as aware Christian citizens.

31



BIBLIOGRAPHY/RESOURCES

Books and Articles

In preparation of The Panama Canal and Social Justice,
a variety of reading lists and card catalogues were consulted.

For serious students of an issue, there is no substitute for

that kind of research; most of the books listed in the foot-

notes of the chapters of this book and the following list of
additional sources are available in university and public

libraries.

"Controversy Over Proposed Panama Canal Treaty Revi-
sion: Pro and Con," The Congressional Digest, April,

1976. I >1 f ^ V6»l.

"Controversy Over Proposed Revisions of the Panama Canal
Treaty: Pro and Con," The Congressional Digest, No-
vember, 1972. TK . ^ , I

Early, Lawrence O. Yanqui Politics and the Isthmian Canal.

University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University

Press, 1971.

Liss, Sheldon B. The Canal. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of

Notre Dame Press, 1967.

Low, Helen C. "The Panama Canal Treaty in Perspective."

Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1976.

Mellander, G.A. The United States in Panamanian Politics.

Danville, 111 .: Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1971.

"Panama Canal, 1971." Hearings before the Subcommittee

on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on

Foreign Affairs, September 22-23, 1971. Washington,

D C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.

Voluntary Organizations

A number of church-related and secular organizations
have committed themselves to studying and advocating a

position on the Panama Canal issue. They will be glad to

respond to requests for additional information, guidance in

researching specific questions, and support for the mobiliza-

tion of public opinion.

The Washington Office on Latin America (110 Maryland
Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002) is jointly spon-

sored by the U.S. Catholic Conference and the National

Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S. A. WOLA's
small staff informs Congressional and other government

personnel of the churches' concerns for human rights and
social justice where U.S. aid to Latin America is concerned.

It also puts out a regular bulletin to inform U.S. citizens

about events in Latin America, action in Washington, and

how to affect that action as citizens.

EPICA (Ecumenical Program for Inter-American Communi-
cation and Action, 1500 Farragut Street, N.W., Washing-

ton, D.C. 20011) is a volunteer action group dedicated to

awareness-building on Latin American issues through doc-
umentation and community mobilization.

An EPICA task force has issued a community mobiliza-
tion packet including useful articles and advice on how to
organize support for a new Panama Canal treaty as well as
how to approach key legislators on the issue. The main
item in the packet is a "people's primer," entitled Uniting

Panama: A New Canal Treaty. An updated version of the
primer is now at press and should be available by October
1976. The summary of the 1903 Treaty and later revisions,
included in this booklet as Appendix B, is reproduced from

the primer.

Another product of EPICA's efforts is the National

Committee for Panamanian Solidarity, with affiliated

groups scattered across the United States. For the name
of the group nearest you, write Diane de Graffenreid at

EPICA.

The Americanism Education League (P.O. Box 5986, Buena

Park, California 90622) takes a contrasting view, oppos-

ing U.S. negotiation of the Canal treaty.

Latin American Studies Department at a university near you

can provide a wealth of resources for your study group.

One or more of the professors and graduate students may
be available as speakers or resource people for the dis-

cussion. They may know of recent reports of publications
on the Panama Canal issue.

The foreign student office of the university can also
tell you if there are Panamanian students at the university.

Such students can enrich your discussion with their par-

ticipation, as will students from families living in the

Canal Zone (who are probably U.S. citizens and therefore

not registered with the foreign student office).

Government Spokesmen

All U.S. negotiation on treaties with foreign govern-

ments is the responsibility of the U.S. Secretary of State.

Information on the background and status of the negotia-

tions can be obtained by writing to the Director, Office of

Panamanian Affairs (ARA/PAN), Department of State,

Washington, D.C. 20520.

The official representative of the Panamanian Govern-

ment in the United States is the Ambassador of Panama.

Information on the Panamanian position can be obtained'

through the Embassy of Panama, 2862 McGill Terrace,

N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008.

32



'7

'7V:



Should the United States sign a new treaty with
Panama over the operation and use of the Panama
Canal? Although negotiations have been in process
since June 1970, U.S. public opinion is divided and the
question has become an issue in U.S. domestic politics.

The U.S. Catholic Conference, the Panamanian Bish-
ops Conference, and other church leaders of various
nationalities and confessions have supported renego-
tiation of the treaty. This booklet tells why, and chal-
lenges U.S. Christians to consider the issue them-

selves: to participate in a search for justice and recon-
ciliation as part of their Christian witness.

Margaret D. Wilde, a consultant and translator of the-
ological works, studies theology in Argentina and

graduated from Union Theological Seminary in New
York. She has served in the West Indies as communi-
cations consultant to the Caribbean Conference of

Churches, and is now on assignment to a church-
sponsored social service program in Paraguay.