The Bishop of Worcester's answer to Mr. Locke's letter, concerning some passages relating to his Essay of humane understanding, mention'd in the late Discourse in vindication of the Trinity with a postscript in answer to some reflections made on that treatise in a late Socinian pamphlet.
         Stillingfleet, Edward, 1635-1699.
      
       
         
           1697
        
      
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             The Bishop of Worcester's answer to Mr. Locke's letter, concerning some passages relating to his Essay of humane understanding, mention'd in the late Discourse in vindication of the Trinity with a postscript in answer to some reflections made on that treatise in a late Socinian pamphlet.
             Stillingfleet, Edward, 1635-1699.
          
           154 p.
           
             Printed by J.H. for Henry Mortlock ...,
             London :
             1697.
          
           
             First edition.
             Reproduction of original in Huntington Library.
          
        
      
    
     
       
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         eng
      
       
         
           Locke, John, 1632-1704. -- Essay concerning human understanding.
           Toland, John, 1670-1722. -- Christianity not mysterious.
           Trinity.
        
      
    
     
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           THE
           Bishop
           of
           
           Worcester's
           ANSWER
           TO
           Mr.
           
           Locke's
           Letter
           ,
           Concerning
           Some
           PASSAGES
           Relating
           to
           his
           ESSAY
           OF
           Humane
           Understanding
           ,
           Mention'd
           in
           the
           late
           Discourse
           in
           Vindication
           of
           the
           Trinity
           .
           With
           a
           POSTSCRIPT
           in
           answer
           to
           some
           Reflections
           made
           on
           that
           Treatise
           in
           a
           late
           Socinian
           Pamphlet
           .
        
         
           LONDON
           ,
           Printed
           by
           
             I.
             H.
          
           for
           
             Henry
             Mortlock
          
           at
           the
           Phoenix
           in
           St.
           
           Paul's
           Church-Yard
           ,
           1697.
           
        
      
    
     
       
         
         
         
           THE
           Bishop
           of
           
           Worcester's
           Answer
           TO
           Mr.
           
           Locke's
           Letter
           ,
           &c.
           
        
         
           
             SIR
             ,
          
        
         
           I
           Have
           seriously
           consider'd
           the
           Letter
           you
           were
           pleased
           to
           send
           me
           ,
           and
           I
           find
           it
           made
           up
           of
           two
           Parts
           ;
           A
           Complaint
           of
           me
           ,
           and
           a
           Vindication
           of
           your self
           :
           To
           both
           which
           I
           shall
           return
           as
           clear
           and
           distinct
           on
           Answer
           ,
           and
           in
           as
           few
           words
           ,
           as
           the
           matter
           will
           permit
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           As
           to
           the
           Complaint
           of
           me
           ,
           it
           runs
           quite
           through
           the
           Book
           ,
           and
           even
           your
           Postscript
           is
           full
           of
           it
           .
        
         
           The
           substance
           of
           it
           is
           ,
           that
           in
           
             answering
             Objections
             against
             the
             Trinity
             ,
             in
             point
             of
             Reason
             ,
          
           I
           produce
           several
           Passages
           out
           of
           your
           
             Essay
             of
             Humane
             Vnderstanding
          
           ,
           as
           if
           they
           were
           intended
           
           by
           you
           to
           that
           Purpose
           ;
           but
           you
           declare
           to
           the
           World
           ,
           p.
           150.
           that
           it
           was
           written
           by
           you
           
             without
             any
             Thought
             of
             the
             Controversie
             between
             the
          
           Trinitarians
           and
           Unitarians
           ;
           and
           p.
           224.
           
           
             That
             your
             Notions
             about
             Ideas
             have
             no
             Connexion
             with
             any
             Objections
             that
             are
             made
             by
             others
             against
             the
             Doctrine
             of
             the
             Trinity
             ,
             or
             against
             Mysteries
             .
          
           And
           therefore
           you
           complain
           of
           it
           ,
           as
           
             an
             Injury
             done
             to
             you
             ,
             in
             imputing
             that
             to
             you
             ,
             which
             you
             have
             not
             done
             ,
          
           p.
           95.
           or
           
             at
             least
             in
             leaving
             it
             so
             doubtfull
             ,
             that
             the
             Reader
             cannot
             distinguish
             who
             is
             meant
             ,
          
           p.
           96.
           and
           this
           you
           call
           
             my
             peculiar
             way
             of
             Writing
             in
             this
             part
             of
             my
             Treatise
             .
          
        
         
           Now
           to
           give
           you
           and
           others
           satisfaction
           as
           to
           this
           matter
           ,
           I
           shall
           first
           give
           an
           account
           of
           the
           Occasion
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           then
           shew
           what
           Care
           I
           took
           to
           prevent
           Misunderstanding
           about
           it
           .
        
         
           The
           Occasion
           was
           this
           ,
           Being
           to
           answer
           the
           
             Objections
             in
             Point
             of
             Reason
          
           ,
           (
           which
           had
           not
           been
           answered
           before
           )
           the
           first
           I
           mention'd
           ,
           was
           ,
           
             That
             it
             was
             above
             Reason
             ,
             and
             therefore
             not
             to
             be
             believed
          
           ;
           in
           answer
           to
           this
           ,
           I
           proposed
           two
           Things
           to
           be
           consider'd
           ;
           1.
           
           What
           we
           understand
           by
           Reason
           .
           2.
           
           What
           Ground
           in
           Reason
           there
           is
           to
           reject
           any
           
           Doctrine
           above
           it
           ,
           when
           it
           is
           proposed
           as
           a
           matter
           of
           Faith.
           
        
         
           As
           to
           the
           former
           I
           observ'd
           that
           the
           Vnitarians
           in
           their
           late
           Pamphlets
           talk'd
           very
           much
           of
           
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
             and
             Perceptions
             ,
          
           and
           that
           the
           Mysteries
           of
           Faith
           were
           repugnant
           to
           them
           ,
           but
           never
           went
           about
           to
           state
           the
           Nature
           and
           Bounds
           of
           Reason
           in
           such
           a
           manner
           as
           those
           ought
           to
           have
           done
           who
           make
           it
           the
           Rule
           and
           Standard
           of
           what
           they
           are
           to
           believe
           .
           But
           I
           added
           ,
           that
           a
           late
           Author
           in
           a
           Book
           ,
           call'd
           
             Christianity
             not
             Mysterious
          
           ,
           had
           taken
           upon
           him
           to
           clear
           this
           Matter
           ,
           whom
           for
           that
           cause
           I
           was
           bound
           to
           consider
           ;
           the
           design
           of
           his
           Discourse
           related
           wholly
           to
           
             Matters
             of
             Faith
          
           ,
           and
           not
           to
           
             Philosophical
             Speculations
          
           ;
           so
           that
           there
           can
           be
           no
           Dispute
           about
           his
           Application
           of
           those
           he
           calls
           
             Principles
             of
             Reason
             and
             Certainty
          
           .
        
         
           
             When
             the
             Mind
             makes
             use
             of
             intermediate
             Ideas
             to
             discover
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             the
             Ideas
             received
             into
             them
             ,
             this
             Method
             of
             Knowledge
             ,
          
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             is
             properly
             called
             Reason
             or
             Demonstration
             .
          
        
         
           
             The
             Mind
          
           ,
           as
           he
           goes
           on
           ,
           
             receives
             Ideas
             two
             ways
          
           :
           
             
             
               1.
               
               
                 By
                 Intromission
                 of
                 the
                 Senses
              
               .
            
             
               2.
               
               
                 By
                 considering
                 its
                 own
                 Operations
              
               .
            
          
        
         
           
             And
             these
             simple
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
             ,
             are
             the
             sole
             Matter
             and
             Foundation
             of
             all
             our
             Reasoning
             .
          
        
         
           And
           so
           
             all
             our
             Certainty
          
           is
           resolved
           into
           two
           things
           ,
           either
           
             immediate
             Perception
             ,
             which
             is
             self-Evidence
             ,
          
           or
           
             the
             use
             of
             intermediate
             Ideas
             ,
             which
             discovers
             the
             Certainty
             of
             any
             thing
             dubious
          
           ;
           which
           is
           what
           he
           calls
           Reason
           .
        
         
           Now
           this
           I
           said
           did
           suppose
           ,
        
         
           
             That
             we
             must
             have
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
             of
             what-ever
             we
             pretend
             to
             any
             Certainty
             of
             in
             our
             minds
             (
             by
             Reason
             )
             and
             that
             the
             only
             way
             to
             attain
             this
             Certainty
             is
             by
             comparing
             these
             Ideas
             together
             ;
             which
             excludes
             all
             Certainty
             of
             Faith
             or
             Reason
             ,
             where
             we
             cannot
             have
             such
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
             .
          
        
         
           From
           hence
           I
           proceeded
           to
           shew
           ,
           that
           we
           could
           not
           have
           such
           
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
          
           ,
           as
           were
           necessary
           in
           the
           present
           Debate
           ,
           either
           
             by
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
          
           ,
           and
           consequently
           we
           could
           not
           attain
           to
           
             any
             Certainty
          
           about
           it
           ;
           for
           which
           ,
           I
           instanced
           in
           the
           
             Nature
             of
             Substance
          
           and
           Person
           ,
           and
           the
           Distinction
           between
           them
           .
        
         
         
           And
           by
           vertue
           of
           these
           Principles
           I
           said
           ,
           
             That
             I
             did
             not
             wonder
             ,
             that
             the
             Gentlemen
             of
             this
             new
             way
             of
             Reasoning
             had
             almost
             discarded
             Substance
             out
             of
             the
             Reasonable
             Part
             of
             the
             World.
             
          
           Which
           Expression
           you
           tell
           me
           
             you
             do
             not
             understand
          
           .
           But
           if
           you
           had
           pleased
           to
           have
           look'd
           back
           on
           the
           Words
           just
           before
           ,
           a
           Person
           of
           your
           Sagacity
           could
           not
           have
           missed
           the
           Meaning
           I
           intended
           .
           
             Which
             are
             ,
             Now
             this
             is
             the
             case
             of
             Substance
             ;
             it
             is
             not
             intromitted
             by
             the
             Senses
             ,
             nor
             depends
             upon
             the
             Operations
             of
             the
             Mind
             ,
             and
             cannot
             be
             within
             the
             compass
             of
             our
             Reason
             .
          
        
         
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
           
             That
             if
             I
             mean
             that
             you
             deny
             or
             doubt
             that
             there
             is
             in
             the
             World
             any
             such
             thing
             as
             Substance
             ,
             I
             shall
             acquit
             you
             of
             it
             ,
             if
             I
             look
             into
             some
             Passages
             in
             your
             Book
             which
             you
             refer
             to
             .
          
           But
           this
           is
           not
           the
           point
           before
           us
           ,
           whether
           you
           do
           own
           Substance
           or
           not
           ?
           but
           whether
           by
           vertue
           of
           these
           Principles
           ,
           you
           can
           come
           to
           any
           Certainty
           of
           Reason
           about
           it
           ?
           And
           I
           say
           ,
           the
           very
           places
           you
           produce
           do
           prove
           the
           contrary
           ;
           which
           I
           shall
           therefore
           set
           down
           in
           your
           own
           Words
           ,
           both
           as
           to
           Corporeal
           and
           
             Spiritual
             Substances
          
           .
        
         
         
           
           
             When
             we
             talk
             or
             think
             of
             any
             particular
             sort
             of
             Corporeal
             Substance
             ,
             as
             Horse
             ,
             Stone
             ,
          
           &c.
           
             tho'
             the
             Idea
             we
             have
             of
             either
             of
             them
             be
             but
             the
             Complication
             or
             Collection
             of
             those
             several
             simple
             Ideas
             of
             sensible
             Qualities
             which
             we
             use
             to
             find
             united
             in
             the
             thing
             called
             Horse
             or
             Stone
             ,
             yet
             because
             we
             cannot
             conceive
             how
             they
             should
             subsist
             alone
             ,
             or
             one
             in
             another
             ,
             we
             suppose
             them
             existing
             in
             and
             supported
             by
             some
             common
             subject
             ,
             which
             Support
             we
             denote
             by
             the
             name
             Substance
             ,
             tho'
             it
             be
             certain
             we
             have
             no
             clear
             or
             distinct
             Idea
             of
             that
             thing
             we
             suppose
             a
             Support
             .
             The
             same
             happens
             concerning
             Operations
             of
             the
             Mind
             ,
          
           viz.
           
             Thinking
             ,
             Reasoning
          
           ,
           &c.
           
             which
             we
             considering
             not
             to
             subsist
             of
             themselves
             ,
             nor
             apprehending
             how
             they
             can
             belong
             to
             Body
             or
             be
             produced
             by
             it
             ,
             we
             are
             apt
             to
             think
             these
             the
             Actions
             of
             some
             other
             Substance
             ,
             which
             we
             call
             Spirit
             ,
             whereby
             yet
             it
             is
             evident
             ,
             that
             having
             no
             other
             Notion
             or
             Idea
             of
             Matter
             ,
             but
             something
             wherein
             those
             many
             sensible
             Qualities
             ,
             which
             affect
             our
             Senses
             do
             subsist
             ,
             by
             supposing
             a
             Substance
             wherein
             Thinking
             ,
             Knowing
             ,
             Doubting
             ,
             and
             a
             Power
             of
             Moving
             ,
          
           &c.
           
             do
             subsist
          
           ,
           
           
             we
             have
             as
             clear
             a
             Notion
             of
             the
             Nature
             or
             Substance
             of
             Spirit
             as
             we
             have
             of
             Body
             ,
             the
             one
             being
             supposed
             
             to
             be
             (
             without
             knowing
             what
             it
             is
             )
             the
          
           Substratum
           
             to
             those
             simple
             Ideas
             we
             have
             from
             without
             ,
             and
             the
             other
             supposed
             (
             with
             a
             like
             Ignorance
             of
             what
             it
             is
             )
             to
             be
             the
          
           Substratum
           
             to
             those
             Operations
             which
             we
             experiment
             in
             our selves
             .
          
           You
           mention
           other
           places
           to
           the
           same
           purpose
           ,
           but
           these
           are
           sufficient
           for
           mine
           .
           
             These
             and
             the
             like
             fashions
             of
             speaking
             ,
          
           
           
             you
             say
             intimate
             ,
             that
             the
             Substance
             is
             supposed
             always
             something
             ,
          
           &c.
           
           I
           grant
           that
           you
           say
           over
           and
           over
           ,
           
             that
             Substance
             is
             supposed
          
           ;
           but
           that
           is
           not
           what
           I
           looked
           for
           ,
           but
           something
           in
           the
           way
           of
           Certainty
           by
           Reason
           .
           Yes
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
             we
             cannot
             conceive
             how
             these
             sensible
             Qualities
             should
             subsist
             alone
             ,
             and
             therefore
             we
             suppose
             a
             Substance
             to
             support
             them
             .
          
           It
           is
           but
           supposing
           still
           ,
           because
           we
           cannot
           conceive
           it
           otherwise
           .
           But
           what
           Certainty
           follows
           barely
           from
           our
           not
           
             being
             able
             to
             Conceive
          
           ?
           Are
           there
           not
           multitudes
           of
           Things
           which
           we
           are
           not
           able
           to
           conceive
           ,
           and
           yet
           it
           would
           not
           be
           allowed
           us
           to
           suppose
           what
           we
           think
           fit
           on
           that
           account
           ?
           I
           could
           
             hardly
             conceive
          
           that
           Mr.
           L.
           would
           have
           brought
           such
           Evidence
           as
           this
           against
           himself
           ;
           but
           
             I
             must
             suppose
             some
             unknown
             Substratum
          
           in
           this
           Case
           .
        
         
         
           But
           you
           go
           on
           ,
           
             That
             as
             long
             as
             there
             is
             any
             simple
             Idea
             ,
             or
             sensible
             Quality
             left
             ,
             according
             to
             my
             way
             of
             Arguing
             ,
             Substance
             cannot
             be
             discarded
             ,
             because
             all
             simple
             Ideas
             ,
             all
             sensible
             Qualities
             carry
             with
             them
             a
             supposition
             of
             a
             Substratum
             to
             exist
             in
             and
             of
             a
             Substance
             wherein
             they
             inhere
             .
          
           What
           is
           the
           meaning
           of
           
             carrying
             with
             them
             a
             supposition
             of
             a
             Substratum
             and
             a
             Substance
          
           ?
           Have
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           the
           Notion
           of
           a
           Substance
           in
           them
           ?
           
             No
             ,
             but
             they
             carry
             it
             with
             them
             .
          
           How
           so
           ?
           Do
           
             sensible
             Qualities
          
           carry
           a
           
             Corporeal
             Substance
          
           along
           with
           them
           ?
           Then
           a
           Corporeal
           Substance
           must
           be
           intromitted
           by
           the
           Senses
           together
           with
           them
           .
           
             No
             ;
             but
             they
             carry
             the
             Supposition
             with
             them
             .
          
           And
           truly
           that
           is
           burden
           enough
           for
           them
           .
           But
           which
           way
           do
           they
           
             carry
             it
          
           ?
           It
           seems
           it's
           only
           
             because
             we
             cannot
             conceive
             it
             otherwise
             .
          
           What
           is
           this
           Conceiving
           ?
           It
           may
           be
           said
           that
           it
           is
           
             an
             Act
             of
             the
             Mind
             ,
             not
             built
             on
             simple
             Ideas
             ,
             but
             lies
             in
             comparing
             the
             Ideas
             of
             Accident
             and
             Substance
             together
             ,
             and
             from
             thence
             finding
             that
             an
             Accident
             must
             carry
             Substance
             along
             with
             it
             ?
          
           But
           this
           will
           not
           clear
           it
           ;
           for
           the
           Ideas
           of
           Accidents
           are
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ,
           and
           carry
           nothing
           along
           with
           them
           ;
           but
           the
           Impression
           
           made
           by
           sensible
           Objects
           :
           and
           the
           Idea
           of
           Substance
           comes
           in
           by
           way
           of
           Supposition
           with
           the
           other
           ,
           so
           that
           it
           is
           not
           
             the
             comparing
             two
             Ideas
             together
          
           ,
           but
           the
           supposing
           one
           Idea
           from
           another
           ,
           and
           that
           a
           very
           
             obscure
             and
             confused
             one
          
           too
           ,
           as
           is
           confessed
           ,
           
             viz.
             That
             it
             is
             something
             which
             supports
             Accidents
             ,
          
           and
           was
           found
           out
           for
           that
           substantial
           End.
           As
           appears
           from
           these
           remarkable
           words
           of
           yours
           .
        
         
           
             They
             who
             first
             ran
             into
             the
             Notion
             of
             Accidents
             ,
          
           
           
             as
             a
             sort
             of
             real
             Beings
             that
             needed
             something
             to
             inhere
             in
             ,
             were
             forc'd
             to
             find
             out
             the
             word
             Substance
             to
             support
             them
             .
             Had
             the
             poor
          
           Indian
           
             Philosopher
             ,
             but
             thought
             of
             this
             word
             Substance
             ,
             he
             needed
             not
             to
             have
             been
             at
             the
             trouble
             to
             find
             an
             Elephant
             to
             support
             it
             ,
             and
             a
             Tortoise
             to
             support
             his
             Elephant
             .
             The
             word
             Substance
             would
             have
             done
             it
             effectually
             .
             And
             it
             might
             have
             been
             taken
             for
             as
             good
             an
             Answer
             from
             an
          
           Indian
           
             Philosopher
             ,
             that
             Substance
             without
             knowing
             what
             it
             is
             ,
             is
             that
             which
             supports
             the
             Earth
             ,
             as
             we
             take
             it
             for
             a
             sufficient
             Answer
             ,
             and
             good
             Doctrine
             from
             our
          
           European
           
             Philosophers
             ,
             that
             Substance
             without
             knowing
             what
             it
             is
             ,
             is
             that
             which
             supports
             Accidents
             .
          
           What
           can
           be
           ridiculing
           the
           Notion
           of
           Substance
           ,
           
           and
           the
           European
           Philosophers
           for
           asserting
           it
           ,
           
           if
           this
           be
           not
           ?
           I
           forbear
           now
           your
           Repetition
           of
           it
           ;
           because
           I
           see
           it
           doth
           not
           please
           you
           .
           
           But
           truly
           it
           was
           not
           to
           upbraid
           you
           with
           the
           bare
           Repetition
           as
           a
           
             fault
             in
             Writing
          
           (
           many
           of
           which
           I
           am
           too
           much
           sensible
           of
           my self
           ,
           to
           blame
           it
           in
           others
           )
           but
           only
           to
           shew
           that
           it
           was
           not
           a
           sudden
           Fancy
           ,
           but
           a
           deliberate
           ,
           and
           (
           as
           you
           thought
           )
           a
           lucky
           Similitude
           .
        
         
           
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             You
             would
             be
             glad
             to
             hear
             a
             clearer
             and
             more
             distinct
             Idea
             of
             Substance
             ,
             but
             you
             can
             find
             no
             better
             in
             your
             own
             Thoughts
             ,
             or
             in
             the
             Books
             of
             Logicians
             .
          
           Are
           not
           these
           Logicians
           a
           sort
           of
           
             European
             Philosophers
          
           ,
           who
           were
           despised
           so
           much
           before
           ,
           for
           this
           very
           Notion
           of
           Substance
           ?
           Even
           Burgersdicius
           and
           Sanderson
           (
           whom
           you
           quote
           )
           were
           so
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           many
           others
           of
           the
           dull
           
             Tribe
             of
             Logicians
          
           .
        
         
           But
           I
           do
           not
           find
           fault
           with
           the
           Definition
           of
           Substance
           brought
           by
           Logicians
           ;
           for
           they
           do
           not
           say
           ,
           
             that
             it
             was
             found
             out
             only
             to
             support
             Accidents
             ,
          
           but
           they
           say
           ,
           it
           first
           implies
           a
           
             Subsistence
             by
             it self
          
           ;
           and
           then
           
             that
             it
             supports
             Accidents
          
           :
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             The
             former
             implies
             no
             more
             than
             that
             Substance
             is
             a
             Thing
             or
             
             Being
             ;
             or
             in
             short
             ,
             something
             they
             know
             not
             what
             .
          
           Is
           there
           no
           difference
           between
           the
           bare
           Being
           of
           a
           Thing
           ,
           and
           its
           
             Subsistence
             by
             it self
          
           ?
           I
           had
           thought
           Accidents
           or
           
             Modes
             of
             Matter
          
           which
           make
           sensible
           Impressions
           on
           us
           ,
           were
           Things
           or
           Beings
           ;
           or
           else
           there
           could
           be
           no
           effect
           of
           them
           ,
           but
           you
           will
           not
           say
           they
           
             subsist
             of
             themselves
          
           ,
           and
           are
           in
           no
           other
           thing
           as
           the
           proper
           subject
           of
           them
           ,
           and
           you
           confess
           at
           last
           ,
           
             that
             Substance
             doth
             imply
             that
             it
             is
             not
             supported
             it self
             as
             a
             Mode
             or
             Accident
             .
          
           So
           that
           our
           
             European
             Philosophers
          
           happen
           to
           be
           in
           the
           right
           at
           last
           .
        
         
           Well!
           
           
             but
             I
             would
             think
             it
             hard
             to
             be
             thought
             to
             discard
             every
             thing
             which
             I
             do
             not
             comprehend
             ;
             for
             I
             own
             Mysteries
             .
             Why
             then
             should
             I
             charge
             others
             for
             discarding
             Substance
             ,
             because
             they
             have
             but
             a
             confused
             Idea
             of
             it
             .
          
           This
           is
           the
           force
           of
           the
           Charge
           which
           I
           bring
           into
           as
           few
           words
           ,
           as
           may
           be
           ,
           but
           without
           the
           least
           Intention
           to
           abate
           the
           strength
           of
           it
           .
        
         
           To
           which
           I
           answer
           ,
           That
           I
           do
           not
           charge
           them
           with
           
             discarding
             the
             Notion
             of
             Substance
          
           ,
           because
           they
           have
           but
           an
           
             imperfect
             Idea
          
           of
           it
           ;
           but
           because
           upon
           those
           Principles
           there
           can
           be
           no
           
             certain
             Idea
          
           at
           all
           of
           it
           ,
           whereas
           I
           assert
           it
           to
           be
           
           one
           of
           the
           most
           natural
           and
           
             certain
             Ideas
          
           in
           our
           Minds
           ,
           because
           it
           is
           a
           Repugnance
           to
           our
           first
           conception
           of
           Things
           that
           Modes
           or
           Accidents
           should
           subsist
           by
           themselves
           ;
           and
           therefore
           I
           said
           the
           Rational
           Idea
           of
           Substance
           is
           one
           of
           the
           first
           Ideas
           in
           our
           Minds
           ;
           and
           however
           imperfect
           and
           obscure
           our
           Notion
           be
           ,
           yet
           we
           are
           as
           certain
           that
           Substances
           are
           and
           must
           be
           ,
           as
           that
           there
           are
           any
           Beings
           in
           the
           World.
           Herein
           you
           tell
           me
           
             you
             agree
             with
             me
          
           ,
           
           
             and
             therefore
             you
             hope
             this
             is
             no
             Objection
             against
             the
             Trinity
             .
          
           I
           never
           thought
           it
           was
           ,
           but
           to
           lay
           all
           Foundation
           of
           Certainty
           as
           to
           matters
           of
           Faith
           upon
           
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
          
           ,
           which
           was
           the
           Opinion
           I
           opposed
           ,
           does
           certainly
           overthrow
           all
           
             Mysteries
             of
             Faith
          
           ,
           and
           excludes
           the
           Notion
           of
           Substance
           out
           of
           
             Rational
             Discourse
          
           ,
           which
           at
           length
           you
           apprehend
           to
           have
           been
           my
           meaning
           .
        
         
           
           But
           ,
           say
           you
           ,
           
             if
             any
             assert
             ,
             that
             we
             can
             have
             no
             Ideas
             but
             from
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
             ,
             you
             declare
             ,
             that
             this
             is
             not
             your
             Opinion
             .
          
           I
           am
           very
           glad
           of
           it
           :
           And
           I
           will
           do
           you
           all
           the
           Right
           I
           can
           in
           this
           matter
           .
           But
           we
           must
           take
           your
           Meaning
           from
           your
           own
           words
           .
           And
           there
           are
           three
           Particulars
           you
           express
           it
           in
           .
        
         
         
           (
           1.
           )
           
             That
             your
             Meaning
             was
          
           ,
           
           
             to
             signifie
             all
             those
             Complex
             Ideas
             of
             Modes
             ,
             Relations
             ,
             and
             specifick
             Substances
             ,
             which
             the
             Mind
             forms
             out
             of
             simple
             Ideas
             .
          
           So
           that
           these
           Ideas
           are
           allowed
           by
           you
           although
           they
           come
           not
           by
           
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
          
           .
           But
           is
           not
           the
           Notion
           of
           
             particular
             Substances
          
           a
           
             Complex
             Idea
          
           ,
           because
           it
           is
           a
           
             Complication
             of
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ,
           as
           will
           presently
           appear
           from
           your
           own
           words
           ;
           but
           all
           
             simple
             Ideas
             come
             in
             by
             Sensation
             and
             Reflection
             .
          
           But
           you
           may
           say
           
             the
             Combination
             of
             them
             to
             make
             one
             Idea
             ,
             is
             an
             Act
             of
             the
             Mind
             ,
             and
             so
             this
             Idea
             is
             not
             from
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
             .
          
           It
           seems
           then
           ,
           the
           Mind
           hath
           a
           Power
           to
           form
           
             one
             Complex
             Idea
          
           out
           of
           many
           
             simple
             ones
          
           ,
           and
           this
           makes
           a
           true
           Idea
           of
           a
           
             particular
             Substance
          
           not
           coming
           in
           by
           Sensation
           or
           Reflection
           .
           But
           I
           am
           still
           to
           seek
           ,
           how
           this
           comes
           to
           make
           an
           
             Idea
             of
             Substance
          
           ;
           I
           understand
           it
           very
           well
           to
           be
           a
           
             Complex
             Idea
             of
             so
             many
             Accidents
          
           put
           together
           ;
           but
           I
           cannot
           understand
           ,
           how
           a
           
             Complex
             Idea
             of
             Accidents
          
           should
           make
           an
           
             Idea
             of
             Substance
          
           .
           And
           till
           you
           do
           this
           you
           are
           as
           far
           as
           ever
           from
           a
           
             true
             Idea
          
           of
           Substance
           ,
           notwithstanding
           your
           
             Complex
             Ideas
          
           .
        
         
         
           (
           2.
           )
           
             You
             never
             said
             that
             the
             general
             Idea
             of
             Substance
             comes
             in
             by
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
             .
          
           
           And
           if
           there
           be
           any
           Expressions
           that
           seem
           to
           assert
           it
           to
           be
           
             by
             a
             Complication
             of
             simple
             Ideas
             ,
             (
             and
             not
             by
             Abstracting
             and
             Inlarging
             them
             )
             because
             we
             accustom
             our selves
             to
             suppose
             a
             Substratum
          
           ;
           
           it
           ought
           to
           be
           look'd
           on
           
             as
             a
             slip
             of
             the
             Pen
             ,
             or
             a
             Negligence
             of
             Expression
             .
          
           In
           which
           Cases
           ,
           I
           think
           no
           Man
           ought
           to
           be
           severe
           .
           But
           was
           there
           not
           too
           much
           occasion
           given
           for
           others
           to
           think
           ,
           that
           the
           Idea
           of
           particular
           Substance
           was
           only
           a
           
             Complication
             of
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ;
           and
           because
           
             all
             simple
             Ideas
             do
             come
             in
             ,
          
           you
           say
           ,
           
             only
             by
             Sensation
             and
             Reflection
          
           ,
           therefore
           all
           the
           
             Ideas
             of
             particular
             Substance
          
           (
           which
           is
           but
           a
           Complication
           of
           them
           )
           must
           either
           come
           in
           those
           ways
           ,
           or
           else
           we
           can
           have
           no
           true
           Idea
           of
           particular
           Substance
           at
           all
           ?
        
         
           So
           that
           there
           are
           Two
           things
           ,
           wherein
           you
           are
           very
           far
           from
           giving
           Satisfaction
           .
        
         
           
           1.
           
           That
           although
           you
           say
           ,
           
             That
             the
             Idea
             of
             Substance
             in
             general
             is
             made
             by
             Abstraction
          
           ;
           yet
           you
           add
           ,
           
             That
             all
             the
             Ideas
             we
             have
             of
             particular
             distinct
             Substances
             are
             nothing
             but
             several
             Combinations
             of
             simple
             Ideas
             .
          
           From
           whence
           it
           
           is
           plain
           ,
           that
           according
           to
           your
           repeated
           Assertions
           ,
           we
           can
           have
           no
           Idea
           of
           
             particular
             and
             distinct
             Substances
          
           ,
           but
           what
           is
           made
           up
           of
           a
           Complication
           of
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           :
           and
           although
           there
           may
           be
           some
           abstracted
           Notion
           or
           
             general
             Idea
             of
             Substance
          
           ,
           which
           is
           only
           an
           act
           of
           the
           Mind
           ,
           yet
           there
           is
           no
           real
           Idea
           of
           any
           particular
           Substance
           ,
           but
           what
           is
           a
           Complication
           of
           simple
           Ideas
           .
           
             And
             that
             a
             Man
             hath
             no
             other
             Idea
             of
             any
             Substance
             ,
          
           
           
             let
             it
             be
             Gold
             or
             Horse
             ,
             Iron
             ,
             Man
             ,
             Vitriol
             ,
             Bread
             ,
             but
             what
             he
             has
             barely
             of
             those
             sensible
             Qualities
             ,
             which
             he
             supposes
             to
             inhere
             with
             a
             supposition
             of
             such
             a
             Substratum
             ,
             as
             gives
             as
             it
             were
             a
             support
             to
             those
             Qualities
             or
             simple
             Ideas
             ,
             which
             he
             has
             observed
             to
             exist
             united
             together
             .
          
           These
           are
           your
           own
           words
           ;
           and
           what
           can
           the
           meaning
           of
           them
           be
           ,
           but
           that
           we
           neither
           have
           nor
           can
           have
           any
           Idea
           of
           a
           
             particular
             Substance
          
           ,
           but
           only
           with
           respect
           to
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           which
           make
           it
           up
           ;
           and
           these
           being
           
             sensible
             Qualities
          
           ,
           there
           is
           no
           such
           thing
           as
           an
           
             Idea
             of
             Substance
          
           ,
           but
           only
           a
           supposition
           of
           a
           
             Substratum
             to
             support
             Accidents
          
           .
        
         
           2.
           
           
             That
             although
             the
             Idea
             of
             Substance
             
             be
             made
             doubtfull
             by
             attributing
             it
             only
             
             to
             our
             accustoming
             our selves
             to
             suppose
             some
             Substratum
             ;
             yet
             the
             Being
             of
             Substance
             is
             not
             .
          
           How
           is
           this
           possible
           ?
           Is
           not
           the
           Being
           doubtfull
           if
           the
           Idea
           be
           ;
           and
           all
           our
           Certainty
           come
           in
           by
           
             Ideas
             ?
             No
          
           ,
           
           say
           you
           ,
           
             the
             Being
             would
             not
             be
             shaken
             ,
             if
             we
             had
             no
             Idea
             of
             Substance
             at
             all
             .
          
           What!
           not
           as
           to
           our
           Knowledge
           ?
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             there
             are
             many
             things
             in
             Nature
             of
             which
             we
             have
             no
             Ideas
             .
          
           And
           can
           we
           have
           any
           Certainty
           of
           Reason
           as
           to
           those
           things
           ?
           For
           about
           that
           our
           debate
           is
           ,
           viz.
           What
           Certainty
           we
           can
           have
           as
           to
           Substance
           ,
           if
           we
           can
           have
           no
           Idea
           of
           it
           ?
           So
           that
           the
           
             Being
             of
             Substance
          
           on
           these
           Principles
           is
           far
           from
           
             being
             safe
             and
             secure
          
           as
           to
           us
           ,
           when
           we
           have
           so
           lame
           an
           account
           of
           the
           Idea
           of
           it
           .
        
         
           But
           you
           have
           yet
           a
           farther
           distinction
           to
           bring
           off
           the
           Idea
           of
           Substance
           ;
           for
           you
           say
           ,
        
         
           
           (
           3.
           )
           
             That
             the
             Idea
             of
             Substance
             is
             a
             Relative
             Idea
             .
             For
             the
             mind
             can
             frame
             to
             it self
             Ideas
             of
             Relation
             ,
             and
             perceiving
             that
             Accidents
             cannot
             subsist
             of
             themselves
             ,
             but
             have
             a
             necessary
             Connexion
             with
             Inherence
             or
             being
             supported
             ,
             which
             being
             a
             Relative
             Idea
             ,
             it
             frames
             the
             Correlative
             of
             a
             Support
             ,
             which
             is
             Substance
             .
          
           
           And
           now
           I
           think
           we
           have
           all
           that
           is
           said
           in
           Defence
           of
           the
           
             Idea
             of
             Substance
             ;
             viz.
          
           That
           there
           is
           a
           
             Complex
             ,
             Abstracted
          
           and
           
             Relative
             Idea
          
           of
           it
           ;
           which
           is
           derived
           from
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
             got
             by
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
             .
          
           But
           this
           
             Relative
             Abstracted
             Idea
          
           is
           confessed
           to
           be
           
             an
             obscure
             ,
             indistinct
             ,
             vague
             Idea
             of
             Thing
             or
             Something
             ;
             and
             is
             all
             that
             is
             left
             to
             be
             the
             positive
             Idea
             ,
             which
             hath
             the
             Relation
             of
             a
             Support
             or
             Substratum
             to
             Modes
             or
             Accidents
             :
          
           And
           
             that
             what
             Idea
             we
             have
             of
             particular
             and
             distinct
             Substances
             is
             nothing
             but
             a
             Complication
             of
             simple
             Ideas
             with
             the
             supposition
             of
             a
             Substratum
             or
             Support
             .
          
        
         
           These
           being
           the
           Concessions
           and
           Distinctions
           you
           make
           in
           this
           Matter
           ,
           I
           must
           now
           return
           to
           the
           Occasion
           of
           this
           Debate
           ,
           which
           was
           ,
           whether
           the
           ground
           of
           our
           Certainty
           ,
           as
           to
           the
           Nature
           of
           Substance
           can
           be
           resolved
           into
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           we
           receive
           in
           by
           
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
          
           .
           The
           question
           is
           not
           ,
           Whether
           you
           
             doubt
             or
             deny
             any
             such
             Being
             as
             Substance
             in
             the
             World
          
           ?
           nor
           whether
           the
           Notion
           you
           have
           of
           it
           be
           
             clear
             and
             distinct
          
           ?
           for
           you
           confess
           it
           is
           not
           ;
           but
           the
           point
           in
           debate
           is
           ,
           What
           Certainty
           we
           can
           have
           of
           the
           Nature
           of
           Substance
           
           from
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           we
           have
           by
           
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
          
           ?
           And
           here
           the
           question
           is
           not
           ,
           Whether
           the
           mind
           cannot
           form
           Complex
           and
           
             Abstracted
             general
             Ideas
          
           from
           those
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ?
           But
           whether
           those
           
             simple
             Ideas
             are
             the
             Foundation
             of
             our
             Knowledge
             and
             Certainty
             as
             to
             the
             Nature
             of
             Substance
          
           ?
        
         
           
           For
           you
           affirm
           over
           and
           over
           (
           if
           I
           may
           have
           leave
           to
           say
           so
           )
           
             That
             the
             simple
             Ideas
             we
             have
             by
             Sensation
             and
             Reflection
             are
             the
             Foundation
             of
             all
             our
             Knowledge
             .
          
           
           And
           yet
           
             that
             the
             Ideas
             we
             have
             of
             particular
             distinct
             Substances
             are
             nothing
             but
             several
             Combinations
             of
             simple
             Ideas
             of
             Accidents
             .
          
        
         
           Which
           being
           supposed
           ,
           I
           think
           it
           no
           hard
           matter
           to
           make
           it
           appear
           that
           we
           cannot
           come
           to
           any
           Certainty
           as
           to
           the
           Nature
           of
           Substance
           in
           this
           way
           of
           Ideas
           .
           For
           ,
        
         
           1.
           
           The
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           afford
           no
           ground
           of
           Certainty
           any
           farther
           than
           as
           to
           themselves
           .
           Outward
           Objects
           make
           an
           impression
           on
           our
           Senses
           ;
           and
           all
           the
           Certainty
           we
           have
           by
           them
           is
           that
           our
           Senses
           are
           so
           and
           so
           affected
           by
           them
           ;
           but
           what
           that
           is
           in
           those
           Objects
           which
           produces
           those
           Effects
           in
           us
           ,
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           do
           not
           acquaint
           us
           .
           For
           the
           
           old
           or
           new
           Doctrine
           of
           Qualities
           may
           be
           true
           ,
           notwithstanding
           any
           Effect
           of
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           upon
           us
           ;
           for
           the
           same
           effects
           would
           be
           whether
           there
           be
           
             real
             Qualities
             in
             the
             Objects
          
           ,
           or
           only
           a
           
             power
             to
             make
             such
             Impressions
          
           on
           us
           ,
           which
           we
           fancy
           to
           be
           Qualities
           without
           us
           .
           And
           so
           for
           our
           inward
           Perceptions
           ;
           we
           certainly
           know
           ,
           that
           we
           have
           a
           Power
           of
           Thinking
           ,
           Doubting
           ,
           Considering
           ,
           &c.
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           we
           are
           very
           certain
           of
           ;
           but
           whether
           these
           Perceptions
           come
           from
           a
           Material
           or
           
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
             cannot
             be
             certainly
             known
             by
             these
             simple
             Ideas
             :
          
           for
           you
           think
           Matter
           may
           be
           so
           refined
           and
           modified
           as
           to
           produce
           them
           .
           Now
           it
           is
           a
           very
           strange
           thing
           to
           me
           ,
           that
           Men
           of
           Understanding
           should
           make
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
             the
             Foundation
             of
             all
             our
             Knowledge
             and
             Certainty
          
           ;
           and
           yet
           ,
           that
           we
           should
           be
           able
           to
           attain
           to
           no
           Certainty
           at
           all
           by
           them
           ,
           from
           whence
           they
           proceed
           .
           For
           if
           these
           Ideas
           were
           intended
           for
           the
           means
           of
           our
           attaining
           to
           any
           Certainty
           ,
           this
           would
           be
           the
           first
           thing
           we
           should
           know
           by
           them
           .
           It
           is
           not
           distinguishing
           Primary
           and
           
             Secondary
             Qualities
          
           will
           help
           us
           out
           here
           .
           For
           these
           sensible
           Qualities
           of
           Bodies
           ,
           which
           
           arise
           from
           the
           first
           ,
           
             viz.
             Bulk
             ,
             Figure
             ,
             Texture
             and
             Motion
             of
             Parts
             ,
          
           do
           not
           carry
           any
           evidence
           along
           with
           them
           that
           they
           are
           not
           Resemblances
           of
           something
           in
           the
           Objects
           as
           well
           as
           the
           Primary
           .
           It
           is
           very
           easie
           to
           affirm
           ,
           
             That
             there
             is
             in
             Truth
             nothing
             in
             the
             Objects
             themselves
             ,
             but
             only
             Powers
             to
             produce
             various
             Sensations
             in
             us
             :
          
           but
           I
           intend
           not
           to
           dispute
           whether
           it
           be
           so
           or
           not
           ;
           all
           that
           I
           observe
           ,
           is
           ,
           that
           there
           have
           been
           Philosophers
           ,
           both
           European
           and
           others
           ,
           of
           another
           opinion
           ;
           and
           that
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ,
           which
           are
           said
           to
           be
           
             the
             only
             Foundation
             of
             our
             Knowledge
             ,
          
           do
           not
           help
           us
           one
           jot
           in
           the
           Discovery
           .
           For
           it
           is
           confessed
           by
           your self
           ,
           
           
             That
             Sensation
             discovers
             nothing
             of
             Bulk
             ,
             Figure
             or
             Motion
             of
             Parts
             in
             the
             Production
             of
             sensible
             Qualities
             ,
             nor
             can
             Reason
             shew
             how
             Bodies
             by
             their
             Bulk
             ,
             Figure
             and
             Motion
             should
             produce
             in
             the
             Mind
             the
             Ideas
             of
             Blew
             ,
             Yellow
             ,
          
           &c.
           
           How
           then
           are
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           the
           
             Foundation
             of
             our
             Knowledge
             and
             Certainty
             ,
          
           when
           by
           them
           we
           can
           discover
           nothing
           of
           the
           true
           causes
           of
           those
           Impressions
           which
           are
           made
           upon
           us
           ?
           And
           you
           own
           ,
           
           
             That
             the
             Ideas
             of
             Sensation
             are
             often
             corrected
             by
             Iudgment
             ,
             and
             that
             so
             insensibly
             ,
             that
             we
             are
             apt
             to
             mistake
             
             one
             for
             the
             other
          
           ;
           so
           that
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           are
           but
           a
           very
           slippery
           and
           uncertain
           Foundation
           for
           our
           Knowledge
           ,
           unless
           Reason
           and
           Judgment
           be
           watchfull
           to
           prevent
           the
           Errors
           we
           are
           liable
           to
           in
           the
           Ideas
           of
           Sensation
           But
           if
           no
           more
           be
           meant
           by
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
             that
             come
             in
             by
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
             ,
             and
             their
             being
             the
             Foundation
             of
             our
             Knowledge
             ,
          
           but
           that
           our
           Notions
           of
           Things
           come
           in
           either
           from
           our
           Senses
           or
           the
           Exercise
           of
           our
           Minds
           :
           As
           there
           is
           nothing
           extraordinary
           in
           the
           Discovery
           ,
           so
           I
           am
           far
           enough
           from
           opposing
           that
           ,
           wherein
           I
           think
           all
           Mankind
           are
           agreed
           .
           But
           when
           new
           Terms
           are
           made
           use
           of
           by
           ill
           men
           to
           promote
           Scepticism
           and
           Infidelity
           ,
           and
           to
           overthrow
           the
           
             Mysteries
             of
             our
             Faith
          
           ,
           we
           have
           then
           Reason
           to
           enquire
           into
           them
           ,
           and
           to
           examine
           the
           Foundation
           and
           Tendency
           of
           them
           .
           And
           this
           was
           the
           
             true
             and
             only
             Reason
          
           of
           my
           looking
           into
           this
           way
           of
           
             Certainty
             by
             Ideas
          
           ,
           because
           I
           found
           it
           applied
           to
           such
           Purposes
           .
        
         
           (
           2.
           )
           
             The
             Idea
             of
             particular
             Substances
          
           being
           only
           
             the
             Complication
             of
             many
             simple
             Ideas
             ,
          
           can
           give
           no
           greater
           Foundation
           of
           Knowledge
           or
           Certainty
           than
           those
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           of
           which
           it
           consists
           .
        
         
         
           Which
           is
           so
           clear
           of
           it self
           ,
           that
           I
           shall
           not
           go
           about
           to
           prove
           it
           .
           But
           that
           you
           make
           the
           Ideas
           of
           
             particular
             Substances
          
           to
           be
           no
           other
           ,
           
           is
           plain
           from
           the
           several
           places
           before
           mention'd
           ,
           produced
           by
           your self
           in
           this
           Book
           .
           So
           that
           as
           to
           the
           Notion
           of
           
             particular
             Substances
          
           ,
           we
           can
           find
           no
           Foundation
           of
           Knowledge
           or
           Certainty
           at
           all
           from
           the
           Ideas
           .
           It
           cannot
           be
           denied
           ,
           that
           you
           joyn
           
             the
             supposition
             of
             a
             Substratum
          
           with
           this
           
             Complication
             of
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ;
           but
           we
           must
           take
           notice
           that
           you
           place
           the
           Idea
           of
           
             particular
             and
             distinct
             Substances
          
           in
           that
           Complication
           ,
           and
           only
           reserve
           the
           supposition
           of
           the
           Substratum
           ,
           as
           a
           general
           confused
           unknown
           thing
           ,
           which
           makes
           no
           part
           of
           the
           Idea
           ,
           but
           is
           only
           kept
           at
           a
           dead
           lift
           to
           
             support
             Accidents
          
           .
           Your
           words
           are
           ,
           
             When
             we
             talk
             or
             think
             of
             any
             particular
             sort
             of
             Corporeal
             Substance
             ,
          
           
           
             as
             Horse
             ,
             Stone
          
           ,
           &c.
           
             tho'
             the
             Idea
             we
             have
             of
             either
             of
             them
             be
             but
             the
             Complication
             or
             Collection
             of
             those
             several
             simple
             Ideas
             of
             sensible
             Qualities
             ,
             we
             use
             to
             find
             united
             in
             the
             thing
             called
             Horse
             or
             Stone
             :
          
           then
           follows
           ,
           
             Yet
             we
             suppose
             them
             existing
             in
             some
             common
             Subject
             ,
          
           &c.
           
           So
           that
           the
           Idea
           was
           compleat
           before
           the
           supposition
           .
           
           And
           again
           ,
           
             Whatever
             be
             
             the
             secret
             Nature
             of
             Substance
             in
             general
             ,
             all
             the
             Ideas
             we
             have
             of
             particular
             Substances
             are
             nothing
             but
             several
             Combinations
             of
             simple
             Ideas
             .
          
           Can
           any
           thing
           be
           plainer
           ?
           Yet
           there
           follows
           ,
           
             Co-existing
             in
             such
             ,
             though
             unknown
             cause
             of
             their
             Vnion
             ,
             as
             makes
             the
             whole
             subsist
             of
             it self
             .
          
           Here
           we
           have
           still
           
             an
             unknown
             Support
          
           ,
           but
           made
           no
           part
           of
           the
           Idea
           it self
           .
           In
           another
           place
           ,
           the
           
             Idea
             of
             Substance
          
           is
           said
           to
           be
           
             a
             Complication
             of
             many
             Ideas
             together
             ,
          
           
           
             because
             not
             imagining
             how
             these
             simple
             Ideas
             can
             subsist
             by
             themselves
             ,
             we
             accustom
             our selves
             to
             suppose
             some
             Substratum
             which
             we
             call
             Substance
             .
          
           And
           this
           is
           said
           to
           be
           
             the
             Notion
             of
             pure
             Substance
             in
             general
             ,
          
           
           and
           not
           of
           any
           particular
           Substance
           ,
           which
           consists
           in
           a
           
             Complication
             only
             of
             simple
             Ideas
          
           .
        
         
           (
           3.
           )
           The
           
             Relative
             Idea
          
           of
           Substance
           arising
           from
           the
           
             necessary
             Support
          
           of
           Accidents
           is
           a
           mere
           effect
           of
           Reason
           and
           Judgment
           ,
           and
           no
           effect
           of
           any
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           .
           For
           it
           arises
           from
           nothing
           suggested
           by
           the
           Ideas
           of
           Sensation
           or
           Reflection
           ,
           but
           it
           comes
           only
           from
           the
           Mind
           it self
           .
           Because
           ,
           as
           I
           said
           before
           ,
           it
           is
           a
           Repugnancy
           to
           our
           first
           Conception
           of
           Things
           ,
           that
           Modes
           or
           Accidents
           should
           subsist
           by
           themselves
           .
           But
           
           which
           of
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           is
           this
           built
           upon
           ?
           You
           tell
           me
           ,
           
             You
             say
             the
             same
             thing
          
           ,
           and
           quote
           these
           Words
           of
           yours
           ;
           
             And
             I
             say
          
           ,
           
           
             Because
             we
             cannot
             conceive
             how
             simple
             Ideas
             of
             sensible
             Qualities
             should
             subsist
             alone
             ,
             or
             one
             in
             another
             ,
             we
             suppose
             them
             existing
             in
             and
             supported
             by
             some
             common
             Subject
             .
          
           But
           you
           have
           not
           told
           me
           ,
           how
           this
           is
           founded
           on
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ,
           which
           was
           your
           main
           point
           ;
           
             You
             boast
          
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
             of
             my
             Agreement
             with
             you
             herein
             :
          
           I
           wish
           we
           might
           as
           well
           agree
           in
           all
           other
           things
           under
           Debate
           ;
           but
           why
           did
           you
           not
           inform
           me
           ,
           how
           you
           came
           to
           this
           ,
           by
           your
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ;
           and
           what
           steps
           and
           progress
           you
           made
           in
           the
           
             Complication
             of
             your
             simple
             Ideas
          
           before
           you
           came
           to
           it
           .
           For
           truly
           ,
           I
           should
           have
           found
           some
           difficulty
           in
           it
           ,
           since
           you
           make
           the
           
             Idea
             of
             a
             particular
             Substance
             a
             Complication
             of
             many
             simple
             Ideas
             :
          
           for
           if
           it
           be
           so
           ,
           how
           could
           a
           
             Complication
             of
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ,
           which
           cannot
           subsist
           by
           themselves
           ,
           make
           the
           Idea
           of
           a
           Substance
           which
           doth
           subsist
           by
           it self
           ?
           This
           looks
           a
           little
           untowardly
           in
           the
           way
           of
           Knowledge
           and
           Certainty
           .
           But
           there
           is
           no
           help
           for
           it
           ,
           a
           
             Substratum
             must
             be
             supposed
             to
             support
             these
          
           unlucky
           Accidents
           .
           Let
           it
           be
           so
           
           then
           .
           How
           came
           we
           to
           know
           that
           these
           Accidents
           were
           such
           feeble
           things
           ?
           What
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           inform'd
           you
           of
           it
           ?
           If
           none
           ,
           then
           it
           is
           to
           be
           hoped
           there
           is
           some
           other
           way
           to
           attain
           Knowledge
           and
           Certainty
           in
           this
           matter
           .
           No
           ;
           you
           tell
           me
           ,
           there
           is
           no
           need
           of
           any
           other
           way
           ,
           but
           this
           of
           Ideas
           .
           How
           so
           ?
           Your
           words
           are
           these
           ,
           
           
             The
             general
             indetermined
             Idea
             of
             Something
             ,
             is
             by
             the
             Abstraction
             of
             the
             mind
             derived
             also
             from
             the
             simple
             Ideas
             of
             Sensation
             and
             Reflection
             .
          
           But
           alas
           !
           We
           are
           not
           upon
           the
           
             general
             indetermined
             Idea
             of
             something
          
           ;
           but
           upon
           the
           
             particular
             Idea
             of
             distinct
             Substances
          
           ,
           which
           is
           granted
           not
           to
           be
           by
           Abstraction
           ,
           but
           by
           a
           
             Complication
             of
             simple
             Ideas
          
           .
           So
           that
           this
           is
           quite
           off
           from
           the
           matter
           .
           But
           as
           to
           your
           
             general
             abstracted
             Idea
          
           ,
           I
           have
           something
           farther
           to
           say
           .
        
         
           (
           4.
           )
           A
           general
           
             Abstracted
             Idea
          
           of
           Substance
           is
           no
           
             real
             Substance
          
           ,
           nor
           a
           
             true
             Idea
          
           of
           one
           ,
           if
           
             particular
             Substances
          
           be
           nothing
           but
           a
           
             Complication
             of
             simple
             Ideas
          
           .
           For
           you
           say
           ,
           
           
             That
             the
             Mind
             by
             Abstraction
             from
             the
             positive
             simple
             Ideas
             got
             by
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
             comes
             to
             the
             general
             Relative
             Idea
             of
             Substance
             .
          
           If
           then
           the
           
             general
             Idea
          
           be
           raised
           from
           the
           
             simple
             
             Ideas
          
           ,
           and
           those
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           make
           that
           of
           particular
           and
           
             distinct
             Substances
          
           only
           by
           Complication
           ,
           then
           the
           
             general
             Idea
          
           of
           Substance
           can
           be
           nothing
           but
           an
           
             Abstracted
             Complication
          
           of
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ,
           or
           else
           it
           is
           not
           by
           Abstraction
           from
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           .
           But
           I
           do
           not
           deny
           that
           there
           is
           a
           
             general
             Nature
             of
             Substance
          
           ,
           which
           is
           as
           real
           as
           a
           
             general
             Idea
          
           can
           be
           ,
           and
           it
           is
           that
           ,
           which
           makes
           any
           
             particular
             Substance
          
           be
           what
           it
           is
           in
           its
           own
           Nature
           without
           respect
           to
           Individual
           Modes
           and
           Properties
           .
           And
           although
           this
           general
           Substance
           doth
           not
           exist
           of
           it self
           ,
           yet
           it
           doth
           really
           exist
           in
           the
           several
           Individuals
           that
           belong
           to
           its
           kind
           ;
           and
           the
           several
           kinds
           of
           particular
           Substances
           are
           really
           distinguished
           from
           each
           other
           ,
           not
           merely
           by
           
             simple
             Ideas
             of
             sensible
             Qualities
          
           ,
           but
           by
           their
           inward
           Frame
           and
           Constitution
           :
           as
           the
           Substance
           of
           a
           Man
           is
           from
           that
           of
           a
           Horse
           or
           a
           Tree
           .
           For
           it
           is
           ridiculous
           to
           imagine
           ,
           that
           these
           really
           differ
           from
           each
           other
           only
           as
           Individuals
           of
           the
           same
           sort
           under
           the
           general
           
             Abstracted
             Idea
          
           of
           Substance
           .
           And
           if
           there
           be
           Substances
           of
           several
           kinds
           really
           different
           from
           each
           other
           ,
           an
           account
           must
           be
           given
           ,
           not
           only
           of
           the
           
             general
             Notion
             of
             a
             Substratum
             
             for
             Accidents
             ,
          
           but
           of
           the
           
             specifick
             Nature
          
           of
           
             different
             Substances
          
           ,
           and
           wherein
           the
           difference
           of
           the
           
             unknown
             Support
          
           lies
           ,
           as
           to
           the
           Modes
           and
           Accidents
           of
           their
           kinds
           ,
           which
           I
           despair
           of
           ever
           seeing
           done
           by
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
             of
             Sensation
             and
             Reflection
             .
          
           And
           your self
           confess
           ,
           
             That
             we
             have
             no
             Idea
             of
             Abstract
             Substance
          
           ;
           
           and
           that
           
             by
             the
             Complex
             Idea
             of
             sensible
             Qualities
             ,
             we
             are
             as
             far
             from
             the
             Idea
             of
             the
             Substance
             of
             Body
             ,
             as
             if
             we
             knew
             nothing
             at
             all
             .
          
        
         
           And
           now
           I
           freely
           leave
           the
           Reader
           to
           judge
           whether
           this
           be
           a
           tolerable
           Account
           of
           the
           
             Idea
             of
             Substance
          
           by
           
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
          
           ,
           and
           whether
           I
           deserve
           so
           much
           to
           be
           complained
           of
           ,
           for
           exposing
           the
           unreasonableness
           of
           laying
           
             the
             Foundation
             of
             all
             our
             Certainty
             and
             Knowledge
             upon
             simple
             Ideas
             which
             we
             receive
             by
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
             .
          
        
         
           But
           before
           I
           proceed
           further
           ,
           it
           will
           be
           proper
           here
           to
           take
           notice
           how
           you
           justifie
           your
           
             Idea
             of
             Substance
          
           from
           
             the
             Etymology
             of
             the
             Word
          
           ;
           
           which
           ,
           say
           you
           ,
           
             is
             standing
             under
             or
             upholding
          
           .
           I
           told
           you
           very
           little
           weight
           is
           to
           be
           laid
           on
           a
           bare
           Grammatical
           Etymology
           ,
           when
           the
           Word
           is
           otherwise
           used
           by
           the
           best
           Authors
           for
           the
           Essence
           of
           a
           thing
           ;
           and
           
           I
           named
           Cicero
           and
           Quinctilian
           ;
           and
           the
           Greek
           Word
           imports
           the
           same
           .
           But
           still
           you
           say
           ,
           it
           is
           derived
           
             à
             substando
          
           ;
           and
           you
           tell
           us
           your
           opinion
           ,
           
             That
             if
             we
             knew
             the
             Original
             of
             Words
             ,
          
           
           
             we
             should
             be
             much
             helped
             to
             the
             Ideas
             they
             were
             first
             applied
             to
             and
             made
             to
             stand
             for
             .
          
           If
           you
           mean
           the
           
             true
             Ideas
             of
             them
          
           ,
           I
           must
           beg
           leave
           to
           differ
           in
           my
           opinion
           ,
           and
           my
           Reason
           is
           this
           ,
           because
           Words
           were
           used
           before
           men
           came
           to
           form
           Philosophical
           Notions
           or
           Ideas
           of
           Things
           ;
           and
           therefore
           they
           were
           forced
           to
           make
           use
           of
           Words
           applied
           in
           another
           Sense
           ;
           or
           else
           to
           coin
           Words
           on
           purpose
           to
           express
           their
           own
           (
           as
           Cicero
           often
           doth
           ,
           as
           
             Qualities
             ,
             Evidence
             ,
             Comprehension
          
           ,
           &c.
           )
           So
           that
           if
           substare
           were
           used
           in
           another
           Sense
           before
           ,
           it
           doth
           not
           follow
           ,
           that
           it
           ought
           to
           be
           so
           ,
           when
           we
           enquire
           into
           the
           true
           Ideas
           of
           Things
           .
           But
           one
           of
           the
           best
           Criticks
           of
           the
           Latin
           Tongue
           in
           our
           Age
           ,
           hath
           told
           us
           ,
           that
           substantia
           is
           so
           called
           ,
           
           
             quia
             per
             se
             substat
          
           .
           And
           substare
           is
           used
           by
           Terence
           ,
           not
           for
           
             standing
             under
          
           ,
           but
           for
           
             being
             stedfast
             ,
             Metuo
             ut
             substet
             hospes
             .
          
           But
           as
           to
           your
           general
           Observation
           ;
           I
           think
           there
           are
           very
           few
           Words
           used
           in
           the
           Philosophical
           Language
           of
           the
           Romans
           ,
           but
           what
           were
           
           taken
           off
           from
           the
           original
           Sense
           they
           were
           applied
           to
           ;
           as
           Persona
           was
           first
           taken
           for
           a
           Man
           in
           
             Masquerade
             ,
             Genus
          
           for
           a
           
             Pedegree
             ,
             Species
          
           for
           a
           Sight
           ,
           from
           
             Specio
             ,
             to
             see
             ,
             Virtus
          
           for
           manly
           Courage
           ,
           and
           distinguish'd
           from
           
             Probity
             .
             Sit
             virtus
             etiam
             non
             Probitate
             minor
             .
             Ovid.
             de
             Pont.
             l.
          
           3.
           
           And
           so
           Anima
           was
           first
           taken
           for
           
             the
             Breath
             in
             the
             Body
          
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           Spiritus
           .
           Thence
           Varro
           saith
           ,
           
             Their
             Ancestors
             ,
             although
             they
             eat
             Leeks
             and
             Onions
             ,
          
           yet
           were
           
             bene
             animati
             ,
             had
             no
             ill
             Breath
          
           ;
           and
           thence
           
             Animam
             agere
          
           and
           efflare
           ,
           saith
           Cicero
           ;
           and
           from
           Anima
           ,
           he
           saith
           ,
           came
           Animus
           ,
           by
           which
           they
           understood
           
             the
             Mind
             ;
             Hinc
             Animus
             ad
             intelligentiam
             tributus
             ,
          
           saith
           Varro
           ▪
           and
           many
           others
           of
           a
           like
           Nature
           .
           But
           I
           shall
           only
           add
           one
           more
           ,
           and
           that
           is
           the
           Name
           of
           Idea
           ,
           so
           very
           often
           used
           by
           your self
           and
           others
           of
           late
           .
           I
           wish
           we
           had
           been
           told
           
             the
             original
             use
             of
             it
             ,
             and
             how
             it
             was
             first
             applied
             ,
          
           that
           we
           might
           better
           judge
           of
           the
           true
           meaning
           of
           it
           now
           when
           so
           much
           Weight
           is
           laid
           upon
           it
           .
           
           I
           find
           in
           Thucydides
           ,
           who
           was
           an
           accurate
           Writer
           ,
           and
           understood
           the
           true
           Sense
           of
           Words
           ,
           that
           an
           Idea
           is
           used
           by
           him
           for
           an
           
             Appearance
             and
             Shew
          
           without
           Reality
           ,
           as
           when
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             That
             
             the
          
           Athenians
           
             in
             dealing
             with
             the
          
           Sicilians
           ,
           
             made
             use
             of
             the
             same
             Idea
             which
             they
             had
             done
             before
             .
          
           Where
           it
           can
           signifie
           nothing
           but
           what
           he
           calls
           before
           a
           Pretence
           .
           But
           when
           the
           Philosophers
           came
           to
           use
           this
           Word
           ,
           they
           applied
           it
           to
           another
           Sense
           ;
           Plato
           made
           use
           of
           it
           to
           signifie
           the
           true
           Exemplars
           or
           Models
           of
           Things
           ,
           according
           to
           which
           the
           several
           sorts
           of
           them
           were
           framed
           and
           distinguished
           .
           This
           Notion
           he
           had
           ,
           as
           many
           others
           ,
           from
           the
           Pythagoreans
           ,
           but
           what
           they
           Mystically
           called
           Numbers
           he
           called
           Ideas
           .
           But
           Idea
           in
           its
           
             original
             Sense
          
           from
           the
           Etymology
           of
           it
           ,
           is
           derived
           from
           Seeing
           ,
           and
           so
           the
           natural
           Sense
           of
           it
           is
           
             something
             Visible
          
           ;
           from
           thence
           it
           came
           to
           signifie
           the
           Impression
           made
           in
           us
           from
           our
           Senses
           ;
           and
           thence
           it
           was
           carried
           to
           the
           
             general
             Notion
          
           of
           a
           thing
           ,
           and
           from
           thence
           by
           Metaphysical
           and
           abstracted
           Speculations
           to
           the
           
             Original
             Exemplars
          
           of
           particular
           Essences
           ,
           which
           were
           
             Simple
             and
             Vniform
          
           and
           not
           liable
           to
           those
           Changes
           which
           visible
           Objects
           are
           subject
           to
           .
           So
           Cicero
           tells
           us
           ,
           
           
             Plato
             formed
             his
             Notion
             of
             Idea
             ,
          
           which
           he
           would
           by
           no
           means
           allow
           to
           any
           Representation
           made
           by
           our
           Senses
           ,
           which
           
             are
             dull
             ,
             heavy
             ,
             uncertain
             
             and
             imperfect
             either
             by
             the
             Minuteness
             ,
             or
             Distance
             ,
             or
             Mutability
             of
             the
             Objects
          
           ;
           thence
           the
           Philosophers
           of
           his
           School
           denied
           any
           true
           grounds
           of
           Certainty
           to
           be
           laid
           in
           the
           Ideas
           we
           have
           by
           our
           Senses
           ,
           which
           can
           only
           afford
           ground
           for
           Probability
           (
           not
           as
           to
           the
           bare
           Objects
           )
           but
           as
           to
           the
           Notions
           we
           take
           from
           them
           .
           But
           all
           Knowledge
           and
           Certainty
           was
           placed
           in
           the
           acts
           of
           the
           Mind
           
             (
             Scientiam
             nusquam
             esse
             censebant
             nisi
             in
             animi
             notionibus
             atque
             rationibus
             )
             i.
             e.
          
           in
           examining
           and
           comparing
           ,
           not
           the
           
             bare
             Ideas
          
           ,
           but
           the
           
             Definitions
             of
             things
          
           ;
           and
           from
           these
           ,
           judging
           of
           the
           Truth
           and
           Certainty
           of
           them
           .
           And
           if
           our
           Ideas
           of
           things
           be
           
             so
             few
             ,
             so
             superficial
             ,
             and
             so
             imperfect
          
           as
           you
           confess
           them
           to
           be
           ;
           if
           we
           are
           so
           much
           to
           seek
           ,
           as
           to
           
             the
             Connexion
             of
             Ideas
          
           ,
           and
           the
           finding
           out
           proper
           
             intermediate
             Ideas
          
           ,
           I
           am
           afraid
           this
           way
           of
           Certainty
           by
           Ideas
           will
           come
           to
           very
           little
           at
           last
           .
           And
           so
           
             this
             Agreement
             and
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
          
           will
           have
           the
           Fate
           of
           the
           
             Stoicks
             Criterion
             of
             Truth
          
           ,
           which
           only
           multiplied
           Disputes
           ,
           but
           ended
           none
           .
           Never
           any
           men
           talked
           more
           of
           Certainty
           than
           they
           ;
           and
           they
           boasted
           of
           their
           Discoveries
           of
           the
           
             true
             grounds
          
           of
           it
           :
           and
           the
           question
           then
           
           was
           not
           about
           a
           Criterion
           of
           the
           
             bare
             Existence
             of
             things
          
           ;
           (
           about
           which
           they
           allow'd
           the
           Judgment
           of
           the
           Senses
           to
           be
           sufficient
           ,
           and
           the
           Ideas
           from
           them
           to
           be
           true
           ;
           )
           Nor
           was
           it
           about
           a
           Criterion
           for
           
             the
             Actions
             of
             Life
          
           ,
           for
           which
           they
           thought
           Probability
           or
           Opinion
           sufficient
           ;
           but
           it
           was
           about
           finding
           out
           such
           a
           
             mark
             of
             truth
             in
             the
             Ideas
             of
             our
             Minds
             as
             could
             not
             agree
             to
             a
             Falshood
             ,
          
           i.
           e.
           such
           
             an
             Impression
             or
             Signature
          
           ,
           as
           Cicero
           expresses
           it
           ,
           
           
             as
             appear'd
             in
             that
             which
             was
             ,
             which
             could
             not
             be
             found
             in
             that
             which
             was
             not
             .
          
           And
           this
           was
           called
           Visum
           ,
           or
           a
           
             true
             Idea
          
           ;
           his
           words
           are
           ,
           
             Quale
             igitur
             visum
             ?
             quod
             ex
             eo
             quod
             esset
             ,
             sicut
             esset
             ,
             impressum
             est
             ,
             signatum
             ,
             &
             effectum
             .
          
           
           The
           Greeks
           called
           it
           a
           
             Comprehensive
             Idea
          
           ,
           which
           they
           compared
           to
           Light
           ,
           which
           discovers
           it self
           as
           well
           as
           other
           Things
           .
           But
           when
           they
           came
           to
           be
           pinched
           with
           particular
           difficulties
           about
           the
           Natures
           of
           Things
           ,
           they
           were
           never
           able
           to
           make
           out
           that
           infallible
           mark
           of
           Truth
           in
           their
           Idea
           ;
           and
           yet
           this
           was
           a
           more
           likely
           way
           to
           have
           found
           it
           ,
           than
           to
           place
           the
           grounds
           of
           Certainty
           in
           the
           comparing
           the
           
             Agreement
             and
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
          
           ,
           unless
           it
           could
           be
           made
           out
           that
           we
           have
           a
           
           full
           stock
           of
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           are
           able
           to
           discern
           and
           make
           out
           the
           Connexion
           of
           them
           with
           one
           another
           .
           For
           if
           we
           fail
           in
           either
           of
           these
           ,
           the
           talking
           of
           Ideas
           and
           comparing
           those
           which
           we
           have
           will
           do
           us
           little
           service
           in
           finding
           out
           of
           Truth
           .
        
         
           But
           I
           confess
           ,
           the
           design
           in
           general
           is
           so
           good
           ,
           that
           it's
           pity
           that
           it
           should
           lie
           open
           to
           so
           many
           Objections
           ;
           and
           much
           more
           ,
           that
           it
           should
           be
           abused
           to
           very
           bad
           purposes
           .
           But
           my
           joyning
           
             your
             words
             with
             another's
             Application
          
           ,
           is
           that
           which
           hath
           given
           you
           so
           much
           Offence
           as
           to
           make
           you
           think
           it
           necessary
           to
           publish
           this
           Letter
           for
           your
           Vindication
           .
        
         
           2.
           
           I
           come
           therefore
           now
           to
           shew
           
             the
             Care
          
           I
           took
           to
           prevent
           being
           mis-understood
           ;
           which
           will
           best
           appear
           by
           my
           own
           Words
           .
           
             I
             must
             do
             that
             right
             to
             the
             Ingenious
             Author
             of
             the
             
               Essay
               of
               Humane
               Vnderstanding
            
             ,
             (
             from
             whence
             these
             Notions
             are
             borrow'd
             to
             serve
             other
             purposes
             than
             he
             intended
             them
             ,
             )
             that
             he
             makes
             the
             case
             of
             Spiritual
             and
             Corporeal
             Substances
             to
             be
             alike
             .
          
           It
           was
           too
           plain
           ,
           that
           the
           bold
           Writer
           against
           the
           
             Mysteries
             of
             our
             Faith
          
           took
           his
           Notions
           and
           Expressions
           
           from
           thence
           ,
           and
           what
           could
           be
           said
           more
           for
           your
           Vindication
           ,
           than
           that
           he
           turned
           them
           to
           other
           purposes
           than
           the
           Author
           intended
           them
           ?
           And
           the
           true
           Reason
           why
           the
           
             Plural
             Number
          
           was
           so
           often
           used
           by
           me
           ,
           was
           because
           he
           built
           upon
           those
           which
           he
           imagin'd
           had
           been
           your
           grounds
           ,
           and
           my
           business
           was
           to
           shew
           that
           those
           Expressions
           of
           yours
           ,
           which
           seemed
           most
           to
           countenance
           his
           method
           of
           Proceeding
           could
           not
           give
           any
           reasonable
           Satisfaction
           .
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
           
             You
             do
             not
             place
             Certainty
             only
             in
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
             ;
             but
             in
             the
             clear
             and
             visible
             Connection
             of
             any
             of
             our
             Ideas
             .
          
           And
           
             Certainty
             of
             Knowledge
          
           ,
           you
           tell
           us
           ,
           
             is
             to
             perceive
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
             ,
             as
             expressed
             in
             any
             Proposition
             .
          
           Whether
           this
           be
           a
           true
           account
           of
           the
           
             Certainty
             of
             Knowledge
          
           or
           not
           ,
           will
           be
           presently
           consider'd
           .
           But
           it
           is
           very
           possible
           he
           might
           mistake
           or
           misapply
           your
           Notions
           ;
           but
           there
           is
           too
           much
           reason
           to
           believe
           ,
           he
           thought
           them
           the
           same
           ,
           and
           we
           have
           no
           reason
           to
           be
           sorry
           ,
           that
           he
           hath
           given
           you
           this
           occasion
           for
           the
           explaining
           your
           Meaning
           ,
           and
           for
           the
           Vindication
           of
           your self
           in
           the
           matters
           you
           apprehend
           I
           had
           charged
           you
           with
           :
           And
           if
           
           your
           Answer
           doth
           not
           come
           fully
           up
           in
           all
           things
           to
           what
           I
           could
           wish
           ,
           yet
           I
           am
           glad
           to
           find
           that
           in
           general
           you
           own
           
             the
             Mysteries
             of
             the
             Christian
             Faith
             ,
          
           and
           the
           Scriptures
           to
           be
           the
           
             Foundation
             and
             Rule
             of
             it
          
           .
           For
           thus
           you
           conclude
           your
           Book
           ,
           in
           the
           last
           Paragraph
           of
           the
           
             Postscript
             .
             The
             Holy
             Scripture
             is
             to
             me
             ,
          
           
           
             and
             always
             will
             be
             the
             constant
             Guide
             of
             my
             Assent
             ,
             and
             I
             shall
             always
             hearken
             to
             it
             ,
             as
             containing
             infallible
             Truth
             relating
             to
             things
             of
             the
             highest
             Concernment
             .
             And
             I
             wish
             I
             could
             say
             there
             were
             no
             Mysteries
             in
             it
             ;
             I
             acknowledge
             there
             are
             to
             me
             ,
             and
             I
             fear
             always
             will
             be
             .
             But
             where
             I
             want
             the
             Evidence
             of
             things
             ,
             there
             yet
             is
             ground
             enough
             for
             me
             to
             believe
             ,
             because
             God
             hath
             said
             it
             :
             And
             I
             shall
             presently
             condemn
             and
             quit
             any
             Opinion
             of
             mine
             ,
             as
             soon
             as
             I
             am
             shewn
             that
             it
             is
             contrary
             to
             any
             Revelation
             in
             the
             Holy
             Scripture
             .
          
        
         
           Which
           Words
           seem
           to
           express
           so
           much
           of
           a
           Christian
           Spirit
           and
           Temper
           ,
           that
           I
           cannot
           believe
           you
           intended
           to
           give
           any
           advantage
           to
           the
           Enemies
           of
           the
           
             Christian
             Faith
          
           ;
           but
           whether
           there
           hath
           not
           been
           too
           
             just
             occasion
          
           for
           them
           to
           apply
           them
           in
           that
           manner
           is
           a
           thing
           very
           fit
           for
           you
           to
           consider
           .
           For
           in
           an
           age
           wherein
           the
           
             Mysteries
             of
             Faith
          
           are
           
           so
           much
           exposed
           by
           the
           Promoters
           of
           Scepticism
           and
           Infidelity
           ,
           it
           is
           a
           thing
           of
           dangerous
           consequence
           to
           start
           such
           new
           methods
           of
           Certainty
           as
           are
           apt
           to
           leave
           mens
           minds
           
             more
             doubtfull
          
           than
           before
           ;
           as
           will
           soon
           appear
           from
           your
           own
           Concessions
           .
           For
           if
           the
           ground
           of
           Certainty
           be
           resolved
           into
           
             the
             Agreement
             and
             Disagreement
             of
             the
             Ideas
             as
             expressed
             in
             any
             Proposition
          
           ;
           is
           it
           not
           natural
           enough
           from
           hence
           to
           infer
           ,
           that
           from
           whencesoever
           this
           Proposition
           comes
           ,
           I
           must
           judge
           of
           it
           by
           
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             the
             Ideas
          
           contained
           in
           it
           ?
           You
           make
           a
           Distinction
           between
           the
           
             Certainty
             of
             Truth
          
           and
           
             the
             Certainty
             of
             Knowledge
          
           .
           The
           former
           you
           say
           ,
           
           
             Is
             when
             Words
             are
             so
             put
             together
             in
             Propositions
             as
             exactly
             to
             express
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             the
             Ideas
             they
             stand
             for
             :
          
           and
           the
           latter
           ,
           
             When
             we
             perceive
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
             ,
             as
             expressed
             in
             any
             Proposition
             .
          
           But
           our
           question
           about
           Certainty
           must
           relate
           to
           what
           
             we
             perceive
          
           ,
           and
           the
           means
           we
           have
           to
           judge
           of
           the
           Truth
           and
           Falshood
           of
           Things
           as
           they
           are
           expressed
           to
           us
           ;
           which
           you
           tell
           us
           ,
           
             Is
             by
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             the
             Ideas
             in
             the
             Proposition
             .
          
           And
           in
           another
           place
           ,
           
           
             Where-ever
             we
             perceive
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             any
             of
             our
             Ideas
             ,
          
           
           
             there
             is
             certain
             Knowledge
             ;
             and
             when-ever
             we
             are
             sure
             those
             Ideas
             agree
             with
             the
             Reality
             of
             Things
             ,
             there
             is
             certain
             real
             Knowledge
             :
          
           and
           then
           conclude
           ,
           
             I
             think
             I
             have
             shewn
             wherein
             it
             is
             that
             Certainty
             ,
             real
             Certainty
             ,
             consists
             ,
             which
             ,
             what-ever
             it
             was
             to
             others
             ,
             was
             ,
             I
             confess
             ,
             to
             me
             heretofore
             ,
             one
             of
             those
             Desiderata
             which
             I
             found
             great
             want
             of
             .
          
           So
           that
           here
           is
           plainly
           a
           new
           Method
           of
           Certainty
           owned
           ,
           and
           that
           placed
           in
           
             the
             Agreement
             and
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
             .
          
           But
           the
           Author
           already
           mention'd
           ,
           professes
           to
           go
           upon
           the
           same
           grounds
           ,
           and
           therefore
           it
           was
           necessary
           for
           me
           to
           examine
           them
           .
        
         
           He
           saith
           ,
           
           
             That
             the
             simple
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
             we
             receive
             by
             Sensation
             and
             Reflection
             are
             the
             sole
             Matter
             and
             Foundation
             of
             all
             our
             Reasoning
          
           ;
           and
           that
           
             our
             Knowledge
             is
             in
             Effect
             nothing
             else
             but
             the
             Perception
             of
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             our
             Ideas
             .
          
           
           And
           
             that
             where
             our
             Perception
             is
             not
             immediate
             ,
             our
             Certainty
             comes
             from
             the
             clear
             and
             visible
             Connexion
             of
             Ideas
             .
          
           
           For
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             That
             if
             the
             Connexion
             of
             all
             the
             intermediate
             Ideas
             be
             not
             indubitable
             ,
             we
             can
             have
             no
             Certainty
             .
          
           
           Wherein
           now
           do
           his
           grounds
           of
           Certainty
           differ
           from
           yours
           ?
        
         
           But
           
             he
             applies
             them
             to
             other
             Purposes
             .
          
           I
           grant
           he
           doth
           so
           ,
           and
           that
           was
           it
           which
           I
           had
           said
           for
           your
           Vindication
           .
           But
           the
           question
           now
           is
           ,
           whether
           your
           general
           expression
           had
           not
           given
           him
           too
           much
           occasion
           for
           it
           ?
        
         
           It
           is
           true
           ,
           that
           Ch
           3.
           he
           distinguishes
           
             the
             means
             of
             Information
          
           from
           
             the
             ground
             of
             Perswasion
          
           ;
           and
           he
           reckons
           all
           Authority
           Divine
           as
           well
           as
           Human
           among
           
             the
             means
             of
             Information
          
           :
           and
           the
           
             ground
             of
             Perswasion
          
           he
           makes
           to
           be
           nothing
           but
           Evidence
           ;
           and
           this
           Evidence
           ,
           he
           saith
           ,
           lies
           in
           our
           Ideas
           ,
           Ch.
           4.
           in
           the
           
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             them
          
           ,
           p.
           19.
           and
           he
           places
           Certainty
           in
           
             our
             clear
             Perceptions
             of
             this
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             ,
          
           which
           you
           call
           
             clear
             and
             visible
             Connexion
             of
             Ideas
             .
          
           And
           wherein
           then
           lies
           the
           difference
           as
           to
           the
           grounds
           of
           Certainty
           ?
        
         
           But
           his
           design
           is
           
             to
             overthrow
             the
             Mysteries
             of
             Faith.
             
          
        
         
           This
           is
           too
           true
           .
           But
           upon
           what
           grounds
           ?
           Is
           it
           not
           upon
           this
           Principle
           ,
           
             that
             our
             Certainty
             depends
             upon
             the
             clear
             Perception
             of
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
             in
             any
             Proposition
             .
          
           Now
           
           let
           the
           Proposition
           come
           to
           us
           either
           by
           Human
           or
           
             Divine
             Authority
          
           :
           If
           our
           Certainty
           depends
           upon
           this
           ,
           we
           can
           be
           no
           more
           certain
           ,
           than
           we
           have
           clear
           
             Perception
             of
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             the
             Ideas
             contained
             in
             it
          
           ;
           and
           so
           he
           thought
           he
           had
           reason
           to
           reject
           all
           Mysteries
           of
           Faith
           ,
           which
           are
           contained
           in
           Propositions
           ,
           upon
           your
           grounds
           of
           Certainty
           .
        
         
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           you
           own
           
             the
             infallible
             Truth
             of
             the
             Scriptures
             ,
             and
             that
             where
             you
             want
             the
             Evidence
             of
             Things
             there
             is
             ground
             enough
             for
             you
             to
             believe
             ,
             because
             God
             hath
             said
             it
             .
          
           I
           do
           verily
           believe
           you
           ,
           because
           I
           have
           a
           far
           greater
           Opinion
           of
           your
           Sincerity
           and
           Integrity
           than
           I
           see
           reason
           for
           ,
           as
           to
           the
           other
           Person
           who
           pretends
           mightily
           to
           own
           the
           Authority
           of
           Scripture
           at
           the
           same
           time
           when
           he
           undermines
           it
           .
           For
           his
           Words
           are
           ,
           
             The
             Authority
             of
             God
             or
             Divine
             Revelation
             is
             the
             Manifestation
             of
             Truth
             by
             Truth
             it self
             ,
             to
             whom
             it
             is
             impossible
             to
             lye
             ,
          
           p.
           16.
           
           But
           when
           he
           comes
           to
           state
           the
           point
           ,
           how
           far
           we
           are
           to
           believe
           upon
           Divine
           Revelation
           ,
           he
           hath
           these
           Words
           ,
           Sect.
           2.
           ch
           .
           1.
           n.
           10.
           
           The
           natural
           Result
           of
           what
           hath
           been
           said
           is
           ,
           
             That
             to
             believe
             the
             Divinity
             
             of
             Scripture
             ,
             or
             the
             Sense
             of
             any
             Passage
             thereof
             without
             rational
             Proofs
             ,
             and
             an
             evident
             Consistency
             is
             a
             blameable
             Credulity
             ,
             and
             a
             temerarian
             Opinion
             ordinarily
             grounded
             upon
             an
             ignorant
             and
             wilfull
             Disposition
             .
          
           And
           in
           the
           next
           Chapter
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             That
             Revelation
             is
             not
             a
             necessitating
             Motive
             ,
             but
             a
             mean
             of
             Information
             .
             Not
             the
             bare
             Authority
             of
             him
             that
             speaks
             ,
             but
             the
             clear
             Conception
             I
             form
             of
             what
             he
             says
             is
             the
             ground
             of
             my
             Perswasion
             .
          
           And
           again
           ,
           
             Whoever
             reveals
             any
             thing
             ,
             his
             words
             must
             be
             intelligible
             ,
             and
             the
             matter
             possible
             .
             This
             rule
             holds
             good
             ,
             let
             God
             or
             Man
             be
             the
             Revealer
             .
             As
             for
             unintelligible
             Relations
             ,
             we
             can
             no
             more
             believe
             them
             from
             the
             Revelation
             of
             God
             ,
             than
             from
             that
             of
             Man.
          
           Sect.
           2.
           ch
           .
           2.
           n.
           16.
           p.
           42.
           
        
         
           But
           what
           are
           all
           these
           things
           to
           you
           ,
           who
           own
           ,
           
             That
             where
             you
             want
             the
             Evidence
             of
             things
             ,
             the
             Authority
             of
             Revelation
             is
             ground
             enough
             for
             you
             to
             believe
             .
          
           I
           do
           not
           impute
           them
           to
           you
           ,
           but
           I
           must
           say
           ,
           that
           he
           alledges
           no
           ground
           for
           his
           sayings
           but
           your
           ground
           of
           Certainty
           :
           For
           in
           the
           same
           Page
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             That
             the
             conceived
             Ideas
             of
             things
             are
             the
             only
             subjects
             of
             Believing
             ,
             Denying
             ,
             Approving
             ,
             and
             every
             other
             act
             of
             the
             understanding
             .
          
           
           All
           the
           difference
           we
           see
           is
           ,
           that
           he
           applies
           that
           to
           
             Propositions
             in
             Scripture
          
           ,
           which
           you
           affirm'd
           of
           
             Propositions
             in
             general
          
           ,
           viz.
           that
           our
           Certainty
           depends
           upon
           
             the
             clear
             Perception
             of
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             the
             Ideas
             contained
             in
             them
             .
          
           But
           I
           shall
           do
           you
           all
           the
           Right
           I
           can
           ,
           as
           to
           this
           matter
           ,
           by
           shewing
           what
           Reason
           I
           had
           to
           say
           ,
           that
           
             your
             Notions
             were
             turn'd
             to
             other
             purposes
             than
             you
             intended
             them
             ,
          
           and
           that
           I
           shall
           make
           appear
           from
           several
           passages
           in
           the
           same
           Book
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           You
           own
           the
           great
           Defects
           of
           
             Humane
             Knowledge
          
           ,
           
           notwithstanding
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           we
           have
           by
           Sensation
           or
           Reflection
           .
           And
           from
           these
           things
           ,
           
             
               1.
               
               The
               Paucity
               and
               Imperfection
               of
               our
               Ideas
               in
               general
               ;
               because
               our
               Sensation
               and
               Reflection
               goes
               so
               little
               a
               way
               in
               respect
               of
               the
               vast
               extent
               of
               the
               Universe
               ;
               and
               the
               infinite
               Power
               and
               Wisdom
               of
               the
               Creator
               of
               it
               :
               So
               that
               what
               we
               see
               in
               the
               intellectual
               and
               sensible
               World
               ,
               holds
               no
               proportion
               to
               what
               we
               see
               not
               :
               and
               whatever
               we
               can
               reach
               with
               our
               Eyes
               or
               our
               Thoughts
               of
               either
               of
               them
               ,
               is
               but
               a
               point
               ,
               almost
               nothing
               in
               comparison
               of
               the
               rest
               .
            
             
               
               2.
               
               The
               want
               of
               Ideas
               which
               we
               are
               capable
               of
               ,
               because
               although
               we
               have
               Ideas
               in
               general
               of
               Bulk
               ,
               
               Figure
               and
               Motion
               ;
               yet
               we
               are
               to
               seek
               as
               to
               the
               particulars
               of
               them
               in
               the
               greatest
               part
               of
               the
               Bodies
               of
               the
               Universe
               ;
               although
               we
               daily
               see
               their
               Effects
               .
               And
               that
               because
               of
               the
               Distance
               and
               Remoteness
               of
               some
               ,
               and
               the
               Minuteness
               of
               others
               ,
               and
               therefore
               we
               cannot
               come
               to
               a
               scientifical
               Knowledge
               in
               Natural
               Things
               ,
               much
               less
               to
               that
               of
               Spiritual
               Beings
               ,
               of
               which
               we
               have
               only
               some
               few
               and
               superficial
               Ideas
               .
            
             
               
               3.
               
               Want
               of
               a
               discoverable
               Connexion
               between
               those
               Ideas
               we
               have
               .
               Because
               the
               Mechanical
               Affections
               of
               Bodies
               have
               no
               Affinity
               at
               all
               with
               the
               Ideas
               they
               produce
               in
               us
               ;
               there
               being
               no
               conceivable
               Connexion
               between
               any
               Impulse
               of
               any
               sort
               of
               Body
               ,
               and
               any
               Perception
               of
               any
               Colour
               or
               Smell
               which
               we
               find
               in
               our
               Minds
               .
               And
               so
               the
               Operations
               of
               our
               Minds
               upon
               our
               Bodies
               are
               unconceiveable
               by
               us
               ;
               And
               the
               Coherence
               and
               Continuity
               of
               Parts
               of
               Matter
               ;
               and
               the
               original
               Rules
               and
               Communication
               of
               Motion
               ,
               are
               such
               as
               we
               can
               discover
               no
               natural
               Connexion
               with
               any
               Ideas
               we
               have
               .
            
             
               
               4.
               
               Want
               of
               finding
               out
               such
               intermediate
               Ideas
               ,
               
               which
               may
               shew
               us
               the
               Agreement
               or
               Disagreement
               they
               have
               one
               with
               another
               .
               And
               this
               for
               want
               of
               due
               Application
               of
               Mind
               in
               acquiring
               ,
               examining
               and
               due
               comparing
               those
               Ideas
               ;
               and
               by
               ill
               use
               of
               Words
               ,
               which
               have
               so
               much
               perplexed
               and
               confounded
               Mens
               understanding
               .
            
          
        
         
           2.
           
           You
           own
           the
           many
           Failings
           in
           our
           Reason
           .
           
           By
           which
           you
           understand
           two
           Faculties
           in
           our
           Minds
           ,
           
             viz.
             Sagacity
          
           and
           Illation
           ;
           the
           one
           finding
           out
           ,
           and
           the
           other
           ordering
           the
           intermediate
           Ideas
           ;
           so
           as
           to
           discover
           the
           Connexion
           between
           them
           .
           But
           Reason
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           fails
           ,
           
           
             where
             our
             Ideas
             fail
             us
          
           ,
           and
           because
           of
           the
           Obscurity
           ,
           
           
             Confusion
             or
             Imperfection
             of
             our
             Ideas
             ,
          
           
           both
           as
           to
           Matter
           and
           our
           own
           Minds
           ,
           and
           the
           Divine
           Operations
           ;
           and
           for
           want
           of
           intermediate
           Ideas
           ;
           
           and
           by
           proceeding
           upon
           false
           Principles
           and
           dubious
           Expressions
           .
        
         
           3.
           
           As
           to
           Propositions
           you
           own
           these
           things
           ;
           
             
               1.
               
               Those
               are
               according
               to
               Reason
               ,
               
               whose
               Truth
               we
               can
               discover
               ,
               by
               examining
               and
               tracing
               those
               Ideas
               we
               have
               by
               Sensation
               or
               Reflection
               ;
               and
               by
               natural
               
               Deduction
               find
               to
               be
               true
               or
               probable
               .
            
             
               2.
               
               Those
               are
               above
               Reason
               ,
               whose
               Truth
               or
               Probability
               we
               cannot
               by
               Reason
               derive
               from
               those
               Principles
               .
            
             
               3.
               
               Those
               are
               contrary
               to
               Reason
               ,
               which
               are
               inconsistent
               with
               ,
               or
               irreconcileable
               to
               our
               clear
               and
               distinct
               Ideas
               .
            
             
               4.
               
               As
               to
               Faith
               and
               
                 Divine
                 Revelation
              
               you
               own
               ,
               
                 
                   
                   1.
                   
                   That
                   Faith
                   is
                   the
                   Assent
                   to
                   any
                   proposition
                   ,
                   not
                   thus
                   made
                   out
                   by
                   deductions
                   of
                   Reason
                   ,
                   but
                   upon
                   the
                   Credit
                   of
                   the
                   Proposer
                   ,
                   as
                   coming
                   immediately
                   from
                   God
                   which
                   we
                   call
                   Revelation
                   .
                
                 
                   2.
                   
                   That
                   things
                   
                     above
                     Reason
                  
                   and
                   not
                   contrary
                   to
                   it
                   ,
                   are
                   properly
                   Matters
                   of
                   Faith
                   ,
                   and
                   to
                   be
                   assented
                   to
                   on
                   the
                   Authority
                   of
                   Divine
                   Revelation
                   .
                
              
            
          
        
         
           Thus
           far
           I
           have
           endeavoured
           with
           all
           possible
           Brevity
           and
           Clearness
           to
           lay
           down
           your
           Sense
           about
           this
           matter
           .
           By
           which
           it
           is
           sufficiently
           proved
           that
           I
           had
           reason
           to
           say
           ,
           that
           your
           Notions
           were
           carried
           
             beyond
             your
             Intention
          
           .
        
         
           
           But
           you
           still
           seem
           concerned
           
             that
             I
             quote
             your
             Words
          
           ,
           although
           I
           declare
           ,
           that
           they
           were
           used
           to
           other
           purposes
           than
           you
           intended
           them
           .
           I
           do
           confess
           to
           you
           ,
           that
           the
           Reason
           of
           it
           was
           ,
           that
           
           I
           found
           your
           Notions
           as
           to
           
             Certainty
             by
             Ideas
          
           was
           the
           main
           Foundation
           which
           the
           Author
           of
           
             Christianity
             not
             Mysterious
          
           went
           upon
           ;
           and
           that
           he
           had
           nothing
           which
           look'd
           like
           Reason
           ,
           if
           that
           Principle
           were
           removed
           ;
           which
           made
           me
           so
           much
           endeavour
           to
           shew
           that
           it
           would
           not
           hold
           .
           And
           so
           I
           suppose
           the
           Reason
           of
           my
           mentioning
           your
           words
           so
           often
           is
           no
           longer
           a
           Riddle
           to
           you
           .
           
        
         
           I
           now
           proceed
           to
           other
           particulars
           of
           your
           Vindication
           .
        
         
           Among
           other
           Arguments
           against
           this
           Principle
           of
           Certainty
           ,
           I
           instanced
           in
           the
           
             Being
             of
             Spiritual
             Substances
             within
             our selves
             ,
             from
             the
             Operations
             of
             our
             Minds
             ,
             which
             we
             do
             perceive
             by
             Reflection
             ,
             as
             Thinking
             ,
             Doubting
             ,
             Considering
             ,
          
           &c.
           
           This
           Argument
           I
           yielded
           to
           be
           very
           good
           ;
           but
           that
           which
           I
           urged
           from
           thence
           was
           ,
           that
           it
           could
           not
           be
           from
           those
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           of
           the
           Operations
           of
           the
           Mind
           ;
           because
           you
           had
           affirmed
           that
           it
           is
           impossible
           for
           us
           by
           the
           Contemplation
           of
           our
           Ideas
           to
           be
           certain
           without
           Revelation
           that
           a
           material
           Substance
           cannot
           think
           .
           This
           is
           a
           point
           ,
           in
           my
           apprehension
           ,
           of
           great
           consequence
           ,
           and
           therefore
           I
           must
           more
           strictly
           examine
           what
           you
           say
           in
           answer
           to
           it
           .
        
         
         
           
           Which
           is
           ,
           
             That
             thinking
             is
             inconsistent
             with
             the
             Idea
             of
             Self
             Subsistence
             ,
             and
             therefore
             hath
             a
             necessary
             Connexion
             with
             a
             Support
             or
             Subject
             of
             Inhesion
             ,
          
           i.
           e.
           If
           there
           be
           Thinking
           there
           must
           be
           something
           that
           Thinks
           .
        
         
           But
           the
           question
           is
           ,
           Whether
           that
           something
           be
           a
           Material
           or
           Immaterial
           Substance
           ?
           
             But
             this
             Thinking
             Substance
             is
             in
             your
             Sense
             a
             Spirit
             .
          
           The
           question
           I
           put
           is
           ,
           Whether
           Matter
           can
           think
           or
           not
           ?
           If
           not
           ,
           then
           the
           Substance
           which
           thinks
           must
           be
           Immaterial
           ;
           if
           it
           can
           think
           ,
           then
           there
           can
           be
           no
           evidence
           from
           the
           
             Idea
             of
             Thinking
          
           to
           prove
           the
           Substance
           which
           thinks
           to
           be
           Immaterial
           .
        
         
           This
           I
           take
           to
           be
           plain
           Reasoning
           ;
           which
           you
           must
           allow
           ,
           because
           it
           is
           about
           
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             two
             simple
             Ideas
             ,
          
           viz.
           Matter
           and
           Thinking
           .
        
         
           
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             That
             the
             general
             Idea
             of
             Substance
             being
             the
             same
             every-where
             ,
             the
             Modification
             of
             Thinking
             ,
             or
             the
             Power
             of
             Thinking
             joyned
             to
             it
             makes
             it
             a
             Spirit
             ,
             without
             considering
             what
             other
             Modification
             it
             has
             ,
             as
             whether
             it
             has
             the
             Modification
             of
             Solidity
             or
             not
             .
             As
             on
             the
             other
             side
             ,
             Substance
             ,
             which
             hath
             the
             Modification
             
             of
             Solidity
             ,
             is
             Matter
             ,
             whether
             it
             has
             the
             Modification
             of
             Thinking
             or
             not
             .
             And
             therefore
             if
             I
             mean
             by
             a
             Spiritual
             an
             Immaterial
             Substance
             ,
             you
             grant
             that
             you
             have
             not
             proved
             nor
             upon
             your
             Principles
             can
             it
             be
             demonstratively
             proved
             ,
             that
             there
             is
             an
             Immaterial
             Substance
             in
             us
             that
             thinks
             .
          
        
         
           I
           have
           thus
           set
           down
           your
           own
           Words
           ,
           that
           you
           may
           not
           complain
           I
           have
           done
           you
           Injury
           .
           
           But
           when
           you
           put
           in
           
             demonstratively
             proved
          
           ,
           I
           suppose
           you
           mean
           
             in
             the
             way
             of
             Certainty
             by
             Ideas
          
           ;
           for
           concerning
           that
           our
           dispute
           is
           .
           And
           therefore
           when
           you
           add
           ,
           
             That
             you
             expect
             that
             I
             should
             conclude
             it
             demonstrable
             from
             Principles
             of
             Philosophy
          
           ;
           you
           must
           give
           me
           leave
           to
           say
           ,
           this
           is
           going
           off
           from
           the
           business
           before
           us
           ;
           which
           is
           about
           
             your
             Principles
             of
             Certainty
             from
             Ideas
          
           ;
           for
           it
           was
           only
           to
           that
           purpose
           ,
           that
           I
           brought
           this
           argument
           to
           prove
           ,
           that
           we
           cannot
           from
           our
           Ideas
           be
           certain
           of
           one
           of
           the
           points
           of
           greatest
           importance
           ,
           viz.
           that
           there
           is
           a
           Spiritual
           Substance
           within
           us
           ;
           and
           yet
           the
           operations
           of
           our
           Mind
           are
           made
           one
           of
           the
           Sources
           of
           those
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ,
           which
           are
           made
           by
           you
           the
           Foundation
           of
           Knowledge
           and
           Certainty
           .
           So
           that
           the
           
           point
           before
           us
           is
           ,
           whether
           this
           Assertion
           of
           yours
           ,
           
             That
             the
             Power
             of
             Thinking
             may
             belong
             to
             modified
             Matter
             ,
          
           doth
           not
           overthrow
           your
           Certainty
           by
           Ideas
           ?
        
         
           No
           ,
           say
           you
           ,
           that
           which
           you
           are
           certain
           of
           by
           the
           Idea
           is
           only
           ,
           
             That
             there
             is
             in
             us
             a
             Spiritual
             Substance
             ,
          
           and
           that
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           implies
           no
           more
           than
           a
           
             Thinking
             Substance
          
           ,
           i.
           e.
           that
           by
           Thinking
           you
           can
           prove
           you
           have
           a
           Power
           of
           Thinking
           ,
           which
           I
           believe
           may
           be
           
             demonstratively
             proved
          
           .
        
         
           But
           I
           pray
           Sir
           ,
           consider
           how
           this
           question
           arose
           ,
           it
           was
           from
           your
           distinguishing
           Spiritual
           and
           
             Corporeal
             Substances
          
           from
           each
           other
           ;
           and
           saying
           that
           
             we
             have
             as
             clear
             a
             Notion
             of
             a
             Spirit
             as
             we
             have
             of
             a
             Body
             .
          
           Against
           this
           I
           urged
           ,
           that
           if
           it
           be
           possible
           for
           Matter
           to
           think
           ,
           which
           you
           assert
           ,
           then
           from
           the
           Idea
           of
           Thinking
           ,
           we
           cannot
           prove
           the
           Certainty
           of
           a
           Spiritual
           Substance
           within
           us
           ,
           where
           it
           is
           plain
           ,
           that
           a
           
             Spiritual
             Substance
          
           is
           opposed
           to
           the
           
             Power
             of
             Matter
          
           .
           It
           is
           not
           ,
           whether
           
             Matter
             so
             modified
             can
             think
          
           ,
           but
           whether
           
             Matter
             can
             think
          
           ;
           and
           let
           it
           be
           modified
           how
           it
           will
           ,
           Matter
           is
           Matter
           still
           .
           
             But
             the
             Power
             of
             Thinking
             makes
             it
             a
             Spirit
             ,
          
           say
           
           you
           .
           But
           doth
           it
           cease
           to
           be
           Matter
           or
           not
           ?
           If
           not
           ,
           then
           it
           is
           Matter
           still
           endued
           with
           a
           Power
           of
           Thinking
           ;
           and
           so
           our
           Idea
           can
           be
           no
           other
           ,
           than
           of
           a
           Material
           Thinking
           Substance
           .
           But
           you
           say
           further
           ,
           
             That
             the
             Power
             of
             Thinking
             makes
             it
             a
             Spirit
             ,
             without
             considering
             what
             other
             Modifications
             it
             has
             ,
             whether
             it
             hath
             the
             Modification
             of
             Solidity
             or
             not
             .
          
           That
           is
           ,
           
             Although
             it
             be
             really
             a
             
               Material
               Substance
            
             ,
             yet
             the
             Modification
             of
             Thinking
             makes
             it
             a
             
               Spiritual
               Substance
            
             ;
             for
             we
             are
             to
             go
             no
             farther
             than
             that
             
               Modification
               of
               Thinking
            
             ,
             and
             from
             thence
             we
             are
             to
             conclude
             it
             to
             be
             a
             
               Spiritual
               Substance
            
             .
          
           But
           we
           are
           now
           enquiring
           not
           into
           the
           bare
           
             Modification
             of
             Thinking
          
           ;
           but
           whether
           from
           thence
           we
           can
           prove
           an
           
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           within
           us
           ,
           or
           which
           is
           all
           one
           ,
           a
           
             Spiritual
             Substance
          
           as
           opposed
           to
           Corporeal
           ,
           which
           is
           your
           own
           Distinction
           .
           And
           that
           I
           may
           not
           be
           thought
           to
           do
           you
           injury
           ,
           I
           shall
           produce
           your
           own
           Words
           .
        
         
           
             By
             the
             simple
             Ideas
             we
             have
             taken
             from
             our
             own
             minds
             —
             we
             are
             able
             to
             frame
             the
             complex
             Idea
             of
             a
             Spirit
             .
          
           
           
             And
             thus
             by
             putting
             together
             the
             Ideas
             of
             Thinking
             ,
             Perceiving
             ,
             Liberty
             and
             Power
             of
             moving
             
             themselves
             ,
             we
             have
             as
             clear
             a
             Perception
             and
             Notion
             of
             Immaterial
             Substances
             ,
             as
             well
             as
             material
             .
          
           So
           that
           here
           we
           have
           two
           things
           clear
           .
        
         
           
             1.
             
             That
             a
             Spirit
             and
             
               Immaterial
               Substance
            
             are
             the
             same
             .
          
           
             2.
             
             That
             from
             the
             
               Operations
               of
               our
               Minds
            
             ,
             we
             have
             a
             
               clear
               Idea
            
             of
             an
             
               Immaterial
               Substance
            
             within
             us
             .
          
        
         
           
           Again
           you
           say
           ,
           
             That
             the
             primary
             Ideas
             we
             have
             of
             Body
             as
             contradistinguished
             to
             Spirit
             ,
             are
             the
             Cohesion
             of
             solid
             and
             consequently
             separable
             parts
             ,
             and
             a
             Power
             of
             communicating
             Motion
             by
             Impulse
             .
             These
             you
             think
             are
             the
             Original
             Ideas
             proper
             and
             peculiar
             to
             Body
             .
          
           Here
           Body
           is
           
             contradistinguished
             to
             Spirit
          
           ;
           and
           as
           it
           is
           so
           ,
           
             the
             Cohesion
             of
             solid
             and
             separable
             Parts
          
           is
           made
           one
           of
           the
           
             original
             Ideas
          
           proper
           and
           peculiar
           to
           Body
           
             as
             distinguished
          
           from
           
             a
             Spiritual
             Substance
          
           :
           How
           then
           ,
           I
           pray
           ,
           can
           a
           
             Spiritual
             Substance
          
           consist
           of
           
             solid
             and
             separable
             Parts
          
           ?
           For
           whatever
           is
           solid
           ,
           you
           grant
           to
           be
           
             consequently
             separable
          
           .
           This
           seems
           to
           me
           to
           confound
           the
           Ideas
           of
           
             Body
             and
             Spirit
          
           ,
           which
           you
           had
           taken
           so
           much
           care
           to
           distinguish
           ;
           and
           so
           must
           destroy
           all
           Certainty
           of
           a
           Spiritual
           Substance
           from
           your
           Ideas
           .
           For
           although
           the
           
           bare
           
             simple
             Idea
          
           of
           Thinking
           may
           be
           said
           to
           be
           distinct
           from
           that
           of
           a
           
             solid
             Body
          
           ;
           yet
           it
           is
           impossible
           from
           that
           Idea
           so
           explained
           to
           prove
           a
           
             Spiritual
             Substance
          
           ,
           as
           distinct
           from
           Body
           .
           Which
           was
           the
           thing
           I
           intended
           to
           prove
           .
        
         
           But
           you
           go
           on
           to
           compare
           the
           
             Complex
             Idea
          
           of
           Spirit
           and
           Body
           in
           these
           Words
           ;
           
           
             Let
             us
             compare
             then
             our
             Complex
             Idea
             of
             Spirit
             ,
             without
             our
             Complex
             Idea
             of
             Body
             .
             Our
             Idea
             of
             Bod●
             is
             an
             extended
             solid
             Substance
             ,
             capable
             of
             communicating
             Motion
             by
             Impulse
             ;
             and
             our
             Idea
             of
             our
             Souls
             is
             of
             a
             Substance
             that
             thinks
             and
             has
             a
             Power
             of
             exciting
             Motion
             in
             Body
             by
             Will
             and
             Thought
             .
             These
             you
             think
             are
             our
             Complex
             Ideas
             of
             Soul
             and
             Body
             as
             contradistinguished
             .
          
           Here
           you
           do
           not
           speak
           of
           the
           bare
           Ideas
           of
           Thinking
           and
           Solidity
           ;
           but
           of
           the
           
             different
             Substances
          
           ,
           and
           one
           is
           said
           to
           be
           a
           
             solid
             Substance
          
           and
           the
           other
           
             a
             Substance
             that
             thinks
          
           .
        
         
           I
           shall
           add
           one
           passage
           more
           to
           the
           same
           purpose
           .
        
         
           
             The
             Idea
             we
             have
             of
             Spirit
             compared
             with
             that
             we
             have
             of
             Body
             ,
          
           
           
             stands
             thus
             .
             The
             Substance
             of
             Spirit
             is
             unknown
             to
             us
             ,
             and
             so
             is
             the
             Substance
             of
             Body
             equally
             unknown
             to
             us
             .
          
           Here
           we
           have
           again
           
             the
             
             Substance
             of
             Spirit
          
           and
           the
           
             Substance
             of
             Body
          
           distinguished
           from
           each
           other
           ;
           and
           not
           the
           bare
           Modifications
           .
           So
           that
           I
           need
           no
           body
           to
           answer
           you
           but
           your self
           .
           But
           least
           such
           expressions
           should
           be
           thought
           a
           mere
           
             slip
             of
             the
             Pen
          
           ;
           you
           are
           pleased
           again
           to
           assert
           
             the
             Notion
             of
             an
             Immaterial
             knowing
             Substance
             to
             imply
             no
             more
             of
             a
             Contradiction
             than
             an
             extended
             divisible
             Body
             .
          
           
        
         
           And
           yet
           after
           all
           this
           you
           confess
           ,
           
             That
             you
             have
             not
             proved
             an
             Immaterial
             Substance
             ,
          
           
           
             and
             that
             it
             cannot
             be
             proved
             upon
             your
             Principles
             .
          
        
         
           What
           is
           the
           meaning
           of
           this
           ?
           I
           cannot
           think
           you
           intended
           to
           lessen
           the
           Authority
           of
           your
           Book
           in
           so
           considerable
           a
           part
           of
           it
           :
           And
           I
           should
           much
           rather
           have
           thought
           the
           latter
           Passage
           a
           
             slip
             of
             your
             Pen
          
           ,
           but
           that
           in
           your
           Letter
           you
           go
           about
           to
           defend
           it
           .
           Therefore
           I
           must
           attend
           your
           Motions
           in
           it
           .
        
         
           
           You
           say
           ,
           
             That
             all
             the
             great
             ends
             of
             Religion
             and
             Morality
             are
             secured
             barely
             by
             the
             Immortality
             of
             the
             Soul
             without
             a
             necessary
             supposition
             that
             the
             Soul
             is
             Immaterial
             .
          
        
         
           I
           am
           of
           opinion
           ,
           that
           the
           
             great
             ends
             of
             Religion
             and
             Morality
             are
             best
             secured
          
           by
           the
           Proofs
           of
           the
           
             Immortality
             of
             the
             
             Soul
          
           from
           its
           
             Nature
             and
             Properties
          
           ;
           and
           which
           I
           think
           prove
           it
           Immaterial
           .
           I
           do
           not
           question
           whether
           God
           can
           give
           Immortality
           to
           a
           
             Material
             Substance
          
           ;
           but
           I
           say
           it
           takes
           off
           very
           much
           from
           the
           evidence
           of
           Immortality
           ,
           if
           it
           depend
           wholly
           upon
           God's
           giving
           that
           ,
           which
           of
           its
           own
           Nature
           it
           is
           not
           capable
           of
           .
           For
           if
           the
           Soul
           be
           a
           
             material
             Substance
          
           it
           is
           really
           nothing
           but
           Life
           ;
           or
           Matter
           put
           into
           Motion
           with
           such
           Organs
           and
           Parts
           as
           are
           necessary
           to
           hold
           them
           together
           ;
           and
           when
           Death
           comes
           ,
           then
           this
           
             Material
             Substance
          
           so
           modified
           is
           lost
           .
           God
           may
           by
           his
           Power
           grant
           a
           new
           Life
           ;
           but
           will
           any
           man
           say
           ,
           God
           can
           preserve
           the
           Life
           of
           a
           Man
           when
           he
           is
           dead
           ?
           This
           is
           a
           plain
           Absurdity
           ,
           and
           I
           think
           no
           such
           thing
           tends
           to
           
             preserve
             Religion
             or
             Morality
          
           .
        
         
           Mr.
           Hobbes
           speaks
           very
           consonantly
           to
           his
           own
           Principles
           (
           although
           not
           to
           those
           of
           Religion
           and
           Morality
           .
           
           )
           For
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             That
             the
             universe
             being
             the
             Aggregate
             of
             all
             Bodies
             ,
             there
             is
             no
             real
             part
             of
             it
             that
             is
             not
             also
             a
             Body
             .
          
           And
           so
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             That
             Substance
             and
             Body
             signifie
             the
             same
             thing
             ,
             and
             therefore
             Substance
             Incorporeal
             are
             Words
             which
             destroy
             one
             another
             .
          
           But
           what
           then
           is
           
             a
             
             Spirit
             ?
             That
          
           ,
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             in
             the
             proper
             signification
             of
             it
             in
             common
             Speech
             ,
             is
             either
             a
             subtle
             ,
             fluid
             ,
             invisible
             Body
             ,
             or
             a
             Ghost
             ,
             or
             other
             Idol
             or
             Phantasm
             of
             the
             Imagination
             .
          
           But
           is
           there
           not
           an
           
             Immortal
             Soul
          
           in
           Man
           ?
           
             The
             Promise
             of
             Immortality
          
           ,
           saith
           he
           ,
           
             is
             made
             to
             the
             Man
             and
             not
             to
             the
             Soul
          
           ▪
           and
           
             Immortal
             Life
             doth
             not
             begin
             in
             Man
             till
             the
             Resurrection
             .
          
           From
           whence
           it
           is
           plain
           ,
           he
           look'd
           on
           the
           Soul
           as
           nothing
           but
           the
           Life
           ;
           
           and
           so
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             That
             Soul
             and
             Life
             in
             Scripture
             do
             usually
             signifie
             the
             same
             thing
             .
          
           And
           in
           the
           Vindication
           of
           his
           Leviathan
           ,
           
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             That
             his
             Doctrine
             is
             ,
             that
             the
             Soul
             is
             not
             a
             separated
             Substance
             ,
             but
             that
             the
             Man
             at
             his
             Resurrection
             shall
             be
             revived
             .
          
           And
           he
           answers
           that
           place
           ,
           
             Fear
             not
             them
             which
             kill
             the
             Body
             ,
             but
             cannot
             kill
             the
             Soul
          
           ;
           thus
           ▪
           
             Man
             cannot
             kill
             a
             Soul
             ,
             for
             the
             Man
             killed
             shall
             revive
             again
             .
          
           I
           think
           he
           might
           as
           well
           have
           said
           ,
           
             That
             Man
             cannot
             kill
             the
             Body
          
           ;
           for
           that
           shall
           be
           revived
           at
           the
           Resurrection
           .
        
         
           
             But
             what
             is
             all
             this
             to
             you
             ?
          
           I
           hope
           nothing
           at
           all
           .
           But
           it
           shews
           ,
           that
           those
           who
           have
           gone
           about
           to
           overthrow
           
             the
             Immortality
             of
             the
             Soul
             by
             Nature
             ,
          
           have
           not
           been
           thought
           
             to
             secure
             the
             
             great
             ends
             of
             Religion
             and
             Morality
             .
          
        
         
           And
           although
           we
           think
           the
           separate
           State
           of
           the
           Soul
           after
           Death
           is
           sufficiently
           revealed
           in
           Scripture
           ,
           yet
           it
           creates
           a
           great
           difficulty
           in
           understanding
           it
           ,
           if
           the
           Soul
           be
           nothing
           but
           Life
           ,
           or
           a
           
             Material
             Substance
          
           ,
           which
           must
           be
           dissolved
           when
           Life
           is
           ended
           .
           For
           if
           the
           Soul
           be
           a
           
             Material
             Substance
          
           it
           must
           be
           made
           up
           as
           others
           are
           ,
           
             of
             the
             Cohesion
             of
             solid
             and
             separate
             Parts
             ,
          
           how
           minute
           and
           invisible
           soever
           they
           be
           .
           And
           what
           is
           it
           which
           should
           keep
           them
           together
           ,
           when
           Life
           is
           gone
           ?
           So
           that
           it
           is
           no
           easie
           matter
           to
           give
           an
           account
           ,
           how
           the
           Soul
           should
           be
           capable
           of
           Immortality
           ,
           unless
           it
           be
           an
           
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           ;
           and
           then
           we
           know
           the
           Solution
           of
           the
           Texture
           of
           Bodies
           cannot
           reach
           the
           Soul
           being
           of
           a
           different
           Nature
           .
        
         
           And
           this
           is
           no
           more
           than
           what
           the
           wisest
           and
           most
           intelligent
           Philosophers
           have
           asserted
           ,
           merely
           from
           the
           consideration
           of
           the
           Nature
           and
           Properties
           of
           the
           Soul
           :
           as
           you
           very
           well
           know
           ;
           and
           I
           need
           not
           for
           your
           sake
           ,
           run
           into
           such
           a
           Digression
           ,
           (
           or
           as
           you
           call
           it
           
             step
             out
             of
             my
             way
          
           )
           any
           farther
           ,
           then
           you
           give
           occasion
           for
           it
           in
           what
           follows
           .
           For
           you
           tell
           me
           ,
           
           
             You
             have
             great
             Authorities
             
             to
             justifie
             your
             using
             a
             Spiritual
             Substance
             without
             excluding
             Materiality
             from
             it
             .
          
           And
           for
           this
           you
           refer
           me
           to
           two
           great
           men
           indeed
           among
           the
           
             Romans
             ,
             Cicero
          
           and
           Virgil.
           I
           was
           surprized
           at
           what
           you
           say
           out
           of
           Cicero
           ,
           having
           been
           no
           stranger
           to
           his
           Writings
           about
           these
           matters
           ,
           and
           I
           have
           consulted
           the
           place
           you
           refer
           to
           ;
           where
           you
           say
           that
           he
           opposes
           Corpus
           to
           Ignis
           and
           Anima
           ,
           i.
           e.
           Breath
           ;
           and
           that
           the
           Foundation
           of
           his
           distinction
           of
           the
           Soul
           from
           the
           Body
           is
           ,
           
             because
             it
             is
             so
             subtle
             as
             to
             be
             out
             of
             Sight
             .
          
           It
           is
           a
           very
           easie
           matter
           to
           multiply
           Citations
           out
           of
           Cicero
           ,
           where
           Spiritus
           and
           Anima
           are
           both
           taken
           for
           Breath
           ;
           but
           any
           one
           who
           will
           but
           read
           the
           very
           beginning
           of
           his
           
             Tusculan
             Questions
          
           ,
           may
           understand
           his
           meaning
           .
           For
           in
           the
           Entrance
           of
           that
           Dispute
           he
           takes
           Animus
           for
           the
           Soul
           ,
           and
           neither
           Anima
           nor
           Spiritus
           :
           and
           he
           tells
           us
           ,
           there
           were
           two
           opinions
           about
           it
           at
           Death
           .
           Some
           held
           a
           
             Discessus
             Animi
             à
             Corpore
          
           ,
           a
           departure
           of
           the
           Soul
           from
           the
           Body
           ,
           others
           said
           ,
           that
           the
           Soul
           never
           departed
           ,
           but
           was
           extinguished
           with
           Life
           :
           and
           the
           several
           opinions
           he
           sets
           down
           at
           large
           ,
           Ch.
           9
           ,
           10.
           and
           then
           Ch.
           11.
           he
           summs
           up
           the
           different
           opinions
           ;
           and
           
           saith
           he
           ,
           
             If
             it
             be
             the
             Heart
             ,
             or
             Blood
             ,
             or
             Brain
             ;
             because
             it
             is
             a
             Body
             ,
             it
             will
             be
             extinguished
             with
             it
             :
             If
             it
             be
          
           Anima
           ,
           
             the
             Vital
             Breath
             ,
             it
             will
             be
             dissipated
             ,
             if
             it
             be
             Fire
             ,
             it
             will
             be
             extinguished
             .
          
           It
           is
           true
           ,
           he
           distinguishes
           here
           the
           
             Vital
             Breath
          
           from
           the
           Body
           ;
           and
           no
           one
           questions
           such
           a
           distinction
           of
           the
           Animal
           and
           Vital
           Spirits
           from
           the
           grosser
           parts
           of
           the
           Body
           ;
           but
           all
           this
           proceeds
           upon
           the
           Supposition
           of
           those
           who
           held
           nothing
           to
           survive
           after
           Death
           ;
           but
           then
           he
           goes
           on
           to
           those
           who
           held
           the
           Souls
           ,
           when
           they
           are
           gone
           out
           of
           their
           Bodies
           ,
           
             to
             go
             to
             Heaven
             as
             their
             proper
             Habitation
             .
          
           And
           here
           he
           plainly
           supposes
           the
           Soul
           not
           to
           be
           a
           
             finer
             sort
             of
             Body
          
           ,
           but
           of
           a
           different
           Nature
           from
           the
           Body
           which
           it
           leaves
           .
           
             Nam
             Corpus
             quidem
          
           ,
           saith
           he
           ,
           
             quasi
             vas
             est
             &
             receptaculum
             Animi
             ,
          
           C.
           22.
           and
           elsewhere
           he
           calls
           the
           Body
           the
           Prison
           of
           the
           Soul
           ,
           C.
           30.
           and
           saith
           ,
           
             That
             every
             wise
             Man
             is
             glad
             to
             be
             dismissed
             out
             of
             the
             Bonds
             and
             Darkness
             of
             it
             :
          
           and
           his
           business
           in
           the
           Body
           is
           
             secernere
             Animum
             à
             Corpore
          
           ,
           to
           draw
           off
           the
           Soul
           from
           the
           Body
           ;
           which
           the
           Philosophers
           called
           
             Commentatio
             mortis
          
           ,
           i.
           e.
           a
           
             Continual
             Exercise
             of
             Dying
          
           ;
           therefore
           ,
           saith
           he
           ,
           
             Disjungamus
             nos
             à
             Corporibus
             ,
             
             id
             est
             ,
             consuescamus
             mori
             .
          
           Is
           it
           possible
           now
           to
           think
           so
           great
           a
           Man
           look'd
           on
           the
           Soul
           but
           as
           a
           
             Modification
             of
             the
             Body
          
           ,
           which
           must
           be
           at
           an
           end
           with
           Life
           ?
           Instead
           of
           it
           ,
           there
           are
           several
           things
           very
           remarkable
           in
           this
           very
           Book
           concerning
           the
           Immortality
           of
           Souls
           by
           Nature
           ;
        
         
           1.
           
           He
           extremely
           despises
           those
           who
           made
           the
           Soul
           a
           mere
           Mode
           of
           Matter
           which
           was
           extinguished
           with
           Life
           ;
           and
           he
           saith
           ,
           they
           were
           
             Plebeii
             Philosophi
             ,
             Ch.
          
           23.
           a
           mean
           sort
           of
           Philosophers
           ,
           and
           in
           another
           place
           
             minuti
             Philosophi
          
           ,
           De
           Senect
           .
           c.
           23.
           
             who
             held
             there
             was
             no
             Sense
             after
             Death
             .
          
           But
           he
           represents
           Cato
           there
           ,
           as
           weary
           of
           
             the
             Noise
             and
             Filth
             of
             this
             World
             ,
          
           and
           
             longing
             to
             go
             to
             far
             better
             Company
             .
             O
             praeclarum
             diem
             ,
             cum
             ad
             illud
             Divinum
             Animorum
             Concilium
             Coetumque
             proficiscar
             ,
             atque
             ex
             hâc
             turbâ
             &
             colluvione
             discedam
             !
          
           Did
           these
           men
           look
           on
           the
           Souls
           of
           Men
           ,
           as
           mere
           
             Modifications
             of
             Matter
          
           ?
        
         
           2.
           
           He
           urges
           the
           
             general
             Consent
          
           of
           Nations
           for
           the
           Permanency
           of
           Souls
           after
           Death
           .
           c.
           16.
           and
           he
           affirms
           Nature
           it self
           
             de
             Immortalitate
             Animorum
             tacitè
             judicare
          
           ,
           c.
           14.
           
           And
           I
           do
           not
           think
           the
           general
           Consent
           of
           Mankind
           in
           this
           
           Matter
           ,
           so
           uncertain
           ,
           or
           so
           slight
           an
           argument
           ,
           as
           some
           have
           made
           it
           ;
           even
           since
           
             the
             late
             Discoveries
          
           :
           as
           I
           think
           it
           were
           no
           hard
           Matter
           to
           prove
           ;
           but
           I
           shall
           not
           here
           
             go
             out
             of
             my
             way
             to
             do
             it
             .
          
        
         
           3.
           
           The
           most
           ancient
           Philosophers
           of
           Greece
           held
           the
           same
           opinion
           as
           he
           shews
           from
           
             Pherecydes
             ,
             Pythagoras
             ,
             Socrates
             ,
             Plato
             ,
          
           &c.
           c.
           16
           ,
           17
           ,
           &c.
           and
           they
           went
           upon
           far
           better
           Reasons
           than
           the
           other
           ,
           as
           he
           proves
           at
           large
           ,
           c.
           21
           ,
           22
           ,
           23.
           
        
         
           4.
           
           That
           the
           Bodies
           and
           Souls
           of
           Men
           have
           a
           different
           Frame
           and
           Original
           .
           
             Our
             Bodies
          
           ,
           he
           saith
           ,
           c.
           19.
           are
           made
           of
           
             Terrestrial
             Principles
          
           ;
           but
           the
           Souls
           ,
           he
           saith
           ,
           are
           of
           
             a
             divine
             Original
          
           ;
           and
           
             if
             we
             could
             give
             an
             account
             how
             they
             were
             made
             ,
             we
             should
             likewise
             how
             they
             were
             dissolved
             ,
          
           c.
           14.
           as
           we
           may
           of
           
             the
             Parts
             and
             Contexture
             of
             Bodies
          
           ;
           but
           saith
           he
           ,
           
             Animorum
             nulla
             in
             terris
             origo
             inveniri
             potest
             ,
             nihil
             est
             enim
             in
             animis
             mixtum
             atque
             concretum
             ,
             aut
             quod
             ex
             terra
             natum
             atque
             fictum
             esse
             videatur
             ,
          
           c.
           27.
           
           So
           that
           here
           he
           plainly
           makes
           a
           Difference
           between
           our
           
             Bodily
             Substance
          
           ,
           and
           that
           of
           our
           Souls
           ,
           which
           have
           no
           bodily
           Texture
           and
           Composition
           ;
           because
           there
           is
           no
           material
           Substance
           ,
           which
           
           can
           reach
           to
           the
           wonderfull
           Faculties
           and
           Operations
           of
           the
           Soul
           ;
           and
           therefore
           he
           concludes
           in
           these
           words
           ,
           
             Singularis
             est
             igitur
             quaedam
             natura
             atque
             vis
             animi
             sejuncta
             ab
             his
             usitatis
             notisque
             naturis
             .
          
           What
           can
           express
           the
           Soul
           to
           be
           of
           a
           different
           Substance
           from
           the
           Body
           ,
           if
           these
           words
           do
           it
           not
           ?
           And
           presently
           adds
           ,
           
             That
             the
             Mind
             is
             of
             a
             divine
             and
             Spiritual
             Nature
             and
             above
             Material
             Composition
             as
             God
             himself
             is
             .
          
        
         
           I
           hope
           this
           may
           give
           you
           satisfaction
           as
           to
           Cicero
           ,
           how
           far
           he
           was
           from
           making
           the
           Soul
           a
           
             Material
             Substance
          
           .
           And
           the
           only
           place
           you
           produce
           out
           of
           him
           ,
           c.
           22.
           proves
           nothing
           but
           
             that
             the
             Soul
             is
             Invisible
          
           ,
           as
           you
           may
           see
           by
           looking
           upon
           it
           again
           .
        
         
           As
           to
           Virgil
           ,
           you
           quote
           that
           Expression
           ,
           
             Dum
             Spiritus
             hos
             regit
             artus
          
           ;
           where
           it
           is
           taken
           for
           the
           
             Vital
             Spirit
          
           ;
           which
           sense
           I
           know
           no
           body
           questions
           ;
           and
           so
           Tully
           expresses
           life
           ,
           
             quae
             Corpore
             &
             Spiritu
             continetur
          
           ,
           and
           opposes
           it
           to
           a
           Life
           of
           Immortal
           Fame
           ,
           which
           he
           there
           speaks
           of
           ,
           
             Pro
             Marcello
          
           ,
           c.
           9.
           but
           the
           only
           matter
           in
           debate
           is
           ,
           Whether
           they
           excluded
           any
           other
           Notion
           of
           Spirit
           ,
           which
           was
           not
           done
           ,
           as
           I
           have
           made
           it
           appear
           concerning
           Cicero
           ,
           and
           so
           I
           shall
           of
           Virgil
           too
           .
        
         
         
           For
           soon
           after
           ,
           Aeneid
           4.385
           .
           he
           hath
           these
           Words
           ,
           
             
               Et
               cum
               frigida
               mors
               Animae
               seduxerit
               Artus
               ,
            
             
               Omnibus
               Vmbra
               locis
               adero
               ,
               dabis
               improbe
               poenas
               .
            
          
        
         
           Which
           shews
           that
           Virgil
           did
           believe
           
             the
             Soul
          
           to
           be
           more
           than
           a
           mere
           
             Vital
             Spirit
          
           ,
           and
           that
           it
           subsisted
           and
           acted
           in
           a
           separate
           State
           :
           And
           it
           is
           observed
           by
           Servius
           ,
           that
           Virgil
           uses
           
             Spiritus
             ,
             Mens
          
           and
           Animus
           for
           the
           same
           .
           In
           Aeneid
           6.726
           .
           
             
               Spiritus
               intus
               alit
               ,
               totamque
               infusa
               per
               artus
               .
            
             
               
                 Mens
                 agitat
                 molem
              
               —
            
          
        
         
           And
           he
           proves
           ,
           that
           Virgil
           asserted
           
             the
             Immortality
             of
             Souls
          
           ,
           and
           answers
           the
           arguments
           against
           it
           ;
           and
           
             as
             far
             as
             he
             could
             understand
             ,
          
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             that
             our
             Bodies
             are
             from
             the
             Elements
             and
             our
             Souls
             from
             God
          
           ;
           and
           
             the
             Poets
             intention
             was
             ,
             Vt
             Animos
             immortales
             diceret
             .
          
           So
           that
           neither
           Cicero
           nor
           Virgil
           do
           you
           any
           kindness
           in
           this
           matter
           ,
           being
           both
           Assertors
           of
           the
           
             Souls
             Immortality
          
           by
           
           Nature
           .
           
           If
           these
           will
           not
           do
           you
           bring
           me
           to
           Scripture
           ,
           and
           say
           ,
           that
           
             Solomon
             himself
             speaks
             after
             the
             same
             manner
             about
             Man
             and
             Beast
             ,
             as
             the
             one
             dieth
             ,
             so
             dieth
             the
             other
             ,
             yea
             ,
             they
             have
             all
             one
             Spirit
             ,
          
           Eccles.
           3.19
           .
           I
           will
           not
           dispute
           about
           the
           proper
           Sense
           of
           the
           Hebrew
           Word
           ,
           but
           I
           must
           about
           
             Solomon's
             Sense
          
           .
           For
           although
           he
           makes
           Life
           and
           Death
           common
           to
           
             Man
             and
             Beast
          
           ;
           yet
           he
           saith
           ,
           v.
           21.
           
           
             The
             Spirit
             of
             a
             Man
             goeth
             upward
             ,
             and
             the
             Spirit
             of
             a
             Beast
             goeth
             down
             to
             the
             Earth
             .
          
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             If
             the
             Notion
             of
             a
             Spirit
             excludes
             Materiality
             then
             the
             Spirit
             of
             a
             Beast
             must
             be
             Immaterial
             ,
             as
             well
             as
             that
             of
             a
             Man.
          
           I
           answer
           ,
           that
           although
           the
           bare
           Word
           doth
           not
           prove
           it
           ,
           yet
           the
           design
           of
           
           Solomon's
           Discourse
           doth
           ,
           and
           so
           
             the
             going
             upward
             of
             the
             Spirit
             of
             a
             Man
          
           must
           be
           understood
           in
           a
           very
           different
           Sense
           ,
           from
           
             the
             going
             downward
             of
             the
             Spirit
             of
             a
             Beast
             .
          
           For
           he
           saith
           concerning
           Man
           ,
           
             That
             the
             Spirit
             shall
             return
             to
             God
             that
             gave
             it
             ,
          
           c.
           12.7
           .
           To
           what
           purpose
           ?
           To
           be
           dissipated
           in
           the
           common
           Air
           ?
           or
           to
           be
           lost
           in
           the
           vast
           Confusion
           of
           Matter
           ?
           no
           ,
           but
           he
           concludes
           his
           Book
           thus
           ;
           v.
           14.
           
           
             For
             God
             shall
             bring
             every
             Work
             into
             Iudgment
             with
             every
             secret
             
             thing
             ,
             whether
             it
             be
             good
             ,
             or
             whether
             it
             be
             evil
             .
          
           If
           these
           be
           
           Solomon's
           Words
           ,
           as
           no
           doubt
           they
           were
           ,
           and
           he
           were
           a
           Man
           of
           Sense
           ,
           and
           laid
           his
           sayings
           together
           ,
           as
           no
           doubt
           he
           did
           ;
           these
           last
           Words
           must
           interpret
           the
           foregoing
           ,
           and
           his
           other
           sayings
           be
           made
           Consonant
           to
           this
           .
           Yes
           ,
           you
           may
           say
           ,
           
             This
             relates
             to
             the
             general
             Iudgment
             ,
             and
             not
             to
             the
             Soul's
             Subsistence
             after
             Death
             .
          
           But
           Solomon
           speaks
           of
           the
           
             Spirit
             of
             a
             Man
             going
             upward
             at
             Death
             ,
             and
             returning
             to
             God
             that
             gave
             it
             :
          
           What
           Sense
           is
           there
           in
           this
           ,
           if
           it
           be
           a
           
             Material
             Substance
          
           which
           vanishes
           and
           is
           dissolved
           then
           ?
           And
           if
           the
           Soul
           be
           not
           of
           it self
           a
           free
           ,
           thinking
           Substance
           ,
           I
           do
           not
           see
           what
           Foundation
           there
           is
           in
           Nature
           for
           a
           Day
           of
           Judgment
           .
           For
           where
           there
           is
           nothing
           but
           Matter
           ,
           there
           is
           no
           Freedom
           of
           acting
           ;
           where
           there
           is
           no
           Liberty
           ,
           there
           is
           no
           Choice
           ;
           where
           there
           is
           no
           Choice
           ,
           there
           is
           no
           room
           for
           Rewards
           and
           Punishments
           ,
           and
           consequently
           no
           
             Day
             of
             Iudgment
          
           .
           But
           Solomon
           positively
           concludes
           ,
           there
           will
           be
           a
           Judgment
           to
           come
           as
           to
           
             good
             and
             evil
             Actions
          
           in
           another
           World
           ,
           and
           therefore
           he
           must
           be
           understood
           in
           those
           Expressions
           ,
           to
           mean
           a
           Free
           and
           Thinking
           ,
           and
           consequently
           an
           
             Immaterial
             Spirit
          
           in
           us
           .
        
         
         
           
           But
           you
           urge
           farther
           ,
           
             That
             our
             Saviour
             himself
             opposes
             Spirit
          
           to
           Flesh
           and
           Bones
           ,
           Luk.
           24.39
           .
           i.
           e.
           
             to
             such
             a
             gross
             Compages
             as
             could
             be
             seen
             and
             felt
             .
          
           The
           question
           then
           was
           ,
           whether
           it
           were
           the
           real
           Body
           of
           Christ
           or
           only
           an
           Appearance
           of
           it
           ;
           and
           how
           could
           this
           be
           resolved
           better
           than
           our
           Saviour
           doth
           ?
           
             Handle
             me
             and
             see
             ,
             for
             a
             Spirit
             hath
             not
             Flesh
             and
             Bones
             as
             you
             see
             me
             have
             .
             But
             he
             calls
             this
             a
             Spirit
             .
          
           What
           follows
           ?
           Therefore
           
             a
             Spirit
             is
             only
             an
             Appearance
          
           ?
           I
           do
           not
           think
           that
           is
           your
           meaning
           .
           And
           no
           body
           questions
           but
           the
           name
           of
           Spirits
           is
           sometimes
           given
           to
           Apparitions
           .
           But
           this
           is
           far
           from
           our
           case
           ,
           which
           is
           ,
           whether
           that
           
             real
             Spiritual
             Substance
          
           we
           find
           in
           our selves
           be
           Material
           or
           not
           ?
           Doth
           a
           
             Spiritual
             Substance
          
           imply
           Matter
           in
           its
           Idea
           or
           not
           ?
           You
           cannot
           say
           it
           doth
           :
           Then
           it
           may
           be
           Immaterial
           :
           But
           how
           come
           we
           to
           know
           things
           but
           by
           their
           distinct
           Ideas
           ?
           Is
           the
           Idea
           of
           Matter
           and
           Spirit
           distinct
           or
           not
           ?
           If
           not
           ,
           to
           what
           purpose
           do
           we
           talk
           of
           Knowledge
           by
           Ideas
           when
           we
           cannot
           so
           much
           as
           know
           Body
           and
           Spirit
           from
           each
           other
           by
           them
           ?
        
         
           Is
           it
           then
           any
           Absurdity
           to
           call
           a
           
             Spiritual
             Substance
             Immaterial
          
           ?
           
           No
           ,
           
           you
           say
           ,
           
             You
             would
             not
             be
             thought
             to
             affirm
             ,
             that
             Spirit
             never
             does
             signifie
             a
             purely
             Immaterial
             Substance
             ;
             for
             in
             that
             Sense
             the
             Scripture
             attributes
             the
             Notion
             of
             Spirit
             to
             God
             ,
             and
             you
             have
             proved
             from
             your
             Principles
             ,
             that
             there
             is
             a
             Spiritual
             Immaterial
             Substance
             .
          
           And
           this
           you
           think
           proves
           an
           
             Immaterial
             Substance
             in
             your
             way
             of
             Ideas
             .
          
           But
           of
           that
           afterwards
           .
           We
           are
           yet
           upon
           the
           proving
           an
           
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           in
           our selves
           
             from
             the
             Ideas
             we
             have
             by
             Sensation
             and
             Reflection
             .
          
           Now
           ,
           I
           say
           ,
           still
           this
           is
           impossible
           if
           the
           
             Spiritual
             Substance
          
           in
           us
           
             may
             be
             material
          
           .
           And
           at
           last
           you
           grant
           ,
           
             That
             what
             I
             say
             is
             true
             ,
          
           
           
             that
             it
             cannot
             upon
             these
             Principles
             be
             demonstrated
             .
          
           Then
           ,
           say
           I
           ,
           
             Your
             grounds
             of
             Certainty
             from
             Ideas
          
           are
           plainly
           given
           up
           .
           
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             it
             may
             be
             proved
             probable
             to
             the
             highest
             Degree
             .
          
           But
           that
           is
           not
           the
           point
           ;
           for
           it
           is
           not
           Probability
           ,
           but
           Certainty
           ,
           that
           we
           are
           promised
           in
           this
           
             way
             of
             Ideas
          
           ;
           and
           that
           
             the
             Foundation
             of
             our
             Knowledge
          
           and
           
             real
             Certainty
             lies
             in
             them
          
           ;
           and
           is
           it
           dwindled
           into
           a
           Probability
           at
           last
           ?
           The
           only
           reason
           I
           had
           to
           engage
           in
           this
           matter
           was
           a
           bold
           Assertion
           ,
           that
           
             the
             Ideas
             we
             have
             by
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
             are
             the
             sole
             Matter
             and
             
             Foundation
             of
             all
             our
             Reasoning
             :
          
           and
           that
           
             our
             Certainty
          
           lies
           in
           
             perceiving
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
             as
             expressed
             in
             any
             Proposition
          
           ;
           which
           last
           are
           your
           own
           Words
           .
           How
           can
           we
           then
           be
           certain
           where
           we
           have
           no
           Ideas
           from
           Sensation
           or
           Reflection
           to
           proceed
           by
           ?
           As
           in
           the
           present
           case
           .
           I
           have
           a
           Mind
           to
           be
           resolved
           whether
           the
           Soul
           in
           Man
           be
           an
           
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           or
           not
           ;
           and
           we
           are
           to
           judge
           of
           the
           Truth
           of
           it
           by
           our
           Ideas
           .
           I
           ask
           then
           ,
           What
           Idea
           you
           have
           of
           the
           Soul
           by
           Reflection
           ?
           You
           answer
           ,
           
             That
             it
             is
             a
             Thinking
             Substance
             .
          
           But
           doth
           this
           prove
           it
           Immaterial
           ?
           You
           answer
           ,
           
             That
             you
             cannot
             be
             certain
             ,
             but
             that
             it
             is
             very
             probable
             .
          
           Is
           not
           this
           giving
           up
           the
           Cause
           of
           Certainty
           ?
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
           
             You
             never
             offer'd
             it
             as
             a
             way
             of
             Certainty
             where
             we
             cannot
             reach
             Certainty
             .
          
           But
           did
           you
           not
           offer
           to
           put
           us
           into
           the
           
             way
             of
             Certainty
          
           ?
           What
           is
           that
           ,
           but
           to
           attain
           Certainty
           in
           such
           things
           ,
           where
           we
           could
           not
           otherwise
           do
           it
           ?
           And
           what
           a
           strange
           way
           is
           this
           ,
           if
           it
           fails
           us
           in
           some
           of
           the
           first
           Foundations
           of
           the
           real
           Knowledge
           of
           our selves
           ?
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             If
             I
             dislike
             your
             way
             ,
             you
             desire
             me
             to
             shew
             you
             a
             better
             way
             of
             Certainty
             as
             to
             these
             points
             .
          
        
         
         
           I
           am
           sensible
           that
           you
           design
           herein
           ,
           
           to
           draw
           me
           
             out
             of
             my
             way
             to
             do
             you
             a
             kindness
          
           ;
           but
           I
           will
           so
           far
           gratifie
           you
           at
           this
           time
           ;
           and
           to
           oblige
           you
           the
           more
           ,
           I
           will
           make
           use
           of
           no
           other
           Principles
           or
           Ideas
           ,
           than
           such
           as
           I
           meet
           with
           in
           your
           Book
           ;
           and
           from
           thence
           I
           do
           not
           despair
           of
           proving
           ,
           that
           we
           may
           be
           certain
           that
           a
           
             material
             Substance
             cannot
             think
          
           .
        
         
           And
           the
           method
           I
           shall
           proceed
           in
           ,
           shall
           be
           to
           prove
           it
           ,
           by
           such
           
             ways
             and
             steps
          
           as
           you
           have
           directed
           me
           to
           ,
           although
           you
           might
           not
           think
           to
           find
           them
           so
           laid
           together
           .
        
         
           1.
           
           From
           your
           general
           Principles
           as
           to
           Knowledge
           and
           Certainty
           .
           You
           say
           ,
           
             That
             all
             our
             Knowledge
             consists
             in
             the
             view
             the
             Mind
             hath
             of
             its
             own
             Ideas
          
           ;
           
           
             which
             is
             the
             utmost
             Light
             and
             greatest
             Certainty
             ,
             we
             with
             our
             Faculties
             and
             in
             our
             way
             of
             Knowledge
             are
             capable
             of
             .
          
           Here
           you
           resolve
           our
           
             Knowledge
             and
             Certainty
          
           into
           
             the
             view
             of
             the
             Ideas
             in
             our
             Minds
          
           ;
           therefore
           by
           those
           Ideas
           we
           may
           come
           to
           know
           the
           Certainty
           of
           things
           ;
           not
           in
           the
           Frame
           and
           inward
           Essence
           of
           them
           ,
           as
           you
           often
           tell
           us
           ;
           but
           by
           the
           Powers
           and
           Properties
           which
           belong
           to
           them
           .
           Whatever
           ,
           say
           you
           ,
           
             be
             the
             secret
             
             and
             abstract
             Nature
             of
             Substance
             in
             general
             ,
          
           
           
             all
             the
             Ideas
             we
             have
             of
             particular
             distinct
             Substances
             ,
             are
             nothing
             but
             several
             Combinations
             of
             simple
             Ideas
          
           And
           you
           take
           pains
           to
           prove
           ,
           
           
             That
             Powers
             make
             a
             great
             part
             of
             our
             complex
             Ideas
             of
             Substances
             :
             and
             their
             secondary
             Qualities
             are
             those
             which
             in
             most
             of
             them
             serve
             principally
             to
             distinguish
             Substances
             one
             from
             another
          
           ;
           
           
             which
             secondary
             Qualities
             ,
             as
             has
             been
             shewn
             are
             nothing
             but
             bare
             Powers
             .
          
           So
           that
           our
           Knowledge
           cannot
           reach
           the
           inward
           Substance
           of
           things
           ;
           and
           all
           our
           Certainty
           of
           Knowledge
           as
           to
           them
           ,
           and
           their
           Distinction
           from
           each
           other
           ,
           must
           depend
           on
           those
           Powers
           and
           Properties
           which
           are
           known
           to
           us
           .
        
         
           One
           would
           think
           sometimes
           ,
           that
           you
           would
           allow
           Mankind
           
             no
             more
             Knowledge
             than
             suits
             with
             the
             Conveniencies
             of
             Life
          
           ;
           
           but
           this
           would
           overthrow
           the
           great
           design
           of
           your
           Book
           ,
           which
           is
           to
           put
           us
           into
           a
           way
           of
           real
           Certainty
           
             by
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
          
           ;
           
           
             and
             where
             ever
             we
             perceive
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             any
             of
             our
             Ideas
             ,
             there
             is
             certain
             Knowledge
             .
          
           So
           that
           here
           you
           own
           we
           may
           come
           to
           a
           Certainty
           of
           Knowledge
           (
           which
           is
           beyond
           mere
           
           Probability
           )
           and
           that
           
             by
             perceiving
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
             .
          
        
         
           2.
           
           If
           we
           can
           find
           the
           Disagreement
           of
           any
           two
           Ideas
           upon
           your
           own
           Principles
           ,
           we
           must
           do
           those
           of
           
             Body
             and
             Spirit
          
           .
           For
           the
           
             Idea
             of
             Matter
          
           in
           general
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
           
             That
             in
             Truth
             it
             contains
             nothing
             but
             the
             Idea
             of
             a
             solid
             Substance
             ,
             which
             is
             every-where
             the
             same
             ,
             every-where
             uniform
             .
          
           And
           
             that
             Body
             stands
             for
             a
             solid
             extended
             figured
             Substance
             .
          
           So
           that
           
             Solidity
             ,
             Extension
          
           and
           Figure
           are
           the
           inseparable
           Properties
           of
           Bodies
           .
           And
           in
           another
           place
           you
           have
           these
           Words
           ,
           
           
             The
             primary
             Ideas
             we
             have
             peculiar
             to
             Bodies
             as
             contradistinguished
             to
             Spirit
             ,
             are
             the
             Cohesion
             of
             solid
             and
             consequently
             separable
             Parts
             ,
             and
             a
             Power
             of
             communicating
             Motion
             by
             Impulse
             .
             These
             you
             think
             are
             the
             original
             Ideas
             proper
             and
             peculiar
             to
             Body
             ,
             for
             Figure
             is
             but
             the
             consequence
             of
             finite
             Extension
             .
          
           Here
           we
           have
           the
           
             Idea
             of
             Body
          
           laid
           down
           by
           your self
           
             as
             contradistinguished
             to
             Spirit
          
           .
           Therefore
           by
           your
           own
           confession
           we
           may
           perceive
           the
           Disagreement
           of
           these
           two
           Ideas
           of
           Body
           and
           Spirit
           ,
           and
           consequently
           may
           certainly
           know
           their
           Distinction
           from
           each
           other
           by
           their
           inseparable
           Properties
           .
           But
           if
           it
           be
           possible
           
           for
           
             Matter
             to
             think
          
           ,
           then
           these
           Ideas
           must
           be
           confounded
           :
           Yet
           you
           distinguish
           the
           Ideas
           of
           a
           Material
           and
           
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           in
           these
           Words
           ,
           
           
             Putting
             together
             the
             Ideas
             of
             Thinking
             and
             Willing
             ,
             and
             the
             Power
             of
             Motion
             or
             Rest
             added
             to
             Substance
             ,
             we
             have
             the
             Idea
             of
             a
             Spirit
             ,
             and
             putting
             together
             the
             Ideas
             of
             solid
             coherent
             Parts
             ,
             a
             Power
             of
             being
             moved
             ,
             joyned
             with
             Substance
             ,
             we
             have
             the
             Idea
             of
             Matter
             .
             The
             one
             is
             as
             clear
             and
             distinct
             an
             Idea
             as
             the
             other
             ;
             the
             Idea
             of
             Thinking
             and
             Moving
             a
             Body
             being
             as
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
             ,
             as
             the
             Ideas
             of
             Extension
             ,
             Solidity
             and
             being
             moved
             .
          
           Can
           any
           thing
           now
           be
           plainer
           than
           the
           Disagreement
           of
           these
           two
           Ideas
           ,
           by
           the
           several
           Properties
           which
           belong
           to
           them
           ?
           But
           if
           after
           all
           this
           Matter
           may
           Think
           ,
           what
           becomes
           of
           these
           clear
           and
           distinct
           Ideas
           ?
           And
           yet
           you
           have
           th●se
           Words
           ,
           
             Thus
             by
             putting
             together
             the
             Ideas
             of
             Thinking
             .
             Perceiving
             ,
             Liberty
             and
             Power
             of
             moving
             themselves
             and
             other
             things
             ,
             we
             have
             as
             clear
             a
             Perception
             and
             Notion
             of
             Immaterial
             Substances
             as
             we
             have
             of
             Material
             .
          
           Here
           it
           is
           plain
           ,
           that
           you
           make
           Thinking
           and
           Perceiving
           to
           be
           part
           of
           the
           Complex
           Idea
           of
           an
           
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           .
           How
           
           is
           this
           possible
           ,
           if
           a
           
             Material
             Substance
          
           be
           capable
           of
           Thinking
           as
           well
           as
           an
           Immaterial
           ?
           either
           therefore
           you
           must
           renounce
           your
           own
           Doctrine
           of
           Certainty
           by
           Ideas
           ,
           or
           you
           must
           conclude
           ,
           that
           Matter
           cannot
           think
           .
        
         
           3.
           
           But
           I
           urge
           this
           yet
           further
           from
           your
           Notion
           of
           Liberty
           and
           Necessity
           .
           
           Liberty
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
             is
             the
             Idea
             of
             a
             Power
             in
             any
             Agent
             to
             do
             or
             forbear
             any
             Action
             ,
             according
             to
             the
             Determination
             or
             Thought
             of
             the
             Mind
             ,
             whereby
             either
             of
             them
             is
             preferred
             to
             the
             other
             .
             So
             that
             Liberty
             cannot
             be
             ,
             where
             there
             is
             no
             Thought
             ,
             no
             Volition
             ,
             no
             Wish
             .
          
           
           And
           again
           ,
           
             Agents
             that
             have
             no
             Thought
             ,
             no
             Volition
             at
             all
             are
             necessary
             Agents
             .
          
           But
           you
           make
           a
           
             Power
             of
             Thinking
          
           and
           Liberty
           to
           be
           parts
           of
           the
           
             Complex
             Idea
          
           of
           an
           
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           ,
           in
           the
           Words
           before
           cited
           .
           But
           what
           Liberty
           can
           you
           conceive
           in
           mere
           Matter
           ?
           For
           you
           grant
           ,
           
             That
             Bodies
             can
             operate
             upon
             one
             another
             only
             by
             Impulse
             and
             Motion
          
           ;
           
           that
           
             the
             Primary
             Qualities
             of
             Bodies
             which
             are
             inseparable
             from
             it
             ,
          
           
           
             are
             Extension
             ,
             Solidity
             ,
             Figure
             and
             Mobility
             from
             any
             Body
             .
          
           Now
           how
           can
           the
           Idea
           of
           Liberty
           agree
           with
           these
           simple
           Ideas
           of
           Body
           ?
           To
           be
           
             moved
             only
             by
             Impulse
             from
             another
             Body
          
           ;
           
           and
           from
           
             the
             free
             Determination
             of
             our
             own
             Thoughts
          
           ;
           are
           two
           Ideas
           as
           disagreeing
           with
           each
           other
           ,
           as
           we
           can
           well
           imagine
           .
           But
           if
           Matter
           may
           Think
           ,
           it
           may
           have
           Liberty
           too
           ,
           because
           you
           join
           these
           together
           ;
           but
           if
           it
           be
           uncapable
           of
           Liberty
           which
           goes
           along
           with
           Thinking
           ,
           how
           can
           you
           imagine
           it
           should
           be
           capable
           of
           Thinking
           ?
        
         
           I
           argue
           ,
           from
           your
           Notion
           of
           
             Personal
             Indentity
          
           ,
           which
           you
           place
           in
           
             self
             Consciousness
          
           .
           
           For
           you
           tell
           us
           ,
           
             That
             a
             Person
             is
             a
             thinking
             intelligent
             Being
             that
             has
             Reason
             and
             Reflection
             ;
             and
             can
             consider
             it self
             ,
             as
             it self
             ,
             the
             same
             thinking
             thing
             in
             different
             times
             and
             places
             ;
             which
             it
             does
             only
             by
             that
             Consciousness
             ,
             which
             is
             inseparable
             from
             thinking
             ,
             and
             seems
             to
             you
             essential
             to
             it
             .
          
           From
           whence
           it
           follows
           ,
           that
           if
           there
           can
           be
           no
           Self-consciousness
           in
           Matter
           ,
           then
           it
           cannot
           think
           ,
           because
           it
           wants
           that
           which
           you
           say
           is
           Essential
           to
           it
           .
           
             It
             being
             impossible
             ,
             for
             any
             one
             to
             perceive
             ,
             but
             he
             must
             perceive
             ,
             that
             he
             doth
             perceive
             .
          
           But
           what
           is
           there
           like
           Self-consciousness
           in
           Matter
           ?
           Or
           how
           is
           it
           possible
           to
           apprehend
           that
           meer
           Body
           should
           perceive
           that
           it
           doth
           perceive
           ?
           For
           Bodies
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
             operate
             only
             by
             Impulse
             and
             Motion
          
           ;
           i.
           e.
           one
           Body
           
           upon
           another
           .
           But
           how
           can
           a
           Body
           operate
           upon
           it self
           without
           Motion
           ?
           Those
           you
           call
           the
           
             Secondary
             Qualities
             of
             Bodies
          
           ,
           are
           only
           you
           say
           ,
           
             the
             effect
             of
             the
             Powers
             in
             some
             Bodies
             upon
             others
             endued
             with
             Sense
             and
             Perception
             .
          
           So
           that
           the
           effects
           of
           these
           Powers
           in
           Bodies
           ,
           or
           of
           the
           Primary
           Qualities
           of
           
             Bulk
             ,
             Site
             ,
             Figure
             ,
             Motion
             ,
          
           &c.
           is
           not
           upon
           themselves
           but
           upon
           other
           Bodies
           ,
           either
           by
           changing
           those
           Primary
           Qualities
           in
           them
           by
           different
           Site
           ,
           Figure
           ,
           Motion
           ,
           &c.
           or
           producing
           those
           Effects
           in
           us
           ,
           or
           which
           we
           call
           
             Sensible
             Qualities
          
           .
           But
           either
           of
           these
           ways
           there
           is
           no
           possibility
           for
           Matter
           to
           operate
           upon
           it self
           in
           a
           way
           of
           Self-consciousness
           .
           If
           then
           every
           intelligent
           thinking
           Being
           have
           this
           so
           inseparably
           belonging
           to
           it
           ,
           that
           you
           say
           ,
           
             It
             is
             impossible
             ,
             for
             any
             one
             to
             perceive
             ,
             without
             perceiving
             that
             he
             doth
             perceive
          
           ;
           and
           it
           be
           impossible
           from
           the
           Idea
           of
           Matter
           to
           make
           out
           that
           a
           meer
           Body
           can
           
             perceive
             that
             it
             doth
             perceive
          
           ,
           I
           think
           it
           is
           more
           than
           probable
           in
           the
           way
           of
           Ideas
           that
           Matter
           cannot
           think
           .
        
         
           5.
           
           I
           argue
           ,
           from
           the
           power
           of
           Abstracting
           which
           you
           make
           proper
           to
           a
           thinking
           Substance
           .
           
           This
           is
           done
           ,
           say
           you
           ,
           
             by
             considering
             Ideas
             in
             the
             Mind
             as
             
             separate
             from
             the
             Circumstances
             of
             Time
             and
             Place
             .
             And
             this
             power
             of
             abstracting
             ,
          
           you
           add
           ,
           
           
             puts
             a
             perfect
             distinction
             between
             Man
             and
             Brutes
             ;
             and
             is
             an
             Excellency
             which
             the
             Faculties
             of
             Brutes
             do
             by
             no
             means
             attain
             to
             .
          
        
         
           
           You
           tell
           me
           ,
           
             That
             you
             did
             not
             say
             the
             chief
             Excellency
             of
             Mankind
             lies
             chiefly
             ,
             or
             any
             ways
             ,
             in
             this
             that
             Brutes
             cannot
             abstract
             ;
             for
             Brutes
             not
             being
             able
             to
             do
             any
             thing
             ,
             cannot
             be
             any
             Excellency
             of
             Mankind
             .
          
           But
           I
           hope
           it
           is
           the
           Excellency
           of
           Mankind
           ,
           that
           they
           are
           able
           to
           do
           what
           the
           Brutes
           cannot
           :
           And
           you
           say
           ,
           
             This
             puts
             a
             perfect
             distinction
             between
             Man
             and
             Brutes
          
           ;
           and
           I
           had
           thought
           in
           comparing
           Man
           and
           Brutes
           that
           which
           
             put
             a
             perfect
             Distinction
             was
             the
             chief
             Excellency
          
           with
           respect
           to
           them
           .
           But
           let
           that
           be
           as
           it
           will
           ;
           the
           thing
           I
           insist
           upon
           is
           ,
           the
           power
           of
           Abstracting
           following
           that
           of
           Thinking
           so
           closely
           that
           you
           utterly
           deny
           it
           to
           Brutes
           ;
           but
           if
           it
           may
           be
           in
           the
           power
           of
           Matter
           to
           think
           ,
           how
           comes
           it
           to
           be
           so
           impossible
           for
           such
           Organized
           Bodies
           as
           the
           Brutes
           have
           to
           inlarge
           their
           Ideas
           by
           Abstraction
           ?
           Pomponatius
           thinks
           to
           avoid
           the
           Argument
           from
           Abstraction
           to
           prove
           the
           Souls
           Imateriality
           ,
           
           by
           saying
           ,
           That
           in
           the
           most
           
           abstract
           Speculation
           the
           Mind
           rests
           upon
           Particulars
           ;
           
             Vniversale
             in
             singulari
             speculatur
          
           .
           But
           this
           doth
           not
           reach
           the
           force
           of
           the
           Argument
           ;
           which
           is
           not
           ,
           whether
           the
           Mind
           hath
           not
           an
           Eye
           to
           Particulars
           ,
           when
           it
           forms
           Universal
           Notions
           ;
           but
           whether
           the
           power
           of
           forming
           such
           Abstract
           Ideas
           from
           Particulars
           do
           not
           argue
           a
           Power
           which
           meer
           Matter
           can
           never
           attain
           to
           :
           And
           all
           that
           Philosopher
           hath
           said
           ,
           doth
           not
           amount
           to
           the
           least
           Proof
           of
           it
           .
        
         
           6.
           
           Lastly
           ,
           I
           argue
           from
           the
           Reason
           you
           give
           ,
           why
           God
           must
           be
           an
           
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           .
           
           For
           these
           are
           the
           words
           in
           your
           Letter
           .
           
             And
             the
             Idea
             of
             an
             Eternal
             ,
             actual
             ,
             knowing
             Being
             is
             perceived
             to
             have
             a
             Connection
             with
             the
             Idea
             of
             Immateriality
             ,
             by
             the
             Intervention
             of
             the
             Idea
             of
             Matter
             ,
             and
             of
             its
             actual
             Division
             ,
             Divisibility
             and
             Want
             of
             Perception
             ,
          
           &c.
           
           Here
           the
           
             want
             of
             Perception
          
           is
           owned
           to
           be
           so
           essential
           to
           Matter
           ,
           that
           God
           is
           therefore
           concluded
           to
           be
           Immaterial
           ;
           and
           this
           is
           drawn
           from
           the
           Idea
           and
           Essential
           Properties
           of
           Matter
           ,
           and
           if
           it
           be
           so
           Essential
           to
           it
           ,
           that
           from
           thence
           you
           concluded
           God
           must
           be
           an
           
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           ,
           I
           think
           the
           same
           Reason
           will
           hold
           ,
           as
           to
           any
           thinking
           Substance
           .
           Because
           
           the
           Argument
           is
           not
           drawn
           from
           any
           thing
           peculiar
           to
           the
           Divine
           Perfections
           ,
           but
           from
           the
           general
           Idea
           of
           Matter
           .
        
         
           
           But
           after
           all
           ,
           you
           tell
           me
           ,
           
             That
             God
             being
             Omnipotent
             ,
             may
             give
             to
             a
             System
             of
             very
             subtil
             matter
             ,
             Sense
             and
             Motion
             .
          
           Your
           words
           before
           were
           ,
           
             a
             Power
             to
             perceive
             or
             think
          
           ;
           and
           about
           that
           ,
           all
           our
           debate
           runs
           ;
           
           and
           here
           again
           you
           say
           ,
           
             That
             the
             Power
             of
             Thinking
             joined
             to
             Matter
             ,
             makes
             it
             a
             Spiritual
             Substance
             .
          
           But
           as
           to
           your
           Argument
           from
           
             God
             s
             Omnipotency
          
           ,
           I
           answer
           ,
           That
           this
           comes
           to
           the
           same
           Debate
           we
           had
           with
           the
           Papists
           about
           the
           
             Possibility
             of
             Transubstantiation
          
           .
           For
           ,
           they
           never
           imagin'd
           ,
           that
           a
           Body
           could
           be
           present
           after
           
             the
             manner
             of
             a
             Spirit
          
           in
           an
           ordinary
           way
           ,
           but
           that
           by
           
             God's
             Omnipotent
          
           Power
           it
           might
           be
           made
           so
           :
           but
           our
           Answer
           to
           them
           was
           ,
           That
           God
           doth
           not
           change
           the
           Essential
           Properties
           of
           things
           while
           the
           things
           themselves
           remain
           in
           their
           own
           Nature
           :
           And
           that
           it
           was
           as
           repugnant
           for
           a
           Body
           to
           be
           after
           the
           manner
           of
           a
           Spirit
           ,
           as
           for
           a
           Body
           and
           Spirit
           to
           be
           the
           same
           .
           The
           same
           we
           say
           in
           this
           Case
           .
           We
           do
           not
           set
           bounds
           to
           
             God's
             Omnipotency
          
           :
           For
           he
           may
           if
           he
           please
           ,
           change
           a
           Body
           into
           an
           
             Immaterial
             
             Substance
          
           ;
           but
           we
           say
           ,
           that
           while
           he
           continues
           the
           Essential
           Properties
           of
           Things
           ,
           it
           is
           as
           impossible
           for
           Matter
           to
           think
           ,
           as
           for
           a
           Body
           by
           Transubstantiation
           to
           be
           present
           after
           the
           manner
           of
           a
           Spirit
           ;
           and
           we
           are
           as
           certain
           of
           one
           as
           we
           are
           of
           the
           other
           .
           These
           things
           I
           thought
           necessary
           on
           this
           occasion
           to
           be
           cleared
           ,
           because
           I
           look
           on
           a
           mistake
           herein
           to
           be
           of
           dangerous
           Consequence
           as
           
             to
             the
             great
             Ends
             of
             Religion
             and
             Morality
             :
             which
             ,
          
           you
           think
           ,
           
             may
             be
             secured
             although
             the
             Soul
             be
             allowed
             to
             be
             a
             Material
             Substance
          
           ;
           but
           I
           am
           of
           a
           very
           different
           Opinion
           :
           For
           if
           God
           doth
           not
           change
           
             the
             Essential
             Properties
             of
             things
          
           ,
           their
           Nature
           remaining
           :
           then
           either
           it
           is
           impossible
           for
           a
           
             Material
             Substance
          
           to
           think
           ,
           or
           it
           must
           be
           asserted
           ,
           that
           a
           Power
           of
           thinking
           is
           within
           the
           
             Essential
             Properties
          
           of
           Matter
           ;
           and
           so
           thinking
           will
           be
           such
           a
           Mode
           of
           Matter
           ,
           as
           Spinoza
           hath
           made
           it
           :
           and
           I
           am
           certain
           you
           do
           not
           think
           ,
           he
           hath
           promoted
           
             the
             great
             Ends
             of
             Religion
             and
             Morality
             .
          
        
         
           I
           shall
           now
           proceed
           to
           consider
           the
           Arguments
           for
           proving
           a
           
             Supream
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           ,
           which
           you
           freely
           allow
           to
           be
           so
           .
           And
           my
           Design
           ,
           as
           I
           
           said
           ,
           was
           to
           shew
           ,
           that
           the
           certainty
           of
           it
           is
           not
           placed
           upon
           any
           clear
           and
           distinct
           Ideas
           ,
           but
           upon
           the
           force
           of
           Reason
           distinct
           from
           it
           .
        
         
           
           To
           this
           you
           answer
           ,
           
             That
             Knowledge
             and
             Certainty
             in
             your
             Opinion
             ,
             lies
             in
             the
             Preception
             of
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
             ,
             such
             as
             they
             are
             ,
             and
             not
             always
             in
             having
             perfectly
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
             .
          
           But
           those
           who
           offer
           at
           
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
          
           ,
           bid
           much
           fairer
           for
           Certainty
           than
           you
           do
           ;
           and
           speak
           more
           agreeably
           to
           your
           original
           grounds
           of
           Certainty
           .
           
           For
           your
           
             Relative
             Idea
          
           ,
           which
           you
           here
           run
           to
           again
           is
           no
           certainty
           at
           all
           from
           the
           Idea
           ,
           but
           from
           the
           plain
           Evidence
           of
           Reason
           ,
           that
           Accidents
           cannot
           support
           themselves
           .
        
         
           I
           pass
           over
           all
           which
           I
           think
           I
           have
           sufficiently
           answered
           already
           ;
           as
           when
           you
           spend
           so
           many
           Pages
           about
           
             my
             using
             the
             Plural
             Number
             when
             your
             words
             are
             only
             mentioned
             ,
          
           &c.
           
           But
           I
           shall
           pass
           over
           nothing
           which
           may
           seem
           to
           an
           indifferent
           Reader
           to
           require
           any
           farther
           Consideration
           .
        
         
           
           Whether
           you
           took
           this
           
             way
             of
             Ideas
          
           from
           the
           Modern
           Philosopher
           mentioned
           by
           you
           ,
           is
           not
           at
           all
           material
           ;
           but
           I
           intended
           no
           Reflection
           upon
           you
           in
           it
           
           (
           for
           that
           you
           mean
           
             by
             my
             commending
             you
             as
             a
             Scholar
             of
             so
             great
             a
             Master
          
           )
           I
           never
           meant
           to
           take
           from
           you
           the
           Honour
           of
           your
           own
           Inventions
           ;
           
           and
           I
           do
           believe
           you
           when
           you
           say
           ,
           
             That
             you
             wrote
             from
             your
             own
             Thoughts
             ,
             and
             the
             Ideas
             you
             had
             there
             .
          
           But
           many
           things
           may
           seem
           New
           to
           one
           that
           converses
           only
           with
           his
           own
           Thoughts
           ,
           which
           really
           are
           not
           so
           ;
           as
           he
           may
           find
           when
           he
           looks
           into
           the
           Thoughts
           of
           other
           Men
           which
           appear
           in
           their
           Books
           .
           And
           therefore
           ,
           although
           I
           have
           a
           just
           Esteem
           for
           the
           Invention
           of
           such
           who
           can
           
             spin
             Volumes
             barely
             out
             of
             their
             own
             Thoughts
          
           ;
           yet
           I
           am
           apt
           to
           think
           they
           would
           oblige
           the
           World
           more
           ,
           if
           after
           they
           have
           thought
           so
           much
           themselves
           ,
           they
           would
           examine
           what
           thoughts
           others
           have
           had
           before
           them
           concerning
           the
           same
           things
           ,
           that
           so
           ,
           those
           may
           not
           be
           thought
           their
           own
           Inventions
           ,
           which
           are
           common
           to
           themselves
           and
           others
           .
           If
           a
           man
           should
           try
           all
           the
           Magnetical
           Experiments
           himself
           ,
           and
           publish
           them
           as
           his
           
             own
             Thoughts
          
           ,
           he
           might
           take
           himself
           to
           be
           the
           Inventor
           of
           them
           ;
           but
           he
           that
           examines
           and
           compares
           them
           with
           what
           Gilbert
           and
           others
           have
           done
           before
           him
           ,
           will
           not
           diminish
           the
           Praise
           of
           his
           
           Diligence
           ,
           but
           may
           wish
           he
           had
           compared
           his
           Thoughts
           with
           other
           Mens
           ,
           by
           which
           the
           World
           would
           receive
           greater
           Advantage
           ,
           altho'
           he
           lost
           the
           Honour
           of
           being
           an
           Original
           .
        
         
           
           
             The
             Matter
             of
             Certainty
          
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
             one
             cannot
             imploy
             too
             many
             Thoughts
             about
             ,
          
           viz.
           as
           to
           the
           
             finding
             the
             true
             Grounds
             of
             it
             ,
             or
             wherein
             it
             is
             placed
             .
          
           This
           I
           was
           led
           to
           consider
           ,
           by
           our
           Vnitarians
           placing
           it
           in
           
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
          
           ;
           and
           therefore
           rejecting
           
             the
             Mysteries
             of
             Faith
          
           ,
           because
           they
           could
           not
           have
           
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
          
           of
           them
           .
           And
           one
           wrote
           purposely
           to
           shew
           that
           we
           were
           not
           to
           believe
           any
           
             Mysteries
             in
             the
             Gospel
          
           ,
           because
           
             all
             our
             Certainty
             depended
             upon
             the
             Preception
             of
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             those
             simple
             Ideas
             which
             we
             have
             by
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
             .
          
           Now
           if
           these
           Principles
           of
           Certainty
           hold
           good
           as
           to
           all
           Propositions
           we
           can
           have
           no
           Certainty
           of
           Faith
           ,
           where
           we
           cannot
           perceive
           the
           Connexion
           of
           the
           Ideas
           contained
           in
           them
           .
           I
           own
           that
           you
           say
           ,
           
             That
             Faith
             is
             an
             Assent
             to
             any
             Proposition
             not
             made
             out
             by
             any
             Deductions
             of
             Reason
             ,
             but
             upon
             the
             Credit
             of
             the
             Proposer
             .
          
           But
           this
           doth
           not
           clear
           the
           matter
           ;
           for
           ,
           is
           Faith
           an
           
             Vnreasonable
             Act
          
           ?
           Is
           it
           not
           an
           Assent
           
           to
           a
           Proposition
           ?
           Then
           ,
           if
           all
           certainty
           in
           Acts
           of
           Reason
           be
           derived
           from
           the
           
             perceiving
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
          
           of
           the
           Ideas
           contained
           
             in
             it
          
           ,
           either
           there
           can
           be
           no
           Certainty
           of
           the
           Reasonable
           Act
           of
           Faith
           ,
           or
           the
           Grounds
           of
           Certainty
           must
           be
           laid
           some
           other
           way
           .
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             Where
             you
             want
             Evidence
             of
             things
             there
             is
             yet
             Ground
             enough
             for
             you
             to
             believe
             because
             God
             hath
             said
             it
             .
          
           Which
           doth
           not
           yet
           remove
           the
           Difficulty
           ,
           from
           the
           true
           Ground
           of
           Certainty
           ;
           for
           say
           they
           ,
           
             Revelation
             is
             but
             a
             means
             of
             Information
             ;
             and
             God
             discovers
             by
             that
             such
             Propositions
             ,
             which
             we
             could
             not
             have
             found
             out
             without
             Revelation
             ;
             but
             where-ever
             Propositions
             are
             offered
             to
             our
             Vnderstandings
             ,
             we
             must
             judge
             of
             them
             by
             our
             Perception
             of
             the
             Agreement
             and
             Disagreement
             of
             the
             Ideas
             contained
             in
             them
             .
             And
             Faith
             doth
             not
             overthrow
             Nature
             :
             If
             therefore
             the
             Nature
             of
             Certainty
             lies
             herein
             we
             cannot
             be
             certain
             without
             it
             .
          
        
         
           Is
           it
           not
           enough
           for
           you
           to
           disown
           the
           Consequence
           ,
           but
           to
           shew
           that
           it
           doth
           not
           follow
           from
           
             your
             Principles
          
           of
           Certainty
           :
           But
           of
           this
           I
           have
           spoken
           already
           ,
           and
           I
           love
           not
           Repetitions
           .
           I
           only
           take
           notice
           ,
           that
           you
           Assert
           and
           hold
           to
           the
           same
           .
           
           
             I
             stick
             to
             my
             own
             plain
             way
             of
             Certainty
             by
             Ideas
             .
          
           And
           so
           do
           
           those
           who
           reject
           
             the
             Mysteries
             of
             Faith
          
           ,
           because
           
             not
             agreeable
             to
             their
             Ideas
          
           ,
           and
           think
           they
           proceed
           upon
           your
           Grounds
           .
        
         
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             That
             according
             to
             my
             Rules
             you
             know
             not
             where
             to
             place
             Certainty
          
           ;
           
           for
           in
           the
           Account
           I
           give
           of
           
             Des
             Cartes
          
           ,
           I
           have
           these
           words
           concerning
           him
           .
           
             The
             first
             thing
             he
             found
             any
             Certainty
             in
             ,
             was
             his
             own
             Existence
             ,
             which
             he
             founded
             upon
             the
             Perception
             of
             the
             Acts
             of
             his
             Mind
             .
             From
             hence
             he
             proceeded
             to
             enquire
             how
             he
             came
             by
             this
             Certainty
             ,
             and
             he
             resolved
             it
             into
             this
             ,
             that
             he
             had
             a
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Preception
             of
             it
             .
             And
             from
             hence
             he
             formed
             his
             general
             Rule
             ,
             that
             what
             he
             had
             a
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Perception
             of
             was
             true
             .
             Which
             in
             Reason
             ought
             to
             go
             on
             farther
             ,
             than
             where
             there
             is
             the
             like
             Degree
             of
             Evidence
             ;
             for
             the
             Certainty
             was
             not
             grounded
             on
             the
             clearness
             of
             the
             Perception
             ,
             but
             on
             the
             plainness
             of
             the
             Evidence
             .
             Which
             is
             of
             that
             nature
             that
             the
             very
             doubting
             of
             it
             proves
             it
             ,
             since
             it
             is
             impossible
             that
             any
             thing
             should
             doubt
             or
             question
             its
             own
             being
             that
             had
             it
             not
             .
             So
             that
             here
             it
             is
             not
             the
             clearness
             of
             the
             Idea
             ,
             but
             an
             immediate
             Act
             of
             Perception
             ,
             which
             is
             the
             true
             ground
             of
             Certainty
             .
             And
             this
             cannot
             extend
             to
             
             things
             without
             our selves
             ,
             of
             which
             we
             can
             have
             no
             other
             Perception
             ,
             than
             what
             is
             caused
             by
             the
             Impression
             of
             outward
             Objects
             .
             But
             whether
             we
             are
             to
             judge
             according
             to
             those
             Impressions
             doth
             not
             depend
             on
             the
             Ideas
             themselves
             ,
             but
             upon
             the
             Exercise
             of
             our
             Judgment
             and
             Reason
             about
             them
             ,
             which
             put
             the
             difference
             between
             true
             and
             false
             ,
             and
             adequate
             and
             inadequate
             Ideas
             ,
             so
             that
             our
             Certainty
             is
             not
             from
             the
             Ideas
             themselves
             ,
             but
             from
             the
             Evidence
             of
             Reason
             ,
             that
             those
             Ideas
             are
             true
             and
             just
             ,
             and
             consequently
             ,
             that
             we
             may
             build
             our
             Certainty
             upon
             them
             .
          
        
         
           These
           I
           acknowledge
           to
           be
           my
           words
           ;
           and
           yet
           I
           see
           no
           Reason
           why
           I
           may
           not
           
             stick
             to
             them
          
           .
           
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             That
             I
             have
             placed
             the
             Grounds
             of
             Certainty
             of
             our
             own
             Existence
             ,
             sometimes
             in
             the
             plainness
             of
             Evidence
             ,
             in
             opposition
             to
             the
             clearness
             of
             Perception
             ;
             sometimes
             in
             the
             immediate
             act
             of
             Perception
             in
             opposition
             to
             the
             clearness
             of
             the
             Idea
             ;
             and
             the
             certainty
             of
             other
             things
             without
             us
             in
             the
             Evidence
             of
             Reason
             ,
             that
             these
             Ideas
             are
             true
             and
             just
             in
             opposition
             to
             the
             Ideas
             themselves
             ;
             so
             that
             such
             is
             your
             Dulness
             you
             cannot
             by
             these
             Rules
             tell
             ,
             where
             to
             place
             Certainty
             .
          
        
         
         
           But
           all
           these
           Mists
           will
           easily
           be
           scattered
           ,
           if
           you
           set
           your self
           a
           little
           to
           consider
           the
           Design
           of
           my
           Discourse
           ;
           which
           was
           not
           ,
           to
           lay
           down
           Rules
           of
           Certainty
           ,
           but
           to
           shew
           that
           the
           Grounds
           of
           Certainty
           from
           clear
           and
           distinct
           Ideas
           were
           not
           well
           laid
           at
           first
           by
           
             Des
             Cartes
          
           himself
           .
           Because
           he
           deduced
           his
           Rule
           as
           to
           Certainty
           of
           other
           things
           ,
           from
           the
           Evidence
           he
           had
           as
           to
           his
           own
           Existence
           ,
           which
           he
           had
           both
           from
           immediate
           Perception
           and
           uncontroulable
           Evidence
           ,
           when
           even
           the
           Doubting
           of
           it
           necessarily
           proved
           it
           .
           But
           the
           main
           Question
           was
           ,
           whether
           this
           would
           reach
           to
           other
           things
           without
           us
           :
           Yes
           said
           he
           ,
           
             the
             Rule
             will
             hold
             ,
             where-ever
             there
             are
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
             .
          
           But
           I
           say
           the
           Certainty
           doth
           not
           depend
           upon
           the
           Idea
           but
           upon
           inward
           Perception
           and
           the
           Evidence
           founded
           upon
           it
           ;
           and
           we
           have
           not
           the
           same
           as
           to
           External
           Objects
           :
           For
           we
           have
           no
           inward
           Perception
           of
           them
           ,
           nor
           any
           Evidence
           that
           results
           from
           our
           own
           Beings
           ;
           therefore
           the
           Rule
           of
           Certainty
           is
           carried
           beyond
           the
           true
           Ground
           of
           it
           .
           I
           do
           not
           oppose
           in
           the
           former
           Case
           the
           
             plainness
             of
             the
             Evidence
          
           to
           
             the
             clearness
             of
             the
             Perception
          
           ;
           but
           I
           suppose
           them
           both
           as
           to
           our
           own
           
           Existence
           .
           I
           say
           indeed
           after
           ,
           that
           it
           is
           not
           the
           clearness
           of
           the
           Idea
           ,
           but
           an
           immediate
           act
           of
           Perception
           which
           is
           the
           true
           Ground
           of
           Certainty
           as
           to
           our
           own
           Existence
           ;
           but
           there
           I
           take
           Idea
           as
           
             Des
             Cartes
          
           did
           ,
           for
           the
           clear
           and
           distinct
           Perception
           of
           our
           Minds
           ,
           which
           might
           reach
           to
           other
           Objects
           as
           well
           as
           our selves
           ;
           and
           such
           an
           Idea
           I
           deny
           is
           the
           Ground
           of
           Certainty
           as
           to
           our
           own
           Beings
           ,
           which
           is
           founded
           on
           an
           immediate
           Act
           of
           Perception
           .
           And
           when
           they
           prove
           this
           as
           to
           such
           outward
           Objects
           ,
           which
           we
           have
           the
           Ideas
           of
           ,
           they
           may
           then
           carry
           the
           Rule
           so
           far
           ;
           but
           I
           say
           the
           Case
           is
           vastly
           different
           ,
           as
           to
           a
           clear
           Perception
           we
           have
           from
           our
           own
           Acts
           ,
           and
           that
           which
           we
           have
           as
           the
           Impressions
           from
           outward
           Objects
           ;
           in
           the
           former
           Case
           we
           have
           such
           an
           Evidence
           ,
           as
           it
           is
           impossible
           to
           doubt
           of
           ,
           but
           the
           very
           doubting
           must
           prove
           it
           :
           Is
           it
           the
           same
           as
           to
           the
           Ideas
           of
           External
           Objects
           ?
           And
           as
           to
           these
           I
           do
           not
           deny
           ,
           but
           we
           may
           come
           to
           a
           Certainty
           :
           but
           I
           say
           ,
           it
           is
           not
           from
           the
           Ideas
           ,
           which
           may
           be
           true
           or
           false
           ,
           adequate
           or
           inadequate
           ,
           and
           whether
           we
           may
           be
           certain
           of
           them
           or
           not
           ,
           depends
           upon
           the
           Exercise
           of
           our
           Reason
           and
           Judgment
           about
           
           them
           .
           So
           that
           I
           found
           the
           Certainty
           of
           Ideas
           upon
           Reason
           ,
           and
           not
           Reason
           upon
           the
           Certainty
           of
           Ideas
           .
        
         
           And
           so
           I
           come
           more
           closely
           to
           consider
           the
           Argument
           from
           the
           Idea
           as
           to
           the
           Proof
           of
           a
           
             Supream
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           .
        
         
           If
           our
           Certainty
           did
           arise
           from
           
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
          
           then
           it
           must
           hold
           ,
           where
           we
           have
           a
           
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Idea
          
           ,
           as
           it
           is
           confessed
           we
           have
           concerning
           God.
           But
           this
           Argument
           from
           the
           Idea
           will
           not
           be
           allowed
           in
           this
           Case
           ;
           it
           is
           denied
           by
           others
           plainly
           ;
           but
           I
           do
           not
           say
           ,
           that
           it
           is
           
             denied
             by
             you
          
           ,
           but
           that
           it
           is
           made
           
             a
             doubtfull
             thing
          
           .
           Which
           comes
           to
           the
           same
           ,
           in
           the
           point
           of
           Certainty
           :
           and
           so
           
             the
             force
             of
             my
             Argument
             doth
             by
             no
             means
             fail
             .
          
           
        
         
           
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             That
             you
             intended
             by
             your
             words
             not
             to
             deny
             that
             the
             Idea
             of
             a
             most
             perfect
             Being
             doth
             prove
             a
             God
             ,
             but
             to
             blame
             those
             who
             take
             it
             for
             the
             only
             proof
             ,
             and
             endeavour
             to
             invalidate
             all
             others
             .
             For
             the
             Belief
             of
             a
             God
             being
             the
             Foundation
             of
             all
             Religion
             and
             genuine
             Morality
             you
             thought
             no
             Arguments
             that
             are
             made
             use
             of
             to
             work
             the
             Perswasion
             of
             a
             God
             into
             mens
             Minds
             should
             be
             invalidated
             ,
             which
             you
             grant
             is
             of
             very
             ill
             Consequence
             .
          
           
        
         
         
           Here
           you
           must
           give
           me
           leave
           to
           ask
           you
           ,
           what
           you
           think
           of
           the
           universal
           Consent
           of
           Mankind
           ,
           as
           to
           the
           Being
           of
           God
           ?
           Hath
           not
           this
           been
           made
           use
           of
           ,
           as
           an
           Argument
           not
           only
           by
           Christians
           ,
           but
           by
           the
           wisest
           and
           greatest
           Men
           among
           the
           Heathens
           ?
           And
           what
           then
           would
           you
           think
           of
           one
           who
           should
           go
           about
           to
           invalidate
           this
           Argument
           ?
           And
           that
           by
           proving
           ,
           that
           it
           hath
           been
           discover'd
           in
           these
           latter
           Ages
           by
           Navigation
           ,
           that
           there
           are
           whole
           Nations
           at
           the
           Bay
           of
           Soldania
           ,
           in
           Brasil
           ,
           in
           the
           
             Caribbe
             Islands
          
           ,
           and
           Paraquaria
           ,
           among
           whom
           there
           was
           found
           no
           Notion
           of
           a
           God
           ,
           And
           even
           the
           Author
           of
           
             the
             Essay
             of
             Human
             Vnderstanding
          
           hath
           done
           this
           .
           
        
         
           This
           cannot
           be
           thought
           a
           
             mere
             slip
             of
             the
             Pen.
          
           For
           men
           do
           not
           quote
           Authors
           so
           punctually
           then
           .
           But
           if
           it
           would
           not
           be
           thought
           
             stepping
             too
             much
             out
             of
             my
             way
             ,
          
           I
           think
           I
           could
           prove
           that
           these
           Instances
           are
           very
           ill
           chosen
           ,
           because
           either
           they
           were
           taken
           from
           such
           as
           were
           not
           sufficiently
           acquainted
           with
           the
           People
           and
           Language
           of
           the
           Country
           ;
           or
           that
           their
           Testimony
           is
           contradicted
           by
           those
           who
           have
           been
           longer
           among
           them
           and
           understood
           them
           better
           ;
           or
           
           lastly
           that
           the
           account
           given
           of
           them
           makes
           them
           not
           fit
           to
           be
           a
           standard
           for
           the
           Sense
           of
           Mankind
           ,
           being
           a
           People
           so
           strangely
           bereft
           of
           common
           Sense
           ,
           that
           they
           can
           hardly
           be
           reckoned
           among
           Mankind
           ,
           as
           appears
           by
           the
           best
           accounts
           both
           of
           the
           Cafres
           of
           Soldania
           ,
           and
           the
           Caiguae
           of
           Paraquaria
           .
        
         
           But
           this
           would
           be
           too
           much
           a
           Digression
           in
           this
           place
           .
           I
           return
           therefore
           to
           the
           argument
           for
           proving
           the
           Existence
           of
           God
           ;
           and
           you
           may
           plead
           for
           your self
           that
           your
           design
           was
           only
           to
           prove
           ,
           
             That
             there
             is
             no
             Innate
             Idea
             of
             a
             God.
          
           But
           doth
           not
           this
           however
           take
           off
           from
           the
           force
           of
           an
           Argument
           some
           have
           used
           to
           perswade
           Men
           that
           there
           is
           a
           God
           ?
           I
           meddle
           not
           with
           
             Innate
             Ideas
          
           ;
           but
           have
           not
           some
           Persons
           of
           Note
           ,
           in
           these
           Matters
           ,
           used
           the
           Argument
           from
           the
           
             Mark
             and
             Character
             of
             God
             imprinted
             on
             the
             Minds
             of
             Men
          
           to
           prove
           his
           Being
           ?
           And
           have
           you
           not
           set
           your self
           to
           disprove
           it
           ?
           
        
         
           But
           I
           leave
           this
           ,
           and
           come
           to
           the
           argument
           from
           the
           
             Idea
             of
             God
          
           ,
           concerning
           which
           you
           say
           ,
           
           
             That
             though
             the
             Complex
             Idea
             for
             which
             the
             Word
             God
             (
             whether
             containing
             in
             it
             the
             Idea
             of
             necessary
             Existence
             or
             no
             ,
             for
             the
             case
             is
             the
             
             same
             )
             will
             not
             prove
             the
             real
             Existence
             of
             a
             Being
             answering
             that
             Idea
             ,
             any
             more
             than
             any
             other
             Idea
             in
             any
             ones
             mind
             will
             prove
             the
             real
             Existence
             of
             any
             real
             Being
             answering
             that
             Idea
             ,
             yet
             you
             conceive
             it
             does
             not
             hence
             follow
             ,
             but
             that
             there
             may
             be
             other
             Ideas
             by
             which
             the
             Being
             of
             God
             may
             be
             proved
             .
          
        
         
           And
           afterwards
           you
           offer
           
             to
             shew
             that
             your
             Proof
             of
             a
             Deity
             is
             all
             grounded
             on
             Ideas
             ,
          
           
           i.
           e.
           
             from
             the
             Ideas
             of
             our selves
             ,
             as
             we
             are
             thinking
             Beings
             .
          
           But
           you
           confess
           ,
           that
           you
           think
           ,
           that
           the
           argument
           from
           the
           Idea
           will
           
             not
             hold
          
           ,
           but
           however
           you
           will
           not
           give
           up
           the
           argument
           from
           Ideas
           .
           Against
           which
           I
           urged
           your
           own
           argument
           ,
           
             That
             from
             the
             Consideration
             of
             what
             we
             find
             in
             our selves
             and
             in
             our
             Constitutions
             ,
             our
             Reason
             leads
             us
             to
             the
             Knowledge
             of
             this
             certain
             and
             evident
             Truth
             ,
             that
             there
             is
             an
             eternal
             ,
             most
             powerfull
             ,
             and
             most
             knowing
             Being
             .
          
           All
           which
           ,
           I
           said
           ,
           I
           did
           readily
           yield
           ;
           but
           we
           see
           plainly
           ,
           the
           Certainty
           is
           not
           placed
           in
           the
           Idea
           ,
           but
           in
           good
           and
           sound
           Reason
           from
           the
           Consideration
           of
           our selves
           and
           our
           Constitutions
           .
           To
           which
           you
           reply
           ,
           
           
             That
             you
             never
             thought
             the
             Consideration
             of
             our selves
             and
             our
             Constitutions
             excluded
             the
             Consideration
             
             of
             the
             Idea
             of
             Being
             or
             of
             Thinking
             ,
             two
             of
             the
             Ideas
             that
             make
             a
             part
             of
             the
             Complex
             Idea
             a
             Man
             hath
             of
             himself
             .
          
           But
           is
           the
           Reason
           you
           speak
           of
           ,
           which
           leads
           us
           from
           thence
           to
           the
           Knowledge
           of
           an
           eternal
           ,
           most
           powerfull
           ,
           and
           most
           knowing
           Being
           ,
           con●ained
           in
           the
           Complex
           Idea
           of
           a
           Man
           or
           not
           ?
           
             A
             Complex
             Idea
             is
             made
             up
             of
             simple
             Ideas
             ,
             all
             simple
             Ideas
             come
             in
             by
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
          
           ;
           and
           upon
           comparing
           these
           simple
           Ideas
           our
           Certainty
           you
           say
           is
           sounded
           .
           What
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           then
           are
           there
           in
           Man
           ,
           upon
           which
           you
           ground
           the
           Certainty
           of
           this
           Proposition
           ,
           That
           there
           is
           a
           God
           ?
           I
           grant
           you
           ,
           that
           there
           is
           a
           Certainty
           grounded
           upon
           our
           Beings
           and
           the
           Frame
           of
           our
           Natures
           ;
           but
           this
           I
           still
           say
           ,
           is
           a
           Certainty
           of
           Reason
           and
           not
           of
           Ideas
        
         
           
           You
           say
           ,
           
             You
             do
             not
             well
             understand
             what
             I
             mean
             by
             being
             not
             placed
             in
             the
             Idea
             ;
             for
             you
             see
             no
             such
             Opposition
             ,
             but
             that
             Ideas
             and
             sound
             Reason
             may
             stand
             together
          
           ▪
           i.
           e.
           
             in
             Reason
             rightly
             managing
             those
             Ideas
             so
             as
             to
             produce
             Evidence
             by
             them
             .
          
           But
           what
           need
           all
           this
           great
           noise
           about
           Ideas
           and
           
             Certainty
             ,
             true
             and
             real
             Certainty
             by
             Ideas
             :
          
           if
           after
           all
           ,
           it
           comes
           only
           to
           this
           ,
           that
           our
           Ideas
           
           only
           represent
           to
           us
           such
           things
           ,
           from
           whence
           we
           bring
           arguments
           to
           prove
           the
           Truth
           of
           things
           ?
           But
           the
           World
           hath
           been
           strangely
           amuzed
           with
           Ideas
           of
           late
           ,
           and
           we
           have
           been
           told
           ,
           that
           strange
           things
           might
           be
           done
           by
           the
           help
           of
           Ideas
           ,
           and
           yet
           these
           Ideas
           at
           last
           come
           to
           be
           only
           common
           Notions
           of
           things
           ,
           which
           we
           must
           make
           use
           of
           in
           our
           Reasoning
           .
           
           You
           say
           ,
           
             in
             that
             Chapter
             about
             the
             Existence
             of
             God
             ,
             you
             thought
             it
             most
             proper
             to
             express
             your self
             in
             the
             most
             usual
             and
             familiar
             way
             ,
             by
             common
             Words
             and
             Expressions
             .
          
           I
           would
           you
           had
           done
           so
           quite
           through
           your
           Book
           ;
           for
           then
           you
           had
           never
           given
           that
           Occasion
           to
           the
           Enemies
           of
           our
           Faith
           to
           take
           up
           your
           new
           way
           of
           Ideas
           ,
           as
           an
           effectual
           Battery
           (
           as
           they
           imagin'd
           )
           against
           the
           
             Mysteries
             of
             the
             Christian
             Faith.
          
           But
           you
           might
           have
           enjoy'd
           the
           satisfaction
           of
           your
           Ideas
           long
           enough
           ,
           before
           I
           had
           taken
           notice
           of
           them
           ,
           unless
           I
           had
           found
           them
           employ'd
           in
           doing
           Mischief
           .
        
         
           But
           at
           last
           you
           tell
           me
           ,
           
           
             That
             whether
             I
             will
             call
             it
             placing
             the
             Certainty
             in
             the
             Idea
             ,
             or
             placing
             the
             Certainty
             in
             Reason
             ;
             or
             if
             I
             will
             say
             ,
             it
             is
             not
             the
             Idea
             that
             gives
             us
             the
             Argument
             ,
             but
             the
             Argument
             ,
             
             it
             is
             indifferent
             to
             you
             .
          
           And
           if
           you
           mean
           no
           more
           by
           your
           
             Certainty
             from
             Ideas
          
           ,
           but
           
             a
             Certainty
             from
             Reason
          
           ,
           I
           am
           not
           such
           an
           unreasonable
           Man
           to
           disagree
           with
           you
           .
        
         
           The
           next
           Argument
           for
           the
           Existence
           of
           God
           stands
           thus
           ,
           as
           I
           have
           summ'd
           it
           up
           .
        
         
           We
           find
           in
           our selves
           Perception
           and
           Knowledge
           .
           So
           that
           there
           is
           some
           Knowing
           ,
           Intelligent
           Being
           in
           the
           World.
           And
           there
           must
           have
           been
           a
           Knowing
           Being
           from
           Eternity
           ,
           or
           an
           Unknowing
           ;
           for
           something
           must
           have
           been
           from
           Eternity
           :
           but
           if
           an
           Unknowing
           ,
           then
           it
           is
           impossible
           there
           ever
           should
           have
           been
           any
           Knowledge
           ,
           it
           being
           as
           impossible
           for
           a
           thing
           without
           Knowledge
           to
           produce
           it
           ,
           as
           that
           a
           Triangle
           should
           make
           three
           Angles
           bigger
           than
           two
           right
           ones
           .
        
         
           To
           which
           I
           added
           ,
           that
           allowing
           the
           Argument
           to
           be
           good
           ,
           yet
           it
           is
           not
           taken
           from
           the
           Idea
           ,
           but
           from
           Principles
           of
           true
           Reason
           ,
           as
           that
           no
           Man
           can
           doubt
           his
           own
           Perception
           ;
           that
           every
           thing
           (
           we
           see
           )
           must
           have
           a
           Cause
           ;
           that
           this
           Cause
           must
           either
           have
           Knowledge
           or
           not
           ;
           if
           it
           have
           ,
           the
           point
           is
           gain'd
           ;
           if
           it
           hath
           not
           ,
           nothing
           can
           produce
           nothing
           ,
           
           and
           consequently
           a
           not
           knowing
           Being
           cannot
           produce
           a
           Knowing
           .
        
         
           In
           your
           Answer
           to
           this
           ,
           I
           must
           first
           take
           notice
           of
           your
           Exception
           to
           that
           Expression
           ,
           
             Allowing
             the
             Argument
             to
             be
             Good
          
           ;
           
           which
           you
           say
           ,
           seems
           to
           imply
           that
           I
           thought
           the
           Argument
           not
           to
           be
           Good
           ,
           which
           was
           very
           far
           from
           my
           meaning
           .
           For
           I
           had
           said
           before
           ,
           
             That
             you
             brought
             very
             good
             Arguments
             to
             prove
             the
             Existence
             of
             a
             God
             in
             that
             Chapter
             :
          
           and
           afterwards
           ,
           
             That
             I
             was
             far
             from
             weakning
             the
             force
             of
             your
             Arguments
             .
          
           And
           so
           I
           hope
           that
           Exception
           is
           removed
           .
        
         
           
             You
             except
             not
          
           ,
           
           you
           say
           ,
           
             against
             my
             Arguments
             or
             Principles
             of
             Reason
             :
          
           but
           you
           think
           still
           ,
           
           
             this
             is
             an
             Argument
             taken
             from
             Ideas
             :
          
           if
           you
           will
           think
           so
           ,
           I
           cannot
           help
           it
           .
           But
           you
           endeavour
           to
           shew
           ,
           
             That
             the
             very
             Principles
             you
             allow
             are
             founded
             upon
             Ideas
             :
          
           As
           that
           a
           man
           cannot
           doubt
           of
           his
           own
           Perception
           ;
           This
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
             is
             by
             perceiving
             the
             necessary
             Agreement
             of
             the
             two
             Ideas
             of
             Perception
             and
             Self-Consciousness
             .
          
           But
           I
           rather
           think
           ,
           it
           is
           from
           that
           Self-Evidence
           which
           attends
           the
           immediate
           Perception
           of
           our
           own
           Acts
           ,
           which
           is
           so
           great
           ,
           
           that
           as
           S.
           Augustin
           observes
           ,
           the
           Academicks
           
           had
           nothing
           to
           say
           against
           that
           kind
           of
           Certainty
           ,
           but
           only
           against
           that
           which
           arose
           from
           things
           convey'd
           by
           our
           Senses
           to
           our
           Mind
           .
        
         
           The
           next
           Principle
           that
           every
           thing
           must
           have
           a
           Cause
           ,
           must
           be
           understood
           of
           the
           Matter
           treated
           of
           ,
           
             i.
             e.
          
           the
           things
           we
           see
           and
           perceive
           in
           the
           World.
           You
           say
           ,
           
             It
             is
             a
             true
             Principle
             that
             every
             thing
             that
             hath
             a
             Beginning
             must
             have
             a
             Cause
             ,
             because
             by
             contemplating
             our
             Ideas
             we
             find
             that
             the
             Idea
             of
             Beginning
             is
             connected
             with
             the
             Idea
             of
             some
             Operation
             ;
             and
             that
             with
             the
             Idea
             of
             something
             operating
             which
             we
             call
             a
             Cause
             ,
             and
             so
             the
             Beginning
             to
             be
             ,
             is
             perceived
             to
             agree
             with
             the
             Idea
             of
             a
             Cause
             ,
             as
             is
             expressed
             in
             the
             Proposition
             .
          
           Is
           not
           here
           a
           great
           ado
           to
           make
           a
           thing
           plain
           by
           Ideas
           ,
           which
           was
           plainer
           without
           them
           ?
           For
           is
           not
           any
           Man
           who
           understands
           the
           meaning
           of
           plain
           Words
           satisfied
           that
           nothing
           can
           produce
           it self
           ?
           or
           ,
           That
           what
           is
           not
           cannot
           make
           it self
           to
           be
           ?
           And
           so
           the
           evidence
           doth
           not
           depend
           on
           the
           Agreement
           of
           the
           Ideas
           of
           Beginning
           ,
           and
           Operation
           ,
           and
           
           Cause
           ;
           but
           upon
           the
           Repugnancy
           of
           the
           contrary
           Supposition
           .
           As
           in
           that
           Principle
           ,
           
             That
             it
             is
             impossible
             for
             a
             thing
             to
             be
             and
             not
             to
             be
             at
             the
             same
             time
             :
          
           If
           you
           say
           ,
           that
           this
           depends
           upon
           the
           Disagreement
           of
           the
           Ideas
           of
           Not-Being
           and
           Being
           ,
           it
           will
           be
           to
           little
           purpose
           for
           me
           to
           say
           any
           more
           about
           it
           .
        
         
           But
           there
           is
           one
           thing
           which
           deserves
           to
           be
           consider'd
           ;
           
           which
           is
           
             the
             Connexion
             between
             the
             Idea
             of
             an
             Eternal
             ,
             Actual
             ,
             Knowing
             Being
             with
             the
             Idea
             of
             Immateriality
             .
          
           This
           was
           the
           thing
           I
           look'd
           for
           .
           And
           by
           what
           means
           now
           doth
           this
           Connexion
           between
           these
           two
           Ideas
           appear
           ?
           
             By
             the
             help
             of
             an
             Intermediate
             Idea
             .
          
           What
           is
           that
           ?
           
             Even
             the
             Idea
             of
             Matter
          
           .
           How
           so
           ?
           The
           Idea
           of
           Matter
           you
           tell
           us
           ,
           implies
           its
           
             Actual
             Division
             ,
             Divisibility
             ,
             and
             want
             of
             Perception
             ,
          
           &c.
           
             which
             are
             the
             Arguments
             you
             use
             in
             this
             Proof
             .
          
           Are
           they
           so
           indeed
           ?
           And
           will
           not
           the
           same
           Ideas
           prove
           our
           Souls
           to
           be
           Immaterial
           ?
           If
           
             want
             of
             Perception
          
           be
           in
           the
           very
           Idea
           of
           Matter
           ,
           how
           can
           Matter
           be
           made
           capable
           of
           Perceiving
           ?
           But
           I
           find
           you
           do
           not
           always
           attend
           to
           the
           
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             your
             own
             Ideas
             .
          
           But
           of
           this
           before
           .
        
         
         
           I
           proceed
           to
           the
           last
           Argument
           I
           produced
           to
           shew
           ,
           that
           your
           Proofs
           of
           the
           Existence
           of
           God
           doth
           not
           depend
           upon
           Ideas
           .
           And
           the
           Substance
           of
           it
           I
           thus
           put
           together
           .
           If
           we
           suppose
           nothing
           to
           be
           first
           ,
           Matter
           can
           never
           begin
           to
           be
           ;
           is
           bare
           Matter
           without
           Motion
           be
           Eternal
           ,
           Motion
           can
           never
           begin
           to
           be
           ;
           if
           Matter
           and
           Motion
           be
           supposed
           Eternal
           ,
           Thought
           can
           never
           begin
           to
           be
           .
           For
           if
           Matter
           could
           produce
           Thought
           ,
           then
           Thought
           must
           be
           in
           the
           Power
           of
           Matter
           ;
           and
           if
           it
           be
           in
           Matter
           as
           such
           ,
           it
           must
           be
           the
           inseparable
           Property
           of
           all
           Matter
           ,
           which
           is
           contrary
           to
           the
           Sense
           and
           Experience
           of
           Mankind
           .
           If
           only
           some
           Parts
           of
           Matter
           have
           a
           Power
           of
           Thinking
           ,
           how
           comes
           so
           great
           a
           difference
           in
           the
           Properties
           of
           the
           same
           Matter
           ?
           What
           Disposition
           of
           Matter
           is
           requir'd
           to
           Thinking
           ?
           And
           from
           whence
           comes
           it
           ?
           Of
           which
           no
           account
           can
           be
           given
           in
           Reason
           .
           This
           I
           took
           to
           be
           the
           Force
           of
           your
           Argument
           ,
           which
           I
           said
           ,
           I
           was
           far
           from
           designing
           to
           weaken
           :
           Only
           I
           observed
           that
           the
           Certainty
           of
           it
           is
           not
           placed
           upon
           clear
           and
           distinct
           Ideas
           ,
           but
           upon
           Reason
           distinct
           from
           it
           ;
           which
           was
           the
           Thing
           I
           intended
           to
           prove
           .
        
         
         
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
           
             You
             do
             not
             see
             but
             the
             same
             proof
             may
             be
             placed
             upon
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
             ,
             and
             upon
             Reason
             too
             .
          
           I
           hope
           this
           matter
           is
           made
           a
           little
           clearer
           to
           you
           ;
           having
           so
           fully
           shew'd
           to
           you
           before
           ,
           that
           in
           the
           way
           of
           Ideas
           you
           can
           come
           to
           no
           Certainty
           about
           any
           Substance
           ,
           but
           by
           Reason
           as
           it
           is
           distinct
           from
           the
           Ideas
           ;
           
             i.
             e.
          
           as
           to
           Material
           Substances
           that
           your
           Certainty
           is
           resolved
           into
           this
           Principle
           of
           Reason
           ,
           that
           Accidents
           cannot
           subsist
           without
           a
           Substratum
           .
        
         
           As
           to
           Spiritual
           Substance
           in
           us
           ,
           that
           depends
           on
           two
           things
           ,
           
             
               1.
               
               That
               Thinking
               is
               only
               a
               Mode
               ,
               and
               must
               suppose
               a
               Substance
               .
            
             
               2.
               
               That
               Matter
               cannot
               think
               ,
               and
               therefore
               it
               must
               be
               an
               Immaterial
               Substance
               ;
               which
               I
               have
               proved
               from
               your
               own
               Principles
               .
            
          
        
         
           As
           to
           a
           
             Supreme
             Immaterial
             Substance
          
           ,
           the
           evidence
           depends
           upon
           this
           Reason
           ,
           that
           Matter
           and
           Motion
           cannot
           produce
           Thought
           ;
           and
           therefore
           an
           Eternal
           Thinking
           Being
           must
           be
           Immaterial
           .
           And
           that
           Matter
           and
           Motion
           cannot
           produce
           Thought
           ,
           is
           proved
           by
           this
           Reason
           ,
           that
           either
           it
           must
           be
           an
           inseparable
           Property
           of
           Matter
           ;
           or
           some
           
           account
           in
           Reason
           must
           be
           given
           why
           some
           part
           of
           Matter
           should
           think
           and
           not
           others
           .
           And
           doth
           not
           all
           this
           proceed
           upon
           Reason
           as
           distinct
           from
           Ideas
           ?
        
         
           And
           when
           I
           said
           ,
           
             That
             the
             Certainty
             of
             it
          
           ,
           i.
           e.
           the
           Argument
           
             is
             not
             placed
             on
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
             ,
             but
             upon
             the
             force
             of
             Reason
             distinct
             from
             it
             ,
          
           I
           meant
           
             the
             Certainty
             from
             ideas
          
           ,
           although
           it
           were
           not
           so
           clearly
           expressed
           as
           it
           might
           have
           been
           ;
           but
           here
           I
           observe
           you
           call
           for
           the
           
             Plural
             Number
          
           ,
           which
           you
           are
           so
           offended
           with
           in
           other
           Parts
           of
           your
           Letter
           .
        
         
           The
           next
           thing
           I
           undertook
           to
           shew
           was
           ,
           that
           we
           can
           have
           no
           clear
           and
           distinct
           Idea
           of
           Nature
           and
           Person
           from
           
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
          
           .
           Here
           you
           spend
           many
           Pages
           to
           shew
           that
           this
           doth
           not
           concern
           you
           .
           Let
           it
           be
           so
           .
           But
           it
           concerns
           the
           Matter
           I
           was
           upon
           ;
           which
           was
           to
           shew
           that
           we
           must
           have
           Ideas
           of
           these
           things
           which
           we
           cannot
           come
           to
           by
           Sensation
           or
           Reflection
           .
        
         
           My
           words
           are
           ,
           I
           grant
           that
           by
           Sensation
           or
           Reflection
           we
           come
           to
           know
           the
           Powers
           and
           Properties
           of
           Things
           .
           But
           our
           Reason
           is
           satisfied
           ,
           that
           there
           must
           be
           something
           beyond
           these
           ,
           because
           
           it
           is
           impossible
           that
           they
           should
           subsist
           by
           themselves
           .
           So
           that
           the
           Nature
           of
           things
           properly
           belongs
           to
           our
           Reason
           ,
           and
           not
           to
           mere
           Ideas
           .
           Still
           you
           are
           at
           it
           ,
           
           
             That
             you
             can
             find
             no
             Opposition
             between
             Ideas
             and
             Reason
             :
             but
             Ideas
             are
             the
             Objects
             of
             the
             Vnderstanding
             ,
             and
             Vnderstanding
             is
             one
             of
             the
             Faculties
             imploy'd
             about
             them
             .
          
           No
           doubt
           of
           it
           .
           But
           you
           might
           easily
           see
           that
           by
           Reason
           ,
           I
           understood
           ,
           
             Principles
             of
             Reason
          
           ,
           allow'd
           by
           Mankind
           .
           Which
           I
           think
           are
           very
           different
           from
           Ideas
           .
           But
           I
           perceive
           Reason
           in
           this
           Sense
           is
           a
           thing
           you
           have
           no
           Idea
           of
           ,
           or
           one
           as
           obscure
           as
           that
           of
           Substance
           .
           But
           if
           you
           set
           aside
           these
           
             common
             Principles
          
           of
           Reason
           ,
           your
           Ideas
           will
           signifie
           very
           little
           ;
           and
           will
           like
           Accidents
           want
           a
           Substratum
           to
           support
           them
           .
        
         
           But
           your
           Notion
           of
           Nature
           and
           Person
           deserves
           to
           be
           more
           throughly
           consider'd
           .
           Therefore
           to
           proceed
           more
           clearly
           in
           a
           debate
           of
           this
           Consequence
           with
           respect
           to
           the
           
             Doctrine
             of
             the
             Trinity
          
           (
           what-ever
           you
           pretend
           to
           the
           contrary
           )
           I
           shall
           first
           set
           down
           your
           Notions
           of
           Nature
           and
           Person
           from
           your
           own
           Words
           ,
           and
           then
           enter
           upon
           the
           Examination
           of
           them
           .
        
         
         
           
           As
           to
           Nature
           ,
           you
           tell
           me
           in
           short
           it
           is
           this
           ,
           
             That
             it
             is
             a
             Collection
             of
             several
             Ideas
             combined
             into
             one
             Complex
             Abstract
             Idea
             .
             Which
             when
             they
             are
             found
             united
             in
             any
             Individual
             Existing
             ,
             though
             joyned
             in
             that
             Existence
             with
             several
             other
             Ideas
             ,
             that
             Individual
             is
             truly
             said
             to
             have
             the
             Nature
             of
             a
             Man
             ,
             or
             the
             Nature
             of
             Man
             to
             be
             in
             him
             :
             for
             as
             much
             as
             all
             these
             simple
             Ideas
             are
             found
             united
             in
             him
             ,
             which
             answer
             the
             Complex
             Abstract
             Idea
             to
             which
             the
             specifick
             name
             Man
             is
             given
             by
             any
             one
             ;
             which
             Abstract
             Specifick
             Idea
             keeps
             the
             same
             ,
             when
             he
             applies
             the
             Specifick
             Name
             standing
             for
             it
             ,
             to
             distinct
             Individuals
             ,
          
           i.
           e.
           
             no
             body
             changes
             his
             Idea
             of
             a
             Man
             ,
             when
             he
             says
             ,
          
           Peter
           
             is
             a
             Man
             ,
             from
             that
             Idea
             which
             he
             makes
             the
             Name
             Man
             to
             stand
             for
             ,
             when
             he
             makes
          
           John
           
             a
             Man.
          
           
        
         
           
           As
           to
           
             Person
             in
             the
             way
             of
             Ideas
             ,
          
           you
           tell
           us
           ,
           
             That
             the
             Word
             Person
             in
             it self
             signifies
             nothing
             ,
             and
             so
             no
             Idea
             belonging
             to
             it
             ,
             nothing
             can
             be
             said
             to
             be
             the
             true
             Idea
             of
             it
             ;
             but
             when
             any
             Language
             appropriates
             it
             to
             any
             Idea
             ,
             then
             that
             is
             the
             true
             Idea
             of
             a
             Person
             and
             so
             of
             Nature
             .
             These
             are
             therefore
             the
             signs
             of
             two
             Ideas
             they
             are
             put
             to
             stand
             for
          
           ;
           
           
             and
             by
             enumeration
             all
             the
             simple
             Ideas
             that
             are
             contained
             
             in
             the
             Complex
             Idea
             that
             each
             of
             them
             is
             made
             to
             stand
             for
             ;
             we
             shall
             immediately
             see
             the
             whole
             difference
             that
             is
             between
             them
             .
          
        
         
           After
           which
           ,
           you
           conclude
           ,
           
             That
             you
             must
             content
             your self
             with
             this
             condemned
             way
             of
             Ideas
             ,
             and
             despair
             of
             ever
             attaining
             any
             Knowledge
             by
             any
             other
             than
             that
             ,
             or
             farther
             than
             that
             will
             lead
             you
             to
             it
             .
          
        
         
           But
           this
           must
           not
           hinder
           me
           from
           enquiring
           a
           little
           more
           strictly
           into
           these
           Notions
           of
           Nature
           and
           Person
           ,
           for
           if
           these
           hold
           ,
           I
           do
           not
           see
           how
           it
           is
           possible
           to
           defend
           the
           Doctrine
           of
           the
           Trinity
           .
           For
           if
           these
           terms
           really
           
             signifie
             nothing
             in
             themselves
          
           ,
           but
           are
           only
           
             Abstract
             and
             Complex
             Ideas
          
           ,
           which
           
             the
             common
             use
             of
             Language
             hath
             appropriated
             to
             be
             the
             signs
             of
             two
             Ideas
          
           ;
           then
           it
           is
           plain
           ,
           that
           they
           are
           only
           
             Notions
             of
             the
             Mind
          
           ,
           as
           all
           
             Abstracted
             and
             Complex
             Ideas
             are
          
           ;
           and
           so
           
             one
             Nature
          
           and
           
             three
             Persons
          
           can
           be
           no
           more
           .
        
         
           We
           must
           therefore
           examine
           what
           your
           Notion
           is
           ,
           of
           
             Abstracted
             and
             Complex
             Ideas
          
           ,
           and
           how
           it
           can
           be
           applied
           to
           
             Nature
             and
             Person
          
           :
           and
           whether
           they
           are
           
             only
             signs
             of
             such
             Ideas
          
           as
           People
           have
           agreed
           to
           signifie
           by
           them
           .
        
         
         
           To
           explain
           this
           ,
           I
           must
           give
           an
           account
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           I
           can
           ,
           from
           your self
           ,
           how
           these
           Abstracted
           and
           
             Complex
             Ideas
          
           come
           to
           be
           formed
           in
           our
           Minds
           ,
           and
           what
           is
           implied
           in
           them
           .
           
           
             The
             Vnderstanding
          
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
             seems
             to
             you
             not
             to
             have
             the
             least
             glimmering
             of
             any
             Ideas
             which
             it
             hath
             not
             by
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
             .
             These
             and
             their
             several
             Modes
             and
             the
             Compositions
             made
             out
             of
             them
             ,
             we
             shall
             find
             contain
             our
             whole
             stock
             of
             Ideas
             ;
             and
             that
             we
             have
             nothing
             in
             our
             Minds
             which
             did
             not
             come
             in
             one
             of
             these
             two
             ways
             .
          
           
           From
           hence
           you
           consider
           the
           several
           sorts
           of
           
             Ideas
             ,
             some
             Simple
             and
             some
             Complex
             .
             The
             simple
             Ideas
             are
             the
             Materials
             of
             all
             our
             Knowledge
             ;
             and
             when
             the
             Vnderstanding
             is
             once
             stored
             with
             these
             simple
             Ideas
             ,
             it
             has
             the
             Power
             to
             repeat
             ,
             compare
             and
             unite
             them
             ,
             even
             to
             an
             almost
             infinite
             variety
             ,
             and
             so
             can
             make
             at
             pleasure
             new
             Complex
             Ideas
             :
             But
             no
             understanding
             can
             make
             one
             new
             simple
             Idea
             ,
             not
             taken
             in
             by
             the
             ways
             before
             mention'd
             ,
             nor
             can
             it
             destroy
             those
             that
             are
             there
             .
          
           After
           you
           have
           given
           an
           account
           of
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           both
           ways
           ,
           you
           come
           to
           the
           
             Faculty
             of
             Discerning
             in
             our
             Minds
             ,
          
           and
           there
           you
           reckon
           up
           ,
           
           
             Distinguishing
             Ideas
             ,
             Comparing
             ,
             Compounding
          
           and
           Abstracting
           .
        
         
         
           The
           
             Reason
             of
             Abstraction
          
           ,
           
           you
           say
           ,
           
             is
             to
             have
             one
             general
             Name
             for
             many
             Particulars
             ,
             or
             else
             Names
             would
             be
             endless
             .
             Which
             Abstraction
             is
             performed
             by
             separating
             the
             Ideas
             of
             particular
             Objects
             from
             the
             Circumstances
             of
             real
             Existence
             ,
             as
             Time
             ,
             Place
             ,
          
           &c.
           
           
             Complex
             Ideas
             are
             those
             simple
             Ideas
             which
             the
             Mind
             unites
             as
             one
             Idea
             .
          
           
           
             But
             still
             it
             is
             confin'd
             to
             those
             simple
             Ideas
             which
             it
             received
             by
             Sensation
             or
             Reflection
             ,
             which
             are
             the
             ultimate
             Materials
             of
             all
             its
             Compositions
             .
          
        
         
           Of
           these
           you
           reckon
           ,
           Modes
           ,
           
           Substances
           and
           Relations
           .
        
         
           
             The
             Ideas
             of
             Substances
             are
             such
             Combinations
             of
             simple
             Ideas
             ,
          
           
           
             as
             are
             taken
             to
             represent
             particular
             things
             subsisting
             by
             themselves
             .
             And
             these
             are
             of
             two
             sorts
             ,
             one
             of
             single
             Substances
             as
             they
             exist
             separately
             ,
             as
             of
             a
             Man
             ,
          
           &c.
           
             the
             other
             of
             several
             of
             these
             put
             together
             as
             an
             Army
             of
             Men.
             
          
        
         
           In
           your
           Chapter
           of
           
             Complex
             Ideas
             of
             Substances
          
           ▪
           
           you
           affirm
           
             the
             Ideas
             of
             particular
             Substances
             to
             be
             made
             by
             a
             Combination
             of
             simple
             Ideas
             :
          
           and
           again
           ,
           
             that
             it
             is
             by
             such
             Combination
             of
             simple
             Ideas
             as
             co-exist
             in
             some
             unknown
             cause
             of
             their
             Vnion
             .
          
           
        
         
         
           
           
             That
             the
             Complex
             Ideas
             we
             have
             of
             God
             and
             separate
             Spirits
             are
             made
             up
             of
             the
             simple
             Ideas
             we
             have
             by
             Reflection
             ;
             by
             inlarging
             the
             Ideas
             we
             find
             in
             our selves
             .
          
        
         
           
           In
           your
           3d
           Book
           you
           consider
           
             general
             Terms
          
           .
           And
           the
           Reason
           of
           them
           ,
           you
           say
           is
           
             because
             it
             is
             beyond
             the
             power
             of
             Human
             Capacity
             to
             frame
             and
             retain
             distinct
             Ideas
             of
             all
             Particulars
             .
             And
             these
             are
             made
             by
             way
             of
             Abstraction
             from
             Circumstances
             of
             Time
             and
             Place
             .
          
           After
           which
           you
           tell
           us
           ,
           
           
             That
             General
             Natures
             are
             nothing
             but
             Abstract
             Ideas
             ;
             and
             the
             whole
             Mystery
             of
             Genera
             and
             Species
             ,
          
           
           
             which
             make
             such
             a
             noise
             in
             the
             Schools
             ,
             is
             nothing
             else
             but
             Abstract
             Ideas
             with
             Names
             annexed
             to
             them
             .
          
           From
           whence
           ,
           
           you
           say
           ,
           
             it
             is
             plain
             ,
             that
             General
             and
             Vniversal
             ,
             belong
             not
             to
             the
             real
             Existence
             of
             Things
             ,
             but
             are
             the
             Inventions
             and
             Creatures
             of
             the
             Vnderstanding
             ;
             made
             by
             it
             for
             its
             own
             use
             and
             concern
             only
             Signs
             whether
             Words
             or
             Ideas
             .
          
           
           And
           the
           
             Abstract
             Idea
             and
             the
             Essence
             of
             the
             Species
             or
             Genus
             of
             the
             same
             thing
             :
          
           
           
             and
             every
             distinct
             ,
             abstract
             Idea
             is
             a
             distinct
             Essence
             .
          
        
         
           But
           then
           you
           distinguish
           
             the
             Real
             and
             Nominal
             Essence
          
           .
           
           
             The
             former
             is
             the
             Real
             ,
             
             Internal
             Constitution
             of
             particular
             things
             ;
             and
             the
             Nominal
             is
             the
             Abstract
             Idea
             .
             But
             there
             is
             so
             near
             a
             Connexion
             between
             them
             that
             the
             Name
             cannot
             be
             attributed
             to
             any
             particular
             Being
             ,
          
           
           
             but
             what
             has
             this
             Essence
             ,
             whereby
             it
             answers
             that
             Abstract
             Idea
             ,
             whereof
             that
             Name
             is
             the
             Sign
             .
          
        
         
           These
           things
           you
           repeat
           and
           inlarge
           upon
           in
           several
           other
           places
           ,
           but
           this
           I
           think
           is
           the
           substance
           of
           what
           you
           say
           upon
           this
           matter
           :
           For
           I
           would
           not
           willingly
           mistake
           or
           mis-represent
           your
           Meaning
           .
        
         
           The
           Question
           now
           between
           us
           comes
           to
           this
           ,
           Whether
           the
           common
           Nature
           or
           
             Essence
             of
             Things
          
           lies
           only
           in
           an
           
             Abstract
             Idea
          
           ,
           or
           
             a
             General
             Name
          
           ,
           and
           the
           Real
           Essence
           consists
           only
           in
           particular
           Beings
           from
           which
           that
           Name
           is
           abstracted
           ?
        
         
           The
           Question
           is
           not
           ,
           Whether
           in
           forming
           the
           Notion
           of
           Common
           Nature
           ,
           the
           Mind
           doth
           not
           abstract
           from
           the
           Circumstances
           of
           particular
           Beings
           ?
           But
           it
           is
           whether
           there
           be
           not
           an
           Antecedent
           Foundation
           in
           the
           Nature
           of
           things
           upon
           which
           we
           form
           this
           Abstract
           Idea
           ?
           For
           it
           there
           be
           ,
           then
           it
           cannot
           be
           called
           
             an
             universal
             Name
          
           only
           :
           or
           a
           meer
           sign
           of
           an
           Idea
           ,
           which
           we
           have
           
           formed
           from
           putting
           many
           simple
           Ideas
           together
           ,
           which
           Name
           belongs
           to
           all
           of
           such
           a
           sort
           ,
           as
           have
           those
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           united
           together
           .
           I
           know
           not
           how
           it
           comes
           to
           pass
           ,
           that
           a
           
             Man
             spinning
             Books
             out
             of
             his
             own
             Thoughts
          
           should
           hit
           so
           luckily
           upon
           the
           Thoughts
           of
           another
           Man
           :
           I
           do
           not
           mean
           now
           ,
           about
           clear
           and
           distinct
           Ideas
           ,
           but
           about
           this
           Point
           of
           
             universal
             Names
          
           .
           
           For
           Mr.
           Hobbs
           in
           his
           Chapter
           of
           Speech
           ,
           tell
           us
           ,
           That
           Names
           were
           to
           serve
           for
           
             Marks
             or
             Notes
             of
             Remembrance
          
           ,
           and
           therefore
           were
           called
           
             Signs
             .
             Of
             these
             Names
             ,
             some
             are
             proper
             and
             singular
             to
             one
             thing
             ,
             as
          
           Peter
           ,
           John
           ,
           
             this
             Man
             ,
             this
             Tree
             ;
             some
             are
             common
             to
             many
             things
             ,
             as
             Man
             ,
             Horse
             ,
             Tree
             ,
             in
             respect
             of
             all
             which
             it
             is
             called
             an
             Vniversal
             ,
             there
             being
             nothing
             in
             the
             World
             Vniversal
             but
             Names
             ;
             for
             the
             things
             nam'd
             ,
             are
             every
             one
             of
             them
             individual
             and
             singular
             .
          
        
         
           
             One
             universal
             Name
             is
             imposed
             on
             many
             things
             ,
             for
             their
             similitude
             in
             some
             Quality
             or
             other
             Accident
             ;
             and
             whereas
             a
             proper
             Name
             bringeth
             to
             mind
             one
             thing
             only
             Vniversals
             recall
             any
             one
             of
             those
             many
             .
          
        
         
           
             And
             of
             Vniversals
             some
             are
             of
             more
             ,
             or
             less
             Extent
             ,
             the
             larger
             comprehending
             
             the
             less
             large
             ,
             and
             some
             of
             equal
             extent
             ,
          
           &c.
           
        
         
           This
           is
           enough
           to
           let
           you
           see
           that
           these
           Notions
           are
           not
           so
           peculiar
           but
           that
           another
           Person
           ,
           from
           his
           
             own
             Thoughts
          
           too
           ,
           had
           said
           much
           the
           same
           things
           .
        
         
           But
           whoever
           said
           or
           thought
           them
           first
           ,
           we
           must
           examine
           how
           reasonable
           these
           Thoughts
           are
           .
        
         
           I
           know
           no
           Body
           that
           thinks
           now-a-days
           ,
           that
           
             Vniversals
             exist
             any
             where
             by
             themselves
          
           ;
           but
           I
           do
           think
           ,
           that
           there
           is
           a
           difference
           to
           be
           made
           between
           that
           and
           making
           them
           
             meer
             Names
          
           ,
           or
           
             signs
             of
             Ideas
          
           .
        
         
           I.
           And
           the
           Reasons
           I
           go
           upon
           are
           these
           .
           In
           the
           first
           place
           ,
           we
           are
           agreed
           ,
           that
           there
           is
           a
           supream
           immaterial
           most
           perfect
           Being
           ;
           whose
           Essential
           Attributes
           do
           not
           depend
           upon
           our
           
             Arbitrary
             Ideas
          
           ;
           nor
           any
           Names
           or
           
             Signs
             of
             Honour
          
           we
           give
           him
           ,
           nor
           upon
           the
           meer
           
             Inlarging
             the
             Ideas
          
           of
           our
           own
           Perfections
           ;
           or
           such
           as
           we
           account
           to
           be
           so
           in
           our selves
           :
           for
           we
           attribute
           those
           to
           God
           which
           we
           are
           not
           capable
           of
           ,
           as
           Eternity
           or
           
             Necessary
             Existence
             ,
             Immutability
          
           ,
           &c.
           
           Herein
           ,
           we
           take
           up
           no
           
             Complex
             Ideas
          
           from
           several
           Individuals
           ;
           
           but
           we
           form
           a
           true
           Idea
           of
           a
           Divine
           Essence
           ,
           from
           such
           Attributes
           as
           are
           Essential
           to
           an
           infinitely
           perfect
           Being
           ,
           which
           being
           Infinite
           is
           thereby
           ,
           Incomprehensible
           by
           us
           .
           And
           so
           you
           own
           ,
           
             that
             the
             great
             God
             of
             whom
             and
             from
             whom
             are
             all
             things
             is
             incomprehensibly
             Infinite
             .
          
           
           And
           
             that
             God
             is
             infinitely
             beyond
             the
             reach
             of
             our
             narrow
             Capacities
             .
          
        
         
           II.
           In
           the
           next
           place
           ,
           we
           look
           on
           this
           Supream
           Being
           ,
           as
           the
           wise
           Creator
           of
           all
           things
           ,
           who
           hath
           ordered
           the
           several
           Sorts
           and
           Ranks
           of
           Beings
           in
           the
           World
           according
           to
           his
           own
           Eternal
           Wisdom
           ;
           and
           hath
           given
           them
           all
           such
           Properties
           as
           himself
           thought
           fit
           ,
           whereby
           they
           are
           really
           and
           essentially
           distinguished
           from
           one
           another
           ;
           as
           appears
           by
           Mankind
           ,
           and
           Brutes
           ,
           and
           Plants
           .
           And
           no
           man
           that
           ever
           imploys
           his
           own
           Thoughts
           can
           think
           ,
           that
           these
           are
           distinguished
           from
           each
           other
           ,
           only
           by
           an
           Act
           of
           our
           Minds
           .
        
         
           III.
           Among
           these
           it
           is
           evident
           ,
           that
           there
           are
           some
           things
           ,
           wherein
           they
           agree
           ;
           and
           some
           wherein
           they
           differ
           .
           They
           all
           agree
           in
           being
           real
           ,
           created
           Beings
           ,
           and
           having
           a
           sort
           of
           Life
           belonging
           
           to
           them
           .
           But
           they
           differ
           ,
           that
           some
           have
           Sense
           ,
           which
           others
           have
           not
           ;
           and
           some
           have
           Reason
           and
           Understanding
           which
           others
           want
           .
           And
           all
           this
           ,
           is
           so
           plain
           and
           evident
           ,
           that
           one
           might
           question
           ,
           whether
           those
           had
           Understanding
           or
           not
           ,
           who
           could
           think
           the
           difference
           of
           these
           from
           each
           others
           was
           not
           in
           their
           Natures
           ,
           but
           only
           depended
           on
           
             the
             several
             Names
          
           that
           we
           call
           them
           by
           .
        
         
           IV.
           Among
           the
           Individuals
           of
           the
           same
           kind
           ,
           there
           is
           an
           Agreement
           in
           the
           same
           Essential
           Properties
           ;
           as
           all
           Men
           in
           being
           
             Rational
             Creatures
          
           ;
           and
           there
           is
           a
           Real
           Difference
           from
           each
           other
           in
           the
           several
           Accidents
           that
           belong
           to
           them
           ;
           as
           to
           Time
           ,
           Place
           ,
           Qualities
           ,
           Relations
           ,
           &c.
           
           And
           no
           Man
           in
           his
           Senses
           can
           call
           this
           in
           question
           .
           For
           his
           most
           plain
           and
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           will
           inform
           him
           of
           it
           .
        
         
           V.
           The
           Question
           now
           is
           ,
           Whether
           that
           wherein
           they
           do
           all
           agree
           ,
           be
           a
           meer
           
             Vniversal
             Name
          
           and
           
             Abstract
             Idea
          
           or
           not
           .
        
         
           It
           is
           certain
           ,
           that
           what
           God
           created
           is
           no
           meer
           Name
           or
           Idea
           :
           It
           is
           certain
           ,
           
           that
           God
           created
           not
           only
           Individuals
           but
           the
           
             several
             Kinds
          
           ,
           with
           the
           Differences
           ,
           which
           they
           have
           from
           each
           other
           ;
           it
           is
           certain
           ,
           that
           these
           Differences
           do
           not
           lie
           in
           meer
           Names
           or
           Ideas
           :
           How
           comes
           it
           then
           not
           to
           be
           certain
           that
           there
           is
           a
           Real
           Common
           Essence
           or
           Nature
           in
           the
           Individuals
           of
           the
           same
           kind
           ?
        
         
           But
           
             it
             comes
             not
             to
             us
             in
             the
             way
             of
             Ideas
             .
          
           If
           it
           be
           so
           ,
           the
           way
           of
           Ideas
           and
           Reason
           are
           two
           different
           ways
           ;
           and
           I
           shall
           never
           forsake
           one
           for
           the
           other
           ,
           unless
           I
           could
           see
           better
           Reason
           for
           it
           ;
           and
           even
           then
           I
           should
           not
           ;
           but
           adhere
           to
           Reason
           still
           .
        
         
           But
           how
           doth
           it
           appear
           by
           Reason
           ,
           that
           
             Nature
             is
             any
             thing
             else
             but
             a
             Collection
             of
             several
             Ideas
             combined
             into
             one
             Complex
             Abstract
             Idea
             .
          
        
         
           That
           will
           be
           done
           by
           considering
           ,
           
             
               1.
               
               What
               these
               Ideas
               are
               ,
               which
               are
               so
               collected
               into
               a
               
                 Complex
                 Idea
              
               ;
               which
               is
               called
               Nature
               .
            
             
               2.
               
               What
               that
               Essence
               is
               which
               is
               implied
               in
               this
               Idea
               ;
               whether
               it
               be
               a
               Real
               or
               only
               a
               
                 Nominal
                 Essence
              
               .
            
          
        
         
           1.
           
           What
           these
           Ideas
           are
           ,
           of
           which
           this
           Complex
           Idea
           of
           Nature
           consists
           ;
           and
           they
           are
           said
           to
           be
           ,
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
             of
             particular
             Substances
          
           united
           together
           ,
           
           without
           the
           Circumstances
           of
           Time
           and
           Place
           .
           But
           those
           simple
           Ideas
           may
           be
           considered
           two
           ways
           .
        
         
           
             1.
             
             With
             respect
             to
             the
             Qualities
             of
             things
             ,
             and
             these
             Ideas
             are
             said
             to
             be
             
               true
               and
               adequate
            
             ;
             but
             they
             go
             no
             farther
             than
             the
             Qualities
             ;
             which
             reaches
             only
             to
             that
             Sense
             of
             Nature
             ,
             as
             it
             is
             taken
             for
             Properties
             .
          
           
             2.
             
             With
             respect
             to
             the
             Subject
             of
             them
             ,
             which
             is
             the
             Nature
             or
             Substance
             that
             supports
             them
             ,
             and
             of
             this
             you
             confess
             we
             have
             only
             
               imperfect
               and
               inadequate
               Ideas
            
             .
          
        
         
           As
           they
           are
           true
           and
           adequate
           ;
           and
           so
           they
           are
           not
           the
           
             true
             Representations
             of
             Things
             without
             us
             ,
             but
             of
             the
             Effects
             of
             such
             Powers
             in
             them
             as
             produce
             Impressions
             in
             us
          
           ;
           which
           are
           those
           you
           call
           
             Secondary
             Qualities
          
           .
           
           And
           in
           that
           Sense
           I
           take
           your
           words
           .
           And
           of
           these
           I
           said
           ,
           that
           we
           can
           understand
           nothing
           really
           by
           them
           but
           the
           Effects
           they
           have
           upon
           us
           ;
           
             i.
             e.
             the
             Powers
          
           and
           not
           
             the
             Ideas
          
           .
           The
           Ideas
           are
           the
           Impressions
           on
           our
           Minds
           ;
           and
           by
           these
           we
           can
           understand
           nothing
           but
           the
           Effects
           which
           the
           Powers
           in
           outward
           Objects
           have
           upon
           us
           ,
           and
           consequently
           not
           the
           Nature
           of
           them
           .
           This
           I
           take
           to
           be
           plain
           Sense
           .
        
         
         
           To
           this
           you
           Answer
           Two
           things
           ;
           
             
               
               1.
               
               
                 That
                 we
                 certainly
                 know
                 to
                 distinguish
                 things
                 by
                 Ideas
                 ,
                 supposing
                 them
                 nothing
                 but
                 Effects
                 produced
                 in
                 us
                 by
                 these
                 Powers
                 ,
                 as
                 if
                 they
                 were
                 Representations
                 .
              
            
             
               
               2.
               
               
                 That
                 we
                 have
                 certainly
                 as
                 much
                 pleasure
                 and
                 delight
                 by
                 those
                 Ideas
                 ,
                 one
                 way
                 as
                 the
                 other
                 .
              
            
          
        
         
           Granting
           all
           this
           to
           be
           true
           ,
           what
           is
           it
           to
           the
           
             Complex
             Idea
             of
             Nature
          
           ,
           which
           arises
           from
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
             ?
             Nature
             is
             a
             Collection
             of
             several
             Ideas
             combined
             into
             one
             Complex
             Abstract
             Idea
             .
          
           But
           the
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           acquaint
           us
           not
           with
           the
           Nature
           of
           the
           Objects
           ,
           but
           only
           with
           the
           Powers
           which
           are
           in
           them
           ;
           by
           the
           help
           of
           
             Bulk
             ,
             Size
             ,
             Figure
          
           and
           Motion
           ;
           which
           you
           call
           the
           
             Primary
             Qualities
          
           .
           
           Now
           these
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
             are
             really
             in
             the
             things
             themselves
             ;
             whether
             the
             Senses
             perceive
             them
             or
             not
             ;
             and
             the
             Ideas
             of
             these
             are
             the
             true
             Resemblances
             of
             what
             exists
             in
             the
             Objects
          
           ;
           i.
           e.
           that
           by
           the
           Impressions
           we
           find
           in
           our selves
           ,
           we
           are
           certain
           that
           there
           are
           Bodies
           of
           a
           determinate
           
             Bulk
             ,
             Size
             ,
             Figure
             and
             Motion
             .
          
           And
           this
           is
           all
           ,
           we
           can
           by
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           come
           to
           ,
           as
           the
           Nature
           of
           Corporeal
           Substances
           .
           But
           suppose
           one
           should
           ask
           how
           we
           can
           understand
           ,
           the
           Nature
           
           of
           these
           Operations
           of
           the
           
             Primary
             Qualities
          
           in
           producing
           the
           Secondary
           ;
           we
           are
           soon
           answered
           ,
           
           
             that
             there
             is
             no
             conceivable
             Connexion
             between
             them
             and
             that
             Reason
             cannot
             shew
             how
             Bodies
             by
             their
             Bulk
             ,
             Figure
             and
             Motion
             should
             produce
             in
             the
             Mind
             ,
             the
             Ideas
             of
             Blue
             ,
             Yellow
             ,
          
           &c.
           
           And
           so
           we
           are
           extremely
           helped
           by
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           in
           understanding
           the
           Nature
           of
           any
           
             particular
             Substance
          
           .
           For
           the
           sensible
           Qualities
           in
           us
           are
           only
           the
           Effects
           of
           certain
           Powers
           in
           the
           Objects
           ,
           caused
           by
           their
           Bulk
           ,
           Size
           ,
           Figure
           and
           Motion
           ;
           but
           if
           we
           ask
           how
           they
           are
           produced
           ,
           we
           are
           plainly
           told
           ,
           that
           our
           Reason
           by
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           can
           reach
           to
           no
           knowledge
           of
           it
           .
           And
           so
           we
           are
           left
           in
           as
           much
           Ignorance
           ,
           as
           ever
           as
           to
           the
           Manner
           how
           Things
           without
           us
           produce
           Ideas
           in
           us
           .
        
         
           But
           say
           you
           ,
           
           
             By
             these
             simple
             Ideas
             ,
             we
             can
             as
             certainly
             distinguish
             the
             Beings
             wherein
             those
             Powers
             are
             ,
             and
             receive
             as
             certain
             Advantages
             from
             them
             ,
             as
             if
             those
             simple
             Ideas
             were
             Resemblances
             .
          
        
         
           As
           to
           
             Advantages
             from
             them
          
           ,
           that
           is
           quite
           out
           of
           our
           Enquiry
           ;
           which
           is
           concerning
           the
           
             Idea
             of
             Nature
          
           ?
           as
           it
           is
           a
           Complexion
           of
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ;
           and
           all
           that
           it
           amounts
           to
           is
           ,
           that
           by
           these
           
             simple
             Ideas
          
           ,
           
           we
           understand
           the
           
             Distinct
             Powers
          
           in
           several
           Bodies
           to
           produce
           Impressions
           in
           our
           Minds
           ;
           and
           by
           
             the
             secondary
             Qualities
          
           we
           find
           in
           our selves
           ,
           we
           are
           certain
           of
           the
           
             primary
             Qualities
          
           in
           Bodies
           ,
           from
           their
           different
           Bulk
           ,
           Size
           ,
           Figure
           and
           Motion
           .
           But
           still
           we
           have
           nothing
           but
           an
           
             Idea
             of
             Qualities
          
           ,
           which
           goes
           no
           farther
           than
           the
           Essential
           Properties
           ;
           but
           the
           Idea
           of
           Nature
           goes
           farther
           and
           implies
           that
           Being
           wherein
           those
           Qualities
           are
           ;
           and
           that
           I
           said
           ,
           which
           is
           the
           subject
           of
           Powers
           and
           Properties
           is
           the
           Nature
           or
           Substance
           of
           it
           ;
           which
           in
           this
           respect
           is
           the
           same
           .
           Have
           we
           any
           
             Adequate
             Idea
          
           of
           this
           ?
        
         
           To
           this
           you
           say
           :
        
         
           
           2.
           
           
             That
             all
             Ideas
             of
             Substances
             ,
             which
             are
             referr'd
             to
             Real
             Essences
             are
             in
             that
             respect
             Inadequate
             .
          
           This
           is
           what
           your self
           own
           to
           be
           your
           Sense
           ;
           and
           is
           as
           much
           as
           I
           desire
           .
           For
           ,
           I
           pray
           consider
           what
           a
           
             fine
             Abstract
             Complex
             Idea
          
           you
           have
           given
           us
           of
           Nature
           .
           Our
           
             Adequate
             Ideas
          
           go
           no
           farther
           than
           Qualities
           ,
           and
           if
           we
           enquire
           into
           the
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           ,
           or
           Substance
           that
           supports
           them
           ,
           we
           are
           told
           that
           they
           are
           Inadequate
           ;
           and
           consequently
           we
           can
           have
           no
           true
           Notion
           or
           Idea
           at
           all
           of
           it
           .
        
         
         
           But
           you
           say
           farther
           ,
           
           that
           you
           do
           not
           affirm
           ,
           
             That
             Abstract
             Ideas
             are
             only
             general
             Names
             .
          
           For
           you
           assert
           a
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           in
           things
           ;
           
             the
             internal
             unknown
             Constitution
             is
             the
             Real
             Essence
             ;
             and
             the
             Abstract
             Idea
             is
             the
             Nominal
             Essence
             .
          
        
         
           The
           former
           you
           tell
           me
           ,
           
           you
           do
           
             readily
             own
          
           ;
           viz.
           
             That
             Essence
             which
             is
             in
             particular
             Substances
          
           ;
           but
           the
           Question
           before
           us
           is
           ,
           Whether
           that
           which
           is
           in
           more
           Individuals
           than
           one
           ,
           be
           a
           Real
           or
           only
           a
           
             Nominal
             Essence
          
           .
        
         
           2.
           
           And
           this
           is
           that
           ,
           which
           we
           are
           next
           to
           Examine
           .
           To
           clear
           this
           ,
           I
           put
           the
           Instance
           of
           the
           Sun
           ,
           where
           
             an
             Essence
          
           was
           said
           by
           you
           
             to
             be
             in
             one
             Individual
          
           ;
           and
           yet
           more
           Suns
           might
           agree
           in
           it
           .
           In
           this
           one
           Sun
           there
           is
           a
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           ,
           and
           not
           a
           meer
           Nominal
           and
           
             Abstracted
             Essence
          
           :
           upon
           which
           I
           asked
           ,
           If
           there
           were
           more
           Suns
           ,
           would
           not
           each
           of
           them
           ,
           have
           the
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           of
           the
           Sun
           ?
           For
           what
           is
           it
           makes
           the
           second
           Sun
           ,
           to
           be
           a
           true
           Sun
           ,
           but
           having
           the
           same
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           with
           the
           first
           ?
           If
           it
           were
           but
           a
           
             Nominal
             Essence
          
           ,
           then
           the
           Second
           would
           have
           nothing
           but
           the
           Name
           .
        
         
           Here
           I
           must
           examine
           your
           Answer
           ,
           as
           far
           as
           I
           can
           understand
           it
           :
           For
           here
           indeed
           you
           may
           complain
           of
           the
           want
           of
           
           
             clear
             and
             distinct
             Ideas
          
           ;
           but
           I
           will
           do
           what
           I
           can
           to
           explain
           that
           which
           I
           conceive
           to
           be
           your
           Sense
           .
        
         
           
           You
           say
           ,
           
             This
             doth
             not
             at
             all
             concern
             the
             Real
             ,
             but
             the
             Nominal
             Essence
             .
          
        
         
           How
           is
           this
           possible
           ?
           Is
           there
           not
           the
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           of
           the
           Sun
           in
           that
           Individual
           ,
           we
           call
           the
           Sun
           ?
           But
           I
           put
           the
           Case
           ,
           that
           there
           were
           a
           Multiplication
           of
           Individuals
           ;
           and
           there
           were
           more
           Suns
           :
           would
           not
           each
           of
           these
           have
           the
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           of
           the
           Sun
           ?
           If
           it
           were
           only
           a
           
             Nominal
             Essence
          
           ,
           the
           rest
           would
           have
           only
           the
           Name
           .
        
         
           
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             you
             did
             not
             mean
             the
             real
             Essence
             of
             the
             Sun
             was
             in
             that
             Individual
             .
          
           How
           could
           you
           mean
           otherwise
           ,
           when
           you
           acknowledge
           the
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           to
           be
           in
           
             particular
             Substances
          
           ?
           And
           is
           not
           the
           Sun
           a
           
             particular
             Substance
             ?
             But
             the
             Idea
             of
             it
             being
             a
             Complex
             and
             Abstracted
             Idea
             ,
             could
             not
             be
             the
             Real
             Essence
             .
          
           I
           answer
           ,
           That
           the
           Essence
           of
           the
           Sun
           being
           communicated
           to
           another
           is
           a
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           ;
           or
           else
           ,
           the
           Second
           is
           but
           the
           Name
           and
           nothing
           else
           .
        
         
           You
           tell
           me
           ,
           
             That
             you
             say
             expressly
             ,
             that
             our
             distinguishing
             Substances
             into
             Species
             by
             Names
             ,
             is
             not
             at
             all
             founded
             on
             their
             Real
             Essences
             .
          
           And
           I
           think
           it
           
           is
           clear
           to
           any
           one
           that
           understands
           things
           ,
           and
           not
           meer
           Ideas
           ;
           that
           another
           
             true
             Sun
          
           must
           have
           the
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           of
           a
           Sun.
           
        
         
           You
           ask
           ,
           
             What
             I
             mean
             by
             a
             true
             Sun.
          
           I
           answer
           ,
           That
           which
           hath
           the
           Essence
           of
           a
           Sun
           ;
           and
           that
           the
           Name
           cannot
           be
           truly
           applied
           to
           that
           which
           hath
           it
           not
           .
           Yes
           ,
           say
           you
           ,
           
             it
             may
             to
             any
             thing
             ,
             which
             hath
             united
             in
             it
             that
             Combination
             of
             sensible
             Qualities
             ,
             by
             which
             any
             thing
             else
             that
             is
             called
             Sun
             is
             distinguished
             from
             other
             Substances
             ,
          
           i.
           e.
           
             by
             the
             Nominal
             Essence
          
           .
           So
           that
           now
           the
           
             Abstract
             Complex
             Idea
          
           is
           owned
           to
           be
           nothing
           but
           a
           
             Combination
             of
             Qualities
          
           in
           one
           Idea
           .
        
         
           But
           I
           must
           still
           ask
           ,
           what
           becomes
           of
           this
           Combination
           of
           Qualities
           in
           the
           second
           Sun
           ,
           if
           there
           be
           not
           a
           Real
           Essence
           to
           support
           them
           ?
           
             You
             grant
             it
             when
             the
             second
             Sun
             comes
             to
             exist
             .
          
           And
           if
           it
           does
           not
           exist
           ,
           how
           can
           it
           be
           the
           Second
           Sun
           ?
        
         
           
             Should
             it
             be
             true
          
           ,
           
           say
           you
           ,
           
             that
             the
             Real
             Essence
             of
             the
             Sun
             were
             in
             any
             of
             the
             fixed
             Stars
             ,
             yet
             it
             could
             not
             be
             called
             by
             us
             the
             Sun
             ,
             whilst
             it
             answers
             not
             our
             Complex
             Idea
             ,
             or
             Nominal
             Essence
             of
             a
             Sun.
          
           If
           the
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           of
           a
           Sun
           be
           in
           a
           fixed
           Star
           ,
           it
           is
           really
           a
           Sun
           ,
           
             whether
             
             you
             call
             it
             so
             or
             not
          
           ;
           as
           a
           Laplander
           is
           as
           really
           a
           Man
           whatever
           you
           call
           him
           ,
           if
           he
           hath
           the
           Essence
           of
           a
           Man.
           And
           it
           is
           strange
           to
           me
           to
           find
           any
           Man
           dispute
           such
           evident
           things
           .
        
         
           And
           so
           I
           come
           to
           the
           Instance
           of
           the
           Individuals
           among
           Men.
           I
           said
           ,
           that
           there
           must
           be
           a
           Real
           Essence
           in
           every
           Individual
           of
           the
           same
           kind
           .
           
             Peter
             ,
             Iames
          
           and
           Iohn
           are
           all
           true
           and
           real
           Men
           ;
           not
           by
           attributing
           a
           general
           Name
           to
           them
           ;
           but
           because
           the
           true
           and
           real
           Essence
           of
           a
           Man
           is
           in
           every
           one
           of
           them
           .
        
         
           
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             I
             first
             suppose
             them
             to
             be
             Men
             :
          
           no
           otherwise
           than
           as
           they
           are
           Individuals
           of
           the
           same
           kind
           .
        
         
           Your
           
             Weweena
             ,
             Cuchepy
          
           and
           Cousheda
           I
           have
           nothing
           to
           say
           to
           ,
           they
           may
           be
           Drills
           for
           any
           thing
           I
           know
           ;
           but
           
             Peter
             ,
             Iames
          
           and
           Iohn
           are
           Men
           of
           our
           own
           Country
           ,
           and
           we
           know
           them
           to
           be
           several
           Individuals
           of
           the
           Race
           of
           Mankind
           :
           And
           what
           is
           it
           makes
           them
           Men
           ,
           but
           that
           the
           true
           and
           real
           Essence
           of
           a
           Man
           is
           in
           every
           one
           of
           them
           ?
           Yes
           ,
           say
           you
           ,
           
           
             if
             making
             be
             taken
             for
             the
             Efficient
             Cause
             .
          
           Whoever
           dreamt
           of
           a
           
             Specifick
             Essence
          
           being
           the
           
             Efficient
             Cause
          
           ?
           But
           I
           said
           ,
           that
           it
           was
           the
           true
           and
           real
           Essence
           of
           a
           Man
           ,
           which
           made
           every
           
           Individual
           a
           true
           and
           real
           Man
           ;
           of
           which
           I
           said
           we
           are
           as
           certain
           ,
           as
           that
           we
           are
           Men.
           
           That
           ,
           say
           you
           ,
           
             is
             only
             by
             our
             Senses
             finding
             those
             Properties
             ,
             which
             answer
             the
             Abstract
             ,
             Complex
             Idea
             ,
             which
             is
             in
             our
             Minds
             of
             the
             Specifick
             Idea
             to
             which
             we
             have
             annexed
             the
             Specifick
             Name
             Man.
          
           I
           leave
           to
           you
           the
           Honour
           of
           this
           
             Scholastick
             Language
          
           ,
           which
           is
           always
           most
           proper
           when
           there
           is
           nothing
           under
           it
           .
           I
           love
           to
           speak
           plain
           Sense
           if
           I
           can
           ,
           and
           so
           as
           to
           be
           understood
           by
           every
           one
           that
           is
           acquainted
           with
           these
           Matters
           :
           but
           these
           
             Specifick
             Names
          
           and
           Abstract
           and
           
             Complex
             Ideas
          
           ,
           I
           think
           tend
           to
           confound
           Mens
           Apprehensions
           ;
           who
           can
           never
           think
           otherwise
           ,
           but
           that
           every
           Man
           is
           said
           to
           be
           a
           true
           
             real
             Man
          
           ;
           not
           for
           any
           
             Specifick
             Name
          
           ,
           but
           because
           his
           Properties
           shew
           him
           to
           be
           endued
           with
           the
           
             true
             real
             Essence
             of
             a
             Man.
          
           I
           said
           ,
           that
           the
           general
           Idea
           is
           not
           made
           from
           the
           simple
           Ideas
           ,
           but
           by
           meer
           Act
           of
           the
           Mind
           abstracting
           from
           Circumstances
           ,
           but
           from
           Reason
           and
           Consideration
           of
           things
           .
        
         
           You
           Reply
           ,
           
           
             That
             you
             thought
             Reason
             and
             Consideration
             had
             been
             meer
             Acts
             of
             the
             Mind
             ,
             when
             any
             thing
             was
             done
             by
             them
             .
          
           I
           hope
           the
           Ideas
           you
           have
           of
           
           the
           Acts
           of
           your
           own
           Mind
           ,
           are
           clearer
           than
           those
           you
           have
           of
           other
           Mens
           .
           For
           it
           is
           plain
           ,
           I
           opposed
           your
           
             General
             and
             Abstract
             Idea
             by
             a
             meer
             Act
             of
             the
             Mind
             ,
             to
             a
             Rational
             Inference
          
           from
           the
           Nature
           and
           Properties
           of
           things
           .
           For
           I
           added
           ;
           for
           ,
           when
           I
           see
           so
           many
           Individuals
           ,
           that
           have
           the
           same
           Powers
           and
           Properties
           ,
           we
           thence
           inferr
           ,
           there
           must
           be
           something
           common
           to
           all
           ,
           which
           makes
           them
           of
           one
           kind
           ;
           and
           if
           the
           difference
           of
           Kinds
           be
           real
           ,
           that
           which
           makes
           them
           of
           one
           kind
           and
           not
           of
           another
           ,
           must
           not
           be
           a
           Nominal
           but
           a
           
             Real
             Essence
          
           .
           Is
           there
           now
           no
           difference
           between
           these
           Two
           Acts
           of
           the
           Mind
           ,
           
             viz.
             Abstraction
          
           and
           Ratiocination
           .
        
         
           
           And
           you
           
             grant
             ,
             that
             the
             Inference
             is
             true
             .
          
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
             it
             doth
             not
             follow
             ,
             that
             the
             general
             or
             specifick
             Idea
             is
             not
             made
             by
             the
             meer
             Act
             of
             the
             Mind
             .
          
           Where
           do
           I
           deny
           that
           Abstraction
           is
           made
           by
           an
           Act
           of
           the
           Mind
           ?
           But
           that
           is
           not
           the
           Question
           ;
           but
           whether
           the
           Notion
           of
           Essence
           in
           Individuals
           of
           the
           same
           kind
           ,
           be
           a
           meer
           Act
           of
           the
           Mind
           by
           Abstraction
           ,
           or
           have
           a
           real
           Foundation
           in
           the
           Nature
           of
           Things
           ?
           
             i.
             e.
          
           whether
           it
           be
           a
           Real
           or
           a
           
             Nominal
             Essence
          
           .
        
         
         
           But
           you
           say
           ,
           
           
             There
             may
             be
             Objections
             to
             the
             Name
             of
             Nominal
             Essence
             .
          
           My
           Objection
           is
           not
           to
           the
           Name
           ,
           but
           to
           the
           Thing
           you
           understand
           by
           it
           ,
           viz.
           that
           there
           is
           nothing
           beyond
           Individuals
           but
           Names
           ,
           which
           utterly
           overthrows
           the
           Difference
           of
           Nature
           and
           Person
           .
           For
           if
           there
           be
           nothing
           really
           ,
           but
           an
           individuated
           Essence
           ,
           then
           it
           must
           follow
           ,
           that
           there
           can
           be
           no
           difference
           of
           Hypostases
           in
           the
           same
           Nature
           :
           For
           Nature
           individuated
           must
           take
           in
           the
           Hypostasis
           ;
           and
           Nature
           being
           taken
           as
           common
           is
           affirmed
           by
           you
           to
           be
           nothing
           but
           an
           Abstract
           and
           Complex
           Idea
           ,
           and
           a
           mere
           Nominal
           Essence
           .
        
         
           You
           say
           ,
           
           
             That
             we
             cannot
             know
             the
             differences
             of
             things
             by
             their
             real
             Essences
             .
          
           And
           what
           then
           ?
           Do
           I
           ever
           deny
           ,
           that
           the
           difference
           of
           kinds
           is
           to
           be
           understood
           from
           the
           different
           Properties
           ?
           But
           we
           are
           not
           upon
           our
           Knowledge
           of
           the
           difference
           of
           Species
           ,
           but
           upon
           the
           Real
           and
           
             Nominal
             Essence
          
           .
        
         
           And
           I
           shew'd
           that
           the
           real
           Essence
           doth
           not
           depend
           upon
           Complex
           Ideas
           ;
           because
           if
           men
           mistake
           never
           so
           much
           in
           the
           Combination
           of
           Ideas
           ,
           yet
           the
           same
           Essence
           remains
           ;
           as
           I
           instanced
           in
           the
           Essence
           of
           a
           Man
           ,
           a
           Horse
           and
           a
           Tree
           .
        
         
         
           
           True
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
             Our
             Thoughts
             or
             Ideas
             cannot
             alter
             the
             real
             Constitutions
             of
             things
             that
             exist
             ;
             but
             the
             Change
             of
             Ideas
             can
             and
             does
             alter
             the
             signification
             of
             their
             Names
             ,
             and
             thereby
             alter
             the
             kinds
             ,
             which
             by
             these
             Names
             we
             rank
             and
             sort
             them
             into
             .
          
        
         
           But
           this
           doth
           by
           no
           means
           reach
           the
           point
           ,
           which
           is
           not
           concerning
           our
           
             sorting
             of
             Things
          
           ,
           which
           is
           by
           Names
           ,
           but
           
             God's
             sorting
          
           them
           ,
           when
           he
           made
           them
           of
           different
           kinds
           .
           For
           so
           I
           said
           ,
           that
           the
           Essences
           remain
           always
           the
           same
           ,
           because
           they
           do
           not
           depend
           on
           the
           Ideas
           of
           Men
           ,
           but
           on
           the
           Will
           of
           the
           Creator
           ,
           who
           hath
           made
           several
           sorts
           of
           Beings
           .
        
         
           
           All
           the
           Answer
           you
           give
           is
           this
           ,
           
             That
             the
             real
             Constitution
             or
             Essence
             of
             particular
             things
             existing
             ,
             do
             not
             depend
             on
             the
             Ideas
             of
             Men
             ,
             but
             on
             the
             Will
             of
             the
             Creator
             ,
             but
             their
             being
             ranked
             into
             sorts
             ,
             under
             such
             and
             such
             Names
             ,
             does
             depend
             and
             wholly
             depend
             upon
             the
             Ideas
             of
             Men.
             
          
        
         
           But
           my
           Argument
           did
           not
           proceed
           upon
           
             particular
             things
             existing
          
           ,
           but
           upon
           
             the
             several
             kinds
             of
             God's
             making
             ,
          
           and
           is
           it
           possible
           for
           you
           to
           think
           that
           the
           kinds
           are
           not
           of
           his
           making
           ,
           but
           that
           
           
             Men
             only
             by
             their
             Ideas
             make
             the
             several
             sorts
          
           ?
           If
           so
           ,
           I
           have
           very
           little
           hopes
           to
           remove
           you
           from
           your
           Ideas
           ;
           but
           I
           am
           bound
           to
           do
           what
           in
           me
           lies
           to
           hinder
           such
           Notions
           from
           overthrowing
           the
           
             Mysteries
             of
             our
             Faith.
          
           
        
         
           And
           it
           is
           a
           great
           satisfaction
           to
           me
           to
           find
           ,
           that
           these
           Notions
           of
           Ideas
           ,
           as
           far
           as
           they
           tend
           that
           way
           ,
           have
           so
           very
           little
           Foundation
           in
           Reason
           ,
           or
           rather
           are
           so
           manifestly
           repugnant
           to
           them
           .
        
         
           Before
           I
           conclude
           my self
           ,
           I
           must
           take
           notice
           of
           your
           Conclusion
           ,
           viz.
           
             That
             you
             must
             content
             your self
             with
             this
             condemned
             way
             of
             Ideas
             ,
             and
             despair
             of
             ever
             attaining
             any
             knowledge
             by
             any
             other
             than
             that
             ,
             or
             farther
             than
             that
             will
             lead
             me
             to
             it
             .
          
           Which
           is
           in
           effect
           to
           say
           ,
           that
           you
           see
           no
           way
           to
           avoid
           Scepticism
           but
           this
           :
           but
           my
           great
           Prejudice
           against
           it
           is
           ,
           that
           it
           leads
           to
           Scepticism
           ,
           or
           at
           least
           ,
           that
           I
           could
           find
           no
           way
           to
           attain
           to
           Certainty
           in
           it
           upon
           your
           own
           grounds
           .
        
         
           For
           (
           1.
           )
           you
           say
           ,
           
           
             That
             Knowledge
             to
             you
             seems
             to
             be
             nothing
             ,
             but
             the
             Perception
             of
             the
             Connexion
             and
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             ,
             and
             Repugnancy
             of
             any
             of
             our
             Ideas
             .
             In
             this
             alone
             it
             consists
             .
          
           Whence
           it
           unavoidably
           follows
           ,
           that
           where
           we
           
           can
           have
           no
           Ideas
           ,
           we
           can
           have
           no
           Knowledge
           .
        
         
           But
           you
           go
           about
           to
           prove
           ,
           
             That
             there
             are
             many
             more
             Beings
             in
             the
             World
             ,
          
           
           
             of
             which
             we
             have
             no
             Ideas
             ,
             than
             those
             of
             which
             we
             have
             any
             ;
             and
             that
             one
             holds
             no
             Proportion
             to
             the
             other
             .
          
           So
           that
           we
           are
           excluded
           from
           any
           Possibility
           of
           attaining
           to
           knowledge
           ,
           as
           to
           the
           far
           greatest
           part
           of
           the
           Universe
           for
           
             want
             of
             Ideas
          
           ;
           and
           yet
           you
           say
           ,
           
             That
             he
             that
             will
             consider
             the
             infinite
             Power
             ,
             Wisdom
             and
             Goodness
             of
             the
             Creator
             of
             all
             things
             ,
             will
             find
             Reason
             to
             think
             it
             was
             not
             all
             laid
             out
             upon
             so
             inconsiderable
             ,
             mean
             and
             impotent
             a
             Creature
             ,
             as
             he
             will
             find
             man
             to
             be
             ,
             who
             in
             all
             Probability
             is
             one
             of
             the
             lowest
             of
             all
             intellectual
             Beings
             .
          
           And
           not
           long
           after
           ,
           
           you
           say
           ,
           
             That
             the
             Intellectual
             World
             is
             a
             greater
             Certainly
             and
             more
             beautifull
             World
             ,
             than
             the
             Material
             .
          
        
         
           But
           whence
           comes
           this
           Certainty
           ,
           where
           there
           can
           be
           no
           Ideas
           ?
           Is
           a
           
             general
             Reason
          
           sufficient
           without
           particular
           Ideas
           ?
           Then
           why
           not
           in
           other
           cases
           as
           well
           ?
        
         
           2.
           
           Suppose
           we
           have
           no
           Ideas
           of
           the
           Intellectual
           World
           ,
           yet
           surely
           we
           may
           have
           as
           to
           the
           visible
           World
           :
           No
           ,
           you
           
           say
           ,
           
           
             That
             although
             we
             have
             Ideas
             of
             Bulk
             ,
             Figure
             and
             Motion
             in
             general
             ;
             yet
             not
             knowing
             what
             is
             the
             particular
             Bulk
             ,
             Figure
             ,
             and
             Motion
             of
             the
             greatest
             part
             of
             the
             Bodies
             of
             the
             Vniverse
             ,
             we
             are
             ignorant
             of
             the
             several
             Powers
             ,
             Efficacies
             and
             Ways
             of
             Operation
             ,
             whereby
             the
             Effects
             we
             daily
             see
             are
             produced
             .
             These
             are
             hid
             from
             us
             in
             some
             things
             by
             being
             too
             remote
             ,
             in
             others
             by
             being
             two
             minute
             .
          
        
         
           So
           that
           you
           confess
           ,
           
           
             We
             can
             attain
             to
             no
             Science
             ,
          
           
           either
           as
           to
           Bodies
           or
           Spirits
           .
           And
           what
           a
           narrow
           compass
           must
           our
           Knowledge
           then
           be
           confined
           to
           ?
           You
           confess
           ,
           
           
             We
             have
             no
             Ideas
             of
             the
             Mechanical
             Assertions
             of
             the
             minute
             Particles
             of
             Bodies
             ;
             and
             this
             hinders
             our
             certain
             Knowledge
             of
             universal
             Truths
             concerning
             natural
             Bodies
             ;
             and
             our
             Reason
             carries
             us
             herein
             very
             little
             beyond
             particular
             matter
             of
             Fact.
             Certainty
             and
             Demonstration
             we
             must
             not
             in
             these
             things
             pretend
             to
             .
          
           So
           that
           all
           Certainty
           is
           given
           up
           in
           the
           
             way
             of
             Knowledge
          
           ,
           both
           as
           to
           the
           visible
           and
           invisible
           World
           ,
           or
           at
           least
           ,
           the
           greatest
           part
           of
           them
           .
        
         
           3.
           
           But
           still
           it
           is
           to
           be
           hoped
           ,
           that
           where
           we
           have
           Ideas
           ,
           we
           may
           come
           to
           a
           Certainty
           in
           discerning
           the
           
             Connexion
             
             between
             them
          
           .
           
           No
           ,
           you
           say
           ,
           
             Another
             Cause
             of
             our
             Ignorance
             is
             ,
             the
             want
             of
             a
             discoverable
             Connexion
             between
             those
             Ideas
             we
             have
             .
          
           What!
           are
           we
           at
           a
           loss
           here
           too
           ,
           and
           yet
           all
           our
           Certainty
           depend
           no
           
             the
             perceiving
             the
             Agreement
             and
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
             ?
          
           Yes
           ,
           you
           confess
           ,
           
             That
             the
             Mechanical
             Affections
             of
             Bodies
             having
             no
             Affinity
             at
             all
             with
             the
             Ideas
             they
             produce
             in
             us
             ,
             we
             can
             have
             no
             distinct
             Knowledge
             of
             such
             Operations
             beyond
             Experience
             .
             And
             the
             Operations
             of
             our
             Minds
             on
             our
             Bodies
             is
             as
             unconceivable
             .
          
        
         
           4.
           
           But
           by
           the
           help
           of
           
             Intermediate
             Ideas
          
           ,
           may
           we
           not
           come
           to
           find
           out
           the
           certain
           Agreement
           or
           Disagreement
           of
           Ideas
           ,
           so
           there
           be
           
             due
             Application
          
           of
           the
           Mind
           to
           it
           ?
           
           Yes
           ,
           say
           you
           ,
           
             This
             may
             be
             done
             ,
             and
             this
             is
             that
             we
             call
             Reasoning
             ,
             and
             those
             intervening
             Ideas
             are
             called
             Proofs
             :
             and
             where
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             is
             clearly
             and
             plainly
             perceived
             ,
             it
             is
             called
             Demonstration
             .
          
           But
           how
           if
           this
           way
           of
           Demonstration
           be
           made
           impossible
           ?
           What
           benefit
           can
           we
           have
           of
           it
           in
           the
           way
           of
           Certainty
           :
           
             Each
             step
          
           ,
           
           you
           tell
           us
           ,
           
             That
             Reason
             makes
             in
             demonstrative
             Knowledge
             must
             have
             intuitive
             
             Evidence
             ;
             for
             else
             ,
             you
             say
             ,
             that
             Intermediate
             Idea
             would
             need
             a
             Proof
             .
             And
             for
             want
             of
             this
             ,
             Men
             often
             embrace
             Falshoods
             for
             Demonstrations
             .
          
           But
           if
           there
           be
           no
           way
           of
           coming
           to
           Demonstration
           but
           this
           ,
           I
           doubt
           we
           must
           be
           content
           without
           it
           .
        
         
           5.
           
           You
           give
           no
           reasonable
           Satisfaction
           in
           the
           way
           of
           Ideas
           ,
           as
           to
           the
           plainest
           Evidence
           of
           Sense
           concerning
           the
           Existence
           of
           external
           Objects
           .
           For
           there
           is
           no
           
             Intuition
             of
             the
             Mind
          
           ,
           nor
           Demonstration
           in
           this
           Case
           ;
           and
           all
           the
           evidence
           in
           your
           way
           must
           be
           from
           the
           Ideas
           in
           our
           Minds
           ,
           which
           are
           supposed
           to
           arise
           from
           external
           Objects
           ;
           but
           the
           question
           is
           ,
           how
           from
           these
           Ideas
           within
           our selves
           ,
           we
           can
           prove
           the
           certain
           Existence
           of
           Objects
           without
           our selves
           .
           Because
           men
           may
           have
           such
           Ideas
           in
           their
           Minds
           by
           the
           power
           of
           Imagination
           ,
           when
           there
           are
           no
           Objects
           to
           produce
           them
           ?
           You
           say
           ,
           
           
             A
             man
             is
             invincibly
             conscious
             to
             himself
             of
             a
             different
             Perception
             ,
             in
             seeing
             the
             Sun
             in
             the
             Day
             ,
             and
             remembring
             it
             in
             the
             Night
             ,
             and
             tasting
             of
             Wormwood
             and
             smelling
             of
             a
             Rose
             ,
             and
             thinking
             of
             it
             afterwards
             .
          
           But
           this
           doth
           not
           clear
           the
           main
           difficulty
           ,
           which
           is
           ,
           how
           from
           
           the
           Idea
           of
           the
           
             Tast
             of
             Wormwood
             or
             Smell
             of
             a
             Rose
          
           I
           can
           prove
           the
           actual
           Being
           of
           such
           things
           without
           me
           ,
           since
           you
           grant
           ,
           that
           there
           is
           
             no
             conceivable
             Connexion
             in
             Reason
             ,
             between
             the
             Powers
             in
             the
             Objects
             and
             the
             Ideas
             in
             us
             :
          
           and
           if
           there
           be
           not
           ,
           how
           can
           we
           be
           certain
           in
           the
           
             way
             of
             Ideas
          
           ?
           I
           do
           not
           speak
           ,
           as
           to
           
             Pain
             or
             Pleasure
          
           ,
           but
           as
           to
           the
           Evidence
           from
           the
           Ideas
           in
           our selves
           .
           For
           the
           most
           that
           you
           say
           is
           ,
           
             That
             a
             Man
             may
             perceive
             a
             very
             manifest
             difference
             between
             dreaming
             of
             being
             in
             a
             Fire
             ,
             and
             being
             actually
             in
             it
             ,
             because
             of
             the
             Pleasure
             or
             Pain
             that
             follows
             the
             Application
             of
             certain
             Objects
             ;
             which
             Certainty
             is
             as
             great
             as
             our
             Happiness
             or
             Misery
             ,
             beyond
             which
             we
             have
             no
             Concernment
             to
             know
             or
             to
             be
             .
          
           But
           the
           present
           difficulty
           is
           not
           merely
           about
           the
           difference
           between
           
             sleeping
             and
             waking
          
           ;
           and
           I
           grant
           you
           ,
           that
           a
           Man's
           being
           sensible
           of
           Fire
           touching
           him
           ,
           will
           effectually
           convince
           him
           that
           he
           is
           not
           in
           a
           Dream
           :
           but
           the
           point
           before
           us
           is
           ,
           when
           we
           are
           sensible
           we
           are
           awake
           ,
           what
           it
           is
           in
           the
           
             way
             of
             Ideas
          
           ,
           which
           can
           satisfie
           us
           of
           the
           real
           Existence
           of
           external
           Objects
           .
           For
           you
           confess
           ,
           
           
             That
             the
             having
             the
             Idea
             of
             
             any
             thing
             in
             our
             Mind
             ,
             no
             more
             proves
             the
             Existence
             of
             that
             thing
             ,
             than
             the
             Picture
             of
             that
             Man
             evidences
             his
             being
             in
             the
             World
             ,
             or
             the
             Visions
             of
             a
             Dream
             make
             a
             true
             History
             .
          
           How
           then
           can
           we
           come
           to
           any
           Certainty
           in
           the
           
             way
             of
             Ideas
          
           ?
           The
           Account
           you
           give
           is
           this
           ,
           
           
             that
             the
             actual
             receiving
             Ideas
             from
             without
             ,
             makes
             us
             know
             that
             something
             doth
             exist
             at
             that
             time
             without
             us
             ,
             which
             causes
             that
             Idea
             within
             us
             .
          
           Which
           is
           in
           other
           terms
           to
           remove
           the
           Certainty
           from
           the
           Idea
           to
           the
           mere
           Act
           of
           Sensation
           :
           but
           all
           our
           Dispute
           hath
           been
           not
           about
           the
           Certainty
           either
           of
           Sense
           or
           Reason
           ;
           (
           which
           I
           freely
           yield
           to
           )
           but
           about
           a
           particular
           way
           of
           Certainty
           by
           
             the
             Agreement
             or
             Disagreement
             of
             Ideas
          
           ;
           and
           of
           this
           I
           shew
           that
           you
           give
           no
           satisfactory
           Account
           ,
           as
           to
           the
           Existence
           of
           the
           plainest
           Objects
           of
           Sense
           .
           For
           you
           say
           ,
           
             The
             Certainty
             lies
             in
             perceiving
             the
             Connexion
             between
             Ideas
          
           ;
           and
           here
           you
           grant
           ,
           
             That
             Reason
             cannot
             perceive
             the
             Connexion
             between
             the
             Objects
             and
             the
             Ideas
             ,
          
           how
           then
           should
           we
           possibly
           attain
           any
           Certainty
           in
           the
           way
           of
           Ideas
           ?
           So
           that
           your self
           gives
           up
           the
           way
           of
           
             Certainty
             by
             Ideas
          
           .
        
         
         
           I
           might
           easily
           pursue
           this
           matter
           farther
           ;
           but
           I
           think
           this
           is
           sufficient
           to
           let
           you
           see
           ,
           you
           have
           no
           such
           cause
           to
           be
           so
           well
           contented
           with
           this
           
             condemned
             way
             of
             Ideas
          
           ,
           as
           you
           are
           pleased
           to
           call
           it
           .
        
         
           And
           now
           to
           conclude
           ,
           I
           am
           very
           far
           from
           being
           an
           Enemy
           to
           any
           free
           Enquiries
           into
           the
           Nature
           and
           Reasons
           of
           Things
           ,
           and
           would
           be
           glad
           to
           find
           any
           real
           Discoveries
           that
           way
           .
           And
           I
           can
           easily
           bear
           the
           putting
           of
           Philosophical
           Notions
           into
           a
           modern
           and
           fashionable
           Dress
           .
        
         
           Let
           Men
           express
           their
           Minds
           by
           Ideas
           if
           they
           please
           ;
           and
           take
           Pleasure
           in
           sorting
           and
           comparing
           and
           connecting
           of
           them
           ;
           I
           am
           not
           forward
           to
           condemn
           them
           ;
           for
           every
           Age
           must
           have
           its
           
             new
             Modes
          
           ,
           and
           it
           is
           very
           well
           if
           Truth
           and
           Reason
           be
           received
           in
           any
           Garb.
           I
           was
           therefore
           far
           enough
           from
           
             condemning
             your
             way
             of
             Ideas
          
           ,
           till
           I
           found
           it
           made
           the
           only
           ground
           of
           Certainty
           ,
           and
           made
           use
           of
           
             to
             overthrow
             the
             Mysteries
             of
             our
             Faith
             ,
          
           as
           I
           told
           you
           in
           the
           beginning
           .
           This
           was
           it
           which
           made
           me
           look
           more
           narrowly
           into
           it
           at
           first
           ,
           and
           now
           to
           give
           you
           this
           Trouble
           of
           an
           Answer
           to
           your
           Letter
           .
        
         
         
           I
           hope
           that
           in
           the
           managing
           this
           Debate
           ,
           I
           have
           not
           either
           transgressed
           the
           Rules
           of
           Civility
           ,
           or
           mistaken
           your
           Meaning
           ,
           both
           which
           I
           have
           endeavourd
           to
           avoid
           .
           And
           I
           return
           you
           thanks
           for
           the
           Civilities
           you
           have
           expressed
           to
           me
           through
           your
           Letter
           ;
           and
           I
           do
           assure
           you
           ,
           that
           it
           is
           out
           of
           no
           Dis-respect
           ,
           or
           the
           least
           ill
           will
           to
           you
           ,
           that
           I
           have
           again
           consider'd
           this
           Matter
           ,
           but
           because
           I
           am
           farther
           convinced
           ,
           that
           as
           you
           have
           stated
           your
           
             Notion
             of
             Ideas
          
           ,
           it
           may
           be
           of
           dangerous
           consequence
           as
           to
           that
           Article
           of
           
             Christian
             Faith
          
           ,
           which
           I
           endeavour'd
           to
           defend
           .
        
         
           I
           am
           no
           Lover
           of
           Controversies
           ,
           however
           I
           have
           been
           often
           engaged
           in
           them
           ;
           but
           I
           have
           that
           satisfaction
           in
           my
           mind
           ,
           that
           my
           design
           was
           to
           promote
           that
           ,
           which
           upon
           my
           best
           Enquiries
           ,
           I
           thought
           to
           be
           Truth
           ;
           and
           by
           such
           means
           as
           were
           most
           sutable
           to
           the
           pursuit
           of
           it
           ,
           without
           any
           Bitterness
           against
           those
           I
           opposed
           .
           But
           of
           all
           Truth
           ,
           I
           am
           convinced
           ,
           that
           it
           is
           fittest
           for
           me
           to
           employ
           the
           Remainder
           of
           my
           Days
           in
           what
           concerns
           the
           Vindication
           of
           our
           
             Holy
             Religion
          
           contained
           in
           the
           Scriptures
           ,
           
           which
           gives
           us
           the
           only
           sure
           Grounds
           to
           hope
           for
           a
           
             Blessed
             Immortality
          
           .
           And
           in
           the
           Defence
           and
           Practice
           of
           that
           ,
           I
           hope
           ,
           by
           the
           Grace
           of
           God
           both
           to
           live
           and
           die
           .
        
         
           
             I
             am
             ,
             Sir
             ,
             
               Your
               Real
               Friend
               ,
               and
               Humble
               Servant
               ,
            
             Edw.
             Wigorn.
             
          
           
             Worcester
             ,
             
               March
               27.
               1697.
               
            
          
        
      
       
         
         
           Postscript
           .
        
         
           I
           Had
           no
           Thoughts
           of
           adding
           a
           Postscript
           to
           my
           Answer
           ,
           as
           you
           had
           done
           to
           your
           Letter
           ;
           but
           before
           the
           Sheets
           were
           wrought
           off
           ,
           there
           was
           sent
           to
           me
           a
           new
           
             Socinian
             Pamphlet
          
           ,
           wherein
           there
           are
           Reflections
           (
           and
           little
           more
           )
           on
           my
           late
           Treatise
           in
           
             Vindication
             of
             the
             Trinity
          
           .
           The
           reason
           I
           had
           to
           joyn
           my
           short
           Animadversions
           on
           that
           to
           these
           Papers
           ,
           was
           the
           advantages
           he
           takes
           
             from
             the
             abstracted
             Notion
             of
             Nature
          
           against
           the
           Doctrine
           of
           the
           Trinity
           ,
           which
           was
           the
           thing
           I
           told
           you
           ,
           I
           apprehended
           to
           be
           of
           dangerous
           Consequence
           in
           it
           .
        
         
           But
           before
           I
           come
           to
           that
           ,
           I
           cannot
           but
           take
           notice
           of
           their
           very
           different
           way
           of
           Writing
           from
           yours
           ,
           which
           is
           Grave
           and
           Civil
           ,
           but
           theirs
           is
           trifling
           ,
           and
           too
           scurrilous
           in
           matters
           of
           Religion
           ,
           for
           which
           I
           had
           so
           justly
           rebuked
           them
           before
           ,
           but
           it
           seems
           to
           very
           little
           purpose
           :
           which
           makes
           me
           apt
           to
           think
           ,
           their
           greatest
           Hopes
           still
           are
           in
           
           such
           Readers
           ,
           who
           love
           to
           see
           Matters
           of
           Religion
           ridiculed
           ;
           and
           the
           Persons
           who
           are
           concerned
           to
           defend
           them
           exposed
           to
           Scorn
           and
           Contempt
           .
           This
           was
           that
           I
           told
           them
           ,
           which
           gave
           such
           a
           Relish
           to
           their
           late
           Pamphlets
           ,
           as
           though
           nothing
           would
           go
           down
           with
           such
           vitiated
           Palats
           ,
           that
           had
           not
           a
           Mixture
           of
           this
           
             Assa
             soetida
          
           with
           it
           .
           But
           because
           in
           the
           Conclusion
           of
           his
           Pamphlet
           ,
           he
           charges
           me
           as
           well
           as
           others
           ,
           with
           
             using
             them
             unjustly
             as
             well
             as
             roughly
             .
          
           I
           shall
           give
           a
           Tast
           of
           this
           man's
           decent
           manner
           of
           Writing
           .
           The
           first
           thing
           he
           insists
           upon
           against
           me
           ,
           is
           ,
           
             That
             I
             openly
             profess
             my
             Method
             ,
             that
             I
             will
             prove
             First
             ,
             then
             Secondly
             ,
             then
             Thirdly
             ,
             then
             Fourthly
             and
             Fifthly
             .
          
           And
           what
           harm
           is
           there
           in
           using
           the
           plainest
           Method
           in
           a
           nice
           and
           intricate
           Subject
           ?
           Should
           I
           go
           about
           to
           justifie
           this
           ,
           by
           the
           Rules
           of
           the
           ancient
           and
           best
           Masters
           of
           Writing
           in
           Arguments
           of
           such
           a
           Nature
           ?
           That
           would
           be
           shewing
           too
           much
           regard
           to
           such
           pitifull
           Cavilling
           .
           But
           methinks
           these
           men
           should
           not
           object
           this
           Method
           against
           us
           ,
           of
           
             First
             ,
             Secondly
          
           and
           Thirdly
           ,
           who
           had
           before
           charged
           us
           with
           
             brutal
             and
             inexcusable
             Ignorance
             in
             Counting
             or
             Numbring
             .
          
           But
           
           he
           goes
           on
           .
           
             And
             now
             beloved
             first
             of
             the
             first
             .
          
           Have
           I
           any
           words
           like
           these
           ?
           No
           matter
           for
           that
           .
           But
           this
           serves
           well
           enough
           for
           the
           Farce
           ;
           when
           the
           design
           is
           to
           ridicule
           the
           
             Form
             and
             Way
             of
             modern
             Sermons
          
           ;
           which
           he
           knew
           was
           an
           acceptable
           Subject
           to
           his
           
             Men
             of
             Wit
          
           ,
           as
           he
           calls
           them
           .
           If
           they
           be
           really
           so
           ,
           they
           cannot
           but
           despise
           such
           Fooling
           in
           serious
           matters
           .
           And
           our
           
             Modern
             Sermons
          
           are
           such
           ,
           both
           as
           to
           the
           Structure
           and
           Reason
           of
           them
           ,
           as
           will
           bear
           the
           Censures
           of
           Men
           of
           Judgment
           ,
           (
           as
           well
           it
           may
           be
           ,
           as
           of
           any
           Age
           )
           but
           his
           
             Men
             of
             Wit
          
           ,
           who
           love
           Religion
           in
           no
           dress
           ,
           will
           always
           have
           something
           or
           other
           in
           Sermons
           to
           find
           fault
           with
           .
           And
           our
           Author
           was
           hard
           put
           to
           it
           to
           bring
           in
           this
           smart
           Reflection
           on
           
             Modern
             Sermons
          
           to
           please
           his
           Friends
           ,
           which
           was
           very
           remote
           from
           a
           Debate
           about
           the
           Trinity
           .
        
         
           The
           next
           thing
           is
           ,
           (
           for
           I
           must
           not
           say
           Secondly
           )
           
             That
             my
             Way
             of
             Writing
             is
             too
             obscure
             ;
             and
             that
             he
             could
             not
             take
             my
             Meaning
             under
             two
             or
             three
             Readings
             .
          
           Which
           to
           please
           his
           Men
           of
           Wit
           ,
           he
           facetiously
           expresses
           after
           this
           manner
           ;
           
             And
             when
             I
             have
             strained
             my
             Iaws
             and
             hazarded
             my
             Teeth
             to
             break
             the
             Shell
             ,
             
             most
             commonly
             it
             proves
             nothing
             but
             a
             Shell
             ,
             that
             I
             am
             tempted
             to
             renounce
             Nuts
             for
             ever
             .
          
           And
           I
           think
           he
           will
           do
           wisely
           in
           it
           .
           I
           am
           certain
           ,
           I
           was
           so
           far
           from
           affecting
           Obscurity
           ,
           that
           I
           endeavoured
           to
           put
           the
           darkest
           points
           into
           as
           good
           a
           Light
           ,
           as
           I
           could
           ;
           and
           I
           am
           afraid
           he
           sometimes
           shut
           his
           Eyes
           ,
           that
           he
           might
           complain
           of
           the
           darkness
           of
           the
           Room
           .
        
         
           I
           dare
           not
           go
           so
           far
           as
           Thirdly
           ;
           and
           therefore
           come
           to
           consider
           the
           main
           parts
           of
           his
           Pretence
           to
           answer
           my
           Book
           .
        
         
           
             As
             to
             the
             Contents
             of
             my
             Book
             ,
          
           he
           saith
           .
           
             I
             shew
             ,
             that
             neither
             Antiquity
             ,
             nor
             Reason
             ,
             nor
             Scripture
             is
             at
             all
             for
             them
             ,
             they
             are
             all
             against
             them
             .
          
           Wherein
           he
           is
           very
           much
           in
           the
           right
           .
           And
           I
           shall
           now
           examine
           what
           he
           hath
           said
           ,
           to
           take
           off
           any
           part
           of
           the
           Charge
           .
        
         
           He
           begins
           with
           Antiquity
           ,
           and
           very
           fairly
           takes
           it
           for
           granted
           ,
           That
           for
           4000
           Years
           ,
           
             The
             Doctrine
             of
             the
          
           Unitarians
           
             was
             the
             true
             Doctrine
          
           :
           but
           he
           observes
           ,
           
             That
             I
             make
             the
             Doctrine
             of
             the
             Trinity
             to
             have
             been
             a
             part
             of
             the
             Cabala
             or
             Oral
             Tradition
             among
             the
             Iews
          
           ;
           upon
           which
           he
           cries
           out
           ,
           
             Where
             is
             Conscience
             ,
             or
             is
             Religion
             nothing
             but
             a
             Name
             ?
          
           
           Why
           ,
           what
           's
           the
           matter
           ?
           How
           comes
           Conscience
           and
           Religion
           to
           be
           so
           deeply
           concerned
           ,
           whether
           the
           Jews
           had
           any
           Anticipation
           of
           the
           Trinity
           among
           them
           ?
           But
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             I
             do
             not
             believe
             the
             Iewish
             Cabala
             ,
             no
             more
             than
             the
             Alchoran
             ,
             and
             yet
             I
             produce
             the
             Authority
             of
             it
             :
          
           and
           he
           adds
           ,
           
             That
             it
             was
             a
             Fiction
             of
             the
             Pharisees
             ;
             and
             that
             it
             is
             a
             Prevarication
             in
             me
             to
             mention
             it
             as
             the
             unwritten
             Word
             of
             God.
          
           I
           am
           afraid
           
             his
             Cracking
             of
             Nuts
          
           hath
           put
           him
           into
           some
           Disorder
           ,
           and
           made
           him
           cry
           out
           ,
           without
           any
           other
           Cause
           but
           the
           Pain
           of
           his
           Teeth
           .
           Where
           did
           I
           ever
           give
           the
           least
           Cause
           to
           suspect
           my
           owning
           
             the
             Iewish
             Cabala
             ,
             as
             the
             unwritten
             Word
             of
             God
             ?
          
           All
           that
           I
           said
           was
           this
           .
           The
           Socinians
           had
           said
           ,
           
             That
             Christ
             was
             called
             the
             Word
             ,
             because
             he
             was
             the
             Bringer
             or
             Messenger
             of
             God's
             Word
             .
          
           To
           which
           I
           answer'd
           ,
           That
           the
           Jews
           were
           to
           understand
           it
           in
           the
           Sense
           it
           was
           known
           among
           them
           :
           which
           was
           for
           
             a
             Divine
             Subsistence
          
           ,
           as
           I
           proved
           from
           the
           
             Chaldee
             Paraphrast
          
           ,
           and
           the
           Testimonies
           of
           Philo
           the
           
             Alexandrian
             Iew
          
           ,
           who
           lived
           so
           near
           our
           Saviour's
           time
           .
           Here
           is
           not
           a
           Word
           of
           the
           
             Pharisaical
             Cabala
          
           ,
           which
           every
           one
           knows
           to
           have
           been
           about
           
             Traditional
             Customs
          
           ,
           which
           
           they
           laid
           as
           much
           weight
           upon
           ,
           as
           upon
           the
           Law
           of
           God
           ,
           if
           not
           more
           .
           But
           the
           
             Chaldee
             Paraphrast
          
           was
           in
           very
           great
           Esteem
           ,
           as
           giving
           the
           true
           Sense
           of
           the
           Scripture
           ,
           and
           for
           that
           only
           I
           produced
           it
           .
           And
           what
           answer
           doth
           he
           give
           to
           the
           Testimonies
           out
           of
           it
           ?
           He
           saith
           ,
           
             They
             relate
             either
             to
             the
             Law
             ,
             or
             to
             the
             Command
             of
             God
             to
          
           Moses
           ,
           
             or
             to
             the
             Power
             of
             God.
          
           But
           I
           shew'd
           that
           Rittangel
           ,
           who
           managed
           the
           Debate
           on
           this
           Argument
           with
           a
           learned
           Vnitarian
           ,
           proved
           to
           his
           plain
           Conviction
           ,
           that
           these
           places
           could
           be
           understood
           of
           nothing
           but
           a
           
             Divine
             Subsistence
          
           .
           But
           he
           mightily
           triumphs
           ,
           that
           the
           most
           pertinent
           Place
           is
           false
           printed
           ;
           for
           it
           is
           set
           down
           ,
           Gen.
           20.21
           .
           and
           he
           tells
           us
           ,
           
             There
             are
             but
          
           18
           
             Verses
             in
             that
             Chapter
          
           ;
           but
           a
           Man
           of
           common
           Ingenuity
           would
           suspect
           an
           Error
           in
           the
           Press
           in
           such
           a
           case
           ;
           and
           if
           he
           had
           pleased
           to
           have
           look'd
           on
           Gen.
           28.21
           .
           he
           might
           have
           have
           found
           22
           Verses
           ,
           and
           the
           Words
           in
           the
           21.
           
           Therefore
           ,
           saith
           he
           ,
           
             so
             much
             for
          
           Chaldee
           and
           Cabala
           ,
           
             despised
             by
             all
             learned
             Men
             ,
             Iews
             as
             well
             as
             Christians
             ;
             and
             never
             used
             but
             when
             the
             People
             are
             to
             be
             gulled
             with
             noisy
             Nothings
             .
          
           One
           would
           hardly
           think
           it
           possible
           such
           mean
           stuff
           
           as
           this
           should
           pass
           for
           an
           answer
           ,
           among
           any
           that
           pretend
           to
           Sense
           or
           Knowledge
           .
           For
           how
           can
           he
           deny
           the
           sense
           of
           the
           
             Chaldee
             Paraphrast
          
           ,
           when
           Philo
           the
           
             Alexandrian
             Iew
          
           concurs
           in
           that
           Interpretation
           ,
           as
           is
           evident
           by
           multitudes
           of
           places
           in
           him
           ?
           Did
           I
           not
           expresly
           mention
           his
           Testimony
           as
           concurring
           with
           the
           other
           ?
           Why
           not
           a
           word
           said
           to
           it
           ?
           Did
           I
           not
           add
           the
           Consent
           of
           Eusebius
           concerning
           the
           Jews
           owning
           the
           Divinity
           of
           the
           Messias
           ,
           till
           they
           fell
           off
           from
           it
           in
           opposition
           to
           the
           Christians
           ?
           And
           are
           these
           but
           
             noisy
             Nothings
             to
             gull
             People
             with
             ?
          
           Let
           what
           will
           become
           of
           the
           Dispute
           between
           the
           Pharisaical
           Jews
           and
           the
           Karaites
           ;
           those
           who
           know
           any
           thing
           of
           these
           Matters
           ,
           do
           know
           that
           I
           went
           upon
           other
           grounds
           ;
           viz.
           whether
           the
           Israelites
           did
           receive
           from
           God
           an
           Oral
           Law
           ,
           which
           they
           are
           bound
           to
           observe
           as
           much
           as
           the
           written
           Law
           ,
           and
           to
           interpret
           the
           written
           Law
           ,
           and
           the
           force
           of
           its
           obligation
           by
           it
           .
           And
           this
           I
           never
           mention'd
           or
           intended
           to
           plead
           for
           it
           .
           And
           as
           to
           the
           13
           ways
           of
           
             Cabalistical
             Interpretations
          
           ,
           I
           look
           on
           them
           as
           groundless
           and
           frivolous
           things
           ;
           but
           the
           thing
           I
           aimed
           at
           ,
           was
           only
           this
           ,
           There
           are
           certainly
           
           places
           of
           the
           Old
           Testament
           ,
           which
           speak
           of
           the
           Messias
           as
           the
           Son
           of
           God
           ;
           
             Thou
             art
             my
             Son
          
           ,
           &c.
           and
           call
           him
           Lord
           ,
           
             The
             Lord
             said
             unto
             my
             Lord.
          
           The
           question
           is
           ,
           what
           the
           Sense
           of
           these
           places
           was
           ,
           and
           how
           they
           are
           to
           be
           applied
           to
           Christ
           ?
           Now
           if
           it
           appear
           ,
           that
           the
           most
           ancient
           Jews
           did
           understand
           them
           in
           such
           a
           manner
           ,
           as
           to
           apply
           them
           to
           a
           
             Second
             Subsistence
          
           in
           the
           Divinity
           ,
           we
           have
           great
           reason
           to
           follow
           that
           Sense
           ,
           which
           is
           so
           agreeable
           to
           the
           New
           Testament
           ;
           and
           about
           this
           we
           have
           no
           manner
           of
           Reason
           to
           despise
           the
           Sense
           of
           the
           ancient
           Jews
           ,
           and
           especially
           of
           the
           
             Chaldee
             Paraphrast
          
           ,
           who
           asserts
           a
           second
           and
           a
           third
           Subsistence
           in
           the
           Divinity
           .
           And
           this
           he
           could
           not
           but
           find
           without
           
             any
             danger
             to
             his
             Iaws
          
           ,
           was
           the
           only
           thing
           I
           intended
           .
        
         
           The
           next
           thing
           in
           point
           of
           Antiquity
           which
           he
           contests
           ,
           is
           about
           the
           Nazarenes
           :
           That
           Name
           ,
           I
           said
           ,
           was
           at
           first
           common
           to
           all
           Christians
           ,
           as
           is
           plain
           from
           Act.
           24.5
           .
           afterwards
           it
           was
           applied
           to
           the
           Jewish
           Christians
           at
           Pella
           and
           Decapolis
           ;
           and
           to
           such
           as
           admitted
           no
           Gentiles
           to
           their
           Communion
           ,
           but
           kept
           to
           the
           Ceremonies
           of
           the
           Law
           ;
           and
           of
           these
           I
           said
           they
           might
           be
           all
           
           Ebionites
           ;
           but
           I
           utterly
           denied
           it
           of
           such
           as
           were
           Members
           of
           the
           Catholick
           Christian
           Church
           ,
           as
           it
           was
           made
           up
           of
           
             Iews
             and
             Gentiles
          
           .
           This
           Distinction
           he
           calls
           a
           pure
           figment
           ,
           but
           answers
           not
           one
           of
           the
           Reasons
           I
           brought
           for
           it
           ;
           although
           I
           proved
           from
           uncontroulable
           Evidence
           ,
           that
           they
           made
           two
           different
           Bodies
           ,
           had
           different
           Rules
           of
           Faith
           ;
           and
           that
           the
           Church
           of
           Ierusalem
           did
           hold
           the
           Divinity
           and
           Pre-existence
           of
           our
           Saviour
           .
           And
           is
           all
           this
           
             Cabala
             too
             ,
             and
             only
             to
             be
             used
             when
             People
             are
             to
             be
             gulled
             with
             noisy
             Nothings
             ?
          
           i.
           e.
           with
           empty
           Pleroma's
           ,
           and
           silent
           Thunder-claps
           .
           The
           Alogians
           were
           theirs
           ,
           for
           any
           thing
           I
           know
           in
           all
           respects
           ;
           and
           I
           will
           give
           them
           Theodotion
           ,
           and
           
             Paulus
             Samosatenus
          
           ,
           and
           Photinus
           .
           But
           I
           think
           not
           much
           to
           their
           comfort
           ;
           the
           two
           latter
           were
           most
           certainly
           condemned
           by
           the
           Christian
           Church
           ;
           and
           whether
           the
           former
           were
           a
           mere
           
             Iewish
             Proselyte
          
           ,
           or
           an
           Ebionite
           is
           not
           worth
           contending
           about
           ;
           since
           S.
           Ierom
           makes
           him
           to
           translate
           the
           places
           about
           our
           Saviour
           like
           a
           Jew
           ,
           and
           Aquila
           like
           a
           Christian
           ;
           which
           shews
           how
           mean
           an
           opinion
           he
           had
           of
           his
           Sincerity
           .
        
         
         
           I
           proved
           the
           condemning
           
             Paulus
             Samosatenus
          
           while
           they
           were
           under
           the
           power
           of
           Zenobia
           ,
           to
           be
           a
           plain
           evidence
           of
           the
           sense
           of
           the
           Christian
           Church
           against
           his
           Doctrine
           ;
           at
           a
           time
           when
           no
           interest
           could
           be
           supposed
           to
           sway
           them
           .
           To
           this
           he
           gives
           a
           twofold
           Answer
           ,
           (
           1.
           )
           
             That
             be
             sure
             it
             is
             false
             ,
             that
             they
             were
             then
             under
             the
             power
             of
          
           Zenobia
           .
           But
           how
           can
           we
           
             be
             sure
             it
             is
             false
          
           ,
           when
           I
           brought
           proof
           it
           was
           true
           ,
           and
           he
           answers
           nothing
           at
           all
           to
           it
           ?
           But
           it
           seems
           ,
           all
           is
           
             Cabala
             and
             noisy
             Nothings
          
           that
           stand
           in
           his
           way
           .
           (
           2.
           )
           He
           saith
           ,
           
             They
             were
             all
             Hereticks
          
           .
           A
           very
           short
           Answer
           .
           But
           how
           is
           this
           proved
           ?
           For
           a
           little
           proof
           looks
           well
           sometimes
           ,
           and
           a
           man
           must
           not
           always
           say
           ,
           
             be
             sure
             it
             is
             so
          
           .
           Well
           ,
           here
           is
           a
           plain
           proof
           ;
           
             they
             differ'd
             from
             the
             Council
             of
          
           Nice
           about
           Homoousios
           .
           But
           I
           had
           before
           given
           a
           full
           Answer
           to
           that
           ,
           p.
           42.
           to
           which
           he
           gives
           not
           the
           least
           reply
           ,
           viz.
           that
           they
           took
           it
           in
           two
           different
           Senses
           .
        
         
           As
           to
           Lucian
           ,
           I
           leave
           it
           to
           the
           Readers
           Judgment
           ,
           if
           he
           compares
           what
           I
           have
           said
           ,
           and
           what
           he
           answers
           together
           ,
           and
           whether
           he
           thinks
           it
           probable
           that
           the
           Arians
           should
           forge
           a
           Creed
           under
           his
           Name
           at
           Antioch
           ;
           if
           he
           continued
           in
           
           the
           Doctrine
           of
           
             Paulus
             Samosatenus
          
           ,
           which
           was
           contrary
           to
           it
           .
        
         
           This
           is
           all
           ,
           he
           saith
           ,
           that
           seems
           considerable
           in
           point
           of
           Antiquity
           ;
           and
           whether
           he
           hath
           said
           any
           thing
           really
           considerable
           about
           it
           ,
           let
           the
           Reader
           judge
           .
        
         
           Come
           we
           now
           to
           the
           
             point
             of
             Scripture
          
           ,
           which
           is
           the
           main
           point
           in
           the
           case
           .
           For
           I
           had
           declared
           ,
           p.
           112.
           that
           our
           Faith
           as
           to
           the
           Trinity
           ,
           is
           built
           upon
           that
           ;
           and
           that
           there
           are
           many
           places
           of
           Scripture
           ,
           of
           which
           no
           tolerable
           Sense
           can
           be
           given
           without
           it
           .
           And
           therefore
           I
           examined
           the
           Sense
           the
           Vnitarians
           gave
           of
           the
           most
           remarkable
           Places
           ,
           and
           shew'd
           the
           Weakness
           and
           Inconsistency
           of
           it
           ,
           and
           then
           in
           an
           entire
           Chapter
           proved
           our
           Doctrine
           from
           
             the
             Form
             of
             Baptism
          
           delivered
           by
           our
           Saviour
           ,
           as
           it
           was
           always
           understood
           in
           the
           Christian
           Church
           .
           This
           I
           think
           was
           a
           very
           plain
           and
           easie
           Method
           of
           proving
           our
           Doctrine
           .
        
         
           And
           what
           now
           saith
           our
           Vnitarian
           to
           all
           this
           ?
           Truely
           ,
           I
           have
           met
           with
           few
           Answers
           like
           it
           .
           In
           short
           ,
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             That
             for
             his
             part
             ,
             he
             is
             enough
             perswaded
             without
             further
             arguing
             the
             Matter
             ,
             that
             I
             have
             spent
             my
             Breath
             against
             a
             Rock
             .
          
           
           This
           is
           just
           the
           Popish
           way
           of
           answering
           by
           Infallibility
           and
           
             super
             hanc
             Petram
          
           .
           But
           in
           neither
           case
           can
           I
           see
           the
           least
           ground
           for
           such
           mighty
           Confidence
           .
           Alas
           for
           them
           !
           they
           say
           ,
           
             That
             if
             we
             write
             against
             their
             Interpretations
             of
             Scripture
             ,
             they
             are
             not
             at
             leisure
             to
             wipe
             off
             every
             small
             Soil
             that
             may
             happen
             to
             be
             scatter'd
             in
             their
             Books
             .
          
           Not
           
             at
             Leisure
          
           !
           Whence
           have
           come
           all
           those
           Swarms
           of
           pestilent
           Books
           which
           have
           come
           abroad
           of
           late
           Years
           among
           us
           ,
           to
           spread
           their
           infectious
           Doctrine
           over
           the
           Nation
           ?
           And
           now
           are
           they
           
             not
             at
             Leisure
          
           to
           defend
           them
           ?
           And
           at
           the
           same
           time
           have
           
             Leisure
             enough
          
           to
           run
           into
           other
           Matters
           ,
           about
           which
           there
           may
           be
           more
           Colour
           for
           Cavilling
           .
           So
           that
           this
           cannot
           be
           the
           true
           Reason
           ,
           and
           I
           leave
           the
           Reader
           to
           judge
           what
           it
           is
           .
        
         
           The
           last
           thing
           is
           the
           
             point
             of
             Reason
          
           ;
           and
           here
           he
           finds
           
             Leisure
             enough
          
           to
           expatiate
           .
           But
           I
           shall
           keep
           to
           that
           point
           ,
           upon
           which
           he
           supposes
           the
           whole
           Controversie
           to
           turn
           ,
           which
           is
           ,
           whether
           the
           difference
           between
           Nature
           and
           Person
           ,
           which
           we
           observe
           in
           Mankind
           ,
           do
           so
           far
           hold
           with
           respect
           to
           the
           Divine
           Nature
           ,
           that
           it
           is
           a
           Contradiction
           to
           
           say
           ,
           there
           are
           three
           Persons
           and
           not
           three
           Gods
           ?
        
         
           And
           there
           are
           several
           things
           I
           proposed
           ,
           in
           order
           to
           the
           clearing
           of
           this
           Matter
           ,
           which
           I
           shall
           endeavour
           to
           lay
           down
           as
           distinctly
           as
           I
           can
           ;
           and
           I
           shall
           not
           be
           Hector'd
           or
           Banter'd
           out
           of
           that
           which
           I
           account
           the
           most
           proper
           Method
           ,
           although
           it
           happen
           to
           be
           too
           obscure
           for
           our
           
             Men
             of
             Wit
          
           to
           understand
           without
           
             Hazard
             of
             their
             Iaws
          
           .
        
         
           The
           Principles
           or
           Suppositions
           I
           lay
           down
           are
           these
           ;
           
             
               I.
               Nature
               is
               One
               and
               Indivisible
               in
               it self
               ,
               whereever
               it
               is
               .
            
             
               II.
               The
               more
               perfect
               any
               Nature
               is
               ,
               the
               more
               perfect
               must
               its
               Unity
               be
               .
            
             
               III.
               Whatever
               is
               affirmed
               of
               a
               most
               perfect
               Being
               ,
               must
               be
               understood
               in
               a
               way
               agreeable
               to
               its
               Perfection
               .
            
             
               IV.
               It
               is
               repugnant
               to
               the
               Perfection
               of
               the
               divine
               Nature
               ,
               to
               be
               multiplied
               into
               such
               Individuals
               as
               are
               among
               Men
               ;
               because
               it
               argues
               such
               a
               dependence
               and
               separation
               ,
               as
               is
               inconsistent
               with
               the
               most
               perfect
               Unity
               .
            
             
               
               V.
               To
               suppose
               three
               distinct
               Persons
               in
               one
               and
               the
               same
               Indivisible
               Divine
               Nature
               ,
               is
               not
               repugnant
               to
               the
               Divine
               Perfections
               ;
               if
               they
               be
               founded
               on
               such
               relative
               Properties
               ,
               which
               cannot
               be
               confounded
               with
               each
               other
               ,
               and
               be
               in
               themselves
               agreeable
               to
               the
               Divine
               Nature
               .
            
             
               VI.
               Whether
               there
               be
               three
               such
               distinct
               Persons
               or
               not
               ,
               is
               not
               to
               be
               drawn
               from
               our
               own
               Imaginations
               ,
               or
               Similitudes
               in
               created
               Beings
               ,
               but
               only
               from
               the
               Word
               of
               God
               ,
               from
               whom
               alone
               the
               Knowledge
               of
               it
               can
               be
               communicated
               to
               Mankind
               .
            
          
        
         
           Let
           us
           now
           see
           how
           he
           proves
           ,
           that
           since
           there
           is
           no
           Contradiction
           for
           three
           Persons
           to
           be
           in
           one
           common
           human
           Nature
           ,
           it
           must
           be
           a
           Contradiction
           to
           assert
           three
           Persons
           in
           the
           same
           divine
           Nature
           .
           He
           offers
           at
           no
           less
           than
           
             demonstrative
             Reason
          
           ,
           p.
           58.
           c.
           2.
           but
           I
           have
           always
           had
           the
           most
           cause
           to
           fear
           the
           Men
           that
           pretend
           to
           Infallibility
           ,
           and
           Demonstration
           .
           I
           pass
           over
           his
           
             Mysterious
             Boxes
          
           ,
           as
           Trifles
           fit
           only
           to
           entertain
           his
           
             Men
             of
             Wit
          
           ,
           and
           come
           immediately
           
           to
           his
           
             demonstrative
             Reason
          
           ,
           is
           it
           be
           to
           be
           met
           with
           .
           It
           comes
           at
           last
           to
           no
           more
           than
           this
           ,
           that
           
             Human
             Nature
             ,
             and
             Angelical
             Nature
             ,
             and
             Camel
             Nature
             have
             no
             Existence
             but
             only
             in
             our
             Conception
             ;
             and
             are
             only
             Notions
             of
             our
             Minds
             ;
             but
             the
             Persons
             in
             the
             same
             rational
             Being
             are
             not
             mere
             Metaphysical
             Persons
             or
             Relative
             Properties
             ,
             but
             they
             are
             such
             as
             necessarily
             suppose
             distinct
             Substances
             as
             well
             as
             distinct
             Properties
             .
             But
             in
             the
             Trinity
             ,
             the
             Nature
             is
             a
             really
             existing
             Nature
             ,
             't
             is
             a
             Spiritual
             Substance
             ,
             and
             endued
             with
             a
             great
             number
             of
             Divine
             Attributes
             ,
             not
             an
             abstracted
             or
             mere
             notional
             imaginary
             Nature
             ;
             and
             the
             Divine
             Persons
             are
             not
             distinct
             Substances
             or
             real
             Beings
             ,
             but
             Properties
             only
             in
             a
             real
             Being
             and
             in
             an
             infinite
             Substance
             .
          
           This
           is
           the
           force
           of
           the
           Demonstration
           .
           But
           now
           if
           I
           can
           make
           it
           appear
           ,
           that
           every
           Nature
           is
           not
           only
           One
           and
           Indivisible
           in
           it self
           ,
           but
           endued
           with
           Essential
           Attributes
           and
           Properties
           belonging
           to
           it
           as
           such
           ,
           then
           it
           will
           be
           evident
           ,
           that
           Nature
           is
           not
           a
           
             mere
             Abstracted
             Notion
             of
             our
             Minds
             ,
          
           but
           something
           which
           really
           exists
           somewhere
           ;
           and
           then
           the
           Foundation
           of
           this
           
             demonstrative
             Reason
          
           is
           taken
           away
           .
           And
           I
           appeal
           to
           any
           Persons
           
           that
           consider
           things
           ,
           whether
           the
           
             Human
             ,
             Angelical
             ,
             and
             Camel
             Nature
          
           (
           as
           he
           calls
           it
           )
           do
           not
           really
           differ
           from
           each
           other
           ,
           and
           have
           such
           
             Essential
             Properties
          
           belonging
           to
           them
           as
           cannot
           agree
           to
           any
           other
           Nature
           ?
           For
           else
           it
           must
           be
           a
           mere
           Notion
           and
           Fiction
           of
           the
           Mind
           ,
           to
           make
           any
           real
           difference
           between
           them
           .
           But
           if
           
             Human
             Nature
             and
             Camel
             Nature
          
           do
           essentially
           differ
           from
           each
           other
           ,
           then
           every
           Nature
           hath
           its
           Essential
           Unity
           and
           Properties
           which
           cannot
           belong
           to
           any
           other
           ,
           and
           that
           without
           any
           act
           of
           our
           Minds
           .
           And
           if
           every
           Nature
           is
           really
           and
           essentially
           different
           from
           another
           ,
           it
           must
           have
           an
           Existence
           somewhere
           independent
           on
           our
           Notions
           and
           Conceptions
           .
        
         
           It
           may
           be
           said
           ,
           
             That
             no
             such
             Nature
             doth
             really
             exist
             by
             it self
             ,
             but
             only
             in
             the
             several
             Individuals
             .
          
           But
           that
           is
           not
           the
           present
           Question
           ,
           where
           or
           how
           it
           exists
           ,
           but
           whether
           it
           depend
           only
           on
           our
           Imaginations
           or
           the
           acts
           of
           our
           Minds
           ;
           and
           if
           it
           doth
           so
           ,
           then
           there
           can
           be
           no
           real
           and
           essential
           Difference
           in
           the
           Natures
           of
           Men
           and
           Beast
           ,
           which
           I
           think
           none
           who
           have
           the
           Understanding
           of
           a
           Man
           can
           imagine
           .
        
         
         
           
             But
             really
             existing
             Natures
          
           ,
           he
           saith
           ,
           
             are
             in
             such
             Persons
             ,
             as
             necessarily
             suppose
             distinct
             Substances
             ,
             as
             well
             as
             distinct
             Properties
             ;
             and
             if
             they
             existed
             only
             in
             a
             common
             Nature
             ,
             as
             the
             Humanity
             ,
             and
             had
             not
             also
             distinct
             Substances
             ,
             they
             would
             never
             make
             distinct
             Persons
             .
          
        
         
           I
           do
           allow
           ,
           that
           in
           created
           and
           dependent
           Beings
           ,
           there
           must
           be
           
             distinct
             Substances
          
           to
           make
           
             distinct
             Persons
          
           ;
           but
           he
           ought
           to
           have
           given
           an
           account
           what
           that
           is
           which
           makes
           
             distinct
             Persons
             '
             necessarily
             to
             suppose
             distinct
             Substances
             .
          
           For
           the
           Nature
           is
           One
           and
           Indivisible
           in
           them
           all
           ;
           or
           else
           every
           Individual
           must
           make
           a
           new
           Species
           ,
           which
           is
           an
           Absurdity
           I
           suppose
           he
           will
           not
           be
           fond
           of
           .
           If
           there
           be
           then
           one
           and
           the
           same
           Nature
           in
           the
           Individuals
           ,
           whence
           comes
           
             the
             difference
             of
             Substances
             to
             be
             so
             necessarily
             supposed
             ?
          
           If
           it
           be
           from
           Diversity
           ,
           Dissimilitude
           ,
           Dependence
           and
           separate
           Existence
           ,
           as
           I
           asserted
           ,
           then
           these
           Reasons
           can
           hold
           only
           in
           created
           Beings
           ;
           and
           where
           they
           cannot
           hold
           ,
           as
           in
           the
           Divine
           Nature
           ,
           why
           may
           there
           not
           be
           a
           distinction
           of
           Persons
           founded
           on
           relative
           Properties
           ,
           without
           any
           distinction
           of
           Substances
           ,
           which
           is
           repugnant
           to
           the
           perfect
           Unity
           of
           the
           Godhead
           ?
           
           What
           
             demonstrative
             Reason
          
           ,
           nay
           ,
           what
           probable
           Argument
           hath
           he
           offer'd
           against
           this
           ?
        
         
           He
           takes
           notice
           p.
           60.
           of
           what
           I
           had
           said
           about
           the
           distinction
           of
           Personality
           and
           Person
           ;
           and
           that
           Personality
           is
           originally
           only
           a
           particular
           Mode
           of
           Subsistence
           ;
           and
           a
           Person
           besides
           the
           relative
           Property
           takes
           in
           the
           divine
           Nature
           together
           with
           it
           .
           And
           what
           Demonstration
           have
           we
           against
           this
           ?
           So
           far
           from
           it
           ,
           that
           he
           falls
           to
           Tristing
           again
           to
           keep
           his
           
             Men
             of
             Wit
          
           in
           good
           Humour
           .
           
             So
             much
             for
             Madam
             Personality
             ,
             now
             for
             Sir
             Person
             .
          
           Is
           this
           a
           decent
           way
           of
           Writing
           about
           these
           Matters
           ;
           to
           begin
           with
           the
           Talk
           of
           
             demonstrative
             Reason
          
           ,
           and
           to
           end
           with
           Burlesquing
           ,
           and
           turning
           them
           into
           Ridicule
           ?
           If
           this
           be
           an
           agreeable
           Entertainment
           for
           his
           
             Men
             of
             Wit
          
           ,
           it
           shews
           that
           they
           deserve
           that
           Character
           ,
           as
           well
           as
           he
           doth
           that
           of
           a
           Demonstrator
           .
        
         
           But
           this
           sportfull
           Gentleman
           hath
           found
           something
           else
           to
           play
           with
           ,
           viz.
           that
           my
           Notion
           of
           three
           Subsistences
           without
           three
           Substances
           is
           really
           nothing
           but
           Sabellianism
           .
           But
           I
           had
           already
           said
           so
           much
           for
           the
           clearing
           of
           this
           ,
           both
           in
           the
           Preface
           and
           the
           Book
           it self
           ,
           that
           I
           need
           not
           to
           add
           one
           Word
           about
           it
           ,
           unless
           
           he
           had
           suggested
           some
           new
           
             demonstrative
             Reason
          
           to
           prove
           it
           .
           Which
           he
           is
           far
           enough
           from
           .
           All
           that
           he
           saith
           ,
           is
           ,
           
             That
             they
             must
             be
             called
             Fools
             as
             well
             as
          
           Sabellius
           ,
           
             if
             they
             asserted
             Relative
             Properties
             ,
             or
             any
             Properties
             that
             were
             in
             no
             Essence
             .
          
           But
           the
           Author
           of
           the
           Discourse
           of
           
             Real
             and
             Nominal
             Trinitarians
          
           ,
           (
           to
           whom
           he
           is
           no
           Stranger
           )
           had
           said
           
             That
             the
          
           Sabellians
           
             held
             that
             the
             Father
             ,
             Son
             and
             Spirit
             are
             but
             only
             three
             Names
             of
             God
             given
             to
             him
             in
             Scripture
             by
             occasion
             of
             so
             many
             several
             Dispensations
             towards
             the
             Creature
             ,
             and
             so
             he
             is
             but
             one
             subsisting
             Person
             and
             three
             Relative
             Persons
             .
          
           If
           this
           be
           true
           ,
           here
           are
           
             Relative
             Properties
          
           indeed
           relating
           to
           a
           Divine
           Essence
           :
           but
           how
           ?
           not
           as
           to
           any
           
             Internal
             Relations
          
           of
           
             Father
             ,
             Son
             and
             Holy
             Ghost
          
           ;
           but
           as
           to
           
             External
             Dispensations
          
           ,
           which
           are
           another
           kind
           of
           
             Relative
             Properties
          
           .
        
         
           This
           is
           all
           that
           I
           can
           find
           in
           this
           last
           Effort
           ,
           that
           relates
           to
           my self
           :
           As
           to
           what
           concerns
           others
           ,
           they
           are
           very
           able
           to
           defend
           themselves
           ,
           and
           particularly
           as
           to
           Dr.
           S.
           and
           Dr.
           Sh.
           I
           must
           still
           say
           I
           think
           them
           much
           his
           Superiours
           as
           to
           Wit
           and
           Learning
           ,
           (
           for
           of
           them
           I
           spake
           without
           the
           least
           Respect
           to
           my self
           ,
           however
           he
           makes
           it
           
             a
             Complement
             to
             my self
             
             and
             them
             ,
          
           I
           know
           not
           for
           what
           Reason
           ,
           unless
           it
           be
           that
           I
           speak
           of
           those
           against
           whom
           they
           had
           written
           
             with
             Insolence
             and
             Scorn
          
           .
           )
           But
           I
           hope
           they
           will
           shew
           themselves
           so
           much
           his
           Superiours
           too
           in
           Wisdom
           and
           Discretion
           ,
           as
           not
           to
           renew
           their
           Quarrels
           upon
           his
           Provocations
           ,
           for
           he
           doth
           what
           in
           him
           lies
           to
           inflame
           them
           ;
           and
           he
           thought
           it
           ,
           (
           and
           I
           do
           not
           blame
           him
           for
           it
           )
           the
           best
           service
           he
           could
           do
           to
           his
           sinking
           Cause
           .
        
         
           
             WORCESTER
             ,
             
               April
               26
               ,
               1697.
               
            
          
           
             E.
             W.
             
          
        
         
           FINIS
           .
        
      
    
     
       
         
           ERRATA
           .
        
         
           Pag.
           3.1
           .
           an
           Answer
           .
           P.
           42.
           l.
           4.
           for
           Temerarian
           r.
           temerarious
           P.
           63.
           l.
           22.
           for
           diceret
           r.
           doceret
           .
           P.
           82.
           l.
           17.
           for
           Preception
           r.
           Perception
           .
        
      
       
         
         
           Books
           published
           by
           the
           Right
           Reverend
           Father
           in
           God
           ,
           Edw.
           L.
           Bishop
           of
           Worcester
           ,
           and
           sold
           by
           
             H.
             Mortlock
          
           at
           the
           Phoenix
           in
           St.
           
           Paul's
           Church-yard
           .
        
         
           
             A
             Rational
             account
             of
             the
             Grounds
             of
             the
             Protestant
             Religion
             ;
             being
             a
             Vindication
             of
             the
             Lord
             Archbishop
             of
             
             Canterbury's
             Relation
             of
             a
             Conference
             ,
             &c.
             from
             the
             pretended
             Answer
             of
             
               T.
               C.
            
             2d
             .
             Edit
             .
             Fol.
             
          
           
             
               Origines
               Britannicae
            
             ,
             or
             the
             Antiquities
             of
             the
             British
             Churches
             ,
             with
             a
             Preface
             concerning
             some
             pretended
             Antiquities
             relating
             to
             Britain
             ,
             in
             Vindication
             of
             the
             Bishop
             of
             St.
             
               Asaph
               .
               Fol.
            
             
          
           
             Irenicum
             ,
             A
             Weapon-Salve
             for
             the
             Churches
             Wounds
             .
             4
             to
             .
          
           
             
               Origines
               Sacrae
            
             ,
             or
             a
             Rational
             Account
             of
             the
             Grounds
             of
             Christian
             Faith
             ,
             as
             to
             the
             Truth
             and
             Divine
             Authority
             of
             the
             Scripture
             and
             the
             matters
             therein
             contained
             .
             4
             to
             .
          
           
             A
             Discourse
             concerning
             the
             Idolatry
             practised
             in
             the
             Church
             of
             Rome
             ,
             and
             the
             hazard
             of
             Salvation
             in
             the
             Communion
             of
             it
             .
             8
             vo
             .
          
           
             An
             Answer
             to
             several
             late
             Treatises
             occasion'd
             by
             a
             Book
             ,
             entituled
             ,
             A
             Discourse
             concerning
             the
             Idolatry
             practised
             in
             the
             Church
             of
             Rome
             ,
             and
             the
             hazard
             of
             Salvation
             in
             the
             Communion
             of
             it
             ;
             Part
             I.
             8
             vo
             .
          
           
             A
             Second
             Discourse
             in
             Vindication
             of
             the
             Protestant
             Grounds
             of
             Faith
             ,
             against
             the
             pretence
             of
             Infallibility
             in
             the
             Roman
             Church
             ,
             in
             answer
             to
             the
             Guide
             in
             Controversie
             ,
             by
             
               R.
               H.
            
             Protestancy
             without
             Principles
             ,
             and
             Reason
             ,
             and
             Religion
             ;
             or
             the
             certain
             Rule
             of
             Faith
             ,
             by
             
               E.
               W.
            
             with
             a
             particular
             enquiry
             into
             the
             Miracles
             of
             the
             Roman
             Church
             .
             8
             vo
             .
          
           
             An
             Answer
             to
             Mr.
             
             Cressy's
             Epistle
             apologetical
             to
             a
             Person
             of
             Honour
             ,
             touching
             his
             Vindication
             of
             Dr.
             Stillingfleet
             .
             8
             vo
             .
          
           
             A
             Defence
             of
             the
             Discourse
             concerning
             the
             Idolatry
             
             practised
             in
             the
             Church
             of
             Rome
             ,
             in
             answer
             to
             a
             Book
             entituled
             ,
             Catholicks
             no
             Idolaters
             .
             8
             vo
             .
          
           
             Several
             Conferences
             between
             a
             Roman
             Priest
             ,
             a
             Fanatick
             Chaplain
             ,
             and
             a
             Divine
             of
             the
             Church
             of
             England
             ;
             being
             a
             full
             Answer
             to
             the
             late
             Dialogues
             of
             
               T.
               G.
            
             8
             vo
             .
          
           
             A
             Discourse
             concerning
             Bonds
             of
             Resignation
             of
             Benefices
             in
             Point
             of
             Law
             and
             Conscience
             ,
             8
             vo
             .
          
           
             A
             Discourse
             concerning
             the
             Illegality
             of
             the
             Ecclesiastical
             Commission
             ,
             in
             Answer
             to
             the
             Vindication
             and
             Defence
             of
             it
             :
             wherein
             the
             true
             notion
             of
             the
             Legal
             Supremacy
             is
             clear'd
             ;
             and
             an
             Account
             is
             given
             of
             the
             Nature
             ▪
             Original
             and
             Mischief
             of
             the
             dispensing
             Power
             .
          
           
             The
             Unreasonableness
             of
             Separation
             ,
             or
             an
             Impartial
             Account
             of
             the
             History
             ,
             Nature
             and
             Pleas
             of
             the
             present
             Separation
             from
             the
             Communion
             of
             the
             Church
             of
             England
             .
             4
             to
             .
          
           
             The
             Grand
             Question
             concerning
             the
             Bishops
             Right
             to
             vote
             in
             Parliament
             in
             Cases
             Capital
             stated
             and
             argued
             ,
             from
             the
             Parliament
             Rolls
             and
             the
             History
             of
             former
             times
             ;
             with
             an
             enquiry
             into
             their
             Peerage
             ,
             and
             the
             Three
             Estates
             in
             Parliament
             .
             8
             vo
             .
          
           
             A
             Discourse
             concerning
             the
             Doctrine
             of
             Christ's
             Satisfaction
             ;
             or
             the
             true
             Reasons
             of
             his
             Sufferings
             ;
             with
             an
             Answer
             to
             the
             Socinian
             Objections
             .
             To
             which
             is
             added
             ,
             A
             Sermon
             concerning
             the
             Mysteries
             of
             the
             Christian
             Faith
             ,
             Preached
             April
             7.
             1691.
             
             With
             a
             Preface
             concerning
             the
             true
             state
             of
             the
             Controversie
             about
             Christ's
             Satisfaction
             .
             8
             vo
             .
          
           
             Twelve
             Sermons
             preached
             on
             several
             Occasions
             ,
             by
             the
             Right
             Reverend
             Father
             in
             God
             ,
             Edward
             ,
             Lord
             Bishop
             of
             Worcester
             .
             The
             first
             Volume
             .
             8
             vo
             .
          
           
             A
             Second
             Volume
             will
             speedily
             be
             publish'd
             .
          
           
             The
             Effigies
             of
             the
             Right
             Reverend
             Father
             in
             God
             ,
             Edward
             ,
             Lord
             Bishop
             of
             Worcester
             ,
             Engraven
             on
             a
             Copper-plate
             by
             
               Robert
               White
            
             .
             Price
             6
             d.
             
          
        
      
       
         Notes, typically marginal, from the original text
         
           Notes for div A61522-e140
           
             P.
             6.
             
          
           
             P.
             7.
             
          
           
             P.
             8.
             
          
           
             P.
             9.
             
          
           
             Book
             2.
             
             Ch.
             13.
             
             Sect.
             19.
             
          
           
             P.
             14.
             
          
           
             Ch.
             23.
             
             Sect.
             2.
             
          
           
             P.
             11.
             
          
           
             P.
             12
             ▪
             
          
           
             P.
             22.
             
          
           
             P.
             35.
             
          
           
             P.
             25.
             
          
           
             P.
             38.
             
          
           
             P.
             28
             ,
             29.
             
          
           
             P.
             32.
             
          
           
             Book
             2.
             ch
             .
             23.
             
             Sect.
             6.
             
          
           
             P.
             32.
             
          
           
             P.
             33.
             
          
           
             P
             ▪
             40.
             
          
           
             P.
             18
             ,
             23
             ,
             24
             ,
             36
             ,
             37.
             
          
           
             P.
             8.
             
          
           
             Essay
             ,
             B.
             2.
             ch
             .
             8.
             
             Sect.
             25.
             
          
           
             Ch.
             9.
             
             Sect.
             8
             ,
             9
             ,
             10.
             
          
           
             P.
             7
             ,
             8
             ,
             10
             ,
             30.
             
          
           
             P.
             6.
             
          
           
             P.
             8.
             
          
           
             B
             2.
             ch
             .
             23.
             
             Sect.
             1.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             2
             ,
             3
             ,
             4.
             
          
           
             P.
             22.
             
          
           
             P.
             40.
             
          
           
             P.
             40.
             
          
           
             B.
             2.
             
             Ch.
             24.
             
             Sect.
             16.
             
          
           
             P.
             43.
             
          
           
             P.
             44.
             
          
           
             Voss.
             Etymol
             .
             in
             V.
             Sto.
             
          
           
             Thucyd.
             l.
             6.
             p.
             392.
             
             Ed.
             Ox.
             &
             l.
             3.
             p.
             184
             
          
           
             Acad.
             l.
             1.8
             .
          
           
             Cicer.
             in
             Lucul
             .
             c.
             6.
             
          
           
             C.
             24.
             
          
           
             P.
             57.
             
          
           
             P.
             226.
             
          
           
             Book
             4.
             
             Ch.
             6.
             
             Sect.
             3.
             
          
           
             Ch.
             4.
             
             Sect.
             18.
             
          
           
             Christianity
             not
             Myst.
             p.
             10.
             
          
           
             P.
             12.
             
          
           
             P.
             13.
             
          
           
             B.
             4.
             ch
             .
             3.
             
             Sect.
             23.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             24
             ,
             &c.
             
          
           
             Sect
             28.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             30.
             
          
           
             Book
             4.
             
             Ch.
             17.
             
             Sect.
             1.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             9.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             10.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             11.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             12.
             
          
           
             B.
             4.
             ch
             .
             17.
             1.
             
             Sect.
             23.
             
          
           
             B.
             4.
             ch
             .
             18.
             
             Sect.
             2.
             
          
           
             P.
             59.
             
          
           
             P.
             62.
             
          
           
             P.
             65.
             
          
           
             P.
             66.
             
          
           
             Id.
             p.
             74.82
             .
          
           
             B.
             2.
             
             Ch.
             23.
             
             Sect.
             15.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             17.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             22.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             30.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             31.
             
          
           
             P.
             67.
             
          
           
             P.
             68.
             
          
           
             Leviath
             .
             ch
             .
             34.
             
          
           
             Leviath
             .
             ch
             .
             38.
             
          
           
             Vindicat.
             of
             Leviath
             .
             p.
             90
             ,
             91.
             
          
           
             P.
             69
             
          
           
             P.
             71.
             
          
           
             P.
             72.
             
          
           
             P.
             73.
             
          
           
             P.
             74.
             
          
           
             P.
             75.
             
          
           
             P.
             81.
             
          
           
             P.
             81.
             
          
           
             Book
             4.
             
             Ch.
             2.
             
             Sect.
             1.
             
          
           
             Book
             2.
             ch
             .
             23.
             
             Sect.
             6.14
             .
          
           
             Sect.
             7.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             8.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             12.
             
          
           
             Book
             4.
             
             Ch.
             4.
             
             Sect.
             18.
             
          
           
             B.
             3.
             ch
             .
             10.
             
             Sect.
             15.
             
          
           
             B
             2.
             ch
             .
             23.
             
             Sect.
             17.
             
          
           
             B.
             2.
             ch
             .
             23.
             
             Sect.
             15.
             
          
           
             B.
             2
             ch
             .
             21.
             
             Sect.
             8.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             13.
             
          
           
             B.
             2.
             ch
             .
             8.
             
             Sect.
             11.
             
          
           
             Sect
             10.
             
          
           
             B.
             2.
             ch
             .
             27.
             
             Sect
             9.
             
          
           
             B.
             2.
             ch
             .
             11.
             
             Sect.
             9.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             10.
             
          
           
             Letter
             ,
             p.
             27.
             
          
           
             
               De
               Immort
               .
               Animae
            
             .
             c.
             9.
             
          
           
             Let.
             p.
             139.
             
          
           
             P.
             73.
             
          
           
             P.
             66.
             
          
           
             P.
             87.
             
          
           
             P.
             88.
             
          
           
             P.
             101.
             
          
           
             P.
             103.
             
          
           
             P.
             106.
             
          
           
             P.
             107.
             
          
           
             Ib.
             
          
           
             P.
             107.
             
          
           
             P.
             110
             
          
           
             P.
             113.
             
          
           
             P.
             114.
             
          
           
             B.
             1.
             
             Ch.
             4
             Sect
             8.
             
          
           
             Ch.
             4.
             
             Sect.
             12.
             
          
           
             P.
             119.
             
          
           
             P.
             123.
             
             P.
             125.
             
             P.
             121.
             
          
           
             P.
             120
             
          
           
             P.
             128.
             
          
           
             P.
             127.
             
          
           
             P.
             132.
             
          
           
             P.
             145.
             
          
           
             P.
             136.
             
          
           
             P.
             137.
             
          
           
             
               Cum
               enim
               duo
               sint
               genera
               rerum
               quae
               sciuntur
               ,
               unum
               earum
               quae
               per
               sensus
               corporis
               percipit
               animus
               ,
               alterum
               earum
               quae
               per
               scipsum
               ▪
               multa
               illi
               Philosophi
               garrierunt
               contra
               corporis
               sensus
               ;
               animi
               autem
               quasdam
               firmissimas
               per
               seipsum
               perceptiones
               rerum
               verarum
               ,
               quale
               est
               illud
               ,
               Scio
               me
               vivere
               ,
               nequaquam
               in
               dubium
               vocare
               potuerunt
               .
            
             De
             Trin.
             l.
             15.
             c.
             12.
             
          
           
             P.
             139.
             
          
           
             P.
             142
             
          
           
             P.
             157.
             
          
           
             P.
             165.
             
          
           
             P.
             216.
             
          
           
             P.
             217.
             
          
           
             ●
             2.
             ch
             .
             1.
             
             Sect.
             5.
             
          
           
             Ch.
             2.
             
             Sect.
             1.
             
             Sect.
             2.
             
          
           
             Ch.
             11.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             9
             
          
           
             Ch.
             12.
             
             Sect.
             1.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             3.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             6
             
          
           
             Ch
             ●●
             .
             Sect.
             3.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             6
             ,
             14
             
          
           
             Sect.
             33.
             
          
           
             B
             3.
             ch
             .
             3.
             
             Sect.
             2.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             6.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             9.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             11.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             12.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             14.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             15.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             16.
             
          
           
             Leviath
             .
             ch
             .
             4.
             
          
           
             B.
             2.
             ch
             .
             17.
             
             Sect.
             1.
             
          
           
             P.
             169
             
          
           
             P.
             170.
             
          
           
             P.
             171.
             
          
           
             B.
             2.
             ch
             .
             8.
             
             Sect.
             10
             ,
             15
             ,
             17
             ,
             23.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             25.
             
          
           
             P.
             174.
             
          
           
             P.
             176.
             
          
           
             P.
             178.
             
          
           
             P.
             181.
             
          
           
             P.
             190.
             
          
           
             P.
             191.
             
          
           
             P.
             193.
             
          
           
             P.
             195.
             
          
           
             P.
             197.
             
          
           
             P.
             198.
             
          
           
             P.
             199.
             
          
           
             P.
             201.
             
          
           
             P.
             20●
             .
          
           
             P.
             203.
             
          
           
             P.
             210.
             
          
           
             P.
             212.
             
          
           
             Book
             4.
             
             Ch.
             1.
             
             Sect.
             1.
             
          
           
             Ch.
             3.
             
             Sect.
             23.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             27.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             24
             
          
           
             Sect.
             26.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             27.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             25.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             28.
             
          
           
             B.
             4.
             ch
             .
             2.
             
             Sect.
             2.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             7.
             
          
           
             Ch.
             2.
             
             Sect.
             14
             ▪
             
          
           
             ●●●●
             Sect.
             1.
             
          
           
             Sect.
             2.